Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Trust is the foundation of society. Where there is no truth there can be no trust, and where there is no trust, there can be no society."

- Frederick Douglas. Social reformer, abolitionist, orator, and writer, (1818-1895)

"A little knowledge that acts is worth infinitely more than much knowledge that is idle."

- Kahlil Gibran

The most terrible fight is not when there is one opinion against another, the most terrible is when two men say the same thing -- and fight about the interpretation, and this interpretation involves a difference of quality.

- Soren Kierkegaard

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2023

2. Judge Throws Out Accused Bomber’s Confession as Derived from Torture

3. U.S. and Thailand Co-host Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Workshop in Bangkok to Strengthen Regional Nonproliferation Coordination

4. The U.S. Is Beefing Up Alliances in Asia. But Don’t Expect an ‘Asian NATO’

5. Russia’s Lunar Lander Crashes Into the Moon

6. On the Front Lines, Ukrainians Are Buoyed to Be on the Offensive

7. U.S., China Try to Draw Nations to Their Side as Divisions Harden

8. Mounting Cyber Espionage and Hacking Threat from China

9. With $4.5B investment planned in Organic Industrial Base, a focus on next-gen vehicles

10. Army announces two aviation brigade deployments

11. Anti-Access, Area-Denial Top NATO Priority, Official Says

12. Employing artificial intelligence for joint operations and the edge continuum

13. China’s 40-Year Boom Is Over. What Comes Next?

14. Ukraine running out of options to retake significant territory

15. Let’s understand the awful truth of the Afghan war | Column

16. Just-war theory allows for no blank checks in Ukraine

17. China’s economic malaise is causing disillusion among the young

18. Warfighting and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century - An Introduction

19. Covert Naval Activities Part 1 - Covert, Low Profile Military Vessels in the LittoralCovert Naval Activities Part 1 - Covert, Low Profile Military Vessels in the Littoral

20. When Is a Coup Not a Coup? When the U.S. Says So.

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2023

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a missile strike during the day on August 19 targeting Chernihiv City center after carrying out a series of Shahed drone strikes overnight.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on Soltsy airbase in Novgorod Oblast and reportedly damaged strategic aircraft on August 19.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 19, and advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and senior officers at the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on August 19.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is continuing to set conditions to possibly replace Wagner Group forces with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs).
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and advanced in certain areas on August 19.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on August 17 establishing the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely in an effort to further integrate proxy military formations in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 19, 2023

Aug 19, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 19, 2023, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on August 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a missile strike during the day on August 19 targeting Chernihiv City center after carrying out a series of Shahed drone strikes overnight. Russian forces struck Taras Shevchenko Theater in Chernihiv City, killing seven people and injuring 117.[1] Chernihiv Oblast Administration Head Vyacheslav Chaus reported that Russian forces “probably” launched a “ballistic missile” at the theater, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces used an Iskander-M ballistic missile during the strike.[2] The theater reportedly hosted a drone exposition called “Lyuti Ptashky” (Angry Birds), which had previously occurred in other Ukrainian cities.[3] The event organizer, Maria Berlinska, stated that organizers only shared the location of the event with individuals who registered and were screened before attending the event.[4] The event reportedly ended shortly after an air raid warning, and organizers advised people to hide in a shelter.[5] Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are targeting public events to emotionally affect Ukrainians and noted that Russian forces have previously struck public events even without prior public announcements of such events.[6] Many Russian milbloggers originally claimed that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) building, before most indicated that Russian forces struck the drone exhibition.[7]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces also carried out 17 Shahed drone strikes overnight on August 19 and that Ukrainian forces shot down 15 drones.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff later reported that Russian forces also carried out five missile strikes.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, and Ukrainian regional officials reported that Russian attacks overnight on unspecified targets wounded eight people.[10] The Zhytomyr Oblast Administration reported that a Russian loitering munition targeted unspecified infrastructure in the oblast and that debris from the shot down drone sparked a localized fire.[11]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on Soltsy airbase in Novgorod Oblast and reportedly damaged strategic aircraft on August 19.[12] Geolocated images published on August 19 show smoke rising from the Soltsy airbase.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian drone using small arms and that a fire damaged one aircraft.[14] A Russian insider source claimed that the fire damaged at least two aircraft and that the Soltsy airbase housed an unspecified number of Tu-22M3 (NATO reporting name Backfire-C) long-range supersonic bombers.[15] The source also claimed that Russian forces moved the undamaged aircraft to Olenya air base, Murmask Oblast.[16]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 19, and advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[17] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain the initiative in the Bakhmut direction.[18] Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances east of Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City).[19] Additional geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[20] CBS News reported on August 18 that anonymous US officials stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in the direction of Tokmak (a major Russian stronghold in western Zaporizhia Oblast) and have cleared a Russian minefield north of Tokmak.[21] US officials are likely referring to recent Ukrainian advances north and east of Robotyne (about 23km northeast of Tokmak). ISW previously assessed that recent Ukrainian advances near small settlements in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia are likely tactically significant because of the structure of Russian defensive lines.[22] These advances may allow Ukrainian forces to begin operating in less heavily mined areas of the Russian line of defense that are likely more conducive to more rapid Ukrainian gains.[23]

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and senior officers at the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on August 19.[24] This was reportedly Putin’s first visit to Rostov-on-Don since the Wagner Group took control of the SMD headquarters on June 23-24.[25] Putin rarely visits areas associated with the war in Ukraine; in April he visited Kherson and Luhansk oblasts and in March he visited Mariupol.[26] Putin’s visit to the SMD headquarters is likely a public gesture that he continues to side with Gerasimov and his group of commanders despite these commanders’ failure to stop Wagner’s rebellion or achieve the war aims Putin set for them. Putin’s visit occurred about two months after the rebellion, and he is likely attempting to portray himself as in control of his regime and military.

The Russian MoD is continuing to set conditions to possibly replace Wagner Group forces with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs). A Wagner-affiliated source that there is an ongoing effort to recruit Wagner personnel to deploy to missions abroad as part of PMCs. The source claimed that unspecified Russian authorities – likely referring to Russian MoD – are forming the new “Rossiyskiy Ekpeditsionniy Korpus” (Russian Expeditionary Corps) PMC at the base of one of the advanced Spetsnaz brigades.[27] The source also claimed that the Russian MoD controls “Redut” PMC (also known as “Zvezda” PMC), which is currently recruiting personnel for missions in Africa instead of in Ukraine.[28] The source suggested that Redut PMC may have been attempting to recruit Wagner fighters to Redut’s operations in Africa, referring to a statement that Wagner commanders issued on August 9 warning fighters about calls from “second-rate” PMCs advertising jobs in Africa.[29] The Russian MoD may be attempting to lure Wagner personnel away from Wagner with new work opportunities at MoD-controlled PMCs as part of a wider effort to break up Wagner.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces launched a missile strike during the day on August 19 targeting Chernihiv City center after carrying out a series of Shahed drone strikes overnight.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on Soltsy airbase in Novgorod Oblast and reportedly damaged strategic aircraft on August 19.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 19, and advanced along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and senior officers at the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on August 19.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is continuing to set conditions to possibly replace Wagner Group forces with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs).
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and advanced in certain areas on August 19.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on August 17 establishing the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely in an effort to further integrate proxy military formations in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push western into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kupyansk on August 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[30] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to push Ukrainian forces from Synkivka.[31] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russian forces continued probing attacks in the Kupyansk area but have not achieved any significant advances.[32] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Representative Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) continued offensive operations in the direction of Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk on August 19, but did not advance. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks and counterattacks near Synkivka, Vilshana, and the Mankivka tract (about 15km east of Kupyansk).[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on August 19 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing at a rate of one to 1.5km per day in the direction of Oskil (57km northeast of Kreminna).[35] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack on Bilohorivka (12km southwest of Kreminna) on August 18.[36]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on August 19, but did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove) and south of Kuzmyne (4km southwest of Kreminna).[37] Russian sources, including Russian Central Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk, claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian armored assaults near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[38] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces skirmished along the Raihorodka-Karmazynivka line (up to 13km southwest of Svatove).[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on August 19 but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances. The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), and along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an armored assault near Klishchiivka and that fighting is ongoing.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the “Alexander Nevsky” Brigade and “Volki” (Wolves) Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade volunteer formations have recently repelled several Ukrainian attacks west of Soledar (11km northeast of Bakhmut).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations around Bakhmut on August 19 but did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations north of Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), north and south of Klishchiivka, east of Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut), and near Toretsk (20km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continue to control Klishchiivka.[45] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz, 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate or GRU), and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) are operating together near Klishchiivka.[46] Footage published on August 18 purportedly shows elements of the 137th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) operating in the Soledar-Bakhmut direction and elements of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) operating south of Bakhmut.[47] ISW observed elements of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operating near Marinka in June.[48]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line as of August 19 and recently made limited advances. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances east of Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City).[49] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Krasnohorivka and Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka).[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 19 and did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novokalynove (11km northeast of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[51]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on August 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to restore lost positions near Urozhaine and unsuccessfully counterattacked near Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine.[54] A Russian source claimed that elements of the 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[55] ISW has previously observed that the 247th VDV Regiment reportedly moved from the Orikhiv area to the Staromayorske area in late July and that units of the 7th VDV Division are currently split across at least two, possibly three, sectors of the front – supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces lack operational reserves and are conducting lateral redeployments across the front.[56]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on August 19. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasingly attacking in the direction of Zavitne Bazhannya (12km south of Velyka Novosilka), east of Urozhaine, and near Pryyutne.[57]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on August 19. Geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced north of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[58] Ukrainian forces may have been operating in this area before August 19, but Russian sources claimed this area was under Russian control. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[59] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the northern and northeastern outskirts of Robotyne on August 18 and 19.[60]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that an explosion occurred during a meeting at the office of the Enerhodar occupation police chief on August 18.[61] GUR reported that the explosion injured the head of the Enerhodar occupation police department head Colonel Pavel Chesanov and other occupation police officials and that Russian authorities planned to evacuate the wounded to Russia via military helicopter.[62]

Ukrainian forces are using counterbattery actions to set conditions for future maneuvers on the left (east) bank of Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Operational Command South Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces’ current main task in Kherson Oblast is to set conditions for the security of future operations and maneuvers on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[63] Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces are currently conducting counterbattery measures to clear Russian maneuver boats that can hinder Ukrainian operations.[64]

Russian sources claimed on August 18 and 19 that Russian forces control the area of the left bank of Kherson Oblast near Kozachi Laheri. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attempts to gain a foothold on the left bank of Kherson Oblast near Kozachi Laheri, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces control the area on the left bank near the settlement.[65]

The Russian navy is reportedly incapable of enforcing control over Black Sea maritime traffic. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 18 that at least six civilian ships are leaving Ukraine towards the Mediterranean Sea through Ukrainian-created temporary corridors in the Black Sea.[66] The milblogger claimed that the Russian navy's ability to prevent these movements is limited due to “gross mistakes in the construction of the fleet in the pre-war period, the irrational use of forces and means,” and unresolved organizational issues.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on August 17 establishing the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School under the Russian MoD, likely in an effort to further integrate proxy military formations in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[68] The Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School will have 3,436 military personnel and staff. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that Russia is establishing the Donetsk command school to professionally train Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) personnel for command roles and observed that there are two similar command schools in Russia.[69] The establishment of the command school follows numerous complaints from Russian milbloggers who stated that DNR commanders could not retain their positions as part of the Russian Armed Forces without receiving additional command training and may indicate that Russia is attempting to improve issues with some of its command staff.[70] The establishment of a command school, however, may reveal that the Russian MoD wants to keep proxy forces separate from regular Russian forces and that DNR forces are not entirely integrated into the regular forces. The Russian military command could have sent DNR commanders and servicemen to train in existing Russian command schools, rather than spending additional federal funds to create an entirely new school. ISW previously observed that Russia maintains border checkpoints between occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts despite illegally annexing these territories, and it is likely that the Russian MoD is extending similar separation policies between Russian regular and irregular forces.[71] The Russian MoD alternatively may be attempting to avoid giving DNR servicemen who are engaged in combat in Donetsk Oblast a reason to go to Russia amidst the full-scale invasion.

Russian Cossacks are forming a new volunteer battalion in Rostov Oblast to defend against external and internal threats.[72] The Russian “Oplot” veterans movement announced on August 19 that Cossacks began recruiting volunteers for the “Oplot-1” volunteer battalion to fight against Ukrainian sabotage groups and “undermining of confidence in authorities.” The “Oplot” volunteer battalion is recruiting men ages 21 to 50 without a criminal record.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue to deport children from occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated that occupation authorities sent a third group of 18 children from Skadovsk Raion, occupied Kherson Oblast to a recreation center in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic.[73] The Skadovsk Raion occupation administration reportedly stated that occupation authorities will send a fourth group of local children between the ages of seven and 16 to the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic in September.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

Spokesperson of the United Press Center of the Northern Direction Ukrainian Defense Forces, Colonel Yurii Povh, reported that Wagner Group forces in Belarus do not pose a strategic threat to Ukraine. Povh reported on August 19 that the situation on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is under control and that Russia is conducting information operations to incite speculations about Wagner’s presence in Belarus in order to exert psychological influence on Ukrainian, Polish, and Western audiences.[75] Povh stated that Wagner instructors currently travel to various Belarusian training grounds to train military personnel.[76] Povh’s statements are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Wagner forces currently do not pose a significant military threat to Ukraine or NATO.[77]

Some Wagner personnel may have left Belarus because of a decrease in their incomes. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 19 that the number of Wagner personnel decreased from 5,800 at an unspecified date to 4,400 at a later unspecified date.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that some Wagner personnel joined operations in Africa, went on vacation, joined a different PMC, or resigned from Wagner due to a lack of funding from the Russian government.[79] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Wagner instructors who train Belarusian forces are dissatisfied with their salaries from the Belarusian government and therefore do not plan to stay in Belarus permanently.[80] A Belarus-focused milblogger likened the Wagner camp in Belarus – likely referring to the main Wagner base in Tsel, Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast – to a “mini-city” with traffic, a car repair shop, a medical unit, mobile shops, and sports ground.[81]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarussian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Judge Throws Out Accused Bomber’s Confession as Derived from Torture

Rule of law.

Excerpts:

“If there was ever a case where the circumstances of an accused’s prior statements impacted his ability to make a later voluntary statement, this is such a case. Even if the 2007 statements were not obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, they were derived from it.”

Rear Adm. Aaron C. Rugh, the chief prosecutor for military commissions, did not respond to a question about whether his team would appeal the ruling. With a new judge expected later this year, prosecutors could seek reconsideration at the Guantánamo court or raise the issue with a Pentagon appeals panel, the Court of Military Commissions Review.

...

Katie Carmon, one of Mr. Nashiri’s lawyers, said there were no immediate plans to withdraw their challenge and called Colonel Acosta’s decision suppressing the 2007 interrogations both “morally and legally correct.”

“The government that tortured Mr. al-Nashiri has never been held accountable,” she said. “But today’s ruling is a small step forward as the government loses a critical part of its prosecution.”

Judge Throws Out Accused Bomber’s Confession as Derived from Torture

By Carol Rosenberg

Carol Rosenberg has been reporting from Guantánamo Bay since the prison opened in 2002. She reported this story from New York.

Aug. 18, 2023

The New York Times · by Carol Rosenberg · August 18, 2023

The Saudi defendant was waterboarded and subjected to other forms of torture by the C.I.A. in 2002 in a secret prison network.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is accused of orchestrating Al Qaeda’s suicide bombing of the U.S. warship Cole on Oct. 12, 2000, in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, that killed 17 U.S. sailors.Credit...Reuters

Aug. 18, 2023, 5:21 p.m. ET

The military judge in the U.S.S. Cole bombing case on Friday threw out confessions the Saudi defendant had made to federal agents at Guantánamo Bay after years of secret imprisonment by the C.I.A., declaring the statements the product of torture.

The decision deprives prosecutors of a key piece of evidence against Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 58, in the longest-running death-penalty case at Guantánamo Bay. He is accused of orchestrating Al Qaeda’s suicide bombing of the warship on Oct. 12, 2000, in Yemen’s Aden Harbor that killed 17 U.S. sailors.

“Exclusion of such evidence is not without societal costs,” the judge, Col. Lanny J. Acosta Jr., wrote in a 50-page decision. “However, permitting the admission of evidence obtained by or derived from torture by the same government that seeks to prosecute and execute the accused may have even greater societal costs.”

The question of whether the confessions were admissible had been seen as a crucial test of a more than decade-long joint effort by the Justice and Defense Departments to prosecute accused architects of Qaeda attacks at the special Guantánamo court, which was designed to grapple with the impact of earlier, violent C.I.A. interrogations while pursuing justice through death-penalty trials.

Similar efforts to suppress confessions as tainted by torture are being made in the case against Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four other prisoners who are accused of conspiring in the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Mr. Nashiri, like Mr. Mohammed, was waterboarded and subjected to other forms of torture in 2002 by C.I.A. interrogators, including contract psychologists, through a program of “enhanced interrogation.”

Testimony showed that the psychologists took part in a yearslong program that, even after the violent interrogation techniques ended, used isolation, sleep deprivation, punishment for defiance and implied threats of more violence to keep the prisoners cooperative and speaking to interrogators.

Prosecutors considered Mr. Nashiri’s confessions to federal and Navy criminal investigative agents at Guantánamo in early 2007, four months after his transfer from a C.I.A. prison, to be among the best evidence against him.

Mr. Nashiri is charged in the longest-running death-penalty case at Guantánamo Bay.Credit...ABC, via Associated Press

But prosecutors also sought, and received permission from the judge, to use a transcript from other questioning at Mr. Nashiri’s eventual trial.

In March 2007, he went before a military panel examining his status as an enemy combatant and was allowed to address allegations involving his role in Al Qaeda plots. He told military officers that he had confessed after being tortured by the C.I.A., but then recanted.

At the administrative hearing, Mr. Nashiri denied being a member of Al Qaeda or involvement in the plots but admitted to knowing Osama bin Laden and receiving funds from him for an unrealized shipping business project in the Persian Gulf.

Human rights and international law experts had been eagerly awaiting the decision as a test of a U.S. government theory that federal agents could obtain a lawful confession, untainted by previous abuse, if so-called clean teams questioned the defendants without threats or violence and repeatedly told former C.I.A. prisoners that their participation was voluntary.

But testimony in the pretrial hearings showed that after his capture in 2002, Mr. Nashiri was subjected to both authorized and unauthorized physical and emotional torture in an odyssey through the C.I.A. secret prison network — from Thailand to Poland to Afghanistan and then Guantánamo Bay — that including waterboarding, confinement inside a cramped box, rectal abuse and being tormented with a revving drill beside his hooded head to coerce him to answer interrogators’ questions about future and suspected Qaeda plots.

By the time he was questioned by federal agents in January 2007, lawyers and experts argued, the prisoner was trained to respond to his interrogators’ questions.

Judge Acosta, who retires from the Army next month, agreed.

Mr. Nashiri had no reason to believe “that his circumstances had substantially changed when he was marched in to be interviewed by the newest round of U.S. personnel in late January 2007,” Judge Acosta said.

“If there was ever a case where the circumstances of an accused’s prior statements impacted his ability to make a later voluntary statement, this is such a case. Even if the 2007 statements were not obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, they were derived from it.”

Rear Adm. Aaron C. Rugh, the chief prosecutor for military commissions, did not respond to a question about whether his team would appeal the ruling. With a new judge expected later this year, prosecutors could seek reconsideration at the Guantánamo court or raise the issue with a Pentagon appeals panel, the Court of Military Commissions Review.

Separately, the panel is considering a challenge to Colonel Acosta’s status as the judge in the U.S.S. Cole case. Defense lawyers had asked him to step down earlier this year when he disclosed that he was applying for a post-retirement, civilian job as clerk of the Air Force Judiciary. Colonel Acosta refused, saying he had disclosed his application the day after he applied for the job, and so there was no hidden bias in favor of the government.

Katie Carmon, one of Mr. Nashiri’s lawyers, said there were no immediate plans to withdraw their challenge and called Colonel Acosta’s decision suppressing the 2007 interrogations both “morally and legally correct.”

“The government that tortured Mr. al-Nashiri has never been held accountable,” she said. “But today’s ruling is a small step forward as the government loses a critical part of its prosecution.”

Carol Rosenberg has been covering the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, including detention operations and military commissions, since the first prisoners were brought there from Afghanistan in January 2002. She worked as a metro, national and foreign correspondent with a focus on coverage of conflict in the Middle East for The Miami Herald from 1990 to 2019. More about Carol Rosenberg

The New York Times · by Carol Rosenberg · August 18, 2023

3. U.S. and Thailand Co-host Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Workshop in Bangkok to Strengthen Regional Nonproliferation Coordination

All well and good. But actions speak louder than workshops. Let's begin aggressive execution of the PSI.

Excerpt:

Countries that participate in the PSI by endorsing the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles make a political commitment to take action to impede or stop, individually or in coordination with other partner states, shipments of WMD-related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with domestic and international laws and frameworks.

U.S. and Thailand Co-host Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Workshop in Bangkok to Strengthen Regional Nonproliferation Coordination

th.usembassy.gov · by U.S. Embassy Bangkok · August 18, 2023

The United States and Thailand will co-host a Southeast Asia Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Workshop from August 17-18, 2023, in Bangkok, Thailand.

This multilateral workshop brings together civilian and military leaders from Cambodia, Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, the United States, and Thailand. During the workshop, participants will examine modern weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation pathways, improve understanding of WMD interdiction obligations, explore legal frameworks and the best practices of partners, and enhance the connections of the “Countering WMD” community in Southeast Asia. The workshop also includes briefs, including an expert brief on global and regional proliferation threats from the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, panel discussions, and a scenario-based tabletop discussion focused on intra-governmental information sharing and decision-making about potential WMD-related proliferation activities in the region.

The PSI was established in 2003 to stop or impede transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Thus far, more than 100 states have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.

Countries that participate in the PSI by endorsing the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles make a political commitment to take action to impede or stop, individually or in coordination with other partner states, shipments of WMD-related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with domestic and international laws and frameworks.

By U.S. Embassy Bangkok | 18 August, 2023 | Topics: News, Press Releases, U.S. & Thailand

th.usembassy.gov · by U.S. Embassy Bangkok · August 18, 2023

4. The U.S. Is Beefing Up Alliances in Asia. But Don’t Expect an ‘Asian NATO’

True, do not expect an Asian NATO. But our hub and spoke alliance system now has a number of larger hubs (AUKUS, QUAD, NATO+AP4, and now JAROKUS) that create more connectivity among the many spokes.

The U.S. Is Beefing Up Alliances in Asia. But Don’t Expect an ‘Asian NATO’

TIME · by Chad de Guzman · August 18, 2023

U.S. President Joe Biden will meet at Camp David in Maryland on Friday with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts for a first-of-its-kind trilateral summit aimed at bolstering security partnerships amid increasing tensions in the Asia-Pacific.

The White House said in July that, aside from addressing the “continued threat” of North Korea’s nuclearization, the leaders will use the meeting to focus on how they can fortify relationships with Southeast Asian and Pacific nations to counter China’s increasing exertion and expansion of its influence in the region. The summit is also expected to touch on maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. Two senior Biden officials told Reuters earlier this week that the trilateral alliance will launch “joint initiatives on technology and defense,” and a three-way crisis hotline during the meeting.

The summit is a monumental coming-together for two parties, Japan and South Korea, whose historically strained relationship has been on the mend only in recent months. Some observers have claimed the three-way partnership represents a sort of “mini-NATO,” while others have suggested it could pave the way for a “de facto Asian NATO”—referencing the mutual defense pact formed in 1949 between the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and several European states (since expanding to include almost all of Europe) in response to the security threat posed by the former Soviet Union.

Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is most known for its Article 5, which defines an armed attack on any member state as an attack on the entire coalition—and requires a collective response. It’s an appealing concept for some worried about military aggression from Beijing and Pyongyang. But experts tell TIME that a multilateral, U.S.-led Asian defense alliance like NATO “is not feasible,” nor necessary.

The Asia-Pacific is “too diverse politically and economically” to host the formation of a NATO-like construct, Nicholas Szechenyi, deputy director for Asia at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells TIME.

For one, Asian nations are certainly not unified in their opinions on the U.S. and China. The U.S. has found democratic allies in some countries in the Indo-Pacific. But many Southeast Asian states, such as Myanmar and Cambodia, are led by authoritarian regimes, which the U.S. has criticized and China has embraced. Meanwhile, other countries are pursuing strategic non-alignment: India, just behind China in military size with 1.4 million active personnel, has vowed not to side with either the U.S. or China.

But at the core of most states’ expected hesitancy to fully commit to a regional defense pact is economic reliance on China. Analysis by the Economist Intelligence Unit shows China dominates trade in Asia, with every major economy in the region having a bigger two-way goods trade relationship with China than with the U.S. “U.S. allies in the region want to maintain economic interdependence with China but are also uncertain about China’s military ambitions,” says Szechenyi. “This is the dilemma for frontline states.”

Riley Walters, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute specializing in international economics and national security, says a NATO-like construct would be redundant given the existence of other, more specific bilateral and multilateral collective defense arrangements. There’s already the Quad (a security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.), the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-U.S.) Treaty, individual alliances with the Philippines and others, and now the trilateral partnership of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. “I believe the efforts between the U.S., its allies, and with Taiwan, are already working to deter against [North Korea’s] aggression on the Korean Peninsula and conflict in the Taiwan Strait,” Walters tells TIME.

Walters points to the aid sent by the U.S. and other NATO members to Ukraine, a non-member, as evidence that existing alliances can deter and respond to attacks on third parties. Even the actual NATO, which has stated it sees China as a threat to its interests, is already stepping up its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, with Japan and South Korea having been invited to formal talks with the transatlantic congregation earlier this year. “You don’t need to be a member of NATO to get NATO-like support,” Walters says.

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TIME · by Chad de Guzman · August 18, 2023

5. Russia’s Lunar Lander Crashes Into the Moon

My first feeling is to gloat. But moon landings are difficult.

Russia’s Lunar Lander Crashes Into the Moon

By Kenneth Chang and Anton Troianovski

Aug. 20, 2023

Updated 6:14 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Anton Troianovski · August 20, 2023

The robotic Luna-25 spacecraft appeared to have “ceased its existence” after a failed orbital adjustment, the space agency Roscosmos said.

An image released by the Russian Space Agency, Roscosmos, of a Soyuz rocket carrying the Luna-25 launching from the Vostochny cosmodrome in Russia’s far east on Aug. 11.

Aug. 20, 2023Updated 5:56 a.m. ET

A Russian robotic spacecraft that was headed to the lunar surface has crashed into the moon, Russia’s space agency said on Sunday, citing the results of a preliminary investigation a day after it lost contact with the vehicle.

It is the latest setback in spaceflight for a country that during the Cold War became the first nation, as the Soviet Union, to put a satellite, a man and then a woman in orbit.

The Luna-25 lander, Russia’s first space launch to the moon’s surface since the 1970s, entered lunar orbit last Wednesday and was supposed to land as early as Monday. On Saturday afternoon Moscow time, according to Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, the spacecraft received orders to enter an orbit that would set it up for a lunar landing. But an unexplained “emergency situation” occurred, and the orbital adjustment did not occur.

On Sunday, Roscosmos said that measures to find and re-establish contact with the craft had failed, and that it calculated the failure of the adjustment meant that Luna-25 had deviated from its planned orbit and “ceased its existence as a result of a collision with the lunar surface.”

An interagency commission would be formed to investigate the reasons for the failure, it added.

Luna-25, which launched on Aug. 10, was aiming to be the first mission to reach the moon’s south polar region. Government space programs and private companies all over Earth are interested in that part of the moon because they believe it may contain water ice that could be used by astronauts for future space missions.

Another country, India, will now get the chance to land the first probe in the lunar south pole’s vicinity. Its Chandrayaan-3 mission launched in July, but it opted for a more roundabout but fuel-efficient route to the moon. It is scheduled to attempt a landing on Wednesday.

That India may succeed after Russia failed would be a blow to President Vladimir V. Putin, who has used Russian achievements in space as part and parcel of his hold on power.

That is part of the Kremlin’s narrative — a compelling one for many Russians — that Russia is a great nation held back by an American-led West that is jealous of and threatened by Russia’s capabilities. The country’s state-run space industry in particular has been a valuable tool as Russia works to remake its geopolitical relationships.

“The interest in our proposals is very high,” the head of Russia’s space program, Yuri Borisov, told Mr. Putin in a televised meeting in June, describing Russia’s plan to expand space cooperation with African countries. The initiative is part of the Kremlin’s overall efforts to deepen economic and political ties with non-Western countries amid European and American sanctions.

Interest in the Luna-25 mission within Russia itself appeared muted. The flight lifted off from a remote spaceport in Vostochny in the country’s Far East at an hour when most Russians, who live in the country’s west, were probably sleeping. The mission’s progress toward the moon was not a major subject in state media.

A view of the Zeeman crater on the far side of the moon taken by Luna-25 on Thursday.Credit...Roscosmos, via Reuters

In recent decades, Russia’s exploration of Earth’s solar system has fallen a long way from the heights of the Soviet era.

The last unqualified success was more than 35 years ago, when the Soviet Union was still intact. A pair of twin spacecraft, Vega 1 and Vega 2, launched six days apart. Six months later, the two spacecraft flew past Venus, each dropping a capsule that contained a lander that successfully set down on the hellish planet’s surface, as well as a balloon that, when released, floated through the atmosphere. In March 1986, the two spacecraft then passed within about 5,000 miles of Halley’s comet, taking pictures and studying the dust and gas from the comet’s nucleus.

Subsequent missions to Mars that launched in 1988 and 1996 failed.

The embarrassing nadir came in 2011 with Phobos-Grunt, which was supposed to land on Phobos, the larger of Mars’ two moons, and bring back samples of rock and dirt to Earth. But Phobos-Grunt never made it out of Earth’s orbit after the engines that were to send it to Mars did not fire. A few months later, it burned up in Earth’s atmosphere.

An investigation later revealed that Russia’s financially strapped space agency had skimped on manufacturing and testing, using electronics components that had not been proven to survive the cold and radiation of space.

An image taken by the Luna-25 spacecraft during its trip to the moon.Credit...Roscosmos, via Reuters

Otherwise, Russia has been confined to low-Earth orbit, including carrying astronauts to and from the International Space Station, which it jointly manages with NASA.

Luna-25 was to have completed a one-year mission studying the composition of the lunar surface. It was also supposed to have demonstrated technologies that would have been used in a series of robotic missions that Russia plans to launch to the moon to lay the groundwork for a future lunar base that it is planning to build with China.

But the schedule for those missions — Luna 26, 27 and 28 — has already slipped years from the original timetable, and now there are likely to be further delays, especially as the Russian space program struggles, financially and technologically, because of sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Although NASA and the European Space Agency continue to cooperate with Russia on the International Space Station, other joint space projects ended after the invasion of Ukraine. For the lunar missions, that means Russia needs to replace key components that were to come from Europe, including a drill for the Luna-27 lander.

Russia has struggled to develop new space hardware, especially electronics that reliably work in the harsh conditions of outer space.

“You cannot really fly in space, or, at least, fly in space for a long time, without better electronics,” said Anatoly Zak, who publishes RussianSpaceWeb.com, which tracks Russia’s space activities. “The Soviet electronics were always backwards. They were always behind the West in this area of science and technology.”

He added: “The entire Russian space program is actually affected by this issue.”

Other ambitious Russian space plans are also behind schedule and will likely take much longer than the official pronouncements to complete.

Angara, a family of rockets that has been in development for two decades, has only launched six times.

A few days ago, Vladimir Kozhevnikov, the chief designer for Russia’s next space station, told the Interfax news agency that Oryol, a modern replacement for the venerable Soyuz capsule, would make its maiden flight in 2028.

Back in 2020, Dmitry Rogozin, then the head of Roscosmos, said that the maiden flight of Oryol would take place in 2023 — meaning that, in just three years, the launch date has slipped five years.

Landing on the moon is treacherous, and China is the only country to do so successfully this century — three times, most recently in December 2020. Three other missions have crash-landed in recent years, most recently an attempt by Ispace, a Japanese company. Its Hakuto-R Mission 1 lander crashed in April when a software glitch led the vehicle to misjudge its altitude.

Kenneth Chang has been at The Times since 2000, writing about physics, geology, chemistry, and the planets. Before becoming a science writer, he was a graduate student whose research involved the control of chaos. More about Kenneth Chang

Anton Troianovski is the Moscow bureau chief for The New York Times. He was previously Moscow bureau chief of The Washington Post and spent nine years with The Wall Street Journal in Berlin and New York. More about Anton Troianovski

The New York Times · by Anton Troianovski · August 20, 2023

6. On the Front Lines, Ukrainians Are Buoyed to Be on the Offensive

The moral (and morale) is to the physical as three is to one (said Bonaprte I believe).

On the Front Lines, Ukrainians Are Buoyed to Be on the Offensive

By Carlotta Gall

Reporting from the front lines in Ukraine

Aug. 20, 2023,

5:00 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · August 20, 2023

Despite tough fighting and heavy casualties, Ukrainian commanders say their forces are in better shape now than just months ago, while Russian troops appear worse off.

The Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade prepared for an evening assault against Russian forces near Bakhmut, in eastern Ukraine, on Aug. 14.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Aug. 20, 2023, 5:00 a.m. ET

In 18 months of war, Ukrainian land has mostly changed hands in sudden bursts, with Russia snatching a mass of territory at the start and Ukraine recapturing chunks in dramatic counterattacks. Now 10 weeks into its most ambitious counteroffensive, with heavy casualties and equipment losses, questions have been growing about whether Ukraine can punch through Russian lines.

Despite grueling fighting, Ukrainian forces along much of the 600-mile front are moving forward, and commanders and veteran soldiers say they are in better shape now than six or 12 months ago.

“If a year ago we were conducting defensive operations and we had the task of holding back the enemy, now we have the ability to attack,” Col. Dmytro Lysiuk, commander of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade, said in an interview in his frontline bunker last week.

Ukrainian officers are almost invariably upbeat in interviews. Even if the counteroffensive has yielded only mixed results so far, with Ukrainian troops slowed by dense Russian minefields and sustained firepower, they describe previous periods as being tougher than this one.

Their optimism is tempered by the deepening realization that the war looks likely to continue at least a couple of years more. Some commanders even talk of a permanent state of conflict.

But Colonel Lysiuk and other leaders interviewed in recent weeks point to what they describe as a number of encouraging changes. Their units are better trained and equipped than ever, thanks to billions of dollars of Western aid.

They have worked out how to manage the training of fresh soldiers and how to keep replenishing their ranks after losses, even while continuing to fight. Almost every unit has grown in professionalism and size: Battalions have turned into brigades, and volunteer groups into formal army units.

“If a year ago we were conducting defensive operations and we had the task of holding back the enemy, now we have the ability to attack,” said Col. Dmytro Lysiuk, commander of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

Longer-range Western artillery and, in particular, the cluster munitions recently provided by the United States, with some controversy, have been proving effective in destroying not only concentrations of Russian troops but also Russian armor and artillery systems.

Russian reinforcements have been holding back, reluctant to move into range of Ukraine’s guns, several commanders said.

“They can’t approach closer, or they will be destroyed,” said Lt. Ashot Arutiunian, the head of a drone unit of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army. Russia has resorted to other weapons, using more aviation bombs and missile strikes as a result, he said.

He showed video from his drones revealing damaged Russian armor. Vast craters gouged out of the earth by Russian aerial bombs and S300 missiles are visible in Ukrainian settlements all along the front line, where they have ripped up roads and smashed next to medical centers.

Even if it does not recapture territory quickly, the counteroffensive signals a shift of perspective for Ukrainian fighters.

For more than a year, units like the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade were ordered to hold the line along the Zaporizhzhia front, often a grim task of defending trenches and fortified positions under constant bombardment. Colonel Lysiuk was charged with rebuilding the brigade after it had taken heavy losses and lost its commander in December. It was back on operations in a week.

“It is tough,” Colonel Lysiuk said, “but the system is already tested.”

Empty ammunition boxes inside a position of the 129th Territorial Defense Brigade in on the southern front, in the Donetsk region.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

In June, his troops played a role in the first weeks of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, recapturing several villages in a strategic area near the Dnipro River and an intersection that leads south to the Black Sea and west to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

Colonel Lysiuk declined to say what his main tasks were then, but he said the brigade had fulfilled them all. “I’ll tell you after the war,” he said.

It is a measure of how tough the fighting has been that the advance amounted to just a few miles. The Russians moved up reinforcements, he said, and assaults on the next village have failed.

Yet Colonel Lysiuk was unperturbed. “It’s not a small job,” he said. “Some directions are more of a priority for development for a successful counteroffensive.”

Most of Ukraine’s seasoned commanders said they had learned from previous counteroffensives that Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, chief of the armed forces, and his top generals were adept at subterfuge and feints.

For months last year, Ukraine talked up its counteroffensive in the southern Kherson region and then surprised the world, and many of its own troops, with a sudden breach of Russian lines in the northeastern region of Kharkiv.

The Kherson counteroffensive unfolded by destroying Russian supply routes, which eventually forced the Russians to retreat from territory west of the Dnipro.

The two successful campaigns have given many Ukrainian soldiers and officers on the front confidence in General Zaluzhny’s overarching plan, even when troops receive a mauling, as did the new brigades spearheading the counteroffensive.

“We were disappointed, we thought they would punch quickly through to the sea,” said a 30-year-old deputy battalion commander of the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade, fighting on the eastern front. He gave only his call sign, Tysen, according to military protocol.

Members of the 129th Territorial Defense Brigade clean and prepare their weapons inside a kindergarten on the southern front.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

But Tysen said he had friends fighting in the south and they remained confident.

“Tactically, with cunning, with Western equipment, the Ukrainian armed forces are breaking through their defenses,” he said. “Success is just a question of time.”

Russian forces have mounted a fresh offensive in northeastern Ukraine toward the city of Kupiansk, but Ukraine units say they have managed to hold them at bay.

Tysen and other commanders said that the Russian forces they saw appeared to be in poorer shape than the Ukrainian ones.

“Compared to the beginning of the war, their equipment and personnel are in a very sorry state,” Tysen said.

On the southern front, soldiers and commanders said there were signs that Ukrainian artillery was wearing down Russian units facing them, largely thanks to American cluster munitions.

“We are using them quite effectively,” Colonel Lysiuk said. “They arrived mid-July. And we use them constantly.”

“We are fighting for the future generations, for our children,” a deputy battalion commander of 129th Territorial Defense Brigade, with the call sign Kherson, said.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

“We destroyed a lot of the enemy’s artillery in this time,” he said. “If before 20 enemy guns were working, now it’s two to four.” There are also signs, he said, that the Russians “cannot maintain constant combat readiness.”

Tactics mattered, too, said a deputy battalion commander of 129th Territorial Defense Brigade, who goes by the call sign Kherson.

A 41-year-old former government administrator who enlisted after the Russian invasion last year, Kherson led his unit in a combined assault on the village of Neskuchne at the beginning of the counteroffensive.

His men gained a foothold in the village and battled at close quarters for three days, he said.

“The Russians attempted counterattacks, tried to squeeze us out, to encircle us but everything happened as we envisioned,” he said. “We also had strong support from artillery and the higher command.”

Soldiers of Ukraine’s 80th Air Assault Brigade prepare for a nighttime attack on Monday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

As the Russian troops began to retreat, Russian forces fired rockets at the battlefield, killing their own men.

“They buried quite a lot of their own guys,” Kherson said.

Most Ukrainian commanders said their leaders had shown far more concern for the lives of their men than the Russian command for its troops. A few said hesitancy sometimes actually cost more Ukrainian lives.

A special operations forces officer, Oleksii, whose unit lost 15 men in four days of failed assaults on one village at the start of the counteroffensive, said, “If we had had harsher orders, that we had no option, we had to take the village, we would have.”

Instead, commanders delayed the operation, giving the Russians time to mine the trenches, he said. Then, when the first assault ran into difficulty, the commanders pulled back to regroup instead of sending in reinforcements.

“If you did it in one push, you would succeed and lose less people,” he said. “They thought, ‘we will try and lose less people,’ and now almost our whole group is in the hospital.”

How long such losses can be sustained by both sides may now prove critical to the war’s future course. Russia can draw from a population more than three times as large, but Ukrainian commanders repeatedly pointed to a crucial difference between the two sides: They were fighting to save their country.

“It doesn’t matter how long it is,” Kherson said. “It would be great if it ends in a week. If it is longer — we don’t have a choice.”

A commander in the Ukraine Volunteers Army analyzed footage from a reconnaissance drone inside his base in the Donetsk region. Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

Oleksandr Chubko and Dyma Shapoval contributed reporting.

Carlotta Gall is a senior correspondent currently covering the war in Ukraine. She previously was Istanbul bureau chief, covered the aftershocks of the Arab Spring from Tunisia, and reported from the Balkans during the war in Kosovo and Serbia, and from Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2001. She was on a team that won a 2009 Pulitzer Prize for reporting from Afghanistan and Pakistan. More about Carlotta Gall

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · August 20, 2023

7. U.S., China Try to Draw Nations to Their Side as Divisions Harden

The two scorecards look very different - one team has a lot more world class members than the other.

U.S., China Try to Draw Nations to Their Side as Divisions Harden

After Biden’s meeting with Japanese and South Korean leaders, Xi Jinping looks for friends at a summit in South Africa

By Peter Landers

Follow and Dasl Yoon

Aug. 20, 2023 6:53 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-china-try-to-draw-nations-to-their-side-as-divisions-harden-43f1ffd3?mod=hp_lead_pos10

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida committed to moves to shield their economies from Chinese threats. PHOTO: ADAM SCHULTZ/WHITE HOUSE/ZUMA PRESS

If this isn’t another Cold War, it certainly resembles one.

On the one side, leaders of the U.S., Japan and South Korea, touting their shared democratic values, pledged cooperation in confronting China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior.”

On the other, Chinese leader Xi Jinping was traveling to South Africa for a summit with developing nations open to Beijing’s wooing. China’s state news agency denounced America as “driven by a desperate bid to salvage its hegemonic power.”

Cold War I, for the U.S., was about assembling allies and friends to counteract the Soviet Union. Two of the most important were Japan, facing Soviet power on its northern edge, and South Korea in its standoff with communist North Korea.

Now those two countries, putting aside longstanding feuds with each other, are teaming up with the U.S. to present a united front against Beijing. At a summit hosted by President Biden on Friday at his Camp David retreat, the three nations committed to annual military exercises and moves to shield their economies from Chinese threats.

They said they would cooperate in areas such as batteries and semiconductors, strengths for both South Korea and Japan, and tighten export controls on technology with military applications. They restated as a group previous U.S. admonitions to Beijing against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

“The bargaining positions of all three parties improved vis-à-vis China as a result of the meeting because it is harder for China to drive a wedge in the trilateral relations,” said Tongfi Kim, a professor of Asian geopolitics at the Brussels School of Governance.

The pictures of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol smiling and strolling side by side with Biden would have been hard to imagine as recently as early last year, when Tokyo and Seoul had a long list of disputes over historical issues and were hardly speaking with each other. Since taking office in May 2022, Yoon has systematically shaved down the list, most importantly by proposing a plan to settle World War II-era Korean forced laborers’ claims against Japan without Japanese money.

Japan and South Korea, which both have extensive trade with China, have shifted to a tougher stance toward Beijing this year because of U.S. pressure and concern about Chinese moves. Tokyo has criticized joint China-Russia exercises that included a flotilla navigating around the Japanese archipelago.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping are expected to participate in a summit of developing nations in South Africa. PHOTO: SERGEI BOBYLEV/POOL SPUTNIK KREMLIN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

In response to the Camp David meeting, China’s official Xinhua News Agency issued a commentary bristling with anti-American language that could have come from a Brezhnev-era Tass dispatch. Xinhua called the U.S. a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” whose “evil intent is self-evident.”

Xinhua said Japan and South Korea would become the sacrificial lambs of America’s hunger for dominance and be shunned as U.S. lackeys. “By sowing seeds of division and intensifying opposition, the meeting represents a perilous gambit that might resurrect the specter of the Cold War,” Xinhua said.

Beijing is looking to shore up its own friendships among nations in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia that are traditionally suspicious of U.S. power.

That is the backdrop to the summit of Brics nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—scheduled to begin Tuesday in Johannesburg, where they will be joined by other African leaders. China’s Xi will attend in person, with Russian President Vladimir Putin expected to join by video link.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said the group would “inject stability and positive energy into today’s world.”

The original Cold War likewise featured Soviet attempts to attract developing nations with promises of economic aid mixed with warnings about what the Soviets described as an overbearing and colonialist America.

India, then as now, is a wild card. It has worked in the past few years with the U.S., Japan and Australia in the grouping known as the Quad, including military exercises, and is enmeshed in a sometimes-bloody border dispute with China, but it also relies on Russian military equipment.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is attending the South Africa summit in person alongside Xi, and analysts say India is likely to work to prevent the Brics group from becoming a vehicle for expanding China’s influence.

“It is not at all clear how this world will resolve into a predictable set of coalitions,” said Sheila Smith, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She forecast an era of fluidity in which major powers “play in multiple coalitions simultaneously, and try to influence others to align—and stay aligned—with them.”

Mounting Cyber Espionage and Hacking Threat from China

moderndiplomacy.eu · by Vaishali Basu Sharma · August 19, 2023

Published

1 day ago

August 19, 2023

Earlier this month a ransomware attack on America’s Prospect Medical Holdings, which operates dozens of hospitals and hundreds of clinics and outpatient centres across the states of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and Southern California was forced to shut off its centres in several locations as the healthcare system experienced software disruptions. In June India’s premier hospital, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) faced a malware attack on its systems which was thwarted by its cyber-security systems. This is not the first time that the premier hospital’s data was breached. In November 2022, AIIMS had experienced a cyberattack within weeks of announcing that from January 2023, it would operate on a completely paperless mechanism. The cyber attack which involved ransomware, designed to deny a user or organisation access to files, lasted for nearly a month affecting the profile of almost 4 crore patients – affecting registration, appointments, billing, laboratory report generation, among other operations of the hospital. Regarding the quantum of data that was compromised, the government revealed that “five servers of AIIMS were affected and approximately 1.3 terabytes of data was encrypted.”

Till June this year, Indian Government organisations faced over one lakh cyber security incidents and financial institutions saw over four lakh incidents. Data presented by the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), which has the mandate of tracking and monitoring cybersecurity incidents in India, indicates rising Cyberattacks to government organisations. or systems year on year. From 70798 in 2018, to 112474 in 2023 (up to June) incidents of cyber attacks have been on the rise, on a year on year basis. Presenting this data at the Parliament, Minister for electronics and IT Ashwini Vaishnaw said, “With innovation in technology and rise in usage of the cyberspace and digital infrastructure for businesses and services, cyber-attacks pose a threat to confidentiality, integrity and availability of data and services, which may have direct or indirect impact on the organisation.”

A lot of the hacking activity points towards China. Western intelligence agencies are becoming increasingly wary of digital intrusion by hacking teams that they believe are being backed by China’s government. Almost a decade ago, American computer security firm Mandiant had made the startling claim that these hacking groups are operated by units of China’s army. The firm was able to trace an overwhelming percentage of the attacks on American corporations, organisations and government agencies to a building on the outskirts of Shanghai. Mandiant made the case that the building was one of the bases of the People’s Liberation Army’s corps of cyberwarriors. US intelligence analysts have detected that a central element of Chinese computer espionage is Unit 61398 which targets American and Canadian government sites. Mandiant, which was hired by The New York Times, found that hacker groups like “Comment Crew” or “Shanghai Group” were behind hundreds of attacks on U.S. companies, focusing “on companies involved in the critical infrastructure of the United States — its electrical power grid, gas lines and waterworks” thereafter bringing that information to the military unit 61398.

In their defence the China’s authorities simply denied any form of state-sponsored hacking, and have in turn dubbed the US National Security Agency (NSA) as “the world’s largest hacker organisation.”

Nonetheless, since the 2013 revelations, Chinese hacking teams have generated a lot of interest and Western cybersecurity companies and intelligence agencies have accused them of global digital incursion. They allege that Chinese government-backed hackers attempt to target everything from government and military organisations to corporations and media organisations.

Most recently in the footsteps of the incident involving the Chinese spy balloon Microsoft claimed that in an ongoing effort Chinese state-sponsored hackers group ‘Storm-0558’ was forging digital authentication tokens to gain unauthorised access to Microsoft’s Outlook accounts and urged users “close or change credentials for all compromised accounts”. On May 24, Microsoft and US intelligence state-sponsored hackers of ‘Volt Typhoon’ were engaged in ongoing spying of critical US infrastructure organisations ranging from telecommunications to transportation hubs, using an unnamed vulnerability in a popular cybersecurity suite called FortiGuard, and had been active since mid-2021.

According to US cybersecurity firm Palo Alto Networks cyber espionage threat group ‘BackdoorDiplomacy’ has links to the Chinese hacking group called ‘APT15’and they are all involved in cyber intrusions and financially motivated data breaches for the Chinese government. During the visit by then-US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei, APT27 initiated a range of cyber attacks targeting Taiwan’s presidential office, foreign and defence ministries as well as infrastructure such as screens at railway stations. Television screens at 7-11 convenience stores in Taiwan Began to display the words: “Warmonger Pelosi, get out of Taiwan!”

Mara Hvistendahl’s article in Foreign Policy, 2017 ‘China’s Hacker Army’ estimated China’s “hacker army” anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 individuals, but rejected the belief that it was a monolithic cyber army. Mara contends that Chinese hackers are for the most part dangerous ‘freelancers’ whose ‘causes neatly overlap with the interests of the Chinese government’ and these hackers are left alone as long as they target foreign sites and companies.

Although cyber attacks have gone up globally, data by Check Point, an American-Israeli software company, reveals that weekly cyber attacks in India have gone up by 18 per cent this year, which is 2.5 times more than the global increase. Furthermore the cyber attacks are becoming more sophisticated as hackers try to weaponize legitimate tools for malicious gains. For instance the use of ChatGPT for code generation, enables hackers to effortlessly launch cyberattacks.

Last year in a massive case of cyber espionage, Chinese-linked hackers broke into mail servers operated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in February 2022 and stole sensitive data. At the recent ‘Conference on Crime & Security on the theme of ‘NFTs, AI and the Metaverse’, current G20 President India, has highlighted the need for cooperation to build cyber-resilience in an increasingly connected world. Both cyber attacks and cyber crimes have national security implications.

In India, investigations into the cyberattack, which had crippled the functioning of India premier health institution AIIMS, revealed that “the IP addresses of two emails, which were identified from the headers of files that were encrypted by the hackers, originated from Hong Kong and China’s Henan province”.

Earlier this year, US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray had an alarming metric, – that Chinese hackers outnumber FBI cyber staff 50 to one. Addressing a Congressional panel he said, China has “a bigger hacking programme than every other major nation combined and has stolen more of our personal and corporate data than all other nations — big or small — combined.”

China is today home to some of the most sophisticated hackers, whose capabilities have only improved with time. Their motivations and actions might be independent but are conveniently entwined. However, much more needs to be understood about the hacker culture from China in recent years, if the menace of cybercrime and ransomware is to be mitigated successfully .

Related Topics:China Cyber warfare cybersecurity featured

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Vaishali Basu Sharma

Vaishali Basu Sharma is an analyst of strategic and economic affairs. She has worked as a consultant with India’s National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) for nearly a decade. She is presently associated with New Delhi based think tank Policy Perspectives Foundation.

9. With $4.5B investment planned in Organic Industrial Base, a focus on next-gen vehicles

Can our industrial base build the "iron mountain(s)" (survivable versions or variations) we need to fight and win future wars?

With $4.5B investment planned in Organic Industrial Base, a focus on next-gen vehicles - Breaking Defense

The OIB comprises 23 depots, arsenals and ammunition plants owned by the government.

By FLAVIA CAMARGOS PEREIRA

breakingdefense.com · by Flavia Camargos Pereira · August 18, 2023

A 155 mm artillery tube enters a heat treatment furnace at Watervliet Arsenal in New York as part of a process called “austenitizing.” Watervliet is one of 23 depots, arsenals and ammunition plants managed by AMC that make up the Army’s Organic Industrial Base. (Photo Credit: Mr. John B Snyder (AMC)

GVSETS 2023 — With the US Army preparing to invest nearly $4.5 billion over the next 15 years to modernize its Organic Industrial Base (OIB) in order to support a next-generation vehicle fleet, an Army officer said Thursday those dollars will be prioritized towards improvements in tooling, machinery, energy consumption and cybersecurity.

Speaking at the 15th Annual Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering & Technology Symposium, in Novi, Mich, Brig. Gen. Michael B. Lalor, head of the Army Tank-Automotive & Armaments Command (TACOM), said the money will also enable the branch “to build [in] some surge capacity.”

The OIB comprises 23 depots, arsenals and ammunition plants owned by the government. Lalor told the audience that some of the OIB infrastructure “dates back 70, 80 years,” and their modernization will enable integrating robotic processes and removing personnel from hazardous work environments.

“We are going to be able to do more of that capability in the future,” he noted.

This improvement effort is part of the Army’s Organic Industrial Base Modernization Implementation Plan, which was established in 2021 and will comprise over 500 initiatives across the OIB.

Thelmina Myles, branch chief for OIB Modernization and Business Development, pointed out that “each of these projects’ objectives is either safety, health, efficiency, quality green manufacturing and industry 4.0 compliance,” which will involve advancing the use of artificial intelligence.

From her perspective, “the implementation of these priorities is important to ensure the OIB sites are compatible as well as versatile enough to support both enduring and signature modernization systems in the future.”

The improvement of the Organic Industrial Base will cover, for instance, the upgrade of the Red River Army Depot’s Rubber Products Facility, which will automate its cleaning and painting processes and build a new combat platforms center to support the operation of the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.

Lalor stressed that Red River “had atrophied over time based on lack of consistent funding and workload,” but now it “is turning hard on Bradley production for Ukraine” and “building some surge capacity.”

In the Sierra Army Depot, the branch is upgrading the rail system to improve material distribution and modernizing the warehouse tracking and management systems.

The Joint Systems Manufacturing Center-Lima, meanwhile, has been updating its production facility and replacing several cranes that have exceeded the operational life.

According to Lalor, the Army is focused on innovation and “on how to do processes differently” in order to be prepared the future systems that will be part of its inventory.

“When I think about all the robots that are coming into our formations and everything, [I wonder] who is going to maintain those robots, how they are going to be maintained and sustained,” he said.

The Next Generation Combat Vehicles program is among the service’s key modernization initiatives alongside Long-Range Precision Fires, Future Vertical Lift, network, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality.

The Army plans to increase investments in its future land platforms and requested $2.696 billion to progress with development and acquisition programs in this domain over the next fiscal year. The proposal is nearly $630 million higher than the FY23 enacted funds.

The Army’s request earmarks around $1 billion in R&D for the maturation of detailed design and prototyping phases of the XM30 program. Other funds were allocated to the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle ($555 million) and Mobile Protected Firepower ($395 million) programs.

The service also proposed $271 million for modernizing combat vehicles with silent watch and mobility, increased operational duration and more onboard electrical power.

breakingdefense.com · by Flavia Camargos Pereira · August 18, 2023

10. Army announces two aviation brigade deployments

I'm sure we have plans to backfill them if we need to deploy those divisions.

Army announces two aviation brigade deployments

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · August 18, 2023

Two aviation brigades will deploy abroad in the months ahead, Army officials announced Friday.

The 82nd Airborne Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade will deploy across the Middle East in the first quarter of fiscal year 2024 “as part of a regular rotation of forces,” a news release said.

Although officials did not specify the Fort Liberty, North Carolina-based unit’s exact mission or destination, its troops will replace those of the Army National Guard’s 185th Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade. The outgoing Guard unit, which deployed around May, is headquartered in Mississippi and consisted of troops from 11 states.

And the 1st Infantry Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade will also deploy in the first quarter of fiscal year 2024, according to the release. The aviators from Fort Riley, Kansas, are heading to Europe.

Army announces next three brigades deploying to Europe

The announcement signaled that the Army will keep two tank brigades in Europe for at least a few more months.

The Big Red One’s aviation wing will replace the 3rd Infantry Division’s Combat Aviation Brigade there. Known as “Marne Air,” the departing troops were there for roughly nine months “to support the United States’ commitment to NATO allies and partners,” the release said.

Once in Europe, the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade’s soldiers will join thousands of other U.S. troops there as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve, a long-running NATO deterrence mission that kicked into a higher gear when Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

11. Anti-Access, Area-Denial Top NATO Priority, Official Says

Excerpts:

Hecker said a fight like the one in Ukraine has not been seen since World War I, “where you have two folks … toe to toe, throwing 155 [millimeter] rounds at one another — indiscriminately in some cases — hitting hospitals, hitting schools, a lot of casualties back and forth.”

As more sophisticated weapons entered the war on both sides, neither was able to obtain air superiority because both had “very good integrated air and missile defense systems,” Hecker said. “That alone is what has prevented air superiority.

“So, that’s my number one priority throughout NATO on the air side,” he said. Hecker is responsible for the air and missile defense of the 31 NATO alliance member nations, and said the anti-access and area denial mission has drawn “a lot of effort on improving our skills and using all of the allies to do that

Anti-Access, Area-Denial Top NATO Priority, Official Says

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Laura Heckmann

8/18/2023

Gen. James Hecker

Air Force photo

An inability for either Russia or Ukraine to obtain air superiority in a conflict that has persisted for a year and a half has focused NATO’s top priority on its anti-access and area denial mission, said the leader of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Africa.

Speaking at a media event Aug. 18, Gen. James Hecker — who also leads Allied Air Command and is the director of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre — said the “largest lesson we’ve learned” from the conflict in Ukraine is “that neither side was able to get air superiority.”

Hecker said a fight like the one in Ukraine has not been seen since World War I, “where you have two folks … toe to toe, throwing 155 [millimeter] rounds at one another — indiscriminately in some cases — hitting hospitals, hitting schools, a lot of casualties back and forth.”

As more sophisticated weapons entered the war on both sides, neither was able to obtain air superiority because both had “very good integrated air and missile defense systems,” Hecker said. “That alone is what has prevented air superiority.

“So, that’s my number one priority throughout NATO on the air side,” he said. Hecker is responsible for the air and missile defense of the 31 NATO alliance member nations, and said the anti-access and area denial mission has drawn “a lot of effort on improving our skills and using all of the allies to do that.”

Listing out four more priorities, the conflict in Ukraine has informed them all, Hecker said. Number two is “knowing how Russia is going to fight when they can’t get air superiority,” using weapons such as one-way attack drones and cruise missiles.

“We need to make sure that we in NATO have a good integrated air and missile defense system,” he said. “So, we are really trying to improve our capability there because we know that that’s what we’re going to need to protect ourselves.”

Hecker’s third priority was one “to make us all better,” he said — information sharing. “It’s amazing what you can do if you share information amongst your allies,” he said. “And how much better and capable you make each other, really at zero cost.”

Priority number four is the concept of Agile Combat Employment, better known as ACE, he said. The goal of Agile Combat Employment is to develop a hub-and-spoke network of small bases and facilities so if one gets hit, the losses are small.

Hecker said as a rule, aircraft and high value equipment are dispersed amongst a base “so they don’t just hit one section of the base and they get all your aircraft.”

That’s not good enough now, he said. With more accurate weapons, every single aircraft can be hit, no matter how dispersed. “So, what we have to do now is disperse our aircraft amongst different airfields and potentially even on highways, and these kind of things that Finland brings to the plate, as they recently got in.”

Hecker said the effort will begin with 20 to 25 different airfields in strategic locations around Europe, then working with the allied nations “so that we can get interoperable on different kinds of aircraft.”

Hecker’s final priority was command and control. “How are we going to command and control all these units, especially if they’re taking off and landing at other airfields using the ACE concept?” he said.

“So, those are the five priorities, primarily derived from the lessons of the last year and a half from Ukraine,” he said.

Hecker also spoke to the future of U.S. operations in Niger following a coup in the African nation in late July. He said they are “not planning to go anywhere,” but continue to “prudently plan” for multiple scenarios.

“As far as Niger, if our civilian lawmakers decide that they want us out of there, then obviously we’ve been doing planning for that and we’ll be ready to get us out of there,” he said. “We hope it’s in a permissible environment, but we’re planning both just in case.”

Leaving would “obviously have an effect on our [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] and our ability to continue to do [counterterrorism] in that region,” Hecker said. Should that happen, he said the United States will look to partner with allies on where to potentially move its assets.

“So, we’re kind of looking at some of those should that become the case, but of course what we hope for is that we have a peaceful diplomatic solution to this and we don’t have to move.”

Hecker said a decision to evacuate is “not anywhere close to being made,” and that a decision from civilian leadership may be weeks out, “if not much longer.”

“We're doing a lot of prudent planning. But right now, we're not going anywhere,” Hecker said. “And we don't plan to go anywhere until we're told to go anywhere, and right now there's not a need to go anywhere. So our civilian leadership is just saying, ‘Hey, hang tight and continue to plan in case something happens.’ And we'll be ready if something happens. But hopefully this thing gets done politically and diplomatically with no bloodshed.”

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Laura Heckmann

12. Employing artificial intelligence for joint operations and the edge continuum

Download the 3 page memo at this link or read the memo on the website at the link below. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/AI-and-Edge-Continuum_Memo-1.pdf

Strategic Insights Memo

August 18, 2023

Employing artificial intelligence for joint operations and the edge continuum

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/strategic-insights-memos/employing-artificial-intelligence-for-joint-operations/?utm

By James E. Cartwright and Jags Kandasamy

DOWNLOAD PDF

TO: US National Security Community

FROM: General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.) and Jags Kandasamy

DATE: August 18, 2023

SUBJECT: Operationalizing Artificial Intelligence and the Edge Continuum for Joint All-Domain Dominance: Unpacking a Four-Layer Architecture

In Spring 2023, experts from the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and Latent AI convened for discussions on employing artificial intelligence for joint operations. This memo builds upon takeaways and insights gleaned from those meetings.

Executive summary

In March 2022, the US Department of Defense (DOD) released the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) strategy, which describes the urgent need for an “enterprise-wide, holistic approach” to integrate command-and-control (C2) capabilities and empower joint-force commanders across all domains, theaters, and threats. This paper employs the JADC2 decision-cycle vision of “sense” (integrate information across domains), “make sense” (leverage intelligence to understand the environment), and “act” (decide and disseminate based on intelligence) through the lens of data, artificial intelligence (AI), and the edge continuum. It then presents a four-layer edge computing architecture for the DOD.

Sense: The DOD has deployed sensors at every vantage point in recent years, and a reflexive instinct has emerged in DOD to address operational problems by deploying more sensors for information gathering. As more sensors are added to the picture, even more data are being generated—for example, aircraft sensors and onboard equipment gather up to a terabyte of data during a flight. Yet, at the same time, more data bottlenecks are being created as communication networks fail to keep up with expanding data and sensor locations, a situation akin to freeways with the addition of more automobiles.

Make sense: Data without proper context and analysis are insufficient for actionable insights. Better understanding and analysis of the data provides information for decision-makers. This “make sense” paradigm becomes increasingly complex as the volume, velocity, and variety—the “three Vs”—of data coming from the sensors continue to grow. The DOD faces challenges in efficiently processing and analyzing the vast amounts of data generated by its operations in remote and hostile environments. AI and machine-learning (ML) algorithms have proven to be the optimal solution to make sense of the “three Vs” of the data conundrum. The emergence of AI at the edge (processing on or near devices where the data are created) has brought a significant opportunity for the DOD to filter the signal from the noise and enable real-time decision-making.

Act: Sensing and computing are distributed throughout the theater, from ground and aerial to geospatial sensors. Visualizing the connectivity of these assets enables the idea of the edge continuum. The edge continuum conceptualizes the distribution of resources and software assets between centralized computing clusters and deployed nodes and sensors in the theater as a path connecting the sensors to the command. Positioning key services and analytics along this edge continuum provides significant decision advantage by analyzing the data at the appropriate level and supporting the decision-makers at the unit, formation, and command levels, while relieving the bandwidth bottleneck.

13. China’s 40-Year Boom Is Over. What Comes Next?

Charts, graphs, and photos thee link: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-economy-debt-slowdown-recession-622a3be4

China’s 40-Year Boom Is Over. What Comes Next?

The economic model that took the country from poverty to great-power status seems broken, and everywhere are signs of distress

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-economy-debt-slowdown-recession-622a3be4

By Lingling WeiFollow

and Stella Yifan XieFollow

Aug. 20, 2023 12:01 am ET

For decades, China powered its economy by investing in factories, skyscrapers and roads. The model sparked an extraordinary period of growth that lifted China out of poverty and turned it into a global giant whose export prowess washed across the globe.

Now the model is broken.

What worked when China was playing catch-up makes less sense now that the country is drowning in debt and running out of things to build. Parts of China are saddled with under-used bridges and airports. Millions of apartments are unoccupied. Returns on investment have sharply declined.

Signs of trouble extend beyond China’s dismal economic data to distant provinces, including Yunnan in the southwest, which recently said it would spend millions of dollars to build a new Covid-19 quarantine facility, nearly the size of three football fields, despite China having ended its “zero-Covid” policy months ago, and long after the world moved on from the pandemic.

Other localities are doing the same. With private investment weak and exports flagging, officials say they have little choice but to keep borrowing and building to stimulate their economies.

Economists now believe China is entering an era of much slower growth, made worse by unfavorable demographics and a widening divide with the U.S. and its allies, which is jeopardizing foreign investment and trade. Rather than just a period of economic weakness, this could be the dimming of a long era.

“We’re witnessing a gearshift in what has been the most dramatic trajectory in economic history,” said Adam Tooze, a Columbia University history professor who specializes in economic crises.

What will the future look like? The International Monetary Fund puts China’s GDP growth at below 4% in the coming years, less than half of its tally for most of the past four decades. Capital Economics, a London-based research firm, figures China’s trend growth has slowed to 3% from 5% in 2019, and will fall to around 2% in 2030.

China’s working-age population

China’s total factor productivity

growth, annual change

Chinese corporations’

average return on assets

Actual

Projected

1 billion

10%

Privately owned

State owned

1990

2000

’10

’20

’30

’40

’50

1980

’90

2000

’10

2017

’22

Sources: The Lowy Institute based on UN Population Division data (working-age population);

The Lowy Institute (productivity); Bruegel (returns)

At those rates, China would fail to meet the objective set by President Xi Jinping in 2020 of doubling the economy’s size by 2035. That would make it harder for China to graduate from the ranks of middle-income emerging markets and could mean that China never overtakes the U.S. as the world’s largest economy, its longstanding ambition.

Many previous predictions of China’s economic undoing have missed the mark. China’s burgeoning electric-vehicle and renewable energy industries are reminders of its capacity to dominate markets. Tensions with the U.S. could galvanize China to accelerate innovations in technologies such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors, unlocking new avenues of growth. And Beijing still has levers to pull to stimulate growth if it chooses, such as by expanding fiscal spending.

Even so, economists widely believe that China has entered a more challenging period, in which previous methods of boosting growth yield diminishing returns.

Some of these strains were apparent before the pandemic. Beijing was able to keep growth ticking over by borrowing more and relying on a booming housing market, which in some years accounted for more than 25% of China’s gross domestic product.

Residential buildings developed by Country Garden Holdings. One of the country’s largest surviving property developers, Country Garden Holdings is on the cusp of a possible default. PHOTO: QILAI SHEN/BLOOMBERG NEWS

The country’s initial success in containing Covid-19, and a surge in pandemic spending by U.S. consumers, further masked China’s economic troubles. The housing bubble has since popped, Western demand for Chinese products has ebbed and borrowing has reached unsustainable levels.

The outlook has darkened considerably in recent months. Manufacturing activity has contracted, exports have declined, and youth unemployment has reached record highs. One of the country’s largest surviving property developers, Country Garden Holdings, is on the cusp of a possible default as the overall economy slips into deflation.

Japan-like slowdown?

Without more aggressive stimulus from Beijing, and meaningful efforts to revive private sector risk-taking, some economists believe China’s slowdown could snowball into prolonged stagnation akin to what Japan has experienced since the 1990s, when the bursting of its real-estate bubble led to years of deflation and limited growth.

Unlike Japan, however, China would be entering such a period before reaching rich-world status, with per capita incomes far below more advanced economies. China’s national income per person reached about $12,850 last year, below the current threshold of $13,845 that the World Bank classifies as the minimum for a “high-income” country. Japan’s per capita national income in 2022 was about $42,440, and the U.S.’s was about $76,400.

A weaker Chinese economy could also undermine popular support for Xi, the most powerful Chinese leader in recent decades, though there is no current indication of organized opposition. Some U.S. analysts worry Beijing could respond to slower growth by becoming more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad, raising the risks of conflict, including potentially over the self-governing island of Taiwan.

At an Aug. 10 political fundraiser, President Biden called China’s economic problems a “ticking time bomb” which could spur its leaders to “do bad things.”

Beijing fired back with a commentary by its official Xinhua News Agency, saying Biden “intends to take smearing China as part of his ‘grand strategy’ to shoot America’s economic troubles.” The commentary also described China’s economic recovery this year as robust, despite some challenges.

Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects construction sites of a rail station and an international trade center in Hebei Province, in May. PHOTO: YAN YAN/XINHUA/ZUMA PRESS

Construction of a high-speed interchange in China’s Henan Province shown in June. PHOTO: CFOTO/DDP/ZUMA PRESS

Chinese officials have taken some modest steps to revive growth, including cutting interest rates, and have pledged to do more if conditions worsen. The State Council Information Office, which handles media inquiries for China’s leadership, didn’t respond to questions.

“Certain Western politicians and media have exaggerated and hyped up the current difficulties in China’s post-Covid economic recovery,” a Foreign Ministry spokesman said on Aug. 16. “Facts will prove them wrong.”

‘Chinese Century’

The transition marks a stunning change. China consistently defied economic cycles in the four decades since Deng Xiaoping started an era of “reform and opening” in 1978, embracing market forces and opening China to the West, in particular through international trade and investment.

During that period, China increased per capita income 25-fold and lifted more than 800 million Chinese people out of poverty, according to the World Bank—more than 70% of the total poverty reduction in the world. China evolved from a nation racked by famine into the world’s second-largest economy, and America’s greatest competitor for leadership.

Academics were so enthralled by China’s rise that some referred to a “Chinese Century,” with China dominating the world economy and politics, similar to how the 20th century was known as the “American Century.”

China’s boom was underpinned by unusually high levels of domestic investment in infrastructure and other hard assets, which accounted for about 44% of GDP each year on average between 2008 and 2021. That compared with a global average of 25% and around 20% in the U.S., according to World Bank data.

Such heavy spending was made possible in part by a system of “financial repression” in which state banks set deposit rates low, which meant they could raise funds inexpensively and fund building projects. China added tens of thousands of miles of highways, hundreds of airports, and the world’s largest network of high-speed trains.

Over time, however, evidence of overbuilding became apparent.

About one-fifth of apartments in urban China, or at least 130 million units, were estimated to be unoccupied in 2018, the latest data available, according to a study by China’s Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.

A high-speed rail station in Danzhou, a city in China’s southern province of Hainan, cost $5.5 million to build but was never put into use because passenger demand was so low, according to Chinese media reports. The Hainan government said keeping the station open would incur “massive losses.” Efforts to reach the local government were unsuccessful.

Guizhou, one of the poorest provinces in the country with GDP per capita of less than $7,200 last year, boasts more than 1,700 bridges and 11 airports, more than the total number of airports in China’s top four cities. The province had an estimated $388 billion in outstanding debt at the end of 2022, and in April had to ask for aid from the central government to shore up its finances.

A passenger waits at Yuezhao Airport, in Guizhou province. Guizhou, one of the poorest provinces in the country, boasts more than 1,700 bridges and 11 airports, more than the total number of airports in China’s top four cities. PHOTO: QILAI SHEN/BLOOMBERG

The Huajiang Gorge Bridge under construction in Guizhou province, shown in May. PHOTO: CFOTO/NURPHOTO/ZUMA PRESS

Kenneth Rogoff, a professor of economics at Harvard University, said China’s economic ascent draws parallels to what many other Asian economies went through during their periods of rapid urbanization, as well as what European countries such as Germany experienced after World War II, when major investments in infrastructure boosted growth.

At the same time, decades of overbuilding in China resembles Japan’s infrastructure construction boom in the late 1980s and 1990s, which led to overinvestment.

“The leading point is they are running into diminishing returns in building stuff,” he said, “There are limits to how far you can go with it.”

With so many needs met, economists estimate China now has to invest about $9 to produce each dollar of GDP growth, up from less than $5 a decade ago, and a little over $3 in the 1990s.

Returns on assets by private firms have declined to 3.9% from 9.3% five years ago, according to Bert Hofman, head of the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute. State companies’ returns have retreated to 2.8% from 4.3%.

China’s labor force, meanwhile, is shrinking, and productivity growth is slowing. From the 1980s to the early 2000s, productivity gains contributed about a third of China’s GDP growth, Hofman’s analysis shows. That ratio has declined to less than one sixth in the past decade.

Deepening debt

The solution for many parts of the country has been to keep borrowing and building. Total debt, including that held by various levels of government and state-owned companies, climbed to nearly 300% of China’s GDP as of 2022, surpassing U.S. levels and up from less than 200% in 2012, according to Bank for International Settlements data.

Much of the debt was incurred by cities. Limited by Beijing in their ability to borrow directly to fund projects, they turned to off-balance sheet financing vehicles whose debts are expected to reach more than $9 trillion this year, according to the IMF.

Rhodium Group, a New York-based economic research firm, estimates that only about 20% of financing firms used by local governments to fund projects have enough cash reserves to meet their short-term debt obligations, including bonds owned by domestic and foreign investors.

In Yunnan, location of the giant quarantine center, heavy infrastructure spending lifted growth for years. Officials spent hundreds of billions of dollars including on Asia’s tallest suspension bridge, more than 6,000 miles of expressways and more airports than many other regions in China.

The projects boosted tourism and helped expand trade of Yunnan products including tobacco, machinery and metals. From 2015 to 2020, Yunnan was one of the fastest-growing regions in China. Growth has weakened in the past few years. The slumping property market has hit local finances hard, as revenue from land sales dries up.

The Longjiang Bridge, in west Yunnan. Officials spent hundreds of billions of dollars including on Asia’s tallest suspension bridge, more than 6,000 miles of expressways and more airports than many other regions in China. PHOTO: IMAGINE CHINA/REUTERS

Yunnan’s debt-to-revenue ratio climbed to 151% in 2021, breaching a 150% level designated as alarming by the IMF, and up from 108% in 2019, according to Lianhe Ratings, a Chinese rating agency. Fitch Ratings earlier this year said financing firms used by the province to fund infrastructure construction were risky because of the size of their borrowings and the government’s strained finances.

Yet Yunnan has continued to hatch big schemes. In early 2020, the Yunnan government said it planned to spend nearly $500 billion on hundreds of infrastructure projects, including a more than $15 billion program aimed at diverting water from parts of the Yangtze River to the dry center of the province.

A February plan issued by Wenshan, a city in Yunnan, listed the “permanent” quarantine center as one of several measures aimed at promoting economic stability. Once the government officially put out a bid in June for its construction, local residents questioned the use of funds.

“It’s such a waste of money,” wrote one user of Weibo, a popular microblogging platform in China.

A Yunnan official confirmed the plan to build the quarantine facility, which is expected to be completed at the end of this year, but declined to comment further.

Tighter control

In Beijing’s corridors of power, senior officials have recognized that the growth model of past decades has reached its limits. In a blunt speech to a new generation of party leaders last year, Xi took aim at officials for relying on borrowing for construction to expand economic activities.

“Some people believe that development means investing in projects and scaling up investments,” he said, while warning, “you can’t walk the old path with new shoes.” Xi and his team so far have done little to shift away from the country’s old growth model.

The most obvious solution, economists say, would be for China to shift toward promoting consumer spending and service industries, which would help create a more balanced economy that more resembles those of the U.S. and Western Europe. Household consumption makes up only about 38% of GDP in China, relatively unchanged in recent years, compared with around 68% in the U.S., according to the World Bank.

Changing that would require China’s government to undertake measures aimed at encouraging people to spend more and save less. That could include expanding China’s relatively meager social safety net with greater health and unemployment benefits.

Xi and some of his lieutenants remain suspicious of U.S.-style consumption, which they see as wasteful at a time when China’s focus should be on bolstering its industrial capabilities and girding for potential conflict with the West, people with knowledge of Beijing’s decision-making say.

The leadership also worries that empowering individuals to make more decisions over how they spend their money could undermine state authority, without generating the kind of growth Beijing desires.

A plan announced in late July to promote consumption was criticized by economists both in and outside China for lacking details. It suggested promoting sports and cultural events, and pushed for building more convenience stores in rural areas.

Vendors wait for customers at a store in Shanghai in August. PHOTO: RAUL ARIANO/BLOOMBERG NEWS

A worker monitors production at a semiconductor manufacturer in Suqian city in east China’s Jiangsu province in February. PHOTO: FANG DONGXU/AVALON/ZUMA PRESS

Instead, guided by a desire to strengthen political control, Xi’s leadership has doubled down on state intervention to make China an even bigger industrial power, strong in government-favored industries such as semiconductors, EVs and AI.

While foreign experts don’t doubt China can make headway in these areas, they alone aren’t enough to lift up the entire economy or create enough jobs for the millions of college graduates entering the workforce, economists say.

Beijing has spent billions of dollars to try to build up the country’s semiconductor industry and reduce its dependence on the West. That has resulted in expanded production of less-sophisticated chips, but not the advanced semiconductors produced by companies such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing. Among the projects that failed were two high-profile foundries that received hundreds of millions of dollars in government support.

Last week, just as Beijing released a barrage of disappointing economic data, the party’s premier journal, Qiushi, published a speech made by Xi six months earlier to senior officials, in which the leader emphasized the importance of focusing on long-term goals instead of pursuing Western-style material wealth. “We must maintain historic patience and insist on making steady, step-by-step progress,” Xi said in the speech.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com and Stella Yifan Xie at stella.xie@wsj.com

14. Ukraine running out of options to retake significant territory

Ukraine analysis seems to be all over the map.

Ukraine running out of options to retake significant territory

By Susannah George

August 20, 2023 at 1:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Susannah George · August 20, 2023

Ukraine appears to be running out of options in a counteroffensive that officials originally framed as Kyiv’s crucial operation to retake significant territory from occupying Russian forces this year.

More than two months into the fight, the counteroffensive shows signs of stalling. Kyiv’s advances remain isolated to a handful of villages, Russian troops are pushing forward in the north and a plan to train Ukrainian pilots on U.S.-made F-16s is delayed.

Ukraine’s inability to demonstrate decisive success on the battlefield is stoking fears that the conflict is becoming a stalemate and international support could erode. A new, classified U.S. intelligence report has predicted that the counteroffensive will fail to reach the key southeastern city of Melitopol this year.

Meanwhile, a war weary Ukrainian public is eager for leaders in Kyiv to secure victory and in Washington, calls to cut back on aid to Ukraine are expected to be amplified in the run up to the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

Without more advanced weapons slated to bolster the front line or fully committing forces still being held in reserve, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to secure a breakthrough in the counteroffensive, according to analysts.

“The question here is which of the two sides is going to be worn out sooner,” said Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Center for New American Security, who visited Ukraine in July. “We shouldn’t expect the achievement of any major military objectives overnight.”

Gady said that Russia and Ukraine are now in an “attrition” phase, attempting to sap each other’s resources rather than secure significant territorial advances. With its ground forces largely stymied, Ukraine has mounted a flurry of new drone strikes on Russian soil, including targets in Moscow, but the strikes have caused minimal damage.

When asked about the counteroffensive’s progress, Western and Ukrainian officials call for patience, describing the fight as slower than expected, but insisting that it is steadily making gains.

However, the window of time for Ukraine to conduct offensive operations is limited. Last year, Ukrainian forces made little progress after recapturing the southern city of Kherson in early November, as inhospitable weather set in.

With its ground forces advancing slowly, Ukraine is using drone strikes to expand its military’s reach as it waits for more advanced munitions and training — including greater air power, said Yuriy Sak, an adviser to Ukraine’s minister of defense.

“We don’t have the F-16s yet so we have to find way to make up for their absence and drones are somewhat used to compensate for the lack of aviation,” he said.

Ukraine’s main internal intelligence agency was behind the maritime drone attacks that recently struck a major Russian port and a Russian oil tanker near occupied Crimea, according to a Ukrainian intelligence official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

Kyiv’s statements on attacks in Moscow are more opaque. The government publicly distances itself from the strikes, while some officials acknowledge involvement.

But analysts caution that while the drone attacks can shift attention away from Ukraine’s slow-moving ground counteroffensive, they are unlikely to tip the balance of the war in Kyiv’s favor.

“The Ukrainians just don’t have enough capacity to build enough drones and strike deep inside Russian territory at enough targets to erode Russia’s will to fight,” said Bob Hamilton, a retired U.S. Army colonel and head of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program.

Russia also has sophisticated methods to combat Ukrainian drones with jammers and detection. The Kremlin claims to have largely thwarted a wave of Ukrainian drone attacks over the past week. On Saturday, the Russian Defense Ministry said it downed 20 Ukrainian drones targeting Crimea overnight.

“I don’t think a single weapons system can be a silver bullet,” Hamilton said.

Ukraine has been also striking Russian logistical targets with longer-range munitions far from the front line for months, but so far the effect of such strikes has not been reflected on the Russian front line, said Gady, who recently visited Ukraine.

“We know that the Russian position has deteriorated, but it hasn’t deteriorated to the degree where you could expect an imminent collapse,” he said. A campaign of longer-range strikes, also referred to as the “deep battle,” can be described as successful when the opponent’s forces can no longer call on reserve forces or conduct basic support functions like resupply.

Rather than crumble, however, Russian forces are putting up fierce resistance, and even making offensive advances. In northeastern Ukraine, authorities in Kupyansk ordered a mass evacuation of civilians. The city was part of a large swath of occupied territory that Ukraine recaptured in September and October of last year.

On the southern front, Ukrainian forces are continuing to employ a painstakingly slow approach to secure advances, rather than favoring speed as western allies like the United States recommended.

Last month, Ukrainian forces pushed into Staromaiorske, the first village to be retaken in weeks, raising hopes that the advance could be a tempo-changing breakthrough involving Western-trained reserve troops. It was not. It took another three weeks before Ukrainian forces liberated the adjacent village of Urozhaine, and they reportedly suffered heavy losses.

Reaching the sea of Azov and snapping Russia’s land bridge to Crimea is one of the publicly acknowledged goals of the counteroffensive. But the Staromaiorske advances did not involve new tactics. Reconnaissance units surveyed Russian defenses to strike weak points and allow smaller units — often on foot — to move in with a demining team, said Serhiy Kuzmin, the military spokesman for the area.

Sak, the adviser to the defense minister, said the slow progress clearing extensive mine fields along the front is preventing Kyiv from engaging the majority of its Western-trained reserve forces.

“To commit our reserve forces we need to be sure that the pathways are clear,” he said. “We would rather go slower and make sure that we preserve the lives of our troops.”

Ukrainian forces have retaken roughly 81 square miles of occupied territory since the counteroffensive began in June, with the greatest gains occurring near Bakhmut in the east and in the Zaporizhzhia region south of Orikhiv.

To create a sense of momentum, and raise the cost of the war for regular Russian citizens, Ukraine has increased its attacks inside Russia. But that effort to expand the battlespace must rely on Ukraine’s own drones rather than Western-supplied weapons because of restrictions on using NATO weapons to hit Russia on its own territory — and the strategy also comes with risks, analysts said.

The Biden administration has “very successfully” managed risk of a direct conflict with Russia by gradually providing Kyiv with more advanced weapons systems and longer-range munitions, said Kelly Grieco, who researches air power operations as a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, a D.C.-based policy group.

“From the start of this war, one of the things Ukraine’s allies have been concerned about is ending up in some inadvertent escalation,” she said.

Kyiv has requested longer-range missiles called ATACMS, the Army Tactical Missile System, from the United States for months, but the Biden administration has so far refused to provide them, citing limited supplies and fears of an escalating confrontation with Russia.

The United Kingdom and France sent Kyiv similar munitions earlier this year.

Biden administration officials have repeatedly said the United States does not encourage or enable strikes inside Russia.

Increasing the range of weapons systems provided by the United States and others has “come with a lot of assurances from Kyiv that would not use that equipment to target Russian territory,” Grieco said.

If Ukraine expands the use of drones — as the counteroffensive continues in a slow grind, she said, “that still has the potential to make the West anxious about whether Ukraine will continue to exercise that kind of restraint.”

The Washington Post · by Susannah George · August 20, 2023

15. Let’s understand the awful truth of the Afghan war | Column

Robert Bruce Adolph

Let’s understand the awful truth of the Afghan war | Column

Two years after the U.S. withdrawal, it’s important to learn the harsh lessons so we don’t repeat them.

https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/2023/08/19/lets-understand-awful-truth-afghan-war-column/?utm

A Marine Corps carry team moves a transfer case containing the remains of Marine Corps Cpl. Humberto "Bert" Sanchez, 22, of Logansport, Ind., on Aug. 29, 2021, at Dover Air Force Base, Del. Thirteen U.S. troops were killed in the suicide attack near the Kabul airport. [ MANUEL BALCE CENETA | AP ]

“…Someone had blundered. Theirs not to make reply.

Theirs not to reason why. Theirs but to do and die...”

— Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade

Aug. 30 will mark the second anniversary of the ignominious U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is important to understand the truth of it.

Robert Bruce Adolph [ Provided ]

Few things in life are more certain than America will engage in future military conflicts. This certainty is born of history. In addition to several smaller engagements in places like Grenada in the post-World War II period, the nation fought in Asia (Korea and Vietnam), Europe (Bosnia), the Middle East (Iraq and Syria), Africa (Somalia and elsewhere), Central America (Panama) and, of course, Southwest Asia (Afghanistan) — this nation’s longest war. The most wrong-headed notion is that our military lost that protracted conflict, when in fact, one man is largely responsible.

Our losing fight with the Taliban across more than two decades highlights four key mistakes made by a chief executive. Current and future presidents need to take note before we find ourselves embroiled in yet another military confrontation: thinking of Russia and China. American soldiers do not select their adversaries. This is wholly a decision of the nation’s senior civilian leadership. I will be blunt. Too many lives have been lost to do otherwise. In Afghanistan, the key errors were made by former President George W. Bush.

First, Bush’s strategy was fatally flawed. After winning the initial battles, and driving the Taliban out of Kabul, the decision to remain and attempt a wholesale reinvention of a centuries-old tribally based society into something approximating a Western liberal democracy was a doomed objective. Any competent cultural anthropologist could have called it. It was not feasible, suitable or acceptable — a violation of all three analytical tenets of strategy development. Moreover, no skilled senior military officer would ever consider a war-fighting plan that did not first identify well-defined and attainable objectives with an exit ramp.

Second, Bush made a horrible choice when deciding to conduct two wars simultaneously — in Afghanistan and Iraq. No capable general officer would ever choose to engage in two major conflicts at once. This was a decision taken in the White House and was not the result of a Pentagon threat assessment. For reasons known only to Bush, the U.S. opened up a second front in the perennially troubled Middle East, which resulted in starving the more important Afghan theater of needed resources. Saddam Hussein had nothing whatever to do with the despicable 9/11 attack and the promised weapons of mass destruction were never found.

Third, Bush did not request a declaration of war from Congress. In the fall of 2002, Congress passed a resolution that authorized Bush to use the armed forces ‘’as he determines to be necessary and appropriate.” That abdication of authority left all the key decisions to him. The last declaration of war marked the U.S. entry into World War II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Ever since, Congress has ceded this crucially important responsibility to consecutive chief executives who have not done well by it.

Fourth, America lacked resolve, which the Taliban possessed in abundance. After all, they were fighting on their home turf. The North Vietnamese found themselves in a similar situation many years earlier, successfully waiting out their adversary — us. These two examples serve as proof that the best military in the world cannot rescue bad choices made by a sitting president. With this understanding, the war in Afghanistan was not lost on the battlefield, but in the Oval Office before the first shot was fired, also leaving a massive foreign policy quagmire behind for those chief executives who followed.

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Tennyson’s poem, quoted in part at the beginning of this piece, describes another headquarters “blunder” during the 19th century’s Crimean War. That quote seems tragically applicable regarding the decision to send the U.S. forces to Afghanistan, and then remain, burdened with bad strategy lacking an exit plan; an unnecessary conflict of choice in Iraq; no request for a congressional declaration of war; and a predictable lack of political resolve. For the soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, “Theirs but to do and die…”

Robert Bruce Adolph is a former senior Army Special Forces soldier and United Nations security chief. In May 2022, he served as mission leader for a multinational team in support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Ukraine. More recently, he performed a UN security consultancy in post-conflict Azerbaijan. Learn more at robertbruceadolph.com.

16. Just-war theory allows for no blank checks in Ukraine

Some Sunday reading.

Excerpts:

Just-war theory provides an indispensable framework for debates about the morality of a conflict. But it does not lend itself to incontrovertible decisons, because any judgment will be based on analyses and prognostications that are always debatable. So although I have serious concerns about the wisdom of American involvement in the war in Ukraine—which I discussed in a 3-part series earlier this year—I cannot claim infallibility, and I respect the opinions of serious thinkers like my friend George Weigel, who has strongly supported the effort.

But Weigel goes too far in a column for First Things, in which he complains that “many Catholic just-war thinkers accept the notion that the just-war tradition begins with a ‘presumption against war.’” I cannot name a respectable just-war thinker, past or present, who does not begin with that presumption. War is hell, as General Sherman said, and no sane combat veteran has gainsaid him. The Fifth Commandment itself requires a presumption against war, and a heavy one.

Just-war theory allows for no blank checks in Ukraine

catholicculture.org

By Phil Lawler ( bio - articles - email ) | Aug 18, 2023

When I teach an undergraduate course about the Church’s tradition of just-war teaching, I always emphasize how the moral questions are wrapped up in prudential judgments. No one has perfect information about the strengths and intentions of potential adversaries. No one can guarantee the outcome of a given diplomatic or military strategy. So it is rarely possible to say, with complete certainty, that this or that conflict was either just or unjust. And the difficulty of rendering that sort of apodictic judgment is exponentially greater when the battle is raging, the “fog of war” has settled in, and the information coming from the front is filtered through competing propaganda mills.

Just-war theory provides an indispensable framework for debates about the morality of a conflict. But it does not lend itself to incontrovertible decisons, because any judgment will be based on analyses and prognostications that are always debatable. So although I have serious concerns about the wisdom of American involvement in the war in Ukraine—which I discussed in a 3-part series earlier this year—I cannot claim infallibility, and I respect the opinions of serious thinkers like my friend George Weigel, who has strongly supported the effort.

But Weigel goes too far in a column for First Things, in which he complains that “many Catholic just-war thinkers accept the notion that the just-war tradition begins with a ‘presumption against war.’” I cannot name a respectable just-war thinker, past or present, who does not begin with that presumption. War is hell, as General Sherman said, and no sane combat veteran has gainsaid him. The Fifth Commandment itself requires a presumption against war, and a heavy one.

This does not imply, by any means, that a correct understanding of the just-war tradition leads to pacifism. The entire purpose of that tradition is to guide political leaders through the moral calculations that can, in extreme circumstances, justify the use of force. Sometimes the negative consequences of not engaging in military combat are so deleterious that they outweigh the undoubted evils of war. In such cases the principles of ius ad bellum may not only justify but even require warfare.

In his essay Weigel introduces another principle, which he calls ius ad pacem, and defines as “an obligation to build a just peace in the aftermath of war. That obligation certainly exists. But it cannot be invoked to jump over the other requirements of ius ad bellum and ius in bello. Here I am thinking primarily of the demands of proportionality. Is the injustice being confronted grave enough to justify the loss of many human lives? Are the military strategies designed to achieve the greatest good while doing the least damage? Is there a realistic prospect for military success? Without the discipline imposed by those moral considerations, the ius ad pacem could be invoked to justify an unrestrained military campaign, based on the often illusory (but always seductive) promise that military victory will bring a brighter future—in other words that the end justifies the means.

A just war, by contrast, is always a limited war. (In some cases, such as World War II, the conflict may seem unlimited because the worldwide stakes are so high. Even then, a proportional response is mandatory.) The goal is not to annihilate the foe but to prevent him from doing further harm. If they apply just-war principles, leaders are constantly assessing how they might achieve their goals with a minimum of bloodshed, and as soon as those goals are met—or can be met through peace talks—the military campaign should end.

Weigel opens his column by citing the argument of Carl von Clausewitz that “war is the extension of politics by other means.” That quotation is better rendered as “the extension of politics with other means.” The German word mit allows for either translation, but the great Prussian theorist goes on to say that “politics does not cease with the war itself.” In other words warfare is not politics by other means—which could imply that ordinary political dealings end when the shooting starts. Warfare is politics with other means—with another approach to complement the usual tactics of foreign affairs. Clausewitz goes on to caution in the following paragraph that “war can never be separated from politics,” lest “we have left before us a senseless thing without an object.”

What is the object of the war? If that object can be attained peacefully, then war cannot be justified. Can it be attained, realistically, with a heavy application of military force? At what cost? All these questions remain valid, even after we have decided—if we can decide—which side we favor in a conflict. Ius ad pacem is a valid consideration but not a blank ticket.

Phil Lawler has been a Catholic journalist for more than 30 years. He has edited several Catholic magazines and written eight books. Founder of Catholic World News, he is the news director and lead analyst at CatholicCulture.org. See full bio.

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17. China’s economic malaise is causing disillusion among the young

My first thought was that there are similarities between American and Chinese youth. But...

Excerpts:

Dropouts in America have alternatives to pursue. The country offers many routes to a fulfilling life. An ambitious few have even been able to harness their dissent to create great art, music or a multi-billion-dollar company. Mr Xi would like young Chinese to find enlightenment in their hardship, too, but not that sort. Advance comes exclusively through the Communist Party. China’s artists are yoked to its message. Having been branded as the party’s rivals, tech entrepreneurs have been humiliated.

A small but growing number of well-educated, high-potential young Chinese seem likely to abandon their country. Politicians in America and the wider West often say they are on the side of ordinary Chinese. They could prove it by ensuring Western universities and economies welcome young people who feel that their opportunities at home are limited.

Leaders | The danger of letting it rot

China’s economic malaise is causing disillusion among the young

Xi Jinping wants them to focus on the party’s goals. Many cannot see why they should

Aug 17th 2023

The Economist

THE CROWD did not seem excited to see George Michael and Andrew Ridgeley. When Wham! became the first Western pop group to perform in Communist China, the audience was instructed to stay in their seats. It was 1985 and, despite appearances, the young people in attendance were in fact joyous. The country around them was by no means free, but it was starting to reform and open up. Over the next three decades the economy would grow at a rapid pace, producing new opportunities. An increasing number of Chinese travelled and studied abroad. Even the Communist Party showed signs of relaxing (a bit). Those brought up during this period had high hopes for the future.

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Today, reality is falling short of expectations. A dark cloud hangs over Chinese born in the 1990s and 2000s. Since Xi Jinping won power in 2012, the government has grown more repressive and society less vibrant. Censors have turned the internet into a drearier place, while letting nationalist trolls drum in the state’s talking-points. At university students must grapple with Mr Xi’s forbidding personal ideology. Worst of all for some, China’s economy is stagnating. The unemployment rate for those aged 16 to 24 in cities is over 21%—a number so disheartening that earlier this month the government stopped publishing the data, pending a review.

For our Briefing this week, we talked to young Chinese men and women about how they feel. Plenty still have faith in the party and support Mr Xi’s calls to make China strong. But many are suffering a deep sense of angst. University graduates are finding that the skills they spent years learning are not the ones employers want. Scarce jobs and punishing property prices have dashed their hopes of buying a home and starting a family. We scraped social media and found that the mood is growing darker. Disillusioned youth talk of tangping (lying flat) and bailan (letting it rot), synonyms for giving up.

China is hardly the only country where young people are gloomy. Nearly half of Americans aged 18 to 34 say they lack confidence in the future. When Chinese lie flat, Americans “quiet quit”. Perhaps Gen Z and millennials the world over have a tendency to mope. Yet in China, where some 360m people are between the ages of 16 and 35, something more serious seems to be happening. The ladder to a better life is being lifted away. In response, many are choosing to abandon the rat race and turn inwards. For a country that Mr Xi promises to mould into a great power by mid-century, their ennui raises profound questions.

One is whether their malaise carries political risks. Frustrated young folk jolted China in the past, notably in 1989, when students converged on Tiananmen Square to demand more freedom and less corruption. Last year, fed up with the government’s harsh covid-19 controls, young people gathered in cities across China. Some called for Mr Xi and the party to relinquish power.

Nobody can rule out the possibility of more unrest. But last year’s protests were small and our reporting suggests that China’s young are not bursting with revolutionary fervour. They have grown up with an internet bounded by the great firewall, limiting their access to uncensored news and information. Brought up on propaganda about the party’s accomplishments, many continue to support it wholeheartedly. Even hip young urbanites say the government ought to limit some freedoms.

The real question the party faces is more prosaic: not the threat of revolution, but a quiet rejection of its ambitions. In order to accomplish his goal of restoring China’s greatness, Mr Xi needs the young to get married, have children and reverse the country’s demographic decline. In order to refocus the economy on manufacturing and away from consumer-internet technology, he’d like them to study hard sciences, not dream of designing video games. And he wants more youngsters to work in factories, including the type that might produce weapons for China’s growing armed forces. “Endure hardships” and “eat bitterness”, Mr Xi tells the young. Many cannot see why they should.

The party is mindful of their disenchantment. Policymakers have taken steps to curb speculation in the property market in hope of bringing down prices. Firms have been pressed to treat their overworked young employees better. Under the banner of “common prosperity”, Mr Xi has aimed to increase social mobility and reduce inequality. But much of this has backfired. In going after property developers, tech firms and the tutoring industry, he has harmed new graduates’ most reliable employers.

That leads to the biggest question of all. China’s leaders are fond of contrasting their one-party rule with what they tell their people is a flawed and dysfunctional West, a view stoked but not wholly fabricated by the official media. The unhappiness of young people sets the strengths and weaknesses of each system in clear relief. It is not a comparison that favours China.

Dropouts in America have alternatives to pursue. The country offers many routes to a fulfilling life. An ambitious few have even been able to harness their dissent to create great art, music or a multi-billion-dollar company. Mr Xi would like young Chinese to find enlightenment in their hardship, too, but not that sort. Advance comes exclusively through the Communist Party. China’s artists are yoked to its message. Having been branded as the party’s rivals, tech entrepreneurs have been humiliated.

A small but growing number of well-educated, high-potential young Chinese seem likely to abandon their country. Politicians in America and the wider West often say they are on the side of ordinary Chinese. They could prove it by ensuring Western universities and economies welcome young people who feel that their opportunities at home are limited.

Let them dream

However, most young Chinese will stay at home. When Mr Xi plays down their individual aspirations in favour of the collective interest, he adds to their gloom. He also ignores the role that dreams and choices in their hundreds of millions played in fuelling China’s four decades of growth. The party needs to offer its disenchanted young new paths to peaceful prosperity. The alternatives, including the stoking of angry, militaristic nationalism, would pose a threat to China and the world. ■

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The Economist

18. Warfighting and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century - An Introduction

I missed this because I am unfamiliar with London Politica. I am going to check out this web site more often.

A list of descriptions and definitions of most of the common terms we are using.

An interesting gray zone graphic at the link: https://londonpolitica-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/londonpolitica.com/conflict-and-security-watch-blog-list/warfighting-irregular-warfare-introduction?format=amphttps://londonpolitica-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/londonpolitica.com/conflict-and-security-watch-blog-list/warfighting-irregular-warfare-introduction?format=amp

Warfighting and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century - An Introduction

July 3, 2023 London Politica

The nature of warfare has been perpetually altered by continuous innovation in technology and strategy throughout history, never remaining static for long periods of time. This rate of change, however, vastly accelerated during the 20th century seeing a change from cavalry and bayonet charges through nuclear weapons to stand-off precision weapons and cyber warfare. This article will explore some of the key foundational concepts of 21st-century warfare and provide a concrete set of definitions on which this series will base its analysis. It will then explore the scope and range of topics that will be covered in the series going forward and provide a brief overview of Ukraine in order to ground these topics in a conflict currently taking place.

Some definitions

To set the conditions for a comprehensive analysis of these changes, it is first necessary to provide some concrete definitions for often misunderstood or misused terms relating to the topics of irregular warfare and warfighting.

Warfighting

Warfighting, as the name would suggest, refers to the action of fighting a war, specifically and crucially this conflict is through kinetic means with physical military engagement between belligerents. The UK Ministry of Defence states “while the character of warfare is changing, the nature of war does not change, it is always about the violent interaction between people.” This highlights the key point in this term that warfighting is not conflict or contest between groups but rather, actual direct military action. The term ‘conventional warfighting’ will also be used throughout this series to refer to so-called “peer” and “near-peer” warfighting, i.e. warfighting against an adversary considered to be militarily equal or near-equal in terms of capability. A traditional example of this would be, from a US perspective, China as a peer adversary or Iran as a near-peer adversary.

Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare is not a doctrinally defined term within a Western military context, rather it is a concept developed by Frank Hoffman to describe the emerging threat of multifaceted military entities in 21st-century conflict. He talks specifically about the blend between conventional warfighting, irregular warfare, and terrorism or organised crime. Specifically, he describes hybrid warfare as being conducted by state or non-state actors and involving an ambiguous mix of combatants and tactics to exploit military vulnerabilities in a force. While he uses the example of Hezbollah in 2006, a more current example would be the Russian forces deployed in Ukraine where a large conventional Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) element is augmented by militia forces from the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LPR and DPR as well as mercenaries from the Wagner Group amongst others). The term hybrid warfare is often deployed in a context of national competition below the threshold of conflict such as economic warfare, energy warfare or political interference. This is beyond the scope of both Hoffman’s definition as well as the range of this article series and as such we will focus on the, primarily, military nature of Hoffman’s definition.

This form of conflict is becoming increasingly common as states seek to conduct military operations without the domestic and political risk of their state military involvement. These militias offer a level of deniability along with leveraging existing local disputes, power structures and sentiments to increase the chance of military success. Another current example would be that of the ongoing conflict in Syria where various militia factions are supported to varying degrees by the West, Turkey, Iran and the Syrian government itself with international state involvement including the US, Russia and the UK supporting these factions with air-strikes and troops on the ground. It is difficult today to find or imagine an active conflict that does not correspond to this definition. On the contrary, it has become an essential element in conduct of warfare, as irregular forces are often capable combatants and can cause difficulties for conventional military forces.

Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare has traditionally been used, incorrectly, to describe all military activity that does not fit within the traditional view of conventional warfighting. The Modern War Institute defines it as “a coercive struggle that erodes or builds legitimacy for the purpose of political power. It blends disparate lines of effort to create an integrated attack on societies and their political institutions. It weaponizes frames and narratives to affect credibility and resolve, and it exploits societal vulnerabilities to fuel political change. As such, states engaged in or confronted with, irregular warfare must bring all elements of power to bear under their national political leadership.” The key point is that this form of warfare involves various techniques and groups that are not considered conventional and can, but does not necessarily have to, involve violent conflict. Examples of techniques that could be considered irregular warfare would be the spreading of disinformation to reduce legitimacy of a military group. An example could be the Russian focus on and inflation of the far-right elements of the Ukrainian military to portray the entirety of Ukraine as a far-right state despite that not being the case overall.

Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare has a simple definition but two completely different military situations in which this definition can be applied. Kenneth McKenzie Jr defines it as “leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against [the] vulnerabilities of a superior opponent to achieve disproportionate effect.” While this in itself is a fairly tangible definition, the nuances of this term are in what is being considered asymmetric. For example, a war between a nuclear and non-nuclear state could be considered asymmetric even if the belligerents were equal in conventional military power. Similarly, any war involving the US could be considered asymmetric given the unmatched scale of the US Air Force (USAF).

For this series, asymmetry will be used in three ways. Firstly, strategic asymmetry. This concept can be used to describe warfare between two fundamentally unequal military groups where one side is totally outmatched in every metric. An example of this would be the conflict between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Taliban within Afghanistan where ISAF outmatched the Taliban in technology, funding, manpower, training and equipment. It is important to note here that strategic asymmetry does not guarantee defeat for the weaker side as this example illustrates.

A second use of the term asymmetric warfare is that of operational or tactical asymmetry. This can be broken down into asymmetry in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and asymmetry in physical metrics such as equipment or manpower figures. Asymmetric TTPs can be used to describe the situation in which belligerents with a level of conventional military equity seek gains by changing tactics to exploit a perceived weakness. For example, the Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive exploited a perceived stretching of weakened Russian defensive lines by massing lightly armed vehicles with high operational mobility to penetrate and exploit the Russian lines achieving rapid victories. This tactic would not be found in any Soviet, Russian or Ukrainian doctrine handbook and instead capitalised on the available equipment and condition of the battlefield to defeat an opponent expecting a conventional attack.

Further, asymmetry can be used to refer to a disadvantage or difference in a specific physical measurement of military power. This could include a disadvantage in the numbers of troops, equipment or ammunition such as the artillery barrel and ammunition deficit that left Ukraine facing a 10:1 disadvantage around Bakhmut or a specific capability gap such as Ukraine’s lack of a blue water navy or any navy at all. These asymmetric disadvantages leave room for asymmetric innovations and technologies to fill, many of which will be explored in this series.

Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare refers specifically to activities designed to support an insurgency or resistance group in order to achieve political and military goals. It is an element of irregular warfare.

Grey Zone Warfare

Another poorly doctrinally defined yet widely used term. Grey zone warfare has been explained by the Australian government as “activities designed to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict... paramilitary forces, militarisation of disputed features, exploiting influence, interference operations and the coercive use of trade and economic levers.” This essentially overlaps with the definition of irregular warfare but refers more to the non-physical domain in which this activity occurs; the ‘grey zone’. A key point here being that this definition is self-contradictory, stating that grey zone warfare seeks to avoid military conflict but advocates militarisation and interference operations as acceptable tactics. The point this definition is trying to get at is that grey zone warfare seeks to avoid conventional military conflict. The Nord Stream bombings were almost certainly a military operation of some kind regardless of speculation of actors involved, however this activity was designed to add a layer of deniability in order to get a state-on-state advantage without escalating to conventional war.

There is significant overlap between these definitions, some of which are based on existing military doctrine and others which have been created as theoretical tools to group together certain types of military activity.

The diagram below is intended to visually illustrate the overlap of some of these terms and theories and to show how various military actions can be categorised into a certain form of warfare.

Matrix of Conflict. Source: Australian Army Research Centre

Scope of this series

This series will explore a variety of TTPs, technological innovations, and changes in military force design that have occurred or may occur in the near term at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It will illustrate how the changing nature of conflict has influenced and will continue to influence military development in technology, equipment and TTP in the future. The focus will be on the military aspect of these changes rather than the political aspects covered in the Hybrid Warfare series. The series will largely explore topics relating to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as it is the most recent crucible in which these changes can be observed and from which these innovations have, are and will emerge. These lessons and observations can then be applied to other regions of the world to examine their impact on warfighting in the 21st century more generally.

Ukraine as a case study for irregular warfare

The Ukrainian conflict is an ideal case study for examining the various forms of warfare defined above and the physical manifestations of these forms of conflict.

The Ukrainian conflict encompasses all the forms of warfare that this series seeks to cover, from targeted assassinations in Moscow to the destruction of critical national infrastructure and the development of improvised or homemade naval and unmanned aerial systems. While it is not the intention of this series to focus entirely on Ukraine, the conflict provides the most recent evidence base from which lessons can be learned and developments in technology and TTP can be observed. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has provided perhaps the first example of real warfare in the 21st century and has proved to be a theoretical watershed moment as traditional post-Global War on Terror Western thinking sought to distance itself from conventional warfare in Europe and focus on irregular warfare in the Indo-Pacific, as the Integrated Review illustrates. The Russian invasion brought an interesting change to this view, forcing Western states, while not discounting the rising threat posed by China, to accept that the idea of interstate conflict in Europe is not as distant as once thought.

At an operational level, the war in Ukraine has proved another assertion about 21st-century conflict wrong. The idea that conventional warfare is still relevant was relegated to the background in favour of expeditionary, asymmetric, and interventionist warfare as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and South Sudan among others. What Ukraine has shown is that while conventional warfare is still of crucial importance, its nature has entirely changed, as we will see in other articles. 2,000 destroyed, damaged or abandoned Russian tanks would seem to suggest that the TTPs, technology or equipment that the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) have employed so far are fundamentally challenged in the conventional warfighting environment of the 21st century and that there are many lessons to be drawn from their actions, failures, and successes.

The conflict has also provided numerous opportunities to observe asymmetric warfare in action, with examples such as the use of custom-built unmanned surface vessels (USVs) by the Ukrainian army to challenge the Russian Black Sea Fleet or the procurement and employment of Western air defence systems to counter the threat posed by the Russian Air Force and Russian long-range precision guided munitions (LR-PGMs) such as Kalibr, Kinzhal or Iskander-M missiles. This asymmetric tool employed by Ukraine has denied Russian forces air superiority, a key tool that facilitated the allied success in Desert Storm.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this brief introduction to the terms and primary case studies to be used throughout this series aims to have provided a basic conceptual understanding of the spheres of conflict that sit below and alongside the conventional understanding of warfighting. Going forward the series will explore a variety of domains and specific examples of technologies and strategies that exist within these spheres and the impact that these will have on warfighting and conflict in general going forward. These examples will be explored at a variety of scales with innovations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels as well as exploring entirely new domains of conflict such as deep sea warfare.

As the conflict in Ukraine is currently demonstrating, irregular and unconventional warfare is likely to become more prevalent in the coming decades even as conventional interstate conflict continues as a major security threat. As the conflict continues, new material and tactical developments continue to appear driven by the combination of limited economic and military resources on both sides as well as the push to achieve a military advantage and improve the situation on the battlefield.

These developments in Ukraine are being watched globally by various militaries to form the basis for new policy, procurement decisions, and military innovations to move from the traditional Cold War model of interstate warfare to the hybrid forms seen today. The successes and failures of these developments, and their applicability to other potential and current theatres of conflict, will pave the way and shape the nature of 21st-century warfare.

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Warfighting and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century - An Introduction

July 3, 2023 London Politica

Some definitions

Warfighting

Hybrid Warfare

Irregular Warfare

Asymmetric Warfare

Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare refers specifically to activities designed to support an insurgency or resistance group in order to achieve political and military goals. It is an element of irregular warfare.

Grey Zone Warfare

The diagram below is intended to visually illustrate the overlap of some of these terms and theories and to show how various military actions can be categorised into a certain form of warfare.

Matrix of Conflict. Source: Australian Army Research Centre

Scope of this series

Ukraine as a case study for irregular warfare

The Ukrainian conflict is an ideal case study for examining the various forms of warfare defined above and the physical manifestations of these forms of conflict.

Conclusion

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19. Covert Naval Activities Part 1 - Covert, Low Profile Military Vessels in the LittoralCovert Naval Activities Part 1 - Covert, Low Profile Military Vessels in the Littoral

Covert Naval Activities Part 1 - Covert, Low Profile Military Vessels in the Littoral

https://londonpolitica.com/conflict-and-security-watch-blog-list/covert-naval-activities-part-1

Christopher Dufty

Aug 8

This article aims to explore the ways in which state naval forces are employing various forms of non-traditional vessels in order to conduct hybrid warfare in the naval domain. Traditionally, naval power has been the essential tool in power projection and interstate military dominance with this power measured by the number of principal surface combatants (major military ships) possessed by one's navy. The nature of the increasingly surveilled and interconnected naval domain and world in general has created opportunities for irregular activities within it.

A particular area of interest is the littoral. The littoral refers to the area close to a state’s coastline encompassing amphibious operations in a military rather than geographical context. The UK Ministry of Defence defines the littoral zone as ‘those land areas (and their adjacent areas and associated air space) that are susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea’ adding a land component to the definition. Its significance is owed to the tendency of significant population centres, nodes of trade and communication, maritime traffic, and sea-based infrastructure to exist in this zone.

This article explores some of the methods and vessels used by a variety of states to conduct hybrid, grey zone activities in this area as well as further developments going forward and what this could mean for warfare in the 21st century. It furthermore explores vessels from a full spectrum of global navies namely; the US, UK, Iran and the PRC.

US Covert Special Operations Vessels

The US employs low-profile civilian appearance vessels for special operations activities. While the US has never denied their usage in a military role, they do not appear within the list of US navy vessels and have clearly been styled to maintain a non-militaristic appearance in order to avoid attention. The two vessels used, the MV Ocean Trader and MV Carolyn Chouest are both converted civilian vessels that sail without AIS (automatic identification system - publicly accessible ship trackers that all civilian vessels have installed) turned on in order to avoid tracking through open sources. These vessels have been retrofitted to conduct special forces activities through the installation of a flight deck and hangar for helicopters, launch bays for small military craft such as the Combatant Craft Assault (CCA), new signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communication equipment and berthing for special forces personnel.

There is very limited information available on the vessels or their activities, nor are there many official documents where these vessels are mentioned beyond their initial procurement requests. More interestingly, there are also very few photos available of the ships, with the MV Ocean Trader last photographed in Oman in 2018, and the MV Carolyn Chouest last seen in a photo released by the US Department of Defence in the Philippines in 2022. The near total lack of photos suggests that the discrete and uninteresting appearance of these vessels is successful at avoiding public attention and thus photography, assisted by the fact that the absence of AIS tracks prevents a concerted effort to track them through satellite imagery.

MV Ocean Trader, a BAE conversion of the formerly Maersk operated MV Cragside, was highly likely procured by US Special Operations Command to fulfil the role of a forward deployed base from which special forces activities in Africa and the Middle East could be conducted. This is evidenced by the temporary lease of a civilian ship from Edison Chouest Offshore to be statically based off the coast of Somalia until a converted ship could be acquired with the purpose of supporting special operations missions and conducting signals intelligence. The purpose of the MV Ocean Trader seems to be identical to the ship it replaced with facilities to land a number of special forces helicopters, carry special forces craft and launch drones. These operations could include, raids to strike high value targets (HVTs), diving operations, counter piracy and counter hijacking or boarding operations. The vessel has also been observed in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas suggesting it has a special operations role to play here as well.

The advantage of the civilian appearance here is two-fold. Firstly, the vessel can move without drawing attention to itself as it transits the globe thus preventing any suspicion from adversaries as to its intended target or destination. More importantly, and more useful to its likely mission, it can provide basing for special forces in politically sensitive areas without attracting attention or driving political repercussions. For a hypothetical example, the MV Ocean Trader could remain anchored off the coast of Yemen collecting signals intelligence without suggesting it poses a direct military threat, and thus avoiding protest from groups in Yemen like a military-flagged warship would. It could then launch an unexpected raid into Yemen territory to remove an HVT before disappearing again into the clutter of civilian sea traffic. There is no indication that it has been used in this way, however, it certainly has the capabilities to be employed as such, and would be an invaluable asset in the 21st century environment where deniable operations are key.

Image 1: MV Ocean Trader in 2016 with a good view of the subtle military modifications while still retaining the overall appearance of a civilian cargo ship or ferry.

Image 2: MV Carolyn Chouest after conversion demonstrating very similar retrofitted equipment with the notable absence of a flight deck suggesting that the ship was likely converted for its availability and convenience rather than it being a perfect platform to operate from.

The MV Carolyn Chouest is a chartered vessel that originally supported the experimental research submarine NR-1 however was converted and repainted into a low-profile special operations support vessel. It seems to have a Pacific focus to its operations unlike the MV Ocean Trader and was involved in raiding exercises alongside partner nations as part of the Balikatan 22 exercise in the Philippines, suggesting that it’s primary purpose, similar to the MV Ocean Trader, is to support small scale special forces operations in the Pacific rather than the Middle East and Africa.

The Royal Navy has also expressed interest in a ‘littoral strike ship’, initial proposals of which are clearly based on the MV Ocean Trader. Important to note that this vessel is more overtly military and therefore not befitting the title of a covert vessel. It would, however, have similar capabilities as these US ships, demonstrating a view in the Royal Navy that these ships are incredibly useful even without the advantages offered by their covert nature in US service.

Iranian Covert Motherships

Iran, similarly, has become somewhat of a specialist in the usage of these disguised military ships. They employ both discrete civilian-styled vessels with military usage, and civilian vessels that have been overtly converted into military usage as floating ‘motherships’ for Iranian naval activities in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. There is an important distinction to make between the two entities that conduct naval operations for Iran; the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) that conducts overt conventional naval activity and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN), which is largely focussed on covert, asymmetric, and hybrid naval operations in the region. The IRIN is largely analogous with other conventional navies, and is considered ‘green water’ rather than ‘blue water’, meaning it has the capabilities to operate regionally but does not have the assets or experience to claim global naval reach.

The IRGCN on the other hand is at the heart of regional asymmetric and unconventional operations and has been traditionally associated with activities such as swarm boat attacks, harassment of civilian and foreign military vessels, hijackings, smuggling of weapons to Yemen, and special forces operations. While the IRGCN does operate a fleet of overtly armed fast attack craft, the more important vessels are the two visually civilian cargo ships MV Saviz and Behshad.

Image 3: Behshad.

Image 4: MV Saviz. Notice the two fast-attack craft on the deck of the MV Saviz between the cranes as well as their identical, discreet appearance. At least one fast-attack craft was seen in satellite imagery of the Behshad after it took over from the Saviz.

These two vessels, while appearing as civilian cargo vessels, are known to be operated by the IRGCN. Although the nature of their exact roles is unknown, open source intelligence and limited statements by the Iranian Government have been pieced together by intelligence analysts to give an idea of what they are involved in. These vessels seem to fulfil the same role with the Behshad taking over the role from the MV Saviz after it was damaged by an alleged Israeli sabotage attempt and forced to return to port. These vessels appear to fill the role of intelligence and observation ships that can sit in strategically significant areas, such as the Bab Al-Mandab strait on the Red Sea, and observe, document, and potentially interdict vessels travelling through the narrow sea lane.

The advantages that these vessels give Iran are enormous because the civilian nature of the ship means that it can remain in the strait indefinitely, while drawing little attention to itself and its activities. More specifically, the critical nature of this sea lane means that this vessel can act as a floating observation post where reports on Western, and more importantly, Saudi-UAE naval movements can be made to keep track of vessel locations and potentially facilitate windows of opportunity for deliveries of military aid to Houthi rebels, as well as observing Saudi-UAE aid to the Yemeni government. The ship’s radar system and possible signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment would make it very effective at this task, as it could survey the entire width of the strait. In addition, this makes the vessel ideally placed to find potential targets for the IRGCN to seize, with numerous cases of Western vessels being boarded and moved to Iranian ports, or attacked. The presence of fast-attack craft seen on the deck of the MV Saviz seems to suggest that it would be capable of conducting these operations if a good target was located. The sabotage conducted on MV Saviz, whether conducted by Israel or not, suggests that these vessels are deemed enough of a security threat in the region that they warrant a military response. Further, the fact that Iran replaced the damaged MV Saviz with the Beshad within nine days signals that Iran sees these covert vessels as critical to their activities in the region as well, showing how effective and useful a covert naval asset can be.

While an overt naval mothership could also conduct these operations, the strength of the disguised vessels is in the plausible deniability they offer. With the ship seemingly unarmed and non-military in nature, it is able to provide the Iranian government with the ability to deny it is engaged in military activity in the area. This deniability is clearly useful in the event of a vessel seizure or weapon shipment seizure where Iran can claim that it had no military assets in the area and therefore, to a general audience, seemingly convincingly deny involvement and thus not elicit a major military response.

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia

Another geographically distinct example of this kind of vessel use is seen with the Chinese People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is a paramilitary organisation that consists of a mixture of purpose built militia ships and modified fishing trawlers that is designed to augment People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities, especially in the South China Sea. The fleet likely numbers in the thousands, with the vast majority consisting of unarmed fishing trawlers. The role of this organisation appears to be to intimidate foreign naval vessels in order to project Chinese naval power without the need for the higher profile of involvement from PLAN vessels. They achieve this through swarming, harassing, ramming and blocking other states’ naval vessels in the South China Sea. Similar to the previous examples, these vessels give the Chinese government the ability to conduct effective grey zone warfare by having naval assets that are plausibly not under direct government control therefore not drawing as large a military response as a PLAN vessel would.

Image 5: PAFMM Vessel harassing the USNS Impeccable in 2009.

A classic example of the work of this fleet is the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012. In this particular case, Chinese fishing vessels, which were deemed by the Philippines to be fishing illegally, were searched by Philippine Navy personnel. However, when the Philippine Navy attempted to arrest the fisherman, PAFMM vessels physically blocked the ships and used water cannon to force the Philippine vessel away. Following this, consistent disruption efforts by PAFMM vessels have led to the shoal coming under de facto control of China where Philippine fishing vessels are unable to fish the area, while an estimated fleet of 287 Chinese fishing vessels fished the area in 2021. This demonstrates the effect such strategy can have, as harassment tactics rather than direct military confrontation elicit a lesser international response, and therefore allow China to achieve its maritime aims without serious diplomatic or military consequences.

Anti Access Area Denial

To fully understand the effectiveness of these US, Chinese, British and Iranian vessels, it’s essential to introduce the concept of anti-access and area denial (A2AD). A2AD is, in its simplest form, the controlling of access to an area by a military force. This is often thought of in terms of weapons systems that could be employed asymmetrically by a weaker force to prevent a stronger force accessing a certain area to conduct operations. A good example of this would be the use of anti-ship missiles (ASMs) where the threat of missiles fired from land could deny a naval force the ability to operate within the missile’s range of the coast. This can be seen in Ukraine, where the efficacy of Ukrainian naval A2AD systems in allegedly sinking the Moskva have limited the vastly superior Russian naval forces to long range strikes, and have denied them access to conduct amphibious operations against the Southern Ukrainian coastline. Whether the Moskva was indeed sunk by Ukrainian ASMs or otherwise, the relegation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to a series of platforms for launching cruise missiles rather than engaging in littoral operations suggests that Ukraine has successfully leveraged its A2AD assets to deny the Russian forces a domain in which they command complete supremacy.

Image 6 displaying the different layers of the Chinese A2AD bubble in Pacific Asia. These assets could be used to deny Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korean and US navies access to the region and render operations within the bubble impossible due to the threat of casualties from these systems.

In the context of these covert vessels, the advantage they offer is that they can operate within, and threaten an adversary A2AD bubble. This is explored in depth in a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) publication where the concept of a low profile, lightly armed, covert vessel (titled the littoral operation vessel (LOV)) could enter a contested region without eliciting a major military response from an adversary and then conduct low-intensity, grey zone operations to set the conditions for future large-scale military activity or contest opposing grey zone operations. Applying this idea to the examples above gives a set of possible scenarios which can illustrate the importance of these vessels. The MV Ocean Trader could forward deploy to the Middle East and sit without indicating a major US military deployment. On the vessel could sit a task force of US special forces personnel, helicopters and small boat assets that would enable counter piracy, interdiction and sabotage operations. This is particularly significant in the context of the recent US announcement of their intent to deploy small protection teams on civilian vessels transiting the Persian Gulf. The MV Ocean Trader would be perfectly positioned to blend into the mess of civilian traffic and deploy these small teams, as well as directly countering Iranian efforts to threaten shipping by engaging in activities that would be politically damaging to attribute to conventional US naval assets, such as engaging in sabotage or reconnaissance of Iranian fast-attack craft bases. Further, the persistent deployment of this vessel would set a pattern of life that would potentially allow it to operate within the Iranian A2AD bubble, as directly challenging a non-threatening US vessel with ambiguity and deniability in its activities would set Iran on an escalatory path and justify further US actions. If direct confrontation between Iran and the US became necessary, this would allow the US to deploy small special forces teams to destroy Iranian A2AD and shape the battlefield for a future conventional naval task force. The concept follows the same logic for the British Littoral Strike Ship/LOV concept, with three worked concepts found within the RUSI article.

The PAFMM is similar in its ambiguity. Deniability from the central government combined with confusion on ownership, identity of vessels, justification as a military target and autonomy from the PLAN means a PAFMM vessel or fleet isn’t going to cause a direct military response or justify the employment of A2AD assets from a neighbouring navy. Instead one gets below-the-threshold-of-conflict engagements between these vessels and their opponents, consisting of water cannon, ramming, shining of laser, physical blocking and attempts to foul the propulsion systems with nets. In other words, exercising naval power without firing a shot. Overall, these vessels, and those mentioned previously, rely on a perceived lack of threat, operational ambiguity, disguise, deniability and persistent deployment to create enough confusion and uncertainty to prevent an adversary from engaging in military or political response by utilising their A2AD systems, without seeming to be the escalatory power themselves. Thus, they create a dilemma where they either don’t respond and allow the grey zone activities to continue, or escalate, which, in turn, paints them as the aggressor and/or justifies further escalation from the original operator of the covert vessel. A third option is to deploy an opposing asset to conduct countering grey zone activities such as the fate that befell the MV Saviz where, likely Israel, countered Iranian deniable activities with their own deniable attack on the vessel, leading to no escalation from either side and no claiming of responsibility for these actions.

Modularity

A relatively recent naval development that lends even greater significance to these vessels in the roll out of a number of containerised modular systems designed to fit within a 20 or 40 foot standard shipping container space and offer a full spectrum suite of naval sensors, weapons, unmanned systems and countermeasures. The following briefly explores the capabilities offered by the SH Defence CUBE system as this seems to have the greatest integration from other defence manufacturers as well as being the most mature system.

Two images demonstrating the capabilities of the CUBE. Image 7: Sea mine deployment. Image 8 (below): Anti-ship missiles.

With sufficient power generation to run, this system effectively allows any vessel to fit military systems at short notice, or an existing military vessel to enhance its capabilities. A covert vessel would raise very little suspicion with a cargo of a few containers placed on its deck, and it would not detract from the low-profile appearance of the vessel. Yet, these containers could give these vessels full spectrum naval capabilities with air defence, anti-ship or land attack missiles, armed unmanned vehicles, extra attack craft to carry extra special forces, naval mines or sensor systems such as an electronic warfare suite or radar. All of this would be possible within an adversary A2AD bubble. It is important to note that part of the low-profile nature of these ships comes from their lack of overt weapons systems. Therefore, while these modular containerised systems would provide a potent asset, their usage would be one-off before justifying the covert vessel as a legitimate, overt military target. In an amphibious warfare context, however, this brief surprise may be all that is required to achieve an operational objective.

One key issue with this system is target identification. While a navy’s armed surface combatant fitting two containerised air defence missile systems is not problematic regarding military identification, setting the precedent of deploying such a system to a civilian appearance vessel allows the leap to be made justifying any civilian ship with a container as a potential military target. This is clearly an unacceptable situation in the eyes of Western navies, hence the lack of weapon systems on the US and UK vessels presented in this article. The Russian Navy has however, indicated their willingness, or at least consideration, of fitting these systems to a civilian vessel as demonstrated by this graphic.

Image 9: Graphic demonstrating how this system could be fitted to a civilian vessel and blend in with other shipping containers and deliver four anti-ship missiles.

This highlights the important point of the balance these vessels must strike between appearing civilian enough to maintain a low profile and yet still be somewhat attributed to a military entity in order to avoid justifying actions against civilian shipping.

Conclusion

Overall, these vessels, while differing in their intended tasks, their capabilities, and their level of militarisation, have been developed to operate within the same domain. They are designed to operate below the threshold of conflict and provide a capability to operate in the grey zone through deniability, secrecy and ambiguity. They provide an ability to project soft power as well as low-intensity hard power to further a state’s objectives without provoking a significant military or political response. This ability allows them to operate within an A2AD bubble in a peacetime environment, or threaten the destruction of the bubble in a warfighting environment.

With the ongoing increase in multipolar, low intensity, competition across the globe, and the decline of the US as definitive principle naval power, the importance of possessing assets able to achieve political and military goals without sparking major conflict in the littoral zone will continue to increase in relevance. We may be expected to see, or not see, an increase in the number and scope of operators of these vessels in the coming decade.

Warfighting and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century

Covert Naval Activities Part 1 - Covert, Low Profile Military Vessels in the Littoral

https://londonpolitica.com/conflict-and-security-watch-blog-list/covert-naval-activities-part-1

Christopher Dufty

Aug 8

US Covert Special Operations Vessels

Image 1: MV Ocean Trader in 2016 with a good view of the subtle military modifications while still retaining the overall appearance of a civilian cargo ship or ferry.

Iranian Covert Motherships

Image 3: Behshad.

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia

Image 5: PAFMM Vessel harassing the USNS Impeccable in 2009.

Anti Access Area Denial

Modularity

Two images demonstrating the capabilities of the CUBE. Image 7: Sea mine deployment. Image 8 (below): Anti-ship missiles.

Image 9: Graphic demonstrating how this system could be fitted to a civilian vessel and blend in with other shipping containers and deliver four anti-ship missiles.

Conclusion

Warfighting and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century

20. When Is a Coup Not a Coup? When the U.S. Says So.

When Is a Coup Not a Coup? When the U.S. Says So.

The Pentagon refuses to call the overthrow of Niger’s president a coup — a move that could affect military assistance and a U.S. drone base.

Nick Turse

August 19 2023, 7:00 a.m.

The Intercept · by Nick Turse · August 19, 2023

Not long ago, President Joe Biden vowed that the U.S. would “counter democratic backsliding by imposing costs for coups” in Africa. But three weeks after a military mutiny in Africa involving U.S.-trained officers, the Pentagon refuses to call the takeover in Niger a coup d’état.

After a Nigerien junta, which calls itself the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland, seized power on July 26 and detained the democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, France and the European Union immediately called it a coup. But weeks later, in public statements and responses to The Intercept, Pentagon officials have repeatedly stopped short of using that word.

“Not calling a coup a coup not only undermines our credibility but harms our long-term interests in these states.”

“Not calling a coup a coup not only undermines our credibility but harms our long-term interests in these states,” said Elizabeth Shackelford, a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and lead author on a forthcoming report on U.S. military aid in Africa. “We have legal prohibitions on providing security assistance to juntas for a reason. It’s not in our long-term national interest to do so.”

U.S. coup legislation, specifically Section 7008 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, specifies that any country whose “duly elected head of government is deposed by a military coup d’état or decree” will be automatically prohibited from receiving a broad package of congressionally appropriated foreign assistance. The Pentagon’s reluctance to call a coup a coup may be aimed at preserving the ability to continue providing security assistance to military-ruled Niger.

Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh was pressed earlier this week about why the United States has not called the takeover a coup. “It certainly looks like an attempted coup here,” she said. “We have assets and interests in the region, and our main priority is protecting those interests and protecting those of our allies. So a designation like what you’re suggesting certainly changes what we’d be able to do in the region and how we’d be able to partner with Nigerien military.”

While calling a three-week-old coup no more than an attempt, Singh was clear about why the U.S. might be reticent to sever relations with the junta. “Niger is a partner and we don’t want to see that partnership go,” she said. “We’ve invested, you know, hundreds of millions of dollars into bases there, trained with the military there.”

After Two Decades of U.S. Military Support, Terror Attacks Are Worse Than Ever in Niger

Since 2012, U.S. taxpayers have spent more than $500 million on that partnership, making it one of the largest security assistance programs in sub-Saharan Africa. Niger hosts one of the largest and most expensive drone bases run by the U.S. military. Built in the northern city of Agadez at a price tag of more than $110 million and maintained to the tune of $20 to $30 million each year, Air Base 201 is a surveillance hub and the linchpin of an archipelago of U.S. outposts in West Africa. It is home to Space Force personnel, a Joint Special Operations Air Detachment, and a fleet of drones, including armed MQ-9 Reapers.

In the month prior to the coup, the drone outpost was the site of a meeting between Brig. Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, the U.S.-trained chief of Nigerien Special Forces and Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, head of U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Within weeks, Barmou helped topple Bazoum and, according to a U.S. government official, conveyed a threat to Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland to execute the deposed president if neighboring countries attempted a military intervention.

When asked if Singh was equivocating to avoid calling Bazoum’s overthrow a coup, a Pentagon spokesperson passed the buck to the State Department. “The DoD does not make the determination whether the situation in Niger is a coup,” Maj. Pete Nguyen told The Intercept. “The State Department will make the determination as to whether the situation in Niger is a coup.”

Sarah Harrison, who served four years as an associate general counsel in the Pentagon’s Office of General Counsel, including providing guidance on U.S. activities in Africa, says that there is a popular misunderstanding that failing to call a military takeover a “coup” means that the U.S. government does not have to restrict access. “The Biden administration handwringing over saying ‘coup’ is absurd. The law requires no formal designation and is in force regardless of what officials choose to label events,” says Harrison.

“By calling it an ‘attempted coup,’ it implicitly suggests that there is going to be a reversal of it and denies the facts on the ground.”

Elias Yousif, a research analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program, sees the Pentagon equivocations as a “political gesture” of dubious use. “By calling it an ‘attempted coup,’ it implicitly suggests that there is going to be a reversal of it and denies the facts on the ground that the president is under strict house arrest and the military junta is running the show,” he told The Intercept. “There has been a coup in Niger. This is the reality.”

Earlier this month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the “U.S. government is pausing certain foreign assistance programs benefiting the government of Niger.” But the State Department did not respond to The Intercept’s questions about exactly which programs have been paused and if security aid continues to flow to the junta. Just prior to Blinken’s declaration, a State Department spokesperson told The Intercept that there had “been no determination on security assistance at this time.”

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U.S. coup restrictions were first imposed in 1984 when the Reagan White House and Congress battled over military assistance to El Salvador. The next year, Congress passed a law that applied the coup restriction to all other countries. Similar restrictions have been included in every State Department annual appropriations bill since. The U.S. has, however, often employed loopholes, workarounds, and exceptionally strict or selective readings of the law to keep military aid flowing when heads of state are deposed, including in Egypt in 2013, Burkina Faso in 2014, and Chad in 2021. Even when aid has been restricted following coups, alternate funding channels have kept U.S. tax dollars trickling into the coffers of juntas. According to State Department responses to questions from The Intercept, security assistance also continues to fund juntas in Mali, which had coups in 2020 and 2021, Guinea (2021), and Burkina Faso (two in 2022).

“We have laws in place to ensure we don’t help prop up those who undermine democracy,” says Shackelford, who formerly served as a foreign service officer in multiple posts in Africa. “When we find ways around enforcing those laws whenever it’s inconvenient, we undermine our own influence and the stability those laws are meant to promote.”

Indeed, Biden has decried Russia’s creation of a “propaganda ecosystem” that “creates and spreads false narratives to strategically advance the Kremlin’s policy goals.” He added, “There is truth and there are lies. And each of us has a duty and responsibility, as citizens, as Americans, and especially as leaders — leaders who have pledged to honor our Constitution and protect our nation — to defend the truth and to defeat the lies.”

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Nick Turse @nickturse

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The Intercept · by Nick Turse · August 19, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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