Quotes of the Day:

"One day, in retrospect, the years of struggle will strike you as most beautiful."

– Sigmund Freud

"Of all the preposterous assumptions of humanity over humanity, nothing exceeds most criticisms made on the habits of the poor by the well-housed, well-warmed, and well-fed."

– Herman Melville

"Leadership is not the power to command but the courage to serve."

– Plato

1. Upcoming Trump-Lee Summit: Modernizing the Alliance by First Reaffirming Long-Standing Principles

2. North Korea Honors Its Soldiers Who Fought in Ukraine War

3. The Emerging Wealthy Class 'Donju' and Their Rise and Fall in the Kim Jong-un Era

4. Japan's Ishiba, South Korea's Lee affirm cooperation before Lee meets Trump

5. 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea

6. South Korea's plan to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program

7. South Korea's President Lee risks repeating a costly mistake

8. What to Expect from the US-South Korea Summit

9. Lee-Trump summit likely a major test for future alliance trajectory

10. N. Korea berates S. Korea for firing warning shots at its troops in border area this week

11. Lee says won't forget sacrifices of ethnic Koreans in Japan

12. S. Korea's industry minister vows 'best efforts' to ensure successful Lee-Trump summit

13. S. Korean, U.S. top diplomats discuss alliance advancement ahead of Lee-Trump summit: State Dept.

14.  Lee calls for closer cooperation with Japan amid changes in global trade, security order

1. Upcoming Trump-Lee Summit: Modernizing the Alliance by First Reaffirming Long-Standing Principles

Some important analysis from Dr. Kim. This should become the mantra of Korean and Americans regarding the military alliance: "Capabilities are more important than troop numbers."

In my opinion one of the important outcomes for the new national military strategy should not be that China is the "pacing threat." It should be that we need to take a holistic approach to the threats in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region (and around the world) and not be myopically focused on a single threat. We do not need strategic flexibility to address one theat. We need strategic agility to address multiple threats and to do that we need the strength of the silk web of our friends, partners, and allies.

The "pacing threat" idea is intellectually satisfying (and "resource satisfying") because it makes strategic thinking simple. But it is also intellectually and strategically weak. I hope the national security strategy retires that bankrupt concept.

Excerpts (of many important ones):

US rationale behind seeking alliance modernization and strategic flexibility is that US Forces Korea (USFK) and the alliance need to contribute to America’s central security challenge too (i.e., China), just as USFK has been focusing on South Korea’s existential threat of North Korea. It is particularly difficult to argue otherwise when South Korea’s military capabilities are the strongest they have ever been since the 1950 Korean War (although its military readiness is a separate matter). After all, the two countries have a Mutual Defense Treaty (1953) and not a unilateral one. The Treaty, which provides the legal and fundamental framework for US troops stationed in South Korea, does not specify North Korea as the “potential aggressor” nor does it specify any aggressor against which the allies must deter armed attack.” This means that the mission of USFK is not limited to deterring and defending US allies against only North Korea in the Pacific.

The US National Defense Strategy is expected to be complete in late August or September with a Global Posture Review to follow it. Due to the “pacing threat” of China, America’s global military posture is expected to focus more on its navy and air force rather than its army. This means that the number of American troops stationed in South Korea could naturally decrease with, e.g., the deployment of modern weapon systems like fifth generation fighter jets, which require less “manpower” to operate them.

In this context, military capability is certainly more important than the number of American soldiers in Korea. Still, Seoul should seek to sustain a sufficient number of US troops that can deter and immediately fight Pyongyang. US troops are protecting both South Koreans and a large American expat community living there.

Upcoming Trump-Lee Summit: Modernizing the Alliance by First Reaffirming Long-Standing Principles

By Duyeon Kim

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

https://koreaonpoint.org/articles/article_detail.php?idx=449

August 22, 2025

• #South Korea
• #US Foreign Policy
• #US-ROK Alliance

Key Takeaways: 

- Trump is dealing with a different kind of progressive South Korean government in his second term. 

- Ambition could backfire. The leaders should focus on reaffirming long-standing alliance principles rather than details on thorny security and defense issues. 

- Strategic flexibility, burden sharing and details on modernizing the alliance should be dealt with between working-level officials in both governments.

United States President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung will meet for the first time on August 25 in Washington, DC. Trump and his first administration have worked with a progressive South Korean government before. However, it is not inevitable that the alliance is in for another bumpy ride simply because there is another progressive ally in Seoul. The new South Korean President Lee Jae-myung represents a departure from the traditional progressivism of his predecessors Moon Jae-in (2017-2022) or even Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008). In other words, Lee may not possess deep, ideological convictions when it comes to dealing with Japan and the United States, although his critics claim he is “pro-China” for comments made in the past and “pro-North Korea” for allegedly transferring funds illegally to the regime when he was a provincial governor.

In fact, those around Lee claim that he is a foreign policy novice. Some who have worked closely with him even say “he does not care about foreign affairs,” meaning that his priority is domestic policy and domestic politics. Lee is also a self-proclaimed pragmatist, which will certainly be tested in his meeting with Trump and throughout his presidency.

The most notable difference from the Moon government is that half of the political appointees on Lee’s national security team are seen as pragmatic and half are considered ideological or traditional progressives. He has appointed pragmatic, career diplomats to lead the country’s national security and foreign policy. If Lee delegates foreign policy to them and accepts their recommendations, then South Korea’s foreign policy will exhibit more consistency than divergence with a conservative approach. This means that, unlike during the Moon government, the US-Korea alliance relationship will likely be quite smooth. However, Trump’s unpredictable style could tip the balance.

The first indication of such consistency is Lee stating before and after his election that his foreign policy will be based on the alliance with the US and trilateral cooperation with Japan. The architect of such approach is evidently National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac who is respected by the foreign policy community in Seoul. He is known for his pragmatic, strategic mind and could have easily led foreign policy in a conservative administration. Wi has a strong ally on the team with newly-appointed Foreign Minister Cho Hyun. Their main challenge will be grabbing the ear of their president fully as Lee’s national security team also has ideological officials leading the country’s spy agency and Unification Ministry as well as traditionally-progressive mentors who could be influential without assuming an official role.

These three ingredients, if utilized properly, could portend a smooth working relationship with the United States and present more opportunities—perhaps even historical ones—than challenges for the alliance during Trump’s term and for Seoul’s own foreign policy. Washington, meanwhile, may not currently have a Senate-confirmed senior official with the kind of gravitas South Koreans would like to lead America’s Korea policy. But the State Department and Defense Department have strong working-level officials who understand alliance issues and the stakes that are involved in managing thorny factors in them.

US Strategic Flexibility and Alliance Modernization

While the summit date was suddenly set when Washington and Seoul struck a deal on Trump’s tariffs, the months leading up to it were shrouded with suspense and concern in Seoul. South Koreans will zero in on if and how the two leaders use the terms “(US military) strategic flexibility” and “alliance modernization,” which are being pushed by Trump’s administration. At a minimum, Trump will likely want to receive a financial pledge that Seoul will contribute more towards hosting US troops.

Lee will likely seek to focus their conversation on increasing South Korean military expenditures and avoiding a conversation about strategic flexibility, which entails the possibility of redeploying US troops stationed in South Korea flexibly to other conflict zones (i.e., Taiwan Strait). In fact, both leaders should allow their teams at the working level to hash out details on strategic flexibility and how to modernize the alliance with Seoul assuming more responsibility for deterring North Korea.

Trump’s comments about allies and “free riding” since his first presidential term have long primed South Koreans to expect him to demand more military expenditures for Washington’s defense commitment to South Korea. They saw Trump elicit pledges from NATO allies to raise defense spending to five percent of their gross domestic product (GDP). Seoul currently spends about 2.8 percent of GDP. Seoul appears willing to increase up to approximately 3.5 percent while potentially making additional contributions in kind, amounting to a total increase of about 1.5 percent.

Instead, South Korean concern has been driven by Trump’s nonchalant comments about wanting to withdraw US military forces from South Korea due to costs and comments made by Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby before and after his confirmation. Colby believes that US troops based in South Korea should now be focused primarily on deterring China, rather than North Korea because Washington sees Beijing as a “pacing threat.”

The Trump administration is also seeking to modernize the alliance so that Seoul would focus more on deterring North Korea—which includes increasing expenditures on national defense capabilities for deterrence—while Washington focuses more on China in peacetime. In other words, Seoul would be sharing more of Washington’s security burden (known as “burden sharing”), which would include Seoul spending more to strengthen its own capabilities. Burden sharing is different from a cost-sharing agreement called the Special Forces Measures Agreement (SMA), which has long been a challenging negotiation to increase South Korea’s share of the costs to host USFK mainly due to Seoul’s need to receive National Assembly approval. The allies have made a prudent decision to negotiate burden sharing separately from SMA negotiations.

Colby has also been known to want explicit support for strategic flexibility and South Korea’s military involvement in a potential conflict. Seoul is firmly opposed to these two scenarios, let alone allowing them to be discussed between the two presidents.

US rationale behind seeking alliance modernization and strategic flexibility is that US Forces Korea (USFK) and the alliance need to contribute to America’s central security challenge too (i.e., China), just as USFK has been focusing on South Korea’s existential threat of North Korea. It is particularly difficult to argue otherwise when South Korea’s military capabilities are the strongest they have ever been since the 1950 Korean War (although its military readiness is a separate matter). After all, the two countries have a Mutual Defense Treaty (1953) and not a unilateral one. The Treaty, which provides the legal and fundamental framework for US troops stationed in South Korea, does not specify North Korea as the “potential aggressor” nor does it specify any aggressor against which the allies must deter armed attack.” This means that the mission of USFK is not limited to deterring and defending US allies against only North Korea in the Pacific.

The US National Defense Strategy is expected to be complete in late August or September with a Global Posture Review to follow it. Due to the “pacing threat” of China, America’s global military posture is expected to focus more on its navy and air force rather than its army. This means that the number of American troops stationed in South Korea could naturally decrease with, e.g., the deployment of modern weapon systems like fifth generation fighter jets, which require less “manpower” to operate them.

In this context, military capability is certainly more important than the number of American soldiers in Korea. Still, Seoul should seek to sustain a sufficient number of US troops that can deter and immediately fight Pyongyang. US troops are protecting both South Koreans and a large American expat community living there.

For Washington, strategic flexibility today means that USFK’s posture during peacetime will continue to be to deter North Korea while designating a small portion of it to maintain a deterrence posture against China during peacetime. It also means that during wartime, a portion of USFK could be deployed as necessary to a conflict zone. South Koreans fear this scenario would leave a security vacuum on the Korean Peninsula and hand North Korea an opportunity to provoke or even invade the South again.

The concept of strategic flexibility is not a new one. In 2003, Washington first broached the topic with Seoul and, after almost a year of negotiations, the term appeared officially in a 2006 Joint Statement between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon. Such discussions came against the backdrop of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US and the Iraq War, which led to Washington reorienting its global military posture to deal with its top security threat at the time. As a result, the Bush administration’s Global Posture Review led to a reduction of USFK from its previous 37,000 troops and redeployment to the Middle East.

Rice and Ban confirmed strategic flexibility to mean that “The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the US global military strategy, and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the US forces in the ROK. In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the US respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”

South Koreans were certainly anxious about the troop reduction. However, Washington’s decision and President Roh’s agreement to send Korean troops to Iraq were less controversial than today with China. Korean soldiers deployed to Iraq were also medics and combat troops for security and reconstruction missions in non-combat zones.

Metrics for Success

A successful summit would focus less on details regarding security, defense and trade issues. Instead, the two presidents should reaffirm long-standing alliance principles. Seoul should refrain from presenting Trump with a long, detailed list of asks and discussion topics because their efforts could backfire. Instead, it should deal with sensitive issues and specific demands at the working level of the US government.

Lee could express gratitude for US involvement in the Korean War and commitment to defending South Korea against regional threats. He could remind Trump of the importance of USFK’s role in deterring and potentially engaging North Korea militarily because a Taiwan contingency could expand into a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula that puts American expats’ lives at risk. Lee could seek reaffirmation of the US defense commitment to South Korea while pledging to spend more on military expenditures and the procurement of advanced weapon systems. He could also stress that Seoul should be consulted before Washington strikes any future deals with Pyongyang, and that any agreement should be advantageous to Seoul and the alliance’s interests.

Trump, meanwhile, has a propensity to go off script, but he should still avoid trying to secure an explicit agreement about US strategic flexibility and South Korean role in a potential Taiwan or South China Sea contingency. Their Joint Statement does not necessarily need to mention “strategic flexibility,” but if it must, then it would be sufficient to retain the same language used in 2006. After all, both US strategic flexibility and South Korea’s direct or indirect involvement are inevitable. If Trump gives Lee a hard time, Lee’s foreign policy professionals risk losing face, potentially resulting in an altered foreign policy approach from Seoul’s current trajectory.

Trump and Lee could reaffirm their country’s commitment to the alliance amid shifting security dynamics and agree to modernize it in broad terms to meet the needs of today and the future. They could also reaffirm that diplomatic engagement with North Korea is the desired approach while reaffirming the importance of deterrence and North Korea’s denuclearization.

The two leaders should also wait to discuss details of their framework agreement on trade issues until after their teams have sufficiently worked through the necessary measures to implement it.

Finally, another marker of success would be if the two presidents agree to continue implementing their countrys' 2023 Summit Joint Statement on deepening and expanding the alliance across all domains; the 2023 Washington Declaration on US extended deterrence and South Korean nuclear-weapons abstinence; and the 2023 Camp David trilateral summit agreements on expanding trilateral cooperation.

Ambition could backfire. The alliance would benefit from an amicable and respectful summit that focuses on key principles, especially when it will be the first meeting between two unpredictable leaders.

Duyeon Kim is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS based in Seoul. Her expertise includes the two Koreas, nuclear nonproliferation, deterrence, arms control, East Asian relations and geopolitics, and U.S. nuclear policy. She is a Columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and a Visiting Professor at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies teaching “Regional Security Regimes in Europe and Asia;” “Deterrence and Negotiations with North Korea: Theory and Practice;” and “AI, Nuclear Weapons, and Strategic Stability.” She has a Ph.D. from Korea University, an M.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, and a B.A. in English/Literature from Syracuse University.

2. North Korea Honors Its Soldiers Who Fought in Ukraine War

A friend here in Korea pointed out that at first the regime tried to hide the fact that the nKPA was fighting in Russia for Putin. But it sooned learned that it could not do so. So the Propaganda and Agitation Department shifted to honoring the fallen as heroes and is trying to use the fallen to reinforce the legitimacy of the Kim family regime.

North Korea Honors Its Soldiers Who Fought in Ukraine War

The North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, publicly consoled bereaved families, as well as awarding medals to soldiers returning from the force he has sent to aid Russia.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/22/world/asia/north-korea-ukraine-ceremony.html

Listen to this article · 3:40 min Learn more

• Share full article
• 
  

A photo released by North Korean state media on Friday showed Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, at a ceremony for soldiers who had fought in the war in Ukraine.Credit...Korean Central News Agency, via Reuters

By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

Aug. 22, 2025

In a rare show of public grieving, Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, knelt before the portraits of 101 North Korean soldiers killed in Russia’s war against Ukraine and hugged their teary relatives, according to photographs displayed in the country’s state media on Friday.

In a ceremony held in the headquarters of his ruling Workers’ Party in Pyongyang, Mr. Kim awarded medals to troops who fought for Russia, as well as the dead, lionizing them as “great heroes and great patriots” or “martyrs,” the North’s official Korean Central News Agency said.

Mr. Kim said his “heart ached” because he could only meet the dead soldiers in photos. “As I stand in front of the bereaved families of the fallen soldiers, I don’t know how to express my regret and apologies for not being able to protect their precious young lives,” he said.

By publicly paying tribute to the fallen soldiers and honoring the returning soldiers with government medals, Mr. Kim was trying to lift the morale of his people and justify his decision to send troops to aid Russia’s war against Ukraine, South Korean officials told journalists in a briefing on Friday.

Photos carried in state media showed Mr. Kim placing medals on the lapels of officers and soldiers. One image showed Mr. Kim holding the face of a teary young soldier with both hands and hugging him to his chest.

Mr. Kim knelt on one knee when he looked at one of the photos of the dead soldiers, arranged in three rows on a memorial wall. He also bowed to bereaved family members, hugging the young children of the dead soldiers. Some family members wept. A line of soldiers formed, carrying white chrysanthemums to place before the photos of the dead.

The North’s state media quoted Mr. Kim as saying that his country’s overseas military operations had reached a “victorious conclusion.”

Some of the North soldiers and officers traveled to Pyongyang from the front line to receive their medals. But the North did not say when the rest of its troops would return home.

North Korea did not say how many of its soldiers had died while fighting for Russia. But South Korean intelligence officials told Parliament in April that North Korean troops were believed to have suffered 4,700 casualties, including 600 deaths.

Editors’ Picks

A Coney Island Fixture, With Baked Clams and Housemade Mozzarella

The Billion-Dollar Game Built in a Dorm Room

The Makers of ‘BoJack Horseman’ Take Family Matters by the Reins

North Korea has sent an estimated 14,000 to 15,000 troops, as well as large shipments of artillery shells, missiles and other weapons, to aid Russia’s war efforts, according to South Korean, Ukrainian and U.S. officials.

North Korea and Russia had not formally confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops until April. On June 30, North Korean state television showed Mr. Kim looking somber and touching coffins of dead soldiers arriving in Pyongyang.

North Korea has emerged as a key source of badly needed weapons for Russia’s war efforts. After President Vladimir V. Putin met with Mr. Kim in Pyongyang in June last year and signed a treaty of mutual defense and cooperation, North Korea also began sending troops.

In return, the impoverished and heavily sanctions-bound North is believed to have received oil, food and weapons technologies that South Korea and American officials feared would help modernize its military.

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea.

A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 23, 2025, Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: At Ceremony, Kim Mourns Soldiers Killed in Ukraine. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

3. The Emerging Wealthy Class 'Donju' and Their Rise and Fall in the Kim Jong-un Era

Two articles below that provide some insight into north Korean society.

Note how capitalism is really the natural state of economic affairs. Capitalism (black, gray, and eventually up to 400 markets) saved the Korean people after the Arduous March of the great famine of 1994-1996 after the failure of the Korean Workers Party's public distribution system. It is "re-emerging" after the crackdowns of what I call the "COVID Paradox" (the fear and threat of the pandemic combined with KJU recognizing the opportunity to crack down on markets, foreign currency, movement, information, and smuggling to strengthen his control over the population). Will this re-emergence lead to creating the conditions for change? That is the unknown. BUt if we do not use information to our advantage to try to help the KOrean people in the north we will be contributing to the perpetuation of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State and the enslavement of 25 million Korean people in the north that possesses nuclear weapons that is a threat to the South, the region, and the global order as north Korea supports the efforts of the CRInK (China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea).

But this is why we must focus indications and warnings on internal instability as much as we focus on the threat of war.

My assessment of the "COVID Paradox" in 2022. I think it mostly holds today:

COVID-19 Paradox

• No reported cases for 2 years – Outbreak (May 2022) and then Over (July 2022!)
• Assessment: highly unlikely
• Myriad reports from inside about quarantine camps and outbreaks among military
• Kim exploiting COVID to oppress, repress, and suppress
• Close borders, hinder markets, seize foreign currency, stop movement, information crackdown
• “Arduous March” – Great Famine of 1994-1996
• Estimated possibly 3 million perished
• “Saved” by ROK Sunshine policy (and $billions in aid from 1997-2007)
• Development of 400+ markets resilient women taking care of families
• Comparison –a COVID outbreak could be far worse
• Made worse by Kim’s policy decisions to exploit the situation to keep a stranglehold on the people and sustain power
• Regime Collapse: loss of central governing effectiveness by the party combined with loss of coherency and support of the military

The Emerging Wealthy Class 'Donju' and Their Rise and Fall in the Kim Jong-un Era (3) Only the Sign Says 'State-run Store' - What About the Actual Operations? The Resurgence of Donju

asiapress.org

(FILE PHOTO) A man using a mobile phone in Moranbong District in central Pyongyang. Based on his clothing and items used, could he be a donju? Photographed by Kwang-ho Ku in June 2011 (ASIAPRESS)

Taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea completely reorganized its previous market-centered distribution structure under state leadership. In this process, donju who lost their foundation largely collapsed. However, recent reports indicate that new donju forces are emerging who intervene in the state distribution network to gain profits. Who are they, and what lies behind this development? (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Transformation of the Distribution System

After the 'Arduous March' of the 1990s, as North Korea's planned economy collapsed, private distribution networks dependent on Chinese imports developed, and during this process donju expanded their economic influence through distribution businesses. The Kim Jong-un regime wanted to seize control of the market-driven distribution network for political control and economic benefits, but since it was a sensitive area directly connected to citizens' daily lives, it was difficult to attempt easily, and ultimately chose coexistence with the market.

When the COVID-19 pandemic led to border closures and restricted inter-regional movement, the existing market-centered distribution network suffered major damage, bringing donju who primarily engaged in trade, transportation, and wholesale businesses to the brink of suffocation.

During this period, the Kim Jong-un regime pursued donju crackdown policies while simultaneously implementing the 'National Unified Price System' (fixed price system) for state-run stores, strengthening railway transport management, and building material storage warehouses near railway stations to establish a state distribution network.

At present, the state's monopolistic distribution network appears to have been established to a considerable degree. Reporting Partner A residing in North Hamgyong Province reported the following in June:

"Since this year, city and provincial commercial management offices have been transporting seafood, industrial products, and other regional materials using railways and distributing them through state-run stores. What private traders used to do is now being done by the state."

Let's examine state monopoly distribution and how it operates in more detail.

◆ What is State Monopoly Distribution?

To understand state monopoly distribution, it would be helpful to compare it with the past market-centered distribution system. The main changes are as follows:

Import → Production:

Items that were previously imported in large quantities from China were replaced with domestic products where possible. North Korean authorities pursued what they call a powerful trade policy of 'National Unified Trade.'

Wholesalers → Commercial Management Offices:

The role of donju who handled product distribution and wholesale to each region was completely taken over by state-affiliated commercial management offices.

Transport Operators → State-led Transport Methods:

The logistics business of individual transport operators called 'car traders' was replaced with state-led transport methods centered on railways.

Jangmadang → State-run Stores:

The system shifted from the past jangmadang-centered sales structure to one centered on state-run stores with jangmadang limited to a supplementary role.

Container trucks waiting for customs procedures before shipment to North Korea. Photographed at Quanhe Customs, Jilin Province in October 2024 (ASIAPRESS)

Particularly important in the current distribution system is the state's role in overseeing everything. Commercial management offices (commercial bureaus), which are state agencies, integrate management of the entire distribution process and perform the following roles:

○ Product Receipt: Systematically securing domestically produced goods and some imported items

○ Regional Allocation: Regional product allocation considering demand and supply

○ Transport Coordination: Transport coordination through state logistics networks centered on railways

○ Material Management: Preventing material losses during distribution and quality control

○ Sales Supervision: Overall supervision of the sales process reaching final consumers through state-run stores

※ Commercial management offices are practical agencies affiliated with city and county people's committees (governments) that organize, control, and manage regional distribution.

While it looks plausible, does it actually work well? Reporting partners say the state-led distribution structure has limitations.

◆ "The State Has No Money"

The big problem is transportation - vehicles and fuel, says Reporting Partner A.

"In Hamhung, Chongjin, and major cities, there are as many products (in state-run stores) as in the previous jangmadang and wholesale is possible, but these are mostly places near railway stations, and in distant places, product procurement is limited due to transportation means."

A says the state lacks money to operate the new distribution system, and donju are providing the power.

"It sounds good, but since (the state) has no money, donju are doing everything under the name of commercial management offices. Individuals register vehicles they purchased with commercial management offices and handle both material transport and retail/wholesale delivery."

A continued: "Commercial management offices collect products produced in factories and supply them to state-run stores, but since there are no transportation means needed for this, individuals affiliate with state agencies to receive wages while also making money."

A then specifically introduced a case that occurred nearby:

"Recently, the OO city commercial management office sold seafood brought from Chongjin at low prices in state-run stores, but in reality, since (the commercial management office) had no money, an individual provided the money under the commercial management office's name to bring it. It's called a commercial management office, but it's donju making money."

◆ Rising Donju

Reporting partners in Ryanggang Province also reported the evolved behavior of donju. At the end of June, Reporting Partner B in Ryanggang Province reported:

"While donju used to distribute (products) through jangmadang in the past, now they sometimes receive seafood or materials from rural areas under the name of commercial management offices and sell them wholesale at state-run stores."

Reporting Partner C in Ryanggang Province went a step further, explaining that donju connect directly with the state distribution network to make money.

"Since private transactions are cracked down on, donju become commercial management office employees to avoid crackdowns. Even at state-run stores, when donju are in charge, they place family members or relatives as salespeople to make money. Foreign currency stores and consignment purchase stores that sell imported goods are all operated by donju."

Donju who borrow the name of state distribution agencies or affiliate with state agencies to make money. It's still unclear by what standards and methods these people invest in state businesses and how they distribute profits. However, what we can know is that they are attempting to establish relationships with state power in a way that is clearly different from the past - by proactively entering the system.

The next article will examine the role of donju more specifically in connection with the 'Socialist Enterprise Responsibility Management System' that appears to be in full implementation at enterprise sites in North Korea. (continued >>4)

Map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

The Rise and Fall of the New Wealthy Class 'Donju' in the Kim Jong-un Era (4): The Establishment of the 'Enterprise Responsibility Management System' - The Dawn of the Corporate Age... Donju Seizing New Opportunities

asiapress.org

Neighborhood residents gather in an evening alley while children play. October 2024, Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, photographed from the Chinese side of the border with North Korea. (ASIAPRESS)

Alongside the state monopolization of distribution, the most significant recent change in North Korea's economy has been the establishment of the 'Socialist Enterprise Responsibility Management System.' This system was introduced to boost productivity by significantly expanding corporate management authority across all areas—from planning and production to pricing, sales, and profit allocation. Reports indicate that this system has recently begun operating in earnest, and donju are now exploiting the gaps created by increased corporate autonomy. (By JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ What is the 'Enterprise Responsibility Management System'?

The Enterprise Responsibility Management System was first introduced in May 2014 through Kim Jong-un's dialogue with party, government, and military officials titled "On Establishing Our Own Economic Management Methods in Line with the Demands of Current Development." It was later formalized at the 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in May 2016, and in August 2019, it was enshrined in the constitution through the Supreme People's Assembly, drawing attention from media and academia.

The relevant section of the revised North Korean Constitution, Article 33, states:

"...The state implements the socialist enterprise responsibility management system in economic management and ensures proper utilization of economic levers such as cost, price, and profitability."

What specifically has changed with the introduction of this system?

In short, state control over enterprises has been reduced while corporate autonomy has been expanded. Previously, the state made detailed decisions about everything—raw materials, production volumes, sales outlets—while enterprises simply carried out production according to state plans and supply. Now, instead of reduced state support, enterprises fulfill (comparatively smaller) state plans and use the remaining time and resources for autonomous business activities, taking responsibility for the results.

◆ "Now It's Enterprises, Not Markets"

Recent reports from ASIAPRESS reporting partners show that the enterprise responsibility management system is operating on the ground.

In June, Reporting Partner C in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, said:

"Now you have to work with enterprises—there's not much you can do in the markets anymore. Even when factories want to order work uniforms, they can't place orders with individuals. They have to order from local factories or state enterprises, and production only begins after paying at least 50% upfront."

Around the same time, Reporting Partner B also mentioned changes in corporate management practices:

"Enterprises can now sell goods, so they've created separate enterprise stores selling items like ironware, shoes, beer, and bread under the enterprise name."

This explains how a steel factory might make and sell beer—enterprises can now develop and sell products completely different from their original production items, as long as it benefits the company.

Reporting Partner D also reported on changed labor market practices:

"Trading companies can no longer give work directly to individuals and pay them with money or goods like before, as this now causes problems. Instead, they request workers from enterprises and pay labor costs to them."

D further explained: "It's currently squid season, but it's difficult to go to sea without being registered in the fisheries industry. So enterprises dispatch personnel to fishing cooperatives to earn money, which is then used as corporate operating funds."

What was once individual squid fishing has now become inter-enterprise transactions through labor dispatch contracts, with enterprises receiving wages for dispatched workers from fishing cooperatives to use as operating capital.

North Korean squid fishing boat appearing near Japan's EEZ. Late July 2018 (Provided by Japan Coast Guard)

◆ Why Now?

Why is the enterprise responsibility management system being implemented in earnest now, a full decade after its introduction?

Dr. Hwang Ju-hee at the Korea Institute for National Unification, who has long studied the 'Socialist Enterprise Responsibility Management System,' says this is the recent manifestation of a system that has been gradually taking root:

"While the policy was announced ten years ago, that was more about presenting an ideal direction. Actual field implementation has been a gradual process. Particularly, the 'Socialist Enterprise Responsibility Management System' involves reorganizing overall economic management, so it inevitably had to be long-term."

Dr. Hwang explained that during this period, provisions related to the system's introduction have been steadily revised and supplemented across sectoral laws, including enterprise law, farm law, and fiscal law.

She noted that monitoring of North Korea's official media and internal materials related to the enterprise responsibility management system shows that reports about its achievements began appearing around 2022. Particularly in 2023 and last year, there have been increasing reports about the system's implementation, including the selection of top ten enterprises meeting the requirements of the 'Socialist Enterprise Responsibility Management System.'

However, Dr. Hwang cautioned that it's still too early to be optimistic about the system's smooth implementation, highlighting structural constraints inherent in North Korean enterprises:

"As long as North Korea's chronic practice of imposing social tasks continues and deeply rooted corruption structures aren't resolved to some degree, there are various structural burden factors that prevent this system from being implemented effectively. Enterprises' limited fundraising capacity also acts as another constraining factor."

Indeed, North Korean enterprises' financial difficulties appear to be severe. What's interesting is that donju are entering enterprise operations amid these circumstances.

As Reporting Partner B explained:

"While they're supposed to activate inter-enterprise transactions, enterprises actually lack the funds to purchase materials and need to borrow money. Donju are making money by acting as middleman brokers."

All of this is possible because corporate autonomy has increased with the activation of the enterprise responsibility management system. In the next installment, we'll examine the rise of the donju alongside recent enterprises, look at their activities, and conclude the series by diagnosing who these people really are. (Continued in the next installment)

Map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

4. Japan's Ishiba, South Korea's Lee affirm cooperation before Lee meets Trump

One of the positive mutual benefits in the current state of political and national security affairs is the apparent potential for continued trilateral cooperation which is in all our national security interests.

Japan's Ishiba, South Korea's Lee affirm cooperation before Lee meets Trump

South Korea's President Lee Jae Myung shakes hands with Japan's Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in Tokyo, Japan on Aug 23, 2025. (Photo: Reuters/Kim Kyung-Hoon/Pool)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/japan-south-korea-shigeru-ishiba-lee-jae-myung-5310591

23 Aug 2025 06:03PM

(Updated: 23 Aug 2025 06:20PM)

Bookmark

WhatsApp

Telegram

Facebook

Twitter

Email

LinkedIn

Read a summary of this article on FAST.

FAST

TOKYO: Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung reaffirmed security cooperation between the two East Asian neighbours on Saturday (Aug 23), ahead of a summit Lee is to hold with US President Donald Trump on Monday.

On his first official visit to Japan since taking office in June, Lee met Ishiba at the premier's residence in Tokyo to discuss bilateral ties, including closer security cooperation with the United States under a trilateral pact signed by their predecessors.

"Stable relations benefit both our countries and our region," Ishiba said during an expanded round of summit talks. "It is also crucial that we strengthen our trilateral alliance with the US."

The snap election victory of the liberal Lee - following the impeachment of conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol for declaring martial law - raised concerns in Tokyo that relations with Seoul could sour.

Lee has criticised past efforts to improve ties strained by lingering resentment over Japan's colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

The South Korean government last week expressed "deep disappointment and regret" after Japanese officials visited a shrine in Tokyo to Japan's war dead that many Koreans see as a symbol of Japan's wartime aggression.

So far, however, Lee has said he backs closer relations with Japan, including in his first meeting with Ishiba on the sidelines of a Group of Seven summit in Canada in June.

Despite their differences, the two US allies rely heavily on Washington to counter China's growing regional influence.

Together, they host around 80,000 US troops, dozens of American warships and hundreds of military aircraft.

"As the international order has fluctuated recently over trade and security issues, I think that South Korea and Japan, which have similar positions in values, systems and ideology, should strengthen cooperation more than ever," Lee said as he met Ishiba.

In Washington, Lee and Trump are expected to discuss security concerns including China, North Korea, and Seoul’s financial contribution for US forces stationed in South Korea - something the US leader has repeatedly pressed it to increase.

Japan and South Korea also share common ground on trade, with both agreeing to 15 per cent tariffs on US imports of their goods after Trump had threatened steeper duties.

5. 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea

We need a human rights upfront approach. We must remember the example of President Reagan as he negotiated arms control agreements with the USSR. He never stopped talking about human rights and did not fear that human rights (to Gorbachev - "tear down this wall.") Human rights are a moral imperative and we must never forget the 25 million Koreans who are enslaved in the north. But human rights are also a national security issue as KJU must deny human rights to remain in power and horrendous human rights abuses surround the development of his nuclear weapons.

Let me add the following information about the US Committee for Human RIghts in North Korea and its important contributions to the report (despite receiving no funding from State Department grants which were denied by the Biden Administration - and yet State uses the incredible research conducted by the HRNK team):

HRNK Cited in U.S. State Department 2024 Human Rights Report on North Korea

The U.S. Department of State’s 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea highlights ongoing, systemic abuses committed by the DPRK regime.

In two key sections, the report cites HRNK’s research:

Forced Abortions & Racial Purity Ideology

The report references HRNK’s joint study with the International Bar Association, documenting how North Korean officials systematically carried out forced abortions on women repatriated from China, driven by the regime’s obsession with racial “purity.”

Exploitation of Overseas Workers

The State Department also cites HRNK’s report North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China and Russia, which reveals the regime’s denial of labor rights, harsh surveillance, and punishment of workers abroad—including forced repatriation and imprisonment.

These citations underscore HRNK’s crucial role in documenting the DPRK’s human rights abuses and providing credible evidence to the international community.

Read the full U.S. State Department report here: https://lnkd.in/gmhJDKsk

Explore HRNK’s original reports:

- Overseas Workers Report: https://lnkd.in/g6c8EFT2

- Crimes Against Humanity Report: https://lnkd.in/gyfen5YZ

2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea

https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/

Download Report[177 KB]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The government, through brutality and coercion including executions, physical abuse, enforced disappearances, and collective punishment, maintained control of the country; there were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during the year.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including censorship; restrictions of religious freedom; instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilization; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; prohibiting independent trade unions or significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and significant presence of any of the worst forms of child labor.

The government did not take credible steps or action to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses.

6. South Korea's plan to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program

Sigh.... Sunshine Policy 2.0 on steroids?

South Korea's plan to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program

Newsweek · Micah McCartney · August 21, 2025

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung wants to resume dialogue with North Korea, laying out a three-step plan he hopes will convince Pyongyang to first walk back—and eventually abandon—its nuclear weapons program.

Why It Matters

Lee, a liberal in the Democratic Party of Korea, has pledged to deescalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula that peaked under his hardline predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol.

North Korea has cut off official communications with Seoul and Washington, while Kim Jong Un has expanded his nuclear program and test-fired missiles in defiance of United Nations Security Council sanctions.

Kim said his nuclear weapons are necessary to deter aggression by the United States and its allies. Last year, the North's rubber-stamp parliament enshrined the capability in the Constitution.

Newsweek reached out to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing, China, and the White House via email for comment.

The launch of what North Korean state media said was a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile on January 6, 2025. The launch of what North Korean state media said was a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile on January 6, 2025. Korean Central News Agency

What To Know

In an interview with Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun, Lee warned against reengagement on the premise of continued North Korean nuclear development, saying the U.S. approach of "strategic patience" enabled the program's growth.

"Our goal is the denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula, but denuclearization cannot be achieved just by proclaiming it," he said. "In the first stage, we must freeze nuclear and missile [development]. In the second stage, reduce them, and in the third stage, aim for denuclearization."

He drew a contrast with the administration of Yoon, accusing the former president of a "confrontational" attitude that increased North Korean distrust.

"We must seek—and I believe we can find—a path to peaceful coexistence in which we are not threats to one another, recognize and respect each other, and prosper together," he said.

As part of near-term deescalation, Lee, who took office in June, has signaled support for restoring the 2018 inter-Korean agreement to suspend military activities near the border.

What People Are Saying

Kim Yo Jong, vice department director of Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee, was quoted Tuesday by state media: "[South Korean leaders] continue to tediously talk about peace and improved relations, being well aware that it is impossible to realize them, because they have an ulterior motive to finally shift the responsibility for the DPRK-ROK relations failing to recover on to the DPRK."

(The Republic of Korea [ROK] and Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK] are the official names of South Korea and North Korea, respectively.)

Ankit Panda, a nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Frank Aum, senior expert on Northeast Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, in a May article: "North Korea now possesses an advanced nuclear weapons program and has vowed repeatedly that it will not disarm [...]

"De-emphasizing denuclearization would render U.S. policy more consistent with the analytical reality that North Korea is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear weapons and therefore render progress on other key priorities vis-à-vis Pyongyang more likely."

What Happens Next

Lee will visit Japan on Saturday and Sunday for talks with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, his office said during a press briefing Wednesday, per Reuters. The leaders are expected to discuss strengthening trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and ways to promote peace in the region.

About the writer

Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian security issues, and cross-strait ties between China and Taiwan. You can get in touch with Micah by emailing m.mccartney@newsweek.com.

Newsweek · Micah McCartney · August 21, 2025

7. South Korea's President Lee risks repeating a costly mistake

"intelligent men learn from their mistakes. Wise men learn from the mistakes of others." Let's hope that President Lee has the wisdom from his predecessor's mistakes.

Voices Aug. 22, 2025 / 11:04 AM / Updated Aug. 22, 2025 at 1:12 PM

South Korea's President Lee risks repeating a costly mistake

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/22/perspective-Lee-Jae-Myung-criticism/7201755874176/

By Youngjun Kim

Members of Korean Peace Solidarity for Sovereignty and Reunification hold up signs Friday reading "Against the South Korea, U.S and Japan military alliance" during a rally against U.S. President Trump's defense policy toward South Korea, outside the presidential office in Seoul. Photo by Jeon Heon-kyun/EPA

SEOUL, Aug. 22 (UPI) -- President Lee Jae Myung's address marking the 80th anniversary of Korean people's liberation was meant to inspire confidence at a time of profound uncertainty. Instead, it revealed how out of step he and his advisers remain with the realities reshaping the Korean Peninsula and the world.

His lofty rhetoric about dialogue with Pyongyang and dreams of reconciliation only underscored how dangerously shortsighted his government has become.

The North's response was telling. Kim Yo Jong, sister of Kim Jong Un, made clear that Pyongyang no longer considers unification a national goal. To the regime, South Korea is an adversary to be contained, not a partner to be embraced.

For South Korea to pursue the old progressive playbook -- warming ties through symbolic gestures and hopeful summits -- is to chase an illusion even North Korea has abandoned, and in doing so, to cement the division of two states.

The international context makes this delusion even more perilous. Under President Donald Trump, Washington is not simply recalibrating its policy on the Korean Peninsula; it is reshaping the global order.

Through tariffs and a muscular trade policy, the United States is redefining the architecture of international commerce, forcing allies and rivals alike to reconsider their economic dependencies. For South Korea, hemmed in by slowing growth, a declining population, and deepening internal polarization, the stakes could not be higher.

American policymakers, too, must resist the temptation to indulge Lee's misplaced optimism. Past U.S. administrations have sometimes allowed South Korean progressives to pursue engagement with Pyongyang under the banner of alliance solidarity, even when the result was only disappointment and strategic drift.

The "sunshine policy" experiments of the early 2000s brought photo opportunities and fleeting public euphoria but failed to change Pyongyang's behavior. Billions of dollars in aid were funneled northward while the regime continued expanding its nuclear arsenal.

To repeat that mistake now would not only embolden North Korea's intransigence but also weaken Washington's effort to build a coherent Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States should make clear that its support rests on sober realism, not sentimental gestures.

Yet, Lee compounds the danger by leaning toward Beijing at precisely the moment when South Korea should be strengthening its role in a values-based coalition of democracies.

His administration's overtures to China -- couched as pragmatic diplomacy -- risk binding Seoul to a power that undermines the very principles of freedom and sovereignty that Koreans fought to reclaim 80 years ago.

Beijing has repeatedly used economic coercion to discipline countries that challenge its policies, from punishing Australia over calls for a COVID-19 origins inquiry to retaliating against Lithuania for opening ties with Taiwan. To misread China's ambitions as benign is as reckless as misreading Pyongyang's hostility.

The warning signs are unmistakable. Domestically, South Korea is wrestling with one of the world's fastest-aging populations and a birthrate that has collapsed to record lows. The social safety net is already under immense strain, and projections suggest that by mid-century, the nation's population could shrink by nearly one-third.

Economically, global headwinds and the restructuring of supply chains threaten the foundations of its export-driven prosperity. The semiconductor industry, long the crown jewel of Korean competitiveness, now faces mounting U.S. pressure to align with Washington's export controls on China, supply chain restructuring and demands for greater investment in America.

Politically, the country remains riven by ideological divides that prevent consensus on foreign policy or even national purpose. Against this backdrop, Mr. Lee's attempt to recycle the language of past progressive administrations -- dialogue, détente and a manufactured "mood" of unification -- looks detached from both history and present reality.

At a recent international gathering in Seoul marking the 80th anniversary of Korea's liberation, Hyun Jin Preston Moon, chairman of the Global Peace Foundation, delivered a strikingly different message.

He urged Koreans to transcend partisan divisions and root their future in the civilizational vision of Hongik Ingan -- "to live for the benefit of all humanity." His appeal was not for another round of empty summits with Pyongyang, but for Korea to rise as a model nation, one capable of uniting its own people and contributing to global renewal.

That vision stands in sharp contrast to Lee's narrow, ideological approach. To cling to outdated assumptions about the North, to ignore the profound transformation underway in Washington, and to flirt with Beijing as if China offered a safe harbor -- all of this is not simply naïve. It is an abdication of leadership.

History will not be kind to leaders who mistake wishful thinking for strategy. If Lee proceeds with a meeting in Washington armed only with the talking points of past progressive governments, he will not be remembered as a peacemaker, but as the man who led South Korea to the edge of irrelevance.

At this most consequential time, Korea faces not only the risk of decline and even national extinction, but also the greatest opportunity in its modern history. In moments of crisis, it has always been the Korean people themselves who rose to safeguard their nation.

Today, they must once again become the owners of the Korean Dream, exercising a higher spiritual leadership to transform danger into opportunity, achieve unification and realize the ancient ideal of Hongik Ingan.

8. What to Expect from the US-South Korea Summit

It is good to see Jae Ku back on the net. We have not heard from him in a long time.

A principle agreement to expedite the OPCON transition process will be welcomed by Bridge Colby. He cannot get out of Korea soon enough.

Excerpts:

A discussion of potentially contentious issues will likely be postponed, such as the question of US Forces Korea’s “strategic flexibility”—the possibility of redeploying US personnel in regional crises, particularly involving China or Taiwan. One strategic issue President Lee may raise is the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON); he may seek at least a principled agreement to expedite the OPCON transition process.

From the Lee administration’s perspective, the best outcome of this summit would be to strengthen personal rapport between the two leaders and reaffirm the alliance. At a minimum, President Lee will be guided by the Hippocratic principle of “do no harm.”

What to Expect from the US-South Korea Summit

The National Interest · Jae H. Ku · August 22, 2025

Topic: Economic Development

Blog Brand: Korea Watch

Region: Asia

August 22, 2025

By: Jae H. Ku

Share

Both President Lee Jae-myung and President Donald Trump have reasons to avoid contentious issues that might derail the summit.

President Lee Jae-myung will visit Washington, DC, on Monday, August 25, 2025, for his first summit with President Donald Trump. This will be the first presidential summit between the two countries since President Trump’s re-election last November. Much has happened since then. South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, was impeached in April for his failed martial law declaration last December, triggering a snap election on June 3, in which Democratic Party candidate Lee won decisively.

On the American side, President Trump announced sweeping tariffs—25 percent on all Korean imports—to take effect on August 1, 2025. South Korea managed to negotiate the tariff rate down from 25 percent to 15 percent, but many trade issues remain unsettled. So, what can we expect from the summit? What does President Lee hope to achieve?

President Lee comes to Washington seeking to solidify the most important relationship that spans both economics and security, especially during a period marked by global tumult and anxiety. Numerous “hot” issues could disrupt the relationship—from stabilizing trade tensions to developing the alliance into a “future-oriented comprehensive strategic” partnership that China may perceive as an attempt to contain it. Furthermore, President Lee hopes to demonstrate to the Trump administration that, despite his progressive background, he is a centrist committed to strengthening Korea’s security and economic ties with the United States.

Thus far, President Lee has made all the right moves in signaling to the Trump administration that his government is committed to the alliance. In June, China’s President Xi Jinping invited him to attend China’s Victory Day Parade on September 3. Lee’s muted response—deliberately avoiding a visit to Beijing before Washington—signals his priorities.

Additionally, he is stopping over in Tokyo to underscore the importance of the trilateral relationship, despite some opposition from nationalist groups in both Korea and Japan. Again, Lee is signaling to the United States that he is a pragmatist who understands the need for South Korea to maintain strong trilateral relations—an issue of paramount importance to US Asia policy.

As the saying goes, so far, so good. But what could derail the summit? The summit risks failure if either side puts forward demands that are politically or economically untenable. For instance, if President Trump demands that South Korea increase its “host nation support” from $1 billion to $5 billion annually—as he pressed during his first administration—or insists that Seoul raise its defense budget of 2.3 percent of GDP to 5 percent, the relationship could quickly spiral downward.

On trade, if the Trump administration pushes too aggressively for agricultural liberalization (such as beef and rice) or backtracks on the tariff reduction agreement, President Lee would almost certainly face severe political backlash at home.

While such contentious issues may surface, the summit will likely avoid direct confrontation. Instead, both presidents will emphasize positive aspects of the relationship. President Trump will highlight the recently negotiated trade agreement, which reduced tariffs on Korean products to 15 percent in exchange for Korea’s pledge to invest $350 billion in the US economy. President Lee will stress the strength of the economic and security partnership by reiterating Korea’s commitment to purchase $100 billion in US energy and pledging $150 billion toward the “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” initiative. Other areas of cooperation may include semiconductors, batteries, critical minerals, and advanced technologies.

A discussion of potentially contentious issues will likely be postponed, such as the question of US Forces Korea’s “strategic flexibility”—the possibility of redeploying US personnel in regional crises, particularly involving China or Taiwan. One strategic issue President Lee may raise is the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON); he may seek at least a principled agreement to expedite the OPCON transition process.

From the Lee administration’s perspective, the best outcome of this summit would be to strengthen personal rapport between the two leaders and reaffirm the alliance. At a minimum, President Lee will be guided by the Hippocratic principle of “do no harm.”

About the Author: Jae Ku

Dr. Jae H. Ku is the Senior Fellow, US-Korea Relations at the Center for the National Interest. He is an expert in US-Korea relations, Korea’s relations with China and Japan, and human rights in Asia. From 2007-2018, he was the Director of the US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a research institute he co-founded. He was also the director of Freedom House’s Human Rights in North Korea Project, a Congressionally mandated international campaign under the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004.

Image: Wikimedia Commons / Republic of Korea / Public Domain

The National Interest · Jae H. Ku · August 22, 2025

9. Lee-Trump summit likely a major test for future alliance trajectory

Will this be a major inflection point for the alliance?

Excerpts:

The leaders' anticipated show of unity against North Korea's nuclear threats could strike a sour note with the recalcitrant regime, which has already responded angrily to the allies' ongoing Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise despite the scaling-down of the exercise's field training portion.

For Trump, his summit with Lee will be an opportunity to underscore South Korea's pledges for investments and industrial cooperation as his America First policy success, observers said.

Expectations are that Lee will announce new plans for investments in the U.S., while more clarity will be given to last month's broad-brush trade deal, under which Washington agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on Korea to 15 percent from the proposed 25 percent in return for Korea's investment pledges and other commitments.

The summit will also be a chance to "reset" South Korea's role and status in Trump's "hierarchy," Scott Snyder, president and CEO at the KEI, said, noting South Korea's apparently "diminished" influence under the Trump administration considering indicators, including the fact that no close Trump associate or prominent figure has been appointed as U.S. ambassador to Korea.

Lee-Trump summit likely a major test for future alliance trajectory - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, left, and U.S. President Donald Trump. Yonhap

By Yonhap

• Published Aug 24, 2025 7:10 am KST

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

By Yonhap

Published Aug 24, 2025 7:10 am KST

WASHINGTON — The planned summit between Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Donald Trump is expected to be a crucial test for the South Korea-U.S. alliance to set its future trajectory, as Washington is pushing to reshape the bilateral security and economic partnerships in the face of an increasingly assertive China.

Lee and Trump are set to hold their first in-person summit at the White House on Monday, as South Korea and the United States seek to forge a shared understanding of where their partnership should be headed under a joint effort to "modernize" the alliance.

The high-stakes summit will come against the backdrop of the Trump administration's growing demand that South Korea and other Asian allies boost their defense spending and undertake greater security burdens, while the U.S. focuses on deterring the "pacing threat" from its biggest strategic rival, China.

Keen attention is fixated on how Seoul will navigate tricky "alliance modernization" issues, including Washington's potential move to readjust the size, role, composition and operational scope of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in an effort to better deter China.

"(The summit) really stands to be a litmus test for the new administration in Seoul as well as an opportunity to sort of set the trend for the bilateral relationship over the coming years," Arius Derr, director of communications at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), said during a press meeting on Thursday.

Hard issues aside, the summit will be a crucial opportunity for the two leaders to build personal rapport, experts said, at a time when Seoul hopes to further strengthen cooperation with Washington on North Korean nuclear threats, economic security, trade and other fronts.

During their first phone call in June, signs of their budding friendship were detected as Lee and Trump talked about a set of mutually relatable topics — their experiences with assassination threats on the campaign trail and their shared interest in golf.

But an array of challenging alliance issues are expected to figure prominently in the summit. Chief among them is Washington's apparent push for greater USFK "strategic flexibility" to expand its operational scope beyond the Korean Peninsula to cover China-related contingencies, including a Taiwan conflict.

Seoul and Washington already issued a joint statement on strategic flexibility in 2006, which stated that South Korea respects the "necessity" for strategic flexibility, while the U.S. respects Seoul's position that it will not be involved in a regional conflict against the will of the Korean people.

Observers said that Washington might want a more explicit South Korean understanding of the strategic flexibility concept — a move that would test Lee's "pragmatic" approach that values the alliance with the U.S. as the "foundation" of Seoul's security and foreign policy, but leaves open room for better ties with China.

To what extent Trump will push the China-related issue remains to be seen as Trump has touted his "great" relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping at a time when his administration seeks to strike a trade agreement with the Asian superpower.

The USFK issue is expected to be part of the broad alliance modernization agenda.

Alliance modernization is not a novel concept for the allies as their treaty partnership, forged in the crucible of the 1950-53 Korean War, has undergone adjustments in line with America's policy changes, shifting regional and global security landscapes, South Korea's growing military capabilities and its pursuit of an enhanced role in what has been an asymmetric partnership.

"(Alliance modernization) refers to potential changes in the U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula that could include the reduction in ground troops, enhancement of air and naval capabilities, greater South Korean defense spending, changes in the cost-sharing arrangement (and the) return of wartime operational control (OPCON)," Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told reporters on Wednesday.

Speculation has persisted that Washington might weigh the idea of a ground troop reduction in the Army-centric USFK as it apparently sees naval and air force components as more suited for potential operations to address China-related contingencies.

The alliance modernization discussions have proceeded as the Lee administration is expected to pursue the retaking of wartime OPCON within its five-year term -- a goal that some observers say might fall in line with Washington's push for allies to take greater responsibility for their own defense.

Seoul and Washington have been working on the "conditions-based" OPCON transfer. Conditions include South Korea's capabilities to lead combined Korea-U.S. forces, its strike and air defense capabilities, and a regional security environment conducive to such a handover.

South Korea handed over operational control of its troops to the U.S.-led U.N. Command during the 1950-53 Korean War. Control was then transferred to the two allies' Combined Forces Command when the command was launched in 1978. Wartime operational control still remains in U.S. hands, while South Korea retook peacetime OPCON in 1994.

A defense spending issue could also be a point of contention at the summit.

The Trump administration has been expected to demand that South Korea move toward what it has called the "global standard" of spending 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense -- a goal that North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states agreed to achieve by 2035.

South Korea's defense budget this year stands at around 61.2 trillion won (US$44.2 billion), or about 2.32 percent of its GDP, according to Seoul's defense ministry.

How to lure North Korea back to a denuclearization track will be another key alliance issue at the summit.

Both Lee and Trump have expressed their willingness to resume dialogue with Pyongyang, but the reclusive state has reiterated its rejection of any denuclearization dialogue at a time when it has relied on Russia for food, fuel, security, technology and other necessities.

The leaders' anticipated show of unity against North Korea's nuclear threats could strike a sour note with the recalcitrant regime, which has already responded angrily to the allies' ongoing Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise despite the scaling-down of the exercise's field training portion.

For Trump, his summit with Lee will be an opportunity to underscore South Korea's pledges for investments and industrial cooperation as his America First policy success, observers said.

Expectations are that Lee will announce new plans for investments in the U.S., while more clarity will be given to last month's broad-brush trade deal, under which Washington agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on Korea to 15 percent from the proposed 25 percent in return for Korea's investment pledges and other commitments.

The summit will also be a chance to "reset" South Korea's role and status in Trump's "hierarchy," Scott Snyder, president and CEO at the KEI, said, noting South Korea's apparently "diminished" influence under the Trump administration considering indicators, including the fact that no close Trump associate or prominent figure has been appointed as U.S. ambassador to Korea.

10. N. Korea berates S. Korea for firing warning shots at its troops in border area this week

N. Korea berates S. Korea for firing warning shots at its troops in border area this week - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

This photo shows North Korean soldiers installing barbed-wire fences in border areas in March. Courtesy of Joint Chiefs of Staff

By Yonhap

• Published Aug 23, 2025 9:04 am KST
• Updated Aug 23, 2025 2:09 pm KST

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

By Yonhap

Published Aug 23, 2025 9:04 am KST

Updated Aug 23, 2025 2:09 pm KST

North Korea accused South Korea's military Saturday of having fired more than 10 warning shots at North Korean soldiers, who were conducting a border reinforcement project, earlier this week, underscoring a rise in inter-Korean tensions amid an ongoing military exercise between Seoul and Washington.

Ko Jong-chol, vice chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA), issued a statement calling for Seoul to stop its "premeditated and deliberate" provocations that he said are "inciting military conflict," according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"On Aug. 19, the ROK military warmongers committed such a serious provocation as firing more than 10 warning shots with a 12.7 mm large-caliber machine gun at the DPRK soldiers who were conducting a permanent barrier project near the southern border line," the statement read.

ROK is the acronym for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea, and DPRK is short for North Korea's full name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

North Korea said its soldiers were conducting a "barrier project to permanently block the southern border" in an effort to reinforce it. The project came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared inter-Korean ties as those between "two states hostile to each other" in late 2023.

Ko said the North had informed the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea of a plan for the project on June 25 and July 18 in a bid to prevent an accidental conflict near the border.

"In particular, the recent incident, timed to coincide with the large-scale joint military drills being staged in the region of the ROK, cannot but be construed as a premeditated and deliberate provocation aimed at military conflict from A to Z," the official said.

The North's claim came as Seoul and Washington kicked off their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise Monday for an 11-day run through Thursday next week.

"If the act of restraining or obstructing the project unrelated to the military character persists, our army will regard it as a deliberate military provocation and take corresponding countermeasure," Ko warned.

South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said the military fired warning shots earlier this week after North Korean troops crossed the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) separating the two Koreas.

"Measures, such as warning shots, were taken after North Korean soldiers violated the MDL in a central front-line area at around 3 p.m. Tuesday, and they retreated," a JCS official said, adding the military continues to closely monitor the North's military activities in the border area.

Since April last year, North Korean troops have been seen installing barbed wire fences and anti-tank barriers near the MDL — a move seen as aimed at fortifying the border with the South.

The South Korean military had broadcast a warning message when North Korean troops conducting the barrier project moved close to the MDL. It then fired warning shots when they violated the boundary.

The JCS had notified the press shortly after it fired warning shots in response to similar border crossings that occurred in June last year and April this year. But it did not make such an announcement this week, in what is seen as efforts to prevent inter-Korean tensions as Seoul seeks to mend frayed ties with Pyongyang.

In a separate statement carried by the KCNA, North Korea's military condemned the ongoing combined military exercise between Seoul and Washington as "extremely provocative and aggressive" large-scale drills targeting the North.

"The DPRK army, as already declared, will respond to the military provocations of the hostile forces posing direct threat to the safety of the country with proper and indiscriminate exercise of the right to self-defense," an unnamed spokesperson at the General Staff of the KPA warned.

President Lee Jae-myung's work and fruition, everyone. What a joke. (And to my fan "Fools", this does not make me pro-dictatorship, pro-Yoon, pro-extreme right, or even right wing. I don't do silly labels like you. Just a foreigner with some common sense, something you desperately need.)

11. Lee says won't forget sacrifices of ethnic Koreans in Japan

Lee says won't forget sacrifices of ethnic Koreans in Japan | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 23, 2025

By Kim Eun-jung

TOKYO, Aug. 23 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung met with ethnic Koreans in Japan on Saturday, saying he won't forget their sacrifices and patriotism throughout the turbulent history of Korea.

Lee, who arrived in Tokyo earlier in the day for summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, made the remarks at a meeting with a group of ethnic Koreans in Japan, according to the presidential office.

According to historians, many ethnic Koreans in Japan suffered hardships during the Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945.

"At every turn of our nation's turbulent history, marked by pain and struggle, there has been the dedication and sacrifice of our compatriots," Lee said.

"Our government will never forget your patriotism. We will remember it and make sure to repay it," he said.

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a luncheon meeting with Koreans residing in Japan at a hotel in Tokyo on Aug. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

Lee expressed sympathy for the hardships endured by Koreans in Japan during Japan's colonial rule and the subsequent division of Korea while recalling their contributions to the independence movement.

He also issued an apology on behalf of the South Korean government to ethnic Koreans in Japan who unjustly suffered as victims of fabricated espionage cases.

"As president of the Republic of Korea, I sincerely offer words of comfort to the victims of state violence and their families, and once again extend an official apology," he added, bowing his head.

In addition, Lee referred to the atrocities along the Arakawa River in Tokyo, saying the souls of victims who have yet to return to their homeland even a century later must never be forgotten. He was apparently alluding to the Kanto Massacre, in which Korean residents were killed in the aftermath of Japan's 1923 earthquake.

"I will do my utmost to build a strong nation, one where inhumane state violence never occurs again and where the government ensures the safe daily lives of its citizens," he said.

The president also expressed appreciation for Koreans in Japan who, despite hardships and adversity, preserved their national identity by passing down the Korean language and history to future generations.

He pointed to expanding trade and exchanges between the two nations, noting that about 12 million people travel between South Korea and Japan each year and that bilateral trade has grown from US$220 million in 1965 to $77.2 billion in 2024.

"After many twists and turns, our relations are moving forward toward a new future," he said.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 23, 2025

12. S. Korea's industry minister vows 'best efforts' to ensure successful Lee-Trump summit

S. Korea's industry minister vows 'best efforts' to ensure successful Lee-Trump summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 23, 2025

By Song Sang-ho and Park Sung-min

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan pledged Friday to make "best efforts" to ensure the upcoming summit between Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Donald Trump will be successful, as he arrived in Washington for final pre-summit agenda coordination with his U.S. counterparts.

Lee and Trump are set to have their first in-person meeting at the White House on Monday, with the agenda including bilateral trade and industrial cooperation.

"I came here to make preparations to ensure that the South Korea-U.S. summit will proceed well," he told reporters upon arrival at Dulles International Airport near Washington. "(We) will do our best to ensure (the summit) will be successful."

South Korea's Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (C) arrives at Dulles International Airport near Washington on Aug. 22, 2025. (Yonhap)

His arrival in the U.S. capital came less than a month after his last trip to the U.S., during which Trump announced a framework trade deal under which Washington agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on Korea to 15 percent from the proposed 25 percent in return for South Korea's investment commitments and other pledges.

In Washington, Kim plans to meet with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Energy Secretary Chris Wright, as Seoul and Washington are fleshing out last month's trade deal in the lead-up to the summit.

Two days earlier, Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo arrived in the U.S. On Thursday, Yeo met U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to finalize agenda coordination prior to the summit.

Asked if there are any summit topics over which the two countries have differences, Kim refused to go into detail.

"Issues related to the trade deal are things that we have continued to discuss. We will continue to do that," he said.

Lee is set to fly to the U.S. after visiting Japan for a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba this weekend.

The Lee-Trump summit has drawn keen attention as it could affect the future trajectory of the South Korea-U.S. alliance at a time when the Trump administration is seeking to secure increased "burden sharing" by allies and focus on deterring the "pacing threat" from an increasingly assertive China.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 23, 2025

13. S. Korean, U.S. top diplomats discuss alliance advancement ahead of Lee-Trump summit: State Dept.

S. Korean, U.S. top diplomats discuss alliance advancement ahead of Lee-Trump summit: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 23, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea and the United States discussed ways to advance the bilateral alliance during their talks in Washington on Friday, a State Department spokesperson said, as they fine-tuned the agenda for the planned summit between Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Donald Trump.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Secretary of State Marco Rubio held the talks just three days ahead of the summit, where Lee and Trump are expected to discuss joint efforts to "modernize" the bilateral alliance at a time when Washington focuses on deterring an increasingly assertive China.

"Secretary Rubio and Foreign Minister Cho discussed ways to advance the U.S.-ROK alliance centered on a forward-looking agenda that enhances deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, increases our collective burden sharing, helps to revitalize American manufacturing, and restores fairness and reciprocity in our trade relationship," Principal Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott said in a readout.

ROK is short for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

The two sides also reiterated the importance of trilateral cooperation with Japan, he added.

Cho and Rubio, moreover, highlighted the "enduring" strength of the alliance, which Pigott said has remained the "linchpin of peace, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and across the Indo-Pacific for over seven decades."

This photo, taken on July 31, 2025, shows Foreign Minister Cho Hyun shaking hands with Secretary of State Marco Rubio before their talks at the State Department in Washington. (Pool photo) (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 23, 2025

14. Lee calls for closer cooperation with Japan amid changes in global trade, security order

(7th LD) Lee calls for closer cooperation with Japan amid changes in global trade, security order | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 23, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS background, details from joint statement in paras 8, 11-13, 16-18)

By Kim Eun-jung

TOKYO, Aug. 23 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Saturday urged Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to forge closer cooperation to cope with a vortex of changes in global trade and the security order, in their first full summit before Lee is set to hold a high-stakes summit with U.S. President Donald Trump.

Calling Japan a "neighbor that shares a front yard," Lee expressed hope for the two countries to work together to expand cooperation in a wide range of areas, while working to minimize unnecessary conflicts.

"As the international order in trade and security is fluctuating, I believe the Republic of Korea and Japan, which share similar positions in terms of values, order and ideology, must strengthen their cooperation more than ever," Lee said in his opening remarks, referring to South Korea by its official name.

President Lee Jae Myung (L) shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba ahead of their summit at Ishiba's residence in Tokyo on Aug. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

Ishiba echoed the sentiment, underlining the importance of the closer bilateral ties and trilateral cooperation with the U.S.

"Strengthening cooperation among Japan, South Korea and the United States is very important," Ishiba said. "Peace and stability will not come unless we make active efforts, and this is all the more true in such a turbulent era."

Ishiba also thanked Lee for choosing Japan as his first bilateral destination before visiting the U.S.

The Saturday summit with Ishiba comes before Lee will head for Washington for summit talks with Trump, in a rare diplomatic decision for South Korean presidents, who typically choose Washington, a key defense ally, as their first diplomatic destination after taking office.

It was Lee's second in-person meeting with Ishiba, following their encounter on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Canada in June, which Lee described as marking the resumption of "shuttle diplomacy" between the two nations' leaders.

President Lee Jae Myung (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba hold a joint press briefing after their summit at Ishiba's official residence in Tokyo on Aug. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

On security, Lee and Ishiba reaffirmed their goal for the complete denuclearization of North Korea and strengthening trilateral cooperation with the U.S.

"We reaffirmed our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of permanent peace and agreed to close coordination on North Korea policy," Lee said at a joint press briefing.

Following their talks, the two leaders issued a joint statement -- the first from a bilateral summit between Seoul and Tokyo in 17 years.

According to the statement, they agreed on the need to jointly respond to North Korea's illegal cyber activities and its growing military ties with Russia, while underscoring the importance of addressing the North's nuclear and missile programs through dialogue and diplomacy.

The statement also said South Korea and Japan will establish a joint consultative body to tackle common challenges, such as low birthrates and aging populations, and enhance economic cooperation in advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence and hydrogen energy.

President Lee Jae Myung (2nd from L) speaks during an expanded meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at Ishiba's residence in Tokyo on Aug. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

Lee called his visit to Tokyo an opportunity to solidify the foundation for "future-oriented" ties as this year marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of the countries' diplomatic relations.

"Korea-Japan relations simultaneously contain aspects of confrontation, cooperation and mutual tolerance. What's important is to identify as many mutually beneficial elements as possible," he said in the interview. "There is no need to abandon the beneficial aspects because of certain negative ones."

The two leaders also agreed to cooperate on South Korea's hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Gyeongju in late October and on Japan's hosting of the next South Korea-Japan-China summit.

The talks came weeks after both countries separately struck trade deals with the U.S., which lowered proposed tariffs from 25 percent to 15 percent in exchange for large-scale investment pledges and greater market access.

As major exporters to the U.S., Seoul and Tokyo share key interests but also face growing pressure from Washington to increase their defense spending and contribute more to the cost of stationing American troops. Their auto and semiconductor industries also remain vulnerable to U.S. tariff hikes.

President Lee Jae Myung (4th from R) and first lady Kim Hea Kyung (3rd from R) greet welcoming officials upon their arrival at Haneda Airport in Tokyo on Aug. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 23, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com