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"Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to think sanely under the influence of a great fear."

– Bertrand Russell

"Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present."

– Marcus Aurelius

"If it is not yours,

don't take it.

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don't do it.

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1. The Variables of OPCON: The Sovereignty Narrative

2. South Korea’s Lee to Urge US-North Korea Talks at Trump Summit

3. North Korea: Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong says war games show South Korea has ‘dual personality’

4. Dennis Rodman parties with Vladimir Putin and makes bold claim about Kim Jong-un

5. South Korea must navigate the ‘Trump risk’ at key summits in Japan and US

6. Opinion | Why military independence from US could be Seoul’s best chance for peace

7. How a Multi-Domain Command in Japan Would Reshape US Alliances in the Indo-Pacific

8. Army reactivates intelligence company with Korean War lineage

9. Trump's New Import Rules Create Ripples: Korea Post Suspends All US-Bound Mail And Parcels, Other Nations Make Similar Moves

10. Lee set to embark on key diplomatic trip for high-stakes summits with Trump, Ishiba

11. S. Korean, U.S. top diplomats discuss alliance advancement ahead of Lee-Trump summit: State Dept.

12. N. Korea berates S. Korea for firing warning shots at its troops in border area this week

13. North Korea reinforces “two hostile states” narrative in police briefing

14. Foreign language fever sweeps North Korea as students eye better-paying overseas work

15. Korea’s Early Export Lifted by Chips Despite US Tariffs Toll

16. Why Kim Jong Un Needs ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command to Conduct Exercises

1. The Variables of OPCON: The Sovereignty Narrative

This is Clint's third essay on OPCON transition. He delves into a controversial and complicated aspect of sovereignty and puts the OPCON transition into historical perspective to illuminate the issues.

Conclusion:

However, if the Lee administration operates with a de facto timeline in mind, seeks shortcuts around bilaterally approved conditions, and continually pushes to scale down (and, according to some critics, degrade the standard of) alliance exercises that help assess Seoul’s ability to meet such conditions, it could result in alliance discord. Ultimately, progressives in Seoul will have to carefully balance between a long-sought wish to achieve greater sovereignty and the real-world consequences of getting it.

The Variables of OPCON: The Sovereignty Narrative

For Korean progressives, obtaining wartime OPCON means “restoring sovereignty.” For conservatives, a U.S.-led command architecture is what defends South Korean sovereignty.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/the-variables-of-opcon-the-sovereignty-narrative/

By Clint Work

August 22, 2025

Then-U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates conducts a joint press conference with then-South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Jang-soo at the Ministry of Defense, Seoul, South Korea, Nov. 7, 2007. It was at this 39th SCM that the United States and South Korea agreed on “the transition of wartime operational control in 2012.” It still hasn’t occurred.

Credit: U.S. Department of Defense

The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea, or ROK) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate in Washington and Seoul. Although OPCON transition, in one form or another, has been an official alliance policy for two decades if not longer, its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and South Korean administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables.

Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and South Korean officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy.

This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. After exploring the “control rod” logic in the first two articles, this third article explores the “sovereignty narrative.” While the sovereignty narrative drives OPCON transition (sometimes in direct opposition to the “control rod” logic), it also obfuscates people’s understanding of alliance command relations, and the complexities involved.

Subsequent articles will explore variations in alliance command concepts and structures, the conditions of the Condition-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan (COTP), how wartime OPCON transition relates to the regional role of U.S. forces and the alliance, and the role on the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) in a post-OPCON transition environment.

The Sovereignty Narrative

The “sovereignty narrative” is most prominent on the South Korean side of the equation. If the modern nation-state is defined, in part, by a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory, then control over the military – the primary instrument for upholding national security – is a fundamental sovereign authority of the state.

Having a U.S. four-star commander of the Combined Forces Command maintain wartime OPCON over alliance forces appears to violate that sovereign authority. The sovereignty narrative is driven by a basic nationalistic impulse to control the country’s military instrument and not be (or seem to be) subordinate to a foreign military commander. South Korean voices often describe this in straightforward terms as “military sovereignty.”

However, beyond such Weberian logic, the sovereignty narrative in South Korea is rooted in and shaped by historical grievances and internal political contestation over the United States, the alliance, and polarized progressive and conservative conceptions of Korean sovereignty itself. For progressives, taking back or “reclaiming” wartime OPCON is linked to historical arguments about Korea’s truncated sovereignty – and the U.S. role therein – and thus has deep psychological and emotional resonance.

Yet the power and resonance of such sentiments tends to obfuscate other critical operational, strategic, and procedural components of wartime OPCON transition. These components are often emphasized by other groups within South Korea and the ROK interagency process, and by U.S. officials, which tends to introduce caution and delays in the transition process. Such countervailing forces clash with the insistent policy thrust of the progressives’ sovereignty narrative, frustrating its proponents.

Moreover, tied as it is to domestic contestation within South Korea, the progressive’s sovereignty narrative often galvanizes highly politicized, partisan reactions from South Korean conservatives, further complicating an already complex policy process.

Assuaging Some Sensitivities, Catalyzing Others

Progressives in a democratized South Korea were not the first ones to bristle against the real and perceived sovereignty-constraining components of the alliance’s command structure. Such tensions go back to the beginning of the South Korea-U.S. relationship. Although President Rhee Syngman and other South Korean officials accepted placing OPCON of ROK forces under the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) was the price of maintaining an international military presence in Korea, they “were sensitive about their subordinate status in it.” After all, for more than two decades after the Korean War, the U.S.-led UNC possessed mostly unilateral and rather expansive OPCON over the ROK military, both during armistice (i.e. peacetime) and wartime conditions.

South Korean sensitivities to this arrangement manifested in multiple ways throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Presidents Rhee and Park Chung-hee deliberately challenged UNC OPCON by creating units outside of the UNC’s jurisdiction and not responsive to its control. Additionally, at times they openly contravened the U.S.-led UNC by unilaterally removing ROK forces from under its OPCON for repressive internal political purposes. Sometimes, U.S. officials approved Seoul’s requests to remove forces from UNC OPCON, which invariably entangled the United States in internal contestation within South Korea.

To some degree, South Korean leaders’ sensitivities about their subordination were assuaged as ROK officers took on an increased role alongside their U.S. counterparts, most notably with the 1978 creation of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC). The CFC’s creation shifted South Korea’s defense from the U.S.-led UNC to the alliance itself. The CFC commander was still a four-star U.S. general, but his deputy commander was a four-star South Korean general, and the command consisted of a roughly equal number of U.S. and Korean officers., with OPCON being a much more jointly guided within alliance consultative mechanisms.

Nonetheless, despite addressing some South Korean sensitivities, these changes did not alter the fact that the United States remained atop the CFC, nor that the alliance’s command structure was often embroiled in South Korea’s highly contentious and dictatorial domestic politics. Following Park Chung-hee’s assassination, General Chun Do-hwan challenged CFC OPCON in the early stages of his rolling military coup of 1979-1980, a move President Jimmy Carter later warned Chun against repeating. Yet, U.S. officials also continued to approve (or not object to) Seoul’s requests to remove their forces from under CFC OPCON – often with tragic consequences, none more so than in the Gwangju Uprising and Massacre in May 1980.

There have been intense debates about the exact degree of U.S. knowledge of or involvement in events in Gwangju. But what matters is the galvanizing effect the events had within South Korea, based upon the belief among many that the United States was complicit. As Lee Namhee wrote, for political dissidents and activists, the Gwangju Uprising “proved decisively that the United States had not only been deeply involved in Korea but also had shared responsibility for the ugliness of Korean history.”

This critical turn in perception of the United States catalyzed several interconnected strands of thought among leftists. The U.S. was blamed for its role in dividing the Korean Peninsula, sundering the sovereignty of the Korean nation. Progressive also believed that Washington, driven by Cold War strategic dictates, supported South Korean dictators’ repressive rule. Leftists increasingly resented their country’s dependence upon the United States, which forced South Korea to choose between Cold War blocs. They also began advocacy for peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, framing North Koreans as compatriots.

These narratives were antithetical to the conservative establishment’s own deeply held beliefs: namely, the imperative of anti-communism, the necessity of South Korea’s dependence on the United States for its security and survival, unequivocal support for the “free world,” and profound opposition to accommodation with North Korea.

These leftist beliefs had existed within South Korea for decades. Yet in a post-Gwangju and democratizing South Korea, they took on newfound political salience. U.S. OPCON within CFC became a target of this vehemently critical attitude, since it symbolized the historically unequal relationship between South Korea and the United States and was the basis for many democracy activists’ claims of U.S. complicity in the Gwangju Massacre. Driven, in part, by the innate nationalism surrounding the issue and by vehement anti-American sentiment, Roh Tae-woo made a campaign promise in 1987 to explore OPCON transfer.

At the 1988 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), South Korean and U.S. defense officials agreed to study possible revision of the arrangement. These efforts produced a 1992 agreement to transfer peacetime or armistice OPCON to South Korea in 1994.

As noted elsewhere, peacetime OPCON was a political construct, which nodded toward South Korean sovereignty and had important operational implications – particularly in the crisis space between armistice and conflict – yet maintained a U.S.-led combined structure. Alongside the U.S. “control rod” logic and increased concerns about North Korea’s emerging nuclear program, Seoul’s still predominant conservative establishment prevented more radical change. South Korean progressives, however, viewed the 1994 transfer as an incomplete step, reinforcing critiques about U.S.-imposed constraints on Korean sovereignty and a quiescent conservative establishment overly dependent upon the United States.

Although suppressed by South Korea’s deeply anti-communist and conservative political and military establishment during the Cold War, the country’s democratization provided new opportunities to express such sentiments and shape public debate around the issue of wartime OPCON. Moreover, with democratization, former progressive political dissidents and activists entered South Korea’s governing institutions as policymakers and lawmakers and thus effectuated their views on OPCON.

President Roh Moo-hyun’s unlikely 2002 election victory offered the chance to complete an incomplete process and reclaim wartime OPCON. The clashing progressive and conservative narratives around South Korean sovereignty and the policy of wartime OPCON transition in the mid-2000s have shaped the OPCON debate ever since.

Taking Back Korean Sovereignty

The Roh administration, encompassing an array of officials who ascribed to the truncated and aggrieved sovereignty narrative, expressed progressive positions more overtly than any previous South Korean administration. This resulted in charged public debates between political parties and civil society groups and jockeying between “pro-autonomy” and “pro-alliance factions” within Korean policymaking institutions.

Roh was elected amid heightened anti-American sentiment following the acquittal of two U.S. soldiers who had hit and killed two Korean middle school students with an armored vehicle in June 2002. In this context and from early in his term, Roh was outspoken in his desire to foster a more equal relationship with the United States and assert greater South Korean agency in relation to alliance, inter-Korean, and regional affairs (the topic of a later article in this series).

For Roh, executing wartime OPCON transition was critical to achieving Korean agency vis-à-vis the United States, saying it would be like restoring sovereignty to South Korea. Roh castigated Seoul’s military and national security establishment for its lack of initiative in pursuing the transition.

Additionally, Roh and officials in his administration were concerned about potential entrapment in unilateral U.S. moves against North Korea. Reclaiming wartime OPCON, the argument went, would provide Seoul with a more influence over a potential crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Relatedly, the Roh administration opposed alliance contingency operational plans surrounding potential North Korean regime collapse scenarios, which South Korea officials argued could be “a serious obstacle to exercising Korean sovereignty,” unless U.S. forces’ operational role within North Korea were circumscribed.

Roh administration officials proactively sought to reduce tensions and promote engagement with North Korea. They told the Defense Ministry to remove “main enemy” references to North Korea – despite opposition from within the military – and unsuccessfully requested that their U.S. counterparts remove language on the U.S. nuclear umbrella from the annual SCM’s Joint Communique.

Ironically, while the Roh administration pushed for wartime OPCON expecting opposition from the United States, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a willing partner. In 2005, when alliance officials first formally initiated discussions on OPCON, Rumsfeld told South Korean defense officials they were pushing on an open door. These Korean officials, pressured to make the case by their political superiors, immediately went on the back foot. The 2005 SCM’s Joint Communique stated both sides “agreed to appropriately accelerate discussions on command relations and wartime operational control.” U.S. officials insisted on the word “accelerate,” while South Korean officials on the word “appropriately.”

In 2006, allied officials reviewed the alliance’s Command Relations Study and roadmap, and “agreed to expeditiously complete the transition of OPCON to the ROK after October 15, 2009, but not later than March 15, 2012.” While Roh and the U.S. side preferred the earlier date, South Korean defense officials jockeyed for the latter.

In 2007, they announced an April 2012 wartime OPCON transition date under the Strategic Transition Plan (STP). The STP, as noted in a previous piece, would have dissolved the decades-old CFC, replacing it with two parallel, independent national commands – the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM). Yet the future parallel arrangement still would have retained distinct combined elements and consultative mechanism, with U.S. OPCON over important wartime functions.

Interestingly, as strenuously as Roh pushed the sovereignty argument, retention of combined elements within an ostensibly “parallel” structure showed officials on both sides recognized the importance of maintaining cohesion. The political symbolism of the shift sat alongside sticky operational realities that no invocation of sovereignty could overcome, if the alliance were to remain intact. To a degree, it reflected the contradictory balance inherent in the Roh administration’s concept of “cooperative, self-reliant” defense. Even so, for South Korea’s conservative establishment it went way too far.

Conservative Pushback

As soon as Roh began pushing for wartime OPCON transition, conservatives opposed him. Roh’s tendency to characterize wartime OPCON as limiting national sovereignty and his administration’s effort to untether a longstanding military command architecture cut against the very core of the conservative worldview. Driven by a persistent Cold War mentality, conservatives tended to view South Korea’s sovereignty as consonant with and shielded by a U.S.-led command architecture.

Conservative politicians and civic groups – particularly retired military generals and diplomats – systematically opposed the wartime OPCON transition under the STP. Conservative lawmakers visited Washington and lobbied against the change, arguing the CFC was “symbolic of the alliance… like living in one house under one roof, thinking together about threats and fighting together.” Retired generals warned of alliance dissolution and abandonment.

A visitor in Seoul could have encountered protest scenes, wherein hundreds of formerly senior military generals clamored against taking on the wartime OPCON of their own military. These retired generals’ groups – with outsized influence within South Korea’s military and security bureaucracy – successfully organized a 10 million signature campaign opposing the STP.

It bears repeating that South Korea had only once held full OPCON over its own military, namely, from June of 1949 – when the last U.S. combat forces from the occupation period departed – to the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. The one time in South Korea’s history it went alone, the country would have been swallowed whole but for the return of U.S. forces and military leadership. And, as noted, its later operational and command and control experience was largely (though not entirely) fostered within a U.S.-led bilateral architecture. The organizational inertia and sticky psychologies within South Korea’s military establishment, including generations of officers whose formative years were shaped within the CFC structure, posed obstacles to change.

Yet, Roh’s sovereignty narrative, alongside a receptive partner in Rumsfeld, let the proverbial cat out of the bag when it came to wartime OPCON transition. Once established as an alliance policy, it became politically untenable to openly and in principle oppose OPCON transition. In practice, however, successive conservative administrations maneuvered to scrap the parallel command and return to a combined command concept and later cajoled U.S. counterparts to adopt a more stringent conditions-based approach, which, by design, kicked the can down the road.

When progressives returned to office in 2017 under President Moon Jae-in, they again pushed for OPCON transition within Moon’s term of office, reclaiming the sovereignty narrative Roh had employed. Near the end of Moon’s term, frustrated both with a lack of progress on the transition and stalemated talks with the North, progressives began to question the conditions and argue for a more expedited transition while simultaneously pushing for an end-of-war declaration. This invariably caused pushback from their U.S. counterparts and criticism from conservatives that progressives are wiling to undermine national security.

Moon’s successor was another conservative, Yoon Suk-yeol. While Yoon, prior to his impeachment, ostensibly supported wartime OPCON transition, he warned against taking “perfunctory” steps. He presided over a yet more rigorous evaluation of bilaterally agreed upon standards and criteria.

The More Things Change, The More They Remain The Same?

Some of the hardest edges of the progressives’ sovereignty narrative seem to have been tempered by the learning process born of moving from populist politicization of the issue in the early 2000s to grappling with the hard realities of acquiring capabilities and building operational readiness and command and control acumen. Still, old habits die hard. While balancing its messaging, the current Lee Jae-myung administration has signaled well-worn progressive positions. For instance, the administration continues to use the language of “reclaiming” or “returning” OPCON, consistent with Lee’s policy pledges during the presidential campaign. In 2021, Lee echoed his progressive predecessors, asking: “What sovereign nation entrusts wartime command of its military to another country?”

When asked at his confirmation hearing about the timing for wartime OPCON transition, Lee’s pick for defense minister, Ahn Gyu-baek, said that “the goal is to achieve the transition during the Lee Jae-myung administration.” At the time, the South Korean presidential office distanced itself from Ahn’s statement, saying that OPCON transition is part of its policy agenda but no specific deadline has been considered.

Yet in recent days, the State Affairs Planning Committee, a de facto transition team tasked with drafting the Lee administration’s long-term agenda, stated in its final plan the government aims to establish and implement a road map for the OPCON transfer during Lee’s term. Lee himself stated the plan is a “set of proposals outlining the desirable direction of state affairs,” yet it is not a confirmed plan and may be revised through a consultative and coordinated process.

Simultaneously, the Lee administration has made clear it aims to foster inter-Korean engagement and work toward reestablishing the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement with Pyongyang, including by postponing half of the alliances’ field training exercises and calling off live fire ground and aerial drills near the Demilitarized Zone. Although North Korea’s Kim Yo Jong has openly derided these measures, the Lee administration seems undeterred.

At this stage it remains unclear what course the alliance will set or exactly what the Trump administration’s policy stance will be on OPCON transition. The current policy remains what it was during Trump’s first term. The upcoming summit between Lee and Trump will provide some top-line indications of how the issue is going to be framed moving forward. It seems likely any joint statement produced at the summit may contain language similar to the 2017 Moon-Trump summit about “expeditiously” enabling the conditions-based transfer of wartime OPCON. Nonetheless, defense and military officials will do more detailed work in the lead up to this year’s SCM to be held in Seoul.

However, if the Lee administration operates with a de facto timeline in mind, seeks shortcuts around bilaterally approved conditions, and continually pushes to scale down (and, according to some critics, degrade the standard of) alliance exercises that help assess Seoul’s ability to meet such conditions, it could result in alliance discord. Ultimately, progressives in Seoul will have to carefully balance between a long-sought wish to achieve greater sovereignty and the real-world consequences of getting it.

Authors

Contributing Author

Clint Work

Dr. Clint Work is a fellow for Northeast Asia at the Center for Strategy and Military Power (CSMP), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU). The views expressed are the author’s alone.

2. South Korea’s Lee to Urge US-North Korea Talks at Trump Summit

I support this under two very specific conditions.

First, it must be based on a realistic understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.This must be the foundation for any strategy toward the north.

Second, such talks must be in support of a superior political warfare strategy designed to defeat KJU's political warfare with Juche characteristics.

South Korea’s Lee to Urge US-North Korea Talks at Trump Summit

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-22/south-korea-s-lee-to-urge-us-north-korea-talks-at-trump-summit?sref=hhjZtX76

Lee Jae MyungPhotographer: SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg

By Hyonhee Shin

August 22, 2025 at 7:09 PM GMT+9

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

Hide

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung will press Donald Trump to reopen the stalled dialogue with North Korea when he holds his first summit with the US president.
Lee's National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Lee will ask Trump to take steps to rebuild trust with North Korea and follow up on a recently signed trade deal.
Wi said Seoul is willing to contribute more to strengthening military capabilities and the allies are discussing higher defense spending, but noted it's "too early" to give any numbers.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung will press Donald Trump to reopen the stalled dialogue with North Korea when he holds his first summit with the US president next week, his top aide said.

Lee will travel to the US on a three-day trip starting Sunday for his first high-stakes meeting with Trump, during which he will follow up on a recently signed trade deal and discuss other economic and security issues.

While trade and defense issues top their agenda, Lee will ask Trump to take steps to rebuild trust with North Korea, Lee’s National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said. Lee will also visit Japan on Saturday.

Tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula despite Lee’s efforts since coming to power in June to thaw inter-Korean ties. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has vowed “rapid expansion” of his country’s nuclear weapons program, and his sister this week said Lee is “not the sort of man who will change the course of history” and there is no role for Seoul to play in regional diplomacy.

But Lee’s administration will keep trying to defuse tension with Pyongyang and call on Washington to do the same, Wi said.

“I hope a similar process of building trust and dialogue will take place between the US and North Korea, which we can discuss at the summit,” Wi said at a briefing. “We’re encouraging this, though North Korea’s position is extremely rigid and it’s difficult to expect any new developments in the short term.”

Trump and Kim met in person three times during the US president’s first term, but those interactions failed to convince Kim to curb the development of his nuclear weapons program.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile threats and increasing military cooperation with Russia, as well as a US-China rivalry, have boosted the need to reinforce and modernize the South Korea-US alliance, Wi said.

Seoul is willing to contribute more to strengthening military capabilities, and the allies are discussing higher defense spending, he said, noting that NATO members are pledging to raise their defense outlay. Wi said it’s “too early” to give any numbers.

Trump has been urging allies to increase their defense spending, calling South Korea a “money machine” and previously demanding an increase in its annual contribution from about $1 billion to $5 billion to host 28,500 American troops, a presence aimed at deterring threats from the North.

Another topic on the agenda is amendment of a civilian nuclear energy pact with the US to lift limits on Seoul’s ability to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel, Wi said.

South Korea is currently banned from those activities under the accord, last revised in 2015 and due to expire in 2035. The Korean accord contrasts with Washington’s deal with Japan, which permits reprocessing thanks to Tokyo’s long nonproliferation record and advanced industry.

3. North Korea: Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong says war games show South Korea has ‘dual personality’

The most evil and dangerous woman in the world. She makes the point of my recent essay in the National Security Journal.

An excellent book to understand this woman is by our good friend Sung Yoon Lee.

The Sister: North Korea's Kim Yo Jong, the Most Dangerous Woman in the World

https://www.amazon.com/Sister-North-Koreas-Dangerous-Woman/dp/1541704126

A good review of Professor Lee's book is here:

Why Kim Yo Jong is the Most Dangerous Woman in the World by Joseph DeTrani

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/book-review/why-kim-yo-jong-is-the-most-dangerous-woman-in-the-world

Excerpt:

"As noted in The Sister, the Kim family rules forever, not confined by term limits. The book details cruelty on a grand scale, the hallmark of the Kim dynasty.

It’s a fascinating read."

North Korea: Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong says war games show South Korea has ‘dual personality’

independent.co.uk

North Korea: Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong says war games show South Korea has ‘dual personality’ | The Independent

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North Korea has rejected South Korean president Lee Jae Myung’s latest efforts to improve ties, saying Pyongyang will never treat Seoul as a diplomatic partner.

Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, accused Mr Lee of hypocrisy for calling for dialogue while joining US-South Korea military drills, which North Korea sees as invasion rehearsals. The Western allies argue the drills are necessary to prepare for North Korean aggression.

On Friday, Mr Lee urged Pyongyang to rebuild trust by reviving the 2018 inter-Korean military pact that reduced border tensions through buffer zones and no-fly areas. The deal collapsed after both sides abandoned it – North Korea first, and South Korea later in 2024 amid rising hostilities.

Since taking office in June, Mr Lee has tried to ease tensions with Pyongyang – rolling back propaganda loudspeakers at the border, promising not to pursue forced unification, and now proposing a revival of the 2018 military pact.

He has also urged Pyongyang to return to dialogue and remains firm on denuclearisation.

“Lee Jae Myung is not the sort of man who will change the course of history,” Ms Kim said, according to the state-owned Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) news agency.

“At this moment, the Lee Jae Myung regime is repeating the predecessors’ gibberish of ‘defensive drill’ even after staging the reckless US-ROK war drill for aggression directly threatening the security of the DPRK,” she added. ROK refers to the Republic of Korea, the official name for South Korea, and DPRK refers to the official name of North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

“This is the part clearly illuminating the dual personality of the Seoul authorities who are carrying two faces under one hood.”

South Korean soldiers take part in an anti-terror drill at the foreign ministry building in Seoul on 19 August 2025, on the sidelines of a major South Korea-US joint military exercise called the Ulchi Freedom Shield. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called on 19 August for the ‘rapid expansion’ of the country’s nuclear weapons capability, citing ongoing US-South Korea military exercises that he said could ‘ignite a war’ (AFP via Getty Images)

South Korea and the United States launched joint military exercises this week, testing upgraded responses to North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal.

The 11-day Ulchi Freedom Shield, the second of South Korea’s two major annual exercises, was to bring together 21,000 troops – including 18,000 South Koreans – for computer-simulated command operations and field training.

And while the allies later delayed half of Ulchi Freedom Shield’s 44 planned field drills until September, US military officials rejected South Korean media claims that the cutback was intended to create space for diplomacy with Pyongyang, saying the changes were due to extreme heat and flood-damaged training sites.

In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, centre, inspects the warship Choe Hyon in Nampo, North Korea, on 18 August 2025 (AP)

“They continue to tediously talk about peace and improved relations, being well aware that it is impossible to realise them, because they have an ulterior motive to finally shift the responsibility for the DPRK-ROK relations failing to recover onto the DPRK,” Ms Kim said.

On Monday, Kim Jong Un also denounced the South Korea–US military drills and pledged to accelerate the expansion of his nuclear arsenal while touring a new warship equipped with nuclear-capable systems.

State media later quoted his sister, Ms Kim, branding South Korea a “top-class faithful dog” of Washington and declaring that Seoul’s hopes of mending inter-Korean ties “will never” be realised.

South Korean president Lee Jae Myung has urged Pyongyang to revive the 2018 military pact to ease border tensions (via REUTERS)

In a statement last week, North Korean defence minister No Kwang Chol said the exercises reflected the allies’ posture of “military confrontation” with Pyongyang and warned that its forces were prepared to respond to “any provocation going beyond the boundary line”.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain high, with Pyongyang rejecting Mr Lee’s overtures for dialogue as relations have deteriorated in recent years amid Mr Kim’s weapons buildup and closer alignment with Moscow after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This picture taken on 15 August 2025 and released from North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on 16 August 2025 shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visiting the Liberation Tower to mark the 80th anniversary of Korea’s liberation in Pyongyang. Kim has denounced joint US-South Korea drills (KCNA VIA KNS/AFP via Getty Image)

Earlier, North Korea also denied removing propaganda broadcast speakers on the border with South Korea, with Ms Kim labelling the claim a “red herring”.

In a statement published in the KCNA news agency, Ms Kim said: “We have never removed loudspeakers installed on the border area and are not willing to remove them.”

Meanwhile, Ms Kim said at the Tuesday meeting: “They also know that the DPRK-ROK relations desired by them will never come back. If they don’t know, they will be idiots.”

She added: “Clarifying once again on this occasion, the Republic of Korea cannot be a diplomatic partner of the DPRK.”

independent.co.uk

4. Dennis Rodman parties with Vladimir Putin and makes bold claim about Kim Jong-un

Not often (if ever) have I included something from the Irish Star.

But not much there there.

Dennis Rodman parties with Vladimir Putin and makes bold claim about Kim Jong-un

irishstar.com · Abbie Meehan · August 20, 2025

Dennis Rodman has opened up on his unlikely friendships with world leaders including Russian president Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un

Abbie Meehan Sports Writer U-35s

Dennis Rodman has described Vladimir Putin as a "great guy"(Image: YOUTUBE/@N3on)

Dennis Rodman has revealed his tight-knit friendship and wild parties with Russian president Vladimir Putin, and boasted that he's America's top representative for North Korea's Kim Jong-un.

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The former Chicago Bulls star and five-time NBA champ is famous in the celebrity world for his outlandish antics and bold fashion choices - but he also has a surprising connection to global leaders. During a livestream with YouTuber N3ON, the ex-basketball pro recalled his private hangouts with Putin and Kim, calling the Russian president a "great guy. "In the candid discussion, Rodman said: "I know Putin very well.

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"I've met him five times. He has his own hotel, his own Ferrari and Lamborghini dealership. He said, 'Dennis, do you want a Lamborghini?' I said yes, and I had it for a week."

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The ex-Los Angeles Lakers star also described lavish dinners and meetings with Putin, complete with models, opulence, and an atmosphere "straight out of a Hollywood movie."

Rodman's initial brush with Russia came in 2014 when he jetted over as a 'basketball ambassador' upon the president's invitation. The 64-year-old also opened up about his bond with Kim Jong-un, which began at an exhibition basketball game in Pyongyang.

Rodman has stated that the global leader expressed a wish to visit the U.S., viewing the former athlete as a conduit for discussions between North Korea and the West.

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Vladimir Putin is reportedly a close friend of Rodman's(Image: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

The ex-basketball sensation most recently attempted to leverage his ties with Putin in a legal matter involving WNBA star Brittney Griner, who was held in Russia in 2022 on charges of cannabis possession. Reflecting on the tense situation, Rodman claimed he had been granted permission to journey to Moscow and participate in the negotiations.

However, this plan was scrapped after U.S. officials warned him that his involvement could potentially complicate the process for Griner. The three-time Olympic champion was eventually freed in December 2022 as part of a prisoner swap between Washington and Moscow, following her initial arrest in February.

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Such eccentric antics from Rodman are par for the course for those well-acquainted with the former NBA player's history, as his on-court behavior mirrored his unconventional style off the court.

Hailed as 'one of the best rebounders in history', the former Bulls forward was known for his wildly dyed hair, multiple piercings, and outrageous game-day attire.

Kim Jong-un and Dennis Rodman maintain a close friendship to this day(Image: AFP PHOTO /KCNA/AFP/Getty Images)

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Rodman's personal life was equally chaotic - he once enjoyed a high-profile romance with pop music royalty Madonna, and even had a brief marriage to model Carmen Electra. After retirement from the NBA, Rodman dabbled in acting, wrestling, and other professions before becoming an unlikely friendly arm between the United States, Russia, and North Korea.

The ex-athlete insisted that his chats with Kim Jong-un are strictly about sports, however, steering clear of political discussion. Back when his friendship with the North Korean was still blossoming, Rodman said: "My mission is to break the ice between hostile countries.

"Why it's been left to me to smooth things over, I don't know. Dennis Rodman, of all people.

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"Keeping us safe is really not my job; it's the black guy's [Obama's] job. But I'll tell you this: If I don't finish in the top three for the next Nobel Peace Prize, something's seriously wrong."

Despite the odd combination, Rodman insists he maintains solid ties with both Putin and Kim, forming a friendship circle that's as unique as it is unexpected, with the former NBA star at its center.

irishstar.com · Abbie Meehan · August 20, 2025

5. South Korea must navigate the ‘Trump risk’ at key summits in Japan and US

Will Monday August 25th be the inflection point for the alliance?

South Korea must navigate the ‘Trump risk’ at key summits in Japan and US

AP · KIM TONG-HYUNG · August 22, 2025

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung faces a pivotal foreign policy test barely two months after taking office, with back-to-back summits in Tokyo and Washington that reflect the wider struggle of U.S. allies to navigate Donald Trump’s unilateral push to redefine postwar orders on trade, security and alliances.

The meetings come after Seoul and Tokyo reached trade deals with Washington that spared them from the Trump administration’s highest tariffs, but only after pledging hundreds of billions of dollars in new U.S. investments.

Trump’s transactional approach with long-standing allies extends beyond trade to security and has fueled fears in South Korea that he will demand higher payments to support the U.S. troop presence in the country, even as he possibly seeks to scale back America’s military footprint there to focus on China.

The looming concerns about a U.S. retreat in leadership and security commitments come as South Korea and Japan confront growing cooperation between their nuclear-armed adversaries, North Korea and Russia, partners in the war in Ukraine and in efforts to break isolation and evade sanctions.

Here is what is at stake for the Asian allies of the U.S. as they deal with an America-first president who’s more unyielding than his predecessors:

Asian allies pulled closer by Trump

A day after confirming his Aug. 25 summit with Trump, Lee’s office announced he will visit Japan on Aug. 23-24 to meet Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, a rare diplomatic setup that underscores how Trump is drawing closer two often-feuding neighbors with deep-rooted historical grievances.

The meeting on Saturday in Tokyo of Lee and Ishiba — who last met on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in June — is largely about projecting leverage as the countries seek to coordinate their response to Trump, said Choi Eunmi, an analyst at South Korea’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

“There is now the Trump risk,” Choi said. “There’s especially a lot of uncertainty in the business sector, so they might discuss ways to ease that uncertainty … not necessarily in joint efforts to confront Trump, but within the framework of trilateral cooperation.”

Yukiko Fukagawa, a professor at Japan’s Waseda University, said Lee’s visit to Tokyo will also be seen positively in Washington, long frustrated by its Asian allies’ persistent disputes over Japan’s colonial rule of Korea before the end of World War II, and the way these tensions hindered three-way security collaborations.

“Because they have to deal with increasingly challenging mutual counterparts, such as China and America, both Japan and South Korea are under pressure to set aside minor differences to cooperate on larger objectives,” Fukagawa said.

Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, said Lee’s visit will help promote the “stable development” of bilateral ties as their countries work together on international challenges by utilizing the “shuttle diplomacy” of regular summits.

Lee and Ishiba could discuss restarting long-stalled free trade talks and South Korea’s potential entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, a 12-member Asia-Pacific trade pact that Ishiba has pushed to expand amid tensions over U.S. tariffs.

Ishiba, who has met Trump twice in person — at the White House in February and at the G7 in Canada — could also offer Lee tips ahead of his summit in Washington.

Seoul and Tokyo clearly share many crucial interests in the face of Trump’s efforts to reset global trade and U.S. security commitments.

They are both under pressure from Washington to pay more for the tens of thousands of American troops stationed in their countries and also to increase their own defense spending. Their vital automobile and technology industries are vulnerable to Trump’s tariff hikes.

They navigate a tricky balance between the U.S. and its main rival, China, a growing regional threat that is also the largest trade partner for Seoul and Tokyo. They are alarmed by North Korea’s accelerating nuclear program and its deepening alignment with Russia, which could complicate future diplomatic efforts after a long stalemate in U.S.-led denuclearization talks.

It makes more sense for South Korea and Japan to work with the Trump administration under a trilateral framework rather than engage Washington separately, especially given how Trump mixes security and economic demands, said Ban Kil-joo, a professor at South Korea’s National Diplomatic Academy.

For example, the countries could propose a trilateral scheme to support Trump’s push to expand natural gas and other energy production in Alaska, rather than negotiating potential investments bilaterally, he said.

“Beyond the drilling project itself, they would need to address security, including protecting maritime routes for the LNG shipments, and that responsibility could count toward defense cost-sharing or higher defense spending,” which Trump demands, Ban said.

Modernizing the military alliance

Lee’s meeting with Trump could include talks to flesh out the details of South Korea’s $350 million investment fund for U.S. industries, centered on cooperation in shipbuilding, a sector Trump has highlighted in relation to South Korea.

Seoul has one of the largest trade surpluses among Washington’s NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, and Trump is eager to hear from Lee on how his country intends to quickly bridge the trade gap, said Victor Cha, the Korea chair at Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

A more crucial topic for the leaders could be the future of their decades-long military alliance, a legacy of the brutal 1950-53 Korean War.

The U.S., which keeps about 30,000 troops in South Korea to deter North Korea, has long urged Seoul to accept greater flexibility to use them for missions beyond the Korean Peninsula — a demand that has intensified under Trump.

Comments by senior U.S. government and military officials suggest that, in addition to pressing South Korea to pay more for hosting American forces, the Trump administration could seek to reshape U.S. Forces Korea as part of a broader military focus on ensuring capability to respond to a conflict with China over Taiwan.

That shift would mean conventionally armed South Korea taking on more of the burden against the North, while the U.S. turns its focus to China. This could affect the size and role of U.S. Forces Korea, leaving Seoul with fewer benefits but higher costs and risks at a time when the North Korean nuclear threat is growing, experts say.

South Korean lawmakers have also expressed fears that Washington could ask for Seoul’s commitment to intervene if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, a tricky prospect given South Korea’s reliance on China for trade and Beijing’s role in dealing with North Korea.

South Korea should enter the Trump summit with a clear stance on its role in regional security, Ban said, possibly supporting U.S. efforts to maintain Indo-Pacific stability and opposing changes to the status quo, but without explicitly naming China as an adversary. Cha said Trump’s national security aides will want to hear more explicit South Korean commitments on its approach to China.

While potentially accepting a more flexible role for U.S. Forces Korea, South Korea should also seek U.S. commitments to ensure deterrence and readiness against North Korea aren’t compromised. American troop deployments off the peninsula could be offset by increased airpower or the arrival of strategic assets like bombers, helping prevent any miscalculation by the North, Ban said.

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AP writers Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo and Aamer Madhani in Washington contributed to this report.

AP · KIM TONG-HYUNG · August 22, 2025

6. Opinion | Why military independence from US could be Seoul’s best chance for peace

To my American and Korean friends and colleagues. Please do not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Yes, by all means let's "modernize" the alliance (as we have been doing for 7 decades).

A bilateral command is best.

Korean peninsula

Opinion Asia Opinion

Gabriela Bernal

Opinion | Why military independence from US could be Seoul’s best chance for peace

South Korea must secure US cooperation while navigating North Korea’s strengthened position and managing fears over regional security implications

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3322503/why-military-independence-us-could-be-seouls-best-chance-peace

Gabriela Bernal

Published: 5:30am, 22 Aug 2025

South Korea’s newly elected president, Lee Jae-myung, has been increasingly vocal about resuming exchanges with North Korea. This month alone, he has advocated for peaceful coexistence with the North, the removal of loudspeakers from the demilitarised zone (DMZ), the restoration of various inter-Korean agreements and the establishment of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

Despite Lee’s diplomatic overtures, Pyongyang’s response has remained frosty. After years of hardline North Korea policy under former president Yoon Suk-yeol, it will take more than rhetoric to win over North Korea’s leadership. One of Lee’s key administrative goals is transferring wartime operational control (Opcon) of South Korea’s armed forces from a US commander back to a South Korean military general.

Earlier this month, a presidential committee in Seoul discussed a road map to reclaim military Opcon during Lee’s five-year term. This would not be the first such attempt by a South Korean president. Former president Moon Jae-in pursued but failed to accomplish this goal during his tenure. This, in turn, came after discussions about a 2015 transfer collapsed amid persistent concerns about the South Korean military’s capability to effectively counter threats from the North.

If Lee’s plans to revive exchanges and diplomacy with Pyongyang are to succeed, he will need either Washington’s assistance in bringing Kim Jong-un back to the negotiating table or he will have to take an action significant enough to capture Pyongyang’s attention regardless of US foreign policy positions.

Although requiring long-term commitment, transferring military Opcon back to South Korea represents one such consequential action Lee could pursue. While this move alone would not guarantee peninsular peace, it could compel Pyongyang to re-engage diplomatically with Seoul. Primarily, such a move would help in reducing the perception of the South’s military as being controlled by the United States.

Seoul could strengthen its negotiating position with Pyongyang by leveraging this narrative of South Korea regaining complete military sovereignty, the perceived absence of which North Korea has criticised since US intervention during the Korean war more than seven decades ago. In essence, Opcon transfer could help dispel North Korean propaganda portraying South Korea as a US puppet state, potentially creating greater space for direct inter-Korean dialogue.

South Korea removes border loudspeakers in push for peace with the North

This Opcon initiative would coincide with the US, under President Donald Trump’s “America first” doctrine, seeking to reduce overseas commitments. As Trump has demonstrated through his rough treatment of European allies, these strategies do not discriminate among America’s partners.

South Korea faces similar circumstances. While the US continues to verbally affirm its commitment to South Korean security, some Trump administration officials have already expressed favourable interest in Opcon transfer. Earlier this year, Elbridge Colby, US undersecretary of defence for policy, stated that the Trump administration supported Seoul assuming a larger alliance role.

Regarding Opcon, Colby said Trump’s foreign policy vision “involves empowering capable and willing allies like South Korea”. Colby was more explicit in his support last year, arguing Seoul should undertake “overwhelming” responsibility for its own defence. Last month, the Pentagon confirmed that allies continue cooperating to “make progress” towards Opcon transition, though it provided no specific timeline details.

Like every one-term South Korean president, time is against Lee. He must contend with a North Korea that is more emboldened than ever, thanks to expanding military and economic ties with Russia. Simultaneously, the US remains occupied with other global conflicts, including Ukraine and the Middle East. Although Trump held multiple summits with Kim during his first presidency, other priorities now dominate his foreign policy agenda.

South Korea’s new president Lee Jae-myung vows to fix economy, hold talks with North Korea

While renewing inter-Korean cooperation without resumed US-North Korea dialogue will prove challenging, Lee might achieve diplomatic progress with Pyongyang by demonstrating concrete steps towards reclaiming wartime Opcon.

This approach carries significant risks, however. Given North Korea’s relatively strong current military and economic position through its Russian partnership, Pyongyang will be less inclined to pursue cooperation offers from Seoul. If the Ukraine war continues and Trump remains focused elsewhere, Kim is likely to maintain his Moscow alignment while ignoring Seoul.

Another critical concern involves ongoing US-China tensions. While Washington might want Seoul to assume greater responsibility for its defence, maintaining troops on Korean soil and retaining wartime Opcon could prove beneficial in potential regional conflicts involving Beijing. US Forces Korea General Xavier Brunson alluded to this earlier this month, warning that “short cuts” regarding Opcon transfer could create regional and peninsular security vulnerabilities.

Pyongyang has responded coldly to Lee’s multiple overtures this month. This frigid reception stems particularly from the massive annual US-South Korea military exercises that began Monday and continue through August 28. The Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercises bring together 21,000 South Korean and American troops for military drills that Pyongyang consistently denounces as invasion preparations.

On Tuesday, it was reported that Kim had condemned the exercises, accusing Seoul and Washington of seeking to ignite war on the peninsula. He also demanded “rapid expansion” of the country’s nuclear arsenal. He did not express any interest in resuming diplomatic dialogue with either Seoul or Washington.

Lee faces a complex strategic puzzle that requires careful calibration of multiple competing interests. While Opcon transfer represents a potentially powerful diplomatic tool for engaging North Korea, its success depends heavily on broader geopolitical alignments. Lee must secure Trump’s cooperation while navigating North Korea’s strengthened position through its Russian partnership and managing concerns about regional security implications.

The window for meaningful progress remains narrow, constrained by both Lee’s five-year presidential term and the evolving dynamics of great power competition. Ultimately, Opcon transfer’s value as a diplomatic catalyst will largely depend on Seoul’s domestic military capabilities as well as Washington’s willingness to change the status quo.

Gabriela Bernal

Dr Gabriela Bernal is a North Korea analyst based in Seoul, South Korea. She is the founder of Peninsula Dispatch, an online site that provides in-depth analysis of Korean peninsula affairs. Dr Bernal is also a freelance writer and has written for various media outlets as well as for thin

7. How a Multi-Domain Command in Japan Would Reshape US Alliances in the Indo-Pacific

All well and good to station a Multi Domain Task Force in Japan. I support that. However, we should establish a Combined Multi Domain Task Force in Korea.

Why America and South Korea Need a Combined Multi-Domain Task Force

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/why-america-and-south-korea-need-a-combined-multi-domain-task-force

How a Multi-Domain Command in Japan Would Reshape US Alliances in the Indo-Pacific

The establishment of the MDTF headquarters in Japan is poised to induce structural changes within the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/how-a-multi-domain-command-in-japan-would-reshape-us-alliances-in-the-indo-pacific/

By Park Ki-Chul

August 21, 2025

U.S. Army Soldiers with Alpha Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Artillery Regiment, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, U.S. Marines with 12th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force service members with 8th Division, Western Army pose for a group picture during the field training exercise portion of Resolute Dragon 23 at Hijyudai Maneuver Area, Oita Prefecture, Japan, Oct. 25, 2023.

Credit: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Paley Fenner

One of the most consequential military transformations underway in the Indo-Pacific region is the expansion and forward deployment of Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) units by the United States. Recent discussions between the U.S. and Japanese governments have centered on the establishment of a new MDTF headquarters in Japan. Simultaneously, there are indications that a key subordinate unit of the MDTF, the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB), may be deployed in South Korea.

This decision is not merely about troop redeployment; it signifies a profound shift in the geopolitical landscape, driven by the rising influence of China and Russia, evolving Indo-Pacific strategies, and a reconfiguration of trilateral security cooperation among the United States., South Korea, and Japan.

For South Korea, the establishment of the MDTF is intricately linked to the redefinition of the role of U.S. forces stationed in the country, the strengthening of trilateral cooperation, and an increased imperative to counter China, thereby necessitating a strategic response.

Understanding the MDTF Concept and Mission

The MDTF is a novel military formation initiated by the U.S. Army in 2017, designed to counter the anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies employed by China and Russia. These nations have developed capabilities such as long-range missiles, maritime denial systems, advanced air defense networks, and electronic warfare capabilities, which can potentially impede U.S. forces from reaching the battlefield. To overcome these challenges, the MDTF implements “multi-domain integrated operations,” which encompass not only traditional land, sea, and air operations but also cyber, space, and electronic warfare.

The structure of the MDTF includes long-range precision-strike missile battalions, artillery battalions, air defense battalions, and the MDEB. The MDEB plays a crucial role by utilizing reconnaissance satellites, space sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and over-the-horizon radar to detect enemy movements, integrating this information with signals intelligence and military intelligence. Additionally, it is tasked with disrupting enemy operations through non-kinetic means such as electronic jamming, cyberattacks, and psychological operations.

The Significance of Establishing the MDTF Headquarters in Japan

The U.S. plans to establish a total of five MDTFs, with three of them slated for deployment in the Indo-Pacific region. Currently, MDTFs exist in Washington State (1st MDTF) and Hawai’i (3rd MDTF), and there are plans for Japan to host one of two Multi-Domain Commands (MDC), overseeing the 4th MDTF. That would clearly shift the strategic focus of the Indo-Pacific strategy toward Japan.

This is not a coincidence; since 2001, the United States has designated Japan as a key hub for power projection in the Indo-Pacific, while U.S. forces in South Korea have been relatively constrained to a defensive role focused on the Korean Peninsula.

The establishment of the MDTF headquarters in Japan would institutionalize and concretize this strategic vision. With the MDTF in place, U.S. forces in Japan would evolve from a purely defensive posture to a central hub for deterrence against China and for intervention in regional conflicts.

This shift inherently raises questions about the future of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. There are indications that South Korea may host the MDEB rather than the MDTF headquarters itself. This unit would serve as the “eyes and ears” for the Japanese command, responsible for intelligence gathering and early warning functions in the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas.

This arrangement carries significant symbolic weight for South Korea. While Japan assumes the role of strategic command, South Korea may find itself relegated to a supportive role focused on information provision. Such a dynamic raises concerns about the relative strategic standing of South Korea within the South Korea-U.S. alliance, potentially undermining its influence in regional security matters.

Strategic Implications for the South Korea-U.S. Alliance

The establishment of the MDTF headquarters in Japan is poised to induce structural changes within the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

First, the potential positioning of the MDTF in Japan could lead to a narrowing of the role of U.S. forces in South Korea, confining them to defensive operations on the Korean Peninsula and limited overseas support. This shift would effectively relocate the center of gravity of the South Korea-U.S. alliance towards Japan, potentially diminishing South Korea’s strategic relevance.

As a result, South Korea will need to recalibrate its position within the alliance. By linking with the MDTF, South Korea has the opportunity to maintain and enhance the strategic value of U.S. forces stationed in the country. A failure to do so could risk relegating South Korea to a secondary role within the trilateral cooperation framework, undermining its ability to influence regional security dynamics.

Thus, the establishment of the MDTF in Japan would heighten the pressure on South Korea to participate in the alliance’s strategy to counter China. The MDTF would significantly enhance the U.S. and Japanese capabilities to intervene in potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea, compelling South Korea to define its level of involvement in these strategic calculations. This could lead to increased military commitments and a reevaluation of South Korea’s defense posture.

The MDTF represents a new testing ground for trilateral security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Operations in cyber, space, and electronic warfare necessitate real-time information sharing and a high degree of trust among the three nations. This requirement could catalyze the institutionalization of cooperation among the three countries, potentially evolving into a de facto quasi-alliance.

Conversely, China and Russia are likely to perceive these developments as new threats. China has already deployed over 300 military satellites and is accelerating the development of hypersonic weapons. Russia, through its actions in the Ukraine conflict, has demonstrated its long-range missile and electronic warfare capabilities. The establishment of the MDTF in Japan is likely to exacerbate strategic tensions with these nations, prompting them to enhance their military capabilities in response.

South Korea’s Strategic Response to the Changing Landscape of Alliances

The planned establishment of the MDTF in Japan and the potential deployment of the MDEB in South Korea present both challenges and opportunities for South Korea.

First, the South Korean government must reaffirm the strategic value of U.S. forces stationed in the country through high-level strategic dialogues with the United States. This includes clarifying the core missions of U.S. forces (deterring North Korea and initial response) and coordinating roles with the MDTF to ensure that South Korea’s interests are adequately represented.

Second, South Korea should actively participate in trilateral cooperation by institutionalizing joint cyber and space training exercises and information-sharing mechanisms, thereby demonstrating its role as a “leading actor” in the alliance. This proactive approach would not only enhance South Korea’s strategic value but also solidify its position within the trilateral framework.

Third, South Korea must establish parameters for its participation in countering China, maintaining the principle of deterrence focused on the Korean Peninsula while proactively defining the scope and conditions under which it can contribute during crises related to China. This strategic clarity will be essential for navigating the complexities of regional security dynamics.

Finally, South Korea should expand its contributions in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare, articulating the capabilities of its military to enhance its strategic value amid the evolving landscape of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. By doing so, South Korea can position itself as a critical player in the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The establishment of the MDTF headquarters in Japan marks a pivotal moment in reshaping the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. forces in Japan are set to become the focal point for regional power projection, while the role of U.S. forces in South Korea may become more limited. However, South Korea should not view this development solely as a diminishment of its standing within the alliance. Instead, it presents an opportunity to secure new areas of contribution and to expand the South Korea-U.S. alliance from a focus on Korean Peninsula defense to a broader commitment to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Ultimately, it is crucial for South Korea to position itself not as a passive follower but as an active architect of the future of its alliances, shaping its role in a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. By embracing this proactive stance, South Korea can enhance its strategic relevance and contribute meaningfully to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific region.

Authors

Guest Author

Park Ki-Chul

Dr. Park Ki-Chul, an army colonel (ret), currently serves as a visiting fellow at the Asia Center, Seoul National University, and holds the position of adjunct professor at Sookmyung Women’s University. He is also a former ROK WMD Planning officer of G35 in the U.S. Eighth Army.

8. Army reactivates intelligence company with Korean War lineage

Army reactivates intelligence company with Korean War lineage

Stars and Stripes · David Choi · August 22, 2025

Soldiers assigned to the 528th Military Intelligence Company uncase the unit guidon during their activation ceremony at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Aug. 5, 2025. (Wilfred Salters Jr./U.S. Army)

CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — A military intelligence company with a history of action in the Korean War is back in service with the 2nd Infantry Division, the sole U.S. Army division stationed overseas.

The 528th Military Intelligence Company, which saw action during the 1950-53 conflict, was reactivated during an Aug. 5 ceremony at Robertson Field at Camp Humphreys, the Army announced in a news release the following week.

Led by Capt. Brian Park, the company collects and analyzes information on enemy forces, terrain and potential threats, the service said.

The 528th was reactivated to “supplement the operations” of the division directorate responsible for providing commanders with a broad overview of the battlefield, division spokeswoman Maj. Eileen Poole told Stars and Stripes by email Thursday.

She declined to provide information on the unit’s size and equipment, citing “operational security considerations.”

The company was not listed in an organizational chart on the division’s website as of Friday.

Approximately 12,100 soldiers are assigned to 2nd ID, which is headquartered in Pyeongtaek city at Humphreys, the largest U.S. military base overseas, about 40 miles south of Seoul.

During the Korean War, the 528th “served as the eyes and ears of the division and provided critical intelligence that shaped the course of the battle and safeguarded lives,” Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion commander Lt. Col. Eric Swett said in the Army release.

The division took part in several major engagements during the war, including against Chinese forces in North Korea at the Battle of the Chongchon River in November 1950, the release said.

The division reported about 4,940 casualties that month, the majority of which occurred while fighting Chinese forces that reinforced the North Korean army, according to a U.S. Army Center of Military History research paper published in 1990.

Several major intelligence lapses contributed to the heavy casualties against the Chinese troops, who made a “concerted effort to avoid aerial observation,” the paper said.

These efforts included marching during the night and deceiving U.S. forces by mislabeling their battalions as a division.

“By 23 November the U.N. Command had acknowledged the presence of twelve Chinese infantry divisions when in fact there were nine armies with thirty infantry divisions,” the paper said.

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

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Stars and Stripes · David Choi · August 22, 2025

9. Trump's New Import Rules Create Ripples: Korea Post Suspends All US-Bound Mail And Parcels, Other Nations Make Similar Moves

Second and third order effects.

Or blowback.

Trump's New Import Rules Create Ripples: Korea Post Suspends All US-Bound Mail And Parcels, Other Nations Make Similar Moves - Alibaba Gr Hldgs (NYSE:BABA), Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN)

benzinga.com · Vishaal Sanjay

President Donald Trump’s executive order ending duty-free de-minimis exemptions for imports is already triggering fallout overseas, with Korea Post announcing that it will be halting all air parcels bound to the U.S. starting August 25.

Parcels Halted Amid Changes To Customs Policy

On Thursday, South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT announced that the counter acceptance of U.S.-bound air parcels will be halted from August 25, and all items, except for duty-free documents, will be suspended, starting August 26, according to a report by Yonhap News.

This has been attributed to the recent changes in the U.S. Customs policy, which is set to go into effect from August 29. The White House order, issued July 30, suspended the $800 duty-free exemptions that previously allowed low-value goods to enter the U.S. without tariffs.

According to Trump, the move was necessary, “to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threats” to the safety and security of Americans.

Korea Post notes that the mandatory declaration and customs duties on all U.S.-bound items have led to difficulties in processing shipments for the mail network.

The “EMS Premium” product, however, which is operated in partnership with a private company, is still available, with the service handling customs clearance and charging the duties to the recipient.

Korea Post’s CEO, Cho Hae-geun, says, “Customer uncertainty has increased due to changes in U.S. tariff policy. We will closely monitor related trends and swiftly develop countermeasures to minimize inconvenience to the public.”

eCommerce Giants Brace For Impact

eCommerce companies such as Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. BABA, Amazon.com Inc. AMZN, PDD Holdings Inc. PDD, which is the parent company of Temu and Shein, are all bracing for impact.

Platforms such as Shopify Inc. SHOP, Commerce.com Inc. CMRC and Lightspeed Commerce Inc. LSPD, which primarily cater to small online merchants, are also set to see significant headwinds as a result of this move.

StocksYear-To-Date PerformanceSince Liberation DayAmazon.com Inc. AMZN+0.79%+29.75%Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. BABA+39.01%+1.33%PDD Holdings Inc. PDD+26.91%+17.99%Shopify Inc. SHOP+27.11%+77.76%Commerce.com Inc. CMRC-26.54%-16.23%Lightspeed Commerce Inc. LSPD-25.54%+49.10%

Lee set to embark on key diplomatic trip for high-stakes summits with Trump, Ishiba | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 23, 2025

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Aug. 23 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung was set to embark on a key diplomatic trip Saturday for high-stakes summit talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, with his first in-person meeting with Trump expected to focus on reworking the alliance between Seoul and Washington.

Since taking office in early June, Lee is set to hold summit talks with Trump in Washington early next week, after Seoul reached a trade deal with Washington that agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on South Korean goods to 15 percent from the proposed 25 percent in return for massive investments and market opening.

National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac has said Lee and Trump will discuss efforts for "alliance modernization" during their meeting at the White House, adding that modernizing the alliance is aimed at bolstering the joint defense posture between Seoul and Washington.

At a time when the United States is focusing on deterring an increasingly assertive China, analysts said that Washington is pushing to adjust the alliance with Seoul under the name of "modernization" and could discuss a U.S. ground troop cut in Korea.

Wi told reporters that modernizing the alliance is aimed at bolstering the joint defense posture between Seoul and Washington.

"Our envisioned alliance modernization is aimed at making our security stronger and further reinforcing the combined defense posture of South Korea and the U.S.," Wi said.

In Tokyo on Saturday, Lee will hold a summit with Ishiba before flying to Washington on Sunday.

In this file photo, President Lee Jae Myung (L) and first lady Kim Hea Kyung head to the presidential plane at Seoul Air Base, south of Seoul, on June 16, 2025, to attend the Group of Seven summit in Canada. (Yonhap)

Lee and Ishiba held a meeting on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Canada in June. The Tokyo summit is intended to promote "future-oriented" relations and build personal ties, Wi said.

In an interview with Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun on Thursday, Lee said he would uphold past agreements on wartime forced labor and former sex slaves for Japanese troops, euphemistically called "comfort women," issues that remain politically sensitive at home.

A day after summit talks with Trump, Lee plans to visit Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia with senior U.S. officials.

Wi described the facility, acquired by Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean, as "a symbol of shipbuilding cooperation" between the two countries.

In this file photo, President Lee Jae Myung speaks by phone with U.S. President Donald Trump at the presidential residence in Seoul on June 6, 2025. (Yonhap)

On the final day of his U.S. trip, he will also lay a wreath at Arlington National Cemetery.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 23, 2025

11. S. Korean, U.S. top diplomats discuss alliance advancement ahead of Lee-Trump summit: State Dept.

To my action officer friends at MOFA and State, below this article is my recommended Joint Vision Statement for the outcome of the summit. (A fantasy perhaps, but one can dream).

S. Korean, U.S. top diplomats discuss alliance advancement ahead of Lee-Trump summit: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 23, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea and the United States discussed ways to advance the bilateral alliance during their talks in Washington on Friday, a State Department spokesperson said, as they fine-tuned the agenda for the planned summit between Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Donald Trump.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Secretary of State Marco Rubio held the talks just three days ahead of the summit, where Lee and Trump are expected to discuss joint efforts to "modernize" the bilateral alliance at a time when Washington focuses on deterring an increasingly assertive China.

"Secretary Rubio and Foreign Minister Cho discussed ways to advance the U.S.-ROK alliance centered on a forward-looking agenda that enhances deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, increases our collective burden sharing, helps to revitalize American manufacturing, and restores fairness and reciprocity in our trade relationship," Principal Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott said in a readout.

ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

The two sides also reiterated the importance of trilateral cooperation with Japan, he added.

Cho and Rubio, moreover, highlighted the "enduring" strength of the alliance, which Pigott said has remained the "linchpin of peace, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and across the Indo-Pacific for over seven decades."

This photo, taken on July 31, 2025, shows Foreign Minister Cho Hyun shaking hands with Secretary of State Marco Rubio before their talks at the State Department in Washington. (Pool photo) (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 23, 2025

Joint Vision Statement of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, Washington, D.C., August 2025

President Lee Jae-myung of the Republic of Korea and President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America met in Washington, D.C., in August 2025 and reaffirmed the enduring strength, purpose and future trajectory of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. They affirmed their nations' shared commitment to defending liberty, promoting peace and advancing human dignity across the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Recognizing the evolving security landscape and internal challenges faced by both democracies, the two leaders pledged to elevate the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance, one grounded in freedom, unity, strategic agility and an unshakeable commitment to the Korean people's right to self-determination.

Restoring the strategic narrative: information and influence as instruments of peace

President Trump and President Lee jointly recognized that information is a critical domain of strategic competition and human freedom. They expressed deep concern over recent decisions that dismantled decades of information and broadcasting efforts to the Korean people in the North, including:

• The 2025 termination of the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia Korea Services by the U.S. government

• The 2025 suspension of ROK National Intelligence Service-led radio broadcasts into North Korea

The leaders agreed that these decisions must be reversed. To this end, they pledged to:

• Reinstate the VOA and RFA Korean Services immediately, with renewed mandates to support truth, human rights, and democratic values

• Resume Republic of Korea radio broadcasts into North Korea, led by a newly chartered interagency unit under the Ministry of Unification.

• Establish a Joint Information and Influence Coordination Group to synchronize alliance messaging, support defectors and civil society, and modernize information delivery across digital, cyber and unconventional channels.

The presidents affirmed that the human rights of the Korean people in the North are not only a moral priority but a strategic center of gravity in the pursuit of permanent peace. They committed to a human rights upfront approach that informs all alliance strategy toward North Korea.

Shared vision for a free and unified Korea

The two leaders reaffirmed that the unnatural division of the Korean Peninsula must be resolved. They declared that a free and unified Korea, governed under democratic principles, is the only path to permanent peace, full denuclearization and justice.

President Trump expressed support for the Republic of Korea's 8.15 Unification Doctrine, which offers a Korean-led framework for unification grounded in the values of freedom, peace, and prosperity.

The leaders pledged to:

• Promote the right of the Korean people to self-determination as enshrined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

• Empower the Korean people in the North with access to truth and knowledge

• Align alliance policy toward long-term unification as a strategic end state

Reaffirming democratic norms and rule of law

President Trump raised concerns about perceptions surrounding recent legal proceedings involving former President Yoon Suk-yeol. President Lee emphasized the independence of South Korea's judiciary and the Republic's enduring commitment to the rule of law and democratic process.

The leaders agreed that democracy must never be sacrificed to expediency and that freedom and fairness are the foundation of alliance legitimacy.

Modernizing the alliance for strategic agility

The leaders announced major steps to optimize the alliance's defense posture in support of regional and global stability:

• Designating South Korea a strategic agility platform for the defense of Korea and the projection of ROK and U.S. forces for contingencies in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region

• Establishing a Combined ROK-U.S. Multi-Domain Task Force operating across land, sea, air, cyber, space and the electromagnetic spectrum.

• Resumption of rotational U.S. infantry combat patrols on the DMZ, under tactical control of ROK frontline units.

• Increased combined training, missile defense integration and cyber defense coordination.

• Dual-apportionment of U.S. forward forces in Korea to support both Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific contingencies, including in the Taiwan Strait.

• Korea's geostrategic location will serve as a strategic agility platform to enable rapid response, deterrence and alliance resilience across the theater.

Economic and technological partnership for freedom and security

The leaders reaffirmed their countries' deep economic and innovation partnership:

• South Korea remains one of the largest foreign direct investors in the United States, supporting tens of thousands of U.S. jobs in advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, batteries and clean energy.

• The two countries committed to strengthen supply chain security for critical technologies and rare earth minerals.

• Expanded cooperation artificial intelligence, quantum computing and cybersecurity will form a critical axis of alliance modernization.

Conclusion: reclaiming the front lines of freedom

President Lee and President Trump concluded that the ROK-U.S. alliance is not a legacy of the past, but rather a living, evolving instrument of democratic strategy. In an age of authoritarian revisionism and disinformation, the alliance must stand for more than deterrence. It must stand for truth, for liberty and for the unalienable rights of all people.

Together, they pledged: "To speak clearly, act decisively and stand boldly with the Korean people in their journey to freedom and unification."

The alliance remains ironclad in commitment, modern in strategy, and unbreakable in purpose.

America First. Korea Unified. Truth Forward.

Again, please note this is a work of fiction.

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/04/perspective-trump-kim-summit/4171754314991/

12. N. Korea berates S. Korea for firing warning shots at its troops in border area this week

My recommendation:

‘Back to the Line’: Why American Soldiers Should Be on the Korean DMZ

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/back-to-the-line-why-american-soldiers-should-be-on-the-korean-dmz/

N. Korea berates S. Korea for firing warning shots at its troops in border area this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · August 23, 2025

SEOUL, Aug. 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday accused South Korea's military of having fired more than 10 warning shots earlier this week at North Korean soldiers who were in a border reinforcement project, underscoring a rise in inter-Korean tensions amid an ongoing military exercise between Seoul and Washington.

Ko Jong-chol, vice chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, issued a statement condemning the South Korean military's "dangerous provocation" that he said is inciting military conflict, according to the Korean Central News Agency.

"On Aug. 19, the ROK military warmongers committed such a serious provocation as firing more than 10 warning shots with 12.7 mm large-caliber machine gun at the DPRK soldiers who were conducting a permanent barrier project near the southern border line," the statement read.

ROK is the acronym for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea, and DPRK is the short for North Korea's full name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

This photo, taken on June 14, 2025, shows North Korea's loudspeakers installed against South Korea in a border area, observed from a location in Gyeonggi Province. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · August 23, 2025

13. North Korea reinforces “two hostile states” narrative in police briefing

Political warfare with Juche characteristics.

North Korea reinforces “two hostile states” narrative in police briefing

In the message, Kim offered modest praise for South Korea's current administration under President Lee Jae-myung, noting that "not all South Korean officials are the same"

By Jeong Seo-yeong - August 22, 2025

dailynk.com · August 22, 2025

North Korea has doubled down on its “two hostile states narrative” in a recent lecture delivered to senior police officers.

“A message from Kim Jong Un reaffirming the Party’s official theory and position on North-South relations was delivered during a lecture for key officials in the Ministry of Social Security early this month,” a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK recently.

Kim’s message made it crystal clear that South Korea is a hostile state, a separate nation, and a foreign country. According to the message, reunification is only possible if South Korea follows the path of national autonomy—something it cannot do while serving as a vassal state of the US. Therefore, South Korea must be occupied by force.

The message also emphasized that police officers need to fully grasp this situation, closely monitor public sentiment, and work hand-in-hand with inminban (neighborhood watch unit) leaders to ensure this position is explained to all citizens, both adults and children.

In the message, Kim offered modest praise for South Korea’s current administration under President Lee Jae-myung, noting that “not all South Korean officials are the same.”

The message explained that South Korea’s current president belongs to the Democratic Party, just like former president Moon Jae-in, who once addressed Pyongyang citizens at the Rungrado 1st of May Stadium, and former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, who reached significant agreements with North Korea. The Democratic Party, the message stated, has always worked for friendship, unity, and peace since the era of former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

Warning against ideological softening

However, the message warned that whitewashing North-South relations simply because South Korea’s current president is from the Democratic Party would constitute an anti-state action that goes against the party’s fundamental line. Any comments that misrepresent the nature of North-South relations will not be tolerated.

“The message sternly warned that those who don’t understand the ever-changing nature of North-South relations must not create discord with the Central Committee, as that could create an opening for enemies hidden within our midst. In the lecture, beat police officers were instructed to relay this message to all citizens, without exception, by the end of the month,” the source said.

After the lecture, a heavy silence filled the room, with some senior ministry officials present cautiously admitting to feelings of “ideological confusion.”

“People yearned for reunification during the rule of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and their hearts overflowed with the ambition of passing down a single united fatherland to future generations. That’s why they’ve been so puzzled by these orders to treat South Korea like a foreign country. Many officers hinted at their own sadness when talking about how ordinary citizens must find the current situation heartbreaking,” the source said.

dailynk.com · August 22, 2025

14. Foreign language fever sweeps North Korea as students eye better-paying overseas work

Also a possible path for future escape. I met with one Korean from the north who learned English and Russian in the hopes of being posted overseas so he could escape. He was sent to be a translator with a north Korean logging concen in Russia and then escaped.

Foreign language fever sweeps North Korea as students eye better-paying overseas work

Many North Koreans are particularly interested in joint venture factory jobs with Chinese companies

By Lee Chae Eun - August 22, 2025

dailynk.com · August 21, 2025

North Korean students are spending their summer vacations learning foreign languages, driven by the growing belief that language skills are essential for landing overseas assignments or securing jobs in the better-paying trade and tourism sectors.

“Foreign language learning has become the thing to do during summer break among university students in major cities like Chongjin and Hoeryong. More and more students are seeking out professors or even fellow students who can teach these languages. The motivation is clear—they believe learning a foreign language will help them land a job overseas,” a source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently.

In Chongjin, the source noted, the number of students receiving foreign language tutoring has doubled or even tripled compared to previous years. This reflects parents’ growing interest in language education as they hope their children will gain valuable experience through overseas assignments.

The market has completely flipped from previous years. In the past, there were more people capable of teaching foreign languages than those interested in learning them, creating a buyer’s market for students. Now, demand has skyrocketed so much that professors and students with strong reputations can charge premium rates.

Since one-on-one tutorials are beyond many students’ budgets, groups of three or four often pool their money for shared lessons.

Another popular trend involves learning multiple languages from a single tutor. For instance, one second-year middle school student in Chongjin is learning both Chinese and English from a university student for 500 Chinese yuan (approximately 96,000 South Korean won) per month. While the typical monthly fee for each language is 300 yuan, the tutor offers a 100-yuan discount for students who study two languages simultaneously.

“This summer’s surge in foreign language interest has been incredibly profitable for professors and university students,” the source observed.

“This isn’t just about improving grades—students want to reach a level they could actually use in an overseas work assignment. So tutors need more than basic proficiency,” the source explained.

Border cities see similar trends

The foreign language craze is also taking hold in Hyesan, the border city in Ryanggang province.

“This year, an unusually high number of students are trying to learn English and especially Chinese. Since we’re so close to China here in Hyesan, more people seem drawn to learning Chinese with hopes of working in trade or securing an overseas assignment,” said a source in Ryanggang province.

“Since spring, there have been rumors about a Chinese company building a factory here as part of a joint venture. People think Chinese speakers might get hiring priority at the factory. That’s got parents scrambling to scrape together money for private tutoring,” the source added.

Many North Koreans are particularly interested in joint venture factory jobs with Chinese companies because workers there enjoy better conditions than typical factory workers—including higher wages and better food rations.

This highlights how the foreign language learning boom is primarily motivated by the desire for better pay and the broader experience that overseas assignments provide. The main driver is no longer sacrifice or loyalty to the state, but rather the pursuit of a more comfortable life.

“It’s pretty outdated to tell people to study hard so they can become devoted public servants. People are learning foreign languages because they see foreign-related work as the path to gaining experience and securing more stable income,” the source said.

Interestingly, despite North Korea’s strengthening ties with Russia across military, economic, and cultural spheres, there’s reportedly little interest in learning Russian.

dailynk.com · August 21, 2025

15. Korea’s Early Export Lifted by Chips Despite US Tariffs Toll

Korea’s Early Export Lifted by Chips Despite US Tariffs Toll

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/korea-s-early-exports-show-resilience-despite-us-tariffs-toll?sref=hhjZtX76

By Heesu Lee

August 21, 2025 at 9:00 AM GMT+9

Updated on August 21, 2025 at 11:33 AM GMT+9

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

Hide

The value of shipments increased 7.6% from a year earlier in the first 20 days of August, according to data released by the customs office.
"Exports through the first 20 days of August came in stronger than expected, driven by a surge in semiconductor shipments," said Bloomberg economist Hyosung Kwon.
The negative impact from US trade policies is expected to materialize more fully in the second half of the year, according to the state-run think tank Korea Development Institute.

South Korea’s early exports data showed exports held up in August so far, powered by a surge in semiconductor shipments that helped offset pressure from sweeping US tariffs.

The value of shipments increased 7.6% from a year earlier in the first 20 days of August, according to data released Thursday by the customs office. That compared with a 5.8% increase in the full month of July. Imports edged up 0.4%, resulting in a trade surplus of $833 million. Working-day adjusted exports also climbed 7.6% for the first 20 days of the month.

Early Exports Data Show Momentum

Steeper US tariffs from August raise concerns

Source: Korea Customs Service

Note: Figures are working-day adjusted, based on the first 20 days of each month

“Exports through the first 20 days of August came in stronger than expected, driven by a surge in semiconductor shipments,” said Bloomberg economist Hyosung Kwon. “Strong global demand for AI-related computer chips lifted overall exports, while car shipments also jumped — probably supported by an expected decrease in US tariffs on Korean cars to 15%.”

The latest data come after a last-minute trade deal that capped US tariffs on imports of Korean goods at 15% — a higher rate than the 10% implemented from April, but below the 25% level that President Donald Trump had threatened to impose.

Manufacturers, including Samsung Electronics Co., have benefited from Trump’s decision to put smartphones, laptops and other consumer technology products on an exclusion list. Supply-chain relationships with companies such as Apple Inc. have also helped.

South Korea’s shipments of semiconductors increased almost 30% from a year earlier in the first 20 days of August, the customs office data showed, with such devices accounting for nearly 25% of total exports. Meanwhile, auto exports climbed 22% during the same period.

Still, exports face risks ahead. The front-loading impact is expected to fade now that a trade deal has been reached, and Trump has threatened to impose new tariffs on semiconductors this month.

Auto exports also face uncertainty, as the 25% US tariff on Korean cars remains in place until Trump signs an executive order to align it with the 15% universal rate. Written documentation on the trade deals agreed to with Japan and South Korea is “weeks away,” US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said Tuesday in an interview with CNBC. Trump has also threatened to add chip tariffs by the end of August.

The negative impact from US trade policies is expected to materialize more fully in the second half of the year with the front-loading effect gradually wanes, the state-run think tank Korea Development Institute said in a report.

“With US tariff rates on most Korean goods now set, front-loaded shipments ahead of the tariff deal may unwind,” Kwon said. “Any pullback could weigh on South Korea’s exports in the second half of the year.”

Some sectors remained weak. Steel exports dropped 4.5%, staying weak under the pressure of the 50% US tariff, and petroleum product shipments fell 4%. Unadjusted exports to the US fell 2.7%, whereas shipments to China increased 2.7%. Exports to Thailand increased 59%, and those to Singapore rose 82%.

Exports are equivalent to more than 40% of South Korea’s economy, making them a key barometer of growth. While the tariff deal and signs of stronger consumption offer some support, the central bank is likely to stay cautious on the growth outlook, as tariffs may still pose risks to exports down the road, Jeong-Woo Park, a Nomura Holdings economist, wrote in a note this week.

(Updates with economist’s comments and chart.)

16. Why Kim Jong Un Needs ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command to Conduct Exercises

And why we need to train. Always.

My latest essay.

Why Kim Jong Un Needs ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command to Conduct Exercises

nationalsecurityjournal.org · ByDavid Maxwell · August 21, 2025

North Korea Talk

David Maxwell

Published

13 hours ago

Republic of Korea army soldiers assigned to 5th Engineer Brigade, pull security on the K1 tank while it moves across M3 bridge vehicle as part of Freedom Shield 25/Combined Wet Gap Crossing training March 20, 2025 in South Korea. This training was intended to boost combat readiness between the U.S. and ROK Army. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Wilfred Salters)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un needs the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command to conduct military exercises. For Kim, it is a strategic necessity.

Not because it improves his military capabilities, obviously, but because these exercises demonstrate the indispensable enemy crucial to his narrative of political warfare.

The very existence of joint South Korea-U.S. training exercises gives Kim the perfect foil, allowing him to manufacture a crisis to justify his oppression at home, his confrontation abroad, and his influence campaigns against the Seoul-Washington alliance.

Externalizing Internal Crisis

When Kim is under stress – and he often is – he finds a way to shift blame outward. His regime faces persistent structural pressures: a broken economy, elite instability, growing information penetration from the outside world, and cracks in the regime’s ideological control. As any totalitarian dictator does, Kim reaches for his most reliable coping mechanism: He deflects from internal failures by focusing on external threats.

That’s where South Korea-U.S. exercises come in.

Every time the South Korean and U.S. militaries conduct combined training, Kim responds with vitriol, threats, and provocations. He accuses the alliance of preparing for invasion and war. This is a lie. These are defensive exercises, conducted transparently to ensure readiness against possible North Korean aggression. The mission of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command is clear: Deter war, and, if necessary, defeat a North Korean attack.

But to Kim, these exercises are valuable as political fodder.

He uses them to rally domestic support, justify his weapons programs, and portray the U.S. and South Korea as imperial aggressors. This is classic guerilla diplomacy, a term George Kennan, the father of political warfare, might recognize.

The target is not just the battlefield, but the political will of your adversaries.

The Wedge Strategy: Halt the Exercises, Break the Alliance

Kim’s political-warfare strategy is built on a long-term objective: to force U.S. troops off the Korean Peninsula. He knows he cannot achieve that by direct military action. He will lose a war against the combined might of South Korea and the U.S. His strategy, therefore, is to win without fighting by undermining the cohesion of the enemy alliance.

K2 Black Panther Tank Like In Poland. Image Credit: ROK Government.

K2 Black Panther Tank. Image Credit: Polish Ministry of Defense.

K2 Black Panther Tank from South Korea. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

A key intermediate objective in this campaign is the cancellation of combined exercises.

Kim plays the long game. He makes escalatory threats before and during each training event: missile launches, nuclear rhetoric, threats of “unimaginable consequences.” His goal isn’t just to provoke fear. It’s to give political cover to sympathetic or appeasement-minded elements in Seoul and Washington who seek to reduce tensions by offering concessions.

There’s a persistent belief among some South Korean and U.S. administrations that canceling exercises will “create the conditions for dialogue.” That’s the trap. The very act of suspending training, intended as a diplomatic olive branch, becomes a strategic win for Kim.

When exercises are halted:

-Readiness atrophies. The ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command loses its edge, making deterrence less credible.

-Alliance trust erodes. U.S. and ROK forces operate with increasing uncertainty.

-Narrative legitimacy shifts. Kim can claim victory, both domestically and globally.

Once training stops, it becomes easier to question the need for a robust U.S. troop presence in South Korea. And when troops cannot train, political calls for their removal gain momentum. Kim understands this. That’s why every time we cancel or reduce exercises, he seizes the narrative, claiming that the alliance is weakening, that peace is possible without U.S. forces on the peninsula, and that this would be a victory for Korean self-determination.

Except it’s all a ruse. And if the U.S. and South Korea fall for it, they play directly into his hands.

Political Warfare with Juche Characteristics

Kim’s approach is grounded in what I have called “political warfare with Juche characteristics.” It does not stop at propaganda. He has a coherent strategy designed to manipulate perceptions, shape the information environment, and erode enemy will.

ROK/U.S. exercises are an obstacle to that strategy. They signal unity, resolve, and deterrent capability. They are tangible evidence that the alliance remains vigilant, trained, and prepared. That’s why Kim needs them to stop, not because they threaten his regime militarily, but because they threaten his narrative politically.

His information operations revolve around exercises. He sends statements to the United Nations, mobilizes friendly media, activates front organizations in the South, and amplifies disinformation through global networks. The target is not the battlefield; it’s public opinion in Seoul and Washington.

And it works – when his opponents let it.

Why We Must Continue to Train

Seoul and Washington must not let tactical decisions sabotage strategic objectives. Every ROK/U.S. exercise is a demonstration of alliance resolve, operational readiness, and deterrence. It also creates and protects a counter-narrative.

Kim wants to portray the U.S. as a destabilizing outsider, and South Korea as a client state. But when South Korean and U.S. forces train together, as an integrated command with shared leadership and combined planning, they show what true partnership looks like. They show the people of South Korea, and people throughout the region, that they are not preparing for war, but preventing it.

To cancel exercises in hopes of dialogue is to misunderstand Kim’s intent. He does not want peaceful coexistence. He wants to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and impose a gulag state.

As I’ve written before, readiness is deterrence. The moment the allies stop training, they invite miscalculation. The day they stop acting like an alliance is the day Kim’s political warfare strategy starts to win.

Conclusion

Kim Jong Un needs ROK/U.S. exercises – so he can attack them. He needs them to justify his oppression, sustain his threats, and advance his strategy to divide the alliance and remove U.S. forces from the peninsula. But if Seoul and Washington allow his narrative to shape their decisions, they surrender the initiative to him.

The best counter to Kim’s political warfare is clarity, unity, and readiness.

And that means we train. Always. No matter the noise.

About the Author: David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region (primarily Korea, Japan, and the Philippines) as a practitioner, specializing in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation (where he focuses on a free and unified Korea). He commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines during the war on terrorism and is the former J5 and Chief of Staff of the Special Operations Command Korea, and G3 of the US Army Special Operations Command. His final military assignment was teaching national security strategy as a member of the military faculty at the National War College. He was educated at Miami University, the University of Pineland, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College. Following retirement, he was the Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, The International Council on Korean Studies, and the OSS Society, and on the board of advisers of Spirit of America, the Special Operations Association of America, and is the editor-at -large at Small Wars Journal. You can follow him on X: @DavidMaxwell161.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

The Variables of OPCON: The Sovereignty Narrative

South Korea’s Lee to Urge US-North Korea Talks at Trump Summit

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

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Modernizing the military alliance

Opinion | Why military independence from US could be Seoul’s best chance for peace

South Korea must secure US cooperation while navigating North Korea’s strengthened position and managing fears over regional security implications

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3322503/why-military-independence-us-could-be-seouls-best-chance-peace

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eCommerce Giants Brace For Impact

Other Postal Services Halt Shipments

Lee set to embark on key diplomatic trip for high-stakes summits with Trump, Ishiba | Yonhap News Agency

S. Korean, U.S. top diplomats discuss alliance advancement ahead of Lee-Trump summit: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

N. Korea berates S. Korea for firing warning shots at its troops in border area this week | Yonhap News Agency

North Korea reinforces “two hostile states” narrative in police briefing

Foreign language fever sweeps North Korea as students eye better-paying overseas work

Korea’s Early Export Lifted by Chips Despite US Tariffs Toll

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

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Early Exports Data Show Momentum

Why Kim Jong Un Needs ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command to Conduct Exercises

North Korea Talk

Externalizing Internal Crisis

The Wedge Strategy: Halt the Exercises, Break the Alliance

Political Warfare with Juche Characteristics

Why We Must Continue to Train

Conclusion

About the Author: David Maxwell