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Quotes of the Day:
"Before enlightenment, chop wood, carry water. After enlightenment, chop wood, carry water."
– Zen Proverb
"Those who know do not talk. Those who talk do not know."
– Lao Tzu
"Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius hits a target no one else can see."
– Arthur Schopenhauer
1. Russia Draws Hard Line Over Security Guarantees for Ukraine
2. Putin Calls Zelensky the West’s Illegitimate Puppet. Can He Talk Peace With Him?
3. U.S. Is Prepared to Use Air Power to Support Planned European Force in Ukraine
4. China Teases Glimpse of Advanced New Weaponry at Military Parade
5. Critical Followership: Thinking, Failing, and Leading – Expanded Analysis
6. Meet GMARS, NATO’s next big rocket artillery system
7. Trump administration revokes security clearances of 37 current and former government officials
8. Tulsi Gabbard axes nearly HALF of spy agency staff in earthquake 'Deep State' shake-up
9. Why Does Xi Keep Purging Loyalists? Look to Stalin and Mao for the Answer.
10. Power and Peril in Reagan’s Last Cold War Chapter
11. Citizenship reviews now ask immigrants to show "positive contributions" to U.S.
12. “Sabotaging” S-400 & Su-35 Deals, Russia Accuses The U.S. Of Hurting Its Arms Exports To India & Beyond
13. U.S. Allies Still Waiting for Tariff Relief on Autos and Steel
14. How Ian Fleming and His Spy Scheme Inspired a Broadway Show
15. Samuel Huntington’s Prussian Paradox: Clausewitz, Military Professionalism, and the Myth of a “Apolitical” Military
1. Russia Draws Hard Line Over Security Guarantees for Ukraine
Excerpts:
Lavrov’s remarks were a potent sign that Moscow’s maximalist demands in the war haven’t shifted despite a surge in diplomatic engagement in recent days. Western security assurances to deter against future Russian invasions are key to getting Ukraine to sign on to a peace deal.
The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
Russia Draws Hard Line Over Security Guarantees for Ukraine
Foreign minister says any action the West took to protect Kyiv would need Moscow’s cooperation
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/moscow-draws-hard-line-over-security-guarantees-for-ukraine-4b1e8428
By Yaroslav Trofimov
Follow and Georgi Kantchev
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Updated Aug. 20, 2025 3:13 pm ET
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow on Wednesday. Photo: Pavel Bednyakov/Pool/EPA/Shutterstock
Quick Summary
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Sergei Lavrov said Western security guarantees for Ukraine require Moscow’s cooperation, undermining their effectiveness.View more
Russia warned on Wednesday that it should effectively hold veto power over any action to assist Ukraine after a peace deal is reached, rendering planned Western security guarantees for Kyiv moot and delivering a setback to negotiations championed by President Trump.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also played down the likelihood of a summit between the leaders of Russia and Ukraine occurring soon. The White House had announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to an imminent summit, but Lavrov said the Kremlin merely accepted to raise the level of its representation at talks with Ukraine.
Lavrov’s insistence that Russia must have a say in how any security guarantees for Ukraine would be enacted contradicted the Trump administration’s assertion that Putin agreed to European and U.S. security guarantees at the Alaska summit on Friday.
Lavrov’s remarks were a potent sign that Moscow’s maximalist demands in the war haven’t shifted despite a surge in diplomatic engagement in recent days. Western security assurances to deter against future Russian invasions are key to getting Ukraine to sign on to a peace deal.
The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
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President Trump’s summit in Alaska with Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t result in a deal to end fighting in Ukraine. WSJ’s Meridith McGraw explains what happened, and what’s next. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/Press Pool
Lavrov, one of the two top Russian officials who participated in the Alaska talks alongside Putin last week, said any agreement on security guarantees should be based on the Russian proposal during the failed March 2022 peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.
According to that proposal, which Lavrov erroneously described as approved by Kyiv at the time, Russia would have a veto power over any action by the other guarantors of Ukrainian security—making those assurances pointless. On Wednesday, Lavrov said China should also have equal powers in these guarantees.
“We will safeguard our legitimate interests in a firm and harsh manner,” Lavrov said. “Seriously discussing issues of ensuring security without the Russian Federation is a utopia and a path to nowhere.”
Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said Moscow is sending a signal that it won’t accept anything that is precooked by the U.S. and Europeans in negotiations without the Russians at the table.
“Moscow’s hope is that the meeting between Putin and Trump has established their personal rapport and that substantive negotiations over Ukraine will be lengthy, buying Russia time to continue pushing Ukraine on the front line,” he said.
Russia, alongside the U.S. and the U.K., provided assurances of respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence in the 1994 Budapest memorandum, under which Kyiv surrendered to Moscow the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union. With the full-scale invasion of 2022, Moscow also violated its other commitments under the 2015 Minsk agreements brokered by France and Germany.
The White House portrayed Russia’s supposed agreement to Western security guarantees as a major achievement of the summit with Putin. After a Washington meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump indicated his openness to U.S. military support for European troops that might be deployed in Ukraine after a peace deal. Senior U.S. and European military officials have been meeting in recent days to prepare plans for such a mission.
On Tuesday, Trump signaled that the U.S. is prepared to use air power to support a European security force in Ukraine. Trump didn’t specify the role the U.S. military might have in providing air support to a European ground force—whether it would include warplanes, air-defense systems or surveillance drones, for instance.
“When it comes to security, they are willing to put people on the ground,” Trump said in an interview with “Fox & Friends,” referring to the Europeans. “We’re willing to help them with things, especially probably, if you talk about by air, because there is nobody has the kind of stuff we have.”
The idea for these guarantees is to make any peace agreement stick—and to make it more palatable for Ukraine to agree to territorial concessions demanded by Putin.
A soldier walked past Patriot air-defense systems at the military hub for Ukraine in Jasionka, Poland, in March. Photo: sergei gapon/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
It is unclear if Lavrov’s remarks on Wednesday mean that Russia is backing out of the understandings reached in Alaska—or that the Trump administration misunderstood what the Kremlin really meant. Putin, in his own statement in Alaska, made only a vague reference to Ukraine’s security.
“I agree with President Trump,” said Putin. “He said today that Ukraine’s security must be ensured by all means. Of course, we are ready to work on this.”
Some European leaders have expressed skepticism about Putin’s willingness to engage seriously in negotiations. “When I look at the situation and the facts, I don’t see President Putin very willing to get peace now,” French President Emmanuel Macron said on NBC News on Monday, after meeting with Trump at the White House.
The White House also said on Monday that Putin has promised to have a direct meeting with Zelensky. There has been no confirmation of this from Moscow.
Lavrov’s remarks cast further doubt on Moscow’s willingness to participate in such a summit in the near term. He said that Putin had merely committed to raising the “level of representation” in talks that have taken place this year in Turkey between Russia and Ukraine, and to expand them beyond military issues to “political aspects of a settlement.” Any summit between Zelensky and Putin will require “thorough preparation” so that it marks a “final point” in these negotiations, he added—a justification Russia has previously used to steer clear of meeting the Ukrainian leader.
On Monday, Zelensky said that he was ready for any format of talks, including holding a bilateral meeting with Putin.
“We are ready for any formats at the level of leaders, because only at the level of leaders can we resolve all those complex, painful issues,” he said.
Putin has repeatedly dismissed the Ukrainian president as a Western puppet and cast doubt on his legitimacy, questioning Zelensky’s authority to sign a peace deal.
The settlement in Ukraine, Lavrov said, would require removing the “root causes” of the conflict, which he described as the rise to power of a “Kyiv regime” in 2014 and “the extermination of all Russian and Russian-speaking population on Ukrainian territory.”
Lavrov’s remarks were in keeping with some of the most hard-line rhetoric Moscow has used against Ukraine since the start of the war. Zelensky himself comes from a Russian-speaking family, and many Russian-speaking Ukrainians are fighting against the Russian invasion alongside their Ukrainian-speaking compatriots.
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com and Georgi Kantchev at georgi.kantchev@wsj.com
2. Putin Calls Zelensky the West’s Illegitimate Puppet. Can He Talk Peace With Him?
I think Kim Jong Un is sharing some of his rhetoric with Putin.
Putin Calls Zelensky the West’s Illegitimate Puppet. Can He Talk Peace With Him?
Trump seeks to broker a meeting of the two leaders to end Europe’s most destructive war in generations
https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-zelensky-meeting-challenges-ed44eb54
The first and only time Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, left, was in Paris in 2019. Photo: ian langsdon/PRESS POOL
By Thomas Grove
Follow and Matthew Luxmoore
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Aug. 19, 2025 9:00 pm ET
Quick Summary
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Trump is pushing for a meeting between Putin and Zelensky to foster peace in Ukraine, despite strained relations.View more
If Russian President Vladimir Putin agrees to meet his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, as urged by President Trump, he will come face-to-face with a man he has spent 3½ years excoriating as an illegitimate leader and puppet.
Negotiating directly with Zelensky would run sharply counter to the narrative Putin has carefully constructed and sold to Russians in an effort to justify his 2022 invasion of Ukraine: that the war is part of a broader conflict with the West in which Zelensky and his country are mere pawns.
Trump’s call for a meeting puts Putin in a bind. If he declines, he risks angering the U.S. president, who has already threatened him with more sanctions. But sitting down with Zelensky could damage him politically with the Russian elite and the broader public.
Trump said Tuesday that he was working to bring the two leaders together as the next phase in his efforts to forge a lasting peace in Ukraine, but he nodded to the challenge at hand.
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WSJ’s Annie Linskey analyzes the high-stakes meeting between President Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and leaders of European powers to discuss a potential path to ending Ukraine’s war with Russia. Photo: Presidential Press Service
“They haven’t been exactly best friends,” he said in an interview with Fox News, adding that Putin and Zelensky will have to iron out details of a possible meeting if they agree to one.
The question of Putin’s willingness to meet his Ukrainian counterpart has taken center stage following a Trump-Putin summit in Alaska and discussions Monday at the White House between Trump, Zelensky and European leaders.
On Tuesday, Russian officials gave little indication they were working toward such a meeting. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said plans for any contacts between officials should be laid out “with the utmost care.” Other Russian officials ridiculed Zelensky as an unserious politician.
Agreement from Putin to meet Zelensky won’t likely come quickly—or easily. He has dismissed the Ukrainian leader repeatedly as a servant of the West, and has insisted that various complex issues be solved before the two leaders sit down. He has also questioned Zelensky’s legitimacy after he extended his mandate beyond the usual five-year term, citing the problems with holding an election during a war. Putin has questioned his authority to sign any peace agreement.
Ukrainian servicemen installing antidrone nets in the eastern Donetsk region recently. Photo: roman pilipey/AFP/Getty Images
The words ‘For Russia’ on a wall in Mariupol, which Russian forces captured from Ukraine in 2022. Photo: olga maltseva/AFP/Getty Images
Putin has said a meeting between the two leaders should come at the end of a peace process—and more as a formality to sign the necessary documents. “I’m ready to meet, but if it’s some kind of final stage, so we don’t sit there endlessly dividing things up, but bring this to an end,” he said in June. “But we will need the signature of the legitimate authorities.”
The issues also go far beyond Zelensky. Putin sees the war as part of a broader Russian push to relitigate grievances the country has felt since the end of the Cold War, analysts say. Putin’s engagement with the Trump administration is part of an effort to secure an agreement that goes far beyond territorial concessions in Ukraine and concerns the very makeup of Europe’s security architecture.
“For Putin, this is a much wider confrontation with the West. And Ukraine is a battlefield between Russia and the West,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “In Putin’s eyes, Zelensky is not a player,” she added. “The fact Ukrainians are fighting at all is because of Western support.”
Most important, a meeting with Zelensky could end the delicate dance Putin has performed around Trump’s peace efforts. To avoid more punishing sanctions, the Kremlin leader has professed his desire for peace while escalating offensives have won Russian troops important gains in the country’s east. A summit with Zelensky could bring an unwelcome moment of truth.
“A meeting could indicate that he’s really willing to negotiate the end of this war, and I don’t think he’s ready,” said Samuel Charap, veteran Russia watcher and senior political analyst at Rand Corporation.
The first and only time Putin met Zelensky was in 2019 at a very different moment in Russian-Ukrainian relations. At the time, Putin appeared to have high hopes for a relationship with his newly elected counterpart who had made peace with Russia a main campaign priority.
The meeting between Putin and Zelensky was hailed as a step toward peace after Russia had seized Crimea and backed separatists in eastern Ukraine with soldiers and money. But far from being the start of a working relationship, disagreements erupted over the details of a peace deal, including disengagement across the front line. Ties quickly deteriorated thereafter and the two haven’t met since.
The acrimonious relationship between Zelensky and Putin is one of the biggest roadblocks to peace.
Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images, Jeenah Moon/Reuters
Since the start of the war, Zelensky has believed that he could make headway in his relationship with Putin if he could sit down face-to-face with the Kremlin leader, but he has also drawn the ire of Moscow by issuing a vaguely worded decree that calls talks with the Kremlin leader impossible.
To satisfy Trump and Zelensky’s own desire to meet, Putin has said he isn’t opposed to talking face-to-face, but that various conditions would need to be met, including signals from Kyiv that it is ready to make serious concessions. Zelensky, for his part, has shown openness to meet without preconditions, most recently abandoning an earlier demand for a cease-fire to facilitate talks.
“If Ukraine begins setting various preconditions for a meeting—including justified ones regarding a cease-fire—then the Russians will present 100 of their own,” he said after his meeting with Trump and European leaders in Washington on Monday. “I think we should meet without conditions and explore what further progress there can be on this path to ending the war.”
Zelensky has successfully used the Kremlin leader’s resistance against him. In May, Trump had expressed his desire for Putin to come to Turkey where he could meet face-to-face with Zelensky. When Putin passed up the chance, Zelensky flew into Turkey and bemoaned how the Kremlin was “too afraid” to meet. This time, however, the political stakes are higher, adding pressure on the Kremlin leader.
With rising demands from Trump and European leaders, Moscow has hinted it will double down on its refusal and continue to paint Zelensky as a dilettante that Putin shouldn’t stoop to meet.
Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova went on the offensive on Tuesday to level accusations against the Ukrainian leader to justify Putin’s own refusal to meet.
Ultimately, analysts say, Putin is likely to pour cold water on the idea of a meeting without actually refusing one outright—a strategy he has previously deployed in response to calls for a cease-fire.
Agreement over maximalist peace terms that Russia handed to Ukraine in Istanbul, according to Stanovaya, is likely to serve as Moscow’s precondition for a meeting. Those terms include Ukraine’s disarmament, political neutrality, and abandonment of its aspiration to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The War in Ukraine
News and insights, selected by the editors
How Will the War in Ukraine End? Two Scenarios
Trump Plans to Get Putin, Zelensky Talking. That’s Not Even the Hard Part.
Trump Rolled Out the Red Carpet for Putin. He Got Little in Return.
Zelensky's Sartorial Evolution
Essay | Can the U.S. Still Be Europe’s Peacemaker?
Inside Ukraine’s Effort to Fortify Miles of Defensive Lines
A Never-Ending Supply of Drones Has Frozen the Front Lines
Trump to Resume Sending Weapons to Ukraine
“What Putin will say now is ‘let’s do it,’ but first we need to talk about common documents we can finalize in such a meeting,” she said. “And we’ll find ourselves in the same situation as before the Alaska summit.”
Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com and Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the August 20, 2025, print edition as 'Putin’s Demands Jeopardize Hopes for Zelensky Talks'.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
3. U.S. Is Prepared to Use Air Power to Support Planned European Force in Ukraine
I am sure the Air Force does not want to be committed to another "Provide Comfort" and "Northern Watch" as it was in 1991 through 2003 in Northern Iraq. It is a huge train on resources.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northern_Watch
U.S. Is Prepared to Use Air Power to Support Planned European Force in Ukraine
Trump rules out putting U.S. troops on the ground if a deal is reached with Moscow to halt the war
A Ukrainian mobile air-defense unit monitoring the sky. Photo: roman pilipey/AFP/Getty Images
By Lara Seligman
Follow, Michael R. Gordon
Follow and Max Colchester
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Aug. 19, 2025 4:52 pm ET
President Trump signaled on Tuesday that the U.S. is prepared to use air power to support a European security force in Ukraine but ruled out deploying American ground troops.
Planning of the multination force to be sent to Ukraine if a peace settlement is reached accelerated on Tuesday, a day after Trump discussed the idea at the White House with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other European leaders.
After Trump’s summit with his Russian counterpart in Alaska, the president tasked Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to develop options for NATO-like security guarantees for that force, according to a Western official.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Caine was set to meet in person on Tuesday with military chiefs from nations that participated in the White House meeting on Ukraine a day earlier, including Britain, France, Germany and Finland, two Western officials said. The purpose of the meeting, which will also include Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, who is both NATO’s top military commander and the head of U.S. forces in Europe, is to refine military options for the political leaders, one of the officials said.
Grynkewich is also slated to brief a larger group of NATO defense chiefs over videoconference on the war in Ukraine on Wednesday, according to a senior NATO military officer. Grynkewich will participate from Washington, the person said.
But the planned force faces a number of major diplomatic challenges.
While Trump has said that he expects Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept the presence of Western troops in Ukraine, Russia has objected to the idea of sending troops to Ukraine from members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
“We reiterate our repeatedly expressed position that we deny any scenarios that envisage the deployment of a military contingent to Ukraine with the participation of NATO states,” Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharkova said Tuesday. Such as a step, she said, could lead to an “uncontrollable escalation of the conflict with unpredictable consequences.”
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Asked what security guarantees he needs, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said ‘Everything.’ Photo: Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images
Trump didn’t specify the role the U.S. military might have in providing air support to a European ground force—whether it would include warplanes, air-defense systems or surveillance drones, for instance.
“When it comes to security, they are willing to put people on the ground,” Trump said during a Fox Television interview, referring to the Europeans. “We’re willing to help them with things, especially probably, if you talk about by air, because there is nobody has the kind of stuff we have, really they don’t have.”
The Pentagon could deploy aircraft outside Ukraine to protect European troops, including jet fighters to aid European forces in the country if they are attacked or surveillance drones to monitor any peace agreement. The U.S. could also fly European troops and equipment on its cargo planes, provide ground-based air-defense systems to the European forces and contribute military intelligence.
European governments, led by the U.K. and France, have lobbied Washington for months to back what they described as a “reassurance force” that would be deployed to Ukraine after a cease-fire.
European nations are wary of sending their forces to Ukraine without what the British have called a U.S. “backstop,” an assurance that U.S. forces could intervene if the troops are attacked.
In a sign that NATO members are concerned about possible military moves by Moscow, the alliance said Tuesday that its military forces, including its air-defense systems, had been put on alert when Russian aircraft launched missile attacks on Ukraine.
A Patriot air-defense system in southeast Poland. Photo: sergei gapon/AFP/Getty Images
Helicopters kick up dry grass as they participate in the U.S.-led military exercise. Photo: louisa gouliamaki/Reuters
In a statement, the alliance said the move was made out of concern that the Russian missiles might enter the airspace over Poland, which includes a logistics hub that is used to send equipment to Ukraine. As it turned out, no Russian violations of Polish airspace occurred.
Following the White House meeting with top European leaders on Monday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio will start working with the Europeans on plans for a security guarantee for Ukraine. These guarantees could include a potential promise to back up Ukraine modeled on NATO’s Article 5, which stipulates that an attack on one alliance member should be considered an attack on all, officials said.
Without a credible U.S. security guarantee, “it is hard to see how you can have an effective deterrence of Russia or reassurance of Ukraine,” says James Black, a deputy director at Rand Europe, a think tank. European militaries lack the logistics, intelligence-gathering and cybersecurity skills, as well as the large-scale precision missiles, needed to sustain a conflict with Russia, he said.
Defining the U.S. role is aimed at giving countries such as Germany and Italy more confidence about participating in any Ukraine force.
The plan for a reassurance force was hatched by the British and French shortly before Trump won his re-election. It took on greater urgency after Zelensky’s Oval Office clash with Trump earlier this year. Initially, the Europeans planned to put as many as 30,000 troops on the ground. But Trump showed little interest in U.S. involvement, and several European nations, including Germany and Italy, balked at sending troops.
The U.K. and France then began discussing a more modest force that would be composed of a few thousand troops and based far from the front line. The troops would support the Ukrainian military and act as a deterrence against potential Russian aggression.
Soldiers take part in urban combat exercises involving the French and British armies in northeastern France in April. Photo: sameer al-doumy/AFP/Getty Images
European forces wouldn’t likely be near whatever de facto border or legal frontier emerges between Russian and Ukrainian forces if a peace agreement is hammered out. They could be placed at strategically important locations, such as airports and military centers, that could come under Russian attack.
French officials have said Paris could deploy between 3,000 and 5,000 troops in Ukraine initially.
British and French army officers went to Ukraine in April to scope out options. Britain is likely to focus on providing air support, given its army has been slimmed down significantly in the past few decades.
“One of the trickiest tasks in the work undertaken by our military planners is that it is not clear in what circumstances any forces may be required to be deployed, and it is not clear that the details of the negotiated peace deal we all want to see will be in place,” U.K. Defense Secretary John Healey said in April in a statement to Parliament.
Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com, Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Max Colchester at Max.Colchester@wsj.com
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the August 20, 2025, print edition as 'President Weighs Air Aid To EU in Ukraine'.
4. China Teases Glimpse of Advanced New Weaponry at Military Parade
Messaging by parade?
As the old adage says - no inspection ready (or parade ready) unit has ever passed combat and no combat ready unit has ever passed an inspection (or parade). (And note the difference in our June 15th parade on the Army Birthday versus the CRInK's typical parades - I will take our fighting men and women any day of the week and twice on Sunday. Despite the controversy, I was proud to see our Army marching through the streets of DC. And as an aside, what goose stepping Army has ever been successful?)
China Teases Glimpse of Advanced New Weaponry at Military Parade
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-20/india-china-to-explore-border-demarcation-amid-us-tensions?sref=hhjZtX76
Fighter jets during a rehearsal in Beijing on Aug. 17.Photographer: Zhao Yuhong/VCG/Getty Images
By Bloomberg News
August 20, 2025 at 6:35 PM GMT+9
Takeaways by Bloomberg AI
Hide
- China will show off new weapons at a military parade next month, including tanks, fighter jets, drones, and hypersonic weapons.
- Wu Zeke, an official helping organize the event, said the weapons and equipment on display were selected from domestically produced and currently in-service equipment.
- China's military parade will commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and will be overseen by President Xi Jinping, with Russian leader Vladimir Putin reportedly among the attendees.
China said that it will show off new weapons at a military parade next month, potentially giving rivals like the US a first chance to see what hardware the Asian nation is ready to field.
“The weapons and equipment on display this time were all selected from major battle equipment that is domestically produced and is currently in service, with a large proportion being new types of equipment making their debut,” Wu Zeke, an official helping organize the event planned for Sept. 3, said at a briefing in Beijing on Wednesday.
New hardware like tanks, fighter jets, drones and “and other advanced equipment to demonstrate our new quality combat force” would be displayed, he said, adding that the material would include hypersonic weapons.
China under President Xi Jinping has been spending heavily to upgrade its military. The nation is also the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter, with customers are mostly developing nations like Pakistan that have limited funds.
Read More: Chinese Weapons Gain Credibility After Pakistan-India Conflict
China is one of the world’s foremost developers of hypersonics — fast, low-flying and highly maneuverable weapons designed to be too quick and agile for traditional missile defense systems to detect in time. The technology is at the center of escalating competition between the US on one side and on the other China and Russia. Ukraine has said Russia used hypersonics in the war in 2024.
Chinese military personnel during the rehearsal in Beijing on Aug. 20.Photographer: Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images
Still, China’s military has been dogged by worries that corruption limits its effectiveness. In recent years, Xi has mounted a clean-up campaign that has included the department that arms the military. In July, China’s top military body ordered a sweeping overhaul to restore the credibility of political leaders because of the taint of graft.
Read More: China Military Calls for Efforts to Repair Image After Scandals
The military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II will be overseen by Xi, with Russian leader Vladimir Putin reportedly among the attendees. Preparations for the event started in earnest last weekend, when some shopping malls and subway exits along a central boulevard in Beijing were closed.
5. Critical Followership: Thinking, Failing, and Leading – Expanded Analysis
Excerpts:
Conclusion
Simons’ exploration of critical thinking in wartime remains relevant in today’s security landscape. It is this very cohort today from which tomorrow’s senior leaders—and critically, their followers—will emerge. The future of military leadership depends on those in uniform today. If cadets and junior officers are not encouraged to develop habits of critical followership now, when will they? Leadership is a continuum that begins with followership, and fostering an environment where subordinates can critically engage with their superiors ensures that tomorrow’s military leaders will be more adaptable, insightful, and effective.
By re-examining command, management, and leadership through the lens of followership, we see that different military contexts demand different types of critical engagement. It’s the situation that should dictate which one is chosen. While traditional military training prioritizes obedience, modern conflicts require soldiers to engage in nuanced decision-making. Integrating a positive followership model—one that balances discipline with constructive dissent—ensures that soldiers contribute meaningfully to mission success without undermining operational effectiveness.
By shifting the focus from critical thinking as an individual cognitive skill to critical followership as a necessary function within military structures, we ensure that critical engagement is not simply an academic exercise but a foundational element of military culture. The capacity to critically assess orders, provide constructive feedback, and make informed decisions at all levels of hierarchy is vital. But without fostering critical followership, critical thinking risks being an isolated skill rather than an embedded cultural norm. This paradigm shift recognizes that the best leaders emerge from those who have learned to think critically as followers first. As modern warfare continues to evolve, refining military education to cultivate adaptive followership will be key to sustaining operational agility and mission success.
Critical Followership: Thinking, Failing, and Leading – Expanded Analysis
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/20/critical-followership-thinking-failing-and-leading-2/
by Siamak Naficy
|
08.20.2025 at 06:00am
Introduction
Critical thinking is widely acknowledged as an essential skill for military leadership, yet its counterpart—critical followership—remains underexplored. Effective military operations depend not only on decisive leadership but also on subordinates capable of critical assessment, adaptation, and constructive feedback. And military leaders do not emerge in a vacuum; they are shaped by their experiences as subordinates.
Critical followership is the ability of subordinates to think independently while remaining aligned with organizational goals. It involves questioning assumptions, providing informed feedback, and executing orders with an awareness of their broader strategic implications. Unlike passive obedience, critical followership fosters adaptability and resilience, especially in dynamic operational environments.
Understanding that followership and leadership are roles within the broader framework of leadership itself is essential. The natural relationship between leaders and followers is shaped by self-concept, trust, and the ability to adapt to evolving missions. When followers engage in critical thinking and constructive dialogue, they contribute to mission success rather than merely complying with directives. This paper examines the role of critical followership within hierarchical military structures, emphasizing its importance in mission command and decentralized decision-making.
Positive vs. Negative Followership
Followership is often perceived as a passive role, but it is an active and dynamic process that can either enhance or hinder organizational effectiveness. Critical followership involves independent thinking, initiative, and alignment with the leader’s intent, contributing to mission success. Conversely, uncritical followership can manifest as blind obedience, complacency, or passive resistance, leading to inefficiencies and mission failure. As management guru Robert E. Kelley noted, “So the question is not whether to have followers but what kind of followers we want. I think what we want is ‘good’ followership—people who take appropriate actions with great skill and achievement.”
The self-concepts of followers matter. Alienated followers, for example, may have criticisms of leaders, but are passive—often cynical and sarcastic. They may suffer from unmet expectations. Conversely, conformist followers are active but do not engage in critical thinking, accepting assignments without questioning their legitimacy or effectiveness. Moving toward critical followership requires addressing unmet expectations and fosters engagement between leaders and alienated followers to align on new objectives. It also means that too conformist followers be directed to take responsibility for their uncritical followership, or else seek success elsewhere.
Understanding the nuances between these forms of followership is essential for fostering an adaptive and resilient military force. Models of followership (see also Kelley, Grint, Chaleff, Kellerman, and Riggio) can provide a framework for balancing adaptability with operational effectiveness, ensuring that flexibility does not erode cohesion and order. The particular model that is used is not very important. The point is to engage in reflection and conversation about the fact that there are different styles of followership and that these always interact with leadership. This is the natural relationship between leaders and followers.
By understanding different followership styles, leaders can foster a culture where subordinates think independently while maintaining alignment with mission objectives. For example, the effectiveness of military followership can be examined through a positive (enhancing leadership) and negative (detrimental to leadership) model, especially when applied to different types of military challenges. Such models can then influence decision-making at all levels of engagement.
Positive Model:
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For wicked problems: Constructive dissent is vital. Followers may not agree with every action, but they align with the broader goal and provide critical feedback when necessary. For example, during counterinsurgency operations, soldiers who challenge flawed intelligence assessments can prevent tactical missteps.
- For tame problems: Technical experts are needed to focus on the task without resistance. In logistical planning, precision and adherence to protocol ensure operational success.
- For critical situations: Compliance without resistance is required to maintain order and discipline, as in high-intensity combat scenarios where immediate obedience ensures survival.
Negative Model:
- For wicked problems: Followers avoid responsibility, leading efforts astray or failing to provide crucial insights. A lack of critical thinking during humanitarian interventions may result in ineffective aid distribution.
- For tame problems: Over-compliance with nonsensical rules hinders progress and adaptability. Strict adherence to outdated procedures without question can delay mission objectives.
- For critical situations: Followers outright refuse to comply, undermining the system and creating operational dysfunction. Instances of insubordination in combat zones can lead to mission failure and increased casualties.
Followership in Command, Management, and Leadership
The conceptual distinction between command, management, and leadership has roots in both military and business traditions. But its conceptual separation evolved over time through various disciplines, including military strategy, organizational theory, and leadership studies. Command is the oldest of the three, originating in military history. It refers to the authority to give orders and enforce obedience. Ancient military theorists like Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Carl von Clausewitz (On War) emphasized command as the ability to make decisive orders in combat. Leadership in a military context emerged as distinct from command, as effective generals not only commanded but also inspired and led their troops (e.g., Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar). Management in the military developed later with the rise of large bureaucratic armies, particularly in the Napoleonic era and beyond, focusing on logistics, planning, and organization (e.g., Prussian military reforms under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder). The U.S. military and organizations like NATO formalized the distinction between command (authority in structured environments), management (resource allocation and planning), and leadership (inspiring and guiding people).
- Command (Obedient Followership in Crisis Situations): Soldiers must exhibit obedient followership, executing orders rapidly and efficiently. While deep critical analysis is limited in crisis situations, soldiers must still engage in rapid, situational judgment within the boundaries of their given orders. For example, in battlefield operations, immediate response to orders can mean the difference between mission success and failure.
- Management (Competent Followership in Structured Environments): Soldiers in managerial roles exercise competent followership, applying established protocols and optimizing existing systems. Critical thinking is used within predefined parameters to improve processes, rather than to challenge authority or strategic objectives. An example would be logistics officers refining supply chain operations for efficiency.
- Leadership (Adaptive Followership in Complex, Wicked Problems): Soldiers must engage in adaptive followership, where critical thinking plays a significant role. They are expected to anticipate challenges, navigate uncertainty, and contribute to strategic goals while still adhering to military discipline. In counterinsurgency operations, for instance, adaptive followers modify engagement strategies based on evolving intelligence.
By integrating the positive and negative followership models into these categories, we can further refine how different military contexts demand different types of critical engagement.
Leadership, command, and management serve distinct but interrelated functions. While command focuses on authority and structure, leadership inspires vision and cohesion. Management ensures efficiency and resource allocation. Critical followership enhances all three by enabling constructive dissent, mitigating errors, and promoting initiative within established frameworks.
One of the largely forgotten but most insightful of the early management scholars (and someone described as being “too far ahead of her time”), Mary Parker Follett, reinforces this point, “The best leader knows how to make his followers actually feel power themselves, not merely acknowledge his power.” This underscores the idea that followers are not merely passive recipients of orders but active participants in shaping outcomes. When leaders empower their subordinates, they cultivate an environment where critical followership thrives.
Note how hard it is not to slip into considering leaders and followers as being opposites, if you’re not a leader—then you must be a follower. This isn’t really true, for both leader and follower are roles in a setting where both are trying to achieve some common goal. The opposite of this, then, would be a non-leader and a non-follower. So, someone may be occupying the role of a leader or a follower in a particular context, but they both contribute to leadership as I am defining it.
The Necessity of Critical Thinking in the Military
Anna Simons’ (2012) “How Critical Should Critical Thinking Be? Teaching Soldiers in Wartime,” carefully and cleverly examines the challenge of cultivating analytical reasoning within the constraints of military discipline. Critical followership builds on her argument but shifts the focus from leadership to followership, emphasizing its importance in mission command and decentralized decision-making, and exploring how soldiers can apply critical thinking without undermining command structures. By refining models of followership, we can strike a balance where adaptability enhances operational effectiveness without eroding cohesion and order.
Fostering critical followership strengthens military effectiveness by promoting adaptability, reducing operational risk, and enhancing decision-making at all levels. By recognizing followership as an active, intellectual process, military institutions can better navigate the complexities of modern warfare and organizational leadership.
In military education, critical thinking is frequently framed as a leadership trait. Cadets and junior officers are encouraged to analyze complex situations, question assumptions, and engage in problem-solving exercises. However, leadership is not merely about independent thought; it is also about how one interacts with superiors and peers. Critical followership emphasizes not only questioning decisions but also understanding when and how to challenge authority constructively. It is about being an active participant in decision-making while maintaining the cohesion necessary for military effectiveness.
The U.S. military operates under the principle of mission command, which empowers leaders at all levels to exercise judgment and initiative. Orders are issued with both a task and a purpose—so if circumstances make the task unfeasible, soldiers can adapt while still achieving the broader objective. Understanding intent enables flexibility, which is critical in complex and unpredictable combat environments.
Decentralized decision-making and initiative at lower levels improve military effectiveness. A Ukrainian non-hierarchical approach initially helped counter Russian forces and served as a successful albeit short-lived example of mission command in practice. In contrast, the Russian (and non-NATO) model generally is rigidly task-focused, providing no additional guidance or room for adjustment. This fundamental difference underscores the importance of critical thinking in military effectiveness.
Critical thinking is an essential skill for soldiers, particularly in contemporary conflicts where asymmetrical warfare, counterinsurgency operations, and complex geopolitical landscapes demand adaptability. Unlike traditional battlefield engagements, modern warfare often requires soldiers to make split-second ethical and strategic decisions without immediate oversight. Encouraging critical thinking enables them to assess threats, adapt tactics, and respond effectively to unpredictable scenarios. However, the paradox remains: how can soldiers exercise independent judgment while remaining disciplined followers within a rigid chain of command?
Consider, for instance, the classic dilemma of a junior officer in a remote outpost who receives an order that doesn’t quite make sense. Does he follow it blindly and risk mission failure, or does he deviate from the command, knowing that disobedience could have career-ending consequences? Many soldiers who have served in ambiguous combat zones describe moments where doctrine and reality clash—where the map says one thing, but the terrain tells a different story. Navigating this tension is where critical thinking must thrive, yet without undermining military cohesion.
The traditional military structure, with its emphasis on hierarchy and obedience, can sometimes be at odds with fostering critical followership. Yet, historical case studies demonstrate that effective military organizations rely on subordinates who can think independently while executing orders. From the Prussian Auftragstaktik to modern decentralized command structures, militaries that encourage initiative and critical engagement at all levels tend to outperform those that emphasize blind obedience.
Reconciling Discipline and Critical Thinking
Simons highlights the paradox at the heart of military effectiveness: military success relies on hierarchy and discipline, yet critical thinking encourages questioning and independent judgment. This tension can be managed through a tiered approach to followership training:
- At the command level, followership should emphasize disciplined execution with rapid, structured decision-making frameworks.
- At the management level, soldiers should be encouraged to refine and optimize existing systems through measured analysis within a controlled environment.
- At the leadership level, followership should evolve into adaptive, context-sensitive judgment where soldiers contribute insights while maintaining alignment with mission objectives.
Failing to balance these levels can lead to negative followership outcomes—overthinking when compliance is needed, or blind obedience when critical analysis is essential.
Lessons from Recent Conflicts
Lessons from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the importance of critical thinking in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping missions. Soldiers often engage with local populations, navigate complex cultural dynamics, and face ambiguous threats. Those trained to be adaptive followers—balancing critical thought with disciplined action—are better equipped to make informed decisions. These lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, with their emphasis on counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and community engagement, underscore the value of flexible, ground-level judgment. However, the character of conflict has continued to evolve.
The war in Ukraine presents a different but equally instructive case—one of large-scale conventional warfare against a peer adversary. Despite the differences in terrain, tactics, and threat environment, Ukraine also demonstrates how empowering junior leaders with decision-making authority and critical judgment can yield strategic advantages. Ukraine’s ability to decentralize command, allowing junior officers to make battlefield decisions, reinforces the argument about the necessity of critical thinking in modern warfare. In contrast, failures in rigid, top‑down strategies—typified by the Russian military’s hierarchical command structure in Ukraine—have hindered timely responses, stifled initiative, and led to costly tactical setbacks. The Russian emphasis on centralized control has impaired coordination between units and slowed battlefield adaptation. Conversely, Ukraine’s adoption of mission‑command principles—emphasizing decentralized execution and empowering junior leaders—has fostered initiative, rapid adaptation, and measurable success on the ground. These divergent outcomes suggest that encouraging adaptable followership enhances overall mission effectiveness.
For example, junior officers who were given some leeway to adjust their tactics to local realities often found greater success in securing communities than those who rigidly followed top-down directives. The U.S. Army’s village stability operations in Afghanistan demonstrated this principle, where success often depended on local adaptation. Conversely, negative followership—where soldiers either resisted necessary adjustments or blindly complied with failing strategies—often led to mission failure.
A key challenge is balancing disciplined execution with independent judgment. Military organizations must cultivate a culture where subordinates feel empowered to think critically without undermining cohesion. Training programs and institutional reforms can help develop a cadre of followers who enhance, rather than obstruct, mission success.
Conclusion
Simons’ exploration of critical thinking in wartime remains relevant in today’s security landscape. It is this very cohort today from which tomorrow’s senior leaders—and critically, their followers—will emerge. The future of military leadership depends on those in uniform today. If cadets and junior officers are not encouraged to develop habits of critical followership now, when will they? Leadership is a continuum that begins with followership, and fostering an environment where subordinates can critically engage with their superiors ensures that tomorrow’s military leaders will be more adaptable, insightful, and effective.
By re-examining command, management, and leadership through the lens of followership, we see that different military contexts demand different types of critical engagement. It’s the situation that should dictate which one is chosen. While traditional military training prioritizes obedience, modern conflicts require soldiers to engage in nuanced decision-making. Integrating a positive followership model—one that balances discipline with constructive dissent—ensures that soldiers contribute meaningfully to mission success without undermining operational effectiveness.
By shifting the focus from critical thinking as an individual cognitive skill to critical followership as a necessary function within military structures, we ensure that critical engagement is not simply an academic exercise but a foundational element of military culture. The capacity to critically assess orders, provide constructive feedback, and make informed decisions at all levels of hierarchy is vital. But without fostering critical followership, critical thinking risks being an isolated skill rather than an embedded cultural norm. This paradigm shift recognizes that the best leaders emerge from those who have learned to think critically as followers first. As modern warfare continues to evolve, refining military education to cultivate adaptive followership will be key to sustaining operational agility and mission success.
Tags: Critical Thinking, followership, Leadership in War, Mission Command, U.S. Army
About The Author
- Siamak Naficy
- Siamak Tundra Naficy is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. An anthropologist by training, he brings an interdisciplinary perspective to the study of strategic culture, conflict resilience, and the human dimensions of security. His work draws from both naturalist and classical realist traditions, emphasizing how power, interests, the history of ideas, and human nature shape conflict. His research interests span conflict theory, wicked problems, leadership, sacred values, cognitive science, and animal behavior—viewed through an anthropological lens. The views expressed are his own and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army, or the Naval Postgraduate School.
6. Meet GMARS, NATO’s next big rocket artillery system
Meet GMARS, NATO’s next big rocket artillery system
Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall’s new rocket artillery system doubles the firepower of HIMARS and could give NATO a European-built alternative.
Kyle Gunn
Aug 19, 2025 9:06 AM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · Kyle Gunn
Artillery has long been called the “King of Battle” due to its ability to impact a battlefield, and it isn’t going to give up the crown to upstarts like small drones just yet. Systems like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the M270 have proven invaluable in conflicts from the Global War on Terror to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall have produced and test-fired the Global Mobile Artillery Rocket System (GMARS).
GMARS offers double the firepower of the High-mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, matching that of the tracked M270, but in a wheeled version like HIMARS. It presents an interesting option to NATO nations and other militaries who may not want to wait years for HIMARS to be built, and prefer a system manufactured closer to home.
What is GMARS?
GMARS is a joint project between U.S.-based Lockheed Martin and Germany’s Rheinmetall. It’s built on the Rheinmetall HX 8×8 truck. With double the firepower of HIMARS, it can launch:
-
12 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets with ranges from 70–150 kilometers.
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2 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) with ranges up to 300 kilometers
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4 Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) with ranges of 500 kilometers and beyond.
This much firepower and range give GMARS precise and highly mobile long-range fires, which have proved essential for survival on today’s drone-laden battlefields.
How it compares
The HX 8×8 truck gives GMARS a range of about 600 kilometers on the road, with a high ground clearance and a central tire inflation system for rough or soft terrain.
That makes it more flexible for road marches and resupply than the FMTV 6×6 truck used by HIMARS or the tracked Bradley chassis used by the M270, which both have an operational range of about 480 kilometers.
Otherwise, GMARS is designed to slot into existing NATO logistics and training pipelines. It fires the same munitions, uses the same fire controls, and can work alongside HIMARS or M270 batteries seamlessly.
Against competitors, GMARS is also ahead. Russia’s Tornado tops out around 200 kilometers. China’s PHL-16 can fire different calibers with ranges up to 360 kilometers. Iran’s Fadjr-5 reaches about 200 kilometers.
Why now
The rise of drones has changed how artillery fights. Cheap quadcopters and larger, more persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are spotting targets deeper behind enemy lines than ever before. Hitting those targets can be a challenge, though.
Fiber-optic FPV drones can only reach about 50 kilometers. Drones like Shaheds are slow and relatively easy to shoot down. Air strikes face contested skies and can take dozens of minutes to reach the target. A rocket launcher like GMARS, which just needs coordinates, can strike several hundred kilometers away, within minutes, and then displace to avoid counterbattery fire.
That “spot fast, shoot fast, move immediately” cycle is at the heart of modern artillery, and GMARS doubles the firepower available in that window.
Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall’s Global Mobile Artillery Rocket System (GMARS). Photo via Lockheed Martin.
Who’s buying it
Currently, there are no orders for GMARS, though both Lockheed and Rheinmetall have said the system is currently available for purchase.
The Pentagon isn’t a likely customer. The U.S. military already has HIMARS, M270s, and multiple modernization programs underway. But even if the U.S. never fields it, American units will likely train and deploy alongside allies that do.
Though nothing has been confirmed, Poland is one of the more likely customers. Sharing a border with Belarus, the country is currently ramping up defense spending with an especially keen eye toward multiple launch rocket systems, or MLRS. Recently, Warsaw signed a deal with Lockheed to purchase 486 HIMARS launchers to incorporate into their Homars-A program and also agreed to purchase 126 K-239 Chunmoo systems manufactured by South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace for their Homar-K program. In both cases, Poland’s WB Group is fitting the launchers onto domestically produced trucks, specifically the Jelcz 6×6 for the HIMARS launchers and the Jelcz 8×8 for the Chunmoo. They’ve already illustrated a willingness to purchase what works now, and their approach of fitting the purchased launchers onto domestic trucks lends itself well to GMARS.
Smaller European countries that don’t have the defense industrial base of Poland, like Estonia, Lithuania, or Latvia, are potential customers for the entire GMARS, truck included. All three are NATO allies, and all have purchased HIMARS. They may find GMARS a compelling alternative thanks to its HX platform and compatibility with existing HIMARS and M270 across the rest of the NATO alliance.
The bottom line
GMARS takes everything HIMARS proved on battlefields from Iraq to Ukraine and doubles it. With twice the rockets in a single launcher, longer driving range, and compatibility with the newest long-range missiles, it gives NATO armies a powerful new tool. More than that, it reflects where modern artillery is heading: longer-range, highly mobile systems designed to survive in drone-saturated battlefields while striking targets hundreds of kilometers away. We discuss all this and more in depth in the latest for YouTube, which you can watch here.
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7. Trump administration revokes security clearances of 37 current and former government officials
Trump administration revokes security clearances of 37 current and former government officials
AP · ERIC TUCKER · August 19, 2025
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WASHINGTON (AP) — The Trump administration said Tuesday that it was revoking the security clearances of 37 current and former national security officials in the latest act of retribution targeting public servants from the federal government’s intelligence community.
A memo from Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard accuses the singled-out individuals of having engaged in the “politicization or weaponization of intelligence” to advance personal or partisan goals, failing to safeguard classified information, failing to “adhere to professional analytic tradecraft standards” and other unspecified “detrimental” conduct.
The memo did not offer evidence to back up the accusations.
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Many of the officials who were targeted left the government years ago after serving in both senior national security positions and lower-profile roles far from the public eye. Some worked on matters that have long infuriated Trump, like the intelligence community assessment that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election on his behalf. And several signaled their concerns about Trump by signing a critical letter in 2019 that was highlighted on social media last month by right-wing provocateur and close Trump ally Laura Loomer.
The action is part of a broader Trump administration campaign to wield the levers of government against perceived adversaries, and reflects the president’s continued distrust of career intelligence officials he has long seen as working against his interests. The revocation of clearances has emerged as a go-to tactic for the administration, a strategy critics say risks chilling dissenting voices from an intelligence community accustomed to drawing on a range of viewpoints before formulating an assessment.
“These are unlawful and unconstitutional decisions that deviate from well-settled, decades-old laws and policies that sought to protect against just this type of action,” Mark Zaid, a national security lawyer whose own clearance was revoked by the Trump administration, said in a statement.
He called it hypocritical for the administration to “claim these individuals politicized or weaponized intelligence.”
Gabbard on Tuesday sought to defend the move, which she said had been directed by Trump.
“Being entrusted with a security clearance is a privilege, not a right,” she wrote on X. “Those in the Intelligence Community who betray their oath to the Constitution and put their own interests ahead of the American people have broken the sacred trust they promised to uphold.”
The security clearance suspension comes amid a broader effort by Gabbard and other Trump administration officials to revisit the intelligence community assessment published in 2017 on Russian election interference, including by declassifying a series of years-old documents meant to cast doubt on the legitimacy of its findings.
Multiple government investigations have reached the same conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 election in sweeping fashion, including through a hack-and-leak operation of Democratic emails and a social media campaign aimed at sowing discord and swaying public opinion.
But Trump has long resisted the assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin interfered in his favor, and his Justice Department has authorized a grand jury investigation that could bring fresh scrutiny to Obama-era officials.
Security clearances are important not only for current government workers but also former ones whose private-sector jobs require them to retain access to sensitive information. Stripping clearances from such employees could make it hard for them to do their jobs, though it’s unclear how many of the former officials still have or require one.
On his first day of office, Trump said he would revoke the security clearances of the more than four dozen former intelligence officials who signed a 2020 letter saying that the Hunter Biden laptop saga bore the hallmarks of a “Russian information operation.”
He’s also revoked the clearances of former President Joe Biden and former Vice President Kamala Harris, and he attempted to do the same for lawyers at a spate of prominent law firms but was rebuffed by federal judges.
Some of those who were targeted in the latest action were part of Biden’s national security team. Many only learned of the Gabbard action from news reports Tuesday, said two former government officials who were on the list. Both spoke on the condition of anonymity as they ponder whether to take legal action.
AP · ERIC TUCKER · August 19, 2025
8. Tulsi Gabbard axes nearly HALF of spy agency staff in earthquake 'Deep State' shake-up
I am so tired of the Deep State (and DEI) rhetoric. They are such a distraction.
What we should be talking about is something I learned from one of my many mentors. As we developed a task organization he would look at the various headquarters and ask, "what value does this headquarters contribute to the mission? " Is that HQ necessary to accomplish the mission? And then he would chop it if we could not describe sufficient contributions and value. Perhaps that is what the Director should be asking. If you can afford to slash half the workforce, what about the other half?
Tulsi Gabbard axes nearly HALF of spy agency staff in earthquake 'Deep State' shake-up
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15018849/Tulsi-Gabbard-axes-nearly-HALF-spy-agency-staff-earthquake-Deep-State-shake-up.html
By JON MICHAEL RAASCH, US POLITICAL REPORTER
Published: 15:01 EDT, 20 August 2025 | Updated: 15:25 EDT, 20 August 2025
America's top spy agency announced it will 'rightsize' its overall footprint by cutting almost half of all its employees after President Donald Trump directed that members the 'deep state' be rooted out.
Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard sent out an email to Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) employees on Wednesday announcing the launch of 'ODNI 2.0,' the culmination of a months-long effort to reduce redundancies and cut costs, including employees.
'This will reduce ODNI by over 40 percent by the end of the fiscal year 2025 and save taxpayers over $700 million per year,' an ODNI press release announcing the shift says.
The move is directly in line with Trump's efforts to reform the intelligence community and root out the 'deep state,' multiple senior ODNI officials who worked on the sweeping review told the Daily Mail.
And Trump has given his blessing, too, the officials stressed, noting that Gabbard herself briefed the president on the staff reduction two weeks ago, alongside National Security Advisor Marco Rubio.
Created shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, ODNI oversees 18 separate intelligence arms of the U.S. government, serving as a hub designed to connect them.
Though the exact number of ODNI employees is classified, when Gabbard took over the agency, it had between 1,850 - 2,000 staff, the sources shared.
ODNI is now expected to have around 1,300 staffers following Wednesday's seismic shake-up.
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Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard announced on Wednesday that the agency she oversees, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, will reduce staff by up to 40 percent in an effort to streamline the spy agency and cut costs
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Certain ODNI employees will be fired while others will be reassigned internally and some detailees - employees on 'loan' from other intelligence agencies - will return to their original employers, like the CIA, FBI or others. Above USAID workers are shown leaving their HQ
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Multiple senior ODNI officials told the Daily Mail that the restructuring of the agency comes at the behest of Trump. Some officials noted how the reforms will target the 'deep state'
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Gabbard's letter said the layoffs would be effective by September 30, 2025 and would save taxpayers over $700 million annually.
The memo, which was reviewed by the Daily Mail, shares the specifics of the layoffs and has details on how the move better aligns the agency with Trump's vision.
'Mahalo,' the internal announcement ends.
In addition to ODNI staffers being let go on Wednesday, the agency has also been working to slim its workforce by not hiring vacant positions, a senior ODNI official shared.
The agency is also returning detailees - workers from other intelligence agencies on 'loan' to the ODNI - back to their original agencies.
Five senior ODNI officials briefed the Daily Mail and other outlets on the dramatic action just before it was sent out to employees.
They stressed that the reforms will help the intelligence community become more agile and reactive to emerging threats after the ODNI has remained 'relatively untouched for 20 years.'
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A number of employees left the ODNI over Trump's DEI executive order earlier this year, while others have accepted the administration's 'deferred resignation' deals, multiple senior ODNI officials shared
'We couldn't move quickly enough,' one of the ODNI officials said. 'We have to move faster ... and pivot to an elite workforce.'
'DEI was a detriment to national security issues,' another senior ODNI official told the Daily Mail. 'Every position should add value.'
The slashings aim to set a framework for a larger intelligence community overhaul, the officials said, teasing that the ODNI's reforms may soon become standard across other federal intel agencies, like the CIA, FBI and others.
Several of the senior ODNI officials stated the 2.0 project will more easily enable the spy agency to sunset outdated projects and focus on priorities.
Artificial Intelligence and how foreign actors can deploy the technology, for example, is an area of interest for the agency, one senior ODNI official shared. Fighting insurgents abroad, like ISIS, is now less of a focus, they added.
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Sen. Tom Cotton looks on as Tulsi Gabbard, U.S. President Donald Trump's nominee to be Director of National Intelligence, testifies during her confirmation hearing before the Senate
Other disciplines, like the ODNI's Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), are being shut down altogether, and their employees are either being laid off or sent to other parts of the intelligence apparatus.
The shake-up also means the National Intelligence University (NIU) will merge with the National Defense University (NDU) into a joint program now overseen by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth instead of the ODNI.
A satellite campus for the ODNI in Reston, Virginia - where the National Intelligence Council (NIC) meets - will also be shuttered and all NIC employees will now report to ODNI.
Sen. Tom Cotton, the chair of the Senate's intelligence committee, recently put forward a proposal that would limit the number of ODNI staff to 650, about half of the active workforce following Wednesday's announcement.
Even some ODNI officials pushed back against Cotton's more drastic cuts, arguing that his number appears to be too small to effectively operate the spy agency.
'In the national security space we're not looking to slash and burn,' a senior ODNI official told the Daily Mail.
9. Why Does Xi Keep Purging Loyalists? Look to Stalin and Mao for the Answer.
The authoritarian leadership model?
Other than the closest sycophants and those with a survival instinct, what authoritarian leader really demonstrates real leadership that really garners true loyalty?
Why Does Xi Keep Purging Loyalists? Look to Stalin and Mao for the Answer.
China’s “bedside eavesdroppers,” the online posse parsing rumors for power shifts, have a lot to work with as Xi Jinping pushes aside his own political appointees.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/20/business/xi-jinping-china.html
Listen to this article · 8:30 min Learn more
Credit...Saveas
By Li Yuan
Aug. 20, 2025,
12:00 a.m. ET
No matter what Americans think of their politics, the United States still operates in the open. When the most powerful politician and the richest businessman fell out, the public got the full spectacle: barbed posts on social media and sniping in speeches.
China is the opposite. The country still doesn’t know why former President Hu Jintao was abruptly escorted out of the 2022 Communist Party congress, or what really happened when former Premier Li Keqiang died at 68 in 2023. And decades later, the full story of Lin Biao, Mao Zedong’s chosen successor, who fled China and died in a plane crash in 1971, is still unknown.
The secrecy has spawned a niche industry of “bedside eavesdroppers” — Chinese online commentators who parse rumors and fleeting clues for signs of political shifts. Their YouTube videos dissect the gait, complexion or media appearances of China’s leader, Xi Jinping, and can draw millions of views from outside the country’s internet firewall.
The bedside eavesdroppers have had a busy summer. Mr. Xi has purged a number of military and political leaders this year, all of whom he had appointed. The eavesdroppers have contrived a timeline of Mr. Xi’s exit, a combative meeting between Mr. Xi’s bloc and that of the party elders and even the military’s secret plan to topple his rule. The chatter was joined by American voices: a former U.S. national security adviser, a former diplomat and Washington think tanks that suggested there was a fracture in his power structure. Political risk consultancies and investment funds rushed to brief clients: Why is Mr. Xi doing this? Does it signal strength or weakness?
Image
Former President Hu Jintao, standing behind President Xi Jinping, was escorted from the Chinese Communist Party’s congress in 2022.Credit...Noel Celis/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Chinese politics remains a black box, and few credible observers are willing to be seen as indulging in rumor. Yet the questions themselves are legitimate. And they have deep historical echoes.
Mr. Xi’s purges follow in the tradition of Joseph Stalin and Mao, and they serve as tools to discipline the elite and cement the absolute authority of one man. The campaign by Mr. Xi, who rose to the top over 12 years ago, underscores the difficulty of managing a vast system, even for a leader with seemingly unchallenged power. The feverish rumor mill may be a symptom of growing tension between Mr. Xi and the Communist Party elite.
In the 1930s, Stalin’s Great Purge eliminated 70 percent of the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee and more than half of the 1,966 delegates to its 1934 congress. Vast swaths of the Soviet military leadership were executed.
“This is one of the most amazing things of Communism — that it kills its own loyalists,” said Stephen Kotkin, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of two volumes of a planned three-book Stalin biography. “People who don’t waver in their loyalty are nonetheless targeted by the regime in its paranoia and its paroxysms.”
Editors’ Picks
Nearly a century later, Mr. Xi’s campaign is neither bloody nor as sweeping, but it’s the most far-reaching since the Cultural Revolution, when Mao sidelined or destroyed most of his top lieutenants, including Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Xi’s own father, Xi Zhongxun.
In 2024, the Communist Party disciplined 889,000 members, including 73 at or above the provincial or ministerial level, according to official statistics. Since late 2022, about 10 percent of the party’s Central Committee, its top decision-making body, has been purged, sidelined or conspicuously absent from key meetings, the Stanford political scientist Wu Guoguang estimates.
Image
Mao Zedong, right, with Deng Xiaoping around 1975.Credit...Keystone/Getty Images
The military has been hit the hardest. At least 45 officials in the People’s Liberation Army and China’s military-industrial complex have been removed since 2023, according to the Jamestown Foundation. Two defense ministers were charged, on the same day in 2024, with corruption and with deeds that amounted to a betrayal of Mr. Xi.
All of this came after Mr. Xi secured a third term in 2022 and filled the leadership ranks with his allies. Why can’t he stop?
Paranoia is a main driver. In authoritarian regimes, control over military and security forces is existential, said Mr. Kotkin at Hoover, but even loyalists develop their own interests and networks, posing risks for the leader. Mr. Xi, like other strongmen, faces the immense challenge of controlling a vast system that far exceeds the reach of his personal network, Mr. Kotkin said. Mr. Xi has had to reshuffle and purge and pit officials against one another and manipulate rivalries.
“My point is not that Xi Jinping is in trouble,” Mr. Kotkin said. Rather, it’s about the difficulties anyone would have managing such a big system.
Mr. Wu of Stanford sees a recurring cycle in Stalin, Mao and now Mr. Xi: Political purges follow governance failures and further centralize power. Stalin’s Great Purge followed a horrifying famine that his policies helped cause. Mao’s Cultural Revolution came after China’s own Great Famine, which was a result of his disastrous decisions. Mr. Xi’s current campaign follows the “zero Covid” debacles, regressive economic measures and contentious foreign policy moves.
“There is a spiraling, mutually reinforcing relationship between highly centralized power and governance disasters,” Mr. Wu said. “The key link between governance failures and a dictator’s further consolidation of power is the purge.”
In other words, the worse the governance, the greater the purge; and the greater the purge, the tighter the grip. Mr. Wu calls that cycle the “Stalin logic.”
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Mr. Xi reviewing Chinese troops in December. Credit...Li Gang/Xinhua News Agency, via Associated Press
One distinction between Stalin’s rule and Mr. Xi’s is that the vast majority of Russians under Stalin, out of both fear and conviction, believed that he was protecting his country and upholding communism. The same can be said about Mao, but probably not Mr. Xi.
No one is predicting the demise of Mr. Xi’s rule. But the speculation about his grip on power may be a sign of deepening tensions between him and the Communist Party elite.
The elites tolerated Mr. Xi as he consolidated power through anticorruption campaigns, revised the Constitution to eliminate term limits and cracked down on the private sector, said Cai Xia, a retired professor at the Central Party School who has become a party critic. They stayed silent because he didn’t touch their privileges, she said.
But now his purges and China’s economic problems are hitting closer to home. “If this continues, it could lead the party elites to believe that it won’t be Xi who falls, but the party itself,” Ms. Cai said.
Mr. Xi could rule for another decade or two, if his health permits, but only if he maintains the loyalty of the party’s leaders. “One of the great vulnerabilities of the regime is when the elite begins to have doubts,” Mr. Kotkin said.
The Central Intelligence Agency sees potential cracks it is trying to exploit. In May, it released two Mandarin recruitment videos aimed at Chinese officials.
“As I climbed the ranks within the party, I watched my higher-ups fall suddenly into disgrace,” one fictional party official narrates. “Now I realized my destiny is just as precarious as theirs.”
English Virsion here pic.twitter.com/07QsmUxC17
— Li (@Li_DAOmeme) May 2, 2025
Recruitment is not really the point. The U.S. government is trying to convey a message that it believes there is disaffection in elite ranks.
It’s not clear how effective Mr. Xi’s purges will be, though there is no end in sight.
“Xi Jinping’s new model of totalitarianism clashes with the crony-capitalist model favored by C.C.P. elites under his two predecessors, Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao,” Mr. Wu of Stanford said.
He added, “This is not a conflict that Xi can resolve simply by replacing 1,000, 2,000 or even 10,000 cadres.”
More by Li Yuan
Persecuted by Mao, Xi’s Father Became a Reformer. Did Xi Reject His Legacy?
June 3, 2025
China Is a Nation of Savers. Many Are Drowning in Debt.
Aug. 6, 2025
‘Who Killed Love?’ A Video Game Plays to Male Resentment in China.
July 17, 2025
Li Yuan writes The New New World column, which focuses on China’s growing influence on the world by examining its businesses, politics and society.
10. Power and Peril in Reagan’s Last Cold War Chapter
Some fascinating history. Despite the somewhat negative conclusion, I think there is still much to learn (I certainly did not know everything that was even in this article much less what is in the three books)
Excerpts:
Three terrific books can help to provide insight into the geopolitical and historical context swirling around the Reagan White House. Will Inboden’s The Peacemaker Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink and Max Boot’s Reagan: His Life and Legend offer competing interpretations about Reagan. The former focuses nearly entirely on his eight years as president, while the latter is a full-scale biography. In his masterful Gorbachev: His Life and Times, William Taubman downplays the role of the U.S. military buildup in shaping Gorbachev’s actions. I recommend each of these books.
The Foreign Relations of the United States series can help you develop your own argument about Ronald Reagan, nuclear weapons, and the last few years of the Cold War. Try employing a combination of keyword and chronological searches that cut across volumes. For instance, here are all the released documents from one month before the start of the Reykjavik Summit of Oct. 11–12, 1986 — where Reagan and Gorbachev came close to a blockbuster nuclear agreement — to one month after it ended. You can also use the ChatGPT 5 model as a virtual research assistant to serve up these primary documents alongside news reports from this period. How do the declassified White House records compare with what the White House press corps was reporting? This is just one of a multitude of entry points to start your research.
Conclusion:
In the totality of these and other sources, it is possible that National Security Policy, 1985–1988 Part 1 tells you nothing more than what you already knew or could figure out elsewhere. At the very least, it is a convenience. All Foreign Relations of the United States volumes are free and accessible to anyone, anywhere — and in three E-Reader formats. Read them on the beach and come up with your own interpretation of history. Figuring that out is the hardest-yet-most-enjoyable part.
According to paragraph 82, NATO allies — especially nuclear-armed Britain and France — “will continue to oppose the elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles on the grounds that it will undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and weaken the perceived U.S. commitment to Western Europe’s defense.” Paragraph 107 — “Nth Countries” — concluded that it was unlikely that states such as Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea would restrain their nuclear ambitions. To conclude this exhaustive depiction, the Central Intelligence Agency included a chart of what Soviet forces could look like in December 1996 and how menacing that could still be.
Power and Peril in Reagan’s Last Cold War Chapter - War on the Rocks
James Graham Wilson
August 20, 2025
warontherocks.com · August 20, 2025
On Aug. 1, 2025, the Office of the Historian published National Security Policy, 1985–1988 Part 1, which focused on President Ronald Reagan’s pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative and Strategic Modernization Program.
What can we learn from this newly released volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States series? The biggest takeaway is that questions about war and peace in the nuclear age remain so important. Many of the people debating nuclear policy today were born after Reagan was president. Others who grew up when he was president may not have an accurate sense of what he wanted to achieve. Moreover, the challenges facing policymakers today about strategic stability echo similar conversations from the past. Especially in the context of President Donald Trump’s commitment to build a “Golden Dome” and modernize U.S. strategic forces, grappling with the history of the Reagan era can help policymakers produce outcomes that keep America safe. As Mark Twain is rumored to have said: “History does not repeat, but it does rhyme.”
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of key foreign policy decisions and important diplomatic activity of the U.S. government. I started compiling this latest volume as a historian in the Department of State’s Office of the Historian almost exactly 14 years ago. One evening in 2015 — on my way home from the office having spent the day working on it — I accosted former National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane in the produce section of the Foggy Bottom Whole Foods. And I peppered him with questions about fixed land-based intercontinental missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles: “Could they ever be stabilizing?” I asked. “Perhaps not,” he responded — yet I would need to take this up with the U.S. Air Force.
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The Foreign Relations of the United States Series and You
It is not my job to tell the U.S. Air Force (or Space Force) what to do. Nor is it my job to tell you what you should learn. According to 22 U.S. Code § 4351, the purpose of the Foreign Relations of the United States series is to provide “a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity.” If my colleagues and I are doing our jobs, then we are empowering you to come up with your own explanation of how the Reagan administration pursued the Strategic Defense Initiative and modernization of strategic forces to advance overall U.S. objectives in the second half of the 1980s. Keep in mind that this is the 12th Reagan volume to be released out of 52 total volumes so there are a lot more on the way.
Three terrific books can help to provide insight into the geopolitical and historical context swirling around the Reagan White House. Will Inboden’s The Peacemaker Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink and Max Boot’s Reagan: His Life and Legend offer competing interpretations about Reagan. The former focuses nearly entirely on his eight years as president, while the latter is a full-scale biography. In his masterful Gorbachev: His Life and Times, William Taubman downplays the role of the U.S. military buildup in shaping Gorbachev’s actions. I recommend each of these books.
The Foreign Relations of the United States series can help you develop your own argument about Ronald Reagan, nuclear weapons, and the last few years of the Cold War. Try employing a combination of keyword and chronological searches that cut across volumes. For instance, here are all the released documents from one month before the start of the Reykjavik Summit of Oct. 11–12, 1986 — where Reagan and Gorbachev came close to a blockbuster nuclear agreement — to one month after it ended. You can also use the ChatGPT 5 model as a virtual research assistant to serve up these primary documents alongside news reports from this period. How do the declassified White House records compare with what the White House press corps was reporting? This is just one of a multitude of entry points to start your research.
Depending on how deep you want to dive, you can also go to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Evaluate and interrogate primary U.S. documents and compare them to the Soviet documents that Tom Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya include in The Last Superpower Summits: Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War. Consider as well Susan Colbourn’s Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO and Sergey Radchenko’s To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power. To what extent were Reagan’s ideas about nuclear weapons as important as alliance dynamics or the long arc of Soviet leaders’ ambitions throughout the Cold War? My point here is that you can use the Foreign Relations of the United States series to engage in a serious debate with leading scholars on more equal footing.
My Own Take on National Security Policy, 1985–1988 Part 1
National Security Policy, 1985–1988 Part 1 confirms Ronald Reagan’s deep loathing of nuclear weapons and his commitment to abolishing them. He expressed this publicly, for instance, in his address to the Japanese Diet on Nov. 3, 1983, when he stated: “I know I speak for people everywhere when I say our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.” When I first read Paul Lettow’s 2006 Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, I was skeptical. Yet the more I have dug into the records over the past 20 years, the more I am convinced. President Reagan’s “goal is the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” according to declassified minutes of a National Security Planning Group meeting on Dec. 17, 1984.
Still, turning Reagan’s vision into reality required a clear plan of action. And as I contend elsewhere, around the time of that meeting — shortly after the president’s reelection in November 1984 — Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State Paul Nitze put forward a “strategic concept” to move in three phases from strategic offenses to strategic defenses. Nitze was dubious about the Strategic Defense Initiative and (at least by the mid-1980s) the prospect of nuclear abolition. Yet, he was proud of his own role in crafting the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; he wanted to sustain it and wanted to achieve a durable strategic offensive arms reduction agreement.
Ultimately, both Reagan’s ambition and Nitze’s bureaucratic savvy — on top of Gorbachev’s aspirations to reduce or even eliminate nuclear weapons — proved to be essential toward negotiating the December 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and that same month a basic formula for what became the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. That is my interpretation of how we got from December 1984 to December 1987.
What’s New in National Security Policy, 1985–1988 Part 1
This volume reveals how the Department of Defense and intelligence community reacted to Reagan’s proposals in the aftermath of the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit. On Nov. 3, the president signed National Security Decision Directive 250, “Post-Reykjavik Follow-Up,” in which he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence Agency to consider the opportunities and costs associated with eliminating all fast-flying intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles — within a decade.
National Security Decision Directive 250 was previously declassified in part — the Foreign Relations of the United States version is released in full. Newly declassified and available as well are documents showing how the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence Agency carried out President Reagan’s tasking — they were skeptical. In their quarterly meeting with President Reagan on Dec. 19, 1986, Chairman William Crowe and the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff took turns accentuating the negatives.
Chief of Naval Operations Carlisle Trost “noted that much of the Soviet [nuclear attack submarine] force is devoted to protecting bastions for SSBNs [Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear]. Thus, a zero ballistic missile regime would free-up Soviet [nuclear attack submarines] for other missions.” Army Chief of Staff John A. Wickham “noted that the current modernization program for ground forces is only about 30 percent complete and that, to be completed with the ten-year transition period, it would have to be accelerated at an estimated cost of $180 billion.” Commandant of the Marine Corps Paul X. Kelley “noted that up to now, extended deterrence of the ‘nuclear umbrella’ has ‘really depended on ballistic missiles.’ Any premature shift away from ballistic missiles would stress both conventional capabilities and regional balances.” And Gen. Kelley “was not sure we could really implement the necessary force improvements outlined by the other Chiefs.”
Considering this pushback, Reagan insisted he was serious. “[A]t the end of Reykjavik we were talking ballistics, and they [the Soviets] brought up the idea of all nuclear weapons,” the president observed. This was consistent with his long-held aspirations; he also wanted to call the Soviets’ bluff. According to the notes of this meeting, Reagan said: “We needed to go through with this so that the Soviets can see we are serious” and that “[t]hey have a choice — join us in arms reduction or lose an arms race.” At that point in the meeting, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger proclaimed consensus on what to seek within 5 years: a 50 percent reduction. When it came to the period after that, he noted “that while we have the resources to move towards conventional emphasis, we don’t have the will (i.e., ‘We don’t have the votes’).” Democrats had flipped the Senate a few weeks earlier and were set to control all the key committees come January 1987 and complicate Weinberger’s life. He observed: “[So] while the Soviets don’t have the overall resources, they can make up for this through their determination to make further sacrifices.”
On Jan. 15, 1987, Acting Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates sent his agency’s response to National Security Decision Directive 250 to Reagan’s newly appointed National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci: “The paper covers a lot of important issues,” Gates wrote. “I want to emphasize that, although I think it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would go along with a move to eliminate ballistic missiles while retaining bombers and cruise missiles, they, in fact, would be in a much better position to take advantage of such a new regime than most people realize.” In other words, Gorbachev could well be laying a trap.
What follows in the Central Intelligence Agency paper are an overview and 109 paragraphs on topics that remain relevant in 2025. “A zero-zero ballistic missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would be cause for concern in Beijing — despite its longstanding call for the abolition of nuclear weapons,” according to the overview. China would come under great pressure to accede to such a treaty. “At the same time,” the paper went on to say, “compliance with an agreement [. . .] would nullify China’s deterrent, which relies exclusively on ballistic missiles that can threaten the Soviet Union.”
According to paragraph 82, NATO allies — especially nuclear-armed Britain and France — “will continue to oppose the elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles on the grounds that it will undermine the concept of nuclear deterrence and weaken the perceived U.S. commitment to Western Europe’s defense.” Paragraph 107 — “Nth Countries” — concluded that it was unlikely that states such as Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea would restrain their nuclear ambitions. To conclude this exhaustive depiction, the Central Intelligence Agency included a chart of what Soviet forces could look like in December 1996 and how menacing that could still be.
When it comes to National Security Decision Directive 250, Gates’ memo was not quite the end of the road. But you get a sense of the reluctance of the Central Intelligence Agency on top of that of the Joint Chiefs. On April 7, 1987, National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci submitted to Reagan a final report on the military aspects of a world with zero ballistic missiles: “[The Joint Chiefs] conclude that a transition to a zero ballistic missile world by 1996 is possible either with no increase in risk or with no increase in cost, but not both. They provide two plans, one maintaining risk constant, and one involving no increase in cost.” Carlucci spared the president the 100 pages of the Joint Chiefs’ report. He recommended to Reagan that “[p]ending some Soviet movement in that direction, we take no further action on analyzing the Reykjavik formula for a transition to a world without offensive ballistic missiles.”
Of course, none of this took place in a political vacuum. Details about the Iran-Contra affair emerged in November 1986 and hobbled the Reagan administration for months. Congressional hearings began on May 5, 1987 and lasted until Aug. 6, 1987, after which Reagan publicly apologized. These were the lowest months of Reagan’s presidency. Did Iran-Contra impede Reagan’s ability to counter Central Intelligence Agency and Joint Chiefs of Staff skepticism about National Security Decision Directive 250? That I do not know; it is something to ponder.
Reagan rebounded, signing the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987, and he fought hard to conclude the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty before the end of his presidency. “[T]he bottom line is you’ve got to go for the gold,” as he put it to his national security team on Feb. 9, 1988.
Behind the Curtain
In sum, I learned from National Security Policy, 1985–1988 Part 1 that, after the Reykjavik Summit, Reagan instructed his national security team to embark on an exercise that reconsidered a fundamental tenet of U.S. grand strategy from the late 1950s forward — that ocean spanning ballistic missiles would underwrite the protection of the American homeland — and his national security team, which was in flux because of Iran-Contra (as well as the incapacitation of Director of Central Intelligence William Casey), took this charge seriously and concluded that to do so would be too expensive. Especially in the context of the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Balanced Budget Act, which Reagan signed into law in December 1985 and which pegged future spending to deficit projections, the cost of achieving zero ballistic missiles was insurmountable.
In the totality of these and other sources, it is possible that National Security Policy, 1985–1988 Part 1 tells you nothing more than what you already knew or could figure out elsewhere. At the very least, it is a convenience. All Foreign Relations of the United States volumes are free and accessible to anyone, anywhere — and in three E-Reader formats. Read them on the beach and come up with your own interpretation of history. Figuring that out is the hardest-yet-most-enjoyable part.
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James Graham Wilson works on Soviet and National Security Policy volumes for the Foreign Relations of the United States series in the Office of the Historian at the Department of State. He is the author of America’s Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024) and The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government or the U.S. Department of State.
Image: National Archives via Wikimedia Commons
warontherocks.com · August 20, 2025
11. Citizenship reviews now ask immigrants to show "positive contributions" to U.S.
Have we lost our way? I recommend watching this video from President Raegan's last speech as president. I subscribe to his values.
Open doors for the American dream. Reagan’s last speech as president (1989).
https://www.niussp.org/video/open-doors-for-the-american-dream-reagans-last-speech-as-president-1989/
Updated Aug 19, 2025 -Politics & Policy
Citizenship reviews now ask immigrants to show "positive contributions" to U.S.
https://www.axios.com/2025/08/19/trump-immigration-citizenship-good-moral-character
- Avery Lotz
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An attendee holds the U.S. flag and the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner during a naturalization ceremony in Mount Vernon, Virginia on July 4. Photo: Kent Nishimura/Bloomberg via Getty Images
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officers under the Trump administration must consider the "positive attributes" of immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship — rather than just the absence of misconduct — according to a recent policy memo.
The big picture: The Friday USCIS memo calls for a more "holistic" approach to assessing the "good moral character" of an immigrant seeking naturalization under an administration that has cracked down on immigration and pathways to citizenship in unprecedented ways.
Driving the news: Good moral character is not a new requirement for naturalization. But under the USCIS memo, officers are instructed to put "greater emphasis" on an applicants' "positive attributes and contributions."
- Those can include factors like community involvement, family caregiving and educational attainment.
- "Going forward, USCIS officers must account for an alien's positive attributes and not simply the absence of misconduct," the memo states.
Zoom out: The memo also calls for heightened scrutiny of disqualifying behaviors.
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Those include permanent bars to good moral character — like murder, aggravated felonies and genocide — and other offenses, like gambling and drug-related violations.
- But the memo also stipulates that other disqualifying actions could include behavior that is technically lawful but is "inconsistent with civic responsibility within the community," like habitual traffic infractions or solicitation.
- The policy also instructs officers to consider factors that show an applicant could have demonstrated "genuine rehabilitation," through actions like rectifying overdue child support or past-due taxes.
The latest: USCIS on Tuesday announced it would also update guidance regarding factors officers should consider when handling immigration benefit requests — like adjusting their status — including "any involvement in anti-American or terrorist organizations."
- It also said it had expanded the types of requests that will receive social media vetting which will include searches for "anti-American activity."
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A Tuesday memo states that USCIS considers the endorsement, support or promotion of "the views of an anti-American or terrorist organization or group" to be "an overwhelmingly negative factor in USCIS discretionary analyses."
- USCIS Spokesman Matthew J. Tragesser said in a statement that the agency is committed to rooting out "anti-Americanism."
Context: The test of "good moral character" has in the past largely been satisfied if applicants don't have any of the disqualifying or criminal offenses detailed in U.S. immigration law, per CBS News.
- But the memo says "[e]valuating GMC involves more than a cursory mechanical review focused on the absence of wrongdoing."
- It continues, "It entails a holistic assessment of an alien's behavior, adherence to societal norms, and positive contributions that affirmatively demonstrate good moral character."
What they're saying: Tragesser said in a statement provided to Axios that the agency is restoring "integrity" in the immigration system.
- "Today, USCIS is adding a new element to the naturalization process that ensures America's newest citizens not only embrace America's culture, history, and language but who also demonstrate Good Moral Character," he said.
Catch up quick: The Trump administration has launched a sweeping spectacle cracking down on illegal immigration, but it's also significantly curtailed avenues to being in the country legally by terminating past legal protections and targeting refugee admissions.
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That effort has also included heightened scrutiny of legal immigrants and those who want to study in the U.S.
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Under an April policy, USCIS officials screen immigrants' social media accounts for "antisemitic activity," which includes content that indicates an applicant "endorsing, espousing, promoting, or supporting antisemitic terrorism, antisemitic terrorist organizations, or other antisemitic activity."
Go deeper: ICE arrests decline amid backlash to June immigration raids
Editor's note: This story has been updated with the latest announcement from USCIS.
12. “Sabotaging” S-400 & Su-35 Deals, Russia Accuses The U.S. Of Hurting Its Arms Exports To India & Beyond
Perhaps we are practicing political warfare effectively here.
“Sabotaging” S-400 & Su-35 Deals, Russia Accuses The U.S. Of Hurting Its Arms Exports To India & Beyond
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/from-s-400-to-su-35-fighter-deal-russia/
By Sakshi Tiwari -
August 20, 2025
The Main Intelligence Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RuMoD) has claimed that the United States is actively working to scuttle Russian arms exports to countries in the Asia-Pacific, a theatre where Washington is expanding its own influence to counter China’s rise.
Speaking at the Moscow Conference on International Security, Igor Kostyukov, the chief of the Main Intelligence Department of the Russian Defense Ministry, claimed that the US is blackmailing Asia-Pacific nations to prevent them from fulfilling their arms deals with Russia, as reported by the Russian Interfax news agency.
“By blackmailing countries of the Asia Pacific region with the threat of sanctions, Washington is obstructing the implementation of Russian contracts for delivering S-400 air defense missile systems to India, Sukhoi Su-35 fighter aircraft and Mil Mi-17 helicopters to Indonesia, and Mi-171 helicopters to the Philippines.
It is also seeking to disrupt planned military-technical cooperation between Russia and Vietnam,” Kostyukov said.
Kostyukov singled out the issue of S-400 delivery to India, without elaborating much. The intelligence chief did not say if New Delhi had been called upon by Washington to shelve the acquisition of the Russian air defense system.
However, the allegations correspond with Donald Trump taking a hostile approach towards India for buying Russian energy and arms, and fuelling the Russian war against Ukraine. Trump, who was until recently calling India a friend, went so far as to call India a “dead economy” and imposed an additional 25% tariff as a punitive measure.
The US had earlier exempted India from sanctions under the CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) over its acquisition of S-400 in 2018. However, a lot has changed since then, and Trump has expressed his frustration with the unending Ukraine War on multiple occasions in recent months.
The Indian military is highly impressed by the S-400, called ‘Sudarshan Chakra’ within the country, and has repeatedly urged Russia to expedite the delivery amid mounting security threats at its northern and western borders. The delivery of the two remaining squadrons is to be completed by 2027, as recently assured by the Russian side.
A rocket launches from an S-400 missile system (Photo by Dimitar DILKOFF / AFP)So far, India has not hinted whether it faces any pressure from the US to abandon the acquisition of the S-400 air defense system, which played a crucial role in the latest Indo-Pakistan conflict.
On the contrary, reports in the Indian media claim that the country may have paused key military deals with the US, including for additional P-8I Poseidon aircraft, Stryker Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs), and Javelin anti-tank missiles, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times.
Russia is the largest defense supplier to India, despite a general fall in arms exports. It has been pushing the joint production of Su-57 stealth fighters in India.
New Delhi has not accepted the offer so far, perhaps due to concerns regarding the aircraft’s subpar stealth and other features, as noted by the country’s defense community. However, the Indian leadership is also well aware that the decision to acquire or locally produce the Su-57 can backfire and further upset ties with the US.
For Russia, an attempt by Washington to impede exports could come as a massive setback, because its arms exports have already registered a steep fall of about 53% between the periods of 2014–2018 and 2019–2023, as per the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Moreover, there has been a staggering 92% drop from $14.6 billion in exports in 2021 to under $1 billion in 2024, mostly driven by sanctions on the Russian military-industrial complex, production-related issues due to the Ukraine war, and hesitancy in buying Russian arms amid fear of US sanctions.
Given that exports are already at historic lows, ongoing US efforts could compound broader strains on Russia’s economy and military, making the situation increasingly unsustainable.
US Arm-Twisting Countries To Abandon Russian Arms?
By sanctioning NATO member Turkey in 2019 and expelling it from the F-35 program for buying the Russian S-400, Donald Trump set a precedent before the world. The message was clear: face American wrath and sanctions on purchasing Russian equipment.
Several countries that historically bought arms from Russia have since canceled deals with Moscow for fear of being sanctioned by the US, and have been diversifying arms purchases.
According to the Russian Intelligence chief, the United States is currently impeding the implementation of Russian contracts for delivering Sukhoi Su-35 fighter aircraft and Mil Mi-17 helicopters to Indonesia.
The Su-35 deal, initially announced in 2018, entailed Indonesia purchasing 11 Su-35s from Russia for $1.14 billion, with Moscow obligated to accept 50% of the contract value in local commodities, alongside a 35% offset requirement.
However, the deal ultimately failed to materialize due to budgetary constraints exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and apprehensions surrounding potential US sanctions. The enactment of CAATSA had also played a role and intensified Jakarta’s concerns.
Notably, while major arms imports from Russia stalled after Putin seized Crimea in 2014 and launched a full-scale military offensive on Ukraine in 2022, Indonesia has not eliminated discussions on the possible acquisition of Russian Su-35.
In January 2025, Russian Ambassador to Indonesia Sergei Tolchenov stated that the Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet deal with Jakarta remained “on the table.” Russia has also apparently offered joint production of Mi-17 helicopters to Indonesia, which also remains under consideration.
In June this year, the Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto skipped the G7 summit in Canada and instead visited Russia and met President Vladimir Putin. Subianto met Russian counterpart Putin and hailed growing ties with Moscow—a move that may have rattled the United States, as previously highlighted by the EurAsian Times.
The US has offered an F-15EX to Jakarta, and a purchase of Su-35 by Russia may come at the F-15EX’s expense.
Russian Su-35 carrying upgraded R-77M AAM. Credits platform X.This is not the first time that the US has influenced a country’s decision to buy Russian Su-35, a combat-proven air superiority platform. Earlier, Egypt was coerced into abandoning its purchase of 24 Su-35s due to fear of sanctions from the US, which happens to be its biggest benefactor.
The Philippines, on the other hand, had signed a deal for 16 Mi-171 helicopters in 2021 under former President Rodrigo Duterte. However, the deal was canceled in 2022 due to concerns over potential US sanctions related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the impending fear of being slapped with CAATSA.
The Philippines has since focused attention on the American-origin Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters as an alternative to meet its needs amid a rapidly increasing Chinese threat.
Similarly, Vietnam, being a socialist state, traditionally purchased military equipment from the former Soviet Union, which later paved the way for the purchase of Russian arms.
The Vietnamese Air Force is currently composed of vintage Sukhoi Su-22s, MiG-21, Su-27, and more sophisticated Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets. It also acquired the Yak-130 jet trainers in 2019. However, after the US issued CAATSA threats, Vietnam deferred negotiations for additional systems around that time.
Earlier this year, Hanoi and Moscow vowed to enhance defence and security cooperation and committed to deeper ties in military-technical collaboration and efforts to address non-traditional security challenges such as cyber threats and high-tech crime. This cooperation is allegedly being disrupted by the US.
Vietnam has recently switched to exploring diversification of its arms purchases, amid a rapidly evolving geopolitical situation. There is speculation that Vietnam is seriously considering the purchase of about two dozen F-16 fighters from the United States.
If Vietnam goes ahead with the F-16 deal, it could lay the path for the US to tighten its grip on the Indo-Pacific and become its defining partner. It would also mean the end of Russia’s decades-old defense relationship with Hanoi.
Earlier, a 2021 RAND report analyzed 65 cases of Russian arms export negotiations across 33 countries from July 2017 to May 2021. It found that US diplomatic engagement and the threat of CAATSA sanctions created a “chilling effect,” leading several countries to reconsider or cancel deals.
For the US, countries abandoning Russian arms might serve a dual purpose: dealing a blow to the Russian economy and influence globally, and bolstering its own arms sales as it swoops in with American alternatives.
On its part, Russia has been pushing its arms for exports in African and Latin American markets in recent times. However, the United States could easily turn the tide in its favor by threatening sanctions and imposing heavy tariffs.
13. U.S. Allies Still Waiting for Tariff Relief on Autos and Steel
Devil - Details.
U.S. Allies Still Waiting for Tariff Relief on Autos and Steel
Hastily drafted trade accords leave questions about who promised what
https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/u-s-allies-still-waiting-for-tariff-relief-on-autos-and-steel-d44cea38
By Jason Douglas
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Aug. 19, 2025 11:00 pm ET
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Toyota estimates tariffs will cost it billions in lost operating profit. Photo: Toru Hanai/Bloomberg
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Allies in Asia and Europe are still waiting for the U.S. to lower tariffs on key exports, despite investment pledges.View more
TOKYO—In return for billions of dollars of investment pledges and promises to buy more American goods, U.S. allies in Asia and Europe say President Trump agreed to lower tariffs on key exports such as cars and steel.
Weeks later, they are still waiting.
Earlier this year, Trump threatened many of the U.S.’s trading partners with lofty import duties. Then, in a rapid series of deals culminating this month, he lowered them in pacts that, in some cases, included pledges by those countries to invest in the U.S.
The administration, however, has so far left in place a series of tariffs levied for national-security reasons on sensitive products such as cars, steel and aluminum.
The delays in addressing those tariffs—as well as discrepancies over investment and other issues—have created uncertainty for businesses and policymakers over future U.S. trade policy.
Japan and South Korea said agreements they struck with the U.S. included reducing to 15% a 25% tariff on imported automobiles—but for now that levy is still being collected, adding to mounting losses at some of the world’s biggest carmakers. Toyota Motor estimates tariffs will cost it around $9.5 billion in lost operating profit in the fiscal year ending in March, an estimate that had assumed tariffs on U.S. car imports would be reduced this month.
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WSJ’s Alex Frangos explains how countries are affected by tariffs. Photo: Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images
Even the U.K., which was the first country to agree to a new trade pact with Trump back in May, is still waiting for a reduction in steep tariffs on steel. The two sides are thrashing out final terms on exactly which U.K. steel exports will qualify.
A U.S. administration official said the U.S. agreed to discuss and possibly adjust these so-called Section 232 tariffs but said the administration didn’t make a firm commitment to change them as part of these initial agreements.
Such teething problems illustrate the challenge of putting Trump’s rapid-fire trade pacts into practice.
Traditional trade agreements run to hundreds of pages and seek to define clear rules for cross-border commerce to encourage companies to take the risky step of engaging in international trade. Trade lawyers painstakingly haggle over tariffs and regulatory barriers to broaden market access.
In his second term, Trump prefers bold pledges and handshake agreements to detailed legal texts with binding commitments. His trade policy is less about expanding international trade than it is about narrowing chronic U.S. trade deficits and recouping what he believes are billions of dollars lost to foreign countries under the existing global system.
Trading partners, too, have shied away from formal agreements that would impose specific legal obligations on their side. That partly reflects a desire to avoid bureaucratic entanglements and move swiftly, according to analysts and government officials, as well as a wariness of Trump’s commitment to agreements he does make. Trump in his first term signed new trade accords with Japan, South Korea, Canada and Mexico, among others, all of which he has effectively repudiated by unilaterally raising tariffs.
President Trump in his second term prefers bold pledges and handshake agreements on trade. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
Answering critics in Japan’s Parliament who wanted to see a written version of Tokyo’s trade pact with Trump, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba told lawmakers a formal treaty would mean even greater delays in implementation—without a guarantee that Trump would stick with it.
The EU is pushing for a written statement—but has said it won’t be legally binding.
Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said in an interview on CNBC on Tuesday that documents with deal terms for countries including Japan and South Korea are “weeks away,” but that investors shouldn’t expect “250-page trading agreements.”
Unlike the stability and confidence-building brought by traditional trade deals, this new, looser approach to trade policy means delays, disputes and misunderstandings are the new normal for trade relations with the U.S., said Simon Evenett, a professor at IMD Business School in Switzerland who runs Global Trade Alert, which monitors trade policy.
“The upshot is we inject uncertainty rather than remove it,” Evenett said. “It’s the price you have to pay with Washington these days.”
An administration official said the documents being prepared “will more precisely lay out deal terms and put to bed any lingering uncertainty.” The official added that the president reserves the right to adjust tariff rates if he judges the other side has reneged on its commitments.
As well as Japan, South Korea and the European Union, the U.S. has also reached preliminary agreements with smaller but significant trade players such as Vietnam. A deal with China has proved tougher, but Trump this month extended a deadline for higher tariffs on China to come into effect to allow further talks and a possible meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
The typical format for a Trump deal includes a pledge by the U.S. trading partner to invest big sums in the U.S., promises to buy more American exports, and a lower tariff rate in return.
The South Korean trade delegation meeting with members of the media after reaching a deal with the U.S. Photo: Yonhap News/Zuma Press
Almost as soon as some of these pacts were announced, cracks in what exactly they entailed started to show.
Following a deal with Seoul, the White House announced that South Korea would provide “historic market access to American goods like autos and rice.” Yet Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol, one of South Korea’s top trade negotiators, told reporters when he returned home that he didn’t discuss rice with the U.S. team at all.
An administration official said White House announcements have laid out what trading partners have agreed to and “we expect them to abide by these commitments.”
Investment pledges have proved especially controversial, with U.S. allies pushing back on Trump’s insistence that he will have considerable discretion over how those funds are invested.
For instance, a $350 billion investment fund that was the cornerstone of the pact with South Korea, of which $150 billion is earmarked for cooperation in shipbuilding, would be “owned and controlled by the United States, and selected by myself, as president,” Trump said.
Kim Yong-beom, South Korea’s presidential chief of staff for policy, said that the fund “is not a structure where the U.S. unilaterally decides,” and that South Korea will also require the investment projects proposed by the U.S. to be “commercially meaningful.”
Japan’s top tariff negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, flew back to Washington only days after striking Japan’s trade deal. In meetings with Trump officials, he protested that a July 31 White House executive order seemed to “stack” a new levy of 15% on top of any pre-existing tariffs on U.S. imports from Japan. He had told Japanese lawmakers the 15% wouldn’t be piled on top. He ultimately returned with a commitment from U.S. officials, he said, to revise the order.
The U.S. has agreed not to stack the new tariffs for Japan, an administration official said, though the official added that this wasn’t part of the deal Japan had initially negotiated.
The EU is also waiting for relief on auto tariffs and is negotiating improved terms for steel producers.
Asked about the vehicle tariffs recently, an EU spokesman said, “The U.S. has made political commitments to us in this respect and we look forward to them being implemented.”
Write to Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com
14. How Ian Fleming and His Spy Scheme Inspired a Broadway Show
How Ian Fleming and His Spy Scheme Inspired a Broadway Show
The musical “Operation Mincemeat” tells the story of an absurd feat of deception dreamed up by this spy-turned-novelist. His real acts of espionage were even wilder.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/19/theater/ian-fleming-operation-mincemeat-broadway.html
By Thomas Maier
Thomas Maier is the author of “The Invisible Spy: Churchill’s Rockefeller Center Spy Ring and America’s First Secret Agent of World War II.”
- Published Aug. 19, 2025Updated Aug. 20, 2025, 2:44 p.m. ET
The James Bond spy novels dreamed up by Ian Fleming were rooted in his World War II experiences as a British intelligence officer. In one instance, Fleming had an idea that was so wild it’s still hard to believe it actually worked. To misdirect the Nazis, he suggested outfitting a corpse with fake military plans and strategically placing it off the coast of Spain.
Because truth can be stranger than fiction, that scheme is now the subject of the rollicking Broadway musical “Operation Mincemeat.” The show, a hit in England before arriving in New York last spring, gets big laughs from this absurd tale of deception. In a rousing number, “God That’s Brilliant,” the conspiring spies sing rapturously as they plot to kill Hitler. (Fleming paints a picture of a martini-drinking, tuxedo-wearing assassin who “kills the guards, snogs the girl and says something cool.”)
Though the show presents him as a sort of bumbling genius, the Fleming character helps to establish the complex story as a spy caper. He “is so respected and revered and made a huge contribution to British culture,” said one of the show’s creators, Zoë Roberts, who also plays Fleming and other characters. “It seemed like a huge opportunity to have a little bit of fun and poke a little fun at him.”
But the musical provides only a glimpse of Fleming’s life as a spy.
In reality, Fleming was a clever and sophisticated British intelligence officer, who worked on both sides of the Atlantic and gained a wealth of insider knowledge that he later transformed into colorful, action-packed fiction with his Bond novels. “Never say ‘no’ to adventures — always say ‘yes,’” he explained. “Otherwise you’ll lead a very dull life.”
The Operation Mincemeat ruse originated in 1939 — shortly after Britain declared war on Hitler’s Nazi Germany — with a lengthy memo by Fleming’s boss, Adm. John Godfrey, the director of naval intelligence. “It was issued under Godfrey’s name, but it bore all the hallmarks of his personal assistant Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming,” concluded the historian Ben Macintyre, who has written about the wartime caper and Fleming’s fictional character, the suave MI6 agent James Bond, a.k.a. 007, who was portrayed in a string of popular films by a series of actors.
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Zoë Roberts, center, plays Ian Fleming and other characters in “Operation Mincemeat” at the John Golden Theater in Manhattan. She is also one of the show’s creators.Credit...Sara Krulwich/The New York Times
Though the schemes appeared to be implausible, the memo advised, “the more you examine them, the less fantastic they seem.” No. 28 envisioned that “a corpse dressed as an airman, with dispatches in his pockets, could be dropped on the coast, supposedly from a parachute that had failed. I understand there is no difficulty in obtaining corpses at the Naval Hospital, but, of course, it would have to be a fresh one.”
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Fleming’s idea was later put into action by the British naval intelligence officers Charles Cholmondeley and Ewen Montagu. (Both are leading characters in the musical, and properly given credit for their heroics. In 1953, Montagu published a book about it called “The Man Who Never Was.”) According to Macintyre, Fleming was “at least tangentially involved” in launching the plan, though these other spies carried it out.
Found on the corpse were documents identifying him as Capt. (Acting Major) William Martin — he was actually a vagrant named Glyndwr Michael who had died after ingesting rat poison — and paperwork that in time convinced Nazi forces that a 1943 Allied invasion of Italy through Sicily would instead take place at Sardinia. The deception helped make the Allies’ eventual victory in Italy easier and less bloody than expected.
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Sean Connery, the original James Bond, and Shirley Eaton, with Fleming, on the set of “Goldfinger.”Credit...Sunset Boulevard/Corbis via Getty Images
Under Prime Minister Winston Churchill, an advocate of espionage, sabotage and “ungentlemanly warfare,” Fleming was sent to Manhattan to join the spies working to persuade the United States to join the war. For several months before the Americans entered the war, in December 1941, the British Security Coordination (B.S.C.), based on the 36th floor of the International Building at Rockefeller Center, used propaganda, political influence and media manipulation to secretly combat isolationists and the Nazi threat inside America.
Soon, the United States created its first spy agency — the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), a precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency — with the help of Fleming, who impressed officials with his advice about espionage and his willingness to take chances. “The British are many things, but cowards they are not,” Ernest Cuneo, a top O.S.S. official, said after working with Fleming.
GHASTLY BUT INGENIOUS, Fleming’s Mincemeat plan — itself inspired by a detective book on his shelf involving a corpse with forged papers — wasn’t his only creative idea. “Fleming could always laugh when some stratagem misfired — he had plenty more to choose from,” observed John Pearson, whose Fleming biography appeared two years after Fleming’s death, in 1964 at the age of 56.
One of Pearson’s favorite stories was how Fleming and William Stephenson, overseer of Churchill’s spies in Manhattan, broke into the Japanese consul general’s office, located below the B.S.C. headquarters in Rockefeller Center. Stephenson, Fleming and two other spies entered the closed offices at 3 a.m. Fleming acted as a lookout. They picked a safe’s locks and “borrowed” the Japanese code book and other confidential documents. They ran upstairs to their own offices to microfilm the important material.
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Then they returned the papers, leaving them in the same order they were found. “To Stephenson, it was a straightforward operation,” Pearson recounted in Life magazine, “to Fleming a great and gleeful adventure.”
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Ian Fleming in uniform at the AdmiraltyCredit...Sidney Beadell/News International Syndication
Fleming told Godfrey, his former boss, about the successful break-in, hoping the story would reach the appreciative ears of Churchill, whose approval mattered to Fleming on a personal level. Churchill had been friendly with Fleming’s father, Valentine, a fellow Conservative in Parliament, who was killed by German shellfire in World War I when Fleming was only 9.
Years later, Fleming turned this spy scheme in Manhattan into fiction. In his first novel, “Casino Royale,” he introduced the assassin James Bond, who tracks down a Japanese cipher expert who was cracking British coded messages inside Rockefeller Center. Stationed in another building and equipped with a Remington rifle that had telescopic sights and silencer, Bond takes aim and shoots the Japanese agent. “It was a pretty sound job,” Bond summarized. “Nice and clean too.”
After the war, Fleming had felt at a loss, craving the intrigue and intensity of his spy work. “We almost suffered emotional ‘bends’ the day the war ended — tension went out like a power line turned off,” recalled Cuneo, who later ran a small newspaper syndicate with Fleming. “Aside from its horrors, you missed the frightful challenge of war. I think Fleming missed it as much as most; he seemed both grumpy and disconsolate.”
By January 1952, Fleming had turned most of his attention to writing spy novels. He modeled Bond on various real-life figures — notably Stephenson for his bold moves, inventive killing gadgets and coolheaded fearlessness. This fictional secret agent would have a boss called “M” — modeled after his own Royal Navy superior Admiral Godfrey. And Fleming dedicated his “Thunderball” novel to his American spy pal Cuneo.
The author amused himself by slightly changing the names and identities of his spy friends: Cuneo, for example, became Ernie Cureo, a taxi driver and secret C.I.A. informant, in “Diamonds Are Forever.” And the American spy Felix Leiter, a recurring character who appears in “Live and Let Die” and “Goldfinger,” gets his first name “Felix” from the actual middle name of Fleming’s childhood friend, the British spy Ivar Bryce.
One of Fleming’s most enthusiastic readers was President John F. Kennedy. They met at a Washington dinner party the Kennedys were hosting in the spring of 1960, months before the election. Kennedy was already a fan of the 007 novels. After dinner, he asked Fleming how he might handle Fidel Castro’s Communist takeover of Cuba.
“Ridicule, chiefly,” Fleming replied wryly. He then outlined several Bond-like spy techniques that could “deflate” Castro’s reputation. Kennedy seemed amused by Fleming’s far-fetched suggestions. One called for American scientists shooting off a rocket intended to form a fiery cross in the sky, which might be interpreted as a heavenly sign that Castro should be replaced.
Apprised of Kennedy’s dinner conversation, the C.I.A. director Allen Dulles later directed scientists in the agency to see if Bond’s fictional gadgets and high-tech killing devices could be adopted.
Fleming’s novels — already moderately successful — soared in popularity with a public endorsement by the new president. In March 1961, Life magazine listed Fleming’s “From Russia With Love” as one of Kennedy’s favorite books. The Kennedys later hosted a private screening of the Bond movie “Dr. No” at the White House.
Around that time, Dulles received a copy of Fleming’s “From Russia With Love” from the first lady, Jacqueline Kennedy, with the inscription, “Here is a book you should have, Mr. Director.”
A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 24, 2025, Section AR, Page 4 of the New York edition with the headline: His Spy Schemes Came to Life. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
15. Samuel Huntington’s Prussian Paradox: Clausewitz, Military Professionalism, and the Myth of a “Apolitical” Military
I still do not know who is the "Secretary of Defense Rock."
Conclusion:
In the end, the Huntingtonian ideal of “objective control” persists less because it accurately captures the realities of military behavior than because it offers the comforting illusion that technical mastery can be disentangled from politics. The historical record of the Prussian officer corps, and Clausewitz’s own insistence that war is inseparable from policy, demonstrates that professionalism does not neutralize political influence but can, under certain conditions, magnify it. By selectively invoking Prussia as the archetype of the apolitical professional military while overlooking its repeated episodes of political intervention, Huntington provided the American officer corps with a framework that flatters its self-image but obscures its vulnerabilities. A truly robust model of civil–military relations must reckon with the fact that professional competence and political agency are not mutually exclusive. Instead of treating politics as a contamination of military virtue, it should acknowledge that the boundary between the two is inherently porous and that safeguarding democratic control depends not on denying this reality, but on managing it with vigilance, transparency, and an honest reading of history.
Samuel Huntington’s Prussian Paradox
Clausewitz, Military Professionalism, and the Myth of a “Apolitical” Military
https://secretaryrofdefenserock.substack.com/p/samuel-huntingtons-prussian-paradox?publication_id=2339789&post_id=170603659&isFreemail=true&r=f09de&triedRedirect=true
Secretary of Defense Rock
Aug 21, 2025
The Convention of Tauroggen, December 30, 1812.
No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right-that is, successful-any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong. - Carl von Clausewitz, On War1
Since its publication in 1957, Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State has largely stood as the “normative framework” for thinking about civil–military relations in the United States.has largely stood as the “normative framework” for thinking about civil–military relations in the United States.2 Generations of American military officers have been educated in its core premise of “objective civilian control,” the notion that a highly professional, apolitical military can coexist with “civilian supremacy” through a strict division of labor: the armed forces manage the “means” of war while elected leaders determine the “ends.”Generations of American military officers have been educated in its core premise of “objective civilian control,” the notion that a highly professional, apolitical military can coexist with “civilian supremacy” through a strict division of labor: the armed forces manage the “means” of war while elected leaders determine the “ends.”3 Those views are so strong that the former commandant of West Point and the U.S. Army War College, Major General William Rapp wrote, “Huntington’s 1957 Those views are so strong that the former commandant of West Point and the U.S. Army War College, Major General William Rapp wrote, “Huntington’s 1957 The Soldier and the State has defined civil-military relations for generations of military professionals. Soldiers have been raised on Huntingtonian logic and the separation of spheres of influence since their time as junior lieutenants.”has defined civil-military relations for generations of military professionals. Soldiers have been raised on Huntingtonian logic and the separation of spheres of influence since their time as junior lieutenants.”4 To partly illustrate this ideal, Huntington turned to nineteenth-century Prussia, portraying its reformed officer corps as the origin and apex of military professionalism. Yet this historical foundation was far less stable than Huntington’s narrative suggests. In practice, the professionalization of the Prussian army often amplified, rather than diminished, its political power, thus enabling senior officers to act as autonomous agents in shaping state policy.To partly illustrate this ideal, Huntington turned to nineteenth-century Prussia, portraying its reformed officer corps as the origin and apex of military professionalism. Yet this historical foundation was far less stable than Huntington’s narrative suggests. In practice, the professionalization of the Prussian army often amplified, rather than diminished, its political power, thus enabling senior officers to act as autonomous agents in shaping state policy.
For Huntington, the ideal model of this professional ethos could be found in 19th-century Prussia. He credited Prussia with “the distinction of originating the professional officer” and providing “the true beginning of the military profession in the West,” portraying its reformed officer corps under the guidance of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Grolmann as the embodiment of military competence, corporate discipline, and devotion to duty.5 The historical founding for this claim could be dated to August 6, 1808, when the Prussian government issued a decree establishing the principles that would guide the recruitment, promotion, and ethos of its reformed army in the aftermath of the disaster at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806.The historical founding for this claim could be dated to August 6, 1808, when the Prussian government issued a decree establishing the principles that would guide the recruitment, promotion, and ethos of its reformed army in the aftermath of the disaster at Jena-Auerstedt in 1806.6 The decree stated,The decree stated,
The only title to an officer’s commission shall be, in time of peace, education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts. All previously existing class preference in the military establishment is abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal duties and equal rights.7
From a structural perspective, the decree did more than set technical standards; it redefined the army’s social and political role.8 By opening commissions to men of talent rather than birth, it promised to broaden the pool of candidates while simultaneously concentrating authority and legitimacy in the officer corps as a quasi-elite of trained experts in the “management of violence.”By opening commissions to men of talent rather than birth, it promised to broaden the pool of candidates while simultaneously concentrating authority and legitimacy in the officer corps as a quasi-elite of trained experts in the “management of violence.”9 This combination of technical proficiency and corporate identity carried with it both strengths and risks. While it produced a more capable and cohesive military institution, it also fostered a strong sense of collective autonomy. Such cohesion, coupled with the prestige of expertise, could enhance not only the army’s operational performance but also its ability to exert political influence.This combination of technical proficiency and corporate identity carried with it both strengths and risks. While it produced a more capable and cohesive military institution, it also fostered a strong sense of collective autonomy. Such cohesion, coupled with the prestige of expertise, could enhance not only the army’s operational performance but also its ability to exert political influence.
Huntington saw in this reform the foundations of the modern professional officership, but his reading tended to strip away its more ambiguous consequences. The very qualities that made the Prussian officer corps efficient in war also made it more capable of acting as an independent political force when it believed the state’s interests were at stake. In its most basic form, his theory rested on a simple bargain: increasing the military’s professionalism and giving it its own “independent military sphere” would decrease its politicization and prevent the military from undermining civilian control.10 The logic was straightforward; an officer corps with a strong professional identity, rigorous training, and clear boundaries between military and political spheres would have neither the incentive nor the legitimacy to intrude upon political decision-making. Yet in Prussia, the very professional model Huntington admired, the opposite pattern often emerged, as it was the process of professionalization itself that enhanced the officer corps’ political influence and capacity for independent action.The logic was straightforward; an officer corps with a strong professional identity, rigorous training, and clear boundaries between military and political spheres would have neither the incentive nor the legitimacy to intrude upon political decision-making. Yet in Prussia, the very professional model Huntington admired, the opposite pattern often emerged, as it was the process of professionalization itself that enhanced the officer corps’ political influence and capacity for independent action.
The most obvious example of this occurred during the period when the Prussian army’s professionalization was taking shape, immediately following Napoleon’s disastrous retreat from Russia in late 1812. As Russian forces advanced toward the borders of Prussia, pursuing the remnants of the French Grande Armée retreating out of Russia, they faced not only scattered French formations but also a Prussian auxiliary corps commanded by General Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg, who had withdrawn his corps back into East Prussia after a brief campaign in the Baltics in the service of the French. Though Prussia was still formally allied to France under the Treaty of Paris signed in 1812, Yorck, acting entirely on his own authority, had been exchanging messages with Russian authorities and entered into negotiations with Russian General Hans Karl von Diebitsch. History, being stranger than fiction, it was Carl von Clausewitz, along with some other Prussian officers, who had previously resigned from their commissions in protest and joined the Russian army to fight against Napoleon, playing the role of intermediary between the Russians and Prussians.11
The leaders at the Convention of Tauroggen, from left to right, Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg, Hans Karl von Diebitsch, and Carl von Clausewitz
The end result was the Convention of Tauroggen on December 30, 1812, in which Yorck declared his corps neutral, thereby withdrawing it from Napoleon’s command and freeing it from any obligation to fight the Russians.12 This was done completely independent of King William III and the authorities in Berlin; the historian Christopher Clark would observe, “his defection was not merely disobedient; it was treasonable.”This was done completely independent of King William III and the authorities in Berlin; the historian Christopher Clark would observe, “his defection was not merely disobedient; it was treasonable.”13 Moreover, in a letter to the king justifying his actions, Yorck essentially “offered Frederick William the choice of confirming his action or condemning him to death for his disobedience.”Moreover, in a letter to the king justifying his actions, Yorck essentially “offered Frederick William the choice of confirming his action or condemning him to death for his disobedience.”14 Clausewitz later wrote, “If the king was truly determined to adhere to the French alliance he had virtually no alternative but to bring Yorck to trial.”Clausewitz later wrote, “If the king was truly determined to adhere to the French alliance he had virtually no alternative but to bring Yorck to trial.”15 Although the King saw the winds changing and was quietly debating behind the scenes how to make peace and potentially switch sides, it was ultimately the actions of his current and former army officers that forced his hand, “boxing him in” into the 6th coalition and declaring war against France formally on March 17, 1813.Although the King saw the winds changing and was quietly debating behind the scenes how to make peace and potentially switch sides, it was ultimately the actions of his current and former army officers that forced his hand, “boxing him in” into the 6th coalition and declaring war against France formally on March 17, 1813.16
Tauroogen on the evening of December 29, Bonaparte would still occupy the French throne, and the French would still rule Europe.”One could plausibly argue that Yorck’s motives at Tauroggen were pure military prudence, seeking to spare his corps from what appeared to be imminent destruction at the hands of the advancing Russians. Another argument is that it was precisely the lack of military professionalism that prompted Yorck to make the decisions he did. Yet whatever his personal or professional calculations, the consequences boomeranged far beyond a simple military decision as Clausewitz observed, “it would be unreasonable to believe that, had it not been for the decision General Yorck reached at 17 By unilaterally declaring neutrality, Yorck, with the help of Clausewitz, effectively prepositioned Prussia to realign its foreign policy, laying the groundwork for its eventual defection from Napoleon’s alliance to the anti-French coalition.By unilaterally declaring neutrality, Yorck, with the help of Clausewitz, effectively prepositioned Prussia to realign its foreign policy, laying the groundwork for its eventual defection from Napoleon’s alliance to the anti-French coalition.
Still, that wasn’t even the last actions of Yorck and the Reformers. A special session in February 1813 with the Landtag, the local Prussian parliament, concluded with an agreement to raise conscripts to reinforce his corps and provide the necessary financing and supplies.18 This again was done without any consultation with the King and the authorities in Berlin. Not only had they set the stage for war with France but had undertaken a “revolutionary act” by “the raising of a popular army by a province, financed by the province, without prior permission of the king” in the words of the German historian Gerhard Ritter.This again was done without any consultation with the King and the authorities in Berlin. Not only had they set the stage for war with France but had undertaken a “revolutionary act” by “the raising of a popular army by a province, financed by the province, without prior permission of the king” in the words of the German historian Gerhard Ritter.19 Part of Huntington’s argument for the development of military professionalism in Prussia is that there was “stable legitimate authority” and yet the King was boxed into a war he wasn’t even sure he wanted to be involved in.Part of Huntington’s argument for the development of military professionalism in Prussia is that there was “stable legitimate authority” and yet the King was boxed into a war he wasn’t even sure he wanted to be involved in.20
What makes these episodes especially revealing for students of American civil–military relations is that Huntington makes no mention of them in The Soldier and the State nor of the many other occasions in which the Prussian and later German officer corps engaged in what might charitably be called “political intervention,” and less charitably, outright shenanigans.nor of the many other occasions in which the Prussian and later German officer corps engaged in what might charitably be called “political intervention,” and less charitably, outright shenanigans.21 Even later in the 19th century, Huntington argued, “while all the nations of Europe by 1875 had acquired the basic elements of military professionalism, in Prussia alone were these elements developed into a rounded and complete system.”Even later in the 19th century, Huntington argued, “while all the nations of Europe by 1875 had acquired the basic elements of military professionalism, in Prussia alone were these elements developed into a rounded and complete system.”22 Yet, a decade later in 1887, the senior military leadership cooked up a scheme to convince the Kaiser to declare war on Russia on a whim without any real military reason; they also encouraged Austria-Hungary to do the same. The German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, intervened before it escalated into a real crisis; however, it was hardly a model of military professionalism or an instance of exercising objective control.”Yet, a decade later in 1887, the senior military leadership cooked up a scheme to convince the Kaiser to declare war on Russia on a whim without any real military reason; they also encouraged Austria-Hungary to do the same. The German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, intervened before it escalated into a real crisis; however, it was hardly a model of military professionalism or an instance of exercising objective control.”23 Civilian leaders, such as Bismarck, were able to curb the worst impulses of the military profession; however, when left unchecked, they spiraled into the catastrophe of the First World War.Civilian leaders, such as Bismarck, were able to curb the worst impulses of the military profession; however, when left unchecked, they spiraled into the catastrophe of the First World War.24
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It’s paradoxical that Huntington’s own theory of “objective control” was, in practice, designed to prevent precisely the sort of political maneuvering that Yorck engaged in at Tauroggen and the later raising of an army in East Prussia. Huntington looked to Prussia as the archetype of a professional officer corps and ethos, yet the historical record shows that the Prussian officer corps was far from “apolitical.” On the contrary, it often saw itself as an independent guardian of the state’s interests, entitled by virtue of its expertise, institutional standing, and sense of patriotic duty to shape or override political decisions when it deemed necessary. Yorck’s defiance in 1812 was not an aberration, but part of a broader pattern in which professionalization did not dampen political activism; instead, it amplified the military’s ability and confidence to act as a political force in its own right.was, in practice, designed to prevent precisely the sort of political maneuvering that Yorck engaged in at Tauroggen and the later raising of an army in East Prussia. Huntington looked to Prussia as the archetype of a professional officer corps and ethos, yet the historical record shows that the Prussian officer corps was far from “apolitical.” On the contrary, it often saw itself as an independent guardian of the state’s interests, entitled by virtue of its expertise, institutional standing, and sense of patriotic duty to shape or override political decisions when it deemed necessary. Yorck’s defiance in 1812 was not an aberration, but part of a broader pattern in which professionalization did not dampen political activism; instead, it amplified the military’s ability and confidence to act as a political force in its own right.
This is, in fact, the entire flaw of the “objective control” model; professionalism, “a peculiar functional group with highly specialized characteristics” as Huntington defined it, merely means becoming more proficient at one’s craft; it does not magically strip that craft of its inherently political character.25 Military decisions or advice, no matter how technically sound or operationally precise, are never rendered apolitical simply by virtue of professional expertise. On the contrary, the very act of framing strategic options, prioritizing threats, or recommending resource allocations involves value judgments, assumptions about national interests, and implicit trade-offs that are fundamentally political in nature. Clausewitz’s own dictum, that “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” epitomizes, in the most basic sense, the impossibility of insulating military practice from its political context.Military decisions or advice, no matter how technically sound or operationally precise, are never rendered apolitical simply by virtue of professional expertise. On the contrary, the very act of framing strategic options, prioritizing threats, or recommending resource allocations involves value judgments, assumptions about national interests, and implicit trade-offs that are fundamentally political in nature. Clausewitz’s own dictum, that “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” epitomizes, in the most basic sense, the impossibility of insulating military practice from its political context.26 The “objective control” ideal assumes a neat division of labor in which the military provides neutral, “technical” advice while civilian leaders make the political decisions.The “objective control” ideal assumes a neat division of labor in which the military provides neutral, “technical” advice while civilian leaders make the political decisions.27 Yet in reality, the advice itself shapes and constrains those decisions, often in ways that reflect institutional culture, personal ideology, or the military’s preferred conception of national security. Professionalism may sharpen the quality of military counsel, but it cannot erase the political content embedded within it.Yet in reality, the advice itself shapes and constrains those decisions, often in ways that reflect institutional culture, personal ideology, or the military’s preferred conception of national security. Professionalism may sharpen the quality of military counsel, but it cannot erase the political content embedded within it.
Yes, civil-military relations memes exist.
Clausewitz offers a useful civil-military lens because, first and foremost, “he rejected the notion of a politically neutral military.”28 This is not to suggest that he endorsed any specific ideological orientation for the military, whether liberal, conservative, or libertarian.This is not to suggest that he endorsed any specific ideological orientation for the military, whether liberal, conservative, or libertarian.29 Instead, war being an extension of politics, he held the belief that the military could never truly be an “apolitical” actor. He argued,Instead, war being an extension of politics, he held the belief that the military could never truly be an “apolitical” actor. He argued,
Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.30
This passage captures two points. First, Clausewitz recognized that the military is inherently political, not because officers necessarily seek to shape policy, but because the very conduct of war is inseparable from the political aims it serves. Military operations cannot be detached from the policy environment that gives them purpose, defines their constraints, and measures their success. In this sense, an “apolitical” military is a contradiction in terms; the armed forces are always embedded within, and responsive to, the political decisions of the state.
Second, Clausewitz’s formulation provides the earliest and clearest intellectual case for civilian supremacy, or subjective civilian control, over the military. If war is an instrument of policy, then those who set policy, civilian leaders, must have primacy in determining the objectives and acceptable costs of military action. The military may advise, warn, or even protest, but it must ultimately serve the direction of the political leadership.31 This is not simply a matter of legal subordination but of logical necessity: without political guidance, military activity risks becoming self-referential, pursuing operational success without regard for its strategic or diplomatic consequences.This is not simply a matter of legal subordination but of logical necessity: without political guidance, military activity risks becoming self-referential, pursuing operational success without regard for its strategic or diplomatic consequences.
The irony, and the tension with Huntington’s model, is that Clausewitz’s argument presumes that the military will always be politically engaged at the conceptual level, even as it submits to civilian authority. Clausewitz even envisaged that military leaders would be politically literate, writing,
The assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice.32
Clausewitz’s warning here cuts directly against the idea central to Huntington’s “objective control” that there can be a clean separation between military expertise and political judgment. Major military developments such as changes to a military’s force structure, a strategic realignment, or the planning of a campaign, cannot be assessed purely on technical or operational grounds. Every such decision is embedded in a larger political context, reflecting assumptions about national priorities, public opinion, resource constraints, and the actual political risks a government is willing to take in pursuit of that policy.33 To treat these questions as “purely military” is to ignore the fact that they derive their very meaning from policy. Allowing the military to deliberate in isolation risks producing plans that are tactically sound but strategically irrelevant or politically counterproductive.To treat these questions as “purely military” is to ignore the fact that they derive their very meaning from policy. Allowing the military to deliberate in isolation risks producing plans that are tactically sound but strategically irrelevant or politically counterproductive.34
Clausewitz is equally critical of the inverse error, when civilian leaders “summon soldiers” and expect them to provide advice stripped of political considerations. By divorcing military recommendations from the political conditions under which they must be executed, governments risk creating a gap between what is operationally possible and what is politically sustainable. Clausewitz believed that military leaders had a duty to understand, and to some extent participate in, the political reasoning that shapes war, precisely because their advice must be viable within that broader framework.
In this way, Clausewitz rejects both the military acting as if politics were irrelevant and politicians demanding military plans as if they could be divorced from politics. His vision is one of continuous interaction between the two spheres, essentially, a two-way street where professional military advice is necessarily informed by political realities, and political decisions are necessarily informed by the operational and logistical limits of military action. It makes sense that he came to these conclusions; Clausewitz wrote in an era when the boundary between political and military authority was far less rigid than it later became.35 In a monarchical court system, ministers, generals, and courtiers interacted frequently, and the sovereign himself embodied both political and military authority. Nonetheless, this perspective sits uneasily with Huntington’s vision of an apolitical professional military, because Clausewitz is not merely acknowledging that the military is political in the abstract; he is insisting that political literacy is a core professional requirement for senior officers.In a monarchical court system, ministers, generals, and courtiers interacted frequently, and the sovereign himself embodied both political and military authority. Nonetheless, this perspective sits uneasily with Huntington’s vision of an apolitical professional military, because Clausewitz is not merely acknowledging that the military is political in the abstract; he is insisting that political literacy is a core professional requirement for senior officers.
A clear example in the American context is the 2006 debate over whether to surge troops in Iraq. During a Pentagon meeting, General Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, argued that the move “probably would not have a military effect—that it would not reduce the violence.”36 He then shifted the discussion to the war’s eroding domestic support, warning, “I don’t think that you have the time to surge and generate enough forces for this thing to continue to go.”He then shifted the discussion to the war’s eroding domestic support, warning, “I don’t think that you have the time to surge and generate enough forces for this thing to continue to go.”37 Bush replied, “I am the President. And I’ve got the time.”Bush replied, “I am the President. And I’ve got the time.”38
From a Clausewitzian perspective, Schoomaker’s assessment fell squarely within the proper boundaries of military advice. Clausewitz argued that military counsel must account for the political context that gives war its purpose and limits, and public opinion, especially in a democracy, is a core political factor. By linking his operational judgment to the political reality of waning public support, Schoomaker demonstrated an understanding that military feasibility cannot be divorced from political sustainability. His warning reflected not an intrusion into policymaking, but the responsible integration of political realities into professional military advice, the very type of political literacy Clausewitz believed was essential for senior officers.
However, Bush’s dismissal of this warning was problematic because it ignored a fundamental truth of civil–military strategy: time is not just a matter of presidential resolve, but of sustaining the political, logistical, and human resources necessary to prosecute a war. By framing the issue as a personal determination, “I’ve got the time,” rather than as a question of national will and capability, Bush effectively sidestepped the operational limits identified by one of his top military advisers. This not only risked setting objectives disconnected from available means but also underscored the potential breakdown of the collaborative process Clausewitz envisioned, in which political leaders respect and incorporate the military’s informed judgment about what can realistically be achieved.
More memes.
The challenge with Clausewitz’s perspective is what Dr. John Binkly asks: “What happens if the process breaks down and civilian orders conflict with the resources and capabilities the military actually possesses?”39 The other question is; is there a point where military recommendations or advice filtered through a political lens become partisan? Clausewitz experienced both sides breaking down at different points. The first came at the Convention of Tauroggen, when elements of the Prussian army bypassed the king entirely, striking an independent agreement with the Russians that altered the kingdom’s foreign policy without royal sanction. Clausewitz acted as an intermediary, witnessing firsthand how military leaders could take political initiative when they believed the state’s interests demanded it.The other question is; is there a point where military recommendations or advice filtered through a political lens become partisan? Clausewitz experienced both sides breaking down at different points. The first came at the Convention of Tauroggen, when elements of the Prussian army bypassed the king entirely, striking an independent agreement with the Russians that altered the kingdom’s foreign policy without royal sanction. Clausewitz acted as an intermediary, witnessing firsthand how military leaders could take political initiative when they believed the state’s interests demanded it.
The second came during the post-1815 reactionary backlash in Prussia, when conservative forces within the monarchy and bureaucracy halted or diluted many of the reforms advocated by Clausewitz and his fellow reformers. These measures, intended to modernize the army, broaden recruitment, and professionalize the officer corps, were blocked not because they were militarily unsound, but because they were politically inconvenient to entrenched elites.40 In both cases, Clausewitz observed how the alignment between political direction and military capability could collapse: once when the military acted unilaterally to shape policy, and again when political authorities disregarded sound military judgment for their own reasons. Both episodes highlight the persistent problem at the heart of civil–military relations; what happens when the logic of war, as understood by professionals, diverges from the will or judgment of civilian leaders.In both cases, Clausewitz observed how the alignment between political direction and military capability could collapse: once when the military acted unilaterally to shape policy, and again when political authorities disregarded sound military judgment for their own reasons. Both episodes highlight the persistent problem at the heart of civil–military relations; what happens when the logic of war, as understood by professionals, diverges from the will or judgment of civilian leaders.
Clausewitz never offered a fully developed solution to the problem of civil–military relations, beyond his conviction that a balanced partnership between soldiers and statesmen was necessary. His most sustained reflections on the subject appear in, Book Eight, Chapter Six; even there, the discussion extends to only six pages.41 The most significant structural proposal he put forward was having a “commander-in-chief” who would serve in the civilian leader’s immediate advisory circle and act as a conduit between the civilians and military commanders in the field.The most significant structural proposal he put forward was having a “commander-in-chief” who would serve in the civilian leader’s immediate advisory circle and act as a conduit between the civilians and military commanders in the field.42 He wrote,He wrote,
If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.43
This proposal was less a rigid blueprint than a practical safeguard against the breakdowns he had witnessed: it created a structured channel through which political leaders and military commanders would remain in constant dialogue. For Clausewitz, the health of civil–military relations depended not on separating politics from war, as Huntington would later suggest, but on institutionalizing their partnership so that policy and strategy reinforced each other rather than undermining one another.
It is here that the sharp divergence with Huntington becomes clear. Whereas Clausewitz saw politics and war as inseparably linked, requiring interaction, literacy, and mutual adjustment, Huntington built his model of “objective control” on the premise that the two spheres could and should be kept distinct. In Huntington’s vision, professionalism meant insulating the military from politics, allowing officers to focus exclusively on the technical management of violence. But Clausewitz, writing from direct experience in the Napoleonic era, argued the opposite: that such separation was both impossible and dangerous. His insistence that policy and war must remain fused stands as a fundamental challenge to Huntington’s interpretation of Prussia, and it undermines the very historical foundation on which The Soldier and the State rests.
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One notable difference between the American officer corps and the Prussians is their position as individuals and institutions within the political hierarchy. Whereas the Prussian officer corps inherently regarded itself as legitimate political actors in shaping the direction of state policy, the American officer corps has often taken the opposite self-conception, devolving into a “silent order of monks” assuming “that, because he is a professional, he is by definition apolitical.”44 This invariably leads American officers to “define away the possibility that their actions might be political.”This invariably leads American officers to “define away the possibility that their actions might be political.”45 This reflects a deeply internalized version of Huntington’s ideal, in which professional identity is tied to an apolitical ethos and political engagement is seen as beyond the military’s legitimate remit.This reflects a deeply internalized version of Huntington’s ideal, in which professional identity is tied to an apolitical ethos and political engagement is seen as beyond the military’s legitimate remit.
Yet this difference is more one of self-perception than of functional reality. As previously discussed, the Prussian model in many respects accepted political agency as part of the officer’s duty, especially when national survival or honor seemed at stake, leading figures like Yorck to act without, or even against, civilian authorization. By contrast, the American model rests on a professional narrative that casts political neutrality as both a moral and institutional virtue. In practice, however, American officers inevitably operate within a political environment, making choices that shape policy outcomes, whether in how they frame military advice, prioritize threats, or manage alliances. The key distinction is that while the Prussians openly acknowledged and accepted their political role, American officers tend to recast political behavior as merely “professional military judgment,” allowing them to preserve the fiction of apolitical service even as their actions influence the political sphere.
If American officers were more widely familiar with the Convention of Tauroggen and with the many other episodes in which the Prussian or German officer corps undertook political ventures on their own initiative, it might serve as a cautionary reminder of the inherent political potential of a professional military. Such cases illustrate that even the most disciplined, technically proficient, and self-consciously “professional” officer corps can become an active political force when convinced that the nation’s strategic interests demand it. Some have indirectly endorsed this view, Andrew Milburn argues, “when the military professional alone is in a position to prevent calamity, it makes little sense to argue that he should not exercise his discretion.”46 But the difference is, American officers don’t see their actions as “political,” and thus create massive blind spots they can’t or won’t see at home and abroad.But the difference is, American officers don’t see their actions as “political,” and thus create massive blind spots they can’t or won’t see at home and abroad.
By omitting these episodes and what Clausewitz actually wrote from, Huntington leaves American officers with a selective and sanitized view of military professionalism—one that emphasizes technical expertise and operational competence while downplaying the ways in which professional status can enable political agency. The absence of this historical awareness fosters a distorted view of the past, encouraging the belief that professionalism is a reliable safeguard against politicization, rather than acknowledging that in some of the most celebrated military traditions, professionalism and political activism have often been intertwined.
In the end, the Huntingtonian ideal of “objective control” persists less because it accurately captures the realities of military behavior than because it offers the comforting illusion that technical mastery can be disentangled from politics. The historical record of the Prussian officer corps, and Clausewitz’s own insistence that war is inseparable from policy, demonstrates that professionalism does not neutralize political influence but can, under certain conditions, magnify it. By selectively invoking Prussia as the archetype of the apolitical professional military while overlooking its repeated episodes of political intervention, Huntington provided the American officer corps with a framework that flatters its self-image but obscures its vulnerabilities. A truly robust model of civil–military relations must reckon with the fact that professional competence and political agency are not mutually exclusive. Instead of treating politics as a contamination of military virtue, it should acknowledge that the boundary between the two is inherently porous and that safeguarding democratic control depends not on denying this reality, but on managing it with vigilance, transparency, and an honest reading of history.
1
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 608.
2
Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” International Security 44 (4), (2020): 12.44 (4), (2020): 12.
3
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 83.
4
Huntington, 8.
5
Huntington, 30.
6
Huntington, 30.
7
Huntington, 30-31.
8
See America as Prussia in 1806 for more details on the Prussian Army in the leadup to the 1806 disaster.for more details on the Prussian Army in the leadup to the 1806 disaster.
9
Huntington uses this phase fairly frequently, which was first termed by Harold Lasswell.
10
Huntington, 83.
11
One of Clausewitz’s famous writings, his “Political Declaration,” argued that those officers who had resigned from the Prussian Army and continued to oppose France were not acting as traitors but out of a profound sense of duty and patriotism. See Historical and Political Writings, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 285-312.
12
Clausewitz offers his own reflection on the events at Tauroggen in his essay, “The Campaign of 1812 in Russia.” See Historical and Political Writings, 186-202.
13
Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 359.(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 359.
14
Ibid., 360.
15
Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 189.
16
J.P. Riley, Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting (Frank Cass; London, 2000), 55.(Frank Cass; London, 2000), 55.
17
Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, 200.
18
Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 231.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 231.
19
Gerhard Ritter quoted by Paret, 231.
20
Huntington, 32.
21
See Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 2, The European Powers and the Wilhelminian Empire, 1890–1914, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970).
22
Huntington, 31.
23
See The Limits of the Military Profession written by written by
Kiran Pfitzner and me.and me.
24
See Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 3, The Tragedy of Statesmanship: Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor, 1914–1917, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1972).
25
Huntington, 7.
26
Clausewitz, On War, 69.
27
Huntington, 195-200
28
John Binkley, “Clausewitz and Subjective Civilian Control: An Analysis of Clausewitz's Views on the Role of the Military Advisor in the Development of National Policy,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2016), 251.(2016), 251.
29
Huntington, on the other hand, argues that a military professional is inherently a conservative realist, 59-79.
30
Clausewitz, On War, 607. Interestingly, Clausewitz's brother-in-law would alter the text to make the political view subordinate to the political view, hence the later misinterpretations. This is probably the most significant change undertaken in On War.
31
The term often used to describe extreme forms of military protest in American civil–military relations is “McMasterism;” see Peter Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision.” International Security, vol. 35, no. 4 (2011), 94-96.
32
Clausewitz, On War, 607-608.
33
Binkley discusses the challenges of this view in the American context, 265-268.
34
The author would argue this is a common occurrence in modern American civil-military relations since the broad acceptance of “objective control” but that is an article for another day.
35
Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006–2008 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 288.(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 288.
36
Ibid., 288.
37
Ibid., 289.
38
Binkley, 267.
39
See Clausewitz’s essay, “On the Political Advantages and Disadvantages of the Prussian Landwehr” in Historical and Political Writings, 329-334.
40
Clausewitz, On War, 605-610.
41
Binkly discusses this, see 252-253.
42
Huntington, 608-609.
43
Huntington, 608.
44
Sam C. Sarkesian, ‘‘The U.S. Military Must Find Its Voice,’’ Orbis 42, 3 (Summer 1998): 423-437, and Brooks, 17.
45
Brooks, 17.
46
Andrew Milburn, “Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional,” 59 (4) (2010): 105.59 (4) (2010): 105.
16.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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