Quotes of the Day:
"Give the future enough thought to be ready for it - but don't worry about it. Live each day as if you were to die next sunrise. Then face each sunrise as a fresh creation and live for it, joyously. And never think about the past. No regrets, ever. Lazarus Long looked sad, then suddenly smiled and repeated, No regrets."
- Robert A. Heinlein - Time Enough for Love
"Failure is the key to success; each mistake teaches us something."
- Morihei Ueshiba
"Censorship reflects a society's lack of confidence in itself."
- Potter Stewart
1. New Americans from Afghanistan
2. Key Afghan City in Danger of Falling to the Taliban
3. Defense top-line ‘will probably go up.’ Key Dems see GOP boost as path to a deal
4. The Endgame in Afghanistan: Darker Clouds Gather
5. To Fight Vaccine Lies, Authorities Recruit an ‘Influencer Army’
6. House Report Names ‘Public Face’ of China’s ‘Disinformation Campaign’ on COVID Origin
7. Is the U.S. Trying to Smear This Veteran as a Chinese Spy?
8. Warfare of the Mind
9. Virus Flares in Wuhan as Delta Challenges China’s Defenses
10. Taiwan’s gold medal win over China in badminton raises tension.
11. Congress Wants To Cut Guam Defenses
12. Have our enemies found a way to defeat the United States?
13. Pentagon won’t require vaccine for troop deployments, but other details unclear
14. How to End the Pandemic
15. Fighting Myanmar's regime with compassion and military skills
16. China without an army of friends
17. NSA to National Security Employees: Avoid Working on Public Wi-Fi
18. Beijing’s threatens UK after HMS Queen Elizabeth enters South China Sea
19. China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
20. Japan’s Evolving Policy on Taiwan and the US–Japan Alliance: Towards a Nixon Doctrine for Northeast Asia?
21. A World War II Spy Didn’t Live to Tell Her Tale. Her Great-Great-Niece Will.
1. New Americans from Afghanistan
New Americans from Afghanistan
A planeload of our friends finally escape the Taliban.
By James Freeman
July 30, 2021 2:42 pm ET
First Lieutenant Wes Brockbank from Seattle, Washington with the U.S. Army's 4th squadron 2nd Cavalry Regiment and his interpreter walk through a village during a joint patrol with soldiers from the Afghan National Army in March of 2014 near Kandahar, Afghanistan.
PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES
Listen to article
Length7 minutes
Queue
Have the parents of the next Sunisa Lee just landed in Virginia? On Thursday this column noted the Olympic gymnastics champion’s distinguished lineage. The children of American allies who fought alongside U.S. troops during the Vietnam War, Ms. Lee’s Hmong parents escaped murderous communists in Laos to find a better life in the United States. Now stalwart friends of American troops from another war are beginning to arrive in the U.S., but many more are still awaiting a rescue and face grave danger.
As for the welcome start to the desperately needed relocations, Alex Horton reports in the Washington Post:
About 200 Afghan interpreters and their families arrived in Virginia on Friday, the first evacuations of thousands imperiled because of their work with the United States in Afghanistan as the Taliban gains control of more territory nationwide.
The flight departed Kabul with Afghans on their first leg of travel to Fort Lee, Va., where they will finish the last rounds of processing over the next several days, Ross Wilson, head of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan, said Friday. The Afghans will then be resettled across the country.
Thousands more face virtual death sentences as Taliban forces continue to overrun the country while U.S. government bureaucracy prevents the rapid provision of deserved and needed assistance. Mr. Horton adds:
About 20,000 Afghans had applied for the special immigrant visa as of July 15, according to the White House. That number does not include family members; a U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to offer an estimate, said the total number of people in the applicant pipeline including family members could be as high as 100,000.
The Post report notes that many of our friends now have to navigate through areas controlled by the Taliban before even getting the chance to persuade U.S. government employees to approve their escapes. Mr. Horton continues:
“The reality is some of these people are going to die. Why didn’t the U.S. military evacuate them when we had the ability?” asked Matt Zeller, a former Army officer and board chair of the advocacy group. He said Biden administration officials ignored his warnings in January to prepare for mass evacuations.
Mike Jason, a former US Army battalion commander who was deployed to Afghanistan, told the BBC that travelling across Taliban-controlled areas with the documentation needed for [Special Immigrant Visas] puts interpreters in “mortal danger”.
“That’s basically an entire confession that you’re an interpreter working for the Americans. We’re asking them to travel with the evidence,” he said.
Not-for-profit group No One Left Behind estimates that at least 300 Afghans or their family members have been killed for working with the US.
The Journal’s Jessica Donati reports:
As security in Afghanistan declined following the announcement of the U.S. departure earlier this year, the Biden administration came under pressure from Congress to do something to help Afghans who aided the U.S. during the war. In response, the State Department, in coordination with other government departments and agencies, launched what it calls “Operation Allies Refuge.”
The Senate on Thursday passed a bill that directs $1.1 billion in federal funds to aid the Afghan refugees. Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, who negotiated the bill with GOP Sen. Richard Shelby of Alabama, said the legislation will facilitate 8,000 new Afghan Special Immigrant Visas with changes to the program to improve efficiency.
Adds Ms. Donati:
Many of the Afghans are likely to be reunited with families and friends in existing communities of Afghan expatriates, where they continue to speak to each other in local languages and observe cultural and religious traditions.
“We have our own culture in place here,” said one Afghan who recently came to the U.S. through the process. “Here we don’t think we’re in America, we think we’re in Kabul.”
The Afghan said life for his family of six was difficult at first. They lived first with relatives and later for years in a rented basement. Now, he makes a living working as an assistant teacher and doing deliveries for DoorDash and Grubhub.
“I know how to survive,” he said. “America is the land of opportunity.”
But how many will ever get the chance to enjoy the vast opportunities available in this country? Quil Lawrence shares the story of another U.S. ally for National Public Radio:
Fida started working with U.S. Special Forces in 2006. In the following decade, the Afghan interpreter worked for USAID, U.S. Marines and finally the U.S. State Department. When he spoke to NPR back in 2018, Fida asked to only be identified by his first name for security reasons.
“I am proud to have worked with such wonderful people,” he said of the Americans he met over the years, “And they stand by me.”
But that did not seem to translate into Fida receiving the U.S. visa he’d been promised in exchange for risking his life alongside American forces. His application for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) was rejected several times. He was getting death threats from the Taliban, and he was worried...
Finally, a U.S.-based group, the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), took on his case. Last December, after several appeals, Fida and his family were cleared to immigrate to the US.
Weeks later, he was murdered by Taliban gunmen, in front of his 10-year-old son.
U.S. Army Special Forces Sgt. Matt Watters wrote in a Journal op-ed last month about his Afghan comrade:
‘Don’t go down that street,” my interpreter, who goes by the nickname Shafo, whispered into my ear. “This boy said it will explode.” I glanced at the child. He was probably 10, wearing a clean white button-down shirt, though his face was smudged with dirt. “The Taliban told the boys not to go down this alley,” Shafo continued. “Apparently there are bombs underneath the bricks.”
With dozens of compounds left to clear on streets that looked identical, this information was priceless for my U.S. Army Special Forces team. Shafo was an exceptional interpreter. Instead of simply translating, he probed for context, listened when our detainees muttered to each other, helped us build rapport with residents, and always sought out local kids, often canaries in the coal mine. He was a secret weapon in a fight in which enemy combatants don’t wear uniforms.
But now the tables have turned for Shafo. Instead of helping us hunt insurgents, he is being targeted by the Taliban... If the U.S. abandons those who served with such loyalty and conviction, why would anyone risk his life to help America again? Who will tell our soldiers which streets to avoid?
As if encouraging people all over the world to ally with the U.S. is not reason enough to rescue our Afghan friends, this week’s Olympic competition provided an inspiring reminder of the potential of new Americans.
***
***
To suggest items, please email best@wsj.com.
(Teresa Vozzo helps compile Best of the Web. Thanks to Jackie Harty.)
2. Key Afghan City in Danger of Falling to the Taliban
Excerpts:
Attaullah Afghan, the head of the provincial council in Helmand, said the Afghan air force had bombed a private hospital in the city after the Taliban took shelter there, killing a civilian and wounding two others. Several Taliban fighters were also killed in the strike, he said.
“Only the center of the city is free of the Taliban,” said Abdul Halim, a resident. “The city is locked and surrounded by the Taliban from all four fronts.”
Afghan forces on the front line in Lashkar Gah in May.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Mr. Halim said that the presence of U.S. aircraft, part of a muted bombing campaign launched by the U.S. military earlier this month to slow the Taliban’s advance and boost the morale of Afghan security forces, has done little to stop the fighting during the day.
“We have no idea what is going to happen,” Mr. Halim said.
Key Afghan City in Danger of Falling to the Taliban
Government reinforcements arrived Saturday in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province, but people were fleeing their homes and a hospital in the city had been bombed.
Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan, the capital of Helmand Province, in May.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
July 31, 2021
KABUL, Afghanistan — An important city in Afghanistan’s south was in danger of falling to the Taliban on Saturday as their fighters pushed toward its center despite concerted American and Afghan airstrikes in recent days.
Reports from Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand, a province where the Taliban already controlled much of the territory before their recent offensive, were dire: People were fleeing their homes, a hospital in the city had been bombed, and government reinforcements were only now arriving after days of delays.
“We are just waiting for the Taliban to arrive — there is no expectation that the government will be able to protect the city any more,” said Mohammadullah Barak, a resident.
What comes next in Lashkar Gah is anything but certain — the city has been on the brink of a Taliban takeover off and on for more than a decade. But if the insurgent group seizes the city this time it will be the first provincial capital to fall to the Taliban since 2016.
The worsening situation in Lashkar Gah is a more acute version of what is happening in cities across the country after the Taliban seized around half of Afghanistan’s 400-odd districts since U.S. and international forces began withdrawing from the country in May.
On Saturday, fighting between insurgent and government forces around Herat city, a traditionally safe area in the country’s west, edged dangerously close to its periphery. Many shops were shuttered on Saturday and Herat’s airport remained closed to civilian travel for a third day. On Friday, a U.N. compound there was attacked, and one of its guards was killed.
Security officers on Saturday outside the compound of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in the Guzara district of Herat Province.
Taliban fighters also remained entrenched in neighborhoods in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city, in the country’s south. In Kunduz city, an economic hub on the Tajikistan border, efforts to root out the Taliban now garrisoned within its walls have stalled.
The government’s response to the insurgents’ recent victories has been piecemeal. Afghan forces have retaken some districts, but both the Afghan air force and its commando forces — which have been deployed to hold what territory remains as regular army and police units retreat, surrender or refuse to fight — are exhausted.
In the security forces’ stead, the government has once more looked to local militias to fill the gaps, a move reminiscent of the chaotic and ethnically divided civil war of the 1990s that many Afghans now fear will return.
In Lashkar Gah, an Afghan military officer said government forces had requested reinforcements for days without luck, and described the situation as dire. Reinforcements began arriving on Saturday evening, he said.
In May, Afghan and U.S. airstrikes pushed back an attack on the city, and a few staunch Afghan army units held what territory they could after the local police fled. But this time there is less American air support, and Afghan defense officials were frantically trying to reinforce the cities under siege to stall the Taliban advance.
Just north of Lashkar Gah, in a nearby town, the Taliban on Saturday hanged two men accused of kidnapping children from the entrance gate for all to see — a troubling indicator that the insurgents’ hard-line rule of law was inching closer to the provincial capital.
In an effort to break the siege, Afghan aircraft bombed Taliban positions in neighborhoods across Lashkar Gah Friday night, a tactic that almost always results in civilian casualties when carried out in populated areas. Emergency Hospital, one of the main surgical centers in the city, reported on social media Saturday that it was full.
Attaullah Afghan, the head of the provincial council in Helmand, said the Afghan air force had bombed a private hospital in the city after the Taliban took shelter there, killing a civilian and wounding two others. Several Taliban fighters were also killed in the strike, he said.
“Only the center of the city is free of the Taliban,” said Abdul Halim, a resident. “The city is locked and surrounded by the Taliban from all four fronts.”
Afghan forces on the front line in Lashkar Gah in May.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Mr. Halim said that the presence of U.S. aircraft, part of a muted bombing campaign launched by the U.S. military earlier this month to slow the Taliban’s advance and boost the morale of Afghan security forces, has done little to stop the fighting during the day.
“We have no idea what is going to happen,” Mr. Halim said.
Thomas Gibbons-Neff reported from Kabul, and Taimoor Shah from Kandahar. Asadulah Timory contributed from Herat.
3. Defense top-line ‘will probably go up.’ Key Dems see GOP boost as path to a deal
Excerpts:
Amid the Democratic fractures, House Republicans are “totally united” against Biden’s defense top-line, according to Rep. Ken Calvert, the top Republican on the House Appropriations Committee’s defense subpanel. To him, it’s inevitable that a final budget deal matches SASC’s hike to $740 billion.
“At the end of the process, that number will be the number for defense appropriations,” Calvert told reporters at the Capitol last week.
Smith, who has long predicted an internal fight over the top-line, argued a better course for Democrats than rejecting national security measures wholesale, as some progressives do, is to take part in drafting them to make sure they hew to Democratic values.
“I can say ‘Look, you’re right, there’s some things we got to improve,’ but if it’s just a bright line in the sand, you’re just not voting, ‘we just don’t want to have any responsibility for that?’ That’s not a good message coming from the Democratic Party,” Smith said.
If a top-line boost is unavoidable, it looks like the next fight will be about how to spend it.
“I’m not going to choose just killing the defense bill over being forced into a negotiation about how much money to spend, right? Let me say, where we spend that money matters,” Smith said. “I wasn’t overwhelmingly impressed by what I’ve read about where the Senate chose to spend the money. Just buying more platforms because you’ve got the money? How does that fit into the national security strategy?”
Defense top-line ‘will probably go up.’ Key Dems see GOP boost as path to a deal
WASHINGTON ― Senate Armed Services Chairman Jack Reed says the defense top-line “will probably go up” to win Republican support on the path to a budget deal for fiscal 2022 ― and some other key Democrats on defense matters grudgingly say the same.
The comments came days after Reed’s panel unveiled plans for a $740 billion defense authorization bill which includes billions more in equipment purchases than President Joe Biden’s $716 billion Pentagon request, surprising outside observers. Reed, who is a senior appropriator, predicted that an added $25 billion eventually, “will be part of the [Senate] approps bill.”
“People are looking ahead at the final budget resolution, and the Republicans have made it clear that they’re not satisfied with the defense number, and they would require more,” Reed, D-R.I., said last week, adding: “What we’re presenting is what the Pentagon sent over and what they feel is necessary to do their mission.”
On July 14, an FY22 defense appropriations bill that tracks with Biden’s budget advanced out of the House Appropriations Committee, but with weak support. Republicans on the panel, unified in opposition because of the top-line, didn’t commit any votes to it ― and Democratic leaders have since held it back from the floor amid dissent from progressives.
On July 22, the evenly-divided SASC held a strong bipartisan vote, 23-3, to advance its $740 billion version of the annual National Defense Authorization Act. The panel had voted 25-1 to adopt the $25 billion increase as an amendment from the panel’s top Republican, Sen. Jim Inhofe, of Oklahoma.
Republican lawmakers in the House and Senate have lobbied against Biden’s figure for weeks, saying it would be insufficient to counter threats like a growing Chinese military and terrorist groups worldwide. In the narrowly divided House and the 50-50 Senate, Democrats will likely need Republicans to pass defense measures.
Asked last week, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., acknowledged it’s seems likely his panel’s NDAA will end up exceeding Biden’s top-line. A progressive but also a pragmatist, Smith told Defense News he doesn’t agree with the increase personally but he’s open to the idea as a means of advancing the bill.
“The people who want to spend more than the Biden number have built a lot of support, and yes I think that [$25 billion increase] is a potential bipartisan pathway,” Smith said. “I don’t support it, I don’t think that’s where we should go, but at the end of the day, I have one vote.”
“The reality is, as we’ve seen with the defense appropriations bill, we do not have the votes to pass it with just Democrats, and that’s the worst kept secret in the building,” Smith said, adding: “And it is very important to pass a defense bill; it has a lot of important policies that we’re trying to get done.”
Along similar lines, the Senate Democrat in charge of funding the Pentagon, Sen. Jon Tester, said the way to avoid a budgetary impasse with Republicans ― and stopgap continuing resolution at the Oct. 1 fiscal deadline ― is to agree to a plus-up. Like Reed, he foresees the Senate Appropriations Committee eventually mirroring SASC.
“Hopefully what that’s going to do is allow us to get a defense bill through the process ― and by the way, there’s plenty of reasons, plenty of threats ― but get it through the process so we don’t end up with a CR,” said Tester, a centrist from Montana.
Tester would like to begin work on the defense spending bill soon and have it over the finish line by mid-September, but the process has been stuck. Senate Appropriations Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., has for months been calling for bipartisan, bicameral talks with the White House to establish top lines before his panel starts its work.
Top defense officials have completed multiple trips to Capitol Hill to defend President Joe Biden’s flat defense budget request, and now the task of tailoring that request falls to Congress.
By: Joe Gould
Last week, Senate Appropriations Committee Vice Chairman Richard Shelby, R-Ala., called the SASC NDAA, “a positive step,” but he stopped short of abandoning his months-old demand that any increases to nondefense discretionary spending be matched on the defense side. Compared with this fiscal year, Biden’s proposal would hike the nondefense budget up 16% and nudge the defense budget up 1.6%.
“I thought that was a good sign for some of us who believe national security is a very, very important,” Shelby said of the SASC NDAA. “Sometimes, and we all know it’s not what you want, it’s what you can get ― and that is a positive step. Would we like more? We would, but so does every agency want more.”
Meanwhile, some key Democrats want to stick to Biden’s top-line. Tester’s counterpart in the House, who shepherded a bill that matched Biden’s number, told Congressional Quarterly last week that she was not a fan of the heftier, SASC-approved defense budget.
“The Senate can do what it chooses to do. So far I haven’t seen much action or anything ever come out of the Senate,” said Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn. “I support the number that I marked up to.”
But even at the lower figure, the support of the House’s progressive bloc cannot be won. Progressives remain concerned over nuclear spending, the Pentagon’s lack of a complete audit, but most of all, the ever-increasing top-line, according to Congressional Progressive Caucus Chair Pramila Jayapal.
“Chairwoman McCollum has done an amazing job. She has crafted a much better bill than ever before, but as you know, the critical issue for progressives has been the top-line number,” Jayapal, D-Calif., told Defense News. “It does not help that the Senate Democrats added $25 billion to the [administration’s] number. Because we feel like it’s, no matter what the number is, it has to go up.”
Progressive Democrats may get the most headlines, but there’s another influential group who tends to agree with Republicans on the top-line: The so-called national security Democrats, made up of former military or intelligence officers, most of whom have flipped red districts blue and should be facing tough re-election fights in 2022.
One of them, House Armed Services Vice-Chair Elaine Luria has been outspoken that Biden’s proposed defense budget “does not meet the level” the military needs to keep pace with China. Luria, whose Virginia district includes the world’s largest naval base, is a 20-year naval veteran and nuclear-trained surface warfare officer.
“We should match what the Senate has done, and I would clearly like to see 3-5% real growth,” she said of the top-line, during the HASC Readiness subcommittee markup last Thursday.
I will continue working to ensure our Armed Forces have the resources they need to outpace our near-peer adversaries in the Pacific. The House Defense Budget should match the $25 billion increase that the Senate approved on a bipartisan basis. pic.twitter.com/1wrP5KEdFB
— Rep. Elaine Luria (@RepElaineLuria) July 29, 2021
On the Senate side, Sen. Tammy Duckworth, who’s running again in 2022 after reclaiming an Illinois Senate seat for Democrats in 2016, had a similar message. A combat-wounded Army helicopter pilot, Duckworth chairs the Senate Airland Subcommittee.
“I think it’ll make it through,” Duckworth said of the $25 billion boost, adding that Congress routinely added to the defense top-line while Donald Trump was president.
“Why are people surprised when this is what we have always done,” she said. “And frankly, with the tempo that our military has been going through, they need this extra money so that they can maintain their readiness.”
Amid the Democratic fractures, House Republicans are “totally united” against Biden’s defense top-line, according to Rep. Ken Calvert, the top Republican on the House Appropriations Committee’s defense subpanel. To him, it’s inevitable that a final budget deal matches SASC’s hike to $740 billion.
“At the end of the process, that number will be the number for defense appropriations,” Calvert told reporters at the Capitol last week.
Smith, who has long predicted an internal fight over the top-line, argued a better course for Democrats than rejecting national security measures wholesale, as some progressives do, is to take part in drafting them to make sure they hew to Democratic values.
“I can say ‘Look, you’re right, there’s some things we got to improve,’ but if it’s just a bright line in the sand, you’re just not voting, ‘we just don’t want to have any responsibility for that?’ That’s not a good message coming from the Democratic Party,” Smith said.
If a top-line boost is unavoidable, it looks like the next fight will be about how to spend it.
“I’m not going to choose just killing the defense bill over being forced into a negotiation about how much money to spend, right? Let me say, where we spend that money matters,” Smith said. “I wasn’t overwhelmingly impressed by what I’ve read about where the Senate chose to spend the money. Just buying more platforms because you’ve got the money? How does that fit into the national security strategy?”
Leo Shane III in Washington, D.C., contributed to this report.
4. The Endgame in Afghanistan: Darker Clouds Gather
Excerpts:
Finally, detecting and neutralizing any threat of terrorism again taking root will depend on how well the U.S. can shift from 20 years of a close, richly resourced presence to remote operation, which is always more difficult. This will require a robust human and technical intelligence collection, coordinated with capabilities ranging from drones to special operations launched from facilities outside Afghanistan and coordinated with basing countries.
This is theoretically feasible. The reality though is that successful counterterrorism is almost always the result of rapid detection and rapid response.
On my final official visit to Afghanistan in 2004, I left with a sense of guarded optimism — I knew the country’s reputation as the “graveyard of empires,” but the Taliban had been vanquished, we had al-Qaida on the run, and the country had an elected president. But an Afghan colleague had the day before cautioned me with an old Afghan proverb: “One flower does not make it spring.” The succeeding 17 years have certainly proven that prophetic.
The Endgame in Afghanistan: Darker Clouds Gather
By John McLaughlin
ozy.com · by A Modern Media Company · July 28, 2021
The last time I wrote about Afghanistan, I tried to offer a balanced look at the arguments for both pessimism and modest optimism regarding Afghanistan’s future after the U.S withdrawal. Since then, the omens for the mountainous South Asian country have grown darker, with Afghan forces suffering major losses, significant desertions, and the Taliban expanding its influence and control. There are still a few unknowns, but the ones supporting hope are declining in number and credibility.
Taliban commanders are almost certainly exaggerating when they claim to control 85 percent of Afghanistan. It’s probably closer to 50 percent, but that is still worrying, and there’s little question they have made sizable gains. They appear to have the “strategic momentum,” as Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley said in a Pentagon news conference last week.
Their important gains? A border crossing into Iran and, most impressively, a successful hard push in the northeast, where the Taliban had not previously been strong. There, 1,000 Afghan troops fled across the border earlier this month into Tajikistan, and many local officials scrambled aboard planes to escape. Such gains and momentum doubtless spurred the U.S. decision to carry out airstrikes in support of Afghan forces last week, and the U.S. Central Command chief is leaving open the possibility that such strikes could continue after their scheduled end on Aug. 31.
Taliban leaders have been playing a double game. On the one hand, they are pushing ahead militarily to strengthen their position in any dealings with the existing government. On the other, they suggest they remain open to peace talks and agreement with the Kabul administration. They played this out most recently in Tehran, where on July 7 Iran hosted the first round of talks between the Taliban and the Kabul government in months. Nothing came of it, other than an opportunity for the Iranian media to slam the U.S. for leaving Afghanistan “empty-handed after two decades” in circumstances they compared to Vietnam.
Looking ahead, Afghanistan’s internal state and potential return as a terrorist hub depend largely on four factors in the weeks and months after the U.S departure at the end of August.
First, the Afghan security forces will have to hold and gain ground. Logistics will be key, and they face a few big obstacles. With their air force stretched thin and without U.S. assistance, they will have trouble getting to combat, resupplying troops under fire and evacuating the wounded. Maintenance issues will multiply in the absence of U.S. contractors who managed the supply system and repaired equipment. Morale could become fragile under growing pressure — as a former U.S. ambassador has pointed out, Afghan wars have typically ended when people decided “that one side was going to win and stopped fighting.” In the same vein, a former student of mine, a veteran of multiple deployments, reminded me that the Afghan army does not have the long traditions or ingrained commitments of the U.S. Army. Afghans, he said, can just take off their uniforms and go home.
Second, it is unclear how the population and the Taliban will interact in a country that is very different, at least on the surface, from the Taliban-ruled country of 2001. With 70 percent of the country under the age of 25 and 15.6 years the median age, most of today’s Afghans have grown up knowing two things: war and, especially in urban areas, the growing freedom that came with the influx of Western business and values. They want the first to end and the second to continue. Meanwhile, women, who were not allowed to work outside the home when the Taliban ruled before, now comprise 30% of the civil service. But in the newly Taliban areas of the north, the signs are not good: Women now report directives telling them to leave their houses wearing a hijab and only with a male companion. If this clash of values expands nationwide, the Taliban would probably revert to forced submission — but this could just as easily spark a civil war.
Afghan special forces attend a graduation ceremony at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) in Kabul, Afghanistan, on July 17, 2021, where hundreds of special forces, including females, graduated after three months of training.
Source Haroon Sabawoon/Anadolu Agency via Getty
Third, how the international community deals with the Taliban will condition its actions. The best chance for moderating Taliban behavior would come through a successful U.S. campaign to orchestrate concerted pressure on the group by an unlikely coalition of neighbors and great powers. To do so, Washington would have to overcome the reflexive tendency of many of these — India, Pakistan, Russia, Iran — to see Afghanistan as a kind of geopolitical chessboard on which to enhance influence or checkmate another’s.
Finally, detecting and neutralizing any threat of terrorism again taking root will depend on how well the U.S. can shift from 20 years of a close, richly resourced presence to remote operation, which is always more difficult. This will require a robust human and technical intelligence collection, coordinated with capabilities ranging from drones to special operations launched from facilities outside Afghanistan and coordinated with basing countries.
This is theoretically feasible. The reality though is that successful counterterrorism is almost always the result of rapid detection and rapid response.
On my final official visit to Afghanistan in 2004, I left with a sense of guarded optimism — I knew the country’s reputation as the “graveyard of empires,” but the Taliban had been vanquished, we had al-Qaida on the run, and the country had an elected president. But an Afghan colleague had the day before cautioned me with an old Afghan proverb: “One flower does not make it spring.” The succeeding 17 years have certainly proven that prophetic.
ozy.com · by A Modern Media Company · July 28, 2021
5. To Fight Vaccine Lies, Authorities Recruit an ‘Influencer Army’
I guess this is a useful test for the US government. If we cannot effectively operate in the "COVID information environment" and get people to engage in and successfully fight the COVID war I suppose we will not be able to wage effective political warfare against the revisionist, rogue, and revolutionary powers.
Then again, if we are successful perhaps we should be enlisting some of these influencers to help us conduct political warfare.
To Fight Vaccine Lies, Authorities Recruit an ‘Influencer Army’
The White House has teamed up with TikTok stars, while some states are paying “local micro influencers” for pro-vaccine campaigns.
Ellie Zeiler, 17, a TikTok creator, at her home in Escondido, Calif.Credit...Maggie Shannon for The New York Times
The White House has teamed up with TikTok stars, while some states are paying “local micro influencers” for pro-vaccine campaigns.
Ellie Zeiler, 17, a TikTok creator, at her home in Escondido, Calif.Credit...Maggie Shannon for The New York Times
By
LOS ANGELES — Ellie Zeiler, 17, a TikTok creator with over 10 million followers, received an email in June from Village Marketing, an influencer marketing agency. It said it was reaching out on behalf of another party: the White House.
Would Ms. Zeiler, a high school senior who usually posts short fashion and lifestyle videos, be willing, the agency wondered, to participate in a White House-backed campaign encouraging her audience to get vaccinated against the coronavirus?
“There is a massive need to grow awareness within the 12-18 age range,” Village Marketing wrote to Ms. Zeiler’s business email. “We’re moving fast and have only a few available slots to fill, so please let us know ASAP.”
Ms. Zeiler quickly agreed, joining a broad, personality-driven campaign to confront an increasingly urgent challenge in the fight against the pandemic: vaccinating the youthful masses, who have the lowest inoculation rates of any eligible age group in the United States.
To reach these young people, the White House has enlisted an eclectic army of more than 50 Twitch streamers, YouTubers, TikTokers and the 18-year-old pop star Olivia Rodrigo, all of them with enormous online audiences. State and local governments have begun similar campaigns, in some cases paying “local micro influencers” — those with 5,000 to 100,000 followers — up to $1,000 a month to promote Covid-19 vaccines to their fans.
The efforts are in part a counterattack against a rising tide of vaccine misinformation that has flooded the internet, where anti-vaccine activists can be so vociferous that some young creators say they have chosen to remain silent on vaccines to avoid a politicized backlash.
“I didn’t worry about the backlash,” said Christina Najjar, 30, a TikTok star known online as Tinx.Credit...Alyson Aliano for The New York Times
“The anti-vaccine side of the internet is still set on all this vaccine news,” said Samir Mezrahi, the administrator of several “meme pages” such as Kale Salad, which has nearly 4 million followers on Instagram and posts viral videos and other content. “We’re posting about J. Lo and Ben Affleck.”
Renee DiResta, a researcher who studies misinformation at the Stanford Internet Observatory, said that while influencer campaigns can be useful, they may be no match for mass, organic online movements. She noted the contrast between creators who have been asked to spread pro-vaccine messaging versus vaccine skeptics, who have made it a personal mission to question the injections.
Coronavirus Pandemic and U.S. Life Expectancy
“That’s the asymmetric passion,” she said. “People who believe it’s going to hurt you are out there talking about it everyday. They’re driving hashtags and pushing content and doing everything they can do.”
But even if the influencer campaigns amount to a sprinkler in a wildfire, some creators said, they felt compelled to join in.
“I didn’t worry about the backlash,” said Christina Najjar, 30, a TikTok star known online as Tinx. “Helping spread the word about the importance of getting vaccinated was the right thing to do.”
Ms. Najjar said she was thrilled when the White House reached out to her through her manager in June. She soon posted a question-and-answer video about the vaccines with Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, on Instagram.
Their banter was light. Discussing what she called a “happy vaxx girl summer,” Ms. Najjar peppered Dr. Fauci with questions: Was it safe to go out for a drink? Should we be concerned about getting pregnant after getting the vaccine? Do I look 26? “You have an ageless look to you,” he replied.
“I’ll tell my Botox doctor that,” she said.
Ms. Najjar called the session “a great time,” adding, “I think I flirted with Dr. Fauci, but in a respectful way.” A White House official said Dr. Fauci was not available for comment.
Public health officials have used celebrities to reach people since Elvis Presley rolled up his sleeve on “The Ed Sullivan Show” in 1956 to get the polio vaccine. These days, young people are more likely to trust the advice of their favorite content creator than a mainstream celebrity, according to a 2018 study by the marketing agency MuseFind.
As a result, “we need to get an influencer army to push the pro-vaccine message out there,” said Jason Harris, chief executive of the advertising agency Mekanism, which is an authority on influencer marketing. “That’s the only way we’re going to have loud enough voices on social to drown out all the misinfo that’s happening.”
The White House began considering the power of online creators in January, repurposing the influencer marketing tactics that Mr. Biden had used on the campaign trail toward promoting vaccinations, said Rob Flaherty, the White House director of digital strategy.
Mr. Flaherty said he and Clarke Humphrey, the White House’s Covid-19 digital director, teamed up with Village Marketing and Made to Save, a national campaign aimed at promoting access to coronavirus vaccines. In June, they hosted several off-the-record briefings over Zoom so online creators could ask questions about the vaccines and how they worked.
Since then, the Biden administration has rolled out influencer discussions with Dr. Fauci and brought Ms. Rodrigo to the White House, where she urged people to “actually get to a vaccination site.”
The 18-year-old pop star Olivia Rodrigo was recently tapped by the White House to persuade the youthful masses to get vaccinated.Credit...White House, via Reuters
In March, the White House also orchestrated an Instagram Live chat between Dr. Fauci and Eugenio Derbez, a Mexican actor with over 16.6 million Instagram followers who had been openly doubtful of the vaccines. During their 37-minute discussion, Mr. Derbez was upfront about his concerns.
“What if I get the vaccine, but it doesn’t protect me against the new variant?” he asked. Dr. Fauci acknowledged that the vaccines might not completely shield people from variants, but said, “It’s very, very good at protecting you from getting seriously ill.”
Understand the State of Vaccine Mandates in the U.S.
Mr. Flaherty said the whole point of the campaign was to be “a positive information effort.”
State and local governments have taken the same approach, though on a smaller scale and sometimes with financial incentives.
In February, Colorado awarded a contract worth up to $16.4 million to the Denver-based Idea Marketing, which includes a program to pay creators in the state $400 to $1,000 a month to promote the vaccines.
Jessica Bralish, the communications director at Colorado’s public health department, said influencers were being paid because “all too often, diverse communities are asked to reach out to their communities for free. And to be equitable, we know we must compensate people for their work.”
As part of the effort, influencers have showed off where on their arms they were injected, using emojis and selfies to punctuate the achievement. “I joined the Pfizer club,” Ashley Cummins, a fashion and style influencer in Boulder, Colo., recently announced in a smiling selfie while holding her vaccine card. She added a mask emoji and an applause emoji.
“Woohoo! This is so exciting!” one fan commented.
Posts by creators in the campaign carry a disclosure that reads “paid partnership with Colorado Dept. of Public Health and Environment.”
Patricia Lepiani, president of Idea Marketing, said local micro influencers are in demand because they can seem more authentic than national social media stars. “Vaccination campaigns will only be effective if you know your community,” she said.
Colorado officials recently said the state has just two months left to use 350,000 doses of stockpiled Covid-19 vaccines before they expire.
Other places, including New Jersey, Oklahoma City County and Guildford County, N.C., as well as cities like San Jose, Calif., have worked with the digital marketing agency XOMAD, which identifies local influencers who can help broadcast public health information about the vaccines.
Governments’ interest in the campaigns has spiked sharply in the past week, said Rob Perry, chief executive of XOMAD, as concerns have grown about the spread of the Delta variant of the virus. He added that “when large numbers of influencers post in the same time period, vaccination rates go up.”
Ms. Zeiler, who signed on to the White House-backed campaign, also had an online conversation with Dr. Anthony S. Fauci in June.Credit...Maggie Shannon for The New York Times
For Ms. Zeiler, the TikTok star, things moved quickly after she signed on to the White House-backed vaccination campaign. In June, she held an online conversation with Dr. Fauci, using the time to squash the false rumor that vaccines cause infertility. It was a conspiracy theory that she had heard from friends and that she had seen videos of on her TikTok “For You” page.
“When I saw that I was like, OK, I need to ask him about it,” she said. “It was kind of sad to see him be like, no, that’s not true.”
Ms. Zeiler has since used her footage with Dr. Fauci for other platforms, including Instagram, and created original content for YouTube promoting the vaccines. In one 47-second video, she spoke directly into the camera, ticking through the reasons she had gotten vaccinated and why others should too. “Reason one,” she declared, was “you can go wherever you want.”
Ms. Zeiler said in an interview that her work was not done. “I know I won’t stop until all my followers are safe and vaccinated,” she said.
6. House Report Names ‘Public Face’ of China’s ‘Disinformation Campaign’ on COVID Origin
Excerpts:
The committee’s Republicans are releasing the document as an addendum to the COVID-origins report they issued last year. Among other things, this version highlights research from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) that viruses can be genetically modified without leaving a trace and that the WIV made unusual security-related procurements the same day that a mysterious virus database was taken off-line. “The preponderance of evidence suggests SARS-CoV-2 was accidentally released from a Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory sometime prior to September 12, 2019,” the report concludes.
One of the most noteworthy revelations, however, might be indications that the WIV — a CCP-controlled facility — appears to have played a role in Daszak’s efforts to shape public opinion surrounding the virus’s origins.
“It’s incredibly concerning that Peter Daszak, an American scientist who has taken millions of dollars from the U.S. government, took directions from the CCP to persuade the American people a lab leak was nothing more than a ‘conspiracy theory,’” said Representative Michael McCaul, the committee’s top Republican, in a statement to National Review.
House Report Names ‘Public Face’ of China’s ‘Disinformation Campaign’ on COVID Origin
August 2, 2021 12:01 AM
- Share on Facebook
- Share on Twitter
- Share on Flipboard
- E\mail this articl
- Print this a
Peter Daszak, a member of the World Health Organization (WHO) team tasked with investigating the origins of COVID-19 walks at a lakeside in Wuhan, China, February 3, 2021. (Aly Song/Reuters)
A new congressional report will tie Peter Daszak, the controversial director of the New York-based EcoHealth Alliance nonprofit, to the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda campaign about COVID-19’s origins.
“We have uncovered strong evidence that suggests Peter Daszak is the public face of a CCP disinformation campaign designed to suppress public discussion about a potential lab leak,” states a new report, a copy of which National Review obtained before its planned publication later today, by Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Skip A
The committee’s Republicans are releasing the document as an addendum to the COVID-origins report they issued last year. Among other things, this version highlights research from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) that viruses can be genetically modified without leaving a trace and that the WIV made unusual security-related procurements the same day that a mysterious virus database was taken off-line. “The preponderance of evidence suggests SARS-CoV-2 was accidentally released from a Wuhan Institute of Virology laboratory sometime prior to September 12, 2019,” the report concludes.
One of the most noteworthy revelations, however, might be indications that the WIV — a CCP-controlled facility — appears to have played a role in Daszak’s efforts to shape public opinion surrounding the virus’s origins.
“It’s incredibly concerning that Peter Daszak, an American scientist who has taken millions of dollars from the U.S. government, took directions from the CCP to persuade the American people a lab leak was nothing more than a ‘conspiracy theory,’” said Representative Michael McCaul, the committee’s top Republican, in a statement to National Review.
When Daszak organized a now-infamous statement referring to the lab hypothesis of COVID’s origins a “conspiracy theory” in February 2020, he did so at the behest of individuals affiliated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, according to emails cited in the report. The specific messages in question have been accessible online for months, but the report will bring public scrutiny to the WIV’s role in organizing the Daszak statement for the first time.
“You should know that the conspiracy theorists have been very active, targeting our collaborators with some extremely unpleasant web pages in China, and some have now received death threats to themselves and their families. They have asked for any show of support we can give them,” Daszak wrote in an email on February 8, 2020, asking Rita Colwell, a microbiology professor at the University of Maryland and Johns Hopkins University affiliated with EcoHealth Alliance, to add her name to the letter.
The statement, which later appeared in the Lancet, a leading medical journal, uses similar language, vaguely referring to concerns that the virus originally leaked from a lab as a conspiracy. “Conspiracy theories do nothing but create fear, rumours, and prejudice that jeopardise our global collaboration in the fight against this virus,” wrote Daszak.
That letter, among other articles and public statements, was used by Daszak and others to create a false consensus view in the media that COVID did not originate in a lab. Since the early days of the pandemic, however, that’s changed: A number of U.S. officials across the Trump and Biden administrations have stated publicly, or reportedly mused in private, that the disease could have begun with a leak from the Wuhan Institute of Virology. In May, President Joe Biden ordered a 90-day investigation by the U.S. intelligence community to review any available information about such a potential origin.
It has been widely reported that Daszak organized the Lancet letter, but the Republicans’ report might be the first time that the role of the WIV in orchestrating it has been brought to prominence. The emails on which their allegation is based were initially released to the public in November 2020, after U.S. Right to Know, a nonprofit group that advocates transparency in the food system, obtained them via a Freedom of Information Act request.
Despite the group’s relative obscurity, its 466-page email cache soon became a political lightning rod: An email on February 6, 2020, revealed Daszak’s previously undisclosed role in organizing the letter — and the lengths to which he went to conceal his involvement.
When that statement was published on February 19, 2020, the world was in the initial phases of the coronavirus pandemic, and Daszak’s role went largely unexamined. Meanwhile, he played an outsized role, in that statement and his public comments, in downplaying the likelihood of a lab-leak origin of COVID.
All Our Opinion in Your Inbox
NR Daily is delivered right to you every afternoon. No charge.
To this day, the U.S. nonprofit director has been an invaluable resource to the Chinese Communist Party’s propagandists, who have cited him in numerous articles and videos over the past several months. Last week, the People’s Daily noted that he called China a “victim” of the Wuhan-lab theory.
In early 2021, he joined the joint WHO–China study on COVID origins, which deemed such a leak “extremely unlikely.” That determination was widely criticized, however, for all but ruling out the scenario without any evidence. WHO director general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and 13 allies of the United States panned the results of the probe.
Daszak was the only American to join the WHO team, after the three candidates put forward by the Trump administration were rejected by the WHO. At the time, critics pointed out that he had a potentially glaring conflict of interest: EcoHealth Alliance funded coronavirus research at the lab and had received millions of dollars in grant funding from the U.S. National Institutes of Health to do so. These conflicts of interest later led him to step down from the Lancet’s COVID-origins commission.
In addition to the email to Colwell, the GOP investigators point to another that hints heavily at coordination between Daszak and the WIV in downplaying the possibility of a lab leak.
The afternoon after Daszak initially sent out a draft of the statement that would appear in the Lancet 13 days later, he wrote to Ralph Baric, a professor at the University of North Carolina and the world’s leading coronavirus researcher, about a conversation he’d had with Linfa Wang, a Duke-National University of Singapore professor who is also regarded as one of the world’s preeminent authorities on coronaviruses. The report notes that Wang, a PRC national, also chairs the WIV’s scientific advisory board for emerging diseases and had been in Wuhan, likely for meetings with top officials at the institute, until January 18, 2020.
“He thinks, and I agree with him, that you, me and him should not sign this statement, so it has some distance from us and therefore doesn’t work in a counterproductive way,” wrote Daszak in the February 6 email, referring to a conversation he had with Wang about a draft of the Lancet statement. “We’ll then put it out in a way that doesn’t link it back to our collaboration so we maximize an independent voice,” he added.
Baric wrote back: “I also think this is a good decision. Otherwise it looks self-serving and we lose impact.”
That email has been widely commented on, as it shows that Daszak had wanted to obscure his role in the Lancet statement. However, this report’s discussion of the message places a new emphasis on Wang’s role at the WIV and the vast influence of the institute’s Chinese Communist Party Committee.
The GOP lawmakers’ report also notes the extensive record of collaboration between Wang, Daszak, and Shi Zhengli, the WIV director and another subject of fierce controversy, on coronavirus research.
Since supporting the Daszak-led letter, Baric has come around to the possibility of the lab-leak scenario; in April 2021 he signed on to a letter endorsing further investigation of the Wuhan lab in Science magazine. Daszak has not. Instead, after the Science letter and other events brought the lab-leak hypothesis to prominence, he wrote another letter to the Lancet, essentially doubling down on his claims from over a year ago.
But Wang’s role in all of this has remained a bit of a mystery. Following publication of the U.S. Right to Know email trove last November, Alina Chan, a postdoctoral fellow at the Broad Institute, noted on Twitter that “the 2 scientists who would’ve known the most about lab origins plausibility did not agree to sign the letter: Ralph Baric and Linfa Wang.” She also wrote of the prominent researchers, “As far as I can tell, neither one has ruled out a lab-based scenario, even if they have suggested avenues for investigating natural origins.”
The GOP team faces roadblocks to uncovering more information about the CCP’s role in the origins-disinformation campaign. McCaul said it was concerning that Daszak didn’t respond to any of the investigators’ questions.
“That’s why I’m calling for Peter Daszak to be subpoenaed before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It’s our responsibility to conduct oversight of taxpayer’s money — and we need to know exactly what Peter Daszak was spending that money on.”
The report brings new attention to these questions, casting a harsh light on figures who have been sympathetic to Beijing’s position on the origins of COVID. As Beijing has rejected the WHO’s calls for a second-phase investigation, including a closer look at the lab, it seems that only a bipartisan congressional investigation — using subpoenas of Daszak, the Lancet, and others — can reveal the WIV’s role in this disinformation effort and bring us closer to understanding the origins of this calamity.
7. Is the U.S. Trying to Smear This Veteran as a Chinese Spy?
MAVNI was never the Lodge Act.
Is the U.S. Trying to Smear This Veteran as a Chinese Spy?
The feds investigated this U.S. Army veteran for working for Beijing—and got nowhere. Now they’re probing him all over again, as they try to send him to China.
Adam Rawnsley
Senior Researcher
Seamus Hughes
Published Aug. 02, 2021 3:49AM ET
He’s a Chinese-American veteran with an honorable discharge, U.S. citizenship, and a master’s degree from an Ivy League university. But the feds tried to run him out of the Army and investigate him for being an agent of the government of China.
Now that those attempts have failed, the government is trying to strip him of his citizenship—and send him back to the People’s Republic, where he could face a whole different kind of exposure.
Cheng Li—not his real name—asked The Daily Beast to refer to him under a pseudonym because he fears potential retribution from the Chinese government for his service in the U.S. military if the government prevails and he gets deported.
Cheng was one of many immigrants who became an American citizen through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, an initiative created in 2008 that allows non-citizens with in-demand language skills to get citizenship after serving in the military. His case highlights how the controversy over the treatment of immigrants in the U.S. armed forces, which became a flashpoint during the Trump administration, is continuing into the Biden era.
Critics say the Trump administration targeted MAVNI recruits as part of its broader crackdown on immigration, and point in particular to the Pentagon’s dismissal of 500 people in the program in just one year as evidence of a broad-brush attempt to remove immigrants from military service.
Cheng’s attorney, Lance Curtright, told The Daily Beast that his client was unfairly targeted as part of that broader purge of immigrants in the military. But now, Curtright said, Cheng has to fight off the same set of allegations about loyalty and honesty in immigration proceedings—even though the Army already considered and rejected them.
“You have a guy who’s already beaten this charge having to beat it again and he is a U.S. citizen who honorably served our country. I think it’s really disgusting how they’re treating these MAVNIs,” Curtright said in an interview.
The Justice Department did not respond to a request for comment from The Daily Beast.
Cheng enlisted in 2016 after spending three years in the U.S. on a student visa studying in an Ivy League master’s program.
On paper, he was everything the MAVNI program was looking for: a native Mandarin Chinese speaker fluent in English and willing to serve in the American military.
Advertisement
When he applied for naturalization that year as part of MAVNI’s requirements, Cheng was asked whether he had ever joined or was “associated (either directly or indirectly) with the Communist Party” or whether he’d ever been a member of a Chinese military unit. He answered “no,” leading to repeated—and so-far failed—efforts by the Army, FBI, and Justice Department to accuse him of lying.
The trouble for Cheng began in 2017, after he finished basic training and sat for security screening interviews with Army counterintelligence officers. The investigators asked Cheng about his family and friends, and he volunteered that his cousin and a friend of his father worked for China’s Ministry of Public Safety. He also told investigators that he’d participated in a mandatory two-week training course with the People’s Liberation Army that featured firearms and hand-to-hand combat training. In court documents, the FBI alleged that Cheng’s replies “contradict his oral and written responses to the questions asked from his U.S. Application for Naturalization.”
In court documents, FBI agents played up the “weapons training” Cheng supposedly received and how he “learned how to fire bullets and march” with the Chinese military as a college student. Despite the government’s dark intonations, Cheng’s training wasn’t an attempt to join or associate with the Chinese military. Rather, it was part of a mandatory two-week indoctrination experience forced on all Chinese undergraduates. It was introduced as part of Beijing’s attempt to counter the student protest movements that spawned the Tiananmen Square protests with nationalist propaganda. Far from an elite instruction in the art of combat, many Chinese students are often forced to march around with wooden rifles as part of the experience.
In 2018, the FBI followed up on the Army’s interviews with Cheng, with interviews of their own. Agents again asked him about his family members and their potential associations with China’s Communist Party and, faced with more specific questions, Cheng provided more specific answers. He told the agents his parents were party members, and denied that a family friend in the Ministry of Public Security had asked him to speak to mutual friends visiting the U.S. from China about how to get their own citizenship.
Court documents obtained by The Daily Beast show FBI agents investigated Cheng on suspicion of lying to federal agents and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign power—the latter a charge that’s often been used of late against spies. The government even obtained a search warrant for his residence, phone, and WeChat account in search of evidence to support the allegation.
But nothing ever came of the probe, and the government never charged Cheng with a crime.
Advertisement
“I think that was a fishing trip that didn't work out well for them,” Curtright said of the investigation.
In the wake of those interviews, the Army tried to boot Cheng from the service on the grounds that he had allegedly lied about his supposed CCP ties. “They’re taking a very broad approach to how that question is worded,” Curtright said. “It asked him if he’s ever been associated, directly or indirectly, with the CCP. He indicated that he’d never had any such affiliation because he was never a member himself and he didn’t think he had any association with the CCP either.”
"The only reason why they know about these things is because he was trying to be honest with them," he added.
The Army brought Cheng before a separation board based on allegations that he had lied about his background and alleged association with the CCP. The evidentiary threshold for a case in an Army separation board is only a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the more stringent standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” used in criminal trials. Nonetheless, “After a fully vetted trial in which the Army prosecutors brought evidence and witnesses, the Army Separation Board decided they didn’t prove it and they dismissed the charge” against Cheng, his attorney said.
“Basically, [the U.S. government] is attempting to leave Mr. Cheng stateless after he served them honorably in the U.S. military.”
Cheng’s career in the military, however, was effectively over, and he rode out the remainder of his service in a professional limbo, unable to obtain a security clearance, until he was honorably discharged in 2019.
Advertisement
With the Army’s attempts to investigate Cheng having gone up in smoke, the Department of Justice is now trying to denaturalize him, which would strip him of his citizenship. All based on the same allegations that he lied on his naturalization application—but this time under the Biden administration.
“Basically, [the U.S. government] is attempting to leave Mr. Cheng stateless after he served them honorably in the U.S. military,” Curtright said.
China does not recognize dual citizenship, and automatically strips the citizenship of any Chinese national who naturalizes in a foreign country, leaving an open question of where Cheng could go in the event that the U.S. government succeeds in denaturalizing him.
“To prove their case in a denaturalization context, they have to show some type of subjective intent. What did he mean when he answered these questions? Did he mean to deceive?” Curtright said. “There’s absolutely no evidence of that whatsoever. What you have instead is a guy who filled out a form and supplemented it with correct information later.”
8. Warfare of the Mind
Summaries of the recent resistance podcasts from 1st Special Forces Command.
Warfare of the Mind
Fantastic two-part series from the Indigenous Approach podcast on the concept of resistance and unconventional warfare.
The concept of resistance is foundational to Army Special Operations Forces, as our mission is generally to partner with forces to either support or defeat resistance movements. In this two-part series, we pair experts on resistance with our forward-stationed battalion commanders in Germany and Japan to discuss what resistance is and how it’s applied in today’s operational environment.
The Indigenous Approach: Concept of Resistance: Part 1 – Resistance in Europe on Apple Podcasts
Special operations is inundated with terms that define gradations of warfare: unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, information warfare, political warfare, and on and on. Some of these terms are written into doctrine, others are in popular use or academic and carted out to make a point.
The doctrinal terms have unique meanings, and those meanings are incredibly important to the planners and practicioners who see to their execution.
We’ve got squishier terms too, like resistance.
What does that mean in the context of warfare and special operations?
This was such an incredibly insightful two-part series which explains resistance in detail. And while this is a must-listen for folks in the special operations community, I think it is even more important for it to reach a wider national security audience to build an understanding of what special operations can do (and are supposed to do) in supporting resitance operations.
Future war is likely to feature conventional operations as the decisive operation and a resistance force as a shaping operation (or vice-versa, who knows?). It would be helpful for anyone who might have to participate in that future war to have a baseline understanding of resistance operations.
There are some real gems in this series, too.
Poor planning and friction can lead to “going with what you know.”
“When things get difficult, people tend to go with what they know. And what that ends up looking like, you have a defense capability that looks a lot like your military. If you find yourself with a resistance force or irregular defense force that looks exactly like your unit or exactly like your military, then you’ve probably lost your way.”
Part 1, ~29:30
Often, this comes down to equipment and logistics. The “tail” that makes our forces what they are is long (and expensive). Trying to replicate that in a partner force – especially a resistance force – just isn’t going to work. This is also true for tactics. The way we do things works for us – it might not work for them. There is a level of embracing this that is necessary to be effective.
What does SOF do in a bar fight? They’re in the parking lot, pulling wires and cutting tires.
“I use this analogy of what SOF was created to do – of a bar fight. There’s a large bar, there’s a bar fight, the military decides they’re going to go in. The Marine Corps is there to punch the bouncer in the face and get us inside and the Army is supposed to run inside and plug the zone and make sure that the bar fight goes our way. What does SOF do? We’re in the parking lot, pulling wires, cutting tires, ambushing your reinforcements, and influencing the population to come join the fight who are friendly, and dealing with the ones who want to come and reinforce them.”
Part 1, ~38:00
On the role of PSYOP through the continuum of resistance operations:
“PSYOP has the role to assist with the strategic messaging – to assist with the messaging during peacetime now to increase the resiliency of the population and perhaps to warn them, to some degree, against the adversary, and then they also have a role to play if there is a takeover of a nation.”
Part 1, ~41:00
Have you ever heard the term ‘digital standoff’ before? I haven’t.
“If you look at the Jedburghs back in WWII, they show up in a village, and there’s a parade, and people celebrating their arrival because they know they’re going to assist the resistance. That played pretty well back then. But if you did that today, a picture of that would be around the world in three seconds. So I think what that causes is a belief that maybe you can achieve far enough standoff from a digital means or achieve a digital safe haven where the human-to-human piece of this is no longer necessary, or at least that that connection can be made digitally…”
Part 1, ~45:00
The above was super-insightful. Resistance and support to resistance is going to look a lot different in the future. America is not the same. The world is not the same. Additionally, the fact that the picture would make it around the world in three seconds, to me, isn’t a bad thing. It is going to be nearly impossible to prevent that – so you have to embrace it. This is incredibly uncomfortable for a force that is accustomed to operating in the shadows.
GPC and LSCO are not the same.
“Most people when they talk Great Power Competition (GPC) – at least most of the stuff I’ve read – people have a tendency to equate it to Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). So, is that a piece of competition? Is it the most of competition? How does LSCO fit into GPC?”
Part 2, ~8:00
Say it once, say it twice, third time’s the charm.
It’s just true – SOF NCOs are the ones who maintain the long term relationships. Much of this has to do with the fact that officers don’t spend as much time on teams as NCOs do. This isn’t a bad thing – this is the way it is and should be exploited.
“The Philippine generals, three or four of them said ‘Joe how are you doing? It’s been a couple of months since I’ve seen you! How’s everything going?’ More general officers knew him as Joe the Sergeant First Class Special Forces NCO than they knew the PACOM staff senior officers. And that’s really a testament to the relationships that our NCOs have.”
Part 2, ~21:00
The below is a good recruiting line.
“The meme is the new PSYOP leaflet.”
Part 2, ~27:00
I cannot stress the below enough. Our risk aversion in the IE stems mostly from fear of embarressment. How silly is that? No one wants to be dragged through the mud digitally – but it happens all the time, and it’s fine. The day moves on. We’re unwilling to try because we’ve see what happens when someone makes a mistake. We should be making many, many more mistakes and living with it. That’s how we achieve success. Frequency of a theme over time. Not by crafting one, super-polished message.
“The tragedy is if we make a mistake in a kinetic operation, you know, it is unrecoverable. Somebody dies. But if we make a mistake in the information environment, in today’s world, the news cycle is going to move on. And yeah, it might me embarrassing, it might have an effect for a short term, but we can recover from information mistakes, so we should be aggressive and allow our teams to seize the initiative in the information space.”
Part 2, ~28:00
We keep hearing it – PSYOP and influence operations as the desicive operation. The more we embrace this, the more successful we’re going to be.
“It’s a little bit of a culture shift for an ODA to be like ” Hey MIST (Military Information Support Team), how can I help you?”
Part 2, ~35:00
What are we really assessing/selecting for?
“One common trait of special operations is, I think, we select for life-long learners.”
Part 2, ~41:45
This is so true. After assessment, selection, and qualification, you have not arrived. You have just begun. The continuing education – both through PME, unit training, and I think more importantly, self-development, is critical to actually getting good at this stuff.
Enjoy these posts? Follow me on Twitter and sign up for the monthly newsletter.
9. Virus Flares in Wuhan as Delta Challenges China’s Defenses
Excerpts:
Residents in Nanjing, where the recent outbreak began, have been placed under lockdown. Also affected are those living in Zhangjiajie, a scenic area famous for its verdant mountain ridges, where a live outdoor performance a week ago with more than 3,000 spectators fueled the virus’s spread.
The sale of train tickets from Nanjing and Zhangjiajie were suspended on Monday, Beijing Daily reported.
Officials in Beijing -- which has detected six infections so far -- vowed to cut off the virus’ transmission with “fastest pace, strictest measures and the most decisive actions.”
The capital will tighten entry restrictions for those traveling from places currently battling outbreaks, and government and state company employees have been barred from leaving the city. Vigilance already has increased in many places, with security guards once again checking green codes at shopping malls and office buildings. Meanwhile, queues are growing at testing sites around the city.
Virus Flares in Wuhan as Delta Challenges China’s Defenses
Bloomberg News
August 2, 2021, 1:27 AM EDT Updated on August 2, 2021, 5:41 AM EDT
- Original Covid epicenter had been virus-free since last May
- Mass testing to quarantines being tested by contagious delta
China is confronting its broadest Covid-19 outbreak since coronavirus first emerged there in late 2019, with the delta variant spreading to places that had been virus-free for months, including the original epicenter of Wuhan.
Delta has broken through the country’s virus defenses, which are some of the strictest in the world, and reached nearly half of China’s 32 provinces in just two weeks. While the overall number of infections -- more than 300 so far -- is still lower than Covid resurgences elsewhere, the wide spread indicates that the variant is moving quickly.
It’s the biggest challenge to China’s strategy since the virus was first detected in Wuhan, the central Chinese city that saw the world’s first lethal outbreak. The country’s strict anti-virus measures, which include mass testing as soon as a case appears, aggressive contact tracing, widespread use of quarantines and targeted lockdowns, have crushed more than 30 previous flareups over the past year.
A resident gets tested for Covid-19 in Nanjing in Jiangsu province on Aug. 2.Photographer: AFP/Getty Images
The arrival of the more infectious delta variant, however, is testing even that approach. The new strain may be exploiting an easing off in masking and social distancing in some places, since much of the country has been Covid-free for months. That, along with increased travel for summer vacation, created an environment where delta could gain a foothold.
China reported 99 infections on Monday, including 44 who tested positive but have no symptoms. Later in the day, seven more people were found to be infected in Wuhan, plus another in Beijing. By number of cases, it’s the biggest outbreak since a flareup in Hebei province in northern China in January, when 2,000 people were infected.
The broad spread is even more concerning, given the rise of cases in the highly protected capital and in Wuhan, whose virus-free status has been a source of pride in China. The seven new cases there are the first since China brought its original wave under control by locking down the city of some 11 million and the surrounding Hubei province.
Pang Xinghuo, the deputy director of Beijing’s Center for Disease Prevention and Control, pleaded with visitors to the city who have traveled from high-risk areas within China or suspect that they might have been in close contact with someone infected to report to authorities. Officials also urged residents to curb their travel and remain in the city for the near future if possible.
“Cluster outbreaks have occurred one after another around the country and multiple cases have been reported in Beijing, leading to a critical phase in our epidemic response,” Pang said. “We can’t let loose a single strand of risk and hidden danger.”
The initial delta infection arrived via an overseas flight from Moscow into the eastern Chinese city of Nanjing in mid-July, and spread on to a group of airport cleaning staff. Within weeks, cases have also popped up as far away as Hainan island in China’s south, 1,900 kilometers (1,180 miles) from Nanjing.
China’s vaccination rate is close to 60% and among the highest in the world, but it remains to be seen whether the country’s locally-developed shots can slow delta’s spread.
Delta Challenge
Most of those infected in Nanjing were immunized, and the vaccines -- which have been found less effective than Messenger RNA shots in clinical trials -- do appear to be providing protection, with only 4% of those infected in this current wave battling severe disease so far. Many of those have pre-existing conditions such as asthma, diabetes or high blood pressure, Guo Yanhong, an official with the National Health Commission, said at a briefing in Beijing on Saturday.
While all Covid vaccines are proving less effective against delta, concerns are high that non-mRNA vaccines like the Chinese ones and AstraZeneca Plc’s shot will be less able to slow transmission.
State-owned Sinopharm said its inactivated Covid-19 shot, given widely in China, is 68% effective against delta, citing a study in Sri Lanka. Sinovac Biotech Ltd., the other major Chinese supplier, said the antibodies induced by its inactivated Covid vaccine can still neutralize the delta strain in laboratory studies, the state-run Global Times reported, without providing more detail.
The latest Covid updates
Make sense of the headlines and the outbreak's global response with the Coronavirus Daily.
Sign up to this newsletter
Delta is providing a reality check for the world, especially countries that thought they were emerging from the pandemic through virus containment or high vaccination levels. Last week, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reversed its earlier position and said fully vaccinated people should go back to wearing masks indoors in places where infections are rising. Australia, which like China had managed to snuff out Covid with strict border curbs, is battling its own delta-driven resurgence, with major cities back in lockdown.
Flooded City
“Delta accounts for 80% of cases in the U.S., and they re-instituted a requirement for masks,” said Wang Huaqing, chief immunization expert at the Chinese CDC, at the Saturday briefing. “That means delta’s spread is severe and personal protection can not be slackened even with vaccination.”
Adding to the concern is a separate delta cluster in the Chinese city of Zhengzhou, where hospital and cleaning staff have been infected. Cases were reported in the surrounding Henan province as well, where the ability to curb the virus’s spread may be weakened due to the fallout from torrential rain and flooding that destroyed infrastructure, killed 302 people and left 50 missing.
Sponsored Content
Residents in Nanjing, where the recent outbreak began, have been placed under lockdown. Also affected are those living in Zhangjiajie, a scenic area famous for its verdant mountain ridges, where a live outdoor performance a week ago with more than 3,000 spectators fueled the virus’s spread.
The sale of train tickets from Nanjing and Zhangjiajie were suspended on Monday, Beijing Daily reported.
Officials in Beijing -- which has detected six infections so far -- vowed to cut off the virus’ transmission with “fastest pace, strictest measures and the most decisive actions.”
The capital will tighten entry restrictions for those traveling from places currently battling outbreaks, and government and state company employees have been barred from leaving the city. Vigilance already has increased in many places, with security guards once again checking green codes at shopping malls and office buildings. Meanwhile, queues are growing at testing sites around the city.
— With assistance by John Liu, and Dong Lyu
(Updates with new cases in Wuhan and Beijing in 6th and 7th paragraph
10. Taiwan’s gold medal win over China in badminton raises tension.
Sore losers in the PRC.
Excerpts:
Taiwan’s badminton victory has drawn some anger on Weibo, a popular social media platform in China, as well as comments from users congratulating China on a victory that, like Taiwan itself, they see as belonging to Beijing. Others accused the badminton players of advocating Taiwanese independence and criticized them as ungrateful.
“You can participate in the Games because there’s ‘Chinese Taipei’ on your shirts,” wrote one Weibo user who said the Taiwanese players’ allusions to national sovereignty left him speechless.
Similar nationalist attacks have focused on athletes from Hong Kong, a Chinese territory that fields its own Olympic team.
Social media users in Taiwan have responded with memes depicting a badminton court as the island’s new national flag.
The results were reversed in the women’s singles final on Sunday night, when Chen Yufei of China defeated the top-ranked Tai Tzu-ying of Taiwan. Before the match, many Weibo users in China had already accused Tai of being pro-independence, citing past remarks lamenting her inability to hold Taiwan’s flag at international competitions.
“We can lose to anyone but Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independentists,” one user wrote.
Taiwan’s gold medal win over China in badminton raises tension.
Lee Yang and Wang Chi-lin of Taiwan, center, won gold in men’s doubles badminton on Saturday. Taiwan, a self-governing island claimed by China, competes in the Olympics as Chinese Taipei.
By
At the medal ceremony for the badminton men’s doubles on Saturday, the winning players watched a flag being raised, but it was not their own. They sang as a song reverberated in the mostly empty venue, but it was not their anthem.
For decades, politics has been getting in the way of Olympic glory for Taiwan, a self-governing democracy that China claims as its territory. Rather than using its formal name, the Republic of China, or even Taiwan, the island competes in international sporting events as Chinese Taipei, under a resolution passed by the International Olympic Committee. The terms prohibit the use of any symbols suggesting that Taiwan is a sovereign nation.
On Saturday, the Taiwanese badminton duo Lee Yang and Wang Chi-lin prevailed over Liu Yuchen and Li Junhui of China, winning Taiwan’s first gold medal in the sport. In accordance with regulations, their victory was marked by the raising of the flag it uses at the Olympics, a white banner featuring a plum blossom motif and Olympic rings, and the playing of a song known as its flag anthem, commonly used at international sporting events it attends.
Tensions between the two sides had been raised even before the final, with both Lee and Wang emphasizing their Taiwanese identity on social media. In a Facebook post afterward, Lee said his gold medal was “dedicated to my country, Taiwan.”
Badminton is one of the Olympic sports traditionally dominated by China, where the state-run sports system is designed to maximize the number of gold medals in part by focusing on less prominent sports.
Taiwan’s badminton victory has drawn some anger on Weibo, a popular social media platform in China, as well as comments from users congratulating China on a victory that, like Taiwan itself, they see as belonging to Beijing. Others accused the badminton players of advocating Taiwanese independence and criticized them as ungrateful.
“You can participate in the Games because there’s ‘Chinese Taipei’ on your shirts,” wrote one Weibo user who said the Taiwanese players’ allusions to national sovereignty left him speechless.
Similar nationalist attacks have focused on athletes from Hong Kong, a Chinese territory that fields its own Olympic team.
Social media users in Taiwan have responded with memes depicting a badminton court as the island’s new national flag.
The results were reversed in the women’s singles final on Sunday night, when Chen Yufei of China defeated the top-ranked Tai Tzu-ying of Taiwan. Before the match, many Weibo users in China had already accused Tai of being pro-independence, citing past remarks lamenting her inability to hold Taiwan’s flag at international competitions.
“We can lose to anyone but Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independentists,” one user wrote.
11. Congress Wants To Cut Guam Defenses
Yet we are going to position more assets there and use it as a strategic launch base for INDOPACOFIC Operations? What is Congress (or certain members of Congress) thinking? If we do not understand the strategic nature of Guam then there is little hope for an INDOPACIFC strategy.
Excerpt:
Increasing funding for missile defense technology is a necessary policy step given the realities of the Western Pacific military balance. But coherent strategy must inform any funding choice. Guam is central to any U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific. Leaving it exposed creates a critical weakness upon which the PLA will capitalize.
Congress Wants To Cut Guam Defenses
As of last week, the U.S. House's Appropriations Committee intends to cut funding for Guam's missile defenses, even as it approves a funding increase for the Missile Defense Agency. This demonstrates a deep degree of strategic confusion and threatens to undermine deterrence in an increasingly unstable Western Pacific. U.S. military ports, airfields, and logistics facilities are essential to America's existence as the dominant Pacific power. Their effective defense requires a far more advanced command and control system than currently exists. It demands more—not less—funding—and U.S. policymakers should understand why.
The U.S.' competition with China is primarily political-strategic, not an economic, diplomatic, or ideological contest. The CCP has employed every element of national power at its disposal to gain an advantage, joining major international organizations like the WHO and co-opting them to bully China's rivals, stealing technology to increase Chinese productivity at America's expense, using coercive economic inducements to expand its influence in Central Asia, the Near East, Africa, and Southeastern Europe, and wielding the Party-State's media complex to propagate anti-Western ideological narratives. But each of these actions is meant to bolster Chinese military power and facilitate the CCP’s strategic objectives.
China cannot simply await economic primacy. As of the 18th National Congress in 2012, during which Xi Jinping ascended to paramount leadership, the CCP's leaders have recognized the dangers of hoping to accrue economic power and "outbuild" the United States. The liberalization that sparked Chinese economic growth from the 1980s to the 2010s did create the foundation for contemporary Chinese power.
But it also created separate influence spheres, those “corrupt” Party officials and their friends throughout the Chinese economy that Xi Jinping has purged throughout his near-decade in power. State-directed development – and we must be clear, the Chinese "socialist market economy" is an oligarchic hybrid system with major elements of central planning – contains inherent inefficiencies. And it remains an open question as to whether it will be able to deliver the rising living standards that the Chinese people accepted in exchange for the post-Mao CCP’s continued rule. Xi clearly doubts its ability to do so. Hence his accelerating internal consolidation and international aggression, first prosecuting a genocide against Muslims in Xinjiang, then staging a de facto coup in Hong Kong, and increasingly preparing for an invasion of Taiwan.
The United States is the greatest impediment to China’s strategic ambitions. Subduing Taiwan, while the first step in Chinese military strategy, is not enough. The PLA must then pressure the U.S.' Pacific allies, most likely the Philippines, Japan, and, if possible, Australia, and ideally forcing a confrontation under cover of the PLA's ground-launched anti-ship missiles. If the CCP can fracture the U.S.' regional alliance system, the U.S. will be forced to conduct an extended blockade 9,000 miles from its coastline with few to no regional bases. By contrast, if U.S. power remains relevant in the Pacific, and if its formal allies commit to confronting China alongside it, the PLA faces a much less favorable balance of forces, even if it can neutralize Taiwan with negligible air and naval losses.
American force structure is optimized for a specific sort of engagement. Given current global commitments, it fields a small number of high-technology ships embodied in the U.S. Navy's eleven Carrier Strike Groups, only three to four of which operate at any given time. Support facilities for all services are concentrated in a handful of "superbases," massive joint installations like Yokosuka Naval Base near Tokyo and the U.S.' base complex on Okinawa. This approach was reasonable when no adversary could target these bases directly: concentrating logistics and supply facilities, airfields, and barracks in a handful of locations enabled more efficient and cost-effective combat support. However, these superbases are now targets for Chinese attacks. If China can neutralize one of these major facilities, it can disrupt U.S. force coordination throughout the broader region, even simply by destroying airfields, port facilities, and storage depots.
Bases like Kadena and adjacent Marine air installations on Okinawa field a significant portion of the U.S.' regional air combat capacity. Given its proximity to the Chinese coastline, Okinawa is a likely target. Naturally, attacking a U.S. facility would be a sharp escalation. But depending upon the balance of forces and the perceived possibility of U.S. intervention, the PLA may be tempted to strike a major US base as a conflict begins.
While the focus remains on bases like Kadena, the PLA may target installations further from the Chinese mainland that plays an equally important role in American regional strategy. Foremost among these are the U.S. bases on Guam. The Joint Region Marianas includes two critical installations, the U.S. Air Force's Andersen Air Force Base and the U.S. Navy's Naval Base Guam. Andersen is a support facility housing no permanent combat units. But the Eleventh Air Force's 36th Wing is charged with scaling up operations with short notice, fielding Air Force "surge" units like the B-1 Lancer bombers that deployed Guam last summer. If the U.S. Air Force is to reinforce the Pacific, it must use Guam as a staging point.
Naval Base Guam is equally critical. Although the adjacent ship repair facilities were closed in 1995, the base supports four U.S. attack submarines. Any Pacific conflict will have a distinct undersea component. Indeed, given the PLA's missile arsenal, the U.S. may rely exclusively upon submarines to defend Taiwan in a contingency. And PLA submarines can be expected to push into the Philippine Sea, pressuring U.S. forces even if formal hostilities between the U.S. and China have not commenced. Thus, the four Los Angeles-class submarines deployed to Guam will be integral to any U.S. operations during a China/Taiwan conflict's opening phase. Additionally, submarines deploying from Pearl Harbor will rely on Guam's support facilities and its two submarine tenders to re-arm during an extended fight.
Guam is a prime Chinese target. PLA fighter aircraft can engage their U.S. counterparts in Japan and on Okinawa, preventing them from fighting over Taiwan. But suppose a PLA missile bombardment neutralizes Guam, destroying its multipurpose airfields or submarine support facilities. In that case, it will become extremely difficult for the U.S. to reinforce its Pacific Air Forces or "surge" submarines into the East China and Philippine Seas. And the crucial hours to days of reinforcement delays could tip the balance in the PLA's favor, allowing it to neutralize Taiwan’s offensive capability, isolate regional U.S. forces, and apply pressure to Japan or the Philippines.
As Admiral Harry Harris, former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander, has already articulated, the precise technological mix of capabilities used to defend Guam is a secondary question. The primary issue is Guam's insufficient defenses. Once again, the 36th Wing lacks fighter aircraft, while the only permanently deployed missile defenses are THAAD anti-ballistic missile batteries, which will not defend against China’s hypersonic and air-breathing cruise missiles.
The U.S. military's current approach is to deploy AEGIS Ashore, a modified version of the U.S. Navy's AEGIS combat system, to Guam to bolster its air defenses, using AEGIS data to direct SM-3 and SM-6 launchers. This is a reasonable first step. But it is insufficient. AEGIS Ashore is a ballistic missile defense system. Like its counterpart in Romania, it will not cover the variety of cruise missiles with which the PLA would bombard Guam. A more reasonable approach would integrate AEGIS sensors with other open-architecture systems, using a single command and control system rather than the stove-piped approach that links specific sensors to specific missiles.
Decoupling sensors and shooters in this manner appear technologically difficult. But the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System currently provides this capability. Last week, the Army tested the IBCS system, integrating Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force assets for two successful kills on surrogate enemy cruise missiles. The sheer volume of China’s missile threat demands this sort of approach. Failure to do so greatly increases the likelihood that the PLA’s cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons will overwhelm Guam’s disjointed defenses.
Increasing funding for missile defense technology is a necessary policy step given the realities of the Western Pacific military balance. But coherent strategy must inform any funding choice. Guam is central to any U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific. Leaving it exposed creates a critical weakness upon which the PLA will capitalize.
Seth Cropsey is a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy. Harry Halem is a research assistant at Hudson and a graduate student at the London School of Economics.
12. Have our enemies found a way to defeat the United States?
I think this may be similar to Giap's Dau Tranh:
Excerpt:
Our enemies’ successful strategy appears to be to attack us from third-country sanctuaries and bleed our troops until domestic support for the war collapses.
Dau Tranh Strategy: Integrated Political and Military Struggle
Political Struggle:
Dan Van - Action among your people - total mobilization of propaganda, motivational & organizational measures to manipulate internal masses and fighting units
Binh Van - Action among enemy military - subversion, proselytizing, propaganda to encourage desertion, defection and lowered morale among enemy troops.
Dich Van - Action among enemy's people - total propaganda effort to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population.
Military Struggle:
Phase 1: Organizations and Preparation - building cells, recruiting members, infiltrating organizations, creating front groups, spreading propaganda, stockpiling weapons.
Phase 2: Terrorism - Guerrilla Warfare - kidnappings, terrorist attacks, sabotage, guerrilla raids, ambushes, setting of parallel governments in insurgent areas.
Phase 3: Conventional Warfare - regular formations and maneuver to capture key geographical and political objectives.
Have our enemies found a way to defeat the United States?
The Hill · by Kevin T. Carroll, opinion contributor · August 1, 2021
Iraq is kicking American combat troops out of Iraq, at Iran’s behest, just as the U.S. leaves Afghanistan. We are now 1-3-1 in major conflicts since 1945. Our enemies’ successful strategy appears to be to attack us from third-country sanctuaries and bleed our troops until domestic support for the war collapses.
In Korea, Harry Truman would not attack communist sanctuaries in China. Truman’s decision was reasonable; he did not want to risk World War III and believed a Soviet invasion of western Europe was the bigger threat. His decision had serious consequences, however. China nearly threw U.S. forces off the Korean Peninsula. A stalemate developed, as China sent a practically inexhaustible supply of “volunteers” south. Domestic support for the war — and for Truman — collapsed. He did not seek reelection in 1952.
In Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson conducted only limited airstrikes on North Vietnam, and allowed communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Johnson’s decision was reasonable; he did not want to risk a “second Korea” nor distract from his domestic agenda. This decision also had consequences. The North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong sent a practically inexhaustible supply of troops south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Cambodia and Laos. An insurgency developed, punctuated by conventional attacks such as the Tet Offensive. Domestic support for the war — and for Johnson — collapsed. He did not seek reelection in 1968.
Richard Nixon, helped by his invasion of Cambodia, strategic bombing of Hanoi and mining Haiphong Harbor, achieved the Paris Peace Accords. U.S. troops withdrew in 1973. North Vietnam conquered the south in 1975, and terrible human rights abuses followed.
One exception proves the rule. In the Gulf War, George H.W. Bush used overwhelming force and attacked into Iraq to liberate Kuwait. He achieved his limited goal in just six weeks, while maintaining popular support. Bush lost reelection in 1992 despite — not because of — the war.
In Afghanistan, George W. Bush did not pursue al Qaeda and Taliban leaders into Pakistan. Bush’s decision was reasonable; Pakistan is a nuclear power and ostensible U.S. ally. The consequences: Al Qaeda established a redoubt around the Northwest Frontier Provinces and continued to plot terror, and the Quetta Shura Taliban sent a practically inexhaustible supply of Pashtun fighters north.
An insurgency developed, aided by Pakistan. The U.S. only conducted drone strikes against al Qaeda targets within a geographically limited “Predator box,” and launched only two special operations across the border, while leaving the Afghan Taliban leadership undisturbed in Quetta. Gradually, domestic support for the war collapsed. By 2016, Donald Trump campaigned on ending “forever wars.” President Biden will pull out U.S. forces in August. The allied government will soon fall, with human rights atrocities to follow.
In Iraq, Bush allowed two enemy sanctuaries. Sunni foreign fighters flowed in through Syria, while sophisticated munitions for Shia militias, such as explosively formed penetrators, flowed in through Iran. Again, Bush’s decision was reasonable, as world politics might not have borne a regional war.
This consequential decision led to two insurgencies. The U.S. had at least one special operation into Syria, and a border skirmish with Iranian forces, in 2007. But once again, domestic support for the war — and for Bush — collapsed; his party was “thumped,” in his words, in the 2006 midterms. In 2008, Barack Obama campaigned on ending the Iraq War. As president, he withdrew forces in 2011, only to send them back to fight ISIS in 2014.
Former President Trump began to withdraw forces from Syria in 2018. At the host nation’s insistence, Biden is withdrawing troops from Iraq. Iran’s ayatollahs now control a 1,900-mile swath running from Beirut to Herat.
Other factors played roles in these defeats: Our allies never developed clean, competent, popular governments in Saigon, Kabul or Baghdad. And we underestimated the fervor of Maoism, Vietnamese nationalism, Afghan tribalism and Iraqi sectarianism. But the enemy template is clear: Attack U.S. forces from a sanctuary and wait for domestic opinion to turn.
Biden may face challenges similar to his predecessors. What if Russia uses gray zone techniques, such as cyberattacks and special forces in civilian clothes (“Little Green Men”) staged from Belarus, against the Baltic States, or long-range air defense and artillery fires from Russia’s salient in Kaliningrad? Will we defend forward? What if China seeks to force our tacit ally Taiwan’s submission to unification, using airstrikes and missiles launched from the Chinese mainland? Will we bomb targets on China’s coast?
When Eisenhower threatened nuclear war to force an armistice in 1953, China and North Korea lacked the atomic bomb, and the Soviets likely lacked the ability to drop one on the U.S. The world is different now, and no easy answers present themselves.
Breaching our NATO commitment to mutual self-defense in Europe, or failing to defend Taiwan against China, would end the American Century with a whimper. Totalitarians in Beijing would assume the mantle of world leadership. Chinese leader Xi Jinping would begin to shape our children’s futures, limiting their economic prospects — and given Han Chinese hypersensitivity to criticism and the globalization of communications, entertainment and media, likely their free expression as well.
Yet, American voters have grown more sensitive to casualties over the past 80 years. This, despite our population growth from 133 million to 333 million, the end of conscription, and an ever-smaller volunteer force. In World War II we suffered 405,399 dead in four years; Korea, 36,515 in three years; Vietnam, 58,209 mostly within seven years; and Afghanistan and Iraq together, 7,056 in 20 years. It hasn’t gotten any harder, or easier, to lose a loved one.
Casualties in a great-power conflict might dwarf those since 9/11. If a conflict over Taiwan devolved into a fleet engagement between the U.S. and China, losses could be particularly severe. For example, the Royal Navy had 6,092 sailors killed in under two days in World War I’s Battle of Jutland. Would America in 2021 bear such losses?
President Biden should ask himself whether he is willing, if necessary, to hold at risk targets adjacent to the countries we are committed to defend. Otherwise, he risks the political fate of Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush.
Kevin T. Carroll is a partner in Wiggin and Dana’s Litigation Department in the Washington and New York offices, and a leader of the firm’s National Security and Congressional Investigations practice groups. He served as an Army and CIA officer, senior counsel to the House Homeland Security Committee, and senior counselor to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The views expressed here are his own.
The Hill · by Kevin T. Carroll, opinion contributor · August 1, 2021
13. Pentagon won’t require vaccine for troop deployments, but other details unclear
Just get the damn vaccination. And a booster shot if necessary. Protect the force. Protect your family. Protect your fellow Americans. Do what is necessary to protect yourself and your fellow human beings. #killthevirus
Pentagon won’t require vaccine for troop deployments, but other details unclear
By LARA SELIGMAN
07/30/2021 05:12 PM EDT
The details come a day after President Joe Biden issued a directive requiring federal employees to get the vaccine or submit to regular testing.
President Joe Biden and first lady Jill Biden meet with troops at a FEMA COVID-19 mass vaccination site at NRG Stadium, Feb. 26, 2021, in Houston. | AP Photo/Patrick Semansky
07/30/2021 05:12 PM EDT
The Pentagon will not require troops heading out on deployment to get vaccinated against Covid-19, but those who are unvaccinated will still need to wear a mask, undergo regular testing and face to-be-determined travel restrictions, a defense official told POLITICO Friday.
“We are already deploying with unvaccinated personnel, and that will continue,” said the official, who like others, spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive plans.
The details come a day after President Joe Biden issued a directive requiring federal employees to get the vaccine or submit to regular testing. The mandate will apply to 1.4 million active-duty troops and more than 700,000 civilian personnel.
After Biden spoke, the Pentagon on Thursday night released a statement adding that those “who are unable or unwilling” to prove their vaccination status will be “subject to official travel restrictions,” raising questions as to whether it the rule affected deployments. The defense official said that while deployments will continue, the exact details of the unspecified travel restrictions will be addressed in the coming days.
Biden also said a vaccine mandate for troops is on the horizon. He directed Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to begin meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the department’s medical professionals to discuss how and when the Pentagon might add the Covid-19 vaccine to the list of required immunizations for the military.
The Pentagon has already been heavily debating whether to require the troops get vaccinated, a second defense official told POLITICO this week. But such a mandate is unlikely to come down soon; spokesperson John Kirby has noted that the vaccine is under emergency authorization and Austin will look at requiring the shot once it receives full FDA approval.
Even before the new federal rules, the services had already taken steps to incentivize troops to get vaccinated. For example, sailors who have gotten the shot won’t have to quarantine before deployment, according to February guidance from the Navy. Vaccinated sailors are also allowed shore leave in countries that allow it.
Over 30 percent of active-duty troops have not been vaccinated, amid a slow-down of vaccinations nationwide.
The Navy has the highest vaccination rate among the services at 72 percent. Navy officials said Friday that the new DoD guidance hasn’t yet affected their deployment guidelines.
In the Marine Corps, some units carried out new policy guidelines allowing vaccinated Marines to use designated fitness centers without a mask, while others offered commands that achieved certain vaccination rates to take additional vacation time, Capt. Andrew Wood said in May.
A total of 59 percent of active-duty Marines are fully vaccinated, while just 21 percent of reserve Marines have received their two shots.
Meanwhile, the Air Force has embarked on a “vaccine campaign,” including posting educational videos, and encouraging base commanders to come up with their own local campaigns to help educate airmen about the vaccine, Air Force spokesperson Lt. Col. Malinda Singleton said in May.
As of this week, 60 percent of Air Force and Space Force active-duty personnel were fully vaccinated, a number that falls to 56 percent when guard and reserve troops are factored in.
In the Army, 62 percent of soldiers are vaccinated.
This week, the White House, State Department and Pentagon reservation have reimposed an indoor mask mandate for all individuals, regardless of vaccination status, as cases of the Delta variant continue to rise across the country.
Paul McLeary contributed to this report.
14. How to End the Pandemic
#killthevirus.
Go unvaccinated and go on a ventilator and risk death. Get vaccinated and risk flu-like symptoms.
Excerpts:
The first three rings of protection form an excellent defense. But they will be insufficient unless they are implemented everywhere. To provide the final ring of protection, the international community must work together to improve disease surveillance, and to provide universal access to tests, treatments, and vaccines.
Here, the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and its vaccines pillar, COVAX, were an important first step. But the power of the platform has been diminished by self-interest and vaccine nationalism. Still, there is hope for the future now that many high-income countries have a surplus of vaccines. There are also efforts underway to increase local vaccine production in underserved areas.
In addition to these efforts, the international community needs to invest in global disease surveillance to identify new outbreaks, especially ones caused by highly infectious variants that can quickly take hold and spread. This requires an enhanced surveillance presence, increased sequencing of the virus across all communities, and a near-real-time method of sharing the data broadly.
With the proper frontline mechanisms in place, the global community of scientists, researchers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers will have to determine how vaccines and treatments fare against each new variant, and what can be done to mitigate their spread and reduce their likelihood of emerging.
Eighteen months into this pandemic, we have what we need to end it. Now, we must apply our knowledge and tools. No single approach will ever be enough. But, together, the four defensive rings – vaccines, antivirals, public-health measures, and international cooperation – can help us eliminate COVID-19 as a life-threatening disease and allow for the dawn of a better life than the one we left behind.
How to End the Pandemic | by William A. Haseltine - Project Syndicate
Even with effective vaccines, the coronavirus and its new variants will continue to subject us to successive epidemic waves. Returning to normal life ultimately will require a multi-layered strategy featuring vaccines, prophylactics, public-health measures, and deeper global cooperation.
BOSTON – The United States has now entered its fifth wave of COVID-19 infections. In each one, the country has paid a high price for doing far less than it could. In the first wave, lockdowns and other restrictions were spotty. Then came untested and unproven treatments. With the vaccine rollout, new infections were pushed down substantially, but now the Delta variant has started pushing them back up in unvaccinated populations.
At each stage, the SARS-CoV-2 virus that causes COVID-19 was underestimated. From what we know of its ability to adapt and thrive through random mutations, there is only one viable option for long-term disease control: a strategy that combines a rapidly growing arsenal of vaccines and antiviral drugs with strong public-health measures and deeper global cooperation.
Vaccines comprise the first ring of defense against COVID-19. The first generation of vaccines in the US are highly effective, and the second, third, and subsequent generations will be even stronger. But even with booster shots in hand and next-generation vaccines tailored to new variants, vaccination alone is unlikely to end the pandemic.
Vaccines won’t work for everybody. In the best-case scenario, against the original wild-type virus, vaccines still fail about 5% of the time. And the Delta variant has proven more adept than previous strains at breaking through vaccine protections. Even if the entire US population was vaccinated, 17.5 million Americans would still be at risk of infection and disease if exposed to the virus.
Moreover, there are substantial populations of people with underlying conditions that diminish vaccine efficacy; these include organ-transplant recipients, people taking immunosuppressant drugs, cancer patients, and a fraction of the elderly population. And like the protection offered by the annual influenza vaccine, early evidence suggests that vaccine-induced immunity against COVID-19 may fade over time.
Antiviral drugs and prophylactics will be needed to fill the gaps and provide a second ring of defense. The US government recently committed $3.2 billion to develop antiviral therapies for COVID-19. While most of the focus has been on using these drugs as a treatment, their true potential lies in pandemic control, because administering prophylactically can prevent people who have been exposed to the virus from becoming ill or passing on an infection.
True, the current generation of these drugs cannot be used widely, owing to their high production costs and the need for intravenous infusions in a clinical setting. Nonetheless, we have achieved proof of principle. Ideally, the next generation of antivirals will come in pill form, giving them enormous potential for use in high-risk settings such as long-term care homes, where there are many immunosuppressed individuals who cannot rely on vaccines for protection. The same approach applies to schools, businesses, professional sports teams, and even ships at sea. If one person tests positive for COVID-19, everyone around him could take a pill to help stave off infection.
The next ring of defense will come from public-health measures to contain the spread of the virus. Countries such as Australia, China, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan have made effective use of widespread testing, exhaustive contact tracing, mandatory isolation, tight border controls, and quarantines for new arrivals. Such strategies have been critical methods of protection in the face of nearly every infectious disease in recent history. But in the US and other countries around the world, testing and contact tracing have stalled (or never got off the ground in the first place).
Fortunately, new antiviral prophylactic drugs can help make up for some of these failures. As opposed to “test, trace, and quarantine,” the mantra may become “test, trace, and swallow a pill” – a much more attractive alternative. These drugs also may help open new opportunities for travel, eliminating the need for long quarantines.
The first three rings of protection form an excellent defense. But they will be insufficient unless they are implemented everywhere. To provide the final ring of protection, the international community must work together to improve disease surveillance, and to provide universal access to tests, treatments, and vaccines.
Here, the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and its vaccines pillar, COVAX, were an important first step. But the power of the platform has been diminished by self-interest and vaccine nationalism. Still, there is hope for the future now that many high-income countries have a surplus of vaccines. There are also efforts underway to increase local vaccine production in underserved areas.
In addition to these efforts, the international community needs to invest in global disease surveillance to identify new outbreaks, especially ones caused by highly infectious variants that can quickly take hold and spread. This requires an enhanced surveillance presence, increased sequencing of the virus across all communities, and a near-real-time method of sharing the data broadly.
With the proper frontline mechanisms in place, the global community of scientists, researchers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers will have to determine how vaccines and treatments fare against each new variant, and what can be done to mitigate their spread and reduce their likelihood of emerging.
Eighteen months into this pandemic, we have what we need to end it. Now, we must apply our knowledge and tools. No single approach will ever be enough. But, together, the four defensive rings – vaccines, antivirals, public-health measures, and international cooperation – can help us eliminate COVID-19 as a life-threatening disease and allow for the dawn of a better life than the one we left behind.
15. Fighting Myanmar's regime with compassion and military skills
Dave Eubank - SOF for life. And beyond that he is a great humanitarian. He lives the ideal. He and his family should be an inspiration to us all.
Fighting Myanmar's regime with compassion and military skills
Free Burma Rangers help thousands fleeing brutal attacks by security forces
David Eubank, founder of the Free Burma Rangers aid organization, rescues a 5-year-old Demoa after her mother was killed by Islamists in the battle for Mosul. (Courtesy of Free Burma Rangers)
DENIS D. GRAY, Contributing writerAugust 1, 2021 08:00 JST | Myanmar
CHIANG MAI, Thailand -- David Eubank, a former U.S. Special Forces officer, believes that some causes are worth dying for. His Free Burma Rangers aid organization, founded to help victims of an earlier Myanmar crisis, has since brought frontline help to many thousands in war-scarred Syria, Iraq and Sudan. Now, it is back in Myanmar helping ethnic minorities to flee escalating attacks by the regime's security forces.
It was a Myanmar military offensive in 1997 that gave birth to the rangers, who rushed in from neighboring Thailand to help some of the 500,000-plus refugees fleeing as Burmese troops shelled their villages, torched their homes and executed entire families.
"Who will go with me?'' Eubank asked a motley crew from the Karen ethnic minority gathered near the Thai-Myanmar border. "I had no plan," he recalled. "I just thought, 'I'll help one person and then they'll help the next.' Everyone counts." His first ranger team included a heavy-drinking boxer, an animist, an atheist and "a weapons trafficker with a murder charge hanging over his head.'' All were volunteers.
Since that day, more than 5,000 men and women have been trained as rangers and have conducted more than 1,000 missions in Myanmar, the Middle East and Africa. Operating like a military unit, Eubank and his rangers carried weapons in Iraq, but in Myanmar are mostly unarmed and protected by Karen guerrillas.
The rangers' latest mission was sparked by the Feb. 1 military overthrow of Myanmar's democratically elected government. Along with the killing of more than 900 civilians by mid-July, according to local monitoring groups, the coup also reignited armed conflict between the central government and ethnic minority groups that constitute more than a third of the population.
The family of a father killed in recent airstrikes by the Myanmar military. Shrapnel is still lodged in the son’s neck. (Courtesy of Free Burma Rangers)
In Kayin, Kayah, Chin and Kachin states, Eubank and the rangers are caring for some of the 170,000-plus people driven from their homes by ground attacks and a devastating new tactic -- aerial bombing of villages -- by the military regime's forces. A ranger, 24-year-old All Lo Sein, was killed in the area in May while rescuing civilians under fire -- one of more than 30 to die serving in FBR ranks. Eubank himself was wounded in Iraq.
Together with ethnic organizations and opposition groups from the majority Burman population the rangers are also operating an "underground railway," conducting anti-regime activists fleeing the cities to safe havens in ethnic controlled areas.
As on most missions, the lean and fit 60-year-old Eubank is accompanied by his remarkable family. His wife Karen, who is active in FBR's programs for the young, has home-schooled their own three children, and their two daughters are taking a "summer break" in Kayin State from their university studies in the U.S. All are jungle-savvy and fearless.
Some criticize Eubank for putting his family in harm's way, but he counters: "We want to show people that they matter, that they are not forgotten, and they respond: 'You came with your kids so we count.'"
Top: The Eubank family in Karen State. From left, Peter, Suu, Sahale, Karen and David. Bottom: Eubank’s two daughters, when still young, carry supplies for Karen victims. Both are expert horse riders. (Courtesy of Free Burma Rangers)
Modeled in some respects after the U.S. Special Forces, although their mission is nonlethal, the rangers operate in small teams, with members specializing in medical treatment, security, counseling and recording human rights violations. Before being sent into the field, usually in teams of five or so men and women, they undergo intensive training, ranging from crossing raging rivers to leadership under fire.
Supported largely by U.S.-based church groups, the teams distribute medicine, clothing, cash, toys and school supplies to victims. They treat the sick and wounded, sometimes under gunfire, enliven deprived children with games and schooling and document lives of tragedy and resilience.
Violence committed by Myanmar's military forces is documented with military precision, with all reports posted on the Internet. An example: "On May 16 at 1530hrs, the Burma army shelled from their base camp near Taw Mu Pler Mae into the Saw Mu Plaw area. The Burma Army Light Infantry Battalion 20 shot 15 rounds of mortars into the village fields, wounding Ki Mae and forcing the villagers to flee."
Children study in the forest after being recently driven from their homes by the Myanmar military. (Courtesy of Free Burma Rangers)
The rangers, who draw no salaries, come from the Karen, Karenni, Shan, Kachin and other ethnic minorities in Myanmar, many of which have been demanding greater autonomy from the Burman-dominated central government for decades. They are often joined by retired buddies from Eubank's U.S. army days. One, American dentist Shannon Allison, has joined Eubank on 23 missions over the past 25 years.
Although he is a committed Christian and a missionary -- and the son of missionary parents who have worked in Thailand since the 1960s -- Eubank stresses that the rangers and those they help can be of any religion, or no religion at all.
The Free Burma Rangers motto -- "Love one another. Never surrender" -- reflects a merger of military esprit de corps and operational methods with a spiritual ethos. Eubank has distributed bibles in Myanmar and killed several Islamic fundamentalist soldiers in 2017 while protecting civilians during the Iraqi government's battle to retake the city of Mosul from the Islamic State group, also known as IS.
Top: Eubank's daughter Sahale, who has learned on-the-job dentistry skills, treats a Karen refugee. Bottom: Karen villagers on the run in the face of a major Myanmar military offensive following the Feb. 1 military coup. (Courtesy of Free Burma Rangers)
Eubank says he also tried to save the life of a wounded IS fighter, adding that he harbors no hatred toward Myanmar soldiers despite the atrocities they commit. "You can and you might have to stop a human heart with a bullet," he says. "But you can only change a human heart with love."
The Mosul mission in 2016 and 2017, undertaken with Eubank's wife and children, as well as rangers from Myanmar, proved the most dangerous. Working alongside the Iraqi army, the rangers treated the wounded and helped civilians flee the embattled city. Some larger aid groups gave the FBR food and medical supplies to distribute on the front lines while they worked in the refugee camps.
Eubank recounts coming on a horrifying IS massacre of civilians, where he spotted a little girl peeking from under the burqa of a motionless woman. While an Iraqi tank and smoke screen by U.S. forces provided some cover, Eubank dashed through gunfire, wrenching 5-year-old Demoa from her dead mother's arms and carrying her to safety. Eubank and Demoa are still in touch.
Eubank and a Karen ranger treat a wounded man in Iraq. (Courtesy of Free Burma Rangers)
"He is not a thrill-seeker who hunts for the next adrenaline fix," says Allison. "He is looking for places that no others will go to help people without a voice or choice, no matter where they are in the world." The dentist says his times with Eubank have involved treating up to 500 wounded patients, training rangers, and providing essential supplies.
Over the past 25 years Eubank has spent most of his time with the Karen, among whom he has attained an almost legendary status. Informally they call him Tha U Wa A Pa ("Father of the White Monkey"), a term of endearment.
David Tharckabaw, a former vice president of the Karen National Union, an armed separatist force, says Eubank is also known as Thra Doh ("Great Teacher"). "By his relentless effort and determination, the ranks of the FBR swell as many youths from ethnic communities come to join him," says this veteran of the Karen's armed struggle. At times, the KNU's troops provide security for ranger teams.
A graduation ceremony after one of the intensive training courses that the rangers must undergo. (Courtesy of Free Burma Rangers)
Eubank says the situation in Myanmar is far worse than it has been in a long time, but he discerns glimmers of hope. "I see a new unity, a feeling between the Burmans and the ethnics,'' he said in an interview from inside Kayin (also known as Karen) State. "Many Burmans who have fled tell us, 'We feel ashamed as we never helped the ethnic people and now they're saving our lives.'"
Many such people are now apologizing for their past behavior, notes Eubank, telling him they now realize what it was like to live under a system that brutalized ethnic minorities for generations. Many vow to fight together for a democracy that would uphold ethnic rights.
Eubank describes a moment on a hilltop some years ago when he sought to comfort an 11-year-old Karen boy as his village, raided by the military, burned below. The boy's eyes had been blown out by a landmine and he was rigid with fear. David says he got him to stand up and then move rapidly down an escape route to a refugee camp in Thailand. He now plays a violin there.
After years in the front line, Eubank is rarely prone to tears, but they trickled down his cheeks as he spoke. "I don't want to be a martyr," he insisted. "But I said to myself: 'This child, these people, are worth dying for.'"
16. China without an army of friends
China has "universal values?" I disagree with Sisci. Freedom and liberty are the "truth". Without them there is no humanity.
Interesting assessment here. A battle of narratives. Or ideological war?
China needs friends, people and countries who will stand for China’s universal values, as they stood in the past century for the values of the Soviet Union or the United States.
The USSR narrative was of liberation from capitalist oppression. The American narrative is about freedom and liberty. These values lead to a lot of mistakes but they are part of the quest for freedom. These narratives are not “the truth” but they have a drive, a global appeal that goes beyond the single country.
What is China’s narrative? China wants to make life better for the Chinese, fine, and then what about other countries? Will China be the dominant power in a constellation of lesser countries in the world?
One can argue that the US is like that, and so it was for the USSR. But America is a country of immigrants, where anybody can have a chance, even the son of an African, like Barack Obama, or refugees from Germany like Henry Kissinger and Poland like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who have shaped US foreign policy for decades.
Something similar happened in the USSR, which was ruled with an iron fist by a Georgian for whom Russian was a second language.
But China is not a country of immigrants, and the Chinese communist revolution was not so much about egalitarianism as about national vindication against Japanese occupation, Western semi-colonialism, and even centuries of Manchu rule over a lesser Han majority.
Conclusion:
This is a new game for China. In the imperial past, China had buffer states at its border where it shared influence with other political actors and the balance helped the country secure its borders. Now, North Korea or Myanmar are not buffer states, they are something new.
Surely, the US also has a wide array of difficult relations, as the American global presence finds millions of problems everywhere and has all the hallmarks of overstretching. But for China, strains in its immediate region are a new feature, and it is hard to see how they will play out in the present international friction with the US.
Moreover, the US already has many friends, along with many enemies abroad. China may have fewer enemies, but certainly, it also has fewer friends. Most importantly, China has no universal values to spread onto the world. Then why should anybody stand up for China? Only mercenaries would do it, but they are just for sale to the highest bidder.
Moreover, if China did have universal values to counter “Western values”, this would speed up and underline the ideological warfare with the “free world” and relations would worsen. The shortcut would be to accept “Western values” and try to work with them and then China could try to de-escalate the current tension.
The next months and years will tell us how this complex algebra of friends, enemies and values will play out for both sides.
China without an army of friends
China needs allies, people and countries who will stand for its universal values but it's not clear yet what they are
As China celebrated its Army Day on August 1, the children of Sunzi, the strategist of victory without a fight, know there is something better than guns for national defense. Or they ought to know.
China needs friends, people and countries who will stand for China’s universal values, as they stood in the past century for the values of the Soviet Union or the United States.
The USSR narrative was of liberation from capitalist oppression. The American narrative is about freedom and liberty. These values lead to a lot of mistakes but they are part of the quest for freedom. These narratives are not “the truth” but they have a drive, a global appeal that goes beyond the single country.
What is China’s narrative? China wants to make life better for the Chinese, fine, and then what about other countries? Will China be the dominant power in a constellation of lesser countries in the world?
One can argue that the US is like that, and so it was for the USSR. But America is a country of immigrants, where anybody can have a chance, even the son of an African, like Barack Obama, or refugees from Germany like Henry Kissinger and Poland like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who have shaped US foreign policy for decades.
Something similar happened in the USSR, which was ruled with an iron fist by a Georgian for whom Russian was a second language.
But China is not a country of immigrants, and the Chinese communist revolution was not so much about egalitarianism as about national vindication against Japanese occupation, Western semi-colonialism, and even centuries of Manchu rule over a lesser Han majority.
In fact, “Han” was during three centuries of Qing rule a semi-derogatory term for the majority of the population, who didn’t belong to the Manchu aristocracy, the bannermen, qiren, the scions of the early elite military units of the emperor – the Tungus, Mongolian people from which the Qing hailed.
The nationalists of Sun Yat-sen a century ago blamed the Manchu for their defeat to the foreigners as well as the foreigners for attacking China. Now calling on foreigners to help China can sound like an admission of defeat and a betrayal of the original nationalist purpose.
China is not a country of immigrants and the Chinese communist revolution was not so much about egalitarianism as about national vindication. Photo: AFP / Getty
But if China stretches out to the world, it can’t “rule” it without foreign knowledge. This has been the rule for all empires.
The Chinese empire did it in the past by progressive assimilation. From the central Yellow River basin, successive empires extended their reach and, in the process, they assimilated many populations by a mix of force and culture. But the process takes centuries.
China can’t think of “assimilating” the world overnight or ignoring it while doling out wealth through a “win-win” strategy. The strategy so far enriched the Chinese elites and groups of foreign “compradors,” clients useful to Beijing’s goals, while leaving out most of the population.
Moreover, money and wealth are useful and essential, but people are more than their bellies. So what is the ideal offered by China to people of the world?
Wealth alone didn’t work for people in Xinjiang, or Tibet or Hong Kong. In those places many spurned Beijing’s expensive gifts and sought their religions or their dreams of independence. How can it work in the rest of the world?
Communication itself is a problem outside of Chinese borders. Beijing has issues speaking to the world. For instance, in Xinjiang, Beijing blames foreigners for lying, which is possible. But foreigners are not allowed in and the Chinese media is not free, so how can one believe it?
Media may also be not free in New York. The New York Times may be government-controlled, but in New York one can read The New York Times and the People’s Daily and decide for yourself.
In Beijing, people can’t read The New York Times. This makes all that China says implausible to non-Chinese, even to people with deep qualms about Western media.
Chinese newspapers in a newsstand. Photo: iStock
Footprint or traps
This is not an abstract problem, but a very practical one as China sweeps its political footprint out of its borders. China has more influence in many countries around it, and all of them are difficult. Let’s take them one by one.
Myanmar. The military coup ousted the civilian government and started a low-intensity civil war. The generals promised the Chinese the situation would be under control in a few days. After months, things are far from normal. Beijing is nervous because of a crucial pipeline from the Indian Ocean to Yunnan that can bypass the tricky Malacca Straits and the South China Sea.
Once, it had ties with both the generals and the civilian government, but now it is in trouble as it doesn’t trust the generals and can’t bet on the dissidents. The positive spin is none of the other Asian countries wants Myanmar to spiral into a full-blown civil war, thus they are not supplying weapons to the anti-putschist militias. But there is no clear stability in the foreseeable future and things are hanging on a very thin thread.
Afghanistan. After the US withdrawal, China is in some ways set to step in. It has an advantage because of its old friendship with Pakistan, the main supporter of the conquering Taliban. But, despite the friendship, Pakistan has not been very reliable in the past. Strong ties with Beijing have not made it impossible for radical Muslims to attack the Chinese and support radical Islamists in China.
This time, it could be the same if Pakistan regains some control of Kabul by dislodging a pro-Indian faction now ruling it. Then, the Pakistani-Indian rivalry could spill onto China or the Chinese presence in Afghanistan. A massive Chinese intervention there seems out of the question, as Beijing is well aware that Afghan mountains are made of the bones of the best soldiers of the world, all of whom tried to conquer it and all of whom failed.
Again, there is no stability there either. Moreover, for the conquering Taliban heroes, feted in China better than the US emissary, there is the lesson of Xinjiang. The lessons of Chinese presence in Xinjiang and their actions with the local Uighur Muslims are not lost on the Taliban.
North Korea. After the still-mysterious disappearance of young dictator Kim Jong Un last year, Pyongyang is no longer so vocal and assertive. All in all, it looks as if Pyongyang is more closely toeing Beijing’s line and China is perhaps now in control of North Korea as never before. But it’s not clear the regional impact of turning North Korea into some kind of satellite.
It could irk delicate links with South Korea and further poison relationships with Japan. Moreover, whatever crazy thing Kim does will be attributed more directly to Beijing. This will embarrass China and also deprive it of a strategic tool. “Crazy North Korea, out of control” was difficult to manage but did also create occasions to further a dialogue with neighbors. Now there is no longer that instrument or pretense.
Cambodia-Laos. Ties there are good and positive, almost idyllic. But neighboring Vietnam and Thailand are annoyed by a growing Chinese presence in their immediate backyards. Growing Chinese business in Cambodia and Laos hinders China’s presence in Vietnam and Thailand.
Locally, that may make sense—they keep Thailand and Vietnam on their toes. More generally, the Chinese presence in Cambodia could poison relations in the region. Chinese support for Cambodia in the 1980s was backed by the US, and therefore it isolated Vietnam and got help from Thailand. Now, as China-US ties sour and Vietnam-US ties improve, Cambodia and Laos may look like a geopolitical trap.
Cambodian students hold portraits of Chinese President Xi Jinping (C) and Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni (R) during Xi’s arrival at Phnom Penh international airport on October 13, 2016. Photo: AFP / Tang Chhin Sothy
This is a new game for China. In the imperial past, China had buffer states at its border where it shared influence with other political actors and the balance helped the country secure its borders. Now, North Korea or Myanmar are not buffer states, they are something new.
Surely, the US also has a wide array of difficult relations, as the American global presence finds millions of problems everywhere and has all the hallmarks of overstretching. But for China, strains in its immediate region are a new feature, and it is hard to see how they will play out in the present international friction with the US.
Moreover, the US already has many friends, along with many enemies abroad. China may have fewer enemies, but certainly, it also has fewer friends. Most importantly, China has no universal values to spread onto the world. Then why should anybody stand up for China? Only mercenaries would do it, but they are just for sale to the highest bidder.
Moreover, if China did have universal values to counter “Western values”, this would speed up and underline the ideological warfare with the “free world” and relations would worsen. The shortcut would be to accept “Western values” and try to work with them and then China could try to de-escalate the current tension.
The next months and years will tell us how this complex algebra of friends, enemies and values will play out for both sides.
This story originally appeared on the Settimana News website and is republished with permission. To see the original, please
17. NSA to National Security Employees: Avoid Working on Public Wi-Fi
No more working from the Starbucks office.
I wonder from these warnings if NSA is telegraphing operations. We have to defend ourselves from the most sophisticated capabilities and there is no organization with more sophisticated and advanced capabilities as NSA.
NSA to National Security Employees: Avoid Working on Public Wi-Fi
anyaberkut/iStock.com
The agency offered best practices for remote work using wireless technologies.
|
August 1, 2021 05:00 PM ET
August 1, 2021 05:00 PM ET
The COVID-19 pandemic changed what work looks like, and for some, telework remains an essential part of daily business. While most teleworkers connect via secure home networks, those that opt for public networks like those in hotels or coffee shops are putting their data at risk, according to the National Security Agency.
The NSA on Thursday released guidance for National Security System, Defense Department, and defense industrial base users describing how to identify vulnerable connections and protect common wireless technologies when working on public networks. US-CERT on Friday shared the guidance as well.
The first best practice, according to NSA, is to simply avoid connecting to public Wi-Fi at all.
Instead, it’s best to connect using personal or corporately-owned hotspots—just not open Wi-Fi hotspots. Hotspots should feature strong authentication and encryption, too, according to the guidance.
But when it can’t be avoided, work on a public Wi-Fi network should be conducted over a corporate-provided virtual private network, or VPN. That way, traffic can be encrypted, and data traversing public Wi-Fi will be less vulnerable to theft. Users should also stick to Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure—https://—websites whenever possible. For laptops, users should also turn off the device file and printer sharing features on public networks. If possible, laptop users should use virtual machines, according to NSA.
It’s also best to avoid entering sensitive passwords, conducting sensitive conversations, or accessing personal data like bank and medical information. Online shopping and other financial transactions should be avoided, too.
Leaving devices unattended in public settings is a no-no as well. And when naming a device, users should avoid putting their own name in the title, according to the guidance. Instead, devices should be updated with the latest patches and secured through multi-factor authentication whenever possible.
NSA also detailed risks posed by Bluetooth and near field communication, or NFC, technologies. According to the guidance, malicious actors can find active Bluetooth signals and potentially gain access to information about devices it finds in its scans. That information can then be used to compromise a device. So it’s best to disable Bluetooth and make sure it’s not discoverable in public settings due to this and other cyber risks, according to the guidance, and users should never accept Bluetooth pairing attempts they didn’t initiate.
And while the fact that NFC tech facilitates device-to-device data transfers, like the kind that allow for contactless payment, which are limited in range, NSA said it’s best to disable the function when it’s not in use just in case. Users should also make sure not to bring a device near other unknown electronic devices because it might trigger automatic communication via NFC. Users should also never use NFC to communicate passwords or sensitive data, according to the guidance.
18. Beijing’s threatens UK after HMS Queen Elizabeth enters South China Sea
I hate it when China is "triggered." Perhap the UK will provide a "trigger warning" next time.
Keep calm and carry on.
South China Sea move triggers Beijing
Beijing’s threatens UK after HMS Queen Elizabeth enters South China Sea
A power struggle has erupted after an aircraft carrier challenged China’s South China Sea rule. Beijing says there will be consequences.
“China will end the struggle between hegemony and anti-hegemony forces with the US. All other countries outside the region are advised to stay away from this confrontation to avoid ‘accidental injury’,” a hostile state-controlled media editorial warns.
The HMS Queen Elizabeth has entered the South China Sea. Picture: UK MOD.Source:Supplied
Is Beijing worried?
Until now, the only nation to directly challenge Beijing’s rejected 12 nautical mile (22km) sovereignty claims has been the United States. It did so again Thursday, with the destroyer USS Benfold passing through the troubled Taiwan Strait.
But the world is watching to see if London will join the US in crossing such “red lines”.
— Global Times (@globaltimesnews) July 29, 2021
“Sending a warship within 12 miles of Chinese territory is a direct challenge to China’s core interests, which might result in misjudgment,” the Chinese Communist Party-controlled Global Times warns.
Other nations, including Australia, have limited themselves to operating warships in nearby international waters and shipping lanes.
Beijing’s uptight enough over the idea to talk even tougher than usual.
“An old saying in China goes that if you want to punish someone, you need to consider saving face for his big brother,” Chinese military analyst Song Zhongping is quoted as saying. “However, what China will do is just the opposite: China will make it clear to the US that London will be punished by acting like Washington’s running dog in provoking Beijing.”
Innocent Passage?
Beijing warns: “We advise US allies to be particularly cautious, keep a significant distance from China’s red lines and refrain from pushing ahead. If their warships rampantly behave as the US military does in the South China Sea, they will more likely become an example of China defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity”.
HMS Queen Elizabeth spotted about 53.9 NM east-southeast of Vanguard Bank, #SouthChinaSea, Jul 28.
— SCS Probing Initiative (@SCS_PI) July 28, 2021
Beijing-based university think-tank South China Sea Probing Initiative located HMS Queen Elizabeth and consorts crossing China’s arbitrary “nine-dash line” on Wednesday.
“China is holding multiple military exercises in sea areas including the Bohai Strait, the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea,” Beijing stated in response to the news.
Open-source intelligence enthusiasts soon also spotted the Chinese aircraft carrier PLAN Shandong operating in the Northern South China Sea.
— Duan Dang (@duandang) July 29, 2021
Beijing accuses London of grandstanding. So, it’s returning the favour.
“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will stand ready to deal with any improper acts by the UK warships and see their South China Sea tour as a chance for practice,” the Communist Party-controlled Global Times warned.
An Astute Class Submarine on the surface with HMS Queen Elizabeth in the background. Picture: UK MOD.Source:Supplied
Two of the military exercises are in the South China Sea. Both are off Hainan Island and the mainland’s Guangdong Province, where the PLAN Shandong was spotted.
“Just like US warships that intruded Chinese islands and reefs in the region, if UK vessels do the same, they will also be expelled by the PLA”.
‘A chance for practice’
China claims almost all the South China Sea, even though it is bordered by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. An international court of arbitration in 2016 judged this “nine-dash line” territorial assertion to be without merit.
Beijing rejected the verdict.
But it insists Western nations are the main threat to peace in the region.
— Global Times (@globaltimesnews) July 29, 2021
The multinational task force, led by the new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, comprises several Royal Navy escort and support vessels along with the American USS The Sullivans guided-missile destroyer and Royal Netherlands Navy HNLMS Evertsen frigate. Other nations are dipping in and out of the formation as it makes its way through Southeast Asia.
The UK’s ministry of defence has said as much. But Beijing won’t let the carrier’s presence go unopposed: “The PLA will closely monitor the UK warships’ activities, stand ready to deal with any improper acts, and also see this as a chance for practice and for studying the UK’s latest warships up close.”
Friends in need
“The Chinese side believes that the South China Sea should not become a sea of great power rivalry dominated by weapons and warships,” Beijing defence department spokesman Tan Kefei told the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, without reference to its heavily armed island fortresses or naval intimidation of Vietnamese, Philippine and Malaysian fishing and resource exploration operations.
“The real source of militarisation in the South China Sea comes from countries outside this region sending their warships thousands of kilometres from home to flex muscles.”
But the UK, US and Netherlands say the aircraft carrier task force is exercising its rights under the International Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Beijing says London “is still living in its colonial days”.
“The UK intends to use its navy to revive its old dream of an empire, but its overall strength cannot support such global ambitions,” a Global Times opinion piece accuses.
An F-35B Lightning Jet on the flight deck of HMS Queen Elizabeth during the replenishment. Picture: UK MOD.Source:Supplied
But it’s not an argument that withstands the test of time, says Council on Geostrategy contributor Dr Bill Hayton.
“It is both lazy and inaccurate,” he writes.
The former colonies of Malaysia and Singapore became independent sixty years ago, he says. Brunei in 1984. “Moreover, all those countries – and many others besides – have invited the UK to make port visits … and take part in combined exercises because of their own concerns about security in the region.
“In an uncertain environment, these countries are reaching out to countries that share the same concerns, such as the UK, for mutual support.”
When push comes to shove
Analysts believe the chances of a showdown between the likes of PLAN Shandong and HMS Queen Elizabeth are slim.
The only direct confrontation between a Chinese and foreign warship in recent times happened in 2018. Then, the destroyer PLAN Luyang forced the destroyer USS Decatur to change course to avoid a collision.
US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was visiting Singapore as the HMS Queen Elizabeth passed by. He joined the UK’s ambassador in rejecting China’s aggressive assertions.
A brilliant and busy time, we have now passed through the Strait of Malacca.
— HMS Queen Elizabeth (@HMSQNLZ) July 27, 2021
“Beijing’s claim to the vast majority of the South China Sea has no basis in international law,” he said Tuesday. “That assertion treads on the sovereignty of states in the region. We continue to support the region’s coastal states in upholding their rights under international law.”
For its part, Beijing has no formal alliances.
This is why the idea of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States turning the Quadrilateral Agreement into a defensive pact has it unsettled. And the presence of the UK-led task force reviving old Cold War friendships represents a further hardening of regional resolve.
Somewhere at sea.
— HMS Queen Elizabeth (@HMSQNLZ) July 13, 2021
“While the warships in themselves pose some threat to China, the tour’s political influence is a bigger threat because other Western countries like Australia and Canada could also follow and form this joint fleet that regularly sails the South China Sea and East China Sea, with the aim of confronting China,” says Song.
“It remains to be seen if this will happen, but even if it does, China will be able to dissolve the threat,” Song added.
19. China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
Excerpts:
There is also a risk, of course, in assuming that this policy development was a linear, coherent, and seamless effort. Here, Doshi does a fair job of presenting the intellectual evolution of the assessments and antecedents of the senior leader’s pronouncements.
“The Long Game” closes with Doshi presenting an asymmetric strategy for competing with China, one that recognizes that accommodation with Beijing or seeking to change Beijing will be unsuccessful, but so too will attempting to compete on a one-to-one, dollar-for-dollar basis. Rather, the United States must blunt China’s regional and global ambitions while building a stronger foundation for its own international order. Doshi articulates a number of sensible, concrete steps that could be taken in pursuit of this strategy, but one wonders whether there is the political will, acumen, and appreciation of the threat to actually act.
China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
here is no shortage today of analysts and pundits attempting to explain China’s behavior, its interests, or its rise. China poses the most impactful challenge to the United States today, and that challenge is radically reshaping the international order. Yet, so much of that analysis and commentary is really a reflection of American fears and interests. As a result, that analysis misses what is actually happening in Beijing and within the Chinese Communist Party.
Rush Doshi, the founding director of the Brookings China Strategy Initiative, corrects that analytical shortcoming in his fascinating and alarming new book, “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order.” The title is far from hyperbolic. Doshi presents a strong case that Beijing’s grand strategy is and has been directly driven by an assessment of America’s relative power and position as the global hegemon. China’s government has been extremely successful in translating this assessment into military, political, and economic actions, Doshi claims. This assertion is not simply speculation from a Pentagon spokesperson or staffer on the National Security Council—this is coming directly from the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership and apparatchiks themselves.
“The Long Game” stands out notably from an increasingly crowded China-studies field in its use of primary Chinese language sources, rather than secondary or tertiary accounts or analysis. Doshi acquired numerous Party texts from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and categorized these texts in terms of quality and proximity to power. This achievement should not be underestimated. Poorly translated documents often draw sensational attention over flowery martial language while not allowing for a holistic view of Chinese decision-making and strategy.
Beijing’s actions regionally and globally are of far greater consequence for America’s strategic future than most popular analysis credits. With America distracted by the Global War on Terror, domestic political sclerosis, and fighting various flavors of “culture war”, Beijing steadily pursued a strategy to unseat the liberal western order, one that underpinned global stability since the end of World War II. The United States, it appears, is struggling to recognize China’s threat whilst dealing with these other issues. While the country certainly needs to wrestle with critical domestic and societal challenges, it must be able to confront Beijing’s rise and its challenge to the international order. What follows will almost certainly define the future order, one driven from Beijing and not Washington.
At the core of “The Long Game” is the argument that Chinese grand strategy is predicated on three phases, each of which are directly tied to the relative power position of the United States. Doshi divides the Chinese Communist Party’s grand strategy into several categories: blunting, building, and expanding—and ties Beijing’s military, political, and economic actions directly to these periods.
In the first phase Beijing saw the United States as a threat (due in part to the Tiananmen Square crisis, the US victory during the 1991 Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union). This perception informed China’s drive to blunt the United States’ ability to project power, influence institutions in a bid to stymie American interests, and limit Washington’s ability to hold Beijing hostage financially. China’s mantra was “hiding capabilities and biding time.” For example, Doshi demonstrates that China’s investment in submarines, mine-laying capabilities, and missiles reflected this focus as Beijing sought to keep the United States at bay.
During the global financial crisis, China shifted to a second phase of building its capabilities while seeking to avoid antagonizing its neighbors or the United States. China made the shift then because, in China’s view, the world was shifting toward a state of “multipolarity” and a dwindling of US influence. Beijing’s strategy included a policy of “active achievement” wherein it projects its own power regionally, creating its own alternative institutions (and influencing those of which it was a part), and strengthening its position financially and economically. This approach was demonstrated by Beijing’s pursuit of an aircraft carrier—something hitherto eschewed in favor of blunting capabilities—carried out in a manner intended not to antagonize the region, but to begin moving towards a power-projection capability that it previously did not have.
In the third (and current) phase, the Chinese Communist Party is actively working to expand its influence and power in much more overt ways. In this phase, China actively seeks to eclipse the United States in its response to what it sees as “great changes unseen in a century”—or the fundamental erosion of American power and prestige, and the undermining of the global liberal international order as evidenced by Brexit, the election of President Donald Trump, and Covid-19. Militarily, this is manifested in Beijing’s desire for a “world-class military”, the military’s increasing role in achieving China’s objectives, and a more vocal articulation of China’s global interests.
There is also a risk, of course, in assuming that this policy development was a linear, coherent, and seamless effort. Here, Doshi does a fair job of presenting the intellectual evolution of the assessments and antecedents of the senior leader’s pronouncements.
“The Long Game” closes with Doshi presenting an asymmetric strategy for competing with China, one that recognizes that accommodation with Beijing or seeking to change Beijing will be unsuccessful, but so too will attempting to compete on a one-to-one, dollar-for-dollar basis. Rather, the United States must blunt China’s regional and global ambitions while building a stronger foundation for its own international order. Doshi articulates a number of sensible, concrete steps that could be taken in pursuit of this strategy, but one wonders whether there is the political will, acumen, and appreciation of the threat to actually act.
Diplomatic Courier received a complimentary copy of the book from the publisher.
About
:
Joshua C. Huminski is Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. He can be found on Twitter @joshuachuminski.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
20. Japan’s Evolving Policy on Taiwan and the US–Japan Alliance: Towards a Nixon Doctrine for Northeast Asia?
We should be re-examining Nixon's Guam doctrine.
This would mirror the Nixon administration’s Guam Doctrine, which aimed – where possible – to leverage the resources of regional major powers while the US provided support and enablers in key areas. The US could in the long term shift its posture in Northeast Asia towards enabling both Taiwanese and Japanese forces, rather than being enabled by them. This would shift US priorities from achieving contested theatre entry to roll back aggression in the Taiwan Strait – an increasingly unlikely objective in any case – to enabling local forces to both achieve sea denial in wartime and thwart more calibrated coercive activity.
Supporting efforts by Japan to secure its southern littoral with US amphibious capabilities, enhancing Japan’s capacity for air and missile defence, and ensuring that extended nuclear deterrence to Japan precludes nuclear blackmail may have greater long-term salience than projecting power into the Taiwan Strait, as these actions would free up Japan’s own forces to take on roles for which they are better positioned.
A lighter footprint posture in the northern parts of the first island chain could free up the US’s own assets to focus on the South China Sea – the part of the region where there is no local power or coalition capable of balancing the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet. Moreover, the effect of reframing the role of the US in a Taiwan conflict as being part of a balance-of-power framework, as opposed to the PLA’s primary antagonist, could to some extent limit the degree to which a Taiwan crisis is viewed primarily through the lens of a bipolar superpower clash, which limits both US and Chinese diplomatic options. This would go some way towards facilitating the eventual negotiations which must follow any conflict. Given historical Chinese fears of a more assertive Japan in East Asia and the belief that the US–Japan alliance restrains this development, the prospect that China’s behaviour in the Taiwan Strait is catalysing the normalisation of Japan’s military posture may contribute to long-term deterrence.
To be sure, this depends on Japanese policy continuing on its trajectory towards greater involvement in the Taiwan Strait. While currently constrained by constitutional restrictions, the Japan Self-Defense Forces could become more usable in a Taiwan scenario if the current reframing of the status of Taiwan as an existential risk for Japan continues. The weight of geography makes this more likely than not, creating important opportunities for the US-led alliance in the region.
Japan’s Evolving Policy on Taiwan and the US–Japan Alliance: Towards a Nixon Doctrine for Northeast Asia?
Dr Sidharth Kaushal30 July 2021
Statements by Japanese officials regarding the vital role of Taiwan for Japan’s security suggest a long-term evolution in Japanese defence policy, which could reinforce the position of the US-led alliance in the region.
Recent statements by senior Japanese officials, such as Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi and Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, indicating that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would pose an ‘existential threat’ to Japan, should come as no surprise. Indeed, the geography of Northeast Asia has historically made the political status of Taiwan a key consideration for Japanese policymakers. The statements underscore precisely why Taiwan is critical to the US’s position in Asia. Beyond its symbolic importance as a democratic entity, the geographical position of Taiwan makes its independence critical to preserving Japan’s freedom of action, and by extension the US–Japan alliance. This reality could result in Japan becoming more directly engaged with cross-strait issues.
The recent statements by Japanese officials do not represent a break from the past. Rather, they are the latest step in a gradual reorientation of Japanese policy which began in the 1990s. Although Japan’s current prime minister was quick to clarify that his administration is not committing Japan’s forces to intervening militarily in the Taiwan Strait, the structural incentives that have driven Japan’s gradual revision of its security posture could make this viable in the medium term, particularly if the ruling Liberal Democratic Party should succeed in its efforts to amend Japan’s constitution, which currently restricts the potential use of force.
Even a greater degree of uncertainty regarding a Japanese military response to a cross-strait conflict could have a deterrent effect on China. Given Japan’s status as a regional power with greater military resources than is sometimes assumed, the need to factor in potential Japanese responses could significantly complicate Chinese planning for a cross-strait invasion. In the longer term, should the country eventually shake off its self-imposed restrictions on the use of force, Japan could become a key actor in any effort to secure Taiwan. This, coupled with military and technological developments allowing Taiwan itself to play a greater role in its own defence, would make it possible for the US to play the part of an enabling power in a Taiwan scenario, intervening with forces sufficient to tip the scales in favour of local partners, rather than achieving preponderance in a contested theatre itself.
This could create long-term military and strategic opportunities for the US-led alliance by both enabling a rationalisation of the US force posture in East Asia and limiting the degree to which any conflict in the Taiwan Strait is viewed by its antagonists primarily through the lens of a superpower clash, lending both the US and China greater diplomatic flexibility. Cumulatively, this could enable US grand strategy in Northeast Asia to eventually emulate the Nixon Doctrine, which encouraged allies to take a more prominent role in order to both limit US commitments and enable greater diplomatic flexibility, escaping the strictures of framing competition with the USSR through a narrow bipolar lens. This need not entail the abandonment of US alliance commitments, but rather a greater degree of burden-sharing and a more prominent role for regional actors. Shared priorities – such as securing freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and at key chokepoints like Malacca – would remain exclusively US responsibilities, which could be better resourced if Japan eventually assumes a more prominent role in the north.
Taiwan is vital to the security of Japan by the very nature of its position. The island, which Admiral Ernst King once described as the ‘cork in the bottle’ of the South China Sea, effectively straddles the major sea lines of communication through which a large portion of Japan’s imports in sectors such as energy and food must pass. A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy based out of Taiwan, which would be able to control routes of egress from the South China Sea and project its submarines beyond the first island chain, would have an effective veto over Japan’s supplies of vital resources. Taiwan is also roughly 100 km from Japan’s southernmost islands, including Yonaguni and the disputed Senkaku Islands, and is 500 km from Okinawa.
In a modern operating environment, the basing of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles on Taiwan would multiply the threat vectors facing Japan and, given the proximity of Taiwan to islands like Okinawa, would shorten defenders’ warning times, thereby complicating Japanese efforts at integrated air and missile defence. The effect of Chinese control over Taiwan, then, would be to turn Japan’s southern flank and make its strategic position all but untenable.
It is thus unsurprising that successive Japanese administrations have gradually revised Japan’s security posture to take this reality into account. For example, in 1997 the Hashimoto administration passed a revision of the US–Japan Security guidelines to include ‘situations surrounding Japan’, which was partially a veiled reference to Taiwan. Similarly, the subsequent Keizo administration demurred on officially endorsing the Clinton administration’s ‘three noes’ policy, which contained an explicit promise not to support either Taiwan’s independence or its membership of international bodies comprised of sovereign states.
The Abe administration, which worked to free Japan of some of its post-war constitutional constraints, similarly enhanced relations with Taiwan in a number of areas. Seen in this light, the statements of senior policymakers regarding Taiwan and the Japanese government’s commissioning of studies examining military options during a Taiwan Strait crisis should come as little surprise.
These developments reflect the latest iteration in a gradual evolution of Japanese policy, driven less by the preferences of individual administrations than by immutable geographical realities. Though the prime minister was quick to deny any suggestion that Japan would become militarily involved in a Taiwan scenario, a direct Japanese role in the defence of Taiwan could represent the eventual culmination of this long-term evolution. While in the immediate term Japan will likely play the role of providing logistical support for US forces, the evolution of Japanese policy could provide a more significant medium-term strategic opportunity for the US–Japan alliance. If they were to become directly involved in stabilising the Taiwan Strait, the Japan Self-Defense Forces would arguably be better positioned to safeguard Taiwan’s freedom of action than regional US forces. Unlike rotationally deployed US forces that must be redeployed from the continental US – straining readiness cycles – the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is regionally postured.
The Japanese fleet, with 34 destroyers and 11 frigates, is currently Northeast Asia’s largest force of permanently stationed major surface combatants (vessels of destroyer size or greater). Moreover, Japan’s large and capable fleet of Soryu-class diesel-electric submarines could arguably be better suited to denying shallow littoral waters in and around the Taiwan Strait to PLA Navy vessels than US nuclear-powered submarines, which are optimised to operate in deeper waters. Japan’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities and its Type 12 ground-based anti-ship missiles could also constrain the freedom of action of China’s surface vessels and submarines in the northern parts of the first island chain from positions astride the Tokara and Miyako Straits. Tracking these assets and planning for contingencies in which they are deployed in a cross-strait scenario would prove a daunting and resource-consuming task for the PLA.
A JMSDF which has more locally available vessels would also potentially be well-positioned to help manage other contingencies. For example, analysts have raised the question of how well-positioned the US Navy is to conduct lower-intensity operations such as convoying merchant vessels, which may be necessary in the event of a PLA Navy quarantine or blockade of Taiwan. Such a blockade might not entail direct kinetic action by China, but rather the declaration of an exclusion zone coupled with seizures of unguarded vessels.
The major challenge in such contests, which may fall below the threshold of open warfare, is to provide numbers of hulls sufficient to protect a steady stream of shipping from interdiction. As this would strain US naval posture and readiness, support from the smaller but regionally postured JMSDF could prove critical to convoying operations for vessels approaching Taiwan. A more direct role in functions such as convoying – which do not entail offensive action – might also be more politically palatable in Japan in the short to medium term.
This is not to say that the US could simply shift the burden of defending Taiwan onto Japan, even if Japan assumes a direct military role. Air operations over the island would almost certainly need to involve the US. Moreover, China may well seek to deter Japanese involvement or divert the attention of Japanese forces in a Taiwan crisis by, for example, simultaneously menacing the Senkaku Islands; indeed, China has linked the two issues in the past.
This would seem to necessitate a role for the US Marine Corps and its expeditionary advanced base operations concept, which is geared towards operating from offshore islands, denying them and their surrounding sea space to an opponent. Finally, the possibility that China may threaten nuclear first use against Japan would make US extended deterrence vital to providing Japanese decision-makers with freedom of action.
However, a steady evolution in Japanese policy towards greater involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis, coupled with Taiwan’s own growing capacity to execute an asymmetrical air and sea denial strategy, may in the long term allow the US to adopt a different strategic approach in Northeast Asia.
This would mirror the Nixon administration’s Guam Doctrine, which aimed – where possible – to leverage the resources of regional major powers while the US provided support and enablers in key areas. The US could in the long term shift its posture in Northeast Asia towards enabling both Taiwanese and Japanese forces, rather than being enabled by them. This would shift US priorities from achieving contested theatre entry to roll back aggression in the Taiwan Strait – an increasingly unlikely objective in any case – to enabling local forces to both achieve sea denial in wartime and thwart more calibrated coercive activity.
Supporting efforts by Japan to secure its southern littoral with US amphibious capabilities, enhancing Japan’s capacity for air and missile defence, and ensuring that extended nuclear deterrence to Japan precludes nuclear blackmail may have greater long-term salience than projecting power into the Taiwan Strait, as these actions would free up Japan’s own forces to take on roles for which they are better positioned.
A lighter footprint posture in the northern parts of the first island chain could free up the US’s own assets to focus on the South China Sea – the part of the region where there is no local power or coalition capable of balancing the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet. Moreover, the effect of reframing the role of the US in a Taiwan conflict as being part of a balance-of-power framework, as opposed to the PLA’s primary antagonist, could to some extent limit the degree to which a Taiwan crisis is viewed primarily through the lens of a bipolar superpower clash, which limits both US and Chinese diplomatic options. This would go some way towards facilitating the eventual negotiations which must follow any conflict. Given historical Chinese fears of a more assertive Japan in East Asia and the belief that the US–Japan alliance restrains this development, the prospect that China’s behaviour in the Taiwan Strait is catalysing the normalisation of Japan’s military posture may contribute to long-term deterrence.
To be sure, this depends on Japanese policy continuing on its trajectory towards greater involvement in the Taiwan Strait. While currently constrained by constitutional restrictions, the Japan Self-Defense Forces could become more usable in a Taiwan scenario if the current reframing of the status of Taiwan as an existential risk for Japan continues. The weight of geography makes this more likely than not, creating important opportunities for the US-led alliance in the region.
The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.
Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we’ll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines for contributors can be found here.
21. A World War II Spy Didn’t Live to Tell Her Tale. Her Great-Great-Niece Will.
Excerpts:
Her literary agent, Jim Rutman at Sterling Lord Literistic, was “persistently dazzled” by her ability to complicate existing narratives about the resistance. “World War II feels as gendered a category of books as we have. It is the quintessence of the ‘dad book,’ broadly speaking,” he said. “To put a woman at the center of the story and to complicate the conventions through which the story is usually told — all of that felt very right and very overdue.”
Donner has emphasized the importance of historiography, or examining how history is written. In existing accounts, for example, Arvid Harnack is often called a “scholar” while Mildred Harnack is called a “teacher,” which Donner said is incorrect. “She got a job at the University of Berlin, he did not, so properly speaking, she was the scholar.”
While her family connection provided unparalleled access (the Russian Embassy even sent “the tiniest shred” of Harnack’s file), Donner does not believe it made her biased in her rendering of Harnack. “I’m not interested in hagiography,” she said, “The greatest honor I can do her is not to put her up on a pedestal but to show how human she was.”
Over the years, she continued asking herself: Why do people commit themselves to acts that look either courageous or suicidal to other people? Harnack knowingly risked death by beheading every day. “My life was nothing like hers, but when you have a family member who has this larger-than-life story of courage and commitment, it is quite inspiring,” Donner said.
Asya Muchnick, the editor at Little, Brown who inherited the book when Boudreaux left the company in 2017, believes there are more stories like Mildred Harnack’s to be told. “She is probably not unique in being a woman who was written out of history, and it’s going to take one book at a time to bring those stories back to life,” Muchnick said.
“It was never a question of whether I would write it, it was just a question of when I would write it,” Donner said. “I made that promise.”
A World War II Spy Didn’t Live to Tell Her Tale. Her Great-Great-Niece Will.
In her book, “All the Frequent Troubles of Our Days,” Rebecca Donner examines the life of Mildred Harnack, part of the anti-Nazi resistance in Germany.
Rebecca Donner in her Brooklyn office. “My grandmother Jane said to me, ‘You must write Mildred’s story,’” she said. “I very much took that to heart.”Credit...Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times
By
Aug. 1, 2021
Every year when Rebecca Donner visited her great-grandmother’s home in Chevy Chase, Md., she and her brother would stand against the kitchen wall to have their heights marked in pencil. When she turned 9, she noticed a letter M near one of the faintest lines.
“Who’s that?” she asked her great-grandmother Harriette, who muttered, “Oh, that’s Mildred.”
Donner’s curiosity was piqued, but it wasn’t until she was 16 that she learned the truth: Mildred Harnack was an American spy during World War II. Along with her husband, Arvid Harnack, she led a resistance organization in Berlin, risking her life to leak information from Germany’s Ministry of Economics, where he worked, in hopes of defeating the Nazis. Despite nearly escaping, she was executed by guillotine in 1943 on Hitler’s direct order.
Though the lore surrounding Harnack is riddled with inaccuracies, Donner sets the record straight in “All the Frequent Troubles of Our Days,” which Little, Brown will publish on Tuesday.
“My grandmother Jane said to me, ‘You must write Mildred’s story.’ I very much took that to heart,” Donner said in an interview at her home in Brooklyn. “I thought, well, yes, but maybe it won’t be my first book,” because she wanted to do the story — and her lineage — justice.
She had a feeling her grandmother had more to say, but she died in a boating accident a few years later. “I was left with this shimmer of mystery,” Donner said. “It was endlessly fascinating.”
Photos of Mildred Harnack, the subject of “All the Frequent Troubles of Our Days.”Credit...Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times
Over the years, Donner graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, completed a master’s in fine arts at Columbia, directed a fiction series at KGB Bar in New York’s East Village, and wrote “Sunset Terrace,” a novel set in Los Angeles, followed by “Burnout,” a graphic novel about ecoterrorism. Just before “Burnout” was published in 2008, she visited Berlin and went to the German Resistance Memorial Center, since she knew her grandmother had been in touch with archivists there.
“I thought, maybe they’ll have a little plaque or something about Mildred,” Donner said, but when the elevator doors opened, she was greeted by a portrait of her great-great-aunt at the entrance to an art exhibition about her life. “There were actually two rooms devoted to her. And this was a huge exhibition,” she said. Still, she didn’t feel ready to tackle a biography.
Instead, she spent several years working on a novel based on her grandmother’s untimely death. But in 2016, when the Trump campaign started gaining momentum, “I had this sense that resistance was in the zeitgeist a little bit,” she said. “I thought, this is actually really important for me to write right now.”
Donner had also learned from her grandmother that Harnack employed the 11-year-old son of a diplomat to deliver coded messages to his parents, who sent the information back to the United States. His name was Donald Heath Jr., he now lived in California, and he was nearly 90.
One of Donner’s bulletin boards is tacked with photographs, including a black-and-white image of Harnack, that figure in her research.Credit...Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times
In Donner’s home, an entire shelving unit is filled with white binders containing scans of correspondence.Credit...Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times
She contacted him, and in 2016 they met in person. Heath told her how he would take a different route to Harnack’s apartment every time they met for “tutoring sessions,” how he would use the aquarium glass at the Berlin zoo as a mirror to check for tails and how every time he accompanied Harnack and his parents for picnics in the countryside, he would wear a stolen Hitler Youth uniform and whistle different songs to let them know whether the coast was clear.
After the interview concluded, Donner remembers, Heath said, “I’ve told you more than I’ve told anybody, but we’re like family.” His eyes welled up. “Now I can die.”
Donner replied, “Don’t do that, Don,” but a month or two later, he was indeed gone.
After that, she sought out a book deal to finance the remaining years of research. She received a six-figure offer from Lee Boudreaux at Little, Brown at auction, along with a fellowship from the Leon Levy Center for Biography. “I had not heard a whisper of this story before, and I thought it was an extraordinary tale,” Boudreaux said.
She was also charmed by Donner’s enthusiasm for the subject, she said. “She is just a big, charismatic personality herself and seemed to be going through life with an adventurous spirit.”
Over the years, Donner accumulated correspondence from Harnack, previously classified documents from the war and other materials from her research trips.Credit...Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times
Donner plunged into archives, either in person or remotely, in the United States, Germany, Britain and Russia. “It’s almost as if the world conspires to show you aspects of the story that you hadn’t even expected you would discover,” she said.
In the weeks after Heath’s death, she received a call from his family, offering access to 12 steamer trunks full of documents from Berlin, where she discovered his mother’s diaries. Louise Heath and Mildred Harnack were good friends, it turns out, and Donner also discovered top-secret intelligence documents offering new insight into the Heaths’ and Harnacks’ espionage.
Though jetting off to Europe for research might sound glamorous, most of Donner’s hours were spent poring over documents in her apartment near Prospect Park. The wall behind her desk is covered in paper where she mapped out the intersecting anti-Nazi resistance networks, “to figure out what the connections are,” she said. “Are they meaningful, or are they not? Are these just coincidences, or not?” A shelving unit is filled with white binders containing scans of correspondence; a bulletin board is tacked with photographs of Harnack, Heath and other figures in her research. Three posters decorate her hallway; they were created by high school students at the Mildred Harnack School in Berlin.
One of Mildred Harnack’s business cards.Credit...Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times
Her literary agent, Jim Rutman at Sterling Lord Literistic, was “persistently dazzled” by her ability to complicate existing narratives about the resistance. “World War II feels as gendered a category of books as we have. It is the quintessence of the ‘dad book,’ broadly speaking,” he said. “To put a woman at the center of the story and to complicate the conventions through which the story is usually told — all of that felt very right and very overdue.”
Donner has emphasized the importance of historiography, or examining how history is written. In existing accounts, for example, Arvid Harnack is often called a “scholar” while Mildred Harnack is called a “teacher,” which Donner said is incorrect. “She got a job at the University of Berlin, he did not, so properly speaking, she was the scholar.”
Mildred Harnack, second from right, was executed in 1943.Credit...Elizabeth D. Herman for The New York Times
While her family connection provided unparalleled access (the Russian Embassy even sent “the tiniest shred” of Harnack’s file), Donner does not believe it made her biased in her rendering of Harnack. “I’m not interested in hagiography,” she said, “The greatest honor I can do her is not to put her up on a pedestal but to show how human she was.”
Over the years, she continued asking herself: Why do people commit themselves to acts that look either courageous or suicidal to other people? Harnack knowingly risked death by beheading every day. “My life was nothing like hers, but when you have a family member who has this larger-than-life story of courage and commitment, it is quite inspiring,” Donner said.
Asya Muchnick, the editor at Little, Brown who inherited the book when Boudreaux left the company in 2017, believes there are more stories like Mildred Harnack’s to be told. “She is probably not unique in being a woman who was written out of history, and it’s going to take one book at a time to bring those stories back to life,” Muchnick said.
“It was never a question of whether I would write it, it was just a question of when I would write it,” Donner said. “I made that promise.”
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
