Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“There are two ways to be filled. One is to believe what isn’t true. The other is to refuse to accept what is true.”

- Soren Kierkegaard

“We seem to be getting closer and closer to a situation where nobody is responsible for what they did but we are all responsible for what somebody else did.”

- Thomas Sowell

"In this age of mass information and precision-guided media, everyone from political candidates to terrorists must instantly and continuously interact with and influence audiences in order to be relevant and competitive. Ignoring the utility of social media is tantamount to surrendering the high ground in the enduring battle to influence minds around the world."

- Matt Armstrong (2009)

1.. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 23 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine marks Independence Day

3. US Expected to Unveil Biggest Arms Package Yet for Ukraine

4. 7 in 10 Americans Want To Send More Weapons To Ukraine, Poll Finds

5. What Ukraine needs to win the war

6. Why Ukraine frets about US commitment to the war six months in

7. After Six Months of War in Ukraine, Momentum Tilts Against Russia

8. What is blowing up those Russian bases in Crimea?

9. An interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky

10. Return of Crimea to Ukraine a requirement of international law: Turkish president

11. Opinion: 6 lessons the West has learned in the 6 months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine

12. Veterans may be key to solving the US military recruitment crisis

13. Tibet: An Underexplored Strategic Lever

14. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Has Created Drama in the Anti-War Community

15. FDD | Nuclear Deal with Iran Would Gut IRGC Sanctions

16. China to forgive loans to 17 African countries

17. Time for Taiwan to be called Taiwan

18. Qatar speaks from both sides of its mouth

19. Washington wins as Turkey and Israel restore normal ties

20. Ukraine's Zelensky vows Russia's war will "end in Crimea"

21. "Social Media as Public Diplomacy" by Matt Armstrong

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 23 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 23

Aug 23, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 23, 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian government sources confirmed that Russia is bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. Russian federal subject (region) Krasnodar Krai’s Family and Childhood Administration posted about a program under which Russian authorities transferred over 1,000 children from Mariupol to Tyumen, Irkutsk, Kemerov, and Altay Krai where Russian families have adopted them.[1] The Administration stated that over 300 children are still waiting to “meet their new families” and that citizens who decide to adopt these children will be provided with a one-time bonus by the state.[2] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) additionally reported that Russian officials transferred 30 Ukrainian children from Khartsyzk, Ilovaysk, and Zuhres in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Nizhny Novgorod under the guise of having the children participate in youth educational-training programs.[3] The forcible transfer of children of one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group“ is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[4]

Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. The LNR Internal Ministry reported on August 23 that LNR Internal Ministry personnel conducted joint patrols with consolidated police detachments from the Internal Ministries of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast in Starobilsk, Shchastya, and Stanystia, occupied Luhansk Oblast.[5] The LNR Internal Ministry also reported on August 22 that Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) units conducted security for Russian Flag Day celebrations in Starobilsk.[6] Ukraine‘s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Rosgvardia elements in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk), Luhansk Oblast are not subordinate to the local LNR forces and that Rosgvardia conducted a search of an LNR official in Dovzhansk.[7] The deployment of Russian security forces to police-occupied areas of Luhansk Oblast supports ISW’s previous assessment that LNR residents and possibly militia forces may be unwilling to continue fighting now that they have reached the Luhansk Oblast borders.[8] Recent intensified Russian efforts to forcibly mobilize residents in Luhansk likely exacerbated this disillusionment, and Russian authorities may be increasing Russian security forces’ presence in Luhansk to suppress any internal instability and/or because they are losing confidence in indigenous Luhansk forces.[9]

Russian authorities’ deployment of Rosgvardia elements to security duties in occupied Luhansk Oblast diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had likely exhausted their momentum from territorial gains around Avdiivka and Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast – a very small section of the whole Ukrainian theater – partially due to their inability to allocate sufficient resources to offensive operations.[10] LNR forces’ unwillingness to fight in the war, coupled with Rosgvardia forces’ presence in the rear instead of near the front will likely contribute to continued Russian failures to make significant territorial gains.

Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City on August 23 to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on August 24, Ukrainian Independence Day. Social media networks in Donetsk City reported that a strike caused damage to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) administrative building, where DNR Head Denis Pushilin works.[11] Pushilin was reportedly absent at the time of the strike. Russian media framed the attack as a direct Ukrainian strike on a DNR government building, potentially to set information conditions for retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.[12] Ukrainian government authorities previously warned government workers in Kyiv to work from home the week of August 22 to 26 and cited concerns that Russian forces will target Ukrainian government assets as part of an extended missile and artillery campaign on Independence Day.[13] Russian-backed head of Kherson’s occupation administration Kirill Stremousov also claimed on August 22 that his administration was preparing for Ukrainian provocations on Independence Day, which could have been conditions-setting for a false-flag attack.[14]

Unverifiable sources reported that axis commanders in Ukraine are reporting directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin, bypassing both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov in the chain of command. Independent Russian outlet Vazhnye Istorii or iStories quoted unnamed sources within the Russian General Staff stating that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has lost Putin’s trust after the initial phase of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that failed despite Shoigu’s assurances of a swift victory.[15] The sources claimed that Putin now bypasses Shoigu and interacts directly with Commander of Central Military District Alexander Lapin who oversees the “central” group of forces in Ukraine, and the Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Sergey Surovikin who commands the “southern” group of forces. ISW cannot independently verify the validity of this report, but if the report is true, it indicates that Putin is also bypassing Gerasimov.

Key Takeaways

Russian government sources confirmed that Russian authorities are bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. The forcible transfer of children from one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. This deployment diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes.
Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City, and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian forces made limited gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast.
Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses for recruits, and are likely recruiting personnel with no prior military experience for specialist positions.
Ukrainian partisan activity continues to disrupt Russian occupation activities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks between Izyum and Slovyansk on August 23. A Ukrainian volunteer claimed that Russian troops launched several attacks around Izyum on August 22 but did not specify exactly where these attacks occurred.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Bohorodychne (20km northwest of Slovyansk) and continued shelling settlements near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[17]

Newly observed and geolocated footage of artillery exchanges between Ukrainian and Russian forces north of Slovyansk in the Sviatohirsk supports ISW’s previous assessment that Russian forces are likely occupying positions within the Sviaty Hory forest and have not yet crossed the Siverskyi Donets River around Pryshb and Tetyanivka.[18] The footage shows Ukrainian troops striking Russian positions in densely forested areas about 22km north of Slovyansk and Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Pryshyb (17km north of Slovyansk), which reaffirms ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have been unable to conduct a contested river crossing of the Siverskyi Donets and advance on Slovyansk from its due north.[19] Russian forces additionally shelled residential infrastructure in Slovyansk on the night of August 22 to 23.[20]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks toward Siversk on August 23. Siversk’s Civil Military Administration reiterated that the city remains under Ukrainian control but that Russian forces constantly conduct artillery strikes on Siversk and surrounding environs.[21]

Russian forces continued ground attacks to the northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 23. Russian troops, including elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic 6th Cossack Regiment, continued to fight in Soledar, about 10km northeast of Bakhmut.[22] Russian forces additionally continued attempts to advance on Bakhmut from the south, specifically from around Kodema and Zaitseve.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces have encircled Kodema (13km southeast of Bakhmut) from three sides and are advancing on Zaitseve (9km southeast of Bakhmut).[24]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on August 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to break through Ukrainian defensive lines and advance towards Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske- which form a line along Donetsk City’s northwestern outskirts. [25] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are continuing to focus on the encirclement of Adviivka (north of Donetsk City) and are in control of 75% of Marinka, on the southwestern outskirts of Donestk City.[26] Russian forces continued to fire on Ukrainian positions along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City-Marinka frontline.[27]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on August 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to improve their tactical positions near Novomykhailivka and Zolota Nyva 25km and 60km southwest of Donetsk City, respectively.[28] Russian troops additionally continued offensive operations around Vuhledar, 45km southwest of Donetsk City.[29]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults around Kharkiv City on August 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces focused on maintaining current positions.[30] The Derhachi City Council reported that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defensive lines near Dementiivka, west of Kozacha Lopan, and towards Velykii Prokhody and Tsupivka, all north of Kharkiv City, which may suggest that Ukrainian forces are continuing limited ground attacks to contest Russian-held lines in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[31] Russian forces conducted airstrikes near Pytomnyk, Kostyantynivka, and Verkhnii Saltiv.[32] Russian forces continued shelling Kharkiv City and settlements along the line of contact.[33]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces made limited territorial gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces took control of Blahodatne (which the Russian MoD referred to as Komsomolske) about 45km due east of Mykolaiv City.[34] The Russian MoD added that Russian forces have established a 12 square km zone of control around Blahodatne by advancing three kilometers into Ukrainian defenses. Geolocated footage posted on August 22 also showed Russian forces reportedly firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems at Ukrainian forces in the northern part of the settlement on an unspecified but likely recent date.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 22 that Russian forces had unspecified “partial” success in the direction of Blahodatne, and Russian forces likely advanced into the settlement.[36] The Russian MoD also claimed control over Blahodativka, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over Inhulets River, and unspecified settlements in its vicinity.[37] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BMD-2 airborne infantry fighting vehicle in Blahodativka, which indicates that the settlement is contested.[38] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Oleksandrivka, approximately 38km west of Kherson City, and reached the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast administrative border.[39] ISW cannot independently verify this claim, for which the Russian MoD did not provide visual evidence.

Ukrainian military officials claimed several strikes on Russian positions, ammunition depots, and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian missile and artillery units destroyed the ammunition depot and command post of the Russian 247th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Guards Air Assault Division in Chornobaivka northwest of Kherson City and struck the command post of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division in Novovoskresenke just south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[40] Elements of the 331st Regiment had previously operated near Hostomel, Kyiv Oblast, in February and March and suffered heavy losses.[41] It is unclear how long elements of the 331st Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast.[42] Elements of the 247th Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast since February 24, the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[43] The Ukrainian Southern Command also confirmed Ukrainian strikes on the Antonivsky and Kakhovka bridges over the Dnipro River, and the destruction of a Russian ammunition depot in Kakhovka on August 22.[44]

Russian forces are attempting to repair damaged GLOCs across the Dnipro River, but Ukrainian forces will likely continue to strike Russian attempts to establish a river crossing. The UK Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces likely started to move barges into position to construct a substantial floating bridge over the Dnipro River immediately neat the Antonivsky road bridge between August 20 and August 21.[45] ISW has previously reported that Russian forces have been using barges to transport unknown equipment between August 17 and August 22.[46] Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Administration Serhiy Khan also noted that Russian forces are building a ”weird construction” under the Antonivsky Bridge and assessed that Russian forces are constructing a pontoon bridge.[47] Russian improvised attempts to improve GLOCs will remain vulnerable to Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to accumulate military equipment at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and are setting conditions to manipulate the public’s perception of the situation in Enerhodar. Ukrainian state energy enterprise Enerhodar reported that Russian forces deployed 40 pieces of military equipment to the ZNPP: 16 military vehicles at the first power unit; seven vehicles near the second power unit; 12 vehicles under an overpass; and two armored personnel carriers and six special trucks in the ZNPP repair zone.[48] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces have been deliberately targeting ash pits at the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) about 5km east of ZNPP with mortars.[49] The GUR stated that ZTPP produces dust-like waste in the ash pits, which contain toxic substances and a radiation level 1.5 times above normal levels. The GUR argued that by striking the ash pits, Russian forces can create a cloud of smoke with radioactive dust for which Russian forces can blame Ukraine.

Russian forces continued to target Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts with missile and MLRS strikes on August 23. Dnipropetrovsk officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City with unspecified missiles, fired Grad MLRS at Marhanets and Nikopol (across the Dnipro River from Enerhodar), and fired Uragan MLRS at Zelenodolsk.[50]

Russian-appointed officials in occupied Crimea claimed shooting down another drone in Sevastopol on August 22.[51] Social media footage showed Russian air-defense systems striking an unspecified object in Sevastopol on August 22.[52]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses for recruits, likely due to a shortage of interested volunteers. Samara Oblast Governor Dmitry Azarov announced that recruits for the “Samara” Volunteer Battalion – part of the newly-forming 3rd Army Corps - will receive a bonus of 300,000 rubles (about $4,980) instead of the originally-promised 200,000 rubles (about $3,320).[53] Oryol Oblast officials also announced an additional payment of 100,000 rubles (about $1,660) to all Russians with a permanent address within or outside of Oryol Oblast ordered to serve in the 3rd Army Corps.[54] ISW has previously reported that the republics of Buryatia and Tatarstan increased their one-time enlistment bonuses by 100,000 rubles (about $1,660). Other Russian federal subjects are also likely increasing payments to generate more volunteers for the 3rd Army Corps or for regional volunteer units.[55] It is also unclear if the volunteer battalions in Buryatia and Tatarstan will join the 3rd Army Corps.

Russian federal subjects are forming specialized military units with likely volunteers without prior military experience. The Republic of Udmurt claimed to have recruited seven volunteers who are currently undergoing training in Tolyatti for the “Italmas” SPETSNAZ unit.[56] Local military recruitment centers in Udmurt announced the recruitment for the ”Italmas” unit on July 23 and did not specify previous military experience as a requirement.[57] There was no information about the ”Italmas” unit prior to this July 23 announcement, suggesting that it is a new volunteer unit. Some local outlets claimed that the unit is recruiting reservists, while others noted that anyone interested in signing a military contract with the unit may do so at a local military recruitment center.[58] The recruitment of only seven volunteers since late July further confirms that Russian federal subjects continue to face challenges in recruiting the planned number of volunteers. Tatarstan local outlets also reported that 21 recruits are undergoing combat coordination activities in Orenburg Oblast with the ”Alga” and ”Timer” volunteer battalions, despite previously claiming to have recruited over 300 volunteers as of June 23.[59]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Ukrainian partisan activity continues to disrupt Russian occupation activities. Ukrainian partisans attempted to assassinate the Russian-appointed Kherson Oblast Deputy Head of the Internal Policy Department Igor Telegin with an improvised explosive device (IED) on August 23.[60] Telegin reportedly survived the attack with minor injuries.[61] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published a document reportedly giving guidance to Russian occupation forces to not accept food or medication from local Ukrainians due to fear of poisoning.[62] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed on August 20 that Ukrainians poisoned Russian forces and occupation official Volodymyr Saldo, though these reports remain unconfirmed.[63]

Russian officials continue importing Russians into occupied territories to serve in occupation administrations likely due to a lack of trust in local Ukrainian collaborators. Ukraine’s Resistance Center reported that former officials in the Russian government now serve as occupation officials.[64] The Resistance Center reported that two new former Russian officials now serve in the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation government and that Russians now hold almost all positions in the Russian occupation governments.[65] The Resistance Center also reported that occupation authorities continue to import skilled workers, such as doctors, teachers, and utility workers, into occupied territories and that the Kremlin aims to import more Russians into occupied territories as a policy.[66] ISW previously reported that occupation administrations face a widespread shortage of willing Ukrainian collaborators and issues trusting established Ukrainian collaborators.[67]

Russian occupation officials continue preparations to hold annexation referenda in occupied Ukraine. A Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official indicated on August 23 that Luhansk residents now residing in Russia will still be eligible to vote in the annexation referendum, supporting ISW’s prior assessments that occupation authorities seek to accelerate preparations for annexation referenda.[68] LNR Deputy Internal Minister Vitaly Kiselev announced that Luhansk Oblast residents who left Luhansk Oblast for Russia will be able to vote on the LNR referendum for Russian annexation.[69] Kiselev claimed that voter turnout will be 100% and that 70% of voters will vote in favor of annexation.[70] Kiselev claimed that the number of people in occupied territories who applied for Russian passports indicates a widespread desire to join Russia.[71]

Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to establish Russian schools in occupied Ukraine. The GUR reported that Russian authorities attempted to reopen 43 educational facilities with Russian teachers and collaborators in occupied Ukraine.[72] The GUR also reiterated prior reporting that occupation officials are threatening to fine Ukrainian parents who do not send Ukrainian children to the occupation-established schools.[73] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin announced that DNR and Russia will cooperate to ensure children in occupied Donetsk Oblast have access to education and educational supplies.[74]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] The original post has since been removed from the administration website, but Ukrainian sources reposted screenshots of the post and ISW was able to locate an archived version.

https://web.archive.org/web/20220823081906/https://uvsd.ru/news/info/339... https://suspilne dot media/273917-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-181-tekstovij-onlajn/; https://uvsd dot ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2469

[2] https://suspilne dot media/273917-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-181-tekstovij-onlajn/; https://uvsd dot ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2469

[3] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html

[5] https://telegra dot ph/Sotrudniki-BPKS-MVD-LNR-i-Svodnogo-otryada-policii-GU-MVD-Rossii-po-gorodu-Sankt-Peterburgu-i-Lenoblasti-proveli-patrulirovanie--08-23; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1530; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1530; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1532

[7] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-lnr-namahaiutsia-provesty-zahalnu-zahalnu-mobilizatsiiu-ta-provodiat-poshuk-rashystivdezertyriv.html

[12] https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1562019295332278272 https://t.me/vo... ru/world/857821; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15538959

[13] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2022/08/21/7364206/; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/16769; https://t.me/donrf22/4034; ht...

[15] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/opinions/2022/08/23/kto-upravlyaet-rossiiskimi-voiskami/index.html

[21] https://www.facebook.com/Gromadasiversk/posts/pfbid02ZdiqDLz3WWN5sB2rUNj... https://suspilne dot media/274114-siversk-znahoditsa-pid-kontrolem-ukraini/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHL...

[42] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505140495256891399; https://vk dot com/wall-26673779_77322

[49] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-obstriliuiut-zolovidvaly-zaporizkoi-tes-shchob-pidniaty-khmary-radioaktyvnoho-pylu.html; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9127

[53] https://samara dot tsargrad.tv/news/bojcam-samarskogo-batalona-uvelichat-edinovremennuju-denezhnuju-vyplatu_610880

[54] https://newsorel dot ru/fn_1133279.html

[56] https://glazovlife dot ru/?p=48019; https://vk.com/wall-187448798_89638; https://udm-info dot ru/news/society/23-08-2022/6-glazovchan-zapisalis-v-podrazdelenie-spetsnaza-italmas-dlya-uchastiya-v-svo-v-ukraine

[57] https://vk dot com/wall-187448798_89638

[58] https://glazovlife dot ru/?p=48019; https://udm-info dot ru/news/society/23-08-2022/6-glazovchan-zapisalis-v-podrazdelenie-spetsnaza-italmas-dlya-uchastiya-v-svo-v-ukraine

[60] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1562036489768386560; https://t.me/rian_ru/175281; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/233; https://t.me/readovkanews/40640 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/40644; https://t.me/stranaua/59434 https://t.me/milinfolive/89286; https://t.me/rybar/37606 ; https://iz dot ru/1383931/2022-08-23/zamglavy-vga-stremousov-soobshchil-o-pokushenii-na-khersonskogo-chinovnika-telegina

[61] https://t.me/stranaua/59434 https://t.me/milinfolive/89286; https://t.me/rybar/37606 ; https://iz dot ru/1383931/2022-08-23/zamglavy-vga-stremousov-soobshchil-o-pokushenii-na-khersonskogo-chinovnika-telegina

[62] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/rashysty-rozrobyly-metodychku-dlia-svoikh-ahitatoriv-na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-shchob-perekonuvaty-naselennia-shcho-vony-ne-marodery-i-vbyvtsi-dokument.html

[64] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/

[65] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/

[66] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/

[69] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html

[70] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html

[71] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html

[72] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html

[73] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine marks Independence Day

Ukraine marks Independence Day

ukrinform.net

Ukraine’s Independence Day is celebrated to honor the adoption of the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1991. The Act is a political and legal document that certified the new status of Ukraine.

Ukraine came a long way to its independence. The history of the formation of the Ukrainian state has a thousand-year tradition. It began with the existence of the State of the Antes, the state unification of the Polans tribe, and later the formation of the Kyivan Rus. After the disintegration of the Kyivan Rus, the traditions of statehood passed to the Principality of Galicia–Volhynia. Then the Grand Duchy of Lithuania emerged, in which Kyiv and Volyn lands enjoyed considerable autonomy.

In the 17th century, the Cossack state began to form on the territory of modern Ukraine. The Cossacks fought for Ukraine’s independence for more than a hundred years, but they never managed to achieve it. In the 18th century, the Ukrainian people lost their statehood and came to be within the two empires – the Russian Empire and the Austria Empire – for the next two hundred years.

In the 19th - early 20th centuries, the Ukrainian national movement evolved and led to the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921 and the revival of Ukrainian statehood. The Central Council of Ukraine was formed and proclaimed with its Third Universal the establishment of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The Fourth Universal declared the independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. In 1919, the Unification Act was signed by the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic and declared the unity of the Ukrainian lands. However, the Ukrainian People’s Republic did not last long.

The Ukrainian people lost a chance to have their own state till the end of the 20th century.

After the August coup in Moscow, seeing the danger looming over Ukraine and continuing the millennial tradition of state formation, Ukraine’s independence was proclaimed at an extraordinary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on August 24, 1991.

This meant that the Ukrainian state had its own indivisible and inviolable territory, in which only the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine have an effect. Ukraine gained the full legal state independence after a national referendum on December 1, 1991, when 90.32% of citizens voted for its independence. By approving the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine on the nationwide referendum, the people brought this document into real force and began a new stage in the development of the history of Ukraine.

This year Ukraine’s Independence Day is a special and restless holiday, as it is also six months as Ukraine has been fighting against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Today the Motherland Monument (Batkivshchyna-Maty) in Kyiv and other significant places will be lit up with the colors of the National Flag of Ukraine. In the National Sanctuary Complex ‘Sophia of Kyiv’, priests of all churches will pray for Ukraine.

In addition, the exhibition of the destroyed Russian military equipment is taking place on Khreshchatyk Street.

At the same time, government authorities urged Ukrainians to stay especially alert this week, follow safety rules and hide in bomb shelters during air raid alerts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky believes Russia’s actions may be especially cruel on Ukraine’s Independence Day.

In Kyiv, and many other Ukrainians cities, mass gathering events were not allowed, as the threat of Russia’s missile attacks and provocations is persisting.

ukrinform.net

3. US Expected to Unveil Biggest Arms Package Yet for Ukraine

US Expected to Unveil Biggest Arms Package Yet for Ukraine

defenseone.com · by Tara Copp

Rescue workers inspect the site of a destroyed hostel as a result of a missile strike in the second largest Ukrainian city of Kharkiv late on August 17, 2022, amid Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. SERGEY BOBOK/AFP via Getty Images

The $3B package—slated for release on the country's independence day—will offer ammunition in amounts “we’ve never seen before,” defense official says.

August 23, 2022 05:12 PM ET

By Tara Copp

Senior Pentagon Reporter, Defense One

August 23, 2022 05:12 PM ET

The U.S. is expected to announce the largest weapons and aid package yet for Ukraine on Wednesday, a $3 billion package that would push total U.S. aid well past the annual budgets of at least eight federal programs, including the entire judicial branch.

Timed for the 41st anniversary of Ukrainian independence, the announcement would arrive just five days after the previous one unveiled a $775 million package of advanced missiles, armored vehicles, and artillery. But while the weapons for Friday’s package will be drawn from U.S. stockpiles, items for the upcoming set will be purchased or ordered from industry, a senior defense official told Defense One on the condition they not be named.

The $3 billion package will be the largest single chunk of the total of $13.7 billion the United States has U.S. announced since Russia’s February invasion. It will contain ammunition in amounts “we’ve never seen before” in the effort to help Ukraine fight off the invaders, the official said.

That total is more than the annual budget of some federal programs, such as the National Science Foundation ($9.2 billion) and the Small Business Administration ($1.7 billion), according to Statista. It is larger than the annual budgets of the federal judiciary ($9.7 billion), Congress ($6.6 billion), or the Executive Office of the President ($0.6 billion). It is creeping up on the budgets of the Environmental Protection Agency ($15.9 billion), if not NASA ($24.9 billion).

The $13.7 billion—plus whatever aid is committed before the fiscal year ends on Sept. 30—will push 2023 defense spending toward the $1 trillion mark, said Larry Korb, a defense budget expert with the Center for American Progress. After President Biden requested $813 billion, Congress decided to raise that amount to account for inflation and other projects. Ukraine and other costs, like amortization rates for the military’s retirement system, will push the total close to 10 figures, said Korb, a former naval flight officer who served as assistant defense secretary in the Reagan administration.

“The question is: Are you going to add to the deficit, which is now over $30 trillion?” Korb said. “How are you going to pay for it?”

In the last several weeks, the Pentagon has announced back-to-back massive rounds of military aid for Ukraine as Russian momentum has stalled. A second senior defense official who briefed reporters Friday said offered assurances that the Pentagon knows where all the aid and weapons are going.

“We have very detailed accountability measures to ensure that we are tracking from the moment that we have authorization to provide a capability from the moment that we move that capability via the U.S. Transportation Command to its destination across the border to Ukraine,” the official said.

“Then working with the Ukrainians, we also have information about how they are deploying these capabilities, how they're using them, and how they are consuming the capabilities that they need replenishment for. So very, very detailed tracking by my military colleagues, both here at the Pentagon, also at U.S. European command and now also with our Defense Attache Office that is reestablished in Kyiv.”

4. 7 in 10 Americans Want To Send More Weapons To Ukraine, Poll Finds

Some good news. The wisdom of the AMerican people.

7 in 10 Americans Want To Send More Weapons To Ukraine, Poll Finds

Survey shows Americans want to keep supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes despite inflation concerns at home.

defenseone.com · by Jacqueline Feldscher

Public support for military and economic aid to Ukraine remains high nearly six months after Russia’s invasion, suggesting the American public is not suffering from war fatigue.

In a July poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 72 percent of respondents said they want to send more weapons and military supplies to Ukraine, down from 79 percent in a March poll. Support for economic assistance dipped to 71 percent from 78 percent.

Support for more sanctions on Russia rose from 77 percent in March to 80 percent in July, while support for Ukrainian refugees to America rose from 74 percent to 76 percent, according to the poll, which surveyed more than 3,000 participants between July 15 and Aug. 1 and whose results were released last week.

Support for sending American troops to Ukraine remains stable, despite no signal from the U.S. government that direct military intervention is on the table. Thirty-eight percent of those polled support sending U.S. troops to Ukraine to help beat back Russia, compared to 36 percent in March.

Support is much higher if Russia were to invade a NATO ally. More than 6 in 10 Americans believe the United States should send troops to defend Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia from a Russian invasion. That’s a steep increase from just 44 percent of people who supported sending U.S. troops to help a NATO ally in March 2021.

Democrats generally support helping Ukraine more than Republicans, but the overwhelming majority of Republicans polled still support boosting sanctions, helping Ukrainian refugees, sending more weapons, and providing economic aid. For example, 79 percent of Democrats want to send more military aid to Ukraine, compared to 68 percent of Republicans and 68 percent of Independents.

On Capitol Hill, some Trump-aligned Republicans have voiced opposition to sending aid to Ukraine, criticizing the administration for focusing attention and money abroad while Americans are suffering under high inflation and supply chain shortages.

“The Democrats are sending another $40 billion to Ukraine, yet America's parents are struggling to even feed their children,” Trump said in May. “America First!”

But the poll suggests the majority of Americans are more concerned with defeating Russia than they are with addressing domestic issues such as combating inflation. About 6 in 10 people believe the United States should support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” even if it means higher gas and food prices at home. Conversely, about 40 percent of those polled want to negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible to cut prices, even if it means Ukraine loses some of its territory.

The desire to support Ukraine regardless of price spikes in the United States is more popular among Democrats, but 50 percent of Republicans also agree higher gas and food prices are worth it to defeat Russia.

Americans are also worried about what precedent the conflict in Ukraine will mean for the rest of the world. More than two-thirds say Russia’s invasion will likely make other countries think that borders can be changed with force, and more than three-quarters said they expected Russia’s actions to encourage a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

The Biden administration has sent nearly $11 billion to Ukraine since taking office, including $775 million on Friday to provision additional HIMARS rockets, surveillance drones, and anti-mine MRAP vehicles to Ukrainian forces as Russia’s momentum in the fight stalls.

defenseone.com · by Jacqueline Feldscher

5. What Ukraine needs to win the war

Conclusion:

Ukraine can win the war but victory depends on Western support that goes well beyond the current level. We cannot ignore that Ukraine, too, has suffered painful losses in troops and materiel. Ukraine has been consistent and clear about its needs. Peace in Europe, and perhaps the world, depends on meeting them.

What Ukraine needs to win the war

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

atlanticcouncil.org · August 22, 2022

In the six months since Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainian military has conducted a stout and stirring defense, inflicting heavy casualties on Russian units and contesting every foot of ground. Against long odds, Ukraine managed to defend the capital, Kyiv, as well as its second largest city, Kharkiv. This has forced Russia to abandon its goal of a quick takeover of the country.

However, staving off defeat is not the same thing as victory. Russian forces today control about 20% of Ukrainian territory, including large tracts in the east and south. What does Ukraine need in order to win the war?

A first step must be to address the disparity in airpower. Success in modern, high-intensity warfare is almost impossible without at least parity in the air. Ukraine began the contest woefully behind the curve with perhaps 100 flyable jets compared to Russia’s more than 1,500. Where Russia has been able to conduct 100-200 sorties per day, the much smaller Ukrainian air force can manage around 10-20.

Accordingly, Ukraine has been generally unable to provide air support to its ground forces for fear of losing its small inventory of high-performance aircraft (mostly MIG-29 and SU-27 fighters and Su-24 and SU-25 ground attack aircraft). Instead, its approach has been to carefully husband its assets and use them only selectively.

On the other hand, Ukraine has been outstandingly successful in denying Russia air supremacy with extremely effective air defense and a strategy of “air denial.”

Though lacking the most advanced air defense systems such as the US Patriot or the Russian S-400, Ukraine’s use of older S-300 (high altitude), SA-11 (medium altitude) and SA-8 (short range) systems has been lethal to Russian airpower. The US has also provided small numbers of its NASAM short to medium-range air defense system, while Germany has promised to send decommissioned Gepard air defense vehicles, though ammunition shortages have delayed actual use.

Employed in concert with large numbers of US-supplied Stinger shoulder-fired missiles and using “shoot and scoot” tactics for survivability, Ukrainian air defense has downed dozens of Russian fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and largely sidelined Russian airpower. An adequate supply of air defense missiles for Ukrainian systems is essential here, and they must come from outside sources in quantity for Ukraine to prevail.

Ukraine has also used drones with devastating effect. The principal military platforms have been the Turkish Bayraktar TB2, which can deliver laser-guided bombs, and the US-supplied Phoenix Ghost drone as well as the Switchblade, a kamikaze drone with onboard explosives that can be flown into the target.

These military drones are supplemented with thousands of cheaper commercial drones used for artillery spotting and intelligence collection. Russian forces have adapted and the loss rate of Ukrainian drones is high, but low cost and ready availability mean that drones will continue to play an important role. When linked to nearby artillery units, drones enable quick target acquisition and precise fires, making the most of Ukraine’s limited artillery resources.

Ukrainian innovation and tactical agility have blunted much of Russia’s dominance in the air, but the ability to generate offensive airpower in the form of close air support and air interdiction will go far towards helping Ukraine prevail. Earlier in the war, Poland and other former Warsaw Pact nations suggested a transfer of Soviet-era jets to Ukraine, an offer blocked by US officials. If NATO is determined not to provide air cover, it is imperative that this block be removed and that partners be permitted to support the Ukrainian air force with platforms it can employ quickly to support air operations.

Backfilling these transfers with US fourth generation aircraft like the F-16 would also hasten the transition in Central Europe’s NATO member states from Soviet-era jets to more interoperable Western aircraft. Even 50 additional jets, with associated munitions and spare parts, could make a major difference in Ukraine. Without a boost in air support, a Ukrainian victory may still be possible if the strategy of air denial holds up, but it will come at higher costs to ground forces.

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Just as important as air support is artillery, which comes in three forms: tubed, rocket, and missile. Ukraine began the war with substantial but outdated tubed artillery from the Soviet era, complicated by a dearth of ammunition. With some 2000 artillery pieces to Ukraine’s 500, Russian artillery is far more numerous, modern, and powerful, with a daily consumption of artillery rounds some 10 times greater than Ukraine’s.

As with air defense, Ukraine has used its limited artillery intelligently, quickly relocating after fire missions to avoid counter-battery fire and relying on drones for precision targeting. The addition of towed 155mm howitzers from the US and smaller numbers of 155mm self-propelled systems from Germany, France and other countries has strengthened Ukraine’s tubed artillery holdings considerably, but Russia’s advantage is still strong.

Here the US can help with M109A6 155mm self-propelled howitzers, recently replaced by the newer M109A7 model and now in storage in quantity. The M109A6 is an armored, tracked vehicle, more survivable against counter-battery fire, quicker to displace, and with smaller crews. It is accurate, lethal, and rugged, making it well-suited to Ukraine’s terrain and operational environment. Approximately 320 of these systems would give Ukraine four additional artillery brigades (one for each of its four regional headquarters), plus an additional battalion in general support for each of Ukraine’s 12 or so division equivalents, leaving some 10% for training and spares.

The real artillery game changer is the multiple launch rocket system in wheeled (M142 HIMARS) and tracked (M270 MLRS) variants. Both are long ranged, precise, mobile, and very destructive. Small numbers have been provided to date and have rendered excellent service. While Ukraine does field older rocket artillery systems like the BM-21 Grad and BM-30 Smerch, HIMARS and MLRS are far superior in range and precision.

As a matter of policy, the Biden administration has withheld longer ranged ATACMS ammunition that can strike targets up to 300 miles away. To level the playing field and transition to the offense with some hope of success, Ukraine probably needs some 50 or so HIMARS or MLRS systems, and it needs the ATACMS round. These capabilities will enable Ukrainian forces to strike high value targets like command posts, airfields, logistics hubs, air defense complexes, and ballistic missile launchers. Given the mismatch in airpower, long range rocket artillery has the potential to turn the tide and put Ukraine on a path towards ultimate success. Without it, victory will remain elusive.

Stronger airpower and more modern rocket artillery will greatly improve the odds, but Ukraine’s tank forces must also be strengthened. When the war began, Ukraine’s standard tank was the T-64B, an older and underpowered Soviet-era design lacking the most modern explosive reactive armor, thermal sights, and modern ammunition. While Ukraine has inflicted heavy losses on Russian armor (often using hand-held anti-tank weapons), its own tank force has been depleted and offensive breakthroughs with tank-heavy forces have not been possible.

Poland has committed to providing 240 PT-91 main battle tanks along with small numbers of Czech T-72s. To equip the Ukrainian army for offensive operations in 2023, the US should consider providing a similar number of M1A1 tanks from its large reserve stocks. Though not the very latest model, the M1A1 is more than a match for most Russian tanks and is available in large numbers.

To assist Ukraine, NATO should consider establishing a NATO Training Mission-Ukraine (NTM-U) based in Poland and developed on a scale similar to the robust training support organizations seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Led by a US three-star general with senior-level representation and staffing from the UK, France, Poland and Germany, NTM-U could provide the expertise, technical assistance, and “connective tissue” that is badly needed as Ukraine fights for its national existence. This organization can serve as the conduit back to the training bases and defense industries of contributing nations as well as the schoolhouse for Ukrainian commanders and staff officers.

Such full-blooded support, even without direct participation in the fighting, will undoubtedly draw Putin’s ire. Why should the US and its European partners risk a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia in this way? The clear answer is that a negotiated peace in Ukraine would be nothing of the sort. Any settlement that leaves Russia in control of occupied territory in exchange for a cessation of hostilities will reward Russia and encourage more aggression.

Western leaders can be sure that Russian success in Ukraine, even at high cost, will put NATO allies like the Baltic states squarely in Putin’s crosshairs. If anything, US and European reluctance to increase support for Ukraine will only reassure Putin that the West fears confrontation and will take pains to avoid it. This is not a recipe for deterring future aggression.

Nor should the West fear Russian rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons. Distilled to its essence, this amounts to the threat of a nuclear exchange if Russia is not allowed to invade and occupy its neighbors. The nuclear deterrence regime that has been in place since the 1950s is surely strong enough to deter such wild adventurism.

Constant statements from Western leaders claiming “we cannot risk WWIII” only encourage Putin to believe that reckless threats about nuclear weapons are working. While a nuclear event cannot be ruled out entirely (Russia might stage a low-yield tactical nuclear detonation in a remote area, for example, to frighten and intimidate the West), the use of nuclear weapons in combat when the existence of the Russian state is not at risk is extremely unlikely.

The outcome of the conflict in Ukraine will have consequences far beyond Europe. China is watching carefully and will weigh the West’s commitment to its friends and partners carefully as it considers the military conquest of Taiwan, especially after the US and NATO’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. So will Iran and North Korea.

For the most part, Russian aggression in Georgia, Crimea, the Donbas, and more broadly in Ukraine has not been met with confidence and firm resolve. Instead, the Western response has consisted of sanctions, rhetoric, and a pronounced unwillingness to risk confrontation. We should not fool ourselves here. Much is at stake.

As the war grinds on, Ukraine has advantages it can leverage. These include an educated and highly motivated military and citizenry, a well-run and efficient railway system, a good understanding of modern technology, and an adaptive and innovative approach to the problems of modern, high-intensity warfare.

An intimate knowledge of the terrain and interior lines has enabled tactical success throughout the campaign. Ukrainian leadership, both civil and military, has on the whole been markedly superior to Russia’s. Above all, the Ukrainian soldier has proven to be tough, resourceful and determined, a fighter who “knows what he fights for and loves what he knows.”

Nevertheless, Ukraine is outmatched and must have stronger outside help to avoid dismemberment and continued occupation. The US and Europe do not need to introduce ground troops in order to ensure Ukraine’s success. Magnificent Ukrainian resistance has badly hurt the Russian military, which is almost totally committed in Ukraine. An opportunity now exists to end further Russian aggression in the European security space for a generation, and perhaps forever.

Ukraine can win the war but victory depends on Western support that goes well beyond the current level. We cannot ignore that Ukraine, too, has suffered painful losses in troops and materiel. Ukraine has been consistent and clear about its needs. Peace in Europe, and perhaps the world, depends on meeting them.

Richard D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

6. Why Ukraine frets about US commitment to the war six months in

Yes we should all worry based on our past history and track record. But perhaps with 70% of Americans supporting continued support for Ukraine we will avoid past mistakes. Of course public support could change at any time.

Why Ukraine frets about US commitment to the war six months in

CNN · by Analysis by Stephen Collinson, CNN

(CNN)Six months after Russia's unprovoked invasion, the war in Ukraine hasn't gone away despite being overtaken in US headlines by former President Donald Trump and inflation. The stakes have not changed; they are as important now as ever. And if anything, the war is more brutal and bloody and may be primed for an escalation that could again test American policy.

But as a conflict that has evolved multiple times reaches another possible pivot point, a familiar question is being raised with new urgency -- especially by Ukrainians: How long is the West willing to stay engaged?

US and European money and military aid remain critical to Ukraine's capacity to stave off Russia's invasion and its hopes of reclaiming territory in the east and south even as it escalates its own attacks in Russian-annexed Crimea.

But senior figures in the Kyiv government are sufficiently concerned that they are again warning of the massive stakes for the democratic world as they face down President Vladimir Putin's troops half a year into the conflict.

"I call it fatigue syndrome, and for me it's one of the main threat(s)," Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said in an exclusive interview with CNN's Sam Kiley. "We need to work with this threat, because we need to ... communicate, to ask people, don't be (in) on this fatigue. Because this is very, very dangerous for us."

'All of it is a lie': Russian paratrooper condemns his country's war in Ukraine

Questions about the longevity and intensity of Western commitment is coming at a perilous moment. The State Department on Tuesday advised Americans to leave Ukraine immediately, warning of potential Russian attacks on Wednesday's 31st anniversary of independence, to which Putin says the country is not entitled.

There are also tenuous fears that the capital's return to a pale imitation of normality could be shattered by Russian strikes after the daughter of influential, ultra-nationalist philosopher and Ukraine war propagandist, Alexander Dugin, was killed in a car bomb on the outskirts of Moscow. Ukraine has denied responsibility and the hasty Russian investigation offers little confidence in its claims that an operative from Kyiv's special services was to blame. But the murder has sparked chilling Russian demands for vengeance and total warfare against Ukraine. In the past, Putin has seized on dubious events as excuses for brutal military action -- unleashing a fearsome assault on Chechnya, for instance, in 1999 after apartment bombings that some foreign observers alleged were false flag operations.

Zelensky warns the world not to get 'tired' of Ukraine

Reznikov is not the only top Ukrainian official worried about waning foreign attention with his country desperately reliant on Western arms and ammunition to keep up a fight that is causing a terrible toll.

President Volodymyr Zelensky told CNN's David McKenzie at a news conference in Kyiv on Tuesday that he understood all countries have their problems, at a time when Western populations are squeezed by a high cost of living. But he added that Ukraine still needs more help. "As soon as the world gets tired of this problem, it will be a very big threat," Zelensky warned.

Biden has an unequivocal short-term answer to Zelensky's concerns. He's preparing to unveil yet another massive security assistance package of up to $3 billion on Ukraine's Independence Day, to add to the sophisticated arsenal and ammunition hauls already sent Ukraine's way. This follows last week's $775 million US package that included HIMARS rocket systems and 105mm Howitzer ammunition, anti-armor missiles and mine-clearing capabilities that reflected a Ukrainian desire to launch more offensives against Putin's forces.

There's little doubt about Biden's personal commitment to the cause. He has argued that the fight for Ukraine is central to US interests because it is ultimately about the struggle for democracy, which is under threat globally and at home and on which he has staked his presidency. Asked whether there would come a point whether the US could no longer afford to offer such largesse to Ukraine, John Kirby, the National Security Council's coordinator for strategic communications, reinforced a message spelled out by Biden at a recent NATO summit.

"The United States is going to continue to support Ukraine for as long as it takes and he meant every word of that," Kirby told CNN's Jake Tapper, promising aid packages from the US and "dozens" of other countries.

Biden's war management is a little heralded foreign policy success

Still, the tension of the last few days has trained new attention on the Biden administration's approach to Ukraine, which earlier in the year dominated US news shows and Washington politics for weeks after Putin's invasion set off a World War II-style conflict in Europe, and triggered concerns of a possible US confrontation with an old Cold War foe.

This is more than just a war about Putin's desire to revive the footprint of greater Russia and to reverse the geopolitical effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has tested the West's will to stand up to a Russian autocrat trying to rewrite the borders of the European landmass. The US proxy campaign is sustaining a sovereign people attacked by a more powerful neighbor who have suffered atrocities. Ultimately, it is a major fight in a wider duel between tyranny and democracy, a geopolitical tussle that also draws in the rising US super power confrontation with China -- to which Moscow has moved closer in opposition to Washington.

Individual flashpoints in the war also threaten US interests. The current standoff over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant threatens an environmental catastrophe that could slam the world economy and put large numbers of lives at risk. US Deputy Ambassador to the UN Richard Mills warned amid a frantic international diplomatic effort Tuesday that Russia is "pushing us to the brink of nuclear disaster."

Americans, like people everywhere, have also suffered punishing economic reverberations from the war. Though some agricultural exports have resumed and oil prices responsible for soaring gasoline costs have dipped, the war retains the capacity to inflict financial pain and political consequences thousands of miles away from its killing fields.

There's been little domestic political payback for Biden's approach to the war in Ukraine. But as the last Western leader who was politically active at a high level during the Cold War, as a senator, he has skillfully unified the West in the confrontation with the Kremlin. So far, he has pulled off the high-wire feat of arming Ukraine while avoiding a direct confrontation with Russia that could cause fears of an escalation going all the way up to the brink of nuclear conflict.

A war of attrition looms

But there are reasons why Ukraine's concerns about Western long-term commitment may be well founded. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, for example, has been warning of a prolonged war. "Winter is coming and it will be hard," he said in an online summit with Zelensky and other world leaders on Tuesday.

"What we see now is a grinding war of attrition," Stoltenberg said, raising the need for a long Western commitment.

The daunting reality for the West is that this war may be as close to existential as it gets for Putin, who has not balked at the appalling cost in blood for Ukrainians or Russian troops alike. Earlier hopes for a diplomatic solution faded long ago, partly owing to mistrust between both sides. Ukraine's ambassador to the UN, for example, said a Security Council session over the nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia on Tuesday was a waste of time because Russia filled it with "fictitious soundbites." And while Western sanctions have pulverized the Russian economy, there are no signs yet it has led to a wobble in Putin's political position or changed his own calculations.

The elongated proxy clash now in prospect between the West and Russia threatens to increase the costs that the alliance's leaders -- many of whom face treacherous political conditions and disgruntled constituents -- will face for continuing to support Ukraine.

In the United States, there is no guarantee, for instance, that a Republican House of Representatives, which could emerge from midterm elections in November, would be as enthusiastic as Biden in sending tens of billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine. Any GOP House majority could be in thrall to radical, pro-Trump members, several of whom have already questioned the US commitment to Ukraine.

Presidents have large discretion in foreign policy, and the administration has not just relied on new congressional spending to help Ukraine, it has used various devices to tap existing funds and the Pentagon armory. But Trump's deference to Putin and the fact that it was a telephone call to Zelensky that triggered his first impeachment could raise questions about how the former President could weigh on US policy through his leverage in Congress. Longer term, Ukraine might have considerable trepidation at the possibility that Trump makes it back to the White House after the 2024 election.

Of more immediate concern is the unity of European allies in what is shaping up to be a miserable winter of high inflation, soaring energy prices and political discontent. Putin has several times in recent weeks signaled his capacity to increase the agony for Western publics that rely on Russian energy. Natural gas prices have spiked again following several maintenance interruptions of a key pipeline bringing Russian gas to Europe, which were seen as unsubtle signals from Moscow.

Germany in June activated an emergency plan that brought it closer to rationing of natural gas because of supply interruptions. The Berlin government has often been seen as a possible weak link in the Western alliance and especially vulnerable to what officials in Washington see as Russian blackmail over energy supplies. The situation will only get more acute as temperatures drop and as political pressure piles on German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and other European leaders.

So far, every time the commitment of the transatlantic alliance to Ukraine has been tested, it has stood firm. But it is based on a comparatively fragile political foundation, which is why Zelensky and his ministers are yet again sounding the alarm about the stakes of the war.

CNN · by Analysis by Stephen Collinson, CNN

7. After Six Months of War in Ukraine, Momentum Tilts Against Russia

Excerpts:

Some results of the war already seem settled. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to rewrite the ending of the Cold War by restoring Moscow’s historic sphere of influence in Eastern Europe has failed. His war on Ukraine has instead united almost all of Europe against him, revivifying the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is poised to add Sweden and Finland as new members.

Widespread evidence of alleged Russian atrocities against Ukrainians and Mr. Putin’s weaponization of energy, food and even nuclear safety have made his regime a pariah throughout the developed world—although not in the Global South, where skepticism toward the West runs deep.

And Ukraine has already achieved a political win by surviving as an independent country, against expectations in Moscow as well as many Western capitals that Kyiv would collapse under Russia’s onslaught. The war has reinforced Ukraine’s distinct national identity and its determination to reorient its economy, politics and security arrangements toward the West.

But the final outcome of the war remains as uncertain as its duration. Russia still has far more artillery and shells. The difficulty of advancing over open ground makes it hard for Ukraine to retake occupied land. Western military aid, especially from Europe, remains slow and stuttering from Kyiv’s perspective. Many Western policy makers continue to doubt that Ukraine can achieve military victory short of a level of Western support that might risk escalation into a direct war with Russia.

The Biden administration has been circumspect from the start, sending weapons in fits and starts and only providing more advanced capabilities such as Himars after weeks or months of careful consideration, fearing escalation or that equipment could fall into the wrong hands. The contemplative approach has opened the U.S. up to criticism that it didn’t move fast enough initially, even as U.S. officials contend they are getting materiel into Ukraine as fast as possible.

Ukraine’s badly damaged economy has begun to stabilize, but its government is acutely short of money, partly because the European Union hasn’t delivered on its promises of financial aid. Money-printing to pay for the war risks undermining Ukraine’s currency.

And the harshest economic fallout won’t hit Europe until early 2023, when winter will test the EU’s frantic preparations for living without Russian gas.

WORLD

After Six Months of War in Ukraine, Momentum Tilts Against Russia

Moscow retains firepower advantage, but Kyiv is starting to take the initiative, while Western support for Ukraine is holding firm despite economic pain

https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-six-months-of-war-in-ukraine-momentum-tilts-against-russia-11661247003?mod=hp_lead_pos6

By Marcus WalkerFollow

and Gordon LuboldFollow

Aug. 23, 2022 5:30 am ET

Six months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, signs are accumulating that the balance on the military and economic battlefields is slowly tilting the way of Kyiv and its Western backers.

In the biggest war between European countries since World War II, the death and destruction have no end in sight. Ukraine is still struggling against Russia’s advantage in raw firepower, but the country’s defenders are increasingly hitting Russian logistics and bases, including in Crimea, as they receive more Western weapons.

A drone strike on the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea on Saturday was one of many recent signs that Russia’s rear areas are increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian attack.

WHAT’S NEWS

The War in Ukraine, Six Months Later

00:00

Political and popular backing for Ukraine in the U.S. and most of Europe remains robust, despite fears that a drawn-out war and rising energy and food prices could undermine Western unity.

The U.S., in particular, is sending Ukraine steadily growing quantities of advanced weapons such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or Himars, as well as crucial financial support. The U.S. announced another nearly $800 million in military assistance for Ukraine on Friday, including drones, artillery and ammunition. For the first time, the package includes mine-clearing equipment and tactical vehicles that suggest the U.S. is arming Ukraine in new ways to retake lost territory.

“The Russian military has lost much of what momentum it had and has redeployed a lot of its forces in anticipation of a Ukrainian offensive in the southern part of the country,” said Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies program at CNA, a defense research organization in Arlington, Va.

“I don’t think there is a natural stalemate on the ground,” he said. “I think there is at least another chapter to play out before winter.”

Why Crimea Is a Focal Point in the Ukraine War

What is blowing up those Russian bases in Crimea? - Breaking Defense

Ukraine appears to have struck Russia in Crimea twice this month. But how they actually pulled it off is a mystery worth unraveling, writes Mark Cancian of CSIS.

breakingdefense.com · by Mark Cancian · August 23, 2022

A pair of strikes against Russian bases in Crimea, well behind the Russian military’s lines in Ukraine, sent shockwaves through observers of the ongoing conflict. The damage was obvious, but what remains shrouded in questions are how the attacks were pulled off. Below, Mark Cancian of CSIS goes into the five potential explanations for what happened, and teases out which is the most likely.

The last two weeks have witnessed major attacks on Russian facilities in Crimea, but the mechanism of the attacks remains a mystery. Are Ukrainian special forces infiltrating Crimea? Are missiles or aircraft penetrating Russian airspace? What is the role of sloppy Russian munitions procedures?

So far, there have been two major attacks. The first, and larger, attack was against Saki airfield in central Crimea on Aug. 9. That attack caused four massive and many smaller explosions, captured on video, and open-source imaging shows at least eight aircraft destroyed on the ground.

The second attack on Aug. 16 struck an ammunition depot and possibly another airbase. Russian sources cite civilian casualties, and videos show Russian teams clearing debris and unexploded ordnance.

The attacks seem likely to continue, but the attack mechanism is a mystery. No single explanation is consistent with all the known facts. To help clarify that mystery, let’s look at five possible mechanisms for what is happening behind Russian lines.

Theory one: An accident. The first theory doesn’t involve Ukrainian action at all, and frankly seems the least likely. Russia blames the first incident on an accident ― careless operations causing an initial explosion that led to secondary explosions.

Secondary explosions occur when an initial explosion causes other nearby munitions or fuel to explode. There is no question that the largest explosions were caused by masses of munitions going off at the same time, not by a single explosive. Open-source images show large craters where two warehouses and parked vehicles had been, and one video appears to capture the dynamic of a small explosion followed by a much larger one. Earlier reports had noted sloppy munitions storage procedures that allowed storage of loose ammunition and fuel near aircraft. So, the Russian explanation is not completely impossible.

However, it is highly unlikely that this is the complete explanation. Damage is spread over a wide area implying multiple causes, not a single accident, and whatever caused the damage seems to have had multiple aiming points. Further, aircraft right next to the explosions are untouched while aircraft further away are shattered. It is not impossible that debris skipped over some nearby aircraft and landed on others farther away, but it seems unlikely.

So, if the official Russian explanation is implausible, we are left with the obvious conclusion: that Ukraine took some form of direct action against these targets. The question then becomes what that action looked like.

Theory two: sabotage on the ground. The leading explanation is that Ukrainian special forces or insurgents caused the damage. The Ukrainian government has put this forward, and Russia explicitly blames “saboteurs” for the second blast. This is certainly possible; teams could infiltrate the airfield or ammunition depot and plant charges.

However, there are three problems with such an explanation. In the Saki airbase attack, the major explosions occurred over the course of almost an hour. Special forces teams would need to have been running around the airfield unopposed for at least that length of time, but there is no indication that Russian security forces engaged anyone or recovered any Ukrainian equipment. Such freedom of movement for a saboteur force is not impossible given Russian failures to follow military doctrine and tactical procedures over the course of this war. However, it would be a shocking lapse of Russian security.

Another problem with this theory is that Crimea has a large Russian-speaking population that is generally sympathetic to Russia. A Ukrainian special forces team would find it hard, though not impossible, to hide for any length of time among this generally hostile population.

Finally, the Ukrainian government has a lot of incentive to dissemble. Maybe it is covering for the actual attack mechanism. Maybe it is trying to spread fear in the Russian rear areas. Truth is the first casualty in war, and the Ukrainians would benefit greatly in pushing the PR message of successful resistance to the Russian invaders.

Theory three: long-range missiles. Long-range fires are another possibility — but what type? Ukrainian forces are about 150 miles away from the targets, but GMLRS rockets, which the Ukrainians possess in large numbers, have a range of only 45 miles. Even the extended range GMLRS, currently in development and possibly available in prototype, has a range of only 90 miles.

Some commentators have speculated about ATACMS, GMLRS’s big cousin. That missile has a range of 180 miles and can be fired from a HIMARS launcher, which the Ukrainians already have. The missile could strike central Crimea from the current Ukrainian front lines and has the necessary explosive power to cause the damage seen.

However, the United States has stated that it would not supply this long-range missile to Ukraine, over concerns that it could strike targets deep inside Russia and thus escalate the conflict. Further, DoD spokespersons have stated that no US weapons were involved. While such spokespersons could be dissembling — did third parties provide the weapons? — the denial is plausible. ATACMS is so visually different from the guided MLRS rocket, and the attacks were so well documented, it seems likely some sign of the weapon’s existence would be appearing on social media.

Other observers have speculated that Ukraine has adapted long-range naval missiles for land attack, and that’s possible. The United States has frequently adapted missiles for other uses, for example modifying the Tomahawk land attack missile and the SAM-6 anti-air missile to anti-ship missions. Ukraine would find this challenging with its smaller defense technology base and a war-disrupted economy, but the country has proven capable of on-the-fly military developments, so it cannot be ruled out.

But social media raises an overarching issue with the theory that the explosions were caused by missiles: There are no reports of anyone seeing a low flying missile, and to cause this level of damage, Ukraine would need to have fired a dozen such weapons. The lack of reports doesn’t preclude the possibility of missile strikes but, given the many social media postings available, it seems likely that one of them would have mentioned missiles flying overhead.

Finally, missiles don’t disappear when they strike their targets. Missile bodies remain at the site of the impact and can be analyzed — and usually show up online, posted by interested bystanders or spotted by open-source imagery.

Theory four: Unmanned strikes. Another possibility is drones. They could, in theory, strike the airfield with onboard weapons or by diving directly onto the target. The problem with this theory is range. All the US-provided kamikaze drones like Switchblade or Ghost Phoenix have relatively short ranges, not nearly enough to reach central Crimea. The TB-2 drone, which the Ukrainians use extensively, has very long endurance but is limited to about 150 miles range because of communications. A strike in central Crimea would be at the far edge of what could be controlled. Because each TB-2 carries a maximum of four missiles, probably four or five drones would be required to hit the many aiming points implied by the overhead photographs. Further, these drones are slow and visible. Someone would have seen or heard them.

Ukrainian insurgents might have flown a smaller, commercially-derivative drone from the local area. The Ukrainians demonstrated that capability in a July attack on Russian Navy headquarters, and a similar attack reportedly took place on Aug. 20. However, to cause the level of damage seen in the airfield strike, the Ukrainians would need to have expanded greatly both the number and firepower of these drones. Dropping hand grenades from a small drone makes a dramatic political statement, as happened in the July and August attacks, but is not enough to level an airfield.

Theory five: Ukraine’s Air Force gets revenge. A final possibility is that the strikes came from Ukrainian aircraft. A guided bomb like a JDAM could do this kind of damage. A few aircraft could carry the dozen bombs necessary to strike the aiming points indicated in both attacks. Although Ukraine is not known to have JDAMs, the United States may have quietly supplied them, since they are relatively easy to use. Indigenously produced munitions might also have the needed capabilities, or weapons could have come from another European ally, given how few of the NATO nations have been open with what they are sending to help Kyiv.

The problem is that the aircraft would have had to fly low to avoid engagement by Russian air defenses, and none of the social media reports cite low-flying aircraft. Further, at some point the Russians would have spotted the aircraft on their radar because the targets are deep inside one of Russia’s most highly defended areas. Even a lax air defense system would have responded to a second attack.

Why it matters: As is obvious from the above rundown, none of the conventional theories about the strikes work particularly well. My best guess, despite the lack of social media coverage, is that long-range missiles or drones conducted the attacks. ATACMs supplied by third countries would be that simplest explanation, but if that comes out, the US will have been caught lying, whatever spin spokespersons put on their statements. Special forces attacks, the favorite Ukrainian explanation, are extremely difficult to pull off, and the Ukrainian Air Force seems too weak and unsophisticated to conduct such as deep strike. Important pieces of information are clearly missing, which makes the analysis difficult.

Now, some might ask why it matters how the strikes happened. The answer, at its simplest, is the vector of the attacks will guide how Russia responds. Russia will need to take countermeasures of some sort to guard against attacks. Those countermeasures, whether beefing up base security or enhancing radar surveillance, will take resources away from the front lines.

And understanding how the attacks were conducted means we can predict where future attacks might be targeted — and be confident, after the clear success of the Saki operation, more attacks are coming. Though no individual strike will be decisive, such attacks could cumulatively damage the Russian military effort. Russian losses from the two attacks so far are real; losing eight front-line combat aircraft hurts, and the aircraft will be irreplaceable for many years. The attacks also bring the war home to the average Russian, reminding them that waging war on a neighbor has a cost. The viral video of anxious Russians leaving their Crimean vacations because of the attacks at Saki shows that the Russian people are learning this lesson.

Although the cause of the attacks is a mystery to us, the mystery has an answer, and the Russians know what that answer is. Radar surveillance, observer reports, and bomb damage assessment have given the Russians a lot of data, certainly enough to make a clear case for one attack mechanism. At some point, likely soon, that answer will come out.

Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Marine colonel now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

9. An interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky

This is an updated publication of the interview published on August 16th.

An interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · August 16, 2022

Updated August 23, 2022 at 5:57 p.m. EDT|Published August 16, 2022 at 5:00 a.m. EDT

KYIV, Ukraine — Over the past six months, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has become an inspiring wartime leader and champion of his country. During an hour-long, wide-ranging interview with The Washington Post at the presidential office, where hallways are kept dark and are lined with sandbags to protect against Russian attack, Zelensky discussed U.S. warnings about Russia preparing to launch a full-scale invasion — and if he believed them.

The following is a translated and lightly edited transcript of the interview.

Q: Can you describe to us the moment when you found out a full-scale invasion had begun? Who informed you and what were your first moves that morning?

A: First of all, the war began in 2014. But I do not want to look like some deep, great historian right now and say that the war began long before 2014. The war of the Russian Federation in one form or another against Ukraine or against the sovereignty of our state or against statehood or against the general existence of Ukraine — this war is old and it has been going on for many decades, even hundreds of years. But if we rely on the date that appears everywhere as the date of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, of course, this is Feb. 24, 2022.

They began this war of occupation where they chipped away from us little by little in 2014, although I believe that they have been encroaching on Crimea since 1991 through [providing Russian passports to Ukrainians] and various other steps. These are hybrid, heavy, cynical measures — albeit professionally implemented ones. They have been trying to devour our country through their information policy, all of their television — I worked in [television], and I understood perfectly how this functions. They have been devouring Ukraine as they had big assets, the petrodollars and revenue from gas, so of course, they bought up our industries and so on. They acted through informational [policy], humanitarian [means], passportization and then bought up the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada [parliament] of Ukraine, financed various parties. And by the way, their party was the second party in the country by the time I became president. The second party in the country was the party of the Russian Federation. If I hadn’t — not specifically because of me — but if I hadn’t run for president, this party would have been the first.

This is also very important to understand. I am not saying that this is my personal merit; this is the merit of the people of Ukraine, who believed [in us]. I am not trying to break this down into right or wrong, but this is a fact. The influence is so strong that this party would have been the first party. Today, we see that this party does not enjoy trust anymore. And this suggests that starting from Feb. 24, there has been a complete reboot, a complete reset of consciousness in Ukraine. That’s what I think.

To understand that they would invade — well, look, we lived in different worlds, I and our Western partners. From the moment when I had the opportunity to communicate closely with the leaders of various countries, be it at the Munich Security Conference or through my speech at the U.N. General Assembly, we’ve been saying that Russia had already begun a full-scale invasion, it was only a matter of time. What will happen next? What is “time” here? That is the moment when they will feel they are capable and when they’ll see that the Western countries are weakened. So what did they do? They created the energy deficit — chaos made out of an artificial shortage of energy resources so, accordingly, people thought about their domestic policy and Ukraine was on the back burner.

The topic of Ukraine moved further and further down [on the agenda]. And over the years, the topic of Crimea has also moved further and further down on the agenda because of various challenges. We raised the topic of Crimea … we began to take steps to update some things. And then we immediately saw a tough reaction from the Russians. We understood what was going on. So the question was only when will this happen. And I believe the problem is that Ukraine has not been given certainty. And I think that only recently, when Ukraine was given a candidate status for the European Union, the country was only then given more or less clear certainty. So it was very recent. Everything else was just words. I do not want to reproach anyone for anything, but the most important thing for Ukraine and the Ukrainian society is certainty. Where do we stand now and [where] we do we stand in the future? Will you be there, will they find you a place among equals?

And from the point of view of security guarantees, which we constantly appealed for, we said that the [Membership Action Plan] in NATO is not NATO membership. What are you afraid of? But that would have also been a signal of certainty. And, of course, we did not receive anything from the point of view of security guarantees. Security guarantees are provided not only by Ukraine’s membership in NATO. It’s not just about safety, although I believe that the [Membership Action Plan] in NATO would have been [one of] those exact preventive sanctions that I constantly talked about at all meetings. Preventive sanctions mean to do something to make the Russians afraid to attack — because they will attack, so do something about it. But this did not happen, unfortunately.

I’m not complaining. We’ve already passed the stage of complaints in our lives. This is not necessary. We’re stronger now than we were before the invasion. We are just stronger. Our position is more correct, and I believe that this is the most important thing, because only an internally strong country can somehow resist. Partners can only help us de-occupy territories, but only the people of Ukraine can stand up and persevere.

These security guarantees, which I constantly mentioned to all leaders, they provide you with access. I am grateful to the partners for the weapons we are receiving now, but if you’re not a NATO member, you can’t get them. Let’s be honest. You can say a million times, “Listen, there may be an invasion.” Okay, there may be an invasion — will you give us planes? Will you give us air defenses? “Well, you’re not a member of NATO.” Oh, okay, then what are we talking about?

Now I am really grateful to many partners who, despite the fact that we are not NATO members, understood what is happening and that Ukraine is the first step on Russia’s bloody path, and that this is not going to end just like that. The fact that we are being given these weapons, let’s be honest, this is not only for us, it is also for them. After all, they have already understood that the Russian troops will not stop, they will move on. Therefore, here on our territory, Europe and the West are protecting themselves, too. I speak quite diplomatically as in it’s not just about them but they are protecting themselves, too. Although everyone has their own price. And so access to these weapons, NATO’s [Membership Action Plan], these NATO programs, the accession of Ukraine to NATO, all this would make it possible for us to upgrade ourselves.

Q: But for you personally, what was Feb. 24 like? What memory of that day stuck with you the most?

A: Well, we understood that this day would happen. The missile strikes were terrible. The cruise missile strikes on Ukraine from the territory of Belarus were a massive mistake. And then [the strikes] from Russia’s side. Historically, this is a point of no return for the Russian Federation. This is an irreversible process, and [Putin] has crossed this line himself. He wiped all the lines, he wiped away the opportunity for this war to end in dialogue.

What I understood in that moment when I was getting dressed, I thought about the rockets flying over my children, over all of our children. This means that there will be a huge number of deaths. It was clear. But he and the Russian military brought this hopelessness through these missiles. This suggests that they were looking for a way to abandon a diplomatic solution to the issue. All they are saying now is just chatter. It’s just chatter, it’s not even interesting to me. It’s not even, as they say, grandmothers and pensioners talking on the bench near their house to discuss something. This is just below any level of dignity, what they have done.

The most important fact is they wanted to cut off the possibility of negotiations. The most important fact is that they waited for a vulnerability, that spot where the energy crisis and the coronavirus overlapped. They understood how blocking our ports would exacerbate the food shortages and so on. That is, they seized the moment and they were sure that the West would not unite around Ukraine. They were absolutely sure of that. Therefore, we heard the three-day plan.

Why did even some European leaders say “three days”? Because some Europeans did not plan to rally around Ukraine. Everyone wanted to just [wipe their hands of this]. Like, okay, this is Ukraine’s problem. Let’s just turn a blind eye to this for a few days. In a few days, the Russians, whatever they may be like, will occupy Ukraine. And then we’ll come to an agreement with them somehow. I am sure that such thoughts have arisen, because this war in Europe, in the center of it, does not benefit anyone.

For the Russian Federation, we were like an appendix that needed to be removed, but they didn’t understand. They thought we were an appendix, but we turned out to be the heart of Europe. And we made this heart beat. These countries have united around us — thanks not only to us but also because the society in these countries was not ready to give up the concept of freedom simply because it is Putin, who is feared and has been demonized in the West. The West itself demonized him, they painted him to be so very terrible, with a nuclear weapon in his hands. Do you remember these posters with Saddam Hussein? Sometimes we too are afraid, but Ukraine showed the devil isn’t as scary as he is made out to be.

Q: On Feb. 25 — Day 2 of the war — you addressed European leaders and told them, “This might be the last time you see me alive.” Did you really believe that at the time?

A: They’re the ones who called me and told me I needed to evacuate and this is the guarantee of your safety . “You must go somewhere, at least to the west of Ukraine, and then, perhaps, to another country. If you are not alive, this means there is no president, and if there is no president, then the system itself, the state of Ukraine, will collapse.”

I told them that I thought the opposite would happen. That means we will hand over power without a fight, and I said that this is impossible. I said that I’m not trying to hold on to power. I don’t cling to power at all. If the issue lies in me, then let’s do it. If the question is that I leave, and that will stop the bloodshed, then I am all for it. I will go right now. I didn’t get into politics for that — and I will go whenever you say, if it will stop the war. But no, there was a manual written by the Russians — who will get which position, how to manage the processes, all of that.

The Western partners wanted to — I’m sure someone was really worried about what would happen to me and my family. But someone probably wanted to just end things faster. Of all those who called me, there was no one who believed we would survive. Not because they didn’t believe in Ukraine, but because of this demonization of the leader of the Russian Federation — his power, his philosophy, the way he advertised the might of the Russian army. And so [they thought], with all due respect to the Ukrainians: They won’t bring it, they’ll be finished off in two or three days, maybe five, and then it will all end.”

Q: Have you been told any scenarios about the threat to your life and your family?

A: I was told before the Russian invasion. I’ve met with leaders of various levels within various intelligence services who told me that I was the number-one target and we need to be thinking about this already. Look, when it comes to these things, I can approach it that someone already knew that would happen and had more information than I did. Or you can approach it differently, thinking that people were really worried about me, my life and really wanted to help. I don’t know where the truth is, maybe one or the other but maybe in the middle. That’s why I don’t like to theorize about such things. I can only share facts with you that I know. I’ve been told about this threat, but I’m a stubborn ram.

Q: What scenarios did they tell you?

A: Well, the scenario is clear: A state, when there is no president of any kind — no matter how that president is viewed — any state without the president falters. This is understandable. It was clear a few months prior. There were things like that. Then I saw some information, I listened, they were looking for allies both within the state, to act through them, and also for external actors they ordered, who would infiltrate and fulfill their tasks of liquidating or discrediting. Listen, I am a living person. I don’t want to die, like any other person. But I definitely know that if I think about that, then I’m already dead. If I think about how, where, why — there are specially trained people that the state paid money to so that these guards could repel these attacks. I can’t tell them how to do their job. If I lock myself in here, well, you can see how the rockets are coming in. This won’t save you. So you have to treat this philosophically. And at some point, you can even enjoy it.

Q: We heard you reacted quite negatively to the offer from American and European officials to evacuate you. Why?

A: I was on the phone every 10 to 20 minutes, discussing various things that we needed first. The first question from them was how to get me out. So I, like any other person, was just bored with it. I was tired of this. These proposals were flying in from all sides. On the one hand, this is nice. But on the other hand, what do they think of you? And it was just getting boring. Look, I love classic movies, like “The Taming of the Shrew” and so on. But I can’t watch it every two hours. And here is the same thing. I love and respect the support shown to us very much, but if it starts every 20 minutes with the same words, excuse me, it’s just poor manners.

Q: When CIA Director William J. Burns met with you here in Kyiv in January, one of the things he told you was that the Russians would attempt a landing at the airport in Hostomel. What was your reaction when that actually happened on Feb. 24? Should there have been more Ukrainian forces already there?

A: Regarding the airport, some six months prior to all of this, and perhaps even earlier, if you remember, there was a gathering of troops on the territory of Belarus and so on. We appealed to all our partners, telling them that we believed this is how they would act. They were training there — and it was well known — to capture or bomb key infrastructure points. They had been training, they had plans to capture Boryspil airport and so on. I don’t know how old these plans are.

They used maps, and the way they were capturing things, some of their paths were the same as those of the Nazis during World War II. So to say they had something unique planned here, it is impossible. Everything we had, it was there.

I’m not ready to talk about everything Burns talked about, but his main signals were about threats to my life. And those were not the first signals — they came from everywhere, from our intelligence services, from foreign colleagues and so on.

Look, as soon as the full-scale invasion began, from that moment on, our economy was losing $5 billion to $7 billion a month. This is wages. And you know the money our partners give us, we cannot spend the money on military salaries. There is some kind of global paradox in all this. I need money so I don’t lose my country. But I can’t spend this money on military salaries. Therefore, simultaneously with the explosions and the shelling, I had a very problematic story. I have to pay salaries to people who go there and die. And you’re hopeless. I don’t have time for reasoning, warnings, commitments — I just have a task to do. I must not allow them to occupy our land, and I have to pay people who die. That’s exactly what it sounds like. There are no sentiments. You have to do this every month.

When it comes to all warnings or signals from certain partners, here is what I explained to them: If we don’t have enough weapons, it will be difficult for us to fight. We will fight them, that’s for sure. And they don’t want to talk. [Russian President Vladimir Putin] hasn’t been willing to communicate for three years. So I don’t want to listen to this nonsense that Russians are ready to talk, this is nonsense. I clearly explained that. Everything we need is weapons, and if you have the opportunity, force him to sit down at the negotiating table with me. I’d been talking about this specifically, because we believed there will be an invasion.

You can’t simply say to me, “Listen, you should start to prepare people now and tell them they need to put away money, they need to store up food.” If we had communicated that — and that is what some people wanted, who I will not name — then I would have been losing $7 billion a month since last October, and at the moment when the Russians did attack, they would have taken us in three days. I’m not saying whose idea it was, but generally, our inner sense was right: If we sow chaos among people before the invasion, the Russians will devour us. Because during chaos, people flee the country.

And that’s what happened when the invasion started — we were as strong as we could be. Some of our people left, but most of them stayed here, they fought for their homes. And as cynical as it may sound, those are the people who stopped everything. If that were to happen, in October — God forbid, during the heating season — there would be nothing left. Our government wouldn’t exist, that’s 100 percent sure. Well, forget about us. There would be a political war inside the country, because we would not have held on to $5 billion to $7 billion per month. We did not have serious financial programs. There was a shortage of energy resources in the market created by the Russians. We did not have enough energy resources. We would not have been able to get out of this situation and there would be chaos in the country.

But it is one thing when chaos is controlled and it is during a military time — you run the state in a different way. You can open the border, close the border, attack, retreat, defend. You can take control of your infrastructure. And it’s another situation when you do not have a military situation or emergency regime in place, and you have a state that is ruled by a huge number of different officials and institutions. And minus $7 billion a month, even without weapons, is already a big war for our country.

Q: So did you personally believe full-scale war was coming?

A: Look, how can you believe this? That they will torture people and that this is their goal? No one believed it would be like this. And no one knew it. And now everyone says we warned you, but you warned through general phrases. When we said give us specifics — where will they come from, how many people and so on — they all had as much information as we did. And when I said, “Okay, if they’re coming from here and it’s going to be heavy fighting here, can we get weapons to stop them?” We didn’t get it. Why do I need all these warnings? Why do I need to make our society go crazy? Since February, even from January as there was a lot going on in the media, Ukrainians transferred out more money than Ukrainians abroad received in assistance. Tens of billions of dollars in deposits have been withdrawn, so Ukrainians spent much more money in Europe compared with the amount Ukrainians had been given there, with all due respect.

Therefore, you must understand that this is a hybrid war against our state. There was an energy blow, there was a political blow — they stirred the pot here, they wanted a change of power from inside the country, thanks to this party. The third blow was during autumn and a financial one. They needed the exchange rate of our currency to be a wartime one so that we did not have gasoline. So they did all this: There was no fuel, we did not have gas, they were cutting us out to ensure that the heating season would lead to destabilization within the country, and for the people to know there are the risks of currency devaluation so they would withdraw money. In general, they did this so we would stop being a country, and by the time of their invasion, we would have been a rag, not a country. That’s what they were betting on. We did not go for it. Let people discuss in the future whether it was right or not right. But I definitely know and intuitively — we discussed this every day at the National Security and Defense Council, et cetera — I had the feeling that [the Russians] wanted to prepare us for a soft surrender of the country. And that’s scary.

Q: I understand concerns about sowing panic and tanking the economy, but what would you say to those Ukrainians who now say, “I would’ve wanted to evacuate my family or just be better prepared”?

A: For all of December, January and February, Ukrainians were withdrawing money out of our economy. We could have been strict about that, but we weren’t letting either the National Bank or anyone else limit the people’s ability to take their money. Although we knew perfectly well that this will affect the country’s economy. The freedom people have in a democratic country is the freedom our people had. They had access to all the information that was available. Sorry, the fact that I wasn’t telling them about the Russians’ plot to do something to me and everything the intelligence services had been reporting to me: “You have to take your family away.” I told them, “How do you imagine that? I’ll be taking my family away, I’ll be doing something, and people will be just staying here? I can’t do that.” Our land is the only thing we have; we’ll stay here together. And then what happened, happened.

Q: If the United States knew for sure that a full-scale invasion was coming, did it give you enough weapons to defend yourself before Feb. 24?

A: Today, I can only be grateful to the U.S. for what we’ve got. But we need to have a clear understanding of the fact that we have always had weapons from the Soviet times. We never had the NATO weapons. The minimum we had from 2014 was, in my view, insufficient. The serious forces we needed, like the HIMARS we can all see now, or, let’s say, the 155-millimeter artillery — I’m not even mentioning tanks and aircraft — we had none of that and we didn’t have a possibility to buy it. The only thing we had agreed on was military drones, Bayraktars, et cetera. But with all due respect, one can’t wage war with drones.

And so, as you probably remember, since the full-scale invasion started and until now, all I’ve been asking is to close the sky, because if the sky was closed, we wouldn’t have all these deaths. And we were offering an alternative to the closed sky: a number of aircraft.

And there was no problem or shortage with that, I think, because we supplied addresses where all those aircraft were. But we never got that opportunity to close the sky. Even now, we are talking about what had been before the war, what had been in 2014, but what’s the point if even today, when this war is on, we haven’t got a chance to close and secure the sky.

Q: Did you ever get an explanation for why you weren’t supplied with more weaponry before Feb. 24 if Washington knew what was coming?

A: I have no complaints — up to the point when someone starts telling me, “But we were sending you signals.” Up to that point, I have no complaints. But when one is claiming they were sending us some signals, I tell them, “Send us weapons.” I was absolutely right, and I’m sure about it even now.

So as soon as we received serious weapons — I had told them, “Our country is not going to run anywhere, we are ready to fight, give us weapons.” And as soon as we got them, we would fight.

Everyone was afraid of the war. No one wants to wage war with Russia. Look, no one wants to wage war with Russia. Everyone wants Ukraine to win, but no one wants to wage war with Russia. And that’s it. That’s a full stop. And that’s why we had to decide how to stay strong. If no one wants to wage war with them, everyone is scared to fight them — excuse me, then we’ll be deciding how to do that, whether it’s right or wrong. But the war will go farther, deeper into Europe, so please send us weapons, because we are also defending you. And they started sending it.

But is it possible to close the sky now? Just wondering. It’s a rhetorical question.

Q: During the Battle for Kyiv, what do you remember most about your interactions with your top military commanders?

A: We talked all of the time. I talked to them starting from 5 a.m. I spoke to [Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Valery] Zaluzhny, [Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Oleksandr] Syrsky, I talked to the Security Service of Ukraine and to the Defense Ministry. I had regular meetings about what was coming from where. But this was not the most important question then. The question was where and in what area are they breaking through and what can we do? How can we load Kamaz trucks full of weapons and give them out? We raked up everything from everywhere. We even made it possible that the military can just come in some hunting shops and take weapons. We acted quickly, and we did everything. We made it possible to rent regular cars, we took armored cars from banks just so people can move.

What was it like? I haven’t revisited my previous life in a while. I guess it is like when you are under constant pressure. It’s like you are constantly being tested and this is one perpetual exam, so you feel like you did when you were young, when your palms are sweating and you have to think constantly because after a while you won’t have time to take this test and you’ve missed it and you can’t go back. Therefore, it was a state of constant tension at a very high speed. The day would start at 5 a.m. during these first days and end deep at night. We slept for a couple of hours in clothes, because honestly, we had to always be ready. Not because it’s something heroic — it was a psychological state. You just can’t afford to relax. And when you do not relax, your brain works and can shoot out some quick decisions. Here you have military, here you have civilians, there you have territorial defense, and you also need to plan this and that. …

The decisions weren’t like, “Okay, it is 6 a.m., let’s write down what we are going to do today.” It was a constant barrage of problems and decisions — bam, bam, bam. Suddenly they seized a nuclear power plant, suddenly they are shooting, so we need to get this on air fast. We did everything, including the information policy. I asked the military to explain what is going where, and they would tell me such and such unit captured this. So I said, “Take out the cameras and show it.” I called the leaders, asked them to post this video so the world sees it. Well, frankly speaking, this is called crisis management.

Q: What was your lowest moment or the one that moved you the most?

A: We had people lying in the corridors — there were people everywhere, snipers, different people. We basically lived here. We had no electricity, we walked with flashlights. And with these flashlights, we worked. You can get used to it all. But what you can’t get used to is when after this storm [of events], when the shots are all fired and all that is left is the destruction. [Bucha] was one of the first trips we made. We saw these corpses left on the roads, bombed houses. And you’re just looking at it and only in that moment, the realization comes. Before that it was all a battle, but only then that moment of consciousness comes of what is happening, what they have done, that irreversibility, that it isn’t possible to go back. All the talk about a peaceful settlement from the Russian side, that all this is a lie. And, of course, as a civilized person and an adequate person, you can understand that, well, of course, in the future these countries will someday agree on something. But you understand that this is the abyss. And corpses of Ukrainians have fallen into this abyss. And every time you will want to walk across or jump over this abyss and agree on something, you’ll be seeing these people who were killed. This is the scary part behind all this. That one man has made the status of the Russian state in the history of the world absolutely null and void. It is their choice. I don’t have to worry about this — I’m only talking about this because they’re our neighbors and they’re not moving out, so we and our next generations will have to live with this. I am also talking about this because a huge number of our people died because of them. Otherwise, I wouldn’t be talking about this at all. All people all make their own choices and live with it. This is their future, but their future is the past. That’s what it’s all about.

Q: Do you remember when this was and where you were?

A: Yes, I ventured out several times without any photos and cameras — we couldn’t allow it, our security did not give me the opportunity to. And of course, we did not take pictures at these checkpoints, because something could have immediately flown there and people would die. So we were very careful about it. It was Hostomel and Vyshhorod, that was the first city. There was this pit, an abyss, that was left after a bridge was bombed. The fighting was still ongoing. I wanted to go and support the guys. And the fighting was ongoing, and I wanted to see how they were but didn’t want them to know I was coming. This war is also terrible from the information point of view. There were a lot of things in the press, that our guys do not have enough bulletproof vests, that our guys use some kind of stoves at checkpoints. So I came and there were bulletproof vests and so on. There were weapons, assault rifles. Of course, there is always something that they are short of — everywhere they said, “Mr. President, give us some RPGs, we will fight here.” But all heavy weapons were sent to the front lines.

Q: But that worst moment that you mentioned before?

A: That’s when we went to Bucha, later. Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka. Those were the scariest moments. That feeling that this is death — when there is silence and silence, and there is nothing left living.

Q: And can you describe your emotions there? Was it fear?

A: I wasn’t scared. By that time, there were no emotions. I understood how many people were dying, how were they dying, and that you could die tomorrow and someone could come for you. So by that time, I would say that there already weren’t any special emotions or sentiments. But that feeling — you’re used to the sounds, screams, shots, but that was a scary moment because it was quiet. There were corpses on the street, there were bombed houses. This feeling is scary. Everything is destroyed and now what? This could be the way it is everywhere. This is how they work. People, their corpses have been found in basements, with their hands tied, they were tortured and blindfolded. I saw all of this in the photos, audios and videos that were given to me — I already understood what was happening here. It’s just scary that people can do this.

Q: When was the moment when you were sure the defense of Kyiv would hold?

A: We didn’t know. We knew we would fight. Why? It was logical. A city of millions is just a city of millions. If we rally and unite, if people believe me as president, if the military unites with the people, then it is logical that they can’t take a city of many millions. They don’t have enough forces, they won’t be able to take it. Because if 1 million people walk out just with a molotov cocktail in their hand, it’s unstoppable. I understood that a city like Kyiv — simply to take it, it’s impossible. How? It’s very difficult, very difficult, if they come into the middle of the city. Everyone understands that the minute they come into the middle, and go into the center of the city onto the Maidan [Independence Square], and start a war within the government quarter — from that moment, we are going to burn them. Because a battle inside the city — it is very difficult, it is very difficult. They needed way more equipment and people. So they had a chance either to shoot us, as they did in Mariupol, where they simply destroyed everything, or they can come into the city — but they would need tons of forces. Or they can get rid of me so they could come in and say there’s no one here and let’s undertake a transition.

Q: Regarding Kherson, what can be done to prevent Russia from holding a referendum there? What are you asking from your Western partners right now to help you stop it?

A: They can only take strong and specific steps using sanctions. Because the illegal referendum and the annexation of Kherson, what the Russians are planning to do, is a violation of any — well, I don’t want to talk about international law, they violated it a long time ago. It makes no sense. But countries can do the same thing because it’s a violation of borders. That is, they can definitely impose restricting sanctions. For example, a ban on the entry of all citizens of the Russian Federation to the European Union countries. Good sanctions. I think they are very good and peaceful.

There is nothing in these sanctions that takes away property or human life. I said from the very beginning that I believe that the most important sanctions are to close the borders, because they are taking away someone else’s territory. Well, let them live in their own world until they change their philosophy. So, countries close the borders and put an embargo on energy resources. My personal opinion is that everything else is weaker. There is no complete embargo on the energy supplies, and the borders are not shut.

It’s very simple: Whatever the citizens of the Russian Federation may be — there are those who support and do not support it — their children are there, studying abroad, in schools, universities and so on. Let them go to Russia. There’s nothing scary about that, let them go there. Not forever, please, let them come back. They’ll just understand then. They say, “Oh, we have nothing to do with this and all people can’t bear the responsibility.” They can. They elected these people and now they are not fighting them, they do not argue with them and don’t shout at them. The Russians who publicly oppose the war are just isolated cases and these people are in prisons. But let Russians go home, let everyone go to Russia. You want this isolation, don’t you? You’re telling the whole world that the whole world will live by your rules. Okay, then go there and live there.

What does this give us? This is the only way to influence Putin. Because this person has no other fear but the fear for his life. And his life depends on whether he is threatened by his internal population or not. Nothing else is threatening to him. That’s the way it is. Therefore, when its population puts pressure on his decisions, then there will be results. And the war will end. These are very understandable sanctions, they are very simple. It’s not about money, it’s not about gas or pipes, or that Germans won’t have heat in the winter. Just close the borders for a year and you’ll see the result.

Q: In the first days of the war, how serious was the problem with traitors in your ranks and government? And how much of a problem does that continue to be today?

A: I think our security service is catching all the traitors, as much as they can. The question of traitors is very simple. On Feb. 24, the streets of Kyiv and many political institutions suddenly became empty. It was quite easy to work on Feb. 24, to tell you the truth, in spite of the war — everything was clear. And it turned out that all those who had been called traitors — the politicians I mean — they all stayed. And on Feb. 24, they were fighting. They were fighting in both senses of the word.

Some of the “traitors” were fighting with machine guns, some of them stayed to work. And some ran away.

And most of those who ran away were the ones who had been screaming: “There are some horrible traitors near me.” This is how life dots the i’s. The main thing is for people to remember — unfortunately, we don’t have a long memory — is who was here on Feb. 24. Who has been staying here since Feb. 24 and who has been working for the state.

They could have quit their jobs, they could have left — those who have been here all these days, who have been completing a variety of tasks, carrying out complex operations, operations where they entered occupied units, with militants in there, risking their lives, and neutralized the occupant commanders. All of them. Many of them. They would blow them up. Some hit mines themselves. A great number of such operations were completed. A huge number, hundreds of such operations. How were these people acting? They were doing very important things.

And some ran away. Some ran away and then came back, saying, “There’s something going on. We haven’t been here for a while and it looks like here at the president’s office there’s something going on again.” See, politics is like that. Even the war that destroys everything, for some reason, doesn’t destroy such people. Such is life. But, oh well, that’s fine.

David L. Stern in Kyiv and Mary Ilyushina in Riga, Latvia, contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Isabelle Khurshudyan · August 16, 2022

10. Return of Crimea to Ukraine a requirement of international law: Turkish president

I would think this is a significant statement. What does this mean for Russia-Turkey relations? I saw a social media comment speculating that this must mean Erdogan thinks Russia is not going to win in Ukraine. Is he trying to ensure he is on the right side of history?

Return of Crimea to Ukraine a requirement of international law: Turkish president

aa.com.tr

Ensuring safety, well-being of Crimean Tatars among Türkiye's priorities, Recep Tayyip Erdogan says

Diyar Güldoğan | 23.08.2022

ANKARA

Ankara supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and rejects the illegal annexation of Crimea, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Tuesday.

"The return of Crimea to Ukraine, of which it is an inseparable part, is essentially a requirement of international law," Erdogan said in a video message to the Second Crimea Platform Summit.

The Crimea Platform is an international coordination mechanism of Ukraine to draw more global attention to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Erdogan said Ankara will continue to support the Crimean Platform that was established to resolve the Crimean issue through peaceful means.

"Türkiye does not recognize the annexation of Crimea and has been openly stating since the first day that this step is illegitimate and illegal. This is a principled stance that has not only legal but also moral foundations," he said.

The president added that protecting Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and political unity is "critical" not only for regional but also for global security and stability.

"Ensuring the safety and well-being of our Crimean Tatar compatriots is also among Türkiye's priorities," he said.

Erdogan also reiterated his expectation for the release of Nariman Dzhelyal, the deputy chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, and at least 45 other Crimean Tatars who were detained by Russia in 2021.

"The Crimean Tatars, who have suffered great pains throughout history, are fighting for a peaceful life in their homeland. Türkiye will continue to stand by the Ukrainian government and the Crimean Tatars in this process," he added.

Erdogan said Türkiye will continue with its mediation role between Russia and Ukraine to ensure peace in the region.

11. Opinion: 6 lessons the West has learned in the 6 months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Excerpts:

One powerful insight from the last half year concerns the importance of individual leaders. The "great man" theory of history is out of fashion these days given the tendency to see human events as the result of deep underlying forces.

Ukraine's battlefield prowess also illustrates a second lesson -- the underappreciated power of the underdog.

Putin's actions also remind us of another key point: Unconstrained autocrats make horrendous mistakes. Quite often, they start revisionist wars to redress "historical injustices."

Within Russia, a notable surprise is the apparent success of Kremlin propaganda, even when peddling conspiracy theories about Nazis in Kyiv.

Support for the war is certainly not universal. Despite heightened repression, a remarkable 18% of respondents still say they oppose their country's military actions. A big question for the next six months is whether discontent will grow into a threat to the Kremlin.

A final lesson is one the West can no longer avoid. Putin's Ukrainian aggression has removed any last doubt that we are in a new Cold War.... As long as Putin remains in power, he will be working to weaken the West.

Opinion: 6 lessons the West has learned in the 6 months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine

CNN · by Opinion by Daniel Treisman

Daniel Treisman is a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles and co-author of "Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century." The views expressed in this commentary are his own. View more opinion on CNN.

(CNN)Six months after Russian President Vladimir Putin sent troops into Ukraine, it's still not clear how this war will end. Ukraine, which has signaled its intent to launch a new counteroffensive, could retake the Russian-occupied city of Kherson and other parts of the south. But it's also possible that a reinvigorated Russian force will break through to Odesa, closing off Ukraine from the sea. Or the front line might stabilize roughly where it is.

Daniel Treisman

Whatever happens, we can already derive some lessons from the war so far. Its many surprises should force us to question our old assumptions.

One powerful insight from the last half year concerns the importance of individual leaders. The "great man" theory of history is out of fashion these days given the tendency to see human events as the result of deep underlying forces. Those obviously matter. But had Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky run away -- as Putin apparently expected or failed to communicate effectively, the Ukrainian resistance might well have been much weaker. Few anticipated that Zelensky, whose ratings had slumped before the Russian invasion, would prove such an inspiring hero.

Similarly, had the Russian President been, say Boris Yeltsin, thousands of victims of the war would almost certainly still be alive. Without Putin, there would be no war. Sure, there are plenty of angry nationalists in Russia. But, outside the President's narrow circle, only a small minority wanted to absorb Ukraine, according to the Levada Center, an independent Russian polling research organization. Judging by the shellshocked faces at the Kremlin's Security Council meeting in February preceding Putin's attack, even many of his close associates were bewildered by their boss's decision.

Ukraine's battlefield prowess also illustrates a second lesson -- the underappreciated power of the underdog. Time after time, we assume the militarily stronger party will quickly prevail. But that view neglects the importance of external support and morale.

When the invasion began, almost everyone thought Kyiv would fall in days. And yet, as we've seen in wars from Israel to Vietnam and now Ukraine, underdogs have often performed much better than expected.

The Ukraine war is also being fought over language

Oddly enough, Russia, too, enjoys a version of the underdog advantage. Since February, the West has unleashed an unprecedented barrage of sanctions that some thought would crush Russia's economy. Its medium run prospects do look bleak. But as of now, the ruble has stabilized, the banking system survived, unemployment remains low, and oil revenues are exceeding those of last year. It helps that other countries that also resent Western dominance -- from China and India to Turkey and Indonesia -- have refused to isolate Putin.

Putin's actions also remind us of another key point: Unconstrained autocrats make horrendous mistakes. Quite often, they start revisionist wars to redress "historical injustices." These have a way of going badly -- from Argentine President Leopoldo Galtieri's attempt to seize the Falkland Islands from the UK in 1982 and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to the Greek generals' attempted coup in Cyprus in 1974. But past failures have not stopped strongmen from repeating such blunders. If there's anything we can take away from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it's that we cannot plan only to defend against attacks that seem rational.

What Putin and Xi don't get about 'messy' democracy

Within Russia, a notable surprise is the apparent success of Kremlin propaganda, even when peddling conspiracy theories about Nazis in Kyiv. From the outside, these seemed too extreme to work, especially given the many personal bonds that linked people on opposite sides of the border. Of course, it's hard to gauge public opinion in a police state at war. But the reports of Russians believing the TV lies rather than their own relatives in Ukraine have been striking.

The success of Kremlin misinformation reflects years of repetition, which have primed viewers to believe terrible things of their neighbors. That and the natural desire to avoid admitting they may be governed by war criminals.

In fact, polls suggest a growing urge to tune out the war completely. In July, 32% of Russian respondents said the "special military operation" was the most memorable event of the previous four weeks, down from 75% in March, according to the Levada Center.

Support for the war is certainly not universal. Despite heightened repression, a remarkable 18% of respondents still say they oppose their country's military actions. A big question for the next six months is whether discontent will grow into a threat to the Kremlin. The danger is less likely to come from anti-war sentiment per se than from potential protests against economic hardship should the sanctions bite.

Some Russian and Chinese citizens are voting with their feet

A final lesson is one the West can no longer avoid. Putin's Ukrainian aggression has removed any last doubt that we are in a new Cold War. It will take skill to keep this one from heating up. This time, the West's adversary is not just Russia, but an ever-closer partnership between the Kremlin and China. The idea that the US could "pivot" from one to the other now seems quaint.

As long as Putin remains in power, he will be working to weaken the West. Although cooperation with China remains possible in some spheres, Xi Jinping also looks committed to challenging the power of the United States.

A painful reckoning awaits the West in the next six months. We saw in February that democracies, although slow to react, can rouse themselves once a threat becomes unmistakable. Western unity behind Ukraine in the spring was impressive. The challenge now will be to maintain that cohesion through a winter of dwindling gas supplies as Putin's Western friends -- from German businesses, eager to revive the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, to countless French and Italian politicians -- attempt to divide us.

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The looming energy crisis is just the beginning. The West has not yet come to terms with the cost of defending itself against China, Russia and a host of other emerging threats. Since the late 1980s, Western leaders have -- like populist politicians on a binge -- pretended they could simultaneously expand NATO and decrease military spending as a share of the budget. Greedy for a big "peace dividend," they left the alliance's new borders -- and borderlands beyond them -- at best lightly defended. That has to change, and it will not be cheap.

Putin's last six months could hardly have been a bigger failure. But according to well-sourced analysts, as reported by Bloomberg News, he strongly believes that time is on his side -- that the West will fracture in the face of economic pressures. The next six months will show if he is right.

CNN · by Opinion by Daniel Treisman

12. Veterans may be key to solving the US military recruitment crisis

It pains me to read comments from veterans on social media who say they would not recommend anyone to serve in the military, to include especially their own children and relatives.

Veterans may be key to solving the US military recruitment crisis

militarytimes.com · by Col. Matthew F. Amidon · August 23, 2022

America’s all-volunteer military force is in crisis, and our veterans and military families can help.

With just two months left in the fiscal year, this promises to be the worst year for military recruiting since 1973, the year that the draft ended.

The Army, with the largest recruiting challenge in terms of raw numbers, is the smallest it’s been since 1939, two years before the United States entered World War II. Yet the Army has cut its recruiting targets to likely achievable levels instead of what’s required. The Air Force, which needs to replace about 50,000 members per year, was more than 4,000 recruits below where it should have been in late June. The Navy and the Marine Corps appear on track to meet their annual goals, but acknowledge the challenges of the current recruiting environment.

We need our veterans and military families to step up to help their country once again to prevent the national security crisis that would occur if our military were unable to fight and win when called upon. We need veterans’ assistance in issuing the call to serve and persuading more young people to answer. The situation is critical: The share of young adults who said they would consider military service currently stands at 9%, the lowest number since 2007, according to a Defense Department survey conducted in the fall of 2021.

Our veterans should be deeply engaged at all levels of the recruitment process, modeling how meaningful a life of service can be. They can help us broaden the pool just by showing up and demonstrating to potential enlistees that many people in the service are just like them: Our military is increasingly composed of minorities, women, and the children of immigrants. Veterans can also provide first-person accounts of how their time in the military enhanced their lives and served as a springboard to successful civilian lives.

Of course, there are many underlying factors that have contributed to the shortage of recruits. The COVID-19 pandemic affected service recruiters’ ability to do their jobs, because they were less effective via remote technology. A strong economy and tight labor market have provided more civilian opportunities for those who otherwise might have considered taking the oath. And fewer people in the right age range are eligible to serve because of obesity, criminal records, diagnosed mental health issues, and low test scores on military assessments.

We must examine the reasons why willing recruits are being disqualified and question whether these determinants remain relevant or need to be adjusted. Certain mental health conditions, for example, can increasingly be addressed and managed after enlistment. And the 21st century’s cyber warfare may not require the same standard of physicality historically demanded of recruits.

This is important because the recruitment crisis won’t just affect one year. Fewer recruits today mean fewer available candidates for key technical training, professional development, and leadership positions in the years to come. Especially concerning is what will happen to the ranks of our noncommissioned officers, or NCOs, and staff noncommissioned officers, or SNCOs, the undeniable backbone of the all-volunteer force.

Recruiting and retention bonuses are currently being offered, but they’re unsustainable and aren’t a long-term solution. And retention bonuses will age our military.

Still, panels of experts considering the recruitment shortage agree that the hardest challenge we face is the declining propensity to serve our nation. And that’s where veterans can come in.

Most veterans say they’re proud of their service, and almost 80% have indicated that they would recommend military service to someone close to them. Veterans can be exemplars of national service, helping steer our age-eligible population to national, community, and military service in every part of our country.

Veteran service organizations and peer networks like Team RWB, Team Rubicon, The Travis Manion Foundation, The Mission Continues, and Student Veterans of America also have roles to play. All emphasize continued service and leadership in our communities and on our campuses. Community serving organizations should welcome these organizations and peer networks for joint opportunities for these veterans to engage with communities at large and where they can be the exemplars of continued service in leadership.

The life cycle of the all-volunteer force doesn’t end with the transition to veteran status, and helping with recruitment is a new way that veterans can serve.

Our future depends on a strong all-volunteer force, enabled by a dedicated and committed veteran community.

Marine Corps Col. Matthew F. Amidon is Director of Veterans and Military Families at the George W. Bush Institute.

13. Tibet: An Underexplored Strategic Lever

Excerpts:

The U.S. has recently made considerable progress in delineating its policy on Tibet. Last month, U.S. Representatives Jim McGovern (D-MA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) introduced the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict Act, designed to strengthen bipartisan efforts to promote dialogue between the PRC and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. The bill would make it U.S. policy that the Tibetan people deserve the right to self-determination under international law, and that the legal status of Tibet as a sovereign entity remains unresolved. It would also expand the State Department’s efforts to counter PRC’s disinformation tactics aimed to manipulate and erase the history, culture, and political institutions of Tibet. By firming up its support behind Tibet’s leadership, the U.S. can pressure the Chinese government to consider a rapprochement or suffer greater international condemnation for violating international law yet again. Washington could look to bolster this policy by integrating India more fully in any potential dialogue between Tibet and China. India’s efforts to stabilize tensions in the short term would also help to reduce the blow when Tibetan religious leaders look to choose a successor to the Dalai Lama in the future.

Getting ahead of the curve on Tibet gives the U.S. an opportunity to further galvanize the international community around human rights, lay out the various costs to Chinese leaders more explicitly if it chooses to double down on aggressive behavior, and develop more cohesive strategic ties with the world’s largest democracy in India. Acting now weakens Beijing’s imperial grip as it prevents more subjugation of Tibetan life in the future.

Tibet: An Underexplored Strategic Lever

By John Kraus

August 24, 2022

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/08/24/tibet_an_underexplored_strategic_lever_849789.html?mc_cid=390ef3ec01

On Wednesday, August 10^th, the Indian Air Force (IAF) deployed a military helicopter to transport Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, to a sacred monastery located in a remote village near the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a contested border shared with the Chinese to its east. Afterwards, the Indian government leaked a photo of its air force personnel standing around the Buddhist monk in a deliberate show of solidarity with Tibet, who has faced an uptick in persecution by the Chinese government in recent years. In June, the CCP announced its plans to relocate approximately 130,000 Tibetan people over the span of eight years under the pretense of “both the ecological protection and people’s demand for a better life,” according to Forestry and Grassland Administration Director Wu Wei. The state-affiliated Xinhua News Agency reported that 18,000 former residents of Tsonyi County have already been relocated, many of whom are subsistence farmers accustomed to nomadic traditions for centuries.

The ethnic cleansing campaign is also executed through various means of political repression against Tibetan displays of indigenous pride. This month, Beijing issued warnings barring Tibetans from posting online photos or congratulations to one of the prominent Buddhist spiritual leaders, the Kirti Rinpoche, on his 80^th birthday. Over the last several years, hundreds of Tibetans have been detained for possessing photos of the Dalai Lama as well. Viewed as a human incarnation of God by fellow Buddhists, the Dalai Lama was labeled an enemy of the state by the Communist regime after he fled the region in 1959. Today, concerns over preserving political unity have driven the CCP to denounce the globally popular Buddhist leader and tighten its grip on Tibet. By curtailing Tibetan freedoms, the Communist Party is looking to cement a more secure political footing in the region, satisfy its ambitious domestic infrastructural development goals, and extract from Tibet’s bounty of natural resources as global stocks diminish.

One of the prized Tibetan natural resources burbling in the minds of top party officials is freshwater. In 2005, former Party Premier Wen Jiabao asserted that water scarcity endangered “the very survival of the Chinese nation.” Twelve provinces north of the Yangtze River comprise a plurality of the country’s agricultural production, industry, and coal power generation, yet the north relies on water from southern provinces, including Tibet. Many of the largest rivers on the planet are sourced in the Tibetan Plateau, such as the Yellow River, the Yangtze, Salween, and Mekong, making the plateau region the largest freshwater repository in all of Asia. The repurposing of river flows for China’s own industry and agriculture could become a “necessary evil” if a domestic freshwater crisis were to become more dire. Tibet’s geography also provides China with immense bargaining leverage against neighboring countries in Southeast Asia who rely on the Mekong for their own economic consumption.

Tibet also holds vast domestic reserves of over ten different metals, including lithium, which is an essential component in electric car batteries. Many predict that the mineral will become one of the defining strategic resources of the 21^st century as the world inexorably weens off of nonrenewable resources. The lithium industry is expected to grow almost eightfold by just 2027, and China currently leads the globe in battery manufacturing and electric car exports. By extracting more lithium from Tibetan reserves for EV production, China could further ensnare American producers seeking to isolate their supply chains from the “workshop of the world.” Hence, China’s motivations to expand mining operations in the region are at least twofold: it can turn greater economic profits in emerging industries while making its geopolitical competitors more dependent on its industrial components, adding risk to potential Western decoupling.

Coupled with Tibet’s geographic advantages, however, is a complicated 60-year history which spills over China’s borders. After the 1959 Tibetan uprising, the Dalai Lama helped to set up the Tibetan government-in-exile in the remote Indian province of Himachal Pradesh, where most Tibetan refugees have resided since. Known today as the CTA, the organization labels itself the “continuation of the government of independent Tibet.” Beijing considers the CTA to be a separatist entity principally aimed to sow discord within China, as it has with pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong. India’s unique position lends it another diplomatic card in its deck in the event of any major impasses with Beijing. The Indian government has shown a willingness to use Tibet’s delicate position as a tool to influence China’s decision-making calculus, especially during the unresolved border tension in Ladakh, which is now entering its third year.

One of the soldiers killed at the height of the Sino-Indian border dispute in 2020 was a Tibetan refugee who served under the Indian Army’s Special Frontier Force (SFF), a unit of Tibetan soldiers whose existence has never been acknowledged officially by the Indian military. At the soldier’s funeral, Senior Bharatiya Janata Party Leader Ram Madhav placed a wreath on the soldier’s coffin, adorned with the flags of India and Tibet. This public display was designed to send a strong message to Beijing about Tibetan refugees’ role in Indian strategy. The standoff also triggered many officials within the ruling BJP Party to recommend conferring India’s highest civilian award, the Bharat Ratna, on the Dalai Lama as a signal to Beijing that the Indian government strongly condemned China’s actions along the Himalayan border. Experts believe that the border crisis has done irreparable harm to Sino-Indian relations, making India’s use of the Tibet card more likely in years to come.

One of the issues capable of turning such regional tensions into a potential crisis is the debate over who succeeds the Dalai Lama. The Chinese government has been explicit in its plans to handpick a successor who will comply with the party’s political aims, even reportedly going as far as to groom a selected group of senior lamas friendly to Beijing. US State Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated that “the Chinese government should have no role in the succession process,” and the Dalai Lama has also condemned the PRC’s public statements on the matter. If the Buddhist spiritual leader insists that his succession takes place within Tibet, it could compel the Chinese government to take drastic measures to tighten its control over the autonomous region. Latest reports state that the 87-year-old is in good health, leaving the matter on the backburner for now. However, if the issue were to arise at the same time as, for example, another potential demonstration of force near Taiwan or a skirmish on the Himalayan border, it could constrain the US and/or India’s abilities to deescalate concurring crises at once. Conversely, added US-Indian pressure in Tibet could help to preempt a Chinese attempt to alter the status quo in other contested areas near its orbit.

The U.S. has recently made considerable progress in delineating its policy on Tibet. Last month, U.S. Representatives Jim McGovern (D-MA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) introduced the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict Act, designed to strengthen bipartisan efforts to promote dialogue between the PRC and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. The bill would make it U.S. policy that the Tibetan people deserve the right to self-determination under international law, and that the legal status of Tibet as a sovereign entity remains unresolved. It would also expand the State Department’s efforts to counter PRC’s disinformation tactics aimed to manipulate and erase the history, culture, and political institutions of Tibet. By firming up its support behind Tibet’s leadership, the U.S. can pressure the Chinese government to consider a rapprochement or suffer greater international condemnation for violating international law yet again. Washington could look to bolster this policy by integrating India more fully in any potential dialogue between Tibet and China. India’s efforts to stabilize tensions in the short term would also help to reduce the blow when Tibetan religious leaders look to choose a successor to the Dalai Lama in the future.

Getting ahead of the curve on Tibet gives the U.S. an opportunity to further galvanize the international community around human rights, lay out the various costs to Chinese leaders more explicitly if it chooses to double down on aggressive behavior, and develop more cohesive strategic ties with the world’s largest democracy in India. Acting now weakens Beijing’s imperial grip as it prevents more subjugation of Tibetan life in the future.

John Kraus is a graduate student in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and is currently a Research Assistant at Yorktown Institute.

14. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Has Created Drama in the Anti-War Community

Excerpt:

Every problem is an opportunity. The Iraq War was relatively uncomplicated for anti-war activists, and the Afghanistan War only somewhat more so. Russia’s war on Ukraine is more complicated in that it has evoked global sympathy and a sense of heroic righteousness. For anti-war activists who have long stressed the malign influence of the defense industry and the perfidy of NATO, embracing the idea of transferring heavy weapons to Ukraine is perhaps too steep of a hill to climb. At the same time, such activists should be wary of making demands that would effectively guarantee the success of Russia’s war of territorial conquest, and open the doors to more such conquests in the future.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Has Created Drama in the Anti-War Community

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · August 23, 2022

Russia’s War in Ukraine: What Should Anti-War Scholars and Academics Think? What are anti-war activists to do in the face of an aggressive war of conquest launched by an authoritarian state against a democratic government?

“Anti-war” embraces a broad community of thought that runs from pragmatic realists to idealistic pacifists. Anti-war activists tend to reject the idea that war is a legitimate tool of statecraft. At the same time, most (but not all) anti-war thinkers reject as specious the idea that a nation under attack from an aggressor ought to lay down its arms and accommodate itself to the demands of its assailant. For example, few who critiqued the Vietnam War from an anti-war perspective demanded that the Viet Cong lay down its arms, that North Vietnam cease support for the insurgency in the South, or that China and the USSR refrain from supporting the DPRVN. Thus, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has necessarily created tension within anti-war activist circles.

This tension is evident in an unfortunate article for The Progressive, in which Phyllis Bennis argues for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and for an end to the sanctions regime against Russia. Given that the United States has exceedingly little influence over Moscow’s decision making, this amounts to a demand that the United States force Kyiv to accede to Russian demands. The article was approvingly cited by the Quincy Institute, a pro-Restraint think tank that has come under internal and external critique for excusing Russian aggression and soft-pedaling Russian behavior. While no single article can represent the breadth and depth of anti-war opinion, this one raises several dilemmas that are worth engaging.

Justifying Russia

Bennis holds the West partially responsible for Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, a temptation common in anti-war circles which paint Russia as the victim of foreign aggression. NATO, it has been argued, painted Russia into a corner by refusing to rule out expansion into Ukraine, thus provoking the war. As we have seen, however, Russia’s invasion does not begin to approach meeting most of the requirements either of legal military conduct under the UN Charter, or a “just war” under the norms of Christian Just War Theory. The West (such that it is) may have conducted itself unwisely with respect to Russian concerns, but this does not provide plausible legal or moral justification for the invasion. Any appeal to the justice of Russia’s war is, from an anti-war perspective, utterly nonsensical. If Russia can legitimately wage war based on the casus belli outlined by President Putin in February of this year, then virtually any state can attack any other at any time. Worse, even if we accept the justice of Russia’s claims, they surely pale against the magnitude of the justice of Ukraine’s war effort, making the argument that the United States should try to force an end to the conflict an unfortunate combination of vile and absurd.

Authorship

Bennis also argues that anti-war activism should be directed against the US government rather than against the Russian government. The idea that Western governments should be subjected to greater criticism because of the relatively open natures of their political systems is superficially appealing but also terribly limited. It is true that open systems of government enable activists to make their case to the public and directly to policymakers, and there is also a certain logic to arguments about responsibility and authorship. When a democratic state goes to war (or enables a war), the people are in effect the author of that war, and it is hardly unreasonable to complain about being assessed responsibility for a war you disagree with.

But the claim has obvious shortcomings. Criticizing US policies which extend a war of justifiable defense against an aggressor instead of criticizing the aggressor itself (beyond requisite hand-waving about Russian behavior) necessarily paints a distorted and deceptive picture of a conflict. Putin’s regime ought not to escape criticism because it is authoritarian; rather, any sensible account should target Moscow both for its authoritarianism and for its aggression. The same goes for Saudi Arabia and Iran and the People’s Republic of China. The Putin government has agency; it did not need to invade Ukraine, just as it does not need to arrest and imprison domestic critics of the war. Any account that focuses on the decision of the US to support Ukraine at the expense of the Russian decision to invade Ukraine does violence to reality and obscures the actual moral calculus of the conflict.

The Future

Activism also needs to take a long-term view. No perspective which ensures that an aggressor will enjoy the fruits of aggression can meaningfully be described as anti-war. A cease-fire would have the immediate effect of locking in Russian territorial gains, and an end to sanctions would ensure that Russia would pay no further price for its invasion. This would have the effect not only of consigning vast portions of Ukraine to Russian domination, but also of ensuring that Moscow (and much of the rest of the world) views war of territorial conquest as a legitimate and useful tool of statecraft. Instead of ending the war, a cease-fire and a cessation of sanctions would, at best, put it on pause to be resumed under circumstances of Moscow’s choosing.

Pragmatism

Finally, a principled but pragmatic anti-war activist could plausibly argue that in a context in which resistance against superior power is hopeless, it is the responsibility of a defender to concede in order to avoid the extravagant evils of war. Whatever the costs of surrender, they are necessarily less than the costs of surrender added to the costs of military defeat. This perspective is limited, because both uncertainty and policy choices matter for the difference between victory and defeat. Ukraine alone might be doomed, but Ukraine with Western support… perhaps not. And in any case, the situation that holds between Russia and Ukraine today cannot plausibly be described as a certain Russian victory. The supply of additional weapons to Ukraine improves Kyiv’s negotiating position, a necessary condition for Russia to contemplate discussing peace.

Parting Thoughts

Every problem is an opportunity. The Iraq War was relatively uncomplicated for anti-war activists, and the Afghanistan War only somewhat more so. Russia’s war on Ukraine is more complicated in that it has evoked global sympathy and a sense of heroic righteousness. For anti-war activists who have long stressed the malign influence of the defense industry and the perfidy of NATO, embracing the idea of transferring heavy weapons to Ukraine is perhaps too steep of a hill to climb. At the same time, such activists should be wary of making demands that would effectively guarantee the success of Russia’s war of territorial conquest, and open the doors to more such conquests in the future.

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · August 23, 2022

15. FDD | Nuclear Deal with Iran Would Gut IRGC Sanctions

FDD | Nuclear Deal with Iran Would Gut IRGC Sanctions

FDD Experts

fdd.org · August 23, 2022

Latest Developments

A top Iranian spokesman said on Sunday that Iran achieved “huge progress” in “sanctions issues.” The West has reportedly offered Iran economic concessions that would lift indirect sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As part of a revived nuclear deal, this action would effectively dismantle the bipartisan sanctions architecture overwhelmingly enacted by Congress just five years ago while America remained a participant in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This and other forms of sanctions relief would allow Tehran to access up to $275 billion during the accord’s first year and $1 trillion by 2030.

Expert Analysis

“The Biden administration’s decision to keep the IRGC on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list now looks like a legal sleight of hand and not like a principled defense of that designation. If reports are true, the Biden team has agreed to gut IRGC sanctions and allow tens of billions of dollars to flow to terrorists actively plotting to murder even more Americans.”

— Mark Dubowitz, FDD Chief Executive

“Either President Biden believes the IRGC is a terrorist organization, or he doesn’t. If this were ISIS or al-Qaeda, would anyone be offering sanctions relief to their top financiers or negotiating how foreigners could do business with their affiliates? Given ongoing IRGC terror plots against the United States, any sanctions relief benefitting the group should be unacceptable. Congress has been firm in its support for sanctions against IRGC affiliates and may need to act to reimpose those sanctions.”

— Richard Goldberg, FDD Senior Advisor

Nuclear Deal Would Enrich the IRGC

The proposed deal would demolish indirect sanctions on the IRGC — the terrorist organization that controls between 20 and 40 percent of Iran’s economy — by reportedly allowing non-U.S. persons to conduct business with the group’s affiliates. While the IRGC would remain on the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list and continue to be designated by the Treasury Department, the full enforcement of U.S. secondary sanctions against IRGC affiliates would be lifted.

The original 2015 agreement gave the IRGC indirect sanctions relief by lifting sanctions on entire sectors of Iran’s economy that the IRGC controls in whole or in part. In so doing, the deal circumvented (but technically complied with) earlier U.S. sanctions on the IRGC for its nuclear program, missile proliferation, human rights abuses, support for Syria’s Assad regime, and terrorism committed by the Quds Force, the IRGC’s foreign-operations arm.

This latest deal exceeds the terms of the original JCPOA. It would provide the IRGC with the same indirect sanctions relief as before, with additional terrorism-sanctions relief for the IRGC’s top financiers, including the Central Bank of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company.

The Biden Administration Must Not Break Its Commitment

In 2021, the Biden administration pledged to enforce terrorism sanctions on Iran without distinguishing between U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons. During his confirmation hearing to serve as secretary of state, Antony Blinken said America should do “everything possible, including the toughest possible sanctions, to deal with Iranian support for terrorism.” Asked specifically if it is in the U.S. interest to maintain terrorism sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company, Blinken answered in the affirmative.

fdd.org · August 23, 2022

16. China to forgive loans to 17 African countries

Surely there will be some kind of strings.

China to forgive loans to 17 African countries

ripplesnigeria.com · by Ripples Nigeria · August 23, 2022

August 23, 2022

The Chinese government has revealed plans to forgive 23 interest-free loans to 17 African countries.

China also revealed its intention to provide food assistance to struggling nations.

The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, disclosed the plans in a post on the ministry’s website.

The Minister failed to specify which countries owed the money or the amount of the loans.

“China will waive the 23 interest-free loans for 17 African countries that had matured by the end of 2021,” Mr Wang said at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, according to a statement.

He pledged that China would continue actively supporting and participating in the construction of major infrastructure projects in Africa through financing, investment and assistance.

“We will also continue to increase imports from Africa, support the greater development of Africa’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and expand co-operation in emerging industries such as the digital economy, health, green and low-carbon sectors.”

“What Africa wishes for is a favourable and amicable cooperation environment, not the zero-sum Cold War mentality,” Wang said, according to the post.

Since the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation took place in Senegal in November 2021, Beijing has delivered $3 billion of $10 billion of credit facilities pledged to African financial institutions, Wang said in the speech.

In addition, this year, China has agreed to tariff-free entry to 98% of exports from 12 African countries and has provided emergency food assistance to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea, he said.

“So far this year, China has signed exchange of letters with 12 African countries on zero tariff for 98% of their export items to China. We have provided emergency food assistance to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea. More African agricultural produce has reached the Chinese market through the green lanes,” he added.

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ripplesnigeria.com · by Ripples Nigeria · August 23, 2022

17. Time for Taiwan to be called Taiwan

Although a local resident, this is a good example of a think tank member writing for publication in his hometown paper to explain foreign policy issues to Americans outside the beltway.

Excerpts:

Taiwan’s sovereignty is Taiwan’s choice, not Beijing’s. Taiwan should be afforded full membership in critical international organizations ranging from the United Nations to the World Health Organization.

In the arena of international sport, athletes from Taiwan should be permitted to compete as Taiwan and not Chinese Taipei. That should be the case in Williamsport this summer just as it should be the case at the Paris Olympics in 2024.

As the film “Sandlot” has taught multiple generations of baseball fans: Heroes get remembered, but legends never die. It’s time for Little League leadership to step up to the plate and make the legendary move to respect the Taiwanese people. The Taiwanese kids playing in Williamsport traveled across the world to represent their country. They’re playing their hearts out on the ballfield and making their families, friends, peers, and country proud. The sad reality is that these boys may one day need to fight on a different battlefield for their country’s survival.

They deserve nothing less than to be called Taiwan.

August 23, 2022 | Pittsburgh Tribune-Review

Time for Taiwan to be called Taiwan

fdd.org · by Nathan Picarsic Senior Fellow · August 23, 2022

It’s August in Pennsylvania. That means kids across the commonwealth are getting ready to return to school. But a talented few from Hollidaysburg are too busy to sharpen their pencils just yet: They’re in Williamsport chasing dreams in the Little League World Series. Unfortunately, one of their potential competitors, a team visiting Pennsylvania from 8,000 miles away, can’t take the field under their accurate, national label. These boys are from Taiwan. But in the Little League World Series, they are referred to as “Chinese Taipei.”

This is offensive. It’s arcane. And, worse yet, it’s deferential to the increasingly hostile and abusive Chinese Communist Party regime that governs mainland China. That mainland Chinese authoritarian government is carrying out a genocide against ethnic minorities within its borders while also threatening to invade Taiwan, a key U.S. partner.

National sovereignty should mean something in our modern international community. National sovereignty should also mean something in baseball, a sport that is as much a symbol for freedom as is the bald eagle. And that should extend to team names on the scoreboard. Little League leadership in Williamsport should lead by example and permanently correct the error. The team from Taiwan should be called what it is.

The history behind this Taiwan-Chinese Taipei mix up, to put it generously, is convoluted. But its importance registers well beyond Williamsport — and newly so.

Taiwan is a sovereign state. Its contemporary lineage as such owes to the 1949 Chinese civil war, which led to the Chinese Communist Party establishing the “People’s Republic of China” on mainland China, while the non-Communists retreated to Taiwan and the “Republic of China.” But even as Taiwan proceeded in the following decades to flourish as a prosperous democracy, the Chinese Communist Party refused to acknowledge it as a sovereign state. Instead, the Communists claim the island as a part of one, single, China — theirs.

The “Chinese Taipei” moniker has been used as a half-hearted compromise label for the Republic of China (Taiwan) in international sporting events since 1979. That year’s Nagoya Resolution struck the deal of allowing Taiwan entry into the Olympics — despite Beijing’s objections — but on the condition that Taiwanese athletes would compete only as the “deliberately ambiguous” Chinese Taipei. The Taiwanese side fought this poor compromise at first. They boycotted the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, alongside others offended not by the rejection of their national identities but by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The Taiwanese Olympic Committee leadership eventually relented and competed as Chinese Taipei in the 1984 Olympics. The label has stuck since.

Here we are now, nearly 40 years later. Some things haven’t changed. The former Soviet Union is again launching unprovoked invasions, inviting international scorn (and fear), and being pushed out of international sporting events. Even as Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine makes today’s Russia increasingly an international pariah, it still enjoys the support of the Chinese Communist Party in China.

And many observers fear that Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine playbook is a prelude to Xi Jinping taking a stab at consolidating control over Taiwan — by force if necessary.

That risk has become so acute that two U.S. congressional delegations visited the island this month, an unprecedented show of support. Elected representatives in the United States are making clear that they stand with Taiwan and against Beijing’s attempts at military and economic coercion. This may be a positive development, reflecting lessons learned from the diplomatic posture vis-à-vis Ukraine prior to Russia’s latest campaign of attacks. Or it may be a sign of how rapidly the tides are turning against Taiwan.

The reality of China’s threat to Taiwan demands more action — and urgently. That action should take the form of concrete deterrence against economic and military threats levied by Beijing. It should include resolute rhetoric from American leaders, and people. Taiwan’s vibrant economy and successful democracy should be celebrated. They should be contrasted against mainland China’s non-market system, which needs to steal technology for economic development, and a CCP government that abuses its own people to stifle the truth about the regime.

Taiwan’s sovereignty is Taiwan’s choice, not Beijing’s. Taiwan should be afforded full membership in critical international organizations ranging from the United Nations to the World Health Organization.

In the arena of international sport, athletes from Taiwan should be permitted to compete as Taiwan and not Chinese Taipei. That should be the case in Williamsport this summer just as it should be the case at the Paris Olympics in 2024.

As the film “Sandlot” has taught multiple generations of baseball fans: Heroes get remembered, but legends never die. It’s time for Little League leadership to step up to the plate and make the legendary move to respect the Taiwanese people. The Taiwanese kids playing in Williamsport traveled across the world to represent their country. They’re playing their hearts out on the ballfield and making their families, friends, peers, and country proud. The sad reality is that these boys may one day need to fight on a different battlefield for their country’s survival.

They deserve nothing less than to be called Taiwan.

Nathan Picarsic, a Westmoreland County native living in Pittsburgh, is a co-founder of Horizon Advisory, a strategy consultancy that helps companies and investors assess geopolitical risk, and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

fdd.org · by Nathan Picarsic Senior Fellow · August 23, 2022

18. Qatar speaks from both sides of its mouth

August 23, 2022 | The Jerusalem Post

Qatar speaks from both sides of its mouth

If Washington wants to prevent further conflict in Gaza, it should let Doha know the game is up.

fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · August 23, 2022

United States President Joe Biden thanked the emir of Qatar this month for his role in brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza. Since then, the emir and his court have been basking in the glow of international approval, depicting their country as a global influencer and peacemaker. Yet, at the same time, Doha’s incitement, through the state-owned Al Jazeera network and other channels, worsens the already explosive situation in Gaza.

In an interview with Al-Jazeera Arabic, Majed al-Ansari, the spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign Ministry, tied himself into knots while seeking to explain the contradictions of Doha’s foreign policy. First, he took credit for the ceasefire, saying that Qatar communicated with all parties involved, including “Palestinian factions in Gaza.” He paused, then added, “and with the Israeli side, also.” Ansari was clearly reluctant to admit any interaction with the Jewish state, likely because Al Jazeera and other Qatari organs spend so much time condemning those Arabs who prefer normal relations with Israel to perennial hostility.

To protect himself, Ansari quickly pivoted to Al Jazeera’s preferred talking points about Gaza and the flare-up this past weekend, when PIJ fired 800 rockets indiscriminately into Israeli territory. Ansari repeatedly referred to the conflict as an example of Israeli aggression and said that Qatar denounced Israel twice, the first time for bombing Gaza, and the second time for invading al-Aqsa, a deliberate mischaracterization of Jewish worshipers passing through the Temple Mount.

One way for Doha to iron out the contradictions in its foreign policy is to broadcast different messages to Arabic speakers and English speakers. Accordingly, when Al Jazeera English played clips of Ansari’s interview, it left out his denunciations of Israel, while letting him boast of Qatar’s role as peacemaker.

Al Jazeera Arabic also did its best to pin the blame on Israel for the death of five Gazan children, even though the available evidence was more consistent with PIJ rocket fire as the cause. The network reported that five children were martyred in an Israeli airstrike on the Jabalya refugee camp but there was no source documenting the airstrike. Meanwhile, the IDF said it never targeted Jabalya and released footage apparently showing a PIJ rocket that veered off course, landing in Jabalya. The IDF released its footage a day before the Al Jazeera broadcast, yet the network ignored it.

Blood libel and martyrdom

At other times, the network simply veers into blood-libel territory. One tweet asked, “What are the roots of the genocidal Zionist doctrine?” It linked to an article on that subject that quotes violent passages from the Bible and claims the Zionist movement applies them directly to Palestinians. The article was not an exception but is rather a recurring theme in many of the articles that Al Jazeera writers post on its website.

Al Jazeera’s leading reporters also praise martyrdom, while suggesting that Palestinian militants fight for liberty, not on behalf of extreme, antisemitic interpretations of Islam. Majed Abdul-Hadi is a veteran correspondent, who won acclaim for reporting from the frontline of the US war in Afghanistan, in 2002. In a four-minute package on the clash in Gaza, he said that Sunday’s ceasefire “will not end the conflict, at least not in the minds of those [Palestinians] whose will and yearning for freedom is stronger than that of the steel” of the Israeli missiles. Abdul-Hadi added, “There are a lot of those Palestinians. They give birth, and are martyred, and give birth [again].”

The star reporter then took a swipe at Arab states, especially the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, that prefer peace and normalization with Israel to endless war: “Ara brothers of the Palestinians have abandoned them and created brotherhood bonds with their enemy [Israel] and all they offer [Palestinians] is to mediate a truce or deescalate the situation to preserve regional stability.”

Against this backdrop, it is not hard to see why Ansari, the foreign ministry spokesperson, might be hesitant to admit that Doha helped broker a truce with Israel. It is also clear why Al Jazeera English conceals so much of the network’s Arabic content from its viewers.

Qatar simply speaks from both sides of its mouth and expects global accolades for its troubled thinking and troublemaking behavior. If Washington wants to prevent further conflict in Gaza, it should let Doha know the game is up.

The writer is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute, focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow Hussain on Twitter @hahussain.

fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · August 23, 2022

19. Washington wins as Turkey and Israel restore normal ties

Excerpts;

The road ahead will not be entirely smooth. During elections in Israel (November 2022) and Turkey (June 2023), opposition forces will likely attack Lapid and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for their respective decisions to restore relations. Meanwhile, flare-ups of conflict in the Gaza Strip or with Hezbollah may spur Erdogan to harshly criticize Israel. For its part, Iran will do anything in its power to disrupt the improving ties between Israel and Turkey.

However, the stakes for security in the region are incredibly high, given the Russian invasion of Ukraine, increasing Iranian-sponsored terrorism directed at Turkey and Israel, as well as potential regional instability due to economic challenges such as rising energy and food shortages. Accordingly, cooperation between Israel and Turkey is more necessary than ever.

August 23, 2022 | Atlantic Council

Washington wins as Turkey and Israel restore normal ties

fdd.org · by Dr. Brenda Shaffer Senior Advisor for Energy · August 23, 2022

Last week, Turkey and Israel announced that they would normalize their diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors and consuls for the first time since 2018. The announcement follows a series of recent high-level visits, including Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s March trip to Turkey, Israeli Foreign Minister and acting Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s visit in June to Turkey, and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s May trip to Israel.

The conflict between Turkey and Israel, which surfaced in 2010, was exceptional in international relations since the two sides have few bilateral disputes: They do not share borders and have no conflicts over issues such as resources or refugees. All disputes between the countries are connected to symbolic issues and policies toward third parties, mainly the Palestinians and Greece and Cyprus. In addition, the dynamics of the Israeli-Turkey conflict were more significantly shaped by developments in each state’s domestic political arena than by their foreign relations.

Accordingly, the conflict itself was largely on the rhetorical level and was never as deep as it appeared. However, the dispute essentially ended military cooperation between the two sides and halted arms sales from Israel to Turkey. Still, the two worked together on anti-terror and other select security issues during this period.

Trade between the two countries did not suffer from the crisis, and actually grew exponentially during it. Turkish companies not only sold goods, but won tenders to build major infrastructure projects in Israel, including power plants. Today, Tel Aviv is tied with Munich and Frankfurt for the top number of daily flights on Turkish Airlines from Istanbul (continuing a trend that held throughout the crisis). During the Netanyahu period, the two countries established a bilateral energy dialogue. Turkey and Israel are also likely to renew this dialogue and discuss Israeli natural-gas exports to Turkey, or via Turkey to Europe. But just as energy was not a factor in the relations between the two during those golden years of cooperation, it was not a major motivating factor in the current renewal of normal relations.

Regional implications

The return of normal diplomatic ties should not be viewed as a threat to the security of Greece and Cyprus, and is actually likely to help lower tensions over the issue. Relations with Greece and Turkey are not zero-sum; in fact, Athens and Ankara maintain regular diplomatic relations. Most countries maintain good relations with both. Thus, there is no need for Israel to forgo full formal ties with Turkey. Better ties between Turkey and Israel is also likely to lower bloc-based behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean and thus contribute to lowering the likelihood of military confrontations between US allies in the region.

For its part, Washington stands to gain by having two of its regional allies end a years-long discord in the strategically important East Mediterranean basin, which is a flashpoint of strategic competition between the United States and Russia. Most of the countries around the East Mediterranean basin are US allies, and thus it is in Washington’s strategic interest when its allies work together. Reduced tensions between Turkey and Israel also mean and that Washington does not need to waste time mitigating a conflict between its allies.

The change in relations between Turkey and Israel is also likely to project onto the situation in Syria—where both seek stability given their borders with that country. Both Israel and Ankara would like to see Iranian military units removed from Syria, or at least a reduced presence.

Iran is clearly unhappy about the open cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Tehran will likely increase its attempts to strike Jewish and Israeli targets in Turkey, as well as other actions aimed to disrupt the normalization process.

In contrast, Azerbaijan’s strategic situation is greatly improved by the reconciliation of its two closest allies. President Ilham Aliyev played a major role in the normalization process. Turkish-Israeli cooperation before and during the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war also contributed to the return of cooperative relations between Ankara and Jerusalem. Azerbaijan’s triumph in the war represented a knockout victory for Western arms technology in the clash between Russian-produced systems used by Armenia, on one hand, and those of NATO member Turkey and US ally Israel, on the other. The success of Turkish and Israeli armaments and their battlefield integration in that war has led to increased commercial interest globally in both defense industries. This is likely to encourage Turkey and Israel to return to mutual developments in that sector.

The road ahead will not be entirely smooth. During elections in Israel (November 2022) and Turkey (June 2023), opposition forces will likely attack Lapid and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for their respective decisions to restore relations. Meanwhile, flare-ups of conflict in the Gaza Strip or with Hezbollah may spur Erdogan to harshly criticize Israel. For its part, Iran will do anything in its power to disrupt the improving ties between Israel and Turkey.

However, the stakes for security in the region are incredibly high, given the Russian invasion of Ukraine, increasing Iranian-sponsored terrorism directed at Turkey and Israel, as well as potential regional instability due to economic challenges such as rising energy and food shortages. Accordingly, cooperation between Israel and Turkey is more necessary than ever.

Brenda Shaffer is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and a senior advisor for Energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. She is the author of Energy Politics, which is used as a textbook on the geopolitics of energy in over two hundred universities. Follow her on Twitter @ProfBShaffer.

fdd.org · by Dr. Brenda Shaffer Senior Advisor for Energy · August 23, 2022

20. Ukraine's Zelensky vows Russia's war will "end in Crimea"

Cannot be much clearer than this.

Ukraine's Zelensky vows Russia's war will "end in Crimea"

Newsweek · by David Brennan · August 23, 2022

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed that Kyiv's forces will retake Russian-occupied Crimea, as the leader and his top officials seek to build international support for full restoration of the country's pre-2014 borders and reversal of all Russian gains.

Zelensky spoke at the second iteration of the Crimea Platform on Tuesday, an online gathering of 60 nations and international organizations. Speakers included Polish President Andrzej Duda—who attended in person with Zelensky; Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau; and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

"Ukraine is strong enough and powerful enough to see a perspective for Ukrainian Crimea," Zelensky said. "We will bring freedom to Ukrainian citizens in Crimea, and we will restore justice to all those who suffered from the repressions and abuses of the Russian occupiers."

"I know that Crimea is with Ukraine, is waiting for us to return. I want all of you to know that we will return. We need to win the fight against Russian aggression. Therefore, we need to free Crimea from occupation.

"It began with Crimea, it will end with Crimea," Zelensky said of Ukraine's war with Russia, quoting jailed Crimean activist Nariman Dzhelyal.

In this combination image, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks during a joint press conference with his Polish counterpart in Kyiv on August 23, 2022, amid Russia's military invasion launched on Ukraine and an inset image of HIMARS, The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System tested at the White Sands Missile Range. Getty

Ukrainian leaders have vowed to retake the Crimean peninsula—occupied and annexed by Russia following the 2014 pro-Western Maidan Revolution—and all territory seized by Russian troops in the eastern Donbas region, where heavy fighting continues.

Crimea served as a launchpad for Russia's latest invasion that began on February 24. Troops coming from the peninsula struck north and northeast, seizing swathes of southern Ukraine including key coastal cities and ports. Ukrainian troops are now preparing for a counter-offensive to take back cities including Kherson and Melitopol.

Crimea has come under repeated Ukrainian attack in recent weeks, with long-range weapons and drones targeting air bases, transport hubs, logistics depots, and command centers. The attacks have caused panic among Russians in Crimea and buoyed Ukrainian confidence.

"Since February 24 from occupied Crimea, they've launched 750 different cruise missiles hitting our cities," Zelensky said, noting the importance of the peninsula to the Russian war effort.

The Crimean city of Sevastopol also hosts the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which has been enforcing a blockade of the Black Sea and choking vital supplies of grain.

"Ukraine's restoration of control of Crimea will be a historic anti-war step in Europe," Zelensky said, adding that he is "sure" that Crimea, like the rest of Ukraine, will one day become part of the European Union—a key Ukrainian strategic goal.

Newsweek reached out to the Russian Foreign Ministry for comment.

Newsweek · by David Brennan · August 23, 2022

21. "Social Media as Public Diplomacy" by Matt Armstrong

Prescient in 2009 when Matt Armstrong wrote this. And probably worth reading more today.

"Social Media as Public Diplomacy" by Matt Armstrong - Layalina Productions

layalina.tv · June 1, 2009

Volume I Issue 2, June 2009

Social Media as Public Diplomacy

By Matt Armstrong

Download PDF

Now more than ever, the United States needs effective public diplomacy. America’s national security depends on smart policies supported by effective and agile engagement to foster understanding of our government’s policies, countering misinformation, developing partnerships, and most importantly, encouraging and empowering others to realize that the government’s fight is their fight as well. This is where public diplomacy, engaging directly and indirectly with people around the globe, proves necessary.

While America created the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter, the appreciation of the tactical and strategic values of social media lags far behind our adversaries’ practices.

In this age of mass information and precision-guided media, everyone from political candidates to terrorists must instantly and continuously interact with and influence audiences in order to be relevant and competitive. Ignoring the utility of social media is tantamount to surrendering the high ground in the enduring battle to influence minds around the world.

Social media breaks through geographical, cultural and even linguistic barriers, democratizing the access to, and distribution of information. The instant exchange of news and opinions among people today means that operations conducted in one place likely have an impact elsewhere. It can either be through sympathetic action (e.g. a terrorist strike by supporters who have only a cyber-connection to the perceived “wronged” party) or through a shift of the battlefield (e.g. a terrorist strike in the homeland or an al- lied city).

Through social media, international influence is as easy as a few clicks of a mouse. Anybody with a camera phone or laptop can now inform and influence global audiences. YouTube and blogs are the new “oxygen of publicity” on which terrorists and insurgents thrive, circumventing and manipulating “old” media to muster support.

According to David Kilcullen, in 1966, a Vietnamese villager had access to ten sources of information, half of which were government controlled. Forty years later, an Afghan villager has access to twenty-five, with the Internet counting as one and only five under government control. Among the twenty other sources are satellite phones and text messaging, as well as traditional sources (1). The products of social media extend through all of these channels and can be seen in the use of DVDs delivered with shabnameh, or “night letters,” in Afghan villages.

Terrorists and insurgents rely on the visceral effects of international reports on their past actions to garner support for their cause among sympathizers. Deny two of the three following components and an act of terrorism loses most, if not all of its hype-inducing value to the terrorist: knowledge of the act, who perpetrated the act, or the motivation of the perpetrator. It is not the death and destruction wrought by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that is valuable. The real purpose of the attack is the imagery of David stoning Goliath across multiple media that creates ripples like a stone thrown in a pond. This is why IED attacks, as well as others, are filmed from multiple vantage points, edited and uploaded to the Internet with a speed any US media producer would envy.

Napoleon said that four angry newspapers were more threatening than a thousand angry bayonets. Today the same could be said of four angry bloggers, as the “CNN Effect” is now synonymous with the “Twitter Effect,” the “YouTube Effect,” and even the “Facebook Effect.” Instead of a segmented media environment, we now live in a time better described as dominated by “Now Media” that combines the old and the new to create an instantaneous reel of information. Social media is central to this “Now Media” world and provides an early warning system, while creating opportunities to monitor and tap into discussions around the world.

Simply put, social media is public diplomacy. It permits direct and indirect international engagement and empowers individuals as well as groups. Similarly, the same limits that restrict America’s use of social media apply to public diplomacy as a whole. Any improvement in social media will have immediate and lasting effects for the whole government.

The first step towards this improvement is to drop the quaint notion that ideas can be contained within geopolitical boundaries of nation-states. The US continues to organize and operate as if it were in the last decades of the Cold War, when traditional diplomacy took precedence over public opinion. This is due in part to the firewall created by Senators J. William Fulbright and Edward Zorinsky that was a product of their respective time and place.

In 1972, Fulbright said America’s international broadcasting should “take their rightful place in the graveyard of Cold War relics (2).” In 1985, Zorinsky compared the United States Information Agency to a Soviet propaganda machine (3). Today is not yesterday. It is time to take the muzzle off and speak freely with greater transparency so that Americans may know what is said and done in their name (and with their tax dollars). An artifact of this belief that America’s public diplomacy is unfit for regular Americans is the bifurcation of public affairs from public diplomacy within the State Department. The bureaucratic and functional division runs deep and is detrimental to agile and effective information-based leadership and engagement within the US government and the world (4).

Smart power requires smart foreign policies that are easily and readily supported by people around the globe who share and must participate in our vision of the future. It is time we start transparently and aggressively managing public opinion, a necessary skill of any democratic leader on the world stage. This means preventing others from maliciously framing our intentions and actions as well as those of our allies. Perhaps more importantly, it means actively holding our adversaries accountable for their actions among the constituents, “swing voters” and our own supporters. Those who subscribe or are sympathetic to terrorist ideology and actions rarely comprehend the true purpose of the groups they follow.

We are engaged in a struggle over the means to influ- ence people to support and participate in a physical and ideological fight against common enemies. For too long we have accepted our adversaries’ propaganda which framed conflicts as the US military against the civilian, when in fact the true struggle was between terrorists and insurgents and the local population. Social media is an essential tool to this end as it helps educate, encourage, equip and empower people to participate. This is what our enemies use it for and it is time we follow suit.

While we are improving in this area, and the new Administration’s leadership gives reason to hope, overall we remain ineffective in countering the propaganda of our enemies that misrepresents both their actions and ours. Fail- ing to correct accidental misinformation and intentional disinformation endangers the security of the US, its allies, and those we aim to protect and empower.

The broad, “always on” struggle for minds and wills requires agility – speed, accuracy, and flexibility – to undermine and not just counter the use of information by America’s adversaries in influencing perceptions. Such agility requires the correct structures and empowerment. Social media is not a panacea but a tool whose use will represent either the upward or downward trend of future US public diplomacy.

Notes

1. Author interview with David Kilcullen.

2. Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 314-15. An “anti-Fulbright faction” would develop against the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that was likely the product of the Nixon Administration in response to Fulbright’s attacks on the USIA. The situation got so bad that Fulbright demurred sponsoring legislation the State Department asked for, saying “Why should I offer it? It will just be beaten.” See John Finney, “Vote in Senate Gives Fulbright Another in a Series of Rebuffs,” New York Times, May 26 1972.

3. See “Senator Edward Zorinsky and Banning Domestic Dissemination by USIA in 1985”, http://mountainrunner.us/2009/05/zorinsky.html.

4. There is a similar division within the Defense Department that requires its own discussion.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Matthew C. Armstrong is principal and co-founder of Armstrong Strategic Insights Group, LLC, and publisher of Mountain-Runner. Mr. Armstrong writes on the organizational, operational and legislative barriers to effective global engagement by the United States Government, particularly in regards to the “Now Media” information environment.

Mr. Armstrong obtained both his B.A. in International Relations and a Master of Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California (USC). He has done work at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, in the areas of US Intelligence, Contemporary European Security, and the Middle East. Prior to this, he spent a decade working as a technologist designing knowledge management systems subsequently developing high-value competencies in areas of Internet influence.

layalina.tv · June 1, 2009

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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