Quotes of the Day:
"Afghanistan was America's shortest war. We won decisively. It was also our longest effort to attempt to force an impossible policy upon a foreign population. That was a miserable failure."
- Robert Jones
“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”
- President John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, January 20, 1961.
"Not only politics, but societies and their cultures make war and peace."
- Colin Gray
1. Three-point Line for Korea's Liberation
2. N.K. media urges S. Korea, U.S. to stop joint military drills, withdraw American troops
3. Moon vows continued efforts to resolve comfort women issue on memorial day
4. N. Korea slams U.S. for putting millions of residents at risk of eviction during pandemic
5. U.S. shipment of Janssen's COVID-19 vaccine to arrive in S. Korea on Sunday: embassy
6. UNICEF receives extended sanctions waiver for health-related aid to N.K.
7. The Quest for Strategic Balance and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Conundrum
8. South Korea’s Ambition to Become a Global Vaccine Hub
9. Global journalists stand with Korean media in fight against 'fake news' law
10. The Real Lessons of the Trump-Kim Love Letters
11. How Does North Korea Fill Its Coffers? Study the Picture.
12. Global Peace Foundation discusses diplomacy for unified Korea
1. Three-point Line for Korea's Liberation
This is how the propaganda and agitation department described Korean history ahead of tomorrow's Liberation Day. As we all know the US took the surrender of the Japanese south of the 38th parallel and the Soviets to the surrender of the Japanese north of it after Japan surrendered to the US and allies on August 15, 1945. There was no Kim Il-sung led anti-Japanese partisan warfare uprising against the Japanese. Yet the entire legitimacy of the Kim family regime rests upon that myth.
Three-point Line for Korea's Liberation
Pyongyang, August 13 (KCNA) -- In the period of the anti-Japanese revolutionary war, President Kim Il Sung set forth the three-point line for national liberation, an important guideline that made it possible for the Korean people to liberate the country by themselves.
To hasten the preparations for the final decisive battle against the Japanese imperialists, he put his heart and soul into mapping out a scientific operation plan for Korea's liberation. And he convened a meeting of military and political cadres of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA) in January Juche 32 (1943) to advance the three-point line for national liberation.
The three-point line was an anti-Japanese final operation plan that called for launching a general offensive of the KPRA combined with an all-people uprising and joint operations by small units of the KPRA and armed resistance organizations behind the enemy lines.
The general offensive of the KPRA, the leading force in the anti-Japanese national liberation struggle, was a main factor for victory in the final decisive battle against the Japanese imperialists. And the idea of raising an all-people uprising in response to the KPRA's general offensive and launching joint operations of small units of the KPRA and armed resistance organizations behind enemy lines was a requisite for the anti-Japanese national liberation struggle and a sure guarantee for decisively smashing the enemies.
Then, the President called a meeting of officers of the KPRA and chiefs of the small units, groups and revolutionary organizations in the Tumubong secret camp in February that year and set forth the concrete tasks and ways for carrying out the three-point line for national liberation.
On the basis of such full preparations, he issued an order on launching the general offensive for final victory, and the historic cause of Korea's liberation was realized on August 15, 1945, one week later. -0-
2. N.K. media urges S. Korea, U.S. to stop joint military drills, withdraw American troops
I wonder if the regime is sensing chaos in both the US and South Korean foreign policy and national security communities caused by internal political divisions that they think can be exploited. And I wonder if they somehow think te US withdrawal from Afghanistan can lead to a withdrawal of US troops. Regardless, the call for it gives fuel to the anti-American factions within South Korea and the progressives who blame the US presence for the lack of progress on north-South engagement, reconciliation, and peace. I wonder if playing the troop withdrawal card so vocally right now is an indication that Kim views the situation in South Korea and the US iipe for exploitation.
N.K. media urges S. Korea, U.S. to stop joint military drills, withdraw American troops | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 14 (Yonhap) -- A North Korean propaganda outlet on Saturday urged South Korea and the United States to stop their joint military exercise and pull American troops out of the South if the South wants peace on the peninsula.
Tongil Sinbo, a North Korean weekly, renewed the call in a commentary, denouncing the military drill as "an exercise taking place under the collusion with foreign forces."
"It's an operation aimed at preemptively striking our republic and a preliminary training for the complete execution of a nuclear war," the commentary read.
"It is the sentiment of the South Korean public believing that peace is guaranteed with the cessation of various practices of wars of aggression in the South, and the removal of the hostile policy by withdrawing America's aggression and its armed forces," it said.
The commentary came as the North has ramped up its criticism over the allies' annual military exercise and renewed the demand for the withdrawal of the 28,500 U.S. Forces Korea stationed in the South in recent statements by its leadership.
Early this month, Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, warned the drills would dampen the conciliatory mood created in the wake of the restoration of the communication lines, saying that it is "imperative for the U.S. to withdraw its aggression troops and war hardware deployed in South Korea."
Kim Yong-chol, head of the North's United Front Department, vowed to make South Korea and the U.S. "pay dearly" for kicking off their summertime exercise this month.
North Korea has long denounced Seoul and Washington's military drills as a rehearsal for an invasion of the North. The allies say that the exercises are defensive in nature.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Moon vows continued efforts to resolve comfort women issue on memorial day
The north and South have quite a different focus around Liberation Day (the 14th is memorial day for sexual slavery victims).
Excerpt:
In 2017, South Korea designated Aug. 14 as a memorial day to commemorate the sexual slavery victims. The date marks the day in 1991 when Kim Hak-sun, a late sexual slavery victim, publicly testified for the first time about Japan operating an organized military brothel program during the war.
Aug. 14 is also the eve of Liberation Day, which marks the end of the 1910-45 Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
Moon vows continued efforts to resolve comfort women issue on memorial day | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 14 (Yonhap) -- President Moon Jae-in vowed Saturday to strive to resolve the pending issue of wartime sexual slavery victims, saying that such efforts are the path to avoid "a repeat of the unfortunate past."
Moon made the remarks in a video message, as the country marks the national memorial day for "comfort women," a euphemism referring to sexual slavery victims who were forced to work at Japanese brothels during World War II.
"Resolving the comfort women issue is the way to not repeat the unfortunate past," Moon said. "We will make sure that the future of forgiveness and reconciliation blooms on the foundation of historical truth created through the testimonies of the elderly victims and the efforts of civil society and academia."
Moon expressed gratitude and respect to the victims.
"We were able to reflect the unforgettable history through the grandmothers. The grandmothers have changed history. I extend my deepest respect and gratitude for standing up for and proving the human dignity through many hardships and adversity they suffered before, during and after the war," Moon said.
"We will communicate and support so that the dignity of every one of them is restored as we firmly maintain the international community's principle of pursuing 'a resolution through the victims-oriented approach.'"
Moon also called for the younger generations of South Korea and Japan to deepen their understanding about the victims.
In 2017, South Korea designated Aug. 14 as a memorial day to commemorate the sexual slavery victims. The date marks the day in 1991 when Kim Hak-sun, a late sexual slavery victim, publicly testified for the first time about Japan operating an organized military brothel program during the war.
Aug. 14 is also the eve of Liberation Day, which marks the end of the 1910-45 Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
According to historians, up to 200,000 women, mostly Koreans, were coerced into sexual servitude in front-line Japanese brothels when the Korean Peninsula was a Japanese colony. There are 14 surviving victims in Korea.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. N. Korea slams U.S. for putting millions of residents at risk of eviction during pandemic
You do have to admire how the propaganda and agitation department can spin the news for its own propaganda.
N. Korea slams U.S. for putting millions of residents at risk of eviction during pandemic | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 13 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Friday denounced the expiration of a pandemic-related U.S. government ban on residential evictions, saying Washington should address its own human rights issues before "poking its nose" into other countries' affairs.
A U.S. government ban on evictions for residents that have failed to pay rent during the COVID-pandemic expired at the end of last month in most parts of the country, putting millions of vulnerable residents at risk of losing their homes.
"Before talking impudently about the 'human rights issues' of other countries, the U.S. should address the human rights problems of its own society, which are daily getting worse, owing to its anti-popular policies," the North's foreign ministry said on its website.
The ministry slammed the United States for being engrossed in "impudently poking its nose" into the human rights situations of other countries rather than taking measures to ensure the elementary rights of its own people.
It then accused the U.S. of acting like a "human rights judge," saying the international community also derides the reality of the U.S.
The ministry claimed that over 15 million inhabitants from 6.5 million families in the U.S. face eviction from their homes.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. U.S. shipment of Janssen's COVID-19 vaccine to arrive in S. Korea on Sunday: embassy
This follows the 1 million does that arrived in June. It would have been nice for the Yonhap headline to mention that and not make it seem like the promised doses are just now arriving. Too many people just read the headline news.
U.S. shipment of Janssen's COVID-19 vaccine to arrive in S. Korea on Sunday: embassy | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 14 (Yonhap) -- The 400,000 doses of Johnson & Johnson's Janssen COVID-19 vaccine the United States has agreed to provide are due to arrive in South Korea on Sunday, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul said Saturday.
The doses will depart from Tennessee on Saturday (U.S. time) and land in Incheon International Airport the following day, the embassy said in a press release.
The vaccines are "for use in the general population as part of the international partnership for fighting the pandemic," the embassy said.
"The ROK's ability to effectively utilize those vaccines was taken into consideration for this donation," it said. The ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
The planned delivery marks the second provision by the U.S., following the June 5 shipment of 1.01 million Janssen doses, twice the amount originally promised during the summit between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Joe Biden in May.
Health authorities here said that the new doses will be administered to sailors and civilians staying in groups at certain institutions, such as correctional facilities and nursing homes. The previous Janssen shots were given mostly to soldiers.
South Korea has suffered setbacks in its nationwide COVID-19 inoculation program due to shipment delays. The full vaccination rate stands at 18.6 percent as of Saturday.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. UNICEF receives extended sanctions waiver for health-related aid to N.K.
Excerpt:
Humanitarian activities in North Korea are not banned under international sanctions, but related materials are subject to sanctions waivers from the U.N.
UNICEF receives extended sanctions waiver for health-related aid to N.K. | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 13 (Yonhap) -- The United Nations has granted a one-year extension of a sanctions waiver to one of its agencies to provide health and vaccine-related equipment to North Korea amid the global coronavirus pandemic, a U.N. website showed Friday.
The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) was given the extension of the sanctions exemption until Aug. 5 next year to deliver essential items for its health programs, including providing safe water to children and providing assistance to mothers with complicated deliveries, according to the website.
Also subject to the exemption are cold chain equipments, such as electric refrigerators for storing the routine immunization program vaccines for children.
The extension comes amid continued procurement and operational challenges due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the website said.
North Korea claims to be coronavirus-free, but it has taken relatively swift and drastic antivirus measures since early last year, including sealing its borders and imposing strict restrictions on movement.
Humanitarian activities in North Korea are not banned under international sanctions, but related materials are subject to sanctions waivers from the U.N.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
7. The Quest for Strategic Balance and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Conundrum
Seoul tries to walk the tightrope between China and the US.
Excerpts:
Also, Seoul will have to engage in greater cooperation with like-minded countries participating in the Quad. At the summit, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to cooperate in the areas of climate change, advanced technologies, vaccine supplies, and more. Since the Quad members also agreed to work together in these areas, South Korea will be effectively participating in Quad cooperation via bilateral coordination with the United States.Of course, getting closer to the Quad is obviously not what Beijing expects from Seoul, and China could coerce South Korea to stay away from the Quad, if necessary, like it did in the case of THAAD. However, it is clear by now that the Quad is not going to be an “Asian NATO” or the military and security mechanism China fears. There is no reason for South Korea not to engage with Quad in functional cooperation in areas where Seoul has keen strategic interests as well as competitive strengths.
Given the Moon government’s strong inclinations to keep its overall strategic balance with Beijing, it is uncertain and remains to be seen how much Seoul is willing to implement its Indo-Pacific commitments and pledges into real actions and tangible outcomes in the coming future. Seoul needs enlighten itself out of the preoccupation with the strategic balance framework, and realize that greater Indo-Pacific engagement with the U.S., and other like-minded countries, will not only enhance its strategic options and relevance as a robust middle power, but also serve as useful strategic assets in engaging with China in a more constructive way.
The Quest for Strategic Balance and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Conundrum
Seoul is walking a fine line, carefully calibrating its cooperation with U.S. initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.
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Given the fact that the Moon Jae-in government in South Korea had never expressed explicit support for or earnestly cooperated with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy before, the level of agreement reached at the Moon-Biden Summit in May 2021 was surprisingly high. The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Leaders’ Joint Statement states that the two countries “share a vision of a region governed by democratic norms, human rights and the rule of law at home and abroad.” In particular, by stating that “the significance of U.S.-ROK relationship extends far beyond the Korean Peninsula,” the two leaders agreed to expand the geographical scope, role, and agenda of the South Korea-U.S. alliance to regional and global levels
Also, it is quite surprising that the language Washington uses in its Indo-Pacific narratives was directly applied in the summit documents without any modifications. It seems that Seoul pledged and acknowledged its commitments to engage with the U.S. Indo-Pacific initiative. Nevertheless, it is hard to say that the Moon government has finally made a strategic decision to join the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
First, it is true that Seoul has taken a step forward with regard to the U.S. Indo-Pacific initiative, but it did so only within a limited scope that would be tolerable to China. Regardless of the pledges made at the summit, Seoul keeps holding tight to its strategic framework of keeping a balance between Washington and Beijing. For example, while the summit document touches upon most of critical issues in the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific agenda vis-à-vis China, such as human rights issues, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and so on, Seoul has taken great care by not specifically mentioning “China,” which is quite a contrast to the U.S.-Japan Leaders’ Joint Statement from the Biden-Suga summit last April.
In addition, the Moon government seems to have carefully coordinated with the U.S. so that the outcome of the summit would not be interpreted as direct criticism against China. In fact, there is no direct mention of South Korea’s “participation” in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy in the joint statement. Instead, it is stated that the South Korea-U.S. bilateral cooperation “anchors our respective approaches to the Indo-Pacific region.”
The strategic message that Seoul intends to send out to Beijing is clear: South Korea is pursuing its own regional initiative — the New Southern Policy — independent from, and without directly participating in, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. For this reason, unlike the Biden-Suga summit, which triggered a strong response from Beijing, China’s reaction to the Moon-Biden summit was quite moderate, without any strong complaints. In this way, the Moon government was able to accommodate the Biden administration’s desire to have Seoul on board with the Indo-Pacific coordination without antagonizing China.
Seoul is expected to play a greater regional role for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. However, unless South Korea abandons its elusive quest for strategic balance between the two great powers, it is less likely that the Moon government would join forces with the U.S. Indo-Pacific coordination in the days ahead. This explains why South Korea under the Moon government has distanced itself from, and hardly participated in, the Indo-Pacific coordination with the U.S. up until now.
Furthermore, Seoul has strategically left sensitive security and strategic issues out of the scope of the New Southern Policy, and remained passive on regional security issues that were sensitive to China, such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea or issues pertaining to international law and order in the region. As long as Seoul keeps prioritizing the strategic balance framework, it is quite unlikely for South Korea to take a clearer position and action on regional security issues like South China Sea, or on the promotion of human rights and democracy as in the case of the Myanmar situation, or to share a deeper strategic understanding with the U.S. on major regional security issues.
Also, Seoul will have to engage in greater cooperation with like-minded countries participating in the Quad. At the summit, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to cooperate in the areas of climate change, advanced technologies, vaccine supplies, and more. Since the Quad members also agreed to work together in these areas, South Korea will be effectively participating in Quad cooperation via bilateral coordination with the United States.
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Given the Moon government’s strong inclinations to keep its overall strategic balance with Beijing, it is uncertain and remains to be seen how much Seoul is willing to implement its Indo-Pacific commitments and pledges into real actions and tangible outcomes in the coming future. Seoul needs enlighten itself out of the preoccupation with the strategic balance framework, and realize that greater Indo-Pacific engagement with the U.S., and other like-minded countries, will not only enhance its strategic options and relevance as a robust middle power, but also serve as useful strategic assets in engaging with China in a more constructive way.
8. South Korea’s Ambition to Become a Global Vaccine Hub
First they must get their population vaccinated.
South Korea’s Ambition to Become a Global Vaccine Hub
The country is looking to ramp up vaccine production – for COVID-19 and beyond.
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In early August, President Moon Jae-in announced South Korea’s intention to become a global hub for the production of COVID-19 vaccines and vaccines for future pandemics.
While South Korea was an early model for handling the pandemic, it has lagged behind other advanced nations in vaccinating its population. According to Our World in Data, only 16 percent of the South Korean population was fully vaccinated as of August 11. This contrasts with the United States and many European countries where over 50 percent of the population is fully vaccinated.
In announcing the vaccine hub initiative, Moon also noted that vaccine inequality remains an issue globally. Only 1.2 percent of individuals in low-income countries are vaccinated and the World Health Organization’s COVAX initiative, which is designed to provide equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines globally, still faces a funding gap of $16.6 billion. The potential need for booster shots to deal with the more contagious Delta variant could further strain supplies for low-income countries.
While South Korea’s pharmaceutical industry has yet to bring a domestically developed vaccine for COVID-19 to market, Moon’s initiative has the potential to expand on the role South Korean firms are already playing in producing vaccines for the global market.
SK Bioscience has been perhaps the most active South Korea firm in the effort to produce vaccines for COVID-19. It is investing $132 million to increase its vaccine production capacity and has agreements to produce COVID-19 vaccines for AstraZeneca and Novavax. SK Bioscience and Novavax have also agreed to cooperate in the development of new vaccines for COVID-19 and other vaccine products.
Through its expanding partnership with the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), one of the main partners for the WHO’s COVAX initiative, SK Bioscience reserved space for the production of 2 billion doses of approved COVID-19 vaccines.
CEPI and SK Bioscience have also expanded their collaboration to include the development of a next generation, or Wave 2, COVID-19 vaccine that would be available for use through COVAX. That vaccine, GBP510, has been approved for Phase III studies.
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SK Bioscience and GC Pharma, however, are not the only South Korean firms involved in the production of vaccines for COVID-19. Earlier this year, Samsung Biologics reached an agreement to serve as a “finish and fill” partner for Moderna’s international vaccine production, and is adding an mRNA vaccine production line that is expected to be finished in the first half of next year. The new mRNA line would allow Samsung Biologics to provide end-to-end manufacturing services for partners on the production of mRNA COVID-19 vaccines.
South Korean firms are also producing Russia’s COVID-19 vaccine. South Korean biotech firm GL Rapha agreed to produce 150 million doses of the Sputnik V vaccine, while a consortium led by Huons Global Co Ltd entered into an agreement with the Russian Direct Investment Fund to produce 100 million doses of Sputnik V a month beginning in September. More recently, Huons Global Co Ltd also contracted to produce the single dose version of the Sputnik V vaccine, Sputnik Light.
Under the Moon administration’s new plan, the South Korean government would also invest nearly $2 billion over the next five years in an effort to establish South Korea as one of the world’s top five vaccine producers. The plan would aim to ensure that South Korea is self-sufficient in the areas of technology and key materials necessary for vaccine production. In addition, South Korea would take steps to expand the human capital needed for growing the industry domestically.
South Korea, however, is entering a competitive market for vaccine production. According to data compiled by UNICEF, global vaccine production capacity for all COVID-19 vaccine types was 4.5 billion doses in the first half of this year. That is expected to rise 8.7 billion doses in the second half of 2021. While some estimates suggest that it will take until next year to reach the 11 billion doses needed to inoculate 70 percent of the world’s population, production capacity is expected to grow significantly in 2022 and reach 42.8 billion doses.
For South Korea to succeed in becoming a global vaccination hub, it will be critical to secure production contracts for mRNA vaccines and for domestically developed vaccines such as GBP510 to be proven effective. If South Korea can balance increased production for existing vaccines with the development of new vaccines, especially with concerns about the development of new variants limiting the effectiveness of existing vaccines, while also increasing its current pledge of $210 million to COVAX, it can play an important role in reducing vaccine inequality and producing the vaccines necessary for inoculating the global population from COVID-19.
9. Global journalists stand with Korean media in fight against 'fake news' law
Some media heavyweights have moved their Asia news hubs to Seoul. The government should consider that and maybe it will contribute to ensuring freedom of the press in South Korea that it appears the ruling party is trying to prevent with this "fake new" law.
Excerpts:
"This kind of regulation, promoted by some of the world's most authoritarian regimes, is often an expedient tool used to silence criticism of political and economic power and thus undermines press freedom," WAN-IFRA CEO Vincent Peyregne said in the statement. "If this change were to go ahead, the South Korean government would be joining the worst authoritarian regimes tempted by reforms of the same order, which are in fact designed to curb free critical discussion."
Amid increasing criticism, the DPK came up with some changes to its original revision plan on late Thursday. Under the changes, high-ranking public officials, elected officials and executives at large companies will be excluded from those who can claim punitive damages, and people who claim they suffered from malicious news will have the responsibility to prove the damage.
But the main opposition People Power Party has claimed despite the DPK's changes, the revision still has risks of being abused and infringing on freedom of the press, saying it will propose its own ideas for changes soon.
As the two parties propose their respective changes, the committee will continue its discussions. But the DPK said regardless of any further discussion, it still plans to pass the bill at the Aug. 25 plenary session.
Global journalists stand with Korean media in fight against 'fake news' law
Lawmakers of the National Assembly Culture, Sports and Tourism Committee hold a meeting to review a revision to the Act on Press Arbitration, at the National Assembly in Seoul, Tuesday. Members of the supermajority ruling Democratic Party of Korea have been pushing ahead with the revision which is aimed at holding media outlets and reporters producing so-called "fake news" subject to punitive damages. Yonhap
By Jung Da-min
A global network of newspapers and news editors have vowed to stand with Korean media organizations in their fight against the ruling party's attempt to revise a law to impose punitive damages on media outlets and reporters for producing what it calls "fake news."
The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) sent a public statement to the Korean Association of Newspapers, Thursday, to deliver a message of support for Korean media organizations. The association is a global network of 3,000 news publishing companies and tech entrepreneurs and 60 publisher associations representing 18,000 publications in 120 countries, and the World Editors Forum is an integral part of it.
"WAN-IFRA and the World Editors Forum have called on the South Korean authorities to retract hastily proposed law changes, designed to curb disinformation, which instead risk silencing critical journalism and harming South Korea's democratic traditions," the statement read.
The ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) has been pushing to revise the Act on Press Arbitration, to allow punitive damages to be sought from media outlets that report so-called "fake news." People damaged by such reports "intentionally made by reporters or media outlets" can claim punitive damages amounting to five times the financial damage they experience.
Despite protests from opposition parties and civic and media groups that the new regulation is likely to undermine freedom of expression and be abused by those in power, the DPK passed the bill at a subcommittee meeting of the National Assembly Culture, Sports and Tourism Committee in late July and plans to pass it at an Aug. 25 Assembly plenary meeting. Six media organizations here ― Journalists Association of Korea, Kwanhun Club, Korea News Editors' Association, Korean Association of Newspapers, Korea Internet Newspaper Association and Korea Woman Journalists Association ― have issued a joint statement against the bill and are conducting a petition in support of the statement.
The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers tweeted about an Aug. 10 report by The Korea Times about the ruling bloc's move to introduce punitive damages for "fake news." Captured from WAN-IFRA Twitter"WAN-IFRA is also extremely concerned about any attempt to determine, in the context of this bill, the criteria characterizing the intention to publish so-called 'fake news.' This would inevitably lead to abuses of interpretation that are detrimental to the freedom to inform," the global network's statement read.
It warned of the risk of over-regulation and said this could infringe on the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Korean Constitution.
"This kind of regulation, promoted by some of the world's most authoritarian regimes, is often an expedient tool used to silence criticism of political and economic power and thus undermines press freedom," WAN-IFRA CEO Vincent Peyregne said in the statement. "If this change were to go ahead, the South Korean government would be joining the worst authoritarian regimes tempted by reforms of the same order, which are in fact designed to curb free critical discussion."
Amid increasing criticism, the DPK came up with some changes to its original revision plan on late Thursday. Under the changes, high-ranking public officials, elected officials and executives at large companies will be excluded from those who can claim punitive damages, and people who claim they suffered from malicious news will have the responsibility to prove the damage.
But the main opposition People Power Party has claimed despite the DPK's changes, the revision still has risks of being abused and infringing on freedom of the press, saying it will propose its own ideas for changes soon.
As the two parties propose their respective changes, the committee will continue its discussions. But the DPK said regardless of any further discussion, it still plans to pass the bill at the Aug. 25 plenary session.
10. The Real Lessons of the Trump-Kim Love Letters
I have to say that I have a very different interpretation than Robert Carlin. Yes, Trump (and Pompeo) deserve criticism (it would have been better if we had a Special representative in place before Singapore and doing the actual negotiation and not Pompeo by the time we had one in place I think the damage was done).
But the exercise criticisms ("I am deeply offended" said Kim) is a deception by Kim that supports his long con and political warfare strategy. Failure to understand that puts us in a very weak negotiating position. Which leads to my most important criticism of Carlin's "analysis." He approaches this from the assumption that Kim Jong-un was and is sincere in seeking denuclearization. He uses these letters as "evidence" that if we just give Kim security guarantees and concessions he will denuclearize in good faith.
Now I have to acknowledge that Carlin has more experience negotiating with the regime and traveling to Pyongyang than me, but I have a very different interpretation of the regime, its nature, objectives, and strategy than he uses. I hope his analysis is correct but I would not bet the farm (or ROK security and US interests) on it.
And we had better not allow Carlin's analysis to influence our position on readiness of the alliance. He is giving fuel to those who labor under the fantasy that we must cancel readiness training in order to get Kim to negotiate. nothing could be more wrong because to cancel exercises will put the ROK at great risk and it will not achieve the objectives we seek.
The Real Lessons of the Trump-Kim Love Letters
What the 27 mostly unpublished missives tell us about the future of U.S.-North Korean diplomacy.
There is probably no other bilateral relationship today where letter writing between two countries’ leaders has played such a dramatic role as that between North Korea and the United States. The 27 letters exchanged between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then-U.S. President Donald Trump between April 2018 and August 2019—characterized as “beautiful letters” by Trump—contained tactical feints, unctuous flattery, and psychological ploys that have marked exchanges of leaders of all stripes and stations throughout history. In this case, they also contained the core perceptions and misperceptions of how each thought to move—and move the other—from decades of U.S.-North Korean hostility to something approaching more normal or at least stable relations between their two vastly different countries.
Of course, the hoped-for reconciliation and nuclear disarmament did not come to pass.
There has now been a hiatus in U.S.-North Korea engagement for almost two years, largely at Pyongyang’s insistence. Nothing is forever, however, and the two sides will sooner or later get back to negotiations. Signals will pulse once again through the usual channels, and the importance of careful, deliberate messages between the two countries’ leaders will return to the fore.
In a letter from then-U.S. President Donald Trump to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un dated May 24, 2018, Trump announces that the United States is pulling out of its planned summit with North Korea in Singapore. White House
When correspondence between the U.S. president and the North Korean leader does start up again, it will be important to understand what has gone through that channel before and how it affected the outcome of diplomacy. With access to the full file of letters that Bob Woodward excerpted in his book about the Trump presidency, Rage, that is what I set out to do. (Woodward, who had access to the original letters while researching his book, was not permitted to make copies or take photos of them. He read the letters into his tape recorder and later transcribed them. It is these transcriptions, most of which have never been published, that are quoted below.)
If the 27 letters exchanged between Trump and Kim have received only scant attention, that’s due in part to the misconception among journalists and pundits that their exchange was nonsubstantive and even risible. When one actually reads them, however, they give the opposite impression. By no means are they simple love letters. In their totality, they are a highly illuminating reflection of the fundamental misperceptions between the two sides. As a close read makes clear, it was the letters, perhaps more than any other aspect of diplomacy and statecraft, that set the stage for the train wreck that was the 2019 Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi and the subsequent breakdown of communication.
The first Trump-Kim summit in Singapore in June 2018 had laid out a number of goals: establishing new relations between the two countries and building a “lasting and stable peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula. The joint statement’s lofty formulations were essentially starting points from which the two sides could address long-standing issues. Of key importance to Washington was that Kim committed to “work toward” the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Through the remainder of 2018 and into 2019, the two leaders kept in touch as they wrestled with how to turn the pledges they made in Singapore into action. From the first letter to Kim after Singapore, Trump focused on denuclearization—no surprise, as getting North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons has been a primary U.S. goal for decades. What is surprising is that Trump’s letters were all but silent on what steps the United States was prepared to take in return. Whether that was deliberate or through careless inadvertence, it was a mistake. Kim saw it and sent warning after warning that the road to denuclearization could only come through practical, synchronous steps that would also address North Korea’s own security concerns. This would remain the heart of the problem: Kim would acknowledge the central U.S. concern of denuclearization, while Trump’s letters almost completely ignored North Korea’s own essential goals, including a new relationship that would relieve the pressure—including from economic sanctions—that Kim believed stood in the way of his plans for the country’s development.
Kim reads a letter from Trump in this undated handout photo from the North Korean government released on June 23, 2019. Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File
Trump shows a letter he said was from Kim during a cabinet meeting at the White House in Washington on Jan. 2, 2019. NICHOLAS KAMM/AFP via Getty Images
On July 3, 2018, Trump informed Kim by letter that he was sending U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang, emphasizing that “most importantly,” Pompeo was under his “instructions” to find agreement on “taking the first major steps toward the final, fully verified denuclearization of Korean Peninsula.” This no doubt set off warning bells in Pyongyang. Right from the start, without any hint of what Washington might be prepared to pledge in return, Trump was focusing on denuclearization.
In his reply on July 6, Kim took the high road, expressing the wish that his “trust and confidence” in Trump would be “further strengthened” in the “future process of taking practical actions.” With that innocent-sounding phrase, Kim was reminding Trump of the firmly held North Korean position that denuclearization could only happen gradually and in synch with “practical actions” taken by the United States. Kim made no explicit reference to specific pledges by either side, however, and did not directly challenge Trump’s characterization of the importance of denuclearization.
Pompeo’s meeting in Pyongyang went badly. Differences over substance and sequence were so deep that the North Korean foreign ministry—certainly with Kim’s approval and probably at his direction—issued a statement immediately after the talks accusing the United States of bringing a “unilateral and brigandish demand for denuclearization” while “putting off to the far back even the issue of the end of war declaration, which has already been agreed upon” and “not even mentioning the issue of building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” An end of war declaration was an “issue that Trump had shown more eagerness for even during the [North Korea-U.S.] summit talks,” the statement continued.
A letter from Kim to Trump, in Korean at left and translated to English at right, dated July 6, 2018. DOUGLAS CURRAN/AFP via Getty Images
At the end of July, Kim sent another letter to Trump. It did not repeat the foreign ministry’s charges. Rather, in gingerly fashion, Kim merely noted the “lack of anticipated declaration on the termination of war” in the negotiations so far.
Trump replied on Aug. 2, not acknowledging the issue of the declaration but once again going right to denuclearization: “It is now time to make progress on the other commitments we made, including complete denuclearization.” Some in the North might have chewed over the use of “we” while unmistakably referring to only one side’s goal.
On Sept. 6, after the sudden cancellation of a planned second visit by Pompeo, Kim sent his most crucial letter during the entire exchange. Ignoring who canceled the visit or why, he expresses—with razor-keen clarity—his views on the U.S. secretary of state: “It is my thought that instead of having a war of words on issues that divide our two sides with Secretary Pompeo, who it is difficult for me to think can fully represent Your Excellency’s mind, it would be more constructive to meet in person with Your Excellency, who [is] endowed with an outstanding political sense, and have an in-depth exchange of views on important issues including the denuclearization.”
This might have been meant as an early signal that any “in-depth exchange” on the nuclear issue would be reserved to direct talks between Kim and Trump. This practice of reserving the most important or sensitive discussions for a face-to-face summit was not unusual. In November 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, the North Korean delegation would not discuss the missile issue with its U.S. counterpart, even though the latter had been sent to the Malaysian capital for the exact purpose of resolving as much of that issue as possible in advance of any summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and U.S. President Bill Clinton.
In the September letter, Kim says he is prepared to fully implement the Singapore joint statement and that “in addition to the steps that we have taken up front, we are willing to take further meaningful steps one at a time in a phased manner, such as the complete shutdown of the Nuclear Weapons Institute or the Satellite Launch District and the irreversible closure of the nuclear materials production facility [at Yongbyon].” However, “in order for us to sustain the momentum … we need to feel some changes in our surroundings, even a little, to prove that the effort[s] we make are by no means in vain.” At this point, Kim was telling Trump plainly what had been a constant North Korean position ever since the Agreed Framework negotiations in 1993 and 1994: Pyongyang’s concessions would have to be modestly veiled by some sort of U.S. move that could be portrayed as addressing North Korean concerns. Kim then reemphasizes that denuclearization must proceed “on the principle of phased, synchronized action.” He goes on: “If our goodwill and sincere efforts are properly appreciated and the United States [takes] more substantive steps and actions in a phased manner, significant progress will be made in the issue of denuclearization.” Here, Kim was telling Trump directly that specific, important North Korean moves were on the table—and shutting down the Nuclear Weapons Institute, an instrumental part of the country’s nuclear weapons program, would be quite important. These were, however, contingent on unspecified “substantive steps” by Washington. In his subsequent messages, Trump never acknowledges or probes Kim’s negotiating stance. Nor is there evidence that Kim’s offering up the Nuclear Weapons Institute even registered in Washington.
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At the summit between North and South Korea later in September, Kim echoed to South Korean President Moon Jae-in what he had told Trump in his letter, laying out in detail what Pyongyang was prepared to offer on the nuclear issue, as well as his intense frustration at not seeing a positive response from Washington. Shortly after the summit ended, Kim fired off another missive to Trump, complaining that the “excessive interest President Moon is showing … in our matter is unnecessary.” He goes on to say that “many people are skeptical about the current status and the prospects of the relations between our countries [and] about our ideas of resolving the issue of denuclearization in the future. I, together with Your Excellency, will definitely prove them wrong.” Here, Kim leaves open whether “many people” refers to those in Washington or in Pyongyang. While it may be difficult to believe Kim faced open skepticism in Pyongyang over his initiative toward Washington—or would admit it to the U.S. president if he did—this is a theme that surfaced more than once in Kim’s correspondence. Skepticism over the negotiations also appears in various forms in the North Korean media throughout this period.
By December, the two sides were seriously discussing the possibility of a second summit, focusing especially on a possible choice of venue given Kim’s avoidance of traveling by air or sea. Kim sent a message on Dec. 25 to discuss the venue. In the letter, he says he has “already instructed” his “closest and most trusted colleagues” to speed up the process. He expresses worry that it “may not reflect positively on us should both sides appear to stubbornly insist on our respective positions” regarding the location. His solution: that the two sides “urgently hold senior-level contact.” At first glance, this may appear to be a nonsubstantive message dealing with mundane logistical matters, but it is actually signaling Kim’s deep interest in moving to a second summit and not allowing the process to be delayed or sidetracked.
On Jan. 18, 2019, after a ranking North Korean envoy visited Washington to discuss the upcoming second summit in Hanoi, Trump wrote a brief note to Kim: “A great meeting and message. I will see you soon.” Incredibly, Trump closes with “Your friend.” Trump’s next note, on Feb. 19, just days before the Hanoi meeting, is even less formal or serious. Written entirely by hand, it says, “I look forward to seeing you next week. It will be great. Best wishes.”
The second summit turned out to be anything but “great.” It was a failure with long-lasting consequences, though the U.S. side did not realize at the time how badly Kim would react. Trump did what he could before leaving Hanoi to assure Kim that the breakdown was only temporary and that they could meet again. In a last-minute move, Kim sent out a senior foreign ministry official to clarify his offer to shut down Yongbyon—that he meant the entire complex, not just part of it. It’s not clear whether the clarification would have helped. It was too late—Trump’s motorcade was already getting ready to leave.
Trump shakes hands with Kim following a meeting at the Sofitel Legend Metropole hotel in Hanoi on Feb. 27, 2019. SAUL LOEB/AFP via Getty Images
The next letter in the exchange comes from Trump on March 22, ostensibly on occasion of the “upcoming anniversary” of the birth of Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, the founder of the North Korean dynasty. “Upcoming” may have been seen by Kim as a stretch, since the April 15 birthday—commemorated as the Day of the Sun in North Korea—was still more than three weeks away. Trump writes that Kim has “carried forward” his grandfather’s vision and now has a “historic opportunity to fulfill [Kim Il Sung’s] dying wish—to achieve denuclearization.” That would likely have been read in Pyongyang as a crude attempt to get Kim back into the game by appealing to a presumed emotional bond to the sacred past. In a speech on April 12, Kim confirmed the breakdown of talks in Hanoi and gave a gloomy view of what the future would hold without a significant change in the U.S. approach. Although Kim’s remarks made clear that Trump’s latest attempt to restart the conversation went nowhere, the North Korean leader added: “But as President Trump keeps saying, the personal ties between me and him are not hostile like the relations between the two countries, and we still maintain excellent relations, as to be able to exchange letters asking about health anytime if we want.”
It probably hadn’t helped that in his March letter, Trump had devolved into what the North Koreans must have seen as tissue-thin psychological warfare—or a cheap negotiating ploy out of The Art of the Deal.
It probably hadn’t helped that in his March letter, Trump had devolved into what the North Koreans must have seen as tissue-thin psychological warfare—or a cheap negotiating ploy out of The Art of the Deal: “[Y]ou are my friend and always will be. Contrary to some media reports about our meeting, you and I have made tremendous progress.” If Kim didn’t laugh out loud at that line, then surely he was slack-jawed. “Although there is still a lot of work to do,” Trump continues, “I have great hope and expectation about what you and I can accomplish … if we remain committed to our shared goals.” Anyone in Pyongyang grasping at straws might have latched on to “our shared goals,” but they had all been burned by the previous exchange. In the sour mood following Hanoi, the optimists—if they existed—probably didn’t carry much weight.
Through May and early June, there were signs—typically obscure—in the North Korean media of a vigorous policy discussion, suggesting that the atmosphere might be slowly improving for another run at engaging Washington. On June 10, Kim used the excuse of the one-year anniversary of the Singapore summit on June 12 and Trump’s birthday on June 14 to send his first letter in five months. Trump would describe the letter to the media as “beautiful.” Much of the U.S. media covering the exchange was by now in a fully cynical mode and suggested that the message had no substance. To the contrary, it was another important letter. Kim writes: “Today’s reality is that without a new approach and the courage it takes, the prospects for resolution of the issue will only be bleak.” Although its substance seems negative, that formulation is essentially a come-hither signal with its reference to the possibility of a “new approach.” Kim ends his letter: “I believe the one day will come sooner or later when we sit down together to make great things happen, with the will to give another chance to our mutual trust.” Although not an explicit invitation to another meeting, this expression of hope meant that the door was cracking open again.
Trump answered Kim quickly and positively on June 12, finally—for the very first time—acknowledging the U.S. commitments made in Singapore: “[Y]ou committed to completely denuclearize, and I committed to provide security guarantees. We both committed to establish new relations for our two countries and to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” At last we are getting somewhere, they may have murmured in Pyongyang. The North Korean media quoted Kim as saying Trump’s letter was “excellent.”
Two weeks later, Trump invited Kim to meet in the Demilitarized Zone along the heavily fortified inter-Korean border with “no special agenda,” and Kim quickly accepted. The two leaders met on June 30, marking the first time a sitting U.S. president stepped on North Korean soil. “I never expected to see you in this place,” Kim told Trump in Korean. Among other things, the two sides agreed to convene expert working groups to move things forward. But whatever may have been possible to achieve as a result of this meeting proved impossible to sustain. A month later, on Aug. 5, in an unusually long letter of unrelenting woe, Kim laid out his concerns. He begins the missive by noting that he “remember[s] clearly” the promise he made to Trump for experts to resolve the outstanding issues. However, he says, “the current environment is different from that day.”
Kim and Trump meet inside the Demilitarized Zone separating South and North Korea in Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. Dong-A Ilbo via Getty Images/Getty Images
The problem, Kim writes, is the annual U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises that had been held in the wake of the summit. These “provocative combined military exercises” had taken place despite Kim’s belief that they “would either be canceled or postponed” ahead of “working-level negotiations where we would continue to discuss important matters.” Kim then asks, rhetorically, “Against whom [are] the combined military exercises taking place in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, who are they trying to block, and who are they intended to defeat and attack?” He answers his own question: “Conceptually and hypothetically, the main target of the war preparatory exercises is our own military. This is not our misunderstanding.”
Kim continues: “I do not understand the purpose of having these ‘war games’ that we consider as threatening at the time when we are looking ahead [to] this very important meeting. At present, it is very difficult for me and my people to understand your side’s and the South Korean authority’s decisions and actions. The most important cause of what your side considers the headache of ‘missile threats’ and nuclear problem is the military actions of your side and the South Korean military that threatens our safety. And until these elements are eliminated, no changed outcome can be anticipated.
“I am clearly offended, and I do not want to hide this feeling from you. I am really, very offended.”
“I am clearly offended, and I do not want to hide this feeling from you. I am really, very offended. At every opportunity after we met, you said there are no more artificial earthquakes [i.e., nuclear tests] and no objects flying in the sky [i.e., no missile tests].”
Kim continues: “In this vein, I have done more than I can at this present stage, very responsively and practically, in order to keep the trust we have. However, what has Your Excellency done, and what am I to explain to my people about what has changed since we met? Have actions been relaxed or any [of] my country’s external environments been improved? Have military exercises been stopped?”
“I do not wish to do anything to disappoint you anytime soon, nor do I plan to do so,” he adds. Then, in about as bald a statement from the North Korean leader as one could imagine, Kim writes: “If you do not think of our relationship as a stepping stone that only benefits you, then you would not make me look like an idiot that will only give without getting anything in return.
“My letter has gone long, but to state my main point, regrettably now is not the time to engage in working-level talks. It is not the right atmosphere in my country, and if we were to move forward with working-level talks now, our leadership would be viewed as strange by the outside world and by us as well.” In any case, “What kind of working-level talks could we possibly have? It obviously would not be about the sanctions relief, which I very much wanted, nor will it be about the location of our fourth summit talks.”
Finally, Kim gets to his bottom line: “To put it another way, we are not in a hurry. If this were like Hanoi, just a few months ago, when I held on to the dream of hastening the start of a better life, it would be different. But we are in a different situation, and we are not in a hurry.”
After this long lament from Kim, the correspondence between the two leaders appears to have ended.
11. How Does North Korea Fill Its Coffers? Study the Picture.
We should keep in mind that these illicit billions of dollars could be used to feed the Korean people in the north. Unfortunately, Kim prioritizes nuclear and missile development, military modernization, and support to the elite over the welfare of the Korean people.
How Does North Korea Fill Its Coffers? Study the Picture.
It's amassed billions of dollars.
Here's What You Need to Remember: North Korea’s continued success in growing and expanding its illicit arms trade is perhaps the starkest illustration of a trend that has long drawn the alarm of Korea experts: the international sanctions regime has proven largely toothless, if not counterproductive, as a means of starving DPRK’s military-industrial complex.
North Korea (DPRK) is sometimes described as an ‘autarky,’ or economically self-reliant state, but this label belies some of the core workings of the North Korean economy: among them, a vast, illicit arms trade that continues to thrive in spite of the international sanctions regime arrayed against Pyongyang.
In the early 1980s, Premier Kim Il-Sung’s DPRK found a lucrative niche as a small arms exporter to dozens of warring and unstable third world nations; these included Libya, Yemen, Uganda, Madagascar, Iraq, Syria, Iran. The crown jewel of North Korea’s arms export ambitions became Zimbabwe, newly independent from British colonial rule; a warm personal relationship between Il-Sung and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe made Zimbabwe one of DPRK’s most loyal customers over the 1980’s, importing a wide array of heavy military hardware including T-14 tanks, armored vehicles, missile defense systems, and artillery installations. According to a 1991 Defense Intelligence Agency report, arms sales grossed for a considerable $4 billion from 1981 to 1989 and comprised over one-third of DPRK’s total export volume in 1982.
In the following decade, DPRK branched out into the missile and nuclear technology business. It is difficult to ascertain the full scale of North Korea’s 1990’s export activities, but defectors and declassified intelligence reports name Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, and Vietnam as among the dozens of prospective clients expressing interest in North Korean missiles or missile technology well into the early 2000’s.
The growing cascade of UN and EU-imposed sanctions in the wake of Pyongyang’s 2003 withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has certainly cut into North Korea’s arms export bottom line, but Pyongyang has proven remarkably adept at discovering new ways to skirt the sanctions regime. Though legally binding, none of the nine U.N Security Council Resolutions that make up the bulk of North Korea’s sanctions burden are self-enforcing. It falls on every individual member state to take adequate action against financial dealings with Pyongyang -- a mandate that is being met with mixed success across the third and developing world.
According to a 2019 UN report, North Korea has developed a sophisticated criminal network to continue selling arms through a diverse cast of proxies, front companies, and foreign middlemen. In recent years, North Korea became a leading arms supplier to the Houthi movement in Yemen, as well as militant groups in Uganda and Sudan, mainly by funneling its merchandise through a Syrian company registered to arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali. Pyongyang has likewise succeeded in cultivating valuable ties at the highest echelons of the Libyan Defense Ministry, resulting in an arms contract that O Chol Su, the Deputy Minister of DPRK’s Ministry of Military Equipment, described as necessary “for the required defence systems and ammunition needed to maintain stability of Libya.”
North Korea also heads a robust maritime smuggling ring. In what the UN described as the "largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” customs officials found a cache with 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades aboard a North Korean vessel en route to Egypt. As it later turned out, the client was none other than the Egyptian Armed Forces themselves; Egypt’s military ordered the North Korean munitions through a complex web of Egyptian business proxies.
North Korea’s continued success in growing and expanding its illicit arms trade is perhaps the starkest illustration of a trend that has long drawn the alarm of Korea experts: the international sanctions regime has proven largely toothless, if not counterproductive, as a means of starving DPRK’s military-industrial complex.
Mark Episkopos is a frequent contributor to The National Interest and serves as a research assistant at the Center for the National Interest. Mark is also a PhD student in History at American University.
Image: Reuters
12. Global Peace Foundation discusses diplomacy for unified Korea
Excerpt:
Moon's book "Korean Dream," exploring the vision of a unified Korea, was re-released in observance of Korea's Independence Movement. In the book, Moon emphasizes that unification is needed to continue South Korea's "Miracle on the Han River," the remarkable economic transformation from a war-ravaged, agricultural society to a modern, high-tech economy in less than half a century.
"In the long-term, unification will bring economic benefits that address all of these concerns. It would bring together the existing synergistic elements of both Koreas for the benefit of all. The South has a highly developed economy that is in dire need of new avenues for growth. The North provides those opportunities through its untapped natural resources, extensive need for new industries and infrastructure, an expanded labor pool, and in the long run, a larger combined domestic market," Moon said.
My thought: The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. In short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
Global Peace Foundation discusses diplomacy for unified Korea
Moon Hyun-jin, founder and chairman of the Global Peace Foundation, speaks during the virtual International Forum on One Korea 2021. Courtesy of Global Peace Foundation
By Kwon Mee-yoo
The world is looking at Korea's diplomatic priorities as South Korea pursues peaceful unification of the two Koreas, participants in an international forum organized by the Global Peace Foundation said Friday, sharing ideas on ways to achieve peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.
Moon Hyun-jin, founder and chairman of the Global Peace Foundation (GPF), called for greater attention to the movement for a free and unified Korea, during the High Plenary Session of the International Forum on One Korea 2021, the same day. The forum is running from Aug. 7 through 15 as part of the Global Peace Convention 2021.
Moon's book "Korean Dream," exploring the vision of a unified Korea, was re-released in observance of Korea's Independence Movement. In the book, Moon emphasizes that unification is needed to continue South Korea's "Miracle on the Han River," the remarkable economic transformation from a war-ravaged, agricultural society to a modern, high-tech economy in less than half a century.
"In the long-term, unification will bring economic benefits that address all of these concerns. It would bring together the existing synergistic elements of both Koreas for the benefit of all. The South has a highly developed economy that is in dire need of new avenues for growth. The North provides those opportunities through its untapped natural resources, extensive need for new industries and infrastructure, an expanded labor pool, and in the long run, a larger combined domestic market," Moon said.
Edwin Feulner, founder and former president of the Heritage Foundation, said Moon's "Korean Dream" concept was timely.
"One of the most noteworthy and original aspects of Korean Dream is its emphasis on the importance of an overarching vision for a united Korea and the principles that should guide that vision and the need for a vigorous civic society to play a central role in the pursuit of unification," Feulner said.
Lee Jong-kul, president of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, said peace and unification will emerge as a key topic in the upcoming presidential election and Koreans should refrain from making political interpretations of the road they are headed on to realize "complete independence."
U.S. Congresswoman Young Kim, who is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and co-chair of the Congressional Study Group on Korea, stressed that the Korean Peninsula issue is ranked high on the foreign policy priorities of the Joe Biden administration.
"The U.S. and South Korea must work together to stabilize the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. This requires the maintenance of a strong and coordinated U.S. force in South Korea, as well as increased coordination between Tokyo and Seoul on responding to and preparing for threats from North Korea that could go beyond basic intelligence sharing. We must form a united front through a tri-lateral partnership to ensure a more secure and stable relationship with North Korea," she said.
She also introduced the Divided Family's Reunification Act HRA26, which would push for opportunities for Korean Americans to reunite with their long-lost family members in North Korea.
North Korean defector-turned-lawmaker Tae Yong-ho of the main opposition People Power Party stated, "a papal visit to North Korea should be pursued to serve as planting the seeds of religious freedom in North Korea."
"Unlike other religious leaders, the Pope can play a very important role in ending the ideological confrontation between the two Koreas in that he can communicate with the leaders of the communist bloc," Tae said.
"The Pope's visit to North Korea should serve as a catalyst for religious freedom, human rights and a liberal democracy on the Korean Peninsula. We need to persuade and help build more religious facilities in Pyongyang and other destinations that will be mostly visited by South Koreans and foreign tourists."
However, he also cautioned, "The Pope's visit to North Korea is an issue that should be approached with great care because there is a possibility for the North to use it in its favor to seek the lifting of economic sanctions on the nuclear state."
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
