Quotes of the Day:

"For of all sad words of tongue or pen, The saddest are these: 'It might have been!'" 

– John Greenleaf Whittier

"Do not ask yourself what the world needs; ask yourself what makes you come alive. And then go and do that. Because what the world needs is people who have come alive." 

– Harold Whitman

"When a man sits with a pretty girl for an hour, it seems like a minute. But let him sit on a hot stove for a minute—and it's longer than any hour. That's relativity."

– Albert Einstein

1. Russia Withdraws Some Forces From Ukraine in Response to Kursk Invasion

2. Meet Philip Gordon: Kamala’s Foreign Policy Guru

3. Biden-Harris appeasement didn't delay Iran retaliation against Israel. Here's what really happened

4. Six Things to Know About the Tim Walz ‘Stolen Valor’ Claims

5. What Is Ukraine Hoping to Achieve With Its Kursk Incursion?

6. Deception and a Gamble: How Ukrainian Troops Invaded Russia

7. Active Duty Navy SEAL Captain alleges Investigation Steering & Mishandling on Shawn Ryan Show

8. Why Are There Fears of War in the South China Sea?

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2024

10. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, August 13, 2024

11. Japan PM Kishida's premiership to end after decision to exit party leadership race

12. In Israel, Support Grows for Offensive Against Hezbollah

13. Liberal Thought Returns to Campus

14. Russia-Iran Ties Are Being Strained by Parallel Conflicts

15. As Gaza Talks Near, Diplomats Try to Keep War From Spreading

16. U.S. plans to sell $20 billion in weapons to Israel over several years

17. Has Zelensky played a masterstroke or fatally poked the Russian bear?

18. Wedge and Hedge: The Political Logic of Ukraine’s Border Incursion

19. Without Talent Agility, America May Lose

20. The ‘Gray Zone’ Comes to Russia

21. Marine who died in Osprey rescue effort awarded top non-combat medal

22. Social-media firms are lowering defenses to foreign disinformation campaigns, researchers warn

23. To avoid history’s mistakes, Taiwan needs unambiguous protection, now

24. China’s Global Public Opinion War with the United States and the West

25. What Was the Biden Doctrine?

26. Fort Liberty soldier will not face charges in killing of Chechen utility worker on his property

27. AUKUS language contains exit clause for the US, but is that a problem?

28. Opinion The Navy is breaking down. We need our allies’ help to fix our ships. By Rahm Emanuel

29. Semiconductor workforce shortage hits S. Korea, U.S., Japan

1. Russia Withdraws Some Forces From Ukraine in Response to Kursk Invasion

Is Russia "out of Schlitz?" Is this an indicator that it does not have sufficient troops to defend Russia? Will its operations in Ukraine reach culmination?

On the other hand can Ukraine sustain its foothold long enough to have leverage at the negotiating table to exploit the territory it has occupied?

Russia Withdraws Some Forces From Ukraine in Response to Kursk Invasion

Ukraine was sending in reinforcements Tuesday to bolster its foothold in the Russian border region

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-withdraws-some-forces-from-ukraine-in-response-to-kursk-invasion-c0a11eee?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Isabel ColesFollow, Michael R. GordonFollow and Ievgeniia Sivorka | Photographs by Svet Jacqueline for WSJ

Aug. 13, 2024 5:52 pm ET

SUMY, Ukraine—Russia is withdrawing some of its military forces from Ukraine to respond to a Ukrainian offensive into Russian territory, U.S. officials said, the first sign that Kyiv’s incursion is forcing Moscow to rejigger its invasion force.

The officials said the U.S. is still seeking to determine the significance of Russia’s move and didn’t say how many troops the U.S. assesses Russia is shifting. But the new U.S. assessment bolsters claims by Ukrainian officials who said last week’s surprise invasion of Kursk province had drawn Russian forces away from Ukraine, where Moscow’s advantage in manpower and equipment is allowing them to grind forward in several places.

Ukraine, meanwhile, sent tanks and other armored vehicles to reinforce troops that have stunned the Kremlin by seizing a chunk of Russian territory.

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Russia is pulling back some military forces from Ukraine to deal with an invasion by Ukraine into Russia’s Kursk province, U.S. officials told The Wall Street Journal. Photo: Anatoliy Zhdanov/Reuters

Ukrainian forces have advanced at least 20 miles into Russian territory since launching the surprise assault last week, quickly overrunning the lightly defended border. Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered his military and security forces to eject Kyiv’s military, but Russia is struggling to mount a coherent response.

On Tuesday, a Ukrainian soldier raised his fist as he rode a tank toward the Russian border. Heavy equipment and trucks loaded with logs used to reinforce bunkers and trenches trundled the same way. In the opposite direction, a pickup truck raced by carrying a half-dozen Russian prisoners with tape over their eyes.

Ukraine’s top military commander said Ukrainian forces were advancing and had taken control of 74 Russian towns and villages.

Ukrainian soldiers heading toward Russia’s Kursk province.

A Ukrainian military vehicle carrying blindfolded men in Russian military uniforms. Photo: roman pilipey/AFP/Getty Images

“There are battles across the front line,” Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy reported to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a snippet from a video call that was aired online.

The Russian Defense Ministry claimed Tuesday it was inflicting heavy losses on Ukrainian forces taking part in the operation, which Putin has blamed on Ukraine’s backers in the West, led by the U.S.

The Biden administration said it wasn’t given prior warning about the operation and has sought in recent days to understand Ukraine’s goals. One of the U.S. officials said Tuesday that Kyiv told the U.S. it had been looking for opportunities to exploit gaps in the Russian lines and found one in Kursk that was loosely defended. Ukraine was also hoping that the incursion would force Russia to pull troops out of Ukraine, which happened in the last day or so, the official said.

In Kyiv, Ukrainian officials gave their most detailed public comments yet on the reasons behind the operation, saying its aim was to destroy logistics and infrastructure that Russia uses to make war on Ukraine.

Russia “is sure that its territory is informally inviolable, and no one will destroy the logistics and infrastructure of the war” there, said Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser. “Today, Ukraine is showing that this is not the case.”

Russia has used the Kursk region to launch aerial and artillery strikes on Ukraine as well as to support its incursion into Ukraine’s Kharkiv province. Podolyak said in a post on X that ground operations were one way to destroy Russian war infrastructure. The other, he noted, was to use long-range missiles of the kind that the West has provided but not cleared for use against Russian territory.

Medics treating wounded troops and local residents in Russia’s Kursk region over the weekend. Photo: anatoliy zhdanov/Kommersant Photo/Reuters

Ukrainian foreign ministry spokesman Heorhiy Tykhi said Kyiv wasn’t interested in occupying Russian territory.

“The purpose of the operation is to save the lives of our people and protect the territory of Ukraine from Russian attacks,” he told reporters. “The sooner the Russian Federation agrees to restore a just peace…the sooner the raids of the Ukrainian defense forces on the territory of the Russian Federation will stop.”

Images of Ukrainian forces tearing down Russian flags have raised morale among troops after months of grinding attritional warfare that favors its much larger enemy. The incursion has also demonstrated to Kyiv’s partners that Ukraine is still capable of striking back against Russia after a failed counteroffensive last year. Ukrainian forces haven’t regained significant territory since the first year of the war, when they pulled off a surprise counteroffensive in the northern Kharkiv region and squeezed Russian forces out of Kherson in the south.

“We have proven once again that we, Ukrainians, are capable of achieving our goals in any situation—capable of defending our interests and our independence,” Zelensky said in his nightly address Tuesday.

Lightly-armed Russian conscripts surrendered en masse after Ukrainian forces burst across the border a week ago, and Zelensky noted in the call with his military chief that these soldiers—which he said numbered in the hundreds—could be exchanged for Ukrainians detained in Russia.

Ukrainian soldiers returning from Kursk on Tuesday said their forces were encountering greater resistance as they pushed to expand their foothold in the region. Some soldiers said Russia was pounding Ukrainian positions with aviation bombs.

“They are massing troops, bringing reserves,” said one soldier who was stocking up on cigarettes, gas and warm clothes to take back to his unit in Kursk. But he said Ukraine was pressing forward. “It’s go go go,” he said.

Ukrainian soldiers say the Kursk operation has lifted morale.

Still, analysts say Ukrainian forces will face serious challenges in sustaining its invasion as supply lines lengthen and Russia regroups. The incursion has also drawn scarce troops and military equipment away from the main front line in eastern Ukraine, potentially weakening Kyiv’s defense there. In recent days Russian forces have continued pressing gains toward the logistical hub of Pokrovsk.

Despite the bleak situation in the east, soldiers involved in the Kursk operation were upbeat.

“Everybody is quite positive,” said another soldier who was buying supplies to take back to his unit inside Kursk. Before the incursion, he had been holding back Russian troops in the neighboring Kharkiv region, which Moscow reinvaded earlier this year.

Outside a convenience store on the road to Russia, the commander of an artillery battalion who had just returned from Kursk said the fight there was ongoing. “So far, we’ve got the upper hand,” he said.

Ukraine’s thrust into Kursk has pushed Russian artillery out of range of villages along the border that have been under fire for months. Zelensky said on Saturday that Russia had shelled border villages in the northern Sumy region more than 2,000 times since June 1. But Mykola Toryanyk, a local official who oversees 14 villages along the border, said Russian planes were now dropping aviation bombs on them instead.

“They’re never going to stop attacking Ukraine,” he said.

Nancy A. Youssef and Ann M. Simmons contributed to this article.

Write to Isabel Coles at isabel.coles@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

Appeared in the August 14, 2024, print edition as 'Russian Pulls Some Forces Out of Ukraine'.

2. Meet Philip Gordon: Kamala’s Foreign Policy Guru

Very curious.

Since I do not work on Iran issues I never really thought about how great a divide there is on Iran. I am now wondering if the divisions over north Korea or Russia or China are at the same level.

Meet Philip Gordon: Kamala’s Foreign Policy Guru

His views on Iran—and connections—are raising eyebrows in Washington.

By Jay Solomon

August 11, 2024

thefp.com · by Jay Solomon · August 12, 2024

What does Kamala Harris believe about the Middle East? Does she side with the old-school Democrats in her party, who are traditionally pro-Israel? Does she believe that the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was transformational—and should be salvaged? What does she think about a U.S. defense pact with Saudi Arabia? Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad? And Sudan’s widening civil war?

With the specter of a broad Mideast war hanging over this presidential election—and potential U.S. involvement growing as the Pentagon dispatches carriers, destroyers, and missile-defense capable cruisers to the region—the answers to all of these questions are far more urgent than they typically would be for American voters. The problem is that Vice President Harris has largely been a back-bencher on foreign policy, unlike some of her predecessors, including her boss Joe Biden.

Which is why a man named Philip Gordon—who has served as Harris’s foreign policy adviser since she ran for the White House in 2020 and has worked in every Democratic administration since Bill Clinton’s—has become the focus of tremendous scrutiny in Washington over the past few weeks.

Republicans believe that through Gordon they have the outlines of a Harris foreign policy agenda. And they’re already crafting their political attacks around it. “Democrats want to put him in charge of the White House’s entire foreign policy,” Republican senator Ted Cruz told The Free Press. “It would be unspeakably catastrophic.”

Gordon’s critics from the right say he’s not just wrong on issues—he’s skeptical of U.S. military power and the efficacy of financial sanctions—but that he’s also developed troubling contacts with institutions and individuals close to Iran. Republicans are already demanding Vice President Harris answer why Gordon wrote a string of 2020 opinion pieces with a Pentagon official, Ariane Tabatabai, who was tied last year to an Iranian government-backed influence operation, called the Iran Experts Initiative, tasked with selling the 2015 nuclear deal. (More in a moment.)

“Before joining your office, Mr. Gordon co-authored at least three opinion pieces with Ms. Tabatabai blatantly promoting the Iranian regime’s perspective and interests.” Republican senator Tom Cotton and Representative Elise Stefanik wrote Harris on July 31. “Each prediction was. . . wrong, as it was biased in favor of Tehran.”

Gordon and Harris’s office declined repeated requests for comment from The Free Press. Ariane Tabatabai has also declined to publicly comment on her role in the Iran Experts Initiative.

The Limits of American Power

Most Americans will never have heard Gordon’s name. But he is part of a core group of Democratic foreign policy experts who have helped guide U.S. global strategy for the past three decades.

The Johns Hopkins University PhD initially focused on Europe during the Clinton and Obama administrations when the U.S. partnered with NATO to use military force and espionage to combat ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and North Africa—ultimately unseating Libyan dictator Muammar Gadaffi. The actions at the time were seen as in line with the Democrats’ core philosophy of liberal interventionism.

But that philosophy began to shift for Gordon during Obama’s second term, when the Middle East became his bailiwick and he coordinated regional policy at the National Security Council.

His recent writings reveal the experience left him—and others in the White House—with a much greater skepticism of the U.S.’s ability to influence events on the ground, given the fallout from the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and Washington’s failures to promote democratic change in Egypt and Syria. “Phil left the Obama administration with a much clearer understanding of the limits of American power and the need for a much more humble foreign policy than most of those in Biden’s inner circle,” Trita Parsi, vice president of the neo-isolationist Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, recently told The Nation.

Former secretary of state Hillary Clinton travels to Tallin, Estonia, for a meeting of NATO foreign ministers discussing the future of the alliance on April 23, 2010. Here the secretary of state and her team, including Philip Gordon, shuffle between meetings. (Charles Ommanney via Getty Images)

Over the past half-decade, Gordon has espoused a deep wariness of using American military and economic power to attempt to coercively affect global change—a view that could be challenged by a rising China and the major wars gripping Europe and the Middle East. In his 2020 book Losing the Long Game, the 61-year-old diplomat recounts what he argues has been a disastrous run of U.S. efforts to use military force to engineer leadership change in countries ranging from Afghanistan to Libya. In the case of Syria, where former president Obama threatened and then backed away from attacking President Assad’s military, Gordon argues that the U.S. would have been better off never calling for the Arab despot’s removal in the first place.

“It is therefore hard to avoid the conclusion that if the United States was not prepared to accept the real costs and consequences of regime change—which are always greater than its proponents acknowledge—it would have been better not to pursue the goal,” he wrote.

But it is Gordon’s view of Iran that has most alarmed Republicans and critics of a constrained American foreign policy.

No recent foreign policy issue has divided Democrats and Republicans more than the Iran nuclear deal—Obama’s signature achievement. Architects of the deal, including Gordon, argue that it is a template for a new American foreign policy. They say the agreement—had Trump not scuttled it—would have neutralized Tehran’s nuclear capacity without requiring American or Israeli military action. And they argue the easing of economic sanctions could have allowed Iranian businesses and civil society to better integrate internationally and potentially moderate Tehran’s clerics. “A nuclear agreement could begin a multigenerational process that could lead to a new relationship between our countries. Iran could begin to reduce tensions with its neighbors and return to its rightful place in the community of nations,” Gordon said in a 2014 speech, outlining President Obama’s hopes for the deal.

But critics have argued the loosening of sanctions on Iran has provided Tehran with billions of dollars to fund its terror proxies across the Mideast—proxies that unleashed the massacres of October 7 and that today threaten commercial traffic across the Persian Gulf and other strategic global waterways. Gordon was among the most vocal Democratic critics of former President Trump’s 2018 decision to pull the U.S. out of that landmark nuclear agreement.

Harris has largely been mum on the Mideast threats since taking to the campaign trail last month. There’s also no foreign policy section yet displayed on her website. But the progressive wing of her party is already pressing their candidate to immediately engage Tehran’s newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, to help end the Gaza war. The Iranian leader has announced his desire to resume nuclear diplomacy with the West, a track Gordon could lead in a Harris administration.

But Americans have gotten some insights into Harris and Gordon’s position in recent weeks. After a late July rocket attack on Israel by Lebanese terror group Hezbollah that killed 12 schoolchildren, Harris drew fire for initially remaining quiet.

Then, last Thursday in Michigan, the candidate met with pro-Palestinian activists who said that that Harris had told them at a political rally she was “open” to discussing their calls for a U.S. arms embargo on Israel. Philip Gordon batted cleanup: “@VP has been clear: she will always ensure Israel is able to defend itself against Iran and Iran-backed terrorist groups,” Gordon said on X. “She does not support an arms embargo on Israel. She will continue to work to protect civilians in Gaza and to uphold international humanitarian law.”

Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas (5th R) meets U.S. national security adviser to the Vice President Philip Gordon (3rd L) in Ramallah, West Bank, on December 6, 2023. (Palestinian Presidency via Getty Images)

Iran Experts Initiative

But it’s not just Gordon’s positions on Iran that are being heavily scrutinized. It’s his ties to Ariane Tabatabai and other Biden administration officials who are, or have been, probed by Congress and the U.S. government in recent months for their suspected links to Tehran’s Islamist leadership.

Alarm about Iran’s influence in Washington first gained traction last year after the State Department quietly revoked the security clearance of the Biden administration’s point man on Iran policy, special envoy Robert Malley. The diplomat had worked closely with Gordon during the Obama years to craft the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. And Malley had been seeking to revive Iran diplomacy when he was placed on unpaid leave in June 2023.

The White House and State Department have repeatedly refused to explain Malley’s absence or status. But Republicans investigating his case told me they uncovered evidence that the FBI is now probing whether Malley illegally downloaded classified documents onto his personal devices and may have shared them with individuals outside the U.S. government. Administration officials have privately told me they were stunned last summer when documents and information tied to Malley began appearing in Iranian state media, giving the impression that Iran had essentially penetrated the U.S. government’s communications systems. Malley has refused to comment publicly on his case beyond an initial statement saying he’d be vindicated and back in government.

Concern about Iran’s activities deepened further last fall when I published in the news site Semafor the first in a series of articles about Iranian influence operations in the West. The initial piece focused on The Iran Experts Initiative, or IEI, and detailed how Tabatabai and a group of other influential U.S.- and Europe-based Iran experts closely coordinated with Iran’s Foreign Ministry, starting in 2014, to produce opinion pieces and studies that advanced Tehran’s position on the nuclear deal and other national security issues, while never disclosing it. The story was based on a large cache of Iranian government emails that were obtained by the Persian-language television channel Iran International and shared with Semafor, where I previously worked.

Some members of the IEI publicly denied they were essentially acting under the control of Iranian diplomats, and described the program as informal. But in the emails I reviewed, Iranian officials describe closely monitoring the publications and media appearances of IEI members. And Tabatabai, in her own correspondence, can be seen seeking Tehran’s guidance on her travel plans and appearances before Congress. Other IEI members offer to ghostwrite opinion pieces for Iranian diplomats and pledge to help the Foreign Ministry advance its positions in the international nuclear talks.

Malley initially brought Tabatabai into the State Department in 2021 to join his nuclear negotiating team with Iran. Shortly before his suspension, she departed to the Pentagon to become chief of staff for Christopher Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. It’s one of the most sensitive offices in the Department of Defense, requiring high-level security clearances.

Republican lawmakers have repeatedly questioned Tabatabai’s continued presence in the Pentagon. And Cotton and Stefanik are seeking to know if Gordon knew of her participation in the IEI when he jointly drafted with her three opinion pieces during the 2020 election cycle that sharply criticized the Trump administration’s position on Iran.

In January 2020, the two argued in The New York Times that the U.S.’s assassination of Iran’s most powerful military officer, Major General Qasem Soleimani, needlessly antagonized Tehran. The Pentagon had argued that Soleimani was behind a string of attacks on U.S. military forces in the Middle East going back more than a decade. “The costs of the United States’ targeted killing. . . are mounting beyond the already significant risks of Iranian retaliation and subsequent military confrontation,” Gordon and Tabatabai wrote on January 6, 2020, just three days after Soleimani’s death.

Three months later, in March 2020, Gordon and Tabatabai pressed in The Washington Post for the U.S. to ease some economic sanctions on Tehran in order to help Iran manage the Covid-19 pandemic that they argued risked spreading the virus across the Middle Eastern country’s borders. “In the face of an impending humanitarian catastrophe in Iran and desperate appeals for an urgent international response, the Trump administration has, unsurprisingly, responded by calling for more pressure and ever more sanctions, the latest of which were imposed on March 18,” the March 2020 article reads.

Gordon’s critics note that Iran’s pandemic troubles didn’t spread cross-border. And they also point out that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei actually declined U.S. offers of Covid-19 assistance, citing a conspiracy theory that Washington actually created the disease to harm its enemies.

Cotton and Stefanik, in their letter to Harris, ask if Gordon and Tabatabai purposefully spread Iranian disinformation to relieve U.S. pressure on Tehran’s theocratic rulers. “Did you request further investigation into Mr. Gordon when Ms. Tabatabai’s connections to the Iranian Foreign Ministry were revealed in September 2023? Did Mr. Gordon admit and report his ties to this individual?” they wrote.

Harris, to this date, hasn’t replied.

Jay Solomon is an investigative reporter for The Free Press, and author of the book, The Iran Wars. He most recently worked at Semafor, where he was global security editor; before that, he was chief foreign affairs correspondent for The Wall Street Journal. Follow him on X at @jaysolomon.

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thefp.com · by Jay Solomon · August 12, 2024

3. Biden-Harris appeasement didn't delay Iran retaliation against Israel. Here's what really happened

I find this very difficult to believe.

Excerpts:

The detailed report stated that the American delegation, arriving on a private plane from Turkey, landed at Payam-e-Khorram Airport in Karaj on Thursday and held a two-hour meeting with Iranian officials before returning to Ankara.

According to the same report, "the delegation presented a list containing the names of ten Mossad agents inside Iran, whom the Americans believe were involved in the assassination, directly or indirectly. This was intended as a good faith initiative in response to the Israeli state's stunning strike, which was carried out without coordination with Washington." It could be one of the most valuable souvenirs given to the Iranian mullahs lately.

As we consider what should be a bombshell above I found this comment on another listserv to provide important context. I truly hope my government took no such action and that the above allegation is wrong.

I would caution against ascribing too much veracity to an opinion piece in a news source hostile to the current government. Amir Fakhravar is an activist who is chairman of the National Iranian Congress who, rightly or wrongly, earns a tidy income telling conservatives what they want to hear about the need for regime change in Iran and how if we take out the leadership, the people will welcome us with open arms and democracy will flourish.

Biden-Harris appeasement didn't delay Iran retaliation against Israel. Here's what really happened

It is clear that something else influenced Iran's decisions, not US diplomacy

  By Amir Fakhravar Fox News

Published August 12, 2024 9:00am EDT

foxnews.com · by Amir Fakhravar Fox News

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On Wednesday, July 31, 2024, at 2 a.m., the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran, just a day after Fuad Shukr, the most powerful military commander of Hezbollah, was killed in an Israeli strike in Beirut, Lebanon.

Shukr was wanted by the U.S. for 41 years, with a $5 million "Rewards for Justice" bounty for any information about him due to his central role in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 U.S. military personnel and wounded 128 others. Haniyeh also directed and celebrated the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, which resulted in the killing of 1,200 people and over 300 days of hostage-taking of hundreds, including Americans, by Hamas.

Adding to the shock, Kuwait’s Al-Jarida newspaper, citing an unnamed source in Iran's Supreme National Security Council, reported that a high-level American security delegation, brokered by Oman, secretly traveled to Tehran.

It was reported that a high-level American security delegation, brokered by Oman, secretly traveled to Tehran. (Getty Images)

Their mission was to deliver a "calming and cautionary" message to deescalate the situation and ensure the supreme leader of Iran understood that the Biden-Harris administration was "kept in the dark" by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the killing of two major terrorist leaders last week.

AMERICA’S RECKLESS IRAN POLICY HAS MIDDLE EAST ON BRINK OF WAR. ONLY ONE THING CAN PULL US BACK NOW

The detailed report stated that the American delegation, arriving on a private plane from Turkey, landed at Payam-e-Khorram Airport in Karaj on Thursday and held a two-hour meeting with Iranian officials before returning to Ankara.

According to the same report, "the delegation presented a list containing the names of ten Mossad agents inside Iran, whom the Americans believe were involved in the assassination, directly or indirectly. This was intended as a good faith initiative in response to the Israeli state's stunning strike, which was carried out without coordination with Washington." It could be one of the most valuable souvenirs given to the Iranian mullahs lately.

Video

Although the U.S. State Department rejected the report on Sunday, later in the week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted that to deescalate the conflict, the Biden administration had "engaged in intense diplomacy with allies and partners, communicating that message directly to Iran," which largely confirms the Kuwaiti newspaper's report.

PUTIN'S IRAN-ISRAEL DILEMMA AMID GROWING FEARS OF REGIONAL WAR: 'COMPLEX CONSIDERATIONS'

Additionally, immediately after the reported visit by the U.S. delegation, "more than two dozen people, including senior intelligence officers, military officials, and staff workers at a military-run guesthouse in Tehran," were arrested in response to the assassination of the Hamas leader, according to the New York Times based on reports from two Iranians familiar with the investigation.

Video

Iran delayed its retaliation attacks on Israel, a move for which some in the Biden administration claimed credit. However, on Monday, Aug. 5, 2024, two major events clearly demonstrated that the supreme leader of Iran did not respect the Biden administration's pleas for deescalation and did not appreciate the American overtures. On that day, Iran-backed militias in Iraq attacked an American Army base, injuring five U.S. troops and two contractors.

Simultaneously, a high-ranking Russian delegation, led by Sergei Shoigu, the secretary of Russia's Security Council and a senior ally of Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin, visited Iran. The delegation included Russia’s defense ministers and several Russian army generals, who met with Tehran's top leaders.

CLICK HERE FOR MORE FOX NEWS OPINION

They delivered Putin’s direct message to his minion the Comrade Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ordering him not to act recklessly by attacking Israel with outdated missiles as they did on April 13, an act that resulted in humiliation. Putin promised to soon deliver advanced weapons, including air defenses, to Iran.

Video

Additionally, the Islamic regime of Pakistan announced plans to provide Iran with advanced ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, in case the supreme leader decides to launch a nuclear attack on Israel.

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It is clear that it was not U.S. diplomacy that worked but rather Russian military and intelligence advice/orders that influenced Iran's decisions.

We are on the brink of World War III. Russia and China’s Communist Party are setting their war chessboard. Iran’s regime is likely to attack Israel with a nuclear bomb soon unless Israel, with the help of America, destroys all nuclear and missile facilities of Iran, thereby giving the Iranian people an opportunity to overthrow the weakened regime of the mullahs.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM AMIR FAKHRAVAR

foxnews.com · by Amir Fakhravar Fox News

4. Six Things to Know About the Tim Walz ‘Stolen Valor’ Claims

What we are missing here is the forest for the trees. We should all be celebrating the fact that two former enlisted service members are now running for the second highest office. That is unprecedented and breaking a paradigm that only former officers run for the highest offices. (though of course there are many former enlisted service members who have served in Congress and other relatively high positions (e.g.,former SECDEF Hegel).

This is one of the more objective less partisan analyses.

Six Things to Know About the Tim Walz ‘Stolen Valor’ Claims

Plus: What about JD Vance’s military service?

https://www.thebulwark.com/p/six-things-to-know-about-the-tim

Will Selber

Aug 13, 2024

Democratic vice presidential candidate Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz speaks during a campaign rally on August 6, 2024. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

BY NOW, YOU HAVE PROBABLY HEARD some version of the controversies touching on the military service of Gov. Tim Walz, the Democratic candidate for vice president—specifically relating to his retirement from the military and what he has said about his service. Here are six things to keep in mind about Walz’s military record, the issue of “stolen valor” that some Republicans have invoked, and how all this relates to our politics.

1. This story is still evolving.

Although Walz has been in elected office for a long time—a dozen years in Congress followed by five years as the chief executive of Minnesota—the level of scrutiny his reputation will face over the next three months is more intense than anything he previously faced.

More attention than ever before will be paid to Walz’s verbal or written inaccuracies, both old and new. A slip of the tongue? A mistake in a moment of forgetfulness? A lost form, or one filled out wrong? An exaggeration while telling a story? A major pattern of long-term deception? You can expect any of these to be dug up and to be treated by his political opponents as devastating and disqualifying.

That’s just how opposition research works.

Expect more to come. It always does.

Sometimes, sorting through the conflicting interpretations just takes some common sense. Other times, it requires the help of honest commentators with expertise and integrity. In this case, both are useful.

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2. Walz served honorably.

Tim Walz served in the Army National Guard from 1981 to 2005. Unless new revelations point to a crime, Walz’s service characterization will remain honorable. His superiors, commanding officers, and raters had twenty-four years to establish a record of a self-centered soldier who always put himself before his troops. They did not do so.

Twenty-four years is plenty of time to paint a vivid picture in performance reports. Nevertheless, the Nebraska National Guard (where Walz began his service) and the Minnesota National Guard (where he continued it after 1996) kept promoting him. He was eventually asked to serve as a command sergeant major (CSM). Why did his superiors do that if Walz was—as a few people who served with him have said—such a problem senior noncommissioned officer?

Real talk: Over the course of a military career, you will make friends, but there will also be people with grudges against you, bad feelings, and axes to grind. That’s the nature of the job, especially in the National Guard, where soldiers serve together in the same units for the majority of their careers. On active duty, service members often rotate in and out of units scattered across the board. So it’s quite common to find unhappy former colleagues and comrades to opine about anyone with a long service record, even someone generally admired and beloved.

During my twenty-year career, I demoted service members and kicked a few out of the military for issues ranging from sexual assault to a refusal to take the COVID-19 vaccine. Those decisions, like many Walz likely made as an SNCO, did not sit well with everyone involved.

Yes, Walz and his campaign were not completely precise in characterizing his rank upon retirement. Walz served as a CSM but was reduced in rank—which is not the same thing as being demoted for cause—because he failed to complete some coursework. (One more bit of real talk: The required coursework might well have been a huge waste of time. Military coursework is often superficial and useless. But checking those boxes for promotion is an important rung on the meritocratic ladder.)

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3. JD Vance served honorably.

Whatever one thinks of JD Vance, the Department of Defense wrote on his DD-214, the Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, that when he left the United States Marine Corps in 2007 after four years, it was under honorable conditions. Vance, who served as a combat correspondent for the Marines but never saw combat during his 2005 Iraq deployment, may have fewer medals than Walz. However, that is what one would expect of a Marine with only one enlistment.

Real talk: If you haven’t served and are posting absurd memes comparing the service record of an E-8/9 (Walz’s rank) and an E-4 (Vance’s rank), you should stop. It’s a bad look—but more importantly, you don’t have standing or likely even the knowledge to compare and contrast the service of two men who served honorably.

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4. Ducking deployments?

Any Iraq or Afghanistan veteran knows of people who ducked deployments. In 2008, when I was a wee lieutenant, my Provincial Reconstruction Team’s deputy commander, who somehow made the rank of lieutenant colonel, ducked out of our deployment at the last minute because of a “tooth pain,” which caused him to delay his deployment . . . for nearly six months! When I was a squadron commander in 2021, I had a few airmen, aided no doubt by the finest barracks lawyers available, who tried to wriggle out of a deployment. Did it upset me? Sure, a little, but I didn’t take it all that personally.

That doesn’t mean ducking out of a deployment isn’t important. It is, but it’s also not exceedingly rare. According to some of Walz’s former CSMs, Walz filed for retirement before his unit conducted a very dangerous year-long deployment to Iraq so he could run for Congress, then said he would not be retiring, then did, in fact, retire. However there remains some confusion about the timeline of his retirement and of the timing of his battalion’s knowledge about their deployment.

Did Walz break any rules or regulations by retiring when and how he did? If he did, again, then his battalion commander should have held him accountable. The military had ample time and space to characterize Walz’s service as anything but honorable, and it did not. Still, Walz’s campaign could quash this entire thing by providing the exact date that Walz applied for retirement, allowing us to compare that date to when his battalion received orders to Iraq.

This one may be the most damaging of all the charges against Walz, though it will be difficult to prove. I deployed six times to Iraq and Afghanistan for over four years. In between my fourth and fifth deployments, my father had a stroke and was essentially dying. I probably could have pushed back on another deployment to Afghanistan. It would have been easy, especially for an experienced, battle-hardened officer. But I had to go, and I knew that my father would have wanted me to go. In short, it’s a very complicated emotional issue; regardless of what veteran any media outlet trots out, it’s subjective.

However, let’s say Walz did duck the deployment. Even that doesn’t necessarily erase twenty-four years of honorable service. After a quarter century, perhaps Walz just decided it was time for something new. Or maybe he didn’t click with his battalion commander, and it was time for everyone involved to find greener pastures. Who knows?

In short, people’s careers are never pristine. For example, a close friend of mine was a “tier one” Joint Special Operations Command analyst who excelled at hunting and killing in the shadows. However, his career ended somewhat awkwardly because he did not fit in with another unit’s culture. I’m sure some people in his last unit thought he wasn’t a great service member. And perhaps he wasn’t at that specific point in time. However, he was also the same service member who supported operations that killed some of America’s most lethal enemies.

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5. “Weapons of war,” “in support” of Afghanistan, and “stolen valor”?

A video making the rounds shows Walz, apparently in the last couple of weeks, arguing against assault weapons, saying, “We can make sure those weapons of war that I carried in war are only carried in war.” I must admit I found these comments foolish, but not for the same reasons that Walz’s critics pillory him. I carried all sorts of weapons in war: knives, hatchets, shotguns, and various handguns. Those are weapons of war, right? Instead, JD Vance and his allies zeroed in on the “I carried in war” part of Walz’s statement.

So what counts as “going to war”? Obviously fighting in a combat zone would count as going to war. But what about being sent to Iraq or Afghanistan and serving in support roles but not seeing combat, like JD Vance? This is, of course, not a slam against combat correspondents. During my time in Afghanistan, I had the honor of giving a “combat cam” a ride through some of the most dangerous battlefields in Afghanistan. Rather, it shows that even having the term “combat” in your job description does not necessarily mean that you saw or experienced combat.

Often, service members will receive medals or ribbons that show they were either shot at or returned fire (e.g., the Combat Action Badge, the Combat Action Medal). But even then, the military does not always get it right. For example, one of my closest brothers-in-arms spent a year fighting as an enabler with various maneuver units. However, because he was attached to those units but not a member of them, nobody from his higher headquarters put him in for a combat medal, which he earned. Is he a combat veteran or not? In short, many of these debates can descend into semantics that would make a lawyer beam with pride while driving most people crazy.

In Walz’s case, he deployed to Europe in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (the war in Afghanistan). Deployments are not always on the frontlines. During the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, service members routinely deployed to other spots inside the United States. While I was stationed in Tampa, we had a reservist in our intelligence shop who was deployed with us in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the war in Iraq). As a commander, I had an airman deployed to Savannah to support operations overseas. So, yes, people deploy everywhere, not just in dangerous spots.

Another case in point: Our military drone operators might fly hundreds of missions and face PTSD and other mental health consequences, but are still officially considered to have had no “combat service.” Would you say they had “weapons of war” while “in war”?

My point is that these categories are messy and that while Walz’s brief remark could be considered misleading (i.e., he did not carry weapons into a war zone), it is also defensible (i.e., he did carry weapons while serving in a war). Either way, though, I don’t see how this incident reaches the level of ‘stolen valor,’ as some commentators have claimed. The original Stolen Valor Act was ruled unconstitutional, and while new legislation has been introduced, it centers mainly on those who profit off combat medals. At most, again, unless more specific evidence is unearthed, Walz was simply imprecise with his words.

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6. This is a ‘veteran’s issue,’ not a ‘veterans issue.’

American veterans are diverse. Some veterans, upon hearing reports about Walz’s retirement or his descriptions of his service, will take great offense. That’s fine. They wore the uniform and have earned the right to disparage Walz’s words and deeds. In turn, other veterans will chuckle at JD Vance’s chutzpah for launching such an attack, considering how his running mate avoided service in Vietnam, repeatedly attacked and dishonored the late Sen. John McCain, and reportedly used the words “losers” and “suckers” to describe American war dead.

This squabble between Walz and Vance is a gigantic distraction from veterans’ issues. Walz and Vance should be focusing on the DoD’s inability to track traumatic brain injuries. Or perhaps they should propose ways to fix the always-struggling Department of Veterans Affairs. Considering this week is the anniversary of the fall of Afghanistan, perhaps Walz and Vance could focus on that humiliating debacle.

Instead, both campaigns will likely spend more time and resources fighting in these muddy trenches instead of discussing policies that could determine the nation’s security or ensure the welfare of the veterans who sacrificed for it.

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5. What Is Ukraine Hoping to Achieve With Its Kursk Incursion?

Military AND political? The military must support the political. A military operation is not successful unless it supports achieving the political object.

What Is Ukraine Hoping to Achieve With Its Kursk Incursion?

Analysts suggest the goals are both military and political.

thedispatch.com · by Joseph Roche · August 13, 2024

KYIV—The surprise was complete, thanks to its meticulous planning. On August 6, despite facing significant challenges in the Donbas, where Russian forces have been steadily gaining ground, the Ukrainian army opened a new front, directly targeting the Kursk oblast—Russian Federation territory—for the first time since the war began in 2022.

This also marks the first time since World War II that a foreign army has launched an attack on Russian soil.

In just a few days of fighting, Ukrainian forces, comprising four of its best brigades with several thousand troops and hundreds of vehicles, reportedly captured territory equivalent to what Russia had conquered in Ukraine over the span of a year.

Ukraine, for its part, has imposed operational silence and managed to catch Russian President Vladimir Putin off-guard. The Russians have reportedly evacuated more than 76,000 people. Putin, meanwhile, is trying to downplay the significance of the incursion, which he called a “large-scale provocation.” On Friday he declared a “counterterrorism” operation in the three Ukrainian-bordering oblasts of Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk, and announced the deployment of reinforcements to counter the Ukrainian advance.

Most of the information we have received comes via Russian Telegram channels from military bloggers, who, without hiding their anger toward Putin’s regime, describe a significant Ukrainian breakthrough and a Russian army in disarray. One of the most influential pro-war bloggers, Rybar, who has more than 1 million followers on Telegram, wrote on Thursday: “Despite the attempts of the Russian forces to stop the advance of the Ukrainian mobile groups, the scale of the crisis is growing. … Points of resistance of the Russian army are being cut off and bypassed along the rockade roads.”

However, these same sources have since tempered their discourse, claiming that the situation, despite some difficulties here and there, has been stabilized.

Ukraine’s allies, without whom it could not continue to defend itself, have unanimously supported the operation. “Washington hasn’t changed its policy of allowing Ukraine to use American-supplied weapons “to target imminent threats just across the border,” said John Kirby, U.S. National Security Council spokesperson.

Ukraine’s objectives remain unclear.

At this stage, it remains difficult to gauge the full scope and objectives of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kursk oblast, though analysts suggest that Ukraine’s goals are both military and political, as well as an attempt to shift the initiative to their side.

Since the beginning of 2023, Russian forces have captured 740 square kilometers, including 150 square kilometers in Kharkiv oblast at the beginning of their counteroffensive in early May before stalling at the Ukrainian defense line.

However, despite being a slow grind, Russian forces in Donbas have been able to ramp up their offensive over the past month, capturing about 177 square kilometers of Donetsk oblast.

On Saturday, the Institute for the Study of War, an American think tank, noted that Ukrainian forces might occupy part of Sudzha, an important hub for gas transit to Europe that sits about six miles over the Ukraine border, and have advanced westward and northwestward in Kursk oblast. War Mapper, a group that relies on open-source intelligence (OSINT) for its analysis, announced that Ukraine could have seized 320 square kilometers of Kursk oblast.

Analyst and journalist Sebastien Gobert reported that this incursion may aim to seize the Kurchatov nuclear power plant and control key logistical routes in the region to undermine the Kharkiv front.

While these factors are worth considering, it is still too early to confirm them with certainty.

Touman, a Ukrainian battalion commander in the Sumy region who provided only his call sign as has been standard for Ukrainian soldiers, remained vague about the progress of Ukrainian troops but suggested that the primary objective might be to force the Russians to thin out their forces on the Donbas front, where Ukraine is facing challenges.

“Our strategy is to force the Russians to ease pressure on certain points of the front, particularly Toretsk [in Donetsk oblast],” Touman explained. “Perhaps also to capture a portion of Russian territory to negotiate in exchange for part of the territory captured by Russia.”

This hypothesis was confirmed by Ukrainian presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak, who said on August 7, “Any possible Ukrainian operations in ‘Russian border regions’ will have an impact on Russian society and improve Kyiv’s position in future peace talks with Moscow.”

Viktor Kevlyuk, a former Ukrainian army colonel and analyst at a defense and strategy center in Kyiv, argued that Ukraine’s objectives are more comprehensive than merely relieving pressure on the Donbas front.

In an interview with The Dispatch, the former officer explained that Ukraine’s main military goals are to curb Russian attacks in the Kharkiv direction and weaken reserve forces. But most importantly, he stated, “The military-political goal is to show the world the weakness and internal unpreparedness of the Russian Federation to transfer the war to its sovereign territory.”

This analysis is echoed by international risk consultant Stéphane Audran, who views the operation as more political than military. In a note dated August 10, he wrote, “Seizing territory, bringing destruction to the aggressor, making its population flee before an invasion—this represents a significant political cost for the Kremlin.” He also emphasized that, besides boosting the morale of Ukrainian troops and civilians, it was crucial for Ukraine to restore a narrative of “victory” and shift the defeatist sentiment to the opposing camp.

Challenges ahead for the Ukrainian army.

Nevertheless, several analysts suggest that, given the political nature of the mission and the Ukrainian army’s lack of manpower and ammunition, this operation may not be sustainable.

In an interview with The Dispatch, OSINT analyst Emil Kastehelmi of the Black Bird Group said, “It all depends on how much power Ukraine wants to commit to the Kursk offensive.”

Moreover, as the analysis points out, “Ukraine can’t commit too many brigades to this, as they must simultaneously keep a strong reserve to respond to potential Russian threats elsewhere on the frontline.”

However, Ronin, a soldier from the Foreign Legion, while not denying the political impact of the operation, claims that the Ukrainians’ plan is to establish a long-term presence in the region.

“I can’t reveal everything, but they’ve taken vehicles and materials meant for holding positions and maintaining a new front for the long term.”

Ronin asserts that Ukraine’s ability to create a front in Kursk will depend on the speed of the Russian forces’ response. He also pointed out that much will depend on how quickly Ukrainian forces can use their artillery systems to strike at the Russian reinforcement columns.

“If the Ukrainians do their job well, it will create breaches in the front lines in Kursk while relieving pressure on the eastern and southern fronts.”

Thus, while it is still difficult to predict the operational success of Ukraine and its ability to sustain such an effort in the long term, the offensive is seen in Ukraine as a form of resurgence against the Russian advance in the Donbas and a massive blow to the security apparatus of Russian territory, as well as a failure of its secret service.

According to Konrad Muzyka, a military analyst at the Polish think tank Rochan Consulting, the operation can be considered successful only if it reduces Russian attacks in the Donetsk region, creates strategic dilemmas for Moscow, allows Kyiv to maintain a presence in Kursk oblast, and strengthens Ukraine’s position in future negotiations. Conversely, it would be deemed a failure if Ukrainian troops are driven out of Russian territory while suffering heavy losses without achieving tangible results, allowing Russian forces to continue their advance in the Donbas.

Touman, on the other hand, suggests that this could be a turning point in the war.

“The Kremlin is weakened, their army is occupied along the entire front line,” he insisted. “Sometimes all it takes is one event to regain the advantage.”

thedispatch.com · by Joseph Roche · August 13, 2024

6. Deception and a Gamble: How Ukrainian Troops Invaded Russia

Photso. map graphics, and multiple videos at the link.

Deception and a Gamble: How Ukrainian Troops Invaded Russia

Planned in secrecy, the incursion was a bold move to upend the war’s dynamics and put Moscow on the defensive — a gambit that could also leave Ukraine exposed.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/13/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-kursk-offensive.html

By Kim BarkerAnton TroianovskiAndrew E. KramerConstant MéheutAlina LobzinaEric Schmitt and Sanjana Varghese

• Aug. 13, 2024Updated 7:42 p.m. ET

The scenes were decidedly Russian. A Gazprom facility. Flags with the country’s signature three horizontal stripes of white, blue and red. A Pyatyorochka supermarket.

The soldiers posting the videos, verified by The New York Times, were Ukrainian, almost giddily showing off just how easily they had pushed over the border and through Russian lines of defense in the past week.

In the Russian town of Sverdlikovo, a Ukrainian soldier climbed onto another’s shoulders, broke off the wooden post anchored to a town council building and threw the Russian flag to the ground. In Daryino, a town five miles to the west, other soldiers also grabbed a Russian flag. “Just throw it away,” a Ukrainian soldier said, grinning, as another flexed his muscles.

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CreditCredit...@ssternenko via Telegram

On Aug. 6, Ukraine launched an audacious military offensive, planned and executed in secrecy, with the aim of upending the dynamics of a war it has appeared to be losing, town by town, as Russian troops have ground forward in the east. The operation surprised even Kyiv’s closest allies, including the United States, and has pushed the limits of how Western military equipment would be permitted to be used inside Russian territory.

For Russia, it was a moment nearly as shocking as the mercenary Yevgeny V. Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in June 2023: the vaunted security state that President Vladimir V. Putin had built crumbled in the face of the surprise attack, failing in its basic task of protecting its citizens. And the unwritten social contract that has largely accompanied Mr. Putin’s 30-month campaign — that most Russians could get on with their normal lives even as he waged war — was cast into question anew.

Mostly on the defensive since a failed counteroffensive last year, Ukraine has pushed seven miles into Russia along a 25-mile front and taken dozens of Russian soldiers as prisoners, analysts and Russian officials say. The governor of Russia’s Kursk region said on Monday that Ukraine controls 28 towns and villages there. More than 132,000 people have been evacuated from nearby areas, Russian officials said.

Kursk

Kurchatov

Lgov

Held by Ukraine

as of Aug. 12

RUSSIA

Sverdlikovo

Area shown

Kyiv

UKRAINE

Ukranian incursion

UKR.

Sumy

10 miles

Source: Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project By Veronica Penney

“Russia brought war to others, and now it is coming home,” President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said in his Monday night address.

This offensive is a major gamble, especially since Russia dominates much of the frontline in Ukraine and has made significant inroads in the east. If Ukrainian troops are able to hold territory, they could stretch the capacity of Russian troops, deliver a major embarrassment for Mr. Putin and get a bargaining chip for any peace negotiations. But if Russia manages to push Ukrainian troops out of Kursk and simultaneously move forward in eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian military leaders could be blamed for giving the Russians an opening to gain more ground, particularly in the Donetsk region.

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Nina Klymenko, 90, being carried on a stretcher by a Ukrainian evacuation team in the village of Yunakivka in Ukraine’s Sumy region, near the border on Monday.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

U.S. officials told The Times they were given no formal heads-up about the high-risk mission — possibly because Ukrainian officials feared the Americans would try to persuade Ukraine to call it off, possibly because of Ukraine’s obsessive concern over leaks. Ukraine was also using American-supplied vehicles, arms and munitions, despite President Biden’s caution in May that Ukraine could only use American-made weapons inside Russia for limited self-defense strikes.

U.S. officials have said that Ukraine’s cross-border offensive didn’t violate that policy. “They are taking actions to protect themselves from attacks,” Sabrina Singh, the Pentagon’s deputy press secretary, said on Thursday.

Ukrainian officials have remained tight-lipped about the mission, including whether they intend to hold ground or fall back to defenses on their side of the border. Mr. Zelensky only acknowledged the operation publicly for the first time on Saturday. Ukrainian soldiers said they didn’t know the plan in advance. Military analysts who spend their days tracking the war said they were surprised.

“This is a good example of how a modern successful operation requires extreme operational security measures and deception,” said Pasi Paroinen, an analyst from the Black Bird Group, a Finland-based organization that analyzes battlefield footage. He added that if analysts couldn’t detect it, the Russians might not be able to either.

A quiet buildup

There were hints of what was to come.

Maps of the battlefield compiled by independent analysts show that soldiers from brigades long fighting in the east had moved discreetly into Ukraine’s Sumy region, just across the border from Kursk. A drone battalion from the 22nd Mechanized Brigade, which for nearly a year had defended the beleaguered frontline town of Chasiv Yar, was spotted near the border in mid-July. Troops from the 82nd Air Assault Brigade, engaged in fierce combat near Vovchansk in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, also shifted to the area. So did soldiers from the 80th Air Assault Brigade, which was at the forefront of fighting in the Kharkiv region this spring.

A few Russians noticed. A report was submitted to Russian military leadership about a month before the attack saying that “forces had been detected and that intelligence indicated preparations for an attack,” Andrei Gurulyov, a prominent member of Russia’s Parliament and a former high-ranking army officer, said after the incursion.

“But from the top came the order not to panic, and that those above know better,” Mr. Gurulyov lamented on national television.

Any movement could have been misconstrued as a new defensive posture. The Ukrainian Army sometimes splits brigades into smaller battalions scattered across the battlefield, and Sumy has long been rumored as a place where Russia might try opening a new front.

Few expected Ukraine to be able to launch a new offensive. Ukrainian brigades were running low on ammunition. Even as new weapons started arriving this spring and summer from the West, an almost fatalistic mood had taken hold of many Ukrainians, that they were losing ground in the east, foot by foot.

Ukraine shuffled parts of brigades into the Sumy area under the pretenses of training and picking up new equipment, said one brigade’s deputy commander, Lt. Col. Artem, who asked to be identified only by his first name and rank, in keeping with military protocol.

Heavy weaponry moved in. Soldiers piled into houses. The Ukrainians hid in plain sight. Officers were told to avoid wearing military uniforms when entering towns and cities so they didn’t draw attention, said one officer, who identified himself by his call sign, “Tykhyi,” in keeping with military protocol.

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A Ukrainian man pushing his bicycle past a tank along a road, about 10 miles from the Russian border in Ukraine’s Sumy region on Monday.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Some residents noticed the buildup. “Maybe they were reinforcing the border, or maybe building something?” said Elena Sima, the head of the Yunakivka district, about five miles from the border. “Everybody was guessing.”

In the village of Khotyn, the rumble of heavy, tracked vehicles woke up Natalya Vyalina, a 44-year-old kindergarten teacher, several nights in a row. She assumed others heard it, too. But in the village, she said, “nobody said anything.”

Even within the army, many were kept in the dark. Tykhyi — which means “quiet one” in Ukrainian — said some units were told of their mission only at the last moment.

On Aug. 3, Colonel Artem said, his brigade commander summoned senior officers to a meeting on the side of a forest road to announce the mission’s goals. To divert Russian troops to help fellow soldiers fighting in the eastern Donbas region. To push Russian artillery out of range of Sumy. To demoralize the Russians by showing their intelligence and planning failures.

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‘Difficult challenges ahead’

The Ukrainian military hadn’t tried a serious push into Russia since the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Commandos had made quick forays across the border, one in May 2023 and another this March. They were claimed by two shadowy paramilitary groups with ties to Ukraine: the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion.

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Members of a paramilitary group with ties to Ukraine that made an incursion into Russia this March.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

Away from the fighting, the Kursk region posed an easier target than elsewhere along the 600-mile front in the east and south of Ukraine. It had fewer anti-armored vehicle ditches, fewer of the anti-tank pyramid obstacles known as dragon’s teeth and fewer manned fighting positions, said Brady Africk, an American analyst who maps Russia’s defenses. Russia also appeared to have sown fewer mines in the Kursk region than in occupied Ukrainian territories.

“Russia’s fortifications in Kursk are less dense than in other areas where Russian forces have built formidable defenses, such as in the south,” Mr. Africk said.

Just before noon on Aug. 6, Russian authorities claimed about 300 soldiers, more than 20 armored combat vehicles and 11 tanks from Ukraine’s 22nd Mechanized Brigade had crossed into the country. But those initial reports were greeted with a shrug. Disinformation and propaganda have become another kind of front in this war, and no one thought such an incursion made any tactical sense.

Hundreds more Ukrainian forces surged forward, breaching border checkpoints and pushing through two lines of defense. With fewer mines and fewer anti-military obstacles, Ukrainian mechanized brigades moved quickly.

Oleksandr, a Ukrainian infantry soldier who declined to give his last name, citing military security protocols, said many Russian soldiers fled as the Ukrainians pushed forward. Eight Russian soldiers surrendered at one checkpoint, he added.

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People who were evacuated from the border regions, including from Sudzha, Russia, at dinner at a temporary shelter in Kursk on Monday.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Early Wednesday, senior U.S. officials woke up to a shock: They learned that more than 1,000 regular Ukrainian Army forces had crossed the border the day before, equipped with mobile air defenses and electronic-warfare equipment to jam Russian radar. Some were driving in armored vehicles sent by Germany and the United States. The soldiers appeared to be planning for an extended fight.

As late as Thursday, U.S. officials said, they were still seeking clarity from Ukrainian officials on the operation’s logic and rationale. Since then, Ukrainian leaders have briefed senior U.S. civilian officials and top military commanders on their goals.

The American officials said they were surprised at how well the operation has gone so far, but were skeptical that the Ukrainians could hold onto their gains. And in making the incursion, they said, Ukraine has created new vulnerabilities along the front where its forces are already stretched thin.

Videos show Ukrainian forces may have faced resistance at times, although there is not visual evidence of widespread losses.

Outside the Russian village of Kremyanoye, a video filmed by a Russian soldier shows Russian soldiers ransacking a captured Ukrainian armored vehicle, and taking away what appeared to be ammunition and other supplies. In another video filmed a few hundred meters away, a Russian soldier tried to rip a Ukrainian flag patch from the uniform of a dead soldier lying in the grass. Other footage, posted on Telegram by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, appeared to show Russian forces firing on a Ukrainian brigade around the Kursk region.

“We all have joy in our hearts,” the Ukrainian soldier, Oleksandr, said in a phone interview at 5 p.m. on Thursday, from somewhere inside Russia. “But we realize that there are still difficult challenges ahead.”

Some Ukrainian troops haven’t been able to stop themselves from publicizing their moves. They’ve posted videos and selfies from Russian towns like Sudzha or villages like Poroz and Dmitriukov, bragging about how they have finally taken the fight to Russia.

Outside a Pyatyorochka store in Sudzha, about six miles from the Russian border, one Ukrainian soldier said that a Ukrainian supermarket chain, ATB, was much better. “Glory to Ukraine,” he said in a video, which like others were verified by The Times. “No Pyatyorochka, ATB will be here soon.”

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CreditCredit...@badcop30 via TikTok

Four Ukrainian soldiers posed outside a nearby Gazprom facility, the Russian state-owned gas monopoly.

“From Sudzha, our news is as follows: The town is controlled by the armed forces of Ukraine,” one said, holding a rifle and standing in front of three soldiers brandishing a blue-and-yellow Ukrainian flag. “Peace in the town. All houses are intact.” He added: “I wish everyone a peaceful sky.”

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CreditCredit...@uaonlii via Telegram

One video filmed by Ukrainian forces showed Ukrainian armored vehicles gliding along roads and through open fields in the Kursk region. Another showed a convoy of a dozen or so burned Russian vehicle husks near the town of Rylsk, some 20 miles inside Russian territory. Bodies could be seen in the back of some trucks.

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CreditCredit...@khornegroup via Telegram, @United24media via X

About three days after the incursion began, a Ukrainian strike destroyed an apparent munitions depot at Russia’s Lipetsk military airfield in the neighboring region.

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Destroyed and burned buildings at a military airfield in Lipetsk, Russia, on Aug. 9, 2024.Credit...Planet Labs

Whether or not the strike was directly related to the ground advance, “Ukraine’s Kursk campaign de facto benefits,” said George Barros, an analyst with the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War.

A haphazard evacuation

For Russians near the border, the incursion arrived with loud booms. Roman, 49, a government worker who insisted on anonymity because he feared repercussions for speaking to a Western news outlet, said shelling woke him at 3:30 a.m. in his village outside Sudzha on Aug. 6, the first day of Ukraine’s incursion.

The next day, he and his wife drove to Kursk, the regional capital, because they knew their daughter’s school wouldn’t soon reopen. That night, they returned to evacuate their parents. They drove on side roads with their headlights off, stopping repeatedly to listen for drones.

Roman said people inundated him with requests for help reaching their relatives. He and others said the incursion appeared to have come as such a shock to the authorities that residents had to rely on each other.

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People who were evacuated from the border regions waiting for supplies being distributed on Monday in Kursk, Russia.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

A Sudzha resident named Ivan, 34, said in a text exchange Thursday that he was trying to evacuate residents. Later in the day, he wrote that he was in the hospital. His car had been hit by shelling while leaving Sudzha, home to around 6,000 people. And he had learned that the coffee shop where he worked had been damaged in the fighting.

“We’ve all been ditched,” Ivan said, also insisting on anonymity. “People are helping with whatever they can. The government doesn’t care.”

On Monday, the governor of Kursk said more than 100 civilians had been injured and a dozen killed, although the figures could not be independently verified.

The Times reviewed several satellite images captured since Aug. 6 that showed at least two dozen structures were damaged or destroyed in Sudzha and a neighboring village, Goncharovka, including homes, an apartment building, a gas station and support buildings of an arts school.

Image

A partly destroyed apartment building in Sudzha, seen in satellite imagery captured on Aug. 7, 2024.Credit...Maxar Technologies

Image

Satellite imagery shows several destroyed small buildings, including some within a school complex, in central Sudzha on Aug. 12, 2024.Credit...Maxar Technologies

As the incursion expanded, the city of Kursk — whose name evokes for many Russians the enormous World War II tank battle nearby in which the Soviets stopped the German advance — filled with people fleeing the fighting. They lined up for help at aid centers set up by charity groups, Yan S. Furtsev, 38, an independent political activist in the city, said in an interview.

Nerves were frayed, he said, by shaky cellphone service and incessant air-raid warnings. Buses stopped when the sirens sounded. Those who couldn’t afford taxis were walking to work or relying on strangers for rides.

Whether the incursion would change people’s views on the war was another matter. On state television, the Kremlin played down the significance of the offensive, rather than casting it as a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“There are a lot of different opinions” about the war, Mr. Furtsev said. “But as for what people think, everyone believes that this is a tragedy.”

Image

A damaged apartment building in Kursk, Russia, on Monday.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

Michael Schwirtz, Adam Entous, Dzvinka Pinchuk, Evelina Riabenko, Aric Toler, Christoph Koettl contributed reporting. Axel Boada contributed video production.

Kim Barker is a Times reporter writing in-depth stories about national issues. More about Kim Barker

Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The Times. He writes about Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. More about Anton Troianovski

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014. More about Andrew E. Kramer

Constant Méheut reports on the war in Ukraine, including battlefield developments, attacks on civilian centers and how the war is affecting its people. More about Constant Méheut

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War

7. Active Duty Navy SEAL Captain alleges Investigation Steering & Mishandling on Shawn Ryan Show

I have not listened to the podcast nor have I seen any other reporting on this. I have not observed any of the "ripples." The Captain makes some shocking allegations.

Excerpt:

This is why allegations made by a high-ranking active-duty Navy SEAL Captain, Brad Geary, have sent ripples across the United States Special Operations community and beyond.

Active Duty Navy SEAL Captain alleges Investigation Steering & Mishandling on Shawn Ryan Show

]

Sam Havelock

Former Navy SEAL, Founder: SOFX Media. Publisher: The SOFX Report ("TSR"). More decision makers rely on TSR for global conflict and battlefield technology reporting than any other daily source.

August 13, 2024

linkedin.com · by Sam Havelock

In the closed society of military special operations, where loyalty to the institution and adherence to the ethos of ‘being a quiet professional’ are paramount, few dare to speak out about the system. This is why allegations made by a high-ranking active-duty Navy SEAL Captain, Brad Geary, have sent ripples across the United States Special Operations community and beyond. Appearing on the Shawn Ryan Show, on Monday, August 5th, 2024, Geary advanced serious allegations regarding investigation steering and mishandling within the military justice system regarding the death of SEAL Candidate Kyle Mullen.

Background

On February 4th, 2022, five hours after completing Hell Week at Naval Special Warfare Training Center, Kyle Mullen, an aspiring SEAL candidate and former Yale football player died. The official cause of death was listed as Pneumonia. Conflicting reports, discovery of performance enhancing drugs among Mullen’s belongings, a failure to test for performance enhancing drugs during post-mortem autopsy along with allegations of misrepresentation and scapegoating on the part of command investigating officers and The Judge Advocate General corps have erupted across the Naval Special Warfare Community, US Special Operations Community, and the United States Navy since the incident.

In a rare and unprecedented case of an Active-Duty Naval Officer still exposed to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Naval Proceedings, Captain Brad Geary conducted a nearly 6-hour public interview with Shawn Ryan on The Shawn Ryan Show Podcast alleging a pattern of mishandling, misrepresentation, and steering across multiple investigations since Mullen’s death. The full-length interview dropped to the general public on Monday, August 5th, 2024, and can be found on YouTube and wherever you download your podcasts.

Shawn Ryan is the CEO of Vigilance Elite, a former Navy SEAL and Central Intelligence Agency contractor who has become a widely respected podcast producer and media personality. The Shawn Ryan Show (SRS) has become a top 5 podcast exploring sensitive topics and guests from all walks of life providing a platform to tell stories that matter. SRS, known for long form interview format on sensitive topics features numerous notable guests in and around special operations, government bumbling, and the like. The Shawn Ryan Show is dedicated to preserving history through the unfiltered stories of heroic events and current world issues by honoring the real experiences of the men and women who lived them. 

Captain Geary is a widely respected and highly decorated SEAL Officer with multiple combat deployments including service at Naval Special Warfare’s most selective command, SEAL Team 6. Geary was the Commanding Officer of The Naval Special Warfare Training Center at the time of Mullen’s death, which is the command responsible for administering the Basic Underwater Demolition / SEAL (BUD/S) course .

The first 3 hours of the podcast interview was wide ranging and covered numerous topics such as:

• Captain Geary’s early life and decisions to go into uniformed service.
• Captain Geary’s experiences during training and operations leading up to the Mullen event.
• Experiences with Navy SEAL Danny Deitz who perished in OPERATION REDWING
• Geary’s recollection of events during the Extortion 17 crash that killed a substantial number of Development Group Squadron teammates, the Task Force 160th crew, and a beloved Military Canine.
• Captain Geary’s very interesting views on risk management, risk assignment, and risk deferral.

The Specifics of the Kyle Mullen Story begins at time hack 3:05:50 of the episode

The Story

As an active-duty Captain, Geary currently faces the prospect of a range of disciplinary and punitive actions to include internal community backlash for breaking ranks with the Special Operations ethos of being “Quiet Professionals.” Critics of the training center both internal and external to the Navy and Naval Special Warfare have questioned the oversight and safety protocols of the SEAL training program, pointing fingers at Captain Geary, his training Cadre, and his senior medical officer. In the interview on the Shawn Ryan Show, Geary addressed this scrutiny head-on. “I’m risking a lot by speaking out, but it’s necessary to address the problems and ensure the truth comes out,” Geary stated. He acknowledged the intense pressure and potential backlash but emphasized his commitment to transparency. “It’s about fulfilling my responsibility and ensuring that the truth is known, even if it means exposing myself to risk,” he explained. 

The Day Kyle Mullen Died

Kyle Mullen was born and raised in Manalapan, New Jersey. He was known for his intellect and athletic capabilities and was a standout football player at Manalapan High School, where he excelled as a defensive end. His talent on the field and academics earned him a spot to Yale University, where he continued to shine both academically and athletically. Outside of athletic and academic commitments, Mullen was known for a strong sense of duty and commitment to serving his country, which ultimately led him to pursue a career with the Navy SEALs. 

Mullen had endured the final hours of Hell Week. Despite exhaustion and harsh conditions, he had by all accounts shown exceptional grit and commitment. As the week concluded, candidates were released from Hell week and finally allowed rest. Several hours after Hell Week concluded, Mullen’s condition began to deteriorate rapidly. Mullen was allegedly offered medical treatment on several occasions but declined escalation of care and transport to the hospital. As the day progressed, Mullen began to exhibit severe respiratory distress symptoms such as coughing up blood and extreme difficulty breathing. At that point, Naval watch standers assigned to observe the candidates decided to transport Mullen to the hospital via EMS. Mullen was transported to a nearby Emergency Room where his vital signs and physical condition continued to deteriorate despite all efforts by the civilian medical community to stabilize him.

Captain Brad Geary, who commanded the training center at the time, recounted the events during his interview on the Shawn Ryan Show. Geary described the intense environment and respect Mullen had earned from his peers and instructors alike.

The Rigors of Basic Underwater Demolition / SEAL Training (BUD/S)

BUD/S is widely regarded one of the most demanding military training programs in the world, designed to weed out all but the most resilient and determined candidates. The training is divided into three phases, each focused on different skills, mental, and physical conditioning.

 Hell, Week is a rite of passage and a key component of this training. Hell Week, more than any other event in Naval Special Warfare serves as the ultimate test of a candidate’s mental and physical fortitude. Those who successfully complete Hell Week and the subsequent phases of BUD/S training go on to become part of the elite Navy SEAL teams, ready to undertake some of the Nation’s most challenging and dangerous missions.

According to Navy reports, since 1954, there have been 11 deaths associated with BUD/S. Numbers vary by season and class but historically only 20%-30% of those selected to attend BUD/s training will eventually become U.S. Navy SEALs.

A New Generation of SEAL Candidates

In the interview, Captain Geary spoke about the importance of training and the new generation of BUD/S candidates. He emphasized how the modern social media landscape and other societal changes have influenced candidates. “This generation of War Fighters… with social media and all its impacts, presents unique challenges that we need to address through our training programs,” Geary remarked. He went on to outline how the use of messaging applications like SIGNAL and group chats enabled the current generation of candidates to develop complex strategies to game the system to include evidence of the coordination of purchasing and delivery of performance enhancing controlled substances. Pursuant to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigation, Geary alleges that Kyle Mullen’s phone was interrogated and found to contain text messages coordinating the procurement of performance enhancing drugs which align to the discovery of a significant quantity of controlled substances in Mullen’s belongings postmortem.

Performance-Enhancing Drugs

The investigation uncovered concerns about the use of performance-enhancing drugs among SEAL candidates. According to information released to the public by Congressman Nick Lalota, The medical examiner’s autopsy report found evidence of physiological changes to Mullen’s organs that were consistent with the use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs). The autopsy did not detect PEBs in Mullen’s system however PED detection, unlike more common narcotic drug testing requires special tests that were not conducted during the Autopsy. Mullen’s cause of death was listed as Acute Pneumonia. Several substances commonly used as performance-enhancing drugs, such as Testosterone, Anastrobol, and Sildenafil, were found in Mullen’s belongings during routine end of life preparation of his belongings for return to next of kin.

The problem of performance-enhancing drugs did not appear to be unique to Mullen; further investigations revealed that the use of performance enhancing drugs was a broader issue affecting many in his class and other SEAL candidates. The pressures to meet the extreme physical demands of BUD/S training have led some candidates to resort to these substances. This pervasive issue has prompted the Navy to implement additional testing for performance-enhancing drugs to ensure all candidates adhere to strict standards (Coronado Times) (Task & Purpose). Captain Geary remarked that these specific Naval Directives only appeared after the Mullen incident.

“Staff and medical professionals who reviewed the findings said in the report that several substances commonly used as performance-enhancing drugs were found in Mullen’s belongings. This issue raises significant concerns about the pressures candidates face to perform at the highest levels,” Gear explained on the podcast.

Calls to Action

Captain Geary believes his public discussion should serve as a call to action for Lawmakers and policymakers. Above all else Geary suggests that he cannot in good conscience allow a narrative to propagate that in his view impairs the reputation of his Cadre, his Senior Medical Officer, and his personal reputation while violating the Navy Code of Ethics and Navy SEAL Ethos. Geary urges taxpayers to demand accountability and transparency by activating congressional representatives to seek accountability and truth from the Navy. Geary goes on to highlight the critical role that public oversight plays in ensuring the safety and effectiveness of military training programs. Captain Geary’s legal team, all experienced former Military JAGs, who appear on the podcast where the Mullen discussion picked up, suggest that there is evidence of gross malpractice and investigative steering on the part of assigned investigating officers and members of the Judge Advocate General Corps across a variety of separate investigations.

“Taxpayers have a right to demand accountability and transparency in how their money is being used, especially in high-stakes training programs like those for Navy SEALs. I urge every taxpayer to contact their congressional representatives and push for a thorough review and necessary reforms to ensure the safety and effectiveness of our training programs,” Geary explained. 

Implemented Reforms and Future Recommendations

Following Mullen’s death, reforms were implemented to improve safety and oversight of SEAL training. These include advanced cardiology screening for SEAL candidates, pneumonia prevention measures, and enhanced medical scrutiny during and after Hell Week. The Navy is now conducting expanded testing for performance-enhancing drugs.

Rear Adm. Keith Davids, head of Naval Special Warfare Command, stated, “Our effectiveness as the Navy’s maritime special operations force necessitates demanding, high-risk training. While rigorous and intensely demanding, our training must be conducted with an unwavering commitment to safety and methodical precision.”

Geary’s call to action for policymakers is clear. Captain Geary alleges there is a need for comprehensive reforms to ensure transparency and accountability in line with the Ethical standards of the Uniformed services. Geary’s insights and willingness to sacrifice what remains of his career, and risk the wrath of repercussions, while still active duty, is largely unprecedented with the exception of the recent Eddie Gallagher case.

For SOFX, Sam Havelock.

Sam Havelock is a former Navy SEAL and U.S. Marine who served on Active Duty for over two decades. Havelock is the founder and publisher of The SOFX Report. The SOFX Report (TSR) informs over 30,000 decision makers about special operations, global conflict, and the impact of technology on the battlefield. As a completely independent publication with no outside investors and a less than 1% annual unsubscribe rate, TSR offers high quality, apolitical reporting. The type of reporting that Main-Stream Media abandoned. The SOFX Report is complimentary and can be subscribed to at the SOFX website. As hardline privacy advocates, the SOFX team does not rent, sell, or share subscriber contact data with anyone.

linkedin.com · by Sam Havelock

8. Why Are There Fears of War in the South China Sea?

I am reminded of this quote from some months ago:

“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”

 – Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024

Why Are There Fears of War in the South China Sea?

China claims most of the strategic waterway and is trying to push out neighbors like the Philippines. Any deadly mistake could risk war.

https://www.nytimes.com/article/south-china-sea-philippines.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

Chinese militia and Coast Guard vessels chasing a Philippine Coast Guard ship in the South China Sea last year.Credit...Jes Aznar for The New York Times

By Mike Ives

Aug. 12, 2024

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China and Vietnam? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

You might not notice Second Thomas Shoal from the air. The disputed atoll near the Philippines is a bit larger than Manhattan and sinks beneath the South China Sea’s surface at high tide.

But diplomats and military officials pay close attention to clashes near the shoal between Philippine and Chinese vessels. The fear is that an incident could turn deadly and prompt the Philippines to activate its mutual defense treaty with the United States.

That could lead to a nightmare: a war between the United States and China.

In one previous dramatic episode, Chinese Coast Guard vessels confronted Philippine Navy ones near the shoal in June, footage released by the Philippine military showed. Some Chinese sailors carried knives, and one Philippine sailor was injured.

Video

00:00

0:21

0:21

CreditCredit...Armed Forces of the Philippines via Facebook

Here’s what’s happening in the South China Sea, and why it matters:

The sea is valuable and contested.

The South China Sea has some of the world’s most productive fisheries, as well as shipping channels that carry about a third of global ocean trade. Surveys suggest that it may also contain large oil and natural gas deposits.

The sea’s features were mostly beyond “the administration and often the awareness” of governments until the late 19th century, the scholar Gregory B. Poling wrote in a recent book. But in the mid-20th century, Beijing laid claim to most of the sea with a sweeping, U-shaped boundary.

Basic geography does not support those claims. The sea’s main island chains, the Paracels in the north and the Spratlys in the south, lie much closer to Southeast Asia.

TAIWAN

CHINA

Extent of China’s

territorial claim

PHILIPPINES

South China Sea

VIETNAM

Exclusive

economic zones

of other countries

BRUNEI

MALAYSIA

INDONESIA

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA

250 miles

Source: Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Esri, Flanders Marine InstituteBy Agnes Chang

Neither does international law. In 2016, an international tribunal ruled that China’s claims in the sea had no legal basis, stating that Second Thomas Shoal and other features were within the Philippines’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.

But Beijing never recognized the ruling, and Chinese vessels have been challenging the Western-driven security order in the Pacific by policing the U-shaped line. They have disrupted oil-and-gas prospecting, destroyed coral reefs to build artificial islands and chased Southeast Asian civilian fleets from traditional fishing grounds.

Image

A Philippine World War II-era warship, the Sierra Madre, in the Second Thomas Shoal last year.Credit...Eloisa Lopez/Reuters

China’s neighbors have few options.

Governments with competing claims in the sea — Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines — have limited options for resisting Beijing’s pressure. That’s partly because Chinese investments in those places put them in the difficult position of wanting to defend their maritime claims without damaging their economic interests.

“Everybody is treading water really carefully,” said Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, a law professor in Indonesia who studies maritime security.

Another deterrent is that China has the world’s largest naval and Coast Guard fleets, and a large maritime militia. It has also spent years reclaiming land on South China Sea atolls, and outfitting them with radars and runways long enough for fighter jets.

Chinese officials and analysts have described this buildup as defensive.

Image

Chinese Coast Guard personnel aboard their ship in the South China Sea last year.Credit...Jes Aznar for The New York Times

Song Zhongping, a military affairs analyst in Beijing, said that the United States — which has sent warships sailing through the sea and military aircraft flying over it — is the real “troublemaker.”

“The U.S., as an extraterritorial country, is going to turn the South China Sea into a sea of war instead of a sea of peace and stability,” he said.

The Philippines is a special case.

China typically likes to sort out disputes with its neighbors directly, and quietly.

Vietnam, for example, has reclaimed land in disputed areas of the South China Sea. But China has been “rather muted” about that island-building, likely because Hanoi has not involved the United States or other external players, said Le Hong Hiep, an expert on Vietnamese politics.

The Philippines poses a thornier challenge for China because it has a mutual defense treaty with the United States. That 1951 pact would require the United States to defend the Philippines if the country’s forces, ships or aircraft came under attack.

Image

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines in Manila on Tuesday.Credit...Pool photo by Basilio Sepe

The current Philippine government is also far less conciliatory toward China than the one it replaced. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who took office in 2022, has beefed up the U.S. alliance and sought support from a wide network of partners, including Japan and Australia.

It’s hard to predict what will happen next.

For nearly three years, the Chinese authorities have interfered with Philippine efforts to resupply sailors on a World War II-era warship that the Philippine Navy ran aground on Second Thomas Shoal about a quarter century ago.

Weeks after the June clash near the shoal, China and the Philippines reached an apparent deal to prevent clashes there. The Philippines later conducted a resupply mission without incident.

But that hasn’t eased fears that a future provocation — or miscalculation — could lead to a conflict.

Image

Philippine Marines on the Sierra Madre warship in 2014.Credit...Erik De Castro/Reuters

A hypothetical clash could be short but significant, like the one along the China-India border in 2020, said Pooja Bhatt, the author of a recent book on the South China Sea.

Then again, China and the Philippines both “appear quite ready to de-escalate,” and Beijing has little incentive to provoke a war over the shoal, said Collin Koh, an expert on maritime security in Southeast Asia.

“I guess both sides realize that they are pretty close to the real thing,” he said.

Muktita Suhartono, Olivia Wang and Shawn Paik contributed reporting.

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and outlined several Ukrainian objectives of the operations in the area.



• Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast amid Russian attempts to stabilize the frontline in the area.

• The Russian military command may be pulling select elements of Russian irregular units from Donetsk Oblast to address the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian authorities appear to be largely relying on Russian conscripts, and elements of some regular and irregular military units pulled from less critical sectors of the frontline to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion, however.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed Russian Presidential Aid Aide Alexei Dyumin to supervise Russia’s “counterterrorism operation” in Kursk Oblast on August 12.

• Russian officials continue to undermine a long-standing Kremlin information operation that falsely portrays Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and places the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine.

• Russian authorities fined Telegram and WhatsApp four million rubles ($44,000) each for failing to remove "prohibited" content on August 13.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to use the Army-2024 International Military-Technical Forum in Moscow to expand its international defense ties.

10. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, August 13, 2024

Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, August 13, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-13-2024

Key Takeaways:

• Israel: Iran is likely trying to expand divisions within Israel and between Israel and the United States ahead of a possible Iranian drone and missile attack.

• Iran: The Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—appears to be preparing for a possible Iranian attack on Israel.

• West Bank: Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

• Russia: Iran showcased its drone and missile technologies, including the new Mohajer-10 drone, at a Russian military exhibition in Moscow.

• ISIS: The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) reportedly seized ground east of al Tanf along the Iraq-Syria border.

11. Japan PM Kishida's premiership to end after decision to exit party leadership race

Probably one of the most stable leadership transitions to take place that will likely see continuity of policy for the most part.

The big question for us is whether Japan will continue its defense buildup and continue to have a more external defense policy, shifting from a self defense only position. Will a new prime minister sustain this?

Japan PM Kishida's premiership to end after decision to exit party leadership race

14 Aug 2024 11:14AM

(Updated: 14 Aug 2024 03:58PM)

channelnewsasia.com

TOKYO: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said on Wednesday (Aug 14) he will not seek re-election as head of his party, meaning his tenure as prime minister will end in September after just under three years.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed Japan almost uninterrupted since 1945, is due to hold an internal leadership contest next month. Its popularity ratings have slumped because of rising prices.

"In this (party) presidential election, it is necessary to show the people that the LDP is changing and the party is a new LDP," Kishida told reporters at a press conference in Tokyo on Wednesday.

"For this, transparent and open elections and free and vigorous debate are important. The most obvious first step to show that the LDP will change is for me to step aside," he said.

"I will not be running in the forthcoming presidential election."

"Politics cannot function without public trust," said Kishida. "I will now focus on supporting the newly elected LDP leader as a rank-and-file member of the party."

Kishida had informed senior administration officials of his intention not to run, media including national broadcaster NHK and Kyodo News reported earlier.

The head of the ruling party is traditionally also prime minister.

Kishida, 67, has been in office since October 2021, and has seen his and his party's poll ratings slide sharply in response to rising prices hitting Japanese incomes and several scandals.

In November last year, Kishida announced a stimulus package worth 17 trillion yen (more than US$100 billion at the time) as he tried to ease the pressure from inflation and rescue his premiership.

But this failed to make him any less unpopular, both among voters in the world's fourth-largest economy and within his own party.

He also faced public discontent over the failure of wages to keep pace with the rising cost of living as the country finally shook off years of deflationary pressure.

Along with inflation - for Japanese voters an unfamiliar and unwelcome phenomenon - growth has spluttered, shrinking 0.7 per cent in the first quarter.

Despite some recovery in recent weeks, the yen has been one of the world's worst-performing currencies, making life easier for exporters but pushing up import prices.

Kishida's public support has also been sliding amid revelations about the LDP's ties to the controversial Unification Church and political donations made at party fundraising events that went unrecorded.

"An LDP incumbent prime minister cannot run in the presidential race unless he's assured of a victory. It's like the grand champion yokozunas of sumo. You don't just win, but you need to win with grace," said Koichi Nakano, a political science professor at Sophia University.

Kishida's decision to quit triggers a contest to replace him as president of the party, and by extension as the leader of the world's fourth-biggest economy.

Whoever succeeds Kishida will have to unite a fractious ruling group and tackle the rising cost of living, escalating geopolitical tensions with China, and the potential return of Donald Trump as US president next year.

EARLY EXIT

Kishida could in theory have governed until 2025, and there had been speculation he might call a snap election to shore up his position.

But NHK reported that growing voices inside the LDP believed it would fare badly in elections under Kishida. In April, the party lost three by-elections.

Kishida, who last year escaped a pipe-bomb attack unscathed, has also faced severe criticism over a major kickbacks scandal linked to fundraising parties.

Kishida decided to jump because he knew he would lose the leadership battle, said Nakano.

"He has failed to close ranks within the LDP," Nakano told AFP.

But he added: "For an LDP leader, staying in power for three years is longer than the average."

Before Wednesday, several figures were mooted in local media as possible challengers to Kishida including digital minister Taro Kono and economic security minister Sanae Takaichi.

The Yomiuri Shimbun daily reported that some LDP members have high hopes for Shigeru Ishiba, former party number two, and Shinjiro Koizumi, former environment minister and son of ex-premier Junichiro Koizumi.

COVID-19 TO INFLATION

As the country's eighth-longest serving post-war leader, Kishida led Japan out of the COVID-19 pandemic with massive stimulus spending. He also appointed Kazuo Ueda, an academic tasked with ending his predecessor’s radical monetary stimulus, to head the Bank of Japan (BOJ).

The BOJ in July unexpectedly raised interest rates as inflation took hold, contributing to stock market instability and sending the yen sharply lower.

Kishida's departure could mean tighter fiscal and monetary conditions depending on the candidate, according to Shoki Omori, chief Japan desk strategist at Mizuho Securities in Tokyo.

"In short, risk assets, particularly equities, will likely be hit the most," he said.

In another break from the past, Kishida also eschewed corporate profit-driven trickle-down economics in favour of policies aimed at boosting household incomes, including wage hikes and promoting share ownership.

DEFENCE SPENDING

Despite that departure on the economy, he stuck with the hawkish security policies of his predecessor Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated in 2022.

He unveiled Japan's biggest military build-up since World War II with a commitment to double defence spending, aimed at deterring neighbouring China from pursuing its territorial ambitions in East Asia through military force.

With prodding from Washington, Kishida also mended Japan's strained relations with South Korea, enabling the two countries and their mutual ally, the US, to pursue deeper security cooperation to counter the threat posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs.

"Under Prime Minister Kishida’s steadfast leadership, Japan and the United States have ushered in a new era of relations for the Alliance," US Ambassador Rahm Emanuel said in a post on X, formerly known as Twitter.

MUSCULAR DEFENCE

Kishida has sided decisively with Ukraine since Russia's invasion, welcoming President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to a Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima and visiting Kyiv.

Under Kishida, Japan also pledged to double its defence spending to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization standard of 2 per cent of gross domestic product by 2027.

Encouraged by the US as the two countries seek to confront an increasingly assertive China, this marked a major change for Japan from decades of strict pacifism.

US President Joe Biden hosted Kishida at the White House in April when the two countries announced a "new era" in cooperation.

Japan and the Philippines in July signed a defence pact allowing for the deployment of troops on each other's territory.

On climate, Kishida promised at COP28 in December that Japan would build no new coal power stations that were "unabated", or lacked measures to reduce emissions.

Critics said that the necessary technologies, such as "co-firing" coal with ammonia or capturing and storing emissions, were unproven on a large scale.

channelnewsasia.com

12. In Israel, Support Grows for Offensive Against Hezbollah

Passion, reason, and chance. Will the passion of the people dominate reason and drive Israel to war?

In Israel, Support Grows for Offensive Against Hezbollah

As the U.S. works to avoid a regional war, inside security circles some wonder whether now is the time to risk one

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/in-israel-support-grows-for-offensive-against-hezbollah-1a4eefe0?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Dov LieberFollow

Updated Aug. 14, 2024 12:03 am ET

TEL AVIV—As Israel braces for an attack from Iran and its ally Hezbollah, there is a debate here over whether now is the right time for the country to launch an offensive attack against the Lebanese militia or try to de-escalate to avoid triggering a wider regional war.

The U.S. has been working feverishly behind the scenes to avoid an escalation that could lead to a regional war. The Biden administration is expected to send a senior delegation to the region this week to work on that effort. 

Inside Israel, there is a split. Some, like Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, say now is the time for a cease-fire in Gaza that would see the release of hostages and help calm tensions on the northern border so the thousands of Israelis displaced there can return home. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he doesn’t want a war but has promised a “heavy price” in response to an attack. 

But there is also a growing number of current and former security officials, as well as politicians from the center, right and far right, who think the timing could be ripe for Israel to take an offensive approach with Hezbollah, which has massed more than 100,000 rockets, missiles, drones and other projectiles along Israel’s northern border. 

Rockets fired from southern Lebanon were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome air-defense system in northern Israel earlier this month. Photo: JALAA MAREY/AFP/Getty Images

The leadership of Israel’s northern command, the military branch responsible for defending the border with Lebanon, is pushing for a more aggressive approach against Hezbollah than Israel has taken during the current war, say current and former Israeli officials.  

One senior security official said a disproportionate response by Hezbollah could “lead to an Israeli attack that will lead to a new reality on the northern border.” 

Amos Yadlin, a former intelligence official and president of MIND Israel, a national-security consulting firm, said a diplomatic deal, while preferable, is unlikely at this point. Strategically, he thinks Israel should wait until after a Hezbollah attack so it has the justification needed to launch a swift and strong campaign that can cripple the group in a matter of days or weeks while enjoying U.S. support. 

“Enough is enough,” said Yadlin. “Since Hamas is basically destroyed, it is time to move to the north.”

Within Netanyahu’s cabinet, far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has been calling for a war with Hezbollah, as have members of Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party. Even centrist politicians, like National Unity party Chairman Benny Gantz, have called for Israel to strike Lebanese infrastructure, an offensive move that is likely to start a war. 

Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s national security minister, has been calling for a war with Hezbollah, while National Unity party Chairman Benny Gantz has called for Israel to strike Lebanese infrastructure, a move that is likely to start a war.

Kobi Wolf/Bloomberg News, Abir Sultan/Press Pool

A war between Israel and Hezbollah has long been considered inevitable so it is just a question of timing, say security analysts. With an anticipated retaliatory strike from Iran and Hezbollah for killings in Beirut and Tehran, Israel could have the justification it needs to hit the group hard enough to deter future attacks for many years to come. Israeli troops are massed at the border. Israelis are psychologically prepared for a war. And the U.S. has moved assets into the region, including a guided-missile submarine. 

There is also tremendous pressure on the government to deal a blow to Hezbollah so that the 60,000 Israelis who have been displaced can return home. 

“I don’t see any way to return residents to northern Israel without a powerful war against Hezbollah in Lebanon,” said Yoav Kisch, education minister and a member of Netanyahu’s coalition, in a radio interview on Sunday. 

Yet after 10 months of war in Gaza, some argue that now is exactly the wrong time to enter into another war. Israeli reservists are exhausted. The economy is struggling. Fitch on Monday lowered the country’s credit rating, citing military operations on multiple fronts. The country also needs time to replenish its stock of weapons. 

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, at the microphone, led a prayer earlier this month over the coffins of Ismail Haniyeh and his bodyguard who were killed in an assassination blamed on Israel. Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/AP

More dangerously, destroying Iran’s most powerful proxy risks a direct confrontation with Tehran, one that would likely lead to a full-blown regional war that could spread beyond the Mideast, likely dragging the U.S. into the conflict. The U.S., Europe and Arab allies in the Mideast have all been working to avoid such a scenario since the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attack that sparked a war in Gaza and the near-constant volley of attacks between Hezbollah and Israel. 

Gallant on Monday pushed back against those calling for war with Hezbollah. “I’ve seen this courage when it comes up for discussion,” he said at a parliamentary hearing. “The conditions for war in Lebanon that exist today are the opposite of what they were at the beginning of the war.” The Wall Street Journal reported that Gallant had advocated for an Israeli attack against Lebanon right after Oct. 7, but President Biden successfully urged the Israelis to halt such plans. 

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WSJ’s Sune Engel Rasmussen reports from Lebanon, where Beirut residents are carrying on amid heightened regional tensions and people displaced by fighting in the south are facing the consequences of war. Photo: Sune Engel Rasmussen

Such a war would be devastating for both sides. Hezbollah is more like a well-armed military than a traditional militant group, with enough missiles and drones to overwhelm Israel’s air defenses and thousands of well-trained infantry to storm its territory. With civilian casualties likely on the Israeli side, the country’s military would seek to finish the war as quickly as possible through a punishing air campaign targeting the group, which is embedded in villages along the southern border, and Lebanese infrastructure, security analysts say. Israel would likely raze Lebanese villages located near Israel and could reoccupy southern Lebanon and create a new buffer zone, the analysts said. 

Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist group and a key ally of Hamas, has vowed to keep fighting until the war in Gaza comes to a halt.

Some are arguing that the military should pre-emptively strike in Lebanon. 

“There is a huge difference who attacks first,” said Amir Avivi, a former deputy commander of the Israeli military’s Gaza division who now heads the Israel Security and Defense Forum, a think tank. 

Smoke billowing after an Israeli strike in the southern Lebanese town of Khiam this past week, amid cross-border clashes between Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters. Photo: rabih daher/AFP/Getty Images

In downtown Beirut this week, a sign in Arabic reads, ‘Enough, we are tired, Lebanon does not want war.’ Photo: wael hamzeh/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

He said Israel would destroy 80% to 85% of Hezbollah’s capabilities in a pre-emptive attack.

“If [Hezbollah] attacks first, then it can be devastating,” he said.  

U.S. and allied countries have been working on the outlines of an Israeli-Hezbollah agreement that would have seen the group moved away from Israel’s border. But those talks have stumbled along with attempts to reach a cease-fire in Gaza. Many in Israel also argue that any diplomatic agreement without a military response would simply delay an inevitable war, as Hezbollah would likely return to Israel’s border and renew hostilities in the future. 

In a poll released by the Jerusalem-based Israel Democracy Institute, 67% of Israelis support a more aggressive approach to Hezbollah and 42% said that should include strikes on Lebanese infrastructure.

Giora Eiland, a former Israeli national security adviser, said Israel should agree to a cease-fire in Gaza and bring Israeli hostages home, even if it means Hezbollah stays intact and Hamas survives in Gaza for now. 

But if Israel’s government doesn’t make that decision, then he said it should launch a full-scale war against the Lebanese state rather than maintain the status quo.

“The two options are bad,” said Eiland. “We simply need to select one.”

A man cleans a fountain next to a memorial in Tel Aviv, featuring pictures of hostages kidnapped during the deadly October attack on Israel by Hamas. Photo: florion goga/Reuters

Carrie Keller-Lynn contributed to this article.

Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com

13. Liberal Thought Returns to Campus

Real liberal thought. This may be a litmus test. Who could oppose this? (A rhetorical question. See the editorial).

Conclusion:

Many colleges are bracing for a rerun of this spring’s anti-Israel protests, and even universities that aren’t could benefit from new models for escaping academic groupthink and helping students navigate controversy without cancel culture. UNC Board of Trustee chairman John Preyer says he hopes his school’s experiment can become “the nation’s model for what academic freedom can do for higher education, and change the entire landscape.”

Liberal Thought Returns to Campus

The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill opens its new school to teach students how to disagree well.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/university-of-north-carolina-chapel-hill-school-of-civic-life-and-leadership-jed-atkins-higher-education-24566d46?mod=latest_headlines

By The Editorial Board

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Aug. 13, 2024 5:49 pm ET

The University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, N.C. Photo: Gerry Broome/Associated Press

With all the dismaying news from college campuses lately, at least there’s one new bright spot for traditional liberal thought: The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill is opening the doors at its new school committed to free expression, after hiring 11 faculty, including seven tenure-line positions.

The School of Civic Life and Leadership will offer three courses this fall, including a primer on the American political tradition and a class on the fundamentals of civil debate. Students will be introduced to materials like the Federalist Papers, the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and philosophical predecessors including Aristotle and Montesquieu. The goal is creating an environment where, as dean Jed Atkins puts it, “students can disagree better.”

The program’s launch is a victory over the progressive monolith that tried to prevent it. Many UNC faculty revolted last year when the Board of Trustees announced the plan for the school without first seeking the professoriate’s permission. UNC’s accreditor, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges, even suggested the trustees’ action could prompt some kind of reprimand. But UNC went ahead anyway, and give the trustees credit for refusing to be intimidated.

Mr. Atkins joined UNC from Duke, where he ran that school’s Civil Discourse Project, a program designed to create debate among friends on campus. Duke students were also given an option to live in a civil-discourse dorm community, which made respectful debate into its own campus affinity group. Perhaps UNC could replicate that arrangement.

Many colleges are bracing for a rerun of this spring’s anti-Israel protests, and even universities that aren’t could benefit from new models for escaping academic groupthink and helping students navigate controversy without cancel culture. UNC Board of Trustee chairman John Preyer says he hopes his school’s experiment can become “the nation’s model for what academic freedom can do for higher education, and change the entire landscape.”

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Journal Editorial Report: The week's best and worst from Kim Strassel, Kyle Peterson and Dan Henninger. Photo: Kai Pfaffenbach/Reuters

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 14, 2024, print edition as 'Liberal Thought Returns to Campus'.

14. Russia-Iran Ties Are Being Strained by Parallel Conflicts

As an aside, it is north Korea that supports both of these countries.

Russia-Iran Ties Are Being Strained by Parallel Conflicts

As Iran ponders strike on Israel and Ukraine penetrates Russian border, Moscow and Tehran weigh how much they can help each other

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-iran-ties-being-strained-by-parallel-conflicts-15155173?mod=Searchresults_pos7&page=1

By Yaroslav Trofimov

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Aug. 13, 2024 3:41 pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin and then Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi at a meeting in Tehran in 2022. Photo: Sergei Savostyanov/Sputnik/Press Pool

DUBAI—The parallel escalations in the Middle East and in the Russian war with Ukraine are creating fresh challenges for the budding partnership between Iran and Russia, two nations that have grown increasingly close because of their shared hostility to the U.S.

Russia and Iran can fill gaps in each other’s intelligence and military capabilities—Russia makes sophisticated air defenses and aircraft, while Iran has developed powerful drones and missiles—as they confront foes in their own regions.

Iran has said it will mount a forceful retaliation against Israel for the July 31 killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Russia, surprised by the Ukrainian invasion of its Kursk region, is scrambling to respond as Kyiv readies its first F-16 aircraft and moves to destroy Russian air defenses.

This convergence of events means that each country has little spare capacity to offer the weapons that the other needs most—at least for now.

“Iran risks that what it had conceived as a contained military action against Israel turns into an all-out war,” said Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group. “If that happens, Iran needs every missile that it has—in the same way that Russia needs every missile defense system that it has.”

A memorial ceremony for slain Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh at a mosque in Tehran. Photo: Rouzbeh Fouladi/Zuma Press

From Moscow’s perspective, diplomats and intelligence officials say, the calculation is simple: a major Middle East war would hamper its own war effort and complicate relations with nations that allow Russia to mitigate the effect of Western sanctions, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

After centuries of conflict and ideological differences, a partnership between Moscow and Tehran coalesced a decade ago, as Russian President Vladimir Putin turned away from the West after his initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

At the time, Russia and Iran successfully joined hands in Syria to prevent the collapse of President Bashar al-Assad, who was losing control to a U.S.-supported insurgency.

Russian setbacks in Ukraine after the February 2022 invasion changed the balance of power in its relationship with Iran. The country’s aura of military prowess was punctured and its economy was subjected to international sanctions that, in some ways, exceed those that Iran has faced for decades.

All of a sudden, Moscow went from being an undisputed senior partner to a needy nation desperate for military assistance from Tehran.

“For the first time in the postrevolution history of the Islamic Republic, Russia is actually dependent on Iran for something crucial, which is weapons,” said Meir Javedanfar, Iran lecturer at Reichman University in Israel. “After the recent defeats in Kursk, Russia needs Iranian support more than ever.”

Iran started supplying Russia with thousands of Shahed attack drones, artillery ammunition and some of its Mohajer drones that can fire missiles in the fall of 2022, after a Putin visit to Tehran. The assembly of the Shaheds has since been localized in the Tatarstan region of Russia.

Ukrainian servicemen this month in the Sumy region, near the border with Russia. Photo: roman pilipey/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

So far, however, Iran has rebuffed Russian requests for ballistic missiles, of which it is believed to possess thousands. A senior Western official described the potential supply of several hundred such missiles to Russia as a “game changer” in Ukraine—saying that Iranian stocks exceed the number of costly interceptors Kyiv can obtain.

Russia has already fired thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles at Ukraine, depleting its own reserves, and recently started using ballistic missiles provided by North Korea, another member of the new axis of anti-Western autocracies.

The U.S. State Department this week warned Iran of “a swift and severe response” by Washington and its allies should the Iranian missiles be provided to Russia.

Retribution, according to European officials, could include a ban on Iranian civilian flights to European nations—not necessarily something that would ultimately deter Tehran, they acknowledge. Russian airlines have already been banned from European and U.S. airspace since 2022, as part of the sanctions imposed for the invasion.

“Western powers have made it clear to Tehran that the transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia would burn any remaining diplomatic bridges over sanctions easing,” said Ellie Geranmayeh, Iran expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Tehran, she added, is unlikely to push these red lines until it establishes what Iran policy will be adopted by the next U.S. administration.

Russian President Vladimir Putin chairing a meeting this week on the situation in the Kursk region. Photo: GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/SPUTNIK/PRESS POOL

Western governments also have growing concerns about a potential shift in Russia’s willingness to share nuclear-weapons technology. So far, the U.S. government says, it has seen no indication that Putin has changed Moscow’s longstanding policy to oppose an Iranian nuclear breakthrough. But the policy—once a consensus—is now the subject of discussion in Moscow’s security establishment, some of it behind closed doors and some in the open.

Sergey Karaganov, honorary chair of Russia’s Foreign and Defense Policy Council advisory group, who moderated Putin’s talk at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, wrote in an article published in February that “sooner or later we must change Russia’s official policy when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation” because it is unfair to many non-Western countries. Iran, he added, should be able to have a nuclear deterrent if it renounced its stated aspiration to exterminate Israel.

Western officials say that the key area of concern, should decision makers in Moscow decide to assist Iran’s nuclear weaponization, would be unofficial knowledge-sharing by Russian scientists that is hard to detect. “Imagine a few Russian nuclear scientists go to Iran on a long vacation, and just fill the knowledge gaps,” one European official said. “That’s what we fear.”

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Border clashes between Israel and Hezbollah risk spiraling into full war as the two sides continue to trade fire. WSJ explains how the group has gained power in the Middle East and why its fight with Israel is intensifying. Photo: Marwan Naamani/Zuma Press

When it comes to conventional weapons, Iran’s weakest spots are its rudimentary air defenses and outdated combat aircraft—areas where Russia has long promised to help. However, the sale of Su-35 multirole fighters announced years ago has yet to be completed, with the aircraft still sitting in Siberia and Western intelligence officials wondering about the reasons for the delay.

Iran received S-300 missile defense systems from Russia in 2016, nearly a decade after first agreeing to the deal, which Moscow canceled at one point. The S-300 system, however, seemed to be inefficient against a pinpoint Israeli strike in April, with satellite images indicating damage to a key component.

Contacts about shipping to Iran the more powerful S-400 air defense systems so far have led to no known agreements.

Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s newly elected president, at a campaign rally in Tehran in July. Photo: Sobhan Farajvan/Zuma Press

With Ukraine launching increasingly frequent drone and missile attacks on military and infrastructure targets in Russia and occupied parts of Ukraine, including military airfields, Moscow is unable to protect its own territory with sufficient air defenses. Several S-400 batteries have been destroyed in recent months.

These constraints point to the fundamental issue of the Russo-Iranian partnership. While Moscow and Tehran increasingly bond over their enmity to the U.S., they don’t publicly support each other’s war goals against their regional enemies.

While Iran seeks the eradication of Israel, Moscow maintains full relations with it, including visa-free travel for each other’s citizens and daily direct flights that continue even as air carriers from the U.S. suspended their links with Tel Aviv. Russia is also cultivating relations with Iran’s Arab rivals, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.

Iran, meanwhile, has never formally acknowledged that it is supplying weapons to Russia, and—unlike North Korea, Belarus or Syria—abstained rather than siding with Moscow in United Nations General Assembly votes condemning the invasion of Ukraine.

“Russia and Iran have distinctive ideologies, competitive national interests and centuries of mutual mistrust,” said Karim Sadjadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “They cooperate when it suits their defiance of the U.S.-led world order, but neither will risk their hold on power by fully committing to each other’s cause.”

Mutual suspicion remains. In May, after the helicopter crash that killed Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, both seen as advocates of closer cooperation with Moscow, Russian military analysts speculated that the incident might have been orchestrated by elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who seek eventual rapprochement with the West.

The July election of President Masoud Pezeshkian, who campaigned on promises of better ties with Europe and lowering tensions with the U.S. to revive the country’s struggling economy, only solidified such fears. Iran’s establishment, meanwhile, fears Moscow would betray Iran if it is able to find an accommodation with the U.S. over Ukraine, especially if former President Donald Trump wins re-election.

The increasingly systemic nature of Russia’s—and Iran’s—conflict with the U.S. and the West, however, brings the two regimes closer together despite such suspicions, said Hanna Notte, director for Eurasia at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif.

“There have been grievances in the past,” she said. “But the historical mistrust factor is by far outweighed today by having a common purpose and a common enemy in the United States and the West—and in seeing each other as partners in this global confrontation with the West.”

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com

15. As Gaza Talks Near, Diplomats Try to Keep War From Spreading

As Gaza Talks Near, Diplomats Try to Keep War From Spreading

Hopes for a breakthrough were damped after Hamas said it would not attend the peace talks set for Thursday.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/13/world/middleeast/gaza-peace-talks.html

Displaced Palestinians watching the aftermath of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Tuesday.Credit...Haitham Imad/EPA, via Shutterstock

By Adam RasgonHwaida Saad and Michael Levenson

Adam Rasgon reported from Jerusalem, and Hwaida Saad from Beirut, Lebanon.

Aug. 13, 2024

International mediators were heading to the Middle East for a high-stakes round of negotiations scheduled for Thursday as they raced to lock down an elusive cease-fire in the Gaza Strip that could defuse tensions ahead of an anticipated attack on Israel by Iran and Hezbollah.

The cease-fire talks, which are set to take place in Doha, Qatar, or Cairo, were expected to include top intelligence officials from Egypt, Israel and the United States, as well as the Qatari prime minister.

But as of Tuesday, Hamas representatives were not planning to take part. Ahmad Abdul-Hadi, a Hamas representative in Lebanon, said in an interview that doing so would mean going “backward to square one,” and accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel of dragging out the negotiations.

“Netanyahu is not interested in reaching an agreement that ends the aggression completely, but rather he is deceiving and evading and wants to prolong the war, and even expand it at the regional level,” Mr. Abdul-Hadi said.

Hamas’s decision did not appear to bode well for a breakthrough on Thursday, but it did not mean the group had completely left the bargaining table.

Hamas leaders have not met directly with Israeli officials throughout the war, relying on Qatar and Egypt to act as intermediaries. And many of Hamas’s most senior political leaders are based in Qatar, a short drive from the offices of Qatari mediators in Doha.

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Mourners at a funeral in Israel on Tuesday for a soldier killed in Gaza.Credit...Amir Levy/Getty Images

Two officials briefed on the talks, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomacy, said that Hamas would still be willing to engage with mediators after the meeting if Israel put forward a “serious response” to Hamas’s latest offer, from early July.

A State Department spokesman, Vedant Patel, said that Qatari officials had assured the United States they would work to have Hamas represented at the talks, though he did not say if members of the group would attend in person or would be represented only by intermediaries​.

“We fully expect these talks to move forward,” Mr. Patel said.

Asked on Tuesday about the potential for a cease-fire deal, President Biden told reporters that “It’s getting harder” but that he was “not giving up.”

Middle East Crisis: Live Updates

Updated 

Aug. 13, 2024, 6:26 p.m. ETAug. 13, 2024

• Israel draws global condemnation after a cabinet minister’s proclamations at a holy site.
• Hamas sends a signal that a breakthrough is unlikely in negotiations.
• Safety is not assured in the zone where Israel has directed civilians to flee, people there say.

Mr. Netanyahu has rejected accusations that he is stonewalling and has accused Hamas of thwarting a deal to stop the fighting and free the remaining hostages who were seized during the attack it led on Israel on Oct. 7. But Mr. Netanyahu has added new conditions to Israel’s demands that his own negotiators fear have created obstacles to a deal, according to unpublished documents reviewed by The New York Times. His office said he was simply clarifying ambiguities.

While Hamas has said a cease-fire agreement should include an end to the war and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, Mr. Netanyahu has said that Israel will not stop fighting until Hamas’s military and governing capabilities are destroyed.

Last Thursday, Mr. Biden, along with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani of Qatar, declared that “the time has come” for a cease-fire and the release of the remaining hostages in Gaza.

“There is no further time to waste nor excuses from any party for further delay,” the leaders said in a joint statement. They said they were willing to present a “final bridging proposal” to close a deal between Israel and Hamas.

At a news conference on Tuesday in Washington, Mr. Patel said that the United States was “so clearly committed to this because we think it is in the vital interests of the region.” A cease-fire could create the conditions necessary to “get the region out of this endless cycle of violence,” he said.

Tensions in the Middle East have been running high since Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed in an explosion while he was visiting Tehran on July 31, just hours after a senior Hezbollah commander, Fuad Shukr, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

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A funeral ceremony for Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran this month.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times

Iran has vowed to retaliate for the assassination on its soil. Israel has not acknowledged that it was behind the explosion, but U.S. officials have privately assessed that it was. Hezbollah, a Lebanese militia backed by Iran that has been trading fire with Israel for months, has promised to avenge Mr. Shukr’s death.

Mr. Netanyahu has promised to “exact a heavy price for any act of aggression against us, from any quarter.”

American and European leaders have urged Iran not to retaliate, warning that an attack could set of a broader regional war. But Iran has insisted it has the right to defend its sovereignty.

On Tuesday, Nasser Kanani, a spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, said that Britain, France and Germany, in issuing a joint statement calling on Iran to exercise restraint, had ignored Israeli attacks in the region.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran is firm and resolute in defending its sovereignty and national security, as well as helping to establish lasting stability in the region and creating deterrence against the real origin and main source of insecurity and terrorism in the region,” Mr. Kanani said in a statement.

Iran, he said, “won’t ask for permission from anyone to use its established rights.”

Adam Rasgon is a reporter for The Times in Jerusalem, covering Israeli and Palestinian affairs. More about Adam Rasgon

Michael Levenson covers breaking news for The Times from New York. More about Michael Levenson

A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 14, 2024, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Cease-Fire Negotiators Gather Ahead of Expected Attack by Iran. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

16. U.S. plans to sell $20 billion in weapons to Israel over several years

U.S. plans to sell $20 billion in weapons to Israel over several years

The Biden administration approved a deal to sell F-15s, air-to-air missiles and munitions, but much of it won’t arrive in Israel until 2026 at the earliest.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/08/13/us-israel-f15-sales/

President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval Office on July 25. The Biden administration announced a $20 billion weapons sale to Israel on Tuesday. (Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post)

By Kyle Melnick and Karen DeYoung

Updated August 13, 2024 at 10:10 p.m. EDT|Published August 13, 2024 at 8:15 p.m. EDT

The Biden administration has approved about $20 billion in new weapons sales to Israel over the next several years, amid fading hopes that a negotiating session scheduled for Thursday would lead to a Gaza cease-fire and hostage release.

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Notification of the pending sale was sent to Congress on Tuesday. It includes F-15 fighter jets, 120mm tank ammunition, tactical vehicles, AMRAAM antiaircraft missiles and high-explosive mortars.

The tactical vehicles and about 50,000 mortar cartridges are expected to be delivered starting in 2026. The following year, more than 32,000 120mm tank-ammunition cartridges are estimated to arrive in Israel.

Roughly 50 F-15 fighter jets, along with supplies to modify Israel’s own fighter jets, are expected to start arriving in 2029 — supplies that will cost about $18.82 billion. It was not immediately clear when the AMRAAM antiaircraft missiles would arrive, but the State Department said in a news release that they would be “sourced from new production.”

“The United States is committed to the security of Israel, and it is vital to U.S. national interests to assist Israel to develop and maintain a strong and ready self-defense capability,” the State Department said in a statement. “This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives.”

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Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant thanked the administration on X for approving the weapons transfers.

Announcement of the sale came as Hamas’s attendance at the Thursday negotiating session, to be held in either Doha, Qatar, or Cairo, appeared increasingly in doubt. The meeting may still take place among Israel and the three countries — the United States, Qatar and Egypt — who have been trying since late last fall to mediate a temporary cease-fire and partial release of Israeli hostages in hopes of arranging a more permanent end to the Israel-Gaza war.

The Biden administration and its partners called for the meeting in what appeared to be a last-ditch effort to resolve outstanding differences between the parties after new Israeli demands, according to a person close to the negotiations.

Hamas has not officially informed Qatar, its main interlocutor in the talks, that it will not show up. Instead, its leaders have said they see little point in talking in the absence of a “serious” Israeli response to the compromise they offered in early July at the behest of the mediators, according to the person, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.

The Hamas offer, described as “significant” by U.S. officials, appeared to meet the conditions set out in the framework agreement outlined by President Joe Biden on May 31. At the time, Biden said, Israel had agreed to its terms.

But in the most recent negotiating session, held in Rome late last month, Israel presented new demands that went beyond the scope of the framework, which called for an initial phase that would include a six-week cease-fire and partial hostage release, to be accompanied by the redeployment of Israeli troops away from populated areas and the free return to northern Gaza of civilians who had fled to the far south to escape Israeli bombardment.

Under its new demands, Israel would maintain indefinite military control over the border between Gaza and Egypt, and the crossing at Rafah, and it would impose travel restrictions on Gazans.

Tensions have escalated in recent weeks after the assassinations of leaders in militant movements aligned with Iran. An Israeli airstrike killed Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut. And in Tehran, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in an explosion. U.S. officials said they were informed by Israel immediately afterward that it was responsible for the assassination. The killings sparked regionwide fears of a reprisal from Iran and its proxies​.

On Monday, the U.S. Navy deployed more vessels to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to aid in defending Israel from an anticipated Iranian attack.

The Biden administration has sent weapons to Israel throughout the war, creating tensions within the Democratic Party between lawmakers who support Israel’s war and those who condemn its military tactics. In May, the administration suspended a shipment of 2,000 pound bombs it said were unsuited for urban combat in heavily populated areas.

At least 39,929 people have been killed and 92,240 injured in Gaza since the war began, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, which does not distinguish between civilians and combatants but says the majority of the dead are women and children. Israel estimates that about 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed in Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack and says 330 soldiers have been killed since the launch of its military operation in Gaza.

Hamas took more than 250 hostages, Israeli authorities said. More than 100 were freed during a brief cease-fire in late November. Of those remaining, some are believed to have died, either in the initial Hamas attack or since the war began.

Israel-Gaza war

The Israel-Gaza war has gone on for months, and tensions have spilled into the surrounding Middle East region.

The war: On Oct. 7, Hamas militants launched an unprecedented cross-border attack on Israel that included the taking of civilian hostages at a music festival. See photos and videos of how the deadly assault unfolded. Israel declared war on Hamas in response, launching a ground invasion that fueled the biggest displacement in the region since Israel’s creation in 1948. In July 2024, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in an attack Hamas has blamed on Israel.

Gaza crisis: In the Gaza Strip, Israel has waged one of this century’s most destructive wars, killing tens of thousands and plunging at least half of the population into “famine-like conditions.” For months, Israel has resisted pressure from Western allies to allow more humanitarian aid into the enclave.

U.S. involvement: Despite tensions between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and some U.S. politicians, including President Biden, the United States supports Israel with weapons, funds aid packages, and has vetoed or abstained from the United Nations’ cease-fire resolutions.

History: The roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and mistrust are deep and complex, predating the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Read more on the history of the Gaza Strip.

By Kyle Melnick

Kyle Melnick is a reporter on The Washington Post's General Assignment desk, where he covers national and international news.

By Karen DeYoung

Karen DeYoung is associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Post. In more than three decades at the paper, she has served as bureau chief in Latin America and in London and as correspondent covering the White House, U.S. foreign policy and the intelligence community.  Twitter

17. Has Zelensky played a masterstroke or fatally poked the Russian bear?

The question is whether Putin can and will escalate the war? What extremes is Putin willing to go to defend Russian territory? 

 Or is this Zelensky's masterstroke?

Maps, graphics, and photos at the link.

Has Zelensky played a masterstroke or fatally poked the Russian bear?

EXCLUSIVEHas Zelensky altered the course of the war - or fatally poked the Russian bear? Experts reveal just what Ukraine hopes to achieve with Kursk offensive and whether it could prove a tactical masterstroke

• MailOnline examines the invasion so far and assesses what may come next
• By David Averr
• Published: 11:00 EDT, 13 August 2024 | Updated: 03:30 EDT, 14 August 2024
• https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13739059/Has-Zelensky-altered-course-war-fatally-poked-Russian-bear-Experts-reveal-just-Ukraine-hopes-achieve-Kursk-offensive-prove-tactical-masterstroke.html

Daily Mail · by David Averre · August 13, 2024

On Tuesday, August 6, around 1,000 brave Ukrainian soldiers supported by a few tanks launched what seemed like a reckless at best - and catastrophic at worst - incursion into Russia's Kursk region.

Within 48 hours of the first reports of the border breach, Russia's stonefaced army chief Valery Gerasimov - who reportedly dismissed intelligence reports indicating a Ukrainian troop buildup along the border two weeks prior - declared the invasion had been stopped in its tracks.

Now, one week later, not only have Kyiv's soldiers made a fool of Gerasimov, but AFU commander Oleksandr Syrskyi claims his troops have seized one square kilometre of territory for each soldier that poured across the border - and that the initial invasion force has been reinforced by thousands more troops backed by Western armour.

With the offensive still grinding on, a Ukrainian foreign ministry spokesperson declared today that 'as long as Putin continues the war, he will receive such responses from Ukraine'.

That defiant statement came hours after his president Volodymyr Zelensky told the world that 'war was coming home' to Russia and vowed to 'kill the Russian terrorists where they are and where they launch their strikes from'.

MailOnline spoke to several experts to examine the invasion so far, explain what its goals might be, and predict how long the valiant Ukrainian units tasked with launching the first invasion of Russia since World War II can hope to hold out.

'Russia must be forced into peace if Putin wants to continue waging war so badly... This always happens to those who despise people and any rules - Russia brought war to others, and now it is coming home,' Zelensky said stoically in his latest address

Ukrainian servicemen operate an armoured military vehicle in the Sumy region, near the border with Russia, on August 12, 2024

This photograph shows a road sign showing the distance to the Russian town of Kursk next to the destroyed border crossing point with Russia, in the Sumy region, on August 13, 2024

How did the invasion unfold and how many Ukrainian troops are now in Russia?

In the early hours of Tuesday, August 6, a contingent of Ukrainian troops launched their first incursion across the border from the Sumy region into Russia's Kursk oblast.

They have since managed to advance up to 20 miles in some directions, have captured dozens of towns and settlements, and have as of this morning reportedly seized Sudzha - a strategic town that is also a key transit hub for Russian gas flowing into Ukraine.

More than 120,000 Russian citizens have been forced to flee their homes amid widespread regional evacuations since last Tuesday, while 12 civilians are said to have died.

Russia has seen previous small-scale incursions into its territory since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022, but the foray into the Kursk region marked the largest attack on Russian soil since World War II.

It was also the first time the Ukrainian army proper had spearheaded an incursion, rather than pro-Ukraine Russian fighters that had defected - and the first offensive in Russia to be acknowledged by Zelensky.

Matthew Savill, the Director of Military Sciences at the RUSI think tank, told MailOnline there could be as many as 10,000 Ukrainian troops now in Russia.

'There's evidence of Ukrainian forces from at least four different brigades - 22nd and 88th Mechanised and 80th and 82nd Air Assault, and possibly more - now involved in the offensive in Kursk.

'These brigades are using Western-provided equipment like infantry fighting vehicles as well as Soviet-era tanks.

'It's hard to judge numbers, but it might be enough for around a division - perhaps 10,000 - given the spread of fighting now underway.

'But we should be very cautious about determining exact size, because units are being rotated, and the presence of elements doesn't tell us the whole unit has been deployed.

'That ambiguity suits the Ukrainians.'

Savill did however challenge the assertion that Ukraine had seized up to 1,000 square kilometres of Russian territory.

'The total area covered by the incursion appears to be around 400 square kilometres, but we don't know what is controlled within this,' he said.

Dara Massicot, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, added that the Ukrainian breakthrough was so effective because it exploited key gaps between various Russian commands in Kursk: border guards, Ministry of Defence forces and Chechen units that have been fighting on Russia's side in the war.

This photograph shows 'dragon's teeth' and other fortifications at the destroyed border crossing point with Russia, in the Sumy region, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukrainian servicemen operate a Soviet-made T-72 tank in the Sumy region, near the border with Russia, on August 12, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukrainian servicemen wait in a military vehicle to head for a combat mission, in the Sumy region, near the border with Russia, on August 13, 2024

Ukrainian soldier stands guard as he surveys a line of Russian POWs taken in Kursk

A Ukrainian soldier raises a Ukrainian flag in Guevo, Kursk Oblast, Russia released August 11, 2024 in this still image obtained from a social media video

What does Ukraine hope to achieve by invading Russia?

Most experts agree that Ukraine's incursion into Russia is a two-pronged tactic designed primarily to signal to its Western partners that its military is still a capable fighting force, while also seeking to put Kyiv in a more favourable bargaining position in the event of ceasefire talks ahead of the US presidential election in November.

That analysis was supported by a statement from a Ukrainian foreign ministry spokesperson, who today told reporters in Kyiv: 'The sooner Russia agrees to restore a just peace, the sooner Ukrainian raids on Russian territory will stop.'

The spokesperson did however add that: 'As long as Putin continues the war, he will receive such responses from Ukraine,' suggesting Kyiv could seek to extend the offensive indefinitely.

He also said that Russia had launched more than 2,000 strikes from the Kursk region in recent months using anti-aircraft missiles, barrel artillery, mortars, drones, 255 glide bombs and more than 100 missiles, and explained that 'the purpose of this operation is to preserve the lives of our children, to protect the territory of Ukraine from Russian strikes'.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian soldiers told reporters this week that the offensive could help to draw Russian resources away from other key battles on Ukrainian soil, giving defenders time to regroup, re-equip and hopefully regain the initiative after months of grinding, bloody conflict.

Read More

Zelensky says war 'is coming home' to Russia as Ukraine's invasion force adorn vehicles with a 'white triangle' to mimic Russia's Z - but Putin warns 'crazy' incursion could spark wider war

Retired US Army Brigadier General and former US Defence Attaché in Moscow Kevin Ryan said: 'Zelensky's goals with the incursion into Russian territory are becoming clearer with time.

'It appears that the attacking force, which is composed of some of Ukraine's best units, is intent on achieving real military objectives and possibly holding some of the ground they take...

'(Russian reports claim) Ukrainian forces are digging in along parts of the new front. This would indicate an intent to hold the territory that Ukraine has seized in the Kursk/Belgorod region.'

Jacob Parakilas, research leader for Defence Strategy, Policy and Capabilities at the thinktank RAND Europe, said: 'The Ukrainians have been understandably cagey about what their intended goals are, but there are a few things they could be seeking to simultaneously accomplish.

'Pushing into Russian territory upsets the narrative that Ukraine is on the defensive and embarrasses Putin.

'On a more tactical level, it forces Russia to divert its own forces towards territorial defence rather than offence – although thus far it seems as though Russian forces are continuing to push forward on Ukrainian territory.

'There are various pieces of strategic infrastructure that Ukraine might be seeking to capture or disable, notably the gas transfer station in Sudzha.'

This photograph shows the destroyed border crossing point with Russia, in the Sumy region, on August 13, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukrainian servicemen operate an armoured military vehicle in the Sumy region, near the border with Russia, on August 12, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Russia last week suffered one of its most crushing blows of the war as hundreds of troops were reportedly killed when a military convoy was hit by Ukrainian HIMARS missiles in Kursk

A man reacts while standing next to burnt-out remains of cars in the courtyard of a multi-storey residential building, which according to local authorities was hit by debris from a destroyed Ukrainian missile, in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict in Kursk, Russia August 11, 2024

RUSI's Savill agreed with the above comments but posited the offensive could have some additional aims not yet revealed by Ukrainian officials.

'It's also about boosting Ukrainian morale after months on the defensive. This seems to be the case in the north - though could easily turn if they take losses which are hard to replace.

'It could also be a diversion, or linked to other, undeclared operations; for example, an advance that threatens the supply lines for Russian troops that crossed the border near Kharkiv, and intends to cause the collapse of those pockets of Russian forces over the border.

'This is a risky operation... but the Ukrainians have shown themselves to be resourceful. They appear to have some air defences with them and have successfully used drones to attack Russian helicopters in the air.

'Moreover, the Russians have been severely embarrassed and the loss of territory and evacuation of civilians will play poorly back in Russia as evidence they ''can't defend themselves'' - especially alongside continued Ukrainian drone attacks as deep strikes.'

How is Russia responding?

Vladimir Putin on Monday lambasted the incursion as the Western plot in its war with Russia, using Ukrainian soldiers to do their dirty work.

'It is now clear why the Kyiv regime refused our proposals to return to a peaceful settlement plan,' he declared.

'To all appearances, the enemy, with the help of its Western masters, is doing their will. By the hands of the Ukrainians, the West is at war with us.

'But what kind of negotiations can we even talk about with people who indiscriminately strike at civilians, at civilian infrastructure, or try to create threats to nuclear power facilities?' he asked - comments that will undoubtedly be ridiculed in Kyiv and the West given the scale of the destruction wrought by Russian missiles, drones and soldiers in towns and cities across Ukraine.

RUSI's Savill said: 'The Russians seem to have been caught by surprise, or at least not prepared.

'Their initial force of border guards and FSB seems to have been overwhelmed, early public messages that the attack had been ''repulsed'' have been deleted, and a state of emergency has been announced in several oblasts,' he said, adding that tens of thousands of civilians were evacuated with tens of thousands more choosing to flee.

He added: 'Over the weekend, it seems like more Russian forces, including some pulled from inside Ukraine, have started arriving and may have now halted further Ukrainian advances, but it's not been a particularly impressive response yet.'

A slew of video footage published late last week showed how homes in various settlements had come under attack from Ukrainian drones and artillery fire, while various Russian warbloggers said hundreds of their troops had perished in a brutal HIMARS strike on a convoy in the Rylsky district of Kursk.

Seeking to blame the incursion on Ukraine's allies in the West, the humiliated Russian President cursed Kyiv's troops for refusing to 'return to a peaceful settlement plan' before ironically condemning them for 'intimidating Russian society' and 'targeting civilians'

This photo taken from video released by Russian Defence Ministry press service on Monday, Aug. 12, 2024, shows Russian military vehicle boarding a lowboy for transfer to Kursk region

Ukrainian servicemen drive Soviet-made T-64 tanks in the Sumy region, near the border with Russia, on August 11, 2024

People evacuated from a fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces queue to receive humanitarian aid at a distribution centre in Kursk, Russia, Monday, Aug. 12, 2024

Russian forces launch an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack, targeting the tank of Ukrainian Armed Forces at the border area near Kursk Oblast, Russia on August 12, 2024

As of this morning, however, Moscow's forces appear to have begun mounting a more robust defence of their territory.

Army units, fresh reserves, army aircraft, drone teams and artillery forces have now been funnelled into the conflict to stop Ukrainian armoured mobile groups from moving deeper into Russia.

A Russian defence ministry statement issued today said that those units had managed to halt the Ukrainian offensive near the Kursk settlements of Obshchy Kolodez, Snagost, Kauchuk and Alexeyevsky - though those reports are yet to be corroborated.

It remains to be seen just how many troops and resources the Kremlin's military chiefs are willing to throw in to defend and retake land in Kursk.

How long could Ukraine's offensive in Russia last?

Russian military blogger Vladislav Shurygin last week encapsulated the efficacy of Ukraine's surprise offensive in a lengthy observation.

He wrote that Ukraine had 'very skilfully and accurately chosen a different strategy - taking advantage of the bureaucratic rigidity and sluggishness of the Russian management system, to exhaust Russia with continuous unexpected strikes on sensitive infrastructure and the civilian population, provoking discontent, disappointment and apathy.'

Read More

Humiliated Putin vows to drive Ukraine's forces out of Russia - with troops now just 35 miles from Kursk nuclear plant - but Kyiv warns Moscow may take murderous revenge with 'hundreds of missiles'

But analysts are split on whether the offensive will endure, with many warning the Ukrainians would be sorely outmatched once Russia's disorganised military command is able to mobilise the requisite resources.

Brig. Gen. Ryan said: 'If, in going to the defence Ukraine can turn this part of the front on Russian soil into the same kind of positional war that has evolved along the rest of the front in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv's forces could hold this ground for weeks or even months.'

Other experts added that Russia could feasibly repel the invasion in short order, but stressed they would likely need to withdraw troops from frontline positions in Ukraine to do so.

RUSI's Savill was more sceptical that Ukraine could - or would even want to - maintain their offensive over the long term.

'Much will depend on the ambition around any consolidation and whether this is intended to play into negotiations - and therefore how long they try to hold on,' he said.

'While the Ukrainians have reversed the public narrative about being on the defensive, it seems unlikely they would want to sustain a large incursion for months; they will have a decision to make about the best time to trade in the ground they have captured, and to what end...

'Media reporting over the weekend suggested that the Ukrainians had deployed some of their most effective mechanised units, and pulled troops from the east because they were at a higher level of readiness. That could result in a short-term gain, for long-term disadvantage.'

RAND Europe's Parakilas concluded that the long-term success of Kyiv's offensive in Kursk is largely dependent on Russia's willingness to sacrifice its gains in eastern Ukraine, particularly as summer rapidly gives way to autumn with cold conditions around the corner.

'The extent to which the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk will last depends heavily on the forces that Russia is willing to commit to retaking its own territory.

'Thus far it seems as though the bulk of the forces that have been engaging Ukrainian troops on Russian territory have been reserve and paramilitary units, which have apparently been unable to retake the territory lost to Kyiv's troops.

'If Russia is willing to pull more experienced and capable formations out of Ukraine and put them to the task, they would increase their odds of reversing the Ukrainian gains.

'But that would also force them to slow the pace of their own offensive on key strategic positions in eastern Ukraine in the key window of time remaining time before colder weather makes offensive operations more difficult.'

Daily Mail · by David Averre · August 13, 2024

​

18.​ Wedge and Hedge: The Political Logic of Ukraine’s Border Incursion

All military operations require "political logic." (or should)

Again, will Putin escalate>

Excerpts:

There is one other hedge that Zelenskyy is perhaps playing for with the incursion—provoking a disproportionate response from Putin that galvanizes the West to redouble its support (and possibly even more directly intervene) and forces uncommitted states such as India and China to at least stay on the sidelines (if not lend their influence on a fair settlement process). This hedge would be especially effective against potentially unfavorable electoral outcomes in France and the United States moving forward.

It seems like we have been at the beginning of the end of the Russo-Ukraine War for some time now. If nothing else, the wedge and hedge strategies that can plausibly be inferred in the political logic of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk tilts the endgame—with its likely political settlement—in the Ukrainians’ favor. In so doing, Ukraine raises the likelihood that Kursk will be remembered with decidedly less pride in this newest chapter of Russian political and military history.

Wedge and Hedge: The Political Logic of Ukraine’s Border Incursion - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Patrick Sullivan · August 14, 2024

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Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region of Russia is a significant and unprecedented development of the Russo-Ukraine War. Despite initial denials, it is now clear that this incursion was a deliberate strategic choice and not simply the initiative of an opportunistic field commander. Moreover, even though the incursion is currently limited by a small force commitment—although much larger than previous cross-border raids by pro-Ukrainian forces—and the continued refusal of the United States for certain weapons to be used in attacks against Russian territory, it appears that the Ukrainians intend to stay and consolidate their territorial gains.

Much of the commentary and analysis of the Ukrainian incursion has rightfully focused on it being a tactical response to continued Russian attempts to break the stalemate in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine. Although the Russians have gained very little territory at the cost of extremely high casualties during the current fighting season, they retain an operational advantage due to sheer mass. The Ukrainians are tired, having difficulty reconstituting their units, and facing difficult decisions on the future application of their limited material resources. Additionally, while the West’s provision of weapons and training to the Ukrainians apparently posture them well to fight the Russians to a stalemate, it is hard to see how the current levels of external support and types of weapons being provided would ever be enough to decisively overcome Russia’s operational advantage. In this context, Ukraine’s border incursion makes sense to relieve the pressure its forces are experiencing in Donetsk and to neutralize—in part—said advantage.

In addition to being a suitable tactical response to conditions in eastern Ukraine, however, the incursion is really smart politics on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s part, particularly if the Ukrainians are in fact able to stay. The numerous factors that Zelenskyy probably considered in his overall political logic to authorize the incursion—and in Kursk especially—can be grouped into two overall strategies: the wedge and the hedge.

The Wedge Strategy

While Ukraine’s incursion drove a physical wedge into Russian territory, the term’s applicability in Zelenskyy’s political logic is more about the information environment and Russian public opinion.

Western support to Ukraine’s cause requires Western attention, and this has waned of late. Some of this waning is predictable, as a certain amount of fatigue sets in with external observers of conflicts that last a long time (nearly thirty months in the case of the Russo-Ukraine War). Some has been unanticipated, however, induced no doubt by the Israel-Hamas War and the seemingly more recent and proximate human tragedy playing out in Gaza. Ukraine’s incursion has reclaimed some of the lost attention in the media and policymaking spaces. In the latter, the timing of the incursion is especially sound; governments in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States have recently transitioned or will do so soon, and the US military’s Security Assistance Group–Ukraine just received a new commander who will bring new priorities to the external support effort. For those responsible for guiding Western policy vis-à-vis Ukraine, the audacious cross-border assault—and its initial success—reframe the strategic and political dimensions of the Russo-Ukraine War. In this context, the incursion is a game changer, a fundamental shift to the strategic situation in Ukraine and the public’s consciousness of it.

The public whose views of the war might shift encompasses a variety of audiences. There are two important domestic audiences who will surely be influenced by the incursion—Zelenskyy’s and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s. For the Ukrainians, the incursion is a proverbial shot in the arm that can undo some of their own war fatigue and bolster them to face whatever remains in the current fighting season, as well as another winter without reliable electricity. For the Russians, the incursion penetrates Putin’s tightly controlled and highly curated narrative about the war. The war being brought to Russian doorsteps—beyond the missile and drone attacks that Ukraine prosecuted earlier this year in the Belgorod region—changes the stakes of the war, invites new contemplations on its possible outcome, and weakens Putin’s image as the capable political leader and strong military commander Russians need to ensure their security. The fact that the incursion is occurring in Kursk is icing on the narrative cake from the Ukrainian perspective—not only is it a direct assault on Russian national pride, with Kursk the site of the signature battle of the Soviet counterattack against Nazi Germany during World War II, but it traces Putin’s current failure back to his mismanagement of the Kursk submarine disaster, which occurred twenty-four years ago this week. Granted, there was no place else for the Ukrainians to go for their border incursion, since Kursk is the only territory between the Belorussian frontier and the contested areas of eastern Ukraine. The ancillary narrative benefit has not been lost on the Ukrainians or their supporters, however, with both Zelenskyy and the US government using it in official statements.

These narrative victories are important for Zelenskyy because they allow him to take the initiative away from Putin in what is perceived to be a Russian attritional campaign in Ukraine. Attrition seeks to degrade an enemy’s military capacity to continue fighting. This incursion into Kursk signals an attempt by the Ukrainians to flip the script away from attrition to exhaustion, whereby the goal is to erode the Russians’ will to continue fighting. Although the Russians have long demonstrated that they are a difficult people to exhaust, the loss of territory in Kursk and the consequent stain on Russia’s national pride may be sufficiently unacceptable to increase pressure on Putin to seek a political settlement.

The Hedge Strategy

The prospect of a political settlement illuminates the second strategy within the political logic of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk—the hedge. Zelenskyy is perhaps literally hedging his bets that political settlement is where the war is going, and the incursion sets better conditions for Ukrainian security interests in that setting.

There are two interrelated reasons an eventual political settlement to the Russo-Ukraine War is likely. First, the adage that the best defense is a good offense usually only applies to a combatant force that enjoys a significant material or capability advantage over its opponent, and when both sides clearly understand each other’s intentions. These conditions do not exist in Ukraine. While the Russians and Ukrainians certainly understand each other after thirty months of fighting, the Russian operational advantage is not a decisive one. Additionally, after the provision of HIMARS, ATACMS, and now F-16s, there is not likely to be a different game changer in the types or volume of weapons provided by the West to Ukraine. As such, the best defense in Ukraine—for both sides—will be a good defense, which suggests that the stalemate will continue. This speaks to the second reason a political settlement is likely. Empirically, the longer a conflict lasts, the less likely it becomes that either side enjoys a decisive victory, particularly in conflicts where one side retains the option to revert from conventional fighting to insurgency (as the Ukrainians clearly do). All conflicts must end eventually, and at a certain point political settlement, usually though a third-party guarantor, becomes the only realistic outcome for long-standing conflicts.

Both conflict parties would want to maximize their negotiating positions going into a political settlement, with the relatively ascendant side improving its likely outcome. With the incursion, the Ukrainians are relatively ascendant at this point in time and will retain a strong prospective negotiating position as long as they hold Russian territory. Moreover, the third-party guarantor tends to fix the negotiations against whatever the tactical situation is at the time negotiations start. Russian occupation of eastern Ukraine and the Crimea is de jure illegal under international law. So is Ukrainian occupation of Kursk. Any political settlement would not likely endorse a continued violation of international law, lest it be rejected by the United Nations and other international institutions. This may seem unimportant to opponents of international institutions, but having the UN’s imprimatur is important for the postbellum conflict parties to be legitimized participants in the international system. Accordingly, the Ukrainian incursion into and subsequent occupation of Kursk sets up an exchange to restore both Russian and Ukrainian territorial integrity in a political settlement to the war.

There is one other hedge that Zelenskyy is perhaps playing for with the incursion—provoking a disproportionate response from Putin that galvanizes the West to redouble its support (and possibly even more directly intervene) and forces uncommitted states such as India and China to at least stay on the sidelines (if not lend their influence on a fair settlement process). This hedge would be especially effective against potentially unfavorable electoral outcomes in France and the United States moving forward.

It seems like we have been at the beginning of the end of the Russo-Ukraine War for some time now. If nothing else, the wedge and hedge strategies that can plausibly be inferred in the political logic of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk tilts the endgame—with its likely political settlement—in the Ukrainians’ favor. In so doing, Ukraine raises the likelihood that Kursk will be remembered with decidedly less pride in this newest chapter of Russian political and military history.

Colonel Patrick Sullivan, PhD, is the director of the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: President of Ukraine

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Patrick Sullivan · August 14, 2024

19. Without Talent Agility, America May Lose

People are more important than hardware. A universal truth (and the late Warlord emeritus Col John Collins told me he meant it that way but wrote it when he was describing SOF - he did not mean it to be an exclusive SOF truth).

And as an aside, in addition to  "giving soldiers an authorized way to have agency to lean into innovative projects" it would also be useful to give personnel from all services "an authorized way to have agency for self study for individual professional military education." 

One of the issues with talent management (which I fully support), is when it becomes an excuse to manage the old boy network. Leaders who have the power to influence assignments based on talent have to be careful not to be perceived as taking care of ONLY those they know. This is the challenge. There is no objective, systematic process to manage talent that takes the human out of the loop. The human must be in the loop and this requires those humans to be serious enlightened leaders themselves.  

Excerpts:

Talent agility is not just a mission enabler — it is an innovation and retention driver. Google is famous for giving employees 20 percent of their time for non-work projects, which have yielded some of their greatest breakthroughs, while Salesforce pioneered giving 1 percent of time, products, and profits to society. Survey data from soldiers leaving the Army in 2021 showed that they care deeply about serving but reach a point where the service no longer feels worth it. It may seem counterintuitive, but giving soldiers an authorized way to have agency to lean into innovative projects — and have a more personal sense of contribution to the mission — may be an answer to the growing personnel crisis.

People — not technology — are America’s decisive military advantage. The American military trains leaders to be bold, creative, and innovative, and civilian leadership at the secretariat level should act now to unlock human capital for modern wars. Personnel policy reform is hard work and these changes are critical now. Defense Department policymakers and Congress have a crucial opportunity to ensure that America has the policy foundations to bring the whole of the military — and, if needed, the whole of society — to bear against America’s enemies. To do so, they should eschew the current, antiquated talent management paradigms that no longer support national objectives.

Without Talent Agility, America May Lose - War on the Rocks

Jim Perkins and Mike McGinley

warontherocks.com · by Jim Perkins · August 14, 2024

When Russia attacked Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine could not afford to waste time establishing an official drone corps before deploying unmanned quadcopters onto the battlefield. Ukrainian soldiers did not pass a formal accreditation process and earn a skill identifier before assignment to these previously non-existent units, either. Instead, a whole-of-nation collaboration allowed civilian innovators to partner with Ukrainian intelligence and cyber units to rapidly create a new military unit, Aerorozvidka, and deploy an innovative threat against the Russian invasion.

The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy states that “people execute the strategy” and will be critical in great-power competition or a future conflict. Senior U.S. defense leaders tout that people are the U.S. military’s “greatest strength” and that the department is in a global war for talent. Yet no major program focuses on innovation and investment in talent management on par with the innovation and investment seen in countless other tangible systems. The department is pursuing sixth-generation fighter aircraft but is seemingly unphased by second-generation talent management systems, processes, and policies. To get serious about winning current and future conflicts, the military needs a talented, flexible, and skilled force, and the Defense Department should take on the thorny tasks of talent management reform.

Despite numerous calls for change over the last two decades, talent management reform has mostly been on the fringes. The policy changes keep pace with quality-of-life enhancements offered outside the military, such as enhanced parental leave, marginally more flexibility in the up-or-out promotion system, and updated grooming standards. In 2013, the department made the most significant shift by removing the restrictions on women from combat arms. These changes are needed progress but represent incremental, insufficient adjustments.

Unless the U.S. military’s talent management system becomes exponentially more agile, America will struggle to win wars. The speed at which the nature of modern warfare is evolving necessitates that the U.S. military remove the friction between services and components of the total force so that the department can identify and employ the right talent at the right place at the right time. The U.S. military should embrace a truly permeable and agile talent ecosystem that recognizes servicemembers as so much more than occupational and skill codes that are five to 15 years behind society. The undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, charged with ensuring efficient and effective support of wartime and peacetime operations of the total force, is uniquely empowered to do this.

In 2024, the U.S. military has almost no idea how many people in its ranks can fly drones, write software, or perform countless other civilian skills that lack official military codes. Existing personnel systems cannot fathom having expertise outside of one’s primary occupation, so the reserve components of the armed forces — and even many active or civilian members — are not fully valued. Even when they have skill codes, services and components create talent silos — inefficiencies that are no longer acceptable. Military personnel bureaucracy usually lags society, but the department ought to treat talent management like a modernization priority and demand better.

Become a Member

Close the Talent Chain

The OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop framework distills warfare down to a competition of speed. The actor that can identify and apply force against the enemy’s interests the fastest will achieve victory. Academics can argue about the changing character of war and analyze different modes of warfare, but the nature of war is unchanging: People, augmented by technology, must exert power over an adversary to break their will to fight. America’s ability to achieve a faster OODA loop than its enemies will depend on the ability to identify critical points in the conflict and then deploy the right talent against them as quickly as possible.

The first quarter of the 21st century has nearly passed, and the lessons from both the wars in the Middle East and the current war in Ukraine offer a warning: Personnel policies designed in the industrial age won’t survive modern warfare. When technology experts saw the horribly outdated methods the U.S. Air Force was using to plan aerial refueling sorties, they called on the Defense Innovation Unit to rapidly modernize “the Gonkulator” — a $2 million software project that immediately paid for itself in saved fuel and flight costs. Imagine if the department tried to estimate the lost mission value from similarly outdated and inefficient talent management practices.

The Joint Force Is Neither Joint nor Agile

Although the myriad personnel management software applications may have been updated over the last 30 years, all of the services (with the possible exception of the Space Force) are still managing their people according to policies designed in the 1970s and 1980s. Fifty years ago, American defense leaders reshaped policy to reconcile the loss in Vietnam and prepare for a massive conflict against the Soviet Union. These policies are rooted in industrial-era artifacts like occupational specialty codes, long-term assignments to billets, and an assumption that servicemembers are interchangeable cogs in a system designed for mass and uniformity.

Unique skills are assets — not defects — and the military’s industrial-era talent management systems struggle to account for modern careers and are too slow to keep pace with today’s threats. Reserve and guard members have civilian careers that do not always align with their military occupation, while active-duty members frequently have valuable skills that either lack a skill code or are outside of their occupation. Whether it’s software or psychology, the U.S. military should be aware of and have access to all the talents of its members.

It took years to finally create skill identifiers for digital technology, and yet many of them are vendor-specific or only count toward a particular military program. Unlike foreign-language certifications, these digital skill identifiers provide no credit for civilian experience (professional or hobbyist). This is a critical failure as the Department of Defense warns of a lack of key skills.

When the department does track talent, service silos create artificial inefficiencies — shortages in one service that can be filled by excesses in another. America is one nation with one Defense Department, and a truly joint force would allow for easy cross-service collaboration. Instead, the department needs to embrace “beyond team” talent and “extreme teaming.” The Navy or Space Force should be able to tap an infantryman in the National Guard with civilian expertise in data science for a few days or weeks to create analytics dashboards, but current policies for approval, funding, and compensating such scenarios are severely restricted or, at best, unclear and outdated. Specifically, the department needs to address outdated policies that emphasize year-long mobilizations and lock out the Individual Ready Reserve.

Military leaders primarily think of their people as billets on an organizational chart — “spaces and faces.” This limits the pool of talent interested because few members of the reserve component want to take a 6- to 12-month break from their day jobs. Worse, this approach seeks generalists instead of specialists and measures value by billets filled instead of work delivered. If commanders shift from billets to key events, deliverables, and outcomes, they can break up their work into more appealing projects — gigs — and get more mission out of their limited budgets. Unfortunately, some of the best talent is almost entirely locked out of the fight.

The Individual Ready Reserve is a manpower pool composed of individuals who have previously served in the active or reserve component and no longer have an obligation to serve but have not left the military completely. This force is larger than the entire Marine Corps — and a gold mine of critical talent — but these reservists are treated as a “break-glass” contingency force that is a pen stroke away from full civilians, unable to contribute due to each service’s own policies. In the face of recruiting and retention crises, the Individual Ready Reserve is a key demographic. It is more difficult and time-consuming to recruit and train a civilian than to mobilize someone from the Individual Ready Reserve.

The Individual Ready Reserve serves an important role, offering precisely the flexibility that sabbaticals and other changes on the margin offer. Managing two careers, education, and families is not easy, and the Individual Ready Reserve allows servicemembers to take a break from drilling without leaving the military. This status also enables reserve spouses of active-duty and drilling reserve troops to keep serving without risking concurrent deployment or mobilization.

Members of the Individual Ready Reserve are not allowed to have common access cards, effectively locking them out from most digital systems like military email and personnel systems even when they have skills and a willingness to serve. When these members do find a mission to support, they can begin work immediately, but they must complete all readiness requirements — a process that can take two months — before being eligible for pay.

The inefficiencies caused by outdated talent management systems, processes, and policies are creating strategic risk. The good news is that a solution is closer and cheaper than the department realizes.

Agile Talent Is a Weapon System

GigEagle is a real-time marketplace for talent across the joint force that links mission stakeholders with the right talent at the right time, regardless of location, using precision talent-sourcing algorithms and a mobile-enabled user interface. This platform, which we run, is a great tool and units and users are flocking to it. But as with many challenges in national security, policy is a more significant hurdle than technology. The department should develop policies promoting an enterprise talent architecture that unlocks the data scattered in silos across the department, clarify funding mechanisms that can penetrate service silos, and cut the red tape that often keeps reservists out of the fight.

GigEagle is currently a prototype — led by a multi-service team with congressional seed funding and incubated by the Air Force’s AFWERX, the Space Force’s Space Systems Center, the Army’s 75th Innovation Command, and the Marine Innovation Unit — built on commercial technology sourced and adapted by the Defense Innovation Unit. The department should create an agile joint talent program office to operate and scale GigEagle across the Defense Department.

GigEagle is the U.S. military’s joint system for the agile talent ecosystem. Just like a joint weapons capability, GigEagle represents a new, joint talent management capability that should have a joint program office. This is both symbolic and pragmatically tactical. A joint program office signals commitment to modernization and provides an entity for the manpower and funding to operate and scale the full suite of capabilities. The Chief Talent Management Office and the Chief Data and Artificial Intelligence Office are key partners. They should help shape this program office as they represent the joint interests of using AI for human capital across the joint force.

To enable truly joint talent, the department should establish a defense working capital fund and empower this joint program office to serve as its clearinghouse, just as the Defense Innovation Unit and National Security Innovation Capital serve similar joint purposes. Approving a universal funding reimbursable authority for cross-service talent matches is an alternative option, but it punts the work down to additional offices, which is inefficient and more error-prone than a centralized solution. A working capital fund category also allows the department to centrally manage some of the mobilization funds without increasing the defense budget.

Further, the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness should update policy to allow (but not force) members of the Individual Ready Reserve to be issued common access cards so that they have access to essential tools. The policy change should also explicitly allow unit commanders to waive health and fitness requirements for members of this reserve to mobilize domestically for up to 30 days. Leaders can sign off on high-risk training events, so they should be able to allow a data scientist to skip a physical fitness test and get paid for a short, voluntary mobilization. The services already grant similar waivers for other situations, and this simple policy change would allow these members to start working with pay immediately.

Talent Agility Matters Right Now

The available evidence seems to indicate that China is preparing for total war. Its military-civil fusion harmonizes national priorities toward a single goal. By contrast, the U.S. military is not even ready to unlock the full talent potential of its joint total force due to policy handcuffs. If China initiates a war, the U.S. military should expect to feel the costs on day zero. The costs could be catastrophic, but the United States can mitigate or even avert them if the Department of Defense takes action to enable agile talent management across the joint force before the fighting starts. Making a joint program office for talent innovation can both benefit the current force and prepare personnel and manpower software systems to better integrate with large-scale mobilization systems and authorities in the event of a major conflict.

Talent agility is not just a mission enabler — it is an innovation and retention driver. Google is famous for giving employees 20 percent of their time for non-work projects, which have yielded some of their greatest breakthroughs, while Salesforce pioneered giving 1 percent of time, products, and profits to society. Survey data from soldiers leaving the Army in 2021 showed that they care deeply about serving but reach a point where the service no longer feels worth it. It may seem counterintuitive, but giving soldiers an authorized way to have agency to lean into innovative projects — and have a more personal sense of contribution to the mission — may be an answer to the growing personnel crisis.

People — not technology — are America’s decisive military advantage. The American military trains leaders to be bold, creative, and innovative, and civilian leadership at the secretariat level should act now to unlock human capital for modern wars. Personnel policy reform is hard work and these changes are critical now. Defense Department policymakers and Congress have a crucial opportunity to ensure that America has the policy foundations to bring the whole of the military — and, if needed, the whole of society — to bear against America’s enemies. To do so, they should eschew the current, antiquated talent management paradigms that no longer support national objectives.

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Jim Perkins is an officer in the Army Reserve and an expert in national security, emerging technology, and military personnel policy. He previously served in the Army’s 75th Innovation Command and is now a product manager supporting the launch of GigEagle. He has previously published in War on the Rocks, the Modern Warfare Institute, and other outlets.

Mike McGinley serves as a brigadier general in the Air Force Reserve and is the creator and director of the Defense Department’s GigEagle Agile Talent Ecosystem. His views are shaped by decades of operating at the intersection of the public and private sectors, including leading the Boston office of the Defense Innovation Unit and U.S. Cyber Command’s commercial innovation team.

The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jim Perkins · August 14, 2024

20. The ‘Gray Zone’ Comes to Russia

Is the Ukrainian attack into Russia not a large-scale combat operation (LSCO)? Or is it just a "gray zone activity?"

Excerpts:

Now the gray zone, a signature legacy of Russian wars, may have come home to Russia. Since last week, Russians, rather than Ukrainians, have taken to social media and blogs to wonder whether the nuclear plant nearest the combat area is safe, to watch videos of their young conscript soldiers taken prisoner and civilians stripped of shelter as the Kursk region disappears behind an active front line. The residents in these border regions can look forward to the same conditions that prevail in other gray zones: intermittent utilities, cash machines empty of money, communications gone dark, no investment that would allow them to rebuild. For those who had to leave the region, President Vladimir Putin has promised a onetime payment of 10,000 rubles, or $111.

Naumlyuk has seen this story unfold before.“For as long as the war goes on, the regions along the border will be abandoned,” he said, “and the population will remain in the gray zone, deprived of rights and compensated with miserable pennies.”

The ‘Gray Zone’ Comes to Russia

Moscow holds certain hot spots abroad in a stasis of isolation and neglect. Now part of Russia is experiencing these conditions for itself.

By Anna Nemtsova

The Atlantic · by Anna Nemtsova · August 13, 2024

Last week, civilians in Russia experienced something new—something Chechens, Georgians, Syrians, Ukrainians, and other civilians in the path of Russia’s military have known about for decades. After Russian tanks withdraw and shelling stops, Moscow holds certain hot spots in stasis. They become “gray zones”: neither at war nor fully at peace, wrecked by heavy artillery, psychologically traumatized and economically ruined, under Russia’s boot but subject to its neglect.

The gray zone has now come to the Russian side of the border with Ukraine. At 8 a.m. last Tuesday, dozens of Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles broke across the frontier and entered the southwestern region of Kursk, where more than a million people live. In the Russian town of Sudzha, locals fled Ukrainian shelling, abandoning belongings in their burning homes. Thousands of residents lost electricity, running water, and cellphone coverage. The Ukrainians pushed deeper into Russia, reportedly controlling as much as 390 square miles of Russian territory within a week of the initial incursion. Russian authorities report that 121,000 people have been evacuated from 28 villages controlled by Ukrainian fighters.

Now, for the first time in many decades, a swath of Russia—including not only Kursk but other regions near Russia’s border with Ukraine, such as Rostov, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Krasnodar—could become a gray zone, a functional part of no country, controlled and punished by Russia’s adversary. And there is nothing like experiencing something for oneself to concentrate the mind.

Read: Ukraine was biding its time

“If there is a civil society in Russia, I hope they can see in real life what it feels like when you have no border left—it’s being demarcated by a foreign state right in front of their eyes, as it was in Ukraine in 2014,” Inna Varenytsa, a journalist and the mother of a 4-year-old boy whose father was killed outside Kyiv in 2022, told me. She said she hoped the intrusion would puncture the indifference of many Russians, “which would not make them feel empathy for Ukraine, but at least it will definitely make them think.”

Gennady Gudkov, a former member of Russia’s Parliament now in exile, also noted the impassivity among Russians. “First, Ukrainian Luhansk and Donetsk, now even Crimea and several Russian regions are turning into abandoned, ruined gray zones, and nobody in Moscow cares,” he told me. “They only think of their own profits and enrichment.”

Certainly, few in Russia have given a thought to the region of Abkhazia. In 1992, Russia fought the Republic of Georgia in a war that killed more than 10,000 people and displaced more than 200,000. When the fighting stopped, Russia swiftly recognized Abkhazia as independent and installed a base for its security services there. Abkhazia became a gray zone: Gudkov traveled to the area in 2001 and found it economically depressed and physically devastated. “My job was to visit these regions in the Caucasus where Russian citizens lived and voted,” he told me. “I saw minefield signs, abandoned armored vehicles, and sandbags.”

Not much had changed 13 years after Gudkov’s visit, when I reported from Abkhazia for Newsweek. In Gagry, hungry dogs roamed abandoned parks littered with bullet cartridges. Once-graceful old buildings moldered in ruins, and local athletes, artists, and ballet dancers complained that their republic, which they had dubbed Apsna, or the Land of Soul, was like Russia’s unwanted child.

Russia had recognized South Ossetia, too, as independent in the aftermath of the same Russo-Georgian war. And South Ossetia was likewise a gray zone, where life was poor, pinched, and cold. Not a single hotel was operational during the week I visited the region’s capital, Tskhinvali, in 2012, so I stayed in a private home, where my elderly landlady kept water boiling in big pots on the stove day and night just to heat her small house. The average income in her neighborhood was less than $300 a month. South Ossetia had held a presidential election the year before, but the winner, Alla Dzhioyeva, was kept under arrest in a local hospital, where I saw gunmen pacing up and down the hallway of her ward.

Russia maintains military and security forces in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria (another internationally unrecognized territory, this one in Moldova). But it does not care to reconstruct or breathe economic life into these regions. Their indeterminate status also isolates them internationally—years go by, and still none of these territories can issue travel or citizenship documents that would be considered valid abroad—and the sanctions on Russia complicate residents’ financial transactions with almost any bank in the world.

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and occupied the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, landing more than 4 million Ukrainian citizens in additional gray zones. Particularly in Donetsk and Luhansk, the fighting never stopped, and in all three territories, civilians have lived under harsh conditions for the past decade. Anton Naumlyuk, the editor and founder of Graty, a Ukrainian media group focusing on law and justice, told me that Crimea’s security services abduct and torture detainees in a manner “sometimes even worse than in the Northern Caucasus.”

Read: How I lost the Russia that never was

Now the gray zone, a signature legacy of Russian wars, may have come home to Russia. Since last week, Russians, rather than Ukrainians, have taken to social media and blogs to wonder whether the nuclear plant nearest the combat area is safe, to watch videos of their young conscript soldiers taken prisoner and civilians stripped of shelter as the Kursk region disappears behind an active front line. The residents in these border regions can look forward to the same conditions that prevail in other gray zones: intermittent utilities, cash machines empty of money, communications gone dark, no investment that would allow them to rebuild. For those who had to leave the region, President Vladimir Putin has promised a onetime payment of 10,000 rubles, or $111.

Naumlyuk has seen this story unfold before.“For as long as the war goes on, the regions along the border will be abandoned,” he said, “and the population will remain in the gray zone, deprived of rights and compensated with miserable pennies.”

The Atlantic · by Anna Nemtsova · August 13, 2024

21. Marine who died in Osprey rescue effort awarded top non-combat medal

Another great American. I am bullish on our young people. I believe there are many more who will walk in this Marine's footsteps.  

I hope his parents find some peace knowing of his truly selfless service.

Excerpts:

But they weren’t expecting to hear these words: Your son didn’t die in the crash.

Cpl. Spencer R. Collart had safely escaped the aircraft. But the 21-year-old saw that the Osprey’s two pilots were unaccounted for. Despite the smoke and flames, he went back in.

Collart “heroically reentered the burning cockpit of the aircraft in an attempt to rescue the trapped pilots,” the official Marine Corps investigation into the crash found. “He perished during this effort.”

Marine who died in Osprey rescue effort awarded top non-combat medal

marinecorpstimes.com · by Tara Copp · August 13, 2024

Alexia and Bart Collart braced for a hard visit. Marines came to their home in Arlington, Virginia, last week to brief them on what caused the Osprey crash in Australia last year that resulted in the death of their son and two other Marines.

But they weren’t expecting to hear these words: Your son didn’t die in the crash.

Cpl. Spencer R. Collart had safely escaped the aircraft. But the 21-year-old saw that the Osprey’s two pilots were unaccounted for. Despite the smoke and flames, he went back in.

Collart “heroically reentered the burning cockpit of the aircraft in an attempt to rescue the trapped pilots,” the official Marine Corps investigation into the crash found. “He perished during this effort.”

For his valor, Collart will be posthumously awarded the service’s highest non-combat award: the Navy and Marine Corps Medal. It is an honor awarded for acts of heroism at great risk to the service member’s life.

It didn’t surprise his dad that Spencer tried to save the pilots.

“I heard a song the other day. I’ve heard it many times,” Bart Collart said. “There was a quote in there, about how ‘the last thing on my mind was to leave you.’ And I think that was Spencer talking with me a little. He had no intention of leaving us. I think he thought he’d go in and get the job done.”

Spencer Collart was a goal-driven, 6-foot-2, grinning Washington-Liberty High School lacrosse player who walked into the house on his 18th birthday with a surprise: He’d just enlisted.

“The Marines are the top of the top. The best of the best,” Spencer told his mom Alexia Collart, when she asked him why. The Collarts weren’t a military family, but Spencer wanted to serve. And he wanted to fly.

He got his top assignment choice and met his two best friends, Lance Cpl. Evan Strickland and Cpl. Jonah Waser. They spent a year together training to become crew chiefs, enlisted Marines responsible for the aircraft and its passengers. There’s a photo of them posing with their class on April 22, 2022, the day they earned their wings.

They were flying the V-22 Osprey, which functions as both an airplane and a helicopter. But it’s an aircraft that has a troubled history and four fatal accidents in two years.

In June 2022, Strickland was killed along with four other Marines in a training crash in California. Collart served as a pallbearer. He stayed in close touch with Strickland’s family, calling to check on them, Facetiming them on the crash anniversary and reading the accident investigation report from cover to cover, Strickland’s mother, Michelle, said.

“He wanted to really understand,” she said.

When Spencer's unit deployed to Australia in April 2023, he asked his mother if he could give Michelle Strickland her number so they could text each other.

“He had the foresight to connect me with Michelle. I don’t know if he was concerned or worried. I suspect maybe he was,” Alexia Collart said.

Still, Spencer flourished in his role. He took on hard jobs no one wanted, like packing the unit’s plane before they deployed. His squadron kept showing up with more gear, so he kept unpacking and repacking it, again and again.

By the fourth try Spencer was “red and black, just covered in grease and sunburn,” his commander told Bart Collart. Spencer earned a first-class ticket to Australia for his effort.

In the Osprey, Spencer spent most of the flight in the “tunnel,” the area right behind the pilot and co-pilot, learning from them, with a goal to become a pilot himself. When Spencer’s personal effects arrived after his death, Bart Collart found his son’s Marine Corps camouflage cap, known as a cover. He put it on and metal nudged his forehead.

Spencer had pinned a 2nd lieutenant’s gold “butter bar” and a set of pilot’s wings into the band.

“He put these in here to remind himself every time he put his cap on of his next goal,” Bart Collart said. “He was all in. He walked the walk, he talked the talk, and he was just, he just loved it so much.”

Marine Cpl. Spencer R. Collart's family, from left, father Bart Collart, sister Gwyneth Collart and mother Alexia Collart, hold his portrait at their home in Arlington, Virginia, Thursday, June 19, 2024. (AP Photo/Rod Lamkey, Jr./AP)

On August 27, 2023, two Marines came to the Collart's door.

Spencer Collart's Osprey had crashed during an Australian military exercise, killing him and Capt. Eleanor LeBeau and aircraft commander Maj. Tobin Lewis. For months, that's all his parents knew. Then, last week, the Marines came back, to brief their findings.

Seconds after the Osprey hit the ground, the aircraft filled with smoke and flames. Collart had been standing in the tunnel even as the plane was going down. Most of the 23 troops on board escaped out the back, including a commander who told investigators he saw Collart escape out a side door.

A site team later found Collart’s tether — what he’d use to latch onto the Osprey to move around during flight — undamaged outside the aircraft.

But not everyone made it out. The pilots were still inside. The Osprey had crashed nose first, and they were trapped.

Collart went back. Investigators believe he may have unbuckled Lewis from his restraints before he succumbed.

Collart “thought the world" of Lewis and LeBeau, Bart Collart said. He believes Lewis' last-minute maneuver to level the plane as it was crashing right side down helped the troops in the back survive.

The fourth member of the flight crew, Cpl. Travis Reyes, has been at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio for the last year recovering from critical injuries. Saturday marked the first time he got to fly home to his parents' house in Maryland.

Spencer's family met Waser for the first time at the funeral. This time it was Waser who put on dress blues to serve as a pallbearer and escort his best friend's remains from Dover Air Force Base to Arlington National Cemetery.

Spencer’s younger sister, Gwyneth Collart, felt instant chemistry. Her parents saw it too.

“As soon as I met him, I was like, this is not the time or the place to be falling in love,” Gwyneth Collart said of Waser. “Grieving will never be easy, but he made grieving a little bit more comfortable to do. And he just, I mean, he took my breath away.”

Months later, Waser asked her father for Gwyneth’s hand.

“You guys told me that Marines work fast, and you weren’t kidding,” Bart Collart said, laughing.

Gwyneth Collart and Waser married July 6 in Arlington and held their reception at Top of the Town, a ballroom that has a terrace overlooking Arlington National Cemetery. They could see the section where Spencer was buried, and Gwyneth pinned her brother’s portrait to her bouquet.

“I think that Spencer knew what I needed and what my family needed after this, and it feels like I got exactly what I needed to get through this,” Gwyneth Collart said.

22. Social-media firms are lowering defenses to foreign disinformation campaigns, researchers warn

There must be some profit motive behind this.

Excerpts:

Meta announced last month that it would replace CrowdTangle with the “Meta Content Library,” a less powerful tool that will not be made available to media companies.

That will help China, Russia, and other autocratic countries that seek to sow political division in the United States, said Nathan Doctor, senior digital methods manager at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

“With these sorts of foreign influence campaigns, probably the biggest thing about them is to keep tabs on them. Otherwise, as we see, they can start to flourish. So as data access…dries up a bit, it becomes a lot more difficult in some cases to identify this kind of stuff and then you know, reactively deal with it, Doctor said on Monday during a Center for American Progress online event.

Social-media firms are lowering defenses to foreign disinformation campaigns, researchers warn

Meta is about to become the latest to scuttle a key tool—just months before a U.S. election

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

August 12, 2024 08:51 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

If there was one thing lawmakers and social media companies agreed on in 2017, it was that no one—not companies or the government or the public—were well prepared for how foreign adversaries might use social media networks to influence the American public during an election year. Eight years later, that consensus may have been the highwater mark in efforts to actually combat that problem.

On Wednesday, Facebook’s parent company Meta will cease to support CrowdTangle, a data tool that allows researchers, journalists, and other observers to uncover disinformation and misinformation trends on the social network. Experts from a variety of organizations warn that the move, coupled with other decisions among social media companies to roll back data monitoring and trust and safety teams, will make it much harder to fight lies spread by hostile powers.

Meta announced last month that it would replace CrowdTangle with the “Meta Content Library,” a less powerful tool that will not be made available to media companies.

That will help China, Russia, and other autocratic countries that seek to sow political division in the United States, said Nathan Doctor, senior digital methods manager at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

“With these sorts of foreign influence campaigns, probably the biggest thing about them is to keep tabs on them. Otherwise, as we see, they can start to flourish. So as data access…dries up a bit, it becomes a lot more difficult in some cases to identify this kind of stuff and then you know, reactively deal with it, Doctor said on Monday during a Center for American Progress online event.

Meta’s decision followed similar moves at other social-media companies. After Elon Musk took over Twitter—now X—in 2022, he disbanded the team that watched for foreign disinformation. Snapchat and Discord have since trimmed their trust and safety teams by 20 to 30 percent, said Priyanjana Bengani, a computational journalism fellow at the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University.

But Meta is far larger than X. Facebook has 3 billion monthly active users and Instagram, also owned by Meta, has 2 billion; while X has about 600 million. Shutting down CrowdTangle will deal a big blow to journalists and others looking to understand how disinformation is spreading, Davey Alba, a technology reporter for Bloomberg said on Monday.

And that’s particularly alarming right now, as the United States prepares for a presidential election that foreign actors are looking to sway with disinformation.

“It will make our work more difficult to do ahead of the U.S. election to have this tool be shut down,” Alba said.

U.S. lawmakers, too, are increasingly concerned. In July, 17 of them sent a letter urging Meta to reconsider its decision—in vain.

That shows that social media companies don’t feel much accountability to policy-makers, the press, or the publice, Brandi Geurkink, the executive director of the Coalition for Independent Technology Research, said Monday.

“In arguably the largest global election year ever, the fact that a company can…signal their intention to make such a decision and then have such a groundswell of opposition from civil society all around the globe, from lawmakers in the United States and Europe, from journalists, you name it, and continue to go ahead with this decision and not really respond to any of the criticism—that's what I think is the bigger worrying piece,” she said.

It’s a far cry from the conversations that social media companies and lawmakers were having eight years ago after the revelation of a Russian campaign to influence a U.S. presidential election. In October 2016, officials from top social media companies appeared before Congress to offer mea culpas.

"This is the national-security challenge of the 21st century," Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said at the time.

Facebook's General Counsel Colin Stretch said he shared that concern.

“In hindsight, we should have had a broader lens. There were signals we missed,” Stretch said in his testimony.

Geurkink said Meta’s CrowdTangle decision belies its promises to fight state-sponsored influence campaigns and other disinformation.

“I think what I do see is dishonesty with regard to the way that they are publicly messaging it,” she said. “In the last election cycle, they were training political parties, training NGOs on how to use this tool to do really good election monitoring work around the election. So it seems very much a bait-and-switch.”

Bengani said there will certainly be a lot more signals missed now.

“I think we're almost at the point where it's worse than what was in 2016 right now,” she said.

Back then, observers could track social-media trends with the Twitter and Reddit APIs—ways for researchers to access the network’s data—and other companies were funding efforts to moderate online conversation and to monitor for foreign influence.

Countries might enact laws to compel transparency from tech companies, but that’s likely to foster a patchwork of practices and perceptions around the globe, she said. The end result: it will become harder for anyone to know what’s real and what isn’t online. She called it a “weird, fragmented transparency ecosystem, which just makes tracking trends or research across geographies incredibly hard.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

23. To avoid history’s mistakes, Taiwan needs unambiguous protection, now

But do we have more people advocating for the defense of Taiwan when the people and government of Taiwan do not seem to be doing everything they can in their defense? Do we want it more than them? That is also something that does not work in foreign policy and national security strategy. History has shown us that when Americans want to defend someone more than they are willing to defend themselves it does not turn out well.

Excerpts:

China’s anti-access-area denial strategy worked. Only one carrier battle group, the crown jewel of the Seventh Fleet, has traversed the Taiwan Strait since China’s 1996 warning that such a transit would meet “a sea of fire.” In recent years, the U.S. Navy has conducted Freedom of Navigation passages using smaller warships singly or in pairs.

Just as China has gradually expanded the scope and intensity of its naval and air exercise in and over the strait, the U.S. should incrementally increase the number and size of ships in the transits until they reach the full complement of a naval battle group. 

President Biden seems to have decided that the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity on defending Taiwan has not dissuaded China from planning to attack Taiwan. He has now stated on four occasions that the U.S. will intervene militarily. But Beijing has reason to doubt that those ad hoc remarks from the 81-year-old leader actually reflect considered U.S. policy. Biden’s administration has a few months left to move the policy in a clear and unambiguous direction. 

Had Putin believed America would directly defend Ukraine, as it promised to do in the Budapest Memorandum, Europe could have avoided another war. Xi Jinping must be made to understand the consequences of fresh aggression in the Indo-Pacific. 

To avoid history’s mistakes, Taiwan needs unambiguous protection, now

by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor - 08/13/24 9:45 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4824340-china-taiwan-conflict/?utm

History is replete with examples of civil wars, wars of aggression and political revolutions altering power relations and sovereignty over once-stable states and territories. 

But not since World War II has there been such a confluence of aggressive powers seeking to change international borders and eliminate entire states.  

In addition to Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and China’s escalating threats against Taiwan, Iran and its proxies are moving to destroy Israel. North Korea also remains in a perpetual state of quasi-war to end the existence of South Korea.

All four conflict or near-conflict situations involve democratic allies of the U.S. under attack, kinetic and otherwise, from proclaimed enemies of the U.S.-led international order. 

The Russia-Ukraine conflict offers the closest major-power analogue to the looming crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The West’s failure to deter Russia’s aggression and war crimes, and its subsequent failure to support a Ukrainian victory is the most important of the pertinent lessons for the looming China-Taiwan conflict. The response should start by confronting the information warfare that invariably precedes the outbreak of war. Adolf Hitler’s claim of German ownership of the Sudetenland is the most dramatic modern example. Likewise, Vladimir Putin distorts both recent events and the historical record in claiming that Ukraine was never a separate nation but a mere “fiction” created by Russia.

Putin conveniently ignores the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which Russia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom formally committed “to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” The three powers also pledged “to reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” The memorandum proved to be for Putin what the Munich Agreement of 1938 had been to Hitler: a mere “scrap of paper.”   

Similarly, Xi Jinping relentlessly talks of “reunification” with Taiwan, even though the Chinese Communist Party never ruled the island. He buttresses his false claim of sovereignty over Taiwan by relying on Henry Kissinger’s too-clever-by-half wordsmithing in the Shanghai Communique, which set the stage for a half-century of fraught China-U.S. relations over the status and future of Taiwan. 

That seminal document separately set forth both sides’ positions on Taiwan without agreement, the rhetorical equivalent of two ships passing in the night. But it allowed China to claim over the following decades that Washington had yielded to Beijing’s interpretation and accepted China’s “one China principle” — i.e., that Taiwan is part of China and not a separate political entity. The U.S. side simply “acknowledged” China’s position and neither “challenged” nor acceded to it. 

After then-President Carter shifted official U.S. relations from Taiwan (the Republic of China) to the People’s Republic of China in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, declaring that America will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Given that vital U.S. interest in Taiwan’s security, Washington pledged “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion.” 

The Act did not commit the U.S. to actively defend Taiwan by intervening in a cross-strait conflict, however. And when Chinese officials asked the Clinton administration for clarification, Assistant Defense Secretary Joseph Nye and Defense Secretary William Perry said the U.S. response “would depend on the circumstances.” For the next 30 years, China built the circumstances that would keep the U.S. out of the fight, with an arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles and a fleet of attack submarines.  

China’s anti-access-area denial strategy worked. Only one carrier battle group, the crown jewel of the Seventh Fleet, has traversed the Taiwan Strait since China’s 1996 warning that such a transit would meet “a sea of fire.” In recent years, the U.S. Navy has conducted Freedom of Navigation passages using smaller warships singly or in pairs.

Just as China has gradually expanded the scope and intensity of its naval and air exercise in and over the strait, the U.S. should incrementally increase the number and size of ships in the transits until they reach the full complement of a naval battle group. 

President Biden seems to have decided that the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity on defending Taiwan has not dissuaded China from planning to attack Taiwan. He has now stated on four occasions that the U.S. will intervene militarily. But Beijing has reason to doubt that those ad hoc remarks from the 81-year-old leader actually reflect considered U.S. policy. Biden’s administration has a few months left to move the policy in a clear and unambiguous direction. 

Had Putin believed America would directly defend Ukraine, as it promised to do in the Budapest Memorandum, Europe could have avoided another war. Xi Jinping must be made to understand the consequences of fresh aggression in the Indo-Pacific. 

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies and a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute. 

24. China’s Global Public Opinion War with the United States and the West

My hand is slapping my forehead with this BFO (yes it is such a blinding flash of the obvious that no one will pay attention). But as Matt Armstrong often counsels me, no organization and no amount of money will address this adequately problem if national leadership is not fully behind it.

Public opinion or media warfare is one of China's three warfares. But we will not call it war even if China views it that way.

Conclusion:

To win the battle for the narrative, the United States should designate and adequately fund an entity to inform its strategic communications planning in ways that anticipate adversary messages and get ahead of them. Fulfilling this mission will require comprehensive analysis of China’s influence efforts — overt, covert, digital, human, and analog — rooted in an understanding of the party.

China’s Global Public Opinion War with the United States and the West - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Heidi Holz · August 14, 2024

In recent years, with the intensification of strategic competition between the United States and China, the “battle for the narrative” in the international media landscape has become more heated. But in the push to understand Beijing’s influence efforts, there is a tendency among elements of Washington and the broader China-watching community to focus on specific aspects of China’s activities depending on where they sit in the U.S. system. In some cases, these narrow and often fragmented perspectives have handicapped Washington’s ability to compete with China in the information domain.

Three narrow approaches to analyzing China’s influence efforts stand out as particularly worrisome. The first is an excessive focus on Beijing’s covert influence operations and assessing them in isolation from its broader — and very overt — efforts to shape the perceptions of target audiences. The second is an excessive focus on the latest evolution in Beijing’s social media tactics. The third is an overreliance on digital tools and big data analytics to understand Beijing’s behavior. Although important, these narrowly focused — or “siloed” — examinations of China’s influence efforts can lead to a fragmented response and prevent the implementation of a more coordinated policy approach.

The key to developing informed policy responses to Beijing’s global propaganda efforts — covert, overt, digital, and analog — is to study them in their totality and ground them in an informed understanding of the Chinese Communist Party. This sort of comprehensive analysis can be used to predict China’s behavior, inform U.S. strategic communications planning, and craft messages designed to inoculate audiences against Beijing’s narratives. At present, the United States does not have a single entity tasked and funded to perform this cross-cutting mission. To win the battle for the narrative, the United States should designate and fund an organization with the mission of informing whole-of-government U.S. strategic communications planning in ways that help Washington get ahead of Beijing’s influence operations.

Become a Member

The Overt Matters, Too

In its 2024 Annual Threat Assessment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence warned that the People’s Republic of China is “expanding its global covert influence posture” to sow doubts about U.S. leadership, undermine democracy, and extend Beijing’s influence. The assessment described China’s covert influence campaigns as incorporating increasingly sophisticated elements such as generative AI and Russian-style tactics aimed at amplifying divisions ahead of the 2024 elections.

But China’s influence campaigns are not confined to the shadows. Beijing’s efforts to shape foreign perceptions include a complex mix of overt and covert tactics. Wielding its massive state-run media complex, Beijing openly seeks to promote a positive image of China to audiences around the world — “to tell China’s stories well,” as General Secretary Xi Jinping describes it — and to discredit, undermine, and delegitimize its competitors, most notably the United States and U.S. partners and allies.

This campaign is driven by the perception that the United States and its partners and allies are waging “public opinion warfare” against China. In China’s strategic thinking, public opinion warfare is one of the “three warfares” and refers to the use of the media to influence public opinion and gain support from international and domestic audiences. The three warfares also include psychological warfare — the use of information and media to support military operations and advance political and military goals — and legal warfare — the use of international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage the political repercussions of military actions.

China’s efforts to expand its overt footprint in the global media environment go back more than two decades and can be traced to the early years of the Hu Jintao era (2002–2012). By the early 2000s, China’s rise as a global economic actor had become undeniable. In 2001, two key events formally marked China’s status as an emerging economic powerhouse: China joined the World Trade Organization, and Beijing was selected to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. Despite these very public successes, however, Beijing was concerned that China’s international image continued to suffer from a perceived anti-China bias in Western media, and that this hampered its efforts to develop international influence. In 2004, the party issued a series of directives designed to improve China’s foreign-directed media and re-established the External Propaganda Work Leading Small Group, marking the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s commitment to the cause.

In 2008, Beijing was confronted with its continued failure to “win hearts and minds” overseas when protests erupted along the path of the Olympic torch relay. This public relations debacle reinforced Beijing’s belief that it needed to improve China’s external propaganda. Less than a year later, China embarked on an estimated $6.6 billion campaign to expand its global media presence and improve its international news coverage.

China’s ongoing global campaign to shape foreign perceptions touches on virtually all aspects of the information environments of target countries, including print, digital, and broadcast media, and even information communications infrastructure. In the Mekong region, for instance, China has actively sought to establish a footprint that includes content sharing agreements with local media outlets in all five countries (Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar), financial investment in local media outlets in several countries, and investment in the development of telecommunications infrastructure by Chinese companies. Far from trying to hide these activities, China often touts them as part of its efforts to “build a community with a shared future for mankind.”

More Than Digital Media

Like many governments and media organizations around the world, China’s propaganda apparatus has adapted to the digital age. China’s state-run media complex has successfully leapt from print and broadcast to online and from traditional to new media. China’s official Xinhua News Agency, for instance, a has robust presence on Facebook, X, Sina Weibo (a Chinese micro-blogging website similar to X), and YouTube. Xinhua’s YouTube channel boasts 1.43 million followers. In addition, Beijing employs a range of social media manipulation tactics, including censorship, bots, trolls, and hired influencers, and it has even begun to experiment with generative AI.

But not all of China’s influence efforts are online. Although it is a critical endeavor, analysis that focuses on Beijing’s digital footprint risks failing to capture the scope of its offline activities, such as its broadcast propaganda and its efforts to target journalists. China’s official overseas broadcaster China Radio International, for instance, produces multimedia content in 61 languages broadcast worldwide. Its short-wave broadcasts reach countries like the pacific island countries, where radio has traditionally been a key source of news.

China’s efforts to influence foreign media and journalists — both inside and outside of China — also go well beyond the digital domain into the realm of real-world human interactions. Beijing’s agents employ tactics that can be as blatant as threatening journalists with physical violence or as subtle as suggesting that a foreign news outlet could lose access to Chinese markets if it does not adopt a pro-Beijing stance. Recently, Beijing has threatened foreign journalists with “an invitation to tea” — a common practice of summoning individuals and threatening them with criminal prosecution for violating China’s national security or counter-espionage laws if they publish information contrary to Beijing’s interests. Beijing has also punished foreign scholars and journalists by refusing to grant or renew visas as retaliation for unfavorable reporting. For those who rely on access to China for their livelihood, this practice can be a career killer and thus creates significant pressure to self-censor.

Overreliance on digital tools

China’s massive digital presence lends itself to the use of digital monitoring tools and analytical models. Indeed, those tools play an important role in capturing, quantifying, and understanding the flood of Chinese influence activities online. And, although they are certainly important to monitoring Beijing’s efforts to exploit the digital domain, it is all too easy for analysts to hyperfocus on their outputs and lose a sense of context.

Approaches that seek to monitor Beijing’s online footprint using big data analytics run the risk of becoming divorced from a broader understanding of the Chinese Communist Party — its imperatives, objectives, and history. This could result in flawed interpretations of the data and conclusions that lack predictive power. For instance, a layman reading one of Microsoft’s excellent reports on information operations by Chinese threat actors — which, quite understandably, focus on discrete 6- to 12-month periods of activity in the digital domain — could easily walk away with the sense that China’s online influence campaigns are rapidly improving their ability to craft narratives that resonate with target audiences. However, when you place these campaigns into their broader historical and political context, it becomes clear that the situation is more complicated — and possibly less dire. China’s influence operations and propaganda campaigns are the products of a system in which political correctness often takes precedence over all else — including effectiveness.

The Importance of History

Comprehensive analysis that considers the totality of Beijing’s influence efforts — overt, covert, digital, human, and analog — and grounds them in an understanding of China’s ruling Communist Party is critical to developing informed policy responses.

First, it is worth keeping in mind that seeking to shape foreign perceptions is not a new behavior for the Chinese Communist Party, and many of the tactics that it uses have been honed over decades. The use of external propaganda is a core element of how the party operates and has been throughout its history. Tactics such as grooming foreign “friends of China” trace back decades. Mao Zedong himself carefully cultivated a relationship with American journalist Edgar Snow, whose sympathetic portrayals of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders gained worldwide attention in the 1930s. Similarly, the party has been printing its own newspapers and broadcasting its messages via radio since the Communist Army hid from Chinese Nationalist forces in the caves of Yan’an nearly 90 years ago. These two practices have been polished and adapted by Beijing over the ensuing decades and remain core elements of its external propaganda today.

Next, placing China’s media behavior in the context of recent party reforms can provide insight into how Beijing’s narratives might evolve over time. Since he came to power, Xi has sought to tighten the Chinese Communist Party’s control over China’s media ecosystem through organizational reforms carried out in 2018. As part of these reforms, the party abolished the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television and transferred its responsibilities to the Central Propaganda Department. This consolidation of party control over China’s media has serious implications for its behavior going forward. It suggests that party imperatives are likely to play a larger role in Chinese media behavior than the commercial imperative of achieving authentic audience engagement. It also means that the narratives that China pushes are likely to be highly predictable and support the master narratives that Beijing seeks to tell the world about itself — even if those narratives are not particularly palatable to target audiences.

Indeed, in the nearly two decades that I have been observing China’s media behavior, one of my key takeaways is that Beijing’s narratives are often quite predictable. Regardless of the specific event that Chinese media is covering, it seizes every opportunity to fulfill the Communist Party’s mandate to promote a positive image of China. At the broadest level, the following narratives permeate Chinse media’s foreign-directed reporting: China is peaceful; China’s approach to cooperation is mutually beneficial and win-win; China is a responsible member of the international community; China is a better partner to developing countries.

On the other side of the coin, Chinese media also reflexively seeks to undermine and delegitimize China’s competitors, especially the United States. Typical Chinese media reporting on America — especially U.S. activities related to competition with China — revolves around narratives such as the following: The United States seeks to maintain its global hegemony; the U.S. military is a destabilizing force; the U.S. approach to cooperation is self-serving; the United States uses international organizations to bully others; U.S. assistance to developing countries comes with political strings attached.

Chinese media reporting related to specific topics and policy issues — such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea or U.S. military deployments to the Indo-Pacific — promotes messages that generally fall within these master narratives and reinforce Beijing’s official position. A quick search within Xinhua’s English language site for the terms “U.S.,” “military,” and “destabilizing” produces a list of headlines seeking to portray the U.S. military as a destabilizing force in the South China Sea, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and globally.

Recommendations

If China’s narratives are predictable, then it is possible to get ahead of them. The first message people read or hear often resonates the loudest — psychologists call this the “primacy effect.” On key issues, it is possible for the United States to predict China’s rhetorical responses based on a historical analysis of how it has responded to similar actions in the past and to craft messages designed to inoculate audiences against Beijing’s narratives. For example, if portrayals of the U.S. military as a destabilizing force are a perennial feature of Chinese messaging targeted at partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. strategic communications can frontload messages about the stabilizing role of a particular operation or deployment. Similarly, given the likelihood that China will seek to portray U.S. aid to Indo-Pacific countries as aimed at maintaining U.S. hegemony and undercutting their governments, U.S. messaging surrounding aid packages should emphasize respect for their sovereignty.

Washington should have an organization tasked with informing U.S. strategic communications vis-à-vis China. At present, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center is mandated to “direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate U.S. federal government efforts to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts.” This is an absolutely critical mission, but it falls slightly short of what is necessary to compete with China in the information space. It puts the United States behind the curve — reacting when it is possible to anticipate, plan, and get ahead of China’s messaging. Giving an organization the mandate to understand and predict adversary propaganda and disinformation efforts could allow America to preempt China’s influence campaigns. At a minimum, this organization could serve in an advisory capacity to federal agencies, making recommendations regarding how to tailor strategic communications based on a comprehensive understanding of China’s influence efforts in various countries and regions and Beijing’s likely responses. A more ambitious approach would be to give this notional organization the mandate to develop a global whole-of-government U.S. strategic communications plan.

To win the battle for the narrative, the United States should designate and adequately fund an entity to inform its strategic communications planning in ways that anticipate adversary messages and get ahead of them. Fulfilling this mission will require comprehensive analysis of China’s influence efforts — overt, covert, digital, human, and analog — rooted in an understanding of the party.

Become a Member

Heidi Holz is a senior research scientist in CNA’s China and Indo-Pacific security affairs division. During her 18 years at CNA, her research has focused on China’s strategic communications, propaganda, and influence efforts.

The views in this article are the author’s and do not reflect those of CNA.

Image: The Fundação Oriente via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Heidi Holz · August 14, 2024

25. What Was the Biden Doctrine?

Regardless of the analysis within this essay, the conclusion has key strategic questions we must consider.

Conclusion:

The world is so much in flux that it is impossible to predict how Biden’s short presidency will fit into the flow of history. Will voters in the United States and Europe turn to populism, go-it-alone nationalism, or even isolationism? What does China intend in the Pacific and beyond? Can the war in Ukraine be ended without setting a precedent that rewards naked aggression? Will the major powers follow each other over the cliff of a second nuclear arms race? And, of course, will Biden have a successor who shares his worldview or be followed by Trump, who will seek to reverse most of what he has done? No matter the answers, and despite the symptoms of debilitating political polarization at home, Biden has made profound changes in foreign policy—not to accommodate American decline but to reflect the country’s inherent strength.

What Was the Biden Doctrine?​

Leadership Without Hegemony

By Jessica T. Mathews

September/October 2024

Published on August 14, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jessica T. Mathews · August 14, 2024

Although it is too soon to judge the historical significance of Joe Biden’s one-term presidency, it is clear that the past four years have witnessed remarkable achievements in foreign policy. Biden has made some notable strategic mistakes, as well, mostly when he chose to follow the policies of his predecessor, Donald Trump. But he has carried out a crucial task: shifting the basis of American foreign policy from an unhealthy reliance on military intervention to the active pursuit of diplomacy backed by strength. He has won back the trust of friends and allies, built and begun to institutionalize a deep American presence in Asia, restored the United States’ role in essential multilateral organizations and agreements, and ended the longest of the country’s “forever wars”—a step none of his three predecessors had the courage to take.

All of this happened in the face of grievous new threats from China and Russia, two great powers newly allied around the goal of ending American primacy. Biden’s response to the most pressing emergency of his term—Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—has been both skillful and innovative, demonstrating a grasp of the traditional elements of statecraft along with a willingness to take a few unconventional steps. The picture is more mixed when it comes to China, which in the long term poses the most complex challenge to U.S. foreign policy. Biden’s approach to Beijing has occasionally reflected a disappointing degree of continuity with that of Trump and has fostered uncertainty over Taiwan, the most sensitive issue in U.S.-Chinese relations. But unlike the former president, Biden has embedded his China policy in a vigorous matrix of new and restored alliances across Asia. He has arguably pulled off the long-sought U.S. “pivot” to the region, without using that term.

In the Middle East, the record is disappointing. The boldness Biden showed in withdrawing from Afghanistan has been conspicuously absent from his reaction to the war in Gaza, where his outdated understanding of Israel has prevented him from exerting more pressure on its leadership to adopt a wiser, less destructive approach.

In a deeply divided country, four years is too little time to establish a foreign policy doctrine. Much of what Biden has achieved could be quickly erased by a successor. Yet his legacy to date suggests the lineaments of a new approach well suited to today’s world. Most important among them is a resolve to eschew wars to remake other countries and to restore diplomacy as the central tool of foreign policy. That diplomatic revival has not been without flaws: it has not fostered a coherent global economic strategy, and it has lacked a strong commitment to nonproliferation and arms control. But it has presented to the world a country that has unambiguously left behind the hubris of the “unipolar moment” that followed the Cold War, proving that the United States can be deeply engaged in the world without military action or the taint of hegemony.

BIDEN’S WORLD

On taking office, Biden’s most important task was to restore trust abroad. He had campaigned on the slogan “America is back” and promised that the country would once again “sit at the head of the table.” Once in the White House, however, he seemed to appreciate that neither U.S. power nor, as he frequently put it, “the power of our example” were what they had been. The administration focused instead on convincing others that they no longer had to worry about Trump’s “America first” policies, open disparagement of NATO, and contempt for multilateral cooperation on issues from climate change to the COVID-19 pandemic.

It was not easy. Even warmly disposed governments understood that Trump (or a leader with similar views) could return as soon as the next election. To highlight the shift, on Biden’s first day in office, he returned the United States to the World Health Organization and the Paris agreement on climate change, both of which Trump had exited. Biden moved quickly to affirm Washington’s commitment to numerous economic and security agreements and bodies, NATO in particular. In the next three-plus years, the number of NATO members reaching the benchmark goal of spending the equivalent of at least two percent of GDP on defense grew from nine to 23, with more set to do so soon. Two militarily strong states, Sweden and Finland, dropped decades of cherished neutrality to join the alliance. Today, readiness is substantially higher across the alliance, as are deployments near Russia’s borders.

The Biden administration directed even more diplomatic energy into building what it calls a “latticework” of deepened and new connections across Asia spanning geopolitical and economic interests, all with the motive of countering China. The image of a crisscrossing web of relationships is meaningfully distinct from the familiar “hub and spokes” metaphor, which portrayed the United States as ensconced in the center of everything with other countries arrayed around it.

The change was not merely a matter of abstraction but of action. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad) partnership linking Australia, India, Japan, and the United States was elevated from a forum for foreign ministers to one for heads of state. To build an Australian nuclear-powered submarine fleet that could operate stealthily and at very long range, strengthening deterrence against China far into the Pacific, the Biden team forged AUKUS, a new security arrangement aligning Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Trilateral summits connected the United States with Japan and the Philippines and with Japan and South Korea, with security as the central purpose. For the first time, a summit of the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations was held in Washington. New bilateral agreements allowed for expanded U.S. military access in Australia, Japan, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines. And Biden deepened U.S. relations with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Even this partial list reflects an extraordinary level of effort and achievement in less than four years, with new and restored ties cemented, where possible, in formal agreements designed to survive a change of direction in Washington.

For more than two decades, leaders in Washington have paid lip service to the centrality of Asia in the twenty-first century and the necessity of a commensurate shift in U.S. foreign policy. But the George W. Bush administration was sidetracked by its all-consuming “global war on terror.” The Obama administration recognized the importance of a stronger strategic presence in Asia but failed to achieve it. The Trump administration’s disdain for alliances weakened relations across the region. The Biden administration made the pivot happen.

A LOST CAUSE

To set a new course for the United States, Biden saw that it was necessary to end the longest “forever war” of the post-9/11 era. By the time he took office, the United States had spent 20 years fighting in Afghanistan at a cost of more than $2 trillion—the equivalent of $300 million a day. U.S. strategy had shifted from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency and back again; from taking a low-profile approach that relied on special forces and air power to deploying 100,000 troops in the country; from wooing the government in Kabul to suggesting that the Afghan government’s corruption was the main impediment to progress. Washington had tried a vast array of tactics: creating a national police force, attempting to build an army, improving literacy and education for women and girls. In the end, it was mostly for naught. By the time Biden was inaugurated, U.S. intelligence showed unequivocally that the Taliban’s control of areas of Afghanistan had been growing for years despite this immense investment—a fact largely unknown or underappreciated by the American public.

In his speech in August 2021, Biden asked what the “vital national interest” was in Afghanistan and offered the correct answer. “We have only one: to make sure Afghanistan can never be used again to launch an attack on our homeland.” The United States had achieved that goal with the defeat of al Qaeda and the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, Biden noted. But then, he said, “we stayed for another decade.”

After the unexpected, shockingly swift collapse of the Afghan army and the national government, the takeover by the Taliban, the chaos in Kabul as thousands of Afghans tried to flee, and the deaths of 13 U.S. service members and more than 160 Afghan civilians in a suicide bombing near the airport, foreign policy experts leaped to criticize the decision to withdraw. “What makes the Afghanistan situation so frustrating is that the [United States and] its allies had reached something of an equilibrium at a low sustainable cost,” Richard Haass, then president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote on Twitter as the chaos grew. “It wasn’t peace or military victory, but it was infinitely preferable to the strategic [and] human catastrophe that is unfolding.” But the apparent low cost was an illusion created by the absence of American deaths in the preceding months: the Taliban had decided to cease attacks on U.S. forces as it waited for them to withdraw under an agreement negotiated by the Trump administration. Had the United States not left, American losses would have resumed, and the price of staying would have been clear once again.

Biden has been unwilling to use U.S. leverage over Israel.

The stark truth was that the United States had lost the war long before August 2021. But defeats are easier to forget than to absorb. With plenty of prompting from Trump, far too many Americans remember the few days of disarray at the end and forget the years of failure that preceded them; the 13 Americans who died at the very end rather than the 2,461 killed and the 20,744 injured in the years before. No strategic loss stemmed from Biden’s decision—quite the reverse. “There’s nothing China or Russia would rather have,” the president correctly noted in his speech, “than the United States to be bogged down another decade in Afghanistan.” Washington failed to anticipate how swiftly the Kabul government would collapse. But the significance of that failure pales beside the significance of Biden’s success in grasping the lasting strategic benefits of withdrawing. “This decision about Afghanistan,” he said, “is about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries.”

Months after the departure from Afghanistan, the Biden administration was tested again when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During his first week in office, Biden and Putin had agreed to extend the New START treaty—the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement—a few days before it would have expired. It was a hopeful sign. But a few weeks later, Moscow moved thousands of troops and heavy weapons to its border with Ukraine. Although Putin’s intentions were opaque, the move raised alarms inside the administration. “We’re looking at it very carefully, 24/7,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told David Ignatius of The Washington Post—nearly a year before Russia invaded, in February 2022. Immediately after the attack began, Moscow put its strategic weapons on heightened alert. Later, Putin spoke of using tactical nuclear weapons should the West’s support of Kyiv go, in his opinion, too far. As the war dragged on, he upped the ante by moving those weapons into neighboring Belarus and ordering joint combat drills in their use.

On the whole, Biden’s handling of the war has been masterful. In the run-up to the invasion, he broke sharply with traditional practice by publicly disclosing U.S. intelligence on Russian troop maneuvers to alert the world to Putin’s plans and neuter the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns. Once the attack was underway, he made his case for an energetic defense of Ukraine by starting with an emphatic prohibition against the involvement of U.S. troops there—a pledge that he repeated often and that largely kept public opposition to active support for Ukraine in check. He then exerted vigorous political and personal leadership to rally European states, NATO, and the U.S. Congress to support Kyiv and ordered an initially cautious but steadily growing flow of weapons and money. He has calibrated the sophistication of weapons Washington has provided against the curve of Russian violence, staying just behind rather than leading it. And he has bolstered Ukrainian strength in less visible ways with the forward-leaning use of U.S. military and intelligence expertise.

FLASH POINTS

Although a path to ending the war has not been found, Biden’s handling of the Russian invasion has been a credit to the United States—as was the Afghanistan withdrawal, conventional wisdom notwithstanding. The record is murkier on two other priorities: China and the Middle East.

The Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy defined China as having both the capacity and the intent to reshape the international order, displacing the United States and its democratic values. Without question, China’s recent behavior in the Indo-Pacific, its steep increase in military spending, its aggressive trade policies, and its “no limits” partnership with Russia (including support for the war in Ukraine) demand a strong American response. The Biden administration has provided that, wisely walking a fine line by strengthening its relations with Asian allies and partners and bolstering the U.S. military presence while dispensing with bluster and needless provocation.

An unfortunate exception has been the administration’s record on Taiwan, the flash point of U.S.-Chinese relations. An intentionally ambiguous “one China” policy negotiated by Washington and Beijing more than four decades ago has kept the peace across the Taiwan Strait ever since. Maintaining it requires constant attention to language and symbolism, especially when it comes to the question of whether Washington would use military force to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. Several times, however, Biden has heightened uncertainty in Beijing by plainly stating that the United States would do just that, requiring the White House to issue clarifications. More serious was his unaccountable acquiescence to an official visit to Taiwan in 2022 by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, a high-profile critic of Beijing and longtime supporter of Taiwan who was at the time second in line to the presidency. As the leader of the Democratic Party, Biden could have easily forbidden the trip, which followed others that also broke an unwritten “one China” rule against official visits. Pelosi’s mission predictably sparked an unprecedented spate of military and cyber-retaliation by Beijing and another ratcheting up of cross-strait tensions.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Biden shaking hands on the day of signing a new security agreement in Fasano, Italy, June 2024

Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Washington can only guess at Beijing’s intentions. China’s military buildup may presage a direct threat to Taiwan or the United States. Or perhaps the Chinese Communist Party is responding to what it perceives as American aggression, or simply taking the steps that any newly arrived great power feels are its due. In the same way, Beijing cannot know whether Washington has purposely abandoned the “one China” policy. Perhaps Biden is encouraging Taipei to assert its independence and would militarily support it if it did so. The only thing both sides know for certain is that an escalating spiral of action and reaction relating to Taiwan is underway, and neither is taking the necessary steps to interrupt it.

Biden took office determined not to be distracted from priorities in Asia and elsewhere by perennial conflict in the Middle East. He inherited a Trump administration policy that seemed to have achieved substantial success. Through the so-called Abraham Accords, Israel normalized relations with Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. The accords embodied the view that if Arab countries were given the right incentives, it would be possible for them to negotiate peace agreements with Israel even without addressing the fate of the Palestinians. But as the administration sought to add the region’s most important state, Saudi Arabia, to the accords, the Netanyahu government was expelling Palestinians from more and more of the West Bank to make way for Israeli settlements. Together, these steps were a bridge too far for many Palestinians, and the militant group Hamas exploited their sense of despair and rage to justify the horrendous terrorist attack it carried out on October 7, 2023—the worst day in Israeli history.

U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s mortifying remark made days before the assault that the region was “quieter today than it has been in two decades” captures the administration’s mix of inattention and wishful thinking. Biden responded to the attack with unprecedented personal support that reflected his career-long passion for Israel. But as the Israeli military response unfolded, he seemed unable to see what was happening on the ground. Washington has put all its weight into trying to broker a permanent cease-fire, an outcome that neither the leadership of Israel nor that of Hamas believes is in its best interest. Biden has remained stubbornly unwilling to use the leverage the United States holds to compel Israel to reduce the staggering level of civilian death and suffering in Gaza, address the humanitarian calamity there, and craft a realistic plan for the long term.

NUCLEAR NEGLECT

The negative side of Biden’s ledger contains a few other items, as well. Biden has extended Trump’s trade protectionism, continuing and in some cases raising tariffs that Trump imposed on imports from China. Unlike Trump, Biden has sharply focused the tariffs, mostly on high-tech and clean energy products, and enhanced their effectiveness with a variety of export bans, sanctions, and subsidies to boost domestic production and slow the development of the Chinese technology sector. He also worked to coordinate such steps with European allies and others. Even so, tariffs are bad economic policy: they are regressive and inflationary and invite retaliation. Because they are hidden taxes disguised as fees paid by foreigners, they also invite dangerous domestic one-upmanship: after Biden quadrupled tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to 100 percent, Trump called for a raise to 200 percent.

With two successive U.S. administrations that disagree on almost everything having adopted the same economic tool, global trade may have reached a turning point: the era of globalization and free trade has perhaps definitively ended. If others follow Washington’s lead, the likely result will be to make all states poorer—as the world learned when protectionism reigned in the 1930s.

Notably missing from Biden’s diplomatic surge has been a sustained effort to advance nuclear arms control and nonproliferation—a surprising omission, given his outspoken advocacy of both goals during his Senate career and vice presidency. Dithering in the administration’s earliest days seriously and perhaps fatally damaged prospects for resolving the most important proliferation issue of the day: what to do about the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In 2018, Trump pulled the United States out of the hard-won agreement, which Iran was abiding by—a decision that Biden and his team saw as a catastrophic own goal. But in trying to prove that they were as tough on Iran as their Republican critics, Biden’s appointees took such aggressively anti-Iranian stances in their Senate confirmation hearings that they left the impression in Tehran and Washington that they did not truly believe in the JCPOA. By the time this got untangled, the narrow window of opportunity to convince Tehran that the administration still wanted to revive the deal had closed.

Biden also set aside nonproliferation considerations in negotiating the AUKUS agreement. By transferring highly enriched (and thus weapons-grade) fuel to power the submarines of Australia, a country without nuclear weapons, the accord set a damaging precedent that other countries could follow by using naval reactor programs as covers for developing nuclear weapons in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Biden had to reverse “America first” beliefs and behaviors.

On arms control, too, the administration has come up short. In January 2022, the leaders of the five original nuclear powers affirmed that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”—repeating the breakthrough statement that emerged from talks held by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Yet Putin’s unprovoked war has been marked by repeated threats of nuclear use. In 2023, he suspended Russian adherence to the extended New START treaty, tying the move not to any lack of U.S. compliance but to Washington’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, China plans to double the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal to 1,000 by 2030. Coupled with the fundamentally new situation created by the deepening Chinese-Russian partnership, these moves have made the prospects for any progress on arms control, or even for maintaining the status quo, unlikely in the extreme.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration made no major effort to reverse this trend and has even contributed its bit to the bleak outlook. It maintains a willingness to negotiate a follow-up to New START and has taken a few small steps toward opening arms control talks with Beijing. But the administration is also pursuing a hugely expensive modernization of all three legs of its nuclear forces, including its land-based missiles. Because those missiles are stuck in silos whose locations are well known to adversaries, they are “first strike” weapons, which must be quickly launched in a conflict or lost to enemy attack. They are therefore both vulnerable and destabilizing. U.S. security and the prospects for avoiding a new arms race would be better served by extending the life of a smaller number of existing Minuteman III missiles instead of buying a new land-based nuclear missile force at a cost of more than $150 billion.

As vice president, Biden fought for a major change in U.S. policy: a declaration that deterrence is the “sole” (rather than the “primary”) purpose of nuclear weapons. That seemingly minor change hides the major meaning: that nuclear weapons have no utility in warfighting. Such a shift would have profound consequences for the design of nuclear forces and for international arms control. President Barack Obama chose not to make this change—and, as president, Biden did the same. It was a missed opportunity. Given the realities of the war in Ukraine and China’s nuclear expansion, however, he arguably had no political leeway to do otherwise.

Partly as a consequence of the poor prospects for arms control, some of the Biden administration’s opponents are calling for expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal and even for a return to nuclear testing. After conducting more than 1,000 tests, the United States has little to learn from carrying out more. But China, which has conducted fewer than 50 tests and is observing the current testing moratorium, could benefit substantially if the United States were to legitimize a return to testing. It would not be long before other states, nuclear and nonnuclear, did likewise—a giant leap backward to the 1950s.

AMERICA REDUX

Biden assumed the presidency with a mountain of his predecessor’s mistakes to undo. He had to reverse the beliefs and behaviors inherent in an “America first” foreign policy. He needed to restore predictability to U.S. policy and rebuild willingness among other countries to support Washington’s initiatives. Although his party controlled both houses of Congress for his first two years as president, it did so by the slimmest of margins, and Biden later faced a House of Representatives run by an increasingly extreme Republican caucus that prioritized scoring political points over substance in foreign policy. From almost his first day in office, he confronted the looming question of what Russia intended in Ukraine; soon after, he faced the stunning reality of the first act of large-scale international aggression in Europe in the postwar era. Finally, he had to manage a relationship with China characterized by rising acrimony, unfulfilled agreements, military threats, and an almost total lack of purposeful communication.

Biden also had made promises that would need to be adjusted or walked back. He had wrongly described the world as divided between autocracies and democracies, suggesting that foreign policy was a Manichean contest between the two camps. He followed through on an unwise promise to hold a “Summit for Democracy,” which, predictably, produced a diplomatic nightmare of deciding which countries qualified for inclusion. In the end, the meetings were mostly held online, with low expectations and little to show in terms of results. Most prominently, Biden had promised “a foreign policy for the middle class.” In practice, this mostly meant massive investments at home in manufacturing, education, health care, and lowering middle-class debt. Abroad, it unfortunately took the form of protectionist trade policies, an element of Biden’s legacy the United States and the world may come to regret.

But Biden’s determination to finally realize a shift in priority to Asia has been a notable success. Relations with China are steadier than those he inherited. There is now at least a floor on which more can be built, even though Taiwan remains a simmering source of tension to which both Washington and Beijing are paying far too little attention. But the number of new partnerships and economic, geopolitical, and military agreements in Asia and the density of new and restored ties there are a testament to what dedicated diplomacy can achieve.

Taliban members celebrating the first anniversary of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Kabul, August 2022

Ali Khara / Reuters

Whether or not a stable cease-fire is reached in Gaza, Biden’s legacy must include his apparent inability to see Israel as the illiberal, militaristic state it has become under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rather than as the plucky young democracy that Biden remembers from decades ago. An Israeli decision to attempt to govern Gaza for the long term and continue to annex the West Bank would foreclose the possibility of a two-state solution; bleed Israel militarily, financially, and reputationally; and constitute a historic injustice for the Palestinian people. As long as the United States maintains a special connection to Israel, it cannot afford to ignore this festering sore, as the Biden administration tried to do.

Biden’s determination to end Washington’s longest war was a major achievement. There are no U.S. forces in sustained combat now for the first time in a quarter century. His policies reflect a recognition that the United States will continue to have global interests but that its ambitions must be tailored to a realistic assessment of its present resources, partisan divisions, and political will. In a world facing existential global challenges, Biden assigned an appropriately high value to alliances and looser partnerships, recognizing them as a major component of American strength, and saw the value of multinational solutions. He reaffirmed that democracies are special political kin but seemed to learn that since so many countries lie somewhere between democracy and autocracy, few causes benefit from a U.S. foreign policy framed as a contest between the two.

The world is so much in flux that it is impossible to predict how Biden’s short presidency will fit into the flow of history. Will voters in the United States and Europe turn to populism, go-it-alone nationalism, or even isolationism? What does China intend in the Pacific and beyond? Can the war in Ukraine be ended without setting a precedent that rewards naked aggression? Will the major powers follow each other over the cliff of a second nuclear arms race? And, of course, will Biden have a successor who shares his worldview or be followed by Trump, who will seek to reverse most of what he has done? No matter the answers, and despite the symptoms of debilitating political polarization at home, Biden has made profound changes in foreign policy—not to accommodate American decline but to reflect the country’s inherent strength.

• JESSICA T. MATHEWS is a Distinguished Fellow and former President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Foreign Affairs · by Jessica T. Mathews · August 14, 2024

26. Fort Liberty soldier will not face charges in killing of Chechen utility worker on his property

Fort Liberty soldier will not face charges in killing of Chechen utility worker on his property

Stars and Stripes · by Corey Dickstein · August 13, 2024

A Special Forces officer assigned to Fort Liberty who killed a Chechen immigrant conducting utility work on his property in North Carolina will not face charges after a three-month investigation into the shooting, law enforcement officials said Tuesday, Aug. 13, 2024. (Corey Dickstein/Stars and Stripes)

A Special Forces officer who killed a Chechen immigrant conducting utility work on his property in North Carolina will not face charges after a three-month investigation into the shooting, law enforcement officials said Tuesday.

The Fort Liberty, N.C., soldier — whose name has not been released to the public — was justified in shooting and killing Ramzan Daraev, a 35-year-old utility worker, under North Carolina law, according to a statement from the Moore County Sheriff’s Office announcing the probe’s conclusion.

Moore County investigators determined Daraev was conducting legitimate utility work May 3 at the soldier’s home in Carthage before he was shot. But the Green Beret officer perceived him as a threat after he became aggressive and lunged at the soldier.

“The determination of justification is based on the reasonable belief of the homeowner, considering the totality of the facts known to the homeowner at the time of the shooting,” according to the sheriff’s office. “The homeowner’s actions were deemed justifiable under the North Carolina Castle Doctrine, which allows for the use of defensive force in situations where there is a perceived imminent threat to personal and family safety within one’s home or property.”

The sheriff’s office said it spent months probing the Dowd Road shooting, collecting physical evidence and interviewing witnesses. The Moore County District Attorney was briefed on the investigation and declined to bring charges in the case.

Though the investigation into the Green Beret’s actions has concluded, the sheriff’s office said it was continuing to probe the “operational background” of Daraev’s employer, Cable Warriors, a subcontractor of New Jersey-based Utilities One.

The sheriff’s office said the Green Beret’s wife first encountered Daraev at dusk on May 3 as he took photographs near a utility line on their property. She said she believed Daraev was taking photos of their home and children, which investigators determined were in the same direction of the utility line, which he photographed with his cellphone.

Daraev, at the time, was wearing a burgundy T-shirt, black shorts and flip flops and had nothing on his person to identify him as a utility worker, according to investigators. He was unarmed and only had his cell phone with him at the time of his death, the investigation concluded.

Utilities One said in a statement that Daraev was “performing pole surveys” for an engineering project to install fiber infrastructure and had been transmitting photographs to the utility firm. Investigators wrote they had confirmed via “business records” that Daraev was employed by Cable Warriors and working on a “fiber optic expansion” project for Utilities One at the time of his death.

The Green Beret told investigators that he initially approached Daraev unarmed and asked him to leave the property when Daraev did not identify himself or explain his business on the property. Daraev then grew increasingly aggressive toward the soldier and claimed to have served in the Russian military and fought in Ukraine, the Green Beret told investigators. Law enforcement officials could not verify whether Daraev served in the Russian military, they said.

Investigators wrote that the Green Beret returned to his home at that point to retrieve a handgun. His wife then called 911 at about 8:12 p.m. to report the suspicious person, Daraev. Just 13 minutes later, the wife made a second 911 call, “pleading for expedited law enforcement response” and warning she was retrieving a shotgun, according to investigators.

The Green Beret shot Daraev shortly after that call ended, just minutes before sheriff’s deputies arrived at the scene, according to the sheriff’s office.

The soldier told investigators Daraev “became agitated and lunged” at him before he fired several shots in response.

“Under the North Carolina Castle Doctrine, the homeowner’s actions are protected, providing legal justification for using defensive force,” the investigation concluded, citing the state’s version of what are more commonly referred to as stand-your-ground laws, which allow lethal force in defense of a person’s home and property.

Family members of Daraev have claimed the utility worker’s body and have said he was “killed in cold blood” while doing his job. They have demanded his shooter face punishment.

In a Change.org petition, family members said he had left Russia for the United States in pursuit of a better life “in a free country.”

The Moore County Sheriff’s Office said Daraev entered the United States via the southern border in December 2022 and had been living in Chicago. The sheriff’s office and the FBI have declined to provide Daraev’s immigration status.

Authorities said questions remain about Daraev’s employers, including a potential link to a Russian cloud server, where employees were provided “electrical infrastructure maps related to the utility expansion.”

During the probe, law enforcement officials found reports of other utility workers without any identification on their persons taking photos of infrastructure in remote locations in the area. They found the workers often worked at night without informing homeowners of their presence.

“Other workers in the utility industry told investigators that conducting utility work near dark on or near private property, especially during nonemergency activities, without identifying clothing and without notifying the homeowner is not common practice,” investigators wrote in their report.

The sheriff’s office said it would continue efforts to access Daraev’s cellphone to gather a better understanding of his work. Investigators were able to access some of Daraev’s images during the probe, officials said.

“Given the unique circumstances of the incident, the sheriff’s office has voluntarily kept all case materials accessible to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Army Criminal Investigation Division throughout the investigation,” the sheriff’s office said. “Additionally, the Moore County Sheriff’s Office has requested an investigation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration into the work practices surrounding this incident to ensure all safety protocols were followed, identify any potential violations and promote safer work practices among utility workers.”

Stars and Stripes · by Corey Dickstein · August 13, 2024

​27. AUKUS language contains exit clause for the US, but is that a problem?

AUKUS language contains exit clause for the US, but is that a problem? - Breaking Defense

"Nothing in this treaty has changed the known level of risk for what is an ambitious project. In some respects, the agreement of the treaty-level document between the three countries can be interpreted as a risk reduction measure," Australian naval expert Jennifer Parker said.

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · August 14, 2024

Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles, British Ambassador to the US, Dame Karen Pierce, and US Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, signed the new treaty-level AUKUS agreement in Washington on Aug. 5. (Rodney Braithwaite/ADF)

SYDNEY — New details about the latest defense agreement between Australia, Britain and the United States have emerged, including the existence of an “out” clause for the US that would allow Washington to terminate the agreement.

The publication of those details are providing an avenue for critics of the Albanese government to target AUKUS, but the government and an outside expert say the language should be no reason for controversy.

The agreement, signed last week in Washington during the annual AUSMIN talks between the foreign and defense ministers of Australia and the US, says any of the parties can withdraw from the agreement with one year’s notice. It adds that Australia must pay the UK or US for any damages caused by “nuclear risks.”

In particular, Article 1 of the agreement underlines the high stakes tied to the AUKUS agreement, essentially saying it will only proceed from one step to the next “provided that the Originating Party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security.”

Australian Sen. David Shoebridge, a Green Party legislator, said Monday this means “that if at any point the United States thinks supplying material under the AUKUS agreement to Australia prejudices their defense, they can effectively terminate the agreement and pull out.” Details about the agreement became public when an analysis and explanation of the document was tabled in Parliament earlier on Monday.

“What this agreement makes clear in black and white: If the United States at any point thinks they don’t have enough submarines for themselves, they can pull out of AUKUS 2.0,” Shoebridge said. “Why isn’t the Albanese government being honest about the size of the gamble?”

Today, he raised the ante, saying on X (formerly Twitter): “AUKUS 2.0 is one of the most irresponsible one-sided international agreements any Government has signed. The Albanese Government doesn’t seem to care about signing away our independence and billions in public $.”

AUKUS 2.0 is one of the most irresponsible one-sided international agreements any Government has signed.

The Albanese Government doesn't seem to care about signing away our independence and billions in public $.

Just make sure you call him Deputy Prime Minister Marles  pic.twitter.com/1RqtteTEqZ

— David Shoebridge (@DavidShoebridge) August 13, 2024

However, one of Australia’s top naval analysts said the new agreement was essentially standard international practice, and Shoebridge’s view was “an odd interpretation.”

“It is standard procedure for international treaties to include termination provisions. Standard termination provisions provide for the notice period that must be given by a party, prior to the treaty being terminated. There is absolutely nothing surprising in the inclusion of a termination provision in the AUKUS Treaty,” Jennifer Parker, an expert at the Australian National University’s National Security College, said in an email. “In fact, it is standard treaty practice. The termination provision applies to all parties, not just the US. Equally it means that Australia can withdraw from the treaty should we wish to with 12 months notice.”

While the US has struggled to build enough Virginia nuclear-powered attack subs for its own needs, there seems little likelihood that the US would withdraw from AUKUS. Congress and the Biden Administration have demonstrated a deep and abiding commitment to the project to sell Australia two Virginia class boats and to help it build the SSN AUKUS fleet with the United Kingdom.The Australian Submarine Agency said the indemnity provisions are consistent with Australia’s commitment to being a sovereign and responsible steward of naval nuclear propulsion technology that will ultimately be owned and operated by Australia.

“The inclusion of indemnity provisions for activities undertaken on behalf of other parties is not uncommon in such arrangements,” a spokesman for the agency said.In terms of the Virginia boats, no indemnification would occur until after the boats were transferred to Australia, the ASA noted.The chances of an event that would trigger payment for a disaster are small.

“The UK and the US naval nuclear propulsion programs have unmatched safety records – including the UK and the US’s 60-year unblemished record of no submarine reactor accident or release of radioactivity that has harmed human health or the quality of the environment,” the ASA spokesperson said.Taken altogether, Parker said the new agreement actually helps reduce risks to Australia and to AUKUS.

“Nothing in this treaty has changed the known level of risk for what is an ambitious project. In some respects, the agreement of the treaty-level document between the three countries can be interpreted as a risk reduction measure. It is no mean feat to get three countries to agree to a treaty to this level of detail, and provides reinforcement of what has been agreed.”

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · August 14, 2024

28. Opinion The Navy is breaking down. We need our allies’ help to fix our ships. By Rahm Emanuel

This seems like a strange OpEd from an Ambassador. Is this an audition for SECDEF or SECNAV in the next administration? (that is snarky I know).

​This is not "Japan centric." It is Japan and Korea centric. (he could have mentioned the Philippines too).

​But I think he is right on these issues.

Opinion  The Navy is breaking down. We need our allies’ help to fix our ships.

Maintenance delays and construction backlogs have led to an atrophied fleet and broken naval industrial base.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/08/13/rahm-emanuel-navy-ships-repairs-china/?utm

5 min

1285

The amphibious assault ship USS Bataan travels through the Red Sea in August 2023. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Riley Gasdia/U.S. Navy/AP)

By Rahm Emanuel

August 13, 2024 at 9:51 a.m. EDT

Rahm Emanuel is U.S. ambassador to Japan.

Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, China has grown in economic and military might. It now has the world’s largest navy and the world’s largest shipbuilding industry and is flexing its muscle. All that has been clear in the way it has harassed and bullied its Indo-Pacific neighbors, from the Philippines to Japan to Taiwan.

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Meanwhile, over the same period, chronic maintenance and repair delays, cost overruns, extended sea tours, and construction backlogs have led to an atrophied American fleet and a broken naval industrial base.

There is a smart way out of this mess that will strengthen our defenses and alliances, but it will require Congress and the U.S. Navy to think differently than they have in the past. We need to turn to our allies in the Pacific to be full partners in repairing and maintaining our fleet.

The challenge is severe. Recently, for example, the USS Boxer, an amphibious assault ship, spent two years out of service for a $200 million overhaul, only to then be dogged by continuing (and costly) engineering problems. The necessary repairs rendered Boxer and its 1,200 Marines unable to relieve a sister ship, the USS Bataan, which had been protecting global shipping from Houthi missile and drone attacks off the coast of Yemen.

Bataan’s extended deployment pushed that ship and its crew to their limits. Bataan and its crew of more than 1,200 spent eight months at sea, both in the Strait of Hormuz and later in the Red Sea.

This deployment juggling act is symptomatic of the Navy’s broader struggle to meet its own goal of having 75 “mission-capable” surface ships at any one time. A seafaring force that once ruled the waves has been reduced to cannibalizing parts from its own ships because of supply chain bottlenecks, parts shortages and dysfunctional ship-repair facilities at home.

Meanwhile, the Navy won’t be able to meet its required production goal of two nuclear submarines a year until 2029 at the earliest. With 36 percent of the submarine fleet either already dry-docked or waiting to be maintained, the Navy is repeatedly missing both construction and repair targets for its entire fleet.

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These are not isolated incidents. They are part of a pattern of degeneration and decline. This is a crisis years in the making. It’s now on all of us to abandon long-held views, think originally and fix the problem.

Part of the answer is within reach. While we try to modernize a handful of government-owned shipyards (we have exactly four) in the United States, Japanese and South Korean facilities — which together produce 47 percent of the world’s ships each year — can help reduce our maintenance and repair backlogs while ensuring we fulfill our collective, in-theater, deterrence agreements with Tokyo and Seoul.

Japan — a steadfast security partner for more than 60 years — and its industrial giants have consistently demonstrated their capacity to deliver high-quality work ahead of schedule and within budget (something U.S. defense firms could learn a thing or two from).

Our ships need to be overhauled where they sail. In this day and age, we cannot afford to have vessels travel thousands of miles back across the Pacific to languish pier-side for years in backlogged U.S. shipyards. The sooner our ships are overhauled, the sooner they return to the fight or deter one. Since the United States, Japan and South Korea train and plan together, it makes sense that we also maintain and repair together.

Besides, every day spent repairing and maintaining ships in our allies’ shipyards means an extra day spent constructing next-generation warships in American yards. A day spent repairing and maintaining ships in theater means a day spent strengthening the projection of our collective deterrence. And a day spent repairing and maintaining ships in Japanese or South Korean yards means a day spent boosting our real-time readiness.

Because the Navy is often the first service to be called upon when a crisis erupts, our ability to project power and fulfill security obligations around the globe is being hampered by a service that has long refused to face its problems or look to allies for help. Not utilizing our allies’ shipyards is a hangover from past policy that needs to change. The U.S. Navy is meeting its repair deadlines only 41 percent of the time. That just won’t cut it anymore.

It’s time to do things differently and to be honest with ourselves about the problems and solutions. Given the geopolitical challenges we face, it means bigger defense budgets are required. But that alone will not address decades of dysfunction. It also means spending more wisely and more strategically, as we have seen Ukraine successfully do in the Black Sea.

Even if we broke ground on a new U.S. shipyard immediately, it would be another decade or more before it could start producing vessels. In the meantime, Japan and South Korea have abundant, state-of-the-art shipyard capacity ready to take on repair and maintenance work. By leveraging our allies’ industrial strengths, we can keep our Navy sailing and our collective deterrence credible.

29. Semiconductor workforce shortage hits S. Korea, U.S., Japan

This would seem to be a national security as well as an economic and business issue. Why the shortage?

Graphics at the link.

Excerpt:

The FT reported that there has been a belief that “increasing chip manufacturing capacity was simply a matter of money,” but it turns out cash alone is insufficient for chipmaking. The report also noted that “the jobs-to-workers gap [in the chip sector] is becoming dangerously wide.” The shortage of semiconductor workers is not just a U.S. issue; companies in South Korea and Japan are also struggling to secure talent.

Semiconductor workforce shortage hits S. Korea, U.S., Japan

U.S. workforce shortfall to reach 146,000 by 2029, McKinsey reports

https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2024/08/14/KCYQNIOR2NFKDC5CTS5NNXUPIU/

By Yun Jin-ho,

Kim Seo-young

Published 2024.08.14. 14:55

Graphics by Baek Hyeong-seon

The U.S. semiconductor industry is projected to face a shortage of 146,000 workers by 2029. Last year, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) estimated a shortfall of 67,000 by 2030, meaning the projected shortage has more than doubled in just one year. The surge in demand for artificial intelligence (AI) semiconductors has prompted major countries, including the U.S., to make massive investments in facilities. However, there is an increased risk of these facilities not being fully operational due to a lack of available talent.

According to the Financial Times on Aug. 13, consulting firm McKinsey’s report released on Aug. 2 projected that an additional 164,000 semiconductor engineers and technicians will be needed in the U.S. from this year until 2029. However, only 18,000 new workers are expected to join the chip industry during this period, resulting in a projected shortage of 146,000 by 2029. The FT reported that there has been a belief that “increasing chip manufacturing capacity was simply a matter of money,” but it turns out cash alone is insufficient for chipmaking. The report also noted that “the jobs-to-workers gap [in the chip sector] is becoming dangerously wide.” The shortage of semiconductor workers is not just a U.S. issue; companies in South Korea and Japan are also struggling to secure talent.

Graphics by Baek Hyeong-seon

The deepening talent shortage is due to significant investments by major countries, including the U.S., China, and Japan, all vying for semiconductor dominance. There are currently 123 semiconductor production facilities under construction worldwide, with China accounting for 43 and the U.S. for 25.

The U.S. government and private sector plan to invest $250 billion (about 342 trillion won) by 2032 to create over 160,000 new jobs. This workforce needs to be sourced from both the U.S. and international pools, yet the supply is falling short. When the CHIPS Act was announced, which includes substantial subsidies for building semiconductor production facilities in the U.S., the U.S. pledged to invest 18 trillion won to bridge the workforce gap through talent development. However, McKinsey estimates that even if the talent development programs under the CHIPS Act are fully implemented, there will still be a shortage of 59,000 workers by 2029.

Bill Wiseman, a senior partner at McKinsey, added that high turnover rates in the semiconductor industry, driven by factors such as work environment issues, exacerbate the problem. Employees at TSMC’s U.S. facility are reported to be dissatisfied with long working hours and high workloads. The New York Times noted that cultural clashes between Taiwanese managers and American workers contribute to difficulties, with some employees struggling to adapt to TSMC’s demanding culture, leading to higher turnover rates.

Graphics by Baek Hyeong-seon

The issue extends beyond the U.S. Japan, aiming to reclaim its former semiconductor powerhouse status, established a semiconductor strategy in 2021. The country is attracting large investments from global semiconductor companies like TSMC and Micron and providing 9 trillion won in subsidies to the joint venture Rapidus, formed by Japanese giants such as Toyota and Sony.

However, according to industry sources, the number of job postings for semiconductor engineers on Japanese job sites has increased more than 14 times compared to 10 years ago. Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing (JASM), a foundry created by Sony and Toyota, launched recruitment activities for South Korean graduate students earlier this year. The Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association forecasts that eight major semiconductor companies in Japan will face a shortage of 40,000 workers over the next decade.

South Korean semiconductor companies are also focusing heavily on retaining talent. South Korea is expected to face a shortage of about 56,000 semiconductor workers by 2031. SK Hynix will host a “Tech Day” event starting on Aug. 20, visiting major domestic universities such as Seoul National University and POSTECH to recruit graduate students in semiconductor-related fields. Unlike in previous years, the company’s CEO will attend the annual event this time. Samsung Electronics’ DS (semiconductor) division has also eased the criteria for experienced hires since February last year to lower the threshold.

Graphics by Baek Hyeong-seon

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com