Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"One of the strongest characteristics of genius is—the power of lighting its own fire."

– John W. Foster

”Worrying is like paying a debt you don’t owe.”

– Mark Twain

"Observe your enemies, for they first find out your faults."

– Antisthenes

1. How China and North Korea could reunite as comrades in war

2. The Challenges Faced by Resettled North Korean Escapees in South Korea

3. Sanctioned N. Korean official handling missile programs attends arms exhibition in Moscow: report

4. Hanwha Aerospace's K9 Thunder successfully tests US M982 Excalibur 155mm precision shells in Arizona

5. US Army conduct swift deployment drill in South KoreaUS Army conduct swift deployment drill in South Korea

6. Sent to flood-ravaged areas, North Korean soldiers steal supplies, townspeople say

7. The issue of North Korean defectors being repatriated by surprise will be discussed at the UN later this month

8. White House: “Cannot Confirm Reports That North Korean Missiles Were Involved in Russian Attack”

9. Germany's membership in UN Command signals commitment to Indo-Pacific

10. N. Korea slams top U.S. officials' op-ed on Biden's diplomat feats

11. Russia sends hundreds of goats to N. Korea amid deepening bilateral ties

12. Yoon voices frustration over 'national foundation day' controversy

13. Pres. Yoon replaces defense minister and NSO chief

14. North Korea reports 'fierce' heat as peninsula bakes

15. What Uganda has that North Korea does not

16. Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents "Do not go to the riverbank”

17. Wildfire erupts in Paju with North Korean trash balloon suspected as cause

18. Enact a Korean version of FARA

1. How China and North Korea could reunite as comrades in war

Gordon provides some interesting analysis based on the recent Foreign Policy article by Markus Garlauskus and Mathew Kroenig. And he included my somewhat contrarian views.

How China and North Korea could reunite as comrades in war

by Gordon G. Chang, opinion contributor - 08/12/24 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4820458-war-east-asia-china-north-korea/?utm

The next war in East Asia will consume the region. It will not be confined just to Taiwan, argue Markus Garlauskas and Matthew Kroenig in a new article in Foreign Policy.

Increased Chinese and North Korean military activity this month suggests that both regimes are contemplating going into battle. For instance, two days before Foreign Policy posted the piece, Kim Jong Un delivered a speech announcing the deployment of “250 new-type tactical ballistic missile launchers” to positions near the Demilitarized Zone.

Kim praised North Korea’s “munition industry workers” for developing the launchers “by their own efforts and technology.” However, Richard Fisher, a China military analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, told me it is far more likely that the launchers are of Chinese origin and were built with Chinese parts and advice.

In any event, the launchers can carry four tactical nuclear weapons each. As Kim boasted, they have “great military significance.”

Garlauskas and Kroenig wrote that any conflict between the U.S. and China over Taiwan “would almost certainly become a region-wide war, engulfing the Korean Peninsula and pulling in both North Korea and South Korea.” The battle would give China “a strong incentive to strike U.S. bases in South Korea” and “urge North Korea to provoke and tie down U.S. forces there.”

They added that North Korea could fight beside China “to preempt a feared U.S. attack, take advantage of a distracted United States to settle old scores with its rival in Seoul or influence the outcome of a war that would have profound implications for its own security.”

In late 1950, China sent “volunteers” to aid beleaguered North Korean forces in their fight against American, South Korean and other United Nations troops. Will the North now go to war alongside China?

Traditionally, China has exercised great influence over North, largely because the Kim rulers needed Chinese aid and diplomatic protection, especially after the economic success of the North’s early years turned into decades of economic failure, beginning in the 1970s.

Yes, the centuries-old antagonism between China and Korea remains, and the Kim regime often publicly disrespects Beijing. But the Chinese communists are patient overlords. The occasional North Korean defiance of China’s wishes is by no means significant. Chinese officials don’t expect obedience all the time, and they support their North Korean allies, whether or not they are compliant at any particular moment.

When Jae Ho Chung was still a professor at Seoul National University, he told me that the Chinese know they have influence but prefer not to exercise it all the time. When China really wants something, it lowers the boom.

But does Beijing have enough leverage to coerce North Korea into fighting a war? The two states are parties to the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which has a mutual defense clause. They were each other’s only military ally until June, when Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un inked a comprehensive agreement with a mutual defense provision.

Fisher told me China has enough clout to force the North into launching “single diversionary strikes or coordinated joint attacks against South Korea, Japan or any number of American targets.”

Not everyone agrees.

“Kim will not act as China’s proxy or puppet,” David Maxwell of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Asia Pacific Strategy told me. “China will be unlikely to pressure or influence Kim to attack the South to support Chinese actions in Taiwan without substantial incentive, which for Kim can only be a guarantee that his actions will be successful.”

China, of course, will not be able to provide such an assurance, especially if it is involved in conflict elsewhere. This means, as a practical matter, Kim must be able to get American troops off the Korean peninsula before he can join China’s side.

Maxwell, who served five tours of duty in Korea as a Special Forces officer, pointed out that the U.S., South Korea and the U.N. command can prevent Kim from aggressive actions by keeping their forces prepared for an attack.

For more than half a century, three Kim rulers have successfully employed one tactic to avoid being dominated by far more powerful neighbors. “Dating back to the Korean War,” Maxwell told me, “the Kim family regime has effectively played Russia and China against each other, and it appears to be doing so today.”

Kim Jong Un now has a problem, however. Both China and Russia, for the first time in decades, are closely coordinating actions.

Last month, for instance, four Russian and Chinese nuclear-capable bombers — two Tu-95 Bears and two H-6Ks — intruded into the U.S. air-defense identification zone near Alaska. The Chinese and Russian navies and armies routinely exercise together as well. Moreover, China has been providing substantial support to Vladimir Putin’s faltering war against Ukraine.

Kim, therefore, will have a difficult time playing off two “no-limits” partners that have decided to go to war together. And it will be difficult for the North Korean leader to keep Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin apart. The two leaders see the world in the same terms, identify the same enemy and conspire together.

And both of them, despite severe problems, are getting arrogant.

“Change is coming that hasn’t happened in 100 years,” Xi told Putin after their 40th in-person chat, in Moscow in March 2023. “And we are driving this change together.”

Kim Jong Un, in the world, as the Chinese and Russian leaders perceive it, is someone who serves their interests.

Kim can always say no to Xi and Putin, but these days that may not be an answer the latter are prepared to accept. So, as Garlauskas and Kroenig argue, Washington has to prepare for a multitheater war in East Asia, as China and North Korea, plus friend Russia, join together as comrades in battle.

Gordon G. Chang is the author of “The Coming Collapse of China” and “China Is Going to War.”

2. The Challenges Faced by Resettled North Korean Escapees in South Korea

Conclusion:

The challenges that North Korean escapees continue to endure following their escape from the Kim regime remain difficult and overlooked. The efforts of the South Korean government in resettling most of the escapees is commendable, especially when this is a task most other countries do not fulfill. The U.S., for example, has accepted only about 220 North Korean escapees since 2006 while China has a history of forcefully repatriating escapees back to the North. Yet, it is also clear that efforts to resettle escapees in the South and to help them assimilate into such a different society are not perfect, as escapees suffer from a number of hardships that are not yet being adequately addressed. These hardships, many of which stem from the culture shock of escaping North Korea, can be difficult and long-lasting to tackle. However, supporting North Korean escapees is not only essential for their resettlement but also to help them fulfill their potential. Otherwise, the financial struggles, mental health problems, and discrimination many escapees face upon their arrival will remain the exclusive reality faced by the North Korean community resettled in the South.

The Challenges Faced by Resettled North Korean Escapees in South Korea

nkhiddengulag.org

By Andrew Chan, HRNK Research Intern

Edited by Diletta De Luca

Introduction

In the decades of isolation and authoritarian rule that have gripped North Korea since the end of the Korean War, the number of escapees fleeing the North and settling in different countries has steadily grown. Among the preferred destinations, the most popular is unsurprisingly South Korea, where North Korean escapees are granted automatic citizenship and receive support services from the government. This includes resettlement payment, training services, support programs, and housing assistance. Additionally, escapees who are able to provide South Korean authorities with intelligence aiding the country’s security are entitled to a reward of $860,000, while other payments also being made for those who escape with weapons. The support that the South Korean government provides to escapees is also generous and expensive, encompassing 12 weeks of adaptation training in a resettlement facility, upwards of $50,000 in settlement benefits and housing subsidies depending on the size of the household, and free public school and university education for children.

North Koreans are therefore often drawn to the South as a destination, as many see it as a place where they will be welcomed as citizens and where they will be free from the authoritarian reality they face in the North. As a result, the number of North Korean escapees in South Korea was estimated by the Ministry of Unification to be at 34,078 in December of 2023. At the same time, North Korean escapees who resettle in South Korea face numerous challenges, and life in their new home entails many significant difficulties.

While resettled North Korean escapees in South Korea find themselves safe from the physical threats posed by the North Korean regime, the hardships many face in the new country are less noticeable in kind. Such challenges are broad in type and have resulted in North Korean escapees struggling to keep up with their fellow South Koreans in many aspects. One example relates to escapee adolescents under the age of 19, which comprise approximately 15% of the escapee population. Among this group, North Korean escapee adolescents demonstrate high rates of faltering growth and compared to their South Korean peers, and studies have found that they are on average shorter and thinner, but also suffer from higher rates of obesity. This is only one example of the physical disparities that are present among North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, and such challenges affect the future generations of these communities.

In order to understand the significance of such disparities, it remains necessary to examine the impact they have on the life of the resettled escapees. These challenges manifest in a number of ways, especially in defining economic, psychological, and cultural differences and struggles. Thus, it is only by examining such challenges and facilitating communication with escapees themselves that positive changes can be achieved to improve the lives of North Korean escapees in South Korea.

Economic Challenges

As perhaps the most visible form of difficulty faced by North Koreans in the South, economic challenges burden almost all of the escapees. As integrating North Koreans into the South Korean economy requires significant support from the government, South Korea provides extensive assistance through financial aid and various programs aimed at increasing self-sufficiency, such as vocational training. Nevertheless, despite the existence of such programs, economic stability is not attainable for most North Korean escapees as many face harsh difficulties in their economic performance.

When compared to their South Korean counterparts, former North Koreans find themselves severely disadvantaged as the unemployment rate among them is approximately twice compared to the national average. Additionally, 56% of North Korean escapees in South Korea are classified as being low-income and 25% qualify for the lowest income bracket subject to national basic livelihood subsidies, a figure which is six times higher than the rate of the South Korean population.

Economic disparities are deeply rooted in multiple causes, including the background of these escapees arriving from North Korea. Many arrive with physical and mental scars that prevent them from settling into a new culture and which affect their ability to obtain and maintain a steady income. Additionally, the different education and training received in North Korea is often incompatible with the job market and society in the South. A BBC interview with an escapee in 2021 discussed many of these issues, describing how many of the jobs available in South Korea are not compatible for the escapees, many of whom have never had to find a job and lack work experience or knowledge of many sectors of the job market.

Financial literacy is another gap existing between North Korean escapees and South Koreans, as the former are significantly less financially literate than the latter. Adapting to a vastly different capitalist society as opposed to a state-controlled command economy is a challenge that requires long-term adaptation and assistance. Nevertheless, North Korean escapees are faced with time constraints and are required to be accustomed to the South Korean model quite abruptly.

Another aspect of the economic challenge is integrating North Korean escapees into a vastly digitized South Korean society that is significantly different from the North. Learning to use modern information and communications technology such as Internet platforms remains a great challenge for many of the escapees who previously had no access to such technologies. Their difficulty in quickly adapting creates a digital divide between them and their South Korean counterparts which further exacerbates social inequality and prevents their smooth integration into a different society. This is an additional contributing factor to the economic woes of North Korean escapees, especially as occupations in countries like South Korea demand higher levels of digital experience and education that escapees do not possess. Such challenges result in frequent low income levels and poor economic performance among North Korean escapees in the South, creating among them chronic feelings of loneliness and abandonment.

Psychological Challenges

Many North Korean escapees arrive in South Korea with psychological trauma that can represent a significant barrier to their resettlement and integration. The trauma and mental health issues escapees suffer stem from traumatic experiences endured in North Korea such as witnessing public executions and enduring human rights abuses as well as the overall state of anxiety that arise from settling in a new country while being separated from family and friends. Additionally, escapees who travelled through different transit countries like China have often fallen victim to human trafficking, which includes gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage against women and girls. Such traumatic experiences greatly affect the mental health of North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea and represent a difficult challenge to overcome.

Among the North Korean escapees resettled in South Korea, rates of trauma and mental distress such as PTSD are significant. A study from 2022 found that, among 531 North Korean escapees interviewed, 81.4% suffered from trauma and 15.3% suffered from PTSD, a figure which is nine times higher than the average for South Koreans. Additionally, 53% of escapees who visited hospitals for psychiatric problems after defection were diagnosed with PTSD and many had severe difficulties adapting to the South Korean society and suffered from a lower quality of life. This demonstrates a direct correlation between these escapees’ mental health and their challenges for resettling to the new country.

Among the mental health challenges endured by former North Koreans, suicidal behaviour and suicidal thoughts are among the most concerning. While the suicide rate in South Korea is already one of the highest among OECD countries, the North Korean escapee community faces especially high suicide rates. A study from 2019 showed that 12.4% of escapees had the urge to commit suicide in the previous year and that the suicide rate among them is three times higher than that of the rest of the South Korean population. Other mental health challenges endured by North Korean escapees also include major depressive disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, and panic disorder. These issues can also be exacerbated by other sources in their new environments such as discrimination, cultural differences, and lack of access to resources like support networks or psychological help.

The severe mental health challenges faced by many North Korean escapees additionally represent a significant barrier throughout their resettlement process in South Korea. Many of the escapees afflicted with PTSD, suicidal behaviour or ideation, depression, and other disorders find it difficult to settle into their new homes and build a new life when faced with these overwhelming challenges to their wellbeing. Another factor is the lack of knowledge on how to request assistance among escapees, as up to 70% of them do not know about counselling centres or psychologists from which to receive support. Additionally, as mental health is an issue completely disregarded in North Korea, many escapees are unaware of their mental well-being or of how they could ask for and receive help. As a result, understanding the importance of mental health among North Korean escapees remains a necessary component in their resettlement efforts and for their integration into South Korean society. Until this is accomplished, mental health remains a major challenge faced by escapees.

Cultural Challenges

The third and final challenge faced by North Korean escapees in South Korea lies in their ability to adapt and assimilate into South Korean society and the differences in economic system, technology, and social behaviour. In an effort not to stand out and face prejudice, many North Korean escapees feel pressured to conceal their identities and fit in, leading to greater insecurity and psychological distress as they try to conform, hide their North Korean roots, or intentionally distance themselves from the escapee community. On the other hand, those who do not try to conform to the South Korean society or form bonds only within the escapee community find themselves isolated or discriminated against by the wider society for failing to assimilate.

Discrimination against North Korean escapees by South Koreans also remains a major issue. Accounts from former North Koreans show that social stigma, mistreatment, and suspicion against them from South Koreans is prevalent among certain segments of the population, and it contributes to worsening mental health conditions among escapees. Social stigma and prejudice also extends to discrimination in employment opportunities towards those with the North Korean accent while women and children – who make up the majority of the escapees – reported to have been victims of exploitation and bullying. Discrimination also exists through the slight language barrier between northerners and southerners because, despite sharing a common language, differences persist in spelling, pronunciation, and accents. This is another way in which North Korean escapees can be stigmatized and ostracized in South Korea, hindering their resettlement.

In addition to the issue of discrimination and to the pressure to quickly adapt to a new societal and cultural standard, North Korean escapees tend to avoid communicating their struggles or treatment as they fear being labeled as ungrateful or being targeted by far-right extremists who reject their resettlement and presence in South Korea. As a result, many North Korean escapees who experience discrimination in their everyday lives are reluctant to speak out about their marginalization to avoid being regarded as unappreciative or undeserving of the governmental support they receive.

In light of such challenges, the cultural unsettlement that many North Korean escapees endure is often suffered in silence. The struggles they face in adapting to a new culture and lifestyle, often in face of discrimination and inadequate support, heavily contributes to difficulties in building their new lives in the South and represents a less-discussed challenge that they must endure during their resettlement and adaptation.

Solutions and Conclusion

In light of challenges that North Korean escapees face once resettled in South Korea, it is evident that the more than 30,000 escapees in the country do not have an easy life. Despite the considerable funds that the South Korean government invests on resettling escapees, the transition from the authoritarian North to the South is not always as smooth as both the government and the escapees themselves would wish it to be. Crafting solutions to such issues would inevitably require direct involvement of the escapees, but some methods and strategies to tackle this issue have already been showcasing positive effects. Many of these solutions, such as a more effective and targeted investment of financial support, better education programs, and mental health resources for escapees, are obvious in their purpose while others remain unprioritized. At the same time, these solutions can have major positive impacts and are worth looking at.

The first solution could include the creation of a social support network to help the North Korean escapees. While offering financial support, employment opportunities, education, and training are essential, other measures are needed for achieving the successful integration of escapees in the South. This could be accomplished by creating strong support networks for escapees, both with fellow North Koreans as well as with South Koreans, as the latter could help facilitate communication and smoothen their assimilation and integration processes.

Another measure for the improvement of the integration process should specifically involve young escapees. Communication and collaboration between North Korean and South Korean students as a form of a school program is key in building relationships that benefit everyone. This engagement may also help in debunking prejudices among the South Korean youth against North Korean escapees, encouraging engagement and understanding among the two. These strategies may foster a critical effect in helping settle young escapees and ensure that they have the tools to thrive in their new homes.

The challenges that North Korean escapees continue to endure following their escape from the Kim regime remain difficult and overlooked. The efforts of the South Korean government in resettling most of the escapees is commendable, especially when this is a task most other countries do not fulfill. The U.S., for example, has accepted only about 220 North Korean escapees since 2006 while China has a history of forcefully repatriating escapees back to the North. Yet, it is also clear that efforts to resettle escapees in the South and to help them assimilate into such a different society are not perfect, as escapees suffer from a number of hardships that are not yet being adequately addressed. These hardships, many of which stem from the culture shock of escaping North Korea, can be difficult and long-lasting to tackle. However, supporting North Korean escapees is not only essential for their resettlement but also to help them fulfill their potential. Otherwise, the financial struggles, mental health problems, and discrimination many escapees face upon their arrival will remain the exclusive reality faced by the North Korean community resettled in the South.

References

Bluth, Christoph. “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against discrimination in the South.” The Conversation. January 7, 2022. https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle- against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.

Cha, Sangmi and Jon Herskovitz. “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South.” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying- lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.

Couch, Christina. “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea.” PBS. February 16, 2017. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.

Kim, Hagyun and Kwanghyuk Kim. “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter- Korean identity through a process of being one of them.” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 288-309. https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.

Kim, Minjung, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee. “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence from North Korean Refugees.” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2505-2527. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.

Kim, So-Yeong. Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi. “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents.” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148-151. https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.

Kim, Hee Jin and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya. “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1188-1201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.

Koh, Ho Youn and Kyungmin Baek. “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees.” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 5-20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.

Lee, Grace J. M. “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea.” Policy Options. August 28, 2023. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Lee, Hyosun. “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea.” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.

Lee, Mi Kyung, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu. “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea.” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.

Lee, Yeon Jung. Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol, Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee. “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea.” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-460. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.

Myeong, Hwayeon and Ahlam Lee. “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices.” British Educational Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 872-899. https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.

Nam, Boyoung and Ijun Hong. “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea.” Violence Against Women (2023): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.

Nam, Boyoung. Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim. “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation.” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564-571. https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.

Nam, Boyoung, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong. “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea.” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024). https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.

Noh, Jin-Won, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu. “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey.” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 26-44. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.

Park, Mi Yung. “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea.” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 271-287. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.

Park, Soim, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan. “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.

Shin, Hyonhee. “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life.” Reuters. January 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.

“South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000.” BBC. March 5, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.

South Korean Ministry of Unification. “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors.” https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.

Williams, Sophie. “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?” BBC. February 16, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.

Yu, Shieun, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo. “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees.” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1019-1029. https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.

Andrew Chan is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy from the University of Toronto. Currently a research intern at HRNK, he is passionate and interested about matters of global security, global policy, and human rights issues.

[1] Hee Jin Kim and Madhu Sudhan Atteraya, “Factors Associated with North Korean Refugees’ Intention to Resettle Permanently in South Korea,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 8 (2018): 1189, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777266.

[2] “South Korea boosts reward for defectors from North to $860,000,” BBC, March 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39170614.

[3] Sophie Williams, “North Korean defectors: What happens when they get to the South?,” BBC, February 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49346262.

[4] South Korean Ministry of Unification, “Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors,” (2023), https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.

[5] So-Yeong Kim, Hye-Min Ku, and Seong-Woo Choi, “The growth status of North Korean refugee adolescents in South Korea: comparison with South Korean adolescents,” Annals of Human Biology 50, no. 1 (2023): 148, https://doi.org/10.1080/03014460.2023.2183988.

[6] Ibid., 148-149.

[7] Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, and Shieun Yu, “Income Among North Korean Refugees in South Korea: A Longitudinal Survey,” North Korean Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44526824.

[8] Sangmi Cha and Jon Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors Are Dying Lonely Deaths in Wealthy South,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-27/north-korean-defectors-are-dying-lonely-deaths-in-wealthy-south.

[9] Hyonhee Shin, “Returned N. Korea defector struggled to resettle in South, lived meagre life,” Reuters, January 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-nkorea-defector-struggled-resettle-south-lived-meagre-life-2022-01-04/.

[10] Cha and Herskovitz, “North Korean Defectors.”

[11] Williams, “North Korean defectors.”

[12] Minjung Kim, Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee, “Economic System and Financial Literacy: Evidence

from North Korean Refugees,” Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 53, no. 11 (2017): 2522, https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2017.1340880.

[13] Ho Youn Koh and Kyungmin Baek, “Digital Capital of North Korean Refugees,” North Korean Review 19, no. 2 (2023): 6-7, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27267193.

[14] Boyoung Nam and Ijun Hong, “Trauma Exposure, Social Networks, and Suicide Risk Among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea,” Violence Against Women (2023): 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012231170861.

[15] Ibid., 2.

[16] Mi Kyung Lee, Ocksim Kim, Kyoung‑A. Kim, and Sang Hui Chu, “Factors associated with posttraumatic growth among North Korean defectors in South Korea,” Scientific Reports 12, 3989 (2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-07945-3.

[17] Ibid., 1-2.

[18] Boyoung Nam, Jae Yop Kim, Jordan DeVylder, and JoonBeom Kim, “Suicidal Ideation and Attempt among North Korean Refugee Women in South Korea: Factors that Distinguish Suicide Attempt from Suicidal Ideation,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 51, no. 3 (2021): 564, https://doi.org/10.1111/sltb.12742.

[19] Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder wherein the affected perceives their surrounding environment, unfamiliar spaces, or large crowds to be unsafe, causing them to become anxious and reluctant to leave their homes.

[20] Yeon Jung Lee, Hyeon-Ah Lee, Kyong Ah Kim, Myungjae Baik, Jong-Woo Paik, Jinmi Seol, Sang Min Lee, Eun-Jin Lee, Haewoo Lee, Meerae Lim, Jin Yong Jun, Seon Wan Ki, Hong Jin Jeon, Sun Jung Kwon, and Hwa-Young Lee, “Standardized Suicide Prevention Program for Gatekeeper Intervention of North Korean Defectors in South Korea,” Psychiatry Investigation 20, no. 5 (2023): 452-453, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2023.0007.

[21] Christina Couch, “The Psychological Trauma of Defecting from North Korea,” PBS, February 16, 2017, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/north-korea-mental-health/.

[22] Shieun Yu, Jungeun Jang, Jin-Won Noh, Young Dae Kwon, Hyunchun Park, and Jong-Min Woo, “What Is It to Be Mentally Healthy from the North Korean Refugees’ Perspective?: Qualitative Research on the Changes in Mental Health Awareness among the North Korean Refugees,” Psychiatry Investigation 15, no. 11 (2018): 1020, https://doi.org/10.30773/pi.2018.09.10.

[23] Nam and Hong, “Trauma Exposure,” 4-10.

[24] Boyoung Nam, Sangyoon Han, and Ijun Hong, “Societal and community factors facilitating cultural adaptation and mental health of North Korean refugee women in South Korea,” American Journal of Community Psychology (2024): 2, https://doi.org/10.1002/ajcp.12757.

[25] Christoph Bluth, “The North Korean who went home: many defectors struggle against discrimination in the South,” The Conversation, January 7, 2022, https://theconversation.com/the-north-korean-who-went-home-many-defectors-struggle-against-discrimination-in-the-south-174366.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Mi Yung Park, “‘I don’t want to be distinguished by others’: language ideologies and identity construction among North Korean refugees in South Korea,” Language Awareness 31, no. 3 (2022): 272, https://doi.org/10.1080/09658416.2020.1867563.

[28] Hyosun Lee, “Ungrateful Refugees: North Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Korean Studies 48 (2024): 318, https://doi.org/10.1353/ks.2024.a931005.

[29] Ibid., 336.

[30] Soim Park, Jennifer A. Wenzel, and Pamela J. Surkan, “How do North Korean refugees in South Korea utilize social support to cope with acculturative stress?,” SSM – Mental Health 4 (2023): 1-2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2023.100272.

[31] Ibid., 7-8.

[32] Hagyun Kim and Kwanghyuk Kim, “North Korean refugee students’ strategy of school engagement and its impact on identity in South Korea: “aspiration towards an inter-Korean identity through a process of being one of them,” Multicultural Education Review 15, no. 4 (2023): 304-305, https://doi.org/10.1080/2005615X.2024.2323700.

[33] Hwayeon Myeong and Ahlam Lee, “Intergroup friendships between South Korean hosts and North Korean refugees: Implications for educational practices,” British Educational Research Journal 47, no. 4 (2021): 894, https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3698.

[34] Grace J. M. Lee, “It’s time for Canada to jumpstart efforts to support families fleeing North Korea,” Policy Options, August 28, 2023, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2023/north-korean-refugee-sponsorships.

Dedication

HRNK staff members and interns wish to dedicate this program to our colleagues Katty Chi and Miran Song.
A native of Chile and graduate of the London School of Economics, Katty became a North Korean human rights defender in her early 20s. Katty was chief of international affairs with the North Korea Strategy Center (NKSC) in Seoul from 2010 to 2014 and worked with the Seoul Office of Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) from 2019 to 2020. A remarkable member of our small North Korean human rights community, Katty brought inspiration and good humor to all. Katty passed away in Seoul in May 2020, at the young age of 32. She is survived by her parents and brother living in Chile.
A graduate of Kyung Hee University and The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Miran was a research intern at HRNK from 2012 to 2013. After graduating from Fletcher, Miran fulfilled her long-cherished dream to work in the field with international NGOs and South Korean government agencies, dedicating herself to sustainable development projects in Uganda and Ethiopia. A staunch human rights defender and passionate humanitarian, she lived her short, difficult, and meaningful life feeling blessed by the opportunity to help others. She passed away in 2022, at the young age of 31.
With the YPWP series, we endeavor to honor Katty and Miran’s life and work.
Greg Scarlatoiu
If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected].

nkhiddengulag.org

3. Sanctioned N. Korean official handling missile programs attends arms exhibition in Moscow: report

Sanctioned N. Korean official handling missile programs attends arms exhibition in Moscow: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 13, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 13 (Yonhap) -- A key North Korean official in charge of the country's ballistic missile programs has attended an arms exhibition in Moscow, a news report showed Tuesday, amid deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia.

Kim Jong-sik, the first vice department director of the ruling Workers' Party, was seen attending the opening ceremony of Army 2024, an international military-technical forum, on Monday (local time), Radio Free Asia, a U.S. media outlet, reported, citing Russian news media.

Kim, known as a key figure in North Korea's ballistic missile development, has accompanied leader Kim Jong-un on inspections of missile launches. He was awarded the title of "hero of the republic" for his contribution to North Korea's development of a long-range rocket in 2012.

The North's official has been sanctioned by U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, adopted in 2017 in the wake of North Korea's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. South Korea, the United States and the European Union have also added him to a list of their unilateral sanctions.

U.N. members should ban the entry of an official sanctioned by UNSC resolutions, but Russia appears to have invited a North Korean delegation to the arms forum amid deepening ties between the two nations.

North Korea and Russia have been bolstering military ties, with the North being accused of supplying Russia with ammunition for use in Moscow's war in Ukraine in exchange for aid and suspected technological assistance for its space program.

The North's leader Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin held summit talks in Pyongyang in June and signed a new partnership treaty that includes a mutual defense clause.

This file image, captured from footage of North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Feb. 19, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (R) and Kim Jong-sik, vice director of the munitions industry department of the ruling Workers' Party. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 13, 2024

4. Hanwha Aerospace's K9 Thunder successfully tests US M982 Excalibur 155mm precision shells in Arizona

The ROK and the US: partners in the Arsenal of Democracy.

Hanwha Aerospace's K9 Thunder successfully tests US M982 Excalibur 155mm precision shells in Arizona

9 Aug, 2024 - 8:02 Defense News Army 2024

armyrecognition.com · by Jérôme Brahy

Defense News Army 2024

On August 6, 2024, Hanwha Aerospace announced that the K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled howitzer had successfully demonstrated interoperability with Raytheon's M982A1 Excalibur precision-guided extended range 155mm artillery projectile. This was confirmed following a live-firing test conducted in April at the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground, near the Arizona-California border.

Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link

The K9 Thunder had successfully demonstrated interoperability with Raytheon's M982A1 Excalibur precision-guided extended range 155mm artillery projectile, specifically targeting an objective nearly 50 kilometers away. (Picture source: Yuma Proving Ground)

The purpose of the test was to verify the K9's compatibility with Excalibur Ib projectiles, specifically targeting an objective nearly 50 kilometers away using various fuze function modes. The test results indicated that a projectile fired from the K9 Thunder achieved a circular error probability (CEP) of less than one meter in the Point Detonating mode, effectively hitting the target. Additionally, another projectile detonated five meters above the target in the Height of Burst mode, demonstrating its capability to engage targets with precision.

This demonstration establishes the K9 as one of the artillery systems globally verified to operate with Excalibur guided munitions, which have been deployed since 2014. The Excalibur projectile, developed through collaboration between Raytheon Missiles & Defense and BAE Systems Bofors, is designed for precision strikes, with an accuracy that confines targets within a radial miss distance of fewer than two meters. This precision extends the operational range of various artillery systems, with the .39-caliber variant reaching 40 kilometers, the .52-caliber extending to 50 kilometers, and the .58-caliber capable of striking targets at 70 kilometers. The Excalibur's efficiency allows it to replace multiple conventional munitions with a single, targeted strike.

The M982 Excalibur is a 155mm GPS-guided, extended-range artillery shell designed to deliver accurate, first-round effects in various weather conditions, with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of about four meters. The projectile is capable of engaging targets at ranges up to 40 kilometers, making it suitable for precision strikes on high-value targets while reducing collateral damage. First deployed in 2007 during operations in Iraq, the Excalibur has also been used in other conflicts, including in Afghanistan.

An enhanced version, the M982A1 Excalibur, known as Excalibur Increment Ib, entered full-rate production in 2018. This version includes improved jamming-resistant GPS technology and updated software that allows for user-defined projectile trajectories. The M982A1 also offers an extended range, reaching up to 70 kilometers when fired from advanced artillery systems such as the XM1299 Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA). The combination of extended range and precision contributes to the M982A1's role in modern artillery operations.

Raytheon has continued to develop the Excalibur system, introducing variants such as the Excalibur S, which includes a semi-active laser seeker for engaging moving targets in environments where GPS is denied, and the Excalibur N5, a naval variant designed for 5-inch naval guns. These developments reflect the ongoing adaptations within the Excalibur system for both land and maritime operations.

As of early 2024, the K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled howitzer holds over 50% of the global market share for self-propelled howitzers. Its adoption is due to its technical specifications, including a high firing rate, long-range capabilities, and mobility in various terrains. These features have made it a choice for armies looking to modernize their artillery systems. The recent export of the K9 to Romania will expand its market presence among NATO members, joining other countries such as Norway, Estonia, Turkey, Poland, and Finland, which have already procured these systems. Additionally, the K9 has been exported to Australia and Egypt.

As of early 2024, the K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled howitzer holds over 50% of the global market share for self-propelled howitzers, due to a high firing rate, long-range capabilities, and mobility in various terrains. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

Introduced into service in 1999, the K9 Thunder offers improvements in range, firepower, and mobility compared to previous artillery systems like the K55 self-propelled howitzers. Since development began in 1989, led by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and involving several South Korean companies, approximately 1,800 K9 units have been produced. The K9 project was initially developed to address North Korea's extensive artillery capabilities.

The K9 Thunder is equipped with a 155mm L52-caliber main gun capable of firing various NATO-standard munitions, with a maximum firing range between 18 to 50 kilometers, depending on the ammunition type. It can deliver three rounds in 15 seconds and sustain a firing rate of six to eight rounds per minute. The howitzer is armored with MIL-12560H steel, providing protection against 155mm projectile fragments, 14.5mm armor-piercing rounds, and anti-personnel mines. Powered by a 1,000-horsepower STX-MTU MT881 Ka-500 engine, the K9 can reach speeds of 67 kilometers per hour and has an operational range of approximately 480 kilometers. Its advanced navigation and fire control systems further enhance its operational efficiency.

armyrecognition.com · by Jérôme Brahy

5. US Army conduct swift deployment drill in South KoreaUS Army conduct swift deployment drill in South Korea

US Army conduct swift deployment drill in South Korea

https://defence-blog.com/us-army-conduct-swift-deployment-drill-in-south-korea/?amphttps://defence-blog.com/us-army-conduct-swift-deployment-drill-in-south-korea/?amp

By Gu Min Chul- Aug 11, 2024

Photo by Dariel J. Cortes

A U.S. armored unit recently conducted an exercise to swiftly deploy soldiers from the U.S. mainland to South Korea, as part of ongoing efforts to maintain rapid response capabilities, the U.S. Army stationed in South Korea announced on Monday.

The exercise, named Pacific Fortitude, involved a battalion from the 1st Armored Division in Texas, which was mobilized last month to a U.S. military base near Daegu, approximately 233 kilometers southeast of Seoul. According to the 8th Army, the troops were notified of the drills on July 17, and just six days later, they began drawing out combat equipment stored at Camp Carroll, in collaboration with the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command.

“Having this critical equipment already in place allows us to project this power at the right time and at the right speed,” Brig. Gen. Jin Pak, commander of the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, said in a statement. “This deployment readiness exercise proves to our allies that the United States is committed to the defense of the ROK-U.S. alliance,” he added, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.

Photos released by the 8th Army showed U.S. troops transporting M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles at the base, preparing them for deployment to a training area. The exercise tested not only the soldiers’ rapid deployment capabilities but also the effectiveness of pre-positioned equipment already stationed in South Korea.

This routine exercise is part of a broader series of military activities designed to enhance the readiness and interoperability of U.S. and South Korean forces.

6. Sent to flood-ravaged areas, North Korean soldiers steal supplies, townspeople say

What will be the tipping point that will spark the resistance?

It will be when there is a complete loss of coherency in the north Korean Peoplease Army and when the nKPA no longer supports the regime. This will be combined with the inability of the regime to govern the northern territory from Pyongyang.

Sent to flood-ravaged areas, North Korean soldiers steal supplies, townspeople say

The troops have not been supplied with food and fuel, so they raid gardens and homes.

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-flood-army-soldiers-stealing-looting-food-supplies-relief-yalu-river-08122024155114.html

By Son Hyemin for RFA Korean

2024.08.12

Personnel cheer and wave flags at a ceremony before being sent to take part in the restoration and reconstruction after flood damage hit North Pyongan Province in late July, in front of the "April 25 House of Culture" in Pyongyang, August 6, 2024.

KCNA VIA KNS/AFP

North Korean soldiers mobilized to rebuild flood-hit towns are stealing food and other supplies because they have been given none by the government, upsetting townspeople, residents told Radio Free Asia.

The troops are part of a new unit called the Paektusan Hero Youth Shock Brigade tasked with rebuilding efforts after heavy rains late last month caused flooding near the mouth of the Yalu River, which separates North Korea from China,

Several inhabited islands in the Yalu were submerged, and parts of towns on its banks were inundated as floodwaters reached their height on July 28.

Last week, troops arrived on those islands and immediately built a barracks, a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (centre R) gestures while seeing off personnel being sent for the restoration and reconstruction after flood damage hit North Pyongan Province in late July, in front of the "April 25 House of Culture" in Pyongyang, Aug. 6, 2024. (KCNA VIA KNS/AFP)

“But the government did not supply materials,” she said. “The brigade salvaged wood and bricks from houses that collapsed from the flood and built temporary lodging.”

The government also did not provide food, so the soldiers were responsible for feeding themselves until government supplies arrived.

“They went around private gardens that had been swept away by flood, they picked fallen corn ears and roasted them,” she said.

Eventually, the party committee from the city of Sinuiju, which lies across the Yalu from China’s Dandong, gave the troops imported corn, but told each platoon that they still needed to provide their own vegetables and fuel, the resident said.

“They went into the city at night and stole things such as coal and salted cabbage from storage in private homes that were not damaged by floods,” she added.

The issue of North Korean defectors being repatriated by surprise will be discussed at the UN later this month

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/human_rights_defector/repatriation-08122024151621.html

WASHINGTON-Jamin Anderson andersonj@rfa.org

2024.08.12

Photo of Kim Cheol-ok taken in China in 2022 [provided by Dr. Kim Hyuk. Resale and DB prohibited]

/Yonhap News

00:00/04:27

Anchor : China continues to insist that the repatriation of North Korean defectors was legal and denies any illegality. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) is expected to discuss the case of Kim Chul-ok, a North Korean defector who was forcibly repatriated in October of last year , later this month . Reporter Jamin Anderson reports .

Last October , China abruptly repatriated 500 to 600 North Korean defectors out of the 2,000 or so North Korean defectors it had detained during the three- year coronavirus lockdown .

Despite international condemnation that this is a violation of international refugee law and international human rights law, China only consistently repeats the response that " the forced repatriation was a legal measure . "

“ North Koreans who illegally cross the Chinese border for economic reasons are not refugees , and they are violating China’s immigration control laws .”

This is the response released by the Chinese government on July 15th in response to a letter delivered by Ms. Kim Gyu-ri, the older sister of Ms. Kim Cheol-ok, one of the North Korean defectors who was forcibly repatriated at the time, through the secretariat of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD ) under the United Nations Human Rights Council .

The Chinese government continued to assert that “ China has always maintained a responsible attitude toward the issue of North Korean residents’ illegal entry into the country , properly handling it in accordance with domestic law , international law , and humanitarian principles , and protecting the rights and interests of relevant persons in accordance with the law . ”

It is virtually identical to the position expressed at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland in March .

The Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), a civil society organization that wrote and sent the letter on behalf of Kim Gyu-ri, made public the Chinese government's response on the 11th .

Shin Hee-seok, a legal analyst for the group, told Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 12th , “ China is ignoring procedures and classifying all North Korean defectors as ‘ illegal residents . ’ ”

Shin Hee-seok, Legal Analyst : Every North Korean defector needs to be individually examined to determine whether or not they are refugees , but ( the Chinese government ) claims that they are all not refugees without such an examination, which is a contradiction in the Chinese government's logic .

He also expressed disappointment, saying, “ The Chinese government has not commented on Ms. Kim Gyu-ri’s request for an explanation of the arrest and repatriation of Mr. Cheol-ok and the procedures involved . ”

The Transition Justice Working Group sent a response refuting China's claims on the 8th .

In addition, Ms. Kim Gyu-ri and her group simultaneously delivered a letter to the North Korean government through the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention last May , but North Korea has not responded as of August 12 .

Accordingly, it has been reported that the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention will discuss the case of Mr. Kim Cheol-ok at its 100th session to be held at the end of this month and make public its decision .

If the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concludes that China's forced repatriation of North Koreans violates international law and constitutes arbitrary detention, the United Nations will recommend that China and North Korea cease arbitrary detention and release Kim Chol-ok .

The new legal analyst said that the significance of this process is that it records human rights abuses and violations of international law in China and North Korea, and continues to publicize the issue of victims of forced repatriation, including Mr. Kim Cheol-ok, to pressure the governments of both countries .

It is also expected that the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of North Korea scheduled for November this year will be able to urge a resolution to the issue of forced repatriation based on the decision of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention .

“Please send my brother back to the North.”

Chinese representative opposes UN's discussion of 'forced repatriation': "Stop attacking China"

[Calling for North Korean human rights in Geneva] ③ "I hope the same tragedy won't happen again"

In a phone call with RFA that day, Kim Gyu-ri said, “ It’s almost been a year since my brother was repatriated to North Korea, and I’m getting more and more scared ,” but she did not give up hope that her brother is still alive .

Kim Gyu-ri : I 've used brokers 3-4 times . But now ( the story about Cheol-ok has become known to the world ) , the situation has gotten so bad that I haven't heard any news about ( my brother ) at all . I can't find him at all . My Cheol-ok doesn't even know Korean, and there's no family in North Korea who can help him , so I told him that if I don't speak up, my brother will die, so I have no choice but to do this . It's scary as time goes by . But I'm sure that my brother is alive, so I'll keep going until the end .

Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Kim Sang-il

8. White House: “Cannot Confirm Reports That North Korean Missiles Were Involved in Russian Attack”

It certainly seems plausible.

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

White House: “Cannot Confirm Reports That North Korean Missiles Were Involved in Russian Attack”

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/nkmissile-08122024142557.html

WASHINGTON-Park Jae-woo parkja@rfa.org

2024.08.12

Video posted by the Kyiv National Emergency Management Agency shows the bodies of a man and a child being carried between firefighters clearing the rubble.

/Kiwi National Emergency Management Agency

00:00/02:26

Anchor : Ukraine announced that Russia fired a ballistic missile at North Korea, resulting in civilian casualties, but the White House said it has not yet confirmed this . Reporter Park Jae-woo reports .

The White House said on the 12th that it “cannot confirm” the announcement that the Russian missiles that attacked the Ukrainian capital of Kiev included North Korean materials .

John Kirby, the White House National Security Advisor, answered a question about this at a press conference that day.

“However, we have seen in recent months that Russia has used North Korea’s ballistic missiles for offensive purposes,” he said . “ If true, this would be related to Vladimir Putin’s efforts to use North Korea’s offensive weapons,” he

added. “Putin is currently in a desperate situation for military supplies . ”

Earlier, on the 11th, the Kiev State Emergency Service ( ДСНС київщин ) posted a video claiming that a residential building in the Brobarsky district was hit by a North Korean KN-23 missile fired by Russia .

Russia resumes attacks with 'North Korean ballistic missiles' after 5 months

“Russia, Ukrainian battlefield use of North Korean armored vehicles”

The KN-23 is a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) that North Korea made by copying the Russian missile 'Iskander'. It is reported to be capable of irregular maneuvers such as rapid ascent while flying at low altitude at the target point .

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on social media today that there were casualties from a North Korean missile attack.

President Zelenskyy : A North Korean missile killed a father and son today in the Kiev region . Over the past week, more than 800 bombs and missiles have been aimed at Ukraine , some of which were apparently supplied by North Korea .

Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Editor Han Deok-in

9. Germany's membership in UN Command signals commitment to Indo-Pacific

Another link between Europe and the INDOPACIFIC (an IP4-NATO connection).

Germany's membership in UN Command signals commitment to Indo-Pacific

August 08, 2024 9:32 PM

By Christy Lee

https://www.voanews.com/a/germany-s-membership-in-un-command-signals-commitment-to-indo-pacific-/7735812.html

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, at left in front, is pictured at Camp Humphreys, the U.S. military headquarters in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul, Aug. 2, 2024, during a ceremony where Germany officially joined the U.S.-led U.N. Command in South Korea.

washington —

Germany's entry into the U.S.-led U.N. Command, which expanded the multinational body tasked with defending South Korea against North Korea, reflects growing fears in Europe and the U.S. that multiple wars that could break out simultaneously across the globe, said analysts.

North Korea this week denounced Germany's membership in the U.N. Command (UNC), calling the expansion an attempt by the U.S. to create an Asian version of NATO, according to state-run KCNA.

The move will "inevitably aggravate the military and political situation on the Korean Peninsula and the rest of the region," KCNA said Tuesday.

Pushing back against Pyongyang's criticism, the German Federal Foreign Office told VOA Korean in a statement on Tuesday that by joining UNC, it is "sending a signal for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and strengthen[ing] our commitment in the Indo-Pacific."

The statement continued, "Just as others are there for us, we are there for others when they need us."

Germany joined UNC on August 2, becoming the 18th member of the body charged with maintaining the armistice on the Korean Peninsula during peacetime. In the event of war, the UNC would coordinate the movement of troops and weapons from its members to the Combined Forces Command of the U.S. and South Korea.

Enhanced deterrence

Markus Garlauskas, who served as the U.S. national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2014 to 2020, said the UNC's main role is to defend South Korea but that "expanding the number of countries contributing to UNC helps enhance deterrence ... of the escalation of aggression in the entire region."

This is particularly important because a conflict on the Korean Peninsula could escalate into a conflict with China, said Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The U.S. maintains several military bases and approximately 28,500 troops in South Korea.

But with wars raging in Ukraine and Gaza and the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, analysts said the addition of new members to the UNC makes it easier for the United States to respond to crises elsewhere without having to send additional forces that may be needed to defend South Korea if the North attacks.

"The U.S. military is not large enough to fight multiple contingencies around the world" by itself, said David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy.

The U.S. Commission on the National Defense Strategy released a report in July saying the U.S. must prepare to deal with simultaneous conflicts coordinated by China and Russia and involving countries such as North Korea and Iran, amounting to a "global war."

Bruce Bennett, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, said, "The more forces that are available to potentially assist South Korea, the better it is for the U.S. if conflict occurs in both Taiwan and in Korea."

By joining the UNC, "Germany is hoping South Korea will also become more supportive of the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression" by sending ammunition and other weapons, Bennett said.

South Korea has withheld sending lethal weapons directly to Ukraine while providing nonlethal weapons.

Germany's membership in UNC follows a NATO summit last month in Washington where the alliance agreed to cooperate closely on security with the Indo-Pacific countries of South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Germany's participation in UNC demonstrates "a tangible step" toward that defense cooperation, Garlauskas said. He noted that Pyongyang's and Beijing's support of Russia's war against Ukraine "directly threatens Germany security."

Germany, along with other NATO member states, has been arming Ukraine so it can defend against Russia, which has been threatening NATO with nuclear strikes. The U.S. and its NATO allies have condemned China for supporting Russia's defense industry and North Korea for sending munitions to aid its war in Ukraine.

James Przystup, senior fellow and Japan chair specializing in alliance management in the Indo-Pacific at the Hudson Institute, said Germany, the U.K., France, the Netherlands and the EU "have all released Indo-Pacific strategy that recognizes that stability in the region is critical to Europe's own prosperity."

Those countries have also expressed their commitment to supporting a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, he said. "But this is far from the emergence of an Indo-Pacific NATO."

10. N. Korea slams top U.S. officials' op-ed on Biden's diplomat feats

Of course the Propaganda and Agitation Department reads the Washington Post and every other major newspaper in the US.

N. Korea slams top U.S. officials' op-ed on Biden's diplomat feats | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 13, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 13 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Tuesday denounced top U.S. officials' joint opinion piece that touted "unprecedented" trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan as feats of U.S. President Joe Biden's Indo-Pacific diplomacy.

In the piece published in The Washington Post last Monday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan highlighted "tremendous results" of Biden's policy strategy.

They said the Indo-Pacific area's serious security challenges, such as North Korea's nuclear saber-rattling, have effects far beyond the region, and assessed the Camp David trilateral summit last year spurred "unprecedented" defense and economic cooperation among the U.S., South Korea and Japan.

Calling the op-ed a "childish" scribble, North Korea accused the Biden administration of glossing over its hostile policy toward Pyongyang at a time when its term is coming to an end.

"(The strengthening of the trilateral cooperation) has not brought benefits to the two vassal forces, but rather the yoke of cannon fodder of a nuclear war that their peoples cannot avoid," the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said in a commentary.

The report said the Biden administration's hostile policy against North Korea has intensified security jitters in the U.S. and made itself a "fixed target plate" that can be easily aimed at.

"Our power will continuously evolve and there will be no limit in bolstering our military force," the KCNA said.

This file photo, taken Aug. 20, 2023, shows South Koraen President Yoon Suk Yeol (L), U.S. President Joe Biden (C) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida holding a joint press conference at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 13, 2024

11. Russia sends hundreds of goats to N. Korea amid deepening bilateral ties

Goat diplomacy?

(LEAD) Russia sends hundreds of goats to N. Korea amid deepening bilateral ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 13, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in last 2 paras)

SEOUL, Aug. 13 (Yonhap) -- Russia's agriculture safety watchdog has approved the shipment of 447 goats to North Korea after reviewing related veterinary and sanitary conditions, according to its website, amid deepening cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow.

After veterinary inspection, 432 female and 15 male goats were sent to a North Korean trading company in the first batch of exports of live animals to the North, according to a statement posted on the website of Russia's Rosselkhoznadzor on Friday.

The shipment was intended to be delivered from Russia's Leningrad region to North Korea's border city of Rason, it said.

The move came as North Korea and Russia have been bolstering the scope of their cooperation following last year's summit between the North's leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The shipment of goats appears to be aimed at providing dairy products to North Korean children amid its chronic food shortages.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 21, 2014, shows a North Korean military farm raising goats andn other livestock. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea's state media reported on Aug. 9 that goat farms with a large capacity have been built in parts of the western port city of Nampho.

"As a result, foundation has been consolidated to smoothly provide dairy products for the children in the municipality," the Korean Central News Agency said, adding that the municipality is spurring efforts to increase the number of goats of good breed in a bid to boost the output of dairy products.

At a plenary party meeting in June 2021, Kim called for setting a party policy to supply all children across the country with dairy products and other nutritious food at the expense of state funds.

Around one in six North Korean children under age 5 were suffering from stunted growth in 2022 due to malnutrition, according to a report jointly released by the U.N. Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and the World Bank Group.

The child stunting rate in the impoverished state was measured at 16.8 percent, or 285,000 children in the age group, the report said. But the figure marked a decline from 2012, when 411,300 North Korean children were estimated to have suffered from stunted growth.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 13, 2024

12. Yoon voices frustration over 'national foundation day' controversy

History matters.

When a new free and unified Korea is established will 1945 still matter? Would a new free and unified Korea – A United Republic of Korea or a United Republic of Corea – be better served by using a new date for a new Korea or should it go back to 1919? The Korean people must decide.

Yoon voices frustration over 'national foundation day' controversy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · August 13, 2024

SEOUL, Aug. 13 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol has expressed frustration over the recent controversy surrounding when should be South Korea's national founding day, saying it is an issue that does no good for people's livelihoods.

The controversy began after Yoon appointed Kim Hyoung-suk, a figure accused of harboring pro-Japanese views, as the new president of the Independence Hall of Korea. Kim's past remarks alleging South Korea came into being when its government was established in 1948 led to suspicions his appointment was a precursor to designating Aug. 15, 1948, as national foundation day.

The question of when South Korea came into being has long been a subject of ideological debate, with some arguing it was April 11, 1919, when a provisional government was established during Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

"What good is this to the people who are struggling to make ends meet?" Yoon was quoted as recently telling his aides, referring to the controversy.

The main opposition Democratic Party and the Heritage of Korean Independence, a state-funded association of independence fighters and their descendants, have vowed to boycott the Aug. 15 Liberation Day ceremony hosted by the government unless the appointment is withdrawn.

"The government and the presidential office have never mentioned a national foundation day, nor have they tried to push for it," a different presidential official told Yonhap News Agency.

In this file photo, President Yoon Suk Yeol delivers a congratulatory speech during a national convention of the ruling People Power Party to elect the party's new leader at a convention center in Goyang, north of Seoul, on July 23, 2024. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · August 13, 2024

13. Pres. Yoon replaces defense minister and NSO chief

Pres. Yoon replaces defense minister and NSO chief

donga.com

Posted August. 13, 2024 08:12,

Updated August. 13, 2024 08:12

Pres. Yoon replaces defense minister and NSO chief. August. 13, 2024 08:12. by Hyung-Jun Hwang constant25@donga.com.

On Monday, President Yoon Suk Yeol nominated Kim Yong-hyun, the director of the Presidential Security Service, as minister of National Defense. Additionally, he nominated current National Defense Minister Shin Won-sik as the director of the National Security Office, and National Security Office Chief Jang Ho-jin as the newly appointed special advisor for Foreign Affairs and Security. This marks the first reorganization of the foreign affairs and security team in eight months, following Director Jang’s appointment when former National Security Office Director Cho Tae-yong transitioned to the role of Director of the National Intelligence Service in December last year.

During a briefing held at the Presidential Office in Yongsan, Chief of Staff Jeong Jin-seok explained that Kim, who was the first director of the National Security Office under the current administration, was chosen for his deep understanding of the president’s defense strategies. A retired lieutenant general and former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Headquarters, Kim is known for his close ties to President Yoon, having been a senior to him at Chungam High School and playing a key role in the president's security policy during the election campaign.

Minister Shin, who has held his current position for just 10 months, was also selected to lead the National Security Office. Chief Secretary Jeong highlighted Shin’s extensive knowledge of current security issues, which made him the ideal candidate to ensure continuity in national security efforts.

Jang Ho-jin, now nominated as the administration’s first Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs and Security, is tasked with addressing strategic challenges, particularly in economic security areas such as nuclear energy and defense.

President Yoon’s decision to reorganize the foreign affairs and security team is believed to have been influenced by the rapidly evolving global landscape and diplomatic challenges encountered at the NATO summit last month. The shift from diplomatic expertise to security specialization at the top of the National Security Office suggests a recalibration of priorities. However, the timing of Jang's replacement, just three months before the U.S. presidential election, has raised concerns among diplomats.

한국어

donga.com

14. North Korea reports 'fierce' heat as peninsula bakes

The Korean people in the north continue to suffer.

North Korea reports 'fierce' heat as peninsula bakes

The Korea Times · August 13, 2024

A North Korean citizen wipes his sweat with a handkerchief in this photo captured from North Korea's Central TV in this July 20, 2023, photo. Yonhap

North Korea is baking in a "fierce" heatwave, a weather agency official said Tuesday, with the mercury forecast to reach as high as 37 degrees Celsius and South Korea also enduring extreme temperatures.

The North was recently hit by severe flooding in its northern regions near China, with state media reporting on high-level efforts to mitigate the impact of "disastrous abnormal weather."

On Tuesday, Kim Kwang Hyok, an official at North Korea's State Hydro-Meteorological Administration, told AFP the country had "witnessed the fierce heat in recent days" including in the capital Pyongyang.

"Severe heat of 33 to 37 (degrees Celsius) is foreseen in some areas. That's why we announced a heatwave warning until 14th of August," he said.

"The State Hydro-Meteorological Administration is focusing on forecasting the fierce heat and is striving to inform... certain areas (so) that they can take necessary measures," he added.

South of the border, Seoul's interior ministry said that as of Tuesday 21 people had died from suspected heat-related causes this year as the country records unusually high temperatures.

South Korea is experiencing a heat wave, with the weather agency reporting a high Monday of 38.7C in the city of Yeoju, in Gyeonggi province.

It also flagged the so-called "tropical night" phenomenon — where overnight temperatures do not drop below 25C — which has happened for 22 straight days, the third-longest such streak since records began.

South Korea's electricity demand also hit an all-time high on Monday as the country's population battled the ongoing heat wave with air conditioners and fans.

By contrast, the impoverished North has long endured power shortages, and experts say most residents have no access to air conditioning.

"Even in the capital city of Pyongyang, the wealthiest region in the country, only about 0.1 percent of the city's total population would be able to turn on an air conditioner when they want to," Ahn Chan-il, a defector-turned-researcher who runs the World Institute for North Korea Studies, told AFP.

He said that the North would never disclose heat casualties but that the number of deaths could be many times higher than in the South.

South Korean media have reported that the number of dead and missing in the North due to the recent flooding could be as high as 1,500.

However, leader Kim Jong Un last week dismissed the reports as a "grave provocation" and "an insult to the flood-stricken people who are all safe and well." (AFP)

The Korea Times · August 13, 2024

15. What Uganda has that North Korea does not

What Uganda has that North Korea does not - Daily NK English

By my estimate, over 60% of North Koreans live below this threshold, with some surviving on less than $1 daily

By Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University - August 13, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · August 13, 2024

FILE PHOTO: In this photo taken in Namyang, North Hamgyong Province, people can be seen walking and sitting on a street. (©Daily NK)

In mid-June, I visited Uganda for an agricultural survey. It fulfilled a long-held wish after turning 60 — an impossible dream had I still lived in North Korea. My key takeaway: Ugandans enjoy a better quality of life than North Koreans.

This observation echoes a memory from around 2010. A North Korean friend, returning from an African trade mission, whispered, “Even beggars eat fried chicken in Africa.” While an exaggeration, it highlighted that North Koreans lived worse than those in countries they once aided.

Uganda is considered one of North Korea’s traditional allies in Africa. President Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power since 1986, has visited North Korea three times, meeting with Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. He also sent a congratulatory message to Kim Jong Un last August. North Korea first established diplomatic relations with Uganda in 1963, but severed them in January of the following year. Later, in July 1972, diplomatic relations were restored, and in December of that year, North Korea established a permanent mission in Uganda’s capital, Kampala (North Korea withdrew its mission from Uganda in October 2023).

Many North Koreans still pride themselves on living better lives than the citizens of their African allies, but this is far from the truth. At least in my experience, Uganda is more prosperous than North Korea.

N. Koreans live in utter poverty

The World Bank defines the poverty line as $1.90 per day. By my estimate, over 60% of North Koreans live below this threshold, with some surviving on less than $1 daily.

The root cause lies in the Kim Jong Un regime’s policies focused on maintaining power. In North Korea, land ownership — crucial for food production — is unequal, and farms are vulnerable to natural disasters. While resources exist, they’re inaccessible without political connections, leaving the lower class facing starvation and malnutrition.

Recent reports indicate that in South Pyongan province’s Yeongwon county, 50% of children under 5 suffer from malnutrition due to food shortages. This statistic exemplifies how political power overshadows rational thinking in North Korean society.

In such extreme poverty, addressing basic needs is paramount. North Korea desperately needs to promote a market economy with bold institutional changes. The key to solving North Korean poverty lies in establishing systems that support a market economy. This requires North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party to embrace change, and for the North Korean people to demand such change.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University · August 13, 2024

16. Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents "Do not go to the riverbank”

The threat is similar along the DMZ between north and South.

Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents "Do not go to the riverbank”

asiapress.org

North Korean border guards patrolling the banks of the Yalu River with rifles. Photographed from the Chinese side of the North Korean border across from Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, in mid-October 2023. ASIAPRESS

◆China likely requested confirmation from North Korea

Concerns are growing that landmines potentially buried on the North Korean side of the upper Yalu River along the North Korea-China border may have been displaced due to heavy rains at the end of July. A Chinese reporting partner has reported that Chinese authorities are warning residents near the border not to approach the riverbank, and appear to have inquired to North Korea about possible landmine displacement. (JEON Song-jun / KANG Ji-won)

Railways Stopped in Northern Region, Continued Power Outages Food Shortages Lead to Increase in Robberies

◆Chinese authorities: "Report any suspicious objects immediately"

Jilin Province's Changbai County faces North Korea's Hyesan in Ryanggang Province across the Yalu River. An ASIAPRESS reporting partner residing there reported on August 7 that Chinese authorities are on high alert for the possibility of North Korean landmines being displaced due to heavy rains.

The reporting partner said they understand that the authorities have inquired to North Korea about landmine displacement and have notified nearby residents to "not go near the river and report immediately if you see any suspicious objects."

The reporting partner also said that a Chinese border patrol official mentioned the possibility of landmines washing over from North Korea.

There have been previous reports that the Kim Jong-un regime planted landmines in border areas along the Yalu River to prevent defections and smuggling, but the veracity of these claims is uncertain. With the possibility of landmine displacement due to the recent floods, Chinese authorities may have requested confirmation from North Korea for the safety of their citizens.

◆Destruction of border posts and wire fences

The reporting partner also stated that they confirmed numerous North Korean border posts and wire fences were destroyed by the heavy rains. This section is opposite Districts 21 and 22 of Changbai County, near Gasan-ri in Bocheon County, where ASIAPRESS previously reported on local resident evacuations due to collapsed embankments on August 5.

◆North Korea refuses aid supplies

The reporting partner also said that North Korea is refusing to accept aid supplies.

"A group of traders who have been doing business with North Korea said they would send aid supplies to North Korea, but North Korea refused, saying there were instructions from the central government not to accept anything," he said. He added that before COVID-19, Chinese traders would send rice or cooking oil for free, and North Korean counterparts appreciated it, but now they react as if it's troublesome when offered help.

※ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

Map of North Korea. Pochon County is located north of Hyesan.

asiapress.org

17. Wildfire erupts in Paju with North Korean trash balloon suspected as cause

Explosive devices in the balloons?

Excerpt:

During firefighting efforts, responders discovered a North Korean trash balloon at the site, raising suspicion that it may have sparked the fire. An investigation is currently underway to determine the exact cause.

Over the weekend, Pyongyang launched more than 240 trash-laden balloons across the border. Only about 4 percent of the identified balloons fell in South Korean territory. These balloons are reportedly equipped with timers and explosive devices, allowing them to release waste at specific locations after a set period of flight.

Wildfire erupts in Paju with North Korean trash balloon suspected as cause

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-08-13/national/socialAffairs/Wildfire-erupts-in-Paju-with-North-Korean-trash-balloon-suspected-as-cause/2111784

Published: 13 Aug. 2024, 11:51

Updated: 13 Aug. 2024, 16:38

SEO JI-EUN
seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr

A wildfire broke out around 11:45 a.m. on Monday in a forested area in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, where a North Korean trash-carrying balloon was discovered. [KOREA FOREST SERVICE]

A wildfire broke out in Paju, Gyeonggi, with a waste-carrying balloon sent from North Korea suspected to be the cause.

The blaze was reported around 11:45 a.m. on Monday on a hill near the border, according to the Korea Forest Service and local fire authorities. Ten fire trucks and 36 personnel were dispatched, and the fire was extinguished within 23 minutes. Approximately 10 square meters (107.6 square feet) of the hill was burned, but no casualties were reported.

North launches more than 240 trash-laden balloons overnight. Only 4 percent land.

North Korea's trash balloons disrupt Incheon Airport 12 times since May

Rooftop blaze ignites after North sends more trash balloons to South Korea

During firefighting efforts, responders discovered a North Korean trash balloon at the site, raising suspicion that it may have sparked the fire. An investigation is currently underway to determine the exact cause.

Over the weekend, Pyongyang launched more than 240 trash-laden balloons across the border. Only about 4 percent of the identified balloons fell in South Korean territory. These balloons are reportedly equipped with timers and explosive devices, allowing them to release waste at specific locations after a set period of flight.

This marks the 11th time this year that North Korea has sent waste-laden balloons into South Korean territory.

The latest incident follows a similar event on July 24, when a North Korean trash balloon landed on the roof of a residential building in Goyang, Gyeonggi, and exploded, causing a fire. The blaze was linked to a timer-attached explosive device on the balloon, which ignited papers inside, leaving soot marks on the roof. No injuries were reported.

Authorities have stated that remnants of wires and other materials found in the debris of the trash balloons suggest that the fires were likely caused by explosive devices attached to the balloons.

"The trash balloons are equipped with timers that cause them to explode after a certain period, spreading the waste," an official from the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. "The proportion of balloons equipped with these devices has increased compared to the first and second launches."

On June 2, another trash balloon caused damage in Bucheon, Gyeonggi, when its explosive device detonated, damaging the roof and ceiling of a house and igniting a parked truck. The incident resulted in damages worth several million won. On May 29, a vehicle parked at a logistics center in Yeongdeungpo District in western Seoul sustained damage to its roof, resulting in property losses totaling 15.7 million won ($11,500).

In response to North Korea's balloon launches, South Korea's military has been broadcasting anti-North Korean messages via loudspeakers in front line areas. The broadcasts, which began partially on July 18, have been fully operational since July 21.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised the public to be cautious of falling objects and to report any discovered waste balloons to the nearest military unit or police station without touching them.

Update, Aug. 13: Further background on previous trash balloon launches and South Korea's response.

BY SEO JI-EUN [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]

18. Enact a Korean version of FARA

Excerpts:

FARA is essential to a liberal democracy. It guarantees the freedom of foreigners to come and go as they please — and ensures their freedom of actions and activities. But there is one precondition: This freedom is only granted if they comply with the laws and norms of the foreign country.

Likewise, Korean citizens who interact with foreign countries or foreigners also must comply with the relevant laws in those countries in order to freely interact with them. As Korea is a liberal democracy, the country is open to foreigners and foreign organizations. So it is inevitable that more and more Koreans will be engaged in activities related to them.

Korea is undeniably a global country. It receives over 13 million foreign visitors annually and hosts 1,835 foreign corporations as of 2022. Last year, there were more than 2.5 million foreigners living in Korea. There are also many Koreans who interact with them or work for these foreign entities. Under such circumstances, Korea needs a law similar to FARA. The rationale and necessity are already there.

Tuesday

August 13, 2024

dictionary + A - A

Enact a Korean version of FARA

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-08-13/opinion/columns/Enact-a-Korean-version-of-FARA/2112153

Published: 13 Aug. 2024, 20:09

Choo Jae-woo

The author is a professor of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University.

U.S. federal prosecutors recently indicted Sue Mi Terry, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), for working for the South Korean government without registering with the U.S. government. Terry is a Korean American international political scientist who has held key positions at the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House National Security Council and the National Intelligence Council.

She was accused of acting as an unregistered foreign agent for the Korean government in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Justice. Former lawmaker Choi Jae-hyung of the governing People Power Party (PPP) had introduced a bill similar to FARA in June last year, but it was automatically shelved as it had never been deliberated in the National Assembly before the session ended.

Since the Sue Mi Terry indictment reignited the need for such a law in Korea, Rep. Choi Soo-jin of the PPP reintroduced the bill. Taking into account the current reality of Korea, this bill’s significance and importance are greater than ever.

In the unsealed indictment, federal prosecutors noted that Terry had several opportunities to register under FARA. The obligation was raised during the three U.S. Congressional hearings she had attended since 2016, and in 2022, Terry even received training on FARA. In June 2023, she admitted to being a source of information for Korea during an interview with the FBI but ignored the process, according to the indictment.

FARA is essential to a liberal democracy. It guarantees the freedom of foreigners to come and go as they please — and ensures their freedom of actions and activities. But there is one precondition: This freedom is only granted if they comply with the laws and norms of the foreign country.

Likewise, Korean citizens who interact with foreign countries or foreigners also must comply with the relevant laws in those countries in order to freely interact with them. As Korea is a liberal democracy, the country is open to foreigners and foreign organizations. So it is inevitable that more and more Koreans will be engaged in activities related to them.

Korea is undeniably a global country. It receives over 13 million foreign visitors annually and hosts 1,835 foreign corporations as of 2022. Last year, there were more than 2.5 million foreigners living in Korea. There are also many Koreans who interact with them or work for these foreign entities. Under such circumstances, Korea needs a law similar to FARA. The rationale and necessity are already there.

A Korean version of FARA would require those foreign nationals and entities — and the Korean nationals involved with them — to register with the Ministry of Justice when they act as foreign agents. But the bill proposed by Rep. Choi Soo-jin needs some modifications. According to her bill, exemptions from the registration duty are listed as the persons engaged solely in activities related to religion, academia, art or scientific research, but the bill should be amended to include them. That means that citizens of allies that are important to Korea’s national defense also should be covered by the law. We must learn a lesson from the Sue Mi Terry’s indictment.

The cornerstone of Korea’s national security should be a Korean version of FARA as we can establish the foreign espionage act on top of it. Article 98 of the Criminal Act stipulates the offense of espionage. Currently, it is only applicable to espionage for the enemy state — in other words, North Korea.

In the global era after the end of Cold War, it is impossible to specify an enemy state. In the era of endless competition, the idea of trusting allies is also anachronistic. This is why we need to replace “the enemy state” with “foreign countries” in the existing Espionage Law. The first step is enacting a Korean version of FARA.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

19.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

How China and North Korea could reunite as comrades in war

The Challenges Faced by Resettled North Korean Escapees in South Korea

Dedication

Sanctioned N. Korean official handling missile programs attends arms exhibition in Moscow: report | Yonhap News Agency

Hanwha Aerospace's K9 Thunder successfully tests US M982 Excalibur 155mm precision shells in Arizona

US Army conduct swift deployment drill in South Korea

Sent to flood-ravaged areas, North Korean soldiers steal supplies, townspeople say

The issue of North Korean defectors being repatriated by surprise will be discussed at the UN later this month

White House: “Cannot Confirm Reports That North Korean Missiles Were Involved in Russian Attack”

Germany's membership in UN Command signals commitment to Indo-Pacific

N. Korea slams top U.S. officials' op-ed on Biden's diplomat feats | Yonhap News Agency

(LEAD) Russia sends hundreds of goats to N. Korea amid deepening bilateral ties | Yonhap News Agency

Yoon voices frustration over 'national foundation day' controversy | Yonhap News Agency

Pres. Yoon replaces defense minister and NSO chief

North Korea reports 'fierce' heat as peninsula bakes

What Uganda has that North Korea does not - Daily NK English

Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents "Do not go to the riverbank”

◆China likely requested confirmation from North Korea

◆Chinese authorities: "Report any suspicious objects immediately"

◆Destruction of border posts and wire fences

◆North Korea refuses aid supplies

Wildfire erupts in Paju with North Korean trash balloon suspected as cause

Related Article

North launches more than 240 trash-laden balloons overnight. Only 4 percent land.

North Korea's trash balloons disrupt Incheon Airport 12 times since May

Rooftop blaze ignites after North sends more trash balloons to South Korea

Enact a Korean version of FARA