Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

[Commencement Address at American University, June 10 1963]”

- John F. Kennedy

“The problem with the world is that intelligent people are full of doubts, while the stupid ones are full of confidence.”

- Charles Bukowski

“A lie doesn’t become truth, Wong doesn’t become right and evil doesn’t become good just because it’s accepted by a majority.”

- Booker T. Washington

1. S. Korea holds first policy meeting on N.K. human rights in over 2 years

2. N. Korea says 4 new fever cases reported after declaring victory over COVID-19

3. N.K. marks Day of Songun

4. U.S. continues to coordinate efforts to denuclearize N. Korea with allies: State Dept.

5. US-South Korea War Games Have a Global Audience

6. Yoon Suk-yeol Maintains the Status Quo on North Korea

7. Tire tracks indicate heavy construction by Kim Jong-un

8. Resuming Ulchi Freedom Shield

9. Korea wins $2.25 bil. nuclear power plant deal in Egypt

10. Court orders NK leader to compensate families of fallen sailors

11. N. Korea orders provincial authorities to ensure military units on border have enough food

12. N. Korea’s breadbasket suffers damage due to rains and winds

13. North Korea Has Been Expanding and Modernising this Key Airfield: Are New Fighter Jet Deliveries Incoming?

14. Democratic Party of Korea turns deaf ear to North Korean human rights law

15. Sending information into North Korea is vital, Seoul's new human rights envoy says

16. 3 Things Pentagon Worries About in Use of Nuclear Weapons

1. S. Korea holds first policy meeting on N.K. human rights in over 2 years

And the alliance must take a human rights up front approach. I know this falls on deaf ears and is not considered helpful by those who think we can achieve denuclearization by diplomacy, but human rights is a national security issue in addition to being a moral imperative. And most important is that focusing on human rights is one line of effort that has not been used to create change within north Korea. It is time the ROK/US alliance (and the international community) focus on human rights issues to pressure the regime to change and to provide relief to the suffering of the Korean people in the north. And most importantly is the focus on human rights will contribute to the eventual free and unified Korea which is the only acceptable durable political arrangement that will end the nuclear threat and the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people in the north.

(LEAD) S. Korea holds first policy meeting on N.K. human rights in over 2 years | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 25, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 6-8)

SEOUL, Aug. 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea held an interagency government meeting Thursday on its North Korean human rights policy for the first time in over two years.

The meeting, last held in May 2020, came as the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration seeks a "principle-based" approach toward the North's human rights issue in a shift from the previous liberal Moon Jae-in government accused of having prioritized improving inter-Korean ties over addressing it.

Chairing the meeting of the 2022 Council on North Korean Human Rights, Vice Unification Minister Kim Ki-woong expressed hope that the session will provide an opportunity to discuss the implementation of the Yoon administration's North Korean human rights policy.

"I look forward to a productive discussion on the human rights situation of North Koreans, as well as the current policies of each ministry on promoting human rights and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's key policy direction," Kim said.

Also attending the session were director general-level officials from the unification, foreign and justice ministries, as well as Lee Shin-wha, a political science professor at Korea University, who was recently appointed as the new envoy for North Korean human rights -- a position that had been left vacant since September 2017.

The unification ministry said the meeting assessed the North Korean human rights policy of the current government and discussed the direction of the drafting of its report on the matter.

In the meeting, the vice minister stressed that the government will work on the issue of North Korean human rights with a greater sense of responsibility to meet expectations from the local and international society, it said.

The ministry added the agencies that took part in the meeting agreed to establish partnerships with civic groups on North Korean human rights and actively take part in global discussions on the issue, such as in the U.N.

Launched in October 2016, the council aims to strengthen intra-government policy coordination to help improve human rights in the reclusive country.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · August 25, 2022

2. N. Korea says 4 new fever cases reported after declaring victory over COVID-19

A premature declaration of victory in the COVID war.

N. Korea says 4 new fever cases reported after declaring victory over COVID-19 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · August 25, 2022

SEOUL, Aug. 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea reported four new fever cases in the northeastern province of Ryanggang, its state media said Thursday, just two weeks after the country claimed victory over the coronavirus crisis.

Four fever cases suspected of being infected with "malignant epidemic" occurred in Ryanggang Province on Aug. 23, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, citing data from the state emergency epidemic prevention headquarters.

Health authorities immediately locked down the area, urgently mobilized anti-epidemic teams to carry out tests for the suspected cases and have taken measures to find the cause of the fever outbreak, it added.

On Aug. 10, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared victory over COVID-19 and ordered the lifting of the country's "maximum emergency anti-epidemic" measures, three months after the nation reported the first confirmed case.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · August 25, 2022

3. N.K. marks Day of Songun

Some say that Songun is no longer the policy of the Km family regime - Songun or Military First Politics - remains a dominating factor in the rule of north Korea by the party.

The regime would not likely be celebrating this day if Songun/Military First Politics was not still important.

Photo at the link.

N.K. marks Day of Songun

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20220825022100325?section=image/nk

North Korea 09:56 August 25, 2022

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N.K. marks Day of Songun

Female North Korean workers dance at a square in Pyongyang on Aug. 24, 2022, one day ahead of the Day of Songun, or Army-First Day, marking the late leader Kim Jong-il's visit to the Ryu Kyong-su Guards 105th Armored Division in 1960, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

(END)

4. U.S. continues to coordinate efforts to denuclearize N. Korea with allies: State Dept.

The path to denuclearization is human rights and a free and unified Korea.

U.S. continues to coordinate efforts to denuclearize N. Korea with allies: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 25, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24 (Yonhap) -- The United States remains committed to coordinating efforts with its allies to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, a state department spokesperson said Wednesday.

Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesperson for the department, also reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and Japan.

"The United States remains focused on coordinating closely with our allies and partners to address the threats posed by the DPRK which includes advancing our shared objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and continuing our ironclad commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan," he said in a telephonic press briefing, referring to South Korea by its official name.

Patel was responding to a question on whether the U.S. may consider normalizing ties with North Korea when and if Pyongyang begins to denuclearize.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol earlier proposed to help "significantly improve" the North Korean economy and launch aid projects for the impoverished country as long as it showed its commitment to denuclearize.

The state department said it fully supports Yoon's initiative to restart dialogue with the North, adding it too remains ready to take "incremental" steps toward denuclearization with the North.

Pyongyang, however, has rejected Yoon's offer as absurd. It has stayed away from denuclearization talks since late 2019.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · August 25, 2022

5. US-South Korea War Games Have a Global Audience

As they should.

One minor correction to the Admiral's statement here.

I’ve been involved in these war games many times, going back to my earliest days at sea in the Pacific serving in an anti-submarine destroyer. Over the years they have increased in tempo and scope, involving hundreds of ships, tanks, aircraft, satellites and tens of thousands of troops. They are among the most demanding of all US exercises globally.

At one time the Team Spirit exercises (ended in 1993) were among the largest exercises in the free world. We have never again approached the scale and scope of Team Spirit in Korea so we still have a lot of room to grow.

That minor criticism aside the Admiral makes some important points:

Ulchi Freedom Shield will also use the lessons that militaries worldwide are drawing from events in Ukraine: the importance of advanced drones, civilian-military cooperation, air defense against attacks launched at critical infrastructure and the vulnerabilities of tanks and other armored vehicles if deployed without sufficient combined arms support. Above all, both the US and South Korea want to test their logistical capabilities, which have been so lacking on the part of Russian forces in Crimea.

...

Two other recent developments also raise the importance and profile of the exercises. The first is the election of the most conservative and pro-defense government in recent South Korean history, led by the just-inaugurated President Yoon Suk Yeol. The new administration in Seoul has pledged strong defense increases, acquisition of new military technologies and greater military cooperation with the US and other western allies in the region.

The second important element is the abrupt rejection by Kim of a peace feeler from Seoul. The South Koreans had offered a sweeping proposal of economic benefits in return for denuclearization (not entirely unlike the package Washington put forth under President Trump). The South promised food, agriculture assistance, health infrastructure and other benefits – but did not address the crippling sanctions under which the North Koreans chafe. In her role as North Korea’s public spokeswoman, Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong scornfully denounced the offer as “stupid.” She went on to blame the Covid-19 outbreaks in the north on South Korea and promised “deadly retaliation.”

US-South Korea War Games Have a Global Audience

Given tensions with China over Taiwan and the war in Ukraine, one of the biggest military exercises America stages will have ripple effects on all its allies and opponents.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-24/us-south-korea-war-games-have-a-global-audience?srnd=opinion-politics-and-policy&sref=hhjZtX76

ByJames Stavridis

August 24, 2022 at 7:00 PM EDT

This week South Korea and the United States commenced several huge, live-fire military exercises for the first time in several years in a clear signal to Pyongyang. Known collectively as the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, they will flex the military muscles of the two allies at sea, in the air, on land and in space. Lasting through Sept. 1, the exercises will also have a significant cyber component.

I’ve been involved in these war games many times, going back to my earliest days at sea in the Pacific serving in an anti-submarine destroyer. Over the years they have increased in tempo and scope, involving hundreds of ships, tanks, aircraft, satellites and tens of thousands of troops. They are among the most demanding of all US exercises globally.

Yoon Suk-yeol Maintains the Status Quo on North Korea

South Korea’s policies toward Pyongyang differ less from administration to administration than is often assumed.

thediplomat.com · by Dylan Stent · August 24, 2022

When Yoon Suk-yeol became the 20th president of the Republic of Korea, many onlookers predicted he would alter its approach to North Korea. These approaches, traditionally based on peaceful co-existence, denuclearization, and economic overtures, have endured since Roh Tae-woo became the first leader of the Sixth Republic. Yoon’s speeches, so far, indicate that his government is likely to continue treading a similar path.

While campaigning for the South Korean presidency, Yoon was framed as a “hawk” who would emphasize deterrence and a security build-up to deter North Korea. Such assessments of Yoon fail to explain his many continuities with previous governments regarding North Korea, including his desire to interact economically with the North as a means of incentivizing denuclearization. Hints regarding Yoon’s approach to North Korea were evident in his inauguration speech, where he suggested, “If North Korea genuinely embarks on a process to complete denuclearization, we are prepared to work with the international community to present an audacious plan that will vastly strengthen North Korea’s economy and improve the quality of life for its people.”

Further allusions to this approach were apparent when Yoon gave his first Liberation Day Speech as president on August 15. Instead of presenting a more aggressive policy regarding an increasingly belligerent North Korea, which has been testing many ballistic missiles this year, Yoon’s speech closely mirrored what previous administrations had been promulgating.

The most well–discussed element of Yoon’s speech was his vision of an “audacious initiative” that will improve North Korea’s economy and North Koreans’ livelihoods if Pyongyang ceases “the development of its nuclear program and embarks on a genuine and substantive process for denuclearization.” If this occurs, Yoon pledged that South Korea would implement a

large-scale food program; provide assistance for power generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure; and carry out projects to modernize ports and airports for international trade. We will also help enhance North Korea’s agricultural productivity, offer assistance to modernize hospitals and medical infrastructure, and implement international investment and financial support initiatives.

Such statements will undoubtedly raise eyebrows for anyone supportive of continued sanctions against the Kim Jong Un regime.

North Korea’s response is also unsurprising, given the Kim regime has never seriously considered abandoning its nuclear weapons. Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister, gave a statement that rejected Yoon’s proposal, including telling the South Korean president to “keep his mouth shut.”

However, do not expect Yoon to change tack any time soon. Attempting to entice North Korea’s denuclearization with economic carrots has been a norm of South Korean governments for decades. Acknowledging this position, rather than being surprised by speeches, would be more beneficial for analyzing South Korean policymaking.

Regardless of their ideological underpinning, South Korean leaders have been telling anyone who would listen that North Korea’s denuclearization will lead to economic cooperation and South Korea’s eventual economic integration with the North. This has been a primary goal in developing peaceful co-existence on the way toward unification.

In previous President Moon Jae-in’s first Liberation Day speech, in 2018, he noted, “When peace is established on the Korean Peninsula along with complete denuclearization, economic cooperation can be carried out in earnest. When the dreams of a peace-based economy and economic community are realized, our economy can take a new leap forward.” Furthermore, the Moon administration promoted a policy strategy based on “Reconciliation and Cooperation between the two Koreas and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Included in this was realizing a “New Economic Map” and the economic unification of the Korean Peninsula.

The previous two conservative governments also presented similar ideas. Park Geun-hye’s 2016 Liberation Day Speech noted, “North Korea has yet to take up our repeated offers to engage in dialogue, and is undermining peace and running counter to the cause of integrating the two Koreas. North Korea is threatening our security and that of the international community by continuing to develop its nuclear capabilities and launching cyber-attacks.” Even while showing a penchant for a harsher critique of the northern regime, Park added, “If, however, North Korea chooses the path of dialogue and cooperation, it will be able to seize an opportunity to improve the lives of its people and lift up its economy.”

In the aftermath of North Korea’s attack on the ROKS Cheonan, a South Korean corvette, in 2010, Lee Myung-bak noted the following in his Liberation Day Speech that year:

In order to achieve that goal, the two Koreas first need to form a peace community that assures security and peace on the peninsula. What is most important in this connection is the denuclearization of the peninsula. The next step is to carry out comprehensive inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation with a view to developing the North’s economy dramatically. The result will be an economic community in which the two will work for economic integration.

Going further back in South Korean political history, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun helped develop and then opened the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region in hopes of attracting change in North Korea. One of the desired changes was, of course, the denuclearization of North Korea.

South Korea’s North Korean policies are much less divisive from administration to administration than is expressed in many studies. Continuity rather than change is what colors policy decisions, with any noticeable changes mainly being based on leaders placing emphasis or importance on particular decisions vis-à-vis North Korea. In other words, North Korean policy changes less than expected.

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Yoon’s North Korean policy is neither particularly hawkish nor novel. Instead, it should be viewed with an eye to South Korean political history. When considered in context, it is evident that his policy decisions represent continuity with the past, showing that the Yoon administration is treading a well-known path. Understanding that denuclearization will spill-over into economic interactions has support in the discourse of the Korean left and Korean right and are essential when trying to understand South Korea’s policy choices regarding North Korea.

Dylan Stent

Dylan Stent is a Ph.D. candidate at Victoria University of Wellington. His study looks at the South Korea’s inter-Korean policies in the democratic era.

thediplomat.com · by Dylan Stent · August 24, 2022

7. Tire tracks indicate heavy construction by Kim Jong-un

Is this in response to the public discussions of the ROK "kill chain" concept? Is Kim taking further precautions to protect himself? Recall in the 1990's when the defense plans were leaked (in articles published by Richard Halloran I believe) that included a counterattack in Wonsan and how the nKPA conducted extensive preparations to repel an amphibious assault there? There is so much PSYOP potential to influence the regime.

Maybe Kim is fearful of the "kill chain."

Thursday

August 25, 2022

dictionary + A - A

Tire tracks indicate heavy construction by Kim Jong-un

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/25/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-Pyongyang/20220825184024480.html

Vehicle tracks on a road in front of the security complex inside a Pyongyang compound for the regime's leadership can be seen in these Google Earth images from May 2022, which were analyzed by 38 North. [GOOGLE EARTH]

Satellite images from Pyongyang have raised speculation that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is fortifying his underground hideouts in case of a South Korean or U.S. attack.

The images, which were analyzed by 38 North, show vehicle tracks on a road in front of a security complex inside a residential and office compound in downtown Pyongyang that is believed to sit above an underground complex of tunnels and roads.

According to 38 North, the distinct white vehicle tracks could represent a large amount of excavation work or demolition of concrete.

The area was described by former British Ambassador to North Korea John Everard and others as the regime’s modern-day equivalent to Beijing's Forbidden City, with entry restricted to the Kim family and the regime’s highest-ranking members.

Kim is believed to move within the compound surrounding the Workers’ Party Central Committee Office Building through the underground network to evade satellite reconnaissance of his movements, according to 38 North and previous intelligence reports.

According to 38 North, there is a possibility that this project is an expansion or upgrade of the underground network.

In Google Earth images from May examined by 38 North, construction work was also underway at two other sites near the Workers’ Party Central Committee Office Building.

On a large plot of land approximately 188 meters (600 feet) south of the building, two excavators and two dump trucks can be seen, with excavated soil on the east side of this area.

In their analysis of the site, which shows exterior framing complete for four buildings and construction of smaller structures, 38 North said it was “highly probably” that the project is a large residence or a banquet hall.

Satellite images from the same period examined by 38 North show another banquet hall and support building between the leader’s headquarters and his official residence have been upgraded and renovated. But the presence of construction equipment nearby suggests the building’s interior and finishing touches were not yet complete.

The ornate architecture of this banquet hall also raises the possibility that this structure might serve as an additional residence or a guest house for foreign dignitaries.

Luxury residences and one guard support building have been constructed inside the Changkwangsan compound within the Forbidden City. [GOOGLE EARTH]

A comparison of Google Earth images taken between May 2021 and May 2022 show that nine luxury residences and one guard support building were constructed within the compound — their scale and surrounding lawns hinting at the lavish lifestyles of the country’s highest-ranking members.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

8. Resuming Ulchi Freedom Shield

A blinding flash of the obvious but it needs to be said.

Conclusion:

Taken together, these are all compelling reasons why these exercises should have been resumed even earlier. There are some costs, to be sure. Pyongyang has responded with predictable anger and China has been more critical than usual of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Diplomatic engagement with both countries will be scratchier. But what was really sacrificed? Pyongyang had already rebuffed the Yoon governments’ proposals for engagement and before that had done almost nothing to reward the Moon government for its unprecedented accommodation of the North.

And we should not be dissuaded from ensuring readiness to defend against a north Korea attack by the regime's rhetoric or that of China and Russia.

Thursday

August 25, 2022

dictionary + A - A

Resuming Ulchi Freedom Shield

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/25/opinion/columns/Ulchi-FreedomShield-Korea-US/20220825195135814.html

Michael Green

The author is senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University in Washington, DC.

When U.S. and ROK forces held their largest live-fire joint military exercises in four years this week, there was anger in Pyongyang and some nervous criticism in Seoul. Critics of the Yoon government predicted the exercises would drive North Korea and China closer together or provoke Pyongyang into resuming nuclear testing. While any action in international security will prompt some counteraction, the fact is that the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise makes the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia more secure in the long run. The risk of resuming the exercises was minimal, and the benefit at least fourfold.

First, the exercises never should have been cancelled in the first place. Former President Donald Trump stunned his own Pentagon, the Congress and our allies by announcing unilaterally in front of Kim Jong-un in Singapore that he would end what he called “war games” with the Republic of Korea. Whether there was diplomatic merit to the pause or not, the way Trump went about it was damaging. Trump later confessed that the idea was Putin’s. This was not surprising since Russia and China only benefit from a weakening of readiness and alliance integration between the U.S. and ROK. That Trump used the propaganda language of Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing and called these regular defensive exercises “wargames” only underscored the reason for concern. The exercises should have been restored even sooner to undo that damage.

Second, the lack of realistic joint training has inevitably meant that U.S. and ROK forces were becoming less ready for real contingencies. For U.S. forces in particular, the ability to train on the ground with ROK counterparts is indispensable. In discussing the halt to exercises with senior U.S. military officers over the past four years, I have noticed steadily growing concern at the costs to readiness of this freeze in exercises. No active-duty general told me it was a bad idea — that was a policy decision above their pay grade — but all readily acknowledged it was becoming increasingly detrimental in operational terms. “We fight tonight” is a motto used by CFC staff to keep deterrence high. The longer this pause in exercises continued the more people worried they might not be ready to fight “until tomorrow night.” Computer simulations can do a lot to prepare forces’ technical and tactical skills and to simulate logistics and other dimensions of combat –but there is no substitute for hard physical training alongside real counterparts.

Third, the resumption of Ulchi Freedom Shield was necessary to shape the expectations and calculations of Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow. North Korea still has a range of provocations it can pursue to undermine security on the peninsula in pursuit of greater leverage –options ranging from cyber-attacks or military moves in the West Sea to resumption of nuclear and ICBM tests. The U.S. and ROK response will necessarily be proportionate, but Pyongyang will attempt to control the escalation ladder. Put a different way, North Korea will feel more confident engaging in grey zone coercion or asymmetrical provocations if Kim Jong-un believes that the U.S. and ROK will be more afraid of escalation than he is. The resumption of Ulchi Freedom Shield not only improves readiness for contingencies, it also demonstrates a resolve to dominate any escalation in the wake of North Korean provocations. This will help to dissuade Pyongyang from taking such risks going forward.

China and Russia are not within the scope of these resumed exercises — which are focused on deterring and defeating North Korean aggression — but the resumption of the exercises also helps to shape Beijing and Moscow’s expectations. China would like to neutralize the Republic of Korea geopolitically and focus on isolating Japan and Australia and surrounding Taiwan. For its part, Moscow welcomes any weakening of the U.S. alliance system anywhere as an opportunity to pursue Russian irridentist aims in Central Europe. The resumption of Ulchi Freedom Shield demonstrates the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance to the entire world and just as importantly the willpower of the Yoon government to take proactive steps to shape Korea’s external environment.

Taken together, these are all compelling reasons why these exercises should have been resumed even earlier. There are some costs, to be sure. Pyongyang has responded with predictable anger and China has been more critical than usual of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Diplomatic engagement with both countries will be scratchier. But what was really sacrificed? Pyongyang had already rebuffed the Yoon governments’ proposals for engagement and before that had done almost nothing to reward the Moon government for its unprecedented accommodation of the North.

9. Korea wins $2.25 bil. nuclear power plant deal in Egypt

South Korea is a nuclear power (or at least cna generate nuclear power)

Korea wins $2.25 bil. nuclear power plant deal in Egypt

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

Whang Joo-ho, fifth from left, CEO of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), poses with Alexander Korchagin, senior vice president of ASE JSC, sixth from left, after signing a contract to join an Egyptian nuclear power plant construction project, in Cairo, Egypt, Thursday. Courtesy of KHNP

Nation secures 2nd nuclear plant export order after Barakah reactors in UAE

By Baek Byung-yeul

Korea won a 3 trillion won ($2.25 billion) project to construct nuclear power plants in El Dabaa, Egypt, a much-awaited contract for the government, which has been trying to restore nuclear plants as a major export item, the industry ministry said Thursday.

The El Dabaa project will see four 1,200-megawatt nuclear reactors being built. For the project, ASE, a subsidiary of Russian energy company Rosatom, won the construction order from the Egyptian Nuclear & Radiological Regulatory Authority.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy said state-run energy company Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) signed a contract with ASE to construct turbine islands and procure and supply equipment and materials for the key components, which extract thermal energy from pressurized steam and convert it into electrical energy.

The El Dabaa project marks Korea's second nuclear power plant export. In 2009, the nation won the Barakah nuclear power plant construction project in the United Arab Emirates.

Due to the previous administration's nuclear phase-out policy, Korea's nuclear industry was on the verge of extinction. But the government said it expects the El Dabaa project to revitalize the nuclear plant industrial ecosystem.

In May, President Yoon Suk-yeol said the country aims to export 10 nuclear power plants by 2030, scrapping the previous administration's nuclear phase-out policy.

A senior official from the presidential office said the Egyptian contract is expected to become a welcome opportunity for Korea's struggling nuclear power plant industry.

"The contract created a valuable precedent of entering the African nuclear power market that has great growth potential. The experience we will earn in Egypt will serve as a bridgehead to the African market," the official said on condition of anonymity.

Lee Chang-yang, minister of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, said winning the contract in Egypt was possible thanks to the government's drive to bring the nuclear power generation-related industry back as one of the country's core industries.

"Winning the El Dabaa nuclear power plants project is the first tangible achievement of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's strong nuclear power export policy," Lee said. "Under the new government's energy policy direction, introduced on July 5, the change in nuclear power policy and the strong will to promote exports contributed to the successful signing of the contract."

The minister added that the government will keep working on winning additional contracts in other countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland.

"As many countries like the Czech Republic and Poland are closely evaluating the excellence of our nuclear power plants, the government will gather all of its capabilities to support nuclear power exports," the minister said.

A rendered image shows four nuclear power plants that Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) will construct in El Dabaa, Egypt. Courtesy of KHNP KHNP said it plans to hold a briefing for local nuclear power-related companies in September to facilitate the participation of domestic nuclear equipment manufacturers in the construction of El Dabaa. The company added it will push ahead with contracts for all equipment as soon as possible.

"Winning the order for the construction project in El Dabaa is an important achievement that has proven Korea's excellent construction capabilities and business management capabilities from the UAE project," said Whang Joo-ho, CEO of KHNP.

Construction of the nuclear reactor building of the first unit of the El Dabaa project began in July. The first unit is expected to begin commercial operations in 2028.

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

10. Court orders NK leader to compensate families of fallen sailors

Never forget what the regime has done and what it is capable of.

But the buried lede is the connection of a former senior Moon administration member to north Korea.

Excerpts:

Following the ruling, the court ordered garnishment on a fund managed by the Foundation of Inter-Korea Cooperation, which is in charge of sending royalties to the North paid by South Korean broadcasters and news outlets for using North Korea's publications.

The foundation, however, refused to pay the compensation, claiming royalties are not subject to garnishment, and the Seoul Eastern District Court acknowledged the foundation's claim in a series of following suits.

The foundation is headed by Lim Jong-seok, former chief of staff to the previous President Moon Jae-in.

Court orders NK leader to compensate families of fallen sailors

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

Chances slim for actual payment due to difficulties in collection

By Nam Hyun-woo

A family member of a sailor killed during the Second Yeonpyeong Battle cries before a facial sculpture of the sailor during a 20th anniversary ceremony of the battle in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, June 29. Joint Press Corps

A district court ordered North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-un to pay a combined 160 million won ($112,000) in compensation to the family members of eight fallen sailors who lost their lives in a 2002 inter-Korean naval skirmish near Yeonpyeong Island in the West Sea.

The Seoul Central District Court on Wednesday ruled in favor of them, acknowledging the physical and psychological suffering claimed by the complainants due to the 2002 battle.

Though neither North Korea nor Kim responded to the lawsuit filed in October 2020, the court carried on its legal procedures after announcing the suit through a public notice.

"According to the Constitution and other domestic laws, North Korea is an enemy state, and defined as an unincorporated foundation in the Civil Procedure Act," the court said. "Domestic courts have the jurisdiction on this case."

The naval confrontation, better known as the Second Yeonpyeong Battle, took place on June 29, 2002, when two North Korean patrol boats intruded into the South's western waters off Yeonpyeong Island and attacked South Korean Chamsuri-class patrol boats. The battle resulted in six South Korean fatalities, 13 North Korean fatalities and dozens of wounded on both sides.

Despite the court ruling, chances are slim for the family members to receive actual payments, given the previous failed attempts to collect compensation from North Korea.

In July 2020, the same court ruled in favor of family members of two South Koreans who were detained in North Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War and ordered North Korea and leader Kim to compensate them.

Following the ruling, the court ordered garnishment on a fund managed by the Foundation of Inter-Korea Cooperation, which is in charge of sending royalties to the North paid by South Korean broadcasters and news outlets for using North Korea's publications.

The foundation, however, refused to pay the compensation, claiming royalties are not subject to garnishment, and the Seoul Eastern District Court acknowledged the foundation's claim in a series of following suits.

The foundation is headed by Lim Jong-seok, former chief of staff to the previous President Moon Jae-in.

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

11. N. Korea orders provincial authorities to ensure military units on border have enough food

This is very important. As we worked on the scenarios for CONPLAN 5029 (for north Korean instability and regime collapse) one of the major scenarios postualted in the great work of Robert Collins' Seven Phases of Collapse is when the regime can no longer provide support to military units and must "prioritize" some military units. This will lead to a competition for resources among military units which could escalate to violent conflict and ultimately to force on force combat operations and civil war. The article below is an indication tat the regime is trying to prevent this by shifting some of the burden for feeding the military to local political units most likely because the regime may be growing incapable of supporting the entire from the national level.

I will say again, this bears watching. And we need to have contingency plans prepared.

N. Korea orders provincial authorities to ensure military units on border have enough food

Some North Koreans are complaining that “feeding the army is a problem for the nation to resolve, not local party committees or people’s committees"

By Lee Chae Un - 2022.08.24 3:01pm

dailynk.com

North Korean soldier stationed at the Sino-DPRK border. (Roman Harak, Flickr, Creative Commons)

The North Korean government recently ordered provincial party and administrative organizations in the China-North Korea border region to make sure military units guarding the border have enough food, Daily NK has learned.

According to a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong Province on Tuesday, immediately after a recent meeting to review the nation’s emergency quarantine efforts, North Korea’s government issued an order to provincial party committees and people’s committees to “resolve the food problem of the sentries standing guard at the front line of the emergency quarantine.”

The order said that soldiers “silently carrying out their duties” along the “front line of emergency disease control efforts” must not go hungry.

In particular, the order implored provincial party committees and people’s committees to “take direct charge and resolve the food issues of the border guard and Storm Corps soldiers” guarding the frontier.

The order also called on party committees to take charge of freeing up food to ensure food makes it to soldiers’ families. This directive appears aimed at making sure soldiers can dedicate themselves to their duties without worrying about their loved ones.

The party committee of North Hamgyong Province responded to the order by gathering leading party, state and legal officials as well as leading officials at other agencies and enterprises for an emergency meeting on Aug. 12. The meeting discussed taking charge of freeing up food for the border guard’s 27th Brigade and Storm Corps, which are currently enforcing security along the border.

The provincial party committee conveyed the party’s orders and ideas to the meeting’s participants, and concluded the meeting by calling on cities and counties to find as much reserve grain as possible to send to the soldiers guarding the border, “even if they have to tighten their belts again.”

In fact, the COVID-19 crisis — which has dragged on for over two years — has had a profound impact on the food situation of soldiers deployed to enforce the border closure. In the case of the border guard’s 27th Brigade in North Hamgyong Province, the unit has not received rations in months, and is barely surviving on corn-on-the-cob and gruel. Soldiers from the unit sometimes even raid civilian homes for food.

The lack of food is impacted how well the soldiers are guarding the border, with lax patrols among the border guard a frequent occurence. Locals have taken advantage of this to engage in smuggling and to defect into China.

North Korean authorities have responded to this situation by ordering local party committees and people’s committees to “unquestioningly resolve” food problems suffered by soldiers manning the frontier, the source told Daily NK.

However, some North Koreans are reportedly expressing discontent with how the authorities are passing the buck, complaining that “feeding the army is a problem for the nation to resolve, not local party committees or people’s committees.”

Indeed, the source said the government has once again “dumped the issue of feeding soldiers onto local party committees.”

“In fact, there’s nothing much [local authorities] can do because all financial resources and food have been exhausted due to the fallout from COVID-19,” the source said. “But because the government ordered [efforts to ensure military units along the border are fed], [local authorities] are holding meetings as a formality, just pretending to discuss the matter.”

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

12. N. Korea’s breadbasket suffers damage due to rains and winds

Tough times are ahead. And there is likely to be no relief valve for this suffering. Without significant trade with China and acceptance of international food aid, we may see a scale of suffering as great if not greater than occurred during the Arduous March of the famine of 1994-1996.

N. Korea’s breadbasket suffers damage due to rains and winds

Some farmers even believe they will get no share of the fall harvest because of the damage done to farmland and crops by rain and wind this season, a source said

By Kim Chae Hwan - 2022.08.25 9:10am

dailynk.com

North Korean farmers in South Hwanghae Province cleaning up a damaged farm field after Typhoon Lingling in 2019. (Rodong Sinmun)

Farmland and crops in some parts of North Korea’s two Hwanghae provinces, considered the country’s breadbasket, have suffered damage due to recent rains and winds, Daily NK has learned.

According to a Daily NK source in North Korea on Tuesday, recent torrential rains have flooded hectares of rice paddies and bean patches in North Hwanghae Province’s Kumchon County, Tosan County and Changpung County, while high winds have blown down corn stalks and caused other crop damage.

In some parts of South Hwanghae Province, including Chongdan County, Paechon County and Yonan County, torrential rains and strong winds destroyed farmland and damaged crops, with collective farms in Chongdan County suffering the worst damage.

In fact, at collective farms in Chongdan County’s Ungok-ri and Chongjong-ri, not only have fields been flooded, but homes and facilities have been destroyed, resulting in casualties.

North Korea’s government, however, has done nothing to respond, forcing some of the people who lost their homes to temporarily live in work-only lounges, day care centers and kindergartens.

Torrential rains and strong winds may have battered the two Hwanghae provinces, but North Korean authorities have simply called for safety measures to reduce damage in the agricultural sector. No mention has been made of the losses suffered in the region.

With North Korea broadly promoting its “victory” over COVID-19, declared during a recent meeting to review national quarantine efforts, the authorities appear to be avoiding mention of natural disasters, which could throw cold water on the self-celebratory mood.

Daily NK’s source said that prior preparations were made to reduce damage to farmland and crops during the rainy season, but “preventing damage from continuous torrential rains and strong winds isn’t easy.”

“Even now, recovery work is fully underway at farms in South Hwanghae Province and North Hwanghae Province,” he added.

Whether North Korean farmers eat or starve depends on the results of the year’s farming. Even if the year’s farming goes well, the actual share of the crop distributed to farmers after the state takes its allotted cut is woefully insufficient, so farmers often receive no share at all.

Some farmers even believe they will get no share of the fall harvest because of the damage done to farmland and crops by rain and wind this season, the source added.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

13. North Korea Has Been Expanding and Modernising this Key Airfield: Are New Fighter Jet Deliveries Incoming?

Note the comment about the north receiving new MIG 29's from Russia.

I would think this is possible. Certainly the regime is trying to improve its warfighting capabilities. Though the MiG 29 is no match for the ROK and US air forces, additional aircraft will provide some additional capabilities as quantity has a quality all its own. (and more targets for ROK and US pilots to become aces). The important point is that while the modernization of nKPA air forces indicates the regime's warfighting intent, it would take many years and many many billions of dollars for the north to be able to compete with the ROK and US air forces. And it is nearly impossible for the regime to invest in such capabilities.

Images at the link.

North Korea Has Been Expanding and Modernising this Key Airfield: Are New Fighter Jet Deliveries Incoming?

August-19th-2022

https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/north-korea-expanding-airfield-sunchon

Although the most conspicuous areas of North Korea’s military modernisation efforts have been its ground forces and strategic missile forces, with the former receiving new generations of equipment ranging from uniforms to armour and artillery while the latter made the country only the third in the world to field hypersonic glide vehicles from 2021, the air force has also gained investment for modernisation. Among the country's armed services the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Air Force has struggled the most with modernisation efforts over the past 30 years, largely due to the fact that combat aircraft are the area where North Korea’s defence sector is least self reliant while ground equipment, surface combatants, and both strategic and tactical submarines have long been produced domestically. Limited air force inventory modernisation has included indigenous production of transport aircraft, most notably lightweight radar evading propeller driven craft for special forces missions, as well as a fast growing range of drones. The country previously also produced MiG-29 fighters under license with Russian support, which began in the 1990s and saw over 20 fighters built in Korea at a conservative estimate. The state of this production line over the past decade, and whether it has continued to receive Russian support and inputs, remains uncertain. Both drones and the fighter fleet have been highlighted by the Korean leadership in recent years as areas where modernisation efforts should be focused.

North Korean MiG-29, Su-25 and MiG-21 Combat Jets

A notable indicator of North Korean interest in modernising its air force, and its fighter fleet in particular, has been the work initiated in 2021 at one of its most critical air bases, Sunchon Airfield located 45 kilometres northeast of Pyongyang, where the main runway was successfully lengthened and the aircraft shelters, aprons and taxiways improved. Sunchon previously hosted the KPA Air Force’s most modern classes of tactical combat jet the MiG-29 fighter and Su-25 attack jet, both of which were first acquired from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. While state of the art at the time, the extent of modernisation over the past three decades remains unknown and their ability to seriously threaten U.S. or South Korean fighter units armed with new fifth generation aircraft has been brought to serious question. The limited capabilities of its fighter fleet has led North Korea to invest more heavily in ground based air defence systems, such as the long ranged Pyongae-5 (KN-06) which entered service in 2017, and in assets capable of striking enemy airfields such as KN-23 ballistic missiles, to asymmetrically compensate for its disadvantages.

North Korean MiG-29s, Su-25s and Il-28s at Wonsan-Kalma Airport

The runway at Sunchon is estimated to have been extended to approximately 2800 metres, with a new north apron having been constructed. Most notably, however, a new taxiway appears to lead directly from the north apron to an underground facility inside a hill adjacent to the airfield. North Korea has long built storage facilities and at times even entire airfields underground, and provided assistance constructing such facilities to Vietnam and China in the past, which reflects part of its broader expertise in constructing fortifications against aerial bombardment. While it is expected that MiG-29s and Su-25s will return to Sunchon Airfield after work on the facility is completed, whether the KPA Air Force will be able to acquire new combat aircraft from abroad remains highly questionable. Western drafted sanctions resolutions passed through the United Nations Security Council prohibit the sale of armaments including combat aircraft to North Korea, although so long as those aircraft provided are from classes that the country already fields such sales could well be deniable.

As North Korea has moved to strengthen defence ties with neighbouring Russia, and the Russian backed self proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, the possibility that Russia will consider resuming deliveries of MiG-29s or other fighter classes to North Korea, possibly MiG-23s or MiG-21BiSs which the country also acquired in the 1980s and 90s respectively, cannot be ruled out. Russia is thought to have hundreds of MiG-29s in storage, along with at least some MiG-23s and possibly a number of MiG-21s. The KPA in turn is according to Russian sources set to deploy assets to support the Russian-led war effort in Eastern Ukraine which began in February and may provide important opportunities for Pyongyang to form new partnerships, gain key combat experience and undermine Western efforts to isolate it.

14. Democratic Party of Korea turns deaf ear to North Korean human rights law

The Democratic Party of Korea needs to reverse its appeasement of the Km family regime. It needs to follow human rights law and it needs to repeal the "anti-leaflet law "which is actually giving aid and comfort to the regime by helping to defend the regime against its existential threat: information.

Democratic Party of Korea turns deaf ear to North Korean human rights law

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

A North Korean flag flutters at a village in North Korea, in this photo taken on July 19 near the South Korean side of the truce village of Panmunjom inside the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. Reuters-Yonhap

Despite opposition party's inaction, gov't makes progress in some areas

By Jung Min-ho

South Korea's main opposition party has repeatedly ignored calls for the implementation of the North Korean Human Rights Act, a law that has remained in name only since it was passed more than six years ago.

An official at the Ministry of Unification told The Korea Times Thursday that the National Assembly has not responded to the government's request to recommend 10 directors of the board at a foundation for North Korean human rights ― a prerequisite for its establishment.

"Whenever we had an opportunity, such as Minister Kwon Young-se's visit to the National Assembly, we asked for cooperation. But it has not answered our written request sent July 25," the official said.

The blame falls on the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), which is responsible for picking five people out of a total of 12 director positions. The ruling People Power Party is required to select another five and the ministry should name the remaining two. After the process is finished, one of them should be elected as the foundation's chief.

During a meeting at the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee last week, Kwon said he was briefed that only the ruling party selected its candidates, and asked the DPK for cooperation.

Unification Minister Kwon Young-se speaks during a meeting at the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee at the Assembly building in Seoul, Aug. 19. Newsis

However, the DPK appears to be determined to block the implementation of the law through its inaction.

On Tuesday, Rep. Woo Sang-ho, its interim leader, rejected the ruling party's offer to move it forward, along with promptly appointing a special inspector for the office of President Yoon Suk-yeol. Since he took office in May, the DPK has been trying to fill the post to investigate potential corruption among the president's family or top-level aides.

When the DPK reluctantly approved the human rights bill in 2016, it was under immense political pressure to do so after North Korea's fourth nuclear weapons test earlier that year. But soon afterward, then President Park Geun-hye faced a crisis following an influence-peddling scandal involving her confidant. She was eventually impeached.

Her successor, Moon Jae-in, immediately shifted the previous North Korea policy and took a more conciliatory approach, staying away from the issues Pyongyang's elites would not like, such as their gross violations of the human rights of ordinary people.

Setting up the foundation may take some time. But in the areas where cooperation from the DPK is not required, the Yoon administration has made noticeable progress.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed Lee Shin-hwa as its new envoy for North Korean human rights last month according to the law, filling the post left vacant since the inaugural ambassador, Lee Jung-hoon, left office in September 2017.

Kim Ki-woon, the vice minister of unification, presided over its first council meeting for North Korean human rights issues in two years and 3 months, Thursday, with senior officials from related government departments and agencies taking part. Issues such as how to measure and document the North's human rights situation were discussed there.

According to the ministry, Kwon is scheduled to meet the leaders of North Korean human rights groups based here on Friday.

North Korea has not reacted to such moves directly. But earlier this month, Uriminzokkiri, a propaganda website linked to the regime, blasted the South for its efforts to shed light on the issue, calling the foundation an organization "for slandering."

According to the U.S. Department of State's annual human rights report released on April 12, there were credible reports of "numerous" human rights abuses committed in North Korea, including unlawful killings, torture and degrading treatment by the regime.

"The government took no credible steps to prosecute officials who committed human rights abuses or corruption … Impunity for human rights abuses and corruption continued to be a widespread problem," the report says.

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

15. Sending information into North Korea is vital, Seoul's new human rights envoy says

Thank you Professor Lee. You are spot on here.

We need a sophisticated and comprehensive information and influence activities campaign built on a foundation of a human rights upfront approach.

Here is a draft paper from 2016 that provides some of my views on such a campaign. (and attached)

Information and Influence Campaign in north Korea

When, Why, and How?

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1tHYBklUxFSfFr97e5PTZcPbP6QGI4nyK/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=102384435176718447584&rtpof=true&sd=true

Sending information into North Korea is vital, Seoul's new human rights envoy says

By Thomas Maresca

upi.com

Lee Shin-hwa, Seoul's new envoy for North Korean human rights, said Wednesday that it is vital to keep spreading information from the outside world into the North. Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI

SEOUL, Aug. 24 (UPI) -- Sending information from the outside world into the secretive North Korean state is vital, Seoul's new envoy for human rights said Wednesday, even as Pyongyang has angrily condemned such efforts.

"I do believe disseminating information to North Korean citizens is very important through various means," Lee Shin-hwa, South Korea's ambassador of international cooperation on North Korea human rights, told reporters at a briefing in downtown Seoul.

"North Korean ordinary people have the full right to have open and transparent information on what is going on around the world," she said.

North Korea has reacted with fury in the past to defectors sending balloons carrying content including leaflets and USB drives across the border. In June 2020, Pyongyang severed all communications with Seoul and blew up an inter-Korean liaison office over what it called South Korea's failure to rein in the defectors.

Lee said she was not in a position to officially comment on methods for delivering the information into North Korea.

"I do believe there are many traditional and non-traditional or creative ways of sending information to fulfill [North Koreans'] right to know," she said.

More recently, North Korea blamed its COVID-19 outbreak on balloons and other "alien things" that had been sent across the border from the South.

Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, warned of a "deadly retaliatory" response if the South does not contain the balloons during a speech earlier this month.

Lee, a political science professor at Korea University, filled the human rights envoy position last month. It had been vacant since 2017, as the administration of President Moon Jae-in downplayed rights issues in an effort to foster diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang.

Moon's government passed a law in December 2020 that prohibits sending propaganda or items such as flash drives into the North, drawing sharp criticism from political opponents and free speech advocates.

Current President Yoon Suk-yeol has looked to recalibrate Seoul's stance toward Pyongyang, taking a stronger defense posture and reviving several North Korean human rights initiatives since taking office in May.

In addition to filling the ambassador post, Yoon's administration will be holding the first inter-agency government meeting on its North Korean human rights policy in two years on Thursday. Seoul is also attempting to launch the government-run North Korea Human Rights Foundation, which has been on hold since 2016.

"It is great that South Korea finally appointed a North Korea human rights ambassador after five years' absence," Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, a legal analyst with Seoul-based human rights NGO Transitional Justice Working Group, told UPI.

Shin called sending information to North Korea "difficult but necessary and important for long-term change" and called on the Yoon administration to abolish the anti-leafleting law.

He added that Seoul should take further steps, including revitalizing an official North Korea Human Rights Archive and formally asking Pyongyang about the fate of two escapees who were forcibly returned to the North by South Korean authorities in 2019.

Lee on Wednesday said South Korea would take a "leading role" in bringing North Korean human rights issues to the international community.

The rights envoy also called for diplomatic pressure to urge Beijing not to deport North Korean defectors who have fled into China.

The flow of North Korean defectors to South Korea has trickled to a near standstill over the past few years, with only 63 escapees arriving in 2021, down from 1,047 in 2019, according to Seoul's unification ministry.

An estimated 1,500 North Koreans are being detained in China while borders remain closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a United Nations human rights expert said in March. They are at risk of being repatriated once the border reopens, where they will likely receive severe punishment in political prison camps.

"Consideration should be given to allowing the Chinese government to engage in negotiations to send them to a third country through quiet diplomacy," Lee said.

Lee is slated to meet with the new U.N. special rapporteur on North Korean human rights, Elizabeth Salmon, on her first visit to South Korea next week.

upi.com

16. 3 Things Pentagon Worries About in Use of Nuclear Weapons

Excerpts:

If the U.S., the other side, or both sides used a nuclear weapon, the goal of the U.S. is to return to the state of nuclear deterrence as quickly as possible. To do this, the U.S. has three basic response options:

—An intentional escalation (as a show of force or as a punitive strike).

—A response in kind (firing back a nuclear weapon of similar yield at a similar target).

—A proportional response (that may or may not involve a nuclear weapon).

...

1. How can a U.S. response be proportional if it doesn’t include use of a nuclear weapon? Again, how did the adversary employ the weapon, with what aim, and what was the yield of the warhead?

...

2. With a response in kind, the U.S. would execute a nuclear strike on the nation that attacked us first, using the same yield of weapon against the same type of target.

...

3. Responding to an adversary’s use of a nuclear weapon with an intentional escalation may seem to be the most provocative option, but this could be the most appropriate response in some scenarios.

3 Things Pentagon Worries About in Use of Nuclear Weapons

dailysignal.com · by Matt Schoenfeldt · August 24, 2022

Under the theory of nuclear deterrence, military strategists’ goal is to make use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield untenable by either side and to avoid escalation to full-scale nuclear war.

Considering this goal is particularly timely and poignant as Russia’s war on Ukraine continues to rage after six months, China stokes tensions with Taiwan, and North Korea makes aggressive moves.

Conventional nuclear integration is an ill-defined term used by military strategists as the basis for internal theater planning, when they contemplate employing and using nuclear weapons in support of troops on the ground.

Strategists use this concept to plan for use of nuclear weapons in conjunction or support of the operations of traditional forces; conventional nuclear integration aims to return any nuclear engagement—whether an adversary’s use of a nuclear weapon or a U.S. first strike—to a state of deterrence.

One caution: Many imprecisely use the term “tactical nuclear weapons” to describe the types of weapons that may be used on the battlefield in situations involving opposing ground or surface forces. It simply isn’t a helpful way to look at using or planning to use nuclear weapons, however, since the word “tactical” implies limited to traditional military forces arrayed against each other as the lowest echelon of warfare. Additionally, any use of nuclear weapons has strategic implications, the highest echelon of warfare.

Much more important distinctions include how nuclear weapons are employed, toward what aim, and the explosive yield of the warheads.

If the U.S., the other side, or both sides used a nuclear weapon, the goal of the U.S. is to return to the state of nuclear deterrence as quickly as possible. To do this, the U.S. has three basic response options:

—An intentional escalation (as a show of force or as a punitive strike).

—A response in kind (firing back a nuclear weapon of similar yield at a similar target).

—A proportional response (that may or may not involve a nuclear weapon).

Unpacking Response Options

Each of these three response options carries different risks that must be considered in reaching the U.S. goal of returning to a state of nuclear deterrence.

It is worth exploring these options to illustrate the complexities of using one or more nuclear weapons on the battlefield and increase understanding of U.S. options in such a scenario, where the goal is avoiding full-scale nuclear war. In reverse order, then:

1. How can a U.S. response be proportional if it doesn’t include use of a nuclear weapon? Again, how did the adversary employ the weapon, with what aim, and what was the yield of the warhead?

If an adversary’s tactical unit employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against a purely military target, perhaps responding with another nuclear weapon against a similar target wouldn’t be an effective response.

If the goal is to return to deterrence, using conventional weapons in response—to achieve a similar effect on our adversary’s military—may be more effective than responding with a nuclear weapon.

The U.S. also could claim a “high road” response and gain national and international support for perceived restraint in not responding with a nuclear weapon.

2. With a response in kind, the U.S. would execute a nuclear strike on the nation that attacked us first, using the same yield of weapon against the same type of target.

On the surface, the option of a response in kind seems appealing. But often it is the least desirable option, especially when the U.S. goal is to return to a state of nuclear deterrence.

This option also assumes that the U.S. response can find a similar target and have a similar impact, and that the U.S. can communicate this intent to the adversary.

A nuclear strike as a response in kind could escalate or normalize the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Escalating to a full-scale nuclear war would mean an adversary using nuclear weapons against nonmilitary targets, including U.S. cities and infrastructure.

This doesn’t mean a response in kind is always a bad option, however. Against an adversary such as North Korea, it could be a better option for a U.S. president than it would be against either China or Russia. North Korea not only has a limited nuclear arsenal, its delivery systems aren’t reliable.

If North Korea used a nuclear weapon on South Korea with limited success, it could be reasonable for the U.S. to respond with a low-yield weapon to demonstrate U.S. willingness to use its own nuclear capability, but not in an escalatory fashion. In this scenario, it seems reasonable that such a response could have a deterrent effect.

3. Responding to an adversary’s use of a nuclear weapon with an intentional escalation may seem to be the most provocative option, but this could be the most appropriate response in some scenarios.

Russia has a stated policy of “escalate to de-escalate.” In a U.S. response to a Russian nuclear strike, a show of force and an element of a punitive strike could be effective to return to the state of deterrence.

This would be especially true if the U.S. response were more than a nuclear strike and included elements of cyberspace and space-based targets to demonstrate that America holds the upper hand in any possible nuclear engagements and could cripple Russian options.

Such a U.S. response could make it clear to Russia that retaining the capability it possesses is a better option than continued escalation that could remove Russia’s parity on the nuclear stage.

It Isn’t Just About Nukes

Although conventional nuclear integration is only one component of nuclear strategy, it is important to understand the concept.

A conventional nuclear integration assessment (that is, looking at the use of a nuclear weapon as part of a wholistic assessment of a broader situation)is much more effective than attempting to classify a nuclear weapon as “tactical,” since “tactical” is an artificial distinction with no real bearing on strategy.

Any attempt to classify a nuclear weapon as “tactical” or “strategic” is a futile exercise that doesn’t lead to increased understanding of the scenario in which the nuclear weapon was used. It also limits the U.S. military’s ability to formulate the proper response to return to the desired state of deterrence.

It also is important to understand that America’s options include more than responding with our nuclear arsenal. Conventional nuclear integration is about blending nuclear options with other elements of military power at the battlefield level and attempting to avoid the use of nuclear weapons on nonmilitary targets.

Thus, any U.S. response to an adversary’s use of a nuclear weapon must account for how best to return to a state of nuclear deterrence.

Communicating the U.S. response is as important as the effectiveness of the response. This is equally true in all three broad categories of options outlined above.

If the U.S. were to conduct a non-nuclear response as a proportional move, it would be important to ensure that the adversary doesn’t see this as U.S. unwillingness to use our nuclear arsenal if needed.

If we were able to respond with purely conventional weapons and achieve a military objective similar to the one that the adversary resorted to nuclear weapons to achieve, this could be a powerful message.

But this approach requires the U.S. to communicate clearly to the adversary, the American public, and other nations the intent behind our response.

What America Has to Get Across

To prevent a response-in-kind approach from escalating, the U.S. must accompany it with two messages.

One message would convey the U.S. desire to return to a state of nuclear deterrence and the other would convey that the U.S. is willing and able to make a more devastating response if pressed to do so.

If the U.S. responds to an adversary’s use of a nuclear weapon with an intentional escalation, we first must successfully demonstrate that the response could cripple the adversary.

But the United States also must communicate a desire to return to a state of nuclear deterrence, or risk that the adversary will calculate that it needs to empty its nuclear arsenal before losing the capability to strike back.

Make no mistake: Use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield is a terrifying proposition. But it is important to understand that the scenario of a limited nuclear exchange doesn’t have to lead to full-scale nuclear war.

Understanding U.S. options and clearly communicating possible responses to a nuclear adversary is crucial to returning to a state of deterrence.

To do this, though, America must retain flexible nuclear options and a military edge in both cyberspace and space-based systems.

The ultimate aim of the U.S. military is to deter adversaries from taking actions that are counter to the interests of the U.S. or key allies.

Once we realize deterrence at all levels is linked, America’s nuclear posture gains significantly in importance as part of our overall military power.

The concept of conventional nuclear integration is just one component. But if the U.S. fails at this stage, it drastically increases the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used on the battlefield—and the risk of all-out nuclear war.

Matt Schoenfeldt

Matt Schoenfeldt is a retired Army field artillery officer with an extensive background in targeting. He served at the Pentagon supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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dailysignal.com · by Matt Schoenfeldt · August 24, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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