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Quotes of the Day:
"When the debate is lost, insults become the loser's tool."
- Socrates
"The oldest and shortest words – 'yes' and 'no' – are those which require the most thought."
– Pythagoras
"I find war detestable but those who praise it without participating in or even more so."
– Romain Rolland
1. Yoon says N. Korea will face 'end of regime' if it invades South
2. NSC conducts integrated cybersecurity drills
3. PM visits independence fighter on 101st birthday
4. Biden approved strategy to prepare against coordinated nuclear challenges from N.K., China, Russia: NYT
5. Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat
6. S. Korea reaffirms shared commitment to N.K. denuclearization after Democratic platform shows no mention of it
7. Korea denuclearization would remain goal if Harris wins White House: campaign official
8. U.S. alliance with S. Korea, Japan will get 'even stronger' regardless of election: Pentagon
9. S. Korea holds regular defense drills around Dokdo: source
10. S. Korea, Japan discuss ways of strengthening economic ties
11. Prosecution team decides to drop charges against first lady in luxury bag case
12. ROK-US Air Force '24-hour live flight' training... 2,000 sorties in 5 days
13. Editorial: S. Korea must prepare as U.S. shifts focus from denuclearizing N. Korea
14. “Strengthening the capacity of North Korean defector human rights activists to inform the public about the reality of human rights in North Korea”
15. South Korea’s Growing Role as a Major Arms Exporter: Future Prospects in Latin America
16. U.S. Army Has A Plan For Paragliding Paratroopers
1. Yoon says N. Korea will face 'end of regime' if it invades South
Visiting the old TROKA headquarters for UFS. The GOC is the command that will orchestrate the ground operations in the defense of the ROK and the counterattack against the nKPA.
He is not wrong in his simple but important message.
Yoon says N. Korea will face 'end of regime' if it invades South | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 21, 2024
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol warned Wednesday that North Korea would face the end of its regime should it attempt to invade South Korea, while inspecting an annual joint exercise with the United States.
Yoon made the remark during his visit to the Ground Operations Command in Yongin, south of Seoul, where he received briefings on the Ulchi Freedom Shield. The joint military exercise began Monday for an 11-day run.
"The North Korean regime is the most irrational group on Earth that can stage provocations at any time," Yoon said. "Only our military's robust military readiness can prevent them from making miscalculations."
Yoon underscored the importance of the joint exercise in assessing military readiness and enhancing the combined defense posture of the allies against the growing North Korean military threats.
"We must make it clear to the North Korean regime, which harbors dreams of forceful unification and constantly eyes the Republic of Korea, that any invasion will lead to the end of its regime," Yoon said, referring to South Korea's official name.
He also called for strong firepower capabilities against the North's long-range artillery and missiles, which are located within striking distance of the greater Seoul area -- home to nearly half of South Korea's 50 million people.
"It is important to overwhelm (North Korea's) long-range artillery and missile bases in the early stages of a war," he said.
Gen. Paul LaCamera, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, and Lt. Gen. Christopher LaNeve, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, accompanied Yoon on his visit to the command.
It marks the first time that a sitting president has visited the Ground Operations Command since its establishment in 2019, following the merger of two Army commands.
K9A1 self-propelled howitzers carry out firepower drills in Cherwon, about 75 kilometers north of Seoul, on Aug. 20, 2024, as part of the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise held between South Korea and the United States. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 21, 2024
2. NSC conducts integrated cybersecurity drills
This is very good to see: a whole range of defensive activities from nuclear to cyber to terrorist actions this week.
Other administrations over the years have not taken these types of activities as seriously as the Yoon administration.
NSC conducts integrated cybersecurity drills | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 21, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- The presidential National Security Council (NSC) said Wednesday it has conducted cybersecurity drills to enhance integrated response between public and private entities against hybrid threats.
The NSC organized the cyber defense drills in conjunction with the annual Ulchi civil defense exercise, involving military, government agencies, intelligence authorities and police, as well as private and public companies.
The Ulchi civil defense exercise has been under way since Monday for a four-day run, held concurrently with the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise jointly held between South Korea and the United States.
The cyber defense drills focused on bolstering joint capabilities between public and public sectors to threats posed by hybrid warfare, which combines cyber threats and military provocations, the NSC said.
The exercises took place at the National Information Resources Service in the central city of Daejeon and a major port in the southeastern city of Busan, simulating scenarios where key infrastructure facilities and the government network come under attack, it noted.
Explosive detection teams carry out drills as part of Ulchi civil defense exercise at a bus terminal in Daejeon, about 160 kilometers south of Seoul, on Aug. 21, 2024. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 21, 2024
3. PM visits independence fighter on 101st birthday
I think this is part of the Yoon administration's effort to continue to emphasize its "8.15 Unification Doctrine." The Independence Movements a key historical touchstone for independence and a free and unified Korea.
PM visits independence fighter on 101st birthday | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · August 21, 2024
By Lee Haye-ah
SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- Prime Minister Han Duck-soo visited one of the oldest surviving independence fighters on his 101st birthday Wednesday, saying he thanks him for his service and wishes him good health, according to the prime minister's office.
Oh Seong-gyu, born Aug. 21, 1923, in North Phyongan Province in what is now North Korea, took part in the fight against Japanese colonial rule from Manchuria before enlisting in the Korean Liberation Army based in Anhui, China.
Prime Minister Han Duck-soo (L) congratulates independence fighter Oh Seong-gyu on his 101st birthday at a veterans' nursing home in Suwon, some 30 kilometers south of Seoul, on Aug. 21, 2024. (Yonhap)
In the months before Korea's Aug. 15, 1945, liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Oh was trained as a commando for the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. He returned to Korea briefly upon liberation but left for Japan soon after due to difficulty adjusting amid ideological battles at home.
In August last year, Oh returned to South Korea after expressing his wish to spend the remainder of his life in his home country and has since lived at a veterans' nursing home in Suwon, some 30 kilometers south of Seoul.
"Thank you for your service in dedicating yourself to our independence," Han told Oh while holding hands. "I wish you continued good health, so that you can remain at our side for a long time."
Four interns working for the Office for Government Policy Coordination accompanied Han on the visit with a birthday cake designed like the flag of the Korean Liberation Army. Together, they gave a deep bow before Oh.
Oh is one of six registered surviving independence fighters. Lee Ha-jeon, who resides in the United States, is the oldest among them at 103, followed by Oh.
In 1990, Oh received the National Medal of the Order of Merit for National Foundation from the South Korean government for his service.
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · August 21, 2024
4. Biden approved strategy to prepare against coordinated nuclear challenges from N.K., China, Russia: NYT
Excerpts:
Updated every four years or so, the document is so confidential that only a small number of hard copies were distributed to a few security officials and Pentagon commanders, according to the newspaper.
During a forum hosted by the Arms Control Association in June, Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on the National Security Council, already mentioned that Biden had issued an updated nuclear weapons employment guidance.
Vaddi commented on the guidance, warning that Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow are expanding and diversifying their nuclear weapons stockpiles at a "breakneck" speed.
"(The guidance) emphasizes the need to account for the growth and diversity of the PRC's nuclear arsenal and the need to deter Russia, the PRC and North Korea simultaneously," he told the forum, referring to China by its official name, the People's Republic of China. "It also reaffirms our commitment to use arms control and other tools to minimize the number of nuclear weapons needed to achieve U.S. objectives."
Vaddi pointed out that the U.S. will need to adjust its posture and capabilities to ensure its ability to deter growing threats from the North, China and Russia should there be no change in their current nuclear weapons policy trajectory.
Biden approved strategy to prepare against coordinated nuclear challenges from N.K., China, Russia: NYT | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 21, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 (Yonhap) -- President Joe Biden approved a secret strategy earlier this year to focus on China's growing nuclear threats and prepare the United States for possible coordinated nuclear challenges from North Korea, China and Russia, The New York Times reported Tuesday.
Biden's approval in March of the revised strategy, called the "Nuclear Employment Guidance," came amid North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile threats, China's rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal and Russia's perceived nuclear saber-rattling.
Updated every four years or so, the document is so confidential that only a small number of hard copies were distributed to a few security officials and Pentagon commanders, according to the newspaper.
During a forum hosted by the Arms Control Association in June, Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on the National Security Council, already mentioned that Biden had issued an updated nuclear weapons employment guidance.
Vaddi commented on the guidance, warning that Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow are expanding and diversifying their nuclear weapons stockpiles at a "breakneck" speed.
"(The guidance) emphasizes the need to account for the growth and diversity of the PRC's nuclear arsenal and the need to deter Russia, the PRC and North Korea simultaneously," he told the forum, referring to China by its official name, the People's Republic of China. "It also reaffirms our commitment to use arms control and other tools to minimize the number of nuclear weapons needed to achieve U.S. objectives."
Vaddi pointed out that the U.S. will need to adjust its posture and capabilities to ensure its ability to deter growing threats from the North, China and Russia should there be no change in their current nuclear weapons policy trajectory.
Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on the White House National Security Council, speaks during a forum hosted by the Arms Control Association in Washington on June 7, 2024, in this file photo captured from the YouTube account of the association. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
His remarks hinted at the U.S.' ongoing efforts to adapt to what he called the realities of a "new" nuclear era.
Early this month, Vipin Narang, the former acting assistant secretary of defense for space policy, also made similar remarks that, absent a change in the nuclear threat trajectories of China, Russia and North Korea, Washington may reach a point where "a change in the size and posture" of its current deployed forces is "necessary."
"There is no need to grow the stockpile yet, but adjustments to the number of deployed capabilities may be necessary if our adversaries continue down the current paths," Narang said.
Vipin Narang, the acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for space policy, speaks during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on Aug. 1, 2024, in this file photo captured from the center's YouTube account. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Moreover, Narang emphasized the need not to "sleep on" North Korean threats, hinting that the U.S. has been keeping close tabs on the North's advancing nuclear program.
"We can't sleep on North Korea, which also continues to expand, diversify and improve its nuclear ballistic missile and non-nuclear capabilities," he said.
"While not a major power rival like the PRC and Russia, North Korea's continued improvement and diversification of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities present deterrence dilemmas for the United States and regional allies," he added.
Nuclear threats from the three countries came into sharper focus recently as Russia has been deepening its strategic cooperation with both North Korea and China in the midst of its diplomatic isolation caused by Moscow's war in Ukraine.
In a telling sign of their burgeoning cooperation, Russia and the North signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" treaty during their summit in June. Russia and China have also boasted their "no limits" partnership, while Washington has decried Beijing for its support for Russia's defense industrial base.
These developments came amid no progress in Washington's pursuit of arms control talks or other dialogue to reduce tensions and promote security.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 21, 2024
5. Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat
Excerpts:
The White House never announced that Mr. Biden had approved the revised strategy, called the “Nuclear Employment Guidance,” which also newly seeks to prepare the United States for possible coordinated nuclear challenges from China, Russia and North Korea. The document, updated every four years or so, is so highly classified that there are no electronic copies, only a small number of hard copies distributed to a few national security officials and Pentagon commanders.
...
... Mr. Kim has doubled down, and now has more than 60 weapons, officials estimate, and the fuel for many more.
That expansion has changed the nature of the North Korean challenge: When the country possessed just a handful of weapons, it could be deterred by missile defenses. But its expanded arsenal is fast approaching the size of Pakistan’s and Israel’s, and it is large enough that it could, in theory, coordinate threats with Moscow and Beijing.
...
“It is our responsibility to see the world as it is, not as we hoped or wished it would be,” Mr. Narang said as he was leaving the Pentagon. “It is possible that we will one day look back and see the quarter-century after the Cold War as nuclear intermission.”
The new challenge is “the real possibility of collaboration and even collusion between our nuclear-armed adversaries,” he said.
Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat
In a classified document approved in March, the president ordered U.S. forces to prepare for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North Korea.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/us/politics/biden-nuclear-china-russia.html
President Biden spent much of his political career as an advocate of nuclear nonproliferation and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in American defenses.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times
By David E. Sanger
David E. Sanger has written about American nuclear strategy for The New York Times for nearly four decades.
Aug. 20, 2024
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President Biden approved in March a highly classified nuclear strategic plan for the United States that, for the first time, reorients America’s deterrent strategy to focus on China’s rapid expansion in its nuclear arsenal.
The shift comes as the Pentagon believes China’s stockpiles will rival the size and diversity of the United States’ and Russia’s over the next decade.
The White House never announced that Mr. Biden had approved the revised strategy, called the “Nuclear Employment Guidance,” which also newly seeks to prepare the United States for possible coordinated nuclear challenges from China, Russia and North Korea. The document, updated every four years or so, is so highly classified that there are no electronic copies, only a small number of hard copies distributed to a few national security officials and Pentagon commanders.
But in recent speeches, two senior administration officials were allowed to allude to the change — in carefully constrained, single sentences — ahead of a more detailed, unclassified notification to Congress expected before Mr. Biden leaves office.
“The president recently issued updated nuclear-weapons employment guidance to account for multiple nuclear-armed adversaries,” Vipin Narang, an M.I.T. nuclear strategist who served in the Pentagon, said earlier this month before returning to academia. “And in particular,” he added, the weapons guidance accounted for “the significant increase in the size and diversity” of China’s nuclear arsenal.
In June, the National Security Council’s senior director for arms control and nonproliferation, Pranay Vaddi, also referred to the document, the first to examine in detail whether the United States is prepared to respond to nuclear crises that break out simultaneously or sequentially, with a combination of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons.
The new strategy, Mr. Vaddi said, emphasizes “the need to deter Russia, the PRC and North Korea simultaneously,” using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China.
In the past, the likelihood that American adversaries could coordinate nuclear threats to outmaneuver the American nuclear arsenal seemed remote. But the emerging partnership between Russia and China, and the conventional arms North Korea and Iran are providing to Russia for the war in Ukraine have fundamentally changed Washington’s thinking.
Already, Russia and China are conducting military exercises together. Intelligence agencies are trying to determine whether Russia is aiding the North Korean and Iranian missile programs in return.
The new document is a stark reminder that whoever is sworn in next Jan. 20 will confront a changed and far more volatile nuclear landscape than the one that existed just three years ago. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine, including during a crisis in October 2022, when Mr. Biden and his aides, looking at intercepts of conversations between senior Russian commanders, feared the likelihood of nuclear use might rise to 50 percent or even higher.
Mr. Biden, along with leaders of Germany and Britain, got China and India to make public statements that there was no role for the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, and the crisis abated, at least temporarily.
“It was an important moment,” Richard N. Haass, a former senior State Department and National Security Council official for several Republican presidents, and the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, noted in an interview. “We are dealing with a Russia that is radicalized; the idea that nukes wouldn’t be used in a conventional conflict is not longer a safe assumption.”
The second big change arises from China’s nuclear ambitions. The country’s nuclear expansion is running at an even faster pace than American intelligence officials anticipated two years ago, driven by President Xi Jinping’s determination to scrap the decades-long strategy of maintaining a “minimum deterrent” to reach or exceed the size of Washington’s and Moscow’s arsenals. China’s nuclear complex is now the fastest growing in the world.
Although former President Donald J. Trump confidently predicted that Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, would surrender his nuclear weapons after their three in-person meetings, the opposite happened. Mr. Kim has doubled down, and now has more than 60 weapons, officials estimate, and the fuel for many more.
That expansion has changed the nature of the North Korean challenge: When the country possessed just a handful of weapons, it could be deterred by missile defenses. But its expanded arsenal is fast approaching the size of Pakistan’s and Israel’s, and it is large enough that it could, in theory, coordinate threats with Moscow and Beijing.
A soldier stands before vehicles carrying China’s DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles.Credit...Thomas Peter/Reuters
It was only a matter of time before a fundamentally different nuclear environment began to alter American war plans and strategy, officials say.
“It is our responsibility to see the world as it is, not as we hoped or wished it would be,” Mr. Narang said as he was leaving the Pentagon. “It is possible that we will one day look back and see the quarter-century after the Cold War as nuclear intermission.”
The new challenge is “the real possibility of collaboration and even collusion between our nuclear-armed adversaries,” he said.
So far in the presidential campaign, the new challenges to American nuclear strategy have not been a topic of debate. Mr. Biden, who spent much of his political career as an advocate of nuclear nonproliferation, has never publicly talked in any detail about how he is responding to the challenges of deterring China’s and North Korea’s expanded forces. Nor has Vice President Kamala Harris, now the Democratic Party’s nominee.
At his last news conference in July, just days before he announced he would no longer seek the Democratic nomination for a second term, Mr. Biden acknowledged that he had adopted a policy of seeking ways to interfere in the broader China-Russia partnership.
“Yes, I do, but I’m not prepared to talk about the detail of it in public,” Mr. Biden said. He made no reference to — and was not asked about — how that partnership was altering American nuclear strategy.
Since Harry Truman’s presidency, that strategy has been overwhelmingly focused on the Kremlin’s arsenal. Mr. Biden’s new guidance suggests how quickly that is shifting.
China was mentioned in the last nuclear guidance, issued at the end of the Trump administration, according to an unclassified account provided to Congress in 2020. But that was before the scope of Mr. Xi’s ambitions was understood.
The Biden strategy sharpens that focus to reflect the Pentagon’s estimates that China’s nuclear force would expand to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, roughly the numbers that the United States and Russia now deploy. In fact, Beijing now appears ahead of that schedule, officials say, and has begun loading nuclear missiles into new silo fields that were spotted by commercial satellites three years ago.
There is another concern about Beijing: It has now halted a short-lived conversation with the United States about improving nuclear safety and security — for example, by agreeing to warn each other of impending missile tests, or setting up hotlines or other means of communication to assure that incidents or accidents do not escalate into nuclear encounters.
One discussion between the two countries took place late last fall, just before Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi met in California, where they sought to repair relations between the two countries. They referred to those talks in a joint statement, but by that time the Chinese had already hinted they were not interested in further discussions, and earlier this summer said the conversations were over. They cited American arms sales to Taiwan, which were underway long before the nuclear safety conversations began.
Mallory Stewart, the assistant secretary for arms control, deterrence and stability at the State Department, said in an interview that the Chinese government was “actively preventing us from having conversations about the risks.”
Instead, she said, Beijing “seems to be taking a page out of Russia’s playbook that, until we address tensions and challenges in our bilateral relationship, they will choose not to continue our arms control, risk reduction and nonproliferation conversations.”
It was in China’s interest, she argued, “to prevent these risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding.”
David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger
6. S. Korea reaffirms shared commitment to N.K. denuclearization after Democratic platform shows no mention of it
South Korea wil parse every word of US documents to determine the implications for its national security. Was this a deliberate omission? A lack of understanding of Korean security among party officials who drafted the platform? Or is it an indication that a Harris administration would shift to an arms control regime thus ceding victory to Kim Jong Un's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies?
S. Korea reaffirms shared commitment to N.K. denuclearization after Democratic platform shows no mention of it | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · August 20, 2024
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Aug. 20 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States remain unchanged in their commitment to denuclearizing North Korea, the foreign ministry said Tuesday, after no mention of the issue in the Democratic Party's new policy platform raised question about its North Korea policy.
On Sunday, the party unveiled the proposed platform that included a renewed commitment to "stand by especially South Korea, against North Korea's provocations," but fell short of touching on the long-elusive denuclearization goal.
It stood in contrast with the 2020 platform that stated a pledge to build a "sustained, coordinated diplomatic campaign to advance the longer-term goal of denuclearization."
"The international community's commitment to the denuclearization of North Korea, including that of South Korea and the United States, is firm," foreign ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a press briefing.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong speaks during a press briefing at the ministry in Seoul on Aug. 13, 2024. (Yonhap)
The government will continue to make efforts for North Korea's denuclearization through the approach of "deterrence, dissuasion and diplomatic dialogue," Lee said.
"Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, we will continue to maintain close communication and coordination with the U.S. on North Korea-related policies and its nuclear issues," he said.
A foreign ministry official said that a party platform tends to cover broad areas in general, rather than addressing specific issues in detail.
"We understand that the platform will further take shape based on the consultations the U.S. will have with major countries after the election," the official said on condition of anonymity.
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · August 20, 2024
7. Korea denuclearization would remain goal if Harris wins White House: campaign official
And batting cleanup at the convention is Colin Kahl.
Korea denuclearization would remain goal if Harris wins White House: campaign official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 21, 2024
By Song Sang-ho and Kim Kyung-hee
WASHINGTON/CHICAGO, Aug. 20 (Yonhap) -- The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would remain a U.S. policy objective should Vice President Kamala Harris win the White House race in November, a former Pentagon official said Tuesday, dispelling concerns about the exclusion of the goal in the Democratic Party's new policy platform.
Colin Kahl, former undersecretary of defense for policy, made the remarks, saying that people appear to be "overreading" the platform. He is known to have participated in a process to write the platform expected to help set the tone for Harris' policy stances.
During the Democratic National Convention in Chicago on Monday, party delegates officially adopted the platform that did not have any mention of the goal in contrast with the 2020 document that stated a pledge to advance the "longer-term goal of denuclearization."
"Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains an objective of this (Biden) administration and, I would have to imagine, a Harris-Walz administration," Kahl told a press briefing.
Colin Kahl, former undersecretary of defense for policy, speaks during a press briefing in Chicago on Aug. 20, 2024. (Yonhap)
Noting the reality of a challenging and time-consuming process to reach that objective, he highlighted a "near-term" priority to beef up deterrence against North Korean threats.
"I think realistically in the near term, I don't think that experts who look at the Korean Peninsula see an imminent prospect of denuclearization," he said.
"So the near-term priority has to be to make sure that we're defending our alliance commitments as it relates to South Korea, but also to close allies like Japan ... but also strengthening our deterrent."
The omission of the denuclearization language in the 2024 platform raised questions over whether it signals any potential policy focus shift or reflects North Korea's unwillingness to talk or other hurdles toward that goal.
Some observers said that the exclusion might reflect Washington's emphasis on doubling down on deterrence to counter North Korean threats following Pyongyang's rejections of talks over a denuclearization deal.
The omission also caused concerns that Pyongyang could misconstrue it as an opening to seek the U.S.' acknowledgment of the North as a de facto nuclear power and negotiations on arms control rather than on denuclearization -- an anathema to Seoul.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 21, 2024
8. U.S. alliance with S. Korea, Japan will get 'even stronger' regardless of election: Pentagon
Pentagon reassurance is important. Military to military relationships will always remain strong and will get stronger.
On the other hand, we have always had strong bipartisan political support for the alliance. But there are cracks in the support as the political warfare campaign of the regime and its supporters in both the South and US have influenced some legislators to take positions on issues such as a declaration of the end of the war that will actually weaken and harm the alliance. We need to reginzie, understand and expose the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies.
U.S. alliance with S. Korea, Japan will get 'even stronger' regardless of election: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 21, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 (Yonhap) -- The United States' alliance with South Korea and Japan will continue to get "even stronger," a Pentagon spokesperson said Tuesday amid questions about how the U.S. presidential election in November would affect Washington's security and foreign policy.
Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder made the remarks as Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump are in a tight race for the White House following President Joe Biden's exit from the contest last month.
"I am not going to get into a hypothetical other than to say (that) I think our alliances with Japan and South Korea are strong ... stronger than they've ever been," he told a press briefing.
"I think going into the future, you will see them continue to get even stronger," he added.
This photo, released by the Associated Press, shows Pentagon press secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder speaking during a press briefing at the Pentagon near Washington on Aug. 13, 2024. (Yonhap)
A key pillar of the Biden administration's foreign policy is to reinvigorate and leverage America's network of alliances and partnerships to confront shared challenges, including North Korean threats.
Harris is expected to build on that policy initiative, while Trump could bring about a policy shift under his "America first" credo.
Asked to comment on North Korea's claim that the ongoing major South Korea-U.S. military exercise is a rehearsal for an invasion, Ryder called it "patently false."
"These exercises are defensive in nature. They are also longstanding and these are opportunities for our forces to work together on interoperability and to learn how to operate in dissimilar environments," he said.
Seoul and Washington kicked off Ulchi Freedom Shield, an annual exercise, on Monday. It features a computer simulation-based command post exercise, concurrent field training and civil defense drills.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 21, 2024
9. S. Korea holds regular defense drills around Dokdo: source
A message to Japan. Watch for China and Russia to conduct air operations in the vicinity (as they have done in the past) and draw reactions from both Korea and Japan. China and Russia would like to add to the friction this territorial dispute causes between Korea and Japan.
S. Korea holds regular defense drills around Dokdo: source | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 21, 2024
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- South Korea conducted regular defense drills near its easternmost islets of Dokdo on Wednesday, a military source said, marking the fifth of its kind under the current Yoon Suk Yeol administration.
The biannual drills took place in waters near the pair of rocky islets in the East Sea at a similar scale as the previous year, the source said, declining to provide details.
Navy and Coast Guard vessels took part in the exercise last December without the participation of Marines.
Some of the drills in the past involved fighter jets and landing maneuvers on the islets, but they have taken place at a relatively smaller scale under the current administration.
Dokdo has long been a recurring source of tension between South Korea and Japan, as Tokyo continues to make sovereignty claims in its policy papers, public statements and school textbooks.
South Korea has been in effective control of Dokdo, with a small police detachment, since its liberation from Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.
In response to the drills last December, Tokyo lodged a protest through diplomatic channels, which Seoul dismissed.
The latest drills came as ties between the Asian neighbors have significantly warmed recently as they seek to bolster three-way security cooperation with their shared ally, the United States, amid growing security threats posed by North Korea.
South Korea launched the defense drills in 1986 and has staged them twice a year since 2003.
South Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo are seen in this undated file photo provided by the foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 21, 2024
10. S. Korea, Japan discuss ways of strengthening economic ties
Dokdo divides but economic ties should bind.
(LEAD) S. Korea, Japan discuss ways of strengthening economic ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 21, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS headline with more info; ADDS details in last 2 paras; CHANGES photo)
SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok met new Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Koichi Mizushima on Wednesday, and they discussed ways to bolster bilateral economic ties, officials said.
During the meeting, Choi told Mizushima that South Korea and Japan are "important trade partners to each other," the Ministry of Economy and Finance said in a release.
The bilateral financial ministerial dialogue, which resumed in 2023 after a seven-year hiatus, has proven to be an effective platform for Seoul and Tokyo to exchange experiences on economic and tax policies, Choi said.
Choi also asked Japan to pay close attention to next year's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, which will be held in South Korea.
Choi also shared efforts to have the country's government bond market included in the World Government Bond Index run by FTSE Russell, with Mizushima acknowledging that Seoul has made progress in making its market more accessible to foreign investors.
"The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation and communications to improve their ties ahead of the 60th anniversary of the normalization of bilateral relations," the ministry said.
Mizushima began his tenure as Japan's top envoy to Seoul in May.
South Korean Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok (L) shakes hands with Japan's new ambassador to South Korea, Koichi Mizushima, ahead of their talks in Seoul on Aug. 21, 2024, in this photo provided by Choi's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
colin@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 21, 2024
11. Prosecution team decides to drop charges against first lady in luxury bag case
(LEAD) Prosecution team decides to drop charges against first lady in luxury bag case | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · August 21, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS more info in last 2 paras)
SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- A prosecution investigation team has decided to acquit first lady Kim Keon Hee of charges related to her acceptance of a Dior handbag from a Korean American pastor in 2022, legal officials said Wednesday.
The team from the Seoul Central District Prosecutors Office (SCDPO), which is in charge of the first lady's case, has recently reported the decision to Lee Chang-soo, the head of the SCDPO, and Lee plans to report it to Prosecutor General Lee One-seok soon, the officials said.
The report to the top prosecutor is expected to take place Thursday, they added.
The SCDPO division concluded that charges of anti-graft law violation cannot be sought against Kim in connection with the allegations she illegally received the luxury bag worth about 3 million won (US$2,255) and other expensive gifts from pastor Choi Jae-young two years ago, they said.
The decision came about four months after the top prosecutor ordered the SCDPO to set up a special investigation team on the case.
The investigation team also reportedly concluded that the bag received from Choi appears to have no relevance to President Yoon Suk Yeol's duties.
The team reportedly regarded the bag as a gift exchanged between individuals to express gratitude, considering the circumstances and Choi's alleged requests for Kim's favors, including one to secure former Korean American U.S. House Rep. Jay Chang Joon Kim's future burial at a national cemetery.
The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) slammed the decision, accusing the investigation team of cutting slack for Yoon and the first lady.
"It's an act that gives impunity to the president and the first lady, and a distorted interpretation of the law that does not align with the legal principles at all," DP Rep. Jeon Hyun-heui said.
This file photo shows first lady Kim Keon Hee with President Yoon Suk Yeol. (Yonhap)
ycm@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · August 21, 2024
12. ROK-US Air Force '24-hour live flight' training... 2,000 sorties in 5 days
And they are just warming up here. I am sure they will surpass 2000 sorties a day when the proverbial stuff hits the fan for real.
This is a good message to send to the regime elite and the nKPA because the one aspect of ROK/US military capabilities they fear the most is airpower. The most common propaganda theme in the north is the devastation of the cities and towns of the north during the Korean War. It is air power that is one of the factors that has had the regime pursue nuclear weapons for decades. Air power strikes fear in the hearts of the elite and the nKPA.
This is a Google translation.
ROK-US Air Force '24-hour live flight' training... 2,000 sorties in 5 days
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/jointdrill-08202024090139.html
Seoul-Hong Seung-wook hongs@rfa.org
2024.08.20
The ROK-US Air Force announced on the 20th that they are conducting the first 24-hour live flight training for multi-domain missions with the participation of five squadrons from the two countries from the 19th to the 23rd. The photo shows KF-16 fighter jets from the 20th Fighter Squadron of the ROK Air Force taxiing before the training. [Provided by the Air Force]
/Yonhap News
Anchor : The South Korean and U.S. air forces are conducting live-flight training with some 200 aircraft participating as part of the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint exercise . Over 2,000 sorties are expected to take place over the course of five days . Hong Seung-wook reports from Seoul .
The ROK-US military authorities began the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint training exercise, which will continue until the 29th , at 00:01 on the 19th .
The Korean Air Force announced on the 20th that in connection with this, it has been conducting '24 -hour live flight training for performing multi - domain missions ' since the first day of the UFS exercise .
This training, which will be held for five days until the 23rd , will mobilize a large force of about 200 aircraft , including F-16 and A-10 fighters from the 8th and 51st Fighter Squadrons from the U.S. Air Force , and F-15K, FA-50, and KF-16 fighters from the 11th, 16th , and 20th Fighter Squadrons from the ROK Air Force .
The ROK-US air forces plan to conduct a record-breaking 2,000 sorties over 120 consecutive hours to enhance their wartime operational capabilities .
In relation to this, the Korean Air Force stated, “ In the past, one squadron each from the Korean and U.S. Air Forces conducted 24 -hour flight training , but this is the first time that multiple squadrons have simultaneously undertaken 24- hour flight training . ”
In this exercise, the ROK and U.S. air forces will review pre-planned wartime air missions and verify their ability to conduct air operations in multiple domains, including at sea and on land.
The training will involve the use of virtual enemy aircraft, and the plan is to enhance realism by assuming situations such as enemy aircraft infiltration and cruise missile launches .
Air squadrons performing ground missions conduct Field Training Exercises (FTX) to support air operations, including bulk munitions assembly, maximum weapon loading, and emergency return and re-engagement .
Korea-US UFS begins...President Yoon: “Strong response to North Korea’s provocations”
ROK-US, UFS Exercise to 'Counter North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction'
As part of the ' Ulchi Exercise ' , a government-wide emergency preparedness drill, a mock drill was also conducted to check the response to GPS, or positioning information system, radio interference .
'GPS interference ' refers to an act of transmitting interference signals with a higher intensity than the GPS reception signal , thereby interfering with the normal use of services that utilize GPS signals , such as receiving location information for land, sea, and air traffic, and time information in the telecommunications, electricity, and financial sectors .
During the training that day, related ministries and companies conducted joint training, assuming a situation similar to the three GPS jamming attempts by North Korea this year .
Minister of Science and ICT Yoo Sang-im, who hosted the training, emphasized , “As North Korea has recently attempted to jam GPS signals frequently , we need to respond quickly to radio interference situations to prevent them from causing major damage . ”
Earlier, South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol had pointed out GPS jamming attacks as one of the “ low-level provocations ” North Korea is carrying out on the 19th .
South Korean President Yoon Seok- yeol (19th ) : The North Korean regime is focusing on developing nuclear weapons and missiles while ignoring the miserable lives of its people. Recently, it has not hesitated to carry out low-level provocations such as GPS jamming attacks and the scattering of trash balloons .
Meanwhile, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated its position on the same day, saying, “ The international community, including South Korea and the United States, has a firm will for North Korea’s denuclearization . ” These are the words of South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lee Jae-woong .
Lee Jae-woong, South Korea's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson : The international community, including South Korea and the United States, has a firm will to denuclearize North Korea , and our government will consistently pursue efforts to denuclearize North Korea through a comprehensive approach of deterrence , deterrence , and dialogue diplomacy based on close South Korea-U.S. cooperation .
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “ Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, South Korea will continue to maintain close communication and cooperation with the U.S. regarding North Korea and North Korean nuclear policies . ”
This is an expression of the Democratic Party's position on the fact that the revised platform put forth by the US Democratic Party ahead of the upcoming presidential election in November did not explicitly include the goal of ' denuclearization of North Korea . '
In relation to this, a South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said, “ The platform does not include all policies on specific issues, ” and predicted, “ It will be specified and made visible based on the results of the upcoming presidential election and consultations with major countries . ”
Editor Lee Hyun-joo, Web Editor Kim Sang-il
13. Editorial: S. Korea must prepare as U.S. shifts focus from denuclearizing N. Korea
The influence of the Democratic platform as well as the possible return of the former president.
The ROK is always trying to figure us out and understand American politics (which is just as difficult for us in trying to figure out ROK politics).
Opinion
Editorial: S. Korea must prepare as U.S. shifts focus from denuclearizing N. Korea
https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2024/08/21/KQY6WRXWZ5GC7PMJ3KA3YOD6AU/
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2024.08.21. 08:52
President Joe Biden (right) raises Vice President Kamala Harris's hand as they take the stage on the first day of the Democratic National Convention at the United Center in Chicago, Illinois, on Aug. 19, 2024. /AP Yonhap News
Ahead of the upcoming November elections, the Democratic Party in the United States has notably removed the term “denuclearization of North Korea” from its newly adopted platform.
In contrast, the previous platform from 2020 included a commitment to pursuing a long-term goal of denuclearization through sustained diplomatic efforts.
Republican Party’s platform, released last month, also lacks any mention of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea, or denuclearization. As North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities, it seems the U.S.-led efforts to achieve denuclearization are losing momentum.
Some experts have expressed concerns that, regardless of which party wins the presidency, the next U.S. administration might shift its focus from denuclearization to nuclear arms reduction when negotiating with North Korea.
Such a shift in policy could mean the U.S. recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear state, which could possibly lead to lifting sanctions without North Korea having to give up its nuclear weapons.
If former President Donald Trump were to return to office, the possibility of this scenario cannot be ruled out. North Korea, emboldened by its nuclear status, could then exert even greater pressure in pursuit of its long-standing ambition to dominate the South, leading to a serious national crisis for S. Korea.
Last year, the United States and S. Korea activated the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) through the Washington Declaration, and just last month, they agreed on guidelines for an ‘integrated system of extended deterrence’ to counter nuclear military threats from the North by combining U.S. nuclear capabilities with S. Korean conventional forces.
For the first time, the ongoing U.S.-South Korea joint exercise, Ulchi Freedom Shield, includes training scenarios that assume a North Korean nuclear attack. It is true that under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the U.S. nuclear umbrella has been strengthened. However, in a critical moment, the question remains: would the U.S. truly sacrifice New York to protect Seoul?
Meanwhile, North Korea is steadily advancing its nuclear arsenal. Two years ago, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that North Korea could have over 200 nuclear weapons by 2027. However, this timeline may have accelerated. If this projection becomes a reality, the United States might prioritize preventing S. Korea from developing its own nuclear weapons over pursuing denuclearization in the North.
This means a non-nuclear S. Korea would not only face threats from North Korea but also from China and Russia, both of which possess far greater nuclear capabilities.
Furthermore, North Korea and Russia have essentially signed a informal alliance, agreeing to intervene if either is attacked. In this context, the removal of ‘denuclearization’ from the platforms of both U.S. parties is a serious concern that South Korea must take into account. South Korea needs to explore all possible options to ensure its national security.
14. “Strengthening the capacity of North Korean defector human rights activists to inform the public about the reality of human rights in North Korea”
We need to hear more voices from north Korea (said escapee Seohyun Lee at the Hudson Center on 29 July 2024 here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNbd-CGUkOQ)
And this is an important element of South Korea's "8.15 Unification Doctrine."
This is a Google Translation.
“Strengthening the capacity of North Korean defector human rights activists to inform the public about the reality of human rights in North Korea”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/human_rights_defector/nkhr-08202024090917.html
Seoul-Lee Jeong-eun leeje@rfa.org
2024.08.20
A poster for the short film 'Two Soldiers' directed by Jeong Ha-neul, which deals with the human rights of the North Korean People's Army.
/ Provided by Director Jeong Ha-neul
Anchor : There is an analysis in South Korea that there are increasing cases of North Korean defectors settling in South Korea and living there for a long time, actively participating in raising awareness of the reality of human rights in North Korea through broadcasting, literature, and art . Reporter Lee Jeong-eun reports from Seoul .
The report, ' North Korean defectors' activities to promote human rights in North Korea : Achievements and suggestions ' , published on the 20th by the Korea Institute for National Unification Studies .
In her report, Cho Hyun-jung, a research fellow at the Institute for Unification Studies and a North Korean defector herself, diagnosed that as the length of time North Korean defectors who have settled in South Korea has increased, there has been a significant increase in the number of cases in which they directly inform the public about the reality of human rights in North Korea through broadcast media , art , and the internet .
By appearing on TV shows or working as a film director , writer , YouTuber, etc., he vividly conveys the reality of human rights violations that North Korean residents experience during the defection process as an experienced person .
Vice-President Cho Hyun-jung cited director Jeong Ha-neul's film ' Two Soldiers (2024),' director Heo Young-chul's film ' Dotori (2023),' director Jo Moon-ho's film ' We Have Been There for So Long (2023),' author Jeong Seo-yoon's essay ' A Certain Crash Landing on You (2024),' and author Seol Song-ah's novel ' The Woman Who Stole the Sun (2023)' as relevant examples .
He also paid attention to the activities of North Korean defectors on the Internet video sharing website ' YouTube ' , explaining that there are over 100 accounts operated by them .
Research Fellow Cho said that the testimonies of North Korean defectors who left North Korea in the 1990s due to economic difficulties were the starting point for informing the international community about the reality of human rights in North Korea , and that since then, they have actively informed the international community of the reality of human rights in North Korea by speaking at the UN and other international stages and participating in NGO activities .
Meanwhile, the testimonies and activities of defectors regarding the poor human rights situation in North Korea have drawn the attention of the international community beyond South Korea , and are driving the North Korean authorities to take action . These are the words of Associate Researcher Cho Hyun-jung at the “ Unification Policy Forum ” hosted by the Institute for Unification Studies in July .
Hyun-Jeong Cho, Associate Researcher at the Institute for Unification Studies ( at the ‘ Unification Policy Forum ’ hosted by the Institute for Unification Studies in July ): The spread of information on the human rights situation in North Korea through the testimonies of defectors has heightened international interest beyond Korea to the UN and the international community , and is contributing to the role of driving the North Korean authorities to improve the human rights of its citizens .
North Korean Defector Crosses Military Demarcation Line to Produce Short Film on 'North Korean Soldiers' Human Rights'
North Korean Human Rights Film 'Acorn' Director Heo Young-chul: "Filming Next Film with Warmbier and Other Themes"
However, research fellow Cho Bu-yeon said that the human rights situation in North Korea remains dire , and that the North Korean authorities are showing a duality by strengthening social control and blocking residents' access to outside information, while externally trying to gain international support and economic assistance .
He also suggested that the role of North Korean defectors, who are the victims, has become more important in improving human rights in North Korea , and that they need to obtain specific cases of human rights violations, such as crimes against humanity, and internal North Korean data and report them to South Korean institutions and international organizations .
We have urged North Korean defector human rights activists to develop their own capabilities and actively build cooperative systems with activists in and outside of Korea .
The number of North Korean defectors who entered South Korea over the past year is 196 , an increase from 67 in 2022 and 63 in 2021, when the number was significantly reduced due to the impact of the novel coronavirus outbreak .
As of the end of June , the number of North Korean defectors who entered South Korea was approximately 34,000 .
Editor Hong Seung-wook, Web Editor Kim Sang-il
15. South Korea’s Growing Role as a Major Arms Exporter: Future Prospects in Latin America
Excerpts:
The war in Ukraine and tensions among global military powers have caused a surge in developing new defense technologies. Unmanned systems, loitering ammunition, artificial intelligence, cyber and electronic warfare, and next-generation combat aircraft are hot topics of conversation. Similarly, the procurement of conventional weaponry is increasing across Europe and elsewhere. However, to fully understand the current and future trends of arms transfers, it is essential not solely to focus on the systems or platforms themselves and their customers but also on the producers and exporters.
Given the increasing competition in the global defense market, now is the right time for South Korea to seek new partners, with Latin American countries emerging as promising candidates. Besides exploring new export destinations, the defense industry should pursue partnerships with regional countries for joint production. Also, South Korea should continue its successful strategy of donating weapons to expand its potential markets in Latin America. These efforts could provide a more secure market for the South Korean defense industry.
South Korea’s Growing Role as a Major Arms Exporter: Future Prospects in Latin America - War on the Rocks
Hoshik Nam and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez
warontherocks.com · by Hoshik Nam · August 21, 2024
The last few years have seen a surge in defense spending, particularly in regard to conventional defense technologies. “We’ve had a huge increase in demand from our European allies and partners over the last few years since the … invasion by the Russians in Ukraine,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency director James Hursch observed recently. U.S. industries are not the only suppliers benefiting from this surge in demand. South Korea has also dramatically expanded its global role as a defense technology supplier. In 2023, South Korea became one of the top 10 arms exporters in the world, exporting $14 billion worth of defense technology to 12 countries.
The South Korean government is ambitious in seeking to become the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter by 2027. The Korean defense industry has succeeded so far on account of its active arms exports, flexible conditions, and joint production, as well as consistent diplomatic support. But there are a number of potential challenges to its current trajectory: the upcoming U.S. presidential election, the Ukraine war, and competition with other major arms exporters. One promising market for Korean defense platforms and systems is Latin America, exemplified by a recent shipbuilding contract with Peru. By maintaining the current strategy that aligns with the unique needs of Latin American countries, the South Korean defense industry could diversify its market and better prepare for an unpredictable future.
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Recent Contracts
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, South Korean defense exports have expanded significantly. From 2018 to 2022, South Korean arms exports increased by over 70 percent compared to the 2013–2017 period. More specifically, the significant increase occurred from 2021 onward within the 2018–2022 period. Until 2020, the country’s exports typically ranged from $2–3 billion, but in 2021, they surged to $7.3 billion, then to $17.3 billion in 2022, and $14 billion in 2023. By March 2024 South Korea had become the 10th largest exporter of major arms. In addition, South Korea is the second-largest provider for six countries out of the 40 largest importers in 2019–2023: Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. It is the top supplier to the Philippines.
A record arms deal occurred in 2022 through a framework agreement with Poland, amounting to $22 billion, after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Since then, the Korean defense industry has significantly diversified its export destinations. After the exports to Poland, several European countries neighboring Russia, including Estonia, Finland, and Norway, purchased weapons from South Korea, In July 2024, Romania confirmed the purchase of 54 K-9 self-propelled howitzers and 36 K-10 ammunition resupply vehicles totaling $920 million. The provision of weapons to European countries holds symbolic importance, signifying that South Korea has become “a new democracy’s arsenal.”
Besides Europe, there has been a significant increase in exports to Arab countries, while the types of exported weapons are also more diverse. In 2021 and 2022, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia had major arms deals with South Korea. The weaponry sold includes K-9s for Egypt, the Chunmoo rocket launcher for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and the Cheongung II medium-range surface-to-air missile for the United Arab Emirates. This year, Saudi Arabia will also import the KM-SAM to bolster its air defense systems. The future looks promising. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s database, South Korea is scheduled to export the largest amount of artillery and tanks among the 10 largest exporters after 2023.
South Korea’s growing exports partly fill the gap created by the decline in Russian arms exports. Russia has experienced a significant decrease in its arms exports, exacerbated since 2020, due to multiple factors, including U.S. export controls and the obvious need to prioritize its own war effort. In response, South Korea has successfully started exporting weapons to former recipients of Russian arms, such as Egypt and Vietnam.
Staying Strong
The South Korean defense industries export weapons and actively collaborate with the recipient countries by transferring technologies and overseas production. Korea Aerospace Industries has an agreement to jointly develop a military cargo aircraft with the United Arab Emirates’ Tawazun, while Hyundai Heavy Industries is participating in the Saudi government’s frigate project with International Maritime Industries, a joint venture established by Hyundai Heavy Industries and Saudi Aramco. Additionally, the South Korean defense industry has started to offer “all-in-one” package deals that include non-military products alongside significant arms deals. For example, in 2019, Hyundai Rotem provided Poland not only with K9 tanks but also trams. In a recent deal with Romania, the company may supply trams that could modernize the country’s road and railway networks.
In July 2024, South Korea strengthened its ties with NATO to support its arms exports. It has become the first Asian country to agree to recognize military airworthiness certification with NATO, which is expected to facilitate collaboration in the defense sector. Additionally, as a member of the IP4 (Indo-Pacific 4), South Korea will cooperate with NATO more in terms of “supporting Ukraine, cyber defense, countering disinformation, and technology.” This close collaboration is expected to increase military cooperation with the alliance in the future.
The Uncertain Future
Several international and domestic factors could positively or negatively impact the future of South Korean defense businesses. These include the U.S. presidential election, competition with major arms exporters, particularly for the European market, and uncertainty in securing a skilled research and development workforce in South Korea.
First, if a second Trump administration continued to emphasize Europeans paying their “fair share” of defense costs, many European countries might increase investment towards domestically developed defense systems and weapons. This shift, combined with the growing caution regarding Korean weapons among European countries, could reduce their purchases of South Korean arms. On the other hand, a Harris administration may not significantly impact the South Korean defense industry’s course, provided it continues with President Joe Biden’s foreign arms sale policy. Vice President Kamala Harris has previously committed to stand with Ukraine. European demand for additional defense technology and weapons from South Korea would also hinge on the future of the conflict in Ukraine. If the conflict ends it would likely diminish European arms purchases. Yet tensions between European governments and Russia will likely continue, allowing Korean industries to still secure contracts.
Increasing competition among different countries could also jeopardize the performance of the Korean defense industry. For example, neighboring countries such as Japan are also trying to boost their arms export businesses. In 2023, the Japanese government revised the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, making it easier to export completed non-lethal and lethal technology to foreign countries if certain conditions are met. As Japanese weapons start to be exported more widely, South Korean defense firms may lose some market share. At the earliest, this could occur within 5–10 years. Additionally, more European countries are emphasizing the expansion of their defense industries. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has insisted that to build European sovereignty and long-term autonomy, Europe should be responsible for developing its defense industry rather than relying on U.S. or South Korean weapons.
Third, there are ongoing concerns about the future of South Korea’s defense industries, particularly in securing a skilled research and development workforce. The country’s largest defense companies are already experiencing significant shortages of research and development experts. This is mainly due to limited salaries, unstable job security from project-based approaches, restrictions on private-sector employment for former military personnel and researchers, and high demand for security maintenance. These challenges could hinder the industry’s ability to develop and acquire advanced technologies, such as aircraft engines, which may see higher demand and profitability in the future. Recognizing these challenges, some companies, such as Hanwha Aerospace, have established branches in other countries to secure a skilled workforce. However, not all defense companies have the budget and resources to pursue this option. These workforce-related issues cast uncertainty over the future of South Korea’s defense industry and could become a more prominent problem once the current high demand for weapons decreases and stabilizes.
Latin America: Land of Opportunity
Amid these potential factors that could negatively affect the Korean defense industry’s future, what kind of strategy should the industry adopt? One strategy could be to further diversify its list of customers by approaching new markets, particularly in Latin America.
One of the primary characteristics of the Latin American defense market is the lack of vast defense budgets compared to Europe or the Arab world. Hence, while arms sales can help cement defense relations, they may not be highly profitable for exporters in the short term. However, arms sales are not necessarily one-time transactions: Their repercussions can extend over a longer period. Considering the lock-in effect, securing the market early can be much more profitable in the long term, even if revenues in the short term are more modest or marginal. For this reason, major European defense industries focus on technical knowledge transfers and offset agreements with South American defense ministries and militaries to maintain their engagement and solidify partnerships. For example, European defense industries have secured contracts with Latin American militaries by focusing on technological transfer and teaching regional defense industries the “know-how.” Brazilian shipyards and France’s Naval Group have teamed up to manufacture four Scorpene-class submarines and one nuclear-powered submarine for the Brazilian navy. Meanwhile, the Dutch shipyard Damen is partnering with the Colombian shipbuilding corporation COTECMAR to build frigates for the Colombian fleet.
The South Korean defense industry follows a similar strategy, focusing on joint production. It has slowly developed partnerships with Latin American countries, specifically with Peru. In April, Hyundai Heavy Industries and the Peruvian shipyard SIMA signed a contract valued at around $460 million to manufacture one frigate, two landing craft units (described by SIMA as a multi-role vessel and an auxiliary transport vessel), and an offshore patrol vessel by 2029. The sale will solidify Korean-Peruvian defense relations. Peru’s air force operates a fleet of Korean Aerospace Industries’ KT-1 Woongbi trainer aircraft, locally called KT1P, manufactured by the air force’s maintenance service department (SEMAN). Similarly, the Peruvian army plans to purchase 30 8×8 White Tiger armored vehicles from Hyundai Rotem.
The South Korean defense industry has also focused on technology transfers to its Peruvian partners. The Hyundai Heavy Industries contract with SIMA is significant not only because it is the first of its kind for South Korea with Latin America, but also because, from the Peruvian side, their shipyard will learn how to build frigates and more complex systems. If the production of the four vessels is successful, Lima could continue relying on Seoul for new ships and maybe even submarines, provided they are manufactured in Peru. This successful collaboration with Peruvian counterparts could help develop future partnerships and sales agreements with other countries in Latin America. Other regional air forces, namely those of Colombia and Peru, are looking to modernize their fleet of primary combat aircraft. The Colombian air force, for example, flies Israel Aircraft Industries Kfir warplanes, which are around four decades old, while the Peruvian air force flies a mixed fleet of old Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s, and Su-25s. Both services seek replacements, and Seoul could offer the KF-21 Boramae fighter aircraft. A successful partnership with Peru could be highly profitable, not just in terms of revenue, in the future.
South Korea’s approach to Latin America has a unique aspect that could facilitate future collaborations: donations. Over the past decade, Seoul has donated corvettes and patrol vessels to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and, most recently, Uruguay. Seoul could continue to use donations to establish relations with South American navies, hoping to sell vessels and other maritime systems in the future.
Besides South Korea, there are two major donors to the countries in Latin America: China and the United States. However, their donations are different and do not necessarily overwhelm or negate the effect of South Korean ones. Over the past decade, Beijing has donated mostly non-lethal technology, including small patrol boats, transport vehicles, and equipment for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Recipient countries include Guyana, Peru, and Uruguay. While donations arguably help diplomatic and military-to-military relations, Beijing has yet to enter the Latin American defense market. Attempts to sell warplanes and armored vehicles to Argentina, for example, have not been successful despite generally cordial diplomatic relations and strong trade between Beijing and Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, Washington continues to be a major, if not the premier, supplier of military technology to Latin American and Caribbean militaries. Donations this year include drones to El Salvador, an ongoing project to manufacture a fleet of 13 near coastal patrol vessels for U.S. allies across the Greater Caribbean, and armored vehicles to Uruguay for peacekeeping operations. These examples do not include direct sales between regional Ministries of Defense and U.S. defense companies. However, given the nature of the inter-American system and U.S. relations with (most) Western Hemisphere nations, Washington stands in a different category than other countries, like South Korea or China, who seek to break into the region’s defense markets.
In other words, donating military technology is another tool governments and militaries can utilize to strengthen relationships or develop new ones. Donating decommissioned corvettes and patrol boats may help Seoul gain South American clients for Korean-made maritime platforms, a promising market given regional maritime security threats, challenges, and the necessity to modernize fleets. While Beijing and Washington have donated some vessels to Greater Caribbean militaries, Seoul’s donation of bigger assets may be a deal-breaker to secure future customers.
Arguably, Seoul is already seeking more partners in the region. For example, the Korean ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Sangryul Lee, met with their air force commander, Maj. Gen. Carlos R. Febrillet Rodríguez, in early July. They pledged to continue bilateral cooperation, though no specific defense project was reportedly discussed. Certainly, other defense manufacturing countries hold similar meetings across the region, while extra-regional defense companies participate in defense expos like Brazil’s Latin America Aerospace and Defense, Chile’s Feria Internacional del Aire y del Espacio, or Colombia’s Expodefensa. South Korea is seeking new customers and partners, but should remember that there are many other domestic, regional, and extra-regional suppliers.
To access the Latin American market, South Korean defense industries should continue the collaborative work and offer further donations and technology sharing based on the unique challenges and defense priorities of Latin American countries.
Final Thoughts
South Korea has recently increased and diversified the sale of defense systems and platforms. The country now ranks among the top 10 global exporters, and its status and profit margin (including revenue) could increase in the coming years. It is not an exaggeration to argue that South Korea’s defense industry is enjoying a new golden age.
The war in Ukraine and tensions among global military powers have caused a surge in developing new defense technologies. Unmanned systems, loitering ammunition, artificial intelligence, cyber and electronic warfare, and next-generation combat aircraft are hot topics of conversation. Similarly, the procurement of conventional weaponry is increasing across Europe and elsewhere. However, to fully understand the current and future trends of arms transfers, it is essential not solely to focus on the systems or platforms themselves and their customers but also on the producers and exporters.
Given the increasing competition in the global defense market, now is the right time for South Korea to seek new partners, with Latin American countries emerging as promising candidates. Besides exploring new export destinations, the defense industry should pursue partnerships with regional countries for joint production. Also, South Korea should continue its successful strategy of donating weapons to expand its potential markets in Latin America. These efforts could provide a more secure market for the South Korean defense industry.
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Hoshik Nam is an assistant professor of political science at Jacksonville State University. He previously served as an active-duty enlisted member of the Korean Army at the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command. He received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Iowa.
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington. He monitors defense and security, geopolitical, and trade issues across Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. He is a non-resident senior associate in the Americas program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Image: Michel Temer via Wikimedia Commons
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Hoshik Nam · August 21, 2024
16. U.S. Army Has A Plan For Paragliding Paratroopers
Funny thing is our ROK Special Forces brothers have been conducting paraglide operations for years. Every time we would go to Maesan RI for airborne operations we would see them launching from the hills. Most of the time people laughed it off and said there would never be an application for this capability.
As an aside you might want to watch this video for some airborne history.
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/vvS7mOGu1OM
The background story is here: https://www.asomf.org/womens-history-month-the-incredible-story-of-georgia-tiny-broadwick/
U.S. Army Has A Plan For Paragliding Paratroopers
Paragliders could give airborne and other Army units valuable new ways to get around and perform other missions on contested battlefields.
Joseph Trevithick
Posted on Aug 20, 2024 1:56 PM EDT
8 minute read
twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick
The U.S. Army is looking at paragliders as a way to give conventional forces, especially airborne units, new options for getting around the battlefield and surveilling enemy forces. The service says these capabilities, which are already found in the special operations community, could be especially useful during a future high-end fight in environments that are too risky for traditional fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to operate in.
The Army put out a contracting notice regarding what it is currently calling the Personnel Air Mobility System (PAMS) earlier today.
Specifically, the Army Combat Capabilities Development Command-Soldier Center‘s Soldier Sustainment Directive (DEVCOM-SC SSD) “is seeking information on technologies or capabilities of private entities (non-profit and commercial) to develop a preliminary Personnel Air Mobility system design that will support a prototype project,” according to the notice. “The Personnel Air Mobility System (PAMS) is planned to be developed to support the U.S. Army’s Airborne forces by addressing a capability gap to provide unit organic personnel air mobility to support freedom of movement in contested environments.”
A member of U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) uses a paraglider during a public capabilities demonstration earlier this year. Jamie Hunter
“Future battlefield threats are expected to require disbursed operations by small units in complex, contested environments,” the notice continues. “Traditional air assets, including fixed wing and rotary wing transport aircraft, will likely be unavailable for the movement of small teams due to supporting other missions and the difficulty of operating these vehicles in anti-access/area denial threat areas.”
“Development of a PAMS will provide an additional option to the unit commander, supporting freedom of action in remote and austere locations. This new system will be capable of transporting individual warfighters hundreds of kilometers, reducing dependency on traditional aircraft platforms and extending the range available through traditional parachute infiltration systems,” the request for proposals adds. “The PAMS will support multiple mission types including reconnaissance, surveillance, troop movement, infiltration and exfiltration. This new PAMS will also significantly reduce the cost to deliver/transport warfighters over traditional means.”
To meet these mission requirements, the Army is looking at a motorized paraglider with a range of at least 62 miles (100 kilometers) that can get up to an altitude of 10,000 feet mean sea level. Objectively, the service is interested in a PAMS that can fly to destinations as far as 186 miles (300 kilometers) away and at altitudes as high as 20,000 feet mean sea level. A supplementary oxygen source would be required for sustained flight at the upper limits of that altitude requirement. This is also something that is necessary for very high-altitude freefall parachute jumps.
A member of the US Army seen making use of a supplementary oxygen system during a high-altitude freefall parachute jump. US Army
Flying at low altitudes using nap-of-the-earth flight profiles would make paragliding troopers harder to detect and reduce their vulnerability to threats in the air and on the ground. Paragliders, in general, have low radar, infrared, sound, and other signatures, which would make it even more difficult for defenders to spot and track them. At the same time, operating at higher altitudes, where viable, would also offer benefits in terms of aerodynamic efficiency and, by extension, fuel economy and range.
In addition, the Army wants the PAMS paraglider itself to weigh no more than 75 pounds without fuel, and potentially as light as 60 pounds, while still having a payload capacity of up to at least 350 pounds, and maybe as much as 400 pounds. The weight of the weapons and gear a typical soldier might be called upon to carry varies widely depending on the mission and other factors, but data from recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that it can easily be more than 100 pounds. Paratroopers expected to operate for extended periods without access to well-established supply chains could well find themselves carrying more. The low logistics footprint required to operate paragliders would offer additional benefits to airborne and other conventional forces operating at the tactical edge, or even behind enemy lines.
Members of the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, laden with parachutes and other gear, board a US Air Force C-130 cargo plane during training. USAF
For general Army use, paragliders might be useful in other roles beyond just getting soldiers around and surveilling opponents, such as casualty evaluation and delivery of small cargoes to frontline units. U.S. special operations units have employed uncrewed cargo paraglider systems called CQ-10A SnowGooses for resupply missions.
It is also worth noting that the U.S. military as a whole is looking for new and novel ways to help rescue downed aircrew in contested environments. Depending on circumstances, forward-deployed teams might be able to use paragliders to reach those personnel and extract them. Paragliders could potentially be air-dropped to rescuees to allow them to escape on their own or at least move to an area where it might be easier for combat search and rescue units to retrieve them.
As mentioned, U.S. special operations forces have already been at least testing and evaluating paragliders, if not operationally using them to some degree, for many of the same reasons the Army has outlined in its PAMS contracting notice. Members of U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) used them to descend into the harbor area in Tampa, Florida during a biennial public capabilities demonstration earlier this year. That event also highlighted the potential for paragliders to be used as small electronic warfare platforms, as well as for mobility and reconnaissance and surveillance, as you can read more about here.
“The parafoil, in general, is a great special operations platform that the Marines are taking advantage of. It’s something that’s easily deployable, it’s light, it’s inexpensive, it uses unleaded gasoline, so you can find that anywhere,” Jim Gregory, the Deputy Director of SOCOM’s Office of Communications, told The War Zone at the time. “And it’s something that can take off from say a ship or you know an otherwise fairly inaccessible area for air capability. So they can get operators up off the ground and take advantage of that other [air] dimension of warfare … that they might not otherwise be able to.”
The U.S. Navy has at least explored the possibility of using paragliders to help Marines, in general, get from amphibious warfare ships to the shore and as airborne surveillance platforms in the past, as well.
In the unprecedented surprise attacks on southern Israel in October 2023, Hamas terrorists also notably used paragliders, underscoring their value for getting personnel into more contested areas. North Korean commandos have trained to employ them to infiltrate across the DMZ and attack critical sites, as well.
This is a known infiltration capability. Paragliders have small radar and thermal signature, very low altitude flight profile, can fly below speed gate settings of certain warning and fire control radars. Widely accessible and not too hard to operate. https://t.co/ZahYPti7rv
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) October 7, 2023
As the new PAMS contracting notice explains, the Army is looking at a future full of distributed operations, especially as part of a potential high-end fight, such as one against the Chinese in the Pacific. In a major conflict with a near-peer competitor like China, U.S. forces would have to contend with an ever-growing anti-access and area denial threat ecosystem. This presents immediate challenges for getting airlifters loaded with paratroopers into the fight. When it comes to moving personnel and materiel by air once in theater, as well as providing organic aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, these issues are further compounded for the Army, which continues to rely heavily on traditional helicopters for these missions. The ongoing war in Ukraine has underscored the threats that helicopters face from modern air defenses.
This all looks to have factored into the Army’s selection of a derivative of Bell’s V-280 Valor tilt-rotor as the successor to at least a portion of its UH-60 Black Hawk fleets in 2022 and its cancellation of the Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program this year. In Febraury, the service announced other major changes to its future aviation plans, including increased investments in new drones.
Whether or not paragliding paratroopers, or other conventional Army forces, become a reality on a broad scale remains to be seen. The service has explored a host of concepts intended to provide individual soldiers with a degree of air mobility, including jetpacks and rocket belts, since the 1960s, but none of them have been adopted for general use. At the same time, paragliders are a known commodity that have already made inroads in the special operations realm.
It is not hard to see how the qualities that make paragliders attractive to special operations units – low cost, low footprint, and low probability of detection – would make them appealing for more general Army use.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
Deputy Editor
Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.
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twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick
De Oppresso Liber,
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Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
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