Quotes of the Day:

"It is easier to conquer than to rule. WIth sufficient lever, the would may be moved by a finger; but to support it the shoulders of Hercules are required."

– Jean-Jacques Rousseau

"Never waste valuable time or mental peace of mind, on the affairs of others – that is too high a price to pay."

– Robert Greene

"You can never really live anyone else's life, not even your child's. The influence you exert is through your own life, and what you've become yourself." 

– Eleanor Roosevelt

1. North Korea’s Top Officers Sent to Russia Are Abruptly Called Home

2. Preparing for the Silent Surge: Countering North Korea’s Gambit in a Dual Contingency

3. When America stops leading, Asia starts looking elsewhere

4. China’s North Korea Problem: How America Can Encourage Beijing to Rein in Pyongyang

5. N. Korea's Kim hails ground commanders of troops deployed in Russia's war on Ukraine

6. N. Korea condemns Britain over warships' visit to S. Korean port

7. Lee vows national interest-focused diplomacy ahead of summits with Trump, Ishiba

8. Hackers who exposed North Korean government hacker explain why they did it

9. Expert notes possibility of Trump raising 'sensitive' China issue in summit with Lee

10. FM Cho departs early for Washington ahead of Lee-Trump summit

11. North Korean denuclearization should start with weapons freeze: ROK president

12. Bill Gates calls on S. Korea to chart course for gradual hike in development aid spending

13. Editorial: Why hide North Korea's human rights abuses?

14. Inside secret behind Hyundai Rotem's K2 export breakthrough

15. North Korean elders mourned lost unification dreams on Aug. 15 anniversary

16. U.S. pressure mounts ahead of Lee-Trump summit

17. President to visit Hanwha's US shipyard alongside summit with Trump

1. North Korea’s Top Officers Sent to Russia Are Abruptly Called Home

Excerpts:

“Ours is a heroic army,” Kim was quoted as saying. The 41-year-old dictator hugged several of the returning commanders.

Some 15,000 North Korean soldiers have arrived in Russia since last fall, having helped Moscow almost entirely eject Ukraine from the Russian region of Kursk earlier this year. Now the front lines are firmly in Ukrainian territory, with summertime fighting heavy in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region.

The commanders’ homecoming signals Russia’s confidence that it can hold the Kursk region by itself, while allowing the Kremlin to avoid North Korea from being a sticking point in any peace negotiations to end the Ukraine war, said Michael Madden, a North Korea expert at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. 

“The North Koreans shouldn’t be a bone of contention at the negotiating table as they are operating on Russian territory,” Madden said.

North Korea’s Top Officers Sent to Russia Are Abruptly Called Home

The Kim regime’s heavy combat involvement could be a complication in peace talks and the use of his forces on the battlefield has waned in recent months

https://www.wsj.com/world/north-koreas-top-officers-sent-to-russia-are-abruptly-called-home-ff4af0c4

By Dasl Yoon

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Aug. 21, 2025 5:49 am ET

In an image released by North Korean state media, Kim Jong Un meets with top commanders. Photo: KCNA/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Quick Summary

• Top North Korean military officers returned from Russia and received a hero’s welcome from Kim Jong Un.View more

SEOUL—Kim Jong Un’s top military officers have returned from Russia, suggesting North Korea’s combat contributions could take a back seat and potentially allow for Pyongyang’s role to be played down in any peace talks over the war in Ukraine.

More than a dozen top North Korean commanders appeared in Kim’s personal office, receiving a hero’s welcome for fighting in Russia’s Kursk region, according to photographs published Thursday in Pyongyang’s state-run media. 

At least two of the attendees—Col. Gen. Kim Yong Bok and Maj. Gen. Sin Kum Chol—were embraced and personally thanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin at Russia’s Victory Day parade in May. They had arrived in Pyongyang for North Korea’s first commendation ceremony for the overseas deployment, state media said.

It is possible that the North Korean commanders are redeployed to Russia, though their departure follows a downturn in combat operations involving North Korean forces in recent months. North Korea is still supplying Russia with artillery shells and munitions, and recently vowed to send an additional 6,000 workers to aid Russia’s reconstruction efforts.

In an image released by Russian state media, President Vladimir Putin is shown with North Korean military leaders at the Victory Day parade in Moscow earlier this year. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/TASS/Zuma Press

“Ours is a heroic army,” Kim was quoted as saying. The 41-year-old dictator hugged several of the returning commanders.

Some 15,000 North Korean soldiers have arrived in Russia since last fall, having helped Moscow almost entirely eject Ukraine from the Russian region of Kursk earlier this year. Now the front lines are firmly in Ukrainian territory, with summertime fighting heavy in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region.

The commanders’ homecoming signals Russia’s confidence that it can hold the Kursk region by itself, while allowing the Kremlin to avoid North Korea from being a sticking point in any peace negotiations to end the Ukraine war, said Michael Madden, a North Korea expert at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. 

“The North Koreans shouldn’t be a bone of contention at the negotiating table as they are operating on Russian territory,” Madden said.

North Korea May Deepen Ukraine Involvement With Troop Surge

Play video: North Korea May Deepen Ukraine Involvement With Troop Surge

From the archive: In June, South Korean lawmakers claimed North Korea might send more troops to Russia as early as July to support its war in Ukraine. WSJ’s Dasl Yoon reports. Photo: AFP/Getty Images

North Korean troops have only engaged in battle on Russian land, South Korean officials have said. That allows Pyongyang and Moscow to frame their cooperation as adhering to a mutual-defense pact the two countries signed last year. Pushing into Ukraine risks undermining their claim that the military cooperation is purely defensive.

North Korea stayed mum about its involvement in the war for months. Then, in April, Pyongyang publicly acknowledged its role for the first time. Since then, North Korea has publicly broadcast video footage of a teary-eyed Kim standing over the flag-draped coffins of fallen soldiers.

According to Western intelligence estimates, North Korean troops have incurred more than 5,000 casualties in the Ukraine conflict—a third of whom have been killed.

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

2. Preparing for the Silent Surge: Countering North Korea’s Gambit in a Dual Contingency

I concur with Dr. Kim. My focus (below) has been on IW in north Korea as a result of post regime collapse and post conflict scenarios for the most part though I strongly agree that we need to conduct an IW campaign plan for north Korea. But the bottom line is we are missing the boat on the IW threat in Korea (because we have to be consumed with the nuclear threat and the very likely large scale combat operations that will be conducted. But there are people and headquarters that could focus on this for the Alliance)

Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/developing-an-irregular-warfare-campaign-for-north-korea/

Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula (2010)

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_11-23_ch14.htm

A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/26/a-modern-national-security-decision-directive/

A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/a-psychological-operations-strategy-for-the-korean-peninsula-from-lessons-learned-in-ukraine/

Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Competition, Deterrence, and Irregular Warfare

https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/284

See this article (pages 411-430):

III. More than a Terror State: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a Misunderstood and Neglected Global Malign Actor that Requires an Innovative New Strategy

https://jsouapplicationstorage.blob.core.windows.net/press/551/2025_RR Book_FINAL.pdf

And of course we cannot focus solely on Korea (or solely on Taiwan). They are both/and not either/or.

America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/

Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/

Excerpts:

To mitigate this risk, U.S., Japanese, and Republic of Korea planners must transcend traditional combined arms paradigms and systematically integrate irregular warfare (IW) countermeasures across joint and multinational planning. This effort could begin with the establishment of a standing Trilateral Special Operations Coordination Cell, preferably co-located with U.S. forces in Okinawa or at Camp Humphreys, to facilitate intelligence fusion, flexible response options, and high-fidelity mission planning tailored to rear-area sabotage scenarios.

Second, the three allies should conduct recurring IW-focused command post and field exercises utilizing red teams modeled on North Korean SOF tactics. These exercises should simulate coordinated, multi-domain attacks on soft targets such as urban subway systems, water treatment plants, media broadcast centers, and hospital networks, integrating cyber-physical threats and information warfare effects.

Third, national-level civil-military resilience mechanisms must be elevated to strategic priority considering potential rear-area sabotage and covert attacks by North Korean special operations forces. In both Japan and South Korea, operators of critical infrastructure—especially in the energy, telecommunications, and transport sectors—must be integrated into national defense drills that simulate SOF-led attacks, cyber-physical disruption, and disinformation.

Preparing for the Silent Surge: Countering North Korea’s Gambit in a Dual Contingency

irregularwarfare.org · Ju Hyung Kim · August 21, 2025

Strategic planners across the Indo-Pacific must reckon with an increasingly plausible scenario: a dual contingency in which North Korea opportunistically launches a full-scale war against South Korea while China conducts military operations against Taiwan. Such a scenario, discussed in a recent Atlantic Council report, represents an acute test of U.S. extended deterrence and allied defense posture in the region.

Yet, an overlooked dimension of this potential conflict lies not in nuclear escalation—but in North Korea’s probable deployment of irregular warfare tactics against U.S., Japanese, and South Korean rear-area targets. While the Guardian Tiger simulations emphasized North Korea’s use of tactical nuclear weapons, it remains plausible—perhaps even preferable from Pyongyang’s perspective—to abstain from nuclear use in the opening stages of conflict. North Korea’s regime may remain deterred from nuclear escalation by the United States’ extended deterrence, reinforced by robust trilateral coordination with Japan and South Korea through mechanisms such as the Camp David Summit agreements and the Nuclear Consultative Group.

Meanwhile, nuclear use could undermine North Korea’s ideological narrative of Korean liberation from “U.S. imperialism” and alienate potential diplomatic supporters such as Russia or China. Instead, Kim Jong Un may seek to exploit the United States’ and its allies’ distraction by unleashing asymmetric capabilities—particularly North Korean special operations forces (SOF)—to sabotage critical infrastructure, disrupt command and control, and sow social and psychological disruption across both South Korea and Japan.

The Silent Threat: North Korean Special Forces in a Dual War Scenario

North Korea’s SOF—estimated at over 200,000 troops—are a formidable unconventional force. Their operational doctrine emphasizes stealth, rapid infiltration, and psychological effect over brute force. Their mission set is extensive: sabotage of civilian infrastructure, disruption of airbase and seaport operations, insertion into urban centers to spread panic, and targeted assassination or abduction of political and military leaders.

Even more concerning is the possibility of dual-front SOF operations, in which North Korean operatives strike not only the South Korean homeland but also critical U.S. and Japanese military installations across Japan, including those operated by U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), in concert with Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. The United States and Japan jointly developed Concept Plan 5055—which later evolved into Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5055—to define bilateral response options in the event of a Korean contingency. That plan, as noted in a recent interview, explicitly considers the possibility of North Korean special operations forces infiltrating Japanese territory and targeting as many as 135 critical facilities.

North Korean planners are believed to envision two primary infiltration methods. First, operatives disguise themselves as North or South Korean refugees or civilians, potentially arriving in Japan amid the chaos of full-scale conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Second, forces make covert maritime landings using small fishing boats along the Japanese mainland to evade detection. The Japanese Coast Guard is better postured to interdict covert maritime infiltrations, but both scenarios present challenges for planners and defense forces.

North Korean special operations forces are also gaining valuable experience in realistic, modern scenarios. In late 2024, North Korea deployed thousands of military personnel to support Russia in its war against Ukraine. Special operations units such as the Storm Corps operated under Russian command and in Russian uniforms, integrated into Russian brigades, and have engaged in frontline combat during the Kursk offensive—receiving a crash course on modern hybrid warfare in real combat conditions, at the cost of thousands of lives.

Even if their role was limited, such experience—or even secondhand observation through liaison and embedded officers—may allow Pyongyang to absorb and adapt new tactics tested through years of conflict in Ukraine. These new tactics include the battlefield use of loitering munitions, mobile encrypted communications, GPS spoofing and jamming, and deep-cover infiltration strategies. The Ukraine conflict may thus serve as a live laboratory for North Korea’s future doctrine innovation and force modernization, especially for its special operations forces.

One could envision North Korea’s strategy as consisting of a two-pronged campaign: a high-tempo conventional invasion aimed at quickly seizing symbolic and strategic terrain north of the Han River, coupled with the simultaneous deployment of special operations forces to South Korea’s rear areas. The conventional thrust would aim to create military leverage near Seoul, while SOF units would create a second front that focuses on infiltration via subterranean tunnels, coastal infiltration using semi-submersible boats, or civilian disguises aboard commercial vessels. Their goals could include sabotaging critical infrastructure, paralyzing logistics, and sowing psychological disruption, maximizing chaos before a coordinated Republic of Korea-U.S. response could be fully mobilized.

Meanwhile, coordinated sabotage attacks on USFJ bases in Okinawa, Iwakuni, and Yokota could delay U.S. reinforcements, distract focus from other regional conflicts, and degrade command and control capacity. Such an approach seeks to create the perception of paralysis across allied rear areas, enabling North Korea to push for a rapid ceasefire and political settlement under a fait accompli framework before U.S. reinforcements arrive from the continental United States.

To be sure, South Korea would respond with layered, coordinated defense across multiple domains, limiting the long-term impact of North Korea’s two-pronged strategy. Nevertheless, the initial stages of such an assault would be deeply disruptive, especially in the information domain and civil infrastructure. The risks of public panic, strategic delay, and political pressure for ceasefire make this a serious and urgent threat that conventional force posture alone cannot deter.

A Trilateral Response: Integrating Irregular Warfare Countermeasures

To mitigate this risk, U.S., Japanese, and Republic of Korea planners must transcend traditional combined arms paradigms and systematically integrate irregular warfare (IW) countermeasures across joint and multinational planning. This effort could begin with the establishment of a standing Trilateral Special Operations Coordination Cell, preferably co-located with U.S. forces in Okinawa or at Camp Humphreys, to facilitate intelligence fusion, flexible response options, and high-fidelity mission planning tailored to rear-area sabotage scenarios.

Second, the three allies should conduct recurring IW-focused command post and field exercises utilizing red teams modeled on North Korean SOF tactics. These exercises should simulate coordinated, multi-domain attacks on soft targets such as urban subway systems, water treatment plants, media broadcast centers, and hospital networks, integrating cyber-physical threats and information warfare effects.

Third, national-level civil-military resilience mechanisms must be elevated to strategic priority considering potential rear-area sabotage and covert attacks by North Korean special operations forces. In both Japan and South Korea, operators of critical infrastructure—especially in the energy, telecommunications, and transport sectors—must be integrated into national defense drills that simulate SOF-led attacks, cyber-physical disruption, and disinformation.

Governments should establish public-private coordination frameworks to support rapid threat dissemination, infrastructure hardening, and continuity of operations—particularly in sectors like energy, telecommunications, and transportation where private operators play a critical role. Models such as Japan’s Basic Act on Cybersecurity, which mandates coordination between the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity and key infrastructure companies, and South Korea’s Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure, which provides the legal basis for incorporating private entities into cyber-physical resilience planning, offer valuable precedents.

At the municipal level, Japan’s Tokyo Metropolitan Government has conducted integrated disaster response and cybersecurity exercises with Tokyo Electric Power Company and NTT Group. In South Korea, while wartime-specific drills remain limited at the local level, city governments are increasingly engaged in public-private coordination for emergency communication and infrastructure resilience. Municipalities across both countries should build on these models to rehearse citizen alert protocols and emergency response, drawing on Cold War-era civil defense concepts while adapting them to the realities of modern hybrid threats.

This emphasis on resilience aligns with the argument advanced in Winning Without Fighting: Resilience as National Security Imperative, which proposes resilience as a fifth pillar of national power, alongside the traditional diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments. The authors contend that in an era defined by persistent geopolitical competition, climate disasters, pandemics, and technological shocks, the ability to endure and recover from crisis is as vital to national security as battlefield strength. In this view, resilience is not merely reactive but constitutes a form of strategic deterrence—enabling societies to withstand disinformation campaigns, infrastructure sabotage, and irregular warfare without collapsing under pressure while raising the costs of an aggressor’s actions. For frontline democracies like Japan and South Korea, institutionalizing resilience is no longer a luxury but a strategic imperative.

Fourth, to ensure operational readiness, the U.S. and its allies should consider adapting existing prepositioning and joint-use frameworks—such as APS-4 in Korea and Japan—to irregular warfare needs. This could include forward-deploying defense kits tailored for tactics associated with irregular warfare, including comprising swarm drone counters, electronic warfare gear, and SOF detection tools near critical infrastructure nodes. While not yet standard practice, such adaptations represent a logical extension of current force posture amid growing irregular threats.

Finally, given the psychological and disinformation dimension of irregular warfare, the three nations must develop a trilateral information operations strategy to inoculate civil society against fear and misinformation. This strategy should include a unified crisis communication framework, joint public service messaging capabilities, and contingency plans for countering fake news, deepfakes, or manipulated casualty reports disseminated by adversaries during the opening stages of conflict.

Building Irregular Resilience Before It’s Too Late

North Korea’s most dangerous asset may not be its nuclear arsenal, but its ability to wage irregular warfare in the shadows of a broader regional conflict. As China draws U.S. attention toward Taiwan, Pyongyang may calculate that a fast, asymmetric strike against Japan and South Korea could shift the strategic initiative. The consequences of failing to prepare for such a scenario would be dire: strategic delay, domestic confusion, and allied disunity.

Only a unified, integrated response by the United States, Japan, and South Korea—built around irregular warfare resilience and real-time operational coordination—can blunt the effects of such a silent surge. The time to build that network of irregular resilience is now—not in an emergency.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim is President of the Security Management Institute, a defense-focused think tank affiliated with South Korea’s National Assembly. He has published articles on special operations and unconventional threats in SOF News, Small Wars Journal, and The Defense Post. His doctoral dissertation explores Japan’s security cooperation with South Korea, including potential North Korean SOF infiltration scenarios during Korean contingencies.

Views expressed in this article solely reflect those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Image generated by ChatGPT using DALL·E, OpenAI (August 18, 2025).

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irregularwarfare.org · Ju Hyung Kim · August 21, 2025

3. When America stops leading, Asia starts looking elsewhere

"Asia starts to hedge."

A wake up call for us?

Excerpts:

None of this is inevitable. Asia is not turning away because it prefers authoritarianism, but because it feels increasingly disrespected by a power that still speaks the language of equal partnership – while treating its allies as subordinates.

If the United States still wants to lead, it must start acting like a leader again – not by coercing but by inspiring. That requires treating Asian partners not as junior clients, but as genuine co-architects of the international order.

Only by treating its partners with respect, restraint and a genuine sense of dignity can Washington regain the moral authority that once made others follow willingly.

Asia remains open to US leadership – but it will no longer follow blindly. The choice is still America’s to make. Time, however, is no longer on its side.

When America stops leading, Asia starts looking elsewhere - Asia Times

Leadership is earned, not imposed – and the US is losing the legitimacy that once made its Asian allies follow

asiatimes.com · Hanjin Lew, Jio Lew · August 20, 2025

As political scientist Joseph Nye argues, successful leadership requires more than coercion. It relies on soft power, the ability to persuade through example, credibility and shared benefits.

For decades, the US understood this. It led not through coercion but through example. It provided security, opened markets and built institutions that others wanted to join – a model sometimes described as “imperialism by invitation.” That is what made the US-led order legitimate.

Washington is now undermining that legacy with its own hands.

Instead of persuading allies through shared interests and mutual respect, it increasingly relies on pressure, threats and transactional demands.

Allies are publicly shamed for being “ungrateful” and “not paying enough.” Security guarantees are being dangled like bargaining chips, and tariffs are imposed on long-standing friends arbitrarily.

In the process, the US is doing China’s job for it – pushing the region to close ranks and look for common cause within Asia.

Everyone in Asia sees China’s predatory behavior. But the uncomfortable truth is that the US is beginning to resemble a bully – and once that distinction blurs, even close friends begin to hedge.

Allies respond to respect, not demands

When a superpower starts to sound desperate, it stops sounding like a leader. What allies hear is not resolve, but insecurity. It sounds less like a leader upholding the rules-based order and more like a frustrated power signaling that it can no longer provide the leadership that made that order possible in the first place.

The problem is not that the US is asking others to share the burden – it’s that it does so in ways that seem arrogant and wound the national pride of its allies.

As one scholar of great-power management warns, “The status quo powers must exhibit empathy, fairness and a genuine concern not to offend the prestige and national honor of the rising power.”

Washington has forgotten that lesson before – and it paid dearly.

Racism and the road to 1941

While the oil embargoes were the immediate trigger for Japan’s attack on the US in 1941, the deeper cause lay in racism and exclusion.

At the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, the Japanese delegation – officially invited as a great power – was openly ignored.

Japanese delegates to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Photo: Library of Congress

When America stops leading, Asia starts looking elsewhere

French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau even remarked, “To think that there are blonde women in the world; and we stay closed up here with these Japanese, who are so ugly.”

Japan’s proposal for a racial equality clause at Versailles was flat-out rejected without debate. When the Council of Four was formed, Japan was excluded.

That contempt became institutionalized in the US when the 1924 US Immigration Act declared Asians “ineligible for citizenship,” and it was reinforced thereafter when the Washington Naval Treaty imposed a discriminatory naval tonnage ratio.

Edward House – President Wilson’s closest adviser – privately warned, “Japan is barred from all the undeveloped places of the earth, and if her influence in the East is not recognized as in some degree superior to that of the Western powers, there will be a reckoning.”

Attempt to create a new order

Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote, “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means.” As diplomacy and appeals for equal treatment failed, Tokyo concluded that only war could create an order in which it would no longer be treated as a subordinate power.

That reckoning came soon enough – in the form of war in 1941. Japanese novelist Sei Itō wrote in December 1941, “Our destiny is such that we cannot realize our qualifications as first-class people of the world unless we have fought with the top-ranking white men.”

As Japanese historian John Dower explains, Japanese leaders framed their campaign by claiming they had already “secured Manchuria against the ambitions of the Soviet Union and freed most of China from Anglo-American exploitation,” and that their next goal was to “liberate East Asia from white invasion and oppression.”

The lesson is not that Japan was justified. The lesson is that when a rising power is repeatedly denied dignity and equality, it eventually seeks to create a new order.

Old prejudices, new forms

A century later, the pattern is recurring. Chinese scholars and researchers have increasingly faced suspicion and visa denials under the “China Initiative.” In many cases, they were investigated not because of what they did but simply because of their ethnicity.

The problem is that this pattern now extends beyond China – affecting even America’s closest allies in Asia.

In 2025, a Korean-born PhD student and longtime US permanent resident was detained for more than a week at San Francisco International Airport – without explanation, despite holding legal status.

Japanese citizens – including ordinary tourists and young women visiting Hawaii – have also reported being denied entry at US airports in recent months, as immigration officials cite vague “suspicion” and apply increasingly discretionary standards.

For South Koreans and Japanese alike, Washington’s indiscriminate harsh treatment of Asians – both friends and foes – seemingly confirms that race still matters, reviving the message of 1924: that Asians will never be fully trusted or accepted.

Asia is losing faith

While race is not the principal driver of today’s tensions in the region, Asia is once again being told – implicitly and explicitly – that it will never be treated as an equal under a US-led order.

Beijing is capitalizing on this perception. “Americans take all visitors from China, South Korea and Japan as Asians. They cannot tell the differences and it’s the same in Europe,” said Wang Yi, the head of the ruling Communist Party’s foreign affairs commission. “No matter how yellow you dye your hair, or how sharp you make your nose, you’ll never turn into a European or American, you’ll never turn into a Westerner.”

Most in South Korea and Japan reject that rhetoric. Yet more and more are starting to ask: Is Beijing wrong – or speaking an inconvenient truth?

A new Asian alignment is beginning to emerge – not because China offers a more attractive vision, but because the US no longer looks like a confident and dependable leader.

Asia starts to hedge

On August 16, a leading Korean newspaper reported an interview with a Japanese political scientist who warned that South Korea and Japan should begin discussing a “security Plan B” without the United States, amid growing concern that a future Trump administration may scale back US involvement in Northeast Asia.

This perception is already shaping regional behavior. In Seoul, even conservative policymakers speak openly about preparing for US disengagement.

In Tokyo, the government has quietly reopened diplomatic channels with Beijing – not out of admiration, but as a hedge.

Regional participation in China-backed initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) keeps expanding, while enthusiasm for the US-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) remains muted.

This is not alignment out of attraction. It is alignment driven by a loss of faith in the existing leader.

Changes needed

None of this is inevitable. Asia is not turning away because it prefers authoritarianism, but because it feels increasingly disrespected by a power that still speaks the language of equal partnership – while treating its allies as subordinates.

If the United States still wants to lead, it must start acting like a leader again – not by coercing but by inspiring. That requires treating Asian partners not as junior clients, but as genuine co-architects of the international order.

Only by treating its partners with respect, restraint and a genuine sense of dignity can Washington regain the moral authority that once made others follow willingly.

Asia remains open to US leadership – but it will no longer follow blindly. The choice is still America’s to make. Time, however, is no longer on its side.

Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs. Jio Lew contributed research for this article.

asiatimes.com · Hanjin Lew, Jio Lew · August 20, 2025

4. China’s North Korea Problem:  How America Can Encourage Beijing to Rein in Pyongyang

Note the subtle shift in terminology. We now wish to "constrain" north Korea's nuclear program.

How has this cooperation with China worked out for us in the past? I mean really? Is this not the definition of insanity? Can we really expect a different result? What makes us think that China is going to help us solve our problems?

Or is there really a middle ground that can be pursued? But most importantly how does the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime factor in all this theory? And do we overestimate th,e influence China can bring to bear on the regime? 

But at least we should look at both security challenges, Taiwan and Korea together rather than separately.

Despite all my negative waves (from Moriarity) above, I do think we share an interest in preventing a catastrophic war in East Asia. How can we prevent that?  

We should not forget to consider the five questions concerning north Korea and what is in fact the root of all evil:

1. What do we want to achieve in Korea?

1. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will protect, serve, and advance US and ROK/US Alliance interests on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia?

1. Who does Kim fear more: The US or the Korean people in the north? (Note it is the Korean people armed with information knowledge of life in South Korea)

1. Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?

1. In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?

The answers to these questions should guide us to the strategy to solve the "Korea question" (para 60 of the Armistice) and lead to the only acceptable durable political arrangement: A secure, stable, economically vibrant, non-nuclear Korean peninsula unified under a liberal constitutional form of government with respect for individual liberty, the rule of law, and human rights, determined by the Korean people.  A free and unified Korea or, in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK)

And lest we forget: the root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. We cannot emphasize this enough.

Excerpts:

This middle ground approach is more politically feasible than a grand bargain—in both Washington and Bejing—because it would not demand a fundamental shift in either side’s long-standing policy toward its respective smaller partner. It would not require China to abandon North Korea or the United States to forsake Taiwan. Instead, it recognizes that the two great powers share a fundamental interest in preventing a catastrophic war in East Asia even as both face limits on how far they can—or are willing to—go in restraining their partners.

Precisely because of those limits, such a framework would be brittle. Washington and Beijing must therefore maintain realistic expectations and tolerance for imperfection. Pyongyang and Taipei are autonomous actors, capable of resisting pressure by their patrons and of taking action to force their patrons’ hands. Sustaining cooperation will also require that the United States and China remain dedicated to a narrowly focused joint effort. Any attempts to bundle in other contentious issues such as trade, technology, or critical minerals would likely doom the entire arrangement, increasing the risk that disagreements in one area would derail progress in others.

If the United States hopes to constrain North Korea’s nuclear program, it will need at least tacit support from China—and ideally, Beijing’s active cooperation. Progress will not be linear, but there is precedent for it. Between 2002 and 2008, active diplomatic efforts by Washington and Beijing worked to curb very real risks of military conflict, on both the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. A joint risk control and reduction framework would not be a perfect solution to the underlying disputes over North Korea and Taiwan, but it could function as a stabilizing guardrail, minimizing the risk of escalatory spirals and creating space for leaders to explore more durable security arrangements for the region.

China’s North Korea Problem

Foreign Affairs · More by Shuxian Luo · August 21, 2025

How America Can Encourage Beijing to Rein in Pyongyang

Shuxian Luo

August 21, 2025

A news report about a North Korean missile test, Seoul, November 2024 Kim Hong-Ji / Reuters

SHUXIAN LUO is an Assistant Professor in Asian Studies at the University of Hawaii and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Since talks collapsed between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi, in 2019, North Korea’s reckless drive for long-range nuclear capabilities has fueled tensions on the Korean Peninsula to new heights. But Pyongyang’s provocations obscure a deeper shift in the region: China’s growing reluctance to rein in its troublesome ally. For years, Beijing has played a crucial role in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table, and it has at times been a key partner in international efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions. China has supported UN Security Council resolutions to inhibit North Korea’s nuclear program and even worked with Washington to tighten sanctions against Pyongyang, despite criticism from Russia for doing so. But in the face of its growing rivalry with the United States, China has quietly stepped back from this cooperative approach.

In recent months, some foreign policy experts in Washington and Seoul have grown cautiously optimistic that the “comprehensive strategic partnership” forged between North Korea and Russia, in 2024, might draw China back in. Beijing’s reserved response to Pyongyang’s provision of weapons and combat troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine—dismissing it as a bilateral matter between Pyongyang and Moscow—betrays a thinly veiled discomfort with its smaller ally’s latest gambit. At the same time, observers in Washington and Seoul have become hopeful that growing public support in South Korea for developing an independent nuclear deterrent might provide Beijing with another compelling reason to renew its efforts to restrain the North’s belligerence.

Reinvigorating joint U.S.-Chinese efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear program is indeed possible. Both great powers continue to publicly endorse some level of denuclearization. In May 2024, China, Japan, and South Korea issued a joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. In February 2025, the Trump administration issued its own trilateral statement with Tokyo and Seoul, pledging to pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea. But many of the pathways recently proposed for incentivizing Beijing’s cooperation rest on shaky assumptions. Analysts in Washington and Seoul often overestimate the impact that tensions between China and North Korea will have on their relationship. Despite the many historical periods of unease between the two countries, China’s policy toward North Korea’s nuclear program has been shaped more by its broader strategic calculations vis-à-vis the United States than by frustration with its defiant ally.

Likewise, the belief that North Korea’s increasing closeness with Russia will rupture Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang is misplaced. History suggests the opposite: Beijing has been more, not less, likely to tighten its ties with Pyongyang when North Korea is drifting toward Moscow. In the late 1960s, for example, China deliberately strengthened its ties to North Korea in fear that Pyongyang was tilting toward the Soviet Union.

Hoping that the possibility of South Korean nuclearization might spur Chinese cooperation on North Korea is equally misguided, and the prospect could even backfire. Rather than inducing cooperation, such a move could trigger a harsh response from Beijing. South Korea’s deployment, in 2016, of the U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, for example—intended to counter North Korean missile threats—prompted sweeping economic retaliation from China. Chinese tourism to South Korea plunged by two thirds between 2016 and 2017, and sales of South Korean cars, such as Hyundai and Kia, dropped by more than half in China. The development of a South Korean nuclear weapons program could trigger even harsher punishment—and might lead Beijing to tacitly accept further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

If Washington wants China to cooperate on containing Pyongyang’s aggression, it should focus on reassuring Beijing about its core strategic interests—above all, Taiwan. The history of negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program shows that China has been more amenable to working with the United States when it feels secure about its vital interests, and no interest matters more to Beijing than preventing Taiwan’s independence—an issue that U.S. policy can directly shape. Beijing has repeatedly used its cooperation on the North Korean issue as leverage to push the United States to hold the line on Taiwan. By reaffirming the United States’ “one China” policy and signaling a continued U.S. willingness to restrain Taipei’s unilateral moves toward independence, the Trump administration could nudge Beijing toward resuming its efforts to curb Pyongyang.

Such diplomacy need not take the form of a sweeping “grand bargain.” Instead, a more limited, realistic arrangement—focused on managing and reducing the risk of military conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait—offers a more viable path. With a narrowly defined scope and clear set of boundaries, Washington and Beijing could lower tensions and preserve stability in East Asia at a time when the world can ill afford another conflict or crisis.

A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

Beijing has long viewed North Korea as both a dangerous liability and a strategic asset. Above all, China fears that its unpredictable and often aggressive client state could spark a military conflict with South Korea and the United States, potentially dragging Beijing into a second Korean War. Even short of provoking outright conflict, North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities still threaten to trigger a regional arms race. The United States and its allies have already expanded missile defense deployments in East Asia, which Beijing views as a direct threat to its strategic deterrence capabilities. Although China retaliated against South Korea for deploying THAAD in 2016, Chinese state media acknowledged that North Korea bore some responsibility. A 2017 commentary in China’s state-run Global Times, for example, blamed Pyongyang for giving Washington and Seoul a justification for THAAD deployment and argued that the North’s provocation had harmed China’s strategic interests.

Beijing is also acutely aware of the risks posed by its shared border with North Korea. Pyongyang’s continuing nuclear and missile developments could invite new rounds of international sanctions, potentially crippling North Korea’s already fragile economy and causing a refugee crisis in northeast China. Nearly half of North Korea’s known major nuclear sites lie within 30 miles of the shared border, making any nuclear mishap—whether caused by an accident in North Korean operations or a preemptive U.S. strike—a possible environmental disaster for China. Beijing’s worst strategic nightmare is a unified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s leadership, with a continued U.S. military presence, which a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime could produce.

Beijing is acutely aware of the risks posed by its shared border with North Korea.

For all these reasons, China has long regarded Pyongyang’s nuclear program as a headache and has consistently affirmed denuclearization as a policy goal. Chinese President Xi Jinping even openly warned Pyongyang, in 2013, that “no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” At times, Beijing has taken harsh measures toward North Korea—including temporarily suspending oil shipments, restricting Chinese tourism, and applying financial sanctions to the North—although such efforts have typically been short-lived and halfhearted.

But North Korea also serves China’s strategic interests in two important ways—both with respect to Taiwan. First, in the event of a military showdown over Taiwan, North Korea could help tie down, or at least distract, U.S. forces in the western Pacific, forcing Washington to keep a substantial number of its military assets in the Korean theater. This logic is not new. As early as 2007, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association—a quasi-official body under the auspice of the Chinese foreign ministry—asserted in its annually published yearbook that Taiwan and North Korea were “intrinsically linked.” An immediate North Korean threat might also dissuade Seoul from supporting any U.S. military operations beyond the peninsula. If Beijing were ever to conclude that force was the only path to unification with Taiwan, it might be more inclined to tolerate—or even shield—North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs because a nuclear-armed North Korea could, in theory, help create a more favorable strategic environment for Chinese military operations across the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing has also long viewed its cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue as a source of leverage to push for U.S. accommodation of its interests on Taiwan. Since the early 2000s, Chinese officials and strategists have made it clear, both privately and publicly, that they expect reciprocity on the two issues. In 2003, a Chinese official told The Washington Post that China was “not linking the issues. . . . But what we are saying is this: The United States cannot expect us to continually give unless it gives us something, too.” According to political scientist Zhao Quansheng, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong acknowledged to him, in 2005, that Beijing had worked with Washington on North Korean denuclearization partly to elicit U.S. cooperation on Taiwan (noting, however, that Beijing had used the linkage strategy very cautiously). In 2008, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable published by Wikileaks, Yang Jiemian—the head of the government-affiliated think tank Shanghai Institute for International Studies and brother of then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi—suggested to senior U.S. officials that the United States could coordinate with China on the Taiwan issue in exchange for China’s help restraining North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. And in 2019, amid rising tensions between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan and stalled negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, Chinese foreign policy experts warned that Beijing’s willingness to help move the negotiations forward would hinge on the United States’ approach to its relations with China and argued that U.S. violations of China’s red line on Taiwan were partly to blame for the deadlock.

PUSH AND PULL

Since the early 1990s, Beijing’s willingness to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions has followed a discernible pattern. When Beijing perceived Washington to be more willing to play ball on Taiwan and felt secure about its interests regarding the island, Chinese leaders were more willing to pressure North Korea. But when the United States took steps that Beijing perceived as threatening to its position on Taiwan, China became more reluctant to cooperate—sometimes even overtly shielding the North.

The first North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 1993, when Pyongyang declared its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, after facing pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency to allow inspections of suspected nuclear sites. At the time, U.S.-Chinese relations were still recovering from the fallout of Beijing’s crackdown on the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square. Beijing, still resentful of U.S. sanctions and criticism of its record on human rights, declined to formally participate in the negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program. But China did play an active behind-the-scenes role, serving as an informal intermediary between Washington and Pyongyang. China did not vote in favor of a UN Security Council resolution calling for North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguards, but by abstaining, it allowed the measure to pass. According to U.S. diplomats involved in the negotiations, Beijing also signaled that it would abstain from a Security Council resolution to impose limited sanctions on Pyongyang, and warned that if such sanctions were adopted, it would cut off oil and food supplies to North Korea. These moves helped convince Pyongyang to come to the negotiating table, where it agreed, under the 1994 Agreed Framework signed with the United States, to give up its nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance. China did not seek U.S. assurances on Taiwan in return for its cooperation, partly because Beijing remained confident that Washington would maintain only unofficial ties with the island—but that faith would soon falter.

The second North Korean nuclear crisis broke out in October 2002, when the United States accused Pyongyang of operating a clandestine uranium-enrichment program that violated the 1994 Agreed Framework. This time, China played a far more active diplomatic role, partly because the strategic context had shifted. Beijing’s latent confidence in U.S. unofficial ties with Taiwan had been shaken by the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, when Washington allowed Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University, where he had studied. Beijing viewed this as a breach of the U.S. pledge to conduct relations with Taiwan on a strictly unofficial basis, and responded with military drills in the Taiwan Strait. Then, in 2000, Taiwan elected Chen Shui-bian from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as president. When, in August 2002, Chen claimed that “one country exists on each side of the Taiwan Strait” and proposed to hold a referendum on Taiwan’s formal independence, Beijing became even more unsettled. During a summit with President George W. Bush in Texas that October, Chinese President Jiang Zemin urged Washington to go beyond merely “not supporting” Taiwan’s independence and to explicitly “oppose” it. At the same summit, he pledged China’s cooperation with the United States on the North Korean nuclear issue. In December 2003, while standing next to visiting Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Bush publicly rebuked Chen, declaring, “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo,” and warning that Chen’s comments and actions indicated that “he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”

A Patriot air defense system in Taipei, July 2025 Ann Wang / Reuters

As North Korea continued advancing its nuclear program, Beijing played a major part in the international efforts to halt and roll it back. In August 2003, Beijing helped launch the Six-Party Talks, hosting Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States to further these efforts. In September 2006, Beijing suspended oil exports to North Korea for a month to dissuade Pyongyang from conducting a nuclear test. When Pyongyang went ahead with the test anyway, Beijing issued a statement denouncing North Korea’s action as hanran, or “blatant”—a rare and unusually strong public condemnation of its ally by Chinese standards—and temporarily suspended financial transactions between major Chinese banks and North Korea. The talks ultimately collapsed in 2009, after Pyongyang withdrew and carried out a second nuclear test. But China, reassured by Washington’s stance on Taiwan, had shown a consistent willingness to pressure its longtime ally.

Between 2009 and 2017, as cross-strait tensions eased, China took an even harder line on North Korea. The election of Ma Ying-jeou, from the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang party, as Taiwan’s president in 2008 ushered in a period of considerably better ties between Taipei and Beijing. Worrying less about Taiwan, Beijing increasingly viewed North Korea’s nuclear provocations as a threat to China’s security interests, rather than as an insurance policy against Taiwan’s independence. Beijing resented the repeated North Korean nuclear and missile tests, which gave Washington and Seoul justification to strengthen their military cooperation, which they did by deploying systems such as THAAD and intensifying joint military exercises. China therefore voted in favor of multiple rounds of UN sanctions against North Korea—in 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017—and its tone toward Pyongyang grew more critical. Chinese strategists began openly suggesting that Beijing should abandon Pyongyang, and senior Chinese officials increasingly emphasized that Chinese–North Korean ties were “normal” state-to-state relations rather than a “blood alliance,” as they had traditionally been described. In a clear signal of Beijing’s frustration, Xi visited South Korea during his second year in office, in 2014, before he visited North Korea, breaking the tradition that a new Chinese leader visit Pyongyang before Seoul. When U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and Taiwanese President-elect Tsai Ing-wen (of the DPP) spoke over the phone in December 2016, China protested. But Trump refused to grant Tsai a second call, primarily out of concern that it might derail Chinese cooperation on North Korea, likely helping sustain Beijing’s willingness to continue exerting pressure Pyongyang through 2017.

Starting in 2018, however, things began to shift. During Trump’s first term, a bipartisan consensus emerged in Washington favoring a tougher policy toward China, which, as Beijing continued escalating pressure on Taipei, also meant strengthening relations with Taiwan. Against this backdrop, North Korea once again looked more like a strategic asset than a liability for Beijing. In March, just days after the White House announced Trump’s summit with Kim and after Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act, which encouraged exchanges between U.S. and Taiwanese officials, Xi hosted Kim in Beijing for his first visit to China. Xi told Kim that the traditional bond between the two countries “should not and would not be altered by a single period of time or a single issue,” signaling his renewed commitment to the partnership. That September, Beijing sent Li Zhanshu, the CCP’s number three official, to attend North Korea’s founding day military parade. To be sure, China’s abrupt shift was also driven by its concern that a breakthrough in U.S.–North Korean relations could marginalize China on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing did believe, however, that direct U.S.–North Korean dialogue could lower tensions in ways that would ultimately serve China’s security interests.

China has long regarded Pyongyang’s nuclear program as a headache.

As U.S.-Chinese tensions over Taiwan ratcheted up in 2019 and 2020—fueled by growing Chinese pressure on the island, major U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and multiple high-level U.S. officials’ visits to Taipei—Beijing grew more overt in its support for Pyongyang, even as North Korea resumed missile tests and refused diplomatic engagement with the United States. In June 2019, Xi visited North Korea for the first time as China’s leader. In March 2020, Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi praised the “positive steps” Pyongyang had taken toward denuclearization and blamed the United States for having failed to reciprocate those efforts and for causing the deadlock in negotiations. That fall, at a ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean War, Xi revived the description of the two countries’ relationship as one “forged with blood.”

China’s support for North Korea peaked early in the Biden administration, as Beijing perceived Washington’s posture to be increasingly confrontational, particularly on Taiwan. Two joint statements issued by the United States in 2021, with Japan in April and South Korea in May, emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. President Joe Biden’s repeated off-the-cuff remarks suggesting a U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack, although consistently walked back by administration officials, further alarmed Chinese leaders.

It was in this context that China renewed its mutual assistance treaty with North Korea in July 2021. When Pyongyang intensified its missile testing in the spring of 2022—including the launch of three ballistic missiles capable of reaching the continental United States—China, along with Russia, vetoed a U.S.-proposed UN Security Council resolution calling for additional sanctions against Pyongyang. This marked China’s first and only veto, to date, of a resolution targeting North Korea, and it came just three days after Biden made remarks suggesting, for the third time, that the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan. In August, Pyongyang returned the favor by condemning U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, echoing Beijing’s outrage.

As Washington and Beijing took steps to deescalate tensions following Pelosi’s visit, China’s overt support for North Korea began to recede. At the Biden-Xi summit in Bali, Indonesia, in November 2022, Biden reaffirmed the United States’ adherence to the “one China” policy and its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. (He also refrained from repeating his earlier remarks about U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s defense.) This more cautious approach continued through the trilateral summit at Camp David, in August 2023, where the United States, Japan, and South Korea issued a joint statement reaffirming that there was “no change in our basic positions on Taiwan” and urged a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. Beijing, for its part, quietly dialed down its engagement with Pyongyang. When North Korea celebrated the anniversary of the end of the Korean War and the Kim regime’s founding, in July and September, respectively, Beijing sent Politburo member Li Hongzhong and Vice Premier Liu Guozhong—two officials who ranked well below Li Zhanshu, who attended the same events in 2018.

Continued affirmation of the official U.S. position on Taiwan has coincided with China’s continued willingness to scale back its support for North Korea. In response to Taiwan’s election of the DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te in January 2024, whom Beijing views as a staunch advocate of Taiwan’s independence, Biden pronounced, “We do not support independence.” The State Department further emphasized the U.S. commitment to advancing the unofficial U.S.-Taiwanese relationship in a way consistent with its “one China” policy. Two months later, when the UN Security Council voted on whether to renew the mandate of an independent expert panel monitoring North Korea’s violations of UN sanctions, China abstained (although Russia again vetoed the measure). And in May, China reaffirmed its support for denuclearization in a joint statement with Japan and South Korea. Pyongyang responded furiously, calling the statement a “grave political provocation.”

MEETING IN THE MIDDLE

Even with Beijing’s recent distancing from North Korea, and Washington’s reaffirmation of its position on Taiwan, the risk of miscalculation over either issue remains dangerously high—high enough that the United States and China could be dragged into a direct military confrontation. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula—or worse, in both—could quickly spiral into a broader war with devastating global consequences.

To mitigate this risk, some analysts have proposed that the United States should seek a “grand bargain” with China. According to this view, Washington could make major concessions on Taiwan, such as explicitly ruling out military intervention in the event of a crisis in Taiwan, in exchange for Beijing’s accommodation of U.S. interests on issues such as North Korea, the South China Sea, and trade. But there is little, if any, appetite in Washington these days for any such grand bargain. More fundamentally, the proposed idea rests on the flawed assumption that great powers can exert total control over their smaller partners. Client states have agency. As both Beijing’s experience dealing with Pyongyang and, to a lesser extent, Washington’s experience with Taipei demonstrate, these smaller partners are not mere pawns to be traded away. They can act unilaterally in ways that complicate their patrons’ strategic goals.

The other end of the policy spectrum is barely a bargain at all. Some analysts argue that China and the United States should base negotiations on single issues, instead of chasing an ambitious but unlikely grand bargain. Single-issue bargaining, however, can reinforce a zero-sum mindset, making it harder to generate the mutual gains needed to reach agreements.

Kim speaking at an event in Pyongyang, August 2025 Korean Central News Agency / Reuters

Rather than choosing between these extremes, Washington should pursue a middle path: a focused effort to work with Beijing to manage and reduce military risks on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Such a cross-issue bargaining approach would offer a higher chance of success than single-issue negotiations because it creates possibilities for side deals that would be unattainable were the bargaining to remain confined to a single issue area.

To that end, the United States should leverage China’s willingness to rein in North Korea when it feels secure about its vital interests, especially Taiwan. The Trump administration should consistently and publicly reaffirm key elements of the “one China” policy, underscoring the unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations, pronouncing U.S. opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either Beijing or Taipei, and reiterating that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence. Such assurances would both reduce North Korea’s strategic value to China and reinforce the perception in Beijing that Pyongyang’s recklessness—not Taipei’s actions—is the greatest threat to regional stability and to China’s strategic interests. China, for its part, should consider easing its military, economic, and diplomatic pressure campaigns against Taiwan—steps that would not only lower cross-strait tensions and advance Beijing’s stated goal of peaceful unification, by appealing to the “hearts and minds” of the Taiwanese people, but also better protect Washington from domestic criticism of its efforts to reassure Beijing on the Taiwan issue.

At the same time, China should press North Korea, even if only in private, to refrain from new nuclear tests, suspend intercontinental ballistic missile launches, scale back short-range missile tests, and reengage in dialogue with the new South Korean government to reduce hostilities and military tensions. If Pyongyang were to meet these conditions, Washington should, in coordination with Seoul and Beijing, consider calibrated steps toward diplomatic reengagement with North Korea and limited sanctions relief.

There is little, if any, appetite in Washington these days for a grand bargain.

This middle ground approach is more politically feasible than a grand bargain—in both Washington and Bejing—because it would not demand a fundamental shift in either side’s long-standing policy toward its respective smaller partner. It would not require China to abandon North Korea or the United States to forsake Taiwan. Instead, it recognizes that the two great powers share a fundamental interest in preventing a catastrophic war in East Asia even as both face limits on how far they can—or are willing to—go in restraining their partners.

Precisely because of those limits, such a framework would be brittle. Washington and Beijing must therefore maintain realistic expectations and tolerance for imperfection. Pyongyang and Taipei are autonomous actors, capable of resisting pressure by their patrons and of taking action to force their patrons’ hands. Sustaining cooperation will also require that the United States and China remain dedicated to a narrowly focused joint effort. Any attempts to bundle in other contentious issues such as trade, technology, or critical minerals would likely doom the entire arrangement, increasing the risk that disagreements in one area would derail progress in others.

If the United States hopes to constrain North Korea’s nuclear program, it will need at least tacit support from China—and ideally, Beijing’s active cooperation. Progress will not be linear, but there is precedent for it. Between 2002 and 2008, active diplomatic efforts by Washington and Beijing worked to curb very real risks of military conflict, on both the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. A joint risk control and reduction framework would not be a perfect solution to the underlying disputes over North Korea and Taiwan, but it could function as a stabilizing guardrail, minimizing the risk of escalatory spirals and creating space for leaders to explore more durable security arrangements for the region.

Foreign Affairs · More by Shuxian Luo · August 21, 2025

5. N. Korea's Kim hails ground commanders of troops deployed in Russia's war on Ukraine

​Heroes fighting and dying for...... Putin. (or for money for KJU)

(2nd LD) N. Korea's Kim hails ground commanders of troops deployed in Russia's war on Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 21, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with Seoul official comments in last 2 paras)

By Park Boram

SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has met with ground commanders of the North's troops deployed to the front-line Kursk region and "highly appreciated" their role in aiding Russia's war on Ukraine, the North's state media reported Thursday.

The meeting with commanding officers of the Korean People's Army's overseas operation unit took place Wednesday, as they returned home to attend a commendation ceremony, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

Kim received a briefing on the military activities of North Korean forces abroad and "highly appreciated their feats of leading the combat units of our armed forces, which participated in the operations to liberate the Kursk Region of the Russian Federation, to victory," according to the KCNA report.

Kim said North Korea has assigned them to carry out the "most important duty" and conveyed "warm militant encouragement" to all commanders and combatants on the mission, the KCNA said.

The news agency also quoted Kim as saying: "Our army has fully demonstrated its unique qualities. Such a result has cemented its appellation and reputation as the most powerful army in the world.

"Our army is now doing what it ought to do and what needs to be done. It will do so in the future, too," he also said.

KCNA photos showed high-ranking officials of the military's General Staff at the meeting, including vice chief Ri Chang-ho, who were reported to have been deployed to the Russia-Ukraine war in its early stages.

The report said the first commendation awarding ceremony for service members who served in the overseas mission is scheduled to take place.

While officially confirming the country's troop deployment to Russia once again, Wednesday's meeting "appears aimed at justifying the deployment and boosting morale," an official at Seoul's unification ministry said.

The official also explained this would mark North Korea's first-ever commendation awarded to troops who fought overseas.

This photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 21, 2025, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C, in black suit) meeting in Pyongyang the previous day with commanders of North Korean troops deployed to help Russia in its war against Ukraine. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 21, 2025

6. N. Korea condemns Britain over warships' visit to S. Korean port

​It is good to see NATO and UNC Member States participating in operations in Korea. KJU is getting the message.

N. Korea condemns Britain over warships' visit to S. Korean port | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 21, 2025

SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Thursday criticized Britain for sending warships to South Korea's port in Busan, calling it a "war expedition."

The North's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) issued the criticism in a commentary after two Royal Navy warships -- the replenishment tanker RFA Tidespring and the frigate HMS Richmond -- docked at the Busan port last week.

The port visit is part of the Royal Navy's Indo-Pacific-focused deployment, called Operation Highmast. In September, the HMS Prince of Wales, a British aircraft carrier, is scheduled to conduct an aerial capability demonstration in South Korean waters.

The KCNA condemned the deployment "as a war expedition that will drive the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the region to its worst state."

The KCNA accused London of finally putting its plans for military intervention in the Asia-Pacific into action, warning that it will not end in "a delightful journey."

This photo, provided by the British Embassy in Seoul on Aug. 12, 2025, shows the Royal Navy frigate HMS Richmond. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 21, 2025

7. Lee vows national interest-focused diplomacy ahead of summits with Trump, Ishiba

​Is there any kind of diplomacy other than "national interest focused?"

(LEAD) Lee vows national interest-focused diplomacy ahead of summits with Trump, Ishiba | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 21, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS more details in last 3 paras)

SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Thursday that he will spare no effort to achieve mutually beneficial diplomacy by putting national interests as the top priority, ahead of high-stakes summit talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.

Lee made the remarks at a meeting with senior aides as he is set to depart for Tokyo for summit talks with Ishiba. Following the Tokyo summit, Lee will travel to Washington for summit talks with Trump on Aug. 25.

"In diplomacy, I think we must prioritize the lasting interests of the nation and all Korean people, rather than my personal position or the temporary standing of the current administration," Lee told the meeting, according to the presidential office.

Amid a shifting international order and trade environment, Lee promised to work toward implementing a "mutually beneficial" diplomatic and security policy, with national interests as the top priority.

"We will continue to seek practical solutions for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula," he added, asking for the public's support.

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a meeting with senior aides and secretaries held at the presidential office in Seoul on Aug. 21, 2025. (Yonhap)

During the meeting, Lee called for measures to reduce the nation's suicide rates, which remain the highest among member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

"The issue of suicide has become so serious that it can no longer be ignored," he said. "We must fundamentally shift the policy paradigm, treating suicide as a social disaster."

Lee also directed the establishment of an intergovernmental body tasked with significantly reducing suicide rates, and developing comprehensive suicide prevention and mental health support programs.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 21, 2025

8. Hackers who exposed North Korean government hacker explain why they did it

Hackers who exposed North Korean government hacker explain why they did it | TechCrunch

TechCrunch · Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai · August 21, 2025

Image Credits:JORGE SILVA / POOL / AFP / Getty Images

Security

Hackers who exposed North Korean government hacker explain why they did it

Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai

5:30 AM PDT · August 21, 2025

Earlier this year, two hackers broke into a computer and soon realized the significance of what this machine was. As it turned out, they had landed on the computer of a hacker who allegedly works for the North Korean government.

The two hackers decided to keep digging and found evidence that they say linked the hacker to cyberespionage operations carried out by North Korea, exploits and hacking tools, and infrastructure used in those operations.

Saber, one of the hackers involved, told TechCrunch that they had access to the North Korean government worker’s computer for around four months, but as soon as they understood what data they got access to, they realized they eventually had to leak it and expose what they had discovered.

“These nation state hackers are hacking for all the wrong reasons, I hope more of them will get exposed, they deserve to be,” said Saber, who spoke to TechCrunch after he and cyb0rg published an article in the legendary hacking e-zine Phrack, disclosing details of their findings.

There are countless cybersecurity companies and researchers who closely track anything the North Korean government, and its many hacking groups are up to, which includes espionage operation but also increasingly large crypto heists, as well as wide-ranging operations where North Koreans pose as remote IT workers to fund the regime’s nuclear weapons program.

In this case, Saber and cyb0rg went one step further and actually hacked the hackers, an operation that can give more, or at least different, insights into how these government-backed groups work, as well las “what they are doing on a daily basis and so on,” as Saber put it.

The hackers want to be known only by their handles, Saber and cyb0rg, because they may face retaliation from the North Korean government, and possibly others. Saber said that they consider themselves hacktivists, and he namedropped legendary hacktivist Phineas Fisher, responsible for hacking spyware makers FinFisher and Hacking Team, as an inspiration.

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At the same time, the hackers also understand that what they did is illegal, but they thought it was nonetheless important to publicize it.

“Keeping it for us wouldn’t have been really helpful,” said Saber. “By leaking it all to the public hopefully we can give researchers some more ways to detect them.”

“Hopefully this will also lead to many of their current victims being discovered and so to [the North Korean hackers] losing access,” he said.

“Illegal or not, this action has brought concrete artifacts to the community, this is more important,” said cyb0rg, in a message sent through Saber.

Saber said they are convinced that while the hacker — whom they call “Kim” — works for North Korea’s regime, they may actually be Chinese and work for both governments, based on their findings that Kim did not work during holidays in China, suggesting that the hacker may be based there.

Also, according to Saber, at times Kim translated some Korean documents into simplified Chinese using Google Translate.

Saber said that he never tried to contact Kim. “I don’t think he would even listen, all he does is empower his leaders, the same leaders who enslave his own people,” he said. “I’d probably tell him to use his knowledge in a way that helps people, not hurt them. But he lives in constant propaganda and likely since birth so this is all meaningless to him,” referring to the strict information vacuum that North Koreans live in, as they are largely cut off from the outside world.

Saber declined to disclose how he and cyb0rg got access to Kim’s computer, given that the two believe they can use the same techniques to “obtain more access to some other of their systems the same way.”

During their operation, Saber and cyb0rg found evidence of active hacks carried out by Kim, against South Korean and Taiwanese companies, which they say they contacted and alerted.

North Korean hackers have a history of targeting people who work in the cybersecurity industry as well. That’s why Saber said he is aware of that risk, but “not really worried.”

“Not much can be done about this, definitely being more careful though :),” said Saber.

Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai

Senior Reporter, Cybersecurity

Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai is a Senior Writer at TechCrunch, where he covers hacking, cybersecurity, surveillance, and privacy.

You can contact or verify outreach from Lorenzo by emailing lorenzo@techcrunch.com, via encrypted message at +1 917 257 1382 on Signal, and @lorenzofb on Keybase/Telegram.

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TechCrunch · Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai · August 21, 2025

9. Expert notes possibility of Trump raising 'sensitive' China issue in summit with Lee

(LEAD) Expert notes possibility of Trump raising 'sensitive' China issue in summit with Lee | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 22, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS photo)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump could raise a "sensitive" China-related topic in the upcoming summit with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, an expert said Thursday, noting that Washington wants U.S. allies to be "firmly aligned" against an assertive China amid an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry.

Ellen Kim, director of academic programs at the Washington-based Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), made the remarks during a press meeting, as the Trump administration is striving to secure increased security "burden-sharing" by allies amid its sharper focus on deterring the "pacing threat" from China.

Lee and Trump are scheduled to have their first in-person meeting at the White House on Monday, as Seoul prioritizes the treaty alliance with Washington while seeking stable ties with Beijing under Lee's "pragmatic" diplomatic policy.

This composite EPA-Yonhap photo shows South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (L) and U.S. President Donald Trump. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

"President Trump's unpredictability is well known. So that means we cannot rule out the possibility that he might ask President Lee about the China case," Kim said. "I think that South Korea also understands that possibility, and may be well prepared."

She noted that the Lee administration's "pragmatic" approach to enhance ties with China would be "very tricky" as the strategic competition between Washington and Beijing continues to harden.

"The Lee government wants to keep some distance away from the previous Yoon (Suk Yeol) government's stance ... to leave some room for South Korea to improve relations with Beijing, hopefully without creating a perception in Washington that South Korea is tilting toward China again," she said, pointing out that the allies are currently "at odds" over sensitive China issues.

Ellen Kim, director of academic programs at the Washington-based Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), speaks during a press meeting in Washington on Aug. 21, 2025. (Yonhap)

The issue surrounding Washington's pursuit of greater "strategic flexibility" for the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in the name of "alliance modernization" would be another potential summit issue that could draw Beijing's attention.

Greater strategic flexibility would mean the use of U.S. troops in South Korea for a wider range of operations outside the Korean Peninsula, including potential roles for China-related contingencies -- a move farther away from their traditional focus on deterring North Korean threats.

Seoul and Washington already issued a joint statement on strategic flexibility in 2006, which presented their understanding of the geopolitically sensitive issue.

The statement said that South Korea respects the "necessity" for USFK strategic flexibility, while the U.S. respects Seoul's position that it will not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.

Kim raised doubts over the possibility of a change in the statement. The issue of strategic flexibility emerged as Trump has touted his "great" relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping while his administration tries to finalize a trade deal with the Asian superpower.

"I don't know whether the U.S. and South Korea will try to change any wording on the strategic flexibility not because of South Korea's opposition, but also because the U.S. might not unnecessarily provoke China at this point," she said.

"It is possible that I think they might continue that language although there could be some additional discussions behind the scenes between the two countries."

Scott Snyder, president and CEO at the KEI, said that the Lee-Trump summit will be an opportunity to "reset" South Korea's role and status in Trump's "hierarchy," as he noted South Korea's apparently "diminished" influence under the Trump administration considering various indicators, including the fact that no close Trump associate or prominent figure has been appointed as U.S. ambassador to Korea.

Scott Snyder, president and CEO of the Washington-based Korea Economic Institute of America, attends a press meeting in Washington on Aug. 21, 2025. (Yonhap)

He also warned that "perceptions that the U.S. is off-loading responsibilities for South Korea's defense against North Korea or failing to closely coordinate diplomatic openings to the North may lessen South Korea's commitments to the U.S."

"South Korea's ability and willingness to be a valuable partner to the U.S. are based on the past credibility of U.S. security assurances, including shared regional security threats and common values," he said.

"This would be the wrong moment for the U.S. to take South Korea for granted or to send signals that demean the value of that partnership, especially as South Korea retains the capacity and (the) will to sustain the partnership against a whole range of common external threats."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 22, 2025

10. FM Cho departs early for Washington ahead of Lee-Trump summit

​The necessary ground work.

FM Cho departs early for Washington ahead of Lee-Trump summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · August 21, 2025

SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun headed for the United States on Thursday, days before President Lee Jae Myung is set to depart for his first summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, a ministry official said.

Cho had been initially expected to accompany Lee to Japan on Saturday for Lee's summit talks with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, but will apparently not be accompanying Lee on his trip to Tokyo.

"Given the significance and weight of this U.S. visit and the fact that it will be the first summit between South Korea and the U.S. since the launch of the new government, we will be visiting first to make final coordination with the U.S. side," the official said.

Lee is scheduled to travel to Washington for his summit with Trump on Aug. 25.

It is not unusual for a foreign minister to visit a nation earlier than scheduled without accompanying a president, but Cho's trip to the U.S. raised speculations that there may be consultations with the U.S. side ahead of summit talks between Lee and Trump.

Cho's trip was reportedly decided just the previous day by South Korea, and his schedule in Washington has not been finalized yet. He is reportedly accompanied by only a small group of senior officials, including the director-general for North American affairs.

South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun speaks to Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono during their talks in Seoul on Aug. 21, 2025. (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · August 21, 2025

11. North Korean denuclearization should start with weapons freeze: ROK president

​The stars may be aligning for ....... KJU.

KJU has long wanted arms control negotiations so he can be put on the same level as the USSR with the SALT and START talks with the US.

Ironically pundits advising both Lee and Trump think arms control negotiations are the way to go. However, doing so will likely not lead to any substantive agreement as KJU will only assess that his political warfare strategy is working, is shaping the environment and creating the conditions for him to not only survive but to survive with and because of his nuclear weapons.

Does KJU have us right where he wants us? Arms Control negotiations? Increasing friction in the alliance? Potential withdrawal of US troops? He seems to continue to have the upper hand in NE Asia poker consistently winning with a pair of twos.

North Korean denuclearization should start with weapons freeze: ROK president

Lee Jae-myung offers detailed road map ahead of summit with Trump, despite DPRK’s insistence it won’t give up nukes

Jeongmin Kim | Jooheon Kim August 21, 2025

https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korean-denuclearization-should-start-with-weapons-freeze-rok-president/

Lee Jae-myung, then-DP leader, speaking at a meeting room featuring former progressive presidents' portraits | Image: Democratic Party (Jan. 23, 2025)

North Korea will need to freeze its nuclear and missile development as part of steps to achieve the “denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula,” South Korean President Lee Jae-myung said in a new interview, despite Pyongyang’s repeated insistence that it will never give up its nuclear weapons.

In his most detailed remarks on the issue since taking office, Lee told Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun that the denuclearization process should begin with a freeze on weapons development, followed by scaling down of the DPRK’s nuclear program and ultimately full denuclearization.

“The goal is the denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula, but denuclearization cannot be achieved by simply clamoring about it,” he reportedly said when asked about the DPRK nuclear threat.

“What matters is the objective reality,” he said. “The first step is to freeze nuclear and missile development, the second step is to scale them down, and the third step is to aim for a complete denuclearization,” he added, according to the partial Japanese-language transcript published by Yomiuri.

Lee also criticized Washington’s past policy of “strategic patience” on North Korea, stating that it allowed North Korea to “expand” its nuclear capabilities and adding that it’s time to “actively engage in dialogue.”

A summary of the interview provided by the South Korean presidential official broadly confirmed the remarks, noting that Lee spoke about three steps and creating “conditions” for denuclearization through coordination with the U.S.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung receives a briefing on the military’s security posture at the inter-Korean border during a visit to the ROK Army’s 25th Division on June 13 | Image: ROK Presidential Office

The interview, conducted Tuesday, comes ahead of Lee’s meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba this weekend and with Trump in Washington on Monday.

It also follows his Aug. 15 Liberation Day speech stating that Seoul respects the DPRK’s political system and opposes unification by absorption, while urging Pyongyang to reinstate the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement.

In the Yomiuri interview, Lee reiterated the need for peaceful coexistence, saying the two Koreas must “recognize and respect each other” and pursue prosperity together. He emphasized the importance of dialogue among the Koreas, Japan and the U.S.

“No one knows which country might take the first step, but cooperation with North Korea would benefit everyone,” he said.

However, Pyongyang has emphatically rejected all of Lee’s overtures so far.

On Wednesday, the North Korean leader’s sister Kim Yo Jong issued her third statement against the Lee administration since late July, calling Seoul a “faithful dog of the U.S.” and criticizing the ongoing Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises.

She said Lee is “not a great man” capable of changing history and that North Korea has no interest in improving ties with the South, signaling that Pyongyang will exclude Seoul from any future talks.

A previous statement on July 29 also warned that North Korea will interpret any mention of denuclearization in dialogue with the Trump administration as a “mockery,” reiterating the DPRK will never give up its nuclear weapons.

Donald Trump, Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in meet at Panmunjom in June 2019 | Image: The White House

WHO IS LEE TALKING TO?

Experts say Pyongyang is unlikely to respond to Lee’s remarks, noting Kim Yo Jong’s recent statements. 

Lee Sang-kyu, chief of the nuclear security research division at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), said the South Korean president’s remarks to Yomiuri were aimed at not just North Korea but also the South Korean public and Trump.

“The message was meant to encourage broader attention to the issue, and to signal to Pyongyang that while it has not made any clear denuclearization commitments, it should take a more active role if conditions improve,” he said, adding that Lee seeks public support for the government’s direction.

Cha Du-hyeogn, a former Blue House official and now vice president at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, observed that Washington will likely support Lee’s road map, noting the use of similar language about “complete denuclearization of the DPRK” during recent talks between Secretary of State Marco Rubio and ROK Foreign Minister Cho Hyun.

While the U.S. is trying to engage Pyongyang, Lee of KIDA noted that North Korea sees little reason to respond as it benefits from ties with Russia. But he said the U.S. still wants to prepare for potential resumption of talks in case Russia-DPRK ties falter, particularly if there’s a resolution to the Ukraine war.

Since returning to office, Trump and his aides have repeatedly referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” in a departure from long-standing U.S. policy, while the White House has often highlighted Trump’s “good relationship” with Kim Jong Un.

Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump shaking hands ahead of the first-ever U.S.-DPRK summit in Singapore | Image: Dan Scavino Jr. (June 12, 2018)

Lee Jae-myung’s proposed denuclearization strategy puts forward nothing particularly new, however, according to experts.

KIDA’s Lee said the three-step road map mirrors the Moon Jae-in administration’s phased approach: freezing and reducing North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for corresponding measures such as economic cooperation and improved ties.

Cha agreed that the strategy is generally consistent with U.S. and South Korea’s approach so far but argued that the process should not “unintentionally lead to accepting North Korea as a nuclear state.”

Meanwhile, the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group released a statement Thursday stressing that DPRK cannot attain the status of a nuclear-weapon state.

“We demand that the DPRK abandon all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and related activities in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” the statement reads. 

Edited by Bryan Betts

12. Bill Gates calls on S. Korea to chart course for gradual hike in development aid spending

Bill Gates calls on S. Korea to chart course for gradual hike in development aid spending | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 21, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Aug. 21 (Joint Press Corps-Yonhap) -- U.S. billionaire philanthropist Bill Gates suggested Thursday that South Korea gradually increase its development aid spending, ideally to 0.5 percent of its economy in the coming years, with a greater focus on multilateral health initiatives.

Gates, chair of the Gates Foundation, made the remark during his visit to Seoul, after meeting with South Korean companies and government officials to discuss ongoing partnerships and collaboration in global health.

"(Korea's) ODA (official development assistance) spending is a bit less than 0.3 percent of GDP, and hopefully that will grow over time ... We've challenged the (South Korean) government a little bit to go back and look at their ODA spending." Gates said during a press availability.

"This new government can take a fresh look at, in terms of getting to 0.7 percent, that's not a near-term aspiration ... Ideally there would be a concrete plan to get towards 0.5 (percent) over the next five years," he said.

South Korea's ODA spending as a share of its economy stood at 0.21 percent in 2024, up from 0.17 percent the previous year.

Bill Gates, chair of the Gates Foundation, speaks during a media roundtable in Seoul on Aug. 21, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Notably, Gates called for placing more focus on multilateral health platforms for contributions, such as GAVI and the Global Fund, citing the efficiency of their operations and what he described as "high-impact" ODA.

"Our proposal is that this government makes a new ODA strategy that the health multilaterals could grow to be as much as 15 percent of that, and draw South Korea into a much stronger role in terms of governance and contributions," he said.

The Gates Foundation, founded in 2000, has been a major investor in global health initiatives, such as vaccine development, production and distribution to combat infectious diseases, as well as projects addressing poverty and climate change.

According to the foundation, its contributions to global health efforts have helped halve the mortality of children under age five, reducing it to 5 million. It has also invested over US$400 million in South Korean bioscience companies, primarily engaged in vaccine development and production.

Gates said the foundation is in the process of opening an office in Seoul.

Asked about the Donald Trump administration's cutbacks on global aid, Gates expressed optimism despite uncertainties, saying he has been in discussions with relevant U.S. officials, including Trump, on the best approach to U.S. foreign assistance.

"While some of the money was cut off, a lot of that money has been restored ... I'm hopeful that it won't be a significant cut," he said.

Gates said South Korea's stronger commitment to ODA could help countries in need, just as South Korea was helped by others and achieved dramatic growth over the past decades following the 1950-53 Korean War.

"Korea is unique in having gone from an (aid) recipient country to a donor. It would set a great example and encourage others at a fairly key time," he said.

"Korea should be very proud of the incredible economic success ... the progress towards being a very strong democracy. I wish every country in the world had made the transition that South Korea has," Gates added.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 21, 2025

13. Editorial: Why hide North Korea's human rights abuses?

​Both the ROK and US are backpedaling on north Korean human rights. Now more than ever we need a human rights upfront policy. We must not abandon the 25 million Korean in the north.

Human rights are not only a moral imperative. They are a national security issue as Kim must abuse human rights to continue his nuclear problem and he must deny the human rights of the Korean people in the north to remain in power.

Editorial: Why hide North Korea's human rights abuses?

https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/08/21/6ASLQZWJJRHNBERGNNYUSSR7BI/

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2025.08.21. 09:02

Updated 2025.08.21. 10:15

A 2024 report on human rights in North Korea./Park Sang-hoon

Ministry of Unification says it won’t release this year’s North Korea human rights report, arguing that past disclosures and public criticism have done little to improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans. That sounds like a pretext. The real motive is almost certainly a desire to avoid provoking Kim Jong-un.

North Korea is not just a country with human rights violations. It is a regime that treats its citizens as the private property—and slaves—of the Kim family. Human rights, as the world understands them, do not exist there. Previous editions of Seoul’s report have laid bare the horror. The 2023 edition documented the execution of a pregnant woman for pointing at a portrait of Kim Il-sung, and the public shooting of teenagers for watching South Korean dramas. Guards were ordered to break the spines of others caught doing the same. Torture, executions and even human experimentation are routine in prison camps and detention facilities.

Exposing such crimes is precisely what Kim fears most. He and his family live in opulence while ordinary North Koreans starve and toil. They have every reason to suppress the truth. Seoul’s government under Lee Jae-myung appears willing to help. At one point, it even considered canceling the report altogether. Instead, it has chosen to issue the report but classify it, turning a record of crimes against humanity into a state secret. What kind of secret is that?

The U.S. State Department, in its annual rights report released Aug. 12, stated bluntly that North Korea maintains power through executions, torture, forced disappearances and collective punishment. Washington is documenting, for the historical record, the suffering of North Koreans and the culpability of their rulers—something Seoul has now stepped away from.

What makes this harder to fathom is that a government led by the Democratic Party, which claims democracy and human rights as its highest ideals, is choosing to shield the world’s most repressive regime. Shouldn’t it be doing the opposite?

14. Inside secret behind Hyundai Rotem's K2 export breakthrough

​Partner in the arsenal of democracies.

Inside secret behind Hyundai Rotem's K2 export breakthrough

Strict testing regimes and a 90% localization rate through hundreds of local partners secure Poland deals

https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2025/08/21/HVYAPUKNNBC7XOGX75HNKCLFZ4/

By Lee Jeong-gu,

Kim Mi-geon

Published 2025.08.21. 10:48

Updated 2025.08.21. 10:53

K2 tanks await testing at Hyundai Rotem’s proving ground in Changwon, South Gyeongsang Province, on Aug. 14, 2025. The K2, a leading export of South Korea’s defense industry, was first sold to Poland under a 2022 contract and followed last month by a second deal worth about 9 trillion won ($6.5 billion). After assembly, each tank undergoes three to four weeks of trials — including sudden-braking and 60% slope tests — before being shipped to Poland./Hyundai Rotem

A 55-ton K2 tank tore across a scorching concrete track at Hyundai Rotem Co.’s defense plant in the Seongsan District of Changwon on Aug. 14, its roar echoing through the testing grounds. The massive vehicle, more than 7.5 meters long excluding its cannon, accelerated to 70 kilometers per hour before grinding to a halt in just 15 meters — a display meant to underscore South Korea’s growing strength in the global defense market.

Hyundai Rotem opened parts of its Changwon plant, billing it as the production base for both “the first domestically developed South Korean tank” and “a flagship of K-defense exports.”

Every K2 undergoes three to four weeks of intensive field testing before shipment. The process has also applied to the 180 tanks ordered by Poland under a $3.3 billion deal signed in 2022, the first overseas sale of the model. By July, 133 had already been delivered, without a single defect reported, and even ahead of schedule.

That record helped secure a second agreement with Warsaw on July 2. Valued at $6.5 billion, the contract calls for 180 additional K2s and 81 support vehicles — the largest single defense export in South Korea’s history.

Graphics by Lee Jin-young

The plant, established in 1978, has been at the center of the country’s armored vehicle industry. It began with refurbishments of U.S. tanks, developed the K1 in 1985, the K2 in 2008, and achieved its first export milestone in 2022. More than four decades of manufacturing experience and stringent quality control, executives say, explain the factory’s rapid-fire export success.

Although details remain classified, the facility is operating at full tilt to meet overseas demand. Shifts run from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. on weekdays with Saturday work added, pushing output to the legal limit. Hyundai Rotem’s annual capacity tops 100 tanks — roughly double that of manufacturers producing Germany’s Leopard main battle tank, according to industry officials.

A key factor is supply. The plant works with 731 partner firms, raising the K2’s localization rate to 90%. That tight network enables fast delivery of parts and swift fixes when problems arise. It has also buoyed small and mid-sized suppliers, some of whose revenues have doubled or tripled. “We plan to expand production lines and increase hiring to prepare for the second export contract,” said Kim Jang-ju, CEO of Kumahydpower Co.

Performance has reinforced the tank’s reputation. “In March last year during a NATO joint exercise in Poland, the K2 competed alongside Germany’s Leopard, France’s Leclerc and the U.S. Abrams,” a company official said. “While other tanks slipped on hills, the K2 advanced without difficulty.” Its firepower has also exceeded design limits: though rated with an effective range of three kilometers, it hit a target five kilometers away during the drills — a capability untested in South Korea due to limited firing ranges.

With the new contract, the Changwon plant is bracing for an even heavier workload. Of the 180 tanks, 116 will be built in South Korea between 2026 and 2027. Another 64, customized for Poland as the K2PL, will be produced locally from 2028 to 2030 by Bumar Labedy S.A. under a technology transfer pact. “The second contract includes extensive technology transfer provisions, with the document alone exceeding 2,000 pages,” a Hyundai Rotem official said. “It goes beyond sales, laying the groundwork for a European hub and future exports to third countries.”

The company is already looking ahead. Together with the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), Hyundai Rotem is working on an AI-enabled hybrid tank capable of both unmanned and manned operations, including target detection, battlefield awareness and autonomous driving. It is also collaborating with Hyundai Motor Group on hydrogen and electric propulsion systems.

15. North Korean elders mourned lost unification dreams on Aug. 15 anniversary

​This should be an easy goal for us to exploit from an information and influence activities perspective. If only we were willing to conduct PSYOP. But it would require South Korea to have a strong and positive unification policy (such as the 8.15 Unification Doctrine).

North Korean elders mourned lost unification dreams on Aug. 15 anniversary

"The country would already have been unified if Kim Il Sung had just lived a little longer," an elderly North Korean said, according to a source

By Lee Chae Eun - August 21, 2025

dailynk.com · August 21, 2025

Unification became a popular conversation topic among North Koreans leading up to Liberation Day, on Aug. 15, with a definite generational divide on the topic.

A North Korean source told Daily NK recently that more North Koreans had been discussing unification as they prepared to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule.

North Korea organized a variety of political and cultural events on Aug. 15 as part of the state’s official narrative presenting Japan’s defeat in World War II and Korea’s subsequent liberation as being the result of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung’s resistance movement.

“As well as being the day when Kim Il Sung liberated Korea, Aug. 15 was always an occasion for reminding us that unification would come someday. The government may have erased the word ‘unification’ (from public discourse), but elderly people were still reminded of it whenever this day rolled around,” the source said.

North Korea has been stepping up efforts to quash discussion of unification ever since supreme leader Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations as “the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not [. . .] consanguineous or homogeneous ones” during the Ninth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in late December 2023.

Older North Koreans were heard to lament that Korea’s unification—something they had assumed would happen in their lifetime—had become impossible. “The country would already have been unified if Kim Il Sung had just lived a little longer,” one said.

These elderly individuals could also be heard quietly humming songs about unification such as “Our Wish Is Unification,” the source related.

Younger generation embraced hostile state narrative

In contrast, younger people’s attitudes toward unification differed substantially from those of the older generation.

“Unification was always an uncertain prospect, so I’m not sure why people are still going on about it. It’s probably for the best that unification isn’t happening,” one young person reportedly said.

“Considering we’re not going to be reunified anyway, it’s not weird to treat a place we can’t even go to as a hostile state,” another said, suggesting that North Korean youth approved of the government’s narrative about “two hostile states.”

The public discussion of unification was rekindled by a map on a North Korean weather report that only showed the northern half of the Korean Peninsula.

Most North Koreans expressed disappointment about the new map on state-run Korean Central Television, which had long displayed the entire Korean Peninsula in its weather reports.

“Older people were told for decades that unification would come someday, and they hadn’t abandoned their belief in unification, no matter how challenging that would be. These people were shocked and saddened to see the southern half of the peninsula omitted from maps on TV reports and in propaganda materials,” the source said.

For many North Koreans, the meteorological map’s exclusion of South Korean territory was dispiriting proof of how unlikely unification had become.

“Banning the word ‘unification’ and cutting the map in half weren’t enough to eliminate ideas of ‘one nation’ and ‘unification’ from people’s hearts. While attitudes toward unification may have varied with the generation, the state wouldn’t find it easy to completely erase thoughts about unification,” the source said.

dailynk.com · August 21, 2025

16. U.S. pressure mounts ahead of Lee-Trump summit

U.S. pressure mounts ahead of Lee-Trump summit

Posted August. 21, 2025 07:31,   

Updated August. 21, 2025 07:31

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250821/5798248/1

With five days remaining before the first South Korea-U.S. summit between President Lee Jae-myung and U.S. President Donald Trump on Aug. 25, Washington is ramping up pressure. After expanding tariffs on steel and aluminum, the United States announced plans to demand equity stakes from semiconductor companies, including South Korean firms, that received subsidies for investments in the U.S. Although tariff negotiations between the two countries have concluded, economic and security demands continue to mount, making the summit a crucial test that could shape the course of the Lee administration’s foreign policy. Analysts warn that as Trump pursues a stronger version of “America First” than in his first term, the outcome of the talks could carry far-reaching consequences for bilateral relations.

U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said on Aug. 19 local time that the U.S. government is considering acquiring equity stakes in semiconductor companies that receive subsidies under the CHIPS Act to build factories in the country, Reuters reported. This raises the possibility that Washington could demand shares from Samsung Electronics or SK hynix, which have agreed to accept subsidies for their semiconductor investments in the U.S. The Trump administration is negotiating with Intel to provide $10 billion in subsidies in exchange for a 10 percent stake. If the government secures ownership, it could use it to influence further investment expansion in the country.

The South Korean presidential office is bracing for the possibility that Trump may make unexpected demands on investment or security during the summit and has launched an all-out effort to prepare. “We are preparing for various scenarios to respond to Trump’s style,” a senior government official said on Aug. 20. “Because President Trump deals in concrete figures, the negotiations will not be easy.” According to government sources, Seoul is preparing for the possibility that Trump could use tariffs and the U.S. troop presence in South Korea as leverage to press for greater investment and unexpected terms related to alliance modernization. “The amount of investment in the United States may increase,” Presidential Policy Chief Kim Yong-bum told reporters the same day. “Negotiations are not over until they are truly over.”

Former senior officials who took part in summits during Trump’s first term warned that the risks have grown significantly in his second term, stressing the need for a thorough risk-avoidance strategy. Cho Yoon-je, former South Korean ambassador to the United States, said, “We must be prepared to demonstrate with numbers that South Korea can be a strong partner in revitalizing U.S. manufacturing,” adding, “Spontaneous demands by President Trump should be accommodated flexibly but deferred to working-level discussions.” Choi Jong-kun, a former first vice foreign minister and now professor of political science and international studies at Yonsei University, said, “While it is important to deliver achievements that Trump can showcase, strategic ambiguity should be maintained on issues such as alliance modernization.”

Hoon-Sang Park tigermask@donga.com

17. President to visit Hanwha's US shipyard alongside summit with Trump

President to visit Hanwha's US shipyard alongside summit with Trump - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

President Lee Jae Myung talks on the phone with U.S. President Donald Trump at the presidential residence in Hannam-dong, Seoul, June 6. Korea Times photo by Wang Tae-seok.

By Park Ung and Lee Hyo-jin

• Published Aug 21, 2025 11:30 am KST
• Updated Aug 21, 2025 6:08 pm KST

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

By Park Ung and Lee Hyo-jin

Published Aug 21, 2025 11:30 am KST

Updated Aug 21, 2025 6:08 pm KST

Top diplomat rushes to Washington in abrupt visit ahead of summit

President Lee Jae Myung will tour Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia on Tuesday (local time) as part of his U.S. visit, which will also include his first summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, the presidential office said Thursday.

The shipyard, acquired by Hanwha for $100 million last year, is seen as a symbolic place to represent the shipbuilding cooperation initiative between the two nations, known as "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again" (MASGA).

The MASGA initiative played a key role for the two nations to reach a tariff deal in late July, when they agreed to lower the U.S.' planned blanket levy on Korean products from 25 percent to 15 percent.

Presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said Lee will visit Japan ahead of the U.S. visit and have a luncheon with Korean residents, followed by a summit and dinner with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. On Sunday, he is to meet leading Japanese lawmakers before departing for Washington.

He is scheduled to arrive in Washington on Sunday afternoon (local time) and open his U.S. visit with a dinner with Korean American residents. On Monday, he is to meet with Trump for a summit and later with business and academic leaders.

On Tuesday, he plans to travel to Philadelphia to tour the shipyard before returning to Seoul on Thursday morning.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun abruptly departed for Washington on Thursday evening, skipping his planned trip to Tokyo, where he was scheduled to accompany the president to his meeting with Ishiba. It is unusual for a top diplomat to be absent from a summit.

Cho's sudden travel to Washington was reportedly decided on Wednesday, fueling speculation that last-minute negotiations between the two countries are running into difficulties.

"Given the significance of this summit as the first meeting between the new administrations of Korea and the U.S., the minister plans to arrive in Washington in advance to conduct a final on-site review with the U.S. side, ensuring more thorough and meticulous preparations," a foreign ministry official said, declining to provide further details.

The official confirmed that Cho will not accompany Lee to Japan.

The minister's early visit to Washington was reportedly arranged at the Korean government's request. He is expected to meet his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The first summit between Lee and Trump is anticipated to address not only the trade deal, but also sensitive security issues amid growing U.S. pressure on Korea to increase defense spending and calls for an expanded role for U.S. Forces Korea in countering China.

The two leaders are expected to issue a joint statement following the talks.

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Park Ung

I cover a wide range of stories about Korean society — one of the most dynamic places in the world. To me, journalism means being on the ground, uncovering untold stories and amplifying marginalized voices, especially in an era when AI is reshaping the media landscape. That’s why I’m always here to listen. Tips and stories are welcome — feel free to reach out via email. Before becoming a journalist, I traveled through 24 countries over 702 days, served two years as a military police officer in the Republic of Korea Air Force and later studied filmmaking at the Korea National University of Arts.

parkung@koreatimes.co.kr

Lee Hyo-jin Profile Image

Lee Hyo-jin

I cover South Korea's foreign policy, defense and security issues on the Korean Peninsula. Before that, I reported on immigration policies and human rights — topics I continue to follow closely. I strive to gain an accurate understanding of the issues I cover and am particularly interested in stories that amplify often overlooked voices. Tips and story ideas via email are always welcome.

lhj@koreatimes.co.kr

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