Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"When we revolt it’s not for a particular culture. We revolt simply because, for many reasons, we can no longer breathe."

~ Frantz Fanon

"There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally. As nearly as we can, we must put ourselves in the place of those who uttered the words, and try to divine how they would have dealt with the unforeseen situation; and, although their words are by far the most decisive evidence of what they would have done, they are by no means final."

~ Learned Hand

"Start with what is right rather than what is acceptable."

~ Franz Kafka

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2023

2. Historian Tim Snyder: ‘Our misreading of Russia is deep. Very deep’

3. Jamming Unrelated Provisions in the NDAA Is Bad for the Military

4. Democracy and the AI Revolution

5. Fitch Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating

6. If Ukraine is Any Barometer of Expenditure Rates in Modern War, America Is Gonna Lose Taiwan

7. China replaces elite nuclear leadership in surprise military shake-up

8. Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

9. China secretly sends enough gear to Russia to equip an army

10. US says formally invites new Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to Washington

11.Biden Made the Final Call on Space Command Basing. Was the Air Force Out of the Loop?

12. Tuberville’s protest is putting stress on units, Pentagon says

13. Getting Smart About Dividing America’s Adversaries

14. Ukraine is ‘extraordinary laboratory' for military AI, senior DOD official says

15. Pentagon’s strategy planner wants China crisis channels

16. The End of China’s Economic Miracle

17. US military targets deepfakes, misinformation with AI-powered tool

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2023

Key Takeaways:

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1.
Likely Ukrainian actors conducted another drone strike on Moscow City in the early hours of August 1.
The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may have signaled his intent to use the Wagner Group to create a foundation for an unspecified Belarusian “contract army.”
Two Belarusian helicopters reportedly violated Polish airspace on August 1.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1.
Russian companies not under Western sanctions continue to recruit volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine.
Iran is pursuing the construction of drone factories in Belarus and Russia, which will help Russia acquire Iranian drones more readily and provide Iran with numerous economic and military benefits.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1 and made advances in certain areas.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 1 and advanced near Kreminna and Bakhmut.
The Russian Cabinet of Ministers granted Russian volunteer fighters and Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) militia fighters (opolcheniye) veteran status on August 1.
Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied regions of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of education and rehabilitation programs.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 1, 2023

Aug 1, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2023

Karolina Hird, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Annika Ganzeveld, and Mason Clark

August 1, 2023, 6:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1. The Russian MoD initially claimed that Ukraine launched three unmanned boats at the “Sergey Kotov” and “Vasily Bykov” Project 22160 large patrol ships in the southwestern part of the Black Sea, about 340km southwest of Sevastopol.[1] The Russian MoD later clarified that the patrol ships were escorting Russian civilian transport ships en route to the Bosphorus Strait via the Black Sea and claimed that the patrol ships detected and destroyed all three semi-submersibles.[2] Russian authorities may be amplifying claims of Ukrainian attacks to frame Ukraine as irresponsibly threatening civilian ships in the Black Sea, thereby setting conditions to further escalate naval activity and consolidate control in the Black Sea, though there is no indication that Ukrainian attacks on Russian military targets have threatened civilian vessels.[3] Geolocated images posted on July 31 show the installation of anti-naval drone barriers in Sevastopol Bay, likely as part of the overall Russian effort to increase naval and defensive posturing in the Black Sea.[4]

Ukrainian actors likely conducted another drone strike on Moscow City in the early hours of August 1. Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin claimed that Russian air defense downed several drones flying towards Moscow, and geolocated footage shows that one drone struck the 21st floor of the IQ-Kvartal Tower in central Moscow City.[5] Russian media reported that the target of the strike was the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, located on the IQ-Kvartal Tower’s 21st floor.[6] Russian sources claimed that drones previously struck the IQ-Kvartal Tower on the night of July 29 to 30.[7] Social media footage from August 1 additionally shows a drone flying over Moscow suburbs in the Odintsovo district.[8] Several sources suggested that the drones were Ukrainian-made.[9] One Russian commentator accused Sobyanin of neglecting to secure Moscow against such continued drone attacks.[10] Russian authorities will likely struggle to balance the need to quell domestic concern over continuing drone attacks deep within the Russian rear with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society for the war and its corresponding consequences.

The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage of Gerasimov on August 1 reportedly inspecting a forward command post in western Zaporizhia Oblast and receiving a briefing on Ukrainian operations and Russian defenses in the area.[11] This footage is one of Gerasimov’s first public appearances since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion and indicates that the MoD continues to publicize Gerasimov’s role as theater commander.[12] Some Russian sources previously claimed that rumored deputy theater commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Gerasimov as overall theater commander in Ukraine following Wagner’s rebellion, but ISW was unable to verify these rumors and assessed that Gerasimov will likely nominally retain his position in the Russian military.[13] The MoD’s footage notably portrays Gerasimov as the architect of Russian defensive operations in one sector of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south, a role that the Russian information space previously attributed to both former deputy commander of the joint grouping of forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin and former 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov prior to their likely dismissals on June 28 and July 15, respectively, for challenging Gerasimov and the traditional MoD hierarchy.[14]

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may have signaled his intent to use the Wagner Group to create a foundation for an unspecified Belarusian “contract army.” Lukashenko stated on August 1 that he seeks to retain the Wagner Group within the Belarusian Armed Forces by using experienced Wagner fighters to “more actively create a contract army.”[15] Lukashenko did not provide details on the “contract army’s” organizational structure, planned end strength, or formation timeline, but noted that the Wagner Group currently includes over 30,000 fighters.[16]

Belarus currently does not have a “contract army” or a structure resembling a “contract army,” which in this context likely refers to the Russian term of “kontraktniki,” professional volunteer soldiers rather than conscripts. The Belarusian military does not field any formations above the brigade level and Belarus’ main combat units are six separate brigades (three mechanized, two airborne, and one spetsnaz) primarily staffed by 18-month conscripts and some contract servicemen.[17] The creation of a “contract army” would likely require the creation of a new formation or a significant reorganization of Belarus’ existing brigades and an overhaul of Belarusian training to create a force of long-serving professional soldiers, as Russia previously (and unsuccessfully) attempted to do in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Then-Belarusian Defense Minister Andrei Ravkov previously stated in 2016 that Belarus should not and does not plan to transition away from the traditional staff and cadre system to have a fully contract army.[18]

Two Belarusian helicopters reportedly violated Polish airspace on August 1. Polish officials reported that two Belarusian helicopters entered Polish airspace on August 1 and that Poland will increase its troop presence at the Polish-Belarusian border in response.[19] Lukashenko also dismissed the Polish government for overreacting to news that the Wagner Group deployed a 100-person element closer to the Belarusian-Polish border and claimed that Wagner forces are in Grodno and Brest, rather than near the international border.[20] ISW continues to assess that Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland (or Ukraine, for that matter) until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued gradually advancing near Bakhmut, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces captured an unspecified height south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[21] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on August 1 that in the past week, Ukrainian forces captured two square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction and 12 square kilometers in southern Ukraine.[22] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks against Russian forces along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne.[23] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) in western Zaporizhia Oblast likely struggles with severe fatigue and that elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) south of Velyka Novosilka likely face a high level of pressure to defend the area and feel that the Russian military command should rotate them from the front line.[24] The UK MoD also reported that Russian commanders in southern Ukraine largely struggle with artillery ammunition shortages, a lack of reserves, and challenges with securing the flanks of defending units.

Russian companies not under Western sanctions continue to recruit volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that unsanctioned Russian companies Rusal, Novatek, PIK, and Mospromstroy that are affiliated with Russian oligarchs, including Oleg Deripaska, Leonid Mikhelson, Sergei Gordeev, and Mikhail Gutseriev, recruit Russian volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine.[25] Vazhnye Istorii reported that both the Russian MoD and Russian “military industrial complex companies” pay recruits’ salaries, who then serve in the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) and the “Sokol” Volunteer Battalion of the 108th Air Assault Regiment (7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division).[26] ISW and Vazhnye Istorii previously reported that Russian state-owned companies such as Gazprom, Russian Railways, and Roscosmos have contributed to recruitment efforts.[27] Gazprom and Russian Railways are under Western sanctions, however.[28]

Iran is pursuing the construction of drone factories in Belarus and Russia, which will help Russia acquire Iranian drones more readily and provide Iran with numerous economic and military benefits. (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s August 1 Iran Update) Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri called for greater defense industry cooperation between Iran and Belarus during a meeting with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin in Tehran on August 1.[29] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani signed a military cooperation agreement with Khrenin on July 31.[30] CTP assessed that Ashtiani and Khrenin may have discussed establishing Shahed kamikaze drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[31] Ukraine claimed in May 2023 that Iranian engineers are exploring how to convert factories in Gomel, Belarus into drone production facilities.[32] The Biden administration revealed in June that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, Russia.[33] Iran opened an Ababil-2 drone factory in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in May 2022. Bagheri notably attended the opening ceremony of this factory.[34] The production of Iranian drones in Belarus and Russia will benefit both Russia and Iran:

Russia will benefit by acquiring Iranian drones for its invasion of Ukraine more readily. Israeli and Ukrainian media have noted that the construction of an Iranian drone factory in Belarus would alleviate the “logistical problems” Russia faces in transporting Iranian drones from Iran to Russia via the Middle East.[35] The Biden administration published a map in June showing Iranian drone transfers from Iran to Russia through the Caspian Sea.[36]
Iran will benefit by receiving revenue for the Iranian economy. The British Secret Intelligence Service revealed in July that Iran seeks to acquire cash from Russia in return for Iranian drones.[37] Iran is currently facing critical economic conditions, with the value of the rial surpassing 500,000 rials to one US dollar on August 1.[38] The Iran Statistical Center reported on July 25 that Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 47.5 percent.[39]
Russia can also benefit Iran's military. Western media speculated in late 2022 that Iran might receive Russian Su-35 fighter jets in return for supplying Russia with drones.[40] Iranian military officials have increasingly expressed skepticism at receiving Su-35s in recent months, however.[41] Western media reported in March that Russia provided Iran with advanced surveillance software and cyber weapons in exchange for drones.[42] A high-ranking Israeli military official separately expressed concern in June that Russia is providing Iran with Western weapons captured in Ukraine.[43]

Iran’s close cooperation with Belarus and Russia may stem, in part, because Iran has signed long-term strategic agreements with these countries. The graphic below depicts which countries Iran has signed or is pursuing cooperation agreements with.

Key Takeaways:

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1.
Likely Ukrainian actors conducted another drone strike on Moscow City in the early hours of August 1.
The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may have signaled his intent to use the Wagner Group to create a foundation for an unspecified Belarusian “contract army.”
Two Belarusian helicopters reportedly violated Polish airspace on August 1.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1.
Russian companies not under Western sanctions continue to recruit volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine.
Iran is pursuing the construction of drone factories in Belarus and Russia, which will help Russia acquire Iranian drones more readily and provide Iran with numerous economic and military benefits.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1 and made advances in certain areas.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 1 and advanced near Kreminna and Bakhmut.
The Russian Cabinet of Ministers granted Russian volunteer fighters and Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) militia fighters (opolcheniye) veteran status on August 1.
Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied regions of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of education and rehabilitation programs.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and made unconfirmed limited gains on August 1. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured a Ukrainian defensive position in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction.[44] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces are increasing assaults in the Kupyansk direction, but that Ukrainian forces repel them.[45] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces have concentrated forces along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border in order to draw Ukrainian forces away from the Bakhmut area.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) are successfully fixing Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast that Ukraine intended to deploy elsewhere along the frontline.[47]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Svatove area and made unconfirmed gains on August 1. The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances near Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove) and along the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka line (12-14km southwest of Svatove).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) in an attempt to cut off the N26 (Svatove-Kupyansk) highway and bypass Ukrainian fortified areas in Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[49] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Svatove and did not advance on August 1. The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Svatove, Berestove, Raihorodka (12km west of Svatove), Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove), and Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove).[50]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area and made unconfirmed advances on August 1. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured a fortified area near Chervonopopivka (5km northwest of Kreminna) and advanced near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[51]

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area and made advances on August 1. Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains southeast of Kuzmyne (2km southwest of Kreminna).[52] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebryanske forest area, and Bilohorivka (32km south of Kreminna).[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and reportedly advanced on August 1. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continue advancing in the Bakhmut direction and that Russian forces are unsuccessfully defending against Ukrainian attacks.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured an unspecified height near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) on July 31.[55] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces changed tactics and are now operating smaller assault groups on the Andriivka-Klishchiivka line (8km southwest of Bakhmut).[56] Another Russian milblogger noted that the situation in Bakhmut “is suspiciously quiet” and that there is almost no movement on the ground.[57]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and did not advance on August 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks west and south of Klishchiivka to recapture lost positions.[58]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance on August 1. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City).[59]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance on August 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Marinka, and Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City).[60] A Russian milblogger also reported unsuccessful Russian ground attacks near Marinka and Pobieda.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not make any confirmed advances on August 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[62] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Russian forces near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cross the dry riverbed between Staromayorske and Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not make any confirmed advances on August 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions east of Staromayorske.[65] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian forces in the Staromayroske area.[66] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control the heights around Staromayorske, and another milblogger reported that Russian forces still control Urozhaine despite Ukrainian attacks towards the settlement.[67]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances on August 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[68] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Russian forces near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and that elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled the attack.[69] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking Russian positions in the Robotyne area with foot mobile infantry wave attacks without armored vehicle support, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued utilizing small assault groups for limited attacks (and Ukrainian forces are highly unlikely to be conducting “wave” attacks comparable to the previous use of that term to describe Russian tactics in Bakhmut).[70] The lack of consensus in the Russian information space as to the size of this purported Ukrainian attack near Robotyne suggests that Ukrainian forces are most likely continuing to conduct limited attacks in this area. A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian reserves are moving from Kherson Oblast to Zaporizhia Oblast.[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances on August 1. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian forces near Robotyne.[72] The source claimed that Russian forces in this area are rotating out and those that have been fighting for many days are resting.[73] Russian forces in this area have notably likely gone extended periods of time without rotation.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian “Klinok” sniper group is operating near Robotyne.[75] The “Klinok” sniper group, also known as the “Nemtsa” Group and the “Brothers of Putin,” is allegedly part of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District), which is known to be operating in this area.[76]

Russian sources continue to discuss purported Ukrainian attempts to cross the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to expand their presence on the Antonivsky Bridge and to land on islands in the Dnipro River delta.[77]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian training camp in Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian training camp on Dzharylhach Island (in the Black Sea 70 km southeast of Kherson City) and that Ukrainian frontline positions are at least 60km from the training camp, suggesting that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike with long-range high-precision munitions.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Ukrainian citizens in the area provided information to the Ukrainian armed forces about the location of the camp.[79] Russian troops recently established the camp to allow for Russian forces to undergo rehabilitation and recovery and to increase the training level of troops.[80]

Russian forces shelled civilian areas in Kherson City on August 1. The Ukrainian Ministry of Health reported that Russian shelling hit the Kherson City Clinical Hospital, and Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported that Russian forces shelled Kherson City 61 times on August 1.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Cabinet of Ministers granted Russian volunteer fighters and Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) militia fighters (opolcheniye) veteran status on August 1. The new policy grants combat veteran benefits to DNR and LNR fighters who fought in Ukraine since May 11, 2014, and Russian volunteer fighters who fought in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts since February 24, 2022, and in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts since September 30, 2022.[82] The Kremlin likely seeks to continue supporting DNR and LNR militia veterans and incentivize more Russians to join volunteer units.

Russian opposition outlet Verstka published an investigation on July 31 that revealed that Russia imported approximately $502 million worth of sanctioned dual-use computer chips, $171 million in airplane components, and $5 million in precision machining tools since the beginning of 2023. The investigation found that a network of Russian companies and international sanctions evasion partners based in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, China, India, Italy, Germany, Thailand, Taiwan, and Hong Kong helped import sanctioned goods supporting Russia’s defense manufacturing.[83]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied regions of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of education and rehabilitation programs. The Kherson Oblast occupation Ministry of Education and Science announced that Russian authorities sent students from occupied Henichesk to the Sokol Children and Youth Recreation Center in Kaluga Oblast for “health improvement and education.”[84] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Evgeny Balitsky stated that his administration sent children from occupied Zaporizhia to “rest” in Saratov Oblast and thanked the Saratov Oblast administration for its assistance in arranging the program.[85] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin confirmed that girls from occupied Donetsk Oblast are “resting” at a children’s camp in Anapa, Krasnodar Krai.[86] Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova claimed on July 31 that Russian authorities have sent over 700,000 children to Russia, a large portion of which are likely being illegally and coercively transferred under the guise of such education and rest programs.[87]

Russian occupation authorities are incentivizing residents of occupied Ukraine to permanently relocate to occupied Crimea. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev announced on August 1 that the Russian Territorial Development Fund transferred 234.2 million rubles (about $2.5 million) to the Sevastopol occupation administration for the provision of applications for the purchase of residential premises for residents of Kherson Oblast who relocated to Sevastopol.[88] Russian occupation authorities may hope to use the promise of financial incentives to coax Ukrainian citizens to move to Sevastopol and other areas of occupied Crimea, which Ukrainian residents register with Russian federal organs such as the Territorial Development Fund.

Russian authorities are preparing for the 2024 presidential elections in occupied areas of Ukraine. The Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation announced on July 31 that the Russian Presidential Council will contribute to the integration of occupied Kherson Oblast into the electronic voting system during the 2024 presidential elections.[89] The Civic Chamber additionally noted that voters will be able to utilize “mobile voting” mechanisms instead of traveling to designated voting stations and reported that there are currently 14 territorial election commissions and 233 precinct election commissions operating in the occupied part of Kherson Oblast.[90]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Wagner Group personnel continue to arrive in Belarus. Independent Belarusian monitoring organization The Hajun Project reported that the 14th Wagner convoy with more semi-trailer trucks arrived in Belarus on August 1.[91] More Wagner Group convoys may arrive in Belarus over the next 96 hours; Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reportedly ordered all Wagner personnel currently on rest and recuperation to arrive at Wagner’s field camps in Belarus no later than August 5.[92]

The Wagner Group in Belarus is reportedly expanding its footprint in Asipovichy. The Hajun Project reported that Wagner forces began using the Belarusian military storage warehouse (28.5537827°E 53.2687449°N - approximately 15 km south of the Wagner field camp in Tsel) located near Poplavy, Asipovichy, since around July 18, 2023.[93] The Hajun Project shared satellite images reportedly showing recent activity at this warehouse between July 17 and 24.[94]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Historian Tim Snyder: ‘Our misreading of Russia is deep. Very deep’

This 46 minute of Tim Synder discussing this issue is at the link and on YouTube here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bJczLlwp-d8

Historian Tim Snyder: ‘Our misreading of Russia is deep. Very deep’

Financial Times · by Sam Jones · July 28, 2023

Porzellan is crowded with a busy lunchtime crush of convivial Viennese spilling out of the bright, high-ceilinged room on to tables outside, all chiffon summer dresses and open linen shirts. Inside, amid the hum, I spot Tim Snyder looking into the middle distance, like the only motionless object in a long-exposure photograph.

He smiles thinly as we shake hands and I sit down.

Afterwards, I will inwardly curse myself for not suggesting that we postpone our lunch. Snyder has, only moments ago, found out about the death of his friend Victoria Amelina, the Ukrainian writer who was among the victims of a Russian missile strike on a packed restaurant in the Donbas city of Kramatorsk. Twelve others were killed in the same attack, children among them. Dozens more suffering life-changing injuries.

Snyder is visibly at a loss. I venture condolences, wincing at how crass they must sound.

Amelina, a feted novelist, had, since the war broke out, dedicated herself to documenting Russian war crimes in Ukraine, particularly against civilians. Shortly after the war began, she wrote of how Russia’s invasion evoked the destruction of Ukraine’s cultural and intellectual elite by Stalin in the 1930s. That she too has now been murdered, a century later, is the bitterest possible vindication of her warning, Snyder reflects: “It shows Russia’s war for what it is. A genocide.”

You might say that this was grief colouring judgment. But as becomes clear over the course of our lunch — which continues until long after the restaurant is cleared of other diners — Snyder, one of the most eminent historians of Ukraine and central and eastern Europe, does not lightly draw from our darkest well of historical remembrance in his characterisation of Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Historians, of course, are not supposed to do this: to insert the past so boldly into the present. But then, we might also wonder — and we do, later during our lunch — what are historians supposed to do?

The waiter comes to take our drinks order and, alongside our sparkling water, I take a Gemischter Satz — the traditional field blend from the city vineyards. Snyder takes a wine spritzer.

Snyder, now 53, is the Richard C Levin professor of history at Yale. But he has in effect made Vienna his European home, ever since taking up a research position at the city’s Institute for Human Sciences in 1996, having just gained his doctorate from the University of Oxford. His first child was born here and, as he tells me, many of his happiest memories are from here.

Snyder has been chided as a perma-pessimist; a leading figure in a western liberal intellectual elite so browbeaten in recent years, the critique runs, that it is now hopelessly addicted to catastrophising.

But if anything, as we begin to discuss the war in Ukraine, the idea unspools that though it is an awful thing, it has also been the right thing: February 2022 was a second “1938 moment”, Snyder suggests, referring to the Munich conference of that year, when Britain and France fatally caved in to Hitler’s threats over Czechoslovakia.

“For me personally, the reference to 1938 is actually really important because that was a terrible mistake. Had Britain and France stood behind Prague, they would have made the second world war impossible — or at least in the form that it took,” Snyder says. “The war in Ukraine is horrible, but the fact that Russia wasn’t appeased is a sign that I’d like to think we have learnt something.”

In other ways, however, Snyder laments western policymakers’ long and still tortured reading of Russia — a problem that beset Barack Obama, and still afflicts Germany and France. “Our misreading of Russia is deep. Very deep,” Snyder says.

Snyder’s introductory course to Ukraine, given at Yale in autumn 2022, six months after Russia began its war, was put on YouTube. At the time of writing, the first of those lectures (there are 23) has alone garnered 1.3mn views. One prominent fan was Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who invited Snyder to Kyiv last year.

The war did not bring Snyder into the mainstream. In 2010, his book Bloodlands — a garlanded tour d’horizon of the Holocaust and other interwar genocides centred on the lands in which they happened, rather than the powers prosecuting them — made him one of the most prominent historians in his field. (That said, Richard J Evans, one of the world’s foremost historians of Germany, was a notably sharp critic). But it was his 2017 book On Tyranny that cast Snyder into America’s liberal intellectual firmament: interviewed on Amanpour, quizzed on the Daily Show, gushed over by Rachel Maddow. On Tyranny was a 128-page manifesto against Trump.

“I’m really not in it for the friction,” Snyder insists when I ask how he enjoys having become such a prominent figure in America’s culture wars. “I’m not an extroverted person at all . . . I’m very happy sitting in an archive for eight hours . . . That’s a great day for me.”

Our starters arrive. Snyder has chosen a dish of fried chilli prawns, served with wild herbs on focaccia. I have taken a beef tartare. It comes, despite my request, rather Germanically mild.

This war is being fought by a lot of people who are not called Vladimir Putin. The person who fired that missile . . . the tens of thousands of Russian soldiers fighting and killing in Ukraine’

For somebody who finds the spotlight uncomfortable, Snyder seems drawn to it, and two more polemical books followed On Tyranny.

“I wrote [On Tyranny] because I felt I had to write it,” he says. And then adds: “I felt like I sort of messed up — like I hadn’t done enough and others hadn’t done enough and now Americans are going to mess up.”

It is a curious statement, and delivered with pained humility rather than bravado. As I turn to asking what made Snyder a historian in the first place, some of the pieces begin to fit into place. In Snyder’s own conception, a powerful sense of ethics is what motivates all of his work.

“I don’t agree with the view that some of my colleagues take that the only way to proceed is to just be a historian — it doesn’t speak to me. I became a historian by caring about a whole constellation of other things,” he says.

One of Snyder’s intellectual mentors — his supervisor at Oxford — was the British historian Timothy Garton Ash. “Imagine a theatre critic who is suddenly hauled up from the stalls to act in the play he meant to review,” Garton Ash wrote in a now famous 1995 essay on the role of intellectuals in public life, based on his own experiences in eastern Europe. “That kind of attitude is biographically normal for me,” says Snyder.

When he started out as a student, Snyder recalls, he had a more mercenary sense of what was intellectually valuable. He wanted to become an arms control negotiator, and saw history as a means of understanding the mechanics of great power politics.

But as he learnt more about states in eastern Europe — Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular, and their intellectual traditions, particularly under communist rule — he was drawn in a different direction. “Somehow here were these people in eastern Europe talking about everything except power, right? Because they couldn’t. They were interested in philosophy and literature and history. Even the people with physics degrees there were involved in this humanistic discourse.”

Snyder is now one of the very few historians capable of conducting original research across the region. He speaks 10 languages. “I think of history as having been this amazing liberatory form of education.”

By the time we finish our starters, our conversation has again turned to Russia and the urgency of putting more historical context in our public debate. Snyder is softly spoken, and gives the impression of having weighed his words with great consideration — but the ideas he advances are, to say the least, provocative. I bring up his initial analogy of the situation in Ukraine with 1938.

He pauses. “In the analogy we’re talking about, Russia is [Nazi] Germany. And I think that is generally productive as a comparison, but it’s also generally taboo. And the fact that it’s generally taboo has been one of our problems from the beginning.”

People are “weirdly hesitant” to call Putin’s Russia fascist, he says. “But there are many levels on which the analogy [with Nazi Germany] holds.”

For Snyder, the west’s lack of historical clarity on Russia has been a deadly mistake, and continues to be at the core of our misreading of Putin. He decries our ongoing focus on “pragmatic” solutions to the conflict, and a conceptualising of Putin as some kind of cynical, but ultimately relatable, power politician in the western mould.

Putin’s radical ideas have been catastrophically minimised in our analysis, Snyder believes. “Ideas, it turns out, matter. Until far too recently [western] policy discussions about Putin were shaped by our own ideas about technocracy and pragmatism and stability — categories which I think have already worn out their welcome.”

And yet, I say, the poisonous ideology of Hitlerism, even if dynamic, was arguably there from the outset, congealing in Hitler’s mind out of a soup of völkisch ideas in German society. Hitlerism, such as it was, went on to shape the modus operandi of the Nazi state. But with Putinism, is it not the case that the modus operandi — a cynical, power-hungry kleptocracy — has, conversely, arrived at the only ideology left that it can govern with?

Snyder is hesitant about this argument. For him, Putin’s ideas have been gestating for a much longer period; we were just blind to them. “When Putin returned to the office of the presidency [in 2012] you could see in his Russian-language proclamations, radio interviews and in print, a clear worldview, which is essentially the world view that has become more familiar to us since February 2022, according to which it’s not about states, it’s about civilisations; it’s not about interests, it’s about missions.”

Much of this ground is covered in his 2018 book The Road to Unfreedom, in which Snyder gives the early 20th-century Russian reactionary philosopher Ivan Ilyin centre stage as the animating intellect behind Putinism.

Russia can’t have a domestic policy. The elite have stolen all the money, the laws are corrupted . . . so foreign policy has to compensate’

The waiter swings back with our main courses. Snyder has again made the better decision: an Eierschwammerl risotto, perfectly all’onda. It being high summer, it is Eierschwammerlsaison — chanterelle season — and every Viennese restaurant worth its salt is offering delicacies made with them. I have gone with a more robust chicken breast wrapped in bacon, which comes with broccoli florets — all a little bit Good Housekeeping in comparison.

So, I ask, is this Putin’s war, or is this Russia’s war? “This war is being fought by a lot of people who are not called Vladimir Putin,” Snyder says. “The person who pushed the button to fire that missile at Kramatorsk that killed Victoria and those children . . . the tens of thousands of Russian soldiers fighting and killing in Ukraine now . . . ”

It is a moral as well as an empirical point, he adds. “Putin is going to die, and when he does, does that mean everything else is forgiven? All of the crimes? The deportations, the kidnappings of children, the rapes of women, the castrations of men, the murder of Ukraine’s elite? How can any of that be processed according to the idea that this is his war alone?”

When we meet, barely a week has passed since the abortive rebellion by Wagner warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin — and so I am also curious to ask whether, given the fascist swerve of Russian society that Snyder identifies, we should not be careful what we wish for in cheering Putin’s demise?

“Putin is really not our problem,” Snyder responds. “I mean, the last 30 years have shown quite clearly that we don’t actually have much ability at all to influence Russia . . . time after time we have demonstrated we don’t change anything inside Russia.”

He continues: “I find the Prigozhin interlude honestly quite reassuring, because it shows us that there are Russians who perfectly well understand the situation in Ukraine; that Russians are also capable of completely forgetting about Ukraine when there’s a greater stress — when there’s an actual succession struggle going on, all they talk about is themselves.

“We drive ourselves round and round in anxious circles about what Russia is thinking about this war, and we’re not letting ourselves realise that the Russians will find ways out for themselves . . . They don’t need for us to have our focus groups and our studies and our exit ramps. Anthropologically speaking, our exit ramps are not applicable to their highways, if you’ll forgive that stupid metaphor?”

He quickly alights on a more elegant turn of phrase: “It’s two different fairy tales, as the Poles say.”

In Russia, the west seems to forget it is not seeing a mirror nation-state to its own. It is a different paradigm of power altogether, driven by “Weberian notions of charismatic leadership”, says Snyder.

“The thing is, Russia can’t have a domestic policy,” Snyder muses. “The elite have stolen all the money, all the laws are corrupted, and there’s almost no social mobility or possibility of change in most Russians’ lives, so foreign policy has to compensate and provide the raw material — the scenography — for governance.”

We both choose to skip dessert and take coffees instead. Now more composed, Snyder stretches out on the bench, hoicking one leg up and casting his arm along the back of it.

“History is a bit like maths,” he says. “The deeper you get the weirder it actually becomes. And more beautiful.”

More appreciation of it is urgently needed in our political discourse, he believes. “The problem is, you can’t really deal with first-rate political problems without history.”

For Snyder, with the end of the cold war, the western liberal political order relapsed into an ahistorical torpor. History, he says, “became cocktail party conversation”.

“It was the triumph of the means paradigm — the managerial paradigm [in politics],” he elaborates, “which said we don’t have to talk too much about the ‘why’ any more because we’ve got that all figured out.”

That has made the west more inept in its dealings around the world, and also weaker in its very democratic foundations because “without history . . . the most idiotic myths become normal. Like about America being great, or a baptism in Kyiv in the ninth century [A story favoured particularly by Putin to justify the synonymity of Ukraine with Russia].”

“History gives us more ways of looking,” he says.

By now Porzellan has emptied and the waiting staff are bustling about laying tables for dinner.

The past, in all its strangeness, often has ways of illuminating the present. Snyder points to our smartphones on the table: symbols of our technocratic triumph over the past. And yet, even Homeric myth has something to tell us about them. “In the Odyssey, the sirens are so irresistible because they have the power to sing to each sailor only about himself. Which is exactly the same algorithmic superpower that that thing has,” he muses.

“Maybe this is my super-conservative side, but if we all had a little more knowledge of history, we’d be better equipped to read the present.”

Sam Jones is the FT’s Switzerland and Austria correspondent

Find out about our latest stories first — follow @ftweekend on Twitter

Financial Times · by Sam Jones · July 28, 2023

3. Jamming Unrelated Provisions in the NDAA Is Bad for the Military

Conclusion:

There is only one guaranteed opportunity where Members of Congress can take a victory lap each year: the NDAA. If members of Congress want to continue issuing these press releases – and start regaining the trust of a jaded public - they must observe one simple principle: stop trying to hoist controversial and non-military provisions on the NDAA.

Jamming Unrelated Provisions in the NDAA Is Bad for the Military

By Gabriel Noronha

August 01, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/01/jamming_unrelated_provisions_in_the_ndaa_is_bad_for_the_military_969858.html

The Senate and House Armed Services Committee (SASC and HASC) are justifiably proud that this year promises to be the 63rd straight year Congress will pass the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) into law. No other committee comes close to matching this track record. However, this success poses the greatest threat to the NDAA’s continued success – both this year and institutionally.

Over the past several years, the collective awareness in Washington that the NDAA is the only guaranteed legislative vehicle has increased attempts from all corners to turn the bill into a gravy train. As a result, members and other committees keep approaching SASC and HASC – or going to the floor - with requests to adopt provisions that don’t belong on the bill, even going so far in previous years as to request the Farm Bill be attached to the NDAA during conference. Members think they have leverage by threatening to derail the NDAA unless it includes their unrelated provisions. This is bad policy.

The NDAA should be about two things: advancing national security and supporting the troops. Nothing else.

One might argue the status of the Lesser Prairie Sage Grouse on the endangered species list has a tangential nexus to military testing grounds – but that doesn’t mean that a controversial public lands and mining dispute should be litigated on the NDAA. In prior years, that particular dispute has sidelined the bill for months.

This year, neither bills on interchange and credit card fees nor controversial social policies should be allowed to endanger the bill. The adoption of similar provisions has often delayed and endangered passage of the bill – depriving the Department of Defense of a timely reauthorization. And if the NDAA is derailed over unrelated provisions, it would be a hit to our national security.

Once the NDAA becomes more about economic or social policy than military policy, Congress will lose focus on what matters most: deterring our adversaries from waging war against America and her allies.This year’s NDAA will be an important opportunity for Congress to help increase the odds Ukraine defeats Russia and that we prevent China from invading and taking over Taiwan. Providing for the common defense is the most important and one of the few explicit responsibilities of the federal government under the Constitution.

It would be a mistake for members to use the NDAA as a vehicle to fulfill ideas they cannot pass elsewhere. The NDAA is where Congress works at its finest – other members and committees should learn from and emulate SASC’s and HASC’s process of regular order to pass their priorities on other subjects, not seek to co-opt the bill because other committees are broken. That would simply result in an even more dysfunctional Congress than we have today.

If members – of both parties – try to use the NDAA to pass measures unrelated to the military they are unlikely to succeed in these efforts - but they will certainly harm the efficiency and lasting bipartisan consensus surrounding the NDAA, damaging the military and hurting Congress’ ability to use the vehicle for much-needed oversight.

To preserve the vital task of passing the NDAA this year and in the future, Members of Congress should agree that legislation unrelated to national security should not be permitted on the NDAA unless it has the unanimous support of the relevant committees of jurisdiction and that the preponderance of the legislative content to be included is national-security related. Trivial or contrived relationships to that subject should be quickly discounted.

There is only one guaranteed opportunity where Members of Congress can take a victory lap each year: the NDAA. If members of Congress want to continue issuing these press releases – and start regaining the trust of a jaded public - they must observe one simple principle: stop trying to hoist controversial and non-military provisions on the NDAA.

Gabriel Noronha is the Executive Director of Polaris National Security and previously served as the Special Assistant to the Senate Armed Services Committee under Chairmen John McCain and Jim Inhofe.

4. Democracy and the AI Revolution

Excerpts:

On the question of totalitarian control, China's social credit system represents a new level of individual monitoring made possible by machine learning and large-scale data analysis. With the integration of COVID monitoring and the general social control system, China now has extensive knowledge of an individual's whereabouts, social interactions, and conversations. While it is a powerful form of control, even such high levels of monitoring have not always yielded the desired outcome, as seen when people protested against zero COVID measures.

It is challenging to predict the effectiveness of these technologies in undermining democracy. In many cases, using technology to counter the negative impacts of technology might be our best solution.

Democracy and the AI Revolution

How are AI and biotechnology impacting democracy? Francis Fukuyama weighs in.

Francis Fukuyama, Mathilde Fasting

31 Jul 2023, 12:51 pm

americanpurpose.com · by Francis Fukuyama · July 31, 2023

Courtesy of our friends at Civita, American Purpose is republishing an excerpt from Mathilde Fasting’s conversation with Francis Fukuyama. This transcript has been lightly edited, and a recording of the full conversation is available.

Mathilde Fasting: Twenty years ago, you wrote a book called Our Post-Human Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. How do you see the ability to modify human behavior or biology affecting liberal democracy?

Francis Fukuyama: In the late '90s, I was running a seminar on new technologies and their impact, focusing on both IT and biotech. At the time, I believed that the biotech revolution could have more significant consequences, and I still think that may be true. While we have witnessed the downsides of social media and information technology in the interim, the biotech revolution has the potential to affect human behavior and biology, thus influencing liberal democracy.

The reason I believe biotech could have significant political effects is because it provides tools for certain individuals to control the behavior of others. Totalitarianism in the 20th century demonstrated the attempts of highly centralized governments to control the behavior of their populations using techniques like agitation, propaganda, re-education, and police state enforcement. However, these methods proved insufficient in the long run, as seen with the breakdown of the Soviet Union and China's struggles to control its population.

Biomedical technologies, particularly germline interventions that can alter heritable human characteristics, could have a profound impact on our understanding of human rights. Human rights are based on our implicit or explicit understanding of human nature, and the most crucial rights are those that respond to the core aspects of being human. Manipulating human nature through biotechnology could ultimately change the nature of rights.

It's important to note that germline engineering is not the only technology with the potential to control behavior. Psychopharmacological interventions and the use of drugs to regulate mood and behavior have already revolutionized our ability to influence behavior. For instance, we currently use drugs like selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) like Prozac and Xanax and amphetamines such as Ritalin to control behavior in children. These interventions will likely increase in the future.

However, the IT revolution has had more noticeable short-term impacts, particularly in the realm of social media. Initially, many of us believed that increased access to information would be democratizing and beneficial for democracy. We thought that spreading power through increased information access would be positive. While power has indeed devolved, we have also witnessed the elimination of hierarchical structures that certified and verified the quality of information. As a result, a lack of trust permeates societies, and we now struggle not only with disagreements about values but also with an inability to agree on simple factual information.

This lack of trust has fueled polarization, as different factions hold contrasting understandings of reality. In the United States, for example, there is a deep divide where one group believes that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump, and no amount of contrary information can sway their belief. This polarization based on divergent understandings of reality poses a danger, and the forthcoming AI revolution may exacerbate this issue. The verifiability of digital artifacts will become increasingly challenging, making it difficult to authenticate information.

For instance, the advent of deep fakes and advanced image manipulation techniques such as generative fill-in programs like Photoshop raise concerns about the authenticity of digital documents. The decline in trust in digital evidence will extend to social institutions in general.

In the future, this lack of trust and the increasing sophistication of interventions will pose challenges in various domains, including in legal proceedings. Authentication of evidence, such as photographic proof in court cases, may be met with skepticism and accusations of manipulation or fabrication.

MF: Can you say something about biotech and the post-human future? I remember that you wrote something about differences between the West and China when it comes to manipulating things, and I'd like you to elaborate a bit on that.

FF: I think that one of the problems is in regulation. If you look at the history of technology, it's always been this race between technological development and the ability of societies to regulate it. And it always takes a long time for that to happen. Think of the printing press when Gutenberg invented movable type. This had a great impact on the Protestant Reformation, for one thing, and the spread of different ideas or challenges to the Catholic Church. That led to 150 years of religious warfare, and eventually, people reconciled themselves to printing. You think about radio, television, their relationship to the rise of fascism and Stalinism. These were technologies that allowed dictators to connect to mass audiences. It took time, but we've kind of figured out how to regulate and deal with those kinds of technologies.

There's going to be a lag between the time that the technology is introduced and the time that society can catch up with it. With biotech, it's very hard to regulate. I have a colleague at Stanford who works with high school students. There's a kind of standardized biotech lab that can do different kinds of interventions using the CRISPR technology that fits inside a shipping container. Many high schools are having competitions with their students that want to do this kind of genetic manipulation. What my colleague does is to create a set of norms that these student groups will follow because it is impossible to monitor what they're doing. So, how do we regulate nuclear weapons and other dangerous technology? Well, we've got overhead satellite photographs and we've got nuclear inspectors and so forth. And because it requires a country to actually engage in that kind of industrial production of nuclear fuel, we can pretty much monitor what's going on in North Korea, Iran, and this sort of thing. With biotech, it's impossible. The technology does not require large facilities, it's very widespread, and the only way that you can hope to regulate it is through some kind of normative intervention that will give the researchers standards that they need to impose on themselves.

And a lot of the work that's being done is very scary. I have another Stanford colleague who runs a biomedical research lab and has been really worried about this. You're probably following the controversy over the Wuhan lab leak, which was dismissed by many people as right-wing propaganda. But now there's evidence that indicates that the whole COVID epidemic was the result of sloppy security at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. We can expect further things: This colleague of mine has another scary briefing about how an American researcher downloaded the genetic code for a monkeypox virus that he created in his lab. This wasn't a virus that was created from another virus; it was simply digital information that was available to anyone on the Internet. And he used this to create a completely novel variant of monkeypox that could be much more virulent than the existing one. And what's going to prevent the spread of this? The only way that you can monitor whether anyone in the world is doing this kind of research is to depend on the responsibility of the organizations and the individual scientists that are working on this sort of thing. And it's very hard to know at what point somebody's going to breach those norms and do very dangerous things.

I spent a long time in the early 2000s thinking about how to regulate biotechnology. One thing I observed and felt was that this stuff is going to happen in Asia long before it's going to happen in Europe or in the United States because, frankly, this is a cultural thing. In countries with a Christian religious heritage, there is a belief in a fairly sharp dichotomy between human and non-human nature. There is a belief that God endowed human beings with a certain degree of dignity that non-human nature doesn't have. This belief forms the basis for our understanding of human rights or the universality of human rights. But it also means a kind of downgrading of the natural world on the other side of this dichotomy.

In most Asian cultural traditions, this dichotomy doesn't really exist. There is a continuum from non-human nature to human nature, and the ability to manipulate one spills over into the other. In fact, China was the first country where a germline experiment on a human embryo was conducted. Although it was shut down, and the scientist involved was punished, I believe that these cultural inhibitions will be much stronger in Europe and North America than in other parts of Asia.

So, this is the larger problem of regulating technology of any sort. You can decide to regulate it within your territorial jurisdiction, but it's going to happen somewhere else. This is also the problem with the idea of regulating AI. If we do it in Europe or the United States, we still have competition with China and other big countries. They might pull ahead, and we'll ask ourselves, "Are we self-limiting this critical technology that will then be developed by somebody else and used against us?" Unless we have a global regulatory scheme, we're stuck in this competition.

MF: Previously, you wrote in American Purpose on the possible social impacts of AI. Even if you say that it's a fool's errand to predict the long term, for instance, of social consequences of AI and technology, can you tell me what we know so far about the overall effect of social media, the Internet, and technology on democracy?

FF: If you think about the transformation that has occurred over the last fifty years with the rise of a whole class of information technologies, there's a broad conclusion by economists that it has increased socioeconomic inequality. There's something to this because right now the main social divide in most countries, most certainly in most advanced democracies, is one that is really based on education. And if you have a higher education, if you've gone to the University of Oslo or you have a degree, you're doing well, your income is much higher, and the gap between those people and people with just a high school education or less has grown enormously—almost everywhere. There's no question that much of the current populism that we see around the world is fuelled by that division, that people that vote for populist politicians are usually less educated people. They don't live in big cities, they are not connected to a kind of larger global economy, and that is upsetting our democratic politics.

However, one consequence that I don't think people have recognized sufficiently is a massive decrease in inequality that was brought about by the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial economy, and that concerns gender relations. The replacement of physical labor by machines and the shift in the nature of work from an industrial economy to a post-industrial one—in which most people instead of working in factories or lifting heavy objects, are sitting in front of computer screens all day in a service industry—has had an enormous impact on the role of women in the economy. Beginning in the late 1960s, virtually every advanced society began to see significant increases in female labor force participation. Now, some people might say this was an ideological or a cultural change, that there was a movement for women's equality that appeared at that time. This is one of those areas where I think cause and effect are very hard to disentangle. It is certainly the case that you could not have had the degree of female empowerment if you didn't have occupations for women where they could earn salaries, support families, and be independent of their husbands. And this began to happen as tens, hundreds of millions of women all over the world entered the workplace in the late 20th century.

And so the consequences of technological change are complicated and hard to foresee. The shift to digitization has had both positive and negative impacts. But it's very hard to say that overall, it's simply increased inequality.

Audience member: Do you think that artificial intelligence will further accelerate democratic decline, or do you think that there's light at the end of the tunnel?

FF: I think there are two clear challenges that the current generation of artificial intelligence poses for democracy. Firstly, there is the general dissolution of our certainty about the information we receive. Deep fakes make it difficult to determine the authenticity of anything we see on the Internet. However, there are AI-based authentication technologies that can be used to certify the provenance of a particular digital artifact. Regulation needs to catch up with technology because once we recognize the general problem of mistrust, we need technological means to verify the authenticity of digital content. The solution is not to ban the technology but to use it for control and verification.

The second challenge is an intensification of what already exists. Social media has been effective at manipulating people through targeted advertising. With artificial intelligence, targeting can become smarter and more adaptive. Once people realize they are being targeted, the manipulation can change automatically by machines, which poses difficulties in detection. I've observed this on Twitter, where the coverage of the Ukraine war shifted subtly after Elon Musk took over, showing less pro-Ukrainian content and more sympathetic content towards Russia. This subtle manipulation can have cumulative effects over time.

On the question of totalitarian control, China's social credit system represents a new level of individual monitoring made possible by machine learning and large-scale data analysis. With the integration of COVID monitoring and the general social control system, China now has extensive knowledge of an individual's whereabouts, social interactions, and conversations. While it is a powerful form of control, even such high levels of monitoring have not always yielded the desired outcome, as seen when people protested against zero COVID measures.

It is challenging to predict the effectiveness of these technologies in undermining democracy. In many cases, using technology to counter the negative impacts of technology might be our best solution.

Francis Fukuyama is chairman of the editorial board of American Purpose and Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow and director of the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Mathilde Fasting is a project manager and fellow at Civita, a Norwegian think tank dedicated to liberal ideas, institutions, and policies based on individual liberty and personal responsibility.

Image: An AI-generated image using the prompt "democracy in the age of artificial intelligence." (Images.ai)

americanpurpose.com · by Francis Fukuyama · July 31, 2023

5. Fitch Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating

Fitch Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating

The ratings agency said that the downgrade reflects an ‘erosion of governance’

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fitch-downgrades-u-s-credit-rating-56c73b89?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Matt Grossman and Andrew Duehren

Updated Aug. 1, 2023 7:25 pm ET

Fitch Ratings downgraded the U.S. government’s credit rating weeks after President Biden and congressional Republicans came to the brink of a historic default, warning about the growing debt burden and political dysfunction in Washington.

The downgrade, the first by a major ratings firm in more than a decade, is evidence that increasingly frequent political skirmishes over the U.S. government’s finances are clouding the outlook for the $25 trillion global market for Treasurys. Fitch’s rating on the U.S. now stands at “AA+”, or one notch below the top “AAA” grade.

America’s reputation for reliably making good on its IOUs has cast Treasury bonds in an indispensable role in global markets: a safe-haven security offering nearly risk-free returns. Treasurys serve as a critical benchmark for returns on stocks and other bonds, because investors generally demand greater yields on any other securities that they buy.

Few investors believe that Fitch’s downgrade will immediately challenge that role. Still, it is the first time a ratings firm lowered its headline assessment of the U.S. government’s propensity to pay its bills on time since Standard & Poor’s in 2011 lowered its rating one notch below the top grade. That decision followed another tense debt-ceiling standoff in Congress.

Moody’s, the other member of the three big U.S. ratings firms, continues to give the U.S. its strongest assessment.

Fitch said Tuesday that the downgrade reflects an “erosion of governance” in the U.S. relative to other top-tier economies over the last two decades.

“The repeated debt-limit political standoffs and last-minute resolutions have eroded confidence in fiscal management,” the agency said.

Biden administration officials criticized Fitch’s decision, blaming governance problems on the Trump administration and arguing that the U.S. was not at risk of missing its debt payments.

“The change by Fitch Ratings announced today is arbitrary and based on outdated data,” Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said in a statement.

Administration officials said Fitch staff, in justifying their concerns over the U.S. political system, repeatedly raised the events of Jan. 6, 2021, when supporters of former President Donald Trump stormed the capital saying the 2020 election was stolen.

Trump was indicted Tuesday for his efforts to overturn his loss to Biden in that election. He has denied wrongdoing, and has repeatedly accused prosecutors of pursuing him for political reasons.

Congress passed legislation suspending the government’s borrowing limit in early June, just days before the deadline Yellen had given for when the government would become unable to pay all of its bills on time.

The eventual compromise, which set caps on federal spending and raised the debt limit for roughly two years, came after months of deadlock between Democrats and Republicans. Republicans had demanded spending cuts in an echo of previous clashes over government borrowing, which Democrats resisted for months. During the impasse, Fitch said it was considering downgrading the U.S.

Fitch said it expects the general government deficit to rise to 6.3% of gross domestic product in 2023 from 3.7% last year. The expected deficit growth reflects cyclically weaker federal revenues, new spending initiatives and a higher interest burden, Fitch said. The firm expects the U.S. economy to slip into a recession later this year.

Institutional investors and day traders alike rely on credit ratings to assess the risk that major borrowers such as governments and corporations won’t make good on debt that they owe. Low-rated institutions typically must compensate investors with higher interest payments in exchange for the privilege of borrowing.

Presiding over the world’s largest economy and in charge of its most important currency, the U.S. government is typically treated as among the safest borrowers anywhere. Banks and companies around the globe often think of U.S. Treasurys as if they are as reliable and liquid as cash—a premise that relies on sacrosanct confidence in the government’s ability to pay its bills.

On Wall Street, banks and investors are unlikely to step back abruptly from their reliance on Treasurys as a safe-haven benchmark following the actions of a single rating agency, said Luke Tilley, chief economist at Wilmington Trust. But moves such as Fitch’s incrementally degrade the confidence that global financial markets place in the U.S. government’s creditworthiness, he said.

“Rome wasn’t built in a day, and it didn’t fall apart in a day either,” Tilley said in an interview in May, when the U.S. was facing an imminent default. “But if the two parties in Washington are going to force investors to rethink whether the U.S. will pay its bills, investors will do exactly that.”

Dean Seal contributed to this article.

Write to Matt Grossman at matt.grossman@wsj.com and Andrew Duehren at andrew.duehren@wsj.com

6. If Ukraine is Any Barometer of Expenditure Rates in Modern War, America Is Gonna Lose Taiwan

I remember being in CAS3 (Combined Armed Services Staff School) just before the ColD War ended and having to conduct analysis of logistics requirements for conventional combat operations (now Large Scale Combat Operations LSCO). I especially recall the references we were using for both casualty rates and ammunition expenditure rates. They were based on World War II statistics. We had no analytical calculations since then. Do those references even exist today? What data are we using to project expenditure rates for future LSCO? Are we going to draw data from Putin's War in Ukraine?

Graphics at the link: https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/08/if-ukraine-is-any-barometer-of-expenditure-rates-in-modern-war-america-is-gonna-lose-taiwan/

If Ukraine is Any Barometer of Expenditure Rates in Modern War, America Is Gonna Lose Taiwan

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · August 1, 2023

U.S. President Joe Biden’s decision to send cluster munitions to Ukraine is important, but it has served up yet another reminder that the U.S. is short on stuff that blows up. Responding to reporters’ questions about the decision to send those shells, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said, “We need to build a bridge from where we are today to when we have enough monthly production of unitary rounds.”

Building a production and manufacturing “bridge” for munitions and mines takes time. These lines and workforces are not light switches that can be turned off and on quickly. From the consolidation of firms and suppliers, to long lead times for parts and energetics, and a number of other issues in between, our inability to produce munitions at scale has numerous causes.

Funding Woes

Dig a little deeper, though, and it is clear that money is the main reason the munitions industrial base lacks surge capacity. And like so much else when it comes to the state of our military today, the insufficient funds are no accident.

When past defense budgets did not provide for real growth, policymakers often allowed munitions to take the hit, choosing to support other underfunded accounts. Flying hours, munitions, sustainment, and workforce are regular bill payers for other defense priorities, according to Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante.

The result is munitions funding — and therefore production — that has come in waves. From over $30 billion at the end of the Cold War, funding fell to around $10 billion during the so-called procurement holiday of the 1990s, and it sits just under $20 billion today. There has not been for decades a sustained and steady increase in how much we spend on the things that give our planes, tanks, and ships firepower.

In a smaller snapshot of the above graph’s timeframe, Eric Lofgren found that between fiscal years 2011 and 2020, Congress tended to “cut roughly 40 percent of all munitions procurement line items.” That creates a lot of unpredictability and uncertainty. It makes industry suspect that this moment of support for Ukraine and Taiwan is just another episode of Lucy pulling away the football when it comes to promised munitions investments.

Deadly Variance

Absent a sustained increase in spending for munitions and mines, industrial bases are left without a clear demand signal. They see variance rather than upward consistency. Many of these highly unique and specialized contractors operate in a monopsony market — unless they are lucky enough to support a foreign military sales contract, their sole customer is the Pentagon.

Year-to-year variance from their sole customer makes it difficult to keep plants open at all, and it is near-impossible for private industry to proactively invest. As the war in Ukraine has shown, even when plants are fully cranking, it can take years to surge production.

Receiving relatively few dollars from the shrunken procurement pot makes it hard for these companies to keep lines open. Just over 10 percent of procurement dollars today buy the payloads that make the weapons for our weapons systems. Without bullets, bombs, missiles, or rockets, our weapons systems are little more than very expensive paperweights.

It is crucial that Washington not only outfit the military with the weapons it needs immediately, but also build a resilient stockpile capable of lasting in a protracted war.

Munitions Win Wars

Take for example the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), an air-launched projectile that would be key to defeating enemy fleets in a potential conflict. In the president’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2024, the Pentagon procures only 118 of these missiles, split between the Navy and Air Force. In previous fiscal years, the quantities were even smaller.

In a conflict with sophisticated enemies, insufficient quantities of key munitions would quickly limit the U.S. military’s ability to win. A CSIS wargame estimated that in a potential conflict with China over Taiwan, the U.S. would deplete its stockpile of LRASMs within a week, a dreary reality check for our brittle industrial base.

Even when given the tools, namely funding and authorities, to fix this problem, not all parties use them fully. For instance, last year Congress provided authorities for the signing of multiyear procurement contracts to purchase a variety of munitions, and the Army and Air Force are smartly taking advantage.

Yet House appropriators won’t approve requests for the SM-6 and AMRAAM missiles, sending yet another wavering signal to industry about U.S. willingness to spend on missiles and munitions. Worse, House appropriators cut funding for Air Force missile procurement and Navy weapons procurement by over $1 billion for the coming fiscal year.

Congress cannot keep shorting munitions investments and expect anything but a brittle, fragile, slow-to-respond industrial base. Only clear and consistent demand and funding will change the trend. Congress should allow multiyear authority for these two missiles and use supplemental funding to add more funds to the missiles and munitions accounts that are not yet maxed out. Purposeful and sustained commitment to munitions production is crucial to revitalizing our ailing industrial base and fixing the munitions shortages.

Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness. She is also a regular guest lecturer at universities, a member of the board of advisers of the Alexander Hamilton Society, and a member of the steering committee of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security.

19fortyfive.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · August 1, 2023

7. China replaces elite nuclear leadership in surprise military shake-up

Excerpts:

While it remains unclear what triggered the changes, or whether Li or Xu have been reassigned to different positions, experts say the shuffle suggests potential concerns about the force leadership from Xi.

It also comes at a time of heightened importance for the branch, which handles China’s missile programs from its nuclear-tipped weapons to the shorter-range missiles used in its recent intimidation of self-governing Taiwan, which China’s ruling Communist Party claims as its own and has not ruled out taking by force.

“The shake-up is fairly significant,” said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Washington-based Stimson Center think tank, adding that’s especially the case if it emerges that this is part of a larger inquiry into the force.

“Especially at a time when China is trying to build up its nuclear arsenal to deter potential US intervention in a Taiwan contingency, the personnel reshuffle and the underlying causes of it (would) raise skepticism about the force’s ability to carry out that mission reliably and successfully,” she said.

China replaces elite nuclear leadership in surprise military shake-up

By Brad Lendon, Simone McCarthy and Wayne Chang, CNN

Updated 5:12 AM EDT, Wed August 2, 2023

https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/02/china/china-pla-rocket-force-shakeup-new-leaders-intl-hnk-ml-mic/index.html?utm

CNN —

China has revealed two new leaders of its People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force this week in a surprise shake-up that has raised questions about the inner workings at the top of the military branch overseeing the nation’s powerful arsenal of nuclear and ballistic missiles.

On Monday, state media named Wang Houbin as commander of the Rocket Force and Xu Xisheng as the political commissar of the force in a report highlighting their promotion to the rank of general by Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

State media has yet to release any information about previous chief Li Yuchao, a veteran of the force who had only served as commander since the start of last year, a comparatively short tenure, or about previous commissar Xu Zhongbo.

The replacement of two top figures in the Rocket Force in one sweep with military figures from outside the branch — as Wang comes from the navy and and Xu Xisheng the air force — is an unusual move, experts say. And it comes a week after China’s former foreign minister, Qin Gang, was suddenly and dramatically ousted from his office without explanation.

The Rocket Force reshuffle follows several weeks of rumors that a leadership change was afoot as Li had not been in public view, now further fueled by a lack of confirmation about his current position within China’s opaque political system.

The last time Li and Xu Zhongbo were mentioned as Rocket Force leaders was in an April 6 statement from the local government in Suzhou city, where they attended a wreath-laying commemoration ceremony, according to a CNN search.

While it remains unclear what triggered the changes, or whether Li or Xu have been reassigned to different positions, experts say the shuffle suggests potential concerns about the force leadership from Xi.

It also comes at a time of heightened importance for the branch, which handles China’s missile programs from its nuclear-tipped weapons to the shorter-range missiles used in its recent intimidation of self-governing Taiwan, which China’s ruling Communist Party claims as its own and has not ruled out taking by force.

“The shake-up is fairly significant,” said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Washington-based Stimson Center think tank, adding that’s especially the case if it emerges that this is part of a larger inquiry into the force.

“Especially at a time when China is trying to build up its nuclear arsenal to deter potential US intervention in a Taiwan contingency, the personnel reshuffle and the underlying causes of it (would) raise skepticism about the force’s ability to carry out that mission reliably and successfully,” she said.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping, center, with new Rocket Force leadership Wang Houbin, back left, and Xu Xisheng, back right, after their promotion to the rank of general in Beijing on July 31, 2023.

Li Gang/Xinhua/Getty Images

Tight control

Xi, China’s most assertive leader in a generation, has overseen an extensive expansion of the military and consolidated his control over its ranks since he came to power in 2012.

This has included an extensive anti-corruption crackdown, with investigations into current and former top military leaders, including from the heart of the Communist Party’s leading Central Military Commission, though fewer such high-profile moves have been announced in recent years.

On Tuesday, the 96th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the official military newspaper ran a commentary calling on military personnel to be loyal to, support, safeguard and defend Xi as the “core” of the Communist Party.

“We must enhance military governance … persist in efforts to rectify conduct, instill discipline and fight corruption,” the commentary said.

The changes in military leadership also come amid a shake-up in China’s diplomatic leadership after Qin, who was appointed foreign minister at the end of last year, was suddenly ousted after a month-long absence from public view and replaced by his predecessor, Wang Yi.

Beijing gave no reason for the change, making the case yet another example of the lack of transparency in China’s political system.

Hawaii-based analyst Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, said the shake-up atop the Rocket Force is likely part of Xi’s bid to ensure those in the PLA’s most powerful positions are absolutely loyal to him.

“Xi appears to be placing loyalty to him over technical and operational experience and knowledge,” Schuster said.

China is erasing mention of its former foreign minister. But it still hasn't said why

The newly appointed Rocket Force leadership both previously held deputy positions in other parts of the military.

Wang was the former deputy commander of the PLA Navy, while Xu was the former deputy political commissar of the Southern Theater Command, one of the PLA’s five theater commands. The commissar represents the Communist Party and monitors its control within the PLA.

Neil Thomas, a fellow for Chinese politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, said the moves were not in step with typical personnel changes.

“It’s unusual for Beijing to appoint outsiders to lead the Rocket Force, it’s unusual to simultaneously replace both the commander and political commissar of any force, and it’s unusual how previous leaders disappeared for the (past) several months,” he said.

Roderick Lee, director of research, USAF Air University China Aerospace Studies Institute in the US, said “the most unusual part of the announcement itself was probably the selection of a previously PLA Navy officer to become the Rocket Force Commander. This is extremely odd, but not entirely unheard of.”

CNN has approached China’s Ministry of Defense for comment on the leadership changes.

Video Ad Feedback

Analysts warn of intensifying arms race across Asia (November, 2021)

03:55 - Source: CNN

New missile silos

The leadership change comes as evidence points to an expanding Chinese nuclear force – creating an even more important role for the Rocket Force, which until 2016 was known as the PLA Second Artillery Force.

In the past few years, satellite photos have shown the construction of what appears to be hundreds of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles in Chinese deserts, and the US Defense Department is predicting exponential growth in the number of nuclear warheads in Beijing’s arsenal in the next decade.

China could have 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035: Pentagon report

China could have some 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 if Beijing continues to expand its stockpile at the current pace, according to a 2022 US Defense Department report on China’s military development.

This has created concern among some analysts about the lack of transparency around the latest leadership changes, especially given the need for international communication around nuclear weaponry – and within the context of the current lack of high-level military communication between China and the United States.

“These are the guys who have their finger on the nuclear trigger. They are responsible for handling and delivering China’s nuclear weapons,” said Drew Thompson, a senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

“Having this kind of personnel turnover with no transparency, no communication, reduces trust, increases the risk of misperception and underscores the need for the US and China to have … authoritative dialogues about strategic nuclear dynamics,” Thompson said.

8. Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

The 240 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2500/RRA2555-1/RAND_RRA2555-1.pdf

Excerpts:

The nature of warfare has evolved since the Cold War, and it has become increasingly clear that the U.S. defense strategy and posture are insolvent.
The U.S. defense strategy has been predicated on U.S. military forces that were superior in all domains to those of any adversary. This superiority is gone. The United States and its allies no longer have a virtual monopoly on the technologies and capabilities that made them so dominant against adversarial forces.

Inflection Point

How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

by Ochmanek, David A., Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Michael J. Mazarr

rand.org · by David A. Ochmanek

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The U.S. defense strategy and posture have become insolvent. Sustained, coordinated efforts by the United States, its allies, and its key partners are necessary to deter and defeat modern threats, including Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and reconstituted forces and China's economic takeoff and concomitant military modernization. This report offers ideas on how to address shortcomings in defense preparations.

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Inflection Point

How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

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FormatFile SizeNotes PDF file 2.3 MB

Research Questions

What are the principal demands for which U.S. and allied military forces should prepare?
If those forces are deemed inadequate, what gaps exist in the capabilities, posture, and operational concepts of those forces?
What options exist to fill those gaps, and what steps should policymakers consider in reformulating plans for future forces?

The U.S. defense strategy and posture have become insolvent. The tasks that the nation expects its military forces and other elements of national power to do internationally exceed the means that are available to accomplish those tasks. Sustained, coordinated efforts by the United States and its allies are necessary to deter and defeat modern threats, including Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and reconstituted forces and China's economic takeoff and concomitant military modernization. This report offers ideas on how to address shortcomings in defense preparations.

Key Findings

The nature of warfare has evolved since the Cold War, and it has become increasingly clear that the U.S. defense strategy and posture are insolvent.
The U.S. defense strategy has been predicated on U.S. military forces that were superior in all domains to those of any adversary. This superiority is gone. The United States and its allies no longer have a virtual monopoly on the technologies and capabilities that made them so dominant against adversarial forces.
U.S. and allied forces do not require superiority to defeat aggression by even their most powerful foes. The United States, acting in concert with key allies and partners, can restore credible postures of deterrence against major aggression without having to regain overmatch in any operational domain against China or Russia.
Russia's brutal and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine has awakened North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the risk of a wider war in the Euro-Atlantic area. This realization has motivated allies to make significant increases in defense spending and preparedness, but much more must be done over the next few years to deter and defend the region against further aggression by Russia's reconstituted military forces.
Taiwan has embraced the rhetoric of asymmetric warfare, but its budget reflects a preference for legacy systems. As a result, there is a gap between the United States' and Taiwan's goals for the direction of Taiwan's defense program.

Recommendations

Equip and posture forces and support assets for rapid and robust response.
Field the basic elements of a multidomain sensing and targeting grid.
Field weapons and platforms capable of delivering sufficient levels of lethality into contested battlespaces to impose severe attrition on the enemy's invasion force in the opening days of a conflict.
Ensure that inventories of preferred munitions and other consumables are sufficient to carry out continued strikes against enemy forces.
Articulate a short list of priority operational challenges for defeating aggression in highly contested environments.
Incentivize innovation.
Make Congress a partner.
Define the future operational concept; efforts will be immeasurably enhanced if all stakeholders have a shared understanding of how joint and combined forces are intended to fight in the future.
Accelerate force adaptation.
Taiwan should assess both its existing force and all future investments to determine the ability of these investments to survive and operate effectively against full-scale attack on Taiwan.
Encourage NATO allies to meet agreed-on defense investment goals and force posture requirements and to devote more resources to military capabilities for sustained, high-end conventional operations, including five-year plans to enlarge munitions inventories.
Create a more resilient forward posture for collective defense on NATO's eastern flank. Work with allies to bring all eight battle groups on NATO's eastern flank to brigade strength and enhance readiness and exercises to realize the force generation goals of the allied Force Model.
Provide Ukraine with assurances of long-term Western security assistance and training and a clear path to NATO membership.

Chapter One
Converging Crises and the Imperative for Change
Chapter Two
Defense Without Dominance: Restoring Balances in Conventional Military Power
Chapter Three
Fighting Together: The Evolving Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Partners
Chapter Four
Restoring Solvency

Research conducted by

RAND National Security Research Division

This research was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Document Details

Copyright: RAND Corporation
Availability: Available
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Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1159-2
Document Number: RR-A2555-1
Year: 2023
Series: Research Reports

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Ochmanek, David A., Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Michael J. Mazarr, Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html. Also available in print form.

Ochmanek, David A., Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Michael J. Mazarr, Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence, RAND Corporation, RR-A2555-1, 2023. As of July 27, 2023: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html

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rand.org · by David A. Ochmanek

9. China secretly sends enough gear to Russia to equip an army

Excerpts:

Maxim Mironov, a sanctions expert and professor of finance at the IE Business School in Madrid, reckons that the West, despite expanding sanctions to punish Putin’s helpers, lacks the political conviction to enforce them against Beijing.

“Do politicians have enough will to put sanctions on China? Basically, the answer is no,” said Mironov.

“China signals: You can try, but I don’t care what you are trying to do,” Mironov added. “And the European Union is like: If you don’t like it, we are not going to do it. And if the Chinese see that, they are just going to continue doing what they think is in their best interest.”

The European Commission, the U.S. National Security Council and the Chinese Mission to the EU did not respond to requests for comment.

China secretly sends enough gear to Russia to equip an army

Shipments of military-capable hardware expose a China-sized loophole in Western sanctions.

Politico · by Lili Bayer · July 24, 2023

Press play to listen to this article

Voiced by artificial intelligence.

The pictures posted on the Chinese company’s website show a tall, Caucasian man with a crew cut and flattened nose inspecting body armor at its factory.

“This spring, one of our customers came to our company to confirm the style and quantity of bulletproof vests, and carefully tested the quality of our vests,” Shanghai H Win, a manufacturer of military-grade protective gear, proudly reported on its website in March. The customer “immediately directly confirmed the order quantity of bulletproof vests and subsequent purchase intention.”

The identity of the smiling customer isn’t clear, but there’s a fair chance he was Russian: According to customs records obtained by POLITICO, Russian buyers have declared orders for hundreds of thousands of bulletproof vests and helmets made by Shanghai H Win — the items listed in the documents match those in the company’s online catalog.

Evidence of this kind shows that China, despite Beijing’s calls for peace, is pushing right up to a red line in delivering enough nonlethal, but militarily useful, equipment to Russia to have a material impact on President Vladimir Putin’s 17-month-old war on Ukraine. The protective gear would be sufficient to equip many of the men mobilized by Russia since the invasion. Then there are drones that can be used to direct artillery fire or drop grenades, and thermal optical sights to target the enemy at night.

These shipments point to a China-sized loophole in the West’s attempts to hobble Putin’s war machine. The sale of so-called dual-use technology that can have both civilian and military uses leaves just enough deniability for Western authorities looking for reasons not to confront a huge economic power like Beijing.

The wartime strength of China’s exports of dual-use products to Russia is confirmed by customs data. And, while Ukraine is a customer of China too, its imports of most of the equipment covered in this story have fallen sharply, the figures show.

Russia has imported more than $100 million-worth of drones from China so far this year — 30 times more than Ukraine. And Chinese exports of ceramics, a component used in body armor, increased by 69 percent to Russia to more than $225 million, while dropping by 61 percent to Ukraine to a mere $5 million, Chinese and Ukrainian customs data show.

“What is very clear is that China, for all its claims that it is a neutral actor, is in fact supporting Russia’s positions in this war,” said Helena Legarda, a lead analyst specializing in Chinese defense and foreign policy at the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a Berlin think tank.

Were China to cross the red line and sell weapons or military equipment to Russia, Legarda said she would expect the EU to enforce secondary sanctions targeting enablers of Putin’s war of aggression.

But, she added, equipment like body armor, thermal imaging, and even commercial drones that can be used in offensive frontline operations are unlikely to trigger a response.

“Then there’s this situation that we’re in at the moment — all these dual-use components or equipment and how you handle those,” Legarda explained. “I would not expect the EU to be able to agree to sanctions on that.”

Disappearing customer

Shanghai H Win, like other Chinese companies producing dual-use equipment, has enjoyed a surge in business since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

According to customs records obtained by POLITICO, Russia has ordered hundreds of thousands of bulletproof vests and helmets made by Shanghai H Win | Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images

“Because of the war, a lot of trading companies are looking for us and ask: 'Are you making this kind of vest?' We received a lot of inquiries,” a sales representative told POLITICO over the phone.

At first, the representative said Shanghai H Win wasn’t allowed to export directly to Russia unless the Chinese military issues a certificate and it can provide documentary proof of its final customer.

Yet when asked who the man in the pictures was, and where he was from, the representative denied that he was even a customer — even though the website said so.

“He is our customer's customer. We cannot ask him directly, 'Where are you from?' But I guess maybe he is from Europe — maybe Ukraine, maybe Poland, even maybe from Russia. I'm not sure.”

Shortly after the call, Shanghai H Win took down the post featuring the mystery shopper from its website.

Who are the buyers?

So, who exactly are those customers? Evidence of deals — importers, suppliers, and product descriptions — can be found in a registry of declarations of conformity by anyone with access to the Russian internet who is familiar with international customs classifications.

In an earlier story, POLITICO searched these filings and found evidence that sniper bullets made in the United States were reaching Russia, where they were freely available on the black market.

The declarations enable the final buyer to certify that the products are genuine and, in effect, make it possible to import goods without the express consent of the maker. If goods are traded through an intermediary, the maker may not even be aware that its goods are going to Russia. The registry is, however, searchable so it’s still easy to find the ultimate buyers of the Chinese kit.

One is Silva, a company headquartered in the remote Eastern Siberian region of Buryatia. It filed declarations in January of this year detailing orders for 100,000 bulletproof vests and 100,000 helmets. The manufacturer? Shanghai H Win.

Such importers often bear the hallmarks of “one-day" firms, as shell companies are known in Russia, set up by actors who want to conceal their dealings. They tend to be new, listed at obscure residential addresses, and have few staff or assets. Their financial statements often don’t report the levels of turnover that the filings would imply.

According to public records, Silva was registered only last September. It reported zero revenues for 2022. A Google Street View search of its address in Ulan-Ude, the capital of Buryatia, takes visitors to a dilapidated apartment block.

POLITICO tried to contact Silva but the phone number given on its filings rang off the hook and a message sent to its email address bounced.

The sale of so-called dual-use technology that can have both civilian and military uses leaves enough deniability for Western authorities looking for reasons not to confront China | STR/AFP via Getty Images

Another Russian company called Rika declared a smaller shipment of body armor from Shanghai H Win in March. Before that, in January, Rika declared a consignment of helmets from a company called Deekon Shanghai.

A woman who answered the phone at Rika said: “We buy in Russia, not in China.” The company didn't reply to a follow-up email from POLITICO.

The denial is hardly plausible: In addition to the protective gear, a search of declarations by Rika threw up hits for deals for thermal optical equipment from China. That was corroborated by customs data accessed by POLITICO, which revealed more than 220 shipments, worth $11 million, for thermal optics and protective equipment since the outbreak of the war. Rika advertises Chinese-made night sights right at the top of its website.

Another Russian company called Legittelekom, whose homepage reveals it to be a Moscow freight forwarding company, also appears as a buyer of 100,000 items of headgear and 100,000 suits of outerwear from Deekon Shanghai, according to filings dated last November 24.

A man who answered a call to Legittelekom declined to comment on POLITICO’s findings and would not say whether the company supplied the Russian military.

“This is a commercial activity and we do not disclose our commercial activities,” the man said in response to both questions.

Deekon said in an email to POLITICO that it has not exported any helmets and bulletproof vests to Russia. "Our company fully complies with Chinese laws and regulations and strictly adheres to all export controls and licensing requirements," it said.

Bigger deal

Then there’s Pozitron, a company based in Rostov-on-Don, the southern city briefly captured by warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner mercenaries in their failed uprising last month. It imported more than $60 million-worth of “airsoft helmets,” “miscellaneous ceramics,” and other items from Chinese firm Beijing KRNatural in November and December 2022, according to customs data shared by ImportGenius.

These flows check out with Pozitron’s own declarations of conformity between late October and December 2022, for a total of 100,000 helmets. The declarations also reveal that Pozitron acquired a range of drones from Chinese multinational SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd last December.

Although the quantity is unclear, the models specified include ones known to have been used in the Ukrainian theater of war, like DJI’s Mavic 2 Enterprise Advanced quadcopter or the Mini 2 lightweight drone.

At first sight, the product descriptions in the declarations and customs records appear harmless enough — the “airsoft helmets,” for example, are said to be for use in paintball games and “not for military use, not for dual use.”

Sanctions and defense experts say, however, that it’s common practice to mislabel dual-use goods as being for civilian purposes when they’re in fact destined for the battlefield.

At any rate, Pozitron, which was only founded in March 2021, is having a very good war: Its revenues exploded from 31 million rubles — around $400,000 — in 2021 to 20 billion rubles — almost $300 million — in 2022, according to its financial statement.

Reached by email, Pozitron’s general director, Andrey Vitkovsky, said that his company has “never imported drones and similar products” from the People’s Republic of China.

“The main activity of Pozitron LLC is the purchase and sale of consumer goods, sporting goods, and fabrics, both produced in the Russian Federation and imported from China,” Vitkovsky added, saying that his company’s activities were “exclusively peaceful in nature, in compliance with all rules and restrictions.”

The denial is typical — Russian companies have good reason to fear Western sanctions if they are implicated in trade that supports the Kremlin’s war effort. After POLITICO reported in March that a company called Tekhkrim was importing Chinese assault weapons, and declaring them as “hunting rifles,” the firm was sanctioned by the United States.

Pozitron is on the West’s radar, said one sanctions expert, who was granted anonymity as they are not authorized to speak publicly.

As for Beijing KRNatural, POLITICO was able to trace a company with a similar name at the address given in the Pozitron filings. The company, Beijing Natural Hanhua International Trade Co., Ltd, is listed as a “small and micro enterprise.” It was founded in April 2022, a few months before the Pozitron deals. Nobody answered when POLITICO called.

Heavenly mechanics

In contrast to the bulk consignments of protective gear that appear intended to equip a large fighting force, the orders for drones found by POLITICO are more dispersed among different buyers — both companies and individuals.

In addition to Pozitron, buyers of drones from DJI and its subsidiaries include firms called Gigantshina and Vozdukh — neither of which responded to emailed requests for comment. Another is Nebesnaya Mekhanika (“Heavenly Mechanics”), which before the war was the Chinese company’s official distributor in Russia.

A DJI spokesperson said that the company and its subsidiaries had voluntarily stopped all shipments to, and operations in, Russia and Ukraine on April 26, 2022 — two months after the war broke out.

“We stand alone as the only drone company to clearly denounce and actively discourage use of products in combat,” the spokesperson said in comments emailed to POLITICO.

DJI said it had also broken off its relationship with Nebesnaya Mekhanika, although the Russian company filed further declarations for shipments of the Chinese company’s drones last September 15 and on March 27 of this year.

The spokesperson said that DJI was not in any way involved in the drafting of the declarations of conformity found by POLITICO: “These documents would have been filled out by Russian parties, and they do not indicate in any shape or form who ex- or imported the products that are being declared conform.”

“We have seen media reports and other documents that appear to show how our products are being transported to Russia and Ukraine from other countries where they can be bought off-the-shelf,” the spokesperson added. “However, it is not in our power to influence how our products are being used once they leave our control.”

Still, a search of ImportGenius shows that a Hong-Kong-based company called Lotos — on behalf of DJI’s local subsidiary Iflight — has continued to ship DJI drones to Nebesnaya Mechanika. The most recent consignment was delivered last October 10. DJI denied making any shipments from its subsidiary Iflight and having any relationship with Lotos.

Nebesnaya Mekhanika, which still advertises DJI drones on its website, did not respond to a request for comment.

Political will

The trafficking of low-tech body armor to high-tech drones and thermal optics highlights a vulnerability in the Western sanctions regime. The ambiguity surrounding the dual-use status of this equipment, coupled with the fact that a significant portion of it is manufactured in China, seems, at least for now, to have placed the possibility of the West taking meaningful action beyond reach.

Then there is the flow of technology through China that may include components made in the West that could be of direct military use.

Russia is fully aware of the China loophole and is using it to buy Western technology to fight its war against Ukraine, according to a recent analysis by the KSE Institute, a think tank affiliated to the Kyiv School of Economics. More than 60 percent of imported critical components in Russian weapons found on the battlefield came from U.S. companies, the researchers found.

It’s an issue that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken brought up on a visit to Beijing last month — the first by Washington’s top diplomat in five years. He told reporters that China had given assurances that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine.” Blinken, however, expressed “ongoing concerns” that Chinese firms may be providing technology that Russia can use to advance its aggression in Ukraine. “And we have asked the Chinese government to be very vigilant about that.”

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters that China had given assurances that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine” during a visit to Beijing last month | Pool photo by Leah Millis/AFP via Getty Images

France is also concerned that China is delivering dual-use equipment to Russia. “There are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do,” Emmanuel Bonne, President Emmanuel Macron’s top diplomatic adviser, told the recent Aspen Security Forum. Pressed on whether China was supplying weapons, Bonne said: “Well, kind of military equipment ... as far as we know they are not delivering massively military capacities to Russia but (we need there to be) no delivery.”

Yet there’s little the West can do to twist Beijing’s arm into halting flows of dual-use products into Russia. Only the United States would have the real power to impose an outright ban on dollar-denominated transactions — as Washington did when it sanctioned Iran over its secret nuclear program.

The EU, however, lacks such a strong sanctions weapon because the euro is far less ubiquitous on global markets. It’s also been hesitant to act. In its latest package of Russia sanctions last month, the EU compiled a list of seven Chinese companies that shouldn’t be allowed to trade with the bloc. But, after lobbying by Beijing, Brussels dropped four companies from the blacklist.

Elina Ribakova, one of the authors of the KSE Institute report, said indirect shipments via China pose challenges in terms of both the scope and enforcement of Western sanctions. Secondary sanctions may not be sufficient, she said. She called for manufacturers to be forced to take responsibility for where their products end up — just as banks were required by regulators to step up customer oversight and anti-money laundering operations in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

“What we can do differently is to create the same infrastructure for the corporates,” explained Ribakova, who is director of the international program at the Kyiv School of Economics. “We have to threaten them with serious fines.”

Maxim Mironov, a sanctions expert and professor of finance at the IE Business School in Madrid, reckons that the West, despite expanding sanctions to punish Putin’s helpers, lacks the political conviction to enforce them against Beijing.

“Do politicians have enough will to put sanctions on China? Basically, the answer is no,” said Mironov.

“China signals: You can try, but I don’t care what you are trying to do,” Mironov added. “And the European Union is like: If you don’t like it, we are not going to do it. And if the Chinese see that, they are just going to continue doing what they think is in their best interest.”

The European Commission, the U.S. National Security Council and the Chinese Mission to the EU did not respond to requests for comment.

Stuart Lau contributed reporting. This story has been updated to include a response from Deekon Shanghai and clarify that Iflight is a Hong Kong-based subsidiary of DJI.

Politico · by Lili Bayer · July 24, 2023

10. US says formally invites new Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to Washington

US says formally invites new Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to Washington

Reuters · by Simon Lewis

WASHINGTON, Aug 1 (Reuters) - The United States has formally invited China's newly reappointed foreign minister, Wang Yi, to Washington, the U.S. State Department said on Tuesday, after Wang's predecessor was abruptly removed from his post by Beijing.

China reappointed veteran diplomat Wang last week, replacing former rising star Qin Gang, who has not been seen for more than month -- a mysterious absence after just seven months in the job that has raised questions about transparency.

China's foreign ministry has only said Qin was off work for unspecified health reasons.

The invitation to Wang was extended on Monday during a meeting at the State Department between U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink and Yang Tao, Director General of the North American and Oceania Affairs at China's Foreign Ministry, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller told a press briefing.

"In the meeting yesterday, we extended the invitation that had previously been made to foreign minister Qin Gang and made clear that invitation did transfer over," Miller said.

Miller did not say if the Chinese side had accepted the invitation but added that this was Washington's expectation.

"We certainly expect that it is something that they would accept and is a trip that we expect to happen, but we have not yet scheduled a date," Miller said.

A spokesperson for China's Washington embassy said that in the "consultation" with Kritenbrink, the two sides had "candid, in-depth and constructive exchanges of views on China-U.S. relations as well as global and regional issues of mutual interest."

"Concerning the high-level exchanges, both side have maintained necessary communication," the spokesperson added.

A U.S. readout of the discussion called it "candid, substantive, and productive" and "part of ongoing efforts to maintain open lines of communication and responsibly manage the bilateral relationship."

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Qin on June 18, on the first visit by America's top diplomat to China in five years. The U.S. State Department said then they held "candid, substantive, and constructive" talks, and Blinken invited Qin to Washington to continue discussions.

Blinken subsequently met Wang on the sidelines of a regional meeting in Jakarta in Qin's absence.

Wang, 69, served as foreign minister from 2013-2022 as ties frayed with the United States to a point Beijing described as an all-time low.

Reporting by Simon Lewis and Humeyra Pamuk; Additional reporting by David Brunnstrom; Editing by Sandra Maler and Alistair Bell

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Humeyra Pamuk

Thomson Reuters

Humeyra Pamuk is a senior foreign policy correspondent based in Washington DC. She covers the U.S. State Department, regularly traveling with U.S. Secretary of State. During her 20 years with Reuters, she has had postings in London, Dubai, Cairo and Turkey, covering everything from the Arab Spring and Syria's civil war to numerous Turkish elections and the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast. In 2017, she was won the Knight-Bagehot fellowship program at Columbia University’s School of Journalism. She holds a BA in International Relations and an MA on European Union studies.

Reuters · by Simon Lewis

11. Biden Made the Final Call on Space Command Basing. Was the Air Force Out of the Loop?

Biden Made the Final Call on Space Command Basing. Was the Air Force Out of the Loop?

military.com · by Thomas Novelly · August 1, 2023

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said for months that additional analysis was needed to decide whether U.S. Space Command should move to Alabama or remain in Colorado -- and that the decision was his to make.

But on Monday, President Joe Biden told the Pentagon that he had made the decision, a move which military experts said is unusual and clearly breaks with public comments that the choice would remain with the Air Force.

The president's decision also appeared to end a years-long political tug-of-war between lawmakers from the two states vying for the command, its prestige and all the federal dollars it could attract. Biden's announcement angered the Alabama delegation, including Rep. Mike Rogers, the Republican chairman of the House Armed Services Committee who had choked off Air Force funding to force a decision for his state.

"Today's decision by President Biden to locate the permanent headquarters of U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs will avoid any disruption to its operational capability," Kendall said in a statement. "The Department of the Air Force will now work expeditiously to implement the decision."

Kendall, who was nominated by Biden in April 2021 and confirmed by the Senate a few months later, added in his statement that "I fully support the president's decision." A Department of Air Force spokeswoman didn't comment on whether Biden's announcement came as a surprise or if he was asked to provide input on the decision.

Pentagon Press Secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said in a statement that Biden notified the Pentagon that he had selected Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado Springs for Space Command "after consultation with [Defense Secretary Lloyd] Austin and weighing the input of senior military leaders."

The White House did not immediately return a request for comment asking whether Kendall was consulted prior to the announcement and why Biden chose to make the final decision instead of the Air Force secretary.

Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, also told reporters in November that the decision was Kendall's to make.

"That is a decision by the secretary of the Air Force, and I know that they have been doing a very deliberate analysis of the two reports that came out," Dickinson told Military.com.

More recently, at the Air and Space Force Association's conference in Colorado in March, Kendall himself told Military.com that he was requesting additional information and conducting more reviews before he made a final choice.

"I hoped to make a decision and make an announcement earlier," Kendall said during a roundtable at the Air Warfare Symposium. "We're doing some additional analysis; we want to make very sure we got this right and have a well-defended decision."

At the time, Kendall said that one issue would be potentially putting two combatant commands in Colorado, which is already home to U.S. Northern Command. He added that his office was doing "sensitivity analysis," a type of financial modeling that looks at what-if scenarios to measure risks.

It's not clear whether that analysis was completed prior to Biden's decision.

Katherine Kuzminski, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank who researches military culture and family issues, told Military.com that the president does have the right to make basing decisions but noted it is unusual.

"As the commander in chief, he is kind of the ultimate guidance for any confirmed appointees," Kuzminski said. "But usually we don't see presidents having much of an opinion on exactly where our military basing decisions are made."

The fight over the final basing decision quickly became seen as a fight between Republicans and Democrats, Red State and Blue State politics and, ultimately, former President Donald Trump and current President Biden.

U.S. Space Command -- SPACECOM -- was reactivated in August 2019 and temporarily stationed at Peterson. SPACECOM is responsible for military operations related to space, while the Space Force organizes and trains space personnel.

In August 2021, while speaking on an Alabama radio show, Trump said the move to the Army's Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville was his decision, which sparked speculation that the former president may have intervened in the process for choosing the base, something that could give ammunition to legal challenges.

Two watchdog reports, requested by members of Colorado's delegation in Washington, followed. They did not point to any major issues with Huntsville as a location for the base, but did scrutinize the process for choosing it.

In May, the findings of a Department of Defense inspector general report said that, while the selection process was marred by shoddy recordkeeping, the ultimate decision to choose Huntsville was reasonable.

And in June, the Government Accountability Office released a report saying that Space Command's move from Colorado to Alabama was driven by an unorganized and unclear process. While that report did not comment on or analyze whether the choice of Huntsville as the home of Space Command was acceptable, the congressional watchdog organization did express concerns about "significant shortfalls in its transparency and credibility," as well as the "appearance of bias" in the decision.

The GAO report did not address whether Trump, or any senior military official, was responsible for the ultimate selection of Redstone Arsenal.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court decision last year allowing states to ban abortion also hangs over the decision.

Moving Space Command from Colorado, where abortion access is unrestricted, to Alabama, where it is illegal with limited exceptions, was also seen as a negative for service members assigned to the command. It has raised a red flag for some Colorado lawmakers who believe it will hurt troops' quality of life, as well as harm the military's retention efforts.

In June, the Air Force denied the concerns. It told Military.com that "reproductive health care and state laws regarding the LGBTQ+ community are not currently part of the criteria considered in the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process."

But Rogers decried the Biden administration's choice in a statement Monday, claiming "that far-left politics, not national security, was the driving force behind this decision."

The chairman told Military.com last month he was holding up the military's ability to move around budgeted funds and cover funding shortfalls because the Air Force hadn't announced whether U.S. Space Command would be permanently located in his state.

A week later, he backtracked and allowed the Air Force to reinstate bonuses for service members that were held up.

Rogers said he was investigating the circumstances around the basing reversal.

"I will continue to hold the Biden administration accountable for their egregious political meddling in our national security," Rogers said. "This fight is far from over."

Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., who is currently holding up hundreds of military promotions -- which are typically approved in bulk by the Senate -- over the Pentagon's travel policies relating to abortion, similarly accused Biden of politicizing the decision.

"Once again, Joe Biden is injecting politics into the military," Tuberville said in a statement. "This sets a dangerous precedent that military bases are to be used as rewards for political support rather than for national security."

Sens. Michael Bennet and John Hickenlooper, both Colorado Democrats, praised the reversal.

"Over the past two and half years, we have repeatedly made the case that the Trump administration's decision to relocate U.S. Space Command was misguided," Bennet said in a statement. "Colorado is the rightful home for U.S. Space Command, and our state will continue to lead America in space for years to come."

Ryder said in a statement announcing Biden's selection of Colorado Springs that the decision was connected to readiness.

"Locating Headquarters U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs ultimately ensures peak readiness in the space domain for our nation during a critical period," Ryder said. "It will also enable the command to most effectively plan, execute and integrate military spacepower into multi-domain global operations in order to deter aggression and defend national interests."

The saga of the basing and what appears to be a final decision by the president has created a concerning scenario, according to Kuzminski.

"Both the White House and Congress don't come out looking great if what they're doing is teeing up the military as a bargaining chip over political and partisan issues," Kuzminski said.

-- Thomas Novelly can be reached at thomas.novelly@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @TomNovelly.

military.com · by Thomas Novelly · August 1, 2023

12. Tuberville’s protest is putting stress on units, Pentagon says

Tuberville’s protest is putting stress on units, Pentagon says

The number of unfilled positions has risen to about 300.

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

The number of senior positions left vacant by an Alabama senator’s hold has risen to about 300, creating decision-making vacuums that are putting extra stress on military units and top leaders, Pentagon officials said Tuesday.

“Right now, we have approximately 300 general officers, flag officers, and policy officials being held up in terms of their ability to have their nominations go through the Senate,” Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters. Those holdups infuse “uncertainty into the chain of command at a time when we need to be focused on our mission.”

Since February, Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., has been protesting the Pentagon’s reproductive health care policy, which provides access to pregnancy termination for service members even if they are among the 46 percent of active-duty women stationed in U.S. states that have new limits on abortion. The result has been a blanket hold on advancing key military nominations through the Senate, including the next Marine Corps commandant, chief of naval operations, and Army chief of staff.

Since then, the White House and Pentagon have become increasingly vocal about the effects of the nomination holds on daily operations.

“As you see more and more of these holds increase, it's going to start to impact not only the folks that were intended to fleet up into those positions, but the folks behind them and their family members, in terms of are you going to be moving this summer? Are you going to be able to enroll your children into school? And so in the midst of trying to do the things that we need to do as a U.S. military, this just adds another element of uncertainty and friction into the system. That's not helpful,” Ryder said.

The promotion holdups can also create a decision-making vacuum that overburdens senior leaders and ultimately stresses individual units as only certain positions, individuals or ranks can exercise certain authorities, he said.

Ryder said he has seen how military organizations suffer when headed by an acting leader who lacks the authorization or rank to make decisions.

“When we've not been able to have an officer serve at an authorized rank, a lot of times that work has to get passed further up the chain of command, which starts to, over time, create an administrative burden, but also puts friction on the unit. Because as they're trying to do their business, they can't get quick permission to do things.”

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin last conversed with Tuberville before departing for Papua New Guinea in July, Ryder said. But the Pentagon is standing by its policy.

“We have a very clear policy that is in support of our service members and at issue here is equitable health care for all of our service members, no matter where they're stationed. And that's, frankly, something that we have always supported and will continue to support,” said Ryder. “And in this case, we're talking about reproductive health care, whether it's in vitro, or if it's an abortion.

“But again, service members don't have the right to choose which state they get deployed to, are stationed in. And so this policy is intended to ensure that there's equitable treatment of all servicemembers.”

defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams

13. Getting Smart About Dividing America’s Adversaries

Excerpts:

The United States must also do a better job of explaining to the American public why improving ties with adversaries can be useful while not exaggerating what the benefits of doing so are. Washington needs to explain how improving ties with one U.S. adversary which has grown wary of another can be beneficial to the United States while not doing so can mean that alliances among adversaries might persist despite serious differences between them. Above all, Washington must convey to the American public that it pursues rapprochements with adversaries not out of altruism or naïve expectations (as the opponents of such rapprochements loudly claim), but in pursuit of realpolitik interests.

Finally, the success of America’s adversaries in taking advantage of differences between Washington and several of its traditional allies shows that American diplomacy needs to focus not just on taking advantage of differences between America’s long-established adversaries, but also on blunting growing rapprochements between its adversaries and traditional U.S. allies. Indeed, it is because America’s adversaries have been as successful as they have in exploiting differences between the United States and some of its allies that it is now especially important for the United States to increase its own efforts at exploiting differences both between its adversaries and between its adversaries and Washington’s traditional allies. The U.S. inability to do this successfully—whether as a result of allied obstruction, domestic political opposition, or any other reason—will only serve to enhance its adversaries’ ability to do so.

Getting Smart About Dividing America’s Adversaries

It would be beneficial for the United States if it could drive wedges among its various adversaries.

by Mark N. Katz

The National Interest · by Mark N. Katz · July 28, 2023

Taking advantage of disputes between adversaries is an attractive idea and the United States has had success at this in the past. The most spectacular example was how Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were able to take advantage of the growing Sino-Soviet dispute to improve U.S. relations both with China and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. But there have been other examples as well.

In his 2021 book, The Power to Divide: Wedge Strategies in Great Power Competition, Timothy W. Crawford described how in 1940-41 the United States and the United Kingdom succeeded at dissuading Spanish leader Francisco Franco from allowing German forces into Spain and attempting to seize Gibraltar from Britain by providing food assistance to his civil war-ravaged country. In the late 1940s, the United States was able to take advantage of the growing dispute between two communist leaders—the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin and Yugoslavia’s Josip Tito—to help communist Yugoslavia exit the Soviet bloc and be neutral throughout the rest of the Cold War. In the early 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger were able to leverage Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat’s disillusionment with the Soviet Union to facilitate Egypt’s move from being a Soviet ally to an American one. In the mid-1980s, the previously hostile U.S.-Iraqi relationship underwent a dramatic improvement for a few years on the basis of common antipathy toward Iran. A second rapprochement between Washington and Moscow occurred in the late 1980s/early 1990s on the basis of what appeared to be not just a convergence of foreign policy interests but political values as well. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration embarked on the normalization of U.S. relations with America’s erstwhile adversary, Vietnam, which has developed into a stronger relationship ever since partly on the basis of their common concern about China. In the mid-2000s, the George W. Bush administration and Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi turned the previously hostile U.S.-Libyan relationship into a cooperative one partly on the basis of their common concern about jihadist forces which both governments regarded as a threat.

Some of these rapprochements lasted for many years or are still in effect while others were far briefer. More recent U.S. efforts at improving relations with adversaries, however, have either failed to make significant progress or have been reversed by subsequent administrations. The George W. Bush administration’s success in improving ties with Libya ended abruptly when the Obama administration worked with several other governments to bring about its downfall in 2011. The Obama administration’s efforts to improve ties with both Cuba and Iran were reversed by the Trump administration. The Trump administration’s attempts to improve relations with Russia, North Korea, and even (oddly enough) Iran also failed. The Biden administration’s efforts to improve ties with Iran enough to restore the Iranian nuclear accord have so far been unsuccessful, though its efforts to improve ties with Venezuela have been somewhat more so.

This is unfortunate for American foreign policy. The United States now has many adversaries, including formidable states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and various jihadist groups. There are also a number of minor adversaries which cooperate with Russia, China, and/or Iran: Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and others still. In the current war between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and North Korea are both supplying arms to Russia while China is supplying Russia with vital economic support.

It would be beneficial for the United States if it could drive wedges among its various adversaries. And there are numerous disagreements and tensions among them that might provide Washington with opportunities for doing so. At present, though, the United States does not seem able—or even willing—to do this. Why? There are several possible explanations.

One identified by Crawford in The Power to Divide is opposition from existing allies to a state offering concessions to an adversary to induce it to alter its behavior. The cases examined by Crawford, though, all occurred either during World War I or just prior to or during World War II. In these cases, the allies in question were all peers or near peers of the state seeking to drive a wedge between adversaries by offering concessions to one of them. Even if the allies were all (more or less) on board, though, such efforts did not necessarily succeed. But opposition from an ally to an effort to woo an adversary made such an effort more difficult to mount due to unwillingness to risk souring relations with or even losing an existing ally in an uncertain attempt to either gain a new one or just to disrupt alliances between one’s adversaries. Opposition from an existing ally also tended to make a state’s efforts to woo an adversary less credible to that adversary.

Since the United States has not had peer or even near-peer allies but only smaller allies since the Cold War up through the present, Washington would appear to be in a very different position than that which the allied nations faced during World War I or World War II. Despite this, however, American allies that are by no means equal to the U.S. in military and economic strength have had an outsize influence on undermining recent American efforts to improve relations with adversaries and reducing their ties to more powerful ones. Israel and Saudi Arabia in particular expressed vociferous opposition to the Obama administration’s efforts in conjunction with the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China to reach a nuclear accord with Iran. Although such an accord was achieved in 2015 despite their opposition, both cheered President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement in 2018 and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has opposed the Biden administration’s efforts at reviving it. A great power whose policies are so subject to influence from its smaller allies will clearly have difficulty in wooing adversaries whom those allies regard as implacable threats—even though improved ties between the United States and an adversary might better serve to reduce the threat from it to America’s existing allies.

Still, small allies can only succeed in disrupting American efforts to take advantage of disputes between adversaries if there is something about the American foreign policymaking process as well as American domestic politics that allows them to do so. And this points to a second explanation, also identified by Crawford, for why the United States cannot successfully pursue wedge strategies: American domestic politics. Improving relations with adversary states is often highly unpopular in the United States. Political forces opposing this are often stronger than political forces supporting it. Allied governments fearing a U.S. rapprochement with an adversary can work with diaspora communities in the United States to oppose it. Diaspora communities from the adversary Washington seeks rapprochement with often oppose it too, especially if they were dispossessed by the regime in power there. Republicans have criticized the Biden administration just for considering lifting some sanctions against Iran and Venezuela in an attempt to change their behavior. (By contrast, Republican efforts to pursue such rapprochements are usually not opposed by Democrats and have had better success in overcoming objections from fellow Republicans.) But as in previous cases (including the Nixon administration’s rapprochements with the Soviet Union and China, the Clinton administration’s normalization with Vietnam, the Obama administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran, and even the Trump administration’s efforts to improve ties with North Korea) have shown, Washington has been able in the past to overcome allied and domestic opposition to the pursuit (even if unsuccessful, as in the case of Trump and North Korea) of rapprochements with adversary regimes not undergoing fundamental internal change. Some might argue, though, that heightened political tensions inside the United States in recent years make the pursuit of pursuit or even rational discussion of a host of policy issues more difficult now.

There is, however, a third possible explanation for why the United States is less able now to take advantage of disputes between adversaries than it was in the past: several of America's adversaries have become much more successful themselves at exploiting differences not only between the United States and its other adversaries, but also between the United States and its traditional allies. China’s enormous trade relations with so many of America’s traditional allies have given many of them an incentive to resist isolating Beijing in ways that the Trump and Biden administrations have sought. Many non-Western governments—including all of America’s traditional allies in the Middle East—have largely refused to join America and the West either in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or supporting Ukraine militarily. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates not only have maintained good relations with Russia after the start of its war in Ukraine but have recently been pursuing their own rapprochements with Iran.

All of these factors may play a role in explaining why it has seemingly become more difficult for the United States to take advantage of disputes among its adversaries. But while they may be obstacles, they are not insurmountable ones.

Objections of smaller allies might be overcome if Washington did a better job of explaining what advantages they may receive from the United States improving ties with common adversaries as well as the continuing or even worsening problems that could result if such a policy does not succeed. A firmer U.S. position which warns of the dangers of interfering in U.S. domestic politics as well as points out the inconsistencies between their objecting to American efforts to improve relations with adversaries when they themselves have sought to do so with different or even the same ones would also be in order.

The United States must also do a better job of explaining to the American public why improving ties with adversaries can be useful while not exaggerating what the benefits of doing so are. Washington needs to explain how improving ties with one U.S. adversary which has grown wary of another can be beneficial to the United States while not doing so can mean that alliances among adversaries might persist despite serious differences between them. Above all, Washington must convey to the American public that it pursues rapprochements with adversaries not out of altruism or naïve expectations (as the opponents of such rapprochements loudly claim), but in pursuit of realpolitik interests.

Finally, the success of America’s adversaries in taking advantage of differences between Washington and several of its traditional allies shows that American diplomacy needs to focus not just on taking advantage of differences between America’s long-established adversaries, but also on blunting growing rapprochements between its adversaries and traditional U.S. allies. Indeed, it is because America’s adversaries have been as successful as they have in exploiting differences between the United States and some of its allies that it is now especially important for the United States to increase its own efforts at exploiting differences both between its adversaries and between its adversaries and Washington’s traditional allies. The U.S. inability to do this successfully—whether as a result of allied obstruction, domestic political opposition, or any other reason—will only serve to enhance its adversaries’ ability to do so.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has contributed numerous articles to The National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Mark N. Katz · July 28, 2023

14. Ukraine is ‘extraordinary laboratory' for military AI, senior DOD official says

Ukraine is ‘extraordinary laboratory' for military AI, senior DOD official says

The Pentagon is taking notes from Ukraine as the U.S. military pursues its own AI-enabled systems, such as drones and other tools.

JON HARPER

AUGUST 1, 2023

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · August 1, 2023

Although Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine is a “horrible thing,” it’s allowing the U.S. military to learn valuable lessons about military employment of artificial intelligence, a top Pentagon official told reporters Tuesday.

Drones with some semi-autonomous capabilities have played a major role in the conflict. And the Ukrainians are increasingly integrating AI into their systems, as noted in recent news reports.

“There is an extraordinary laboratory for understanding the changing character of war in Russia’s unprovoked aggression on Ukraine. Now, to be clear, it is a horrible thing. That said, it is occurring and we have to try to learn from it … And I can tell you there are really robust efforts across the department to ensure that we figure out what, you know, what we’re learning, how and in what ways does it impact how we understand that changing character of war. We also understand other countries are also learning … I think a piece of that is absolutely the role of drones and also artificial intelligence,” Mara Karlin, who has been serving as the assistant secretary of defense for strategies, plans and capabilities and recently took on the role of acting undersecretary of defense for policy, told reporters at a Defense Writers Group meeting.

Relatively low-cost unmanned systems have appeared in previous conflicts, including the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that began in 2021, she noted.

“Obviously, now we have seen that a whole lot [in Ukraine]. And that’s really, really notable. On the AI front this is also probably the case study. It’s hard to look at kind of other conflicts from the last few years where we’ve seen it being used in the same way at the same level. And that’s really, I think, pushed a real culture change,” Karlin said.

The Pentagon is taking notes from Ukraine as the U.S. military pursues its own algorithms and AI-enabled platforms, including drones and other tools.

The department is also collaborating with its international partners in this realm. In April, members of the AUKUS alliance — which includes Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — held their first joint artificial intelligence and autonomy “trial” in the U.K. The event included the deployment of AI-equipped drones in a “collaborative swarm” to test their ability to detect and track simulated targets. It also involved included in-flight retraining of AI models in flight and the sharing of models between the three countries, according to a DOD release.

The Pentagon recently updated its 3000.09 policy that sets up a framework for the development, fielding and employment of autonomous weapons. After the Defense Writers Group meeting on Tuesday, DefenseScoop asked Karlin if any autonomous weapons have already undergone the high-level reviews mandated by the policy.

“I don’t have anything to report on that at this time,” she replied. However, “part of the reason we updated [the policy] was because … we really wanted to ensure we were incentivizing folks to be creative and think under the key policy principles about how and in what ways autonomous capabilities might be relevant, and then go through an actual process” with oversight of their development and fielding.

During the confab with reporters, Karlin noted that the Defense Department has also set up a new Chief Digital and AI Office (CDAO) that reports directly to Pentagon leadership. It’s tasked with helping the department adopt artificial intelligence across the enterprise for a variety of use cases.

“This office … has worked really hard to get folks comfortable with a lot of these things that may feel ephemeral, if you will, to a building that like relies on paper and what have you. And one of the things that they push really hard is making sure you’ve got chief data analytics officers at like all of the different combatant commands as well. And I can’t emphasize enough just how important this is, right. Because you’re trying to literally help the system understand that there is this kind of key approach to how to take in a whole bunch of information from a whole bunch of sources in a really fast way, and then incorporate it into your day-to-day work, right. Because it’s not terribly interesting if we see AI kind of in this still ephemeral way and not really shaping decision-making,” she said.

The Chief Digital and AI Office has also been leading a series of Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE) in partnership with the Joint Staff and U.S. military combatant commands around the globe.

“Having the CDAO shop has been really, really important in helping folks, I think, internalize and realize on a daily basis the impact AI can have. And a lot of that is coming down to how you look across a whole bunch of sources and synthesize them and then understand whether it’s on a battlefield, whether it’s thinking about force management, whether it’s thinking about planning, you name it — how do you do that in a more kind of effective and deeply understood way,” Karlin said. “We’ll, I think, have a lot to learn on both of these pieces. But it feels as though kind of the speed of learning has gotten increasingly robust.”

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · August 1, 2023

15. Pentagon’s strategy planner wants China crisis channels

Excerpts:

The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy prioritizes deterring China in the Indo-Pacific followed by Russia’s challenge in Europe.

To that end, Karlin emphasized the deepening U.S. engagement with Indo-Pacific allies and partners while noting their growing investments in their own military capabilities.

Karlin singled out “Australia and Japan as two notable cases where they’re investing meaningfully in their military” and noted both countries “are putting out strategies that are very much in line” with the U.S. National Defense Strategy. She also noted the two U.S. allies are forging closer ties, while Japan and South Korea are collaborating more closely as well despite their historical tensions.

Additionally, she said overhauling export control regulations for Australia and the U.K as part of the trilateral AUKUS agreement would help get the three countries’ defense industrial bases “knitted together.”

Despite the emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, Karlin emphasized that U.S. force posture in other areas of the world, like the Middle East, has remained steady.

Pentagon’s strategy planner wants China crisis channels

militarytimes.com · by Bryant Harris · August 1, 2023

WASHINGTON ― A Pentagon official tasked with implementing the National Defense Strategy called on China to open crisis communications channels with the U.S. as Beijing continues to expand its nuclear arsenal.

Mara Karlin, the assistant secretary of defense for strategies, plans and capabilities, told reporters at a Defense Writers Group roundtable on Tuesday that “escalation management in the Indo-Pacific is so incredibly important” when asked about China’s accelerating nuclear capabilities.

“We have been trying really hard to set up communications channels, and they have not been enthusiastic about this,” said Karlin. “That’s really problematic. When we look at history, it is usually quite helpful for us to be able to sit down and speak with those whom we disagree not least so we can get an understanding of what they’re doing, what we’re doing, what we all think is escalatory and how we might understand it in different ways.”

U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the nuclear arsenal, disclosed in February that China has more Intercontinental Ballistic Missile launchers than the United States, which has 450.

The Pentagon’s 2022 China military power report found that Beijing’s nuclear warhead stockpile has surpassed 400 and projected “it will likely field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by its 2035 timeline” if it continues its current rate of nuclear expansion. The U.S. stockpile contained 3,750 nuclear warheads as of 2021.

The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy prioritizes deterring China in the Indo-Pacific followed by Russia’s challenge in Europe.

To that end, Karlin emphasized the deepening U.S. engagement with Indo-Pacific allies and partners while noting their growing investments in their own military capabilities.

Karlin singled out “Australia and Japan as two notable cases where they’re investing meaningfully in their military” and noted both countries “are putting out strategies that are very much in line” with the U.S. National Defense Strategy. She also noted the two U.S. allies are forging closer ties, while Japan and South Korea are collaborating more closely as well despite their historical tensions.

Additionally, she said overhauling export control regulations for Australia and the U.K as part of the trilateral AUKUS agreement would help get the three countries’ defense industrial bases “knitted together.”

Despite the emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, Karlin emphasized that U.S. force posture in other areas of the world, like the Middle East, has remained steady.

“There’s this notion, particularly held by some of our partners across the Middle East, that the United States is abandoning the region,” she said. “I just don’t really see the evidence that that is accurate. We still have something like 25,000 to 30,000 or so troops that are out there. We still have a bunch of capabilities.”

She also highlighted Israel’s 2021 integration into U.S. Central Command, which oversees forces in the region, as well as its recent normalization agreements with several Gulf Arab countries brokered by former President Donald Trump.

President Joe Biden recently has endeavored to follow up on these agreements by pursuing his own Israeli-Saudi normalization deal. The Saudis have reportedly asked for a mutual security pact with the U.S. as one of their conditions to normalize ties with Israel.

Karlin declined to discuss “internal deliberations” regarding a mutual defense pact with the Saudis, but said “to the extend you can more closely knit together across the region to help with security and stability in the Middle East, that’s a good thing.”

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

16. The End of China’s Economic Miracle

Excerpts:

The more Beijing tries to stave off outflows of useful factors of economic production—for instance, by maintaining strict capital controls and limiting listings of companies in the United States—the more it will deepen the sense of insecurity driving those outflows in the first place. Other autocrats have tried this self-defeating strategy; many were forced to keep temporary capital controls in place indefinitely, only to drive people and companies to make more efforts to get around them. As seen repeatedly in Latin America and elsewhere, including during the final decline of the Soviet Union, such policies almost invariably spur more outflows of people and capital.

The Chinese economy’s affliction with economic long COVID presents an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to change strategy. Instead of trying to contain China’s growth at great cost to their own economy, American leaders can let Xi do their work for them and position their country as a better alternative—and as a welcoming destination for Chinese economic assets of all kinds. Even knowledgeable officials tend to overlook how well this strategy served the United States in facing down systemic rivals in the twentieth century. It is often forgotten that it was far from evident during the Great Depression that the U.S. economy could outperform fascist regimes in Europe, and similar uncertainty about relative growth performance recurred throughout much of the Cold War. Despite that uncertainty, the United States emerged victorious in part because it maintained an open door for people and capital, siphoning off talent and investment and, ultimately, turning autocratic regimes’ own economic controls against them. As the CCP struggles with its self-afflicted economic long COVID, that strategy is worth reviving today.

The End of China’s Economic Miracle

How Beijing’s Struggles Could Be an Opportunity for Washington

By Adam S. Posen

August 2, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Adam S. Posen · August 2, 2023

As 2022 came to an end, hopes were rising that China’s economy—and, consequently, the global economy—was poised for a surge. After three years of stringent restrictions on movement, mandatory mass testing, and interminable lockdowns, the Chinese government had suddenly decided to abandon its “zero COVID” policy, which had suppressed demand, hampered manufacturing, roiled supply lines, and produced the most significant slowdown that the country’s economy had seen since pro-market reforms began in the late 1970s. In the weeks following the policy change, global prices of oil, copper, and other commodities rose on expectations that Chinese demand would surge. In March, then Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced a target for real GDP growth of around five percent, and many external analysts predicted it would go far higher.

Initially, some parts of China’s economy did indeed grow: pent-up demand for domestic tourism, hospitality, and retail services all made solid contributions to the recovery. Exports grew in the first few months of 2023, and it appeared that even the beleaguered residential real estate market had bottomed out. But by the end of the second quarter, the latest GDP data told a very different story: overall growth was weak and seemingly set on a downward trend. Wary foreign investors and cash-strapped local governments in China chose not to pick up on the initial momentum.

This reversal was more significant than a typical overly optimistic forecast missing the mark. The seriousness of the problem is indicated by the decline of both China’s durable goods consumption and private-sector investment rates to a fraction of their earlier levels, and by the country’s surging household savings rate. Those trends reflect people’s long-term economic decisions in the aggregate, and they strongly suggest that in China, people and companies are increasingly fearful of losing access to their assets and are prioritizing short-term liquidity over investment. That these indicators have not returned to pre-COVID, normal levels—let alone boomed after reopening as they did in the United States and elsewhere—is a sign of deep problems.

What has become clear is that the first quarter of 2020, which saw the onset of COVID, was a point of no return for Chinese economic behavior, which began shifting in 2015, when the state extended its control: since then, household savings as a share of GDP have risen by an enormous 50 percent and are staying at that high level. Private-sector consumption of durable goods is down by around a third versus early 2015, continuing to decline since reopening rather than reflecting pent-up demand. Private investment is even weaker, down by a historic two-thirds since the first quarter of 2015, including a decrease of 25 percent since the pandemic started. And both these key forms of private-sector investment continue to trend still further downward.

Financial markets, and probably even the Chinese government itself, have overlooked the severity of these weaknesses, which will likely drag down growth for several years. Call it a case of “economic long COVID.” Like a patient suffering from that chronic condition, China’s body economic has not regained its vitality and remains sluggish even now that the acute phase—three years of exceedingly strict and costly zero-COVID lockdown measures—has ended. The condition is systemic, and the only reliable cure—credibly assuring ordinary Chinese people and companies that there are limits on the government’s intrusion into economic life—cannot be delivered.

China’s development of economic long COVID should be recognized for what it is: the result of President Xi Jinping’s extreme response to the pandemic, which has spurred a dynamic that beset other authoritarian countries but that China previously avoided in the post–Mao Zedong era. Economic development in authoritarian regimes tends to follow a predictable pattern: a period of growth as the regime allows politically compliant businesses to thrive, fed by public largess. But once the regime has secured support, it begins to intervene in the economy in increasingly arbitrary ways. Eventually, in the face of uncertainty and fear, households and small businesses start to prefer cash savings to illiquid investment; as a result, growth persistently declines.

Since Deng Xiaoping began the “reform and opening” of China’s economy in the late 1970s, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party deliberately resisted the impulse to interfere in the private sector for far longer than most authoritarian regimes have. But under Xi, and especially since the pandemic began, the CCP has reverted toward the authoritarian mean. In China’s case, the virus is not the main cause of the country’s economic long COVID: the chief culprit is the general public’s immune response to extreme intervention, which has produced a less dynamic economy. This downward cycle presents U.S. policymakers with an opportunity to reset the economic leg of Washington’s China strategy and to adopt a more effective and less self-harming approach than those pursued by the Trump administration and—so far—the Biden administration.

NO POLITICS, NO PROBLEMS, NO MORE

Before the pandemic, the vast majority of Chinese households and smaller private businesses relied on an implicit “no politics, no problem” bargain, in place since the early 1980s: the CCP ultimately controlled property rights, but as long as people stayed out of politics, the party would stay out of their economic life. This modus vivendi is found in many autocratic regimes that wish to keep their citizens satisfied and productive, and it worked beautifully for China over the past four decades.

When Xi took office in 2013, he embarked on an aggressive anticorruption campaign, which along the way, just happened to take out some of his main rivals, such as the former Politburo member Bo Xilai. The measures were popular with most citizens; after all, who would not approve of punishing corrupt officials? And they did not violate the economic compact, because they targeted only some of the party’s members, who in total make up less than seven percent of the population. A few years later, Xi went a step further by bringing the country’s tech giants to heel. In November 2020, party leaders made an example of Jack Ma, a tech tycoon who had publicly criticized state regulators, by forcibly delaying the initial public offering of one of his companies, the Ant Group, and driving him out of public life. Western investors reacted with concern, but this time, too, most Chinese were either pleased or indifferent. How the state treated the property of a few oligarchs was of little relevance to their everyday economic lives.

The government’s response to the pandemic was another matter entirely. It made visible and tangible the CCP’s arbitrary power over everyone’s commercial activities, including those of the smallest players. With a few hours’ warning, a neighborhood or entire city could be shut down indefinitely, retail businesses closed with no recourse, residents trapped in housing blocks, their lives and livelihoods put on hold.

Economic long COVID will likely plague the Chinese economy for years.

All major economies went through some version of a lockdown early in the pandemic, but none experienced anything nearly as abrupt, severe, and unrelenting as China’s anti-pandemic measures. Zero COVID was as unsparing as it was arbitrary in its local application, which appeared to follow only the whims of party officials. The Chinese writer Murong Xuecun likened the experience to a mass imprisonment campaign. At times, shortages of groceries, prescription medicines, and critical medical care beset even wealthy and connected communities in Beijing and Shanghai. All the while, economic activity fell precipitously. At Foxconn, one of China’s most important manufacturers of tech exports, workers and executives alike publicly complained that their company might be cut out of global supply chains.

What remains today is widespread fear not seen since the days of Mao—fear of losing one’s property or livelihood, whether temporarily or forever, without warning and without appeal. This is the story told by some expatriates, and it is in keeping with the economic data. Zero COVID was a response to extraordinary circumstances, and many Chinese believe Xi’s assertion that it saved more lives than the West’s approach would have. Yet the memories of how relentlessly local officials implemented the strategy remain fresh and undiluted.

Some say the CCP’s decision to abandon zero COVID in late 2022 following a wave of public protest indicated at least some basic, if belated, regard for popular opinion. The about-face was a “victory” for the protesters, in the words of The New York Times. Yet the same could not be said for ordinary Chinese people, at least in their economic lives. A month before the sudden end of zero COVID, senior party officials told the domestic public to expect a gradual rollback of pandemic restrictions; what followed a few weeks later was an abrupt and total reversal. The sudden U-turn only reinforced the sense among Chinese people that their jobs, businesses, and everyday routines remain at the mercy of the party and its whims.

Of course, many other factors were at play in the immense, complex Chinese economy throughout this period. Business failures and delinquent loans resulted from a real estate bubble that burst in August 2021, and remain a persistent drag on growth and continue to limit local government funding. Fears of overregulation or worse among owners of technology companies also persist. U.S. trade and technology restrictions on China have done some damage, as have China’s retaliatory responses. Well before the onset of COVID, Xi had started to boost the role of state-owned enterprises and had increased party oversight of the economy. But the party had also pursued some pro-growth policies, including bailouts, investment in the high-tech sector, and easy credit availability. The COVID response, however, made clear that the CCP was the ultimate decision-maker about people’s ability to earn a living or access their assets—and that it would make decisions in a seemingly arbitrary way as the party leadership’s priorities shifted.

SAME OLD STORY

After defying temptation for decades, China’s political economy under Xi has finally succumbed to a familiar pattern among autocratic regimes. They tend to start out on a “no politics, no problem” compact that promises business as usual for those who keep their heads down. But by their second or, more commonly, third term in office, rulers increasingly disregard commercial concerns and pursue interventionist policies whenever it suits their short-term goals. They make examples of a few political rivals and large multinational businesses. Over time, the threat of state control in day-to-day commerce extends across wider and wider swaths of the population. Over varying periods, Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Viktor Orban in Hungary, and Vladimir Putin in Russia have all turned down this well-worn road.

When an entrenched autocratic regime violates the “no politics, no problem” deal, the economic ramifications are pervasive. Faced with uncertainty beyond their control, people try to self-insure. They hold on to their cash; they invest and spend less than they used to, especially on illiquid assets such as automobiles, small business equipment and facilities, and real estate. Their heightened risk aversion and greater precautionary savings act as a drag on growth, rather like what happens in the aftermath of a financial crisis.

Meanwhile, the government’s ability to steer the economy and protect it from macroeconomic shocks diminishes. Since people know that a given policy could be enforced arbitrarily, that it might be expanded one day and reversed the next, they become less responsive to stimulus plans and the like. This, too, is a familiar pattern. In Turkey, for instance, Erdogan has in recent years pressured the central bank into cutting interest rates, which he hoped would fuel an investment boom; what he fueled instead was soaring inflation. In Hungary, a large fiscal and monetary stimulus package failed to soften the pandemic’s economic impact, despite the success of similar measures in neighboring countries.

People walking outside the Shanghai Railway Station, Shanghai, December 2022

Aly Song / Reuters

The same trend is already visible in China because Xi drove up the Chinese private sector’s immune response to government intervention. Stimulus packages introduced since the end of the zero-COVID policy, meant to boost consumer spending on cars and other durable goods, have not gained much traction. And in the first half of this year, the share of Chinese companies applying for bank loans remained about as weak as it was back in 2021—that is, at half their pre-COVID average—despite efforts by the central bank and finance ministry to encourage borrowing at low rates. Low appetite for illiquid investment and low responsiveness to supportive macroeconomic policies: that, in a nutshell, is economic long COVID.

Once an autocratic regime has lost the confidence of the average household and business, it is difficult to win back. A return to good economic performance alone is not enough, as it does not obviate the risk of future interruptions or expropriations. The autocrat’s Achilles’ heel is an inherent lack of credible self-restraint. To seriously commit to such restraint would be to admit to the potential for abuses of power. Such commitment problems are precisely why more democratic countries enact constitutions and why their legislatures exert oversight on budgets.

Deliberately or not, the CCP has gone farther in the opposite direction. In March, China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress, amended its legislative procedures to make it easier, not harder, to pass emergency legislation. Such legislation now requires the approval of only the Congress’s Standing Committee, which is made up of a minority of senior party loyalists. Many outside observers have overlooked the significance of this change. But its practical effects on economic policy will not go unnoticed among households and businesses, who will be left still more exposed to the party’s edicts.

The upshot is that economic long COVID is more than a momentary drag on growth. It will likely plague the Chinese economy for years. More optimistic forecasts have not yet factored in this lasting change. To the extent that Western forecasters and international organizations have cast doubt on China’s growth prospects for this year or the next, they have fixated on easily observable problems such as chief executives’ fears about the private high-tech sector and financial fragility in the real estate market. These sector-specific stories are important, but they matter far less to medium-term growth than the economic long COVID afflicting consumers and small businesses at large, even if that syndrome is less visible to foreign investors and observers. (It may be apparent to some Chinese analysts, but they cannot point it out in public). And although targeted policies may reverse problems limited to a particular sector, the broader syndrome will persist.

China today is gripped by widespread fear not seen since the days of Mao.

In recent months, Bank of America, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Goldman Sachs, for example, have each adjusted downward their forecasts for Chinese GDP growth in 2023, shaving off at least 0.4 percentage points. But because the persistence of economic long COVID has not yet sunk in, and because many forecasts assume, erroneously, that Beijing’s stimulus programs will be effective, China watchers still overestimate prospects for growth in the next year and beyond. Forecasts of annual GDP growth in 2024 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (5.1 percent) and the International Monetary Fund (a more modest 4.5 percent) could be off by 0.5 percent or more. The need to correct downward will only grow over time.

China’s private sector will save more, invest less, and take fewer risks than it did before economic long COVID, let alone before Xi’s second term. Durable goods consumption and private-sector investment will be less responsive to stimulus policies. The likely consequences will be a more volatile economy (because macroeconomic policy will be less effective in inducing households and smaller businesses to offset downturns) and more public debt (because it will take more fiscal stimulus to achieve the desired impact). These, in turn, will drive down average economic growth over time by reducing productivity growth, in addition to reducing private

investment in the near term.

Yet Xi and other CCP leaders may simply take this as vindication of their belief that the country’s economic future lies less with the private sector than with state-owned enterprises. Even before the pandemic, government pressure was leading banks and investment funds to favor state-owned enterprises in their lending, while investment in the private sector was in retreat. Research by the economist Nicholas Lardy has found that the share of annual investment going to China’s private-sector firms peaked in 2015 and that the state-owned share has risen markedly since then, year-over-year. Economic long COVID will reinforce this trend, for two reasons. First, private investors and small businesses will err on the side of caution and remain liquid rather than make large loan-financed bets. Second, any tax cuts or stimulus programs aimed at the private sector will deliver less immediate bang for the buck than investment in the state sector. Add to this Xi’s ongoing push for self-sufficiency in advanced technology, which is subjecting a growing share of investment decisions to even more arbitrary party control, and the outlook for productivity growth and returns on capital only dims.

OPEN-DOOR POLICY

U.S. and allied officials, some of whom see strong Chinese growth as a threat, might take heart from the country’s current ailment. But a slower-growing and less stable Chinese economy will also have downsides for the rest of the world, including the United States. If the Chinese keep saving rather than investing and continue to spend more on domestically delivered services than on tech and other durable goods that require imports, their overall trade surplus with the rest of the world will keep growing—any Trump-style efforts to curtail it notwithstanding. And when another global recession hits, China’s growth will not help revive demand abroad as it did last time. Western officials should adjust their expectations downward, but they should not celebrate too much.

Neither should they expect economic long COVID to weaken Xi’s hold on power in the near future. As Erdogan, Putin, and even Maduro can attest, autocrats who break the “no politics, no problem” compact tend to remain in office despite slowing, sometimes even cratering, growth. The perverse reality is that local party bosses and officials can often extract yet more loyalty from a suffering populace, at least for a while. In an unstable economic environment, the rewards of being on their good side—and the dangers of drawing their ire—go up, and safe alternatives to seeking state patronage or employment are fewer. Xi might take economic measures to paper over the cracks for some time, as Orban and Putin have done successfully, using EU funds and energy revenues, respectively. With targeted government spending and sector-specific measures, such as public-housing subsidies and public assurances that the government’s crackdown on tech firms is over, Xi might still temporarily boost growth.

But those dynamics will not last forever. As many observers have rightly pointed out, youth unemployment in China is troublingly high, especially among higher-educated workers. If CCP policies continue to diminish people’s long-term economic opportunities and stability, discontent with the party will grow. Among those of means, some are already self-insuring. In the face of insecurity, they are moving savings abroad, offshoring business production and investment, and even emigrating to less uncertain markets. Over time, such exits will look more and more appealing to wider slices of Chinese society.

Washington should think in terms of suction, not sanctions.

Even if outflows of Chinese financial assets remain limited for now, the long-term incentives are clear: for average Chinese savers, who hold most, perhaps even all, their life savings in yuan-denominated assets, buying assets abroad made sense even before the pandemic. It makes even more sense now that prospects for growth at home are diminishing, and the risks from CCP caprices are rising.

The United States should welcome those savings, along with Chinese businesses, investors, students, and workers who leave in search of greener pastures. But current policies, enacted by both the Trump and the Biden administrations, do the opposite. They seek to close off American universities and companies to Chinese students and workers. They restrict inward foreign investment and capital inflows, and they discourage Chinese companies from moving into the U.S. and allied economies, whether for production or for research and development. They reduce downward pressure on the yuan and diminish, in the eyes of ordinary Chinese people, the contrast between their government’s conduct and that of the United States. These policies should be reversed.

Easing these restrictions need not involve reducing trade barriers, however much this might benefit U.S. economic and foreign policy on its own terms. In fact, if the American economy did a better job of attracting productive Chinese capital, labor, and innovation, those inflows would partly make up for the substantial economic costs incurred as a result of the U.S. trade conflict with China. Neither would Washington need to water down national security restrictions on critical technologies. To prevent illicit technology transfers by Chinese investors, the United States and its allies should, of course, restrict access to some specific sectors, just as they restrict certain sensitive exports. In truth, however, most Chinese intellectual property theft from U.S. companies takes the form of cybercrime, reverse engineering, and old-fashioned industrial espionage—that is, for the most part, it needs to be addressed directly by means other than restricting inward foreign investment.

Removing most barriers to Chinese talent and capital would not undermine U.S. prosperity or national security. It would, however, make it harder for Beijing to maintain a growing economy that is simultaneously stable, self-reliant, and under tight party control. Compared with the United States’ current economic strategy toward China, which is more confrontational, restrictive, and punitive, the new approach would lower the risk of a dangerous escalation between Washington and Beijing, and it would prove less divisive among U.S. allies and developing economies. This approach would require communicating that Chinese people, savings, technology, and brands are welcome in the United States; the opposite of containment efforts that overtly exclude them.

A worker sweeping a street, Beijing, July 2023

Thomas Peter / Reuters

Several other economies, including Australia, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam, are already benefiting from inflows of Chinese students, businesses, and capital. In so doing, they are improving their own economic strength and weakening the CCP’s hold at home. That effect would be maximized if the United States followed suit. If Washington goes its own way instead—perhaps because the next U.S. administration opts for continued confrontation or for greater economic isolationism—it should at the very least allow other countries to provide off-ramps for Chinese people and commerce, rather than pressuring them to adopt the containment barriers that the United States is installing. When it comes to Chinese private commerce, the United States should think in terms of suction, not sanctions, especially as the CCP exercises firmer control of Chinese businesses.

The more Beijing tries to stave off outflows of useful factors of economic production—for instance, by maintaining strict capital controls and limiting listings of companies in the United States—the more it will deepen the sense of insecurity driving those outflows in the first place. Other autocrats have tried this self-defeating strategy; many were forced to keep temporary capital controls in place indefinitely, only to drive people and companies to make more efforts to get around them. As seen repeatedly in Latin America and elsewhere, including during the final decline of the Soviet Union, such policies almost invariably spur more outflows of people and capital.

The Chinese economy’s affliction with economic long COVID presents an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to change strategy. Instead of trying to contain China’s growth at great cost to their own economy, American leaders can let Xi do their work for them and position their country as a better alternative—and as a welcoming destination for Chinese economic assets of all kinds. Even knowledgeable officials tend to overlook how well this strategy served the United States in facing down systemic rivals in the twentieth century. It is often forgotten that it was far from evident during the Great Depression that the U.S. economy could outperform fascist regimes in Europe, and similar uncertainty about relative growth performance recurred throughout much of the Cold War. Despite that uncertainty, the United States emerged victorious in part because it maintained an open door for people and capital, siphoning off talent and investment and, ultimately, turning autocratic regimes’ own economic controls against them. As the CCP struggles with its self-afflicted economic long COVID, that strategy is worth reviving today.

ADAM S. POSEN is President of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Foreign Affairs · by Adam S. Posen · August 2, 2023

17. US military targets deepfakes, misinformation with AI-powered tool

Excerpts:

“We want to give the commanders the right information at the right time so we can impact the enemy. That’s the goal,” Army Col. Brett Riddle, director of the Cyber Battle Lab, told reporters at a Cyber Quest briefing July 28. “And I think Data Robot did show us that we can start to progress forward with that.”

Quickly discerning fact from fiction is critical for forces in the field. And the task is increasingly complex as misinformation floods the likes of Twitter and Facebook and world powers wage online influence campaigns, some more overt than others. A manipulated video surfaced last year in which a poorly edited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called on his soldiers to lay down their arms and surrender to Russia, for example. It was quickly debunked.

The U.S. is now beefing up its information warfare capabilities, a persuasive combination of data awareness and deception aimed at gaining an advantage before, during and after battles. Cyber Quest is organized each year to examine up-and-coming technologies and inform future investments.

US military targets deepfakes, misinformation with AI-powered tool

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · August 1, 2023

WASHINGTON — The U.S. military is testing an artificial intelligence tool that can trawl social media and other open-source information and spot misleading content, such as bots or deepfakes, to better inform commanders of the region they are operating in.

The program, dubbed Data Robot, was part of the Cyber Quest trials held throughout July at Fort Gordon in Georgia. It was previously put through its paces during the Pacific Sentry exercise in Hawaii, officials said.

“We want to give the commanders the right information at the right time so we can impact the enemy. That’s the goal,” Army Col. Brett Riddle, director of the Cyber Battle Lab, told reporters at a Cyber Quest briefing July 28. “And I think Data Robot did show us that we can start to progress forward with that.”

Quickly discerning fact from fiction is critical for forces in the field. And the task is increasingly complex as misinformation floods the likes of Twitter and Facebook and world powers wage online influence campaigns, some more overt than others. A manipulated video surfaced last year in which a poorly edited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called on his soldiers to lay down their arms and surrender to Russia, for example. It was quickly debunked.

The U.S. is now beefing up its information warfare capabilities, a persuasive combination of data awareness and deception aimed at gaining an advantage before, during and after battles. Cyber Quest is organized each year to examine up-and-coming technologies and inform future investments.

“It’s our opportunity to take cutting-edge, newly delivered products from industry, put them into the hands of soldiers and determine if they’re going to work in the field, in the dirt, in the rain, in Georgia, in the hot, humid weather,” Army Maj. Gen. Paul Stanton, the commander of the Army cyber center of excellence, said. “We need opportunities like Cyber Quest to work directly alongside our industry and scientific partners so they can make the modifications to existing protocols so that they’ll meet our needs.”

Sailors, soldiers need skills to fight propaganda, Navy’s Cleary says

The Kremlin is pumping out reams of misinformation concerning its latest invasion of Ukraine, now nearing the one-year mark.

The Data Robot tool required about 90 days’ worth of data to reference before effectively identifying messages pushed by bots, according to Stanton. Pattern recognition and other insights are derived from extensive training regimens.

“Was anyone using artificial intelligence and machine learning? The simple answer is yes,” Stanton said of Cyber Quest. “Social media in the Indo-Pacific doesn’t look like social media in the United States.”

Data Robot could eventually fold into the Command Post Computing Environment to provide snapshots of information, though it will require some troubleshooting, officials said.

The environment consolidates various programs and data streams into a common pane maintained by soldiers. It also provides a software and hardware framework upon which future applications can be built.

“There was a lot of promising work done here at Cyber Quest,” Riddle said. “When we look at information advantage and trying to produce those visual overlays for commanders, it can be done.”

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

Jaime Moore-Carrillo is an editorial fellow for Military Times and Defense News. A Boston native, Jaime graduated with degrees in international affairs, history, and Arabic from Georgetown University, where he served as a senior editor for the school's student-run paper, The Hoya.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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US military targets deepfakes, misinformation with AI-powered tool