Quotes of the Day:
“The supreme quality for leadership is unquestionably integrity. Without it, no real success is possible, no matter whether it is on a section gang, a football field, in an army, or in an office.”
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
If you find your opponent in a strong position costly to force, you should leave him a line of retreat as the quickest way of loosening his resistance. It should, equally, be a principle of policy, especially in war, to provide your opponent with a ladder by which he can climb down.
-Sir Basil H. Liddel-Hart (Strategy, 1954)
"Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. Anger may in time change to gladne ss; vexation may be succeeded by content."
-Sun Tzu
1. Trump’s Pledge to Exit Afghanistan Was a Ruse, His Final SecDef Says
2. CIA’s Former Counterterrorism Chief for the Region: Afghanistan, Not An Intelligence Failure — Something Much Worse
3. For Those Who Served In Afghanistan
4. Journalist Joe Galloway, chronicler of Vietnam War, dies
5. Tom Tugendhat on UK and Afghanistan: Anger, grief, rage
6. The Taliban Have Seized U.S. Military Biometrics Devices
7. What in the absolute hell does Palantir know that we don’t?
8. For Texas veterans, Taliban triumph a gut punch
9. US troops will stay until all Americans are out of Afghanistan, even if past Aug. 31 deadline: Biden to ABC News
10. First Resistance to Taliban Rule Tests Afghanistan’s Uncertain Future
11. Pentagon: No plans for rescuing Americans in Afghanistan who can’t get to the airport
12. Vietnam’s lessons for the Afghanistan failure: Don’t count out US leadership just yet
13. After fall of Kabul, resistance to Taliban emerges in Panjshir | FDD's Long War Journal
14. The Dangerous Road to the Kabul Airport
15. Chinese students rush to return to America
16. After the Debacle: Six Concrete Steps to Restore U.S. Credibility
17. Disinformation, Revisionism, and China with Doowan Lee | Mad Scientist Laboratory
18. The U.S. Is Hostage to the Taliban
19. SECDEF Austin: U.S. Lacks ‘Capability’ in Kabul to Create Safe Passage for Americans, Afghans to Leave Afghanistan
20. Build a More Effective Cyber Force, Not More Bureaucracy
21. Read What The Taliban Told NPR About Their Plans For Afghanistan
22. Opinion | Al Qaeda is loving our withdrawal from Afghanistan
23. Irregular Warfare in Great Power Competition
1. Trump’s Pledge to Exit Afghanistan Was a Ruse, His Final SecDef Says
Fascinating new information: the CT plan, the negotiating "strategy" and the effort to oust Ghani.
What I would like to know is whether or not these plans were briefed to the Biden Administration and if so why were they rejected. It seems the CT option was something that would have conformed to Biden's 2009 CT concept when he argued against the Afghan surge.
Trump’s Pledge to Exit Afghanistan Was a Ruse, His Final SecDef Says
Chris Miller now says talk of a full withdrawal was a “play” to convince a Taliban-led government to keep U.S. counterterrorism forces.
President Donald Trump’s top national security officials never intended to pull all U.S. troops out of Afghanistan, according to new statements by Chris Miller, Trump’s last acting defense secretary.
Miller said the president’s public promise to finish withdrawing U.S. forces by May 1, as negotiated with the Taliban, was actually a “play” that masked the Trump administration’s true intentions: to convince Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to quit or accept a bitter power-sharing agreement with the Taliban, and to keep some U.S. troops in Afghanistan for counterrorism missions.
In a conversation this week with Defense One, Miller revealed that while serving as the top counterterrorism official on the National Security Council in 2019, he commissioned a wargame that determined that the United States could continue to conduct counterterrorism in Afghanistan with just 800 American military personnel on the ground. And by the end of 2020, when he was acting defense secretary, Miller asserted, many Trump administration officials expected that the United States would be able to broker a new shared government in Afghanistan composed primarily of Taliban officials. The new government would then permit U.S. forces to remain in country to support the Afghan military and fight terrorist elements.
That plan never happened, in part because Trump lost his reelection bid in November. And at least one other former senior Trump administration official questioned Miller’s retelling. But in revealing it, Miller challenged recent assertions that Trump is to blame for setting up this week’s chaotic scenes unfolding across Kabul. Miller alleged that despite Trump’s frequent public pledges to end the Afghanistan war and bring home all U.S. troops, many senior national security officials in his administration believed a total withdrawal was not inevitable.
The spectre of Trump’s public comments has lingered into the new administration. On Monday, President Joe Biden asserted that Trump’s February 2020 deal with the Taliban and subsequent troop withdrawals, along with the American public’s growing desire to end the war, left the new president just two choices: send thousands of U.S. troops back into Afghanistan for a fruitless mission or completely and quickly withdraw.
In December, Miller touched down in Afghanistan to formally discuss with Afghan leaders the end of the U.S. troop presence. The response of then-President Ashraf Ghani surprised Miller. “I expected hostility,” he recalled in conversation with Defense One on Saturday. “Instead, he was gracious and respectful. He talked about the sacrifices of the Americans. He thanked the Gold Star families. He said, ‘You have done so much’.”
But the tone of the discussions changed when Miller met with Ghani’s vice president, Amrullah Saleh, who had also served in key intelligence roles over the years.
“He came in and just talked about the threat,” said Miller. “Essentially, the message was: ‘This is going to be bad. And if this happens, al-Qaeda is going to be back’.”
The U.S. delegation and their Afghan counterparts didn’t talk strategy or go into any details about what lay ahead during the meetings, Miller said. The participants already seemed to know the bleak facts. “It would not have been appropriate to say ‘Is your Army going to collapse?’ But of course we were all thinking that.”
While Miller acknowledged on Saturday that it would have been impossible for the United States to support the Afghanistan government forever, he said the Taliban’s rapid advance across the country and the resulting deadly chaos playing out in Kabul could have been avoided had the Biden administration heeded military and national security experts.
Miller is a true believer in special operations forces capabilities. He landed in Afghanistan in December 2001 at the beginning of the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Later, he served as a Green Beret commander and as director of the National Counterterrorism Centers. Appointed acting defense secretary just days after Trump lost his re-election bid, Miller soon traveled to the Green Berets’ home of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for a ceremony to elevate the authority of the special operations assistant secretary.
Weeks later, Miller flew to Afghanistan, where he met Ghani and visited with American troops at Afghan Army’s Special Operations Command at Camp Morehead, in Wardak Province.
"I always felt it was a huge strategic error by expanding the war. I thought the war was for special operations, small footprint,” he said at the time.
By then, Miller knew that some in the U.S. intelligence community believed the war could become smaller once again, and sustainable.
“We did plenty of wargames on this and we knew what the minimal force structure was,” he said this week. “The number was 800. If this all goes bad, what is the minimal force structure needed to maintain [counterterrorism] strike and reconnaissance capability? We can do it for 800, 850.”
Defense One was able to confirm Miller’s account of the 800-personnel study independently with another former NSC staff member.
Miller said he understood Trump’s May 1 withdrawal deal to be a negotiating tactic.
“The whole policy strategy going forward was ‘Ghani is going to have to deal with the Taliban.’ And it wasn’t going to be a 50-50 split between the Afghan government and Taliban. We knew that. It was going to be 75-25 [majority Taliban], and then you flip this thing into an interim government,” he said.
Miller said this was his perception following a meeting of the National Security Council Deputies Committee on the Taliban negotiations, led by Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad, the lead U.S. negotiator, around February 2020. Top Trump administration officials announced the first parameters of their deal with the Taliban at the Munich Security Conference that month, in Germany, attended by Khalilzad, Ghani, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Miller’s predecessor as defense secretary, Mike Esper.
Pompeo offered his own recollections in a Monday appearance on Fox Business.
“We would have demanded that the Taliban actually deliver on the conditions that we laid out in the agreement—including the agreement to engage in meaningful power-sharing agreement—something that we struggled to get them to do but made clear it was going to be a requirement before we completed our requirement to fully withdraw," Pompeo said.
But Miller said there was never meant to be a full withdrawal; the “play” was to persuade the Ghani administration to accept an interim, coalition government or quit as the Taliban demanded. A new government then would be ratified by loya jirga, a traditional Pashtun legal assembly of tribal leaders, which likely would have transferred key ministerial posts and other powers to the Taliban.
“It wasn’t an unconditional surrender: ‘We’re leaving, heading for the door’,” Miller said. “We weren’t just going to head for the door. We were going to jam Ghani hard and make him cut a deal with the Taliban. It would have been ugly. It wouldn’t have been great. But there was no plan to just leave."
The hope was that the process would have allowed the United States, either through Ghani or his replacement, to negotiate a new status-of-forces agreement to extend the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan under the guise of continued counterterrorism training.
"There was going to be a new government. The Taliban wouldn’t exist as an independent entity. That deal is no longer valid. The whole idea was they would agree," Miller said. "We would have called it ‘security assistance,’ so that they could save face, but we were going to maintain a [counterterrorism] strike and reconnaissance capability."
“We were in a stalemate,” he said. “If the Taliban started massing and coming out of their insurgency state...we would have put [American] advisors with Afghan forces.”
If the Taliban attacked Afghan and U.S. forces, the United States would better be able to respond by calling in targeted air strikes, he said.
In the meantime, Miller argued, the interim government process would have bought the United States time to conduct an orderly evacuation in stark contrast to what is playing out in Kabul this week.
Miller felt the process of establishing that new government also would have kept the Taliban in negotiations rather than speeding to take over Kabul.
ln March, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley reportedly told Biden that leaving fewer than 2,500 troops could allow quick Taliban gains and re-establish a haven for extremist groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS to plan attacks against Western targets. Milley’s office this week reportedly has warned some lawmakers already that it is revising the threat level it sees from terrorists in the Middle East.
On Wednesday, Milley said the time for reviewing past decisions on U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan will come later, but asserted that the Pentagon planned for several possible scenarios for the Taliban advance. “One of those contingencies is what we are executing right now,” he said in a press conference.
The chairman’s office did not respond to requests to comment for this story.
Experts long have argued over just how few U.S. troops were needed in Afghanistan to deter and respond to terrorism threats and to continue training and supporting Afghan forces.
Mike Nagata, a retired Army three-star who directed strategic operational planning at the National Counterterrorism Center, said that he wasn't surprised to hear the 800-troop number but that it is inadequate.
“Based on my counterterrorism experience, several thousand U.S. personnel are necessary inside Afghanistan to conduct the intelligence and operational activities needed for reasonable confidence that we could thwart the creation of a new terrorist 'safe-haven' capable of transnational terrorist attacks. However, this is unrelated to what would be needed to sustain the ability of the Afghan government to secure their own population and territory from the Taliban,” said Nagata, who also commanded U.S. Special Operations Command Central.
Even with several thousand troops, Nagata said, the counterterrorism effort would still carry significant risk because of “the enormous size of Afghanistan, the ruggedness of its terrain, and the complexity of its population."
A second former senior Trump administration official acknowledged that there were efforts, led mostly by Khalilzad, to oust Ghani in order to appease the Taliban.
“That was what [Khalilzad] was pushing and that’s what the Taliban wanted. They wanted to get rid of the legitimate government,” said the official.
The official acknowledged that the United States had few options for keeping the Taliban out of Kabul. “The decision space was either: keep a small U.S. counterterrorism presence along with 7,000 to 8,000 NATO troops and kind of hold down the fort and protect our counterterrorism interests, or go to zero and cede the country to the Taliban.”
However, the official disagreed strongly that Miller’s idea was workable. “The Taliban were never going to agree to let any U.S. forces stay in the country and if any U.S. official thought that was possible, I think they were a victim of wishful thinking.”
But, said the former senior Trump administration official, the way in which the Afghan government collapsed could still have been avoided with a more gradual withdrawal.
“There’s probably a middle option to withdraw U.S. forces gradually and keep [special operations] contractors, or at least some of the contractors, in the country. I think what really undermined the Afghans was pulling all 16,000 contractors as well as all U.S. forces so abruptly. It changed the ground under their feet drastically and overnight. And there’s a psychological element if you realize that your partner of the last 20 years has just abandoned you.”
2. CIA’s Former Counterterrorism Chief for the Region: Afghanistan, Not An Intelligence Failure — Something Much Worse
Excerpt:
As the CIA’s former regional counterterrorism chief, and then a private citizen, I advocated the need for the United States to remain in Afghanistan with a small, focused, counterterrorist presence but to adopt a dramatically different approach that did not require us being in the line of fire between rival national forces whose conflicts predated our intervention and will persist long after we’re gone. And while I have criticized the CIA and the intelligence community for various ills that require reform and contributed to the current circumstances, not least of which was a counterterrorism strategy that was arguably more damaging than the ill it sought to address, there was no intelligence failure by the agency in warning either Trump or Biden as to how events would play out. Operating in the shadows and “supporting the White House” will prevent the intelligence community from publicly defending itself. But the failure was not due to any lack of warning, but rather the hubris and political risk calculus of decision makers whose choices are too often made in their personal and political interest or with pre-committed policy choices, rather than influenced by (sometimes inconvenient) intelligence assessments and the full interests of the country.
CIA’s Former Counterterrorism Chief for the Region: Afghanistan, Not An Intelligence Failure — Something Much Worse
August 18, 2021
While it’s certainly convenient to depict the shock and miscalculation U.S. officials claim over Afghanistan’s tragic, rapid fall to the Taliban as an intelligence failure, the reality is far worse. It’s a convenient deflection of responsibility for decisions taken owing to political and ideological considerations and provides a scapegoat for a policy decision that’s otherwise unable to offer a persuasive defense.
As CIA’s Counterterrorism Chief for South and Southwest Asia before my 2019 retirement, I was responsible for assessments concerning Afghanistan prepared for former President Donald Trump. And as a volunteer with candidate Joe Biden’s counterterrorism working group, I consulted on these same issues. The decision Trump made, and Biden ratified, to rapidly withdraw U.S. forces came despite warnings projecting the outcome we’re now witnessing. And it was a path to which Trump and Biden allowed themselves to be held captive owing to the “ending Forever Wars” slogan they both embraced.
The U.S. Intelligence Community assessed Afghanistan’s fortunes according to various scenarios and conditions and depending on the multiple policy alternatives from which the president could choose. So, was it 30 days from withdrawal to collapse? 60? 18 months? Actually, it was all of the above, the projections aligning with the various “what ifs.” Ultimately, it was assessed, Afghan forces might capitulate within days under the circumstances we witnessed, in projections highlighted to Trump officials and future Biden officials alike.
In his prepared remarks on Monday, President Biden stated, “But I always promised the American people that I will be straight with you. The truth is: This did unfold more quickly than we had anticipated.” That’s misleading at best. The CIA anticipated it as a possible scenario.
By early 2018, it was clear President Trump wanted out of Afghanistan regardless of the alarming outcomes the intelligence community cautioned. But he likewise did not want to preside over the nightmarish scenes we’ve witnessed. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was the principal architect of America’s engagement with the Taliban that culminated with the catastrophic February 2020 withdrawal agreement, terms intended to get the president through the coming elections. Pompeo championed the plan despite the intelligence community’s caution that its two key objectives– securing the Taliban’s commitment to break with al-Qa’ida and pursue a peaceful resolution to the conflict — were highly unlikely.
America’s special representative, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, was a private citizen dabbling on his own in 2018 with a variety of dubious Afghan interlocutors against whom the intelligence community warned, trying opportunistically to get “back inside.” Undaunted, his end around to Pompeo and the White House pledging to secure the deal Trump needed which the president’s own intelligence, military and diplomatic professionals claimed was not possible absent a position of greater strength, was enthusiastically received. Our impression was that Khalilzad was angling to be Trump’s Secretary of State in a new administration, were he to win, and would essentially do or say what he was told to secure his future by pleasing the mercurial president, including his steady compromise of whatever leverage the United States had to incentivize Taliban compromises.
But it was just as clear in the Biden camp that the candidate was committed to leaving Afghanistan, the security implications from which his team had more confidence they could manage than the intelligence supported. Endorsing Trump’s withdrawal agreement was considered win-win. It played well with most Americans. Moreover, from my perspective, they appeared to believe that negative consequences would be at least largely owned by Trump, the GOP, and Khalilzad, whose being left in place, intentionally or not, allowed him to serve even more so as a fall guy. For the candidate, who had long advocated withdrawal, the outcome was, as it had been with Trump, a foregone conclusion despite what many among his counterterrorism advisors counselled. President Biden himself has said as much in terms of his mind being made up.
There was a rather naïve confidence among Biden’s more influential foreign policy advisors that the Taliban’s best interests were served by adhering to the agreement’s main points. Doing so, they argued, would guarantee the U.S. withdrawal, and leave room for more constructive engagement, possibly even aid, should the Taliban come to power. The Taliban learned a great deal about the utility of PR since 2001, and maximized their access to Western media as highlighted by Taliban deputy and Haqqani Taliban Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani’s apparently ghost written New York Times OpEd. The reality, of course, as the intelligence community long maintained, was that the Taliban’s control over the country was predicated on isolation from the rest of the world, rather than integration. International recognition, global financial access, and foreign aid were not going to influence how the Taliban would rule.
U.S. policy makers were also cautioned that the broad coalition of Afghan politicians, warlords and military leaders across the country benefiting from the money and power that came with a sustained U.S. presence were likely to lose confidence and hedge their bets were U.S. military forces and intelligence personnel to withdraw. Further, that President Ashraf Ghani’s stubborn resistance to the Afghan political practice of buying support and his dismantling of the warlords’ private armies would weaken their incentives to support the government. Switching sides for a better deal or to fight another day is a hallmark of Afghan history. And U.S. policy to impose an American blueprint for a strong central government and integrated national army served only to enable Ghani’s disastrous and uncompromising stewardship.
Because intelligence is an imprecise science with which to crystal ball given that the conditions upon which any assessment is made will likely change, projections and confidence levels varied based on the U.S. military presence, internal Afghan dynamics, and the credibility of the Taliban’s pledge to good faith negotiations. Scenarios for an orderly withdrawal ranged from those in which the United States retained roughly 5,000 troops and most of the existing forward military and intelligence operating bases, to what was determined to be the minimum presence of around 2,500 troops maintaining the larger bases in greater Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad and Khost, as well as the infrastructure to support the bases we would turn over to Afghan partners. The larger of these two options was judged more likely to prevent Afghanistan’s collapse for 1-2 years and still provide for a degree of continued U.S. counterterrorism pressure; the smaller footprint was more difficult to assess but allowed flexibility for the United States to increase or further reduce its presence should circumstances rapidly deteriorate. (It would be valuable if commentators and news coverage included a greater appreciation of how such contingency-based assessments work rather than conflating assessments.)
Initially, even a “Kabul only” option included the retention of the sprawling U.S. Bagram Air Base and other intelligence facilities in the greater capital area through which the United States could project force, maintain essential logistical, intelligence and medical support to Afghan operated bases, and retain some technical intelligence collection and counterterrorist capability across the country. But without any U.S. military and intelligence presence beyond the Embassy in Kabul, faced with a Taliban military and propaganda offensive, and undermined by Ghani’s fractious relationship with his own national political partners, the intelligence community warned the government could dissolve in days. And so it went.
The clock began to accelerate when US military and intelligence elements withdrew from Kandahar on May 13, and thereafter closed remaining forward operating bases and “lily pads,” the term used for temporary staging areas under U.S. or coalition control. By the time Bagram was closed on July 1, the United States and NATO had also departed Herat, Mazar I Sharif, Jalalabad, Khost and other locations I am not at liberty to name. The Taliban was moving in even as we were packing up. They were quite likely joined by the many al-Qa’ida members (some of whom had enjoyed Iranian sanctuary),-if not direct operational support, augmented further by recently released comrades the Taliban set free from Afghan detention at Bagram and elsewhere.
Policy makers were also aware of the Taliban’s effective use of a parallel “shadow government” structure maintained since losing power that provided for reliable lines of communication with local elders across the provinces, as well as government authorities, often owing to shared family or clan connections. To an American it might be surprising, but it was nothing out of the ordinary for an Afghan military commander or police chief to be in regular contact even with those faced daily in combat.
The Taliban was thus well positioned to negotiate and buy rather than fight their way to successive conquests, itself an Afghan tradition. Moreover, the Taliban was prepared to quickly rule and provide services in the territories coming under its control. And by prioritizing the periphery to secure borders and the lines of communication required to sustain an insurgency, striking first from where they were defeated in 2001, the Taliban clearly learned from history, whereas we still have not. But where did the money come from to finance this campaign?
Persuading low level government fighters and functionaries to turnover their weapons and abandon their posts was well within the Taliban’s means, but it was undoubtedly more expensive securing the cooperation of senior officials with the authority to surrender provincial capitals. Layer on that the need to pay the surge of their own fighters, many of them essentially part-time and seasonal. Payroll and care for the families of fighters killed and wounded is often the greatest expense for the Taliban and its terrorist partner groups, and in Afghanistan, likewise the most important incentive to attract fighters.
The Taliban’s finances are complicated, more so by a structure which is not monolithic, and heavily dependent on the vast international criminal network operated by the Haqqani Taliban Network in the East, and somewhat autonomous regional commanders in the West. Revenues are variously drawn from taxes imposed on locals, narcotics trafficking, foreign donations-largely from Arab Gulf countries, real estate (some of which is abroad), the extortion of mining companies operating in areas under their control–many of which are Chinese government parastatals, and other foreign governments. Pakistan has long been a principal backer, but Russia and Iran increased their investments to court the group in recent years. Moreover, both benefited decidedly from the Taliban’s swift, bloodless conquest that expeditiously purged and humiliated the United States, and minimized what might have been a violent, prolonged fight that increased regional instability and the flow of refugees.
Momentum the Taliban needed to secure their adversaries’ cooperation was facilitated by a robust propaganda machine that, in many instances, successfully manipulated the media into positive, disproportional coverage from the outset of their offensive in casting their conquest as inevitable. Neither the Afghan government nor the United States could ever effectively counter the Taliban’s persistent and savvy media efforts given the need to protect sources and methods, legal restraints, and an unfortunate lack in investment and imagination.
And in grading their own homework, the U.S. defense establishment only exacerbated the problem. While it’s little surprise the Department of Defense was unwilling to objectively evaluate the resolve and capacity of those they trained, equipped, and advised to resist a forthcoming Taliban offensive, their rose-colored depictions of achievement over 20 years flew in the face of reality, and was consistently challenged by the CIA’s more gloomy, albeit realistic projections.
As the CIA’s former regional counterterrorism chief, and then a private citizen, I advocated the need for the United States to remain in Afghanistan with a small, focused, counterterrorist presence but to adopt a dramatically different approach that did not require us being in the line of fire between rival national forces whose conflicts predated our intervention and will persist long after we’re gone. And while I have criticized the CIA and the intelligence community for various ills that require reform and contributed to the current circumstances, not least of which was a counterterrorism strategy that was arguably more damaging than the ill it sought to address, there was no intelligence failure by the agency in warning either Trump or Biden as to how events would play out. Operating in the shadows and “supporting the White House” will prevent the intelligence community from publicly defending itself. But the failure was not due to any lack of warning, but rather the hubris and political risk calculus of decision makers whose choices are too often made in their personal and political interest or with pre-committed policy choices, rather than influenced by (sometimes inconvenient) intelligence assessments and the full interests of the country.
IMAGE: U.S. President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris (on screen) hold a video conference with the national security team to discuss the ongoing efforts to draw down the U.S. civilian footprint in Afghanistan August 16, 2021 at Camp Daviid (Photo by the White House via Getty Images)
3. For Those Who Served In Afghanistan
For Those Who Served In Afghanistan
By Keith Nightingale
OK. Take a deep breath and put your mind in neutral.
Yes-Afghanistan has fallen and we left a lot of blood there.
No-You and our combat casualties did not serve in vain. You shined a light in some of the darkest places on the globe. You did your job. You supported righteous endeavors. You ensured tens of thousands of terrorists never died from old age.
You showed, for a brief shining moment, what American values are all about.
You did this in obscurity and without public note, but to those that witnessed, you made a difference that will resonate far past our absence.
You were an American displaying what we as a Nation are surely all about.
Above all else, you were supremely, demonstrably honorable. Many others cannot say that.
You brought smiles to countless people who otherwise would have nothing to smile about. For a moment in time.
The “agonizing reappraisals” can be left to policy makers, historians, and the American people. Not your job.
Rest easy, You, those that served, gave our dead and wounded meaning by your presence and participation in something greater than yourself.
You are and were our Praetorian Guard-providing purpose and pride to a Service in which many others, acting on a higher plane, could not match the honor.
You well served the small band of family you were with as your successors will wherever they are asked to serve. As they surely will.
Our Nation depends upon its well of citizens willing to serve for all of us, not just some of us.
Causes and policies will change, but the quality of your service will not and cannot.
That would be a betrayal to what serving is all about and for which we, the 99% who do not fight, expect.
Others may have cause for judgement. You do not.
We have no choice.
You do.
Rest easy. You can sleep well. Some other citizens may not.
A Vietnam veteran
About the Author(s)
COL Nightingale is a retired Army Colonel who served two tours in Vietnam with Airborne and Ranger (American and Vietnamese) units. He commanded airborne battalions in both the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 82nd Airborne Division. He later commanded both the 1/75th Rangers and the 1st Ranger Training Brigade.
4. Journalist Joe Galloway, chronicler of Vietnam War, dies
A great American has left us.
Journalist Joe Galloway, chronicler of Vietnam War, dies
AP · by MICHAEL BIESECKER · August 18, 2021
WASHINGTON (AP) — Longtime American foreign correspondent Joseph L. Galloway, best known for his book recounting a pivotal battle in the Vietnam War that was made into a Hollywood movie, has died. He was 79.
A native of Refugio, Texas, Galloway spent 22 years as a war correspondent and bureau chief for United Press International, including serving four tours in Vietnam. He then worked for U.S. News & World Report magazine and Knight Ridder newspapers in a series of overseas roles, including reporting from the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Galloway died Wednesday morning, his wife, Grace Galloway, told The Associated Press, after being hospitalized near their home in Concord, North Carolina. He is also survived by two sons and a stepdaughter.
“He was the kindest, most gentle and loving man,” Grace Galloway said. “He loved the boys and girls of the U.S. military. He loved his country.”
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With co-author retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Hal Moore, Galloway wrote “We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young,” which recounted his and Moore’s experience during a bloody 1965 battle with the North Vietnamese in the Ia Drang Valley. The book became a national bestseller and was made into the 2002 movie “We Were Soldiers,” starring Mel Gibson as Moore and Barry Pepper as Galloway.
“Joe has my respect and admiration — a combat reporter in the field who willingly flew into hot spots and, when things got tough, was not afraid to take up arms to fight for his country and his brothers,” Gibson said Wednesday.
Galloway was decorated with a Bronze Star Medal with V in 1998 for rescuing wounded soldiers under fire during the la Drang battle. He is the only civilian awarded a medal of valor by the U.S. Army for actions in combat during the Vietnam War.
Galloway also served as a consultant for the 2016 PBS documentary “The Vietnam War,” directed by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick. They said he will be missed.
“Joe was a very brave and courageous reporter and phenomenal storyteller the likes of which they don’t make anymore,” Burns and Novick said in a joint statement. “We were lucky he came into our lives and made our understanding of the Vietnam War that much more vivid.”
After reporting from the front lines during Operation Desert Storm, Galloway co-authored “Triumph With Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War.” As he approached age 50, that was Galloway’s last combat assignment, but not the end of his career covering the U.S. military.
In 2002, Knight Ridder asked Galloway to return to reporting after a stint as an adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell to bolster its Washington bureau’s coverage of the Bush administration’s case for ousting Saddam Hussein.
Galloway did that by contributing, often anonymously, to his colleagues’ stories and by writing a column that often was critical of Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who were bent on invading Iraq.
John Walcott, Galloway’s longtime editor and friend, recounted how an exasperated Rumsfeld finally asked Joe to meet with him alone in his office. When Joe arrived, he was greeted by Rumsfeld — and a group of other high-ranking Pentagon officials.
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“Good,” Galloway reported when he returned to the Knight Ridder office. “I had ’em surrounded.”
According to Walcott, Galloway then described how after Rumsfeld accused him of relying on retired officers and officials, he had told the group that most of his sources were on active duty, and that some of them “might even be in this room.”
Asked by his colleagues if that was true, Galloway replied, “No, but it was fun watching ’em sweat like whores in church.”
Galloway’s critical coverage of the Bush administration’s case for invading Iraq was later portrayed in “Shock and Awe,” with fellow Texan Tommy Lee Jones playing Galloway.
“The thing about Joe is that there wasn’t a dishonest bone in his body,” Rob Reiner, the movie’s director, told the AP by phone. “He spoke truth to power. … We will miss him, there’s very few people who hold his level of integrity.”
Clark Hoyt, former Washington editor for Knight Ridder, said it was a privilege to work with Galloway, who he called one of the great war correspondents of all time.
“He earned the trust and respect of those he was covering but never lost his ear for false notes, as shown by his contributions to Knight Ridder’s skeptical reporting on the run up to the Iraq war,” Hoyt said.
Walcott said he was an exemplar of what journalism should be. From the People’s Army of Vietnam to Rumsfeld, no one ever intimidated Galloway other than his wife, Gracie, Walcott said.
“He never went to college, but he was one of, if not the, most gifted writers in our profession, in which his death will leave an enormous hole at a time when our country desperately needs more like him,” Walcott said. “He never sought fame nor tried to make himself the star of his stories. As sources, he valued sergeants more than brand name generals and political appointees.”
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Associated Press writers James LaPorta in Delray Beach, Florida, and Hillel Italie in New York City contributed to this report.
AP · by MICHAEL BIESECKER · August 18, 2021
5. Tom Tugendhat on UK and Afghanistan: Anger, grief, rage
A very powerful and moving video that is of course very critical of the American decision to withdraw.
But the messages he offers are very much worth reflecting upon.
Tom Tugendhat on UK and Afghanistan: Anger, grief, rage
In an emotional speech, Conservative MP Tom Tugendhat tells of the anger, grief and rage felt by veterans at the "abandonment" of Afghanistan.
The foreign affairs committee chairman, who served in Afghanistan, said President Biden's comments about the Afghan military were "shameful".
And he revealed that the health secretary had made a promise to him to "to do more for veterans' mental health".
MPs listened in silence to his speech, which was greeted with cheering and applause, which is not normally allowed in the Commons chamber.
Published
7 hours agoSection
6. The Taliban Have Seized U.S. Military Biometrics Devices
So many issues identified.
The U.S. military has long used HIIDE devices in the global war on terror and used biometrics to help identify Osama bin Laden during the 2011 raid on his Pakistani hideout. According to investigative reporter Annie Jacobsen, the Pentagon had a goal to gather biometric data on 80 percent of the Afghan population to locate terrorists and criminals.
“I don’t think anyone ever thought about data privacy or what to do in the event the [HIIDE] system fell into the wrong hands,” said Welton Chang, chief technology officer for Human Rights First, himself a former Army intelligence officer. “Moving forward, the U.S. military and diplomatic apparatus should think carefully about whether to deploy these systems again in situations as tenuous as Afghanistan.”
The Defense Department has also sought to share the biometrics data collected by HIIDE with other government agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security. In 2011, the Government Accountability Office criticized the Pentagon for not doing enough to ensure these other surveillance agencies had easy access to the information, warning that the military “limits its federal partners’ ability to identify potential criminals or terrorists.”
But the U.S. didn’t only collect information about criminals and terrorists; the government appears to also have been collecting biometrics from Afghans assisting diplomatic efforts, in addition to those working with the military. For example, a recent job posting by a State Department contractor sought to recruit a biometric technician with experience using HIIDE and other similar equipment to help vet personnel and enroll local Afghans seeking employment at U.S. embassies and consulates.
The Taliban Have Seized U.S. Military Biometrics Devices
The Taliban have seized U.S. military biometrics devices that could aid in the identification of Afghans who assisted coalition forces, current and former military officials have told The Intercept.
The devices, known as HIIDE, for Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment, were seized last week during the Taliban’s offensive, according to a Joint Special Operations Command official and three former U.S. military personnel, all of whom worried that sensitive data they contain could be used by the Taliban. HIIDE devices contain identifying biometric data such as iris scans and fingerprints, as well as biographical information, and are used to access large centralized databases. It’s unclear how much of the U.S. military’s biometric database on the Afghan population has been compromised.
While billed by the U.S. military as a means of tracking terrorists and other insurgents, biometric data on Afghans who assisted the U.S. was also widely collected and used in identification cards, sources said.
“We processed thousands of locals a day, had to ID, sweep for suicide vests, weapons, intel gathering, etc.” a U.S. military contractor explained. “[HIIDE] was used as a biometric ID tool to help ID locals working for the coalition.”
A spokesperson for the Defense Intelligence Agency referred questions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which did not respond to a request for comment.
An Army Special Operations veteran said it’s possible that the Taliban may need additional tools to process the HIIDE data but expressed concerns that Pakistan would assist with this. “The Taliban doesn’t have the gear to use the data but the ISI do,” the former Special Operations official said, referring to Pakistan’s spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence. The ISI has been known to work closely with the Taliban.
The U.S. military has long used HIIDE devices in the global war on terror and used biometrics to help identify Osama bin Laden during the 2011 raid on his Pakistani hideout. According to investigative reporter Annie Jacobsen, the Pentagon had a goal to gather biometric data on 80 percent of the Afghan population to locate terrorists and criminals.
“I don’t think anyone ever thought about data privacy or what to do in the event the [HIIDE] system fell into the wrong hands,” said Welton Chang, chief technology officer for Human Rights First, himself a former Army intelligence officer. “Moving forward, the U.S. military and diplomatic apparatus should think carefully about whether to deploy these systems again in situations as tenuous as Afghanistan.”
The Defense Department has also sought to share the biometrics data collected by HIIDE with other government agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security. In 2011, the Government Accountability Office criticized the Pentagon for not doing enough to ensure these other surveillance agencies had easy access to the information, warning that the military “limits its federal partners’ ability to identify potential criminals or terrorists.”
But the U.S. didn’t only collect information about criminals and terrorists; the government appears to also have been collecting biometrics from Afghans assisting diplomatic efforts, in addition to those working with the military. For example, a recent job posting by a State Department contractor sought to recruit a biometric technician with experience using HIIDE and other similar equipment to help vet personnel and enroll local Afghans seeking employment at U.S. embassies and consulates.
The federal government has collected biometric data from Afghans despite knowing the risks entailed by maintaining large databases of personal information, especially given recent cyberattacks on government agencies and private companies. These efforts are continuing to expand.
For example, a February 2020 article published by the Army indicated that the service was modernizing its 20-year-old biometric processing technology and had saved more than 1 million entries in the Pentagon’s Automated Biometrics Identification System, or ABIS, which hosts HIIDE and data collected by other devices as well.
“This updated database will make it more efficient for warfighters to collect, identify and neutralize the enemy,” wrote Col. Senodja Sundiata-Walker, project manager for the Pentagon’s biometrics program.
President Joe Biden’s proposed budget for the Army in fiscal year 2022 seeks more than $11 million to purchase 95 new biometric collection devices expanding upon those used in Afghanistan and Iraq.
7. What in the absolute hell does Palantir know that we don’t?
This article is not a favorable one for Palantir.
Excerpts:
It probably already knows where you are right now — It’s hard to exactly quantify how much Peter Thiel’s PreCrime Division knows about you... if we were asked to make a conservative ballpark estimate, we’d say the answer falls somewhere between a “shitload” and “metric fuck-ton.” The AI-driven data analytics company has abetted some of our country’s most heinous endeavors in recent memory, thanks in no small part to its databases cataloging everything from people’s “names, race, gender, addresses, and contact information” alongside “vehicles, warrants, mugshots... tattoos, scars, surveillance photos, and personal relationships,” as we explained last year.
Given its clientele base includes covert intelligence agencies, military agencies, and racist police forces, it’s safe to say that Palantir is privy to a whole host of information that would keep any sensible person up at night. To see it begin investment and integration of alternative currencies like Bitcoin and precious metals doesn’t inspire a whole lot of confidence in the company’s belief that geo-politics or macroeconomics are gonna improve anytime soon.
Overseen by a man buying collapse retreats — It’s also worth mentioning that Palantir was started by Peter Thiel, the multibillionaire co-founder of PayPal who now owns an estate in New Zealand explicitly to ride out a potential societal collapse. It’s hard to find a more nihilistic enterprise than Palantir, but there’s no denying its access to information and data that most could never dream of. If it is engaging what ostensibly amounts to corporate prepper behavior, then it’s worth taking notice and calling into question.
What in the absolute hell does Palantir know that we don’t?
The simple, creepy answer is “everything.” But its recent financial decisions point to some truly terrifying possibilities.
The information can be found buried within the company’s recent Q2 SEC filings, which confirms that just earlier this month, “the Company purchased $50.7 million in 100-ounce gold bars. Such purchase will initially be kept in a secure third-party facility located in the northeastern United States and the Company is able to take physical possession of the gold bars stored at the facility at any time with reasonable notice.”
This all begs the question: What the fuck does Palantir know that we do not?
Shutterstock
It probably already knows where you are right now — It’s hard to exactly quantify how much Peter Thiel’s PreCrime Division knows about you... if we were asked to make a conservative ballpark estimate, we’d say the answer falls somewhere between a “shitload” and “metric fuck-ton.” The AI-driven data analytics company has abetted some of our country’s most heinous endeavors in recent memory, thanks in no small part to its databases cataloging everything from people’s “names, race, gender, addresses, and contact information” alongside “vehicles, warrants, mugshots... tattoos, scars, surveillance photos, and personal relationships,” as we explained last year.
Given its clientele base includes covert intelligence agencies, military agencies, and racist police forces, it’s safe to say that Palantir is privy to a whole host of information that would keep any sensible person up at night. To see it begin investment and integration of alternative currencies like Bitcoin and precious metals doesn’t inspire a whole lot of confidence in the company’s belief that geo-politics or macroeconomics are gonna improve anytime soon.
Overseen by a man buying collapse retreats — It’s also worth mentioning that Palantir was started by Peter Thiel, the multibillionaire co-founder of PayPal who now owns an estate in New Zealand explicitly to ride out a potential societal collapse. It’s hard to find a more nihilistic enterprise than Palantir, but there’s no denying its access to information and data that most could never dream of. If it is engaging what ostensibly amounts to corporate prepper behavior, then it’s worth taking notice and calling into question.
8. For Texas veterans, Taliban triumph a gut punch
Excerpts:
On Monday, a friend of Hernandez — a Marine Corps special operations officer he’s never personally met — posted a photo of an Afghan falling from a C-17 flying out of the country and invited viewers to “think about the kind of desperation it takes to cling to an airplane that is big enough to carry 800 people as it takes off.”
“Think about the faith you have to have in America to have thought, even in your panic, that’s somehow going to work out,” the Marine wrote. “Then maybe think what little thing you can do to nudge us back a little closer, no matter how infinitesimal the movement, to that ideal as a nation.”
For Texas veterans, Taliban triumph a gut punch
Chris Hernandez, 50, holds his combat boots in front of his home in Spring on Tuesday. A veteran of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he went through a range of emotions when news broke that Kabul had collapsed at the end of a sweeping Taliban offensive.
Hernandez, 50, listened to the radio and watched video of events unfolding in Kabul this week that included three people falling out of the wheel well of an Air Force C-17 cargo plane that left Kabul carrying hundreds of refugees.
“In some ways, it’s really worse than the fall of Saigon, isn’t it?” he asked.
If they weren’t surprised at how America’s longest war ended, Americans who served in Afghanistan still felt shock.
They included Hernandez and Todd Plybon, 50, of Taylor, a Texas Army National Guard soldier who was seriously injured in a 2009 roadside bomb attack that killed two others. They had gone to Afghanistan to improve Afghan animal husbandry and agriculture, among other missions.
Like many in the Texas Guard, they were patriotic and sacrificed even before deploying. One fellow GI, Spc. Anthony G. Green, 28, of Yorktown, north of Victoria, came to Afghanistan with a 70 percent VA disability rating from a roadside bomb in his second tour of Iraq.
He didn’t survive the IED blast that left Plybon, a University of Texas graduate with a degree in chemistry, with traumatic brain injury, daily chronic pain and weekly visits to specialists.
Every soldier who served in Afghanistan made an investment there and many left a part of themselves — or someone else — behind.
The war, in turn, reverberated at home.
As the week began, Houston Police Commander Dan Harris, who commanded the Texas National Guard agribusiness development team, was still taking stock of the nation’s 20-year effort in Afghanistan. Like other veterans, his evaluation is a work in progress.
“I think I’m probably like most Americans. The first thing was surprise at how quickly the Taliban was able to gain ground and gain control,” Harris said.
There was also “a sadness thinking about … the Afghan people themselves and what they are going through now and what they probably will be going through in the immediate future,” he said. “And then also thinking about the costs to America, and it’s not just America, there are other allies that were there with us.
“The only bright side I can think of — until now we were successful preventing Afghanistan from being a launching base, a recruiting base, a training base for more terrorist attacks against the U.S. or other countries,” added Harris, 61, of Conroe. “Now, I don’t know what’s going to become of that mission, what’s going to happen to Afghanistan.”
Altogether, 3,596 troops from a 46-nation coalition had died in Afghanistan through Monday.
At home in Fredericksburg on Tuesday afternoon, Staats’ dad, Bobby Staats, 71, himself a former soldier in the Texas Guard,said he was watching the news.
“I’m feeling pretty bad about it,” he said. “There’s going to be a lot of people left behind that supported the United States. But this administration doesn’t give a damn. They don’t care. They do not care about nothing except their power.”
In all, the Defense Department said 832,000 American troops served in Afghanistan. The highest death toll came in 2010, the year of President Barack Obama’s surge, with 498 killed. The lowest, 11 dead, was last year, Along the way, the United States spent $2.26 trillion in Afghanistan, out of $6.4 trillion in all its post-9/11 wars, which include Iraq, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen, among others, said Stephanie Savell, co-director of Brown University’s Cost of War Project.
The project estimates the death toll in Afghanistan and related fighting in Pakistan, including allied and combatant fighters and civilians who were killed in combat, at 241,000.
Paul Rieckhoff, founder and former chief executive officer of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, said he’d heard an earful from veterans stunned at how an American-trained and equipped military vanished as the Taliban closed on Kabul.
“I think the overall mood is outrage and frustration and anger, and a sense of betrayal,” he said, adding the callers were angry “mostly at Washington and I think increasingly at the president. I think the more nuanced folks want to talk about the (Authorization for Use of Military Force) and how it’s gone this long but I think everybody is focused on - pretty much a consensus - that whether we were going to leave or not, we didn’t have to leave like this.”
A one-time San Antonian who graduated in 1989 from Central Catholic High School, Hernandez saw news accounts of Afghan government forces surrendering or abandoning posts across the country. While initially angry with President Joe Biden over his decision to pull out of Afghanistan, he adopted a different attitude after listening to Biden’s remarks to the nation Monday.
Part of the attitude change was based on something he had expected — a feckless Afghan government and shaky military force.
“Out of the two wars I served in, I never expected Iraq to be the success story,” he said.
Andrew Bacevich, a retired professor of international relations and history at Boston University who was critical of President George W. Bush’s handling of the conflict in Iraq, had said he wasn’t emotionally invested in the Afghan war.
Or so he thought.
“Ever since the Taliban offensive has gained momentum, I have been overcome by a sense of anger, humiliation, and embarrassment that I find hard to explain,” Bacevich, a Vietnam platoon leader and cavalry commander, said in an email. “It was clear to me that the Afghan government's days were numbered. I just didn't expect things to fall apart quite so abruptly.”
The war is intensely personal for Plybon and his wife, Tara. He takes a weekly infusion to help with the headaches that have plagued him since the blast. Now 50, Tara is his caregiver and hasn’t worked in 11 years. While they’ve made huge sacrifices at home that have become yet another forever war, she’ll insist they’re far more fortunate than Gold Star families.
Todd Plybon has taken up photography, shooting pictures of horses, old buildings and small towns, and has entered his work at shows, with some exhibited at a Georgetown museum. Proceeds go to the Ride On Center for Kids, a non-profit that gives equine-assisted services to disabled children, adults, and veterans.
The feeling that America didn’t effectively fight the war has nagged Plybon over the years. He’s never forgotten a PowerPoint briefing slide displaying an icon marked “Taliban HQ” on a map of the Texas Guard’s area of operation outside Ghazni, an hour south of Kabul by helicopter.
“I wanted to raise my hand and say, ‘Excuse me, why is that there?’” he said, wondering why it wasn’t bombed, if identified.
No one asked the question. The Texas Guard’s task was to help introduce modern farming and ranching methods to Afghans. A subsistence farming tradition, an ineffective government and Taliban threats made everything difficult, as did a mindset Plybon observed among his own troops.
“It just seemed like we were not aggressive enough,” he said. “And I wouldn’t want to take away from the guys that were involved in those actions … But as an overall war mindset we just seemed to - at times it seemed as though we were trying to endure,” Plybon said. “I think a lot of guys looked at it as, ‘I’ll get through my year and then I’ll go home.’”
Hernandez was a human intelligence team leader and volunteered for missions from his base, typically two to three a week, sometimes more. He’d go out with the infantry as well and on occasion would find himself in big fights.
That, it turned out, is where he wanted to be.
His Texas Guard 636th Military Intelligence Battalion in Kapisa province, northeast of Bagram Air Base, didn’t lose any soldiers, but Hernandez said he operated with French, Afghan and American embedded military training teams that lost 20 coalition and Afghan troops from February through November 2009.
In a novel he later wrote, “Proof of Our Resolve,” the protagonist, a Texas Army National Guard soldier, talks with the wife of a slain soldier.
“In the novel, my protagonist is trying to explain to somebody who feels like she lost her husband for nothing … that he didn’t die for Afghanistan, he died for America and he died because what he believed about his country and himself was so strong he was willing to fight and die to defend it,” Hernandez said. “And when you’re willing to lay down your life for something you hold that dear, it has to be important.”
On Monday, a friend of Hernandez — a Marine Corps special operations officer he’s never personally met — posted a photo of an Afghan falling from a C-17 flying out of the country and invited viewers to “think about the kind of desperation it takes to cling to an airplane that is big enough to carry 800 people as it takes off.”
“Think about the faith you have to have in America to have thought, even in your panic, that’s somehow going to work out,” the Marine wrote. “Then maybe think what little thing you can do to nudge us back a little closer, no matter how infinitesimal the movement, to that ideal as a nation.”
9. US troops will stay until all Americans are out of Afghanistan, even if past Aug. 31 deadline: Biden to ABC News
This is obviously very important. It is the right decision Leave no one behind. This must include at-risk Afghans as well.
US troops will stay until all Americans are out of Afghanistan, even if past Aug. 31 deadline: Biden to ABC News
In an exclusive interview with ABC News' George Stephanopoulos, President Joe Biden said the U.S. is committed to getting every American out of Afghanistan -- even if it means potentially extending the mission beyond his Aug. 31 deadline for a total withdrawal.
"We've got like 10 to 15,000 Americans in the country right now. Right? And are you committed to making sure that the troops stay until every American who wants to be out is out?" Stephanopoulos asked Biden.
"Yes," Biden replied.
The president cautioned that his focus is on completing the mission by Aug. 31, but when pressed by Stephanopoulos, conceded the mission could take longer.
"So Americans should understand that troops might have to be there beyond Aug. 31st?" Stephanopoulos asked.
"No," Biden replied. "Americans should understand that we're gonna try to get it done before Aug. 31st."
ABC News
President Joe Biden speaks with ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos, Aug. 18, 2021, in Washington, D.C.
"But if we don't," Stephanopoulos said, "the troops will stay --"
"If -- if we don't," Biden interrupted, "We'll determine at the time who's left."
"And?" Stephanopoulos asked.
"And if you're American force -- if there's American citizens left, we're gonna stay to get them all out," Biden said.
Biden told ABC News that in addition to the 10,000 to 15,000 Americans who need to be evacuated, there are between 50,000 and 65,000 Afghans and their families the U.S. also wants to get out.
ABC News
President Joe Biden speaks with ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos, Aug. 18, 2021, in Washington, D.C.
But to do that before the end of the month, Biden said it will require that the ongoing evacuation mission go faster.
"It depends on where we are and whether we can get -- ramp these numbers up to five to five - 7,000 a day coming out. If that's the case, they'll all be out," the president said.
"The commitment holds to get everyone out that, in fact, we can get out and everyone who should come out. And that's the objective. That's what we're doing now. That's the path we're on. And I think we'll get there," Biden said.
The administration has come under fire for the chaos unfolding on the ground in Afghanistan as control of the country quickly fell to the Taliban while the deadline for the final U.S. withdrawal approached.
The Taliban's rapid recapture of the country, the administration acknowledged, happened more quickly than they had expected, and led to chaos at the Kabul airport. As the Taliban continues to block access for desperate Afghan allies who aided the United States during the 20 years war, they now fear retribution for their efforts.
10. First Resistance to Taliban Rule Tests Afghanistan’s Uncertain Future
There will be resistance. What will we do about it? Has someone prepared a finding for the President's desk? I hope we never know (until the history is written some years in the future)
First Resistance to Taliban Rule Tests Afghanistan’s Uncertain Future
While the militants appear firmly in control, some prominent figures vowed to continue resistance as protests erupted in two cities and millions of Afghans parsed clues about the Taliban’s intentions.
A Taliban fighter threatening a woman who was waiting to enter the Kabul airport with her family on Wednesday.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
By
Aug. 18, 2021, 7:10 p.m. ET
As the Taliban sought to consolidate control over Afghanistan on Wednesday, they faced the first challenges to their renewed rule, using force to break up protests in at least two cities, while an opposing faction vowed to hold out in one pocket of the country.
Millions of Afghans tried to parse conflicting clues about what lay in store for them and their nation, but many were not waiting to find out.
Despite Taliban assurances that there would be no reprisals against their opponents, thousands of people continued to crowd around the airport in Kabul, the capital, hoping to get a flight out of the country. Throngs rushed toward certain entrances, only to be met by Taliban troops who beat people back and fired their rifles into the air. A NATO official at the scene said 17 people were injured.
Taliban fighters used gunfire to disperse demonstrations in the northeastern city of Jalalabad and the southeastern city of Khost, with some of the protesters raising the Afghan government flags that the Taliban had taken down just days earlier. News reports said two or three people were killed in Jalalabad.
But in other cities, a tense quiet prevailed.
Crowds seeking to get out of the country gathered outside the airport in Kabul on Wednesday.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
The former president, Ashraf Ghani, who fled the country on Sunday, surfaced in the United Arab Emirates and made his first public statement, saying that if he had stayed in Kabul, “the people of Afghanistan would have witnessed the president hanged.”
President Biden said on Wednesday that he was committed to getting every American out of Afghanistan, even if it meant keeping troops there past the Aug. 31 withdrawal deadline he set. “If there’s American citizens left, we’re going to stay to get them all out,” he told ABC News.
Though the Taliban hold control of nearly all of the country, some prominent figures continued to hold out with a corps of loyal fighters, saying they do not recognize the Taliban as legitimate rulers. One of them, Amrullah Saleh, the vice president in the toppled government, claimed that Mr. Ghani’s flight from the country had made him the acting president.
Mr. Saleh is in the northeastern Panjshir Valley, a stronghold of resistance to the Soviet Union in the 1980s and to the Taliban a decade later. He is allied with a regional leader, Ahmad Massoud, whose father, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was the leading anti-Taliban commander a generation ago, until he was assassinated two days before the Sept. 11 attacks.
“You can see that I’m in Panjshir and with our people,” Mr. Massoud said in a video posted to Facebook on Wednesday. “God willing I will remain here with our people.”
The Taliban have tried to signal to Afghanistan and the world that their return to power this week will not mean a reprise of the bloody regime of 1996 to 2001 that brutally repressed women, minorities and dissenters, and provided a safe haven for Al Qaeda.
But so far, evidence of what that more “inclusive” approach will mean, as a Taliban spokesman described it on Tuesday, has been thin, and Afghanistan is a nation suspended in confusion.
Women have been allowed to go to work and walk around freely in some places, but not others. Some schools have reopened but not others. The calm and order that the Taliban have tried to project have been punctuated by violence and looting. People have been told they could leave the country, but many were prevented from doing so, and it was uncertain how willing the rest of the world would be to welcome those who make it out.
Local Taliban commanders and fighters appeared unsure of what rules to enforce, so conditions varied widely depending on who was present, according to international observers.
“They are saying to us they are still waiting for instructions from the leadership, so the instructions have not yet reached the ground level,” said Caroline Van Buren, the Afghanistan representative for the United Nations’ refugee agency.
A Taliban fighter standing guard as a police officer managed traffic in central Kabul on Wednesday.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
But a threat assessment commissioned by the United Nations says that Taliban militants appear to be stepping up efforts to arrest people who worked in the former government, particularly in the security services, and those who aided them — or, if that fails, may seize their family members, according to a confidential document shared internally among U.N. officials and seen by The New York Times.
The Taliban have asked U.N. aid agencies and other humanitarian groups to remain in Afghanistan, and for the most part they have said they planned to stay. Millions of Afghans rely on foreign aid for food.
In its previous stint in power, the Taliban barred women from working, going to school or even going outside without wearing a burqa and being escorted by a male relative. Those who violated the group’s codes were publicly flogged and sometimes executed.
Taliban officials have hinted that they plan to include former opponents in running the country, and they have left some officials of the former government in place, for now.
High-level representatives of the Taliban and the former U.S.-backed government met again on Wednesday to discuss arrangements, but predictions that they would announce an interim council proved premature.
The U.S. troop presence rose to nearly 5,000 at the airport in Kabul by late Wednesday, the Pentagon said, to provide security and coordinate the evacuation of Americans, as well as Afghans who have worked with the American-led forces and fear Taliban retribution.
In a 24-hour period from Tuesday to Wednesday, officials said, 18 of the giant C-17 military transports left the airport, carrying about 2,000 people; 325 of them were Americans, and the rest were Afghans and the personnel of other NATO countries. John Kirby, a Pentagon spokesman, said the plan is to get that up to 5,000 to 9,000 people per day ferried out from the military side of the airport.
Conditions were more chaotic on the civilian side of the airport. The Taliban, who have asked Afghans to remain in the country, allowed some who had visas and tickets to leave. But thousands of others, including entire families, have been turned away, and remain just outside the airport walls and coils of concertina wire, clamoring to get in, at times clashing with Taliban fighters.
Taliban members blocking an entrance to the airport on Wednesday.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
“We intend to evacuate those who have been supporting us for years, and we are not going to leave them behind,” Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Wednesday at a Pentagon news conference. “And we will get as many out as possible.”
But neither he nor Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III would assure safe passage to the airport, even for Americans, saying that all the U.S. troops there were needed just to secure the airport.
Understand the Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan
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Who are the Taliban? The Taliban arose in 1994 amid the turmoil that came after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. They used brutal public punishments, including floggings, amputations and mass executions, to enforce their rules. Here’s more on their origin story and their record as rulers.
Who are the Taliban leaders? These are the top leaders of the Taliban, men who have spent years on the run, in hiding, in jail and dodging American drones. They are emerging now from obscurity, but little is known about them or how they plan to govern.
“I don’t have the capability to go out and extend operations currently into Kabul,” Mr. Austin said.
The events of the last few days have made for a chaotic end to an ultimately failed 20-year attempt by the United States and its allies to defeat the Taliban and turn Afghanistan into a stable, democratic state.
The Biden administration has faced harsh criticism for not anticipating the swift fall of the government and evacuating sooner, but the president defended himself in the ABC interview.
“The idea that somehow, there’s a way to have gotten out without chaos ensuing, I don’t know how that happens,” Mr. Biden said.
Outside the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on Sunday night.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
On Wednesday, Representative Gregory W. Meeks, a New York Democrat and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said American troops should remain beyond President Biden’s Aug. 31 withdrawal date, if needed, to get vulnerable people out.
Canada, Britain and the United States have each said they intend to take in tens of thousands of Afghans, but the process has been slow. Many European leaders, stung by the backlash from the migrant crisis of 2015-16, have shown little interest in offering refuge to Afghans fleeing the country.
Mr. Ghani, whose location was unknown until Wednesday, said he had faced certain death at the hands of the Taliban, making reference to the fact that they hanged a former president, Mohammad Najibullah, in a public square after taking Kabul in 1996. Denying rumors that he had left with a fortune in cash, he said, “I came just with my clothes and I was not even able to bring my library.”
Looking tired and drawn, Mr. Ghani, 72, said he had every intention of returning to Afghanistan and was in touch with his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, and the former government’s chief peace negotiator, Abdullah Abdullah, who were in discussions with the Taliban.
A half-destroyed poster of Ashraf Ghani, the former Afghan president, in Kabul on Wednesday.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Taliban leaders have promised to defend a free press and women’s rights, though to what extent remains unclear.
On Tuesday, the Taliban’s chief spokesman held a news conference, with women journalists present, and faced tough questions, while another spokesman gave a television interview to a female reporter.
But Ms. Van Buren, of the United Nations, said it was very hard to get a clear picture of how women were being treated around the country. In some places the Taliban were preventing women from going to work or leaving home without an escort, she said, but in other places there had been no reports of such restrictions.
On Wednesday, Shabnam Dawran, a woman who anchors a television news show on the state-owned RTA channel, said Taliban fighters had prevented her from reporting for work in Kabul.
“I was not allowed to despite having a valid ID card,” she said in a video posted on social media. “Most of my male colleagues were able to get in with their ID cards, but they warned me that you cannot go inside and you are not allowed in the job because the regime has changed. These are big challenges in front of us. If the international community is hearing my voice, they should help us because our lives are under severe threat.”
Reporting was contributed by Carlotta Gall, Jim Huylebroek, Eric Schmitt, Marc Santora, Andrew E. Kramer, Matthew Rosenberg, Helene Cooper, Isabella Kwai, Rick Gladstone and Farnaz Fassihi.
11. Pentagon: No plans for rescuing Americans in Afghanistan who can’t get to the airport
Surely we must. And we should be stating that we do have plans and will execute them if the Taliban does not allow safe passage. If we want to conduct an effective influence operation to ensure the Taliban allows safe passage we need to demonstrate the capability to do so. We need to send a strong signal that we will leave no one behind and we will do what ever it takes to secure Americans and at-risk Afghans.
Pentagon: No plans for rescuing Americans in Afghanistan who can’t get to the airport
There are no plans yet to aid Americans unable to make it past the tight cordon the Taliban has placed around Hamid Karzai International Airport, the base of the expanding U.S. evacuation effort in Afghanistan, the Pentagon’s spokesman acknowledged Wednesday.
In the last 24 hours, 18 Air Force C-17 cargo jets lifted off from the airport with about 2,000 passengers, of which 325 were U.S. citizens. The remaining numbers were Afghan civilians and some NATO personnel, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters on Wednesday.
Amid chaotic scenes of Westerners and Afghans seeking to get into Kabul’s only international airport, Mr. Kirby said they did not know how many Americans might still be in Afghanistan and unable to access the airport.
“We’re focused on the present mission — that’s where our heads are,” Mr. Kirby said.
About 4,500 U.S. combat troops are currently on the ground at the airport. The tally may increase by a “couple of hundred” by the end of the day, officials said.
“We’re not anticipating a big shift in personnel beyond that right now,” Mr. Kirby said.
Navy Rear Adm. Peter G. Vasely, commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan-Forward, is on the ground in overall command of the effort at the airport, officials said.
While U.S. troops are in charge at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA,) Taliban fighters control all access into the airport and have imposed a curfew in the area. There have been reports of them refusing to admit people through the gates. Pentagon officials said they are aware of the incidents.
“There is constant communication with Taliban commanders,” Mr. Kirby said. “We are talking to them about the effects their curfew and the limits they’re putting on people outside the airport are having with our ability to accomplish the mission.
The State Department has posted consular officers at the gates leading into the airport to assist with the effort to get people out of the country following the Taliban‘s lightning-fast victory following the complete collapse of the US-trained and equipped Afghan army.
“We’re not unaware that there have been issues out in the town and harassment of individuals. That’s one of the reasons Adm. Vasely is in touch with his Taliban counterparts,” Mr. Kirby said. “We are working very hard to make sure they can get through safely so they can be properly processed.”
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12. Vietnam’s lessons for the Afghanistan failure: Don’t count out US leadership just yet
Yep. Don't count us out. We will recover.
There are still a lot of lessons we can learn from Vietnam.
Excerpt:
The lessons of defeat in Vietnam, understood properly, may help inform Americans as they grapple with the lessons of defeat in Afghanistan.
Vietnam’s lessons for the Afghanistan failure: Don’t count out US leadership just yet
Tue, Aug 17, 2021
CH-46 Sea Knight military transport helicopter flies over Kabul, Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. Photo via a Reuters stringer.
The August 15 images of helicopters lifting fleeing diplomats from the US embassy in Kabul—like those of a similar calamity in Saigon in April 1975—will weigh on the United States. US President Joe Biden had dismissed the possibility of such a scenario just weeks ago, which suggests that neither he nor his administration understood the situation on the ground. Although the decision to pull out of Afghanistan was defensible (though questionable), the United States executed that decision poorly, making the worst outcomes more likely. We’re now faced with a humanitarian disaster for those Afghans who trusted the United States, embraced our values, or even worked with us and our allies over the past twenty years.
What will the debacle in Afghanistan mean for US strategy in the world and for its friends and allies who are watching all of this with dismay? For that question, the answer may lie in the consequences of US failure in Vietnam.
In Vietnam, as in Afghanistan, the United States understood neither the nature of its enemy nor the weaknesses of its friends. In both cases, the United States covered up stalemate with over-optimistic assessments and then, out of frustration and in response to public weariness, cut and ran. Then US President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger did a better job than the Trump and Biden administrations by disguising their retreat for a time, but the result was the same as in Afghanistan: catastrophic defeat for those the United States backed, a disaster for those who trusted in the United States, and a blow to US strategy.
The US failure in Vietnam occurred amid an American crisis of confidence and contributed to it. Then as now, the United States was polarized socially and politically, shaken by racial strife, urban riots, rising violent crime, and profound political tensions, the latter caused by a president who had tested the US constitutional order.
In these circumstances, Americans generalized the Vietnam debacle. To many, defeat seemed like proof that the US Cold War strategy and even US leadership in the world had failed. What had worked so well for the United States in post-World War II Europe, Japan, and South Korea—building alliances, providing military security against communist adversaries, and helping countries emerging from the ruin of war integrate into a US-led liberal international system—did not work in Southeast Asia. Even more, by the mid-1970s many Americans believed that the United States, by virtue of its failings at home and in Vietnam, had no business attempting international leadership at all.
Many Americans concluded that the United States had to pull back in the world and concentrate on challenges at home; that America’s grand strategy, articulated in the 1941 Atlantic Charter between then US President Franklin Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, of seeking to advance a rules-based, liberal world order was a waste of blood and treasure. After the fall of Saigon, this view was espoused by many on the left and those of the realist school of thought who drew lessons, often wise, about overreach and overconfidence. A sense of inevitable US decline infused many of those arguments.
As a demoralized United States retreated from Vietnam in chaos, the Soviet Union believed that its time had come. It increased aggression abroad, culminating, ironically, with its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Many Americans and much of the foreign-policy establishment, demoralized by defeat in Vietnam, concluded that the Soviet Union was winning the Cold War, a view that lasted well into the 1980s.
And yet.
Less than fifteen years after the fall of Saigon, the Berlin Wall fell, and the Soviet Union fell apart shortly thereafter. Former US President Ronald Reagan helped turn around the national mood and pushed back against the Soviets. But the critical actors in the final chapter of the Cold War were determined democracy activists in Central and Eastern Europe who linked up with mass social movements, especially in Poland and the Baltic countries. They were inspired by the vision of a democratic and freedom-supporting United States, undeterred by American pessimism, and committed to achieving freedom for their nations: patriotism in democratic form. They enjoyed some help from the United States but mainly achieved success by themselves as communism decayed. Those activists believed in the United States more than many Americans believed in themselves. And they won.
As it turns out, US strategy during the Cold War—supporting freedom and resisting Soviet communism—succeeded, even in the face of Washington’s blunders in Vietnam and elsewhere. We must have been on to something about the attractive power of freedom and about the resilience of the US-led liberal international system—and the United States itself.
The lessons of defeat in Vietnam, understood properly, may help inform Americans as they grapple with the lessons of defeat in Afghanistan.
One big lesson is that no strategy, even a good one, can protect against stupid. American grand strategy for generations has sought to advance democracy, free markets, and the rule of law because it ultimately serves US interests. That strategy may be the right one. But being right in general doesn’t mean that strategy will work in every country and at any given time. Lessons from the Vietnam debacle about attention to local conditions, realities on the ground, and the limits of American patience and resources have been proven valid with respect to Afghanistan. Americans’ expectations about what the United States can achieve in any particular country need to be tempered. And the bar for military action in far-flung, less organized countries, particularly long-term ground operations, will go up, as it should.
However, even this reasonable lesson could prove complicated in practice. The United States helped topple the Taliban after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and for good reason. Several relatively calm years followed, a golden period that perhaps lent itself to creating better outcomes for Afghanistan, but the United States turned toward Iraq. Could greater concentration on Afghanistan have achieved a better result? Although the best outcome in Afghanistan—a peaceful, modernizing society and burgeoning democracy—might not have been achievable, much was achieved in the past twenty years. Reflecting today, could the United States have preserved that progress through an extended commitment of its relatively modest force presence? Would such a muddling, frustrating solution have been better than what the United States may now face in and from Afghanistan? I suspect the answers are yes, though Biden in his August 16 remarks to the nation argued otherwise and made a strong case. Fights over those questions could be bitter and inconclusive.
A firmer lesson is that while the United States should not attempt too much under unfavorable conditions, it must guard against doing little to support its friends and values. China and Russia are crowing about US failure in Afghanistan and may try to test the United States with new aggression. I’ve heard from anxious friends from Poland, Baltic nations, Ukraine, and others among Europe’s more exposed countries worried about the steadiness of the United States, in which they have put so much trust and thanks to which they have achieved a great deal.
Biden has argued to the nation that the now-defunct Afghan government was unwilling to fight for its country. The Biden administration needs to follow defeat in Afghanistan with steadiness toward worried friends who are willing and able to defend themselves. Ukraine, for all its shortcomings, is one such democracy. Biden can make clear when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits Washington in late August that there is no green light for Putin to attack in direct or hybrid form. The administration should make early efforts—through NATO and bilaterally—to convey to worried allies that it is reliable and that the United States will not turn inward—and that the administration means it. Washington should develop options to counter Putin’s possible avenues of cyber, energy, or hybrid aggression. The administration should also meaningfully convey that same message to allies in Asia such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian countries (ironically including Vietnam) that see the United States as balancing power with respect to China and are also willing to defend themselves.
The Biden administration needs to move hard and fast to protect those Afghans who trusted the United States and its values, to contain Afghanistan under the Taliban, to give no opportunity to authoritarians seeking to take advantage of this bad moment, and to show worried allies that the United States they thought was “back” truly has returned. American foreign policy will have to find that elusive balance of operational realism sorely lacking in Afghanistan as in Vietnam, without throwing out the best principles of its grand strategy—to advance values and interests together with allies—that achieved so much over the past three generations.
Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He was the coordinator for sanctions policy during the Obama administration, assistant secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia during the Bush administration, and senior director at the National Security Council for the Clinton and Bush administrations. He also served as ambassador to Poland during the Clinton administration. Follow him on Twitter @AmbDanFried.
13. After fall of Kabul, resistance to Taliban emerges in Panjshir | FDD's Long War Journal
The question is what will we do about this? Is someone assessing the resistance potential? Do we have contact with these forces? And as I previously asked, has someone drafted a finding for the President to be able to take action?
Excerpts:
It is unclear if Saleh and his Panjshir resistance has any support from the outside. The U.S. is fearful of upsetting the Taliban as it evacuates American citizens via Hamid Karzai International Airport, which is inside Taliban-controlled Kabul. Additionally, President Biden signaled in his Aug. 16 speech that he no longer has the desire or will to help the Afghan people. Russia and China have extended ties to the Taliban; Iran has been friendly with the group and has provided aid; and Pakistan has always been the Taliban’s prime sponsor. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are at the mercy of following Russia’s lead.
While the power brokers in Panjshir no doubt stock up on critical supplies such as fuels, weapons, ammunition and food, those provisions will deplete up over time. Without outside support and supplies, the Panjshir resistance will be hard pressed to sustain itself. Unconfirmed reports indicated that the Panjshir resistance has taken control of Chahikar and is fighting for the strategic Salang Pass, which would give Saleh a lifeline to the outside world.
Saleh fled to Panjshir after the fall of Kabul and the collapse of the Afghan government on Aug. 15. He joined Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the famed commander of the Northern Alliance who was assassinated by Al Qaeda suicide bombers just two days prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Two days later, he declared himself president when Arshif Ghani, the last president, fled the country.
After fall of Kabul, resistance to Taliban emerges in Panjshir | FDD's Long War Journal
The Taliban’s lightning offensive, which began immediately after President Joe Biden’s announcement of withdrawal on April 14, 2021, has resulted in a near total takeover of Afghanistan. However, resistance to the Taliban rule has emerged in the remote and mountainous province of Panjshir.
The Taliban will likely seek to crush this last bastion of resistance, the so-called last “free” region in Afghanistan.
Prospects for this resistance, led by former Vice President and National Directorate of Security chief Amrullah Saleh, make it a decided longshot. Saleh has a formidable task ahead of him and his prospects are bleak. The Taliban dominates the security situation and has been infused with an arsenal of weapons as spoils from the now-defunct Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, which were supplied by the United States and NATO allies. Additionally, the Taliban holds strategic terrain and Panjshir is surrounded. Morale in the rank and file of the Taliban’s army is also buoyed by its stunning victory that saw 32 of 34 provinces and their capitals collapse in the span of just 11 days.
Only Panjshir remains, while the status of neighboring Parwan province is unclear. Saleh’s forces have reportedly attempted to expand their control beyond Panjshir in the neighboring province of Parwan.
The Taliban, while ascendent, has its own challenges. It is attempting to secure Kabul, a city of 4.5 million people flooded with refugees. The Taliban must commit significant resources to do so. There are reports of fighting in western Kabul, and that will tie down Taliban military assets. The Taliban must decide if wants to divert forces from Kabul and elsewhere to put down the emerging threat in Panjshir. The Taliban does not want a repeat of the 1990s, when it battled the Northern Alliance, which halted the Taliban’s goal of dominance in all of Afghanistan’s provinces.
It is unclear if Saleh and his Panjshir resistance has any support from the outside. The U.S. is fearful of upsetting the Taliban as it evacuates American citizens via Hamid Karzai International Airport, which is inside Taliban-controlled Kabul. Additionally, President Biden signaled in his Aug. 16 speech that he no longer has the desire or will to help the Afghan people. Russia and China have extended ties to the Taliban; Iran has been friendly with the group and has provided aid; and Pakistan has always been the Taliban’s prime sponsor. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are at the mercy of following Russia’s lead.
While the power brokers in Panjshir no doubt stock up on critical supplies such as fuels, weapons, ammunition and food, those provisions will deplete up over time. Without outside support and supplies, the Panjshir resistance will be hard pressed to sustain itself. Unconfirmed reports indicated that the Panjshir resistance has taken control of Chahikar and is fighting for the strategic Salang Pass, which would give Saleh a lifeline to the outside world.
Saleh fled to Panjshir after the fall of Kabul and the collapse of the Afghan government on Aug. 15. He joined Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the famed commander of the Northern Alliance who was assassinated by Al Qaeda suicide bombers just two days prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Two days later, he declared himself president when Arshif Ghani, the last president, fled the country.
— Office of President Amrullah Saleh (@AfghPresident) August 17, 2021
Saleh said that he would “under no circumstances bow” to the Taliban and will continue to fight.
I will never, ever & under no circumstances bow to d Talib terrorists. I will never betray d soul & legacy of my hero Ahmad Shah Masoud, the commander, the legend & the guide. I won't dis-appoint millions who listened to me. I will never be under one ceiling with Taliban. NEVER.
— Amrullah Saleh (@AmrullahSaleh2) August 15, 2021
The nascent Panjshir resistance has been bolstered by remnants of Afghan forces that refused to surrender and fled the Taliban takeover of the provinces of Kunduz, Badakhshan, Takhar, and Baghlan. Many of these forces regrouped in Andarab district in Baghlan. Andarab is a known hub for anti-Taliban activity. In 2011, The New York Times Magazine described Andarab as “an entirely Tajik district that is staunchly anti-Pashtun,” the ethnic group that makes up a significant portion of the Taliban.
In addition to keeping supply lines open, Saleh is staring down the tall task of rebuilding Afghan security forces that were ground down by years of fighting with the Taliban. As former NDS chief, Saleh is in possession of contacts throughout the country. Tens of thousands of former soldiers and NDS personnel are in danger of Taliban reprisals. The Taliban has already executed numerous soldiers, policemen, intelligence personnel, interpreters, and a host of Afghans who have helped the former Afghan government and the U.S. It remains to be seen if Saleh organize them to resist an ascendant Taliban.
The first step for Saleh is to hold Panjshir.
Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.
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14. The Dangerous Road to the Kabul Airport
Please go to the link to view the imagery and photos.
The Dangerous Road to the Kabul Airport
While American forces have taken control of Kabul’s airport, chaos dominates just outside. As thousands desperately try to flee Afghanistan, Taliban fighters have blocked entrances, fired rifles and beaten some people in the crowds.
15. Chinese students rush to return to America
Excerpts:
China News Service cited an estimate by Washington’s embassy in Beijing that between 80,000 and 100,000 Chinese students who fled the US at the onset of America’s Covid crisis in early 2020 would consider returning after more than a year of online classes.
The return of Chinese youth will provide a financial boost to US tertiary institutions that derive much of their income from foreign enrolments, largely from China. Fears of a host of “push factors” keeping them away from frayed ties between Beijing and Washington to the resurgence of anti-Asian xenophobia in the US are not apparent in the youthful outrush seen at China’s airports.
Nor has the Biden government’s continuance of the previous Trump administration’s curbs on graduates from blacklisted Chinese schools and academies with alleged military connections. The US embassy insists that only “a fraction” of Chinese applicants have been turned away during visa adjudication.
Former Chinese ambassador Cui Tiankai said in 2019 that there were more than 350,000 Chinese students in the US that year, adding that the largest foreign student population could further underscore the people-to-people exchanges between the two powers and act as a “buffer” when the Sino-US rivalry had been intensifying on almost all other fronts.
Chinese students rush to return to America
Undaunted by high costs, red tape and sanctions, Chinese youth are scrambling for limited seats back to the US
The once-deserted international departure terminal at Shanghai’s Pudong Airport, one of China’s busiest gateways for international air traffic in its pre-Covid heyday, is buzzing again.
Long queues have returned to check-in counters with seats on flights bound for America, Canada and the United Kingdom quickly filled up. Latecomers have to pay sky-high prices to be placed on waiting lists amid the scramble for limited tickets.
Such scenes since last week appear to be in contrast with Beijing’s imperative to seal its borders even tighter and stop issuing passports to its nationals to prevent the spread of Covid-19.
The crowds are not Chinese tourists or business travelers, but students determined to venture to the West and return to their campuses for face-to-face instruction. They have spent more than a year languishing in China attending virtual learning sessions on Zoom and WeChat, with most of their Chinese classmates signing in from their homes.
They rushed to pounce on available seats on the remaining direct flights to the United States when Washington dropped its entry ban on overseas students enrolled in American institutions this month. But flights have long been slashed since Covid’s outbreak.
The crowd of Chinese students at Shanghai’s Pudong Airport. Many are eager to return to the US for the new school year. Photo: WeChat
China News Service cited an estimate by Washington’s embassy in Beijing that between 80,000 and 100,000 Chinese students who fled the US at the onset of America’s Covid crisis in early 2020 would consider returning after more than a year of online classes.
The return of Chinese youth will provide a financial boost to US tertiary institutions that derive much of their income from foreign enrolments, largely from China. Fears of a host of “push factors” keeping them away from frayed ties between Beijing and Washington to the resurgence of anti-Asian xenophobia in the US are not apparent in the youthful outrush seen at China’s airports.
Nor has the Biden government’s continuance of the previous Trump administration’s curbs on graduates from blacklisted Chinese schools and academies with alleged military connections. The US embassy insists that only “a fraction” of Chinese applicants have been turned away during visa adjudication.
Former Chinese ambassador Cui Tiankai said in 2019 that there were more than 350,000 Chinese students in the US that year, adding that the largest foreign student population could further underscore the people-to-people exchanges between the two powers and act as a “buffer” when the Sino-US rivalry had been intensifying on almost all other fronts.
Cui’s successor Qin Gang, who just embarked on a trip to Washington from Pudong as Beijing’s new top envoy earlier this month, is set to meet student representatives and tour some top US universities in September, according to a social media post by the semi-official Federation of Chinese Students in America.
Qin may reassure students and stakeholders of Beijing’s continued support, when previous reports about China halting the issue of passports and tightening border controls added to the anxieties among parents and educators in both countries that Beijing could soon move to stem the outflow of its students.
Chinese news portal NetEase reported that the queues at Shanghai’s Pudong Airport in front of check-in and security counters extended close to one kilometer during the past weekend. Undaunted by additional health check red tape and more paperwork, students waited for extended hours to board their flights.
They also have needed to navigate their way through the regulatory and inspection labyrinth as they are required by the US embassy to present a clean medical slate signed off in English by qualified professionals. They also must fill in a new attestation form prepared by the State Department on top of the usual proof of residence in the US and student status.
Chinese students are also making a detour via Hong Kong when tickets for direct flights are hard to come by in the mainland. Photo: WeChat
Fewer than 20 direct flights are currently permitted to operate between China and the US each week as Covid-induced restrictions have reduced travel to a minimum. Most airlines in both countries are nonetheless reluctant to go through the lengthy approval procedures needed to add additional departures as they feel such a spike in passenger numbers may only be one-way and short-lived.
With tickets hard to secure, many Chinese students are making a detour via Hong Kong, where the city’s flagship carrier Cathay Pacific is sending planes to Shanghai, Beijing and elsewhere across mainland China to fly students to Hong Kong and feed them on to flights to North America.
Cathay says it has maintained services to most of its destinations across the US and Canada and would work with its partners there to meet the rising demand. Unaffected by Beijing’s international flight quota, the Hong Kong carrier now flies to New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Toronto and Vancouver.
Cathay is also expecting a windfall from the limited flights out of mainland China, as strong demand has pushed the price of an economy class ticket from Shanghai to Boston via Hong Kong to 40,000 yuan (US$6,173), according to the airline’s website.
US carrier Delta this week also announced a plan to reinstate some previously canceled flights as chartered ones tailor-made for students, subject to China’s regulatory approval. The American airline now operates only four flights from China each week.
16. After the Debacle: Six Concrete Steps to Restore U.S. Credibility
Conclusion:
Each of these steps could be taken in very short order. They would involve redirecting relatively small sums within the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security, and State Department’s budgets. They would enjoy broad bipartisan support. And they would send a quiet but unmistakable message to Washington’s friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region that the United States remains a faithful partner, notwithstanding the unfortunate circumstances of the U.S. departure from Afghanistan. To be clear, much more than the recommendations outlined here will be required in the coming years to deter the United States’ emboldened foes. But the time to start with small but meaningful steps is today. Rejecting such solutions, all of which have bipartisan support, would put the United States at risk of an even greater catastrophe down the road than the one the world is watching now.
After the Debacle: Six Concrete Steps to Restore U.S. Credibility
Foreign Policy · by Robert C. O’Brien, John Ratcliffe · August 18, 2021
A front-row seat to the Republicans' debate over foreign policy, including their critique of the Biden administration.
Each has bipartisan support and could be taken in short order.
Taiwanese soldiers use mobile launchers from U.S.-made anti-tank missiles during a military drill held in Taiwan on April 18, 2012. Mandy Cheng/AFP via Getty Images
The indelible images from Kabul this week have done serious damage to U.S. credibility abroad. The Chinese Communist Party media mouthpiece, the Global Times, has already used the chaos in Afghanistan to warn Taiwan that the United States cannot be counted on to come to its aid when China eventually attacks the island.
There will be ample time to assess how things went so wrong so quickly for the Biden administration in this still-unfolding crisis. We fully support our diplomats and troops as they execute their mission to evacuate U.S. citizens, allied diplomats, and the United States’ Afghan friends over the coming days and weeks.
Rather than get drawn into a political blame game over the harrowing scenes the world is watching on TV, we believe it is far more important for the United States to immediately take steps to shore up its alliances and diplomatic standing, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Fortunately, there are efforts that can be undertaken without delay to reassert U.S. leadership.
First, the United States’ democratic friends in Taiwan have hundreds of millions of dollars in military equipment on order. These sales were paid for in cash and are not part of an aid program. The administration should work with U.S. defense contractors and look at U.S. Defense Department stockpiles to expedite that equipment’s delivery. Taiwan faces an existential threat from China, which wants to extinguish democracy on the island—just like it recently did in Hong Kong. Getting Taiwan its arms quickly would be an important sign of solidarity with a loyal friend and give the Taiwanese advanced platforms to deter a Chinese amphibious assault.
Second, one of the key rationales for ending combat operations in Afghanistan was to focus on great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific. To show the United States means what it says, some significant portion of the troops that had been in Afghanistan should actually be redeployed to the Pacific. Stationing additional troops, even on a rotational basis, at Robertson Barracks in Australia, on Guam, in Hawaii, or in Alaska would demonstrate Washington meant what it said about pivoting to the Pacific.
These steps would send a quiet but unmistakable message to Washington’s friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region that the United States remains a faithful partner.
Third, negotiations to renew the compacts of free association with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia have been dragging on for years. The biggest hang-up is the U.S. Postal Service wants more money to deliver mail to these island nations. Let’s get the post office paid and renew the compacts today. These islands are close U.S. friends and require assistance. The compacts give the U.S. military unfettered access to a vast swath of the Pacific.
Fourth, the United States does not maintain embassies in the Pacific island nations of Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Instead, diplomacy is conducted from the U.S. Embassy in Suva, Fiji, hundreds of miles away. Each of these small nations has historical ties and affinities with the United States. Although Washington is not present in these geopolitically important islands, Beijing is. For a minimal cost, the United States should post a handful of diplomats, including a Navy or Coast Guard attaché, on each island to promote U.S. interests. As these diplomatic posts take root, deepening relationships will present new opportunities for intelligence collection on adversary activity in these nations. These potential new intelligence streams will bolster insight into the region and augment the strong existing partnerships with the island states themselves, the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partners, and other U.S. allies.
Fifth, the United States recently conducted a survey of the old naval base at Pago Pago in American Samoa to determine the feasibility of permanently stationing a Coast Guard cutter on the island. This U.S. territory in the Pacific has no military presence, and its waters—as well as those of neighboring countries—have been ravaged by illegal, unreported, and unregulated Chinese fishing. A permanent Coast Guard presence on this U.S. territory would bolster the safety and security of fellow Americans. Supporting law enforcement in the neighboring independent countries of Tonga and Samoa through Coast Guard ship rider agreements would show real U.S. commitment in the region.
Sixth, Antarctica brackets the Indo-Pacific. China has been steadily expanding its presence and activities in the region, often in a manner inconsistent with its international treaty obligations. Each year, the United States’ only heavy icebreaker travels thousands of nautical miles from its home port in Seattle to McMurdo Station in Antarctica to lead Operation Deep Freeze, which involves breaking miles of ice up to 21 feet thick. Forward-basing the polar star in Sydney or Hobart, Australia, would dramatically decrease the time it takes the ice breaker to get to Antarctica and would further bind U.S. and Australian Antarctica efforts. Australia would likely share the cost of home-porting the polar star in the Southern Hemisphere.
Each of these steps could be taken in very short order. They would involve redirecting relatively small sums within the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security, and State Department’s budgets. They would enjoy broad bipartisan support. And they would send a quiet but unmistakable message to Washington’s friends and adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region that the United States remains a faithful partner, notwithstanding the unfortunate circumstances of the U.S. departure from Afghanistan. To be clear, much more than the recommendations outlined here will be required in the coming years to deter the United States’ emboldened foes. But the time to start with small but meaningful steps is today. Rejecting such solutions, all of which have bipartisan support, would put the United States at risk of an even greater catastrophe down the road than the one the world is watching now.
Robert C. O’Brien is a former U.S. national security advisor during the Trump administration. Twitter: @robertcobrien
John Ratcliffe is a former U.S. director of national intelligence during the Trump administration. Twitter: @JohnRatcliffe
17. Disinformation, Revisionism, and China with Doowan Lee | Mad Scientist Laboratory
The summary of the podcast below is excellent and the podcast is worth listening to.
Three of the many key points:
– Information Operations are not irregular warfare. DROP THE ADJECTIVE! There is nothing irregular about these operations and they are probably the most regular or everyday form of competition we face.
– Embrace our doctrine. We are not using our tools such as international or bilateral exercises for advantage, while our adversaries are using these exercises, oftentimes in the same contested space, to their information advantage.
– Stop trying to make perfect decisions. Instead, work to perfect decision making using rapid experimentation, learning, and implementation.
347. Disinformation, Revisionism, and China with Doowan Lee | Mad Scientist Laboratory
[Editor’s Note: Given the West’s continuing focus on blunting China’s global ambitions, Army Mad Scientist is pleased to feature again last year’s episode of “The Convergence” podcast with Mr. Doowan Lee. Mr. Lee’s insights regarding disinformation, changes over time in approaches to information warfare, and revisionism and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are just as relevant today as they were when we first featured them last October. Please note that this podcast and several of the embedded links below are best accessed via a non-DoD network due to network priorities for teleworking — Enjoy!]
[If the podcast dashboard is not rendering correctly for you, please click here to listen to the podcast]
Today’s episode of “The Convergence” podcast features our conversation with Mr. Doowan Lee, CEO, VAST-OSINT and Board Advisor, Zignal Labs. Mr. Lee is a National Security expert in influence intelligence, disinformation analysis, data analytics, network visualization, and great power competition. Before joining Zignal Labs, Mr. Lee served as a professor and principal investigator at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he executed federally funded projects on collaborative information systems, network analysis, and disinformation analysis. His article entitled The United States Isn’t Doomed to Lose the Information Wars explores Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns and was featured in Foreign Policy last fall.
The following bullet points highlight key insights from our interview with Mr. Lee:
- Our adversaries see disinformation as just an effective tool that provides strategic and global reach. We see it as irregular warfare when it is anything but irregular.
- Disinformation, or the historical term propaganda, has been around forever. COVID-19 has accentuated this threat vector or surface.
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The Chinese government outlined their national information operations policy in “The Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere” (also known as Document #9):
– Nations talking about the spread of open societies are attempting to undermine the CCP.
– The CCP will maintain positive control of all media.
– The CCP will professionalize information operations.
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The CCP and the Kremlin are increasing their coordination on national security activities and, in some cases, are increasing their collaboration. This resulted in a joint statement that stated the two governments would work together to undermine disinformation that seeks to destabilize the Russian and Chinese governments.
- How is our Great Competition strategy working to prevent Chinese and Russian collaboration?
- Slaughtering the “Golden Calf”
– Information Operations are not irregular warfare. DROP THE ADJECTIVE! There is nothing irregular about these operations and they are probably the most regular or everyday form of competition we face.
– Embrace our doctrine. We are not using our tools such as international or bilateral exercises for advantage, while our adversaries are using these exercises, oftentimes in the same contested space, to their information advantage.
– Stop trying to make perfect decisions. Instead, work to perfect decision making using rapid experimentation, learning, and implementation.
- When engaging the younger generations, we need to discuss data and civil liberties, the philosophy of science or acquiring knowledge, ethics, and critical thinking.
-
What keeps me up at night? Technologies that create strategic latency between offense and defense. Deep fakes is one of these technologies. It has a high first mover advantage and identification tools do not prevent them from getting into the “wild” and impacting our society.
Stay tuned to the Mad Scientist Laboratory for our next podcast with Robin Champ, Chief, Enterprise Strategy Division, U.S. Secret Service, discussing women leading in national security, empowering diversity to think about the future, and how emerging technologies and trends will affect Secret Service missions on 2 September 2021!
If you enjoyed this post and episode, read these related “The Convergence” blog posts and listen to the associated podcasts:
… explore the following China content:
… and check out the following Information Warfare content:
18. The U.S. Is Hostage to the Taliban
I have seen reports on social media (grain of salt of course) that the UK's 2 PARA is conducting operations outside the wire to bring in their citizens and at-risk Afghans and this is supposedly causing friction between them and the 82d which is not authorized to leave the airport.
The U.S. Is Hostage to the Taliban
Pentagon officials admit they don’t have enough troops to protect the Kabul airport and assist Americans and Afghans trying to get to the airport.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
***
There was no lack of determination to do so on the part of Secretary Lloyd Austin and Gen. Mark Milley, both of whom fought in Afghanistan. One or the other said more than once that they view their mission as getting out “all American citizens” who want to leave the country now in Taliban hands.
The problem is the U.S. military now controls only the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) with about 4,500 troops. Americans, foreign nationals and some Afghans who manage to make it to the airport are able to board flights to depart. But Americans and Afghans are on their own in trying to make it to the airport, which means getting past multiple Taliban checkpoints in the city and surrounding the airport perimeter.
Mr. Austin said that, so far, the Taliban are allowing U.S. citizens who have passports to get through. But the Taliban are not letting most Afghans through, and many who are trying are beaten and who knows what else. Many Americans and Afghan allies are also spread around the country and will have to find a way to get to the airport.
Pressed by reporters on whether the military could leave the airport and get Americans, or extend the airport perimeter, or create a safe-passage corridor from Kabul, Mr. Austin said he couldn’t do any of those and keep the airport secure. That means he’s also depending on the goodwill of the Taliban to let our people and our allies go.
Gen. Milley was also pressed on why the military had abandoned nearby Bagram Air Base in July. Bagram has two runways, while HKIA has one. The general said he didn’t have the troops to protect Bagram and the U.S. Embassy given the rapid troop drawdown order from President Biden. Gen. Milley said his orders were to protect the Embassy as a priority, and the military did.
Mark this down as one of the biggest mistakes of the Biden withdrawal plan, if you can call it a plan. Holding Bagram now would help speed up the evacuation and create more room for Afghans and others as they await departure. Gen. Milley ducked a question about whether retaking Bagram from the Taliban is an option. That means it’s Mr. Biden’s call, and the President wants this dreadful mess behind him pronto.
The U.S. military could fly in enough force to retake Bagram. And if the Taliban block Americans or the Afghans who fought with us from getting to the airport, it may have to. What should be unacceptable is for U.S. military leaders to have to tell the world, and the Taliban, five days into this crisis that they don’t have enough force on the ground for anything more than protecting one airport.
The White House may fear that a more robust show of force will cause the Taliban to take Americans hostage. But that concern underscores the degree to which the White House is letting the Taliban dictate the terms of the evacuation. This is a rolling humiliation.
The military men also weren’t any clearer than the White House on the Aug. 31 deadline that Mr. Biden had set for all U.S. military forces to be out of Afghanistan. They ducked the question, though later Wednesday Mr. Biden said in an interview with ABC News that U.S. troops will remain until all Americans are out.
There should be no deadline on evacuating Americans who are still behind enemy lines. The only deadline should be when all Americans and the Afghans who risked their lives to fight with us are safely gone.
We can understand why Mr. Biden would rather talk about Covid vaccines, as he did Wednesday, or $3.5 trillion in new spending. But he and his Administration are responsible for putting Americans and our allies in harm’s way. His top priority, his only priority, has to be getting them out no matter what it takes.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
19. SECDEF Austin: U.S. Lacks ‘Capability’ in Kabul to Create Safe Passage for Americans, Afghans to Leave Afghanistan
How is it that our Brit allies can operate outside the wire and we will not? (note: this is a social media report)
Dominic Farrell@DominicFarrellLots of credible sources suggesting British 2 PARA (Parachute Regiment) is rescuing our people from outside airport, in downtown Kabul, whilst US remain inside perimeter, leading to tensions. If so, not surprised that CO is doing everything possible to achieve the mission 4:17 PM · Aug 18, 2021·Twitter Web App
SECDEF Austin: U.S. Lacks ‘Capability’ in Kabul to Create Safe Passage for Americans, Afghans to Leave Afghanistan - USNI News
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin speaks with reporters on Afghanistan, at the Pentagon on Aug. 18, 2021. DoD Photo
This post has been updated with a statement from President Joe Biden.
The U.S. doesn’t have enough troops in Kabul to secure safe passage for tens of thousands of Americans and Afghan allies seeking to leave the country, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in a press conference on Wednesday.
Now, there are a mix of 4,500 Marines, soldiers and airmen securing the Hamid Karzai International Airport to the north of the city and assisting in processing U.S. citizens and Afghans with Special Immigrant Visas for military flights out of the country.
The White Hose authorized up to 6,000 U.S. troops to support Operation Allied Rescue – the mission to evacuate Afghans who worked with the U.S. – and the parallel non-combatant evacuation operation that has yet to be named publicly.
Austin and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley told reporters on Wednesday that while there was the ability to rescue Americans in dire harm, “we don’t have the capability to go out and collect up large numbers of people,” Austin said.
Milley added that a move outside the boundaries of the airport would be “a policy decision. And if directed, we have capabilities that can execute whatever was directed.”
American forces are currently relying on a brittle truce with the Taliban, negotiated by the State Department and military leaders to allow passage of Americans and qualified Afghans to the airport through checkpoints, where several reports say qualified evacuees are denied passage and sometimes beaten.
U.S. Army soldiers board a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft prior to departure for Hamid Karzai International Airport, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Allies Refuge at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, on Aug. 13, 2021. US Air Force Photo
“We do hear reports of people getting turned away from, from by checkpoints, we’ve gone back and tried to reinforce to the Taliban, that if they have credentials, they need to be allowed through,” Austin said.
Estimates vary, but there could be as many as 15,000 Americans in Afghanistan and tens of thousands of Afghans who qualify for U.S. Special Immigrant Visas. The U.S. has set an Aug. 31 deadline to complete the military pullout and reserved space for 22,000 SIV applicants at three military bases across the U.S., Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said on Wednesday.
President Joe Biden told ABC News that U.S. troops would remain in Afghanistan until they evacuations were complete in a Wednesday evening interview.
“We’re gonna stay to get them all out,” he said.
The operation will be the second-largest non-combatant evacuation operation in U.S. history, Milley told reporters.
The largest NEO to date was the 1991 evacuation of 20,000 U.S. service members and their families from Subic Bay Naval Base, Cubi Point Naval Air Station and Clark Air Base after the explosion of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines, reported USNI News this week.
“We’re going to get everyone that we can possibly evacuate evacuated. And I’ll do that as long as we possibly can until the clock runs out, or we run out of capability,” Austin said.
The U.S. was building toward moving to an upper limit of 9,000 people aboard military transport planes with a plan for flights to leave hourly.
While a photo of a C-17 loaded with almost 700 people emerged over the weekend, most of the transports are averaging much fewer. In a 24-hour period, 18 C-17 Globemasters left Kabul with a total of 2,000 people aboard. That average is about 110 people per plane – or less than half the personnel transport capacity of a Globemaster. Reports from Kabul say some planes left with only a handful of people aboard.
On Wednesday, Austin said the largest barrier to evacuation was vetting people to get aboard the aircraft. Marines specializing in processing evacuees have recently arrived on the ground in Afghanistan to aid in the throughput, Pentagon officials said on Wednesday.
Marines with the 24th MEU assist in processing evacuees at the Hamid Karzai International Airport on Aug. 15, 2021. US Marine Corps Photo
The Marines with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit who embarked with the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group are part of the 4,500 U.S. troops that are currently securing the airport in Kabul.
“Some of the 4,500 include 1,300 Marines that are on deck and they are to continue to flow in there from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response,” Kirby said.
“When we talked about sending this crisis response group, we’re also deploying some evacuation control teams from the Marines that do this really, really well in terms of helping the consular officers manifest and review the paperwork for incoming people,” Kirby said.
“That’s really what we’re focused on over the next 24 hours is how we are reviewing and helping the State Department process individuals qualified individuals to get manifested.”
The unit is part of the logistics component of the 24th MEU, which includes Marines who are trained in processing evacuees, a defense official confirmed to USNI News.
Marines from the 24th MEU were quietly moved off the three-ship ARG in early August and positioned in Kuwait to be transported via C-17 into Afghanistan in case of an armed evacuation. They were joined by elements of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Crisis Response – a 2,000-Marine unit based in U.S. Central Command.
Marines assigned to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) await a flight at Al Udeied Air Base, Qatar Aug. 17, 2021. US Marine Corps Photo
“[Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin] forward-deployed troops, including Marines off of their ship and into Kuwait so that they can be more readily available,” Kirby said earlier this week.
In addition to the two Marine battalions, the U.S. has deployed a brigade of three infantry battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division and a battalion from the Minnesota National Guard to the airport. A battalion from the 10th Mountain Division is securing the U.S. embassy following the evacuation of its staff to the airport, Milley told reporters. In addition, there are unspecified special operations forces in the region.
Milley also stressed the U.S. ability to carry out airstrikes, referencing fighters and unmanned vehicles that could operate from other parts of the Middle East and from USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), which is currently operating in the North Arabian Sea. Milley did not address questions if the U.S. would consider taking and using the shuttered Bagram Airbase to help with the evacuation.
The U.K. is conducting their own parallel operation after sending in elements of the Royal Army’s 16 Air Assault Brigade to assist in evacuating British nationals and allied Afghans as part of Operation Pitting, the U.K. Ministry of Defence announced on Wednesday.
Related
20. Build a More Effective Cyber Force, Not More Bureaucracy
Excerpts:
Even more pressingly, Cyber Command can develop more concrete metrics for evaluating outcomes and for defining what constitutes “success” in cyberspace. This will require explicitly formulating strategy for cyberspace, defining its relationship to other warfighting efforts, detailing ways to operationalize it, and consistently measuring outcomes. The organization has already developed comparable metrics for assessing readiness. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that these are the same as measures of effectiveness.
American officials should also devote time and resources to coordination and deconfliction of civilian intelligence and military cyber operations. The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Force offers one potential model for gaining greater efficiency and reducing bureaucratic conflicts. Pursuing greater effectiveness and cooperation with civilian intelligence may inevitably necessitate organizational changes. But an independent cyber service is not the answer.
America’s existing cyber force structure — consisting of Cyber Command and its current service-level components — provides a strong foundation for effectively carrying out the cyber mission. The United States should make this force structure work better, not undermine its progress with the creation of a new independent service.
Build a More Effective Cyber Force, Not More Bureaucracy - War on the Rocks
We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. … [W]e tend as a nation to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.
When is military reorganization warranted and when is it merely undertaken for its own sake? Charlton Ogburn Jr.’s observations on the downsides of reorganization, developed through his service as a communications officer with Merrill’s Marauders in World War II, serve as a cautionary tale for today.
David Barno and Nora Bensahel recently called for the United States to establish an independent cyber force on par with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Space Force. This recommendation is not new and it offers some advantages. At the strategic level, proponents argue that a cyber service would accelerate doctrinal and capability innovations. Freed from the shackles of extant service parochialism, the expertise consolidated in a new service could allow it to approach cyber as its own mission and not merely as an enabler of conventional operations. Bureaucratically, it could address cyber talent gaps through Title 10 authorities to organize, train, and equip personnel according to standards and cultures that are different from those of the other services. Cyber warriors from the new service would integrate into joint operations and task forces just like personnel from conventional forces, while the other services would retain cyber personnel and capabilities only for tactical purposes.
Notwithstanding such benefits, the United States should not create a new military service for cyberspace: That would be a 20th-century solution to a 21st-century problem. It would risk cementing the false assumption that cyberspace is independent of air, land, sea, and space. In reality, the concept of “domain” has been more of a metaphor than an actual description for cyberspace, which has complex intersections and interdependencies with the military’s other operating environments. Precisely because of this dynamic, America’s force structure should reflect the need to integrate its digital capabilities with its kinetic ones. As an organizational construct, Cyber Command is fit for purpose. Were the United States to create a new cyber service, American policymakers would face tough questions about the future role of Cyber Command and risk ignoring important progress made by the existing services vis-à-vis cyberspace. While there is much merit in criticizing how the elements of the existing force structure coordinate and integrate, establishing a new service would waste precious time, energy, and money. Instead, the U.S. military should focus on achieving greater effectiveness with the cyber force that it already has.
With a New Cyber Service, What Would Happen to Cyber Command?
As a unified joint combatant command, United States Cyber Command draws personnel from its Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps service component commands. Although Cyber Command cannot directly recruit, train, or equip personnel like the services can, it has established joint standards that have helped to align service-administered and contractor-provided training. Unlike a service, Cyber Command retains operational authority, and key to its operational efforts is the Cyber Mission Force, the command’s “action arm.” The Cyber Mission Force consists of service components arranged into four types of teams: the cyber national mission teams focus on identifying and countering adversaries; cyber protection teams defend Department of Defense networks; cyber combat mission teams conduct operations in support of other combatant commands; and cyber support teams provide analytical and planning support to the other teams.
Any proposal for an independent cyber service produces a glaring question for America’s cyber force structure: What would happen to Cyber Command? Advocates of establishing a new service typically leave this issue unaddressed. Logically, creating a new cyber service would entail either the eventual disestablishment of Cyber Command or a redefinition of its relationship to the other combatant commands.
The first scenario — the disestablishment of Cyber Command — would risk an abrupt shift in the “dual hat” arrangement, whereby the commander of Cyber Command simultaneously serves as director of the NSA. This arrangement facilities the coordination of the command’s Title 10 military cyber capabilities and the NSA’s Title 50 cyber intelligence capabilities. Reconfiguring the dual hat relationship with the NSA by swapping out a combatant commander for a service commander would be in stark contrast to how Cyber Command has been led by commanders from different services. That dynamic has arguably introduced diversity of experience and decision-making into the strategic and operational calculus. Dual-hatted commanders of a cyber service could, whether they intend to or not, shape the NSA’s combat support functions over time to suit service-level preferences instead of military-wide prerogatives.
In the short term, replacing Cyber Command with a cyber service would also disrupt military access to the infrastructure and expertise that reside at the NSA while the new service focuses on building its own bureaucracy. This is ill advised given that Cyber Command itself has not met congressional requirements for separation from the NSA. In the longer term, such a move would give operational authority over independent cyber operations to combatant commanders who may be unfamiliar with their full range of utility. While that might ultimately force other combatant commands to develop their cyber proficiencies, it would also be likely to create greater barriers to the deconfliction of military- and intelligence-run cyber operations. Most cyber conflict more closely resembles espionage than it does traditional warfare and the current Cyber Command-led dual hat arrangement acts as a mechanism for weighing competing civilian and military interests in cyberspace. Without it, the distribution of cyber operational authority across combatant commanders would present multiple new avenues for the military and civilian agencies to clash.
In the second and more likely scenario — establishing a cyber service alongside Cyber Command, similar to the current setup of Space Force and Space Command — two bureaucratic issues loom large. First, the overhead costs of standing up a new service and its respective bureaucracy would place an undue burden on a military that is still struggling to modernize and likely faces a period of stagnating or declining budgets. Such costs may be inevitable for a new service, but they would be more acute in this scenario given the cyber-dedicated resources also needed for Cyber Command’s continued development. Even recommendations to reduce start-up costs, such as placing a cyber service under the Air Force, ignore the institutional overload that can result from creating new bureaucracy. One can just look at the rise and fall of Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional), a provisional command established in 2006 after the Air Force expanded its mission to include cyber. Then-Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne tasked the Eighth Air Force — known for its long-range nuclear bombers, not its cyber capabilities — with standing up the command. In addition to broadening the Eighth Air Force’s responsibilities, the service’s leadership placed few conceptual bounds on the cyber mission and gave little guidance on the command’s relationship to other services and the combatant commands. The Air Force also failed to allocate any new funds for the command. These challenges overloaded the Eighth and took a toll on its nuclear mission, ultimately leading the Air Force to suspend the provisional command. Although the 16th Air Force (Air Forces Cyber), the service’s contribution to Cyber Command, provides a more logical basis for spinning off new cyber bureaucracy today, the previous effort highlighted the pitfalls of overhauling organizational structures without providing proper vision and resourcing. This is a salient lesson, especially as the Air Force is already spreading its resources to support the Space Force.
Second, establishing a cyber service alongside Cyber Command would require a redefinition of the Cyber Mission Force, and more specifically of the cyber combat mission teams assigned to the other joint combatant commands. Would components of a new cyber service replace the current cyber combat mission teams? Or would those teams expand to include new cyber service elements alongside the components of the existing services? Here, the relationship between the Space Force and Space Command offers few insights, as both organizations are still sorting out their connections to other combatant commands. Both options carry the risk of disrupting other combatant commands and creating unnecessary stovepiping and in-fighting among the services.
Cyber Force Structure Should Include the Existing Services
A common assumption among cyber service advocates is that the existing services are more interested in maintaining legacy systems than addressing cyberspace. While it is true that cyber operations are not the primary function of the combat services, this assumption ignores much of what the services have done historically to incorporate cyber into their organizations. Moreover, the services are developing new frameworks for using cyber operations in conjunction with other military means. For instance, new ideas surrounding “multi-domain” warfighting doctrine have been a key part of the Army’s forward-looking doctrinal development. The services can and certainly should do more to focus on building cyber-minded cultures. However, this is not unique to the military, and a new cyber force is not a silver bullet for a cultural problem that affects the entire Department of Defense.
Many proponents of an independent cyber force point to the creation of the independent Air Force and Space Force as important precedents for establishing a new service focused on cyberspace. Such analogies are misleading. Cyberspace fundamentally intersects with the other warfighting environments in ways that air and space do not. Responding with a service construct treats the challenges of cyberspace as if they are of the same type as challenges in the air, on land, at sea, and in space. Many are not. In this regard, a more apt analogy for organizing cyber forces — one that reflects a force operating across environments and that is functionally rooted — is that of special forces. Several overlaps exist between cyber forces and special forces, and the analogy actually played a role in facilitating the early discussions about creating Cyber Command.
A Strong Foundation in Need of Improvement
The United States should focus on achieving greater effectiveness with its current cyber force structure. Among the priorities, policymakers could look at ways for the Cyber Mission Force to integrate Space Force’s new cyber personnel. Although the service is in the early stages of building its cyber capabilities, there are still no plans for Space Force to contribute teams to Cyber Command.
Even more pressingly, Cyber Command can develop more concrete metrics for evaluating outcomes and for defining what constitutes “success” in cyberspace. This will require explicitly formulating strategy for cyberspace, defining its relationship to other warfighting efforts, detailing ways to operationalize it, and consistently measuring outcomes. The organization has already developed comparable metrics for assessing readiness. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that these are the same as measures of effectiveness.
American officials should also devote time and resources to coordination and deconfliction of civilian intelligence and military cyber operations. The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Force offers one potential model for gaining greater efficiency and reducing bureaucratic conflicts. Pursuing greater effectiveness and cooperation with civilian intelligence may inevitably necessitate organizational changes. But an independent cyber service is not the answer.
America’s existing cyber force structure — consisting of Cyber Command and its current service-level components — provides a strong foundation for effectively carrying out the cyber mission. The United States should make this force structure work better, not undermine its progress with the creation of a new independent service.
Jason Blessing, Ph.D., is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Research Fellow with the foreign and defense policy department at the American Enterprise Institute. His research focuses on the development of military cyber forces, particularly in the transatlantic space. Follow him on twitter @JasonABlessing.
21. Read What The Taliban Told NPR About Their Plans For Afghanistan
I would not believe a word from the Taliban. But this exchange shows how the Taliban are trying to project a narrative and shape the information environment.
But this excerpt is illustrative. The media is free as long as they follow Islamic law and report in the "national interest."
Do you promise to allow free elections and free media?
Now the media is free, but they should also observe certain laws that they should not be against the Islamic rules and also the national interest. So this is the main thing. Otherwise, they can criticize the government officials, the people, and also to show the best way forward, how the government can go forward, which is best for the people in order to take to the society forward economically and how to advance, be prosperous and how Afghanistan be developed, so they can play the role.
I want to make sure if I didn't follow — you said "can" or "can't"? Did you say they can criticize the government or can't?
Yes, can.
They may criticize the government?
They may, yes.
Read What The Taliban Told NPR About Their Plans For Afghanistan
NPR · by August 18, 20212:03 PM ET
Suhail Shaheen, Afghan Taliban spokesman, speaks during a news conference in Moscow in March 2021. Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP
The Taliban, which have taken over Kabul, the Afghan capital, say they have changed. They are promising amnesty for their enemies and to let people leave the country — a departure from the mass executions and repression when the armed group ruled most of Afghanistan in the 1990s.
Suhail Shaheen, the Taliban spokesman in Qatar, talks with NPR's Steve Inskeep about what he says is the group's commitments of safety to people in Kabul.
Steve Inskeep: What is your group's attitude toward the U.S. evacuation of U.S. citizens and those who supported them right now?
Suhail Shaheen: You mean why we are supporting?
No, I mean, does your group intend to allow American citizens and Afghans who wish to leave to leave peacefully?
Yes, on the basis of the Doha agreement, the Americans should leave peacefully and they withdraw from Afghanistan peacefully. So during their withdrawal from Afghanistan, we will not attack them. That was written in the Doha agreement. But as you see, the Americans violated that agreement. It was until the 1st of May that they should have withdrawn all their forces and then President Biden said that we will withdraw until Sept.11. But still, we restrained our forces not to attack American troops because they are withdrawing from our country. And so we expect them that they withdraw until Sept. 11. And if they continue to station, furthermore, in the country, that could be considered, of course, occupation, continuation of the occupation.
What kinds of contacts do your leaders have with the United States military or U.S. diplomats at this point?
You know, you may have seen reports that [U.S. special envoy] Dr. [Zalmay] Zhalizad, along with a delegation and other U.S. delegation, they come to Doha time and again. They have speak about peace and reconciliation and try to help in the peace process in one way or the other. So we have contacts, yes.
I am asking about the last couple of days. Has the United States military been regularly communicating with the Taliban in Kabul in the last couple of days as the United States has been evacuating its citizens and supportive Afghans?
Yes, of course, there is a kind of understanding between the two sides — so that confrontation do not occur. Of course there is coordination.
Was the Taliban offered or promised anything not to interfere with the evacuation?
Yes, yes, when the American are evacuating from Afghanistan, we will not attack them.
No, that's what the Taliban has committed to. But is the Taliban receiving anything in return?
No, no, we are not receiving anything in return, but that we want our country to be free and the occupation to come to an end. That is why we want them to evacuate from Afghanistan peacefully.
So I understand, Mr. Shaheen, as you know, there are many people who seem desperate to get out of Kabul. And the reason they are desperate to get out of Kabul is that they believe that the Taliban will be going door to door and punishing or even killing people who are believed to have supported the United States. Should people be afraid of those kinds of reprisals from the Taliban?
No, there is not any kind of reprisal nor any revenge under those people who are working with the foreign troops. And so we have announced a general amnesty, they can lead their normal life and they also contribute to the reconstruction of the country, to people's economic prosperity, to their own prosperity. And they can use their talents, capacities, in the service of the country and people.
Does that amnesty and that promise of security apply only to Kabul or to the entire country?
That applies to the entire country, it is not limited to the Kabul city. Of course, it applies to all the country, to the 34 provinces of Afghanistan.
We are hearing reports from Kabul of people being searched for, of Taliban fighters going door to door searching for individuals. Are you saying that such activity is not authorized by your leadership?
Yeah, not authorized, not authorized at all. Because if such a person are seen, they will be detained because it is against the announced statement, official statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. And more, our security forces are coming to Kabul in order to maintain order, and to prevent any such incidents taking place in the city. And we have announced also telephone numbers by their complaint commission. If there is any such incidents and complaints, they can call the complaint commission and to address their grievances.
There are news reports describing people who would be unable to complain because they have been killed. This is outside of Kabul, I should say. There was a CNN report in recent days of Taliban fighters executing 22 Afghan commandos as they attempted to surrender. And there was video of this. Tolo News had a report of 43 people killed in Ghazni. Al Jazeera reported on dozens of civilians killed in Spin Boldak some days ago. Do you deny these reports?
Some of these videos you mentioned, they are fake videos. For example, in Spin Boldak we called on journalists to come to Spin Boldak and investigate for themselves whether any incident of killing or taking people from their houses and killing them has happened. They came, the journalists came, they investigated and they didn't find. When they returned to Kandahar, they were detained by the National Security Department of the former Kabul administration. And also about those commandos, it was a fake because there was two videos and they were spliced to each other and made as one, because one part was that the commandos who were sent by the Kabul administration against our forces in Farah province. There were of course fighting between the two sides and they launched a massive offensive against us. And the other was of people surrendering, so they had to splice the two different locations in different incidents. So they are, you know, spreading such fake videos against us.
I would not say it's impossible that a video is faked, but these stories arrive to us amid some well-documented history of the Taliban when they were last in charge of Afghanistan. When the Taliban took over in 1996, there was a former president who was dragged out of a diplomatic compound and left hanging from a light pole. There were public executions of civilians at a soccer field, a football field in Kandahar. I stood on that football field afterward and talked with people who had seen those executions. I do not doubt that they happened. Is your group any different today than it was?
Today, we have announced a general amnesty. You may have seen our statements not once, two or three times, we announce that they not in one language, Pashto and Persian, many other languages, in English and Arabic and also other languages. We announced this. So it is our commitment. And also we announce that we will provide protection for the smooth functioning of the embassies and diplomats. So this is what we want and this is our policy. But of course, if there is any incident by unscrupulous armed men, which is not affiliated to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and then that is fully investigated by our commission, like the military commission, like the complaints commission. So and the people, those who are behind those incidents, that they are detained and brought to courts to be punished.
Are you saying then that your group is different than the 1990s? And if so, what has changed?
In the 1990s at that time, the media was against us, there was biased reporting against us.
I stood on the football field and I talked with people who had seen the executions. I do not doubt they happened, sir. Are you saying that your group has changed from what it was then?
Oh, yeah. About the execution, I don't say it was if someone has killed a person, the heirs and relatives of that person has the right to kill him as a retaliation according to the law. So that is another story. But if someone comes to a house and gatecrash into the house and steal equipment or utensil of the house and kill the family — so that is not tolerated and the culprits are detained and punished in the quarter.
So, this is very useful because now we're turning to the question of how a country, how Afghanistan should be governed. In the 1990s, when the Taliban were last in power, it was said that people's hands were cut off when they were accused of stealing and that the hands were held up for display. Is that something the Taliban intends to do again?
So I'm not religious scholars, but I can say the Islamic rules that is interpreted by the judges. It is referred to the judges. Of course, there will be three courts: the primary court, the high court and a court of [inaudible]. So everyone has the right of self defense. So then they can issue their ruling as per the law, the Islamic law.
And the law would allow that?
Yes, it is up to the judges. I have no comment on that.
This leads to another question, then, in the country where the Taliban have just taken power, numerous women are in elected positions in the government serving in various roles in the government. Will they be allowed to remain there?
Yes, the women, they have a right to education and to work so they can hold different positions and jobs right now. The doctors who have started serving. The teachers have started teaching. And also in other fields, the women are working. The journalist women, they have started working, by observing hijab. So, yes, women can do their job — only they should observe hijab.
By observing hijab, you're saying that unlike the last time the Taliban were in power, women can move about without male escorts, but they must cover themselves completely?
Of course, when a woman goes to the site for her job, she can go and then return to her home. Yes, that's clear.
Will women have any ability to dress as they want? What if a woman wasn't doesn't want to wear hijab or your idea of what is proper hijab?
The main thing is hijab. So every hijab, if it is hijab, it is a proper hijab. So if it is not a hijab, so you can't call it a hijab, but of course, it is one not only limited to one type, maybe different types.
We spoke earlier with an analyst, Asfandyar Mir, who had recently been in Afghanistan and who said that al-Qaida remains present, some members of al-Qaida remain present at present in Afghanistan. A Taliban spokesman has said in the last day no one will be harmed from Afghan soil. It will not be used as a place to attack other countries. How do you intend to keep that promise?
You know, what he says they are present, I don't believe that. If it said that they are present, and they can show it to the Islamic they are present there, so that we will take action. But it is our commitment that we will not allow anyone to use the soil of Afghanistan against any other country, including the United States. And we consider this as a part of our national interest because we are going to have a country with peace that we want to pave the way for reconstruction of Afghanistan. That could not be achieved without a commitment not to allow anyone to use the soil of our country against other countries.
It's my understanding that Pakistani officials in recent days have been speaking with Taliban leaders and have warned your group no Taliban government is going to be recognized by the world if it takes Kabul by force. And also that there cannot be an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. There must be something more inclusive of different points of view. What do you say to that?
There are many reports which are not based on realities. We want an Afghan inclusive government, it is our statement. Not today, it is from the beginning that is our stance, our policy, and so that we announced a general amnesty. It is our policy from the past year. You see, we have been saying that we are protecting the national projects. That is our policy. And we helped TAPI [Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India] pipeline project because it will go — at that time, 650 kilometers in areas under our control. Now they will go all in our control areas because we have control all over Afghanistan. And at that time, we were helping that. So we have our own policy. So of course we have good relations with other countries, many countries, but that is political relations. And because we need those countries in future to have trade with them and they have on the basis of mutual respect and interest, but that they impose up on us anything and to have dictate to us that is not true.
You said that you do favor an inclusive government. Let's talk about some things that that means. There are ethnic and religious minorities in Pakistan, such as the Hazaras, who were not at all accepted during the last Taliban regime and were even persecuted. Do you promise religious freedom as part of that inclusive government?
Yeah, we have commitment —
Oh, I should correct myself. I think I said Pakistan. Of course I meant Afghanistan. There are religious minorities in Afghanistan, such as Hazaras, who were persecuted during the past regime. Do you promise them religious freedom this time?
Yeah, we promised just freedom to them and as a basis of our Islamic rules, because they are also Muslims, but maybe some differences in the jurisprudence, of religious jurisprudence. But they are Muslims and we have no discrimination against other ethnicities, all ethnicities living in Afghanistan, they are brothers to each other. So they are like all ethnicities, like different flowers in a garden. So we want a national unity of the country. At that time, there were commanders, our military commander was among the Shia people, very famous commanders we had in that war, and [Ustad] Akbari, the leader of Shia, he had joined our forces. He was with us. Now we have a policy that we do not have any kind of discrimination against the Shia people. They are Afghans. They can live in this country peacefully and they can contribute to the reconstruction, prosperity and development of the country.
Do you promise to allow free elections and free media?
Now the media is free, but they should also observe certain laws that they should not be against the Islamic rules and also the national interest. So this is the main thing. Otherwise, they can criticize the government officials, the people, and also to show the best way forward, how the government can go forward, which is best for the people in order to take to the society forward economically and how to advance, be prosperous and how Afghanistan be developed, so they can play the role.
I want to make sure if I didn't follow — you said "can" or "can't"? Did you say they can criticize the government or can't?
Yes, can.
They may criticize the government?
They may, yes.
In the last months of the old government, when the Taliban were attacking across the country, numerous journalists were assassinated. Will that continue?
No, those assassinated, they were not assassinated by us. There was a dictatorship sitting in Kabul. So this question should be asked from them because we know there were many journalists criticizing the government and they were killed.
Can I mention — when you said earlier that they cannot write against the national interest — depending on how you define that, that's not really press freedom at all. That's a way to imprison journalists.
No, the national interest will be well known, so that means that in future it will be very clear these are the national interests. Others are not. So everyone will know. It will not be ambiguous. There will not be ambiguity — it should be clear.
And I also had asked about elections. Will your group allow free elections with multiparty participation?
So now we have consultation and to have an Afghan inclusive government in a few days. So right now, no topic of election is discussed right now. It is not the time for that.
But do you mean to say that in the short term you intend to include other parties in the government?
We are talking to other politicians about plans and of course, we are talking with others how it can be possible that they can work and be part of the government.
Mr. Shaheen, I have one final question. The world was stunned in many cases that your group captured control of the country so quickly. It was, of course, a 20-year war, but the end came very quickly. How do you feel that you succeeded in that way?
Well, I think it was — it showed the support of the people. It showed our movement for liberation of the country was a popular uprising. And it showed that those who were working for the Kabul administration, they were bigger and stronger and sustaining themselves only because of the bombardment and cruise missiles and air strikes, drone attacks of the pilots. Otherwise, when they started withdrawing from the country, the people rejected them and they had no support of the security forces.
I do have a question from a colleague who wants to follow up, regarding groups such as ISIS and al-Qaida. If groups such as ISIS or al-Qaida are identified again on Afghan soil, will your government move to eradicate them?
Of course, when we say that we do not allow anyone to use the soil of Afghanistan, that means we will not allow them, that if they are intending to use this soil for their activities outside the country, so that we will not allow them to, we will not tolerate that.
Suhail Shaheen, thank you very much for the time.
Thank you. Thank you.
NPR · by August 18, 20212:03 PM ET
22. Opinion | Al Qaeda is loving our withdrawal from Afghanistan
Excerpt:
Perhaps the organization won’t be launching operations from a base in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, but a reconstituted Al Qaeda in Afghanistan can strategize and inspire and even direct attacks far from South Asia. We know of repeated efforts in recent years by its operatives in Syria, for instance, to organize attacks on Europe and the U.S. That will be far easier now.
And not only does the withdrawal send a clear message to the world’s terrorists that wars of attrition are a winning strategy; it also tells America’s existing and would-be allies that the U.S. isn’t capable of being a reliable ally — reinforcing America’s similar abandonment of Syria’s Kurds. Next time the U.S. needs local alliances, we may be hard-pressed to find them.
Even that fallout, however, would be rosy compared to the worst-case scenario — that the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s resurgence stokes tension between Pakistan and India, nuclear powers that have clashed over Afghanistan in the past.
The Afghanistan withdrawal is an unforced foreign policy error of possibly historic proportions that could have been avoided had the U.S. kept a small permanent military presence in the country so long as the Taliban and Al Qaeda remained active. It’s a blunder that will most harshly be felt by the Afghan people and U.S. counterterrorism interests.
Opinion | Al Qaeda is loving our withdrawal from Afghanistan
Aug. 19, 2021, 4:30 AM EDT
By Bruce Hoffman, senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Jacob Ware, research associate for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations
On the eve of the 2004 presidential election, Osama bin Laden issued a landmark videotaped statement. In it, bin Laden explained how he and his followers were engaged in a “war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers.” He bragged that, just as Al Qaeda and the Taliban’s predecessors had “bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat” from Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. would suffer the same fate.
Al Qaeda’s core operation has acquired new credibility and energy. Crucially, it has also regained its close governing partner in a historically strategic land.
At the time, bin Laden’s threat was largely dismissed as braggadocio. But this past week’s tragic events in Afghanistan have proven him prophetic. Al Qaeda has played a critical supporting role in the defeat of two superpowers three decades apart. Worse still, much like what followed the Soviet Union’s far more orderly withdrawal, the Taliban’s lightning reconquest of Afghanistan recreates the same safe harbor Al Qaeda previously enjoyed. The likelihood that Al Qaeda will soon reconstitute its operating base in its former home and resume terror attacks on the West has again become a salient U.S. national security concern.
Indeed, the terror threat that Al Qaeda now presents must not be ignored or dismissed, as it was in the days leading up to 9/11. Al Qaeda’s core operation has acquired new credibility and energy. Crucially, it has also regained its close governing partner in a historically strategic land — a crossroads of southwest Asia bordering no fewer than half a dozen countries, including China, Iran and nuclear Pakistan.
America’s intentions in Afghanistan immediately after the 9/11 attacks were correct: Use intelligence assets and a light footprint of U.S. military special operations and ground forces working in concert with indigenous partners to stabilize the country and rid it of the terrorist group and its enabling host. Washington had largely achieved that goal before dramatically shifting its attention to Iraq and diverting critical assets from Afghanistan.
That eventually allowed Ayman al-Zawahri, who took over leadership of Al Qaeda after bin Laden’s death, to implement a low-key strategy that diversified or strengthened its geographical bases in the Levant; the Caucasus; north, south and east Africa; South Asia; and Southeast Asia. Even if the number of Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan was relatively modest — in the low hundreds — their ability to act as force multipliers for the Taliban, providing much-needed intelligence, logistics and tactical support and expertise, is likely to have contributed appreciably to the Taliban’s rapid seizure of power this past week.
The victory by the Taliban, maintaining this solid foundation both inside and outside Afghanistan, will boost Al Qaeda immeasurably. In particular, it will enhance its narrative, which is all but certain to inspire unrest and greater efforts from all the terrorist elements in the group’s universe.
At the same time, the Islamic State militant group also retains a presence in the region. Already there is speculation that the Taliban’s victory will set in motion a broader reconciliation between ISIS and rival jihadi movement Al Qaeda, as al-Zawahri’s patient strategy of engagement through attrition has been vindicated over ISIS’ more aggressive approach. Furthermore, virtually every extremist faction in Afghanistan will be strengthened by the release of imprisoned terrorists there. It is thus not surprising that U.S. military commanders are warning Congress that the terrorism threat from Afghanistan is likely to rise almost immediately.
President Joe Biden is correct that the U.S. has vastly improved counterterrorism capabilities both overseas and at home compared to 20 years ago. But his withdrawal changes things. To start with, until now we have benefited from an on-the-ground presence providing human intelligence and ensuring a robust response capacity to the discovery of any terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan. That is now gone.
Meanwhile, back home, the U.S. is far more divided politically than it was a generation ago, which makes achieving bipartisan agreement on foreign policy far more difficult. And unlike two decades ago, the U.S. is now preoccupied with multiple terrorist threats — domestic as well as the wider array of foreign ones — following the franchising of Al Qaeda and the rise of ISIS.
Back in 2001, the U.S. also wasn’t nearly as worried about peer competition from China or Russia, and it was far less worried about Iran, which is now closer to having nuclear weapons and thus may feel less constrained in intervening directly to further destabilize southwest Asia.
The one constant in this time has been our proclivity to underestimate our adversaries (who can forget President Barack Obama’s early dismissal of the Islamic State as a “JV team”?). Given how wrong so many assumptions about Afghanistan’s fall have been — most important, that the Afghan government would retain at least some control of the country and the Taliban would engage in peace talks with it — it is difficult to embrace with any kind of confidence the administration’s assurances about Al Qaeda’s not being capable of striking the U.S.
Perhaps the organization won’t be launching operations from a base in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, but a reconstituted Al Qaeda in Afghanistan can strategize and inspire and even direct attacks far from South Asia. We know of repeated efforts in recent years by its operatives in Syria, for instance, to organize attacks on Europe and the U.S. That will be far easier now.
And not only does the withdrawal send a clear message to the world’s terrorists that wars of attrition are a winning strategy; it also tells America’s existing and would-be allies that the U.S. isn’t capable of being a reliable ally — reinforcing America’s similar abandonment of Syria’s Kurds. Next time the U.S. needs local alliances, we may be hard-pressed to find them.
Even that fallout, however, would be rosy compared to the worst-case scenario — that the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s resurgence stokes tension between Pakistan and India, nuclear powers that have clashed over Afghanistan in the past.
The Afghanistan withdrawal is an unforced foreign policy error of possibly historic proportions that could have been avoided had the U.S. kept a small permanent military presence in the country so long as the Taliban and Al Qaeda remained active. It’s a blunder that will most harshly be felt by the Afghan people and U.S. counterterrorism interests.
23. Irregular Warfare in Great Power Competition
My view: Great power competition is political warfare. Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare.
This is a very good run down from a doctrinal and historical perspective (dating back to Thucydides and then the OSS :-))
Excerpt:
Although the United States has maintained for years that “IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both,” few would argue that this is now the case across the department. The IW Annex is the first concrete step toward finally operationalizing this concept, but it is by no means complete. Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland and Daniel Egel provide a compendium of challenges associated with the United States’ record of connecting IW activities to strategic objectives in their substantial 2020 RAND Corporation report, The American Way of Irregular War. The book builds on a general consensus from IW professionals across the defense enterprise that the United States is ill-suited for Political Warfare and must “go on the offensive” by growing its capacity to compete militarily below the threshold of armed conflict because its “adversaries are already on the offensive” there.
IRREGULAR WARFARE IS GREAT POWER COMPETITION – PART 1
For the first time since 2001, violent extremist organizations in the Middle East are not the key focus of the U.S. defense enterprise.
Part of this strategic adjustment involves recognizing that China and Russia have been pursuing their interests with a renewed fervor in places where the United States holds little physical influence, such as parts of Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America. Although flashy military technologies often steal the headlines, this new vision for competing in the twenty-first century is as much about building and sustaining relationships with U.S. partner nations (PNs) as it is exploiting emerging military-oriented technology. Tangible reflections of this change include the drafting of the IW Annex that describes how irregular functions will support GPC, and the commissioning and recent worldwide employment of the U.S. Army’s newly-formed Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs).
These developments notwithstanding, the broader GPC conversation typically revolves around capabilities and resources that would brand the DoD “ready” for competition to potentially escalate into armed conflict. Few have articulated how the department should compete actively in this environment while deterring escalation and shaping the theater should deterrence fail. Authors have spilt much ink trying to explain how IW could support U.S. strategic objectives, but this approach neglects the reality that in the competitive space between armed conflicts, Irregular Warfare is the DoD’s contribution to great power competition.
Defining IW in GPC
The Pentagon’s 2010 Joint Operating Concept for IW explains that, in addition to unconventional warfare (UW), stability operations (SO), counterterrorism, foreign internal defense (FID), and counterinsurgency, IW encompasses “a host of key related activities including strategic communications, information operations of all kinds, psychological operations, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations.” In the coming years, these once underemphasized activities will personify a greater deal of IW employment in the competitive space. They allow the United States to maintain a global forward presence and shape the environment without assuming the risk that comes with direct involvement in combat operations. In other words, the ‘W’ in IW should not be conflated with armed conflict.
Twenty-first century IW has become synonymous with low-intensity conflicts because recent wars have predominately associated the term with only one of its five core tasks: counterinsurgency. References to irregular forces or capabilities in U.S. National Defense Authorization Acts appear exclusively as a means of countering non-state actors or groups through PN forces. This results in narrow perspectives that view IW purely as a tool for fighting violent extremist organizations and thereby less relevant to interstate competition. It is true that all counterinsurgency is IW, but not all IW is counterinsurgency.
Although the United States has maintained for years that “IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both,” few would argue that this is now the case across the department. The IW Annex is the first concrete step toward finally operationalizing this concept, but it is by no means complete. Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland and Daniel Egel provide a compendium of challenges associated with the United States’ record of connecting IW activities to strategic objectives in their substantial 2020 RAND Corporation report, The American Way of Irregular War. The book builds on a general consensus from IW professionals across the defense enterprise that the United States is ill-suited for Political Warfare and must “go on the offensive” by growing its capacity to compete militarily below the threshold of armed conflict because its “adversaries are already on the offensive” there.
According to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, IW is defined as activities conducted “by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.” This definition makes it is clear that IW has a place in GPC, but the shift from insurgencies in the Middle East to interstate competition places IW at risk of becoming perceived by policymakers as a phase of contingency operations or simple ‘mil-to-mil’ engagements with PNs. Mil-to-mil is somewhat of a misnomer for what IW actually entails, which, more often than not, encompasses a litany of interagency efforts designed to achieve unified action between the DoD, its diplomatic counterparts in the Department of State, non-governmental organizations, and PN officials. Joint U.S. doctrine recognizes that most security cooperation programs are “integrated and synchronized with the other instruments of national power,” which makes cooperation and coordination with each of these entities an integral facet of IW with far-reaching implications for U.S. interests abroad. The manner in which the United States employs its IW architecture in competition will shape the theaters in which it competes—and if need be, fights.
IW as a Theater Shaping Tool
The initiation of hostilities, what some might refer to as the onset of war, is but a phase in the long arc of a nation’s statecraft. Theater or “regional” shaping occurs daily as nations exercise their instruments of national power abroad, whether it be through diplomacy, economic incentives, social influence, or foreign military sales and deterrence initiatives. It is this proactive shaping process that generates options and opportunities for decisionmakers if tensions escalate or deterrence fails. In other words, the decisions made at peace dictate the options and resources available at war.
Since what was arguably the benchmark great power rivalry between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BCE, competition between major powers has been a political reality that world leaders most often addressed in the form of a grand strategy. That is, a comprehensive and typically long-term strategy that exercises all mechanisms of influence at a state’s disposal. The Athenian Alliance and Sparta’s Peloponnesian League were both constructed and held together by various degrees of security cooperation that underpinned their strength and legitimacy. Thucydides explains how Greece’s rise as a regional power was foremost a product of Athenian naval prowess and the security it offered those traversing maritime trade routes. This stability drew scores of well-off Greeks to Athens’ shores, but it was not only security that made Athens the envy of Greece. Culture, too, played a role.
Athenians were the first to disarm and switch to what Thucydides describes as a “more relaxed and gracious way of life.” In the competitive space where ancient city-states struggled for influence and aligned their national interests with those of others, the Athenian system had a unique appeal that endured until Philip II of Macedon, a master of political warfare, systematically dismantled it in the following century. This framework of international systems and appeal warrants further review if we are to understand how IW serves as a theater shaping tool in GPC.
Deputy Director of the Snowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at The Atlantic Council, Matthew Kroenig, fires back at the popular view that the United States lacks a grand strategy in his new book, The Return of Great Power Rivalry. In it, he suggests that the United States has pursued for 75 years the same objectives of every other democratic hegemony since perhaps Athens: Build an international system, expand partnership within the system, and defend the system. Lacking a robust defense, surely, the system will eventually fail.
Irregular Warfare and its supporting tasks are designed to pursue these objectives directly or support them indirectly through persistent, global, and collaborative joint, interagency, and multinational efforts across the conflict continuum.
This framework compliments the purpose of such an international system as defined by Robert Kagan: “The measure of the order’s success is not whether the United States can tell everyone what to do. It is whether the order itself—the expansion of democracy, prosperity, and security—is sustained.” Kroenig explains the system’s defining tasks as follows: “To build the system, the United States and its allies should continue to provide stability and security to important geostrategic regions. They should proceed with past designs to advance cooperation through international institutions. They should continue to champion an open economic system internationally. And they should sustain efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance.” Irregular Warfare and its supporting tasks are designed to pursue these objectives directly or support them indirectly through persistent, global, and collaborative joint, interagency, and multinational efforts across the conflict continuum.
Gen. James Mattis and Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman presented IW as a twenty-first century theater shaping tool in their 2005 Proceedings thesis describing a “four block war.” Expanding upon U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak’s 1999 “three block war” foundation, Mattis and Hoffman proposed that IW can carve out a competitive edge against regimes who use hybrid tactics in strategic competition with other states. Properly imagined and applied, IW concepts integrated into larger theater strategies can alter the decision-making calculus of state competitors by imposing costs in the psychological and information domains — what Mattis and Hoffman described as the fourth block. It took 15 years and several hard-learned lessons to mold that concept into the IW Annex.
Irregular Warfare is structured to promote political stability as much as military proficiency, which can modify the security makeup of regional spheres upon which revisionist or rogue powers rely to spread influence. Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies submits that a more robust IW architecture built to sustain the principles of “democracy, freedom of religion, and free markets” is as critical to setting conditions and outperforming authoritarian powers today as it was during the Cold War. It is only the last two decades of persistent contingency operations that has distracted from this underlying truth related to the military’s role as a cross-functional instrument of national power that can be as industrious in competition as it is in conflict.
IW in Competition and Conflict
Although many have traced the lineage of modern organizations with an explicit IW capability to the bilateral U.S.-Canadian First Special Service Force (1942), the first U.S. Special Forces units (1952), or the Vietnam War-era Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V), shades of IW have occupied American military thought across the conflict spectrum since it parted ways with the British Empire. Military historian Andrew J. Birtle, for instance, has gone to great lengths documenting this evolution of the American military tradition in operations short of conventional war. But prior to the 1940s, most of these engagements were reactive “small wars” intended to suppress a rebellion or establish order. It was not until Maj. Gen. William Donovan commissioned the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and sent his operatives parachuting into Italy and Nazi-occupied France, and building intelligence networks in Africa and East Asia, that the value of a permanent, worldwide forward security infrastructure became evident.
The 1962 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, contributed to this understanding by including reference to Robert Osgood’s “spectrum of war.” Osgood illustrated degrees of requisite military force ranging from the most extreme circumstance of nuclear war to peacetime, which he classified as a cold war. There is no shortage of discussions questioning whether the United States is on the brink of, or already in, another cold war with China and Russia. But according to Osgood and early army doctrine, a cold war is simply the natural state of competition between major powers when not engaged in open hostilities.
This take resembles eastern strategic philosophies personified by the likes of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung by recognizing what Chairman Mao proclaimed in 1938: “Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.” Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and retired U.S. Special Forces Col. David Maxwell put this best in a conversation with the author by inverting Clausewitz’s maxim: “Politics is war by other means.” Throughout its history, the United States and the DoD in particular have had trouble not only fighting this kind of political war but also recognizing when it is already in one.
That said, the specter of great power conflict rightfully absorbed the preponderance of the War Department’s and later the DoD’s attention during the Cold War, which pushed contingency doctrine and IW planning to the margins of military thinking despite powerful advocates for irregular capabilities, such as President John F. Kennedy. This approach to IW as a miscellaneous and secretive defense function fails to recognize that most overseas military exchanges since the Second World War have been cogs in a larger GPC machine.
Donovan’s OSS trained Chinese irregulars to fight the Imperial Japanese Army during WWII, inflicting some 6,000 casualties and coordinating with a vast network of roughly 300,000 Chinese spies to support the broader war effort. A residual presence of post-war overseas military forces remained in Europe and Asia not to heighten tensions but to lessen them. In his indispensable and curiously rare 1965 book Waging Peace, President Dwight Eisenhower writes that his military strategy in the Middle East was designed to curb Soviet influence there. His 1957 letter addressing Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s concerns about a U.S. military presence in the region defines the competitive aspects of IW superbly:
When we speak of assisting in a military way, we mean only to help each nation achieve that degree of strength that can give it reasonable assurance of protection against internal rebellion or subversion and make certain that any external aggression would meet resistance.
President Eisenhower clarified that, rather than increase tensions, such a presence would “diminish, if not eliminate, any chance of [interstate conflict].” Decades later, the United States found itself in Vietnam because of concerns surrounding a potential domino effect of Communist regimes in Asia, not simply because North Vietnam posed the greatest security quandary to the western world. Fundamentally, it was a war designed to check the Soviet Union’s regional influence. This tendency to view IW as an afterthought that dwells in the shadow of largescale combat operations has resulted in reactive plug and play responses to threats in the gray zone that bleed generational talent critical to the IW function, squander gains, and limit the decision space afforded policymakers in uncertain or emergent operational environments. Here a paradox emerges related to the employment of IW as a deterrent to conflict rather than a prelude to one.
Part 2 will be published on 20 August 2021
Capt. Michael P. Ferguson, U.S. Army, has nearly 20 years of infantry and intelligence experience throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. He has advised foreign security forces from the tactical to strategic level and holds a Master of Science in Homeland Security from the California State University at San Diego.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier (right) assigned to 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and a Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (KASP) member observe provide overwatch during the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s joint forcible entry into exercise Saber Junction at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, 2018 September 19, 2018. Special Operations Forces worked alongside the KASP during Saber Junction 18 to conduct irregular warfare in enemy occupied territory to support the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade as they executed land operations in a multinational joint environment.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek
24.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
