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Quotes of the Day:
“I want our nation to be the most beautiful in the world. By this, I do not mean the most powerful nation. Because I have felt the pain of being invaded by another nation, I do not want my nation to invade others. It is sufficient that our wealth makes our lives abundant; it is sufficient that our strength is able to prevent foreign invasions. The only thing that I desire in infinite quantity is the power of a noble culture. This is because the power of culture both makes ourselves happy and gives happiness to others.”
– Kim Koo, a Korean statesman and leader (1876 to 1949)
"Study strategy over the years and achieve the spirit of the warrior."
– Miyamoto Musashi
“To be clear, the Cold War is not a perfect analog for today's rivalries. Neither China, nor Russia is driven by an ideology as messianic as Soviet communism. Putin's Russia is a shadow of the Soviet Union, and China lacks the global military punch Moscow once possessed, even though it is a stronger economic competitor than the Kremlin ever was. There is far greater economic and technological interdependence, and a far more complex relationship, between America and China than ever existed between the Cold War superpowers. Moreover, the strategic context is different. Now, Russia and China are confronting a well-established, if beleaguered, international order. After World War II, the Soviet danger was so immense because there was no order; chaos convulsed much of the globe. We can't re-run the Cold War playbook in a very different world.”
– Hal Brands
1. Roadmap To Korean Reunification
2. Missiles, chemical weapons & nuke secrets… How Kim is arming the West's enemies
3. Department Disrupts North Korean Remote IT Worker Fraud Schemes Through Charges and Arrest of Nashville Facilitator
4. N. Korea names 4 new ambassadors in less than 10 days
5. S. Korea's memory chip exports to Taiwan up 225 percent in H1 on solid HBM demand
6. South Korea's nuclear dilemma and India's role
7. North Korean missiles fired on Kyiv in deadly Russian attack: Zelensky
8. Daunting tasks lie ahead for new Chinese envoy to South Korea
9. Yoon to meet former president Lee Myung-bak next week
10. Who silenced N. Korean boxer?
11. Koreans need to be more confident about modern history
12. “North Korea’s ‘Divorce Literature’ is a Means of Promoting Communist Unification”
13. Donald Kirk: How Seoul secretly paid for a summit with North Korea
14. North Korean IT workers disguised as Americans are active in China
15. Yoon expected to unveil new unification vision in Liberation Day speech
1. Roadmap To Korean Reunification
This appears to be a classic or conventional negotiation strategy where the participants seek and can live with a "win-win" outcome. That does not reflect the zero sum condition on the peninsula..
Most importantly, this analysis is based on a flawed assumption: that Kim Jong Un would acquiesce and seek peaceful unification.
And the troop reduction and withdrawal shows a lack of understanding of the military forces on the Korean peninsula and the defense strategy of the alliance and the offensive strategy of the Kim family regime.
I doubt very much President Yoon will be using a roadmap based on this analysis when he makes his unification speech on Liberation Day on August 15th.
Roadmap To Korean Reunification – Analysis
eurasiareview.com · August 9, 2024
The Korean Peninsula has been a site of significant geopolitical tension since the mid-20th century, with the Korean War resulting in the division of the region into North and South Korea, separated by one of the world’s most heavily militarised borders. Despite numerous attempts at reconciliation and peace, the area remains a highly volatile hotspot, aggravated by North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
The United States, China, Russia, and South Korea have all played active roles in this ongoing saga, each driven by their strategic interests. A phased approach to achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula presents a pragmatic pathway forward, seeking to gradually reduce tensions and establish a long-term peace and reunification framework. This essay outlines a three-phase process—Negotiation and Agreement, Troop Reduction and Withdrawal, and Post-Security Withdrawal and Cooperation—with the ultimate goal of a denuclearised and unified Korea. The essay also incorporates additional considerations such as nuclear disarmament, humanitarian aid, and civil-military relations into this process.
Phase 1: Negotiation and Agreement
The initial phase of the proposed plan highlights the significance of engaging in high-level diplomatic negotiations among the key stakeholders—North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, and Russia. Such formal talks at a high level would be a groundbreaking development, allowing these nations to directly articulate their interests and concerns. T
he primary objective of these talks should be to build mutual trust, a fundamental prerequisite for any substantive agreements. Confidence-building measures, including the establishment of a direct communication hotline between military leaders, the exchange of prisoners, and joint humanitarian projects, can mitigate the risk of misunderstandings and inadvertent escalations. To ensure the success of these negotiations, a robust monitoring mechanism must be established. This would involve keeping track of troop levels, weapons systems, and military activities in both North and South Korea.
The presence of impartial international observers, potentially under the auspices of the United Nations, would bolster the credibility of the verification process. Moreover, international guarantees from major powers, particularly the UN Security Council, would be essential in securing commitments to support a denuclearized and unified Korea. These guarantees could include offering security assurances to North Korea, which has long justified its nuclear program based on security concerns.
Phase 2: Troop Reduction and Withdrawal
Once a preliminary agreement is reached, the second phase involves the phased reduction and eventual withdrawal of troops. This process needs to be meticulously planned to avoid creating power vacuums or destabilizing the region. A gradual staged withdrawal of troops from both North and South Korea would mitigate security risks and provide time for the implementation of alternative security arrangements.
The withdrawal process should be conducted simultaneously to maintain a balance of power between the two Koreas. This simultaneous withdrawal would be complemented by a parallel reduction of military equipment and weapons systems, ensuring that neither side gains a strategic advantage during the drawdown. The transformation of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into an international peace park or ecological zone would serve as a powerful symbol of reconciliation and a practical buffer zone between the North and South. This initiative could be overseen by an international body, ensuring that the DMZ remains focused on peace and environmental conservation.
Phase 3: Post-Withdrawal Security and Cooperation
The final phase of this plan involves establishing a new security framework and cooperation for the post-withdrawal period. The most critical element of this phase is the formalization of a peace treaty to officially end the Korean War, which technically remains unresolved since the 1953 armistice. A peace treaty would provide a legal and diplomatic foundation for lasting peace and stability on the peninsula.
A regional security architecture would be necessary to manage the security dynamics of a post-withdrawal Korean Peninsula. This framework could involve not only Korea, the US, China, and Russia but also other regional powers like Japan and ASEAN countries. This architecture would address security concerns related to the withdrawal, such as the potential for renewed conflict or power imbalances, and facilitate ongoing dialogue and cooperation.
Economic cooperation between North and South Korea should be promoted as a means of integrating the two economies and reducing the economic disparities that currently exist. Joint economic projects, particularly in infrastructure, energy, and industry, could create shared interests and reinforce peace efforts. International support, both in terms of financial aid and expertise, would be essential for the reconstruction and development of North Korea, which has suffered from decades of economic isolation and underdevelopment.
Additional Considerations
Nuclear disarmament remains a prominent and formidable issue within the context of the Korean Peninsula. A step-by-step process connected to the withdrawal of troops offers a viable approach in which North Korea’s denuclearization is progressively accomplished, contingent upon receiving security assurances and economic incentives. This approach acknowledges the intricate nature of the problem at hand and allows for incremental progress rather than an all-or-nothing demand that could jeopardize negotiations.
Humanitarian aid provided to North Korea serves as another critical factor in reducing tensions and cultivating positive relations. By supplying food, medical supplies, and other essential goods, the immediate needs of the North Korean population can be addressed, thereby decreasing the regime’s reliance on provocative actions to attract international attention and assistance.
Moreover, it is imperative to prioritize the promotion of civil-military relations and reconciliation between North and South Korea to realize long-term peace. Initiatives that foster people-to-people exchanges, joint cultural and educational projects, and the successful reintegration of military personnel into civilian life can help bridge the gap between the two Koreas and instil a sense of shared identity.
Recommendations
1. High-Level Diplomatic Engagement: Initiate and sustain formal talks involving significant stakeholders, with an emphasis on building mutual trust.
2. Phased and Simultaneous Military Withdrawal: Ensure a gradual and balanced process of troop reduction, transforming the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into a peace park.
3. Establishment of a New Security Architecture: Develop a comprehensive regional security framework that effectively addresses the post-withdrawal environment.
4. Promotion of Economic Cooperation: Foster economic ties between North and South Korea, with international support for reconstruction endeavours.
5. Nuclear Disarmament Linked to Troop Withdrawal: Implement a step-by-step approach to denuclearization, ensuring that security guarantees are met.
6. Provision of Humanitarian Aid: Enhance humanitarian assistance to North Korea to alleviate suffering and cultivate goodwill.
7. Strengthening Civil-Military Relations: Promote initiatives that foster connections between the civil and military sectors of North and South Korea.
Conclusion
The journey towards peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula is undoubtedly filled with complexities, but following a phased approach provides a structured pathway forward. By initially building trust through high-level negotiations and confidence-building measures, followed by a coordinated withdrawal of troops and the establishment of a new security framework, the region can progress towards lasting peace. Additional considerations, such as nuclear disarmament, humanitarian aid, and the promotion of civil-military relations, further reinforce this process by addressing the underlying issues that have perpetuated division and conflict. While the road ahead is arduous and intricate, the proposed three-phase plan offers a comprehensive strategy for realizing a denuclearized, unified, and peaceful Korea.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
eurasiareview.com · August 9, 2024
2. Missiles, chemical weapons & nuke secrets… How Kim is arming the West's enemies
We need to aggressively implement the Proliferation Security Initiative and apply to more than WMD.
113 countries have endorsed PSI. This should be one response to north Korea's "gray zone" activities. it should be a key supporting line of effort. We have many tools at our disposal. We just need the political will to employ them.
About the Proliferation Security Initiative
Launched on May 31, 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative is an enduring global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. PSI is a key part of the foundation of the global WMD nonproliferation regime and has maintained strong support as a Presidential priority in each of the U.S. Administrations since its inception.
https://www.state.gov/proliferation-security-initiative/
Missiles, chemical weapons & nuke secrets… How Kim is arming the West's enemies
The Sun · by James Halpin · August 10, 2024
NUKE-mad North Korea is arming Iran and its bloodthirsty proxies to the teeth while the West remains remains blind.
The sanctions regime against the Hermit Kingdom has fallen apart leaving Kim Jong-un to fuel Iran's bloody fight against Israel.
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Sanctions against North Korea have fallen apart, leaving the country free to smuggle weapons to palsCredit: AFPIran's Ayatollah buys North Korean weapons and sends them to his proxy forces fighting IsraelCredit: RexNorth Korean-made F-7 rocket-propelled grenades used by Hamas fighters in IsraelCredit: APHezbollah fighters have also used North Korean weaponsCredit: APTehran's Shahab-3 missile was based off a North Korean bombCredit: Reuters
One expert now says the only thing limiting Pyongyang supplying Tehran with weapons is how fast they can make them.
Professor Justin Hastings at the University of Sydney said that if Iran was buying weapons, North Korea was selling.
Hastings said any sanctions now only existed "on paper" as Russia and China "no longer cooperate" with them.
And it was "no problem" for Pyongyang if Tehran passed the arms on to its proxies like Hezbollah.
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He said North Korea wanted to "strengthen" countries that were hostile to the US and South Korea by selling them weapons.
"But I think the larger reason is because they want to make money.
"You can imagine that Iran might be interested in in buying more weapons from North Korea."
And he said North Korea is now finding it "easier" than ever to move them not having to engage in highly covert smuggling.
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He said: "Now, because of the lack of sanctions enforcement, they're increasingly safer [to trade] and the supply of money is likely to be more stable.
"It can now ship them directly through China, or ship them through Russia, and no one will basically sort of pay attention to how they're getting there."
Fears North Korea border clashes will explode into all-out war over ‘one misstep’
The expert North Korea's only limitation might only be how much they can actually produce, how fast they could do it, and what expertise they were willing to share.
North Korean RPGs were used by Hamas in their murderous October 7 terror attack, VOA Korean Service reported.
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Weapons found in Israel showed they had Korean writing on the ignition device for the F-7 RPG, photos released by the IDF showed.
Since then, the IDF has found "tens of thousands" more of North Korean-supplied explosives.
North Korea is now finding it easier than ever to trade weaponsCredit: AFPAn Iranian woman and her son walk past a Shahab-3 missileCredit: AFP - Getty
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North Korea is banned from selling weapons by strict UN-backed sanctions.
But it has traded missile secrets with Iran for decades.
Iran purchased Scud B and Scud C missiles from North Korea in the 1980s,
And the missile technology is helping Iran in its fight with Israel today.
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Dr Bruce Bechtol, professor of security studies and criminal justice at Angelo State University, said there was "no doubt" the North Korean missile designs had been used by Iran.
Iran's Shahab-3 medium range missile and Mususdan ballistic missile are based on the North Korean NoDong, he said.
Iran fired those missiles at Israel in April, but many failed to launch or were shot down by Israel.
And Iran could be set to launch more of them, as it is expected to launch a revenge strike following Israeli assassinations.
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Bechtol said that North Korean help was "vital" to Hezbollah and described current trade with Iran as "robust".
The regime has sold chemical weapon components and even provided expert assistance on building chemical weapons.
He said: "North Korea plays an important role in supporting – both directly and indirectly – one of Iran’s key proxy benefactors in its ongoing war to be the hegemon in the Middle East."
Previously trade out of North Korea had to be smuggled through covert methods that changed every few months.
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Cargo ships a physically modified to change their look, attached with spoofing location beacons, and are registered under different countries flags.
In 2009, Thai authorities seized a shipment of 35 tons of weapons from North Korea destined for Iran in a cargo plane that had to make an emergency landing in Bangkok.
But a new report says the freer trade could see North Korea making more weapons to fill the terror state orders.
Conversely, it will be easier for the country to import nuke tech for its energy and weapon programmes.
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The report by Dr Daniel Salisbury said the collapse of sanctions said the deepening trade networks would be "bountiful" for North Korea.
Kim uses his oversees diplomats to procure the items the country needs for the weapon programmes.
In 2018, a senior German intelligence source noted that the North Korean embassy in Berlin was being used for WMD-related procurement, CNN reported.
Kim will be able to get more niche technology that isn't even made in China and Russia by using established covert means to import the tech to those countries from makers like the US and Germany.
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North Korea and Iran met in Dubai for trade talks in April, Reuters reported.
But as North Korea's trade routes grow, rogue states of the world the West won't lie down.
South Korea's spy agency is reportedly "keeping tabs" on whether the North is supplying missile tech to Iran.
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Kim Jong-un parades ‘hypersonic nukes that can hit US bases in minutes’
By Katie Davis
KIM Jong-un showcased his deadly hypersonic missiles that are feared to be able to strike US bases in minutes in 2019.
He vowed to build North Korea's nuclear arsenal at its "fastest pace".
The tyrant threatened to use his nuclear forces if provoked as he delivered a speed during a huge military parade that featured the state's most powerful weapons systems.
It comes as Pyongyang has stepped up weapons tests and displays of military power amid stalled denuclearisation talks with the United States and an incoming conservative administration in South Korea.
US and South Korean officials say there are signs of new construction at North Korea's only nuke test site - which has been officially shuttered since 2018.
Satellite images by Maxar from March appeared to show repair work happening at the Punggye-ri site, which may suggest Pyongyang could be preparing to resume testing nuclear weapons.
"The nuclear forces of our Republic should be fully prepared to fulfil their responsible mission and put their unique deterrent in motion at any time," Kim told the parade, according to state news agency KCNA.
Kim Jong-un uses his overseas diplomats as weapons dealers for the country's programCredit: Reuters
The Sun · by James Halpin · August 10, 2024
3. Department Disrupts North Korean Remote IT Worker Fraud Schemes Through Charges and Arrest of Nashville Facilitator
Good work Justice Department. Let's get after the IT networks of the all purpose sword of north Korea.
Department Disrupts North Korean Remote IT Worker Fraud Schemes Through Charges and Arrest of Nashville Facilitator
justice.gov · August 8, 2024
NASHVILLE – Matthew Isaac Knoot, 38, of Nashville, Tennessee, was charged today for his efforts to generate revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) illicit weapons program, which includes weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
According to court documents, Knoot, participated in a scheme to obtain remote employment with American and British companies for foreign information technology (IT) workers, who were actually North Korean actors. Knoot assisted them in using a stolen identity to pose as a U.S. citizen, hosted company laptops at his residences, downloaded and installed software without authorization on such laptops to facilitate access and perpetuate the deception, and conspired to launder payments for the remote IT work, including to accounts tied to North Korean and Chinese actors.
“North Korea has dispatched thousands of highly skilled information technology workers around the world to dupe unwitting businesses and evade international sanctions so that it can continue to fund its dangerous weapons program,” said United States Attorney Henry C. Leventis for the Middle District of Tennessee. “Today’s indictment, charging the Defendant with facilitating a complex, multi-year scheme that funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to foreign actors, is the most recent example of our office’s commitment to protecting the United States’ national security interests.”
“As alleged, this defendant facilitated a scheme to deceive U.S. companies into hiring foreign remote IT workers who were paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in income funneled to the DPRK for its weapons program,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the National Security Division. “This indictment should serve as a stark warning to U.S. businesses that employ remote IT workers of the growing threat from the DPRK and the need to be vigilant in their hiring processes.”
“As today’s charges demonstrate, the FBI will relentlessly pursue those who aid the North Korean government’s illegal efforts to generate revenue,” said Assistant Director Bryan Vorndran of the FBI’s Cyber Division. “Where illicit proceeds may be used to fund the regime’s kinetic capacity, we will prioritize our work to disrupt that flow of money. This indictment should demonstrate the risk faced by those who support the DPRK's malicious cyber activity.”
The DPRK has dispatched thousands of skilled IT workers to live abroad, primarily in China and Russia, with the aim of deceiving U.S. and other businesses worldwide into hiring them as freelance IT workers to generate revenue for its WMD programs. DPRK IT worker schemes involve the use of pseudonymous email, social media, payment platform and online job site accounts, as well as false websites, proxy computers, and witting and unwitting third parties located in the United States and elsewhere. As described in a May 2022 tri-seal public service advisory released by the FBI, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of State, such IT workers have been known individually earn up to $300,000 annually, generating hundreds of millions of dollars collectively each year, on behalf of designated entities, such as the North Korean Ministry of Defense and others directly involved in the DPRK’s UN-prohibited WMD programs.
The indictment unsealed today in the Middle District of Tennessee alleges that Knoot participated in a scheme to assist overseas IT workers to obtain remote IT work at U.S. companies which believed that they were hiring U.S.-based personnel. The IT workers, who were North Korean nationals, used the stolen identity of a U.S. citizen, “Andrew M.,” to obtain this remote IT work. The scheme defrauded U.S. media, technology, and financial companies, ultimately causing them hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages.
According to court documents, Knoot ran a “laptop farm” at his Nashville residences between approximately July 2022 and August 2023. The victim companies shipped laptops addressed to “Andrew M.” to Knoot’s residences. Following receipt of the laptops, and without authorization, Knoot logged on to the laptops, downloaded and installed unauthorized remote desktop applications, and accessed the victim companies’ networks, causing damage to the computers. The remote desktop applications enabled the North Korean IT workers to work from locations in China, while appearing to the victim companies that “Andrew M.” was working from Knoot’s residences in Nashville. For his participation in the scheme, Knoot was paid a monthly fee for his services by a foreign-based facilitator who went by the name Yang Di. A court-authorized search of Knoot’s laptop farm was executed in early August 2023.
The overseas IT workers associated with Knoot’s cell were each paid over $250,000 for their work between approximately July 2022 and August 2023, much of which was falsely reported to the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration in the name of the actual U.S. person, Andrew M., whose identity was stolen. Knoot and his conspirators’ actions also caused the victim companies more than $500,000 in costs associated with auditing and remediating their devices, systems, and networks. Knoot, Di and others conspired to commit money laundering by conducting financial transactions to receive payments from the victim companies, transfer those funds to Knoot and to accounts outside of the United States, in an attempt both to promote their unlawful activity and to hide that transferred funds were the proceeds of it. The non-U.S. accounts include accounts associated with North Korean and Chinese actors.
Knoot is charged with conspiracy to cause damage to protected computers, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, intentional damage to protected computers, aggravated identity theft and conspiracy to cause the unlawful employment of aliens. If convicted, Knoot faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, including a mandatory minimum of two years in prison on the aggravated identity theft count.
Under the Department-wide “DPRK RevGen: Domestic Enabler Initiative,” launched in March 2024 by the National Security Division and the FBI’s Cyber and Counterintelligence Divisions, Department prosecutors and agents are prioritizing the identification and shuttering of U.S.-based “laptop farms” – locations hosting laptops provided by victim U.S. companies to individuals they believed were legitimate U.S.-based freelance IT workers – and the investigation and prosecution of individuals hosting them. Today’s announcement follows successful action taken by the Department in October 2023 and May 2024, which targeted identical and related conduct.
The FBI Memphis Field Office, Nashville Resident Agency is investigating the case.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Kurtzman for the Middle District of Tennessee and Trial Attorney Greg Nicosia of the National Security Division’s Cyber Section are prosecuting the case.
The FBI, along with the Departments of State and Treasury, issued a May 2022 advisory to alert the international community, private sector, and public about the North Korea IT worker threat. Updated guidance was issued in October 2023 by the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and in May 2024 by the FBI, which include indicators to watch for that are consistent with the North Korea IT worker fraud and the use of U.S.-based laptop farms.
An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
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justice.gov · August 8, 2024
4. N. Korea names 4 new ambassadors in less than 10 days
Kim trying to be more of a global player or just getting back to business (embassy illicit activities to raise fund)
N. Korea names 4 new ambassadors in less than 10 days
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · August 9, 2024
By Ji Da-gyum
Published : Aug. 9, 2024 - 16:29
A North Korean flag waves in the wind near the border villages of Panmunjom in Paju, South Korea on Oct. 4, 2022. (File Photo - AP)
North Korea has named new ambassadors to four countries since late July, marking its first ambassadorial appointments since February 2021 after the COVID-19 pandemic.
From July 30 to Thursday, North Korea's Foreign Ministry announced the appointments of ambassadors to Vietnam, Singapore, Romania and Cuba on its official website.
Han Su-chol has been appointed as the ambassador to Cuba, the Foreign Ministry announced Thursday, without providing further details.
Han is believed to be the individual previously introduced by North Korean state media in 2022 as a vice department director in the International Department of the Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee.
The appointment of Han Su-chol as the North Korean ambassador to Cuba occurred approximately five months after Ambassador Ma Chol-su to Cuba retired to North Korea in March, one month after South Korea and Cuba officially established diplomatic relations.
Ri Sang-rim has been appointed as the ambassador to Romania, the Foreign Ministry said on Aug.1.
The ministry on July 30 announced Ri Kil-song and Ri Sung-guk as ambassadors to Singapore and Vietnam, respectively, resuming ambassadorial assignments.
Vietnamese local media reported that Ri Sung-guk arrived in Hanoi on Monday and presented a copy of his credentials to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. The position had been vacant since Kim Myong-gil left Vietnam in April 2019, following the abrupt breakdown of the second summit between the US and North Korean leaders in Hanoi in February of the same year.
North Korea had ceased dispatching newly appointed ambassadors abroad since Ri Ryong-nam became the ambassador to China in February 2021.
Additionally, North Korea has closed embassies in eight countries -- Guinea, Libya, Nepal, Bangladesh, Senegal, Spain, Angola and Uganda -- along with its consulate general in Hong Kong, Seoul's Foreign Ministry confirmed between last December and this January.
Seoul has suggested that the closures may be driven by economic difficulties, stemming from international sanctions and challenges in generating illicit hard currency abroad.
As of July, North Korea maintains 44 foreign missions worldwide, according to a database provided by South Korea's Foreign Ministry.
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · August 9, 2024
5. S. Korea's memory chip exports to Taiwan up 225 percent in H1 on solid HBM demand
S. Korea's memory chip exports to Taiwan up 225 percent in H1 on solid HBM demand | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · August 11, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 11 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's memory chip exports to Taiwan surged over 225 percent in the first half from a year earlier on robust demand for high-performance high bandwidth memory (HBM) products sparked by the fast growth of the global artificial intelligence (AI) market, data showed Sunday.
Outbound shipments of memory chips to Taiwan reached US$4.26 billion in the first six months of this year, up 225.7 percent from a year ago, far outperforming the country's overall increase of memory chip exports at 88.7 percent, according to data compiled by the industry ministry and the Korea International Trade Association.
Taiwan was the third-largest importer of South Korean memory chips in the period, up two notches to outstrip Vietnam and the United States.
Market watchers say the sudden surge in exports to Taiwan is attributable to major Korean chipmaker SK hynix Inc.'s HBM supply to U.S. AI chip giant Nvidia Corp., which packages its AI accelerators at Taiwan's TSMC.
SK hynix is the only South Korean company currently supplying HBM products, a core component of AI accelerators, to Nvidia.
"We can assume the sharp increase in exports is related to SK hynix's supplies for TSMC's final packaging of (AI accelerators)," Kim Yang-paeng, a researcher at the Korea Institutes for Industrial Economics & Trade, said.
Last month, the Korean chipmaker said in an earnings call its HBM sales soared more than 250 percent on-year in the second quarter, noting it expects a 300 percent increase in HBM revenue in 2024 from the previous year.
SK hynix Inc.'s headquarters in Icheon, about 50 kilometers southeast of Seoul, is seen in this undated file photo. (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · August 11, 2024
6. South Korea's nuclear dilemma and India's role
Do not be like India. South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons will play right into Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
South Korea's nuclear dilemma and India's role
The Korea Times · August 8, 2024
By Lakhvinder Singh
Lakhvinder Singh
The debate over whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons is complex and urgent, driven by an evolving geopolitical landscape and increasing threats from North Korea. For some time, South Korea has grappled with the question of pursuing nuclear armament. However, the urgency of this decision is becoming more apparent, as postponement may no longer be a viable option.
South Korea has thus far adhered to its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and relied on its alliance with the United States, refraining from developing nuclear weapons despite having the necessary know-how and technical expertise. However, concerns about the effectiveness of the NPT in curbing nuclear proliferation, combined with uncertainties surrounding the U.S.-South Korea alliance — exacerbated by trade tensions and discussions about potential reductions in U.S. military support — are intensifying the debate.
An independent nuclear capability could provide South Korea with greater autonomy in its defense strategy, reducing reliance on external partners. North Korea's nuclear program has long progressed beyond its early stages, establishing itself as a significant nuclear power with a substantial arsenal. Despite various diplomatic efforts, North Korea has continued to expand its nuclear capabilities, potentially threatening South Korea and even the U.S. mainland. As North Korea's arsenal grows, doubts about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella have surfaced, with some in South Korea questioning whether the U.S. would risk its own security in a nuclear conflict to defend South Korea.
Acquiring nuclear weapons could offer South Korea strategic leverage in its dealings with North Korea and other regional actors. By signaling a potential willingness to develop nuclear weapons, South Korea might encourage North Korea and its allies, including China, to engage more constructively in negotiations. This strategy could help halt North Korea's nuclear advancements and foster more effective denuclearization discussions.
The recent strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia, which includes mutual defense agreements, complicates the regional security landscape. This alliance could further entrench North Korea's nuclear status, prompting South Korea to explore a broader range of security options, potentially including the development of its own nuclear deterrent.
Public opinion in South Korea has shifted notably, with increasing support for a domestic nuclear capability. Polls indicate that a significant portion of the population favors this idea, driven by concerns about North Korea's nuclear threats and skepticism about the reliability of U.S. protection. This shift in public sentiment may reflect a growing national inclination toward considering nuclear armament as a defensive measure.
The possible return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency has rekindled discussions about South Korea's nuclear options. During his previous term, Trump's unconventional foreign policy, particularly toward North Korea, raised concerns about U.S. defense commitments. His direct engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and decisions like suspending joint military exercises with South Korea in 2018 alarmed many in Seoul, as these exercises are vital for maintaining readiness against potential aggression.
If re-elected, Trump might continue to prioritize direct engagement with North Korea, potentially at the expense of traditional deterrence strategies. This could include scaling back the U.S. military presence in South Korea unless Seoul significantly increases its financial contributions.
While developing nuclear weapons could enhance South Korea's deterrence against North Korea, it also poses significant risks, including diplomatic and economic isolation. Such a move could provoke strong reactions from neighboring countries, particularly China and North Korea and potentially trigger a regional arms race. Japan, for instance, might feel compelled to develop its own nuclear arsenal, fundamentally altering the security dynamics in East Asia.
Furthermore, South Korea's nuclearization would violate the NPT, likely resulting in international condemnation and potential economic sanctions. The U.S. might also impose sanctions if South Korea proceeds without proper coordination despite their alliance.
The decision to pursue nuclear weapons involves weighing substantial costs and international implications against the need for a reliable deterrent against North Korea, enhanced national security and strategic benefits. As South Korea navigates this complex issue, it finds parallels in India's nuclear journey. India's nuclear program was driven by security concerns, the desire for strategic autonomy and the aspiration to enhance its international standing. India sought to counterbalance the nuclear capabilities of China and Pakistan and establish itself as a regional power.
Similarly, South Korea has relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to counter North Korea's nuclear threat. However, the persistent and escalating threats have increased domestic support for an independent nuclear deterrent. South Korea seeks greater control over its national security, reducing dependence on the U.S. amid doubts about the credibility and sustainability of U.S. extended deterrence.
India's experience offers valuable lessons for South Korea. Despite facing international backlash and sanctions following its nuclear tests in 1998, India managed to secure strategic partnerships with major powers, including the U.S. This suggests that the long-term benefits of nuclear deterrence can outweigh the short-term diplomatic and economic costs, providing a potential roadmap for South Korea.
As South Korea considers its nuclear future, there are several ways India could assist. India could offer diplomatic support, share its experiences in managing international sanctions and help establish post-nuclearization partnerships. Both nations could benefit from cooperation in nuclear safety, civilian nuclear energy and related fields. A collaborative approach to nuclear issues could enhance regional stability and security, balancing China's influence and addressing the North Korean threat. As strategic partners, India and South Korea can navigate potential international backlash and sanctions, potentially affecting their economies and global standing.
India's support for South Korea's nuclear program could be seen as a strategic measure to counteract the increasing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and its strategic partnership with Russia. By supporting South Korea, India can contribute to a more balanced power structure in Asia and help create a stable and secure regional environment, reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.
India's support for South Korea's nuclear program represents a strategic decision that could enhance regional security, balance geopolitical power in Asia and strengthen bilateral relations. Drawing from its nuclear history, India can provide South Korea with valuable guidance and support, contributing to a more stable and secure Asian continent.
Lakhvinder Singh is the director of peace and security studies at the Asia Institute in Seoul.
The Korea Times · August 8, 2024
7. North Korean missiles fired on Kyiv in deadly Russian attack: Zelensky
A member of the arsenal of dictators supporting another member of the "Dark Quad."
Excerpts:
Ukraine's air force separately said that Russia attacked its territory with four North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles, launched from the border Voronezh region, and 57 drones. All but four of the drones were intercepted, the air force said.
"KN-23 ballistic missiles, although they rarely reach the desired targets, pose a serious threat to the population," said air force commander, Lieutenant General Mykola Oleschuk.
Kyiv authorities said earlier this month that North Korean ballistic missiles were part of an attack on the capital.
North Korean missiles fired on Kyiv in deadly Russian attack: Zelensky
Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · August 11, 2024
BySecurity & Defense Reporter
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Russia used a North Korean missile to attack Kyiv overnight, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Sunday, a trend which the country's air force described as a "serious threat."
Kyiv authorities said on Sunday that Moscow had launched ballistic missiles and "several dozens" of explosive drones at the capital overnight.
Kyiv's suburbs "took the hit" from the missiles, but all drones were shot down, the head of the city's military administration, Serhiy Popko, said in a post to Telegram.
A father and his 4-year-old son were killed, Ukrainian authorities said.
"According to preliminary information, the Russians used a North Korean missile, and this was another deliberate terrorist attack against Ukraine," Zelensky said in a statement on Sunday morning.
Local residents stand near buildings and cars destroyed by a missile strike in Kyiv, on July 8, 2024. Ukraine's air force said on Sunday that Russia had fired four North Korean-made KN-23 ballistic missiles overnight,... Local residents stand near buildings and cars destroyed by a missile strike in Kyiv, on July 8, 2024. Ukraine's air force said on Sunday that Russia had fired four North Korean-made KN-23 ballistic missiles overnight, posing a " serious threat to the population." ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP via Getty Images
Ukraine's air force separately said that Russia attacked its territory with four North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles, launched from the border Voronezh region, and 57 drones. All but four of the drones were intercepted, the air force said.
"KN-23 ballistic missiles, although they rarely reach the desired targets, pose a serious threat to the population," said air force commander, Lieutenant General Mykola Oleschuk.
Kyiv authorities said earlier this month that North Korean ballistic missiles were part of an attack on the capital.
Ukraine has reported the use of North Korean missiles for months as Pyongyang moves closer to a Moscow looking to its allies to restock its arsenal of weapons.
North Korea has denied exporting ammunition and missiles to Russia, although the U.S. and a slew of its allies said evidence had been found of North Korea supplying Moscow with weapons.
In February, Kyiv's SBU security service said Russia had fired more than 20 Hwasong-11 missiles, also known as KN-23 and KN-24 missiles, into Ukraine since late December, killing at least two dozen civilians in that time.
The Hwasong-11 is thought to be similar to Russia's Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile, prompting speculation about Moscow's role in the development of the weapon.
But there are questions over how accurate or effective the North Korean missiles are. Pyongyang has continued its conventional and nuclear weapons development programs despite a number of sanctions leveled at the secretive regime by the United Nations for years.
"About half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air; in such cases the debris was not recovered," the office of Ukraine's prosecutor general told Reuters in early May.
Experts say there is a wealth of information and intelligence to be gleaned from North Korean weapons' use in Ukraine, including their range, how they fly and how well Western air defenses can perform against them.
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About the writer
Ellie Cook
Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. military, weapons systems and emerging technology. She joined Newsweek in January 2023, having previously worked as a reporter at the Daily Express, and is a graduate of International Journalism at City, University of London.
Languages: English, Spanish.
You can reach Ellie via email at e.cook@newsweek.com.
Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine ...
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Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · August 11, 2024
8. Daunting tasks lie ahead for new Chinese envoy to South Korea
Per the ROK's 2022 INDOPACIFIC Strategy all that the PRC news to do is be a responsible member of the international community and uphold the rules based international order for it to have good relations with South Korea.
In politics (like war) everything is simple, but even the simplest thing is hard. (with apologies to Dead Carl)
Daunting tasks lie ahead for new Chinese envoy to South Korea
The Korea Times · August 11, 2024
gettyimagesbank
Increasing geopolitical tensions between 2 nations make job more difficult: experts
By Vanessa Cai
Following the departure of former Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming last month, Beijing has yet to announce its new envoy to Seoul. Whoever it will be, the next envoy faces existing and new challenges as well as uncertainties posed by increasing geopolitical tensions, according to diplomatic observers in both countries and around the world.
Some scholars also suggested that it would be beneficial if the envoy has a broad understanding of the international situation, extending beyond general knowledge of the Korean Peninsula.
However, they also noted that the personal style of a Chinese envoy is less important in the country’s diplomacy than the message that Beijing aims to convey.
On July 25, China said during a meeting between the two countries’ vice foreign ministers Ma Zhaoxu and Kim Hong-kyun that it will “appoint an appropriate and excellent candidate through internal procedures” as its envoy to Seoul, according to a foreign ministry official in Seoul.
A PR official at the Chinese Embassy in Seoul told The Korea Times that the embassy currently has no information about the next Chinese envoy.
Xing, who served as China's envoy for more than four years from January 2020, had an outspoken profile and raised controversies due to his confrontational remarks last year when he blamed Seoul for making a “wrong bet” by leaning toward the U.S.
Former Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming speaks during a press conference at the Chinese Embassy, Feb. 4, 2020. Yonhap
Beijing might try to appoint someone who is different from Xing, as part of a broader trend of Beijing’s aim to “bring in new ambassador profiles” that are “more diplomatic, more willing to engage in dialogue” and less willing to engage in statements that are controversial, said Ramon Pacheco Pardo, an international relations professor at King’s College London.
The recent high-level exchanges reflected some changes and that “in general, China has changed its tone toward (South) Korea,” Pacheco Pardo said, noting that the appointment of a new ambassador “always opens the door for a new beginning. And I think that’s what China is trying to achieve.”
“The new ambassador comes at a time when South Korea is trying to improve relations with China," he said. "Both China and South Korea realize that the relationship was really suffering and that it didn't really make sense to continue down that path … I think this also means the new ambassador will have a slightly easier time in that respect. It won’t be easy, but I don’t think it will be as bad as with the previous one. It was a really challenging time.”
In recent years, the robust trade ties between China and South Korea have been tested under the Yoon Suk Yeol government by Seoul’s closer security and political relations with Washington.
Shi Yinhong, a professor of international affairs at Beijing’s Renmin University, observes that bilateral relations continue to face structural challenges, including Beijing’s stance on North Korea’s Kim Jong-un regime.
“From Seoul’s perspective, the key is North Korea’s greatly accelerated nuclear missile development and Beijing’s explicit appeasement on that,” Shi said.
“Besides, Kim’s recent declaration of relations with the South as a state-to-state hostility eliminates the appeal of North-South national rapprochement as an element of Beijing’s peninsula policy. Other positive factors for the Chinese relations with Seoul, remarkably decreasing, can far from compensate for all the above,” he said.
He added that bilateral ties are also strained by South Korea’s growing alignment with high-tech containment efforts against China, as well as the high levels of antagonism in public sentiment on both sides.
Also noting the relations as being "turbulent," Pang Zhongying, a professor of international political economy at Sichuan University, observes that South Korea's approach will likely continue to focus on stabilizing its relationship with China.
But he also suggested that uncertainties remain due to several factors, including the strengthening of South Korea-Japan ties, the worsening relations between South Korea and Russia, and the potential reelection of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who might continue his engagement with the North Korean leader.
Chung Jae-heung, director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute in Seoul, echoed these views, noting that bilateral ties between China and South Korea are confronted with an increasingly risky international environment. This includes the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, ongoing crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.
“These four geopolitical flashpoints are becoming more intense. Under these circumstances, a new ambassador must first recognize current international trends, otherwise it will be very challenging to serve the role,” he said, noting that South Korea-China relations are no longer just about adopting a bilateral perspective.
Meanwhile, it would be beneficial for Seoul and Beijing to set aside past concepts and work on redefining bilateral relations, said Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul.
“If there is only an emphasis on the relationship between China and North Korea, or the relationship between South Korea and the United States, then the communication channel between the two countries may become increasingly narrow,” Kang said.
Alongside conveying Beijing’s policies, it is also important for the envoy to communicate well with local officials and the general public of the host country, and take the opinions learned into consideration and find a balance, he added.
Vanessa Cai is a reporter with the South China Morning Post. She is currently based in Seoul, reporting for both The Korea Times and the South China Morning Post under an exchange program.
The Korea Times · August 11, 2024
9. Yoon to meet former president Lee Myung-bak next week
Yoon to meet former president Lee Myung-bak next week
The Korea Times · August 10, 2024
President Yoon Suk Yeol, right, shakes hands with former President Lee Myung-bak during his visit to a funeral ceremony for Yoon's father at the Severance Hospital in Seoul, Aug. 15, 2023, in this file photo provided by the presidential office. Yonhap
President Yoon Suk Yeol will have a dinner meeting with former President Lee Myung-bak next week, an informed source said Saturday.
Yoon has invited Lee, who served as president from 2008 to 2013, and his wife for dinner, according to a source familiar with the issue, without providing details on the schedule and the location.
First lady Kim Keon Hee and Chung Jin-suk, Yoon's chief of staff who had served as a senior secretary to Lee for political affairs, plan to attend the dinner, the source said.
It will be their first dinner meeting since Yoon took office in May 2022. Yoon and Lee briefly met at the funeral of Yoon's father in August 2023.
In December 2022, Yoon granted a special pardon to Lee, who had been serving a 17-year prison term for bribery and embezzlement, canceling his remaining prison term of about 15 years and about 8.2 billion won ($6.48 million) of unpaid fines. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · August 10, 2024
10. Who silenced N. Korean boxer?
An important and useful comparison between the north and South and a fascinating description of the two "friends" and their public actions at the press conference.
Who silenced N. Korean boxer?
The Korea Times · August 11, 2024
South Korean boxer Im Ae-ji, right, and North Korean boxer Pang Chol-mi, left, attend a news conference held on Aug. 9 (Seoul time) in Paris. Im and Pang are bronze medalists in women's 54kg boxing. Yonhap
The Paris Olympics concluded their 17-day run on Sunday with a spectacular closing ceremony, but not without controversy. Issues such as Seine water quality, an air conditioning failure, and gender disparities in sports have marred the event.
Like in other Olympics, there were glorious and regrettable moments for Team Korea. Fencing, archery, and shooting once again proved to be goldmines for South Korea. The country's dominance in these sports sparked a joke that it’s no surprise that the South, a nation technically still at war with the North, excels in disciplines involving swords, arrows, and guns.
One of the most regrettable parts of the Olympics is that South Korea’s swimming sensation Hwang Sun-woo was eliminated in the preliminary event of men’s 200-meter freestyle game.
During the Paris Olympics, a troubling issue for South Koreans was the apparent repression of North Korean athletes. It was known that these athletes were coerced into silence and restricted in their actions, with severe consequences awaiting them upon their return home if they violated these restrictions. This situation cast a shadow over the Olympic spirit.
The gag order reportedly silenced North Korea’s boxing hero, Pang Chol-mi. She appeared visibly uneasy and nervous during the press conference on Aug. 9 (Seoul time) following her bronze medal win in the women’s 54kg event. Pang, along with South Korean boxer Im Ae-ji, who also won bronze, attended the news conference together.
The ways they spoke of the Olympics were very different. Im was carefree and smiled a lot, whereas North Korean boxer Pang was grim-faced and gave short answers bluntly. Im spoke freely about her emotions, but Pang kept mum without revealing her emotions at all.
When asked if there were people she would like to show her Olympic medal to as a gesture of gratitude, Im said there are many people who supported her significantly during her preparation for the Games.
"I would like to give each of them a chance to touch and try my medal," she said.
However, the North Korean boxer downplayed her achievement, saying, "I don’t have anyone in mind to share this with because the bronze medal is not what I had aimed for."
A tense silence fell over the venue when a Japanese reporter asked the South Korean boxer if she had hugged the North Korean boxer as she had promised. After a long pause, Im replied, "I’d rather keep it private and not disclose what happened."
In a free society, the question would be a simple yes or no. However, the South Korean boxer hesitated, knowing her answer could impact her friend living under a repressive regime. Im chose to avoid a direct answer rather than lie about her actions.
Im and Pang are close friends, having competed against each other in the round of 16 at last year’s Hangzhou Asian Games. Pang won that match, advanced to the quarterfinals, and ultimately secured a gold medal.
But during the news conference, Im and Pang pretended not to know each other. Im was cautious with her words, likely due to her unintended role in a gaffe that put Pang in a difficult position. Earlier this month, Im mentioned that she and Pang exchanged words of encouragement when they met by chance in the Olympic Village. She quoted Pang as using the word “fighting” to cheer her up, a term common in South Korean conversations, and this exchange was reported by several South Korean media outlets.
Pang being quoted as using the South Korean slang has raised a red flag.
Kang Cheol-won, a North Korean defector-turned-journalist, warned that media reports about Pang could put her life at risk. “I am almost certain she will be sent to a prison camp as soon as she returns to North Korea,” he said. He emphasized that South Korean slang and vocabulary are strictly banned in the North, and violators face severe penalties, including imprisonment or execution. Last year, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un enacted laws to limit foreign influence, including a ban on South Korean language, with harsh consequences for those who disobey, ranging from hard labor to the death penalty.
Olympics are about unity and harmony. It’s about reconciliation. But North Korea’s repression of its athlete and freedom of speech hurts the Olympic spirit. Through the Olympics, the world needs to put further pressure on North Korea’s human rights violations.
The Korea Times · August 11, 2024
11. Koreans need to be more confident about modern history
Korea (all of Korea in reality) needs to adopt and internalize the quote from Kim Koo (as a boss once told me if something is good enough to say once it should be said many times and I think that applies to today's quote).
“I want our nation to be the most beautiful in the world. By this, I do not mean the most powerful nation. Because I have felt the pain of being invaded by another nation, I do not want my nation to invade others. It is sufficient that our wealth makes our lives abundant; it is sufficient that our strength is able to prevent foreign invasions. The only thing that I desire in infinite quantity is the power of a noble culture. This is because the power of culture both makes ourselves happy and gives happiness to others.”
– Kim Koo, a Korean statesman and leader (1876 to 1949)
Koreans need to be more confident about modern history
The Korea Times · August 8, 2024
By Michael Breen
When South Korea’s Olympic athletes were wrongly introduced as North Koreans at the opening of the Paris Olympics, it was a minor error for the French announcer, but a major offense for Koreans and therefore a gargantuan gaffe as far as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was concerned.
That is because the IOC understands better than most the importance of national identity.
Sometimes, though, it seems that Koreans themselves, in their sensitivity to slights, react less out of confidence than out of complicated uncertainty about their own identity.
This may be a difficult argument to make because matters of national identity lie deep and their expression is so familiar that people can react to any tugging at the roots as they would to dental surgery without anesthetic.
However, as a way into this point, consider the common spectacle in downtown Seoul these days of tourists parading around in rented Joseon Dynasty-era costumes. You will see them posing for photos by the statues of Admiral Yi Sun-sin and King Sejong and video recording ceremonies at the royal palaces where guards are paid to dress up in uniforms from the same period.
Of course, tourists are here for vacation and it’s fun to dress up and fun to see them enjoying themselves in this way. But consider it from the point of view of what we are promoting as representative of this country. The identification of Korea with the Joseon Dynasty is not an automatic development. It was a conscious decision for tourism promotion. Tourists like history so, here we are, let’s give them some.
But why do we do this? I ask the question because Koreans themselves have almost zero respect, let alone interest, in this part of their history.
The greatness of Korea is all recent. This remarkable country that is so admired around the world is the result of the blood, sweat and tears of the three generations since its founding in 1948. Before that, this peninsula was a hellish place.
If you think I’m being grumpy, let’s put a few details on the table. In the early 17th century scholars reckon, for example, that three or four out of every 10 Koreans was a slave. Society then was structured in a merciless caste system. The prevailing culture restricted action and enforced duties at all levels, stifling freedom, creativity and progress. As a result, Koreans limped into the 20th century among the poorest and most vulnerable people in the world.
The leadership was so useless and venal that in 40 years of living here, I’ve never heard a single Korean express the – not unreasonable, given nationalism – idea of bringing back the monarchy.
As we know well, after World War II, Koreans were divided. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attracted most intellectuals with its ideological promise of justice and equality. Obviously hard to foresee back then because freedom was not the norm, but its leader, Kim Il-sung, managed to achieve the impossible feat of creating a state that was actually worse than Joseon Korea.
On this side of the DMZ, meanwhile, the Republic of Korea became the greatest nation-building success story of the 20th century.
But contemporary South Koreans are not leaning back to appreciate this progress, like satisfied bankers, our thumbs in our braces.
We are reacting to what is real, which means warts and all. Just as people are more likely to moan about their own family than someone else’s, the instinct is to be critical. We can color the past with nostalgia and gaze across the border and imagine something better whether it’s there or not, but we know ourselves with the level of familiarity that engenders contempt.
The way to counter this is to stop whining and tell ourselves the more compelling and accurate story. But, for some perverse reason, this doesn’t happen. Each new administration, each generation, seems bent on painting its predecessor as worse. It suited Park Chung-hee to portray Rhee Syngman as the North Koreans painted him. Just as it suits the current government to portray its predecessor as bordering on traitorous.
The fact is that, for all of their sins, the people who established this country and have led it since have done something that through the historic long lens appears heroic.
What future generations care about is not individual perfection, but contribution for the better.
If we were able to look at the early leaders of this country for how they built the country up that it might flourish, rather than try and pull them down and thereby question the virtue of our own identity, next time an Olympic announcer gets things wrong, we might have the confidence to shrug it off.
Michael Breen (mike.breen@insightcomms.com) is the author of "The New Koreans."
The Korea Times · August 8, 2024
12. “North Korea’s ‘Divorce Literature’ is a Means of Promoting Communist Unification”
This is a Google translation of an RFA article. "Divorce" should be "division" as in divided families. It is also "diaspora literature" that is being described.
Excerpts:
MC : Is there a book among South Korean diaspora literature that you would recommend for North Korean residents to read ?
Do Myeong-hak : Yes , I would like to recommend Lee Mun-yeol’s novel “ Meeting with My Younger Brother ” and Park Wan-seo’s “ That Winter Was Warm ” and “ The Child from Jangjinho ” which I recommended when we talked about division literature last time . All three works contain stories about war, separated families , and children of displaced people in South Korea in a very honest and realistic way . I would also like to recommend the movies “ Ode to My Father ” and “ Meeting Square ” .
MC : Why would you recommend this work ?
Do Myeong-hak : Compared to the politically provocative works written in North Korea, the works written in South Korea are much more pure, vivid , and realistic, so I think it will help people correct their existing perceptions of South Korea , unification , and distorted perceptions of the plight of separated families .
“North Korea’s ‘Divorce Literature’ is a Means of Promoting Communist Unification”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/b3c4ba85d559c758-b0a8bd81bb38d559ae30d589/literaturesnk-08062024164522.html
WASHINGTON-Hong Albot honga@rfa.org
2024.08.10
A separated family member leaves a message at a cultural event held in Jongno-gu, Seoul, South Korea, to mark the first Separated Families Day in September last year. 9.27.2023
/Yonhap News
00:00 /13:22
MC : It's time for a North-South literary tour with North Korean defector novelist Do Myeong-hak from Seoul . I'm Hong Al-beot from Washington, D.C. Hello, teacher .
Do Myeong-hak : Yes , hello .
MC : Last week , we looked at ' division literature ' among the literature that was established based on the division of the Korean Peninsula . What kind of literature shall we talk about today ?
Do Myeong-hak : Yes , today we will learn about ‘ Isan Literature ’ .
MC : When you say separated literature,the first thing that comes to mind is ' separated families ' . What is separated literature ?
Do Myeong-hak : Yes , it can't be helped because the Korean Peninsula is the only divided country in the world , and because of the war between the North and South, many families have been separated, and the tragedy continues, so for Koreans, the word separation itself is like a piece of shrapnel deeply embedded in their bodies .
However, diaspora literature is not only a story of separated families experienced by our Korean people, but is a universal literary phenomenon used worldwide . Diaspora literature refers to the literature of immigrants who leave the territory of their nation-state and live in a country of immigration . Historically, forced migration due to modern colonialism and modern globalization have brought about the mobility and flexibility of capital and labor , and as the number of immigrants going to other countries for marriage , work , livelihood , and asylum has increased, interest in diaspora literature has increased . In particular, the 21st century is an era of great movement of immigrants and travelers in a post-national , transnational , and global situation . Crossing a border means encountering and coming into contact with other cultures , languages , and ethnicities , and leaving one’s homeland and settling in another country means recognizing discrimination and exclusion as a citizen and a non-citizen as a dual self or diaspora of pluralism rather than a single identity . This is because legal and human superiority are divided depending on whether one has acquired citizenship and status . If we narrow it down to the scope of our people, it is our own diaspora literature , that is, Korean diaspora literature, which generally refers to overseas Korean literature or overseas compatriots literature . Therefore, the works of writers living in Japan , the US , China , and Russia, overseas adoptee literature, and domestic writers' works that deal with the diaspora consciousness or diaspora phenomenon of foreign workers , marriage immigrant women , and the Korean diaspora who have come to Korea as the main characters can also be considered diaspora literature in a broad sense . However, for us, the most weighty, meaningful, sensitive, and painful story of separated families between the South and the North , so to speak, is the literature of separated families .
The Road to the Silent Kaesong Industrial Complex 5.10.2023
MC : I have a question . Aren't there separated families in North Korea ? What do North Korean residents think aboutthese separated families , that is , those who have family or relatives in South Korea ?
Do Myeong-hak : Of course, there are many separated families, whether in the South or the North . Don't we often say tens of millions of separated families ? However, the term "tens of millions of separated families" has now become a symbolic term referring to separated families, as the number of surviving separated families has decreased significantly . It's been 79 years since the division and 71 years since the Korean War ended, so a child who came to the South from the North on his mother's back in 1950 is now in his 70s , meaning many adults who fled have passed away .
This is my personal opinion, but when I was in North Korea, I don’t think the residents’ view of separated families in the South was bad . I think they felt a deep sense of sympathy for their relatives in the South, thinking about how much they would miss their hometowns and how much they would suffer under the American colonial rule and puppet reactionary regime. It may have been because the North Korean authorities themselves brainwashed the residents in this way as part of their communist unification education, but it was also because they had a fundamental sense of love for their country and fellow countrymen . However, after the North Korean economy deteriorated and especially after the rapid influx of the Korean Wave, separated families in the South were perceived as people who might be able to reunite with their families in South Korea and receive help and live well . In reality, separated families wanted to be selected for the government-led separated family reunions, and those who were not selected tried to connect with their families in South Korea through smugglers , ethnic Koreans in China , and defectors . There were cases where they were caught and punished .
A citizen of a separated family is filling out an application for finding separated families at the first Separated Families Day cultural event held in Seoul in September last year. 9.27.2023
MC : And is there no unfair treatment by the North Korean authorities toward separated families from South Korea in North Korea ?
Do Myeong-hak : There were many separated families living in North Korea around me, so I could understand their situations and thoughts . However, although they all had the commonality of being from the South and eagerly awaiting the day they would return home, there were slight differences in their thoughts depending on their situations and positions . They can be roughly divided into three groups . First, there were those who had been active in the South Korean Labor Party and other leftist activities and then voluntarily defected to the North, or those who had joined the volunteer army and fought when the People's Army occupied the South, such as by capturing Seoul, and remained in the North after the armistice . They were the subjects of special management in the North as the driving force for the South Korean revolution, that is, unification under communism . Therefore, they had a strong will for unification under communism, and they believed that unification under communism was the only way to find their hometown and transform their hometown into a socialist paradise . The second group consisted of those who somehow managed to get pushed to the North during the war and ended up staying there. Although they were given a lot of credit for their loyalty, they were generally classified as wavering classes who did not belong to the core class . I don't think there were any major obstacles to entering college or getting promoted, but they were restricted from becoming high-ranking officials or party , security , or public safety officials . The third group included prisoners of war, North Korean prisoners of war from South Korea , and abductees who were taken against their will. They were subject to extreme discrimination and were thus subject to extreme caution .
MC : Generally, when we talk about separated literature, we say it is literature that depicts the lives and identities of immigrants . What are the differences between the works dealing with separated families from North and South Korea and the general works related to separated families that we mentioned earlier ?
Do Myung-hak : The biggest difference is that almost without exception, works dealing with separated families in the South and the North are not unrelated to left-right ideology , the Korean War , or the issue of unification . All of the works imply that the only way to return to one’s hometown or meet separated family and friends is through unification . Unlike other works of separated literature, or universal works of separated literature around the world, works on separated families in the South and the North show the hearts of those who desperately wish to return home, rather than showing the purpose or will to settle down and succeed in the new land they have moved to .
MC : Does diaspora literature exist in North Korea ?
Do Myeong-hak : Yes , although the term “dispersal literature” is not used, there are quite a few works that deal with the pain and tragedy of separation .
North Korean hosts are serving food at the farewell meeting and joint lunch held at the Geumgangsan Hotel on the afternoon of the last day of the second session of the 21st separated family reunion event in 2018. 8.26.2018
MC : Please compare some works related to the literature of the South and the North.
Do Myeong-hak : While literary works about separated families created in South Korea are mainly about the pain of separation and the longing for tragic reunification, stories about separated families created in North Korea are all drawn in a way that incites North Korea-led communist unification . The pain of having to leave one's hometown , the misfortune of remaining family members and relatives are all the fault of the Americans and their failure to liberate the South, so we must quickly accelerate preparations for war and drive out the American military, which can be said to be the ultimate conclusion pursued by works about separated families in North Korea .
MC : Is there a book among South Korean diaspora literature that you would recommend for North Korean residents to read ?
Do Myeong-hak : Yes , I would like to recommend Lee Mun-yeol’s novel “ Meeting with My Younger Brother ” and Park Wan-seo’s “ That Winter Was Warm ” and “ The Child from Jangjinho ” which I recommended when we talked about division literature last time . All three works contain stories about war, separated families , and children of displaced people in South Korea in a very honest and realistic way . I would also like to recommend the movies “ Ode to My Father ” and “ Meeting Square ” .
MC : Why would you recommend this work ?
Do Myeong-hak : Compared to the politically provocative works written in North Korea, the works written in South Korea are much more pure, vivid , and realistic, so I think it will help people correct their existing perceptions of South Korea , unification , and distorted perceptions of the plight of separated families .
During the 2nd farewell meeting and joint lunch of the 21st separated families reunion event, North Korean grandmother Lee Sook-hee sheds tears while talking to her South Korean younger brother Lee Yong-hee. 8.26.2018 / Yonhap News
MC : If there is a book you would like to recommend to South Korean readers, which one would it be and why ?
Do Myung-hak : There are no works that I would like to recommend specifically to South Korean readers . Since separated families are the same in both the South and the North, there is no need to recommend South Korean separated families or North Korean separated families separately. I think all works by separated families are universal works regardless of the North or South, so I would like to recommend the books I recommended to North Korean readers to South Korean readers , especially the younger generation . It would be good to see works by separated families created in North Korea, but they are all cleverly mixed with propaganda for communist unification, so it is difficult to find anything worth recommending .
No civilian exchanges between separated families between the South and the North this year
Following the House of Representatives, the Senate also introduced the 'Korean-American Separated Families Registration Act'
MC : From the perspective of a North Korean defector, please tell us the direction that separated families should take in the future .
Do Myung-hak : The separated families are all elderly, and the second generation is not young either . Now we can say that we are in the era of the third generation, but it can be said that they are insensitive to the pain of separation . So I hope that the first and second generations of separated families will educate the third and fourth generations well before it is too late , and on the other hand, I hope that we can actively support the new displaced people and separated families, the defectors from North Korea, so that they can realize their dream of returning home that they could not achieve in their time .
MC : Among the works dealing with the division of the Korean peninsula, today is the second time , and we talked with Professor Do Myeong-hak about the literature of the divided Korean peninsula . Thank you for working with us until late at night . Thank you for your hard work, Professor .
Do Myung-hak : Yes , thank you .
(Editor Lee Jin-seo, Web Editor Han Deok-in)
13. Donald Kirk: How Seoul secretly paid for a summit with North Korea
Don Kirk has been instrumental in exposing this.
He also shares his thoughts on the Sue Mi Terry incident.
Listen to him discuss these issues at this link to the NK News podcast.
https://www.nknews.org/category/north-korea-news-podcast/latest/donald-kirk-how-seoul-secretly-paid-for-a-summit-with-north-korea/946189/
Veteran journalist Donald Kirk discusses how Kim Dae-jung’s quest for a Nobel prize may have financed DPRK nukes
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08 Aug 2024 Last updated at 12:43
Almost a quarter century ago, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung traveled to Pyongyang to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Il for the first-ever inter-Korean summit, a watershed moment in ties between the longtime adversaries. Months later, Kim Dae-jung received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to promote reconciliation with the DPRK and for his work for democracy and human rights in the ROK.
But in the years that followed, it was revealed that Seoul had sent hundreds of millions of dollars in secret payments to North Korea, ostensibly to convince Pyongyang to agree to the summit, and a new book argues that the real total may have been as high as $3 billion.
This week, veteran journalist Donald Kirk joins the podcast to discuss his book about how Kim Dae-jung arranged the secret payments and may have financed North Korea’s nuclear program in the process. He talks about the South Korean activist’s ambition to win the Nobel Peace Prize and how the payments were routed through the company Hyundai Asan. Kirk also touches on what he learned from his many reporting trips to the DPRK over the years, and shares his thoughts on the recent U.S. charges against North Korea expert Sue Mi Terry.
Donald Kirk is a journalist who has reported on the Koreas for decades and the author of several books about Asian affairs. His latest book is “Kim Dae-jung and the Quest for the Nobel: How the President of South Korea Bought the Peace Prize and Financed Kim Jong-il’s Nuclear Program.”
About the podcast: The North Korea News Podcast is a weekly podcast hosted by Jacco Zwetsloot exclusively for NK News, covering all things DPRK —
14. North Korean IT workers disguised as Americans are active in China
North Korean IT workers disguised as Americans are active in China
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/itworker-08092024140947.html
WASHINGTON-Park Jae-woo parkja@rfa.org
2024.08.09
The U.S. Department of Justice announced on the 8th (local time) that it had arrested an American man in his 30s who helped North Korean information technology (IT) workers get jobs at U.S. and British companies by pretending to be Americans.
/Yonhap News
00:00 / 02:45
Anchor : As cases of North Korean IT workers getting fake jobs at U.S. companies are being revealed, the indictment of their helpers reveals that the North Korean workers are working in China . Reporter Park Jae-woo reports .
The U.S. Department of Justice announced on the 8th that it had arrested an American man in his 30s who helped North Korean IT workers disguise themselves as Americans and get jobs at U.S. and British companies .
Tennessee resident Matthew Isaac Knut helped North Korean workers pose as Americans, according to an indictment obtained by Radio Free Asia (RFA) from the Justice Department .
He ran a " laptop farm " from his home in Nashville, providing North Korean workers with access to the American internet , allowing them to network in the United States .
The North Korean workers reportedly earned more than $250,000 between July 2022 and August 2023 , much of which was falsely reported to tax authorities under stolen identities .
In particular, the indictment mentioned the possibility that the North Korean workers' base was linked to " China . "
Knut is also accused of conspiring to launder money earned by North Korean workers into the financial accounts of North Korean workers disguised as Chinese nationals.
The indictment details the dealings between Knut and the North Korean workers, noting that three Chinese accounts were registered under Chinese names : Jiye Xu, Ting Sun and Cheonglong Jin .
Two of these accounts reportedly sent funds to an online payment platform account belonging to a North Korean worker known as ' Jiang YuZi' .
North Korean workers disguised themselves as Chinese to obtain American status.
“ It is estimated that there are thousands of IT workers dispatched overseas from North Korea, ” the indictment said , adding that “ there are also approximately 1,000 North Korean IT workers operating in cities within North Korea, including Sinuiju, which borders China . ”
Last August , RFA obtained video from a North Korea source showing what is believed to be a base for North Korean hackers stationed overseas .
US Wants North Korean IT Worker… American Arrested for Helping Get Fake Job
“There are North Koreans among our customers” A look at the North Korean IT workers’ disguised employment methods…
Michael Barnhart is a senior analyst at Mandiant, a cybersecurity company owned by Google .
BANN HART ANALYST : Based on the volume and scale of activity we’ve seen , North Korean IT workers are spread across Fortune 500 companies . They’re pooling money and using it to encourage others to help them with their business .
Meanwhile, in May , the U.S. government arrested American citizen Christina Chapman, who had been helping North Korean IT workers get jobs undercover by working for an American company and offering a bounty to the North Korean regime .
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Kim Sang-il
15. Yoon expected to unveil new unification vision in Liberation Day speech
I missed this last week. I am very much looking forward to President Yoon's Liberation Day Speech.
For comparison, here is what I have been recommending and describing for the past few years.
There are three key points to keep in mind:
1) A human rights upfront approach
2) A sophisticated, holistic, and broad public diplomacy (information) campaign toward the Korean people in the north.
3) The pursuit of a free and unified Korea – A United Republic of Korea or UROK (“You Rock”).
Strategic clarity in 26 words: "The two presidents are committed to build a better future for all
Korean people and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace." Biden-Yoon
26 April 2023.
• Spirit of Camp David: “We express support for the goal of the ROK’s Audacious Initiative and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace.”
• Camp David Principles: “We support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace.”
• As a former military planner, I would consider the words of our presidents/prime minister as orders.
• The question is how do we implement those orders?
Now at a major inflection Point: Kim Jong Un’s statements: ROK as main enemy and no more peaceful unification. Kim’s failed promise: nuclear weapons would bring peace and prosperity to the Korean people in the north. Kim is threatened from within and must externalize the threats to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the people. Dismissing unification removes all hope from the Korean people in the north. Kim is in a weakened position despite his possession of nuclear weapons. Can this weakened position be exploited?
There is a unique relationship among denuclearization, human rights, and unification. The only way to achieve denuclearization and end the human rights abuses being committed against the Korean people in the north is by achieving unification. Perhaps counterintuitively it is the focus on human rights that must lead to unification and only when unification is achieved can there be denuclearization. And the connective tissue among the two is information.
Human rights are a moral imperative. However, they are also a national security issue because Kim Jong Un must deny the human rights of the Korean people in the north to remain in power. Dr. Jung Pak often asks who does Kim Jong Un fear the most: the ROK and US military or the Korean people? It is the Korean people especially when they are armed with information and knowledge of their universal human rights. Therefore, Kim Jong Un creates the perception of external threats to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people.
Self Determination of government is a human right:
UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights
Article 21
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Too many Americans, especially among government officials, suffer from a unique American disease. They are infected with what might be called “U.S. unification dismissiveness.” They are often myopically concerned with only denuclearization, or they believe surveys that say the Korean people no longer desire unification. They also think unification is only a Korean problem. This leads them to dismiss all discussions as well as policy and strategy recommendations about unification which means they do not understand the Korea problem and do not know how or even care to solve the “Korea question.” This is a strategic weakness for the U.S., and the alliance, especially as the ROK pursues its unification policy.
• Imperative: Align assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime:
1. Political warfare to subvert the ROK and split the ROK/US Alliance.
2. Blackmail diplomacy to coerce political and economic concessions.
3. Development of advanced warfighting capabilities to support political warfare and blackmail diplomacy and prepare to unify the peninsula by force under domination of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
4. Understand KJU fears the people more than the ROK/US CFC
• The Alliance must shift priority from denuclearization to solving the “Korea question” (Para. 60 of the Armistice and UN General Assembly Resolution 811 (1954)), e.g., the unnatural division of the peninsula.
• From denuclearization first then unification someday, to unification to end the nuclear threat and human rights abuses.
• A new strategy must be built on the rock solid foundation of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command to deter war, deter the use of WMD, defend the ROK, and defeat the nKPA. The military must be prepared to support the political process of unification (OPCON Transition with a ROK general in command is an imperative for any operations in the north).
• Four paths to unification: Peaceful, War, Regime Collapse, Internal Resistance/New Emerging leadership.
• The new strategy must focus “onward toward unification” (Per MOU) consisting of three lines of effort:
1. A human rights upfront approach.
2. A sophisticated information and influence campaign.
3. The pursuit of a free and unified Korea – a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
• Human rights upfront – not only a moral imperative but a national security issue because Kim must deny human rights to remain in power– must be part of all negotiations.
1. Kim fears the Korean people more than the ROK/US combined military. Required for any kind of north-South or north-US engagement.
2. No normalization possible without an end to human rights abuses.
3. There must be no discussion of nK nuclear capabilities without a corresponding discussion of human rights – the Korean people must know they suffer because of the deliberate policy decision to prioritize nuclear weapons over their welfare.
• Public Diplomacy/Information campaign – focus on the three target audiences: regime elite, 2d tier leadership, and the Korean people in the north.
1. The five principles of information: (1) massive quantities of information from news to entertainment; (2) practical information from market activity to organization for collective action; (3) facts and the truth about north Korea and the outside world; (4) understanding of the universal human rights for all people; (5) voices from north Korea
2. Major theme: Kim’s strategy has failed to achieve his objectives.
3. To counter nK propaganda we must recognize the Kim family regime’s strategy(s), understand the strategy(s), EXPOSE the strategy(s) to inoculate the Korean and American publics and the international community, and attack the strategy(s) with a superior form of political warfare (led by information).
• Going forward there are seven key tasks:
1. There must be recognition of decades of failed diplomacy to achieve denuclearization and to bring peace, prosperity, and stability to the entire Korean peninsula.
2. Policymakers, strategists, and civil society activists must begin with a realistic understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
3. Koreans themselves must solve the Korea question (Paragraph 60 of the Armistice - the unnatural division of the peninsula). No other country can lead the effort. However, the U.S. and the international community can and must support the Korean people.
4. Koreans must seek self-determination of government as the solution to the Korea question, in accordance with Article 21 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
5. Change cannot occur until there is an internal transformation in the north. Kim Jong Un must either change his behavior, or the Korean people in the North must change Kim Jong Un.
6. Internal transformation will result from a human-rights-up-front approach and a public diplomacy/information campaign to support action by North Koreans.
7. Internal transformation in the North is the only peaceful path to a free and unified Korea. A free and unified Korea will be a new Korea returning to its historical foundation with modern characteristics.
• Bottom Line The only way we are going to see an end to nuclear development and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity is through achievement of unification:
1. the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, nonnuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people.
2. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK) or a United Republic of Corea (UROC) (if you know you know)
We know “One Dream – One Korea”
We also must know “Tong Il – U-ROK”
We must understand: De Oppresso Liber – “to free the oppressed” – or more appropriately to help the Korean people in the north free themselves.
Yoon expected to unveil new unification vision in Liberation Day speech | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 7, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 7 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol is expected to unveil the government's new vision for unification between the two Koreas when he addresses the nation on Liberation Day later this month, ruling party officials said Wednesday.
Yoon plans to lay out the initiative during his speech next Thursday in an update to the National Community Unification Formula, South Korea's official unification vision unveiled in August 1994 under the administration of late President Kim Young-sam, according to the officials.
The unification ministry earlier said it will draw up a new unification vision based on the principle of liberal democracy.
The move comes amid increasingly strained cross-border ties as North Korea continues to press ahead with weapons tests, while leader Kim Jong-un has vowed not to seek reconciliation and unification with the South.
In his speech, Yoon is expected to emphasize North Korean people's human rights, freedom and prosperity. In a speech last month, he said solving the North Korean human rights issue would be an important foundation for peace on the Korean Peninsula and a unified Korea.
He is also expected to send a message to Japan and touch on trilateral cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.
President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks at Cheong Wa Dae in central Seoul, in this file photo taken July 14, 2024. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 7, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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