Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Live so that when your children think of fairness, caring, and integrity, they think of you."

- H. Jackson Brown, Jr.

"However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results."

– Winston Churchill

"Be kind, for everyone you meet is fighting a hard battle."

– Plato

Please note: I will be travelling overseas today and for the month of August my messages will be somewhat erratic due to my work schedule so please bear with me.

1. Trump says U.S. has 'great' relationship with S. Korea

2. Inside Kim Jong Un’s New Beach Resort, Where the Only Foreigners Are Russian

3. Trump's Asia policy should prioritize security over revenue

4. The Variables of OPCON: The History of the ‘Control Rod’ Logic

5. FM Cho meets U.S. senators, White House officials after tariff deal

6. US tariff deal to face bumpy road over interpretation

7. Ukrainian Intelligence Detects Contingent Of Up To 30,000 North Korean Troops In Russia

8. Why the world fails North Koreans

9. N. Korea accuses U.S. drills with S. Korea, Japan as practice for 'preemptive strikes'

10. N. Korea secretly buries Ukraine war dead alongside Korean war heroes

11. Pyongyang intensifies monitoring with written pledges for informants

12. N. Korean propaganda whitewashes China’s wartime contribution

13. U.S., South Korea discuss realigning U.S. forces

14. U.S., South Korea may postpone joint field drills

15. North Korean General Defects – Says Regime Will Collapse in a Year

16. Why the U.S. must sustain forward stationed forces in Korea

1. Trump says U.S. has 'great' relationship with S. Korea

That is good to hear. Now we need to transform the alliance into a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance. Let's hope for a productive summit.

Why the U.S. must sustain forward stationed forces in Korea

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/01/analysis-korea-us-alliance/7281754067187/

As we prepare for the Summit some thoughts:

South Korea – An Indispensable Ally

Domain

Contribution

Military

Hosting U.S. forces, munitions backfill, overseas deployments, anti-piracy

Strategic Posture

Strategic hub for Asia-Indo-Pacific access and deterrence

Economic

Largest foreign investor, thousands of U.S. jobs in high-tech manufacturing

Technological

Joint R&D in semiconductors, batteries, AI, and 5G/6G

Diplomatic

UN alignment, sanctions enforcement, trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan coordination

Soft Power

Cultural exports reinforce shared values

Global Contributions

UN peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, maritime security

South Korea is more than just a U.S. ally. It is a strategic partner, global contributor, and economic force multiplier for the United States. Its investments, deployments, and political alignment all directly enhance American prosperity, security, and strategic advantage.

Here is the SWOT Analysis:

Trump says U.S. has 'great' relationship with S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 2, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump said Friday that the United States has a "great" relationship with South Korea, after Seoul and Washington reached a trade deal earlier this week following months of grueling tariff negotiations.

Trump made the remarks during a press availability, responding to a reporter's question about his anticipated summit with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, which he said will take place at the White House in two weeks.

"We have a great relationship with South Korea," Trump said tersely.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to reporters before boarding Marine One to depart for New Jersey, at the White House in Washington on Aug. 1, 2025 in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)

On Wednesday, Trump announced the trade deal, under which his administration agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on Korea to 15 percent from the proposed 25 percent in return for Korea's investment commitments and other pledges.

He also said that his South Korean counterpart will visit the White House in two weeks. Seoul's Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said later that talks are underway to coordinate and set a summit date.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 2, 2025

2. Inside Kim Jong Un’s New Beach Resort, Where the Only Foreigners Are Russian

Photos and video at the link: https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-beach-resort-russia-18969699?st=8CZmQ1&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Inside Kim Jong Un’s New Beach Resort, Where the Only Foreigners Are Russian

First outsiders met with free jet-ski rides, an abundance of food and a $465 model of the Hwasong-17 missile

Kim’s beach stroll

North Korea once welcomed hundreds of thousands of foreign tourists a year—mostly from China—before slamming its borders shut in January 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. The country reopened to tourism in February 2024 exclusively to Russian travelers. Last year, roughly 1,500 vacationers actually went, according to a Russian official from Vladivostok, a far-eastern city that has direct flights to Pyongyang.

Starting this February, North Korea allowed certain Western tourists to visit a special economic zone near the Chinese border. But after several weeks, the tours were halted without explanation. That leaves very few nationalities able to enter North Korea. The U.S. State Department since 2017 has barred American citizens from entering the country.

Kim began touting the Wonsan Kalma resort in his New Year’s address in 2018. He pored through thousands of blueprints before settling on a final design, Pyongyang’s state-run media reported. The sprawling seaside complex, with plans for high-rise hotels, a casino and shopping malls, took inspiration from the Spanish holiday mecca of Benidorm.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae attended the resort’s opening ceremony in late June, in a photo released by North Korea. Photo: KCNA/Reuters

The opening of Wonsan was hailed in state media as an achievement of North Korea’s “people-first politics,” reinforcing the regime’s narrative stressing big investments for the well-being of the population, said Eric Ballbach, the Korea Foundation fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

North Korea’s major construction projects “often have an ideological angle to them,” said Ballbach, a German who has previously visited the Wonsan region. Trips to the resort for regular North Koreans are likely to be dangled as rewards for special loyalty, he added.

At Wonsan’s opening ceremony in late June, Kim, cigarette in hand, lounged next to a waterslide. He later strolled down the beach with his young daughter. The complex can accommodate roughly 20,000 visitors, although satellite imagery shows much of it remains unfinished.

That didn’t stop Kim last month from hosting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who flew directly to Wonsan and stayed at the locale’s best hotel. The two met aboard Kim’s luxury yacht anchored nearby, where the North Korean leader pledged to “unconditionally support” Russia’s war efforts against Ukraine.

Lavrov, during his trip, said the North Koreans have shown interest in welcoming more Russian visitors to the resort, state news agency TASS reported. A second batch of Russian tourists is expected to arrive next week.

A water park during the opening ceremony at the Wonsan resort, which the North Korean regime built to portray the country as modern and affluent. Photo: Kim Won Jin/AFP/Getty Images

But it will be a challenge to attract a real boom in foreign tourism to Wonsan since travelers headed to North Korea aren’t typically looking to lounge on the beach, said Rowan Beard, co-founder of Young Pioneer Tours, a China-based travel agency specializing in North Korea tours.

“Most people going to North Korea want to see Pyongyang, the military sites, the monuments, the Communism-related landmarks,” said Beard, an Australian who visited the Wonsan area multiple times before the pandemic.

Free jet-ski rides

The 13 Russian tourists—whose trip to Wonsan overlapped with Lavrov’s visit—needed to pay North Korea $1,400, in addition to around 35,000 rubles, or about $435, to a Russian tourist agency, to make the trip. The meals, flights and other travel were covered; snacks, other incidentals and extra leisure activities weren’t.

There were several couples among the group, including one who had previously traveled to North Korea. Most were well-traveled and affluent, several of the attendees say. There were no children.

According to interviews and their social-media posts, they spent three days in Pyongyang, then were supposed to fly to Wonsan. But the Russians were abruptly told they had to journey there by train—which several of them attributed to Lavrov’s pending arrival.

It took around 10 hours to traverse roughly 120 miles to North Korea’s east coast, slowed by the country’s aged railroad tracks.

In a last-minute change of plans, the tourists reached Wonsan from Pyongyang by train instead of flying.

Daria Zubkova

Daria Zubkova, a 35-year-old veterinarian from St. Petersburg, enjoyed peering into North Korean villages and observing the country’s rural landscape. “We got to see a lot from the train window,” she said.

Zubkova said she encountered almost no restrictions on what she could photograph or film. On her Instagram page, she has since uploaded videos of Heineken beer, Lego-style toy tanks and a bus painted with the slogan, “We work for the people!”

In Wonsan, the visitors were told there were separate beaches for locals and foreigners. The water park, with pools, hot tubs, saunas and slides, was off-limits. To buy things, the Russians tapped electronic payment bracelets at the checkout, needing U.S. dollars, euros or Chinese yuan to add prepaid funds. Rubles weren’t accepted.

A bottle of beer cost about 60 cents, while a face massage ran $15. A plastic model of North Korea’s Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, atop its launch vehicle, fetched $465. The nuclear-capable weapon—the largest of its kind ever seen at its 2020 debut—has the potential range to strike the U.S. mainland and has been flight-tested at least three times.

The souvenir model of North Korea’s Hwasong-17 missile and its launch vehicle. Photo: Alexander Spevak

At one point, Zubkova asked how much it would cost to rent a jet ski and quad bike. The North Korean worker didn’t know how much to charge, so it was free. She said she has a long list of friends now eager to go to North Korea.

“Everything was brand new,” Zubkova said. “It all smelled brand new, too.”

Growing pains

The Wonsan Kalma complex has experienced some growing pains, too, said Alexander Spevak, marketing manager of the Russian tourist group that organized the recent trip to Wonsan. He was among the first batch of 13 Russian travelers.

For instance, the hotel cleaning staff didn’t seem to acknowledge the “Do Not Disturb” sign hanging from his door handle. Spevak had set the water boiler to a higher temperature because he planned to take a shower. But the staff repeatedly entered his room and turned his boiler down to the minimum level.

Beachgoers during the opening ceremony for the Wonsan resort, which was hailed in North Korean state media. Photo: Kim Won Jin/AFP/Getty Images

When Lavrov visited, the resort became packed with North Korean visitors. Spevak, contrasting with what he saw days earlier in Pyongyang, assumed they were elites, based on their smartphones and nicer clothes. “The people we saw at the resort were the first chunky North Koreans we’d seen,” he said.

Then, for unclear reasons, the North Korean visitors were handed swimsuits, goggles and hats. They waded into the waters en masse. That included Spevak’s tour guide, who clung to one of the Russian tourists for hours in the water.

“Our guide couldn’t swim!” Spevak said. “She was so scared.”

The unpredictable nature of the trip did end on a positive note. The canceled round-trip flight to Wonsan prompted the North Koreans to issue each Russian traveler a refund.

The amount: 200 U.S. dollars, paid in cash.

Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com

3. Trump's Asia policy should prioritize security over revenue

This conclusion:

It is far from certain that the geostrategic component of US policy toward the Asia-Pacific—specifically, winning the competition with China—can succeed without subordinating revenue generation to the goals of helping security partners maximize their strategic value to the US.

"America First, Allies Always."

Trump's Asia policy should prioritize security over revenue - Asia Times

Government’s focus on raising revenues and cutting costs at odds with leveraging allies to face and counter China’s challenge

asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · August 2, 2025

Although People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials say they do not seek hegemony, US regional pre-eminence is standing in the way of achieving their objectives, which include satisfying Beijing’s vast irredentist claims, holding veto power over the foreign policies of neighboring countries and keeping out unwanted foreign military influence.

China enjoys important advantages in this competition with the US for regional leadership: geography, ability to focus its forces close to home and superior manufacturing capability. China is also narrowing the technological gap.

Washington recently tried to slow China’s technological progress by restricting sales of US semiconductors and limiting visas for Chinese students, but soon relented because of American dependence on rare earth elements, of which China controls 90% of global production.

Despite questions about possible US retrenchment, senior Trump administration officials say they are committed to maintaining US leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. One of their primary stated US foreign policy goals is to rally friendly governments to block Chinese expansionism.

Perhaps the clearest advantage the US enjoys in pursuit of that goal is a robust network of allies and security partners. As the competition with China reaches a critical stage, America needs the full strategic value of these partnerships—to help prevent Chinese domination of vital supply chains, to unitedly oppose Chinese coercion and aggression against individual countries, to offer bases for US forces, to be prepared to provide additional combat capability if needed and even to build ships for the US Navy.

The administration’s efforts to raise revenue and cut government expenditures, however, are at odds with the geostrategic task of facing up to the China challenge. After half a year in office, the new US government still lacks a coherent Asia strategy.

The most prominent issue here is the tariffs. Trying to maximize revenue from security partners both antagonizes them and makes it harder for them to fulfill US demands that they increase their defense spending.

Washington announced a deal in July that would set Japan’s tariff to 15%, which while lower than a previously threatened 35% rate, is still 10 times what the average US tariff on Japanese imports was in 2024.

Simultaneously, the US has demanded that Japan further raise its defense spending target from an already difficult 2% to 3.5%, then 5%. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba spoke of Japan becoming “less dependent on America” for its security.

South Korean tariffs on US imports already dropped to 1% under the 2012 US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). Then the first Trump administration renegotiated KORUS in 2019, resulting in a deal that Trump called “fantastic” and “a model for fair trade.”

Nevertheless, on July 7, Trump imposed a 25% tariff on South Korea imports. A statement from Korea’s ruling Democratic Party said, “Trump is betraying the trust of allies.”

Later, Washington lowered the figure to 15%, but South Korean trade negotiator Yeo Han-koo said, “We cannot be relieved, because we do not know when we will face pressure from tariffs or non-tariff measures again.” Such US pressure could give Seoul’s new liberal government additional reason to seek a more equidistant position between the US and China.

Australia has a trade deficit with the US, but still drew a 10% tariff, plus higher rates for steel and aluminum products and auto parts. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said the tariffs “have no basis in logic” and are “not the act of a friend.”

Although Taiwan is not a US ally, a similar incoherence is in play. Taiwan got a 20% tariff despite committing $100 billion to build factories for its economic crown jewel, advanced semiconductors, in the US.

Although the US has strong political and strategic interests in helping Taiwan avoid forcible annexation by the PRC, Trump has spoken far more about the US-Taiwan relationship as an economic issue than a strategic issue, suggesting he thinks Taiwan has no value to the US beyond its ability to pay for US military protection.

There are other examples of US policy being economically penny-wise and strategically pound-foolish, including reducing US diplomatic impact by large staff cuts at the Department of State and cutting funding for organizations such as USAID, which promotes international goodwill toward the US, and Radio Free Asia, which counters the anti-American narratives of the Authoritarian Bloc.

Cuts to developmental aid and capacity-building programs are especially damaging in a region such as the Pacific Islands, where Beijing is attempting to increase its influence at the expense of traditional benefactors the US, Australia and New Zealand.

In that case, an amount of aid that is relatively modest in monetary terms goes a long way because the small populations in the island states have sovereignty over huge and strategically important expanses of ocean.

According to a recent report, US Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby asked British defense officials if they could recall a UK aircraft carrier that was en route to a patrol in Asian waters. This bizarre episode seems to represent another instance of elevating economic concerns to the point of strategic counterproductivity.

The Trump government wants NATO countries to spend 5% of their GDP on defense. This has led US officials to discourage European allies from maintaining a military presence in Asia that could help deter China, based on the logic that the Europeans should concentrate on their own neighborhood to free up American resources for Asia.

But if the primary US objective is countering China, Washington should be welcoming rather than rebuffing such direct European assistance. Already outnumbered by the Chinese Navy, America is in no position to turn away additional friendly platforms.

Showing the flags of European countries in maritime Asia complicates Chinese planning for possible aggressive actions and signals that the international costs to Beijing of such actions would be high. Moreover, sending ships to visit Asian waters has minimal negative impact on Europe’s capacity to defeat a Russian invasion, which would primarily require ground and air forces.

Trump government officials have said they will stop helping China wrest global technological leadership from the US, a goal clearly in line with US strategic and security interests. There is a danger, however, that this goal will conflict with Trump’s pursuit of a bilateral trade agreement with China.

During the first Trump Administration, US sanctions came close to killing Chinese telecommunications company ZTE, which would have reduced the danger of China stealing sensitive data from US trade and security partners. Trump, however, decided to let ZTE off the hook, apparently to grease US-China trade talks.

In May 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that out of national security concerns, the US would revoke the visas of Chinese students who have ties to the Chinese Communist Party or study in sensitive technological fields.

In June, however, Trump said in a social media post that “our deal with China is done,” and “we will provide to China what was agreed to, including Chinese students using our colleges and universities.”

In the recent past, the implied American pitch to friendly governments was “help us support a global order that we overpay for and that benefits you.” Now it’s “you must pay more, and our relationship must clearly benefit us.”

It was not always like this. After World War II, the US offered its former bitter enemy Japan generous economic assistance, including $25 billion (in today’s dollars) in grants and loans from 1945 to 1952.

Washington opened the US market to Japanese exports, becoming Japan’s largest trade partner. The Americans also facilitated Japan’s entry into international financial institutions and helped Japan re-integrate into the Asian regional economy.

The assistance was significant enough that Tokyo felt obligated to offer at least symbolic concessions when US President George H. W. Bush visited in 1992 to ask for a redress of the US trade deficit with Japan (a request punctuated by Bush becoming sick during dinner and vomiting on Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa).

Under the cloud of a compelling geostrategic threat (in that case the Cold War), Washington viewed bilateral trade and investment not as decontextualized transactionalism, but as part of a larger strategic vision. Such an approach is necessary again.

In setting tariffs, the US government should consider both the strategic value of its relationships with friendly governments and efforts these countries are making to increase their potential contributions to a counter-China coalition. These considerations should at least partially, if not fully, offset the assessment that a security partner is underpaying for its access to US markets.

Washington should go back to encouraging Western European governments to send military vessels and aircraft to visit the region to demonstrate support for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The non-military tools that increase US influence in the Asia-Pacific tend to be highly cost-effective.

Yanking funding from them is not wise policy. In trade, investment and research cooperation with China, the US government should carefully identify critically important areas in which to implement de-risking and should stick to the policy even if the Chinese complain it is preventing a trade agreement.

It is far from certain that the geostrategic component of US policy toward the Asia-Pacific—specifically, winning the competition with China—can succeed without subordinating revenue generation to the goals of helping security partners maximize their strategic value to the US.

Denny Roy is senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · August 2, 2025

4. The Variables of OPCON: The History of the ‘Control Rod’ Logic

I will be following up with Clint's next articles. He has done a lot of deep study on the OPCON issue. He has conducted incredible in-depth analysis on the issue, probably more than anyone else.

I do not know if my minority opinion will make it into subsequent articles but in my interviews with him I expressed the reason why I support OPCON transition from a very narrow focus. I understand the complications, both political and military (e.g., ROK sovereignty versus the mythical "Perhing rule"), but my focus is on the long term outcome.

Simply stated, it is my belief that any military operation in which South Korean and US forces set foot in northern territory for any contingency (war, regime collapse, HA/DR, stability operations) must be led by a Korean general. This is for three distinct reasons. One is that the US cannot afford another Iraq and Afghanistan. The US must never again be seen as an occupying force. This is especially true on the Korean peninsula which is a unique situation because of the division and claims of sovereignty over the entire peninsula by north north and South and thus very unlike Iran and Afghanistan. The second reason is that the outcome, the end state, the acceptable durable political arrangement after any contingency in north Korea whether war or regime collapse) must be unification. The military will have to support the political process of unification and therefore the military that executes this supporting mission must be led by a Korean general to ensure that military actions are synchronized with the political process of unification. And third, the long term legitimacy of the new nation, the United Republic of Korea (U-ROK) requires that the Korea question (the unnatural division of the Korean peninsula per para 60 of the Armistice Agreement) is solved by Koreans and not outsiders.

Now getting from here to unification is a path fraught with minefields, physically of course but also political and in terms of military command and control. Clint has begun to outline them below in this essay and I know he will be going into detail in subsequent ones. This will be an important series of articles in the Diplomat.

Excerpts:

Put simply, the “control rod” logic holds that by having a U.S. commander in the lead role (i.e. the control rod), the United States can maintain control or, more accurately, a degree of relative if still considerable influence over the security environment on the peninsula. The thinking is that this helps to credibly deter North Korean aggression and, importantly, mitigate crisis escalation in the event of such aggression, particularly by restraining South Korea from adopting a disproportionate retaliatory response. At different points in time, the control rod logic has either overtly or subtly hindered South Korea from taking the lead role in the alliance’s command architecture.

The control rod logic also applies, if in a less tangible manner, to the U.S. view that its presence in and commitment to South Korea – as well as South Korea’s role as a key U.S. ally – is about more than just the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, too fast or precipitous a shift in the command hierarchy or command relations risks the untethering of the U.S. presence and commitment, which helps underpin larger U.S. strategic imperatives and perceptions of U.S. leadership in the region.

The Variables of OPCON: The History of the ‘Control Rod’ Logic

The control rod logic, while not outwardly promoted by U.S. officials, had reemerged to shape the process around the status of wartime OPCON.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/the-variables-of-opcon-the-history-of-the-control-rod-logic/

By Clint Work

August 01, 2025

General Douglas MacArthur, commanding general for the unified U.N. forces Aiding the Republic of Korea to repel the North Korean Communists, and a staff officer (right) inspecting a North Korean tank destroyed during the U.N. landings at Inchon, Sept. 1950.

Credit: U.S. Army photo

The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea, or ROK) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate in Washington and Seoul. Although OPCON transition, in one form or another, has been an official alliance policy for two decades if not longer, its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and South Korean administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables.

Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and South Korean officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy.

This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. The first two articles in the series will explore one of the more consequential if difficult to measure variables, namely the “control rod” logic. Subsequent articles will explore the South Korean “sovereignty narrative,” variations in alliance command concepts and structures, the conditions of the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP), how wartime OPCON transition relates to the regional role of U.S. forces and the alliance, and the role on the U.S.-led United Nations Command in a post-OPCON transition environment.

The “Control Rod” Logic

Put simply, the “control rod” logic holds that by having a U.S. commander in the lead role (i.e. the control rod), the United States can maintain control or, more accurately, a degree of relative if still considerable influence over the security environment on the peninsula. The thinking is that this helps to credibly deter North Korean aggression and, importantly, mitigate crisis escalation in the event of such aggression, particularly by restraining South Korea from adopting a disproportionate retaliatory response. At different points in time, the control rod logic has either overtly or subtly hindered South Korea from taking the lead role in the alliance’s command architecture.

The control rod logic also applies, if in a less tangible manner, to the U.S. view that its presence in and commitment to South Korea – as well as South Korea’s role as a key U.S. ally – is about more than just the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, too fast or precipitous a shift in the command hierarchy or command relations risks the untethering of the U.S. presence and commitment, which helps underpin larger U.S. strategic imperatives and perceptions of U.S. leadership in the region.

The Korean War (and Before)

Like OPCON, the control rod logic preceded – and was embedded in – the establishment of the alliance.

After the end of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (1945-1948) and alongside the establishment of the Republic of Korea as a sovereign state, the U.S. Army Force in Korea commander retained OPCON of the newly established South Korean security forces from August 1948 until the final withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces in June 1949. The arrangement was driven, partly, by a U.S. desire to oversee a stable transition in authority and prevent the already regular fighting between South Korean and North Korean units along the Demilitarized Zone from sparking a larger conflict. If given full control, U.S. commanders and officials worried President Syngman Rhee might order South Korean military commanders to fulfill his oft-repeated promise to “March North.”

A similar sentiment prevailed following the withdrawal of the final increment of the 5th Regimental Combat Team from South Korea on June 29, 1949 – the last U.S. Army forces from the occupation period to depart – and the transfer of OPCON to South Korea. Despite concerns of potential North Korean aggression following the final U.S. withdrawal, the Truman administration withheld tanks, planes, and artillery from Rhee, based upon the concern that with such offensive capabilities – and without the same U.S. presence and OPCON mechanism in place – the South Korean leader might initiate a major armed conflict with the North.

During the Korean War, Rhee granted the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) OPCON of South Korean forces for the duration of the conflict. The Truman administration, as well as General Douglas MacArthur and Pentagon officials, insisted upon U.S.-led command of theater operations. Once U.S. forces were committed to the fight, U.S. officials and officers – who took a dim view of the South Korean military’s performance in the early stages of the war and had severe doubts about its organizational and operational capabilities – were loath to accept any other arrangement with Seoul.

Moreover, before the UNC’s creation, U.S. defense officials objected to U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie’s proposal to create a committee to stimulate and coordinate aid for the war and to supervise military operations. While seeking multinational support to uphold the principle of collective security in the context of the early Cold War, Pentagon officials insisted on leaving military plans and their execution in U.S. hands to meet the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s goal of battlefield effectiveness. To justify U.S. control, defense officials also stressed that the United States provided the vast majority of the weapons, equipment, and logistical support to save South Korea from certain defeat in 1950 and sustained Seoul after that.

Post-Korean War Undulations

Following the signing of the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement and in the context of negotiating and drafting a mutual defense treaty with Seoul, officials in the Eisenhower administration insisted on the U.S.-led UNC’s retention of OPCON over the South Korean military as a condition for ratifying the treaty. This arrangement was codified in the Agreed Minute of Understanding that accompanied the treaty when it entered into force on November 17, 1954.

Rhee’s various challenges to UNC OPCON during the war – his removal of South Korean forces from under the UNC OPCON during the political crisis in the summer of 1952, creation of special security units outside UNC jurisdiction, release of more than 25,000 anti-communist POWs to disrupt armistice talks, and constant threats to take unilateral military action – informed the U.S. position. If the United States was to remain treaty bound to South Korea’s defense, it preferred such an arrangement, not only to maintain U.S. leadership and capabilities for the purposes of deterrence and defense but also to exert maximum control over Rhee’s freedom of action before and during any crisis.

The control rod logic reemerged in the late 1970s in the context of what were then the most notable changes in alliance command relations since the Korean War: the establishment of Combined Forces Command (CFC) in November 1978. The CFC represented a significant change in the alliance’s command relations, wherein the allies more jointly guided OPCON through an array of more cooperative and integrated bilateral structures and processes. Yet as commander-in-chief of the CFC (CINCCFC), the U.S. four-star general remained first among not-so-equals based upon the same logic embedded in the mostly unilaterally U.S.-led UNC.

U.S. officials were eager to have South Korea take on a greater burden given its economic growth and defense modernization. The idea was to evolve the command structure to reflect Seoul’s improved capabilities and facilitate yet further maturation. Nevertheless, throughout the process, while facilitating (if not prodding) South Korea to take on a more elevated role, U.S. officials grappled with how to mitigate the risks of relinquishing relative U.S. leadership within a potentially combustible security environment to which they remained treaty bound.

Moreover, the CFC was to be a transitional structure and intertwined with President Jimmy Carter’s then-controversial troop withdrawal policy. Following further troop withdrawals, the CFC was to evolve into a third-generation command arrangement, characterized by a more overt lead role for South Korea Yet U.S. officials still aimed to retain “the built-in restraint of the current arrangements.” Additionally, they were concerned about the possible future incongruity between the still U.S.-led UNC’s armistice-keeping responsibilities and any third-generation arrangement that allowed for greater South Korean autonomy, particularly as more U.S. troops were withdrawn.

The potential operational and political mismatch between a U.S. commander – atop a relatively small U.S. forward deployment – retaining OPCON and armistice responsibilities over the large military establishment of a deeply nationalistic ally in its own sovereign territory was hardly lost on U.S. planners. Nonetheless, President Ronald Reagan’s rejection of Carter’s Korea troop withdrawal policy and increased U.S. deployments under his administration put any such changes on ice for the next decade. The CFC became a more institutionalized arrangement.

Post-Cold War Openings and Closures

The end of the Cold War along with demands to cash in on the peace dividend provided both strategic and budgetary rationales to reassess and reduce U.S. foreign deployments and pass more burden to increasingly capable allies like Seoul. Simultaneously, amid South Korea’s own political liberalization a diverse array of voices – some staunchly anti-American – demanded a more equal security relationship with the United States and greater control of the South Korean military.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. Department of Defense released its 1990 East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), the first in a series of reports detailing its three-phase post-Cold War military force reductions across the Asia-Pacific region. The EASI aimed to move the United States from a “leading to a supporting role” in the South Korea-U.S. alliance, with plans to ultimately dissolve CFC if the North Korean threat were reduced. Consistent with the effort, Washington transferred peacetime or Armistice OPCON to Seoul in 1994. This resulted in the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff taking over day-to-day security on the Korean Peninsula, with wartime OPCON remaining under the four-star U.S. CINCCFC.

Despite this notable change in the alliance command relationship and South Korea taking on yet more command and operational responsibilities, the creation of peacetime or Armistice OPCON was propelled more by political rather than military imperatives. The creation of peacetime OPCON was a sort of artful, middle-of-the-road solution, nodding toward ROK sovereignty and offering some noteworthy changes in the alliance’s division of labor while maintaining a U.S.-led combined security system.

South Korean military leaders told their U.S. counterparts that they did not want wartime OPCON until “the threat of North Korea has disappeared.” Among officials in Seoul, there was a deeply embedded desire to maintain U.S. wartime leadership, not only due to North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat but also out of South Korean concern that were it no longer in a leadership role, the United States might choose to reduce or even withdraw its commitment. Alongside the control rod logic, South Korean abandonment concerns incentivized keeping the basic structure intact.

And U.S. officials, based on the same control rod logic embedded in the structure from its origins, were neither willing to relinquish key elements of wartime preparation nor wartime OPCON. Moreover, following the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, which came dangerously close to a conflict, and amid burgeoning concerns in Washington that it should halt its broader regional and Korean force posture adjustments in favor of allied reassurance and strategic stability, further changes were put on hold. Yet the U.S. maintained the leading-to-supporting policy language in successive regional policy frameworks throughout the 1990s.

Alliance Growing Pains in the 2000s

By the early 2000s, U.S. and South Korean administration again picked up on that early 1990s framework and pushed for wartime OPCON transition – but for different reasons. The administration of Roh Moo-hyun called for wartime OPCON based on an assortment of arguments, chief among them that OPCON was a sovereign national authority that Seoul must possess. Taking it on would create a more equal alliance relationship. Additionally, South Korean officials argued that their defense capabilities were advancing to the point that Seoul could take on a more self-reliant posture. They also had reservations about the Bush administration’s unilateralism, and concerns about being entrapped in U.S. initiated conflicts, and felt taking OPCON would create less impeded inter-Korean relations.

The Bush administration, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was receptive to Seoul’s desire for change. In the context of the Global Posture Review, critical of static forward deployments, and eager to create a more flexible and responsive force posture, Rumsfeld disapproved of the multiple, seemingly discordant theater commands in South Korea and sought a simplified arrangement. The control rod logic, which long held back or delayed previous efforts to change command relations, was no longer a guiding priority. The shift was the result of various factors.

For one, the alliance had navigated multiple “peacetime” crises over the years, including inter-Korean clashes that did not metastasize into a larger conflict. The lessons from such events and increased confidence in South Korean decision-makers’ ability to navigate them, tempered – but did not end – the longstanding U.S. impulse to exert restraining influence. The Roh administration’s engagement-oriented approach toward North Korea also reduced the risk of precipitous or disproportionate South Korean retaliatory actions.

Finally, Rumsfeld prioritized force posture adjustments and greater strategic flexibility over allied control. Here he found in the Roh administration a strange bedfellow, eager to embrace changes in the alliance command structure that more orthodox South Korean presidents and the country’s conservative establishment often avoided or opposed.

Nonetheless, the control rod logic still shaped the process. Despite moving forward with force reductions and realignment and promoting accelerated discussions on OPCON transition, Rumsfeld reportedly faced skepticism from within the White House and U.S. interagency for moving too fast. Former defense secretaries and prominent U.S. lawmakers, who doubted the wisdom of the untethering a longstanding alliance command structure, levelled public critiques against Rumsfeld. While the allies agreed to a Strategic Transition Plan (STP) in 2007 it was not as complete a wartime OPCON transition plan as it first appeared.

If implemented, the STP would have resulted in the disestablishment of the CFC, as envisioned in the early 1990s. In place of the CFC, the alliance would then stand up two independent, parallel national commands: a leading command operating under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and a supporting U.S. command, called Korea Command. While the shift from a combined to a parallel structure ostensibly would have resulted in transition of wartime OPCON of South Korean forces back to Seoul and U.S. retention of full wartime OPCON over its own forces, the STP retained notable combined elements. These included combined air, amphibious, and combat weapons of mass destruction operations, and these combined operations would have remained under the wartime OPCON of U.S. officers.

Moreover, the Military Committee structure was to be retained to provide unified higher-level operational and strategic guidance and direction to the national commands, and a new military coordination center would provide synchronization at the tactical and operational levels.

Furthermore, given intense reticence within the South Korean security establishment, the allies agreed to transition OPCON in 2012 rather than 2009. Both Rumsfeld and Roh had favored the earlier date, but other constituencies influenced the process, opening time and space for countercurrents.

As a presidential candidate, Lee Myung-bak opposed OPCON transition. Once in office, his administration sought its delay. In June 2010, two months after North Korea’s sinking of the ROKN Cheonan and several months before its artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, Lee and then-U.S. President Barack Obama announced the delay of the 2012 transition date to 2015 under what soon became the new Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan (SA-2015 Plan). The experience surrounding North Korea’s 2010 acts of aggression informed U.S. thinking. Alongside worries about South Korea’s crisis communications and response capabilities witnessed in the 2010 crises, U.S. officials were concerned about – and opposed – very forceful retaliation by South Korea.

In the post-2010 context, U.S. officials certainly tracked high-level South Korean defense officials’ and conservative policymakers’ public grumbling about the U.S.-led UNC’s constraints on Seoul’s self-defense measures, the need to adopt a more robust South Korean counter-provocation doctrine, and the early conceptualization what would later become Seoul’s 3K Defense System, including a range of advanced preemptive and retaliatory military plans and systems. Additionally, amid its broader Asia-Pacific rebalance and effort at allied reassurance, not to mention the emergence of a new and untested North Korean leader who wasted little time advancing Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities, Obama administration officials were disinclined to rejigger longstanding command arrangements on the peninsula.

The control rod logic, while not outwardly promoted by U.S. officials, had reemerged to shape the process around the status of wartime OPCON.

Authors

Contributing Author

Clint Work

Dr. Clint Work is a fellow for Northeast Asia at the Center for Strategy and Military Power (CSMP), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU). The views expressed are the author’s alone.

5. FM Cho meets U.S. senators, White House officials after tariff deal

I still have not seen a date for the Presidential Summit other than in two weeks. What kind of visit will it be? WIll it be a State visit with full honors (to include dinner, etc.)?

FM Cho meets U.S. senators, White House officials after tariff deal | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 2, 2025

SEOUL, Aug. 2 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun has met U.S. senators and White House officials to discuss alliance and security issues, including North Korea's nuclear program, his ministry said Saturday, after the two countries reached a tariff deal this week.

Cho met Sens. Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Pete Ricketts (R-NE) and spoke with Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK) by phone Friday during his visit to Washington for talks with his U.S. counterpart, Marco Rubio, earlier in the week, according to the ministry.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun (R) shakes hands with U.S. Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-TN) during their meeting in Washington on Aug. 1, 2025, in this photo provided by Cho's office the next day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Cho noted that the tariff deal the two countries reached will serve to deepen their "strategic" economic cooperation, and asked the senators for their support for science and technology cooperation in various sectors, such as artificial intelligence.

The senators expressed expectations that the alliance will further deepen through the deal and vowed support so that South Korean investments lead to progress in major areas of cooperation, such as shipbuilding and manufacturing, according to the ministry.

Under the deal announced Wednesday (U.S. time), Washington agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on South Korea to 15 percent from an earlier proposed rate of 25 percent, while Seoul agreed to US$350 billion in investments in the U.S., among other commitments.

Cho also met White House officials, including Andrew Baker, national security adviser to Vice President JD Vance, and Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, on Friday.

During his talks with Hassett, Cho asked for Washington's support for the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit that South Korea will host in late October.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 2, 2025

6. US tariff deal to face bumpy road over interpretation

Nothing is ever easy or simple. And there is no free lunch, especially on trade deals.

US tariff deal to face bumpy road over interpretation - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

In this photo uploaded on the White House's official X (formerly Twitter) account, U.S. President Donald Trump poses with Korean delegation members after reaching an agreement in the two countries' tariff negotiations at the White House, Wednesday (local time). Fourth from left is Korea's Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Kim Jung-kwan, and sixth from left is Deputy Prime Minister Koo Yun-cheol. Captured from X

By Lee Gyu-lee

Published Aug 1, 2025 5:31 pm KST
Updated Aug 1, 2025 6:36 pm KST

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

By Lee Gyu-lee

Published Aug 1, 2025 5:31 pm KST

Updated Aug 1, 2025 6:36 pm KST

Potential disputes over details lie ahead as 2 countries show different opinions on deal

The much-anticipated tariff deal between Korea and the United States was struck Thursday, to cut “reciprocal” tariffs on Korean goods to 15 percent. However, uncertainty persists as crucial details remain unresolved.

With no written form of the deal, concerns are being raised over potentially contentious disputes on the agreement's interpretation.

Announcing the deal, U.S. President Donald Trump wrote on his social media, Truth Social, that Korea has agreed that it “will be completely OPEN TO TRADE with the United States, and that they will accept American product including Cars and Trucks, Agriculture, etc.”

However, the Korean government offered a different perspective, noting that there are no further openings for agricultural products in the deal struck between the two countries.

"(Trump’s comment) is the expression of a political leader, which we understand as such. What really matters is what was discussed between the ministers and counterparts that were responsible for each negotiation … And there was no discussion or agreement at all regarding agricultural and livestock products,” Kim Yong-beom, presidential chief of staff for policy, said during a briefing Thursday.

Kim Yong-beom, presidential chief of staff for policy, speaks during a briefing at the presidential office in Yongsan District, Seoul, Thursday. Yonhap

The deal also includes Korea’s $350 billion in investments in the U.S. and the purchase of $100 billion worth of the U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) and energy products over the next four years.

Trump also wrote, “The Deal is that South Korea will give to the United States $350 Billion Dollars for Investments owned and controlled by the United States, and selected by myself, as President."

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick also wrote on X (formerly Twitter) that 90 percent of the profits will be “going to the American people,” to which Korea’s Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo commented: “There are still several ambiguous areas at this point. It seems these details will be clarified as the agreement is implemented.”

Kim also said the ratio — 90 to 10 — hasn’t been decided and the two sides need more detailed discussions on the topic.

“How the fund will be established hasn’t been decided, like who invests how much to where, so a 90 to 10 ratio is not what we can reasonably infer,” Kim said.

He said the ratio may come from an earlier deal between Japan and the U.S.

“These things will become materialized during follow-up discussions … but it will take quite a long time, and I believe Korea will have a chance to express our stance so the fund can be managed in a way of not harming Korea’s interest.”

U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's post on social media / Captured from X (formerly Twitter)

The Korean arrangement might echo the one with Japan, which struck a similar agreement with the U.S. earlier: a 15 percent tariff, $550 billion in investments in U.S. industries and expanding agricultural and energy imports from the U.S.

Soon after the deal was announced, Japan and the U.S. faced major differences in how each country understands the investment promises, given the lack of documentation of the joint agreement. The U.S. said it expects to receive 90 percent of the profits. Meanwhile, Japan noted it would offer a blend of investments, including loans and loan guarantees, which will total up to $550 billion, rather than direct investment, and that the profits will be allocated based on the committed risk and financial contributions from each country.

Regarding Alaska’s LNG project, Trump said that Japan will help form a joint venture. However, the White House’s fact sheet said the two countries are “exploring a new offtake agreement” for Alaskan LNG, leaving room for interpretation.

Professor Ku Ki-bo of Soongsil University’s department of global commerce said the details of the investments will be determined by the private sector.

“The main investors are not state sectors, but private enterprises,” he said. “Governments may offer financial guarantees or credit support to facilitate these investments, but ultimately, whether or not the investments are made depends on the profitability decisions of private companies. The government itself cannot force them to invest.”

He noted that the U.S.’ comment about 90 percent of profit going back to its industry can be interpreted as reinvestment.

“These profits will often be reinvested into expanding facilities and operations, rather than being fully repatriated to Korea,” he said.

While there’s a possibility that the upcoming summit between President Lee Jae Myung and Trump will involve further discussion to work out the details, the professor said there’s no guarantee.

7. Ukrainian Intelligence Detects Contingent Of Up To 30,000 North Korean Troops In Russia

Snarky comment: Maybe after Ukraine gets done with them there will be 30,000 less troops that can attack the South.

Ukrainian Intelligence Detects Contingent Of Up To 30,000 North Korean Troops In Russia – Analysis

flip.it · by Hudson Institute · August 1, 2025

By Can Kasapoğlu

1. Ukraine Reportedly Detects a Massive North Korean Contingent in Russia

Ukrainian intelligence sources claim to have detected a corps-sized contingent of up to 30,000 North Korean troops in Russia. This force’s presence could presage the next phase of Pyongyang’s involvement in the war, as the troops will likely deploy for combat operations in occupied Ukrainian territory.

Previous editions of this report assessed that North Korean forces are likely to deploy in the Sumy region of Ukraine. In Sumy, Pyongyang’s troops could capitalize on the momentum and combat experience they gained in the counteroffensive push that ousted Ukrainian fighters from the neighboring Russian region of Kursk.

In addition to manpower, North Korea continues to pour materiel into Russian arsenals. South Korea’s intelligence service calculates that Pyongyang has transferred at least 12 million 152mm-class principal artillery rounds to the Russian military—more than 10 times what the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) produce in a year.

Despite losing a brigade’s worth of troops in the Kursk counteroffensive, North Korea maintains the combat-ready manpower and defense industrial capabilities to continue to support Russia’s invasion. According to the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea boasts over 200,000 special forces personnel, centered around the 11th Corps. This corps has been the primary driver of Pyongyang’s efforts in the Russia-Ukraine War and operates under a doctrinal order of battle focused on opening a second strategic front in a conflict. Although North Korea lacks the technological prowess of its Western opponents, its defense industrial base is prolific. Some Russian combat formations have received their entire supply of artillery rounds from North Korea.

Following Russia’s intense air strikes on Ukrainian cities on July 29, President Donald Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Moscow within 10 days if the Kremlin did not agree to halt its invasion campaign. If Russian President Vladimir Putin decides to ignore this warning, a contingent of North Korean fighters stands at the ready.

2. Battlefield Assessment

Russian forces made tactical gains in the Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Kostiantynivka sectors and increased their operational tempo in the long-embattled Pokrovsk sector. Showcasing the severity of Ukraine’s manpower shortage, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law allowing citizens over the age of 60 to join the military.

Ukraine targeted Russian railways and trains in the Rostov region. Railwaysare the Kremlin’s primary means of supplying frontline combat formations. Unlike many other units of the country’s military, the Russian Railway Troops have performed well, maintaining stable command structures through significant leadership reshuffles. Ukraine’s recent attacks have not drastically disrupted Russia’s logistics network. But by persistently targeting Moscow’s most important supply infrastructure, Kyiv could achieve a tactical advantage in the coming weeks.

For its part, Russia continued to hit Ukraine from the skies, launching massive Shahed drone salvos alongside missile strikes. Worryingly, civilians captured footage of a Russian drone over Vilnius, the capital of NATO member Lithuania.

The death toll from Russia’s long-range strikes continues to rise. On July 29 the Russian military launched rockets at Ukrainian civilians waiting to receive humanitarian aid in Kharkiv Oblast. The attack killed six and injured three in the village of Novoplatonivka, near Ukraine’s northeastern border with Russia.

Finally, first-person-view (FPV) drone operators on both sides continued to penetrate protective structures over trench networks, a critical development in FPV drones’ concept of employment (CONEMP). This report will continue to assess this emerging trend’s impact on long-static trench warfare dynamics.

About the author: Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions. He specializes in open-source defense intelligence, geopolitical assessments, international weapons market trends, as well as emerging defense technologies and related concepts of operations.
Source: This article was published by the Hudson Institute

flip.it · by Hudson Institute · August 1, 2025

8. Why the world fails North Koreans

Excerpts:

I also addressed civil society. What are our limitations?

One, our organizations are underfunded and understaffed.

Two, we are in a long-term battle, but donors want quick results. If you are a magician, and you show kids how you did a trick, do they want to see the same trick? That’s a challenge civil society goes through every year. Organizations must show new tricks to donors who are already bored with last year’s tricks.

So why isn’t the world doing more for North Korean human rights? What can the world do? When it comes to expecting governments, young adults and students, media, and civil society to do more for North Korean human rights, it is important to understand the limitations they all face and to craft policies and activities with those limitations in mind.

During the Q&A session, I explained my five-step approach for individuals who want to get involved.

One, start by educating yourself by reading books (FSI has published five), watching videos, and attending events.

Two, get involved with an organization, so you will approach the issue in a more practical way.

Three, take a leadership role, you will learn many lessons.

Four, fundraise.

Five, as valuable as your presence may be, mentor and recruit new advocates.

Why the world fails North Koreans - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

Opinion

By Casey Lartigue Jr.

Published Aug 2, 2025 3:08 pm KST
Updated Aug 2, 2025 3:09 pm KST

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

By Casey Lartigue Jr.

Published Aug 2, 2025 3:08 pm KST

Updated Aug 2, 2025 3:09 pm KST

Why isn’t the world doing more to improve North Korean human rights? That was the question I sought to answer in my keynote address yesterday at “Beyond Borders: Global North Korean Human Rights Forum” organized by International World in Korea (IWIK).

It’s a fair question. But a better question is: “What can the world do?” In discussing global cooperation, we need to consider real-world incentives and limitations, not just hopes, dreams or wishes.

The organizers asked me to address governments, youth, media, and civil society. For each one, I highlighted key limitations and some things they can do that matters.

Many people ask why governments don’t do more about North Korean human rights. But if we want governments to do more, we should ask: why aren’t governments doing more now? What’s holding them back?

They know what is going on in North Korea. I’ve met diplomats, politicians, and government workers. We don’t need to raise awareness among them, they know what is going on. What are the reasons they don’t do much about North Korean human rights?

Casey Lartigue Jr., chairman of Freedom Speakers International (FSI), speaking yesterday at “Global North Korean Human Rights Forum” organized by International World in Korea (IWIK). Courtesy of Freedom Speakers International

One, they may risk alienating China’s government and its 1 billion consumers over an issue they don’t have much control over. Supporting North Koreans can come at the cost of jeopardizing broader national and economic interests tied to China, making it a risky move.

Two, governments operate with a one-size fits all approach. If a government gets deeply involved with North Korean refugees, then Syrian or Afghan refugees will ask, “Why not us, too?” Our organization isn’t part of a government and we struggle for funding, and yet we often have people even asking us why we don’t expand beyond North Korean refugees.

Three, do voters in other countries list North Korean human rights as a priority? Politicians are moved by the next election and what interests their voters. When I worked in Washington, DC, as an education policy analyst, I was asked by staffers of Congressmen and governors: “Where are the votes for school choice?” One said to me point-blank, “The governor agrees with you, but he doesn’t see where the votes will come from.” Politicians don’t like to get in the lead on an issue without a constituency pushing or backing them.

Politicians and diplomats applaud North Korean refugees for risking their lives, they say nice things, and some do criticize China and North Korea. But what are their actions that can really help North Korean refugees?

One of the most important things governments can do? Open their doors. That’s what I wrote last year in my Change.org petition calling on countries to welcome North Korean refugees.

It has been widely reported that more than 34,000 North Korean refugees have escaped to South Korea since the late 1990s. In contrast, the United States has accepted no more than 220 North Korean refugees in the last 20 years. The year before the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States reportedly admitted only one North Korean refugee. As early as 2011, Roberta Cohen of the Brookings Institution reported that 107 out of 238 North Korean applicants from 2004 to 2010 abandoned their asylum applications to the USA because of paperwork and delays.

Canada’s 2016 census recorded that 970 North Koreans were residing in the country. However, five years later, that number had plummeted to 775. By 2018, Canadian authorities initiated the deportation of 242 North Koreans and were in the process of deporting an additional 512 after discovering many had already obtained South Korean citizenship before moving to Canada.

In Europe, the U.K.'s All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea advocates for the rights of North Korean, but more than one-third of the 1,300 asylum applications by North Korean refugees to the U.K. government were rejected between 2003 and 2018.

The Diplomat reported in 2015 that Belgium rejected 99 out of 126 asylum claims by North Korean refugees. The Netherlands and France were even more stringent, rejecting all the applications they processed (128 and 19, respectively) from North Korean exiles.

Governments don’t need new slogans, creative approaches, or to continue condemning China. They can open their doors to North Korean refugees. Criticizing China may feel good, but other governments have no control over China. They do have control over their own immigration policies.

Next, I considered: “Why aren’t young adults and students doing more about North Korean human rights?” The question answers itself. Because they are the young adults and students!

One, they are at a time in their lives when they need to engage in resume and college portfolio padding. They need to get ready for exams and papers, or for their college applications, or graduate school, or applying for jobs, or their next job promotion. How do North Korean human rights fit in as a priority?

Two, they lack resources, experience, and networks. So what’s the best thing youth can do? Fundraise for those of us with long-term commitments.

Third, why isn't the media doing more for North Korean refugees?

One, the news cycle. Do articles about North Korean human rights generate hits? And how often can the media report on it when their readers haven’t shown interest in it out of the many issues in the world?

Two, the media is looking for “new,” not joining a cause. The press is not your advocacy partner. One of the first lessons I learned as a young reporter on the Harvard Crimson decades ago: “What you want printed is advertising. Everything else is news.” Look at the word newspaper; the first part of the word is “new,” and that’s what the media is seeking.

Three, the media don’t want to lose access to North Korea. Many reporters who cover North Korea often use pseudonyms. They might want to visit North Korea one day, and fear North Korea will reject their applications if they have written negative things about the North.

What can people do if the media won’t report on their issue? Make your own media. As context, Freedom Speakers International has been reported on numerous times, but we have had only three cases of a reporter reporting on us more than once. I now say goodbye after a reporter reports on us.

So I write for the Korea Times (as both a blogger and columnist), I give speeches and organize events, and I write all over the internet.

I also addressed civil society. What are our limitations?

One, our organizations are underfunded and understaffed.

Two, we are in a long-term battle, but donors want quick results. If you are a magician, and you show kids how you did a trick, do they want to see the same trick? That’s a challenge civil society goes through every year. Organizations must show new tricks to donors who are already bored with last year’s tricks.

So why isn’t the world doing more for North Korean human rights? What can the world do? When it comes to expecting governments, young adults and students, media, and civil society to do more for North Korean human rights, it is important to understand the limitations they all face and to craft policies and activities with those limitations in mind.

During the Q&A session, I explained my five-step approach for individuals who want to get involved.

One, start by educating yourself by reading books (FSI has published five), watching videos, and attending events.

Two, get involved with an organization, so you will approach the issue in a more practical way.

Three, take a leadership role, you will learn many lessons.

Four, fundraise.

Five, as valuable as your presence may be, mentor and recruit new advocates.

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Casey Lartigue Jr. Profile Image

Casey Lartigue Jr.

Casey Lartigue Jr. is co-founder of Freedom Speakers International, a Seoul Honorary Citizen, and co-author of Greenlight to Freedom.

9. N. Korea accuses U.S. drills with S. Korea, Japan as practice for 'preemptive strikes'

Message received by KJU.

N. Korea accuses U.S. drills with S. Korea, Japan as practice for 'preemptive strikes' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 2, 2025

SEOUL, Aug. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday lambasted recent U.S. military drills with South Korean and Japanese forces, accusing them of being preparations for "preemptive strikes" against it.

The Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper, made the accusation in an article, taking issue with U.S.-led air drills that began last month near Japan and recent air logistics drills between South Korean and U.S. Marines.

"(They) are aimed at conducting pre-emptive strikes against our Republic," the article read. "To ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, indiscriminate military actions by the United States, Japan and South Korea must stop."

The article also criticized ongoing trilateral military cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan, accusing it of being intended to "crush" the North by collective military force.

It said it is only "fair and upright" for the North to bolster its defense force in response to such activities.

South Korea has recently made efforts to strengthen three-way security cooperation with the United States and Japan amid evolving nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.

This file photo, provided by Seoul's defense ministry on July 11, 2025, shows joint air drills among South Korean, U.S., and Japanese military aircraft over international waters south of Jeju Island. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 2, 2025

10. N. Korea secretly buries Ukraine war dead alongside Korean war heroes

Wil there be room for the 30,000 now supposedly deploying to Russia as well? (yes, another ankery comment)

N. Korea secretly buries Ukraine war dead alongside Korean war heroes

Authorities appear to have recognized that publicly lionizing soldiers who died in the war could generate controversy

By Lee Sang-yong - August 1, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korea-secretly-buries-ukraine-war-dead-alongside-korean-war-heroes/

Rodong Sinmun reported on the July 27 that "respected comrade Kim Jong-un visited the Korean War Veterans Cemetery on July 26 in commemoration of the 72nd anniversary of Victory Day." (Rodong Sinmun·News1)

When North Korea honored fallen Korean War heroes at a Victory Day ceremony last week, the regime quietly slipped in something unprecedented: the remains of soldiers killed fighting in Ukraine.

While the Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun publicly announced the burial of Korean War veterans—Republic Double Hero Kim Ki Woo and Republic Heroes Ri Yong Je and Ri Dong Gyu—at the Korean War Veterans Cemetery on July 21, a source revealed that Korean People’s Army soldiers who died in Russia’s war were secretly laid to rest alongside the 1950s-era heroes.

The dual ceremony reflects North Korea’s delicate position as it seeks to honor troops deployed to support Russia while avoiding domestic controversy over sending soldiers to die in a foreign conflict.

Private ceremonies avoid public controversy

According to a Daily NK source inside North Korea recently, “Beyond the officially announced figures, the remains of some soldiers who recently died in the Russian war were also buried together. Families of the fallen traveled from provinces to Pyongyang to participate in the ceremony.”

However, the burial of Russia-Ukraine war casualties was conducted privately within extremely limited scope. Considering domestic and international circumstances, authorities chose not to hold public ceremonies, instead conducting what was described as a “primary internal burial ceremony” under directives from the General Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

The source explained, “Initially, there were plans to highlight Russian war casualties to send the message that ‘we achieved victory in the struggle against imperialism,’ but there were mixed internal opinions about whether to make this public.”

The source added, “I understand they partially shifted strategy due to concerns about sensitive international reactions and mixed public sentiment. This was ultimately a measure designed to maximize regime legitimacy while avoiding provocation of both external and internal audiences.”

Mixed public reactions force strategic caution

Within North Korea, while some people express gratitude to the homeland for remembering sons who fought according to party orders, there’s also an atmosphere where people voice resentment about their sons shedding blood in another country’s war.

Authorities appear to have recognized that publicly lionizing soldiers involved in the war could generate controversy. The source noted that openly commemorating those who died fighting in Russia would prompt more people to question why they died when it wasn’t North Korea’s war. Instead, authorities quietly buried them in the veterans cemetery and only called some families to participate in the burials.

North Korean authorities are currently storing cremated remains in one place. The source suggested that they will likely hold official memorial and commemorative events when a new “Battle Merit Monument” is completed. In April, North Korea announced that “a Battle Merit Monument will soon be erected in our capital to praise the heroic deeds of our proud sons.”

The source concluded, “At some point, depending on circumstances, the state will publicly spotlight these ‘heroic sons’ at the national level. That’s the North Korean way.”

Meanwhile, a form of “gift politics” for fallen soldiers’ families is ongoing. While no public awards or compensation have been provided, some bereaved families are receiving unofficial support including housing and daily necessities. However, how the government supports the families of soldiers varies by household, and there have been no official announcements.

The source observed, “They’re guiding families of the fallen to feel that ‘while it’s sad our sons were sacrificed, we’re grateful that the party remembers and honors them.’ This subtle approach of ‘looking after things quietly’ seems to be judged as effective in reducing internal discord within the system.”

Read in Korean

11. Pyongyang intensifies monitoring with written pledges for informants

Discipline, loyalty, and ideology. That is all KJU has for the Korean people in the north.

But is this an indication of resistance potential and that Kim could lose control? It certainly provides more anecdotal evidence to the statement that KJU fears the Korean people in the north more than he fears the combined military capabilities of the ROK and US.

Pyongyang intensifies monitoring with written pledges for informants

Previously, one security officer managed 300-500 workers, but foreign content consumption, illegal cell phone use, and defection attempts have made this ratio unmanageable

By Lee Ho Jin - July 31, 2025

dailynk.com

Pyongyang intensifies monitoring with written pledges for informants - Daily NK English

FILE PHOTO: A view of Ryanggang province from the Chinese side of the China-North Korea border. (Daily NK)

North Korea is actively considering a plan to increase security personnel monitoring its overseas workers by up to four times current levels, particularly those deployed to Russia and China. This move appears aimed at strengthening surveillance as overseas workers increasingly attempt to access outside information and defect.

According to a source in North Korea recently, the Ministry of State Security is reviewing plans to significantly expand overseas security personnel. Regions with large numbers of deployed workers, particularly Russia and China, could see up to a four-fold increase in security staff, while third countries in the Middle East would strengthen their two-person surveillance teams.

Previously, one security officer managed 300-500 workers, but cases of foreign content consumption, illegal cell phone use, and defection attempts have made this arrangement unmanageable.

The Ministry of State Security has begun overhauling the surveillance system, planning to draft an initial proposal by August and finalize it by Sept. 9 (North Korea’s founding day).

North Korean authorities have historically operated overseas security personnel very restrictively. To save on surveillance costs and resources, they deployed far fewer security officers relative to the number of workers. In practice, just one or two security officers have been responsible for monitoring and managing hundreds of deployed workers.

“Originally, the purpose overseas was to earn money, so the principle was to keep surveillance personnel to a minimum,” a source explained. “But recently, many workers have become ideologically compromised, and there are increasing attempts to secretly connect with the outside world, so internally they concluded that current staffing levels are insufficient for surveillance.”

Expanded surveillance and informant networks

The scope of surveillance items is also expanding. North Korea revised its “Regulations on Life Control for Foreign-Deployed Workers” in February 2025, reportedly including ▲subversive speech and behavior ▲leisure activities in dormitories ▲contact with outsiders ▲unauthorized cell phone use ▲SIM card purchases in monitoring targets. Even borrowing locals’ phones for calls is now punishable unless for emergencies.

“Security officers have no time to rest. Mornings are for roll call, daytime for touring work sites and organizing intelligence gathered from informants, and nights for surprise dormitory inspections,” the source said. “They also have to file weekly reports to superiors, so it’s chaotic.”

The source added, “If surveillance fails and defectors or problem individuals emerge, it becomes entirely the individual security officer’s responsibility. In the worst cases, they’re recalled home and face party expulsion, dismissal, or removal from position.”

Meanwhile, North Korea has moved beyond simply designating some workers as “unofficial monitors” (informants) before overseas deployment—they now require written pledges.

“This goes beyond simple contracts to create an official, systematic surveillance structure,” the source explained. “Getting pledges isn’t just about surveillance—it creates pressure by saying ‘you promised to be loyal to the party and state.'”

North Korea has already established a structure where informants are planted among overseas workers to prevent mutual trust. By keeping workers uncertain about who reports what and when, they’ve created an atmosphere preventing workers from watching foreign content together or planning escapes.

“North Korea seems to view workers as subjects requiring ideological management without the slightest gap,” the source noted. “They come to work but are surveilled all day, with every word and action reported. People say they feel suffocated, and this approach may only build more resentment.”

Excessive surveillance of deployed workers is also causing pushback from local companies. A construction company in Moscow recently complained to North Korean counterparts about “reduced productivity due to excessive interference,” prompting North Korea to issue internal guidelines for restraint.

Read in Korean

Lee Ho Jin

Lee Ho Jin is one of Daily NK's freelance journalists. Please reach out to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net regarding questions or comments about Lee's articles.

dailynk.com

12. N. Korean propaganda whitewashes China’s wartime contribution

The Propaganda and Agitation Department must do so to perpetuate the myth (lie) that Kim Il Sung won the Korean war.

N. Korean propaganda whitewashes China’s wartime contribution

One youth league unit in Kaechon taught that during the Chosin Reservoir battle, "fierce weather and the Korean People's Army's brilliant strategy annihilated the Americans"

dailynk.com · July 31, 2025

A view of the Chonsong Youth Coal Mine, which is managed by the Sunchon Area Youth Coal Mine Company. Entertainers from a mobile propaganda squad are encouraging the workers to increase coal production. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

North Korean authorities stepped up anti-American and anti-imperialist ideological education for youth ahead of July 27, the anniversary of the Korean War armistice, which the regime commemorates as “Victory Day.” Through the Socialist Patriotic youth league, the campaign aimed to instill patriotism and loyalty in a generation seen as ideologically vulnerable, but a source said the program was filled with historical distortions and one-sided propaganda.

A source in South Pyongan province told Daily NK recently that “on July 19, the Kaechon city youth league ordered its local units to carry out anti-imperialist, anti-American ideological sessions in commemoration of Victory Day, focusing on major Korean War battles such as the Nakdong River battle, Wolmido battle, Chosin Reservoir battle, and the battle for Height 1211.”

Each year, North Korea designates the period from June 25 to July 27 as the “Month of Joint Anti-American Struggle,” during which it intensifies efforts to build class consciousness and stir hostility toward the United States.

During this period, not only Party organizations but also affiliated mass groups such as the Socialist Patriotic youth league, General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea, and Socialist Women’s Union of Korea carried out intensive political-ideological activities centered on anti-American themes. These campaigns followed North Korea’s traditional model of ideological control, aimed at preserving the regime and reinforcing internal cohesion.

Historical distortions mask Chinese role

The problem, according to the source, lay in the distorted content. One youth league unit in Kaechon taught that during the Chosin Reservoir battle, “fierce weather and the Korean People’s Army’s brilliant strategy annihilated the Americans.”

In reality, the Chosin Reservoir battle was a brutal winter campaign fought in late 1950, in which the U.S. 1st Marine Division, encircled by Chinese forces, carried out a fighting withdrawal in sub-zero temperatures. The Chinese troops had launched a surprise assault under the name of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.

Although Pyongyang officially acknowledges China’s participation in the Korean War and publicly praises the role of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, the regime tends to minimize or omit their involvement in internal ideological education, revealing a clear double standard.

“Here, you can’t even ask whether victory would have been possible without the Chinese forces,” the source said. “In this kind of atmosphere, there’s no way for anyone to learn the actual history or reality.”

He added, “Since external information gets labeled as impure propaganda and blocked out, people end up accepting only what they’ve been taught and living loyal lives accordingly. With every Victory Day, this one-sided propaganda gets repeated, and youth here are pressured to feel proud of it.”

Meanwhile, local youth league organizations in Kaechon were holding activities such as reading memoirs of North Korean war heroes like Yi Su-bok, Kang Ho-yong, Cho Gun-sil, and An Yong-ae, as well as debates and oratory contests comparing participants to these figures. They were also said to be carrying out support projects for war veterans and disabled soldiers.

Translated by Kyungmin Kim.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · July 31, 2025

13. U.S., South Korea discuss realigning U.S. forces

My thoughts are here:

Why the U.S. must sustain forward stationed forces in Korea

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/01/analysis-korea-us-alliance/7281754067187/

U.S., South Korea discuss realigning U.S. forces

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250802/5761900/1

Posted August. 02, 2025 07:04,

Updated August. 02, 2025 07:04

President Lee Jae-myung is expected to visit the United States in early August for a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump. A senior South Korean official said the role of U.S. forces in Korea could change, citing it as the first time the Lee administration has officially raised the issue of revising their mission. Discussions are likely to center on a potential realignment of U.S. Forces Korea and increased defense spending by Seoul.

Speaking at a July 31 briefing after a foreign ministers' meeting in Washington, the official said the role of U.S. Forces Korea could change due to shifting global dynamics, technological advances, and China’s growing strategic influence. Since Trump began his second term, the United States has pushed for "alliance modernization" to address shared threats such as North Korea and China. The official added that changes to the U.S. military presence in Korea now seem unavoidable.

The official noted that complete consensus between allies is unlikely and stressed that this does not imply full support for the U.S. position. Addressing Washington’s push for NATO-style collective defense in the Indo-Pacific, the official said both sides should align U.S. goals with South Korea’s readiness and interests through close coordination. As the summit approaches, discussions on the U.S. troop realignment and Seoul’s role in deterring China are expected to take center stage.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, according to the State Department. A South Korean official said Rubio also outlined the U.S. approach to global challenges and ways to strengthen cooperation with Seoul.

South Korea is working to finalize President Lee’s first visit to Washington, scheduled for early August. A government official said the itinerary will be kept practical due to time constraints. Foreign Minister Cho added that the two sides are still adjusting the dates and agreed to craft the agenda thoroughly at the working level.

Na-Ri Shin journari@donga.com

14. U.S., South Korea may postpone joint field drills

As we suspected.

This will be a partial victory for KJU's political warfare strategy.

This will not result in an actual positive response from KJU though in keeping with his political warfare strategy he may make it appear so.

This will only weaken combined military readiness which is one of Kim's objectives. Ultimately he wants the alliance to cancel all military training, not because of a perceived threat to the north but as a way to achieve his most important condition for dominating the peninsula -the removal of US troops. If US troops cannot sufficiently train in Korea it will cause commanders to recommend they withdraw because it is the height of irresponsibility to keep troops in harm's way if they cannot train and amaint readiness.

Can we not see the slippery slope Kim wants to put us on? Are we going to play into his hands?

At least the CPX will continue which is important for high level theater and component HQ readiness. That is good since I am departing today to support the exercise.

U.S., South Korea may postpone joint field drills

Posted August. 02, 2025 07:04,

Updated August. 02, 2025 07:04

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250802/5761915/1

South Korea and the United States are reportedly considering delaying some field training exercises scheduled during the Ulchi Freedom Shield joint drills in mid-August. The exercises mark the first joint training under President Lee Jae-myung’s administration. Some observers speculate the delay reflects the government’s conciliatory stance toward North Korea.

Military officials said on Aug. 1 that the allies plan to proceed with the command post exercise, which is conducted through computer simulations. However, they are discussing postponing some field drills until September or later due to extreme heat. Regimental-level FTXs were suspended under President Moon Jae-in in 2018 and resumed in 2022 after President Yoon Suk-yeol took office. Around 30 to 40 drills are typically held during UFS, and about 10 may be pushed back.

Drills directly tied to the CPX scenario or those involving U.S. equipment cannot easily be delayed. But officials say the timing of other exercises remains flexible. A defense official noted that joint field drills have been postponed to September or October in previous years due to operational factors.

Some observers suggest the discussion on delaying drills may be a follow-up to Unification Minister Chung Dong-young’s recent proposal to adjust joint exercises as a conciliatory gesture toward North Korea. His suggestion came shortly after North Korea's Kim Yo Jong issued a statement on July 28 criticizing the drills. Meanwhile, military officials from both countries have reportedly decided to avoid public promotion of field exercises during the UFS period. A military official said final decisions will be made after close consultations between the allies.

Sang-Ho Yun ysh1005@donga.com

15. North Korean General Defects – Says Regime Will Collapse in a Year

Hmmmm... a 3 star general who defected 3 years ago? Why did I not hear about that? Is this real? The voice sounds AI generated. It sounds so perfect (too perfect) until you notice every once in a while the wrong syllable is accented. Example: Juche ideology was "joosh ideology."

So I asked my friend and colleague from north Korea for an explanation.

He told me this:

It is a fake news channel. There’s a Korean version of this channel and I watched several videos of them. They got millions of views with the hook and fake story.

So who is doing this and why? What effect are they trying to achieve other than have me waste 30 minutes of my time watching this looking for something useful? Of course the answer is clicks to monteize their content. I was dped so you do not have to be,

North Korean General Defects – Says Regime Will Collapse in a Year

https://youtu.be/yvDpSaJtxJA?t=3

Aug 1, 2025

“He was a 3-star general in North Korea. Then his best friend vanished—and everything changed.”

Kim Min-ho once stood at the top of North Korea’s brutal power structure.

As a major general in the State Security Department, he wielded unchecked authority.

But when his closest friend was arrested for simply questioning the regime, the truth came crashing down.

What he saw next would haunt him forever:

Torture chambers, brainwashing facilities, children imprisoned for their parents’ so-called “crimes”…

And his friend—broken, starving, but still begging him to tell the world.

This is the story of a man who gave up everything to expose North Korea’s darkest secrets.

From the heart of power to a desperate river escape, Kim Min-ho now speaks for the first time—so the world will finally listen.

If his testimony moved you, please like, comment, and subscribe to help more stories like this reach the world.

Don’t forget to turn on notifications so you never miss a voice from inside the regime.

16. Why the U.S. must sustain forward stationed forces in Korea

As you can tell I am a passionate supporter of the ROK/U.S. Alliance.

Voices Aug. 1, 2025 / 1:34 PM / Updated at 3:20 PM

Why the U.S. must sustain forward stationed forces in Korea

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/01/analysis-korea-us-alliance/7281754067187/

By David Maxwell

U.S. soldiers from the 11th Engineer Battalion and 2nd Infantry Combined Division participate in a joint river-crossing exercise with South Korean 5th Corps Engineer Brigade soldiers as part of the Freedom Shield 25 training exercise, in Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi province, South Korea, in March. File photo by Eon Heon-Kyun/EPA

Aug. 1 (UPI) -- The alliance between the Republic of Korea and United States is one of America's most enduring and strategically significant security relationships.

It is not merely a legacy of the Korean War, but a linchpin of U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific and a critical component of the rules-based international order.

The ROK/U.S. alliance must be understood not simply as a bilateral military arrangement, but as a global comprehensive strategic alliance -- a strategic agility platform for integrated defense, deterrence, regional stability and global influence.

As reported in the Chosun Ilbo, "on July 24, the U.S. Department of State signaled a formal shift in the trajectory of the U.S.-South Korea alliance." Discussions are to begin on what the Trump Administration is calling "alliance modernization." The is wise, important, and necessary. The alliance must modernize for the 21st century and build on the successes of the last seven decades.

To begin this process, we should recognize our alliance partner: The Republic of Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, is now a major partner in the arsenal of democracies and is like-minded with the United States and allies in the pursuit of a free, open, secure, stable and prosperous Asia-Indo-Pacific.

What are we trying to achieve in Korea?

At the heart of U.S. interests in Korea is the pursuit of a durable peace, deterrence of conflict and the protection of a vibrant liberal democracy that serves as a model for the region and the world.

The United States and South Korea seek to prevent war, maintain stability and, ultimately, support conditions for the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula under a free and democratic system.

The alliance also enables both nations to project influence and uphold a free and open Asia-Indo-Pacific, resisting coercive authoritarian revisionism led by China and supported by North Korea and Russia.

The goal is not simply to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack. It is to shape the strategic environment in ways that promote liberal values, deter aggression and ensure prosperity across the region -- and most importantly, to solve the "Korea question," which is the unnatural division of the peninsula as outlined in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

This cannot be achieved by offshore balancing or episodic engagement. It requires a consistent, credible and forward-stationed U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula.

Why a forward U.S. military presence matters

The "tyranny of distance" remains a central challenge in the Asia-Indo-Pacific theater. Korea provides the United States with a strategic agility platform, a base from which U.S. and ROK forces can respond rapidly across Northeast Asia, the Taiwan Strait and even Southeast Asia. With North Korea's continued hostility and China's growing aggression, the ability to project force, reassure allies and deter adversaries hinges on proximity and presence.

The ROK's geographic position offers a unique vantage point, only 300 miles from Beijing and Vladivostok. U.S. forces in Korea are not only positioned to deter a resumption of a second Korean War, but also to reinforce allies and partners such as Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines in a broader crisis. The alliance is thus a force multiplier for U.S. strategy in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, anchoring regional deterrence and amplifying American influence.

The Kim regime's enduring strategy

Do we believe Kim Jong-un has abandoned his seven-decade strategy of subversion, coercion and force to achieve unification under his rule? The answer is unequivocally no.

His so-called "charm offensives" and nuclear brinkmanship are tactical tools in service of a strategic goal: to split the ROK/U.S. alliance, evict U.S. forces from the peninsula and eventually absorb the South. His recent declaration ending the policy of peaceful unification reveals the regime's clarity: there is no intent to reform or co-exist, only to conquer.

The United States must not fall for illusions of detente. Rather, Washington must recognize that Kim remains committed to driving a wedge between the allies. However, his greatest vulnerability lies in his fear of an informed population and his inability to compete with South Korea's political legitimacy, economic dynamism and cultural influence.

A durable political arrangement: unity against tyranny

A fundamental question the alliance must answer is: What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that protects U.S. and ROK interests on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

The answer lies not in appeasement or abandonment, but in preserving a strong, modernized alliance, grounded in shared democratic values and mutual security interests. This includes continuing to support the long-term vision of a free and unified Korea, as outlined in the ROK's 8.15 Unification Doctrine, and ensuring the alliance is resilient to political shifts in Seoul, Washington, Beijing or Pyongyang.

Such an arrangement requires recognizing that change must come from within in North Korea, catalyzed by the Korean people themselves. Kim Jong-un fears the Korean people, armed with knowledge and information, far more than he fears foreign military power.

Thus, the alliance must blend hard power with information and psychological operations that empower the Korean people in the north and disrupt the regime's control so that new leadership can emerge that will seek a free and unified Korea.

Force optimization for a global alliance

The right question now is: How do we optimize our combined force posture to support this global strategic alliance?

The answer lies in modernizing rather than simply seeking to reduce our presence. However, more capable force with a small footprint could result from modernization. Effectiveness is not measured in mere troop numbers. The force must evolve to meet new domains of conflict, cyber, space and information, but it must remain forward-stationed, combat-ready and deeply integrated with ROK forces.

This includes enhancing multi-domain operations, joint command and control, and combined rapid response capabilities. In addition, the alliance should consider returning U.S. forces to combat patrolling on the DMZ fully integrated into ROK frontline commands. Proposals to reduce or withdraw U.S. troops only embolden adversaries and shake allied confidence.

Rather than cut forces, we should focus on increasing interoperability, joint training and technological integration. We must invest in capabilities that enable swift deployment across the region, from defense of the Korean Peninsula to response in a Taiwan contingency. The ROK/U.S. alliance should be seen not just as a peninsula-focused alliance, but as a pillar of Asia-Indo-Pacific security.

Perception equals commitment

Any perception of U.S. disengagement is dangerous. History shows that U.S. presence deters conflict and absence invites aggression. As the Chosun Ilbo recently reported, calls to reduce troop levels in Korea, whether driven by isolationism or budget constraints, would be a gift to Pyongyang and Beijing. They would interpret it as a collapse of American will. Do not repeat the 1950 Acheson mistake.

After the debacle of the Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021, questions remain as to U.S. commitments. To abandon the ROK or to present ambiguity about its commitment would erode deterrence, weaken regional stability and signal to other allies that American support is conditional and transactional. This must never happen.

Conclusion: no retreat, full commitment

The United States must reaffirm, through word and deed, its ironclad commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea along with the pursuit of a free and unified Korea as the only path to denuclearization. But more than that, we must harness the alliance as a strategic platform for promoting freedom, security and prosperity across the Asia-Indo-Pacific.

To modernize the alliance, we must begin by answering the right questions: What are our goals? What kind of peace are we building? Who and what are the real threats? What strategy are our adversaries pursuing? And how do we align our combined military and diplomatic posture accordingly?

The alliance is not a legacy. It is a living, vital, strategic instrument of American power and democratic purpose. We must never abandon it. We must optimize it, for the United States, for Korea, for Asia and for the future of the free world.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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