Quotes of the Day:

"I have never believed that man's freedom consisted of doing what he wants, but rather in never doing what he does not want to do."

– Jean-Jacques Rousseau

“For some reason, the most vocal Christians among us never mention the beatitudes. But, often with tears in their eyes, they demand that the 10 Commandments be posted in public buildings. And of course that's Moses, not Jesus. I haven't heard one of them demand that the sermon on the mount, the beatitudes, be posted anywhere. ‘Blessed are the merciful’ in a courtroom? ‘Blessed are the peacemakers’ in the Pentagon? Give me a break.” 

– Kurt Vonnegut, Cold Turkey, 2004.

"The greatest thing a human being ever does in this world is to see something. To see clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion, all in one." 

– John Ruskin

1. Winning the First Fight: Experimenting with Army Special Operations Forces’ Contributions in Large-Scale Combat Operations

2.  ‘The US Needs to Learn a Great Deal From What Ukraine Has Done’ – Gen. David Petraeus

3. Surprise Attack in Kursk by Mick Ryan

4. Magyar's Birds Destroy 22 Howitzers in Under a Week

5. Defense Dept. Contractor Arrested With Dozens of Classified Documents

6. What Do Terrorists Have Against Taylor Swift Fans? Everything.

7. Top UN official tells Security Council that Islamic State group, affiliates gaining power in Africa

8. The cancellation of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour shows is the latest incident in a long history of concert terrorism

9. Chinese loans and projects turn problematic for Laos

10. Opinion Surprise Ukraine offensive pokes Russia’s soft underbelly by Max Boot

11. The Doctrine Smart Book (Army)

12. Iran Is Better Positioned to Launch Nuclear-Weapons Program, New U.S. Intelligence Assessment Says

13. Freed Russian Dissidents Confront New Reality: Fighting Putin From Exile

14. America’s Anti-Terror Exit From Niger

15. 'Don't Whine': Coming Of Age At A 'Patriotic' Summer Camp In Ukraine's Heartland

16. Unlocking Victory: The Vital Role of Data Superiority on the Battlefield of the Future  

17. US Warns of 'Gray Zone' Conflict With China, Russia, North Korea

18. Ukraine’s Invasion of Russia Could Bring a Quicker End to the War

19. How the Red Cross failed Ukraine.

1. Winning the First Fight: Experimenting with Army Special Operations Forces’ Contributions in Large-Scale Combat Operations

I would note that our major defense plans for Europe, the MIddle East, and Korea throughout the Cold War (particularly in the 1980s based on personal observation) and beyond always included a strong SOF contribution in the deep and rear areas in support of large scale combat operations (LSCO) and throughout the theater (s) of war and beyond, before, during, and after LSCO. We might want to examine some of the old war plans for any useful lessons to be learned (or unlearned in some cases). One commonly overlooked activity that was disregarded by most is that SOF planners always included a proposed unconventional warfare plan in support of all large scale combat operations or war plans. And there was always a PSYOP and Civil Affairs element in all the plans. And there was always a PSYOP and Civil Affairs element to support the Joint Force Commander in all the plans.  

As an aside in a plan I worked on, the Air Component Commander said he would non-concur with the entire war plan because of the proposal for SOF to work in the deep areas organizing indigenous forces because with SOF on the ground it would prevent his ability for indiscriminate bombing. I got myself in trouble when I said to the three star that how will his pilots at 15,000 feet identify targets and tell the difference between remnants of the enemy army versus the indigenous population who were opposed to that enemy army and that perhaps SOF could help him prevent the bombing of the civilian population. However, later the CINC (yes back in the 1990s they were called CINCs with no thanks to Rumsfeld for eliminating the title for combatant commanders) weighed in and asked the 3 star why he would eliminate a capability from a plan that he thought he would need in the future and he told the 3 star not to non-concur. That was a very enlighted CINC.

But I take exception to the author's conclusion. I don't think SOF was ever the supported command for the past 20 years (despite Rumsfeld's early desire in the GWOT) or when the unified command plan gave USSOCOM "coordinating authority." I may be wrong and others may have different opinions or interpretations. Except for the national mission force (with is a very small element of SOF and USSOCOM) in Iraq and Afghanistan, I cannot recall SOF being a supported command except in very small operations (e.g., SOCPAC in the Philippines, and SOCSOUTH in Colombia) but certainly not in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Graphics at the link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/winning-the-first-fight-experimenting-with-army-special-operations-forces-contributions-in-large-scale-combat-operations/

Winning the First Fight: Experimenting with Army Special Operations Forces’ Contributions in Large-Scale Combat Operations - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Richard Fetters, Brigid Hickman, Ryan Jones, Josh Reed · August 9, 2024

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As the US Army embraces the challenges articulated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, its special operations forces must redefine their role in large-scale combat operations. For two decades, these forces were the tip of the operational spear, a prioritized element of US counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns. Now, they must be prepared to contribute to the joint force’s success in a very different operational environment, against a more capable adversary, and with the stakes extraordinarily high. The specific challenge for Army special operations forces is to identify—and demonstrate—how they can provide value to the joint force by employing multidomain capabilities to create effects and set conditions for victory.

The Army’s 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) recently set out to explore what form this value might take, testing multidomain concepts outlined in US Army Special Operation Command’s ARSOF (Army special operations forces) Strategy 2030. It is useful to frame this effort within the list of special operations forces’ core activities. While Army SOF primarily executed direct action operations, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense during the post-9/11 campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, large-scale combat operation (LSCO) requires ARSOF to employ the full suite of its core activities. With the 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and companies from the 98th Civil Affairs and 1st Psychological Operations Battalions, 7th Special Forces Group participated in the first ARSOF-only rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from March 25 to April 20, 2024. These units formed a combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF) and leveraged the placement and access unique to special operations forces to converge effects across the SOF, cyber, and space triad. They specifically targeted critical vulnerabilities in enemy C5ISRT (command, control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting) in the corps deep area and along the periphery to set conditions for the joint forcible entry of a conventional airborne division. Ultimately, the experience highlighted the unique capabilities special operations forces could bring to bear in a LSCO context, including developing resistance forces and enhancing partner force resilience; conducting deep and denied area sensing; enabling deep area fires; conducting deep area irregular partner force maneuver; and gaining, maintaining, and exploiting information advantage. ARSOF’s long-term irregular warfare campaigns enable access and influence through persistent presence and long-term partnerships. In turn, if leveraged properly, this access and influence can create relative advantages in competition and set conditions for victory in conflict.

The JRTC rotation identified a way ARSOF can contribute to joint force success in LSCO. Further experimentation will be vital to uncovering further ways. However, in keeping with the chief of staff of the Army’s call to strengthen the profession through writing, what follows is a description of what 7th Special Forces Group learned during its JRTC rotation.

Exercise Overview

US Army Training and Doctrine Command has developed a scenario, based on the operational environment of the Indo-Pacific region, which served as the exercise’s backdrop. SOF were persistently deployed to South Torbia during competition to build partner force capacity to defend against its bellicose neighbor, North Torbia. As the threat situation transitioned through crisis and into conflict, the CJSOTF’s mission evolved into a multidomain irregular warfare campaign against a peer adversary to set conditions for the conventional force’s joint forcible entry. After North Torbia’s invasion of South Torbia, the CJSOTF commander directed Special Forces teams (Special Forces Operational Detachments–Alpha, or SFOD-As, and Special Forces Operational Detachments–Golf, or SFOD-Gs) in South Torbia to go to ground to allow the enemy to advance past them while the CJSOTF infiltrated additional SFOD-As to link up with South Torbian resistance forces. The combined efforts of the SFOD-As, partnered with resistance and conventional host-nation forces, and SFOD-Gs compelled North Torbia to culminate short of its operational goals and prematurely transition from offense to defense. The rotation’s final phase featured the CJSOTF’s synchronized multidomain actions to set conditions for the joint forcible entry.

Figure 1: CJSOTF-7’s Joint Operating Area for JRTC rotation 24-06

The CJSOTF’s concept of the operation included four phases. Phase one, set the theater, included both SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs building human and physical infrastructure. Phase two, survive, began with the enemy invasion and included the SFOD-As going to ground and permitting the enemy to advance beyond their locations. The joint force commander prioritized survivability of the SFOD-As to provide depth for future operations rather than delaying the enemy as it attacked south. Phase three, conduct reconnaissance, began as the enemy established its rear area. This phase critically enhanced the joint force commander’s understanding of the enemy’s composition and disposition. During phase four, enable the joint forcible entry, SFOD-As, by and with resistance and partnered forces, executed synchronized targets to destroy, dislocate, and disintegrate key enemy capabilities.

Setting the Theater in Competition: Depth and Operational Reach

SOF establish depth and operational reach during competition through their unique placement and access. Field Manual 3-0, Operations defines depth as “the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results.” Depth, the manual continues, can only be achieved when the commander understands enemy strengths and vulnerabilities and attacks them “throughout their dispositions in simultaneous and sequential fashion.” And operational reach is doctrinally defined as the “distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities”—in essence, the depth a unit can attain on the battlefield.

Figure 2: ARSOF in LSCO Concept (Source: Colonel Nate Joslyn, Commander, Special Operations Training Detachment, Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Johnson, Louisiana)

SOF’s persistent presence, long-term relationships with partner forces, and establishment of human and physical networks in competition establish the depth and operational reach required during crisis and conflict to rapidly develop the situation and synchronize effects. The depth and operational reach of forward-deployed SFOD-As in positions behind the enemy’s forward lines provide the joint force commander immediate flexibility, options, and time. As SFOD-As emerge from their go-to-ground positions, they operate in the enemy’s support area, can penetrate the enemy’s antiaccess and area-denial systems, and can force early culmination of enemy offensive operations.

In this JRTC rotation, the commander of the special operations joint task force, the CJSOTF’s higher headquarters, made a critical decision to enable CJSOTF success in establishing depth with devastating effects: he authorized SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs to conduct operational preparation of the environment activities during competition. This authority, with corresponding permissions from the ambassador, enabled teams to set the necessary conditions for success in the event of conflict. For example, the commander tasked SFOD-Gs to develop human and digital infrastructure with specific capabilities to be leveraged during crisis and conflict to extend the CJSOTF’s operational reach, gather intelligence, and provide operational support. Similarly, SFOD-As cached supplies and developed physical infrastructure enabling survivability when they would later go to ground. Failure to permit these activities during competition prevents SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs from achieving the full potential of their capabilities during crisis and conflict.

Transition to Crisis, Convergence in Conflict

The special operations joint task force commander made a second key decision by leaving the SFOD-As in place despite undeniable indicators and warnings of an impending invasion. As the enemy invaded, the SFOD-As went to ground and allowed the enemy to advance past them as it attacked south. Had the commander withdrawn the SFOD-As from the battlefield when competition transitioned to crisis, he could have only recovered depth by reinserting units of action later in the fight at far greater cost after the enemy had established its antiaccess / area-defense bubble. Infiltration of SOF in the rear of a peer enemy introduces extremely high risk. Stay-behind operations remove the high risk of infiltrating a denied area and present the more manageable risk of going to ground ahead of an enemy invasion.

Once the enemy advanced past them, SFOD-As conducted special reconnaissance, a core activity of SOF, to identify the composition and disposition of the enemy. The human and physical infrastructure the SFOD-As and SFOD-Gs built in competition through operational preparation of the environment activities now sustained the teams, allowing them to move and maneuver around the battlespace, provide medical aid and intelligence, and strike high-payoff targets. Without these capabilities, which may require years to develop during competition, the CJSOTF could not have forced the enemy’s early culmination nor adequately degraded enemy antiaccess and area-denial systems to enable the joint forcible entry.

The SFOD-As prosecuted targets from the CJSOTF and airborne division high-payoff target lists. During the targeting cycle, the CJSOTF intelligence and fires sections conducted center-of-gravity and critical-factor analysis to identify the enemy’s critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. The North Torbians’ objectives were known to be seizing energy resources and denying US force projection into South Torbia. As a result, the North Torbian military mission was to seize key energy infrastructure, aerial ports of debarkation, and seaports of debarkation. The source of power, or center of gravity, enabling this was the enemy 4th Division Tactical Group. In turn, this unit’s critical capability was the 44th Brigade Tactical Group, equipped with T-90 and T-72 tanks. The joint force was concerned these armor elements would disrupt or delay the joint forcible entry, and the CJOSTF J2—the task force’s intelligence officer—analyzed how to disrupt the enemy capabilities. Several critical requirements enabled and protected the brigade: logistics; air defense; fires; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; cyber; electronic warfare; and information operations. These requirements presented critical vulnerabilities across the battlefield framework in the form of logistics nodes, communication networks, radar, and electromagnetic spectrum signatures.

Understanding the enemy’s capabilities and intent two levels up from the 4th Division Tactical Group helped the CJSOTF isolate the enemy commander’s decisions critical to his success. The task force’s J2 then mapped the scale of enemy initiative and tempo to identify key transition periods. Transitions forced the enemy to push and pull capabilities between the two countries as the conflict unfolded, presenting the CJSOTF opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities and converge effects to force enemy decisions. Understanding where vulnerabilities would be and controlling operational tempo provided a proactive approach to targeting and collection rather than passively observing which decisions the enemy commanders would choose. In LSCO, the targeting process does not change, but the pace and scale at which SOF execute the process must accelerate and widen to affect the enemy on a broader scale.

Figure 3: Understanding When and Where to Converge against the Enemy

The North Torbian offense culminated after seventy-two hours due to the 4th Division Tactical Group outpacing its supply lines. As the enemy established hasty defensive positions and its operational tempo slowed, the US SOF and partner force’s operational tempo accelerated, focusing on the already vulnerable class III (fuel), V (ammunition), and IX (repair parts) supply depots in the enemy support zone. This marked the first transition point in the conflict for both friendly and enemy forces: the enemy could no longer sustain offensive operations, and friendly forces pivoted from a preeminent focus on survivability to deliberate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Here, the CJSOTF employed the SOF, cyber, and space triad to simultaneously converge effects against the enemy. After disrupting enemy sustainment, the CJSOTF shifted its targeting focus to the remaining air defense, command-and-control, and fires capabilities that provided protection to the armor elements centered on the defense of energy infrastructure. The CJSOTF needed to neutralize these capabilities to soften the armor assets’ protection and enable the friendly airborne division’s rotary-wing assets to air assault the division for the joint forcible entry. CJSOTF targeting maximized convergence effects by prioritizing the targeting of enemy critical requirements instead of simply targeting what was available or easily identifiable.

Transition and Return to Competition

The cessation of hostilities does not trigger SOF’s retrograde. Rather, SOF’s persistent presence assists in the area’s stabilization and converts short-term gains into long-term capacity. What will undoubtedly change during transition, however, is the primacy placed on certain SOF core activities. During conflict, direct action, special reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare are critical to denying or degrading enemy influence and capabilities. However, during transition and the return to competition, SOF core activities such as foreign internal defense and civil affairs operations become increasingly important. Two critical requirements for both SOF and a host nation during this transition period are force generation operations and network development, each of which increase resilience against future acts of aggression, and reposture SOF to respond during crisis.

While often singularly focused on the generation of manpower, force generation encompasses multiple elements of force management, including training, materiel, and facilities. These actions are common to multiple SOF mission types, such as joint combined exchange training and subject matter expert exchanges, and are conducted by Special Forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations personnel. While a primacy of effort is frequently given to military units, SOF is also uniquely postured to assist with force generation of political and social institutions, as well as information capabilities, each of which hardens a society against outside influence and enhances regional stability. Unfortunately, most combat training center exercises and similar training events conclude prior to testing an organization’s ability to plan for force generation. To best posture SOF for the return to competition, CJSOTF staffs must begin planning for force generation operations as soon as conflict occurs.

Another critical requirement during transition and the return to competition is the reestablishment of networks. Networks exist throughout cultures and change during the course of LSCO due to the loss of human life, critical infrastructure, and influence mechanisms. During transition, specific attention must be given to both physical and human networks in addition to the stability and resistance networks necessary to deter future conflicts. The hardening of a society against subsequent incursions occurs through the simultaneous reestablishment of these networks, which can each be leveraged to degrade threat actor influence during competition, crisis, and conflict. Finally, the establishment of networks by SOF assists conventional forces when conducting stability operations in areas arrested from enemy control by enabling the rapid consolidation of gains and return to civilian control.

Exercise Gaps and Way Ahead

During JRTC 24-06, 7th Special Forces Group experimented on multiple fronts, gathering lessons that will undoubtedly spur innovation across the United States Special Operations Command and the wider Army. However, opportunities were also missed, which must be addressed prior to future conflicts. The largest of these was the ability to achieve true integration between SOF and conventional forces, due to 24-06 being a SOF-only rotation. This lack of integration manifested in three primary forms: technical, physical, and relational. Each of these gaps must be addressed by increasing habitual relationships and aligning technical systems that allow seamless communication.

One of the largest exercise gaps was the ability to utilize technical means to achieve integration between the joint force’s SOF and conventional forces as well as partner nation entities. While 7th Special Forces Group remedied many communications architecture issues that were internal to the CJSOTF, the fact that SOF, conventional forces, and partner forces utilize different platforms for their common operational pictures and common intelligence pictures (COP and CIP) was a complication 7th Special Forces Group could not address during the exercise. The current lack of a COP and CIP standard across the Army and joint force requires operations and intelligence professionals to understand not only their own architecture, but also how to connect with other units’ and agencies’ architectures. This is complicated further by classification requirements when corresponding with host nation and coalition partners.

Another exercise gap was the inability of the CJSOTF to physically integrate with a division or corps. While advanced operations bases and SFOD-As are accustomed to integrating with battalions or brigades during combat training center rotations, the SOF staff at the group level rarely has the opportunity to observe, understand, and contribute to operations at echelons above brigade. Due to the fact that combat training center rotations are executed by brigades, the natural solution to this gap is increased SOF group participation in Warfighter exercises, the capstone event for divisions and corps. This would not only develop personal relationships that will pay dividends on the battlefield, but would also allow SOF to refine liaison packages, mission-essential tasks, and supporting collective tasks that posture SOF for success at echelon. By failing to integrate, SOF puts divisions and corps at a disadvantage when planning for LSCO and reinforces the divide created by over twenty years of post-9/11 operations.

Similarly, in the past two decades SOF often enjoyed the benefit of being the supported command during counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. In LSCO this paradigm will shift, causing a change in SOF’s role from the supported command to the supporting command. JRTC 24-06 challenged the CJSOTF and subordinate units to pivot from existing movement and maneuver concepts to a role Army Special Forces has not played for over two decades—the supporting unit to a corps or division attack. While SOF units of action are extremely well versed in operating with limited guidance, the shift to more prescriptive guidance and direction that supports division and corps objectives can only be understood through increased integration at multiple training venues. SOF objectives must be clearly tied to division and corps end states and a mindset shift must occur in which tactical activities are planned and executed in the context of operational effects.

7th Special Forces Group’s JRTC rotation tested a way ARSOF operates in LSCO by providing deep sensing throughout the competition continuum to converge multidomain effects and enable offensive maneuver by the joint force. SOF’s persistent presence, cultural knowledge, long-term relationships, and distinct capabilities set the theater for and provide unique value to joint force commanders. Still, much room for growth exists and ARSOF must continue testing these multidomain concepts. Doing so is crucial to ensure that ARSOF will be ready to support and enable victory in LSCO’s first fight.

Major Richard Fetters is a Special Forces officer and the outgoing deputy S-3 for 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He looks forward to continuing to inform SOF’s role in LSCO in his next assignment at JRTC’s Special Operations Training Detachment.

Major Brigid Hickman is the intelligence officer for 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). She is an alum of the Bradley Fellowship (OSD/JCS Internship Program) and was a 2021 Modern War Institute nonresident fellow. She cofounded the professional development blog Thought to Action.

Major Ryan Jones is the outgoing intelligence officer for 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He previously served in the Joint Special Operations Command and has over a decade of experience targeting in competition, crises, and conflict across multiple areas of responsibility.

Major Josh Reed is the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) future operations planner and civil affairs officer. He previously served in 5th Special Forces Group and the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion with deployments at the SOTF and civil affairs team levels in multiple areas of responsibility.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or those of any organization the authors are affiliated with, including 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces Command, US Army Special Operations Command, and US Special Operations Command.

Image credit: Cpl. Craig J. Carter, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Richard Fetters, Brigid Hickman, Ryan Jones, Josh Reed · August 9, 2024

​2. ‘The US Needs to Learn a Great Deal From What Ukraine Has Done’ – Gen. David Petraeus

A key excerpt:

That said, you are correct to note that I have repeatedly questioned why key decisions (the provision of M1 tanks, ATACMS, F-16 aircraft, cluster munitions, etc.) were delayed when it appeared inevitable that they would be approved. At the outset, I think it was reasonable for the US to ensure that particularly sophisticated capabilities would not fall into the hands of the Russians; however, once the Ukrainians demonstrated how hard and how effectively they were willing to fight, those concerns were dispelled. Then the concern apparently was Russian escalation in some fashion, including potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, if the US provided certain weapons systems. But, once again, those concerns proved unfounded. Thus the delays in the weapons systems I highlighted earlier – and reported current restrictions on certain US systems being used against targets on Russian soil – do not seem well founded to me. That said, having sat many times at the Situation Room table in the West Wing of the White House and having felt the weight of responsibility shared by those at that table, I should acknowledge that it is a lot easier to sit where I do now and question the cautious approach than it is when sitting at that table and considering the potential costs of being overly aggressive…

‘The US Needs to Learn a Great Deal From What Ukraine Has Done’ – Gen. David Petraeus

In a wide-ranging interview, Gen. David Petraeus, one of America’s most distinguished living soldiers, offers Kyiv Post his unique insight into Ukraine’s fight against Russia.

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/37119?utm

by Stash Luczkiw | August 9, 2024, 9:35 am

kyivpost.com · by Stash Luczkiw · August 9, 2024

EXCLUSIVE Interview US F-16

In a wide-ranging interview, Gen. David Petraeus, one of America’s most distinguished living soldiers, offers Kyiv Post his unique insight into Ukraine’s fight against Russia.

by Stash Luczkiw | August 9, 2024, 9:35 am

Ret. General and former CIA Director, David Petraeus, arrives for meetings with President-elect Donald Trump on November 28, 2016 at Trump Tower in New York. (Photo by Eduardo Munoz Alvarez / AFP

Gen. David Petraeus, US Army (Ret.) is the former Commander of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan; former Director of the CIA; and co-author of the New York Times bestselling book Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine. He was sanctioned by Vladimir Putin over two years ago.

US aid: too little too late?

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Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.

KP: The US has been providing robust aid to Ukraine, especially with the passage of the $61 billion military aid package in April. Yet you and others have pointed out that Washington has been consistently slow in making its decisions to help. The Biden administration has been accused of obliging the Ukrainians to fight with one hand tied behind their back, of wanting the Ukrainians not to win, but to “not lose” – i.e., to survive. Likewise, the Biden administration has been averse to seeing Russia outright lose. Do you share Ukrainians’ assessment that Washington has been overly cautious?

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Gen. Petraeus: The US has, of course, provided more overall assistance than just about all other contributing countries put together (though European countries and the EU have now, in aggregate, contributed a bit more than the US in total economic, humanitarian, and security assistance). And the US has provided by far the most security assistance. In fact, without US weapons systems, munitions, vehicles, logistics, coordination, etc., Ukraine would be in a vastly more challenging situation than it is today. Indeed, I believe the US also deserves considerable credit for leading the overall response very early on and ensuring that all Western countries worked together to support Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s brutal, unprovoked, and destructive invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and has continued to do so ever since diplomatically, economically, and with humanitarian assistance, as well as with enormous security assistance and intelligence support.

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That said, you are correct to note that I have repeatedly questioned why key decisions (the provision of M1 tanks, ATACMS, F-16 aircraft, cluster munitions, etc.) were delayed when it appeared inevitable that they would be approved. At the outset, I think it was reasonable for the US to ensure that particularly sophisticated capabilities would not fall into the hands of the Russians; however, once the Ukrainians demonstrated how hard and how effectively they were willing to fight, those concerns were dispelled. Then the concern apparently was Russian escalation in some fashion, including potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, if the US provided certain weapons systems. But, once again, those concerns proved unfounded. Thus the delays in the weapons systems I highlighted earlier – and reported current restrictions on certain US systems being used against targets on Russian soil – do not seem well founded to me. That said, having sat many times at the Situation Room table in the West Wing of the White House and having felt the weight of responsibility shared by those at that table, I should acknowledge that it is a lot easier to sit where I do now and question the cautious approach than it is when sitting at that table and considering the potential costs of being overly aggressive…

The Ukrainian approach on use of technology… is sheer genius.

Ukraine has been on the defensive

KP: You have met with the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky since he took over from Gen. Valery Zaluzhny. Have you noticed any specific tactical changes being implemented by Syrsky? As someone intimately familiar with the workings of both the Pentagon and the CIA, what advice would you give him on how to optimize the AFU’s relationship with Washington, its most important supporter?

Gen. Petraeus: I have had very good meetings with Gen. Syrsky since he took over from Gen. Zaluzhny – and I was briefed virtually by him on multiple occasions before that, as well. His approach has appeared very sound to me, especially considering the delay in the decision on additional US support and the challenges of generating additional Ukrainian soldiers and units which Ukraine is now working to overcome in the wake of the lengthy debate in the Rada on the conscription law.

And, in many respects, the Ukrainian approach on use of technology (especially air and maritime drones, with ground robotic systems coming on line, as well) is sheer genius. The fact that Ukraine, without any meaningful naval vessels, could sink over one third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and force it to withdraw from Sevastopol and the western Black Sea is an extraordinary tribute to the Ukrainian tech sector and those in uniform employing the unmanned air and maritime systems that have enabled those operations. (The opening of the western Black Sea is also, of course, critical to the ability of Ukraine to export grain by ship, an important contribution to Ukraine’s fiscal situation and to food security for Egypt and other north African countries, in particular.)

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The determination of Ukraine to produce 1 million aerial drones in 12 months is equally extraordinary and has done much to offset the substantially greater number of Russian soldiers than Ukrainians on the front lines…

Gen. Syrsky and the Ministry of Defence have orchestrated all of this very impressively, sending machines rather than men whenever feasible, strengthening defenses in locations where that has been advisable, inflicting enormous casualties on the Russian human wave attacks, ultimately preventing all but incremental gains by the Russians, halting the Russian offensive around Kharkiv well beyond artillery range of the city, and rebuilding Ukraine’s air and missile defenses and other critical capabilities as US assistance resumed a couple of months ago.

Moreover, having spent time with American commanders at all levels in Europe, from the theater level to the teams in Kyiv, I can assure you that the relationships between US and European leaders and their Ukrainian counterparts are of enormous mutual trust and admiration. The approaches of the Minister of Defense and Gen. Syrsky have been very helpful in ensuring such relationships.

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Finally, given the recent offensive into the Kursk Oblast of Russia, it is clear that Ukraine is not solely on the defensive any more, as your question implied!

The long overdue arrival of the F-16s will be of enormous importance to Ukraine over time but not a true game-changer in the near term.

Air superiority

Now with a limited number of F-16s in Ukraine, how do you see that presence affecting front lines, which have been getting hammered by Russian glide bombs? Will the F-16s be used only against Russian aircraft, or could they be used against ground targets? More generally, how revolutionary is the development of UAVs (and USVs at sea for that matter) in this war within the context of military history?

Gen. Petraeus: The long overdue arrival of the F-16s will be of enormous importance to Ukraine over time but not a true game-changer in the near term, I don’t think. The systems will be much more capable than the MiGs they replace, but the numbers will be modest at the outset and they will likely be used in a conservative manner as the pilots and the numerous ground support elements build their capabilities. And, needless to say, the Russians will be trying to shoot them down and hit the bases where they are based and from which they may operate.

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A good bit depends on the munitions and radar and other systems provided, of course; regardless, the capabilities the F-16s bring will force the Russian aircraft to be even more cautious than they already are (for example, rarely flying into Ukrainian airspace, where the air defenses have proven so lethal, and seldom, if ever, providing true “close air support” (right on top of the troops on the ground). The F-16s can employ air-to-ground as well as air-to-air munitions, but they will need to be cautious until they have a sense of the Russian air and ground capabilities against them and the respective abilities of each side to “see” and engage the other.

My expectation is that the early focus of the Ukrainian F-16s will be on what are termed defensive counter-air missions, seeking to push Russian aircraft back even further from the frontlines and, in some cases, pushing them out of the ability to range at some of the Ukrainian locations that have previously been vulnerable to the very destructive Russian glide bomb attacks. But, it will take additional F-16s, considerable air and ground experience, and development of all the components of Western aircraft and support elements before the addition of the F-16s begins to truly transform the situation.

On your other questions, as should be clear from my earlier observations, Ukrainian production and employment of air and maritime drones has, indeed, been revolutionary – truly path-breaking, in fact. Indeed, the US and other countries need to learn a great deal from what Ukraine has done – and likely will do – even as unmanned ground systems are introduced in larger numbers, as well!

The ability of Ukraine to throw thousands of aerial drones at Russian soldiers on the battlefield every day – and also to strike strategic targets inside Russia nightly, as well – is truly game-changing. And Ukraine’s ability to employ vast number of electronic warfare [EW] “bubbles” of various sizes all over the battlefield and around headquarters and bases and important infrastructure is also hugely impressive. So have been the ever evolving software components and enablers of all of these technological advances, as their constant refinement and improvement, increasingly involving AI [artificial intelligence], have been the critical element that has enabled the drones to evade Russian EW and air defense systems and engage targets heavily protected by Russian assets. (All of this should suggest, by the way, that Ukraine will be a major exporter of unmanned systems when its domestic requirements are ultimately reduced…)

Intelligence and war

KP: Much of Ukraine’s most surprising successes would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, without the help of US intelligence assistance. The Ukrainians’ ability to rid Crimea and much of the Black of the Russian fleet comes to mind. There has been talk of mutual distrust. The Americans are worried that the SBU might be infiltrated by Russia, as well as annoyed by Ukraine’s withholding information from Washington and general lack of transparency. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians feel the US has been too willing to cut a deal with Moscow that would push Kyiv into accepting concessions. As a retired general and former director of the CIA, how do you assess the relationship between Ukrainian intelligence services (particularly HUR, which the US had a hand in creating, according to the NY Times) and those of the US/NATO?

Gen. Petraeus: Given the sensitivity of these issues, I will not comment in detail other than to note (based on numerous engagement with various Ukrainian and American elements) that the relationships between our respective, multiple intel services are absolutely superb – regardless of whatever political friction might manifest itself from time to time. Beyond that, I think the US Administration has been absolutely right, from the outset, to assert that it will engage in “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” I have certainly not seen a US willingness “to cut a deal with Moscow,” as you put it in your question.

We should strive to do all that we can to ensure that Russia’s revanchist, revisionist, grievance-filled view of history and aggression are halted and reversed in Ukraine

Presidential campaign

Which of the two candidates for president, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, in your opinion, is more likely to help Ukraine win (with win, in this case meaning a return to the pre-2022 lines of control at the least)? Similarly, which candidate is better able to rein in Vladimir Putin’s revanchist project.

Gen. Petraeus: I’m afraid that I don’t engage in domestic politics in the US, so I will leave this to others, while noting that there is very strong bipartisan support in the US Congress for continued assistance to Ukraine and that both of the current candidates ultimately supported the most recent (enormous) package of assistance for Ukraine.

Let me conclude by offering my personal view that the US and all freedom-loving nations of the world should do all that we possibly can to enable Ukraine to halt the incremental Russian gains and build the capacity for future offensive operations (including further remarkable technological advances and training and equipping of substantial additional Ukrainian forces) to enable Ukraine to liberate as much of its territory as is absolutely possible – in order ultimately to dramatically change the situation on the battlefield to provide Ukraine the leverage needed for the future. Ukraine is fighting the common enemy of NATO and has already destroyed roughly half of its tank fleet, among other capabilities. And we should strive to do all that we can to ensure that Russia’s revanchist, revisionist, grievance-filled view of history and aggression are halted and reversed in Ukraine – as Putin would not stop there if he were to be successful – with the goal of not just preservation of Ukraine’s independence, but also membership in the EU and NATO. Doing this will also send a very important message to the rest of the world and do a great deal to shore up deterrence against other would-be aggressors.

As [Andrew Roberts and I] note in Conflict, what takes place in one part of the world often reverberates in other parts of the world as well. And ensuring success in Ukraine is critical in that regard. Slava Ukraini.

3. Surprise Attack in Kursk by Mick Ryan

Kursk. That name should make tankers stand up and take notice. Will there be the world's largest tank battle there again? Or this time will it be the world's largest drone battle?

My question is about the Ukraine strategy. Is taking Russian territory a prelude to negotiations? Will this give Ukraine the leverage at the negotiation table to demand the withdrawal of all Russian occupation forces from all Ukrainian territory (to include Crimea) in return for Ukraine withdrawing from Russian territory?

Or will this cause a Russian escalation beyond the current conventional war? (yes we fear escalation seemingly more than anything).

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/surprise-attack-in-kursk?r=7i07&utm

How Did Ukraine Surprise Russia…Again?

Mick Ryan

Aug 09, 2024

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Ukrainian soldiers of the 61st Brigade at the Gazprom offices in Sudzha, Russia. Image: Twitter / X

Surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception, only in very different degrees according to the nature of the undertaking and other circumstances. Clausewitz, On War, Book 3, Chapter IX

As a principle of war surprise is a combat multiplier that amplifies the effects of the other principles of war. Its effective use allows friendly units to strike at a time and place or in a manner that the enemy is unprepared for, which induces shock and causes hesitation.  US Army Tactics Manual 2023

The past few days in Ukraine have demonstrated, yet again, how surprise plays a major role in human competition and conflict. Regardless of the many technological developments which might inform or speed up decision-making in military and national security endeavours, surprise is an enduring feature of war.

Achieving surprise means that one can execute a plan that is unexpected by the enemy. Whether achieved through physical or virtual approaches, surprise generates a cognitive effect in one’s adversary. This feeling of perplexity, shock, and uncertainty in individuals as well as in teams, is designed by those seeking to achieve surprise to undermine an enemy’s cohesion and morale.

Soldiers, citizens and politicians have been surprised, consistently, over thousands of years of history. The writings of ancient historians such as Thucydides, Polybius, and Herodotus contain examples of nations or city states achieving victory by employing surprise, ruses and deception.

British military officer and military theorist J.F.C. Fuller wrote extensively on surprise as one of his most important principles of war. In his 1926 book, The Foundations of the Science of War, Fuller described surprise as having mental, moral and/or physical dimensions. He wrote in The Foundations of the Science of War that:

In war, surprise is omnipresent, wherever man is there lurks the possibility of surprise. If he wishes to understand war, (he) must examine the nature of surprise in its thousand and one forms. Surprise should be regarded as the soul of every operation.”

In the past century, surprise (or at least the attempt at surprise) was foundational in the operations of the belligerents in all major wars. Pearl Harbor, Korea, the Arab attacks on Israel in 1973, the 9/11 attacks on America and the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks on southern Israel feature examples of the successful achievement of surprise in modern conflict.

Surprising the opponent is an important method of seizing the initiative on the battlefield or at the strategic level. But the impacts of surprise are transient. As such, exploitation must be executed quickly against surprised – and shocked – enemy forces before they can regain coherency in their command and control and respond effectively. Military operations demand not just one but a succession of surprises. As the Russians are discovering, with their reinforcement convoys being ambushed on the way to Kursk, the initial surprise attack is just the first of a series of compounding surprises at the different levels of war.

The aim of this article is to explore surprise in modern war, in particular, the role it has played during the war in Ukraine since 2022. Importantly, I explore here just how the Ukrainians were able to deceive the Russians in the lead up to the Kursk operation this week and achieve such a stunning military surprise.

Surprise During the War in Ukraine

The past 30 months of war since the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine offers multiple examples where advanced technology has not prevented humans from innovating, deceiving and surprising their enemies. Key examples include:

The Belgorod Incursion. In June 2023, armed groups crossed the border from Ukraine and into the Russian Belgorod region. Dmitry Medvedev blamed Ukraine for the attack and demanded the extermination of the culprits. Several ultra-nationalists criticized the Russian government for their slow response. It caused some shock in senior levels of the Russian government and necessitated a re-assessment of Russian military dispositions. A follow-on incursion occurred in March 2024.

The Failed Ukrainian Counteroffensive. In June 2023, a much-heralded Ukrainian counteroffensive commenced in southern Ukraine. Led by newly formed brigades, the attacks into the strongest parts of Russia’s Surovikin defensive line quickly bogged down. Little territory was liberated and in December 2023, President Zelensky admitted the operation had failed. It led to a range of political and strategic impacts including the dismissal of General Zaluzhnyi and probably influenced the U.S. congressional debate over assistance to Ukraine.

The Prigozhin Mutiny. In June 2023, then head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin launched a mutiny which included Wagner Troops advancing towards Moscow. While the event triggered panic in Moscow, and delighted Ukrainian and western observers, the mutiny was called off by Yevgeny Prigozhin within hours of its beginning.

Moscow drone strikes. In May 2023, multiple drones flew over Moscow, with all eventually being shot down or crashing around wealthier parts of the capital. The drones caused minimal physical damage but generated world-wide headlines. This demonstrated the evolving capability for Ukraine to conduct long range strike operations.

The Kerch Bridge. On 8 October 2022, the Kerch Bridge from Russia to occupied Crimea was attacked. Both the railway bridge and roadway were damaged. The attack had an impact on traffic from Russia to Crimea and the bridge took months to repair. It was probably a key determinant in the replacement of the Russian overall commander at the time and the appointment of General Surovikin.

The 2022 Kharkiv offensive. In September 2022, the Ukrainians achieved surprise against the Russians in the Kharkiv region. The Ukrainians attacked what appeared to have been a thinly defended area and achieved a deep penetration into Russian rear areas. This 2022 offensive shifted momentum in the war, and for many months, Ukraine held the strategic initiative. It did however raise expectations for the 2023 counteroffensive.

Reinvigoration and expansion of NATO. After Russia’s large-scale invasion of February 2022, NATO responded in a much more forceful and meaningful way than the Russians expected. Called ‘brain dead’ by French President Macron in 2019, NATO since February 2022 has instead become reinvigorated. It has found new purpose, new unity and new members on its northern flank since the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Defeat of Russian Army north of Kyiv. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine commenced, many Western commentators believed that Ukraine would not be able to hold out against the Russians for more than a few days, or a few weeks at the most. The Ukrainians however were able to hold, and then force the withdrawal of, the Russian forces north and northeast of their capital. It massive surprise for the Russians. It was also a surprise for the West, which then significantly stepped-up military assistance.

The desire to achieve surprise against one’s enemy and to place them in a position where they are at a disadvantage is an enduring feature of warfare. No amount of technological sophistication, proliferation of drones or meshing of civil and military sensor networks, will lead to total transparency of the battlefield or what the enemy is doing well behind the front line.

The events of the past 72 hours have demonstrated this again. Ukraine, in a rapidly developing offensive, crossed its frontier with Russia and has been advancing on two axes of advance into the Kursk region of Russia. While there remains significant uncertainty about the strategic objectives of this surprise offensive, or even how far the Ukrainian forces have penetrated into Russia, this operation has already shifted narratives about the trajectory of the war and Ukraine’s capacity to resume offensive operations.

The question needs to be asked: how did Ukraine achieve such a stunning surprise against the Russians at this point of the war?

Russian reinforcement convoy surprised on its way to Kursk. Military operations rely not just on one surprise, but a succession of surprises to keep the enemy off balance. Image: @NOELReports on Twitter / X

How Ukraine Surprised Russia…Again

One of the most comprehensive examinations of surprise in warfare is Roberta Wohlstetter’s analysis of the surprise Japanese attack on Pearly Harbor called Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Published in 1962, it remains a key text for scholars of war who seek to understand how surprise is achieved at the beginning of wars. In the foreword for the book, Thomas Schelling writes that:

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined that actions get lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected…It includes the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion – which is usually too late.

Surprise has many contributing factors, as Schelling describes above. A full accounting of Russian performance in the lead up to, and during, this August 2024 Ukrainian cross-border offensive is some way off. Likewise, we probably won’t be exposed to the intelligence and planning for this offensive for some time into the future. However, it is likely that the Ukrainian surprise against the Russians was the result of five key factors: good intelligence; Ukrainian deception measures; Ukrainian operational security; timing; and Russian self-deception and failure of humility.

Contributing Factor 1: Good Intelligence. Intelligence is a foundational element of military operations. It underpins all planning as well as the conduct of operations. It informs strategy as well as the development of new and evolved forces as well as institutional learning and adaptation.

Ukrainians also have an intimate knowledge of Russian doctrine, methods and culture. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief, General Syrskyi is a graduate of the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School, and many other members of the Ukrainian military and intelligence communities have deep experience of Soviet and Russian methods, tactics and strategy.

At the same time, Ukraine’s intelligence services are effective as collecting information from an array of military, foreign military and commercial sources and then combining it into an overall ‘meshed intelligence picture’. I have explored this concept of meshed civil-military intelligence in earlier posts here as well as in a recent paper for the Special Competitive Studies Project earlier this year.

Combining this with their breadth of knowledge about the Russians will have provided the foundations for the planning for this operation into Kursk. Importantly, it will have provided key insights into how Ukraine might deceive their enemy in the lead up to the conduct of this cross-border offensive. Possessing good intelligence on the enemy, and on one’s own capabilities, is a key element to achieving surprise.

But so too is denying useful intelligence to the enemy. This is a subject explored in Eliot Cohen and John Gooch’s book, Military Misfortunes. They find that a failure of anticipation is a key reason for military failure, and that the function of anticipation is the principal concern of intelligence organisations. Therefore, the Ukrainians will have undertaken an array of activities to induce a failure of anticipation in the Russian intelligence system as well as in the Russian command and control network. That is one of the key functions of deception, which is explored next.

Contributing Factor 2: Deception. U.S. Army doctrine describes deception as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary…decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. NATO doctrine on deception, which we might infer incorporates agreement on the topic from its constituent members, describes it as “deliberate measures to mislead targeted decision-makers into behaving in a manner advantageous to the commander’s objectives.”

Deception operations have a long history in military affairs. In his writings about the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides describes how deception and treachery were central to the conduct of the war. The eastern tradition is also replete with examples of deception, from antiquity through to the modern day. Sun Tzu in his writings paid particular attention to deception – before and during wars.

There are many good examples of modern deception. These include Operation Fortitude in the lead up to the 1944 D-Day cross channel attacks, the Inchon landing in 1950, the 1973 Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal, and the US liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

Currently, NATO doctrine on deception has six principles, which are as follows:

• Create a behavioural response. Deception must focus on creating a desired behaviour. This behavioural outcome must meet the commander’s intent.
• Reinforce existing beliefs. Understand what the adversary is predisposed to believe (including how they expect friendly forces to act) and what they are predisposed to disbelieve. It is easier to reinforce a belief than to change it.
• Target the decision-maker. Deception targets the decision-maker. The targeted decision-maker must be able to detect deceptive events, process them and subsequently act upon them. The decision-maker may be at the tactical, operational or strategic level.
• Be credible, consistent, verifiable and executable. Deception must be believable, verifiable by enemy collection assets and achievable in terms of the actions required over the time period available.
• Multiple approaches. Creating effects through joint action will ensure an integrated approach. The greater the number of channels used, the greater the likelihood of the deception being perceived as credible.
• Conceal the real and reveal the false. Draw attention away from real dispositions and intentions, while simultaneously attracting attention to false intentions. Alternatives require the adversary to evaluate them.

The Ukrainians have clearly not forgotten the art of deception, and throughout this war they have sought to use tactical, operational and strategic deception to protect their forces (decoy tanks and HIMARS); and protect their plans (the 2022 Kharkiv offensive). Over the past few months, the Ukrainians obviously developed a comprehensive deception plan that used many of the NATO principles above, and was designed to protect the following:

1. Its intention to conduct a major offensive in 2024.
2. The movement of forces to be employed in that offensive.
3. The location and timing of where the Ukrainian offensive would be conducted.
4. The stockpiling of logistics to support the operation.
5. The movement of key supporting elements to the operational area including air defence and EW.

Contributing Factor 3: Operational Security. Achieving surprise also demands strict operational security that commences long before the execution of an operation. This operational security will have been designed by the Ukrainians to deny the Russians knowledge of Ukraine’s intention to deceive them about planned operations.

Maintaining this operational security will have required limiting the number of planners involved in the operation, and limitations on sharing information about it. This probably also involved limiting the amount of information shared with key supporters of Ukraine, including the U.S.

At the lowest levels, operational security will have included tactical postures of Ukrainian forces in northeastern Ukraine that did not give away future intentions to conduct offensive operations. Additionally, the Ukrainians will have also engaged in a recon battle to ensure that the Russian tactical reconnaissance systems, in the air and on the ground, were unable to gain sufficient information that might allow them to assemble the pieces that would provide them with early warning of Ukraine’s intentions in the Kursk region.

Contributing Factor 4: Timing. In war, the ability to exploit time is one of the most important considerations in the planning and execution of military activities. Colin Gray has written that “Every military plan at every level of war is ruled by the clock.” Timing for this Ukrainian offensive will have been driven by its capacity to concentrate the forces required for close combat, engineer support, artillery, air defence, communications, logistics, and electronic warfare.

But at a higher level, the strategic timing is vital. Ukraine probably perceives that Russia is close to culminating in its current offensives, which have now lasted more than six months. This means Russia might have reduced capacity to respond to the Ukrainian attack quickly. At the same time, Ukraine’s political and military leaders probably understand the need to demonstrate that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are capable of offensive operations, and worthy of ongoing support regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election or Russian narratives about ‘inevitable victory’ in this war.

Finally, the Ukrainians have shaped expectations among its supporters – and therefore in the Russian military leadership – that any kind of major offensive from the Ukrainian armed forces is probably not likely in 2024. Therefore, they have got inside the temporal decision cycle of the Russians as well as most of those observing the war. This week, Ukraine did something much earlier than expected. Timing is vital in generating surprise and it has played a key role in the Ukrainians achieving surprise in The Battle of Kursk.

Contributing Factor 5: Russian Self-Deception and Failure of Humility. Self-deception involves denying or rationalizing away the significance, relevance, or importance of opposing evidence and / or logical argument. A 2017 Scientific American article that explored the concept of self-deception described how “one of the most common types of self-deception is self-enhancement. Psychologists have traditionally argued we evolved to overestimate our good qualities because it makes us feel good. But feeling good on its own has no bearing on survival or reproduction.” 

This is not uncommon in military affairs. Norman Dixon explores this phenomenon in his book On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, describing how interwar Royal Navy battleship advocates disregarded all evidence about the potential future impact of aircraft in the maritime environment. As he wrote, “this august group of senior officers needed no encouragement to deceive themselves – and the British government – in their efforts to save battleships.”

More recent examples of military failure have highlighted how military organisations, even when they have significant intelligence pointing to enemy intentions to conduct certain actions, have not been able to reach the right conclusions or act appropriately on that intelligence. In the months before 7 October 2023, The Israelis had a copy of the Hamas plan, known as ‘Plan Jericho’. But these warning signs about Hamas’ intention to implement the plan were not acted upon. It is likely that at some point, the Russians will come to understand that they probably had sufficient intelligence to predict a Ukrainian offensive in Kursk but they were unable to assemble all the pieces into a coherent picture or act upon it.

But another element of this self-deception in the Russian military leadership in the lead up to the Ukrainian offensive might also be a failure of humility. A failure of humility occurs when a military force fails to undertake the intellectual efforts to understand their adversary. The Russians, believing that they had the strategic momentum in this war, and making good progress on the eastern front in Ukraine, may have failed to give the Ukrainians adequate credit for being a thinking, complex and adaptive entity that was studying them and planning accordingly.

Seeing something – we return now to the issue of ‘transparent battlefield’ - is not the same as understanding what is occurring. No sensor can see into the minds of commanders. Visibility of troops, equipment or units is not the same as having knowledge about its intentions. Radar operators at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, the Germans before D-Day, and U.S. intelligence agencies before 9/11 all had visibility of what the enemy was doing but did not understand what they saw.

There are also reports that the Russians were able to observe the Ukrainian build-up of forces before the cross-border operation began. In all these examples, one side lacked the humility to think their adversary might outsmart them or was more willing to take risk than they were.

Conclusion

This is a failure of the entire system of intelligence, and since Putin is responsible for this, then it’s clear this is a blow to Putin. Sergei Markov

Surprise remains one of the enduring features of war. As Clausewitz wrote, “surprise of the enemy…lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings, for without it the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable.” And as we have seen in the past 72 hours, and throughout this war, it will continue to be a feature of the war in Ukraine. We can never have perfect clarity about our adversaries’ intentions or capabilities. As Wohlstetter writes in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision:

It is only human to want some unique…signal, to want a guarantee from intelligence…we have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it. No magic, in code or otherwise, will provide certainty. Our plans must work without it.

Ukraine has achieved a major surprise against Russia. This tactical, operational and strategic surprise shows that modern military operations are far less transparent than some would have us believe. Deception operations, good intelligence, and surprise are crucial elements of modern war. More importantly, the Ukrainian cross-border attack shows that surprise and successful offensive operations are still possible.

4. Magyar's Birds Destroy 22 Howitzers in Under a Week

Video at the link: https://mil.in.ua/en/news/magyar-s-birds-destroy-22-howitzers-in-under-a-week/?utm

Magyar's Birds Destroy 22 Howitzers in Under a Week

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9 August, 2024 D-30A howitzer of the invaders, August 6, 2024. Photo credits: "Birds of Magyar"

Magyar’s Birds Destroy 22 Howitzers in Under a Week

Artillery Occupants elimination Ukraine War with Russia

The 414th Marine Strike UAV Regiment has destroyed 22 towed howitzers of the invaders in six days.

A video of the combat missions was posted on the unit’s page.

From August 1 to August 6, the regiment’s operators used FPV strike drones to critically damage 22 D-30 howitzers that were discovered by an aerial reconnaissance unit on the battlefield.

The drones, equipped with a cumulative warhead, targeted the barrel and breech of each artillery system, making it impossible to use and impractical to repair due to a shortage of barrels for the old systems.

In particular, as noted by the regiment’s commander, Robert Brovdy, on August 6 alone, one crew managed to disable eight enemy guns.

Operators used a drone to inspect the place of the hit, looking for a hole at the site of the hit and, if there was none, re-hitting the target.

It is worth noting that among the detected and damaged Russian equipment, a significant number of early D-30 howitzers, made in 1960 and produced until 1978, can be seen.

They can be identified by a specific 5-slot muzzle brake compensator. The later D-30A has a more massive integrated two-section muzzle brake in its place.

D-30 mod. 1960 howitzer

In his video, Magyar noted that the invaders, hiding their howitzers in the trees and camouflaging them with branches, made elementary mistakes by not dispersing howitzers over the area and often placing them at a distance of 10 meters from each other. In particular, due to this, the unit managed to destroy so many vehicles.

Due to the significant losses in artillery systems that the Russian defense industry cannot compensate for and the shortage of ammunition, the Russian military is actively using alternative means of destruction and munitions.

Recently, a hybrid based on the carriage of the M-46 artillery system and the artillery part of the AK-130 naval gun was spotted in use by the invaders.

The moment of charging the 130mm hybrid gun with the A3-UF-44 high-explosive projectile. Photo: Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The extraordinary solution allowed the ground units of the Russian Armed Forces to use unitary shells instead of the basic 130mm separate-loading ammunition. These shells are available in large quantities in the Russian Navy’s depots.

5. Defense Dept. Contractor Arrested With Dozens of Classified Documents

​Traitors amaze me. I always wonder what motivates them. And then I remember learning about MICE.

• M - Money
• I - Ideology
• C - Compromise
• E - Ego

Defense Dept. Contractor Arrested With Dozens of Classified Documents

Investigators are still trying to determine why the contractor, Gokhan Gun, who became an American citizen in 2021, hoarded so many documents.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/09/us/politics/gokhan-gun-classified-documents.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

Gokhan Gun printed more than 406 pages of documents this week, prosecutors said, among which were 82 top secret markings.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

By Glenn Thrush and Seamus Hughes

Reporting from Washington

Aug. 9, 2024

A Defense Department contractor was arrested on Friday with dozens of highly classified documents he had obtained using his security clearance, as he prepared to depart for a trip to Mexico, according to prosecutors.

The contractor, Gokhan Gun, an electrical engineer born in Turkey who now lives in a Virginia suburb of Washington, printed thousands of documents at his work for the Air Force. Many were unclassified, but some were “batches of documents from the top secret network,” according to an 11-page complaint unsealed in a Virginia federal court.

Mr. Gun is charged with illegally obtaining and retaining national defense secrets.

The case is one of several instances in recent years in which soldiers and civilians working for the military improperly retained military secrets. In March, a young Massachusetts Air National Guardsman, Jack Teixeira, accused of posting secret intelligence reports online, pleaded guilty in exchange for a 16-year sentence and an agreement to document his activities to the authorities.

Investigators are still trying to determine why Mr. Gun, who became an American citizen in 2021, hoarded so many documents. He nonchalantly carried them out of his office in rolled-up wads in plastic shopping bags, according to a law enforcement official briefed on the case.

Mr. Gun, who frequently travels overseas and owns homes in Virginia, Texas and Florida, was taken into custody early Friday by F.B.I. agents who arrived to execute a search warrant at his house in Falls Church, Va. He was preparing to leave for what he described as a fishing trip with friends, intending to board a flight to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, that left at 6:52 a.m.

Agents confronted him in his driveway as he awaited a ride share driver. Among his luggage they found a black backpack that contained a document marked top secret and a listing of his security clearances.

The complaint detailed a pattern of what prosecutors suggest went far beyond normal work-from-home behavior, including numerous instances over several months in which he was captured by security cameras printing documents in bulk.

Since starting his job for the Air Force in mid-2023, Mr. Gun printed 256 documents, totaling around 3,400 pages, many near the end of the work day, investigators said.

Earlier this week, Mr. Gun printed more than 406 pages of documents, which included 82 top secret markings, they added.

Mr. Gun, who had permission to take some work materials home, downplayed the significance of his actions, telling agents that “the classifications might have expired” on many of the documents in his possession, according to the filing.

A search last week of his work space by the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations did not recover the classified information, prosecutors said.

But agents found stacks of papers in his dining room, some clearly marked top secret. Notably, one of them had been printed out on Wednesday, seemingly contradicting his claim that nothing had current classification markings.

A public defender listed as Mr. Gun’s lawyer on court documents did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Mr. Gun was born in Istanbul and entered the United States on an H-1B nonimmigrant work visa in 2001 for a telecommunications company, prosecutors said. He became a lawful permanent resident in the U.S. in 2012, and a naturalized citizen in July 2021 while retaining citizenship in Turkey.

A biography of Mr. Gun on a trade association website lists a bachelor’s degree in engineering from George Mason University, a master’s in engineering from George Washington University and a doctorate in computer science from Southern Methodist University.

He describes himself as an avid runner, cyclist, soccer player and fan of the George Mason Patriots basketball team.

Glenn Thrush covers the Department of Justice and has also written about gun violence, civil rights and conditions in the country’s jails and prisons. More about Glenn Thrush

A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 10, 2024, Section A, Page 16 of the New York edition with the headline: Defense Contractor Arrested With Reams of Classified Papers. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

6. What Do Terrorists Have Against Taylor Swift Fans? Everything.

In terms of controlling the narrative we must take back the word resistance from terrorists and from totalitarian dictators. Their use (and our acceptance of it) can help legitimize them. We need to make sure resistance is used for those who resist occupation and control by totalitarian dictators or any oppressive regime.

For any resistance is romantic and so we need to take it back and make sure it is used in the proper context.

Excerpts:

Hamas has no formal relationship with either ISIS or al-Qaida. But Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted in an email that there are ties among them. Al-Qaida has always had an alliance of sorts with Iran, which supports Hamas and other Islamist militias throughout the Middle East—including Hezbollah, which trained al-Qaida in the 1990s. “Without their tutelage,” Hoffman says, “it is questionable that al-Qaida could have become so threatening and competent.”

All four groups—al-Qaida, ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah—demonize the Western “decadence” that, to their eyes, crowded raucous rock concerts symbolize. Targeting young people, Hoffman says, heightens terrorists’ main goals—“instilling fear and anxiety,” and ultimately “undermining trust and confidence in the ability of the authorities to protect society’s most vulnerable and cherished group: its children.”

...

But this week, a group called Columbia University Apartheid Divest, which claims to consist of more than 100 campus organizations, stated in an Instagram post: “We are Westerners fighting for the total eradication of Western civilization.”

Some student activists have taken to social media to dissociate themselves from this rubbish, but not very many, perhaps because those who signed up for the initial marches and petitions out of anti-war sentiment aren’t organized—and those who hijacked the movement for ideological aims, as usual, are.

Meanwhile, terrorists and their backers—the ones who applaud or at least tolerate attacks on Jews and on rock-concert audiences—have noticed the flag-waving protesters, and they are grateful. This is a statement by the al-Qaida Central Leadership in May:

...

And this, from Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khameini:

Dear University students in the USA, this message is an expression of our empathy and solidarity with you. As the page of history is turning, you are standing on the right side of it… You have now formed a branch of the Resistance Front.

What Do Terrorists Have Against Taylor Swift Fans? Everything.

Slate · by Fred Kaplan · August 9, 2024

Taylor Swift performs on July 5 in Amsterdam. Aldara Zarraoa/Getty Images for TAS Rights Management

The terrorist plot to kill hundreds or maybe thousands of people at a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna has surprised many, not least the tens of thousands who had bought tickets for the event. But it shouldn’t be a shock at all.

Groups like al-Qaida and ISIS, which inspired the teenage planners of this murderous attempt, are still around, even thriving. And pop concerts—attended by many young people, especially young women freely wearing what they want and having too much fun to notice suspicious things around them—are among their favorite targets.

In 2017, an ISIS suicide bomber attacked an arena in Manchester where Ariana Grande was performing, killing 22 people and injuring more than 1,000. This past March, ISIS terrorists carried out a mass shooting and knife-slashing at a huge concert hall in Moscow, killing more than 145 people and injuring more than 550.

Then, of course, there was Hamas’ rampage at Israel’s Nova music festival, killing 364 and kidnapping 40—the first act of the terrorist group’s Oct. 7 assault across the Gazan border, killing about 1,200 Israelis and taking more than 200 hostages in all. It was the deadliest concert attack in history.

Hamas has no formal relationship with either ISIS or al-Qaida. But Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted in an email that there are ties among them. Al-Qaida has always had an alliance of sorts with Iran, which supports Hamas and other Islamist militias throughout the Middle East—including Hezbollah, which trained al-Qaida in the 1990s. “Without their tutelage,” Hoffman says, “it is questionable that al-Qaida could have become so threatening and competent.”

All four groups—al-Qaida, ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah—demonize the Western “decadence” that, to their eyes, crowded raucous rock concerts symbolize. Targeting young people, Hoffman says, heightens terrorists’ main goals—“instilling fear and anxiety,” and ultimately “undermining trust and confidence in the ability of the authorities to protect society’s most vulnerable and cherished group: its children.”

This is what the pro-Palestinian protesters in the West who wave Hamas and Hezbollah flags and chant their slogans don’t grasp: This brand of terrorism isn’t just for going after Zionists. It’s for anyone who dares to exercise freedoms associated with the West.

The young Jews killed in the early hours of Oct. 7 at the Nova festival were attending a music festival celebrating unity. The Israelis in the kibbutzim across the Gazan border, where most of the subsequent killing took place, were among the country’s most left-wing peace activists. Nor were these Israelis on occupied land, like the settlers in the West Bank; many of them, or their families, had lived on the kibbutzim since before the founding of Israel as a state in 1948.

On Oct. 7, none of that mattered.

This is not to absolve Israel of its excesses in this war (and other wars); its insensitivity to Palestinian civilian casualties (abetted by the failure of most Israeli news media to show what’s going on in Gaza); and its government, which refuses to clamp down on murderous settlers in the West Bank and which has two cabinet ministers—Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich—who indulge in rhetoric as murderous toward Palestinians as Hamas’ rhetoric is toward Jews. (Even Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regards them as too right-wing; he keeps them out of meetings on war policy, but he tolerates them in his ruling coalition because without them, he would lose his majority in Parliament.)

But this week, a group called Columbia University Apartheid Divest, which claims to consist of more than 100 campus organizations, stated in an Instagram post: “We are Westerners fighting for the total eradication of Western civilization.”

Some student activists have taken to social media to dissociate themselves from this rubbish, but not very many, perhaps because those who signed up for the initial marches and petitions out of anti-war sentiment aren’t organized—and those who hijacked the movement for ideological aims, as usual, are.

Meanwhile, terrorists and their backers—the ones who applaud or at least tolerate attacks on Jews and on rock-concert audiences—have noticed the flag-waving protesters, and they are grateful. This is a statement by the al-Qaida Central Leadership in May:

As we support the assassination and beheading of Zionist unbelievers, so also we value and appreciate the movement of Western protesters and occupiers from among the students of Western universities.

This, from Hamas spokesman Bassem Naim:

We in the Hamas movement believe that any popular movement demanding an end to the aggression and genocide against our people are useful and supportive activities for our cause.

And this, from Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khameini:

Dear University students in the USA, this message is an expression of our empathy and solidarity with you. As the page of history is turning, you are standing on the right side of it… You have now formed a branch of the Resistance Front.

Hoffman infers from these expressions of thanks that, in the eyes of the terrorist leaders, the Western flag-wavers are supporting not only the Palestinians’ fight against Israel but providing cover for what Hamas and Hezbollah are doing and saying. And that impression, he says, “encourages terrorism and legitimizes it.”

I seriously doubt that most of the protesters intend to have that effect. But protesting for peace and justice doesn’t have to mean supporting terrorists—especially terrorists who view those attending a Taylor Swift concert as abominations worth marking for death.

Slate · by Fred Kaplan · August 9, 2024

7. Top UN official tells Security Council that Islamic State group, affiliates gaining power in Africa

Top UN official tells Security Council that Islamic State group, affiliates gaining power in Africa

Updated 12:37 PM EDT, August 8, 2024

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · August 8, 2024

FILE - Islamic State militants pass a checkpoint bearing the group’s trademark black flag in the village of Maryam Begg in Kirkuk, 180 miles north of Baghdad, Iraq, Sept. 29, 2014. (AP Photo/Hadi Mizban, File)

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UNITED NATIONS (AP) — A top U.N. counterterrorism official told the Security Council on Thursday that a vast stretch of Africa could fall under the control of the Islamic State group and affiliated terrorist organizations.

There was no known link between an alleged plot to attack Taylor Swift shows in Vienna and the group or its affiliates elsewhere in the world, but both suspects appeared to be inspired by the Islamic State group and al-Qaida, Austrian authorities said Thursday.

In a regular report to the council, Vladimir Voronkov, the undersecretary for counterterrorism, told members that IS group affiliates have “expanded and consolidated their area of operations” in West Africa and the Sahel.

A “vast territory stretching from Mali to northern Nigeria could fall under their effective control” if their influence continues, Voronkov said.

He said that IS group affiliates have also expanded operations in other parts of the continent, including parts of Mozambique, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which saw a “dramatic increase in terrorist attacks” that killed large numbers of civilians.

Voronkov told the council that ISIS-K, the group’s Afghanistan affiliate, has “improved its financial and logistical capabilities” in the last six months and increased recruitment efforts. He said IS has demonstrated its global intent by claiming responsibility for ISIS-K attacks and increasing operations in Iraq and Syria.

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · August 8, 2024

8. The cancellation of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour shows is the latest incident in a long history of concert terrorism

The cancellation of Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour shows is the latest incident in a long history of concert terrorism

Authorities have cancelled the singer’s three shows in Vienna after foiling a terrorist threat. In an environment of rising global tensions, vigilance is key. 

unsw.edu.au · by Milad Haghani

Taylor Swift’s Eras’ Tour concerts in Vienna, scheduled for August 8–10, have been cancelled due to a foiled terrorist plot. The events were expected to draw around 65,000 attendees each night.

Two suspects have been arrested. The main suspect is a 19-year-old Austrian citizen who is believed to have pledged allegiance to Islamic State last month. Authorities found chemical substances in his possession and noted that he had been radicalised online. The other suspect was arrested in Vienna.

Concerts have always been prime targets for terrorists seeking to inflict maximum harm. This was tragically underscored by the attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow in March. Four terrorists associated with IS carried out a coordinated attack involving mass shootings, slashing, and incendiary devices, resulting in 145 deaths and more than 551 injuries.

Concerts as terror targets

From 1996 to 2020, at least 33 cases of attempted or executed terror attacks targeting concerts have been recorded globally. These attacks have claimed an estimated 263 lives.

In nearly 70% of these cases, bombings and explosions were the primary method of attack, while firearms were used in almost 24% of the cases. The use of relatively primitive explosive devices, such as hand grenades, was reported in at least eight cases.

The most fatal terrorist attacks on concert venues in history include:

• November 13 2015, Paris: the Bataclan theatre attack by the Islamic State of Iraq resulted in 90 deaths. This incident was part of a coordinated series of attacks across Paris, which left 130 people dead in total.
• October 1 2017, Las Vegas: an alleged anti-government extremist opened fire on attendees of the Route 91 Harvest music festival from a hotel room, killing 58 people and injuring more than 850. This remains the deadliest mass shooting in modern US history.
• May 22 2017, Manchester: a suicide bomber affiliated with IS detonated an explosive device at the end of an Ariana Grande concert, killing 22 people and injuring more than 500.

Given this history, it’s not surprising Austrian authorities decided to cancel the concerts.

Avoiding tragic deja vu

The demographic targeted in the alleged terror plot in Vienna is reminiscent of the 2017 Manchester Arena attack.

The typical profile of Ariana Grande concertgoers, especially during the “Dangerous Woman Tour” when the Manchester attack occurred, included a large proportion of young fans, many of whom were teenagers or even younger children. The audience was mostly female and often included families, with parents accompanying their children.

Among the 22 people killed in Manchester, the youngest victim was an 8-year-old girl. Several other children and teenagers lost their lives. An attack at a Taylor Swift concert could have inflicted similar damage and resulted in a comparable tragedy.

One of the victims of the Manchester Arena attack was 29-year-old Martyn Hett. Martyn’s mother became a prominent advocate for counterterrorism measures in the aftermath of the attack. Her efforts and campaigning resulted in the development of “Martyn’s Law” in the UK. This law aims to improve security at public venues by mandating better preparedness and response strategies to prevent similar terror attacks.

Growing radicalisation

Australia recently raised its terror threat level, a decision reaffirmed by this latest incident in Austria.

One of the likely indicators used by ASIO to assess the threat level is the global security atmosphere, including existing and potential threats identified in other parts of the world. The interconnected nature of global terrorism means threats abroad can have implications for our national security.

This is further highlighted by the recent foiled terror plots ahead of the Paris Olympics, which were largely motivated by ideological extremism and encouraged by global terrorist networks. In the months leading up to the games, French authorities reportedly thwarted at least two terror plots aimed at the Games.

In late April, a 16-year-old was arrested after announcing plans to carry out a suicide bombing. More recently, an 18-year-old was detained for allegedly plotting an attack at a soccer stadium in Saint-Etienne, inspired by Islamist ideologies.

IS, particularly its Afghanistan-based affiliate Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS–KP), had called on its supporters to attack European sporting events this summer, including the Olympics.

ASIO Chief Mike Burgess has emphasised more young Australians are being radicalised through the internet, which he describes as a “the world’s most potent incubator of extremism”. He’s highlighted that the online ecosystem has facilitated the spread of extremist ideologies, conspiracies, and misinformation, making young people particularly vulnerable to radicalisation.

This trend has been exacerbated by global events and conflicts, which have intensified grievances and fuelled extremist views. Burgess has noted that there has been a resurgence in minors embracing violent extremism, with recent cases involving individuals as young as 14. The above examples are case in point.

What does this mean for Australians? First, it reaffirms that our intelligence agencies are ahead of these trends, closely monitoring what’s happening here and around the world. This is cause for reassurance.

It also alerts us that the elevated terror threat level is for a reason, and the call for heightened vigilance is justified. It shows Australia’s commitment to a proactive approach in safety and security, staying ahead of potential risks before they materialise and taking mitigating measures.

It’s important to remember that countering terrorism is a shared responsibility between the government, the private sector and the community. While the current terror threat level is no cause for anxiety or suspicion of one another or any communities, it is crucial to remember that community-level vigilance remains a powerful tool in the fight against terrorism.

Milad Haghani, Senior Lecturer of Urban Mobility, Public Safety & Disaster Risk, UNSW Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

unsw.edu.au · by Milad Haghani

9. Chinese loans and projects turn problematic for Laos

​Debt trap diplomacy at work.

My thesis (beating a dead horse I know): China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, ​w​hile displac​ing democratic institutions.

Chinese loans and projects turn problematic for Laos

https://english.khabarhub.com/2024/09/373244/

Manoj Ghimire

09 August 2024 

Time taken to read : 6 Minute

Laos is under tremendous financial stress and has headed to the debt trap created by the Chinese loans that are often blamed for being predatory and unsustainable.

Laos is facing the difficult task of repaying the expensive loans taken under the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) even as Chinese influence and dominance continues to grow. All this has made Laotian concerned.

The people of Laos are worried about the economic influence and inroads China has made.

They have begun favouring the US over China now, according to the State of Southeast Asia survey for 2023.

“The reduction in the perception of China’s political and strategic influence is most palpable among Laos and Myanmar,” it said.

Chinese loans are being used to construct dams, railway stations, hydroelectric power plants, hotels and residential complexes.

However, the Chinese-sponsored projects have failed to ensure projected returns. The majority of BRI projects in Laos are associated with energy and transport infrastructure development.

While the expenses incurred are ultimately to be paid by Laos, the Chinese involved in these projects are calling the shots and exerting dominance over the locals.

Many small shops owned by local Laotians in BRI project areas have shut as Chinese workers thronged Laos.

“Laos is so indebted to China that the Chinese can come over here and take our land,” said Nin, a vegetable seller from Vientiane.

Local workers complained of harassment and detention by the Chinese companies doing business in Laos.

The landlocked Laos will not be able to repay Chinese loans against the backdrop of financial problems, high inflation, and deteriorating purchasing power.

“It is on the brink of default,” Anushka Shah, vice president at Moody’s Investors Service.

The external public debt servicing costs swelled from USD 507 million in 2022 to USD 950 million in 2023, creating financial and political crises in the country.

Notably, Chinese loans amount to the half of total external loans Laos has obtained.

While international agencies such as World Bank and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) charge under 1 percent, Chinese loans came at the rate of 4 percent.

Currency depreciation and inflation are adding to the problem of repayment of Chinese loans, said Roland Rajah, director of the Lowy Institute’s Indo-Pacific Development Centre.

“Laos simply borrowed too much for projects that could only pay off over the long term but it had to start making big repayments to China now,” he said.

Chinese debt to Laos has ballooned to USD 10.9 billion in the recent years.

“However, if you add in potential or ‘hidden’ sources of public debt exposure to China, this figure increases to roughly USD17 billion, which is equivalent to 88.9 per cent of Laos’ GDP,” said Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData.

“No country in the world with a higher amount of debt exposure to China than Laos.”

This makes Laos vulnerable to Beijing’s predatory loan policies. “I think Laos is at the mercy of being part of China’s economic plans, whether it is train connections or the hydropower that Laos can produce,” said Erin Murphy, a fellow at Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The debt repayment now is going to make things worse for Laos. “Most people will not know the scale of the debt, nor will they associate the debt to Chinese having any direct impact on their lives,” said a Laotian, who wished not to be named for security reasons.

China has claimed the BRI was mutually beneficial and would cause social and economic development in Laos.

However, the Chinese-sponsored projects have failed to ensure projected returns. The majority of BRI projects in Laos are associated with energy and transport infrastructure development.

The BRI projects including the China-Laos rail line have become white elephant and led to 30 per decline in Laos’ currency’s value in 2023 and soaring inflation, said Zachary Abuza, a professor at Washington-based National War College.

“It’s not just debt to China. Laos has a crushing amount of debt. Debt in itself is not bad if it is going to productive uses, but Lao debt has not,” he said.

While China has got access to minerals in Laos thanks to the BRI-led transport projects, Laos may not have received the intended benefits. Rather, it has caused distress.

The second-poorest country in South Asia already witnessed economic downturn thanks to the Covid-led pandemic.

The debt repayment now is going to make things worse for Laos. “Most people will not know the scale of the debt, nor will they associate the debt to Chinese having any direct impact on their lives,” said a Laotian, who wished not to be named for security reasons.

Publish Date : 09 August 2024 22:05 PM

10. Opinion Surprise Ukraine offensive pokes Russia’s soft underbelly by Max Boot

Perhaps we underestimate Ukraine at our peril.

Opinion  Surprise Ukraine offensive pokes Russia’s soft underbelly

Kyiv just made a move that military analysts, and Moscow, apparently, didn’t think was possible.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/08/10/ukraine-offensive-kursk-russia/?utm

6 min

806

A makeshift memorial for fallen Ukrainian soldiers is seen in Kyiv on July 23. (Efrem Lukatsky/AP)

By Max Boot

August 9, 2024 at 5:36 p.m. EDT

As the war in Ukraine settled into a stalemate, two assumptions became prevalent among analysts: First, that it is nearly impossible to achieve any surprise on a battlefield blanketed by drones. Second, that it is nearly impossible to mount fast-moving offensive operations, given the extensive defenses erected by both sides. Ukraine has challenged both assumptions over the past few days with its surprise, lightning-fast thrust into Russia’s Kursk region — an area familiar to military historians as the site, during World War II, of the biggest tank battle in history.

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The Ukrainian military shocked the entire world — and the Russian defenders — when it sent an armored column on Tuesday across the border from Ukraine’s Sumy region. There had been cross-border raids by Ukraine before, but those were much smaller operations conducted by Russian volunteers. This was something much more ambitious: a combined-arms offensive utilizing armored vehicles (some of them German- and U.S.-made), infantry, artillery and electronic-warfare equipment. Ukraine reportedly committed elements of four elite brigades to the operation.

This was, in fact, the kind of well-planned, well-executed assault that the Ukrainians had hoped to pull off last year, on a much grander scale, when their objective was to slice through Russian lines in southern Ukraine and break the land bridge between Crimea and Russia. That offensive failed against well-prepared Russian defenses full of mines and trenches, all covered by heavy artillery fire and large numbers of drones.

By contrast, the Ukrainians have practically waltzed into the Kursk region, because the Russians weren’t expecting an attack there. This reinforces the lesson of the June 2023 rebellion by Wagner Group mercenaries, who found a practically open road to Moscow before turning back at the last moment. The interior of Russia is lightly defended, and the lumbering Russian military cannot react quickly to new threats. It makes you wonder why the Ukrainians mounted a costly and futile frontal assault on Russian lines last summer instead of staging a “left hook” through Russian territory to attack the Russian defenders from the rear — similar to the maneuver that the United States employed against Iraqi forces in Kuwait during the Gulf War in 1991.

“The level of strategic, operational and tactical deception shown by the Ukrainians during the planning, assembling forces, and ongoing execution of the Kursk operation has been superb,” retired Australian Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan, author of the new book “The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation,” wrote on X. “This is not a technical achievement — it is a human one. People who have learned from their successes and failures since February 2022 have crafted an operational design that is being competently executed by motivated soldiers.”

Russia’s armed forces and political leadership appear to have been utterly stunned by the Ukrainian gambit. The Ukrainians have reportedly captured “many” Russian soldiers — prisoners of war who can be used in future exchanges to liberate Ukrainians in Russian captivity.

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin actually complained: “The Kyiv regime has undertaken another large-scale provocation.” So, in the grotesque Putin worldview, it seems that Russia launching an unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine is perfectly proper — but Ukraine striking back at Russia is “provocative.” How dare the Ukrainians defend themselves?

The Kremlin keeps saying that the Ukrainian attack has been defeated, even while the Ukrainians continue to advance. By Thursday, the Institute for the Study of War was estimating that Ukrainian forces had advanced at least 21 miles past the Russia-Ukraine border, while the Economist reported that the Ukrainians had taken about 135 square miles of Russian territory.

The question is: Now what? Will the Ukrainian forces try to hold Russian territory, perhaps in hopes of gaining leverage in a future negotiation, or will they retreat to their own territory before Russia can mobilize a large counteroffensive?

Part of the answer will depend on the attitude of Washington. While the Biden administration has not complained about the use of U.S.-made vehicles in this offensive, it apparently has not yet granted Ukraine permission to use American-made ATACMS missiles to hit Russian airfields and other targets deep inside Russia. Such strikes, perhaps backed up by attacks from Ukraine’s newly acquired F-16s, could impede any Russian counterattack. If Ukraine is not granted the permission it needs from Washington, its forces will be forced to retreat sooner than necessary. Given how Ukraine keeps erasing supposed Russian “red lines” with impunity, this is a risk President Joe Biden should be willing to run.

Despite the early success of the Ukrainian assault, its ultimate fate — and wisdom — remains a matter of speculation. CNN reports, citing U.S. and Ukrainian officials, that the intent is “in part to disrupt and demoralize Russian forces and in part to divert Russian forces away from other parts of the eastern front.” The latter goal will be harder to achieve than the former.

Russia still has a large manpower advantage over Ukraine, despite the heavy losses the Russian army has suffered, and so the Kremlin should be able to send reserves from Russia into Kursk without having to deplete its front-line units in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. By contrast, the Ukrainian forces are so undermanned that they are running a major risk if they are redeploying troops from the fighting in the Donetsk region to Kursk​.

But the Ukrainian assault is already producing the kind of positive headlines for Ukraine that it has not seen since the fall of 2022 when its forces were able to stage dramatic advances in both Kharkiv province in the east and Kherson province in the south.

Before the new Kursk incursion, much of the news in recent weeks had been focused on the slow if steady Russian advances in the east and south that have already eradicated the minor gains achieved by the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukraine has been bracing for more territorial losses as its overstretched troops, depleted after 2½ years of war and still waiting for an influx of fresh recruits mobilized under a new conscription law, struggle to hold a front line stretching across 600 miles. At the very least, the Kursk offensive changes the narrative and reminds the world of the kind of Ukrainian derring-do that was the main story of the war’s early days. Given the importance of global opinion for the outcome of the conflict — Ukraine is dependent, after all, on aid from the United States and Europe — that is no small achievement.

Whatever the ultimate fate of the Kursk offensive, it is the kind of bold and unexpected maneuver that a smaller power such as Ukraine must make when fighting against a larger adversary that is trying to grind down Ukrainian defenses through sheer weight of numbers. Even while a growing number of Ukrainians tell pollsters they are amenable to territorial concessions to end the war, the Ukrainian armed forces are showing they still have plenty of fight left in them — and that the Russians can hardly take victory for granted.

Opinion by Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author of the forthcoming “Reagan: His Life and Legend.” Twitter

11. The Doctrine Smart Book (Army)

As of July 2024.

We should all find this a helpful reference.

However, there is no discussion of or reference to Irregular Warfare (there is Irregular Warfare doctrine in development as I understand it so it is logical it is not included in this until it is published). The word irregular is used only once.

It describes Army Special Operations Forces this way (which is a useful and accurate description from ADP 3-05 (2019)). The Army is still using Special Warfare and Surgical Strike even though this dichotomy is not accepted by (or acceptable to) USSOCOM. Special Warfare is used by USSOCOM but not in conjunction with Surgical Strike.

Army Special Operations Characteristics

All Army special operations share particular characteristics that set them apart from other elements of combat power. Army special operations have the following characteristics:

• Are low-visibility when required.
• Have a minimal signature or small footprint.
• Are used to foster habitual (indigenous) relationships.
• Are used to employ precise and timely direct action.

Core Competencies

Army special operations have two core competencies: special warfare and surgical strike. Army special operations are designed to execute these critical capabilities through either collaborative efforts (special warfare) with indigenous populations or unilateral actions (surgical strike).

Special Warfare

Forces capable of long-duration operations in denied areas designed to train, advise, and assist host nations in conducting special operations, and to build the indigenous warfighting capability.

Surgical Strike

Forces trained and equipped to provide a primarily unilateral, scalable, direct action capability that is skilled in hostage rescue, kill or capture operations against

designated targets, and other specialized tasks.

Principles

• Discrete
• Precise
• Scalable

Core Activities

• Unconventional warfare
• Foreign internal defense
• Security force assistance
• Counterinsurgency
• Direct action
• Special reconnaissance
• Counterterrorism
• Preparation of the environment
• Military information support operations
• Civil affairs operations
• Countering weapons of mass destruction
• Hostage rescue and recovery
• Foreign humanitarian assistance

Tenets of Army Special Operations

Tempo 

• Preemption 

• Disruption 

• Deception 

• Disciplined initiative 

Imperatives 

Understand the operational environment 

Recognize political implications 

Facilitate interorganizational cooperation 

Engage the threat discriminately 

Anticipate long-term effects 

Ensure legitimacy, credibility, and trust 

Anticipate psychological effects and the impact of information. 

Operate with and through others 

Develop multiple options 

Ensure long-term engagement 

Provide sufficient intelligence 

Balance security and synchronization 

Download the PDF at this link: https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/036213FE-330D-43B7-B906-1F7AE61CEFBC-1723220140151/DoctrinexSmartxBookxxJulyx2024x.pdf

The Doctrine Smart Book

Introduction 

The Doctrine Smart Book is a concise collection of Army doctrine summaries that reflects currently approved doctrine and is prepared by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Part one of the Doctrine Smart Book provides a visual representation of the Army’s capstone and keystone doctrinal hierarchy. Part one also contains a list of all current ADPs, FMs, and ATPs. Part one concludes with doctrine broken down by warfighting function. Part two of the Doctrine Smart Book consists of one- page synopses of each currently approved Army doctrine publication (ADP) and field manual (FM). Each synopsis contains basic characteristics, fundamentals, terms, and ideas as they are discussed in each publication. Part two concludes with a list of doctrine points of contact. Part three of the Doctrine Smart Book contains a list of doctrine points of contact, doctrine resources, and visual references. 

The principal audience for the Doctrine Smart Book is all readers of doctrine—military, civilian, and contractor. The Doctrine Smart Book uses Department of Defense terms where applicable. 

The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send questions, comments, and recommendations to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-MCD (Doctrine Smart Book), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337 or by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@army.mil. 

12. Iran Is Better Positioned to Launch Nuclear-Weapons Program, New U.S. Intelligence Assessment Says

If all warfare is based on deception (which it is) I am hard pressed to agree with the assessment that Iran isn't currently seeking to build a nuclear device. Intent is the one of the hardest things to discern. Wouldn't that be the assessment they want us to continue to make until they are ready to show us their nuclear weapons or for as long as they think than can coerce and extort concessions from the US and the international community? Their assessment may be that as long as the international community wants to negotiate over its nuclear program that they have a chance of coerce concessions. Their assessment may be that the US and international community will refrain from taking action against them as long as they believe it is not currently seeking to build a nuclear device which will give it time to both coerce concessions and continue the activities that will help it develop its nuclear capabilities.

I wonder about this irony: Are we making the assessment we want to believe based on what Iran is projecting that they want us to believe? We do not want to believe they are currently seeking to develop a nuclear device so Iran is providing the indicators that would make us assess this because Iran wants us to believe it.

Iran Is Better Positioned to Launch Nuclear-Weapons Program, New U.S. Intelligence Assessment Says

U.S. officials say Iran isn’t currently seeking to build a nuclear device but is engaged in activities that could help it do so

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-better-positioned-to-launch-nuclear-weapons-program-new-u-s-intelligence-assessment-says-e39b6c78?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Laurence Norman

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 and Michael R. Gordon

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Updated Aug. 9, 2024 2:56 pm ET

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA/Reuters

Iran is pursuing research that has put it in a better position to launch a nuclear-weapons program, according to a new assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies.

The shift in Washington’s view of Iran’s nuclear efforts comes at a critical time, with Iran having produced enough highly enriched nuclear fuel for a few nuclear weapons.

The U.S. intelligence community still believes that Iran isn’t currently working to build a nuclear device, a U.S. official said. Nor does it have evidence that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is considering resuming his country’s nuclear-weapons program, which U.S. intelligence says was largely suspended in 2003.

But a July report to Congress from the director of national intelligence warned that Iran has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”

The report omitted what has been a standard U.S. intelligence assertion for years: that Iran “isn’t currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”

Tensions in the Middle East have sharply escalated since Iran threatened to strike Israel following the assassination of a leading Hamas figure in Tehran that the Iranians have blamed on the Israelis.

President Biden has repeatedly said that the U.S. will never allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, raising the possibility of military action if Washington was to determine that Tehran has embarked on an intensive effort to build a nuclear device. Iran says that its nuclear program is purely for civilian purposes. 

A view of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran’s first commercial nuclear reactor. Photo: Rouzbeh Fouladi/Zuma Press

Republicans have assailed the Biden administration, alleging that it hasn’t done enough to strengthen and enforce economic sanctions. But Biden administration officials say former President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal has enabled Iran to speed up its nuclear activities.

Iran has rebuffed U.S. and European attempts to revive that nuclear deal, but U.S. officials are still in communication with Tehran. 

Driving the change in the new intelligence assessment is scientific and engineering research work that Iran has been doing over the past year, experts say. 

The research Iran is conducting “could shrink the knowledge gap Tehran faces in mastering the ability to build a weapon,” though U.S. intelligence maintains it wouldn’t shorten the time the country needs to make a weapon, the U.S. official said.

In the past, some of this work, which is continuing, might have been considered an indication that Tehran was pursuing the development of nuclear weapons, the U.S. official said. But U.S. intelligence agencies are re-examining their criteria for assessing Iran’s nuclear activities in light of what it is learning about the program.

“Iran doesn’t have an active military nuclear program,” said a spokeswoman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently said it would probably take Iran ‘one or two weeks’ to produce enough weapons-grade enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. Photo: Kevin mohatt/Reuters

U.S. officials provided no details regarding the nature of the work Iran is believed to be doing. However, in recent months there have been concerns among Israeli and U.S. officials about weaponization-related research being conducted by Iran, including computer modeling and metallurgy, according to people briefed on the issue. 

Such work is part of a gray zone between putting in place the components for a nuclear weapon, such as producing highly enriched uranium and uranium metal production, and actually building a device. The Iranian research activities are generally dual-use work, allowing Tehran to claim the work is for civilian purposes.

Iran’s research isn’t the only reason for concern. The U.S. assessment also notes “there has been a notable increase this year in Iranian public statements about nuclear weapons, suggesting the topic is becoming less taboo.” 

Even if Iran weren’t to proceed with the development of a bomb, the intelligence report added, Tehran seeks to exploit international worry over the pace of its program “for negotiation leverage and to respond to perceived international pressure.” 

“Now that Iran has mastered the production of weapons-grade uranium, the next logical step is to resume weaponization activities to shorten the time needed to manufacture a nuclear device once a political decision is made,” said Gary Samore, the director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University and a former White House official during the Obama administration. “Given the need for secrecy, it appears that Iran is proceeding very cautiously, which creates uncertainty and ambiguity about its intentions.”  

After the U.S. withdrew from the Iranian nuclear deal, which lifted most international sanctions on Tehran in exchange for tight but temporary restrictions on its nuclear work, Iran massively expanded its uranium enrichment program.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last month that it would probably take Iran “one or two weeks” to produce enough weapons-grade enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. Experts say Iran already has enough enriched uranium of various grades to be able to fuel multiple nuclear weapons within six months.

It also has an advanced missile program and has resumed work on critical components of building a nuclear warhead, such as producing uranium metal.

“I am prepared to accept the IC judgment that the supreme leader hasn’t already made a decision to weaponize the program,” said Ariel Levite, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment and a former Israeli official, referring to the U.S. intelligence community. 

“But by the same token I am inclined to believe that he has at least not forbidden his scientists from engaging in activity that would allow them to take Iran to the uppermost level of a nuclear threshold,” he said. 

There is overwhelming evidence, including from the International Atomic Energy Agency and from archives seized by Israel in 2018, that Tehran had a comprehensive nuclear-weapons program until 2003. 

That past work included advances in many key areas of producing a warhead. It also included weaponization-relevant research. 

While the U.S. assessed that Iran’s core nuclear weapons work stopped in 2003, the U.N. atomic-agency watchdog has said that Iran continued to do research work relevant to mastering a nuclear weapon after 2003. Some experts and officials believe Iran has continued that work throughout the past two decades in some fashion, edging closer to full mastery of building a bomb.

This research could include, for example, refining knowledge on neutron initiators to jump-start the chain reaction in a nuclear weapon, work on guidance systems for warhead-carrying missiles or on separation of a warhead from a missile, experts say. 

The 2015 nuclear accord allowed international inspections of locations where Iran might be carrying out such nuclear-related work. However, those inspections have stopped as Iran wound back its commitments under the nuclear deal in response to the U.S. decision to leave the agreement in May 2018. 

“The recently observed Iranian weaponization-related work may represent a tip of the iceberg of much more activity,” said Andrea Stricker, a research fellow at the Washington-based think tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “The United States should urgently mobilize the International Atomic Energy Agency for inspections.”

The spokesman for the office of the director of national intelligence said the U.S. intelligence community is well-positioned to detect active work by Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

Some experts have doubts. David Albright, a former weapons inspector who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, said it could take Iran less than six months to develop a crude nuclear device and that Iran has before managed to deceive the U.S. and others about its nuclear capabilities in the past.

“We need a new, honest public discussion on Iran’s nuclear-weapons capabilities and the technical and diplomatic structure Tehran has put in place that would allow it to quickly build nuclear weapons while the U.S. is paralyzed in its attempts to avoid a crisis.”

Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

13. Freed Russian Dissidents Confront New Reality: Fighting Putin From Exile

How can or do we support their resistance efforts?

Freed Russian Dissidents Confront New Reality: Fighting Putin From Exile

Activists are adjusting to life outside of their homeland and learning how to carry on their work from abroad

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/freed-russian-dissidents-confront-new-reality-fighting-putin-from-exile-bbd4d250?mod=latest_headlines

By Matthew LuxmooreFollow

 | Photographs by Andrea Gjestvang for WSJ

Aug. 10, 2024 9:00 am ET

BERLIN—Among the first things Ilya Yashin did after being freed with other Russian dissidents last week was to check into a Berlin hotel and go shopping for a watch and some clothes to replace his prison uniform.

Then he went into campaign mode, harnessing his release to rally his support base. On Wednesday evening, he was greeted by a standing ovation as he stepped onto a stage in a Berlin park and paid tribute to the hundreds of Kremlin critics still in Russia.

“I don’t know how to be a Russian politician abroad. But I’ll learn,” he promised the cheering crowd. “Guys, you can count on me.”

Supporters gather in a Berlin park to hear Yashin speak.

Yashin, 41, was released as part of the largest East-West prisoner swap since the Cold War, an exchange that also freed Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, who was imprisoned in Russia for more than a year on a false accusation of espionage.

For the vast community of Russians who have fled their homeland since President Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the release of Yashin and other jailed opposition politicians was a cause for celebration and hope.

But many of those dissidents—now essentially barred from a country they had desperately fought to change from the inside—consider it a grave injustice. For Yashin, placing himself mentally in Russia is crucial to his mission of learning to be an activist in exile.

“I still haven’t fully accepted that I’m no longer in Russia,” he said in an interview after a packed book-signing event in Berlin for a memoir he finished in prison. “The people around me will prevent me from severing my connection to Russian realities.”

Yashin signs copies of his memoir at an event in the German capital.

More than 700 Kremlin critics still languish in Russian jails. Alexei Navalny, Putin’s main political opponent and a close friend of Yashin’s, died in a prison colony last winter.

Yashin was sentenced to more than eight years in prison in 2022 for a YouTube broadcast in which he accused Russia of perpetrating the massacre of Ukrainian civilians in Bucha. He was charged with spreading false information about Russia’s military campaign.

The risks of speaking out have risen so dramatically that the majority of activists now do so from the relative safety of Europe and the U.S. But most of the dissidents released in this month’s swap had chosen to remain in Russia.

The journalist and politician Vladimir Kara-Murza returned to Russia weeks into Putin’s invasion of Ukraine despite being the target of two poisonings he blames on the Kremlin. Former Navalny aide Ksenia Fadeyeva continued speaking out against Putin as a regional lawmaker in Siberia. Human-rights activist Oleg Orlov was penning antiwar articles from his Moscow base long after Russia introduced laws that made that a criminal offense.

Human-rights activist Oleg Orlov, also in Berlin, had been jailed for criticizing the war in Ukraine.

Inside Russia, all of them struggled daily with a wrenching choice: whether to risk arrest by staying, or risk losing relevance by leaving. Many see opposing the regime from abroad as a doomed endeavor, because it is difficult for activists living in comfort in Europe to convincingly urge supporters inside Russia to risk imprisonment by taking to the streets.

And despite their longing for home, the dissidents’ return to Russia now would likely mean a very long prison sentence with no option of being included in another prisoner swap. It would also undermine the efforts of the governments that lobbied for their release, first and foremost Germany, which has come under criticism for releasing the convicted assassin Vadim Krasikov as part of the deal. 

The Russian opposition abroad is riven by infighting over how best to weaken Putin, whose government has begun blocking YouTube in its latest push to drown out opposing voices.

“Directly influencing whatever happens inside Russia is impossible when you’re dealing with a highly repressive authoritarian regime,” said Yekaterina Schulmann, a Russian political scientist now also based abroad. “There are different kinds of autocracies, but the kind we have in Russia these days does not allow even a semblance of political competition.”

To Yashin and other freed activists, Putin has robbed them of some of the symbolic power they wielded by exiling them. Behind bars, they were prisoners of conscience who were risking their lives to protest his authoritarianism and war in Ukraine. Every word they spoke in recorded court hearings or wrote in letters to supporters carried a weight they don’t have when uttered from exile.

Banishing opponents is an age-old Kremlin tactic that has stumped generations of dissidents. The Bolsheviks set up in Switzerland, Paris and London before returning to the collapsing Russian Empire to seize power. Soviet dissidents such as writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn came home after the U.S.S.R. collapsed.

Kara-Murza invoked the example of those Soviet forerunners during an emotional press conference less than 24 hours after the freed dissidents arrived in Germany. Sitting beside him, Yashin denounced his inclusion in the prisoner swap, holding up a written appeal against his expulsion that he says he handed to Russian officials.

“I say this sincerely: More than anything I want now to go back home,” Yashin said, fighting back tears.

On the flight from Moscow to Turkey, where the Russian dissidents were transferred to another plane that took them to Germany, there was a sense of collective tragedy, said Andrei Pivovarov, an activist who had one month left to serve of a four-year sentence he received for working for a banned political organization in 2021.

Some of the Russians cried or just sat in stunned silence. Others jokingly asked agents of Russia’s Federal Security Service who accompanied them whether there was space on the flight back to Russia, Pivovarov said. Referring to Gershkovich and the other freed Americans, he said: “They were going home. We were leaving our home.”

In the week following their release, the dissidents went different ways. Pivovarov settled into a hotel in Bonn, Germany, where his wife joined him; Kara-Murza flew to the U.S.; and Ksenia Fadeyeva and Liliya Chanysheva joined other former Navalny aides in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius. Chanysheva said she wants to improve her health so she can start a family with her husband, who remains in Russia. All of the activists said they plan to continue their political work.

The conflicting emotions about exile affect even Kara-Murza, whose health was rapidly deteriorating in prison due to the effects of the two poisonings, in 2015 and 2017. The U.S. resident is now with his family at his Virginia home, where he brought the books and notepads he had with him in his Siberian jail, including a Spanish-language course book he studied every day.

“I still feel like I’m watching a film. A good film, admittedly,” he said. “Every morning in prison I’d wake up with the thought that I’ll die in Putin’s prison.”

Andrei Pivovarov, pictured in a Russian court in 2021, was traded one month before the end of his sentence. Photo: Associated Press

The freed activists know they aren’t entirely safe—even abroad. Former Navalny aide Leonid Volkov was attacked by unidentified assailants in Vilnius in March. Russian pilot Maksim Kuzminov was gunned down in Spain in February after defecting to Ukraine.

After the prisoner swap, Russian officials and state propaganda denounced the exchanged dissidents as traitors who should watch their backs wherever they go. Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s security council, said the activists should “burn in hell” and “never forget about the frailty of their existence in this world.”

Yashin has taken all of that in stride. He has reactivated his social-media accounts and YouTube channel to resume denouncing the Russian government and its war in Ukraine.

He has also been seeking advice from friends and supporters about how he might continue his work abroad, taking inspiration from previous dissidents whose memoirs he read in prison. He said he plans to travel across Germany to speak with Russian diaspora communities and gauge their hopes and needs​.

Yashin addresses the crowd in Berlin. He plans to pause his campaigning while adapting to his new life.

The flurry of public events will end on Monday, Yashin said, when he will take a break from political activism to focus on putting down roots in Germany’s capital. There’ll be an apartment to rent, a subway pass to buy and documents to arrange. He’ll have to adapt not only to life abroad, but also to life as a free man.

“I got used to jail,” he said. “I can get used to exile.”

Bojan Pancevski contributed to this article.

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com

14. America’s Anti-Terror Exit From Niger

America’s Anti-Terror Exit From Niger

Iran and Russia fill the vacuum after a U.S. troop withdrawal.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/u-s-troops-leave-niger-biden-administration-sahel-russia-iran-5addf27d?mod=latest_headlines

By The Editorial Board

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Aug. 9, 2024 5:33 pm ET

U,S. Air Force plane takes off from their base In Agadez, Niger, Aug 5. Photo: Omar Hama/Associated Press

The U.S. finished its withdrawal from its last military base in Niger this week, and bad actors are already filling the vacuum. The consequences will extend far beyond Africa’s troubled Sahel region.

The Pentagon said Monday it had completed pulling out troops and equipment from Air Base 201 in the central Nigerien city of Agadez. Before last summer’s coup in Niger, the U.S. maintained about a thousand American troops in the country as a base against the growing jihadist presence in Africa. But in March the ruling junta canceled the status of forces agreement that protected U.S. soldiers from legal risks in Niger, and two months later the U.S. agreed to a full withdrawal by mid-September.

The U.S. had invested some $110 million in Air Base 201. The Sahel has become a global center of terrorism, and the U.S. drone base conducted intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance missions. Niger’s ruling junta has also expelled some 1,500 French troops.

The U.S. withdrawal is also creating opportunities for Iran. Senior Nigerien officials have led repeated delegations to Tehran in the past year. The U.S. has raised concerns about Iran gaining access to Niger’s abundant uranium reserves. Several recent reports in the French press have suggested Iran may seek 300 tons of refined uranium in exchange for missiles and drones.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense has praised “the growth of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation” with Niger. The Kremlin has been working to expand its influence across Africa and has close ties to neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali. Russian state-owned media reported that military equipment and instructors arrived in Niger in April, and in May incoming Russian personnel and departing American troops overlapped at a Niamey air base.

The U.S. can’t stay where it isn’t wanted, and perhaps the Biden Administration couldn’t do much to stop the Niger government’s anti-Western moves. But the withdrawal is one more sign of America’s weakening global influence.

WSJ Opinion: The Replicator Drone Initiative and the Department of Defense

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10:30

Replicator’s goals of drone deployment and business development process change are both worthy objectives. But given the Pentagon's antiquated culture, is two years enough time to procure more hard power faster? Photo: Dept. of Defense

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 10, 2024, print edition as 'America’s Anti-Terror Exit From Niger'.

15. 'Don't Whine': Coming Of Age At A 'Patriotic' Summer Camp In Ukraine's Heartland

'Don't Whine': Coming Of Age At A 'Patriotic' Summer Camp In Ukraine's Heartland

rferl.org · by Aleksander Palikot · July 21, 2024

KHOLODNIY YAR, Ukraine -- Big round glasses magnifying his eyes, “Rocket” stood ramrod-straight along with about 40 other children aged 10 to 13, all dressed in black clothes and identical black baseball caps.

After an instructor inspected the tidiness of their attire, the children put their hands on their hearts and recited what’s known as the Prayer Of A Ukrainian Nationalist.

“Burn all the weakness in my heart with the life-giving fire. May I know no fear or hesitation,” they intoned -- part of an oath written in 1936 by nationalist leader Osyp Mashchak that is now popular among some of the Ukrainian military units fighting against the Russian invasion.

Children declaim the Prayer Of The Ukrainian Nationalist, a patriotic oath that is now popular among some military units in Ukraine.

These assemblies, morning and evening, set the tone for a 10-day “patriotic-nationalistic” youth camp in Kholodniy Yar, an ancient forest fabled among nationalists in Ukraine: Partisans supporting the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic held out here against both Bolsheviks and Whites in the Ukrainian War of Independence just over a century ago.

The Russian invasion has bolstered Ukrainian unity and strengthened the sense of national identity. Amid the onslaught, various forms of military training are becoming part of everyday life for millions of people -- children not excluded.

As many as 73 percent of Ukrainians believe that “military-patriotic education” is advisable in schools, with 16 percent opposed, according to a study on the militarization of society conducted by the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center in May 2024 and supported by USAID.

This shift in popular opinion was expressed by Ukraine’s first lady, Olena Zelenska, who said in Davos in January 2023: "What [the Russians] have achieved is that all our children will be nationalists."

'Responsible Citizens'

The program of the Call Of The Ravine camp -- "yar" means ravine -- includes sports, lectures on Ukrainian history and nationalist ideology, and activities such as assembling AK-47 rifles, first aid training, and a mine safety workshop.

"Rocket" and a friend attend a workshop on mine safety.

“We don’t want our kids to fight. We’d like them not to have to,” Illya Maryan, the head of the camp, told RFE/RL. “But we want to raise responsible citizens capable of organizing and defending themselves.”

Most of the children at the camp cannot remember a Ukraine fully at peace. They were toddlers when Russia seized Crimea and fomented war in the Donbas region in 2014, and they were around 10 years old when Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.

Children at the camp in Kholodniy Yar learn to assemble AK-47 rifles as well as other military-type skills.

“Rocket,” 13, whose real name is Heorhiy, was attending the camp for the third time. He said he received his nickname -- all campers use them, like Kholodniy Yar partisans had in the past -- when friends threw him into a lake in 2021 and he “flew high in the air like a rocket.”

That summer, he met Pavlo Nakonechniy, an activist and historian who initiated the camp in 2020 and died fighting against the Russian invasion in June 2022 at the age of 25. He left the organization in the hands of close friends, young people mostly from nearby Cherkasy, a sleepy and until recently largely Russian-speaking city on the Dnieper River in central Ukraine.

Children take a 30-kilometer hike in Kholodniy Yar, a picturesque region where pro-independence Ukrainian partisans held out over a century ago.

“I found my place here,” Heorhiy said during a daylong hike in the forest and surrounding hills. His parents recently divorced, and he and his mother moved to a village in another region to live with his stepfather.

He considers himself a nationalist: “It means being faithful to the nation and following its ideas,” he said.

Maryan, who at 23 was the oldest person at the camp, said that while the word “nationalism” might have carried negative connotations for some in Ukraine in the past, it now poses no barrier for parents sending their children there, even if they themselves steer clear of politics and ideology.

Ukraine’s nationalist tradition has been a divisive issue inside and outside the country, with some voicing criticism of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its military arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought alongside and against Nazi Germany at different times during the Second World War and is accused of carrying out murderous campaigns against Poles and Jews.

After a session of kayaking, campers and instructors jump up and down chanting “Together to the end” during a summer rain.

As the campers climbed a hill where legend has it that 17th-century Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytskiy is buried, Maryan said that his group acknowledges “dark episodes” in the history of Ukrainian nationalism but focuses on its “positive aspects,” “modernizes it,” and “does not preach aggression but readies for self-defense.

“Above all, we are teaching the children the value of discipline, brotherhood, and patriotism,” he said.

Separated By War

For “Oak,” an 11-year-old whose real name is also Heorhiy, the 30-kilometer hike ended with a bloody nose. He carried a military backpack with first-aid and survival kits, a gift from an older friend who is a soldier, like Heorhiy’s father and grandfather.

“The nosebleed is not a big deal,” he said, as instructors helped him.

Children at the camp are required to perform basic duties in their tent town.

Roughly half of the campers have close relatives in the military, and almost all of them have soldiers among broader family or social circles.

“Rocky,” 13, whose real name is Solomia, speaks to her father on the front line every four days and texts him daily. She said she was proud of him and came to the camp following his advice.

She enjoyed patriotic rituals, songs, and poems that are ever-present at the camp, she said, because to her they are “an act of respect toward our heroes.”

Nazar, or “Keba,” 12, hasn’t seen his father, who joined the army shortly after Russia launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022, in over six months. They talk every week, but Nazar, who wore military pants and a piece of paper rolled up like a cigarette in his mouth, said he misses his father a lot.

Unlike most of the children, Nazar did not always follow orders from the camp organizers, who leave little room for disobedience or unpunctuality. When he insisted on filling his water bottle despite a request to hurry up, the whole group had to crouch in a plank position while waiting for him. Organizers call it “collective responsibility.”

Separation from parents and fear for their lives can paralyze a child’s development, Volodymyr Voloshyn, the head of the Institute of Psychology of Health, which holds rehabilitation sessions for children of military personnel, told RFE/RL.

“They desperately need social interaction and acceptance, but each individual case requires an individual approach,” Voloshyn said.

The organizers of the camp, most of them high school and university students who themselves participated in Call Of The Ravine camp in their teens, spent an hour every night discussing problems faced by participants and generally addressing their concerns.

According to Kateryna Doroshenko, one of the instructors, for children used to anxious air raids and solitary online schooling, the camp is “a safe haven.”

Maksym, 12, saw the explosion when a Russian missile struck the center of his native city of Vinnytsia in July 2022, killing 20 people. He said his aunt was buried in a mass grave in Mariupol, the Azov Sea port city that Russia occupied after a deadly siege in the spring of 2022.

Children at the Call Of The Ravine camp line up to get their portion of cutlets, potatoes, zucchini, and cucumbers.

He said he collected money to pay his way to the camp, calling Kholodniy Yar a place where “I do what I want.”

Many Ukrainian children experience loss, dislocation, or violence, which results in feelings of isolation, misunderstanding, and powerlessness, Inna Knyazyeva, a psychotherapist at the charitable foundation Voices Of Children, told RFE/RL.

Knyazyeva, who also co-organizes therapeutic camps for children, said that anxious parents often become overprotective in wartime, so children may enjoy clear rules and powerful authority as well as physical activities and adventures.

'In The Trenches'

Children at the camp get all of this in abundance. They wake up around 6 a.m., do morning exercises, and stand in long lines for simple country meals. They are allowed to use their mobile phones for one hour in the evening -- something that 10-year-old Matviy, “Seal,” decried as a “0-out-of-10 experience.”

Discipline is an important part of the camp. Disobedience or unpunctuality is punished with mild physical exercise.

Campers are required to keep discipline and perform basic duties such as washing dishes and cleaning toilets, which have banners reading “Russian restaurant” hung above the pit.

Everybody at the camp must speak in Ukrainian; Russian is allowed only for phone calls with parents.

Illya Maryan, the head of the Call Of The Ravine camp, wears a T-shirt bearing its slogan, “Don’t Whine!”

The camp’s slogan, coined by its founder, Nakonechniy, is: “Don't whine!”

Yuriy Yuzych, the ex-head of the board of Plast, the largest scouting organization in Ukraine and an acquaintance of the late Nakonechniy, described the Call Of The Ravine camp as an "exemplary initiative" that should be replicated “on the state level.”

“The demand for military-patriotic education is huge because every day we see Russians killing us and our children,” he said in the wake of the Russian missile strike on Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt children's hospital. He said that many of his former charges have been killed fighting the invasion.

This summer, some 150 children, aged 10-17, will attend several sessions in Kholodniy Yar, Roman Nadtochiy, 35, the organization’s co-founder who is now serving in the army, told RFE/RL. The organizers dream of transforming the place into an all-year educational center.

Several times during the 10-day camp, a so-called “alarm” was conducted at night. On the third night, after campers chose their nicknames, they were woken up at 2 a.m. to swear an oath vowing to always act in a brave and dignified way, like organizers said Kholodniy Yar’s partisans did.

Participants at the Call Of The Ravine youth camp at a nighttime ritual in which they acquire new nicknames.

As the children knelt, surrounded by torches and mystical music coming from loudspeakers, Maryan, an actor by training, put a replica of a Cossack sword on their shoulders.

Artem, or “Dragon,” 11, said that for him it was “the best part of the camp.” He said he wanted to be a soldier like his grandfather Serhiy, who joined the army at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, at the age of 58 and used “Dragon” as his call sign. Serhiy, who was sent home after suffering two heart attacks, supports Artem and his single mother with the money he receives as a disabled person.

“I think he had to go through something similar in the trenches,” Artem said of his grandfather.

rferl.org · by Aleksander Palikot · July 21, 2024

16. Unlocking Victory: The Vital Role of Data Superiority on the Battlefield of the Future  

Excerpts:

Conclusion: The Future of Data Superiority

As technology continues to advance, the future of data superiority in military operations looks promising. Emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, have the potential to revolutionize data processing capabilities, enabling faster and more complex analyses. The integration of autonomous systems in data collection and analysis will further enhance military capabilities.

To maintain data superiority, military forces must continuously adapt their strategies, invest in training, and embrace new technologies. As conflicts grow more complex and technology-driven, the ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate data effectively will determine the success of military operations. Data superiority is becoming an essential part of modern military operations. By overcoming challenges and leveraging advanced technologies, military forces can achieve data superiority and secure a decisive advantage on the battlefield of the future.

Unlocking Victory: The Vital Role of Data Superiority on the Battlefield of the Future        

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/unlocking-victory-the-vital-role-of-data-superiority-on-the-battlefield-of-the-future?

In an era where data is power, the concept of data superiority has emerged as a critical factor in determining military success. As modern warfare evolves, the ability of military forces to collect, analyze, and disseminate data more effectively than their adversaries is becoming increasingly vital. This article explores the significance of data superiority in military operations, the technological advancements that enable it, and the challenges that must be overcome to achieve it. This article explores the idea of data superiority and explores if the idea holds intrinsic value for the warfighter.

Why Data Superiority Not Information Superiority?

Data superiority refers to the strategic advantage gained through superior data management. Unlike traditional notions of battlefield superiority, which focused primarily on physical dominance, data superiority emphasizes the importance of intelligence in modern conflicts. Historically, the use of data in military operations has evolved from simple reconnaissance to sophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques, reflecting the changing nature of warfare. Data is different from information, where data is raw information processed. Fundamentally, data is required for information to be derived from it, and as a precursor, it stands to reason that whomever controls data controls the battlefield of the future.

The term data superiority is increasingly recognized as a more effective descriptor than information superiority in the context of contemporary military operations. This distinction emphasizes the critical role of raw data collection and management, highlighting that superior data access is essential for informed decision-making. In an era dominated by technological advancements, data superiority aligns closely with innovations in data analytics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, which are pivotal for processing vast amounts of information.

Data superiority suggests a proactive approach focused on obtaining, analyzing, and utilizing data for advantage. This term provides clarity and precision, delineating the specific importance of data management in military strategy. Furthermore, it underscores the shift towards data-driven decision-making, reflecting the growing recognition that superior data capabilities are vital for operational effectiveness.

Data Superiority: The Military Advantages

The advantages of data superiority are significant. Data provides numerous advantages to a military commander over an adversary, significantly enhancing decision-making and operational effectiveness. One of the primary benefits is enhanced situational awareness. With access to real-time data about troop movements, enemy positions, and environmental conditions, commanders can maintain a comprehensive understanding of the battlefield. This level of awareness enables informed decision-making and timely responses to changing situations, which is crucial in dynamic combat environments.

Informed decision-making is another critical advantage that data offers. Access to accurate and timely data empowers commanders to make better strategic and tactical choices. By analyzing data, they can identify trends, assess risks, and evaluate potential outcomes, leading to more effective planning and execution of operations. This analytical capability is essential for adapting to the complexities of modern warfare.

Data also provides predictive capabilities, allowing commanders to forecast enemy actions and movements. By analyzing historical data alongside current intelligence, commanders can anticipate adversary strategies, enabling them to counteract effectively and seize the initiative. This foresight can be a game-changer in military engagements, allowing forces to stay one step ahead of their opponents.

Operational efficiency is significantly enhanced through data-driven insights. Commanders can streamline logistics, resource allocation, and troop deployment, optimizing supply chains and managing personnel effectively. This ensures that resources are allocated where they are most needed, enhancing overall operational efficiency and effectiveness. By integrating intelligence from various sources, commanders can identify high-value targets and execute operations with minimal collateral damage. This capability increases the effectiveness of strikes while reducing unintended consequences, which is vital in maintaining public support and minimizing civilian casualties.

Real-time communication and coordination are also facilitated by data. Commanders can share critical data quickly among units, enhancing collaboration and ensuring that all forces are aligned. This cohesive response to evolving situations is essential for operational success. With access to real-time data, commanders gain adaptability and flexibility in their strategies and tactics. This flexibility allows them to respond to unexpected developments, exploit opportunities, and mitigate threats as they arise, which is crucial in the fast-paced nature of modern combat.

Data superiority can have a psychological impact on adversaries. Knowing that a commander has superior intelligence and situational awareness can deter enemy actions and influence their decision-making processes. This psychological advantage can be as crucial as physical capabilities in determining the outcome of military engagements.

Lessons in Data Superiority from the Ukraine Conflict

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine illustrates the significance of data superiority in contemporary warfare. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have utilized advanced technologies to gather intelligence and conduct operations. The use of commercial satellite imagery and social media analytics has provided real-time insights into troop movements and battlefield dynamics. Ukraine's ability to leverage data from various sources has enabled it to counter Russian advances effectively, demonstrating that data superiority can empower smaller forces to challenge larger adversaries.

Ukraine reveals several key lessons about data superiority. First, the integration of diverse data sources is essential for comprehensive situational awareness. Military forces must invest in technologies that facilitate the collection and analysis of data from multiple platforms. Second, the speed of data processing and dissemination is critical; the ability to turn raw data into actionable intelligence can determine the outcome of engagements. Finally, training personnel to interpret and utilize data effectively is paramount. As warfare becomes increasingly data-driven, military forces must prioritize developing the skills necessary to harness data superiority for strategic advantage.

Conclusion: The Future of Data Superiority

As technology continues to advance, the future of data superiority in military operations looks promising. Emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, have the potential to revolutionize data processing capabilities, enabling faster and more complex analyses. The integration of autonomous systems in data collection and analysis will further enhance military capabilities.

To maintain data superiority, military forces must continuously adapt their strategies, invest in training, and embrace new technologies. As conflicts grow more complex and technology-driven, the ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate data effectively will determine the success of military operations. Data superiority is becoming an essential part of modern military operations. By overcoming challenges and leveraging advanced technologies, military forces can achieve data superiority and secure a decisive advantage on the battlefield of the future.

17. US Warns of 'Gray Zone' Conflict With China, Russia, North Korea

​As much as I do not really like "gray zone" I am glad to see north Korea included in the list (though the headline should have included Iran as well).

I think Matt Armstrong best explains the relationship between political warfare and the gray zone.

"Political warfare includes all measures short of war... for hostile intent through discrete, subversive, or overt means short of open combat... Whereas gray zone tells us where along a spectrum between war and peace activities take place, political warfare tells us why."

⁃      Matt Armstrong

US Warns of 'Gray Zone' Conflict With China, Russia, North Korea

Newsweek · by Hugh Cameron · August 7, 2024

ByLive News Reporter

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The U.S. intelligence community believes America will have to contend with increasingly frequent "gray zone" attacks by its geopolitical rivals, who are willing to employ "diverse and damaging" means to undermine the country on the world stage.

A July 31 report, published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), outlined the nature of the new threat facing the U.S., which it said "will create both concrete and intangible threats to the United States and its partners, U.S. commitments, and the international order."

"Through 2030, great power competition and international relations generally will increasingly feature an array of hostile 'gray zone' activities," the report read. "As China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia seek to challenge the United States and gain advantage over other countries through deliberate campaigns, while also trying to avoid direct war."

In the attached lexicon, the ODNI defined the "gray zone" as the realm of interstate competition which falls between peaceful interstate relations and armed conflict.

The activities which take place in this zone include, among others, cyber-attacks, acts of "economic coercion" and informational campaigns to "sow division, undermine democratic processes and institutions, or steer policy decisions in favor of the foreign actor's objectives."

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping attend an official welcoming ceremony in front of the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on May 16, 2024. A recent report... Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping attend an official welcoming ceremony in front of the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on May 16, 2024. A recent report released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence warned that international relations will contend with an increase in "gray zone" activities by states such as China, Iran, Russia and North Korea. , "as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia seek to challenge the United States and gain advantage over other countries." Sergei Bobylov/AFP via Getty Images

Matthew Savill, the director of Military Sciences at the Royal United Services Institute and a former civil servant within the U.K. Ministry of Defense, spoke to Newsweek about the concept of a geopolitical "gray zone," and the activities which fall under this umbrella.

While Savill said that many of these activities were arguably as much a feature of the Cold War as 21st Century statecraft, he acknowledged that recent developments have made them a larger concern for states.

"Developments in cyber capabilities and globalization have provided more points of vulnerability and therefore opportunities for such acts," Savill said, before adding that "examples abound" of recent gray zone activities by the four states the ODNI identified.

"Russian attempts—via covert means or proxies like the Internet Research Agency—to amplify existing political division in the West fit the bill because of their subversive intent," Savill said.

The Internet Research Agency was a Russian organization engaged in covert, online influence operations, which former Facebook Chief Security Officer Alex Stamos accused of using "complex networks of inauthentic accounts to deceive and manipulate people who use Facebook, including before, during and after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections."

Savill also listed "notionally non-military" activities by China in the Indo Pacific as examples of gray zone actions, such as using its coastguard to threaten and pressure countries such as the Philippines into accepting its maritime claims in the South China Sea.

This photo taken on March 5, 2024 shows China Coast Guard vessels deploying water cannons at the Philippine military chartered Unaizah May 4 in the disputed South China Sea. One expert told Newsweek that these... This photo taken on March 5, 2024 shows China Coast Guard vessels deploying water cannons at the Philippine military chartered Unaizah May 4 in the disputed South China Sea. One expert told Newsweek that these sorts of actions were an example of "gray zone activities" by Beijing, which will "put pressure on other countries in the Indo-Pacific to accept its maritime claims." Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via Getty Images

North Korea, meanwhile, has made notable use of cybercrime in recent years, both to prop up its own economy and as an offensive tool against foreign states and individuals.

Savill referred to a May report by United Nations Security Council sanctions monitors, which revealed that Pyongyang had engaged in 97 cyberattacks between 2017 and 2024, the total damage of which was valued at around $3.6 billion.

This included an attack in which $147.5 million was stolen from the HTX cryptocurrency exchange before being laundered in March.

The ODNI said that these sorts of campaigns "are likely to increase and diversify because of more enabling technologies, the erosion or absence of accompanying norms, challenges with attribution, and perceptions of their advantages."

However, it also warned that they will also become a more multilateral phenomenon, as "a convergence of worldviews and deepening ties among US geopolitical opponents are creating a foundation for more direct collaboration."

Do you have a story we should be covering? Do you have any questions about this article? Contact LiveNews@newsweek.com.

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About the writer

Hugh Cameron

Hugh Cameron is Newsweek Live News Reporter based in London, U.K. His focus is reporting on international politics, conflict, and crime. Hugh joined Newsweek in 2024, having worked at Alliance News Ltd where he specialised in covering global and regional business developments, economic news, and market trends. He graduated from the University of Warwick with a bachelor's degree in politics in 2022, and from the University of Cambridge with a master's degree in international relations in 2023. Languages: English.

You can get in touch with Hugh by emailing h.cameron@newsweek.com

Hugh Cameron is Newsweek Live News Reporter based in London, U.K. His focus is reporting on international politics, conflict, and ...

To read how Newsweek uses AI as a newsroom tool, Click here.

Newsweek · by Hugh Cameron · August 7, 2024

18. Ukraine’s Invasion of Russia Could Bring a Quicker End to the War

​Wishful thinking I fear. But I wish this assessment would be correct.

​I had the same thought about negotiations. Can or will this provide Ukraine leverage?

Or will this cause Putin to escalate?

Ukraine’s Invasion of Russia Could Bring a Quicker End to the War

One aim of the surprise breakthrough may be for Kyiv to gain leverage in negotiations.

By Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Foreign Policy · by Andreas Umland

August 9, 2024, 11:21 AM

Russia’s War in Ukraine

Understanding the conflict two years on.

More on this topic

In the space of four days, the Russia-Ukraine war has dramatically shifted. The incursion of Ukrainian forces into Russia’s Kursk region has quickly turned into the largest territorial gain by either side since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson in the fall of 2022. As of this writing, it is still unclear whether thinned-out and poorly prepared Russian forces have been able to halt the Ukrainian advance, with reports of burning columns of Russian reinforcements reminiscent of the early days of the war.

The operation demonstrates Ukraine’s ability to achieve surprise and exploit sudden breakthroughs, something at which Russia has consistently failed since the start of its invasion. It is also the first time Russia has been invaded by foreign troops since World War II, showing Russians in no uncertain terms that the bloody war they unleashed against their neighbor has come home. Ukraine’s Western supporters seem to be on board, with the White House and European Union headquarters issuing statements that it was up to Ukraine to decide on the operation.

Previously, there had been much debate in Washington, Berlin, and among a wildly speculating media about the Kremlin’s supposed red lines that would set off World War III and nuclear Armageddon, with one of the lines being taking the war to Russia with Western weapons. The latter has now occurred. The belief in uncontrolled escalation led the Biden administration and some of its partners to severely restrict both the types of weapons delivered to Ukraine and their permitted range; Ukraine has not been allowed to use Western missiles to hit military installations on the Russian side of the border, for example. Part of the effect and purpose of the Kursk operation could be to demonstrate, once again, the fallacy of the red-line argument.

As the offensive unfolds and Kyiv stays mostly mum on events, it’s still too early to say what strategic goals Ukraine is hoping to achieve. One speculation that has gained a lot of traction is that it could lead to a quicker end to the war. The operation makes it clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine retains significant potential to inflict pain on Russia. And if Ukrainian forces can hold on and maintain control of Russian territory—for which they appear to be digging in as they bring in more equipment and build new defensive lines—it could strengthen Ukraine’s leverage in any potential negotiations to end the war. Already, Ukraine’s lightning foray into Russia undermines the widespread idea that Putin holds all the cards to dictate the terms of a cease-fire.

Kyiv seems to be signaling that leverage in negotiations is one of the goals of the offensive. An unnamed advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told the Washington Post: “This will give them the leverage they need for negotiations with Russia—this is what it’s all about.” This dovetails with recent hints by Zelensky that Kyiv was ready to negotiate. In an interview with BBC News in July, he said, “We don’t have to recapture all the territories” by military means. “I think that can also be achieved with the help of diplomacy.” Occupied Russia could be traded for occupied Ukraine: As former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt suggested on X, “Would an idea be for both states to retreat to within their respective recognized border?”

If Kyiv seems to be preparing the ground for potential negotiations—by seeking to strengthen its hand and publicly declaring its willingness—it is also a response to several factors.

One is growing war weariness among the Ukrainian population. Although the majority of Ukrainians favor fighting on until all the territories Russia has occupied since 2014 are liberated, the number saying that Ukraine could trade some of that territory for peace has been rising.

Second, there has been growing criticism, particularly in Western Europe and the global south, of the way Ukraine has repeatedly ruled out talks with Moscow. Major substantive issues aside, with the Kremlin apparently back-channeling openness to talks, Kyiv risked being seen as intransigent in preventing an early end to the war.

Finally, Ukraine’s strategic position is risky, even if it holds back Russia and maintains the flow of Western weapons. A victory by Donald Trump in the November U.S. presidential election and a sudden stop of U.S. aid cannot be ruled out, and even a Harris administration may have trouble cobbling together future support packages if the Republicans keep their majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. Zelensky may have decided to gamble to change and accelerate the dynamics of the war, including greater leverage if negotiations end up taking place sooner than anticipated.

Without much leverage, Kyiv has had to appeal to moral, normative, and legal arguments when communicating with its foreign partners about any peace short of full liberation. In the past, this has led to highly skewed negotiations. In the talks that produced the Minsk I and II accords in 2014 and 2015, Ukraine had such a weak hand that it had to agree to impossible terms: It could only get the Russian-controlled Donbas back if it allowed Moscow’s proxies to become part of the Ukrainian polity through local elections manipulated by the Kremlin, which would have given Moscow a permanent veto over Kyiv’s politics. Previously occupied and annexed Crimea was not even included in the discussion.

In March 2022, direct talks between Ukraine and Russia on the Belarusian border were not a negotiation but Russia’s delivery of surrender terms to Ukraine. In April 2022, negotiations brokered by Turkey in Istanbul also went nowhere: Russia’s price for ending its invasion was a considerable limitation of Ukrainian sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Since then, Russia’s proposal has been for Ukraine to permanently cede, in addition to Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts—including substantial parts that Russia has never occupied.

Not only has Ukraine lacked negotiation leverage, but Russia has also been successful in promoting, to audiences around the world, its land-for-peace approach to ending this round of the war. As Ukrainian counteroffensives after 2022 largely failed and the Russian war machine slowly but steadily took more territory in Ukraine’s east, another Minsk-type deal limiting Ukrainian territorial integrity and political sovereignty seemed to loom on the horizon.

Kyiv has not only changed the military narrative on the ground but may also be trying to change the narrative on negotiations—from a “land for peace” deal to a “land for land” deal. This puts Putin in a bind: Loss of control over parts of Russia proper is an enormous embarrassment for the Kremlin. But since their illegal annexation by Russia, the Ukrainian territories Putin seeks to keep are also part of the state territory he is obliged to defend. That said, in terms of Russian elite and popular perception, the restoration of Russia’s legitimate state territory will take precedence over continued occupation of recently conquered domains—especially if a land swap opens an avenue to the end of Western sanctions.

In a way, the new Ukrainian strategy may provide an opening for doves in the Russian leadership—assuming they exist and have any influence over Putin—to argue that the annexations should be reversed in order to restore Russia’s territorial integrity. As long as Ukraine can hold on to its captured territories in Russia, there will a strong pressure on Putin to return them under Moscow’s control.

None of this, however, changes the most fundamental problem with a negotiated outcome: the fact that Russia has ignored just about every agreement it has signed with Ukraine. But for Ukrainians and their Western supporters hoping for an end to the war, some intriguing possibilities may soon be on the table.

Foreign Policy · by Andreas Umland

19. How the Red Cross failed Ukraine.

I think it is rare to see this level of criticism of the Red Cross.

How the Red Cross failed Ukraine.

The international organization is meant to be a beacon for international law around the globe. But it has fallen short, standing by without fulfilling its basic duties, in the Ukraine-Russia war.

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/how-the-red-cross-failed-ukraine?utm

Mariana Lastovyria and Tim Mak

Aug 10, 2024

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When Ukrainians were beaten to death in Russian prisoner of war camps, the Red Cross was nowhere to be seen.  

The organization left Mariupol early in the full-blown war when more than 300,000 civIlians were surrounded by occupation troops, leaving them to their fates. 

And it failed to do enough as evidence has piled up that Russia has violated international humanitarian law — time and time again. That’s despite the ICRC’s role being to enforce the so-called “rules of war”, protecting humanitarian rights.

Their near-silence has given the green light for more war crimes, claim freed prisoners of war and the families of existing POWs who told their stories to The Counteroffensive.

“The Red Cross would rather let people die, as long as it maintains its reputation” for neutrality, said Ukrainian Marine Illia Iliashenko, who was released in March 2023 from Russian captivity.

Ukrainian marine Illia Iliashenko. Photo was taken from Illia’s Instagram.

The failures of the Red Cross to adequately track Ukrainian prisoners of war; facilitate communications between POWs and their families; ensure that prisoners are not being tortured; or otherwise monitor and publicize violations of international law suggest that existing institutions are not sufficient for modern warfare. 

The war in Ukraine has shown that the Red Cross is not in a position to protect civilians or prisoners when a country refuses to abide by international law – which puts the very purpose of its existence into question.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. (Photo by Fabrice COFFRINI / AFP) (Photo by FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP via Getty Images)

The Red Cross is a primary global watchdog on compliance with international humanitarian law. Responding to criticisms that it doesn’t speak out enough, the ICRC claims to be focused on “confidential dialogue.”

“We talk about existing problems, just not with other people and not in the public space, but directly with the parties to the conflict,” the organization has said. 

However, more than two years after Russia's full-scale invasion, the ICRC has shown little effectiveness in carrying out its mandate.

The Russians have tortured 95 percent of the Ukrainian POWs in their prisons, according to a UN official. At least 61 prisoners of war have been executed.

And still, the Red Cross has not publicly condemned Russia.

Illia, known by his call sign ‘Smurf,’ experienced this firsthand. He defended his hometown of Mariupol from the first day of the full-scale invasion.

A view shows the city of Mariupol and the Azovstal steel plant on May 10, 2022. (Photo by STRINGER/AFP via Getty Images)

Along with more than 1,900 other soldiers, he surrendered at Azovstal in the spring of 2022 when the plant was surrounded. Medicine, food, and water had nearly run out. They believed that their capture would not last long – they just needed to hold out for a few months.

One factor influencing their choice to surrender was the Ukrainian government’s belief that international organizations could be trusted to ensure Russia’s commitments to treat prisoners humanely.  

“The key condition for the chosen format was the Russian side's commitments to international organizations to preserve the lives and health of Ukrainian defenders,” read a joint statement by Ukrainian government agencies in June 2022.

However, the ICRC not only failed to protect Illia and his fellow soldiers from relentless torture, but it also neglected one of its most basic responsibilities: registering them as prisoners of war. When a prisoner is taken in war, the ICRC takes down their details on a ‘POW card’, making a record of who they are. 

The Red Cross arrived in Azovstal on May 17, 2022, although the Ukrainian military had begun to surrender the day before. 

The ICRC blamed the timing for missing some of the POWs, claiming it could not observe the departure of all Ukrainian soldiers from the Azostal, since one or two buses with prisoners had already been taken away by the Russians before they arrived.

Smurf was one of the last to leave Azovstal, but for some unknown reason he met the same fate. As he boarded the bus after leaving the plant, Illia filled out his information and his family's contact details on a ‘POW card’, so that they could be notified of his capture. 

The ICRC never informed Illia's mother that Russia had captured her son. 

For almost a year, the Red Cross considered Smurf missing in action. After he was released, he tried to find out what happened. 

Mariupol during Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Andrey BORODULIN / AFP via Getty Images)

“A representative of the Red Cross assured me that I had made a mistake somewhere and that they could not find my relatives. Then they convinced me that I had filled out a regular information card, not a POW card. It seemed to me that in half an hour they were going to tell me that I filled out an employment form,” Illia recounted his conversation with the ICRC in Geneva a year after he was released.   

The ICRC refused to comment on any individual cases, including Illia Iliashenko’s, arguing that it will have an impact on “ability to access those most affected by conflict.” 

And it says that it does not have the ability to ensure POW safety. 

“We did not guarantee the safety of the POWs once in enemy hands because it is not within our power to do so. We had made this clear to the parties in advance. It is the obligation of parties to the armed conflict to ensure POWs are protected against acts of violence, intimidation, and public curiosity, as well as against the effects of hostilities,” the ICRC said.  

Illia Iliashenko, a defender of Azovstal, is holding a poster: “I was in captivity, I know what hell is.” Photo was taken from Iiia’s Instagram.

The Red Cross has no public record of the number or names of the Russian POW camps it has visited. The reason for this is the policy of confidential dialogue to which the organization adheres. 

“This approach is also why we often do not call out violations of the law of war publicly. Instead, our preferred approach is to go straight to the source, directly to those involved to share our concerns with them one-on-one. This approach allows us to be as frank as possible in sharing our concerns, while also not risking loss of humanitarian access to those who need our help the most,” Pat Griffiths, ICRC Spokesperson in Ukraine, told The Counteroffensive.

But the Russian-Ukrainian war suggests the opposite. Since 2014, Moscow has hardly allowed the Red Cross any visits to the POW detention sites, and Russia has provided very little information about who it has in custody as POWs.

Until 2022, the ICRC reported visiting Ukrainian POWs in the temporarily occupied territories only once. 

ICRC representatives in Luhansk region observe the exchange of prisoners in October 2015. Source: www.radiosvoboda.org 

Officially, the ICRC is very careful not to criticize Russia. It does not deny that Russia doesn’t allow them access to prisoners of war. But it also does not publicly say that it is Russia that is blocking access. 

Russian POWs eating in a Ukrainian prison canteen. (Photo by Mykhaylo Palinchak/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

Moreover, even when the ICRC finds violations during its visits to places of detention, the mission's representatives merely pass on requests to improve detention conditions. But this is never made public. 

The Red Cross has a policy of confidentiality. It does not publicly report to anyone. It keeps a record of all violations in its archives, which are not made public until decades later. The Red Cross maintains that if it starts reporting war crimes, it will lose access to all prisoners of war and communication with the party violating the Geneva Conventions. 

The Red Cross does not publicly report war crimes, even when it has all the evidence to do so. Testifying before the International Criminal Court is also prohibited. 

The ICRC’s lack of support frustrates many Ukrainians, especially those who have loved ones in captivity.

“We understand that confidential dialogue is sometimes an effective method. But crimes against humanity cannot be silent. Silence is permission to continue,” said Anastasia Savova, daughter of an Azovstal defender still in Russian custody. 

Citing confidentiality, the Red Cross publishes joint reports for both sides of the war. The ICRC recently announced that more than 8,000 families had received information on the whereabouts and health of their loved ones. Given that Ukraine provides access to POW sites, while Russia blocks it, it is reasonable to assume that most of this data relates directly to communication between Russian prisoners and their families.

Relatives of captured Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol demand for a prisoner exchange during a rally on Maidan Nezalezhnosti on February 18, 2024 in Kyiv, Ukraine. The participants came out to remind that the Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol have been in Russian captivity for the second year. (Photo by hurricanehank/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

"There is an illusion that the Red Cross is effective, that they work with families, that they work with prisoners of war [from both sides]. But given the fact that this is generalized information, it would be good if at least a thousand Ukrainian families received information about their loved ones in captivity," Anastasia said. 

Even after receiving information about the exact place of detention, the ICRC is unable to establish communication between prisoners and their families, although this is part of its mandate. 

Throughout his captivity, neither Smurf nor his fellow prisoners have received a single letter from their families through the Red Cross. According to POW family coordinators from various brigades, only around five or ten percent of Ukrainian POWs receive letters from their families.

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According to the Red Cross, Russia is blocking communication.

“In any armed conflict, the law of war is clear that prisoners of war need to be treated with dignity and are entitled to communicate with their families. Our role is to support this process where we can, where we are granted access. But the primary responsibility is with the states who are parties to the conflict,” Pat Griffiths, ICRC Spokesperson in Ukraine, told The Counteroffensive.

Meanwhile, representatives of the Red Cross movement on the Russian side contribute to the functioning of the Kremlin's military propaganda machine.

The Russian Red Cross has repeatedly violated the basic principle of neutrality. Foreign media reported on leaked Kremlin documents showing plans to finance new “puppet” Red Cross branches in occupied Ukrainian territory, replacing the work of the international Red Cross. 

In February 2024, the Russian Red Cross began cooperating with the Russian state foundation ‘Defenders of the Fatherland’, which supports Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. The European Union has included the head of the organization Anna Tsivilova, who is Putin’s cousin, on its sanction list.

Screenshot from the official website of the Russian Red Cross Society, where the organization raises funds for the families of Russian soldiers

In addition, in October 2022, the Russian Red Cross announced a fundraising event for the families of the Russian military. This was part of the ʼWe Are Togetherʼ campaign initiated by Putin. It delivers military equipment, food, trench tape, etc. to the Russian army. It also teaches schoolchildren how to assemble drones that can direct the fire of Russian artillery.

The Counteroffensive sent a request for a comment to the Russian Red Cross regarding its ties with the Kremlin but received no response. 

The Ukrainian Ombudsman who monitors human rights violations, Dmytro Lubinets, has already called for and investigation into the Russian Red Cross, suspending its membership in the International Federation, and expelling it from the organization for violating its neutral status. This was done with the Belarusian Red Cross last December over accusations of deporting Ukrainian children from the temporarily occupied territories to Belarus. 

Instead, the ICRC continues to recognize the Russian Red Cross Society as part of the movement and has invited it to its international conference, which will be held for the first time since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this October. 

“The expectation for all members of the International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement is that they adhere to our statutes and fundamental principles, including on integrity and to work towards achieving the same humanitarian goals. It’s essential that humanitarian action isn’t pulled into political dynamics,” Pat Griffiths, ICRC Spokesperson in Ukraine, said to The Counteroffensive.

Families of Ukrainian POW’s the office of ICRC on June 17, 2024. Photo provided by Valeriia Tymoshenko, a wife of missing-in-action

Today, former POWs and families awaiting the release of their loved ones continue to draw international attention to the fate of the Ukrainians in captivity. 

100 families of Ukrainian POWs recently visited the ICRC headquarters in Geneva in June 2024. They called on the Red Cross to state the impossibility of fulfilling its mandate, and asked them to condemn the torture and deaths of Ukrainian prisoners of war.

But the families left disappointed. Valeriia Tymoshenko, who shares a child with a soldier now missing in action, told The Counteroffensive: 

 “Imagine 150 people like I am, who passed a thousand kilometers just to visit ICRC not only to ask for an explanation. We also suggested what is possible to do, we suggested involving us. They didn't accept it at all, just ignored.”

Many Ukrainians, who have watched their loved ones facing war crimes from the Russian side, want more from the ICRC.

“As long as we remain silent, we strengthen Russia's confidence that it can do anything. The Red Cross had to draw conclusions about its activities and start acting in a different, more effective direction,” said Anastasia Savova, the daughter of an Azovstal defender still in captivity. “We don't have time to wait for confidential dialogue to work when all we see are tortured bodies.”

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com