Quotes of the Day:

"People seem not to see that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character."

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

"I hate victims who respect their executioners."

–Jean Paul Satre

"It has been my philosophy of life that difficulties vanquish when faced boldly."

– Isaac Asimov

1. How Will the War in Ukraine End? Two Scenarios

2. Putin Returns to Moscow With Air of Triumph After Summit

3. Blackwater’s Erik Prince Muscles Back Into the Mercenary Business

4. How Putin Could Lose Another 1,900,000 Soldiers in Ukraine War

5. Putin Sees Ukraine Through a Lens of Grievance Over Lost Glory

6. Trump drops ceasefire demand for Ukraine war, tells allies Putin wants land

7. As America silences its voice in Africa, China and Russia amplify theirs

8. Who Are the Green Berets Supposed to Be? Revisiting the Special Forces Identity Crisis

9. The Secret to Success in Professional Military Education

10. Decision-Making Paralysis & Trust Erosion: From Psychological Warfare to an AI-Led “Information War”

11. Australian and Philippine forces launch largest military exercises near disputed South China Sea

12. Opinion: Europe faces the Koreanization of Ukraine

13. Half-Baked Alaska – Moving from ceasefire to full settlement by Sir Lawrence Freedman

14. European Leaders to Back Zelensky in Washington, Hoping to Counter Putin

15. A Bad Summit’s Silver Lining By John Bolton

16. Russia's Glorious Summit by Mick Ryan

17. Trump says no imminent plans to penalise China for buying Russian oil

18. Trump says Xi told him China will not invade Taiwan while he is US president

19. Fear of a new Oval Office fiasco over Ukraine

20. America’s new plan to fight a war with China

21. False Flags, Fake Flags: Propaganda Muddles the Trump-Putin Meeting

22. Dan Rice to Newsmax: 'Trump Chose Diplomacy' in Talks With Putin

23. The Bolduc Brief: The Trump-Putin Alaska Summit - A Predictable Failure in the Quest for Peace

24. 

1. How Will the War in Ukraine End? Two Scenarios

Excerpts:

Russia’s attempt to conquer Kyiv outright failed, and is likely beyond reach. Ukraine’s still-tenacious defense is limiting Russia to marginal battlefield gains at a high cost. Ukraine’s hopes of fully expelling the Russian invaders have also dwindled, given the stretched state of its own army.

That leaves two plausible endings to the biggest war in Europe since World War II. Here is what they mean, and what they depend on.

Partition with protection

Ukraine’s leadership has quietly come to accept that it doesn’t have the military strength to get its borders back in full. Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated his willingness to negotiate about territory in video calls with President Trump and European leaders—after a cease-fire that freezes the current front line.

...

Partition with subordination

Russia’s demands since its 2022 invasion have included shrinking the size of Ukraine’s armed forces, limiting its weaponry and its supplies of Western armaments, and changing its political regime—including its constitution, its leadership, and its policies on language, history and national identity.

The greatest danger for Ukraine isn’t just losing its east and south. It is that what remains wouldn’t be able to resist a third Russian invasion, following those of 2014 and 2022. The threat could force Kyiv to show deference to Moscow’s wishes about its leadership and its policies at home and abroad.

How Will the War in Ukraine End? Two Scenarios

Putin’s goals go beyond a land grab and aim at Ukraine’s capitulation. Kyiv and the West hope to draw a line.

https://www.wsj.com/world/how-will-the-war-in-ukraine-end-two-scenarios-2bcc0d99

A basement in eastern Ukraine housing drone production for the Ukrainian military.

By Marcus Walker

Follow | Photographs by Manu Brabo for WSJ

Aug. 16, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Quick Summary

• The Trump-Putin summit in Alaska failed to yield a diplomatic breakthrough regarding the war in Ukraine.View more

The Trump-Putin summit in Alaska is over, and peace in Ukraine isn’t yet nigh. But the two most likely endings to the Russian invasion are coming into view.

Ukraine could lose land but survive as a secure and sovereign, if shrunken, nation state. Alternatively, it could lose both land and sovereignty, falling back into Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Which will come to pass—and when—is no clearer after Alaska, which disappointed hopes for a diplomatic breakthrough.

Russian President Vladimir Putin brushed off the push by the U.S. and Europe for a cease-fire that would freeze the current front line, followed by talks about control of Ukrainian territories and guarantees for Ukraine’s security. Instead, Putin signaled he would continue the war until Ukraine and the West are willing to satisfy Moscow’s broader geopolitical aims.

“We are convinced that, in order for the Ukrainian settlement to be sustainable and long-term, all the root causes of the crisis, which have been repeatedly discussed, must be eliminated, all of Russia’s legitimate concerns must be taken into account, and a fair balance in the field of security in Europe and the world as a whole must be restored,” Putin said after the summit.  

Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Trump arriving to address reporters on Friday in Alaska after their meeting. Photo: Al Drago/Bloomberg News

Putin said Ukraine’s security also should be ensured—but past talks have shown the devil is in the details.

His emphasis on “root causes”—his standard shorthand for a litany of grievances about Ukraine’s Westward-oriented political trajectory and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s expansion into central and Eastern Europe—show he hasn’t given up his overarching goals of restoring Russian political sway over Ukraine, rebuilding Moscow’s sphere of influence in Europe’s east, and regaining the status of a global great power. That is what he went to war for in 2022.

Russia’s attempt to conquer Kyiv outright failed, and is likely beyond reach. Ukraine’s still-tenacious defense is limiting Russia to marginal battlefield gains at a high cost. Ukraine’s hopes of fully expelling the Russian invaders have also dwindled, given the stretched state of its own army.

That leaves two plausible endings to the biggest war in Europe since World War II. Here is what they mean, and what they depend on.

Partition with protection

Ukraine’s leadership has quietly come to accept that it doesn’t have the military strength to get its borders back in full. Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated his willingness to negotiate about territory in video calls with President Trump and European leaders—after a cease-fire that freezes the current front line.

Kyiv and European countries say they would never give legal recognition to Russia’s gains, a step that would turn international law into an incentive for further conquest instead of a taboo against it. But they are signaling they would live with the reality of de facto Russian control.

Ukrainian soldiers resting in a basement last month in their country’s Donetsk region, keeping out of sight of Russian drones.

A Ukrainian paramedic loaded a wounded soldier into an ambulance last month.

The best-case scenario for Kyiv and its European backers is probably to limit Russia to what its forces already occupy, equivalent to about one-fifth of Ukraine’s land. The Kremlin continues to insist that Ukraine retreat from areas that it claims as Russian but doesn’t control—notably the Ukrainian-held part of the Donetsk region, where Ukraine holds a chain of fortified cities that Russia so far has been unable to conquer.

But the biggest question is what happens to the other 80% of Ukraine.

Kyiv and its European allies want to protect the future security and sovereignty of the remaining rump with a combination of strong Ukrainian military defenses and Western security assistance. A so-called “coalition of the willing” led by the U.K. and France wants to deploy some of its own troops to Ukraine as a further deterrent against a future Russian attack. 

European leaders are hoping that the U.S. would join security guarantees for Ukraine, and they have been encouraged in recent days by Trump’s apparent openness to it. Any possible U.S. role remains unclear, however.

Such an outcome would bear a resemblance to the ending of the Korean War in 1953, which left the peninsula divided but South Korea shielded ever since, not least by American troops.

For Putin, however, a Korea-style outcome would amount to a historic failure.

He would hold 20% of Ukraine’s land—swaths of it reduced to rubble—but lose the bulk of Ukraine for good, while watching Western troops protect a country he insists is a brother-nation of Russia.

A Soviet poster at a theater in the abandoned city of Pripyat near Chernobyl, Ukraine, last month.

Putin’s reasons for such a climbdown might be that he fears the war is imposing unsustainable economic and political risks to Russia’s internal stability—or that Russia couldn’t cope with an escalation of U.S.-led sanctions. So far, though, most observers see little reason to think that is true.

“The Russian viewpoint at the moment is that this war isn’t sustainable, but Ukraine is less sustainable, and by the time economic problems would force an end to the war, Ukraine will have lost,” said Janis Kluge, a Russian economy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, a think tank in Berlin.

Trump and other U.S. officials have suggested Washington could batter Russia’s economy with a crackdown on its oil revenues, via punitive tariffs on Russian oil buyers, sanctions on banking transactions, banning Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers and other measures. Most analysts say sanctions could be tightened but major effects would take time.

And, short of Putin fearing for his own rule, it isn’t clear at what point he would put economic strains ahead of his historical fixation with Ukraine and his determination to make Russia great again.

Partition with subordination

Russia’s demands since its 2022 invasion have included shrinking the size of Ukraine’s armed forces, limiting its weaponry and its supplies of Western armaments, and changing its political regime—including its constitution, its leadership, and its policies on language, history and national identity.

The greatest danger for Ukraine isn’t just losing its east and south. It is that what remains wouldn’t be able to resist a third Russian invasion, following those of 2014 and 2022. The threat could force Kyiv to show deference to Moscow’s wishes about its leadership and its policies at home and abroad.

First responders covering the body of a factory worker killed in a Russian missile strike near Dnipro, Ukraine, in June.

Such an outcome would turn the surviving rump of Ukraine into a Russian protectorate, amounting to a capitulation for a nation that wants to consolidate its democracy and integrate with Europe and the West. It is this, even more than the fields and towns of Ukraine’s east, that Ukrainians are fighting to prevent.

The battlefield remains the only way Putin could achieve such capitulation terms. Although Russia’s forces continue to make only limited gains in terms of square miles, their main objective is to wear down Ukraine’s army—and the country’s will to fight.

After 3½ years of relentless war, Ukrainian troops are tired, outnumbered and discontented with their own generals. But they continue to resist. And the nature of the war—with drones increasingly dominant—favors defense over attack.

A Ukrainian soldier checking on a drone before a night mission in June.

“I don’t see the Ukrainian army collapsing. But on a long enough timeline, we could get to a point where, if Ukraine fails to address its problems of force generation and force management, it might not be defeated on the battlefield, but it will grow increasingly exhausted,” said Michael Kofman, a military expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank.

Russia’s advantages in population, troop numbers and financial resources make its war effort look more sustainable than Ukraine’s, most analysts say. “But the history of this war is that Ukraine has proved adaptable and resilient,” Kofman said.

Against the odds, Ukraine has so far found ways to prolong its resistance and keep the outcome open.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

How do you think the war in Ukraine will end? Join the conversation below.

Write to Marcus Walker at Marcus.Walker@wsj.com

2. Putin Returns to Moscow With Air of Triumph After Summit

Do we think Russia is an equal to the US? Does the international community think so? Putin certainly seems to.

Putin Returns to Moscow With Air of Triumph After Summit

The meeting with Trump helped give the Kremlin leader much of what he wanted, including putting Russia on an equal footing with the U.S.

https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-returns-to-moscow-with-air-of-triumph-after-summit-4e6bf35e

By Thomas Grove

Follow

Aug. 16, 2025 7:00 pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin during the news conference Friday in Anchorage, Alaska. Photo: Julia Demaree Nikhinson/AP

Quick Summary

• Trump rolled out the red carpet for Putin despite tensions.View more

ANCHORAGE, Alaska—Russian President Vladimir Putin couldn’t have scripted his first visit to the U.S. since 2015 much better.

The Russian leader strutted along a red carpet at a U.S. air base and posed smiling with President Trump, who had weeks earlier been expressing mounting frustration with him and threatening to hit Russia and its trading partners with sanctions. He met with Trump under a sign that read “pursuing peace.”

When they emerged 3½ hours later, the leaders said they hadn’t reached a deal. Instead, Putin used the stage to press his demands on Ukraine. Neither Trump nor Putin, who is facing an international arrest warrant for war crimes, took questions from the U.S. press.

Putin, by clinching a long-awaited summit with Trump, scored a win. The Kremlin leader has staked his legacy on dismantling the post-Cold War world order and resurrecting Russia’s great-power status to put it on par with the U.S.

“Putin achieved exactly what he wanted: He simultaneously preserved his relationship with Trump, avoided additional sanctions, and received the blessing to continue his war,” said Andrey Kolesnikov, a Moscow-based political analyst and a columnist at New Times, an independent Russian-language magazine.

The summit gave Putin a platform to turn longstanding narratives about the Ukraine war on their head, emphasizing that the U.S. and Russia are neighbors separated at their closest point by just over 2 miles of water. Meanwhile, he has tried to paint Europe and Ukraine as the two biggest obstacles to peace, while stepping up recent attacks on Ukrainian cities.

Putin and President Trump emerged from talks Friday without a deal. Photo: andrew caballero-reynolds/AFP/Getty Images

Trump spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders in the days before the summit to understand better their red lines in negotiations with Russia. But the images of the two leaders in Alaska were certainly unsettling on the continent.

Trump rolled out a red carpet for Putin on the taxiway of a U.S. air base, applauding as the Kremlin leader approached. After a firm handshake, Trump invited him to ride in his armored limousine to the meeting.

“Putin loves trolling and rubbing Europeans’ noses in the fact that there is a strong relationship with Trump,” said Andrew Weiss, who worked on Russian affairs in George H.W. Bush’s and Bill Clinton’s administrations, and is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank based in Washington, D.C.

Hours after arriving back in Moscow, Putin gathered his top officials inside the Kremlin to tell them the summit had been a resounding success.

“We have not had direct negotiations of this kind at this level for a long time,” he said to an array of officials, including the defense minister, the chief of staff and intelligence chiefs. “I repeat once again: We had the opportunity to calmly and in detail once again explain our position.”

To be sure, Trump said in the days before the summit that he didn’t expect any major breakthroughs and said he hoped he could clinch a cease-fire and lay the foundation for a lasting peace process. 

Trump and Putin on the taxiway at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage. Photo: Julia Demaree Nikhinson/AP

But in the hours after the summit, previous calls for an immediate cease-fire evaporated. Meanwhile, Trump’s own language mirrored that of the Russian side, calling in a post on Truth Social for an overarching peace agreement as opposed to a halt to fighting first. That effectively gives Putin the green light to continue the fighting to capture more land in eastern Ukraine, where Russian troops are making gains.

“The president of our great country showed Trump, the president of another great country, that Russia is a party to be reckoned with,” said Alexander Dugin, a far-right politician and a pro-Putin ideologue. “Therefore, we cannot be forced to do things that anyone wants, be it the West or Trump.”

Putin, who has called the fall of the Soviet Union a geopolitical catastrophe, has been working to resurrect slowly Moscow’s sphere of influence in parts of the territory that once encompassed the Soviet Union. Ukraine occupies a special place in Russian history. The founding dynasty of the Russian Empire had roots there.

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He is unlikely to sacrifice his ambition to reclaim Ukraine as a part of Russia to improve relations with Washington. But it would be a coup for the Russian leader if he could accomplish both after years of Western isolation sparked by his invasion.

“Both sides want normalization, which has a very strong business aspect that could unlock some money flows for both countries,” said Elina Ribakova, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Putin seemed to signal as much on Friday when he signed a decree that could offer Exxon Mobil re-entry into the Russian market through a stake in the potentially lucrative Sakhalin-1 oil field, which it pulled out of after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

Whether the takeaways from the summit can translate into a sustainable peace process is hard to determine. In a call from Air Force One on his way home from the summit, Trump relayed to the Europeans the outcome of the meeting and that Putin wanted to keep fighting, according to European officials. Trump plans to meet Monday with Zelensky, who wasn’t invited to Friday’s summit.

Analysts said expectations are low that a road to peace can be found in a war that Russia is slowly winning.

“The bubble of inflated expectations has burst, and the process itself has turned into ‘Waiting for Godot,’” said Kolesnikov, referring to a play about endless waiting.

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

3. Blackwater’s Erik Prince Muscles Back Into the Mercenary Business

As they say I guess it is good work if you can get it.

Excerpts:

Prince said he keeps members of Trump’s national security and diplomatic teams informed about his projects in Africa and Latin America. These include National Security Council Africa director Brendan McNamara and Henry Wooster, the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Haiti, as well as members of Congress, according to people familiar with the matter. His intention, Prince said, is to make sure his work doesn’t conflict with Trump administration policies. McNamara couldn’t be reached for comment.

So far, there hasn’t been daylight between Trump’s view and Prince’s. The Vectus Global leader said he was the one to first suggest using prisons in El Salvador to detain migrants arrested by U.S. immigration authorities.

After a visit to El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center last year, Prince pitched the Trump administration on designating parts of the prison as U.S. sovereign territory, allowing the detention of foreign-born criminals snared in the U.S. His idea was dismissed, but the Trump administration adopted a similar plan and deported hundreds of Venezuelans to the prison.

A White House official said Prince hasn’t met with White House senior staff to discuss this or other proposals.

Last year, Prince accompanied Steve Bannon to a prison facility where Bannon was sent for refusing to cooperate with a congressional inquiry on the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol. During Trump’s first administration, Prince pitched Bannon, then a White House strategist, about outsourcing the Afghanistan war to contractors. Bannon didn’t respond to requests for comment.

After Trump was wounded in an assassination attempt during his campaign, Steve Witkoff, now the president’s Middle-East envoy, sought Prince’s advice on improving Trump’s security, Prince said. Prince suggested posting special forces on Trump’s trips. A Witkoff spokesman didn’t respond to requests for comment.

When Hegseth’s nomination as defense secretary drew wide criticism over his personal misconduct and lack of leadership credentials, Prince voiced support. “I and my entire network of friends are ready to help him in any way possible because the republic needs to be defended,” he told a CPAC meeting at Mar-a-Lago that month. 

Prince says his subsequent contacts with Hegseth have focused solely on streamlining dozens of external boards that advise the Defense Department on issues such as medical coverage, technologies and women in the military. The Pentagon declined to comment.

Prince’s high-level connections have limits. After three days in Lima, he still couldn’t land a meeting with President Dina Boluarte. Eager to keep busy, Prince flew to Haiti.

After landing in Port-au-Prince, Prince said he didn’t need Boluarte’s cooperation. “We could possibly start just working for private entities,” he said.

As Prince’s armored convoy drove along the bumpy roads of Haiti, his attention focused on the task at hand, launching his drones on local gangs terrorizing the island nation. “We’re going to put an end to that without apology,” he said.

Blackwater’s Erik Prince Muscles Back Into the Mercenary Business

Prince has a new guns-for-hire firm to take overseas security jobs the White House doesn’t want to pay for

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/erik-prince-mercenaries-vectus-global-5a166dca

By Benoit Faucon

Follow and Vera Bergengruen

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Aug. 16, 2025 9:00 pm ET

LIMA, Peru—Edwin Ajahuana, a mine owner from high in the Andes, spent 23 hours traveling by road to meet the mercenary he hoped could protect his workers and assets.

At the bougainvillea-adorned headquarters of a conservative think tank in Lima, he joined other business owners urging Erik Prince, the founder and controversial former leader of Blackwater, to bring law and order to the gold-laden mountains of the Puno region.

“The dead keep turning up on roads, in dumps, in garbage bins,” Ajahuana told Prince. “For us, the state almost doesn’t exist. We have been abandoned.”

The former Navy SEAL had his own pitch ready. Prince showed drone footage of his mercenaries in Haiti helping hunt and kill alleged gang members under a government contract he struck in March. For an asking price of at least $10 million a year—paid by the government or a coalition of private interests—Prince said he could do the same in Peru’s gold country, deploying a team to disable criminal networks extorting and killing miners.

Prince, who is back in the good graces of the White House, believes his mercenaries can pick up the slack for international security jobs the Trump administration would prefer not to pay for. He says he wants to turn a profit in countries desperate for U.S. assistance. 

Prince’s host in Lima, former presidential candidate Hernando de Soto, told the group that Prince “has Trump’s ear,” giving Peru its best shot at getting on the White House radar for security help and grabbing the attention of U.S. investors wary of security troubles overseas.

”I’m not close to Trump. But I am close to his staff,” said Prince, including Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The two men swam together across the Hudson River between New Jersey and New York for a charity event. Hegseth, as a Fox News host in 2019, advocated clemency for the four Blackwater contractors sentenced to prison for the killing of 14 civilians in Iraq. 

Erik Prince, second from right, meeting with miners in Lima, Peru. Photo: Angela Ponce for The Wall Street Journal

Blackwater, once America’s largest mercenary force, lost its standing in the U.S. after the disclosure of violent excesses during former President George W. Bush’s war on terror. Prince, 56, had made a fortune flying in the slipstream of Bush’s foreign policy, providing security assistance in spots around the globe, at times operating beyond the reach of law. 

In 2006, a Blackwater fighter was whisked out of Baghdad without charge after drunkenly shooting and killing a bodyguard of the Iraqi vice president. Nearly a year later, the four contractors killed the Iraqis in Baghdad’s Nisour Square while escorting a U.S. Embassy convoy. At the end of Trump’s first term, the president pardoned the four convicts.

Prince, who sold Blackwater 2010, launched his new company, Vectus Global, as the global brand for a network of companies he established to do security work in Ecuador, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. He sees his months-old enterprise as the vanguard of a burgeoning industry capitalizing on the president’s cuts to foreign aid. 

While the White House declined to comment on Prince’s ties to the administration, the entrepreneur is trying to fill the vacuum created by Trump’s selectively hands-off America First policy in Latin America and Africa. Some countries have responded to Trump’s transactional policies by offering access to critical minerals or accepting deported migrants to win U.S. favor.

Blackwater at its peak had as many as 20,000 contractors. By comparison, Prince’s new firm employs dozens, but his sights are high. Vectus Global’s slogan is “We don’t just advise, we act.”

In February, Prince was asked at the Conservative Political Action Conference who could be the U.S. equivalent of Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries. Prince said he would be.

“As American companies do start to go abroad for energy, minerals, infrastructure projects,” Prince said, he would be right there with them.

This account is based on interviews with Prince as well as U.S., Latin American, Haitian and European officials and business associates.

A September 2003 photo of Blackwater security contractors in Baghdad escorting Paul Bremer, center, the U.S. civilian administrator in Iraq at the time. Photo: European Pressphoto Agency

Under pressure

Vectus focused its initial marketing in Latin America, reflecting the Trump administration’s hard-line stance on border security, gangs and drug trafficking.

El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele agreed to house more than 250 migrants the Trump administration wanted to deport in his maximum security prison. The deal was worth $20,000 per prisoner and led in April to a high-profile Oval Office meeting with Trump. This month, the State Department’s human-rights report markedly softened its criticism of Bukele’s government.

Prince has also cultivated ties with Bukele, as well as another right-wing head of state, Ecuadorean President Daniel Noboa. Ecuadorean and Salvadoran officials didn’t return requests for comment.

In a video posted by the country’s defense ministry, Prince said the partnership with Ecuador would provide “the law enforcement and the military the tools and the tactics to effectively combat the narcogangs.” 

Ecuador’s partnership with Prince is part of Noboa’s broader efforts to show he’s fighting organized crime, including by aligning more closely with the U.S. He has proposed offering the U.S. a naval base in his country. 

A Salvadoran soldier standing guard in April at the Terrorism Confinement Center prison in Tecoluca, El Salvador. Photo: jose cabezas/Reuters

Some in the country’s national security forces “view Prince’s involvement as an insult to the work they’ve been doing,” said Mario Pazmiño, the former head of Ecuador’s military intelligence.

“We understand that Mr. Prince has traveled to Ecuador as a private citizen,” the State Department said. “The U.S. government is not involved in private security counternarcotics operations in the country.”

To prospective clients, Prince pledges to restore law and order “when critical services or capabilities fail” by cracking down on rebels and organized crime.

Prince said his potential customers share one thing in common: They are places where U.S. influence has receded. “We are gap-fillers, providing law-enforcement solutions where the lack of government capacity has led to lawlessness,” he said.

Latin America and the Caribbean, where crime worries top voter concerns, are fertile ground for his services. 

Among Prince’s most recent efforts, the Haiti deal is his most deadly. As part of a one-year security contract, he hired Salvadoran mercenaries to help local police target gangs with off-the-shelf drones loaded with explosives, using techniques developed in the Ukraine war. 

The drones killed at least 233 gang members and three civilians in April and May, the United Nations reported this month. One woman was killed when two gang members took refuge in her home, and a drone chasing the two men exploded, the U.N. said.

Prince’s team is operating on behalf of the government, he said, and it is accountable only to Haiti.

“The drone operations stopped the bleeding,” Haitian Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé said. Previously, gang leaders bragged about their crimes on social media, he said. Now, they are in hiding, “You don’t see them walking the streets,” the prime minister said.

A drone launched during a Haitian policing operation against armed gangs. Photo: Patrice Noel/Zuma Press

Fils-Aimé said that the amount that Haiti will pay Prince under the contract is equal to about 1% of the $1 billion spent in recent years by the U.N. and previous governments for security. Prince also signed a 10-year deal to help stabilize Haiti’s revenue, paid by a percentage of the customs taxes generated from importing goods in the country.

Prince’s approach risks worsening instability, said Dan Foote, a U.S. diplomat who served as special envoy to Haiti in 2021. Private security intervention in Haiti will fail if it is run by foreigners who aren’t accountable to Haitian laws and people, he said.

Fils-Aimé said keeping innocent citizens safe is a government priority. “One civilian that passes away is one too many,” he said. 

The Canadian government has expressed concern about “reports of extrajudicial executions” in Haiti, including in its use of drones. A group of Democratic senators have asked the State Department and Department of Homeland Security for details about Prince’s operations. 

Prince says he isn’t worried about reprimands from Washington. A U.S. official said Prince’s drone operation was consistent with government goals, which include keeping the Haitian government from collapse. 

Prince’s security contractors joined Haitian police on Aug .7 to repel a gang attack on the presidential palace. An official in the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince said he had never seen gunfire of such intensity even during the Iraqi insurgency Fallujah in 2004.

In Congo, President Felix Tsishekedi hired Prince in December to protect tax collectors responsible for as many as 40 mines, including for minerals critical to the U.S. automotive and electronics industry such as cobalt. 

 “In the Congo, they would just laugh if you come knock at the front door of the mine and say, ‘Hey, I’m here to audit your taxes,’” Prince said. He expects the budget to be $30 million, paid from a percentage of taxes collected from the mines. He said his armed contractors will be prepared to use force.

Prince’s contract includes a second job—to stem mineral trafficking and help authorities secure Congo’s borders. Amid rumors of a coup, Prince also is in talks with Congo about bringing Salvadoran mercenaries to secure Tsishekedi’s presidential palace in the capital of Kinshasa, according to people familiar with the matter. A government spokesman said Congo was working with Prince to combat mining tax fraud but couldn’t comment further.

President Trump speaking at an Oval Office meeting in June with Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner and Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe. Photo: ken cedeno/Reuters

Friends in high places

To keep Vectus aligned with the Trump administration, Prince maintains close ties with the president’s allies inside and outside the government. Since Trump’s election, Prince has visited the president’s Mar-a-Lago resort and the White House. 

Prince said he keeps members of Trump’s national security and diplomatic teams informed about his projects in Africa and Latin America. These include National Security Council Africa director Brendan McNamara and Henry Wooster, the chargé d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Haiti, as well as members of Congress, according to people familiar with the matter. His intention, Prince said, is to make sure his work doesn’t conflict with Trump administration policies. McNamara couldn’t be reached for comment.

So far, there hasn’t been daylight between Trump’s view and Prince’s. The Vectus Global leader said he was the one to first suggest using prisons in El Salvador to detain migrants arrested by U.S. immigration authorities.

After a visit to El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center last year, Prince pitched the Trump administration on designating parts of the prison as U.S. sovereign territory, allowing the detention of foreign-born criminals snared in the U.S. His idea was dismissed, but the Trump administration adopted a similar plan and deported hundreds of Venezuelans to the prison.

A White House official said Prince hasn’t met with White House senior staff to discuss this or other proposals.

Erik Prince arriving at a news conference in April after an anticrime operation in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Photo: gerardo menoscal/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Last year, Prince accompanied Steve Bannon to a prison facility where Bannon was sent for refusing to cooperate with a congressional inquiry on the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol. During Trump’s first administration, Prince pitched Bannon, then a White House strategist, about outsourcing the Afghanistan war to contractors. Bannon didn’t respond to requests for comment.

After Trump was wounded in an assassination attempt during his campaign, Steve Witkoff, now the president’s Middle-East envoy, sought Prince’s advice on improving Trump’s security, Prince said. Prince suggested posting special forces on Trump’s trips. A Witkoff spokesman didn’t respond to requests for comment.

When Hegseth’s nomination as defense secretary drew wide criticism over his personal misconduct and lack of leadership credentials, Prince voiced support. “I and my entire network of friends are ready to help him in any way possible because the republic needs to be defended,” he told a CPAC meeting at Mar-a-Lago that month. 

Prince says his subsequent contacts with Hegseth have focused solely on streamlining dozens of external boards that advise the Defense Department on issues such as medical coverage, technologies and women in the military. The Pentagon declined to comment.

Prince’s high-level connections have limits. After three days in Lima, he still couldn’t land a meeting with President Dina Boluarte. Eager to keep busy, Prince flew to Haiti.

After landing in Port-au-Prince, Prince said he didn’t need Boluarte’s cooperation. “We could possibly start just working for private entities,” he said.

As Prince’s armored convoy drove along the bumpy roads of Haiti, his attention focused on the task at hand, launching his drones on local gangs terrorizing the island nation. “We’re going to put an end to that without apology,” he said.

Write to Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com and Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com

4. How Putin Could Lose Another 1,900,000 Soldiers in Ukraine War

Excerpts:

Putin is assessed to be in a bad position politically, because his military has lost more than 1 million personnel killed, wounded, or missing since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

“His problem now,” said the same former NATO official, “is he has nothing he can present to the Russian people in the form of territorial gains that can justify the sacrifice of lives on this scale. His military cannot take the rest of these oblasts – the areas under Ukrainian control. Putin has been trying to conquer the rest of Donetsk since 2014. If his army could gain these territories under their control by force they would have done it by now.”

Continuing military operations to completely occupy the four regions would result in losses that are probably unacceptable even for Russia. Based on the rate that Russia has been gaining territory to date, it would take Russian forces approximately 4.4 more years to gain 100 percent of the four Ukrainian oblasts’ territory.

Russia’s average daily casualty rate in 2025, as reported by the Ukrainian General Staff, would create approximately 1,930,000 more Russian killed or wounded if it continued for 4.4 years. This would be in addition to the approximately 1,060,000 casualties Russia has already suffered since 2022. These numbers include around 250,000 killed or missing and presumed dead.

How Putin Could Lose Another 1,900,000 Soldiers in Ukraine War

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Reuben Johnson · August 15, 2025

PUBLISHED on August 15, 2025, 6:56 PM EDT – Key Points and Summary: On the eve of his Alaska summit with President Trump, Vladimir Putin has reiterated his “maximalist demands,” insisting Ukraine withdraw from four of its own oblasts.

-According to a UK intelligence report, this move is a deliberate ploy to frame Kyiv as the obstacle to peace when it inevitably rejects the impossible terms.

T-90M from Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

-With over a million Russian casualties, analysts believe Putin cannot afford to end the war without a significant territorial victory to justify the immense losses, a victory his military has been unable to achieve on the battlefield.

Putin’s Nightmare: 1 Million Casualties and Nothing to Show For It

WARSAW, POLAND – A UK Ministry of Defense intelligence briefing on Aug. 15 reported Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his war aims on the eve of his summit with U.S. President Donald Trump.

His statement could sink the summit between the two in Anchorage, Alaska, regardless of what happens there.

According to the UK Defense Intelligence Service, on the eve of his meeting with the U.S. president, Putin “reiterated longstanding maximalist demands regarding Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, including for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the four internationally-recognized Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson.”

Russia announced the illegal annexation of these four Ukrainian oblasts in September 2022. The announcement included claims to areas in all four oblasts that remain under Ukrainian control. Such territorial claims contradicted Moscow’s own formal recognition of Ukrainian independence and sovereignty following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The inviolability of Ukraine’s borders was signed off by the government of then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1994 in the Budapest Memorandum. In return for Moscow’s recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign state and its borders, the Ukrainian government agreed to relinquish its nuclear arsenal – the world’s third-largest at the time – which it had inherited from the collapsed Soviet Union.

The warheads were all then transferred to Russia for decommissioning. This act additionally enabled Ukraine to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.

Putting Pressure on Zelenskiy

Repeating his position that these territories belong to Russia, Putin was setting conditions for the meeting that he knows full well the Ukrainians will reject.

Putin’s hope is that his demands will prompt Trump to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to cede land in exchange for a cessation of hostilities.

“There are a couple of very clear ploys that Putin is engaging in,” said a former senior NATO official who spoke to National Security Journal on the subject today.

“As a reaction to him repeating his claim to these four provinces, Trump may try to convince Zelenskiy to accept what he has been referring to as ‘land swaps,’ which will be refused,” he said.

“When that happens, Putin will say that he and the American president had a formula to end the war and stop the killing, but Zelenskiy will not agree. In this way, he and the Moscow elite can then say Zelenskiy is the obstacle to peace, and not Russia. It is a trick typical of someone with Putin’s background in the KGB,” he continued.

Putin Could Lose Almost Two Million More Soldiers

Putin is assessed to be in a bad position politically, because his military has lost more than 1 million personnel killed, wounded, or missing since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

“His problem now,” said the same former NATO official, “is he has nothing he can present to the Russian people in the form of territorial gains that can justify the sacrifice of lives on this scale. His military cannot take the rest of these oblasts – the areas under Ukrainian control. Putin has been trying to conquer the rest of Donetsk since 2014. If his army could gain these territories under their control by force they would have done it by now.”

Continuing military operations to completely occupy the four regions would result in losses that are probably unacceptable even for Russia. Based on the rate that Russia has been gaining territory to date, it would take Russian forces approximately 4.4 more years to gain 100 percent of the four Ukrainian oblasts’ territory.

Russia’s average daily casualty rate in 2025, as reported by the Ukrainian General Staff, would create approximately 1,930,000 more Russian killed or wounded if it continued for 4.4 years. This would be in addition to the approximately 1,060,000 casualties Russia has already suffered since 2022. These numbers include around 250,000 killed or missing and presumed dead.

About the Author: Reuben F. Johnson

Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. Johnson is the Director of Research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor’s degree from DePauw University and a master’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.

Defense Watch

F/A-XX Is the YF-23 on a Carrier?

F-15EX vs. J-20: Stealth Might Not Always Win

Boeing X-32 vs. J-20: It Was Not Even Close

In this article:

Written By Reuben Johnson

Reuben F. Johnson has thirty-six years of experience analyzing and reporting on foreign weapons systems, defense technologies, and international arms export policy. He is also a survivor of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He worked for years in the American defense industry as a foreign technology analyst and later as a consultant for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia. In 2022-2023, he won two awards in a row for his defense reporting. He holds a bachelor's degree from DePauw University and a master's degree from Miami University in Ohio, specializing in Soviet and Russian studies. He lives in Warsaw.

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Reuben Johnson · August 15, 2025

5. Putin Sees Ukraine Through a Lens of Grievance Over Lost Glory

Exaggerated grievances communicated well. As I have written:

We see the politics on all sides. Don't forget grievance politics that the opponents are practicing - Exaggerated grievances, communicated well by actors who seek to divide societies to gain and maintain power. Every time someone feels aggrieved by an issue they should ask themselves why and who is making them feel aggrieved. There is unrestricted warfare and the three warfares of our adversaries (psychological warfare, legal warfare, and media or public opinion warfare) and then there is also domestic politics. The only solution is our own individual critical thinking. No one is coming to rescue us

Excerpts:

Returning to grudges he first aired angrily in 2007 at a security conference in Munich, and revived in February 2022 to announce and justify his full scale-invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Putin in his post-summit remarks in Alaska demanded that “a fair balance in the security sphere in Europe and the world as whole must be restored.”

Only this, he said, would remove “the root causes of the crisis” in Ukraine — Kremlin shorthand for Russia’s diminished status since it lost the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of Moscow’s hegemony over Eastern Europe.

Mr. Putin did not directly mention the war, saying only that he “was sincerely interested” in halting “what is happening” because Russians and Ukrainians “have the same roots” and “for us, this is a tragedy and a great pain.” Casting Russia as the victim of the war it started has been a staple of Kremlin propaganda ever since Mr. Putin announced his invasion, described as a “special military operation” to save Russia.

Putin Sees Ukraine Through a Lens of Grievance Over Lost Glory

NY Times · by Andrew Higgins ·

Speaking after Friday’s summit, President Putin again implied that the war is all about Russia’s diminished status since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Listen to this article · 8:08 min Learn more

President Vladimir Putin during a news conference at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on Friday.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By

Andrew Higgins is a former Moscow bureau chief and now reports on Eastern Europe.

Aug. 17, 2025Updated 4:06 a.m. ET

After all of the pre-summit talk of land swaps and the technicalities of a possible cease-fire in Ukraine, President Vladimir V. Putin made clear after his meeting in Alaska with President Trump that his deepest concern was not an end to three and a half years of bloodshed. Rather, it was with what he called the “situation around Ukraine,” code for his standard litany of grievances over Russia’s lost glory.

Returning to grudges he first aired angrily in 2007 at a security conference in Munich, and revived in February 2022 to announce and justify his full scale-invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Putin in his post-summit remarks in Alaska demanded that “a fair balance in the security sphere in Europe and the world as whole must be restored.”

Only this, he said, would remove “the root causes of the crisis” in Ukraine — Kremlin shorthand for Russia’s diminished status since it lost the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of Moscow’s hegemony over Eastern Europe.

President Trump with President Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson on Friday in Anchorage.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Mr. Putin did not directly mention the war, saying only that he “was sincerely interested” in halting “what is happening” because Russians and Ukrainians “have the same roots” and “for us, this is a tragedy and a great pain.” Casting Russia as the victim of the war it started has been a staple of Kremlin propaganda ever since Mr. Putin announced his invasion, described as a “special military operation” to save Russia.

“Putin and Russia are revisionist; they cannot accept having lost the Cold War,” said Laurynas Kasciunas, a former defense minister of Lithuania, which until 1991 was part of the Soviet Union and has since joined NATO. Also now in NATO are Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and other former members of Moscow’s now-defunct military alliance, the Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Putin, Mr. Kasciunas added, never mentions the war and refers instead to the “situation around Ukraine” so as to “portray everything as a Western plot against Russia that merely uses Ukraine as a pawn and an instrument.”

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Russia and Ukraine? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, unsubtly signaled the Kremlin’s ambitions by arriving at his Alaska hotel wearing a sweatshirt emblazoned with the letters “CCCP,” Cyrillic for USSR.

But just before Mr. Putin and Mr. Trump met on Friday, Poland gave Moscow a pointed reminder that the old order was gone by holding a parade of tanks and other military hardware, much of it American-made, along the Vistula River in Warsaw. The display of military might, which also included a flyover of warplanes and helicopters, celebrated Polish victory over the Red Army in 1920 and showcased what is now the biggest military in the European Union.

A military parade for Polish Armed Forces Day on Friday in Warsaw.Credit...Kuba Atys/Agencja Wyborcza.pl, via Reuters

In an apparent effort to salve Mr. Putin’s wounded pride over his country’s reduced post-Cold War status, Mr. Trump, in an interview after the summit, with Sean Hannity of Fox News, inflated Russia’s position in the global hierarchy. Ignoring China and the European Union, he said, “We are No. 1 and they are No. 2 in the world.”

That, like that effusive welcome and applause given to Mr. Putin by Mr. Trump when he arrived in Alaska, went down well in Russia, where Kremlin-controlled media outlets and nationalist pundits rejoiced at what they saw as Russia’s readmission to the club of respectable and respected nations.

“I didn’t expect such a good result,” Aleksandr Dugin, a belligerent geopolitical theorist, said on Telegram. “I congratulate all of us on a perfect summit. It was grandiose. To win everything and lose nothing, only Aleksandr III could do that,” he added, referring to the reactionary 19th-century czar who overturned the liberal reforms of his father.

Andrei Klishas, a nationalist senator who after the start of all-out war in Ukraine in 2022 said Russia should have contacts with the West only “through binoculars and gunsights,” said that the summit had “confirmed Russia’s desire for peace, long-term and fair” and left it free to carry out the special military operation “by either military or diplomatic means.”

Insisting that Russia has the upper hand on the battlefield and is “liberating more and more territories,” he added, “A new architecture of European and international security is on the agenda, and everyone must accept it.”

Ukrainian firefighters in Kharkiv extinguishing burning cars after a Russian strike last month.Credit...David Guttenfelder/The New York Times

Exactly what this new architecture would look like is unclear, but its main pillar is the restoration of Russia to its Cold War position as a regional hegemon and global power treated as an equal by the United States, as it was at the Yalta conference in 1945.

Shortly before attacking Ukraine in 2022, Russia presented NATO and the United States with draft treaties demanding that NATO retreat from Eastern Europe and bar Ukraine from ever entering the alliance. These demands, which would reverse Russia’s Cold War defeat, were swiftly dismissed.

Mr. Putin, in a television address in 2022 announcing the invasion, focused not on Ukraine but on complaints about what he described as Western bullying and disregard for legitimate Russian interests and status.

“Over the past 30 years, we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe,” he said. “In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns.”

A central part of Mr. Putin’s push to reshape the post-Cold War order has been his effort to weaken or destroy the trans-Atlantic relationship created after World War II and expanded since 1991 with the admission to NATO of formerly Communist nations in Eastern Europe.

On that score, the invasion of Ukraine has backfired, increasing NATO’s presence near Russia’s borders. Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia, in 2023 cast aside decades of military nonalignment to join the NATO alliance. Sweden also joined.

But Mr. Trump, who has blown hot and cold for months on supporting Ukraine, sowed discord in the alliance in Alaska by seeming to adopt Mr. Putin’s plan to seek a sweeping peace agreement in Ukraine instead of securing the urgent cease-fire he said he wanted before the summit.

In an interview after the summit, President Trump inflated Russia’s global position. Ignoring China and the European Union, he said: “We are No. 1 and they are No. 2 in the world.”Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

The American president’s moves got a chilly reception in Europe, where leaders have time and again seen Mr. Trump reverse positions on Ukraine after speaking with Mr. Putin.

Echoing Russia’s line that Ukraine is a second-tier country whose interests cannot compete with those of Russia, he told Fox News: “Russia is a very big power, and they’re not.”

Whether the war ends, he added, depends on Ukraine and Europe, not the United States. “Now it is really up to President Zelensky to get it done,” he said. “I would also say the European nations have to get involved a little bit.”

Dmitri Medvedev, Russia’s hawkish former president, celebrated the summit for restoring “a full-fledged mechanism for meeting between Russia and the United States at the highest level” and showing that negotiations are possible between the two big powers “simultaneously with the continuation” of Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine.

Ivan Nechepurenko contributed reporting from Moscow, and Tomas Dapkus from Vilnius, Lithuania.

Andrew Higgins is the East and Central Europe bureau chief for The Times based in Warsaw. He covers a region that stretches from the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Kosovo, Serbia and other parts of former Yugoslavia.

NY Times · by Andrew Higgins ·

6. Trump drops ceasefire demand for Ukraine war, tells allies Putin wants land

Excerpts:

After the summit, Trump told Zelensky and other European leaders in a phone call that in addition to land Russia has seized in the war, Putin wants Ukraine to cede all of Donbas in exchange for a promise to freeze the front line elsewhere, according to four people familiar with the discussion. All spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter.

In years of fighting, Russia has been unable to seize all of Donbas. Russian forces occupy almost all of the Luhansk region of Donbas but do not control part of the strategic, fortified Donetsk region, where Russian forces have made an advance in recent days.

Trump conveyed that he was shifting away from the ceasefire demand and toward reaching a swift deal, which could make the Russian conditions the starting point for talks, two of the people said.

Trump also told the Europeans he would be open to providing security guarantees for Ukraine in a deal but the details were unclear, according to two European diplomats. European leaders were invited to join Zelensky and Trump in the White House on Monday, the diplomats said.

Trump drops ceasefire demand for Ukraine war, tells allies Putin wants land

Trump’s swerve increases pressure on the Ukrainian leader as he heads to the White House on Monday to make his case.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/16/ukraine-washington-zelensky-russia-trump/

UpdatedAugust 16, 2025 at 5:40 p.m. EDTtoday at 5:40 p.m. EDT

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrives for a meeting with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in London on Thursday. (Tolga Akmen/EPA/Shutterstock)

By Ellen Francis, Siobhán O'Grady, Catherine Belton and David L. Stern

BRUSSELS — President Donald Trump dropped his demand for a ceasefire in Ukraine and told its president Saturday that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Ukraine’s eastern Donbas area in exchange for halting the war.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

Hours after Trump and Putin met Friday in Alaska, Trump said Ukraine and Russia should go straight to negotiating a settlement, a split with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European allies that aligns the United States with Putin.

Zelensky has rejected Russian demands to cede Ukrainian land. The Ukrainian leader and his European partners, including the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, had lobbied the White House to pressure Moscow into a ceasefire before any negotiations.

Trump’s swerve increases pressure on the Ukrainian leader as he prepares to go to the White House on Monday to make his case. Kyiv’s European backers say it cannot negotiate under attack and are wary of a rushed deal that could reshape the continent’s security landscape.

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After the summit, Trump told Zelensky and other European leaders in a phone call that in addition to land Russia has seized in the war, Putin wants Ukraine to cede all of Donbas in exchange for a promise to freeze the front line elsewhere, according to four people familiar with the discussion. All spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive matter.

0:59

President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin reached no agreement to end the war in Ukraine on Aug. 15. The Post's Michael Birnbaum explains. (Video: Julie Yoon, Cat Zakrzewski, Michael Birnbaum/The Washington Post)

In years of fighting, Russia has been unable to seize all of Donbas. Russian forces occupy almost all of the Luhansk region of Donbas but do not control part of the strategic, fortified Donetsk region, where Russian forces have made an advance in recent days.

Trump conveyed that he was shifting away from the ceasefire demand and toward reaching a swift deal, which could make the Russian conditions the starting point for talks, two of the people said.

Trump also told the Europeans he would be open to providing security guarantees for Ukraine in a deal but the details were unclear, according to two European diplomats. European leaders were invited to join Zelensky and Trump in the White House on Monday, the diplomats said.

The Europeans have said any agreement should protect Ukraine against further Russian attacks and welcomed comments by Trump that the United States could back security guarantees, a level of U.S. involvement that Europeans have long sought.

Before the Alaska summit, European officials expressed guarded optimism that the United States was supporting their demand for a ceasefire along the current line of contact. But after the call Saturday, Trump abandoned it publicly.

“It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

Putin has repeatedly rebuffed calls for a ceasefire. He has insisted instead on broader negotiations for a final peace deal. Ukraine and its European allies say that position is a stalling tactic for Russia to press its gains on the battlefield.

Putin told a meeting of top Russian officials on Saturday that the summit with Trump was “very useful” and “in my opinion, it brings us closer to the right decisions.” He said he told Trump that settling “root causes” — his demands that Ukraine be demilitarized and barred from joining NATO — “must be at the heart of any possible agreement.”

‘No deal until there’s a deal’: Trump, Putin meet in Alaska

1:08

On Aug. 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Donald Trump briefly addressed the press after meeting for three hours in Anchorage. (Video: The Washington Post)

Zelensky, meanwhile, said he and Trump had a “long and substantive” conversation on Saturday, lasting around an hour, before they were joined on the call by European leaders.

He would meet with Trump “to discuss all of the details regarding ending the killing and the war,” he said, asserting “readiness to work with maximum effort to achieve peace.”

It was important, Zelensky added, that European countries and the United States were “involved at every stage to ensure reliable security guarantees” for Ukraine, and there were “positive signals” that Washington would participate.

He also repeated his support for Trump’s earlier proposal of a trilateral summit with him and Putin.

Top Putin aide Yuri Ushakov said, however, that this was not broached in Alaska.

After their call Saturday, the leaders of France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Poland, Finland and the European Union said they stood “ready to work” for the trilateral summit “with European support.”

“We are clear that Ukraine must have ironclad security guarantees,” they said in a joint statement. They vowed to keep supporting Kyiv and pressuring Moscow.

They said there could be no limitations on Ukraine’s military, no “Russia veto” in its ambitions to join the E.U. or NATO, and that it remained “up to Ukraine to make decisions on its territory.”

They did not mention an insistence on a ceasefire before any negotiations.

On Zelensky’s last visit to the White House, in February, Trump and Vice President JD Vance upbraided the Ukrainian leader and accused him of blocking a deal. European leaders worked with Zelensky to mend the relationship.

European leaders, who have made painstaking efforts to keep Trump onside, praised on Saturday his efforts to end the war.

But the call left them once again scrambling to absorb the president’s foreign policy gyrations. A few weeks ago, Trump had threatened new sanctions on Moscow if it did not commit to a ceasefire and complained that Putin was deceiving him.

Still, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sought to suggest some cause for hope Saturday.

There could be “much more to come, according to the American president — namely, a comprehensive peace agreement,” Merz told German broadcaster ZDF. He called U.S. willingness to participate in security guarantees for Ukraine “good news.”

“But, of course,” he said, “the Europeans, for their part, must contribute to ensuring Ukraine’s security in the long term.”

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said the discussions included “credible and robust” security guarantees for Ukraine.

Trump cautioned this week that this could not come through NATO.

Europe’s own plans for security guarantees acceptable to Ukraine remain blurry. Zelensky’s top aspiration — joining NATO — is elusive without consensus. A plan for a small European force in Ukraine remains on a back burner.

European allies say guarantees would start with their pledges of more weapons and training for Ukraine’s army. France and Britain had sought to build U.S. support for a plan to deploy some forces to Ukraine, away from the front lines, in a future deal. The proposal draws on the United States supporting a force or ceasefire with key capabilities such as intelligence and satellite surveillance.

The summit, which ended with no agreement, was seen as a public relations success for Putin, who was welcomed by Trump after years of Western isolation since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Trump told Fox News after the summit that he and Putin “agreed on a lot of points” but that “one or two pretty significant items” remained.

“It’s really up to President Zelensky to get it done,” Trump said. “I would also say the European nations, they have to get involved a little bit.”

Putting the onus on Zelensky leaves the Ukrainian leader in a delicate position, as all sides maneuver to avoid being seen as hindering Trump’s push for a peace deal.

Although polls show that war-weary Ukrainians increasingly favor a settlement, it would be difficult for Kyiv to sell giving away territory — home to hundreds of thousands of people, and where forces built up defensive lines for years — for an undefined truce.

One of the people familiar with the talks said Ukraine would not relinquish Donetsk because it would leave Ukraine wide open to future attacks. “If [Putin] takes over Donbas, he has a clear road all the way to Odesa.”

O’Grady reported from Kharkiv, Belton reported from London and Stern reported from Kyiv. Michael Birnbaum in Alaska and Kate Brady in Berlin contributed to this report.

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By Ellen Francis, Siobhán O'Grady, Catherine Belton and David L. Stern

7. As America silences its voice in Africa, China and Russia amplify theirs

Will we ever recover from this catastrophic strategic mistake?

This should be an indicator. We are ceding the information domain to our enemies. They are amplifying now because they could not compete effectively with us. WIth VOA silenced they can now capture audiences that were loyal VOA listeners.

As America silences its voice in Africa, China and Russia amplify theirs

by Cameron Hudson, opinion contributor - 08/15/25 11:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5452490-russia-china-africa-disinformation-surge/

After gutting our principal development, humanitarian and peacebuilding institutions, the Trump administration is now pushing to close another of our most powerful institutions on the frontlines of a growing global information war: the Voice of America. 

The timing for its closure could not be worse. Disinformation campaigns targeting African information systems have surged nearly fourfold since 2022, with Russia and China leading a systematic assault.  

According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 189 documented disinformation campaigns now target Africa — nearly quadruple the number reported in 2022. These campaigns have triggered “destabilizing and antidemocratic consequences,” all of which undermine U.S. interests on the continent. 

At least 39 African countries have been targeted with foreign disinformation, with half facing three or more campaigns.

Russia has emerged as the primary architect of this disinformation offensive, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns across more than 22 countries in Africa. Perhaps nowhere are the effects of these campaigns on American interests so visible as in Niger, a country then-Secretary of State Blinken praised as “a model of resilience” on a first-ever visit to the Sahelian state. 

Only months later, an army coup would topple the country’s democratically elected leader with the help of Russian networks. 

In the months following, content about Niger spiked by 6,645 percent on Russian state media and Wagner Telegram channels and included narratives about Western imperialist forces fomenting instability to exploit Niger’s mineral resources and sovereignty. 

A year later, U.S. Defense officials blamed their forced abandonment of a $100 million drone base in the country’s north on a Russian “disinformation playbook,” bringing into full relief the scale and effectiveness of Russia’s info war.

But Russia’s assault extends beyond crisis exploitation and into the quotidian. 

RT, the Russian state-controlled television network, has pivoted to training African journalists after being banned across the Western world, including online platforms like Meta, for spreading disinformation about Ukraine. More than 1,000 African journalists have reportedly completed these courses, creating a network of Moscow-trained journalists across 35 African nations. 

This Kremlin propaganda machine now broadcasts to more than 40 countries on the continent in six languages and recently launched services in Portuguese and Amharic. TASS, the Russian news service, recently announced plans to open six new African bureaus by next year. 

Meanwhile, China has adopted an even more comprehensive approach to media influence. Like Moscow, Beijing trains approximately 1,000 African journalists every year in China and Chinese-state news agencies are expanding their presence across the continent. 

Xinhua already maintains 37 news bureaus and counting across Africa, more than any other African or non-African news agency.

China Global Television Network, CGTN, recently announced plans to increase its presence beyond Africa’s five sub-regions, where it employs its locally-hired staff to “paint a rosy picture” of Chinese engagement and investment in local languages like Hausa and Bambara.  

But its China’s purchase of stakes in local African media, like South Africa’s Independent Media, that also allows it to fly undetected on the continent and to “tell China’s story well,” a strategy proposed by then-Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping at the party’s National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference. 

With 300 million Africans coming online in the past seven years, authoritarian powers are systematically exploiting Africa’s digital transformation to reshape the continent’s information environment. Voice of America represents one of America’s most effective responses to this assault. 

Unlike RT’s propaganda masquerading as journalism or China’s state-influenced messaging, VOA has operated uninterrupted since 1942 under a congressional charter mandating editorial independence and journalistic integrity. This credibility advantage is crucial in an environment where Africans are increasingly skeptical of obviously biased content. 

VOA’s weekly audience is estimated at a little over 93 million, has been growing rapidly and is trusted in many of Africa’s most important markets. This stands in stark contrast to European news organizations that have been banned in recent years in tens of African countries citing anti-government biases and growing anti-Western sentiment.

In contrast, in the 48 African countries where VOA broadcasts, it plays an important role in countering extremist narratives pushed by terror groups like Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and other ISIS affiliates, while equipping local populations with the information they need to resist extremist propaganda.  

These threats, according to the Defense Department, “are the epicenter of terrorism around the globe…and therein lies the threat to the [U.S.] homeland.”

More importantly, Voice of America has a unique mandate to tell America’s story and explain U.S. policy to African audiences. Commercial media outlets, like the Associated Press, Reuters or CNN lack both the purpose and the incentive to systematically present American perspectives on global issues, particularly in languages and markets where profitability is limited.  

Voice of America also covers stories that no other commercial broadcaster prioritizes: African perspectives on American foreign policy, and in-depth coverage of African issues that matter to American policymakers. 

Africa’s population will double by 2050, with 70 percent of the population under the age 35 — a demographic that still looks to the U.S. for leadership in governance and democratic values — but at a decreasing rate. 

Recent polling shows a widening gap among Africans, 60 percent of whom believe that China has a positive political and economic influence on their countries, versus a declining rate of only 53 percent for the U.S. 

Eliminating Voice of America would hand China and Russia unopposed control over narrative formation among the world’s youngest and fastest-growing population. The response to authoritarian efforts to undermine American interests and African narratives is not retreat but reinforcement. 

At precisely the moment when Russia and China are investing billions in media operations designed to promote their influence operations and undermine American interests, silencing America’s voice constitutes a unilateral disarmament in an information war that we cannot afford to lose. 

Cameron Hudson was National Security Council director for Africa in the administration of George W. Bush and is a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

8. Who Are the Green Berets Supposed to Be? Revisiting the Special Forces Identity Crisis

Access the full article at this link: https://sway.cloud.microsoft/BoeFAcd24HpDzPk5?ref=email

Who Are the Green Berets Supposed to Be? Revisiting the Special Forces Identity Crisis

Authored by:

Greg E. Metzgar

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Commentary

Published on 8/5/2025

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The U.S. Army Special Forces (SF)—better known as the Green Berets—stand at a crossroads. After more than two decades of continuous conflict and evolving mission sets, Special Forces Branch faces a profound question: Who are the Green Berets supposed to be?

Colonel Edward C. Croot's "identity crisis" and the rebuttal by Sergeant Major (Retired) David Shell are not a superficial branding issue. It should be encouraging to Special Forces Branch to see two of its members debating a timely topic rather than allowing outside pundits to examine and attempt to hypothesize critically about the SF Branch.

See also: Mission or Meaning? Rethinking the Identity Crisis in U.S. Army Special Forces by Siamak T. Naficy, PhD, and W5 Maurice "Duc" DuClos.

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Who Are the Green Berets Supposed to Be? Revisiting the Special Forces Identity CrisisBy Greg E. Metzgar, U.S. Army (Retired)

9. The Secret to Success in Professional Military Education

Some thoughtful advice.

What I was told by mentors over the years and that I have found to be true: PME is what you make of it. I have found every PME experience an opportunity for reflection, critical thinking, and learning. Yes, I remember others saying it is only a lot of reading if you do it. But my recommendation is to do all the reading and more (though I admit that I could only handle what was required of us in SAMS because it was a pretty extensive reading load!)

The Secret to Success in Professional Military Education

sofrep.com · by Ken Segelhorst · August 16, 2025

18 hours ago

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The US Naval War College. Image Credit: US Navy / Bruce Katz

Author’s Note: I first published this article in 2022 on West Point’s Center for Junior Officers (CJO) website. After retiring in 2024, I published multiple articles for other publications exposing systemic issues at West Point and the other service academies. These included “Gen Z Goes to West Point” (2025), “Cheating Without Consequences” (2025), and “Army-Navy Game: Celebrating Tradition While Concealing a Crisis” (2024). Consequently, CJO removed this piece along with “The Commissioning Ceremony: Planning a Meaningful and Memorable Event” from its website and social media. Despite repeated requests, neither CJO nor the Academy has provided any explanation. I’m republishing “How to Succeed in Professional Military Education” with SOFREP so it can once again serve as a resource for members of the profession.

—

It Started With a Question. It was a conversation I had several times as an assistant professor at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. First-class cadets, mere months or even weeks from graduating, would approach me with questions on how to succeed at the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). These cadets, having read my instructor biography, knew that I had performed well in my professional military education (PME) and wanted to know my “secret to success” for such courses.

Unfortunately, I was never able to provide these cadets with a comprehensive answer. The fact is that I never went into one of these courses with the intent of graduating at the head of the class, let alone with a plan to do so. Rather, in most cases, I simply hoped to graduate alongside my classmates.

As my time at West Point came to an end, I finally found the time to look back and deliberately reflect on what made me successful in my PME courses. Through that reflection, I was able to identify several common characteristics, some conceptual and some more practical, that I believe contributed to my success. I share these now in hopes that all officers – commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned – can apply them to succeed in their PME, both for themselves and the young men and women they will lead throughout their careers.

Attitude is Everything. Like so many things in life, when it comes to PME, attitude is everything. Officers must approach PME with the right mindset. They must recognize that PME represents both a tremendous opportunity as well as a professional responsibility. They must check their egos at the door and acknowledge that, regardless of their past experience or commissioning source, they are not omniscient. All officers have significant room to learn and develop as members of the profession. Only after an officer accepts these truths can they fully commit to their PME experience.

It is an Opportunity. Officers need to realize that PME is not something to simply “get through.” Instead, it represents a tremendous opportunity. Few professions provide such structured developmental opportunities where members can unplug entirely from work for several months or even a year to learn and grow as a member of the profession. While all commissioned officers in the Army have the opportunity to attend BOLC and the Captains Career Course (CCC), PME beyond these courses becomes increasingly selective. The Army selects approximately 50% of newly promoted majors to attend resident intermediate level education (ILE). The selection rate for lieutenant colonels and colonels to attend a senior service college (SSC) is even lower. Officers who acknowledge and accept PME as a unique opportunity are less likely to squander it. Rather than taking the “check the block” approach, these motivated officers will seek to get the most from their PME experience. Approaching PME with this positive attitude will greatly contribute to an officer’s performance by providing the necessary motivation to overcome challenges and push them to excel.

It is a Responsibility. While a tremendous opportunity, PME also represents a professional responsibility. Unfortunately, many officers selfishly view these courses as completely distinct from their future obligations. As such, many fail to take their personal development seriously. They may fail to complete assigned readings, put forth minimal effort on practical exercises, or play on their electronic devices during class. These shortsighted officers believe they are not hurting anyone but themselves by doing the bare minimum to pass. That is simply not the case. Officers who coast through PME fail not only themselves but also their future subordinates, peers, and superiors. As Army professionals, we have a responsibility to become experts in our craft and stewards of the profession. Officers who do not take their PME seriously fail to live up to these expectations and, unfortunately, it is often the soldiers they lead who pay the price.

Be Humble. To fully embrace PME as both an opportunity and an obligation, an officer must be humble. At every course I attended throughout my career, there were always officers that acted as if they already knew all the answers, as if they had nothing to gain and the course was beneath them. This can be a considerable obstacle for young West Point graduates who, as noted in Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Swain and Captain James Watson’s article, “West Point Lieutenants Lack Self-Awareness,” often graduate with inflated opinions of themselves. The haughtiness of the West Point graduates was clear to me as a young second lieutenant at the Armor Officer Basic Course (OBC). Their inflated egos kept them from learning from officers from other commissioning sources and their NCO instructors, both groups that the “Old Grads” seemed to view as beneath them. Similarly, at the Maneuver CCC, I remember fellow captains with one or two combat deployments exhibiting “been there, done that” attitudes that prevented them from approaching the course with open and eager minds. No matter an officer’s knowledge or experience, they should approach PME with humility; a humble mind drives a thirst for knowledge and development.

It Requires a Commitment. Succeeding at PME requires commitment. However, to truly excel, an officer must make PME their number one priority. Competing requirements can make this a significant challenge for some officers. I remember many West Point graduates exercising their newfound freedom at OBC to go drinking every night. These lieutenants appeared more focused on having a good time than their professional education and development. At CCC and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), many officers, mentally and physically exhausted from years of combat deployments, understandably chose to use their time at PME to reconnect with family and “take a knee” from operational requirements. Ultimately, it is each individual officer’s choice as to how they prioritize PME. However, for those wanting to earn top marks, they must make PME the top priority and be willing to make sacrifices accordingly. It was this commitment to PME that enabled the more practical methods that contributed to my success.

Prepare for PME. Success at PME begins long before the first day of class. Just like any other operation, success requires proper planning and preparation. Officers should take advantage of the time leading up to PME, whether it is prior to a permanent change of station or while “snowbirding,” to set conditions for their success. A few months in advance, officers should begin reviewing notes and material from their previous PME. For example, prior to attending CCC, it is advantageous to review notes from BOLC. Prior to attending ILE, officers should review their CCC materials. This can help shore up an officer’s foundational knowledge prior to PME, allowing them to focus on new material. Next, officers should seek out course materials for their upcoming PME to help get a jump start on the course. Simply skimming through the readings and presentations in advance can provide a significant advantage in comprehending the information during the course. Officers can also begin chipping away at course requirements. For example, the battle analysis paper was a long-standing requirement at CCC and represented the course’s longest writing assignment. Knowing this, I selected a battle, did my research, and outlined my thoughts all before I even started CCC. This saved me a considerable amount of time during the course that I could refocus on other course content.

Set Conditions. Preparing for PME goes beyond academics. Officers should do their best to eliminate distractions and set conditions for success prior to their first day. Officers should ensure that their annual requirements, to include Army Regulation 350-1 training and medical readiness, are not only current but will not expire during PME. It is also important to show up to PME physically fit and healthy. Contrary to many officers’ beliefs, PME is not the best time to lose weight, get in shape, or have surgery. It can be extremely challenging just to maintain one’s level of physical fitness based on course schedules and out-of-class requirements. Strict policies regarding absences can also make it difficult to schedule appointments. Medical procedures or conditions that require convalescent leave may result in a recycle or even a drop from the course.

Get Your Home in Order. Officers need to set conditions at home prior to beginning PME. Officers should backward plan and arrive far enough in advance to get established prior to the first day of class. Upon arriving, it is important to spend some time becoming familiar with the area and determining where to live. Living on or near post provides distinct advantages regarding time management, affording more time for study, fitness, family, and rest than those commuting a long distance from a nicer off-post community. Officers should plan moves and household goods deliveries with sufficient time to get unpacked and settled. When setting up a new home, it is essential to have a dedicated space void of distractions to work and study, such as a home office. For those with families, it is important to manage expectations. It is important for family members to be aware that although their spouse or parent may be home, they may still have a significant amount of work to do; out-of-class requirements for PME are substantial.

Establish Good Study Habits. Transitioning into an academic environment can present a challenge for officers of all ranks. Young lieutenants may find it challenging to dive right back into an academic mindset after graduating college, whereas senior officers, several years removed from academia, may need to reestablish study habits. For me, establishing a routine was critical to maintaining good study habits. While my exact routine varied from course to course, generally the overall pattern remained largely the same. I would conduct physical training each morning. After personal hygiene and breakfast, I would briefly review my notes from the previous evenings’ readings or assignments before class. After class was done for the day, I would take time to deliberately review that day’s content. After taking a break for a few hours to decompress, do some PT, and have dinner, I would settle in to my designated study area to begin completing any reading or assignments for the next day. I always kept this area free of distractions, such as television, cell phones, and social media. Before concluding my studies for the day, I would always take one final look over my notes and prepare questions for any material I did not fully comprehend.

Get Organized. While every officer’s approach to studying may vary, organization should be the common denominator. Officers attending PME are required to balance numerous out-of-class requirements including readings, presentations, and writing assignments. For some courses, rotational leadership positions, organized physical training, and extended field exercises add additional layers of complexity to the calendar. To excel, officers must effectively forecast and prioritize requirements and balance their time accordingly. This requires both long-range and short-range planning. For example, at the beginning of each course, I would review requirements and note all major events on my calendar, to include papers, briefings, examinations, field problems, and other unique requirements. This helped ensure that major events never caught me by surprise and helped facilitate backward planning. Each weekend I would conduct my short-range planning, forecasting all requirements for the coming week day by day in significant detail, allowing me to identify potential points of friction and plan accordingly. During the work week, I would review my calendar multiple times a day to stay abreast of requirements and work ahead when possible, such as during short breaks between lessons or over lunch. This detailed planning gave me a significant advantage over my classmates who elected to take a day-to-day approach to PME. Many of these officers lived by the adage, “If you wait until the last minute, it only takes a minute,” and it showed in their performance.

Read Next: ‘Static Line’: An Airborne Infantryman’s Career: Chapter 2 Excerpt – ‘Stand Up, Hook Up’

Leverage Downtime. Time is perhaps an officer’s most precious resource during PME. Those striving to excel must seek to maximize their time outside of class. This includes multitasking and taking advantage of weekends and holidays. Physical training and daily commutes present excellent opportunities for multitasking. Several reading requirements, including military publications, are now available as audiobooks. While not for the faint of heart, officers can also make voice recordings of their study materials to use as audio flashcards. Although not the most riveting material, completing reading assignments or studying by audio while doing cardio, driving, or performing chores around the house can buy back a considerable amount of time. Weekends and holidays offer the most potential. While these short breaks provide a great opportunity to unwind and relax, officers striving to excel will take advantage of this downtime to chip away at long-range requirements and prepare themselves for the coming week.

Do the Reading. As an assistant professor at West Point, it never failed to surprise me how many cadets consciously chose to “assume risk” rather than do the assigned reading for class. While some cadets may have been able to skate by, it was exceptionally disappointing to learn that this was the approach that so many of America’s “best and brightest” took toward their education. Unfortunately, that same indolence exists in officers at PME, epitomized by the popular saying, “It’s only a lot of reading if you do it.” While many officers still manage to complete PME in this manner, those seeking to excel need to do the reading, take notes, and participate in class. These simple actions, which are every officer’s responsibility during PME, will help set studious officers apart from their apathetic classmates in more ways than just their academic evaluation reports (AERs).

Learn From Your Classmates. Instructors are not the only people officers can learn from during PME. Officers can learn a great deal from their classmates if so inclined. Each officer brings unique knowledge, skills, and experiences into the classroom. Unfortunately, some officers fail to capitalize on the knowledge and experience of their peers. For example, during the Special Forces Qualification Course, all but two of the captains had combat experience. Many of my peers dismissed these captains based on their “slick sleeves.” However, in reality, these two captains had a lot to contribute. Having served their lieutenant years as opposing force (OPFOR) platoon leaders at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center, these two officers possessed several years of training and experience in small unit tactics and guerrilla warfare. Those of us willing to learn from the experiences of our “slick-sleeved” classmates benefited immensely.

Help Your Classmates. Officers in a position to do so should seek out opportunities to assist their fellow classmates. Aiding others can help an officer develop mastery of the subject matter. While attending CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, I spent a considerable amount of time assisting my classmates from non-combat arms branches with assignments and exercises related to tactics and strategy. Beyond the sense of personal and professional fulfillment I felt from helping my fellow officers, talking them through different concepts and answering their questions forced me to rethink and articulate the subject matter, ultimately strengthening my knowledge of the topics.

PME is Enduring. Officers should remember that PME is enduring. Officers cannot afford to simply “brain dump” knowledge immediately following an examination, practical exercise, or even graduation. While formal PME may be limited to the months spent in each course, every officer has a responsibility to continue their own professional military education and development beyond the confines of formal schooling. Officers must not only retain this knowledge but should continue to build upon it through its practical application. Taking the time to deliberately reflect on and make the connections between schoolhouse knowledge and real-world application is what truly makes an officer an expert in their craft. As such, officers should keep and periodically review their PME materials. A technique I employed was to maintain a three-ring binder with all of the unclassified study guides I used throughout my career. Every week I would pick one or two study guides and dedicate ten or fifteen minutes to reviewing the material. Beyond just refreshing my memory, the information would often take on new meaning as I would reflect on it with new experiences, ultimately contributing to a deeper understanding of the material.

The Bottom Line. There are numerous factors that contribute to an officer’s success at PME. To me, the most important quality is taking one’s education and development as an officer seriously. In every course I attended, there were officers that were likely more capable than I was, but very few took their responsibility as seriously as I did. By approaching PME with the right attitude and commitment, I repeatedly found myself at the head of the class on graduation day. However, infinitely more important than graduation day honors or high marks on a course evaluation were the knowledge and experience I took away from those courses and applied to operational assignments throughout my career. Study hard and good luck!

—

About the Author: Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Ken Segelhorst graduated at or near the top of every evaluation-producing military course he attended during his career. He graduated first in his class at the Command and General Staff Officer Course, Special Forces Qualification Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course, and second at the Maneuver (Infantry) Captains Career Course and the Information Operations Qualification Course. These experiences informed his perspective on professional military education and the advice he shares here.

As someone who’s seen what happens when the truth is distorted, I know how unfair it feels when those who’ve sacrificed the most lose their voice. At SOFREP, our veteran journalists, who once fought for freedom, now fight to bring you unfiltered, real-world intel. But without your support, we risk losing this vital source of truth. By subscribing, you’re not just leveling the playing field—you’re standing with those who’ve already given so much, ensuring they continue to serve by delivering stories that matter. Every subscription means we can hire more veterans and keep their hard-earned knowledge in the fight. Don’t let their voices be silenced. Please consider subscribing now.

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sofrep.com · by Ken Segelhorst · August 16, 2025

10. Decision-Making Paralysis & Trust Erosion: From Psychological Warfare to an AI-Led “Information War”

Excerpts:

Malicious actors employ a wide range of strategies to manipulate information. These are compounded by unintentional actions, such as the widespread resharing of unverified content, which also contribute significantly to the spread of disinformation. As previously highlighted, these hybrid threats are multimodal and increasingly realistic, often triggering what is known as the Liar’s Dividend: a phenomenon where the sheer volume of manipulated content leads people to distrust even accurate information.

When highly convincing visual content is combined with sophisticated textual or audio manipulation, it becomes increasingly difficult to escape the credibility trap they create. Moreover, disinformation is no longer limited to emotional language or overtly biased narratives. Today’s manipulation strategies are far more subtle and complex, making even text-based distortions harder to detect and more dangerous in their ability to shape perceptions.

To begin, it’s essential to distinguish between the different tactics used in the spread of misinformation and disinformation:

Framing: 

Translation and Transcreation Manipulation:

Artificial Amplification and the Illusion of Consensus

Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) Exploitation

Doppelgänger Operations: Cyber Deception Meets Disinformation

From AI-weapons to AI for Good: how AI can support OSINT analysts

Decision-Making Paralysis & Trust Erosion: From Psychological Warfare to an AI-Led “Information War”

hozint.com · by Hozint · August 12, 2025

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Information Warfare is no longer confined to the battlefield; it permeates every layer of society. From institutional decision-making and intelligence analysis to everyday users seeking trustworthy news, we are all operating in an environment shaped by increasingly sophisticated disinformation tactics. What was once a secondary concern in OSINT operations is now a primary threat: the credibility of sources and content is under continuous attack.

While not a new phenomenon, Information Warfare has evolved into one of the most complex hybrid threats, especially with the rise of Generative AI. As highlighted by organisations like NATO, EDMO, and the Joint Research Centre, AI-powered deepfakes, doctored footage, and manipulated texts are now weaponised to distort perception, paralyse decision-making, and undermine public trust.

This article examines the evolving strategies of disinformation and AI-driven manipulation, and their implications for situational awareness in an era of digital deception. We also briefly discuss potential approaches to enhance the detection and mitigation of disinformation.

Challenges in Source Reliability and Content Credibility

Malicious actors employ a wide range of strategies to manipulate information. These are compounded by unintentional actions, such as the widespread resharing of unverified content, which also contribute significantly to the spread of disinformation. As previously highlighted, these hybrid threats are multimodal and increasingly realistic, often triggering what is known as the Liar’s Dividend: a phenomenon where the sheer volume of manipulated content leads people to distrust even accurate information.

When highly convincing visual content is combined with sophisticated textual or audio manipulation, it becomes increasingly difficult to escape the credibility trap they create. Moreover, disinformation is no longer limited to emotional language or overtly biased narratives. Today’s manipulation strategies are far more subtle and complex, making even text-based distortions harder to detect and more dangerous in their ability to shape perceptions.

To begin, it’s essential to distinguish between the different tactics used in the spread of misinformation and disinformation:

Framing: This is a subtle yet powerful manipulation technique in which factual information is presented in a way that steers interpretation. By selectively emphasising or omitting details, using metaphors, repetition, or specific visual cues, actors can guide audiences toward a desired narrative. Framing is particularly dangerous because it does not rely on false information per se, but on how the information is packaged. Its sophistication allows it to not only reinforce existing biases within echo chambers but also mislead well-intentioned individuals seeking accurate information. Disinformation about migration in Europe often relies on framing migrants as threats to society. Recent studies by the EU have found that false narratives frequently portray migrants as dangers to Europeans’ health, wealth, or cultural identity. For example, in August 2023, Greece’s Evros region (a key entry point for asylum seekers from Turkey) was engulfed in the largest wildfires ever recorded in the EU, killing at least 20 people; many of them migrants who were hiding in the forests. Instead of uniting the country in mourning, these fires became the backdrop for a disinformation campaign that falsely blamed migrants for the disaster. Almost immediately after the fires broke out, conspiracy-laden stories began spreading. “600 more [migrants are] ready to burn you… they will burn the city down”, urging citizens to form groups to “protect the homeland” or “We are at war – illegal immigrants… have set more than 10 fires”. Other examples of framing can also be found in Ukraine-Russia-related content, with even more sophisticated strategies.

Translation and Transcreation Manipulation: Disinformation is often tailored, or localised, to specific audiences, whether national populations or niche online communities. As a result, translation becomes a critical factor in both the detection and dissemination of manipulated narratives. Simply translating a piece of content into English (or any other language) may not be sufficient to uncover the underlying framing tactics or narrative distortions. In some cases, translation itself is weaponised: content is deliberately mistranslated to alter meaning, inject bias, or provoke division. During the war in Ukraine, for example, Chinese-language disinformation campaigns paired genuine video footage with fabricated subtitles, completely distorting the statements of Ukrainian officials. This tactic, known as transcreation, goes beyond translation or localisation; it actively reshapes the message to manipulate perceptions across linguistic and cultural lines.

However, the propagation of disinformation goes far beyond textual manipulation; it also involves psychological strategies and technically sophisticated tactics designed to exploit both individual cognition and digital ecosystems.

Artificial Amplification and the Illusion of Consensus

Disinformation campaigns frequently rely on coordinated bot networks, troll farms, and fake accounts to artificially amplify false or misleading narratives. This manufactured amplification creates a false sense of consensus and perceived credibility. The more often a piece of content is seen, the more likely it is to be accepted as true by the average user.

During recent conflicts, such as the Iran-Israel escalation, armies of fake and automated social media accounts disseminated AI-generated videos, like viral deepfakes of missile strikes and downed jets, to millions. Similarly, Russian influence operations have employed bot-driven campaigns across platforms to reinforce preferred narratives while drowning out dissenting or fact-based information. These efforts entrench users within filter bubbles and echo chambers, where repeated exposure reinforces belief, even in demonstrably false claims.

Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) Exploitation

Closely linked to amplification, SEO manipulation is another key tactic. Disinformation actors leverage marketing strategies, such as keyword stuffing, traffic hijacking, and exploiting data voids, to dominate search results.

Bot and troll networks can fill gaps in online discourse by introducing new narratives and repeatedly sharing them until they become trending topics. Conversely, they can hijack already trending keywords to attach visibility to completely unrelated or misleading content.

Moreover, these networks often coordinate to drive traffic toward a specific “anchor source,” which may appear authoritative while being entirely fabricated. With the rise of AI agents capable of automating and scaling these efforts, this tactic is only set to grow in sophistication and reach.

Doppelgänger Operations: Cyber Deception Meets Disinformation

One of the most insidious hybrid threats is the Doppelgänger operation, a blend of cyber tactics and information warfare. At the basic level, this may involve spoofing trusted domains by slightly altering top-level domain names (e.g., nationalgeographic.com.co instead of nationalgeographic.com). More complex operations involve cloning entire news websites to create fake but convincing replicas that publish fabricated or heavily distorted content.

In 2024, German investigative outlet CORRECTIV exposed how Russian networks conducted such operations, cloning reputable domains like spiegel.de into spiegel.ltd. These campaigns used rotating domains, traffic obfuscation, and cybercriminal infrastructure to bypass detection by social media platforms and content moderation tools.

Doppelgänger campaigns represent a full-spectrum hybrid threat. They combine psychological manipulation, linguistic deception, and technical obfuscation to exploit trust, deceiving not only readers but also platforms, search engines, and even regulators. Their “credibility trap” is not merely narrative but structural, making them especially difficult to counter.

From AI-weapons to AI for Good: how AI can support OSINT analysts

As AI-War is always closer, for us at Hozint it is always increasingly important to make sure to provide trusted information and situational awareness solutions, while supporting our Analysts against Information Overload and disinformation and misinformation strategies. In a world where AI can be used as a weapon, we want to leverage it in an ethical way.

Firstly, we want to work on AI as a support for Analysts in assessing sources’ reliability and content credibility. Once again, AI will not be a replacement for humans. Hybrid Tactics need Hybrid Responses. A Multi-Layer Solution is essential. Furthermore, our AI-based solution could have a dual usability: supporting analysts from one side, and revealing disinformation and cognitive strategies patterns and clusters on the other, making our platform always closer to investigating new and more sophisticated Hybrid Threats.

But how can we achieve this? How can AI support OSINT Analysts in filtering among reliable and trusted sources and content?

Among the various experiments and solutions to test, here are some ideas on how AI can support analysts both in assessing reliability and in investigating new hybrid threat patterns.

Following the order of the disinformation strategies presented previously, we will start with linguistic and narrative-related strategies.

Both Framing and Multilingualism can be supported by the use of Agentic AI and Large Language Models, which are increasingly improving their multilingual skills, supporting OSINT companies and analysts in detecting mistranslations, and/or performing preliminary automatic analysis of contents in several languages, which, of course, need to be checked by a human native speaker. Several solutions are being tested lately, just like LlamaLens, which can already support the analysts in checking coherence between titles and the news of texts (thus also coherence with SEO keywords), perform fact-checking and linguistic analysis. Framing analysis is still complex, and this is where we want to put our efforts in research.

Moving to metadata and more technical aspects, some of the viable solutions may be related to increasing the extraction of metadata. Our AI crawlers can be enhanced to not only extract relevant articles and reports, but also to comprehensively collect and evaluate key metadata, such as author, publisher, publication date, domain registration (WHOIS checks), and even location or topic clustering. This supports analysts in quickly identifying suspicious sources, such as doppelganger websites or domains with unusual propagation patterns, while maintaining a continuously updated reliability database.

AI can flag anomalous propagation of news, such as rapid distribution across obscure domains or clusters of articles that link back to suspicious anchors, by automatically analysing temporal data and SEO keywords. This identifies signs of bot/troll amplification and SEO abuse, which are increasingly common tactics in hybrid threats. Analysts can then focus their expertise on these red flags, instead of focusing on content from the whole Internet.

It is important to note that we are aware of the fact that metadata richness should be intended as a positive sign, but it could itself be part of a malicious strategy. What if the names of authors are simply pseudonyms? Or they can even be real, and still want to disseminate low-quality content. By leveraging AI for preliminary analysis, to be then confirmed or corrected by analysts, our databases will avoid static scoring, and will also keep track and monitor scores per source and authors (if any). While this information will be kept private, it will support the continuous building of a credibility trap table per content, depending on the several analyses performed, while also highlighting and revealing possible clusters of threats.

Data and Information Findability, accessibility, transparency, interoperability, and shareability are all important in OSINT analysis, and now more than ever, it is important for us to leverage them for ethical AI use in mitigating disinformation and psychological warfare.

We are still at the very beginning of our research and development journey, aiming not only to improve the real-time discovery of information but also to equip analysts with new, more powerful tools to defend themselves from today’s rapidly evolving information warfare.

About The Author:

Antonella Calò, former Intern at HOZINT – Horizon Intelligence, is a National Ph.D. Candidate in “Regulation, Management, and Law of Public Sector Organisations” (38th Cycle) at the University of Salento. Her academic research intersects with applied projects in cooperation with the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), focusing on Critical Entities Resilience, Hybrid Threats detection, and computational linguistics applications in defence, security, and societal preparedness. In 2022, leveraging a background in linguistics, Antonella joined the Datalab at the Department of Engineering for Innovation (University of Salento), where she expanded her expertise in Data and Information Sciences. This led to her specialisation in Computational Linguistics, including Natural Language Processing (NLP), Large Language Models (LLMs), and Ontology Engineering. Her work also integrates principles of Cyber and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), particularly in the context of threat detection and information environments. Her main research focus revolves around the availability, quality, lack of harmonisation, and/or manipulation of information, and AI-based methods to mitigate their negative impacts on societal resilience. Her work at HOZINT, also consisted of doing research and sharing her perspectives on source reliability and content credibility methodology assessment in the era of AI-led Information and Cognitive Warfare.

hozint.com · by Hozint · August 12, 2025

11. Australian and Philippine forces launch largest military exercises near disputed South China Sea

Members of our silk web of friends, partners, and allies getting after it with China.

Australian and Philippine forces launch largest military exercises near disputed South China Sea

greenwichtime.com · by JIM GOMEZ

In this photo provided by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine military chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. speaks during the opening ceremony of joint military drills between Australia and the Philippines called Alon, meaning wave in the Philippine language, in Palawan province, Philippines on Friday, Aug. 15, 2025. (Armed Forces of the Philippines via AP)

AP

In this photo provided by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Deputy Ambassador of Australia to the Philippines Moya Collett, left, places the Exercise ALON 2025 patch on military chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. during the opening ceremony of joint military drills between Australia and the Philippines in Palawan province, Philippines on Friday, Aug. 15, 2025. (Armed Forces of the Philippines via AP)

AP

In this photo provided by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from left, Maj. Gen. Francisco F Lorenzo Jr., commander of AFP Education, Training and Doctrine Command; military chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr., Deputy Ambassador of Australia to the Philippines Moya Collett, Vice Adm. Alfonso F Torres Jr., Commander of Western Command, Donald D. Ocampo, Acting Head, DFA Consular Office in Puerto Princesa, and Deputy Chief of Joint Operations Maj. Gen. Hugh McAslan stand together as the exercise flag unfurls during the opening ceremony of joint military drills between Australia and the Philippines in Palawan province, Philippines on Friday, Aug. 15, 2025. (Armed Forces of the Philippines via AP)

AP

In this photo provided by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Maj. Gen. Francisco F Lorenzo Jr., left, commander of the AFP Education, Training and Doctrine Command, pins the ALON Exercise 2025 patch on Deputy Chief of Joint Operations Maj. Gen. Hugh McAslan during the opening ceremony of joint military drills between Australia and the Philippines in Palawan province, Philippines on Friday, Aug. 15, 2025. (Armed Forces of the Philippines via AP)

AP

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — Australia on Friday launched its largest military exercises with Philippine forces, involving more than 3,600 military personnel in live-fire drills, battle maneuvers and a beach assault at a Philippine town facing the disputed South China Sea, where the allies have raised alarm over Beijing’s assertive actions.

The exercises are called Alon, meaning wave in the Philippine language, and will showcase Australia’s firepower. The drills will involve a guided-missile navy destroyer, F/A-18 supersonic fighter jets, a C-130 troop and cargo aircraft, Javelin anti-tank weapons and special forces sniper weapons.

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Military officials said defense forces from the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Indonesia will join as observers.

“This exercise reflects Australia’s commitment to working with partners to ensure we maintain a region where state sovereignty is protected, international law is followed and nations can make decisions free from coercion,” Vice Admiral Justin Jones of the Royal Australian Navy said in a statement.

The combat exercises are “an opportunity for us to practice how we collaborate and respond to shared security challenges and project force over great distances in the Indo-Pacific,” Jones said.

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The exercises will run until Aug. 29.

Australia is the second country after the U.S. with a visiting forces agreement with the Philippines, allowing the deployment of large numbers of troops for combat exercises in each other's territory.

The Philippines has signed a similar pact with Japan, which will take effect next month. It is in talks with several other Asian and Western countries including France and Canada for similar defense accords.

China has deplored multinational war drills and alliances in or near the disputed South China Sea, saying the U.S. and its allies are “ganging up” against it and militarizing the region.

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China claims most of the South China Sea, a busy global trade route, where it has had a spike of territorial faceoffs with the Philippines in recent years. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also lay claims to the resource-rich waters.

On Monday, a Chinese navy ship collided with a Chinese coast guard ship while trying to drive away a smaller Philippine coast guard vessel in the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.

The Australian Embassy in Manila expressed concern over “the dangerous and unprofessional conduct of Chinese vessels near Scarborough Shoal involving the Philippine Coast Guard” and said the incident “highlights the need for de-escalation, restraint and respect for international law.”

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In response, the U.S. deployed two warships off the Scarborough on Wednesday in what it called a freedom of navigation operation to protest China’s expansive claims, restrictions and its demand for entry notifications in the disputed waters.

In February, a Chinese J-16 fighter jet released flares that passed within 30 meters (100 feet) of an Australian P-8 Poseidon military surveillance plane in daylight and in international air space, Australian defense officials said at the time.

greenwichtime.com · by JIM GOMEZ

12. Opinion: Europe faces the Koreanization of Ukraine

Excerpts:

With the U.S. now likely moving to a purely “offshore balancer of power,” in Europe, perhaps it can show how an economically integrated but militarily loose federation of states backed by French and U.K. nuclear deterrents can cobble together enough economic and military power to deter and deny Russia.

But they’re going to have to move fast. Poland, Finland, Sweden and the Baltics are already doing all the heavy lifting. Those five per cent NATO commitments west of the Danube are going to need to meaningfully translate into material hard power — not just raising depleted military wages and pension pots.

It’s also going to mean developing a fully integrated defence structure to manage its Eastern flank that has potency. Without the U.S., this also means losing scale in delivering precision guided munitions (PGMs) through space-based reconnaissance strike complexes (RSCs).

Putin has largely kept the war away from his own cities. Europe must quickly develop a credible deterrence with precision long-range munitions at scale through an anti-access, area denial (A2AD) strategy that makes Putin think twice about the price he, his rear areas, and his cities would pay for renewed aggression. They’ve got 3 years to do it.

If Europe can manage that, and with the U.S. otherwise distracted or disinterested, a Koreanized Ukraine with an uneasy peace held together by fear and mutual distrust is about the best we can hope for.

Opinion: Europe faces the Koreanization of Ukraine

It is about the best that can be hoped for

Author of the article:

By Othón León, David Oliver

Published Aug 15, 2025

Last updated 1 day ago

nationalpost.com · by David Oliver

It is about the best that can be hoped for

(FILES) (COMBO) This combination of file photographs created on August 8, 2025 shows Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) giving a speech during an event to mark the 1160th anniversary of Russia's statehood in Veliky Novgorod on September 21, 2022, and US President-elect Donald Trump looking on during a meeting with France's President at the Elysee Palace in Paris, on December 7, 2024. (Photo by ILYA PITALEV,SARAH MEYSSONNIER/SPUTNIK/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

The Korean War’s fighting ended in 1953 without a formal treaty — one of the original “frozen conflicts.” Its end, after years of bloody stalemate, came through exhaustion and with the spectre of nuclear war.

The conflict in Ukraine will be a similarly frozen one — Koreanized. A semi-permanent pause, probably without a meaningful concluding treaty, and like Korea, an enduring geopolitical sore that could turn “hot” again at any moment.

U.S. President Trump has been on something of a roll with “peace” agreements recently. He’s concluded them with Vietnam and Cambodia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ukraine continues to elude him.

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Stephen Kotkin, the preeminent Russian historian and Stalin biographer, wrote in 2016: “Someday, Russia’s leaders may come to terms with the glaring limits of standing up to the West and seeking to dominate Eurasia. Until then, Russia will remain not another necessary crusade to be won but a problem to be managed.”

Trump doesn’t face Mao and Stalin as Eisenhower did, but a man in Vladimir Putin who deludes that Russia can recreate itself as a Eurasian power even as its demographic, economic and technological decline increases its own status as supplicant to China. Just like North Korea.

As Trump seeks the cherry on the cake of his application for a Nobel Peace prize in Anchorage on Friday, the West remains divided on how to manage the “problem.”

The U.S. doesn’t want to be seen to have lost in Ukraine, but as JD Vance has just restated, it doesn’t want to pay the bill to win either. Europe, with its failure of statecraft, complacently ignored Russia’s renewed contestation in Europe from 2007, dithered after his brazen annexation of Crimea in 2014, and only started to confront its new geopolitical reality after the full invasion in 2022.

While it has stumped up plenty of cash to support Ukraine, it still lacks credibility as a realistic military force, which is why Trump circumvents them.

A deal on Friday will mean nothing much really changes for Putin. No Russian troops will be leaving Crimea. Or the Donbas. None will be leaving the Crimea land-bridge regions of Zaporizhzhia or Kherson.

Putin could give up some token Russian gains so that Trump can declare a ceasefire or the hope for more negotiations that will resolve little. While Ukraine will never willingly give up land, its exhausted and knows it can’t evict Russia from the 20 per cent of Ukraine it occupies even as Putin pushes for a few final, cynical gains.

It is a tragedy that peoples and territories of a sovereign country will have to accept de facto annexation by a revisionist, backward looking and declining Great Power. But that’s already happened. Ukraine will, like Korea, end up being split and frozen because there’s no better alternative, no prospect of victory for either side that doesn’t escalate to nuclear conflict.

Putin believes the U.S. is mentally already on its way out of Europe, even if its nuclear umbrella stays intact. A ceasefire could give him time to rearm and reequip to try and test Europe’s resolve again in a few years. By then there might be a real crisis in the Taiwan strait that leaves little scope for U.S. attention in Europe. This would be a very dangerous situation.

Trump and Vice-President JD Vance’s frustration with Europe’s lack of military heft forgets that Europe was never meant to be able to protect itself after 1945 because that would have meant another hegemonic continental power. The fear of a revived Germany dominated U.S. and western strategy during the Cold War as much as the fear of the Soviet Union — ask Margaret Thatcher who believed German reunification was a mistake.

With the U.S. now likely moving to a purely “offshore balancer of power,” in Europe, perhaps it can show how an economically integrated but militarily loose federation of states backed by French and U.K. nuclear deterrents can cobble together enough economic and military power to deter and deny Russia.

But they’re going to have to move fast. Poland, Finland, Sweden and the Baltics are already doing all the heavy lifting. Those five per cent NATO commitments west of the Danube are going to need to meaningfully translate into material hard power — not just raising depleted military wages and pension pots.

It’s also going to mean developing a fully integrated defence structure to manage its Eastern flank that has potency. Without the U.S., this also means losing scale in delivering precision guided munitions (PGMs) through space-based reconnaissance strike complexes (RSCs).

Putin has largely kept the war away from his own cities. Europe must quickly develop a credible deterrence with precision long-range munitions at scale through an anti-access, area denial (A2AD) strategy that makes Putin think twice about the price he, his rear areas, and his cities would pay for renewed aggression. They’ve got 3 years to do it.

If Europe can manage that, and with the U.S. otherwise distracted or disinterested, a Koreanized Ukraine with an uneasy peace held together by fear and mutual distrust is about the best we can hope for.

David Oliver is a geopolitical strategy expert and founder of Minerva Group. Othón León is the managing director of the Canadian Centre for Strategic Studies.

nationalpost.com · by David Oliver

13. Half-Baked Alaska – Moving from ceasefire to full settlement by Sir Lawrence Freedman

Excerpts:

So the basic consequence of this shift (if it lasts) is that it is even less likely that there will be any peace deal soon. Trump may not appreciate this. One of the problems with his peacemaking efforts is that he fabricates deals in his head and then gets cross when it turns out that either Putin or Zelenskyy or both don’t agree. A move to a full peace settlement contradicts his determination to get a quick deal and end the killing. It potentially changes the incentives for the two sides - if a ceasefire is thought to be imminent then the idea is to grab as much territory as possible before the firing stops. With difficult and probably extensive negotiations underway in the background the inclination will play a much longer game. All this assumes that a serious negotiating process can be set up, which requires more than occasional meetings between leaders or perfunctory conversations between lower-level delegations. If the US is going to play a role in this then it needs to set up a proper process with full technical support. I have my doubts. This is a sudden conversion by Trump and, like others before, it may not last.

This is an unfolding story and I’ll follow it during the course of this week. I’ll do a post soon on Ukraine’s ability to keep going when an early ceasefire is not on the cards.

Half-Baked Alaska

Moving from ceasefire to full settlement

https://substack.com/@lawrencefreedman454213

Lawrence Freedman

Aug 16, 2025

∙ Paid

It is fair to say that the Alaska summit was not burdened by high expectations. Its origins gave ample grounds for anxiety. The US had been on course to punish Russian intransigence with new sanctions. Instead Putin was rewarded by a high-profile summit. As I wrote in my previous post the Trump administration bamboozled itself into thinking that a breakthrough was on the cards. This was because amateur negotiator Steve Witkoff had misunderstood what was on offer from Moscow. Trump spoke enthusiastically about land swaps as a way forward, although Putin had never suggested any interest in such a deal.

Those gloomiest about the likely outcome worried that Putin would persuade Trump to agree a one-sided deal which he would then impose on Zelenskyy. That did not happen. Trump said there had been progress but no deal. In addition he spoke to Zelenskyy after the summit, with European leaders, and the Ukrainian leader spoke positively about the conversation afterwards. He will now be visiting Trump in Washington.

That was the glass half full aspect of the summit. The glass half empty aspect was Putin’s red carpet treatment, the imagery that allowed the Russian media to claim that Putin had been rescued from international isolation, and the fact that he was allowed to frame the results as soon as the meeting concluded, speaking before Trump. He presented the conversation, which was shorter than anticipated and did not even reach lunch, as a great success and a boost to US-Russian friendship, and presented himself as a seeker after peace, repeating his standard formulation:

‘We’re convinced that in order to make the settlement lasting and long-term, we need to eliminate all of the primary causes of the conflict.’

He added for good measure that:

‘We expect that Kyiv and European capitals will perceive that constructively and will not throw a wrench in the works.’

Trump’s response was subdued, as if he was casting about for something to say to hide the fact that nothing had been achieved, leading him into a familiar riff on the ‘hoax’ about Russian interference in the 2016 election, and the sort of pleasantries that might be tolerable when trying to bring a fruitless business meeting to an end but excessive when dealing with an aggressive state. At the end Putin caught him out by suggesting (in English) that the next meeting could be in Moscow but at least that offer was deflected.

In a follow-on interview with Sean Hannity, Trump was more upbeat. Again, he did not rule out sanctions but once again a decision was put off for ‘two to three weeks.’ He also described the meeting as ‘ten-out-of-ten’ and quoted Putin approvingly on how he had not really lost the 2020 election.

I concluded my previous post suggesting that:

‘During this week, as functionaries try to prepare the agenda for the summit, it will become apparent that the big concession they thought they had was an illusion, and that Putin is only looking forward to lecturing Trump on the righteousness of the Russian position.’

In terms of substantive proposals Putin took to the summit the proposal which he had first tried out on Witkoff, who had then misinterpreted it as something about land swaps (about which I suspect we will now hear little). This proposal required that Ukraine handing over of all of Donetsk in return for a ceasefire along the rest of the line of contact. The idea of handing over any Ukrainian territory has been rejected by Zelenskyy and it is some relief that it was rejected by the US side at the summit. There is one area where there has been a shift - not in terms of substance but of process. This is to shift the argument from how to get an immediate ceasefire, which has been Trump’s priority, to negotiations on a final settlement while the fighting continues. In the rest of this post I’ll explore the implications of this shift for the peace process.

The One Thing That has Changed

On 11 August Trump repeated his belief in land swaps, and reverted back to blaming the victim when Zelenskyy tried to explain that his constitutional position was limited when it came to agreeing territorial changes for the sake of a settlement. Trump described himself as ‘a little bothered’ by this claim: ‘He’s got approval to go into war and kill everybody, but he needs approval to do a land swap?’ By the next day he was sounding more cautious. The summit now would be a ‘feel-out meeting’ intended to see if Putin was ready to reach an agreement, with the added suggestion that this might not take more than a couple of minutes. He admitted that there was 25% chance that the meeting with Putin would not be successful. He even started to talk about 'severe consequences' for Russia if there was no agreement.

It did not take too long for Moscow to engage in its expectation management. It was made clear that Russia was not going was not going to give back land it had taken, and wanted more. Alexei Fadeev of the Russian Foreign Ministry soon explained that: ‘Russia's position remains unchanged, and it was voiced in this very hall just over a year ago, on June 14, 2024.’ (I discussed this speech and the regular repetition of its main themes in this post). The Kremlin also damped down expectations, with spokesman Dmitri Peskov explaining that there would not be a prepared document. The Russians also appeared keen to add to the agenda questions of economic cooperation and even nuclear arms control to avoid the risk of a blow up over Putin’s disinterest in an immediate ceasefire.

Allies, fretting about what Trump might do, managed to arrange a virtual meeting on 13 August to impress upon Trump their concerns, finding the right blend of language to praise his efforts to get a peace while warning of Putin’s malign intentions. Their basic objective was to push back the conversation to the place where Trump had started – in favour of an immediate ceasefire with detailed negotiations to follow. Zelenskyy had his own conversation with Trump, which apparently went well. He then gathered around him his support group of European countries - the ‘coalition of the willing’, led by Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron. This is what they stated:

• Meaningful negotiations can only take place amid a ceasefire or a lasting halt to hostilities
• Sanctions and wider economic measures to put pressure on Russia should be strengthened if a ceasefire is not agreed at Friday's Alaska meeting
• International borders "must not be changed by force"
• Ukraine needs "robust and credible" security guarantees to defend its sovereignty and land - the coalition says it is "willing to play an active role" in this via a "reassurance force" once fighting ends.

Just before the meeting, in an interview with Bret Baier, Trump confirmed the first point:

‘I'd like to see a ceasefire. I wouldn't be thrilled if I didn't get it. But everyone says you're not going to get the ceasefire, it'll take place on the second meeting. The second meeting is going to be very, but I'm not going to be happy with that. So, we'll see what happens. I'm going to be, I won't be happy if I walk away without some form of a ceasefire. Now, I say this, and I've said it from the beginning, this is really setting the table today,’

But after the meeting, in a post on his ‘Truth Social’, Trump recorded an important change in his position:

‘It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up.’

This is a big change and brings Trump in line with Putin’s position that a ceasefire would just freeze the problem and provide no solution.

The post-summit ‘coalition of the willing’ statement, made no mention of a ceasefire, despite its prominence before the summit. It instead stressed security guarantees - the big issue in earlier discussions.

‘We are clear that Ukraine must have ironclad security guarantees to effectively defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It will be up to Ukraine to make decisions on its territory. International borders must not be changed by force.’

They were also pushing the idea of a trilateral summit with Trump, Putin and Zelenskyy, which is even less likely now, but they expressed satisfaction that Trump would be meeting Zelenskyy.

What does the big change mean?

The end of pressure for an immediate ceasefire is a win for Putin, but it comes with some caveats.

First, Putin’s position on what makes for an acceptable settlement involves handing over unoccupied Ukrainian territory to Russia. That idea appealed to Trump when he had the notion that there would be some territorial compensation to Ukraine but Putin ruled that out. So adopting the position that there should be a negotiated settlement does not currently carry with it any concept of what the settlement might look like. The potential agenda for negotiations is huge (as discussed below).

Second, in the past, at least until the autumn of 2023, Ukraine was assumed to be the party most opposed to a ceasefire on the grounds that it would allow Russia to hold on to its gains. Even now there are Ukrainians who are opposed to a ceasefire for this reason, and also because it would frustrate Kyiv’s ability to pursue its own issues - including child abductions and other war crimes, and reparations. Ceasefires make it possible to delay consideration of awkward issues - so Russian territorial gains may stay de facto but they don’t have to be made de jure - but in practice this may be a distinction without a difference. It avoids having to concede the point but the land stays lost.

Third, the only direct negotiations that have taken place between Russia and Ukraine, during the first months after the full-scale invasion were about a long-term settlement. They foundered on the question of security guarantee, but it is also important to note that they did not address territorial issues. Russia has insisted, against the evidence (see here), that this was a missed opportunity. Direct talks in Istanbul were reinstated last May, and so far the main achievement has been prisoner swaps. There have been reports of some direct conversations that have reverted to some of the earlier issues including force levels but little detail.

Fourth, while ceasefires are simpler to negotiate than full peace settlements that does not mean that they are simple. Some sort of disengagement of forces may be required. Demarcation lines will have to be identified. Then there are questions of how they are to be policed.

Fifth, a peace settlement cannot be arranged without an extensive process covering a multitude of issues, often of some technical complexity. In addition to the unavoidable question of security guarantees for Ukraine, the agenda will soon be filled up with Putin’s other issues of ‘denazification’ and ‘demilitarization’, which essentially refers to the subjugation of Ukraine, while Ukraine has its own issues of reparations for all the damage done to its territory by the Russian aggression, as well as war crimes.

So the basic consequence of this shift (if it lasts) is that it is even less likely that there will be any peace deal soon. Trump may not appreciate this. One of the problems with his peacemaking efforts is that he fabricates deals in his head and then gets cross when it turns out that either Putin or Zelenskyy or both don’t agree. A move to a full peace settlement contradicts his determination to get a quick deal and end the killing. It potentially changes the incentives for the two sides - if a ceasefire is thought to be imminent then the idea is to grab as much territory as possible before the firing stops. With difficult and probably extensive negotiations underway in the background the inclination will play a much longer game. All this assumes that a serious negotiating process can be set up, which requires more than occasional meetings between leaders or perfunctory conversations between lower-level delegations. If the US is going to play a role in this then it needs to set up a proper process with full technical support. I have my doubts. This is a sudden conversion by Trump and, like others before, it may not last.

This is an unfolding story and I’ll follow it during the course of this week. I’ll do a post soon on Ukraine’s ability to keep going when an early ceasefire is not on the cards.

14. European Leaders to Back Zelensky in Washington, Hoping to Counter Putin

Excerpts:

The leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Britain, Finland, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said they would join Zelensky at the White House. Zelensky on Sunday traveled to Brussels to meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, a top EU leader, and hold a video call with the other leaders to prepare for the meeting with Trump at the White House.

“It’s very important that you are with us and that we speak to America together,” Zelensky said in Brussels, standing alongside von der Leyen. “It’s crucial that Europe is as united now as it was at the very beginning—as it was in 2022,” when Russia staged its large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Zelensky said. “This unity really helps encourage real peace, and it must stay strong.”

Zelensky also thanked Trump for saying in recent conversations with European leaders that he was open to providing security guarantees to Ukraine.

European Leaders to Back Zelensky in Washington, Hoping to Counter Putin

Europeans expect Trump to pressure Ukraine’s leader to accept concession to Russia in return for ending war

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/european-leaders-to-back-zelensky-in-washington-hoping-to-counter-putin-2a82aaa4

By Daniel Michaels

Follow and Laurence Norman

Follow

Updated Aug. 17, 2025 1:11 pm ET

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels on Sunday. Photo: Olivier Hoslet/EPA/Shutterstock

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• European leaders and Zelensky will meet with President Trump in Washington to counter Russia’s proposed peace terms.View more

BRUSSELS—European leaders will travel to Washington with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to meet with President Trump on Monday, aiming for unity in pushing back against Russian efforts to dictate peace terms in their war.

The leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Britain, Finland, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said they would join Zelensky at the White House. Zelensky on Sunday traveled to Brussels to meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, a top EU leader, and hold a video call with the other leaders to prepare for the meeting with Trump at the White House.

“It’s very important that you are with us and that we speak to America together,” Zelensky said in Brussels, standing alongside von der Leyen. “It’s crucial that Europe is as united now as it was at the very beginning—as it was in 2022,” when Russia staged its large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Zelensky said. “This unity really helps encourage real peace, and it must stay strong.”

Zelensky also thanked Trump for saying in recent conversations with European leaders that he was open to providing security guarantees to Ukraine.

“For everyone in Europe this is a significant change, but there are no details how it would work and what America’s role will be, what Europe’s role will be, what the EU can do,” Zelensky said. “This is our main task: We need security to work in practice.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Sunday that a major focus of the Monday talks will be security guarantees, including the role the U.S. might potentially play.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky says it is paramount that Kyiv and its European allies stand united. Photo: simon wohlfahrt/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

“A lot of it will be centered around what are the kinds of security guarantees that Ukraine is looking for,” Rubio told Fox News. The U.S. now needs to hammer out the details of the proposal, he said, then present it to Russia and get Moscow to accept it.

“But first we have to have our, you know, our, our ducks in order,” he added.

Special Envoy Steve Witkoff said security guarantees could be modeled on Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization treaty, which says that an enemy attack against one member would be viewed as an attack against all. But the assurances wouldn’t be given formally by the alliance but by individual members, he said.

“It means that the United States is potentially prepared to be able to give Article V security guarantees but not from NATO, directly from the United States, and other European countries,” Witkoff told Fox News. “That is big.”

The European leaders said after their call that they had discussed security guarantees for Ukraine, as well the importance of Ukraine making decisions about its territory for itself, and the need to maintain pressure on Russia through sanctions.

European officials said they expect Zelensky to face pressure from Trump to accept a deal outlined by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin on Friday at their meeting in Alaska. Under that proposal, Ukraine would withdraw from and surrender its eastern Donbas region, including parts of the Donetsk region it still controls, according to officials familiar with the discussions. In exchange, Russia would freeze the conflict along the current contact line in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, the officials said.

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President Trump said he would meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after the Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin ended without any breakthrough. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/AFP/Getty Images

The officials said the main task for Zelensky on Monday will be to persuade Trump that there are other, better alternatives for meeting the U.S. president’s top goal of ending the war quickly.

Were Zelensky simply to reject Putin’s demands, the resulting impasse could lead to a fresh tensions between Trump and Zelensky. When Zelensky visited the White House in February he got into a shouting match with Trump and Vice President JD Vance.

Zelensky and European leaders have long insisted that Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereign choices should be respected in peace negotiations. European officials privately acknowledge that Ukraine won’t regain all of its territory, but they say Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine should be as small as possible and should never be recognized legally as Russian territory.

Zelensky noted Sunday that Ukraine’s constitution forbids surrendering territory or trading land. He would likely face huge pushback domestically if he ceded territory that Russia’s military hasn’t been able to conquer. 

“Putin has many demands, but we do not know all of them,” Zelensky said. “It will take time to go through them all. It’s impossible to do this under the pressure of weapons,” so a cease-fire is necessary now, followed by quick work on a final deal, he said.

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com

15. A Bad Summit’s Silver Lining By John Bolton

Excerpts:

While it is a minority view, I believe Mr. Trump’s announcement is positive news for Kyiv, although not for the reason he gives. Cease-fire lines typically fall along existing military front lines. When negotiations follow a cease-fire, particularly when accompanied by the deployment of peacekeeping forces, as has also been suggested, the cease-fire line often hardens. In short order, cease-fire lines can become de facto borders. Consider the history of many United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as Cyprus since 1964, or the Korean Armistice, which after two years of negotiations froze the border between North and South Korea for 72 years and counting.

Mr. Putin’s postsummit remarks emphasized that Russia’s aims—essentially re-creating the Russian Empire, hadn’t changed a scintilla. Russia holds roughly 20% of Ukraine’s territory, doubling from the approximately 10% seized in 2014 in the first phase of Moscow’s annexation plan. If a cease-fire line traces what Moscow now holds in phase two and negotiations drag on, Mr. Putin will gain time to restore his economy, rebuild and repurpose his army and navy, and prepare for phase three. He has patience, waiting eight years between the first two efforts at reuniting “little Russia” (as Muscovites call Ukraine), with the rodina, or motherland. In response, Ukraine requires security guarantees, including from Washington—about which Mr. Trump remains exceedingly vague, his recent positive noises notwithstanding.

Kyiv should reject this scenario unequivocally, not embrace it, with one major caveat. Ukraine must have assurances that European and U.S. military assistance will continue at appropriate levels to allow them to resist further Russian advances, and begin regaining lands, to achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s stated goal of restoring the country’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity. This will force Mr. Trump and the Europeans to decide whether they are prepared to accept Russian aggression or resist it.

A Bad Summit’s Silver Lining

Trump’s announcement that a cease-fire won’t precede peace talks is good news for Ukraine.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/a-bad-summits-silver-lining-russia-ukraine-war-trump-putin-summit-alaska-88ee5c42

By John Bolton

Aug. 17, 2025 11:36 am ET

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Alaska, Aug. 15. Photo: PO/Zuma Press

Vladimir Putin led Russia out of international isolation on Friday, striding down a red carpet to greet an applauding Donald Trump. He accepted a ride with President Trump in “the Beast,” and one-on-one applied his KGB training to restart one of Moscow’s most effective influence operations ever. After the Alaska summit, Mr. Putin could legitimately say, as generations of victorious generals have, “The day is ours.”

Since his first encounter with Kim Jong Un, Mr. Trump has argued that U.S. presidents lose nothing by meeting rogue foreign leaders without previously exacting a price. Most everyone else disagrees, especially the rogues. Friday’s summit should clear up Mr. Trump’s misapprehension. Mr. Putin emerged from diplomatic purdah with flags unfurled, literally. How long before Europeans like France’s ever-opportunistic Emmanuel Macron phone Mr. Putin or visit him in Moscow? And how does India, under sanctions from Washington for buying Russian oil, feel about still hanging out to dry?

At the summit’s concluding media event, the leaders were addressing multiple audiences: America, Russia, Ukraine, Europe and, never forget, China. Worried about all these audiences, the White House worked assiduously beforehand to lower expectations. Among Americans, only MAGA loyalists could assert their leader had a good day. Russians seemed exuberant, and in Kyiv and other European capitals the mood was disquiet or dismay. Xi Jinping may now be more inclined to meet with Mr. Trump, having noted his evident fatigue during the press conference.

We don’t know whether the economic teams—Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and their Russian counterparts—took advantage of their free time to confer. From Moscow’s perspective, it was a real opportunity. Even if these ministers reached no conclusions, they could have laid the basis for future discussions between Messrs. Trump and Putin, or at least arranged for their own subordinates to prepare the way.

Mr. Trump rated the Putin meeting a 10 “in the sense that we got along great,” essentially the only measure he credits. “Make a deal,” he advised Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky. “Russia is a very big power.” Mr. Zelensky immediately announced he would meet Mr. Trump in Washington on Monday.

The crucial news, underlining the Monday meeting’s importance, came after Mr. Trump left Alaska. He wrote on Truth Social that “the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up.”

That directly contradicts the unanimous pre-summit European view that a cease-fire must be in place before substantive discussions begin. It was unclear how European leaders reacted; their postsummit statement was silent on the subject.

While it is a minority view, I believe Mr. Trump’s announcement is positive news for Kyiv, although not for the reason he gives. Cease-fire lines typically fall along existing military front lines. When negotiations follow a cease-fire, particularly when accompanied by the deployment of peacekeeping forces, as has also been suggested, the cease-fire line often hardens. In short order, cease-fire lines can become de facto borders. Consider the history of many United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as Cyprus since 1964, or the Korean Armistice, which after two years of negotiations froze the border between North and South Korea for 72 years and counting.

Mr. Putin’s postsummit remarks emphasized that Russia’s aims—essentially re-creating the Russian Empire, hadn’t changed a scintilla. Russia holds roughly 20% of Ukraine’s territory, doubling from the approximately 10% seized in 2014 in the first phase of Moscow’s annexation plan. If a cease-fire line traces what Moscow now holds in phase two and negotiations drag on, Mr. Putin will gain time to restore his economy, rebuild and repurpose his army and navy, and prepare for phase three. He has patience, waiting eight years between the first two efforts at reuniting “little Russia” (as Muscovites call Ukraine), with the rodina, or motherland. In response, Ukraine requires security guarantees, including from Washington—about which Mr. Trump remains exceedingly vague, his recent positive noises notwithstanding.

Kyiv should reject this scenario unequivocally, not embrace it, with one major caveat. Ukraine must have assurances that European and U.S. military assistance will continue at appropriate levels to allow them to resist further Russian advances, and begin regaining lands, to achieve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s stated goal of restoring the country’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity. This will force Mr. Trump and the Europeans to decide whether they are prepared to accept Russian aggression or resist it.

Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the U.N., 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

16. Russia's Glorious Summit by Mick Ryan

Following a negative assessment of the Alaska summit, the fighting in Ukraine and a Pacific update, Mick Ryan gives us his Big 5 for the week.

1. Modern War: A Japanese Perspective

2. The Innovation Imperative

3. The Alaska Summit: A View from Estonia

4. Russia’s View of Future War

5. China’s Response to Golden Dome

Russia's Glorious Summit

My regular update on global conflict & confrontation. This week: Trump's defeat in Anchorage, the trajectory of the Ukraine War after Alaska, the Pacific theatre and my recommended Big Five reads.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/russias-glorious-summit?utm

Mick Ryan

Aug 17, 2025

While Trump and Putin talk, the grim fight goes on for Ukraine. Image: @DefenceU

I want to commend the units of the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine “Azov”, the units of the 7th Corps of the Air Assault Forces, the units of the 38th Separate Marine Brigade named after Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi, as well as the units of our 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade “Kholodnyi Yar.” The destruction of the occupiers who tried to infiltrate deeper into our positions continues. President Zelenskyy, 16 August 2025

It has been a crazy week with news about the war in Ukraine, with the Alaksa Summit between Putin and Trump dominating the news, while at the same time there was the Russian penetration and attempted breakthrough on the eastern front in Ukraine, Putin’s continued his aerial onslaught against his “brothers” in Ukrainian cities, as well as Chinese ships playfully ramming each other in the Pacific.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

This week, I explore issues related to the war in Ukraine as well as news from the Pacific theatre. As always, I also include my top five national security and war reads.

Ukraine

It is easy to forget in the media scramble to cover the Alaska Summit that Ukrainian soldiers continue to fight a grim battle on the southern, eastern, and northern fronts as well as engage in a nightly battle to defend Ukraine’s skies. I want to mention that before the section about the Alaska Summit because every screw up by politicians at these kinds of summits might result in a little embarrassment for them, but has life-changing implications for those doing the fighting, and can have existential effects for nations.

As Williamson Murray has written in Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change:

It is more important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than it is at the operational and tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected but political and strategic mistakes live forever.

The Alaska Summit. The much anticipated Putin-Trump summit was held in Anchorage, Alaska on Friday, Alaska time. Commencing with the ceremonial reception of the two smiling, jovial leaders (this was a war summit right?), handshakes, and a flyover, Trump and Putin soon got down to business. Fortunately, they were not left alone for a long one-on-one chat, and were supported by staff such as their respective foreign ministers.

After nearly three hours of talks, Trump and Putin emerged. Putin was still smiling. Trump, not so much. Both leaders issued statements. Putin ilaid the flattery on quite thickly, in a Rutte-esque endorsement of Trump’s claimed 2020 election win. Putin, also celebrated the wonderful, close historical relationship between Russia and America. Trump did not appear quite as happy while he issued his statement.

Neither of the two took questions after delivering their prepared remarks. Each departed Alaska after short detours to commemorate fallen service personnel (Putin) and give a media interview (Trump).

In the immediate wake of the summit, I published an article with the catchy title “Moscow Next Time!” that provided my initial assessment. To save you having to read the entire thing, I have provided a summary below of my initial thoughts:

• First, Putin appeared to be more upbeat at the press conference than Trump did. While Trump did not appear downcast, there was a marked disparity in the overall posture of the two leaders. This indicates that no overall agreement has been reached but that some small points of common ground may have been agreed.
• Second, Putin was laying on the flattery of Trump in a big way. This is an attempt by Putin to ensure the next meeting is also a one-on-one and does not include Ukraine. It will also be an attempt to split Trump from European leaders by convincing him that Putin is not as bad as European leaders have portrayed.
• Third, ultimately, Putin is paving the way for future talks with Trump. Putin is too good a manipulator to think he will get what he wants in a single meeting. Putin will probably have mapped out a campaign of meetings and conversations with Trump to get what he wants. This is just one of those conversations.
• Fourth, there were no details on what was agreed and what was not. Trump was clear he would be making a bunch of phone calls to Ukraine’s president and European leaders. We may find out more then.
• Fifth, Putin made it clear that he has not stepped back from his key objectives of the war, which remain the destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty, removal of its capacity to defend itself and ensuring Ukraine can never join NATO.
• Finally, there was no ceasefire agreed to – at least not that has been discussed yet. As Trump noted, “there is no deal until there is a deal. I will call President Zelenskyy. It is ultimately up to them.”

One good thing that emerged from the Alaska Summit is that Trump has not (yet) bargained away Ukrainian territory.

Over the past 24 hours, we have learned more about what Trump discussed with Putin. Perhaps the most serious and concerning issue was that Trump has endorsed Putin’s view that no ceasefire is necessary and that Ukraine and Russia should leap directly to negotiating a war termination agreement. On his social media platform, Trump wrote that:

It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up.

This goes against Ukrainian and European negotiating strategies for ending the war. A ceasefire is necessary to give the sides the time and space to negotiate. Neither Ukraine or Europe wants to negotiate war termination while still under the pressure of active military operations. Trump, who appears to be easily seduced into changing his mind by Putin, has blown that strategy away.

In the wake of the summit, President Zelenskyy held a long phone call with Trump. Zelenskyy describes how the U.S. president provided a summary of what was discussed at the summit and also raised the possibility of American involvement “in guaranteeing Ukraine’s security”.

The Washington Post also describes how:

Trump also told the Europeans he would be open to providing security guarantees for Ukraine in a deal but the details were unclear, according to two European diplomats.

Other leaks about the Trump-Putin conversation have emerged. In an article for Financial Times, Christopher Miller writes that:

Vladimir Putin has demanded Ukraine withdraw from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as a condition for ending Russia’s war but told Donald Trump he could freeze the rest of the frontline if his core demands were met…Trump then communicated that message to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders in a call on Saturday, during which he urged them to drop efforts to secure a ceasefire from Moscow…Putin made it clear that he had not dropped his core demands to “resolve the root causes” of the conflict, which would essentially end Ukraine’s statehood in its current form and roll back Nato’s eastward expansion.

Ukrainian and European leaders understand that the root causes of this conflict are not about territory or even Ukraine’s membership of NATO. The true root cause of this conflict is Putin’s terror that neighbouring countries might demonstrate alternative, democratic forms of government as an example for the Russian people. This is intolerable for Putin because it directly conflicts with his ability to rule for life and continue looting their national treasuries for their own gains.

The Trajectory of the War From Here. Moving forward, President Zelenskyy will visit Washington DC early in the coming week for discussions with President Trump and other U.S. officials. Reports are already emerging that he may be accompanied by other European leaders in order to prevent the kind of terrible spectacle we witnessed on 28 February.

There is some hope for a trilateral summit, involving the leaders of Ukraine, America and Russia. However, the Kremlin has noted that this was not discussed in Alaska.

Given the editorials in Ukrainian and other news outlets in the past 24 hours, the summit has also dashed any slim hope that Ukrainians and many Europeans had that Trump might slip the bonds of his Putin admiration and begin to support Ukraine in achieving a just peace. That is now an almost impossible prospect to imagine.

Putin had a Cheshire Cat grin for the entirety of the Alaska summit for very good reason. As a war criminal, he had a red carpet welcome, a lovely USAF flyover and a very friendly greeting from an American leader who in a previous era would have been described as “the leader of the free world”. Putin left the meeting having received no further sanctions and with absolutely no mention of the brutality he has unleashed on the Ukrainian people since 2014.

Putin achieved something else. He very successfully kicked the can a long way down the road for any ceasefire, allowing him to continue his ground and aerial assaults against Ukraine.

Perhaps worst of all, Putin now definitively understands that he has Trump’s full measure. And he knows the rest of us know that as well. This does not bode well for the road ahead in achieving a just peace for the people of Ukraine.

For Europeans, this only reinforces that they must urgently build up their defences against Putin. Putin is already conducting a massive sabotage and subversion campaign against Europe, and has malign designs against other parts of Eastern Europe. Trump’s supine, passive posture before Putin at the Alaska summit confirms (again) that Trump is not inclined to offer any defence against Russia’s future predatory behaviour against its neighbours - because Putin will talk him out of it.

For those of us in the Pacific, we must do the same as the Europeans. And we must wonder just what kind of deal Xi of China will offer Trump now to throw Taiwan (and possibly the rest of us) under the bus of Chinese hegemonic aspirations.

The Eastern Front Penetration by Russia. Earlier this week, Russian forces penetrated Ukraine’s front line defences on the eastern front. This occured in a region just to the east of Dobropillia. In an article I published on this issue earlier in the week, I wrote the following:

Like all operations of this type, time is absolutely critical. Whoever can utilise time most wisely in the coming days will win this crucial battle. If Ukraine can deploy its reserves to cut off the salient more quickly than Russian can surge reinforcements into the salient, danger might be averted. But if Russia can rush more mobile troops, supported by artillery, drones and aircraft delivery glide bombs, this penetration could turn into a breakthrough.

In the past 48 hours, the situation has clarified. It is clear that the Ukrainians were better at utilising time and reserve forces in the region of the new Russian salient. As the maps below demonstrate, Ukrainian forces have stopped further penetration into Ukrainian defensive lines, while also cutting off the penetration about halfway along its length.

9-16 August - Russian penetration. Source: Deep State live

But as Rob Lee has noted in a recent post, Ukraine was required to employ elements from multiple brigades, as well as the newly formed 1st Azov army corps to achieve this. A full list of these (sourced from Rob and @Deepstate_UA) is below. To confirm, it is not confirmed whether it was elements from each of these formations or the entire brigades:

• 79th Air Assault brigade.
• 82nd Air Assault brigades.
• 1st and 425th Assault Regiments.
• 25th Airborne Brigade.
• 2nd battalion, 92nd Assault Brigade.
• 32nd Mechanised brigade.
• 93rd Mechanised brigade.
• 38th Marine Brigade.
• 14th National Guard Brigade.
• Magyar Brigade.
• National Police and SBU.
• 1st Azov Corps to contain Russia's advance east of Dobropillia.

Clearly the Ukrainian general staff still retains significant reserves - both dedicated and situational - on the eastern front. The question is this however: has the deployment of these reserves created further opportunities for the Russians in other parts of the front line?

As of today’s reporting, Ukrainian forces appear to be continuing operations to capture or destroy Russian forces in the salient created by the Russian penetration. As President Zelenskyy noted in his update last night, there has also been an important replenishment of Ukraine’s “exchange fund” with Russian soldiers.

In separate news, it has been reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to two kilometres in Sumy. Good news.

Putin’s Air War Against Brotherly Ukraine Continues. In his comments at the end of the Alaksa Summit, Putin made the following statement:

We've always considered the Ukrainian nation, and I've said it multiple times, a brotherly nation…We have the same roots, and everything that's happening is a tragedy for us, and terrible wound.

While there was a lot of cynical stuff in Putin’s statement, this plumbed new depths. Putin’s forces have looted, raped, castrated, murdered, tortured and kidnapped their way through Ukrainian territory in the past three and half years. They continue mass ground attacks across a thousand kilometre front line and are executing a nightly terror bombing campaign with drones and missiles against Ukraine’s people and cities.

Source: Ukrainian Air Force

This is a weird way to treat a brotherly nation, given that air attacks continued on Ukraine throughout the week, including the nights before and after the Alaska Summit. Such is Russian ‘good will’ towards a brotherly nation.

Ukraine’s Strike Campaign. This week, Ukraine has stepped up its strategic strikes against Russian economic and military targets. It has hit oil refineries in multiple regions of Russia and also struck a Russian freighter in the port of Olya in the Astrakan region that was carrying munitions and part for Russian military drones. There has been a lot going on with Ukrainian strategic strike capability in the past couple of months, and I will shortly publish a detailed update on this topic.

The Pacific

Oops. Chinese navy and coast guard playing chicken this week.

Playing Chicken at Sea. This week, two Chinese vessels collided while they were attempting to coordinate their operations around the Scarborough Shoal. A useful summary of the incident was posted by Ray Powell, which you can read here.

Ray also recorded a podcast on this subject, which you can see here.

Of course, the Chinese blamed the Philippines for the collision.

Ferry-borne Amphibious Operations. This week, naval expert Tom Shugart posted about an exercise where a Chinese civil ferry was employed to transport and launch assault vehicles on amphibious operations. You can the his thread, as well as associated articles on this topic, at this link.

Image: @tshugart3

Taiwanese and Chinese Naval Drones. This week, H.I. Sutton published a couple of useful updates on the development and deployment of naval drones by Taiwan and China.

In the first article, published by Naval News, Sutton examines the development of several maritime drones by Taiwan which are designed to deter or prevent a Chinese invasion. Among the types examined are the Endeavour Mantra, the Sea Shark 800 (essentially a speed boat), and the stealthy Piranha 9.

Image: H.I. Sutton and Naval News

In his second article, Sutton examines China’s growing fleet of underwater drones and its extra-large drone submarine (XLUUV) programs. The article, which is available to read at Naval News here, is focussed on two models of this uncrewed submarines: the AJX002 and another even larger design.

Image: H.I. Sutton and Naval News

Exercise Alon 2025. This week, Exercise Alon 25 kicked off in the Philippines. More than 3,600 personnel are participating in the activity, including personnel from the Philippines, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Since beginning in 2023, Exercise Alon has expanded in scope to include training in maritime, sea, cyber, space and air domains.

Australia is deploying an Australian Amphibious Force Joint Task Force Headquarters, Navy’s Hobart-class destroyer, HMAS Brisbane, an Army combined Arms Land Task Group and an Air Task Group of Super Hornets, Growlers and Hercules aircraft.

Image: @DefenceAust

The nations participating in the exercise will also conduct amphibious landing operations and maritime exercises.

*********

It’s time to cover this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a new report from the National Institute of Defence Studies in Japan that explores how the war in Ukraine may have forced changes in the military strategies of China, Taiwan and America. There is also an analysis of the Alaska Summit from Estonia, a good piece on strategic innovation, and an article on how China views the American Golden Dome missile defence program.

Finally, there is a new CNA report that examines how Russia’s views on the future of war may have evolved since its full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Modern War: A Japanese Perspective

In this new publication from the highly respected National Institute for Defence Studies in Japan, a range of experts examine change and continuity in warfare. Drawing heavily on the experience of war in Ukraine, as well as Chinese military aggression in the Pacific, the authors, provide a range of useful insights across six chapters. It provides a good analysis of how the Ukraine war may have changed Chinese, Taiwanese and American strategy for a future conflict in the Pacific. You can access the publication (in English) here.

2. The Innovation Imperative

In this article, the author examines the institutional imperative for innovation and adaptation, and why tactical adaptation is insufficient for military success. As the author notes, “a fixation on bottom-up models permeates the American military culture and its desire to promote individualistic achievements, but future conflicts will require innovative concepts to address the growing disparity between America’s strategic interests and its military capabilities.” You can read the full article here.

3. The Alaska Summit: A View from Estonia

In this piece, the author examines the outcomes of yesterday’s Alaksa Summit from the perspective of European nations. Unsurprisingly, there is an explicit tone of disappointment in the article. As the author notes, “whatever the outcome of the Alaska summit, it is unlikely to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. On the contrary, it would confirm the Kremlin’s perception of “the collective west” as weak and encourage further expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence through military aggression.” The full article is available at this link.

4. Russia’s View of Future War

This is a fascinating new CNA report that examines the evolution of Russian thinking about military strategy and conventional military operations after three years of conflict in Ukraine. One of the report’s key finding is that “despite significant technological advances, which in turn have led to major tactical changes in the character of armed conflict (especially widespread use of uncrewed systems), Russian strategic and operational thinking on conventional military operations remains largely unchanged from approaches adopted before the war.” The full report is available at this link.

5. China’s Response to Golden Dome

In this piece published by the China Aerospace Studies Institute, the authors examine how the Chinese regime views the development of America’s Golden Dome missile defence system. The authors describe how “the PRC has long been concerned by U.S. missile defense efforts. Beijing has expressed alarm over the U.S. Golden Dome system since its inception in late January.” You can read the full piece here.

17. Trump says no imminent plans to penalise China for buying Russian oil

Excerpts:

He was asked by Fox News' Sean Hannity if he was now considering such action against Beijing after he and Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to produce an agreement to resolve or pause Moscow's war in Ukraine.

"Well, because of what happened today, I think I don't have to think about that," Trump said after his summit with Putin in Alaska.

"Now, I may have to think about it in two weeks or three weeks or something, but we don't have to think about that right now. I think, you know, the meeting went very well."

Chinese President Xi Jinping's slowing economy will suffer if Trump follows through on a promise to ramp up Russia-related sanctions and tariffs.

Xi and Trump are working on a trade deal that could lower tensions - and import taxes - between the world's two biggest economies. But China could be the biggest remaining target, outside of Russia, if Trump ramps up punitive measures.

Trump says no imminent plans to penalise China for buying Russian oil

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/trump-says-no-imminent-plans-penalise-china-buying-russian-oil-5297686

Oil pump jacks outside Almetyevsk in the Republic of Tatarstan, Russia on Jun 4, 2023. (File Photo: Reuters/Alexander Manzyuk)

16 Aug 2025 11:00AM

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WASHINGTON: United States President Donald Trump said on Friday (Aug 15) he did not immediately need to consider retaliatory tariffs on countries such as China for buying Russian oil but might have to "in two or three weeks".

Trump has threatened sanctions on Moscow and secondary sanctions on countries that buy its oil if no moves are made to end the war in Ukraine. China and India are the top two buyers of Russian oil.

The president last week imposed an additional 25 per cent tariff on Indian goods, citing its continued imports of Russian oil.

However, Trump has not taken similar action against China.

He was asked by Fox News' Sean Hannity if he was now considering such action against Beijing after he and Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to produce an agreement to resolve or pause Moscow's war in Ukraine.

"Well, because of what happened today, I think I don't have to think about that," Trump said after his summit with Putin in Alaska.

"Now, I may have to think about it in two weeks or three weeks or something, but we don't have to think about that right now. I think, you know, the meeting went very well."

Chinese President Xi Jinping's slowing economy will suffer if Trump follows through on a promise to ramp up Russia-related sanctions and tariffs.

Xi and Trump are working on a trade deal that could lower tensions - and import taxes - between the world's two biggest economies. But China could be the biggest remaining target, outside of Russia, if Trump ramps up punitive measures.

Source: Reuters/js

18. Trump says Xi told him China will not invade Taiwan while he is US president

Whew. I'm glad we have that settled. Now we no longer have to worry about Taiwan (at least until 2029). But I guess that confirms Xi does have plans to invade Taiwan, but only after President Trump is out of office. So I guess the Davidson Window is still nominally in effect.

Trump says Xi told him China will not invade Taiwan while he is US president

US President Donald Trump holds a press conference following his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, in Anchorage, Alaska on Aug 15, 2025. (Photo:…see more

16 Aug 2025 09:47AM

(Updated: 16 Aug 2025 05:56PM)

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WASHINGTON: United States President Donald Trump said on Friday (Aug 15) that Chinese President Xi Jinping told him China would not invade Taiwan while Trump is in office.

Trump made the comments in an interview with Fox News, ahead of talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin over Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

"I will tell you, you know, you have a very similar thing with President Xi of China and Taiwan, but I don't believe there's any way it's going to happen as long as I'm here. We'll see," Trump said during an interview on Fox News' "Special Report".

"He told me, 'I will never do it as long as you're president.' President Xi told me that, and I said, 'Well, I appreciate that,' but he also said, 'But I am very patient, and China is very patient.'," Trump said.

Trump and Xi held their first confirmed call of Trump's second presidential term in June. Trump also said in April that Xi had called him but did not specify when that call took place.

China views Taiwan as its own territory and has vowed to "reunify" with the democratic and separately governed island, by force if necessary. Taiwan strongly objects to China's sovereignty claims.

The Chinese Embassy in Washington on Friday described the topic of Taiwan as "the most important and sensitive issue" in China-US relations.

"The US government should adhere to the one-China principle and the three US-China joint communiqués, handle Taiwan-related issues prudently, and earnestly safeguard China-US relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait," embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu said in a statement.

Although Washington is Taiwan's main arms supplier and international backer, the US - like most countries - has no formal diplomatic ties with the island.

While Taiwan's government has yet to respond to Trump's remarks, on Saturday a senior lawmaker from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party said that Taiwan was grateful for support from "our major ally".

"However ... security cannot rely on the enemy's promise, nor can it rely solely on the help from friends. Strengthening our own defence capability is fundamental!" Wang Ting-yu, who sits on the Taiwan parliament's defence and foreign affairs committee, wrote on his Facebook page.

Source: Reuters/js

19.

Excerpt:

A Ukrainian intelligence officer says the Americans are being “unbelievably aggressive” in pushing Ukraine to forfeit more land. The Russian interest is clear enough, he says. “They want to maximise the package they will get in return—from sanctions relief, to the return of seized assets, to the re-opening of energy markets.” What, he says, is far less clear is why the Trump administration was pushing so forcefully to promote Russia’s interests.

Despite the obvious headwinds, Mr Trump appears committed to his quick-fix peace. The Economist understands a three-way meeting between Mr Trump, Mr Putin and Mr Zelensky could come as early as the end of next week. Before that, on Monday, the Ukrainian leader is scheduled to arrive in Washington for his first visit since his humiliation in February. European leaders will join him in a show of support. But some of the ingredients appear ominously similar to his previous visit. Channelling the logic of Mr Putin, Mr Trump is already preparing to blame Ukraine if his plans blow up, Ukrainians fear. “Make a deal,” he advised Mr Zelensky, via Fox News. “Russia is a very big power. [You] are not.”

Fear of a new Oval Office fiasco over Ukraine

Officials worry Trump backs the Kremlin’s land grabs and fantasies

https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/08/17/fear-of-a-new-oval-office-fiasco-over-ukraine

Photograph: Getty Images

Aug 17th 2025

|

KYIV

|

5 min read

T

IME DIFFERENCES meant that most Ukrainians only learned about the Alaska summit on Saturday morning. Though their initial reaction was relief, now they are dreading what comes next. The immediate sigh of calm was understandable. The feared grand bargain in Anchorage between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin had not materialised. Initial reports highlighted that the talks at an American military base were truncated and lacked any clear outcome. “Disaster averted: Trump has not sold us down the river,” commented one MP early yesterday morning.

But as the sketchy details have hardened into a growing prospect of forthcoming demands that will prove impossible for Ukraine to accept, confidence is giving way to unease, not least about the planned meeting in Washington on Monday between Mr Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The warning signs were visible from the start of the summit. A red carpet, laid down before Mr Putin’s presidential plane by American soldiers. Applause and handshakes for Mr Putin from Mr Trump. The very fact of a summit happening at all before a ceasefire had been agreed, despite earlier tough rhetoric from Mr Trump to the contrary. Ukrainian officials insist that holding negotiations is constructive, and point to European talk of American-backed security guarantees for Ukraine. “There is an attempt to get somewhere,” said one. But privately they worry the American president has just allowed the ending of the war to be re-written on Russian terms.

The most obvious change is the new acceptance of Russia’s preferred sequencing. Gone is any prospect of a full ceasefire as a first stage, or of the crippling sanctions once promised by Mr Trump if Mr Putin would not agree to one. On Saturday Serhiy Leshchenko, an adviser in the Ukrainian presidential office, reiterated the Ukrainian position: a ceasefire must come before a more general agreement to freeze or end the conflict. But Mr Trump, abruptly siding with Mr Putin, now says the immediate goal must be a comprehensive peace. It is an “all or nothing” prospect that could be easily sabotaged by bad actors—or used to extract the maximum concessions. European leaders are meeting later today by videoconference to co-ordinate their responses.

Ukrainian security sources say they worry about what a “comprehensive peace” means. For Mr Putin, it appears to still mean removing what he calls the “root causes” of the Ukrainian war, a vision he outlined in a belligerent essay in 2021 that put forward his case for invasion: in translation, he objected to NATO’s eastward expansion since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and to Ukrainian independence. In that essay, Mr Putin talked about Ukraine and Russia as “one people”. On Friday, at least, his rhetoric softened to talking of “brotherly” relations, something that most Ukrainians would however have huge difficulty in detecting three and a half years into a savage invasion that has led to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian casualties and millions of refugees.

Mr Trump may or may not have understood the signalling from Mr Putin, but he said nothing to contradict him. “For Putin, a comprehensive peace means changing us,” complains a Ukrainian source. “And now the Americans appear to be on board, whether they are conscious of it or not.” Roman Bezsmertny, a former Ukrainian diplomat, says Mr Putin has “mocked” the American president and his desire for a Nobel peace prize. “This is not a tragedy for Ukraine. It is a tragedy for America and for the world. Under Mr Putin’s spell, Trump is an incapacitated politician.”

Throughout July secret contacts between Ukraine and Russia had brought the two countries closer to an understanding of how the war could be frozen. But subsequent talks between Mr Putin and Steve Witkoff, a confidant of Mr Trump from his real-estate days, created a series of impossible new territorial demands on Ukraine. At the summit on Friday Mr Putin once again demanded that Ukraine retreat from the parts of Luhansk and Donetsk provinces that it still holds, which together represent the most fortified sections of the front line. This would put Mr Putin in a far stronger position to attack again in the future, should he choose to do so. In return, the Russian president offered to give back tiny chunks of occupied territory in Sumy and Kharkiv provinces, and to freeze the current lines in Zaporizhia and Kherson.

Years of war have strained the Ukrainian people, and Russia continues to press its advantage in metal and men on the front lines. Unsurprisingly, opinion polls show a clear switch to pragmatism on concessions for peace. A majority of those asked are now in favour of acknowledging de facto occupation of the areas Russia already holds in exchange for genuine security guarantees from the West. But there are nonetheless consistent and overwhelming majorities against making any further territorial concessions to Russia. According to Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, less than one in five would be prepared to accept the kind of land swap Mr Trump is said to be favouring.

A Ukrainian intelligence officer says the Americans are being “unbelievably aggressive” in pushing Ukraine to forfeit more land. The Russian interest is clear enough, he says. “They want to maximise the package they will get in return—from sanctions relief, to the return of seized assets, to the re-opening of energy markets.” What, he says, is far less clear is why the Trump administration was pushing so forcefully to promote Russia’s interests.

Despite the obvious headwinds, Mr Trump appears committed to his quick-fix peace. The Economist understands a three-way meeting between Mr Trump, Mr Putin and Mr Zelensky could come as early as the end of next week. Before that, on Monday, the Ukrainian leader is scheduled to arrive in Washington for his first visit since his humiliation in February. European leaders will join him in a show of support. But some of the ingredients appear ominously similar to his previous visit. Channelling the logic of Mr Putin, Mr Trump is already preparing to blame Ukraine if his plans blow up, Ukrainians fear. “Make a deal,” he advised Mr Zelensky, via Fox News. “Russia is a very big power. [You] are not.” ■

20. America’s new plan to fight a war with China

A rumble in the jungle? I hope there is not a "Thrilla in Manila" too.

Mission Command? Are we really banking on that? But I guess we will need those "windows of creativity" er... I mean "windows of connectivity. (But I only say this half in jest, mission command should create windows of creativity which I think will be needed to prevail).

Excerpts:

Co-ordinating an ever-shifting military kaleidoscope requires robust command-and-control systems. Combatants will seek to wreck each other’s data systems, not least by attacking satellites. Even so, top brass argue, data flows may be degraded but not permanently severed. Units will have “windows” of connectivity. Above all, they will rely on “mission command”, the ability to act without explicit orders in line with the commander’s intent. That initiative, say generals, gives America an advantage over rigidly controlled Chinese forces.

Is that enough to win? China may not need to defeat America, only hold it at bay for long enough to take Taiwan. War games suggest that, as China runs out of long-range munitions, American forces could move closer and defeat a landing, albeit at great cost. But America is short, too, and China’s greater industrial capacity may give it the means to outlast America.

Out along the edges

David Ochmanek of the RAND Corporation, another think-tank, reckons China has enough firepower to overwhelm airfields in the first island chain for as long as needed, and may soon be able to do so in the second chain. He argues that, close in, the air force must shift to drones that do not need runways. These would be bigger than the hand-held quadcopters ubiquitous in Ukraine, or even the loitering munitions that INDOPACOM is thinking of to create a “hellscape” for China near Taiwan. Air-combat drones with greater range, sensors and even weapons could be fired from rails, lorries or rockets, he argues.

International | Rumble in the jungle

America’s new plan to fight a war with China

Readying for a rumble in the jungle

https://www.economist.com/international/2025/08/14/americas-new-plan-to-fight-a-war-with-china

Photograph: U.S. Air Force

Aug 14th 2025

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TINIAN AND GUAM

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8 min read

Listen to this story

I

T COULD BE a giant archaeological dig. Bulldozers tear at the jungle to reclaim the history of the second world war and its dark finale: the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 80 years ago this month. The work on Tinian, a speck in the Pacific Ocean, has exposed the four runways of North Field. Glass protects the cement pits where Little Boy and Fat Man, the first and only atom bombs used in war, were loaded onto American B-29s. For a time Tinian was the largest air base in the world, but it was soon mostly abandoned.

With China as its new rival, America is reviving old wartime facilities across the Pacific. Tinian once allowed its bombers to smash Japanese cities. These days China wields the long spear: it has built up a vast stockpile of missiles that can blast American bases in the region. Any war between the superpowers would be a cataclysm. And both now have nuclear weapons.

As in the cold war, nuclear worries go hand in hand with preparations for conventional conflict. The air force is expanding Tinian’s small commercial airport as a backup landing place. On the day your correspondent visited, two F-22 jets—America’s most capable fighters—took off with a deafening roar. Crews huddled in tents as C-130 transporters brought gear.

Photograph: U.S. Air Force

The fighters had deployed from Alaska for the recently concluded REFORPAC exercise—part of the biggest air-force war game in the Pacific since the cold war—involving more than 400 aircraft and 50 locations thousands of miles apart. It demonstrated America’s ability to bring forces quickly from the American mainland. It was also a test of “Agile Combat Employment” (ACE), a doctrine of hide-and-seek whereby American aircraft disperse to small bases to survive attacks by China, rejoin in the air to punch back and then scatter again—like a murmuration of starlings.

Map: The Economist

Because of China’s reach, the air force can no longer mass its planes in big bases close to the action, as it has done in recent decades. It must plan to survive and fight throughout China’s deep “kill zone”, learning from the island-hopping campaigns of the Pacific war and more recent conflicts. Ukraine has shown how, even under relentless attack, its planes can keep fighting by hiding and moving. America intends to do the same on a grand scale. “In a peer conflict our airmen will be under constant threat,” explains General David Allvin, the chief of the air force. “We must be lethal and agile, aggregating for effect and disaggregating for survival.”

Even so, it faces formidable difficulties, including the vastness of the Pacific; the density of China’s firepower; the paucity of usable airfields; the shortage of bomb-proof hangars; the vulnerability of air-refuelling tankers; the complexity of logistics; and the disruption of data networks.

China would be fighting mostly in its backyard, within the “first island chain” that runs from Japan to Malaysia—with Taiwan, about 100 miles away, at its heart (see map). Most American forces would be rushing in from the far side of the vast ocean, thousands of miles away. Many of China’s ballistic missiles have a greater range than the usual combat radius of America’s fighter jets (typically 500-600 nautical miles, or nm).

Photograph: U.S. Air Force

Calculations for The Economist by Timothy Walton of the Hudson Institute, an American think-tank, illustrate the challenge. His model suggests China could rain about 2,000 bombs or missiles a day on targets within 500nm, including hundreds on Kadena, a big American air-force base in Okinawa. It could simultaneously drop some 450 munitions a day over the second island chain, including Guam and its vital complex of bases, 1,600nm away; 60-odd over important rear bases in Alaska; and perhaps a score a day over faraway places such as Hawaii, the headquarters of America’s Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), 3,600nm back. Missiles can strike quickly and accurately, though most munitions would in fact be delivered by aircraft. (These theoretical figures assume that no planes or missiles are shot down, and Chinese facilities are not attacked.)

Ride into the danger zone

There are relatively few good landing spots east of the first island chain before reaching the continental United States. Mr Walton counts just 21 in American and allied territories with the runways, aprons and fuel supplies to take tankers, bombers and larger aircraft. Smaller fighter jets could use up to 125 airfields, but most are farther from China than their usual range, even with air-to-air refuelling. All this assumes host countries would grant permission for “ABO”—access, basing and overflight—and risk China’s wrath.

Aircraft-carriers, which helped win the Pacific war and have symbolised American power ever since, are increasingly vulnerable to China’s long-range “carrier-killer” missiles, such as the DF-26B with a range of more than 2,000nm. Unlike carriers, which may sink when struck, airfields can be repaired, often within hours.

Thus the importance of Tinian. Its four new runways, once refurbished, will provide valuable alternatives to the two at Andersen air base on Guam, and two more that have been refurbished nearby. The air force, which says it just needs “places, not bases” to make ACE work, is concentrating on dispersal and improved air-defence systems for the likes of Guam. But the more it scatters, the more places it must defend.

Photograph: U.S. Air Force

American think-tanks say it is neglecting passive defences such as hardened aircraft shelters made of concrete. Portable pop-up shelters that can stop shrapnel would be useful, too, since China would have to fire more missiles to hit all of them, including empty ones, in a high-stakes shell game. Generals talk of dispersing planes within airfields and “flushing the force” by getting planes in the air before a missile can strike.

And yet, even during the ACE exercise, about two dozen fighter jets were parked close together in the open in Guam—convenient for pilots and ground crews, but an easy target for missiles. Similar concerns apply to fuel dumps and, indeed, ground crews. It is also unclear how far the air force is responding to newer threats, exemplified by Ukraine’s use of lorry-launched drones to destroy Russian bombers thousands of miles from the front.

In a war, America would fire at Chinese ships crossing the Taiwan Strait and other targets with long-range bombers, submarines and ground units lurking on islands. It would require vast amounts of air-to-air refuelling. Yet tankers and bombers are precious assets and, apart from the B-2, easy to see on radar. Moreover, America’s tanker fleet is more than 50 years old, on average. Mr Walton says China is optimising missile warheads to seek big planes such as tankers and airborne radars. Most may have to be held far back. But the farther planes must commute to war, the less effective they are.

Hiding and moving complicates China’s targeting, but also America’s logistical task. Fuel, crews and spare parts must be brought to the right place at the right time. Supply convoys would be juicy targets. Logisticians are thinking about how to move them through safer routes, via Australia. 3D-printing of spares in theatre will help, as will artificial intelligence. The lesson of the second world war, notes General Kevin Schneider, the head of Pacific Air Forces, is that “logistics and sustainment are absolutely key to generating air power.”

Co-ordinating an ever-shifting military kaleidoscope requires robust command-and-control systems. Combatants will seek to wreck each other’s data systems, not least by attacking satellites. Even so, top brass argue, data flows may be degraded but not permanently severed. Units will have “windows” of connectivity. Above all, they will rely on “mission command”, the ability to act without explicit orders in line with the commander’s intent. That initiative, say generals, gives America an advantage over rigidly controlled Chinese forces.

Is that enough to win? China may not need to defeat America, only hold it at bay for long enough to take Taiwan. War games suggest that, as China runs out of long-range munitions, American forces could move closer and defeat a landing, albeit at great cost. But America is short, too, and China’s greater industrial capacity may give it the means to outlast America.

Out along the edges

David Ochmanek of the RAND Corporation, another think-tank, reckons China has enough firepower to overwhelm airfields in the first island chain for as long as needed, and may soon be able to do so in the second chain. He argues that, close in, the air force must shift to drones that do not need runways. These would be bigger than the hand-held quadcopters ubiquitous in Ukraine, or even the loitering munitions that INDOPACOM is thinking of to create a “hellscape” for China near Taiwan. Air-combat drones with greater range, sensors and even weapons could be fired from rails, lorries or rockets, he argues.

Photograph: Pacific Air Forces

The air force is far from giving up on pilots, though this year it will start testing prototypes of the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), a drone that for now will use runways and be controlled by crewed aircraft to augment their firepower. Yet even if drones can be made “runway independent”, they will still need ground crews, fuel and munitions.

For all the Trump administration’s boasts of a trillion-dollar defence budget, it has provided only a sugar rush in its “Big Beautiful Bill”. Its core defence-budget request is flat, ie, a cut after inflation.

After Tinian’s capture in 1944, construction teams started building North Field. B-29s were using it within six months. The modern restoration is slower. Eighteen months after starting work, engineers are still clearing vegetation. When might the first F-22 be able to use it? Enveloped in smoke and rain, the officer in charge shrugs. China’s leader, Xi Jinping, wants his armed forces ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. America, though, is still preparing for war with a peacetime mindset. ■

Stay on top of our defence and international security coverage with The War Room, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter.

This article appeared in the International section of the print edition under the headline “Readying for a rumble in the jungle”

21. False Flags, Fake Flags: Propaganda Muddles the Trump-Putin Meeting

10th Special Forces Group is caught in the Russian propaganda web.  

The website claimed on Tuesday that the United States Army’s 10th Special Forces Group had killed a would-be Ukrainian assassin in Wasilla, a town north of Anchorage, according to NewsGuard, a company that tracks disinformation online.

No such killing took place, but the conspiratorial theme spread across social media platforms including X, Instagram, Substack and Rumble, NewsGuard said. One post on X from a user that previously promoted the QAnon conspiracy claimed there were two assassins who intended to kill “both Trump and Putin.”

False Flags, Fake Flags: Propaganda Muddles the Trump-Putin Meeting

The summit in Alaska between President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has unleashed a wave of propaganda and disinformation from Russian state media and online conspiracy theorists.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/15/world/europe/misinformation-russia.html

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A screen in Manhattan showing President Trump with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Alaska on Friday.Credit...Eduardo Munoz/Reuters

By Steven Lee Myers

Aug. 15, 2025

The meeting in Alaska between President Trump and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has spawned a miasma of propaganda and disinformation, online trolling and unhinged conspiracy theories.

Russia’s Defense Ministry warned this week, without evidence, that Ukraine was planning to stage a false attack on its own soil for the benefit of “Western reporters” and blame it on the Russians in an effort to disrupt the talks.

The claim, posted in English by the Foreign Ministry on X, spread widely in Russian media and online, according to Alliance4Europe, an organization that tracks disinformation. (A Russian drone did strike Sumy, in northeastern Ukraine on Friday, according to Ukrainian reports, but the attack did not cause the “large number of casualties” the Defense Ministry claimed would happen in a provocation.)

False claims by Russia about the war have become routine, but in the United States, a website with a history of spreading disinformation also echoed Russian efforts to disparage Ukraine ahead of Friday’s meeting by fabricating the foiling of an assassination plot.

The website claimed on Tuesday that the United States Army’s 10th Special Forces Group had killed a would-be Ukrainian assassin in Wasilla, a town north of Anchorage, according to NewsGuard, a company that tracks disinformation online.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Alaska? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

No such killing took place, but the conspiratorial theme spread across social media platforms including X, Instagram, Substack and Rumble, NewsGuard said. One post on X from a user that previously promoted the QAnon conspiracy claimed there were two assassins who intended to kill “both Trump and Putin.”

Even before Mr. Putin’s arrival, state media and posts on social media touted the meeting as a triumph for the Russian leader, citing it as evidence of his pre-eminence on the international stage.

Numerous articles and posts also noted Russia’s historical presence in Alaska. It sold the territory to the United States in 1867, but the posts suggested American sovereignty was a historical anomaly.

Tsargrad TV, a television network with close ties to the Kremlin, posted a fabricated image of a flag on Telegram declaring in Russian, “The People’s Republic of Alaska.” That and other posts claiming that Mr. Putin signed a decree to reclaim the state fueled credulous posts that Russia still had designs on Alaska — or that Mr. Trump might somehow cede it back, according to NewsGuard.

Image

Tsargrad TV, a television network with close ties to the Kremlin, posted a fabricated image of a flag declaring, “The People’s Republic of Alaska.”Credit...via Telegram

“How’s the new flag of Alaska for you?” the Tsargrad TV post wrote, in Russian, under a design that resembled the flags of Donetsk and Luhansk, two regions of Ukraine that Russia has illegally occupied and annexed. That post was viewed more than 80,000 times on the platform.

Mr. Trump, for his part, seemed irritated by suggestions he had made any concessions to hold the meeting.

“If I got Moscow and Leningrad free, as part of the deal with Russia, the Fake News would say that I made a bad deal,” he wrote on Wednesday on the platform he owns, Truth Social. (He was referring to Russia’s capital and the city that since 1991 has been called St. Petersburg.)

“HIGH STAKES!!!” Mr. Trump wrote in a new post on Truth Social on Friday morning before arriving in Alaska. One follower replied with a pastiche of photographs of Mr. Putin in a naval uniform and American elected officials that the Russian leader would expose as “career criminals” involved in corruption in Ukraine.

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Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation and disinformation from San Francisco. Since joining The Times in 1989, he has reported from around the world, including Moscow, Baghdad, Beijing and Seoul.

22. Dan Rice to Newsmax: 'Trump Chose Diplomacy' in Talks With Putin

And there is this:

"I do think he was right that the invasion wouldn't have happened, but he's using the wrong reasons," Rice said. "He's saying that Ukraine wouldn't have been the aggressor. Ukraine wasn't the aggressor."

Rice further argued that former President Joe Biden's decision to withdraw U.S. Army Special Forces from Ukraine signaled weakness.

"That sent a signal to Putin that the door was open," he said. With those forces and advanced weapons, "they would have stopped the Russians at the front lines. That's why we need a security guarantee going forward that he will never invade ever again."

Dan Rice to Newsmax: 'Trump Chose Diplomacy' in Talks With Putin

https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/dan-rice-donald-trump-vladimir-putin/2025/08/16/id/1222752/

By Sandy Fitzgerald    |   Saturday, 16 August 2025 02:30 PM EDT

Even though no ceasefire deal was reached during the summit in Alaska between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, "a lot of progress has been made," Dan Rice, a former special adviser to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and president of American University Kyiv, told Newsmax Saturday.

"First of all, you can't solve this war without dialogue, and this is the first step in dialogue," Rice said on Newsmax's "Saturday Agenda." "As much as we'd all love to see Putin hanging from a rope, basically you can't humiliate a dictator with nuclear weapons in public. So President Trump chose diplomacy."

Rice said Trump likely told Putin during their meeting that the United States, NATO, and Ukraine do not want the war to continue. He added that Trump also likely warned that if the fighting does not stop, the United States will provide Ukraine with more weapons than it has supplied so far.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy should be involved in negotiating the peace, Rice said, adding that he hopes the Ukrainian leader's upcoming meeting at the White House will move both sides toward "peace, progress, and security."

Rice also commented on Putin's contention that the war would not have happened had Trump been in office, saying he agrees that the invasion likely would not have occurred, but for different reasons.

"I do think he was right that the invasion wouldn't have happened, but he's using the wrong reasons," Rice said. "He's saying that Ukraine wouldn't have been the aggressor. Ukraine wasn't the aggressor."

Rice further argued that former President Joe Biden's decision to withdraw U.S. Army Special Forces from Ukraine signaled weakness.

"That sent a signal to Putin that the door was open," he said. With those forces and advanced weapons, "they would have stopped the Russians at the front lines. That's why we need a security guarantee going forward that he will never invade ever again."

Sandy Fitzgerald 

Sandy Fitzgerald has more than three decades in journalism and serves as a general assignment writer for Newsmax covering news, media, and politics. 

23. The Bolduc Brief: The Trump-Putin Alaska Summit - A Predictable Failure in the Quest for Peace

Excerpt:

In conclusion, the summit served as a stark reminder of the complexities involved in seeking peace amidst ongoing conflict and highlights the critical need for seasoned, strategic leadership in international relations. The Alaska Summit, rather than fostering peace, validated President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorial methods and the credibility of his invasion of the Ukraine.

The Bolduc Brief: The Trump-Putin Alaska Summit - A Predictable Failure in the Quest for Peace

sofrep.com · by Donald Bolduc · August 17, 2025

4 hours ago

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Brigadier General (Ret.) Donald C. Bolduc, former US Army Special Forces Commander. (US Army)

The anticipation surrounding the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska was palpable among Americans, Europeans, and the Ukrainian people, who all hoped it would pave the way for a peace deal in Ukraine. However, as many skeptics, including myself, predicted, the summit did not meet these expectations.

Instead, it turned into a highly predictable failure.

A Summit That Validated Aggression

The Alaska Summit, rather than fostering peace, inadvertently validated President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorial methods and the credibility of his invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the summit, Ukraine launched drone strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russia is assessing that they have offensive momentum. Given this, they would not have any incentive to end the war.

A Game of Ego and Influence

President Trump found himself ensnared by Putin’s narrative when he reiterated that the Ukraine war would not have started if he had been in office. This assertion, though debatable and largely irrelevant, seems to have played into Trump’s ego. If Trump indeed possessed the influence that Putin attributed to him, he would ostensibly use it to bring about an end to the conflict.

Moreover, Putin cleverly exacerbated tensions between the U.S. and Europe, a move that played into the hands—and ego—of President Trump.

Putin’s True Intentions

To those not enthralled by dictatorial power, it is clear that Putin has no real intention of seeking peace. Putin’s manifesto is clear, and it does not include backing down or giving up territory. His strategy with the U.S. likely involves stalling efforts that could introduce more severe sanctions against Russia.

Consolidation Without Meaningful Concession

Putin aims to consolidate these perceived victories while avoiding any meaningful concessions. While diplomatic engagements may continue, they will likely lack substantive results.

The Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti, under Putin’s control, celebrated the summit by claiming negotiations favored Russia and hinted at a Ukrainian surrender. This exaggeration reflects Putin’s thinking and his belief that the summit tilted in his favor.

The anticipation surrounding the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska was palpable among Americans, Europeans, and the Ukrainian people, who all hoped it would pave the way for a peace deal in Ukraine. However, as many skeptics, including myself, predicted, the summit did not meet these expectations.

Instead, it turned into a highly predictable failure.

A Summit That Validated Aggression

The Alaska Summit, rather than fostering peace, inadvertently validated President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorial methods and the credibility of his invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the summit, Ukraine launched drone strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russia is assessing that they have offensive momentum. Given this, they would not have any incentive to end the war.

A Game of Ego and Influence

President Trump found himself ensnared by Putin’s narrative when he reiterated that the Ukraine war would not have started if he had been in office. This assertion, though debatable and largely irrelevant, seems to have played into Trump’s ego. If Trump indeed possessed the influence that Putin attributed to him, he would ostensibly use it to bring about an end to the conflict.

Moreover, Putin cleverly exacerbated tensions between the U.S. and Europe, a move that played into the hands—and ego—of President Trump.

Putin’s True Intentions

To those not enthralled by dictatorial power, it is clear that Putin has no real intention of seeking peace. Putin’s manifesto is clear, and it does not include backing down or giving up territory. His strategy with the U.S. likely involves stalling efforts that could introduce more severe sanctions against Russia.

Consolidation Without Meaningful Concession

Putin aims to consolidate these perceived victories while avoiding any meaningful concessions. While diplomatic engagements may continue, they will likely lack substantive results.

The Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti, under Putin’s control, celebrated the summit by claiming negotiations favored Russia and hinted at a Ukrainian surrender. This exaggeration reflects Putin’s thinking and his belief that the summit tilted in his favor.

Feckless Diplomacy and Novice Leadership

The summit showcased a feckless diplomatic strategy led by inexperienced national security leaders. America’s display of B-52 bombers did little, if anything, to faze Putin or alter his course.

Instead, the encounter underscores the necessity for diplomacy grounded in realism and devoid of personal glorification. To think that Putin is going to be intimidated by US fire power is a huge miscalculation.

In conclusion, the summit served as a stark reminder of the complexities involved in seeking peace amidst ongoing conflict and highlights the critical need for seasoned, strategic leadership in international relations. The Alaska Summit, rather than fostering peace, validated President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorial methods and the credibility of his invasion of the Ukraine.

Donald C. Bolduc

As someone who’s seen what happens when the truth is distorted, I know how unfair it feels when those who’ve sacrificed the most lose their voice. At SOFREP, our veteran journalists, who once fought for freedom, now fight to bring you unfiltered, real-world intel. But without your support, we risk losing this vital source of truth. By subscribing, you’re not just leveling the playing field—you’re standing with those who’ve already given so much, ensuring they continue to serve by delivering stories that matter. Every subscription means we can hire more veterans and keep their hard-earned knowledge in the fight. Don’t let their voices be silenced. Please consider subscribing now.

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Brandon Webb former Navy SEAL, Bestselling Author and Editor-in-Chief

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sofrep.com · by Donald Bolduc · August 17, 2025

24.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com