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Quotes of the Day:
"The best way to examine truth is to examine things as they really are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy ourselves, or have been taught by others to imagine."
– John Locke
"People often claim to hunger for truth, but seldom like the taste when it's served up..."
– George R.R. Martin
"I have a foreboding of America in my children's or grand children's time – – when the United States is a service and information economy; when nearly all the manufacturing industries have slipped away to other countries; when awesome technological powers are in the hands of a very few, and no one representing the public interest, can even grasp the issues; when the people have lost the ability to set their own agendas or knowledgeably question those in authority; when, clutching our crystals in nervously consulting our horoscopes, our critical faculties in decline, unable to distinguish between what feels good, and what's true, we slide, almost without noticing, back into superstition and darkness..."
– Carl Sagan, "The Demon Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark"
1. America Needs a Strategy for China
2. In Beijing’s Quest for Control of the South China Sea, a New Flashpoint Emerges
3. Zelensky’s Invasion of Russia Sends a Message to Moscow—and Washington
4. Live Updates: Israel Strikes Hezbollah in Lebanon and Says It Thwarted Major Attack
5. Australia offers U.S. a vast new military launchpad in China conflict
6. Snap Insight: Israel and Hezbollah exchange heavy fire, but all eyes are on Iran
7. China, Philippines clash in South China Sea despite efforts to rebuild trust
8. China 'strongly dissatisfied' with fresh US sanctions
9. The cracks are appearing in Putin's relationship with China
10. The fall of Vladimir Putin is now only a matter of time
11. Military Might - United States vs. China: A Great Power Competition Report
12. The Circle of Life: The Four-Year National Policy and Strategy Cycle
13. Seawolf-Class: The U.S. Navy's Great Mistake Can't Ever Be Fixed
14. Preparing for a Less Arrogant America
15. ‘Great Game’ Unfolds in Pacific as US, China Vie for Backing
16. Air Force Academy restricted all cadets to base as classes started, leading to meat shortages
17. A new Asian order
18. Palantir taps former GOP Rep. Mike Gallagher as new defense business head
19. Army progressing toward Theater Information Advantage Detachments deployments
20. Amber Strapponi ’26: Inside the Secure World of Cybersecurity with Joint Special Operations Command
21. “Operation Unsinkable” - The Army's Ambitious Plan to Stay Afloat in the Pacific
1. America Needs a Strategy for China
With our global interests and responsibilities we have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.
But these are key points and we need to examine our assumption(s) on strategic competition.
Excerpt:
Contrast that with the present day: The cold war with China has begun without an end in mind. American strategy lacks a guiding objective. We have an emerging bipartisan consensus on the short-term means of U.S. grand strategy. Republicans and Democrats increasingly agree on the need to arm Taiwan to deter a Chinese communist invasion and reduce U.S. economic dependency on China. But there is little discussion, let alone consensus, on the long-term ends of U.S. grand strategy.
...
Rush Doshi, a former leading China strategist in the Biden White House, concedes that “managed competition” is unlikely to resolve any “fundamental disagreements"
...
At a minimum, as we near the end of the beginning of the new cold war, we need to begin a debate about its end.
Can we manage this competition? And more to the point, what are we really competing for? Are we competing for the same thing(s)? What is the "guiding objective" for our strategy?
My China thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions.
What are we seeking to do? (a positive objective and not simply to counter China).
Mr. Gallagher is asking for our end state. As LTG Dubik might ask, what is the acceptable durable political arrangement that will sustain, protect, and advance US interests? We need to identify and articulate that. And achieve it.
America Needs a Strategy for China
Biden’s team seemed to be developing one. Then the Ukraine war diverted its attention and resources.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/america-needs-a-china-strategy-biden-team-lacking-plan-after-ukraine-diverted-focus-a622932a?mod=opinion_feat2_commentary_pos1
By Mike Gallagher
Aug. 22, 2024 4:50 pm ET
Illustration: David Klein
The Cold War began with the end in mind. As early as 1947 George Kennan stated explicitly that U.S. policy should aim to “increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate . . . which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Americans still had bitter arguments over our approach to the Soviet Union—the 1952 Republican platform, for example, rejected President Harry S. Truman’s “futile and immoral” policy of containment. The ensuing debate, however, focused on the means of containment rather than whether containment itself was the proper end for American strategy. Historian John Lewis Gaddis argues that over the decades that followed there was an “implicit agreement” among the foreign-policy establishment on containment’s purposes that never wavered.
Contrast that with the present day: The cold war with China has begun without an end in mind. American strategy lacks a guiding objective. We have an emerging bipartisan consensus on the short-term means of U.S. grand strategy. Republicans and Democrats increasingly agree on the need to arm Taiwan to deter a Chinese communist invasion and reduce U.S. economic dependency on China. But there is little discussion, let alone consensus, on the long-term ends of U.S. grand strategy.
The Biden administration briefly appeared willing to accept the reality of a new cold war and offer something approximating a long-term objective. The White House’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy called for “building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to United States [and] our allies and partners.” In essence, the administration sought constrainment—to constrain Beijing’s operating environment. Thirteen days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. As the Biden team’s focus moved to the conflict in Europe (and later the Middle East), its approach to China softened significantly.
Now the only stated end of American strategy toward China seems to be to avoid at all costs a cold war that could erupt into a major crisis. Thus, President Biden launched an “all hands on deck effort” to intensify “detailed, dogged diplomacy” with China. While in Asia last year, Mr. Biden repeatedly reassured regional leaders that he isn’t trying to contain or hurt China. The priority, according to national security adviser Jake Sullivan, is to “manage competition [with China] to reduce tensions and find a way forward on shared challenges” such as climate change, public health and the risks of artificial intelligence. The administration seeks to “outcompete” rather than contain or constrain China. Mr. Sullivan disavows any expectation—or even aspiration—for a “transformative end state like the one that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union.”
Many in the Biden administration have framed the resulting lack of clarity on China as strategic wisdom. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell believes a confrontational approach is “reckless” and “unproductive.” He previously criticized what he calls a “neo-containment policy.” Rush Doshi, a former leading China strategist in the Biden White House, concedes that “managed competition” is unlikely to resolve any “fundamental disagreements,” and he fears that seeking victory would “turn the U.S.-Chinese rivalry into an existential one for China’s leadership,” giving them “little reason to exercise restraint.” The best we can achieve is a stable but uneasy balance of power, in which the U.S.-led coalition denies Beijing regional hegemony.
There are at least two problems with the Biden approach. First, the Chinese Communist Party—which is pursuing global hegemony and openly talks about the struggle with the U.S. in existential terms—is unlikely to settle for a stable regional balance of power. This is especially true if American policymakers continue to let the ghost of the Cold War spook them even from uttering the word containment—let alone aggressively pursuing it or constrainment as a long-term goal. We are creating a permissive environment that feeds Xi Jinping’s appetite for conquest and invites war.
Consider that the Biden administration, along with allies in the Group of Seven, recently called out China for fueling the Russian war machine, conducting persistent cyberattacks, engaging in aggressive military activity in the South China Sea, employing forced labor in Xinjiang, and undermining our democratic institutions (a nonexhaustive list). Does that sound like the behavior of a nation exercising restraint in response to Mr. Biden’s skillfully managed competition and detailed, dogged diplomacy?
Second, strategic competition with China will be difficult and expensive. There is no easy or cheap way to rebuild and modernize the U.S. military to prevent World War III or undo two decades of Chinese integration into the global economy. American leaders must convince their constituents to sacrifice, and nobody wants to sacrifice much in pursuit of “managed competition” or “a stable balance of power” or some fragile equilibrium in which the U.S. constantly exercises restraint as China salami-slices its way to regional and global dominance.
Better to level with the American people, mobilizing their patriotism and creativity in pursuit of cold war victory. This means constantly highlighting Beijing’s malevolent campaign to destroy the free world. It means stating plainly that America doesn’t merely want to deter China’s designs on Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. It means containing the Communist Party’s attempts to export its techno-totalitarian model of governance and rolling back its control of the commanding heights of critical technology.
Even without a president effectively using the bully pulpit and aggressively making the case for how we win the new cold war, recent polling suggests Americans are starting to understand the stakes. Perhaps this is because the people are often smarter than their political leaders. They have seen Beijing’s deliberate subsidization of illicit fentanyl precursor exports kill 200 Americans a day and more a year than died in the Vietnam War. They have seen a virus that likely escaped from a Chinese lab kill even more and upend the lives of everyone on the planet.
At a minimum, as we near the end of the beginning of the new cold war, we need to begin a debate about its end.
Mr. Gallagher, a Journal contributor, is head of defense for Palantir Technologies and a distinguished fellow at the Hudson Institute. He represented Wisconsin’s Eighth Congressional District (2017-24) and was chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.
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Replicator’s goals of drone deployment and business development process change are both worthy objectives. But given the Pentagon's antiquated culture, is two years enough time to procure more hard power faster? Photo: Dept. of Defense
Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the August 23, 2024, print edition as 'America Needs a Strategy for China'.
2. In Beijing’s Quest for Control of the South China Sea, a New Flashpoint Emerges
Again, this is not new to Philippine Ambassador Romualdez:
“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”
– Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024
In Beijing’s Quest for Control of the South China Sea, a New Flashpoint Emerges
China is showing a growing willingness to escalate in the David-and-Goliath fight with the Philippines over the vital trade route
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/in-beijings-quest-for-control-of-the-south-china-sea-a-new-flashpoint-emerges-5ac29fc5?mod=hp_lead_pos10
By Niharika MandhanaFollow
Updated Aug. 25, 2024 12:04 am ET
For months, the Philippines has pushed back against Beijing in the South China Sea. China has responded with increasing hostility, directing its ire against Philippine vessels and crew.
Now, a 97-meter coast-guard ship has become a new symbol of the David-and-Goliath fight between America’s top geopolitical rival and an ally it has pledged to defend in the event of an armed attack. Tensions around the vessel this week have shown China’s willingness to escalate its use of forceful tactics to tighten its control of the South China Sea.
TAIWAN
CHINA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINES
Second Thomas Shoal
Palawan
Sabina Shoal
BRUNEI
200 miles
MALAYSIA
INDO.
200 km
Since mid-April, the Philippines’ BRP Teresa Magbanua has stood anchored at a stretch of low-lying reefs called Sabina Shoal, 75 nautical miles off the Philippines’ western coast. Manila says it wants to keep a close eye on the site—which lies within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone—after it detected an intensifying presence of China’s fishing militia and marine research vessels there, as well as signs of what it suspects could be preliminary land reclamation.
China has demanded that the Philippines withdraw the ship. It says much of the South China Sea belongs to Beijing—including the uninhabited Sabina Shoal, which lies 630 nautical miles from China—and rejects a 2016 ruling by an international tribunal that said its claims have no legal basis.
It says the Teresa Magbanua, anchored for months, marks an attempt by Manila to create a long-term presence at Sabina Shoal. Meanwhile, dozens of Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels persistently patrol, swarm and monitor contested reefs and rocks across the South China Sea, hundreds of miles from its coast.
Matters came to a head this week when China sent its coast guard to chase away its Philippine counterparts. Beijing says it believes the pair of Philippine vessels was on its way to deliver supplies to the Teresa Magbanua. Collisions ensued, leaving the Philippine ships with large holes and heavy damage.
Manila said the vessels were headed elsewhere and that China’s coast guard aggressively rammed them. China accused the Philippines of causing the collision.
Mischief Reef, one of China’s artificial-islands-turned-military-bases in the region. Photo: Ezra Acayan/Getty Images
A Vietnamese Coast Guard ship seen from a Philippine Coast Guard vessel during a joint maritime exercise in the waters off Manila Bay. Photo: Francis R. Malasig/Shutterstock
“Essentially what they did was that they violently interdicted the Philippines’ freedom of navigation on the high seas within the [Philippines’] exclusive economic zone,” said Raymond Powell, director of an initiative called SeaLight, which tracks China’s activities in the South China Sea, at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. “Their approach is that they can’t allow the Philippines to win or to visibly contest.”
Since President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.came to power in 2022, the Philippines’ security policies have undergone a shift. Manila has challenged China’s ubiquitous presence in the South China Sea, sought to regain the ability to patrol contested areas, broadcast aggressive Chinese tactics to galvanize global support and strengthened its alliance with the U.S.
Each step of the way, China has doubled down, resulting in risky confrontations at sea. It says it is protecting its sovereignty and maritime rights, and accuses the Philippines of stirring trouble. The threat of a dangerous escalation looms large.
For the Philippines, keeping a ship at Sabina Shoal indefinitely isn’t only burdensome—the country has only a handful of coast-guard vessels of the size of the Teresa Magbanua, while China has dozens of large vessels—but now also perilous. Beijing’s response this week suggests it plans to block any effort to either send supplies to the anchored vessel or replace it with another ship.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Photo: Lisa Marie David/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
That potentially creates the same escalatory dynamic at Sabina Shoal that for months existed at another reef, Second Thomas Shoal. That site hosts a small detachment of Filipino marines. Until last month, each time the Philippines sent ships to resupply the outpost, China sought to obstruct them with water cannons and ramming, and on one occasion threatened Filipino personnel with axes and knives.
A deal last month appeared to ease tensions there, at least for now, but similar confrontations could play out around Sabina Shoal—once again raising the potential for conflict and stretching the Philippines thin. Dozens of Chinese vessels can surge, often at short notice, from Mischief Reef—one of China’s artificial-islands-turned-military-bases—located just 50 nautical miles west of Sabina Shoal.
Another option for the Philippines would be to withdraw the coast guard ship. That, however, might be perceived as a win for China. More important, Beijing—which has dialed up its deployment of vessels at Sabina Shoal—may take permanent control of the site. It could potentially deny the Philippines access and create a new presence just 75 nautical miles from its coast.
Chinese-occupied islands/reefs
With built-on runway
Other islands/reefs
Potential Chinese military ranges from islands
Anti-aircraft missiles
Anti-ship missiles
Surface radar
Air radar
Fighter jets
TAIWAN
CHINA
VIETNAM
LAOS
Paracel
Islands
THAILAND
Scarborough
Shoal
SOUTH CHINA SEA
CAMBODIA
Subi
Reef
PHILIPPINES
Fiery Cross
Reef
Mischief
Reef
Spratly Islands
BRUNEI
MALAYSIA
100 miles
100 km
INDONESIA
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Max Rust/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
“It’s a Catch-22,” said Rommel Ong, who retired as a vice commander of the Philippine Navy in 2019. “There’s no way that we can leave Sabina Shoal anymore. If we leave, then most likely they’ll take over.”
Ong said the Philippines should avoid repeating what happened at Scarborough Shoal—another atoll—in 2012, when Philippine ships withdrew after a long standoff and China seized control. Now, Chinese coast guard and maritime militia are present there around the clock, blocking the Philippines from accessing its lagoon for fishing or patrols.
Occupying Sabina Shoal would advance China’s quest for control of the South China Sea, Ong said. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to turn the sea—a vital artery for shipping and commerce—into a Chinese lake where others have limited room to maneuver, he said.
The BRP Sierra Madre at the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. Photo: Eloisa Lopez/Reuters
U.S. and Philippine troops take part in joint military exercises in the Philippines. Photo: Ezra Acayan/Getty Images
For the Philippines, losing access to Sabina Shoal—and contending with a Chinese footprint there—would further complicate its ability to resupply its outpost on Second Thomas Shoal. Sabina Shoal serves as a rendezvous point for Philippine forces headed there.
Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said that China’s modus operandi has long been to gradually encroach on different sites in the South China Sea and unilaterally subvert the status quo. The Philippines had thwarted such attempts at Sabina Shoal, he said.
“By having a presence, it means that you’re not acquiescing to the Chinese presence,” said Koh. To do that, Koh said, even one ship was enough.
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
What is the best way to confront China’s ambitions in the South China Sea? Join the conversation below.
Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com
3. Zelensky’s Invasion of Russia Sends a Message to Moscow—and Washington
Excerpts:
The biggest risk for Ukraine is that diverting troops for the incursion will spread its forces too thin on the front line in the country’s east. Russian troops have ramped up assaults on the town of Chasiv Yar and now are just over 5 miles from the logistical hub of Pokrovsk.
If Russia makes greater gains there, it could place further pressure on Zelensky at home and increase international calls for him to initiate peace talks with Russia—at a time when he’s poorly placed to wring concessions from Putin.
“There’s a sense that this operation has boosted optimism and somewhat improved the government’s standing,” said Anton Hrushetskiy, director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, which conducts nationwide polls. “But whether that’s a short- or long-term effect depends on how the operation culminates and how bad things get in the east.”
U.S. officials say the Ukrainian objective in Kursk is threefold: force Russia to divert troops from Ukraine’s east; break the narrative of battlefield defeat; and improve Ukraine’s standing ahead of potential peace talks. For now, all three goals have been achieved, to a limited degree.
Zelensky’s Invasion of Russia Sends a Message to Moscow—and Washington
Ukraine’s audacious move across the border is an effort to show the world that the country is still in the fight
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/zelenskys-invasion-of-russia-sends-a-message-to-moscowand-washington-48eaef63?mod=latest_headlines
By Matthew LuxmooreFollow
and Alexander WardFollow
Updated Aug. 25, 2024 12:04 am ET
KYIV—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky marked his country’s Independence Day on Saturday with a video shot in the region where his armed forces launched a brazen offensive designed to send a message to Russia—and the West.
Russian President Vladimir Putin “will not dictate any of his red lines to us,” Zelensky said against the backdrop of forests and hills in Ukraine’s northern Sumy region. “Only Ukraine and Ukrainians will determine how to live, what path to take, and what choice to make.”
After a year of gradually losing ground on the battlefield, Zelensky made an audacious gamble to seize back the initiative. His bet is that the operation that began Aug. 6 will not only knock Russia off balance and force it to shift its troops, but also encourage the West to throw its weight more firmly behind Ukraine. Zelensky has been calling for more weapons and for U.S. permission to use long-range ATACMS missiles on Russian territory.
Zelensky also needs to maintain the faith of weary Ukrainians who have endured 2 ½ years of war. Increasingly, some are considering whether some kind of accommodation with Russia might be better than a slow suffocation. By boldly moving into Russia, Zelensky is trying to convince Ukrainians they have still got fight in them.
Since pouring armored vehicles and thousands of its best troops into Russia’s Kursk region in a lightning advance, Ukraine’s army has occupied almost 100 Russian settlements and taken as much territory as Russia has in Ukraine this year.
Zelensky has lauded the capture of some 2,000 Russian soldiers in Kursk. On Saturday, 115 of them were exchanged for the same number of Ukrainians who had languished in Russian captivity.
A battle-scarred building in Sudzha, one of the Russian settlements occupied by Ukraine’s army since it advanced across the border earlier this month. Photo: EPA/Shutterstock
Prisoners of war returned to Ukrainian territory Saturday, released from Russian captivity in a swap for captured Russian soldiers. Photo: EPA/Shutterstock
The evacuation of 130,000 residents from Kursk puts pressure on Putin, whose quarter-century rule has been underpinned by a promise of safeguarding security for Russians. It also shifted the prevailing narrative of a Ukraine unable to stop Russia’s military juggernaut.
President Biden’s administration was caught off guard. In contrast to previous battlefield moves, Ukraine kept the details of the operation quiet, U.S. officials said.
The U.S. was initially confused about why Ukraine had taken such a drastic move and what would come next. “Eyebrows were raised very high,” a senior administration official said.
Zelensky has said Ukraine purposefully kept even allies in the dark as he assumed they would say it was unrealistic as it crossed “the reddest of red lines” for Russia. He has said Russia’s muted response shows that the West has little to fear from Russian threats and should give stronger backing to Ukraine, including allowing strikes with longer-range missiles.
Ukrainian front line
Ukrainian advances near Kursk region
Russian forces
KURSK REGION
BELARUS
Kursk
RUSSIA
Sumy
Kyiv
Kharkiv
UKRAINE
Chasiv Yar
Pokrovsk
MOL.
Mariupol
Kherson
Odesa
Sea of Azov
CRIMEA
100 miles
Black Sea
100 km
Note: As of Aug. 22
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Andrew Barnett/WSJ
Now, the administration is cautiously waiting to see if Zelensky’s gamble will pay off. The U.S. is giving Ukraine space to carry out the operation while trying to avoid engaging on the issue publicly, officials say. From the White House and the Pentagon to the headquarters of U.S. European Command in Germany, officials are watching with cautious optimism.
“I think at some level, it shows, once again, sometimes the fragility of the Russian military security that they were seemingly unprepared for this event,” said Chris Maier, the top Pentagon official for special operations.
Publicly, Zelensky has said the goal of the Kursk incursion is in part to create a “buffer zone.” But at the Pentagon, senior officials still have questions—particularly whether and how Ukraine is planning to expand that zone, spokeswoman Sabrina Singh said on Thursday. Senior officials also aren’t convinced Ukraine can hold the area it has taken.
“Is their intention to continue to hold? Or, when they say they’re creating a buffer zone…how large are they going to expand?” Singh said. “These are some of the questions that we’re asking.”
Military columns rolling through Ukraine’s Sumy region in the north, as the army’s occupation of Russian territory continues. Photo: Svet Jacqueline for WSJ
A military vehicle drove past a destroyed Ukrainian vehicle near the border with Russia earlier this month. Ukraine risks spreading its front-line troops too thin. Photo: roman pilipey/AFP/Getty Images
Singh said Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is going to engage with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. The two last spoke on Aug. 20.
The biggest risk for Ukraine is that diverting troops for the incursion will spread its forces too thin on the front line in the country’s east. Russian troops have ramped up assaults on the town of Chasiv Yar and now are just over 5 miles from the logistical hub of Pokrovsk.
If Russia makes greater gains there, it could place further pressure on Zelensky at home and increase international calls for him to initiate peace talks with Russia—at a time when he’s poorly placed to wring concessions from Putin.
“There’s a sense that this operation has boosted optimism and somewhat improved the government’s standing,” said Anton Hrushetskiy, director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, which conducts nationwide polls. “But whether that’s a short- or long-term effect depends on how the operation culminates and how bad things get in the east.”
U.S. officials say the Ukrainian objective in Kursk is threefold: force Russia to divert troops from Ukraine’s east; break the narrative of battlefield defeat; and improve Ukraine’s standing ahead of potential peace talks. For now, all three goals have been achieved, to a limited degree.
Ukrainians who have spent years calling for Zelensky’s administration to expedite negotiations over the fate of soldiers stuck in Russian jails have also found something tangible to pin their hopes on: The realistic prospect that their husbands and sons will return home in further prisoner swaps involving Russians whom Kyiv says it took captive in Kursk.
“For the first time, I have hope,” said Tetiana Vyshniak, whose son, Artem, was among soldiers of the Azov regiment captured in Mariupol in May 2022, after holding out for weeks at the city’s Azovstal steelworks. “I started to believe that something might happen.”
Tetiana Vyshniak’s 24-year-old son was captured by Russian forces in 2022 and received a 22-year prison sentence in March. Photo: Emanuele Satolli for WSJ
Artem, who in March was sentenced by a Russian court to 22 years in prison on terrorism charges, is among some 900 Azov prisoners of war held by Russia. Kyiv alleges that some have been subjected to particularly brutal treatment by the Russians. In July, an Azov soldier died in Russian captivity from a “closed chest injury caused by a blunt object,” according to an autopsy conducted in Ukraine.
Russia still holds far more prisoners of war than Ukraine does, but Kyiv’s capture of hundreds in Kursk has brought it closer to parity. Russia and Ukraine have swapped more than 900 soldiers this year so far, but a five-month hiatus last year stretched the capacity of the jails Ukraine uses to host POWs, according to a Ukrainian intelligence official familiar with the situation.
Vyshniak has attended demonstrations in Kyiv and traveled abroad to lobby for intercession on her son’s behalf, even meeting with the pope in the Vatican in June. But it wasn’t until the capture of Russian prisoners in Kursk that her mood changed. In a meeting with her and other Azov relatives last week, a senior Ukrainian intelligence officer said the chances of a swap involving Azov soldiers had dramatically risen.
On Saturday, the returning Ukrainian prisoners, their heads shaved and with Ukrainian flags draped around their emaciated shoulders, sang their national anthem as they reached Ukrainian territory.
“We remember each and every person,” Zelensky wrote in a statement. “Thanks to every military unit that increases our pool of prisoners for exchange.”
Oksana Grytsenko and Lara Seligman contributed to this article.
The Ukrainian flag flying in Sumy. Zelensky is trying to maintain the faith of weary Ukrainians after 2½ years of war. Photo: Svet Jacqueline for WSJ
Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com
4. Live Updates: Israel Strikes Hezbollah in Lebanon and Says It Thwarted Major Attack
Live Updates: Israel Strikes Hezbollah in Lebanon and Says It Thwarted Major Attack
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/08/24/world/israel-hamas-gaza-war
The Israeli military said it had destroyed rocket launchers aimed at Israel. Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based armed group, later said it had fired hundreds of rockets, but both sides appeared to signal they did not intend to escalate further.
- An Israeli fighter jet ejecting flares near the Lebanon-Israel border.
- Atef Safadi/EPA, via Shutterstock
- An information board showing some canceled flights at the international airport in Beirut.
- Mohamed Azakir/Reuters
- Smoke billowing on the Lebanese side of the border with Israel, as people walk along a beach in Tyre in southern Lebanon.
- Aziz Taher/Reuters
- A damaged residential building in Acre in northern Israel.
- Ammar Awad/Reuters
- A beach closed to the public in Haifa, northern Israel.
- Ammar Awad/Reuters
- A Hezbollah drone intercepted by the Israeli military over northern Israel.
- Jalaa Marey/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Pinned
Updated
Aug. 25, 2024, 8:50 a.m. ET3 minutes ago
Aaron BoxermanIsabel KershnerEuan Ward and Vivek Shankar
Israeli warplanes bombarded dozens of targets in southern Lebanon on Sunday to stop what Israel said were preparations for a major attack by Hezbollah, which later said it had fired hundreds of rockets at Israel in retribution for the killing of a senior commander. But within hours of the strikes, some of the heaviest between them in months, both sides signaled they were moving to de-escalate.
Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed militia, said its military operation had “finished for the day” and that its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, would deliver an address later on Sunday. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that while Israel had successfully intercepted the Hezbollah attack, “what happened today is not the final word,” and the Israeli military said it was still carrying out air attacks against Hezbollah targets.
For now, at least, the exchange of attacks fell short of the major escalation that many had feared after an Israeli airstrike killed Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander, in the Beirut suburbs last month. Iran has also warned it would strike Israel, which it blamed for the killing of a Hamas leader on its soil shortly after that, although an attack by Tehran hasn’t materialized, and officials there had indicated in recent days that a direct strike on Israel might have been placed on hold.
Still, the attacks underscored the threat of a wider war in the Middle East, and added urgency to the Biden administration’s push to close a cease-fire deal between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, an effort to lower temperatures in the region.
Here’s what else to know:
- Israel’s attacks: The Israeli military said roughly 100 of its fighter jets bombed more than 40 targets in southern Lebanon, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said “thousands of rockets” pointed toward Israel had been destroyed. Daniel Hagari, the Israeli military spokesman, said Hezbollah had intended to fire a few hundred rockets at northern Israel, as well as launch unmanned drones at central Israel. Some of the rocket launchers hit in the strikes had been programmed to fire at 5 a.m. in the direction of Tel Aviv, according to a Western intelligence official. Lebanon’s Health Ministry said that at least three people had been killed and two others hurt in Israel’s attack.
- Hezbollah barrage: Hezbollah later said it had fired more than 320 rockets at nearly a dozen Israeli military bases and positions. If confirmed, it would be one of the largest barrages since the war in Gaza began last October. It was not immediately clear whether any of the rockets had hit their targets. Israel said it had largely thwarted the strikes, and an Israeli military spokesman said there had been “very little damage.”
-
Regional tensions: Concerns of a wider conflict in the region have been elevated in recent weeks, following the assassinations of Mr. Shukr and Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed on July 31 during a visit to Tehran. Israel claimed responsibility for the airstrike on Mr. Shukr in the Beirut suburbs, but has remained silent about the other killing. To show support for Israel and in a bid to deter Iran, the United States has steadily moved Navy forces closer to the area, including two aircraft carrier groups and a guided-missile submarine.
- Nasrallah to speak: Hezbollah said that its leader would deliver a speech at 6 p.m. (11 a.m. Eastern) in which he would refute Israel’s claim that it had disrupted his group’s attacks.
- Gaza talks: Officials from the United States, Egypt and Qatar — who are mediating the talks — were planning to meet in Cairo later on Sunday with an Israeli delegation to discuss the latest cease-fire proposal. Despite a full-bore diplomatic push from the Biden administration, Israel and Hamas remain far apart on key issues, leading officials to conclude that an immediate breakthrough is unlikely.
Ronen Bergman, Hwaida Saad and Gabby Sobelman contributed reporting.
Aug. 25, 2024, 8:26 a.m. ET28 minutes ago
Isabel KershnerReporting from Jerusalem
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An Israeli Air Force fighter jet ejecting flares as it intercepts a drone launched from Lebanon, over the border area with southern Lebanon on Sunday.Credit...Jalaa Marey/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
For weeks, Israelis have waited in trepidation for a major attack by Hezbollah in retaliation for Israel’s assassination of a senior commander of the Lebanese group in Beirut last month, amid widespread fears that a cross-border escalation could spiral into an all-out regional war.
But much of Israel woke up on Sunday to find that, at least for the immediate term, the long-dreaded attack appeared to be over almost before it started.
Both Israel and Hezbollah quickly claimed victories of sorts: Israel for its predawn pre-emptive strikes against what the military said were thousands of Hezbollah’s rocket launcher barrels in southern Lebanon; and Hezbollah for its subsequent firing of barrages of rockets and drones at northern Israel, which the Israeli military initially said had caused little damage.
By breakfast time, the two sides were employing the language of containment.
Hezbollah announced that it had completed the “first stage” of its attack to avenge the assassination of the senior commander, Fuad Shukr, and appeared to be calling it a day, at least for now. Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, said he had spoken with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and they had “discussed the importance of avoiding regional escalation,” according to a statement from Mr. Gallant’s office.
Still, the Middle East remained on edge, the days ahead uncertain.
“There can be stages,” cautioned Ehud Yaari, an Israel-based fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a research group. “You can have escalation that is gradual.”
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Smoke billowing from the site of an Israeli airstrike on Zibqin in southern Lebanon on Sunday.Credit...Kawnat Haju/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Later Sunday morning, the Israeli military said it was continuing to strike Hezbollah launchers in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is estimated to possess tens of thousands of rockets and a smaller number of more sophisticated, precise missiles.
And Iran, Hezbollah’s patron, still has an open account with Israel, blaming it for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of its ally Hamas, while he was in Tehran, just hours after the killing of Mr. Shukr. Israel officially took responsibility for Mr. Shukr’s death but not for Mr. Haniyeh’s.
Based on intelligence, Israel took the decision to pre-empt Hezbollah’s attack on Sunday “but not to go beyond,” Mr. Yaari said. The targets that Israel struck were all less than 30 miles inside Lebanon, he said. Israel said they were focused on thwarting Hezbollah’s immediate attack plans, not its wider assets or infrastructure.
Hezbollah, for its part, appears to be “signaling that it is done for now,” Mr. Yaari said. “At the same time, they are saying this was the first stage of retaliation, leaving open the option to do more, if they get a green light from the Iranians,” he added.
The events on Sunday have raised the stakes for negotiators gathering in Cairo to try to advance a cease-fire and hostage release deal for the ongoing war in Gaza. The United States is leading the push, along with Qatari and Egyptian mediators, for a deal that would end the 10-month conflict between Israel and Hamas, in the hope that such an agreement could help calm tensions in the region.
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A resident checking damage caused by a strike from Lebanon, in the Israeli coastal town of Acre on Sunday.Credit...Jack Guez/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Hezbollah and Israel had already engaged for months in tit-for-tat cross-border clashes. Hezbollah began firing in solidarity with Hamas after last October’s Hamas-led assault on southern Israel prompted Israel to go to war in Gaza.
The exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah have grown in intensity in recent weeks, in what many analysts have described as a war of attrition.
Aug. 25, 2024, 8:18 a.m. ET36 minutes ago
Johnatan ReissReporting from Nahariya, Israel
In his latest statement, Daniel Hagari, the Israeli military spokesman, said Hezbollah had intended to fire a few hundred rockets at northern Israel, as well as launch drones at central Israel. “We thwarted the bulk of the attack Hezbollah had planned, and we intercepted many of the threats launched toward Israel,” he said.
Aug. 25, 2024, 7:45 a.m. ET1 hour ago
Hwaida Saad and Euan WardReporting from Beirut, Lebanon
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A view toward the port in Beirut on Sunday.Credit...Anwar Amro/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Some Hezbollah supporters reacted with disappointment to the group’s attack on Israel on Sunday, saying it had not gone far enough to avenge the assassination of Fuad Shukr, the top Hezbollah commander who was killed last month in an Israeli strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Others praised the attack — which Hezbollah said had included 320 rockets, enough to make it one of the largest barrages in recent months — and said the armed group had demonstrated its strength while avoiding an escalation that could open up a full-scale war that almost all agree would be devastating for both Israel and Lebanon.
With both sides attempting to project success, some analysts said Hezbollah’s attack appeared to have been a bust. Israel said that there had been minimal damage from the attacks, and it did not immediately report any casualties. Three people were reported killed in Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon on Sunday, according to Lebanon’s Health Ministry.
What happens next is contingent on several factors, analysts said, including the comments expected later on Sunday by Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader. The armed group said Mr. Nasrallah would deny Israel’s claim to have thwarted a major attack, suggesting that he would seek to claim a victory that could in effect close this chapter of hostilities.
“They don’t want an escalation. They don’t want a war,” Mohanad Hage Ali, a Beirut-based fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, said of Hezbollah. He said the attack provided Hezbollah with an off-ramp to avoid a wider escalation, even if it did not go as intended.
“They want to say that we’ve registered a response, and now move on from this phase of anticipation of a wider escalation,” he said.
Still, he said, “this would be a failure, militarily speaking,” for Hezbollah, the best armed of Iran’s array of regional proxy forces.
“If Hezbollah did not cause casualties on the Israeli side, and deep into their territory, this is not really a response.” Mr. Hage Ali said.
Some Hezbollah supporters in Lebanon agreed.
“If this is the response for Shukr’s death, I think that they will lose a lot of support from the public,” said Mohammed Awada, 52, a taxi driver who lives in Beirut’s southern suburbs, an area of the Lebanese capital where Hezbollah holds sway. “They did not even get close to their promise,” he added, referring to Hezbollah’s earlier pledge to strike Tel Aviv if Beirut was hit.
Sabah Suleiman, a resident of Beirut’s southern suburbs who was near the site of Mr. Shukr’s assassination last month, said she was pleased that Hezbollah had retaliated, though she feared a further response from Israel.
“I can’t say I’m not afraid,” she said in a text message, adding that she couldn’t flee the area because she couldn’t afford to live elsewhere.
“We have no option except to stay and wait, but Sayed Nasrallah gave us hope” with Sunday’s attack, she said, using an honorific for the Hezbollah leader.
Kassem Kassir, a Lebanese analyst with ties to Hezbollah, said the group’s attack was “an initial response, but the battle is not over.”
“No one can determine the course of the confrontation,” he said, adding: “Sayed Nasrallah will speak today — we are all waiting.”
Aug. 25, 2024, 7:09 a.m. ET2 hours ago
Gabby SobelmanAaron Boxerman and Hwaida Saad
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A drone intercepted by the Israeli military over northern Israel on Sunday.Credit...Jalaa Marey/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Israel and Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia backed by Iran, have engaged in some of their heaviest cross-border air attacks in months. Israeli aircraft bombarded southern Lebanon on Sunday to stop what Israel said were preparations for a major Hezbollah attack. Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese militia, later said it had fired hundreds of rockets and drones at Israel as retribution for Israel’s killing of a senior commander in July, though Israel said there had been little damage.
Here’s a look at how the latest strikes unfolded on Sunday morning in Israel and Lebanon (times are local and approximate):
5 a.m. (11 p.m. Eastern on Saturday): The Israeli military says that its fighter jets have begun bombarding targets in Lebanon belonging to Hezbollah. The military “identified the Hezbollah terrorist organization preparing to fire missiles and rockets toward Israeli territory,” it says.
In a video statement, the Israeli military’s chief spokesman, Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, says that Israel had begun “a self-defense act to remove these threats,” describing Hezbollah’s preparations as “extensive.” Ben-Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv is closed to flights.
5:32 a.m.: Air-raid sirens blare across northern Israel, warning of an incoming rocket barrage. The Israeli news media circulates footage showing Israeli air defenses intercepting rockets fired from Lebanon and describes the barrage as longer than has been typical in the months of intensified launches by Hezbollah.
6:09 a.m.: Hezbollah confirms that it launched an attack as part of an “initial response” to the Israeli assassination of Fuad Shukr, one of the group’s most senior commanders, last month. The group says it targeted Israeli military bases and aerial defense batteries, and fired drones toward a significant but unspecified military target.
6:20 a.m.: Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, announces that a state of emergency is in place, limiting public gatherings. Mr. Gallant’s office says he spoke by phone with Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III to update him on Israeli actions “to thwart an imminent threat against the State of Israel.”
6:30 a.m.: Admiral Hagari, at a news briefing, says Israel is “removing threats to the Israeli home front.” He signals that attacks aiming deep into Israel may have been neutralized, saying that Ben-Gurion airport will soon reopen for flights.
6:55 a.m. Hezbollah releases a second statement saying it completed the first phase of its attack. It says the assault included launching both attack drones and 320 rockets at 11 military installations in northern Israel. The rockets were aimed at Israeli military sites in an attempt to facilitate the drones’ passage toward targets deeper inside Israel, according to Hezbollah.
8:12 a.m.: The Israeli military says that about 100 Israeli fighter jets were involved in the Israeli operation, which attacked and destroyed thousands of Hezbollah rocket launch barrels in southern Lebanon, most of which had been aimed toward northern and central Israel. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesman, tells reporters Hezbollah fired hundreds of drones and rockets but caused little damage.
8:26 a.m.: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel releases a statement with his remarks to a cabinet meeting a short time earlier. He reiterates his pledge to create the conditions for tens of thousands of Israelis displaced from their homes by Hezbollah attacks near the border to go back home. “We are determined to do everything to protect our country, to return the residents of the north safely to their homes and continue to uphold a simple rule: Whoever harms us, we will harm them,” he said, according to his office.
8:58 a.m.: Hezbollah releases a new statement saying its military operations were “finished for the day,” and denies Israel’s claim that it had thwarted a major attack. It says its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, will speak about the day’s events Sunday evening.
11:08 a.m.: Admiral Hagari says that Israel’s strikes against Hezbollah are continuing and that “several areas in southern Lebanon” were hit over the previous hour. The pace and intensity of the Israeli strikes appears to be slowing.
12:42 p.m.: The Israeli military lifts the restrictions on public gatherings that it had imposed hours earlier.
Aug. 25, 2024, 6:04 a.m. ET3 hours ago
Aaron BoxermanReporting from Jerusalem
The Israeli military has lifted most of the emergency orders it imposed on the nation in the wake of its pre-emptive strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon. The instructions — which included restrictions on gatherings — were aimed at protecting civilians in the event of a massive response by the Lebanese armed group. The announcement that most Israeli citizens can go about their daily routines was another indication that the country’s top security authorities do not expect an imminent attack.
5. Australia offers U.S. a vast new military launchpad in China conflict
Bases in Australia are helpful but cannot totally overcome the laws of physics: time and distance. But MAcArthur went to Australia after his escape from Corregidor for a reason. He didn't go to Hawaii. Australia was a key strategic location for the pacific war against Japan.
Australia offers U.S. a vast new military launchpad in China conflict
Australia is expanding its northern military bases, with U.S. support, to counter China's growing threat. Critics quip it’s become the “51st state.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/24/us-military-base-australia-china/
8 min
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Philippine and Australian soldiers during an exercise in San Antonio, Philippines, in August 2023. (Ted Aljibe/AFP/Getty Images)
By Michael E. Miller
August 24, 2024 at 5:00 a.m. EDT
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE BASE TINDAL, Australia — Deep in the outback, a flurry of construction by Australia and the United States is transforming this once quiet military installation into a potential launchpad in case of conflict with China.
Runways are being expanded and strengthened to accommodate the allies’ biggest airplanes, including American B-52 bombers. A pair of massive fuel depots is rising side by side to supply U.S. and Australian fighter jets. And two earth-covered bunkers have been built for U.S. munitions.
But the activity at RAAF Tindal, less than 2,000 miles from the emerging flash points of the South China Sea, isn’t unique. Across Australia, decades-old facilities — many built by the United States during World War II — are now being dusted off or upgraded amid growing fears of another global conflict.
The Tindal air force base, near the town of Katherine in the Northern Territory, Australia, is the site of many construction projects. (Kirsty Needham/Reuters)
“This is about deterrence,” Australia’s defense minister, Richard Marles, said in an interview. “We’re working together to deter future conflict and to provide for the collective security of the region in which we live.”
The United States has ramped up defense ties with allies across the region, including with the Philippines and Japan, as it tries to fend off an increasingly assertive and aggressive China. Australia offers the United States a stable and friendly government, a small but capable military and a vast expanse from which to stage or resupply military efforts.
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U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, hailing the “the extraordinary strength of our unbreakable alliance with Australia,” said after a meeting with Marles earlier this month that deeper cooperation — including base upgrades and more frequent rotational bomber deployments — would help build “greater peace, stability, and deterrence across the region.”
Australia has also joined the AUKUS agreement, under which the United States and Britain will provide it with nuclear-propelled submarines, some of the world’s most closely guarded technology.
These moves underscore a bigger shift, as Canberra has grown increasingly tight with Washington as they both grow wary of Beijing. Military cooperation has become so extensive that critics quip Australia is becoming the United States’ “51st state.”
Mihai Sora, a former Australian diplomat who is an analyst at the Lowy Institute, a Sydney think tank, has a different metaphor. Australia is “an unsinkable aircraft carrier right at the bottom of the critical maritime sea lanes.”
“As the stakes increase in the South China Sea, as the risk over conflict in Taiwan increases, northern Australia in particular becomes of increasing strategic value for the United States,” Sora said.
American representatives on a recent congressional delegation to Darwin, on Australia’s northern coast, agreed.
“This provides a central base of operations from which to project power,” Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Tex.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said during the trip.
Some Australian experts, however, argue that the growing U.S. military footprint doesn’t deter conflict with China so much as ensure Australia will be involved.
“I have deep misgivings about the whole enterprise” of increased U.S. military activity in Australia, said Sam Roggeveen, a former Australian intelligence analyst who is also at the Lowy Institute. “It conflates America’s strategic objectives in Asia with ours, and it makes those bases a target.”
Australia’s center-left government inherited AUKUS from a previous conservative administration, but it has embraced the agreement and the broader idea of enhanced U.S.-Australia military cooperation. Still, some critics have accused it of moving too cautiously.
“We need the current plans times 10,” said Peter Jennings, a former senior defense official who has urged Australia’s military to make rapid changes to deter a conflict with China. “The direction is right, but what it needs now is money and serious political effort.”
President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak speak on the partnership between the three countries at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego in March 2023. (Leah Millis/Reuters)
Catching China’s attention
Australia has been rattled by a decade of growing Chinese military assertiveness in the region. But Beijing’s recent trade war on Canberra and a Chinese security agreement with Australia’s neighbor the Solomon Islands have accelerated Australia’s tilt away from its biggest trading partner and toward the United States.
Australia has spent roughly $1 billion on upgrading the Tindal air force base. Built by U.S. Army engineers in 1942 to stage bombing raids on Japanese targets in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, Tindal is now the site of dozens of construction projects. A key one is the new parking apron capable of accommodating four of Australia’s biggest planes: KC-30 tankers that can refuel fighter jets and allow for far more distant attacks.
But there are also plans for the United States to build its own parking apron here, big enough for six B-52 bombers capable of reaching mainland China.
“That is absolutely something China would pay attention to,” said Roggeveen.
Marles declined to comment on the increasing rotations mentioned by Austin, but said the trajectory is “an increasing American force posture in Australia.” “We see that as very much in Australia’s national interest,” he said. “People understand that we are living through challenging times, when the global rules-based order is under pressure.”
Darwin, 200 miles north of Tindal, was heavily bombed by Japan during World War II. It has hosted six-month rotations of U.S. Marines since 2012, but what began as a training mission has evolved into a much larger enterprise.
The United States recently built a new fuel depot for the Marines’ MV-22 Ospreys, tilt-rotor aircraft that can take off and land vertically like a helicopter but can transition midair to fly like an airplane. The United States is planning to expand the parking apron here, too, to enable more Osprey operations.
A map provided to the visiting U.S. congressional delegation showed how midair refueling could extend the Ospreys’ range into the South China Sea, the Philippine Sea and to the Solomon Islands.
“As Chairman Xi [Jinping] is looking out at all of this, he’s feeling more deterrence,” McCaul said, pointing to the map. “Our capabilities to respond are getting stronger.”
Australia is also surveying three “bare bases” — skeleton facilities in remote parts of Western Australia and Queensland — with an eye to upgrading them so heavier Australian and American airplanes can use them, said Brigadier Michael Say, who leads Australia’s Force Posture Initiative. He said it’s still being determined whether the United States will pay for some of the improvements.
In the Cocos Islands, tiny coral atolls in the Indian Ocean northwest of the Australian continent and just south of Indonesia, Canberra will soon begin upgrading the airstrip to accommodate heavier military aircraft, including the P-8A Poseidon, a “submarine hunter” that could monitor increased Chinese naval activity in the area. A U.S. Navy construction contract published in June listed the Cocos as a possible project location, but Say said it hasn’t yet been decided whether the United States will contribute.
Diversifying — or redistributing?
These “bare bases,” which stretch for 3,000 miles from east to west, fit a new U.S. strategy of dispersing its forces to prevent China from delivering a knockout blow.
“If one location gets taken out, the U.S. can still project force, it can still replenish and resupply and reinforce its troops,” Sora said. “Australia is fundamental to that but is just one plank in America’s regional force posture.”
Roggeveen questioned, however, whether the United States is actually increasing its capabilities in the region or merely moving assets out of places like Guam, which are more immediately threatened by China’s improving missile capability. Under AUKUS, the United States will begin rotating up to four nuclear-powered submarines through Western Australia in 2027.
“It’s not at all clear to me if the [U.S.] Pacific Fleet is getting more submarines or if they are just being moved from existing commitments in Guam or Pearl Harbor,” Roggeveen said.
Commander Matthew Comer, a spokesperson for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said it was too early to say from where the submarines will come.
Even if the subs are moved from Pearl Harbor or San Diego, their rotation through Perth will be “significant strategically,” said Charles Edel, Australia chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “We are pulling them closer in to where they are needed.”
Some concerns linger in Washington over Australia’s commitment, however. During the visit to Darwin, McCaul and other representatives asked about the 99-year lease a Chinese company holds over the port surrounding the Australian naval base. Australian officials said two reviews had found there wasn’t a security concern, and that in the case of a conflict the port could be nationalized.
“Australia relies on China for prosperity and on America for security,” Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-Calif.) told The Post. “That’s the balance they are playing.”
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By Michael E. Miller
Michael E. Miller is The Washington Post's Sydney bureau chief. He was previously on the local enterprise team. He joined The Washington Post in 2015 and has also reported for the newspaper from Afghanistan and Mexico. Twitter
6. Snap Insight: Israel and Hezbollah exchange heavy fire, but all eyes are on Iran
Snap Insight: Israel and Hezbollah exchange heavy fire, but all eyes are on Iran
Even if escalation on the border between Israel and Lebanon is almost inevitable after one of the biggest exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and Israel, a full-scale regional war is still avoidable, says international security expert Stefan Wolff.
Stefan Wolff
25 Aug 2024 06:17PM
(Updated: 25 Aug 2024 06:29PM)
channelnewsasia.com
BIRMINGHAM: The early hours of Sunday (Aug 25) saw one of the biggest clashes between Hezbollah and Israel since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. Reactions in the coming hours and days will determine whether the long-feared full-scale escalation towards a regional war is now under way.
The Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militia group launched a barrage of more than 320 Katyusha rockets which it claims hit 11 military targets in Israel. Just prior to that, the Israeli military carried out strikes against alleged Hezbollah missile launch sites in southern Lebanon, which it said was to pre-empt a more deadly attack.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already vowed a tough response. The pre-emptive strike against Hezbollah on Sunday morning certainly indicates that, for now, Israel has both the intelligence and military capabilities to rein in its adversaries in the region.
TIMING OF HEZBOLLAH STRIKES
The timing of the Hezbollah strikes – especially the thwarted larger missile attacks – is telling.
It comes after yet another visit by United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken – his ninth since the start of the Gaza war – to the region that ended without any breakthrough on a ceasefire deal. While negotiations on a ceasefire, mediated by the US, Egypt and Qatar, have resumed in Cairo, an agreement remains elusive.
There is also an ongoing visit by Air Force General CQ Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top military official in the US, which indicates both the priority that Washington attaches to the crisis, as well as the dimming prospects that a full-scale regional war can be averted.
US expectations that it would unavoidably be drawn into such a confrontation are also clear from the increased deployment of American forces in the region.
All this points in the direction of further escalation, and Hezbollah’s attacks may well have been only the opening salvo in what is likely to turn at least into another round of tit-for-tat clashes along Israel’s northern border.
Hezbollah’s ominous statement that Sunday’s strike had completed "the first phase" of its response to the assassination of senior commander Fuad Shukr and that the full response would take "some time" certainly indicates the inclination for a drawn-out campaign of retaliation.
WILL IRAN RESPOND?
Yet, it will be the Iranian response that will be critical in deciding whether this remains a localised confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah or escalates into a regional war.
Iran promised retaliation following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran last month, but has yet to carry out its threat. With the Gaza ceasefire negotiations in a deadlock and the humanitarian catastrophe rapidly worsening, Iran has few incentives to delay retaliatory action.
But Tehran does not have any good options left to execute its threatened response – either via proxies or on its own.
Among its once highly capable proxy forces, Palestinian militant group Hamas has been decimated after months of the war in Gaza. The threat of Yemen’s Houthi rebels remains mostly confined to shipping lanes in the Red Sea. And Israel’s pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah this morning is another demonstration of the limited utility of Iranian proxy warfare.
The Iranian strikes on Israel in April – of more than 300 drones and missiles but with ultimately little damage– demonstrated capability but not effect. Any similar attack this time is unlikely to deal a devastating blow to Israel and will almost certainly trigger an Israeli military response, and possibly an American one.
The question now is whether the combined Israeli and US military capabilities in the region will be a sufficient deterrent to Iran and its proxies, or whether their combined military might will merely serve as an assurance to Israel that the US will come to its defence in any further escalation.
If it is the former, we may yet avoid an all-out war in the Middle East. If it is the latter, further recklessness on all sides is likely to lead the region further into the abyss.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.
Source: CNA/ch
7. China, Philippines clash in South China Sea despite efforts to rebuild trust
China, Philippines clash in South China Sea despite efforts to rebuild trust
25 Aug 2024 06:51PM
channelnewsasia.com
MANILA: The Philippines and China clashed in disputed waters of the South China Sea on Sunday (Aug 25) over what Manila said was a resupply mission for fishermen, the latest in a series of sea and air confrontations in the strategic waterway.
The incident overshadows efforts by both nations to rebuild trust and better manage disputes after months of confrontations, including a violent clash in June where a Filipino sailor lost a finger.
The Philippines accused China of "aggressive and dangerous manoeuvres" to block the resupply mission, while China's coast guard said it had taken "control measures" against a vessel that had "illegally" entered the waters and repeatedly approached Chinese ships in a dangerous manner.
In the incident near the Sabina Shoal, the Philippine South China Sea task force said Chinese vessels rammed and used water cannons against a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries ship transporting food, fuel and medical supplies for Filipino fishermen.
China asserts sovereignty over nearly all of the South China Sea, including areas claimed by the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Brunei. Beijing has deployed an armada of vessels to protect its claims.
An international arbitral tribunal in 2016 ruled Beijing's claim had no basis under international law, a landmark victory for the Philippines, which filed the case. Beijing rejects that decision.
The Philippines and China agreed to "restore trust" and "rebuild confidence" to manage maritime disputes in a high-level meeting last month.
That was followed by a provisional arrangement about Manila's resupply missions to a beached Filipino naval ship in the South China Sea.
"These unprofessional, aggressive, and illegal actions posed serious risks to the safety of the Filipino crew and the fishermen they were meant to serve," the Philippine task force said of Sunday's confrontation.
It said the Bureau of Fisheries vessel, operating from Half-Moon Shoal to Sabina Shoal, encountered multiple Chinese vessels that deployed "perilous manoeuvres", causing its engine to fail and forcing it to end the resupply mission.
Manila repeated its call for Beijing to halt "provocative actions that destabilise regional peace and security".
On Saturday, Manila accused Beijing of "unjustifiably" deploying flares from the China-occupied Subi Reef on Thursday while a Manila aircraft was conducting patrols.
The same aircraft had "faced harassment" from a Chinese jet fighter while it was conducting a surveillance flight near the Scarborough Shoal on Monday, the Philippines said.
Treaty ally the United States echoed the Philippines' call on Saturday, condemning China for launching the flares.
Source: Reuters/mi
8. China 'strongly dissatisfied' with fresh US sanctions
China 'strongly dissatisfied' with fresh US sanctions
25 Aug 2024 06:57PM
(Updated: 25 Aug 2024 07:31PM)
channelnewsasia.com
China and US flags are seen printed on paper in this illustration taken Jan 27, 2022. (File photo: REUTERS/Dado Ruvic)
25 Aug 2024 06:57PM (Updated: 25 Aug 2024 07:31PM)
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China is "strongly dissatisfied" and "firmly opposed" to fresh US sanctions on Chinese companies over ties to Russia's war in Ukraine, the commerce ministry said on Sunday (Aug 25).
"China urges the US to immediately stop its wrong practices and will take necessary measures to resolutely safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies," a ministry spokesperson said.
Washington on Friday imposed sweeping sanctions against almost 400 individuals and companies it believes are aiding Russia's war in Ukraine, including several Chinese firms, expanding existing measures to curb Moscow over the invasion of its neighbour.
These include companies in China involved in shipping microelectronics and machine tools to Russia, according to a State Department fact sheet outlining its sanctions.
The sanctions target individuals and companies both inside and outside of Russia "whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions," the US Treasury Department said in a statement.
China's commerce ministry on Sunday said the move was "typical unilateral sanctions" that "disrupt international trade order and rules, hinder normal international economic and trade exchanges, and threaten the security and stability of global industrial and supply chains".
The United States has repeatedly warned China about its support for Russia's defence industry. China, however, presents itself as a neutral party in the war and says it is not sending lethal assistance to either side, unlike the United States and other Western nations.
But China is a close political and economic ally of Russia, and NATO members have branded Beijing a "decisive enabler" of the war, which it has never condemned.
Source: AFP/fh
9. The cracks are appearing in Putin's relationship with China
Maybe half of the Dark Quad will face some problems of their own making.
Can we exploit this? Should we? Or should heed Bonaparte and simply "never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake?"
The cracks are appearing in Putin's relationship with China
The Spectator · by Ian Williams · August 22, 2024
Relations between China and Russia are going from strength to strength – or so they say. In reality, the strain is beginning to show. ‘Against the backdrop of accelerating changes unseen in a century, China is willing to further strengthen multilateral coordination with Russia,’ said Xinhua, the Chinese state news agency after a meeting on Wednesday in Moscow between premier Li Qiang and Vladimir Putin. Far more intriguing, though, was what wasn’t said, and which suggests a growing tensions in their ‘no limits’ partnership.
First there were the cyber spies. A few days before Li arrived in Russia, Kaspersky, a Moscow-based cyber security company, suggested that Chinese state-linked hackers had targeted dozens of computers belonging to Russian tech companies and state agencies. Kaspersky dubbed the espionage campaign EastWind, and while not explicitly blaming China (precise attribution is always tricky), it said that the tools used were associated with Chinese groups. The US has suggested that Kaspersky is linked to Russian intelligence, which the company strongly denies, but the timing of the report – indeed its very existence – is intriguing, given Putin’s increasingly dictatorial control of Russia.
China is now barely bothering to treat Moscow as an equal
Then there is the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline project, once hailed as a centrepiece of their burgeoning economic relationship and designed to carry 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year from the Yamal region in northern Russia to China, by way of Mongolia. Although conceived more than a decade ago, it has taken on a new urgency for Moscow after the invasion of Ukraine, with the Kremlin eager to double gas sales to China. It wants to compensate for the loss of sales to Europe, which used to take around 80 per cent of Russian gas exports. The pipeline project has been bogged down in bickering over the price of the gas and who will pay for construction, with Beijing taking a very hard line. It was not mentioned in the bland communique this week and now appears to be dead.
Russian nationalists were irked last year when Beijing decreed that vast areas of Russia’s Amur region and its Far East, snatched from the Qing Dynasty by Tsarist Russia during the nineteenth century, would henceforth be referred to on Chinese maps by their former Chinese names. Hence Vladivostok became Haishenwai, or Sea Cucumber Cliff. This has played to Russian paranoia about its thinly populated and economically deprived border regions being subsumed by China, with some nationalists suggesting that Beijing’s tactic is to bide its time until Russia collapses.
Premier Li, China’s second ranking official behind President Xi Jinping, said bilateral relations had reached an ‘unprecedentedly high level’. Yet there was no direct mention of the Ukraine war, though Li’s meeting with Putin came amid Ukraine’s audacious snatching of land in the Kursk region – the first occupation of Russian territory since the second world war, and just a few hours before Russia repelled one of Ukraine’s largest ever drone attacks on the Russian capital.
Last month, Nato accused China of being a ‘decisive enabler of Russia’s war’ by providing equipment, microelectronics and tools for the Kremlin’s war machine. As the war has ground on, Moscow has become increasingly dependent on China economically and diplomatically. Beijing has effectively underwritten the aggression with sharply increased trade, cushioning Putin from Western sanctions. The value of two-way trade in 2023 hit a record $240 billion (£182 billion), with half of Russia’s oil and related petroleum exports going to China.
Beijing and Moscow increasingly define their relationship in terms of opposition to Western democracies – and to the US in particular. They share deep-seated resentments and a vision of restoring imperial greatness. Their joint military drills are increasingly complex and geographically widespread, with one recent naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman joined by Iran. After Moscow, Li was going on to Belarus, with whose army Chinese troops last month conducted joint exercises close to the border with Poland.
All of this is deeply troubling. Two factors in particular though are becoming increasingly apparent and were underlined by Li’s visit to Moscow: first is that for all the bland commitments to ‘inject strong momentum’ into the relationship, China is now barely bothering to treat Moscow as an equal. Beijing is calling the shots. Secondly, despite a shared loathing of the West – and the marriage of convenience this has created – the fault lines in the relationship are never far from the surface.
Ian Williams
Ian Williams is a former foreign correspondent for Channel 4 News and NBC, and author of Vampire State: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Economy (Birlinn).
The Spectator · by Ian Williams · August 22, 2024
10. The fall of Vladimir Putin is now only a matter of time
Is this possible? Or is this wishful thinking?
And most importantly, if it happens are we prepared for what might come next?
The fall of Vladimir Putin is now only a matter of time
Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk will have been intended to bring forward the end of the dictator’s rule
The Telegraph · by Daniel Hannan 24 August 2024 • 3:01pm
Credit: Gavriil Grigorov
It has been the most efficient offensive of the entire war. Ukrainian intelligence identified the Russians’ weak points. Special forces crossed the frontier in advance to prepare the ground. And when the attack on the Kursk oblast came on 6 August, it was a textbook example of what strategists call an all-arms manoeuvre.
Cyber-attacks were combined with armour, artillery, infantry and specialist engineering to dismantle enemy defences. Russian drones and sensors were blinded by electronic warfare. An air defence umbrella was thrown up, closing the skies to Putin’s planes.
At first, it looked like a limited cross-border raid. Preparations had been made in such secrecy that Ukraine’s allies seemed to be as much in the dark as her enemies. Volodymyr Zelensky had learned the lessons of the much-trailed 2023 counter-offensive, when Russia took advantage of the long notice period to build a three-mile-deep belt of landmines, barbed wire and gun emplacements.
This time, Ukraine caught the Russians off guard. Some 400 square miles have been seized, and an estimated 2,500 Russian conscripts captured, with perhaps 3,000 more now kettled south of the river Sejm. The Europeans and Americans have been every bit as blindsided by the speed of the advance as the Russians.
I would write that “no one saw this coming” but, throwing modesty to the winds, I did point out in this column just over a year ago that there was a short-cut available: “Ukraine could launch a massive left hook through Kursk, aiming to cut off the enemy’s forces”. What I had in mind was a flanking stroke that would sever Russian supply-lines, rather as the Israelis stopped the successful Egyptian advance in 1973 by launching a counter-offensive far in their rear, on the other side of the Suez Canal.
In retrospect, I was too optimistic. It is easier to advance across these sparse steppelands than to hold them. Russians and Ukrainians, who won the decisive battle of the Second World War at Kursk in 1943 – the largest armoured battle in history and, on most measures, the largest battle of any kind – understand that better than most.
Still, this is the most significant Ukrainian victory in two years. Russian infrastructure is being degraded, bridges thrown down, gas installations hit. More airfields, refineries and supply depots are now within range. The gas plant in Sudzha has had its rail links cut. The nuclear power station in Kursk is at risk. Around 130,000 Russian civilians have been displaced.
What is Ukraine’s strategic goal? As is often the case, the offensive had a chief objective and several secondary ones. The principal aim was to alter the calculus within Russia, making the war less attractive and turning key figures against the man determined to prosecute it at any cost, Vladimir Putin. But before we come to that, let us consider what else Ukraine hoped to achieve.
First, the Zelensky government needed a morale boost. The failure of last summer’s counter-offensive had wiped out the successes of the previous autumn’s Kharkiv and Kherson campaigns. Since then, the momentum has been with Russia, which has been grindingly widening its zone of control in the Donbas. As I write, Russia is advancing towards the railway town of Pokrovsk (which, until 2016, was called Krasnoarmeysk, one of numerous places in the old Soviet Union named after the Red Army). Now, at a stroke, Zelensky has reminded his people that they can still win.
Second, that same message has gone out to Ukraine’s allies in Europe and North America, some of whom were asking whether they should open-endedly support an apparently unwinnable war. It now seems clear that, if Ukraine’s Nato allies explicitly authorise the use of long-range missiles within Russia, Ukraine will continue to make gains.
Third, the attack is intended to draw Russian forces from Ukraine.
Fourth, Russian POWs are a valuable bargaining chip. Ukraine wants the return of its Azov volunteers and other troops. The mothers of those raw Russian conscripts are pressing for prisoner exchanges.
Fifth, Ukraine has significantly tilted the negotiating table in its favour in advance of any final settlement talks. As long as Russia occupied chunks of Ukrainian territory, Zelensky had little to bargain with. Now, he has opened the door to land swaps.
But all these are, as I say, subordinate objectives. Zelensky knows that the surest way to end the war is to topple Putin, who has a mystical longing to establish some kind of protectorate over Kyiv, which he sees as the birthplace of Russia. Yes, Putin is also motivated by hunger for the energy reserves under Donbas and in the waters off Crimea. But even if the annexation of his four Ukrainian oblasts were recognised, he would not rest until Kyiv acknowledged Russian suzerainty, at least in foreign policy.
Ukraine’s strategy, then, is to make the war unpopular with Russians. Everyone in the former USSR remembers the conscription riots that preceded the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. That war had claimed 15,000 Soviet lives in ten years. This one is estimated to have claimed ten times as many in a quarter of the time.
The mothers of those wretched conscripts, drawn disproportionately from east of the Urals, lack political clout. But Ukraine aims also to convince the generals and siloviki that the costs of war are excessive.
It began by destroying Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Then it attacked oil and gas installations within Russia, intending economic disruption. Then its drones hit Russian military targets as far afield as Moscow and Murmansk, where last month it struck an airfield 1,100 miles from the front line. Now it is using Western-supplied weapons on Russian soil.
What has been Putin’s response? To crack down further on the media, to deny that there is a problem and to issue bland assurances of victory. He has put his former chief bodyguard, Aleksey Dyumin (himself from Kursk) in charge of “Operation Revenge”. But, obsessed with the Donbas, he has not diverted significant numbers of troops. Western intelligence sources estimate that around 5,000 men have been sent from Crimea and Zaporizhia, but none from Donetsk, where Russia’s main offensive is taking place. And 5,000 is nowhere near adequate to the task of taking back territory.
In 2002, Putin made a big song and dance about creating the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, an alliance of six former Soviet republics intended as a response to Nato. Yet he has not triggered its Article Four, the mirror of Nato’s Article Five, which requires the other members to treat an attack on one as an attack on all.
Perhaps he senses that the others would refuse to help. More likely, he doesn’t want to admit the enormity of what has happened, namely that a special operation that was supposed to deliver Kyiv within days has instead led to the fighting being carried into Mother Russia.
The great temptation, in any war, is to fixate on front lines. It is a mistake. When the Armistice took effect in November 1918, Germany still held most of Belgium, a sliver of France, and the greater part of Poland, Belarus and the Baltic States. What determined the outcome of the First World War was not territory, but productive capacity. The sequence was that Germany ran out of money, troops began to mutiny, the Kaiser was forced to abdicate, and the new government capitulated.
Russia has not yet run out of money. But, outside the big cities, the problems of spiralling inflation, goods shortages and labour shortages, as emigration exacerbates the impact of conscription and of the diversion of manpower to wartime production, are becoming impossible to disguise, despite the central bank’s best attempts to present the world with optimistic figures.
Plenty of generals and oligarchs will see that Putin is isolating, disgracing and ruining their country in pursuit of what is little more than a personal obsession brought on by reading too much history during lockdown.
Prigozhin’s mutiny exposed Putin’s vulnerability. Sooner or later, someone else will act decisively where Prigozhin hesitated. Everything Ukraine is doing is intended to hasten that day.
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The Telegraph · by Daniel Hannan 24 August 2024 • 3:01pm
11. Military Might - United States vs. China: A Great Power Competition Report
Chart/graphic at the link.
Excerpt:
The U.S. military's efforts from January to July 2024 to deter China in the Indo-Pacific region were multifaceted. They involved a combination of increased military presence, joint exercises, and reaffirmation of defense commitments to allies. These measures were designed to maintain stability, uphold international norms, and prevent any unilateral changes to the regional status quo by China. They have also been largely ineffective at deterring Chinese cyber-attacks, influence operations, lawfare, East China Sea aggression, expanding military capabilities, supporting Russia and Iran, or harassing partners and allies internationally. The Joint Force has no equivalent to the PLA’s Strategic Support Force and only a desperate and uncoordinated interagency response to defeat the threat it poses. This must be rectified, or China’s advantage in psychological, informational, and cyber capabilities will continue to outclass those of the United States. Despite the Lowey Institutes’ dominant military capability score for the U.S. (see below), it does not reflect China's dominance in key strategic capabilities. The U.S. military cannot be overconfident despite legitimate power projection. It urgently needs to set the theater for conflict to deter war while shoring up the manifold areas it is either not competing, not deterring, or deterring with little effect.
- 35 minutes ago
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- 11 min read
Military Might - United States vs. China
A Great Power Competition Report
Strategy Central
By Monte Erfourth – August 25, 2024
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/military-might-united-states-vs-china
THE COMPETITION REPORT SERIES
The Strategy Central Great Power Competition report series details the United States and China’s great power competition in the first half 2024. It offers an analysis to help strategists grasp the current rivalry between these two superpowers regarding national power, economics, military power, and diplomacy. This is the third of five segments covering each aspect of great power competition and will focus on military competition.
This article focuses on the military dynamics that have shaped U.S.-China relations throughout the first half of 2024. The article examines the strategic maneuvers by both nations in key areas across the Asian-Pacific such as the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and East China Sea, highlighting their efforts to assert dominance and deter each other's influence. It explores how the U.S. has intensified its military presence and alliances to counter China's growing capabilities. It details China's aggressive posturing and strategic partnerships with Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Through a nuanced exploration of military engagements, defense strategies, and geopolitical implications, the report underscores the deep rivalry and persistent mistrust that define U.S.-China relations.
Situation
Military tensions have been pronounced between China and the United States, particularly in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The U.S. continued its freedom of navigation operations, which China views as provocations. In response, China increased its military activities, including building infrastructure on man-made islands and expanding its naval presence. The strained military relationship was further complicated by disagreements over the AUKUS pact, which involves the U.S., U.K., and Australia cooperating on nuclear-propelled submarines—a move Beijing sees as a containment strategy. Despite some high-level talks aimed at maintaining open lines of communication and managing the competition, deep mistrust persists, with both sides accusing each other of aggressive posturing.
U.S. Strategy
DoD employs the 2022 National Security Strategy's concept of integrated deterrence to blend military capabilities across all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—to prevent adversaries from engaging in predatory activities. This approach aims to create a seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their aggressive actions will outweigh the benefits. The strategy includes cooperation across different branches of the U.S. military, integration with other government agencies, and collaboration with international allies to ensure a comprehensive deterrent posture.
However, the application of integrated deterrence is, at best, aspirational and faces significant challenges. Integrating all forces and capabilities across various domains and agencies (plus allies) into a cohesive deterrent strategy is daunting and unachievable. The U.S. military, traditionally specialized in warfighting, struggles to adapt to a role primarily focused on deterrence, which is inherently a political function. Effective deterrence requires clear communication of intentions and capabilities to adversaries, which can conflict with the secrecy and specialized nature of many military operations, particularly in cyber and space domains.
In April of 2024, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy assessed the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in a nearly 100-page report criticizing the Pentagon for not implementing its strategy effectively.
The Commission found:
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DoD. The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot and should not solely be responsible for national defense. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes the need for an "integrated deterrence," which is not currently being implemented effectively. A comprehensive approach that involves all elements of national power is necessary to coordinate and utilize resources across the Department of Defense, the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.
o Technology. Fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental changes in how the DoD functions. When the danger approaches wartime urgency, the DoD operates at the speed of bureaucracy.
o Force Size. The NDS force-sizing construct is inadequate for today’s needs and tomorrow’s challenges. We propose a Multiple Theater Force Construct—with the Joint Force, in conjunction with U.S. allies and partners—sized to defend the homeland and tackle simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.
o Production. U.S. industrial production is currently insufficient to meet equipment, technology, and munitions needs, especially in a major conflict between world powers.
o Readiness. The Joint Force is currently struggling to maintain readiness. Adding more responsibilities without providing the necessary resources will only lead to further breakdown.
o Interagency. DoD should seek to align its concepts with other parts of the interagency to better coordinate military tools and other instruments of national power in pursuit of integrated deterrence.
U.S. Military Deterrence Efforts Against China in the Indo-Pacific
From January to July 2024, the U.S. military undertook several strategic initiatives to deter China's assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific region. These efforts were concentrated around Taiwan, the Philippines, the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku Islands, and the East China Sea. The U.S. aimed to reinforce its commitment to regional allies, uphold international laws, and maintain a balance of power to prevent any unilateral changes to the status quo by China.
In response to increasing Chinese military pressure around Taiwan, the U.S. escalated its military presence and engagement with Taiwan. The U.S. conducted several freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through the Taiwan Strait, underscoring the international waters' status and the U.S. commitment to free passage. Additionally, there were joint military exercises between U.S. and Taiwanese forces, focusing on enhancing Taiwan's defensive capabilities against potential amphibious assaults and missile attacks from China. These exercises included simulated air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and cyber defense operations, demonstrating a comprehensive approach to deterrence.
The U.S. fortified its alliance with the Philippines through increased military aid, joint exercises, and the rotational presence of U.S. troops under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Notably, the annual Balikatan exercises were expanded in 2024, involving more complex scenarios and advanced weaponry. These drills included amphibious assaults, live-fire exercises, and air-to-ground operations to improve interoperability and readiness against regional threats, including Chinese maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea. The U.S. also worked on upgrading military facilities in the Philippines to ensure rapid deployment capabilities if necessary.
In the contested Spratly Islands, the U.S. conducted multiple FONOPs to challenge China's extensive territorial claims and militarization of artificial islands. These operations were complemented by aerial reconnaissance missions to monitor Chinese activities and assert the right to freedom of overflight. The U.S. Navy's presence in the region was bolstered by carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups conducting patrols and exercises, demonstrating the capability to respond to any provocations swiftly. The U.S. also engaged with regional partners such as Vietnam and Malaysia, providing maritime security assistance and enhancing collaborative surveillance efforts.
- The Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea
To support Japan in its territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, the U.S. reaffirmed its defense commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This included increased joint patrols and surveillance missions in the East China Sea, where Chinese incursions into Japanese-claimed waters had escalated. The U.S. and Japan conducted joint air and naval exercises to deter Chinese aggression and demonstrate their alliance's robustness. These drills involved anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and missile defense operations, showcasing a comprehensive deterrence strategy.
China’s Strategy In The Asian Pacific
As initially described by former US diplomat and current military professor Patrick Mendis, China's' Blue Dragon' Strategy seeks to expand its influence and strategic reach across major water and land areas, countering US efforts and increasing PRC control. China’s strategy is broken into three regions: the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. It involves establishing claims on manmade islands and the surrounding maritime exclusion zones.
In the South China Sea, China has constructed and armed several artificial islands, outfitting them with military facilities like airstrips, radar systems, and missile installations. A key part of China's strategy, known as the Blue Dragon, involves making strong territorial claims, backed by the "nine-dash line," a boundary China uses to assert its control over about 90% of the South China Sea. This area includes important maritime zones and various islands and reefs also claimed by countries including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. In 2023, China released a new map to further assert its claims over these disputed territories.
China’s Blue Dragon strategy is anchored on Taiwan and Sri Lanka. Taiwan is crucial to Xi Jinping’s goals of revitalizing China by reclaiming all the territory that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes rightfully belongs to the PRC. Strategically, controlling Taiwan would give the PRC dominion over the Taiwan Strait. This is a strategically critical maritime route through which 80% of the world’s largest container ships pass, accounting for 40% of the global shipping fleet.
China's strategy of winning a war without fighting is evident in its tactical maneuvers from Taiwan to Sri Lanka, challenging the United States' traditional Cold War-era containment methods. The modern global landscape, marked by intertwined political, corporate, technological, and trade connections, makes it difficult to divide the world into clear pro-American or pro-China camps. To counter China's growing influence, the United States must stay ahead in scientific and technological innovation while maintaining robust security guarantees for its allies in the Indo-Pacific. However, military cooperation alone, such as through the Quad, AUKUS, or bilateral treaties with nations like the Philippines and Vietnam, isn't sufficient. Washington must also engage its smaller allies as partners in both military and economic matters, as seen in its recent diplomatic efforts to engage the Pacific Islands Forum to counter China's influence in the South Pacific.
Beijing's centralized power and autocratic mindset could lead to strategic miscalculations, driven by overconfidence in its military strength and economic capabilities. Unlike democratic systems with self-correcting mechanisms like regular elections and freedom of expression, China's autocratic governance may become its downfall, similar to the Soviet Union's collapse under its own miscalculations and systemic weaknesses. The United States should adopt a flexible containment policy, leveraging partnerships with allies while allowing China to falter through its own strategic errors. This approach could potentially turn China's internal challenges into strategic advantages for the U.S. in the geopolitical contest.
China Undeterred
Beijing's expansion of its global influence posture is a strategic maneuver aimed at bolstering the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) objectives. This strategy seeks to undermine U.S. leadership, destabilize democratic institutions, and extend Beijing's influence globally. Key elements of this approach include:
- Promoting Pro-China Narratives: Beijing focuses on disseminating favorable narratives about China while countering U.S.-promoted narratives that threaten its interests. This includes leveraging generative AI to enhance the sophistication of its influence operations.
- Exploiting U.S. Societal Divisions: Beijing mirrors Moscow's influence tactics by exploiting perceived divisions within U.S. society. This was evident during the 2022 U.S. midterm elections when PRC propaganda arms targeted candidates from both political parties via platforms like TikTok.
- Molding Public Discourse: Beijing intensifies efforts to shape U.S. public opinion on sensitive sovereignty issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. This includes monitoring Chinese students abroad for dissident views and mobilizing student associations to act on Beijing's behalf.
- Influencing Research and Academia: The PRC influences research by U.S. academics and think tank experts, aiming to control the narrative and policy choices regarding China.
- Maritime Power Projection. From intimidating Taiwan with live fire exercises all around the island to the militia fishing fleets violating other nations’ territorial waters and harassing their coast guard and naval forces with their own, China conducts maritime operations just under U.S. redlines with great regularity.
- UN Power Moves. In 1971, the PRC replaced the ROC as the recognized government of the Chinese people in the UN. Under PRC pressure, the number of nations that recognize Taiwan today has dwindled to twelve.
Given these activities, it is plausible that Beijing may attempt to influence the U.S. elections in 2024. The PRC's enhanced capabilities in covert operations and disinformation dissemination, coupled with the actions of individuals not directly supervised by Beijing but aligned with its goals, pose a significant risk to the integrity of the electoral process.
If the list does not look like traditional military activities, then you may not be aware of China’s competitive military organization. In late 2015, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched significant reforms that reshaped its structure, warfighting model, and organizational culture, notably by creating the Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF centralizes the PLA's space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities, shifting from land-based territorial defense to extended power projection in strategic frontiers like space, cyberspace, and the far seas. This reorganization aims to enhance efficiency and synergy among disparate capabilities, enabling decisive strategic information operations (IO). The SSF's two main branches, the Space Systems Department and the Network Systems Department oversee space and cyber operations, consolidating previous departmental responsibilities to streamline command and control. Despite the ongoing transition, the SSF is poised to play a critical role in the PLA's strategy for fighting and winning information-centric wars.
The SSF's formation is part of broader PLA reforms, including the dissolution of four general departments and the Central Military Commission (CMC) expansion. This new structure supports the dual command system where services focus on force construction, and theater commands handle joint operations. The SSF and the Rocket Force remain outside this bifurcated arrangement, responsible for force construction and strategic operations. The SSF centralizes technical reconnaissance and information support, which is essential for joint operations and strategic defense. Modeled partly on the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the SSF integrates various operations, including cyber espionage, cyber-attacks, and psychological warfare, addressing historical coordination challenges within the PLA. However, the SSF's effectiveness will depend on overcoming organizational culture issues and ensuring seamless integration across its various missions and with other military entities.
The Axis
China is central in fostering cooperation, coordination, and mutual support among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This alliance significantly impacts global dynamics, notably by supporting Russia's military operations in Ukraine. China has contributed critical technology and economic backing, while Iran has provided advanced drone technology. North Korea, though not a formal member of this axis, has reinforced these efforts by supplying ammunition and missile systems to Russia. These contributions enhance Russia's military capabilities and undermine Western efforts to diplomatically and economically isolate Moscow. This supports President Xi Jinping’s vision of China as the preeminent East Asian power and a leading power on the world stage. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will attempt to preempt its reputation and legitimacy challenges, undercutting U.S. influence, driving wedges between Washington and its partners, and fostering global norms favoring its authoritarian system with the support of Russia and Iran.
Military Collaboration
Military collaboration between the U.S. and China saw a cautious but positive development with the resumption of high-level military-to-military communications. This includes reinstating the U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings. These dialogues are crucial for managing potential crises and ensuring open lines of communication, especially in hotspots like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Both sides also agreed to resume telephone conversations between theater commanders, marking a significant step in mitigating risks of unintended military escalations.
Summary
The U.S. military's efforts from January to July 2024 to deter China in the Indo-Pacific region were multifaceted. They involved a combination of increased military presence, joint exercises, and reaffirmation of defense commitments to allies. These measures were designed to maintain stability, uphold international norms, and prevent any unilateral changes to the regional status quo by China. They have also been largely ineffective at deterring Chinese cyber-attacks, influence operations, lawfare, East China Sea aggression, expanding military capabilities, supporting Russia and Iran, or harassing partners and allies internationally. The Joint Force has no equivalent to the PLA’s Strategic Support Force and only a desperate and uncoordinated interagency response to defeat the threat it poses. This must be rectified, or China’s advantage in psychological, informational, and cyber capabilities will continue to outclass those of the United States. Despite the Lowey Institutes’ dominant military capability score for the U.S. (see below), it does not reflect China's dominance in key strategic capabilities. The U.S. military cannot be overconfident despite legitimate power projection. It urgently needs to set the theater for conflict to deter war while shoring up the manifold areas it is either not competing, not deterring, or deterring with little effect.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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"Biden and Xi at APEC: Averting Further Crisis in U.S.-China Relations." United States Institute of Peace. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://www.usip.org.
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"China Sets Diplomatic Goals for 2024." China Daily. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn.
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"China’s Top Diplomat Presents Diplomatic Goals for 2024." English.gov.cn. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn.
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"Cooperate and Compete: Getting the Most out of U.S.-China Economic Relations." CSIS. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://www.csis.org.
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"Five Takeaways from China’s Latest Diplomacy." United States Institute of Peace. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://www.usip.org.
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"The U.S.-China Relationship in 2024: Managing Competition without Conflict." CSIS. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://www.csis.org.
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"The U.S.-China Relationship in 2024 Is Stabilized but Precarious." Brookings. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://www.brookings.edu.
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"Votes Around the World in 2024 Will Test Chinese Diplomacy." Chatham House. Accessed August 5, 2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org.
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Lee, John. "Xi Jinping Conceals China’s Vulnerability, Hoping We’ll Fall for It." Hudson Institute. Accessed August 7, 2024. https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/xi-jinping-conceals-china-vulnerability-hoping-well-fall-it-john-lee.
- Smith, Andrew. "U.S. Military Engagement in Taiwan: Strengthening Defense Capabilities." Asia-Pacific Defense Journal, April 2024.
- Johnson, Robert. "Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement: U.S.-Philippines Military Collaboration in 2024." Pacific Security Review, May 2024.
- Davis, Michael. "Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea: U.S. Strategies and Implications." Naval War College Review, June 2024.
- Tanaka, Hiroshi. "U.S.-Japan Joint Defense Initiatives in the East China Sea." Japan Defense Quarterly, July 2024.
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- https://power.lowyinstitute.org/report/
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- https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds_commission_final_report.pdf
12. The Circle of Life: The Four-Year National Policy and Strategy Cycle
A summary of the planning system/cycle.
One recommendation I have is to institutionalize Eisenhower's Solarium commission on a two year cycle.
I would require the new administration to conduct a Solarium project exercise in the summer of the first year of the administration's 4 year term at the National War College (Summer 2025). I would convene government officials and key practitioners and academics to review the current national security strategy in this way: Conduct a detailed assessment of the global geostrategic situation, review current strategic assumptions and assess the effectiveness of the current strategy and identify shortfalls or weaknesses with the focus on three outcomes:
- Recommend the current national security strategy to be sustained.
- Recommend the current national security strategy be modified in specific ways.
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Recommend and develop a new national security strategy based on changes in the global security situation and new assumptions.
By December (2025) POTUS would either validate the current strategy, issue a modified/updated version or issue an NSS.
At the halfway point of the administration (e.g., summer 2027), POTUS would convene a new Solarium commission to conduct the review of the current NSS to focus on the same three outcomes (sustain sustain with changes, or develop a new NSS). By December POTUS would issue an updated or new NSS).
In the next administration or next term the cycle would repeat (summer of 2029).
The purpose of this process would be to conduct a disciplined review of the NSS and provide an opportunity for better continuity by not simply rejecting what came from the previous administration but also by making modifications and only if necessary issuing a new NSS.
I would use these declassified national security strategies as examples to strive to emulate (at least in conciseness and directness)..
NSDD 32 - 1982 National Security Strategy (8 pages)
https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-32.pdf
NSDD 238 1986 Basic National Security Strategy (19 pages)
https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf
The Circle of Life: The Four-Year National Policy and Strategy Cycle
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-circle-of-life-the-four-year-national-policy-and-strategy-cycle
Elections serve as a fundamental mechanism in shaping the national strategy of the United States, significantly influencing the trajectory of policies that govern national security and defense. As new administrations assume office, they are charged with the intricate task of developing comprehensive strategies that address the multifaceted and evolving threats confronting the nation. This process unfolds in a cyclical manner, wherein each electoral cycle catalyzes the formulation of critical strategic documents. This article examines the interplay between electoral outcomes and the development of national security strategies, elucidating the interconnectedness of political leadership and national defense, as well as the broader implications for practitioners of strategy..
The Presidential Election as a Driver of Policy and Strategy
The United States conducts presidential elections every four years, a pivotal event that determines the occupant of the White House. Following the election, the newly elected administration embarks on the complex endeavor of implementing its policy platform, managing national affairs, and addressing emergent crises.
In instances where the incumbent president is reelected, policy continuity often results in minimal alterations to the strategic landscape. Conversely, a transition to a new party in power can precipitate significant shifts in policy and strategy, engendering a period of heightened activity within national security and defense sectors as military and strategic institutions recalibrate to align with the new administration's directives. This transition triggers subsequent cascade of strategy documents that can last two years or more.
Election + 9 to 18 Months: The National Security Strategy (NSS)
The National Security Strategy (NSS) emerges as the first formal document in this cycle. It articulates the administration's vision for national security, delineating key threats, strategic objectives, and the means by which the government intends to achieve its goals. The NSS encompasses a broad spectrum of issues, including military readiness, economic security, cybersecurity, and global health, reflecting the interconnected nature of contemporary security challenges.
Typically unclassified, the NSS transcends a purely military focus; it integrates diplomatic, economic, and social dimensions of security, advocating for a holistic approach. This document serves as a guiding framework for various government agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and intelligence agencies, ensuring that all efforts are harmonized with overarching national security objectives.
Election + 18 to 24 Months: The National Defense Strategy (NDS)
Subsequent to the NSS, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is signed by the Secretary of Defense and represents a critical articulation of the Department of Defense's approach to safeguarding national security and ensuring military readiness. Published as both a classified and unclassified document, the NDS functions as a strategic framework that informs defense policies, priorities, and resource allocation. It delineates the primary objectives of U.S. defense policy, including the protection of national interests, deterrence of adversaries, and defense of allies and partners.
Central to the NDS is a comprehensive assessment of current and emerging threats, encompassing state actors, non-state actors, cyber threats, and regional conflicts. By identifying these challenges, the NDS prioritizes military capabilities and readiness initiatives, emphasizing the necessity of maintaining a capable and prepared military force equipped to respond effectively to a diverse array of contingencies.
Election + 24 to 36 Months: The National Military Strategy (NMS)
Signed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Strategy (NMS) serves several essential functions in guiding the United States Armed Forces and ensuring alignment with national security objectives. Primarily, it translates the broader goals articulated in the NSS and NDS into actionable military plans and operations and is typically published in both classified and unclassified forms. In doing so, the NMS provides a clear framework for the employment of military resources and capabilities in addressing both current and emerging threats.
A key purpose of the NMS is to establish strategic priorities for the military, focusing on deterrence, defense, and the capacity to project power globally. It underscores the importance of readiness and modernization, ensuring that the Armed Forces are adequately equipped and prepared to respond to a spectrum of contingencies, ranging from conventional warfare to asymmetric threats. In summary, the NMS is a vital instrument for guiding military operations, ensuring readiness, promoting joint collaboration, and strengthening alliances, all while aligning military efforts with national security objectives.
Conclusion
The cyclical nature of the national strategy underscores the interplay between political leadership and national security in the United States. Each election not only determines the occupant of the White House but also initiates a series of strategic documents that shape the nation’s response to an ever-evolving landscape of threats and challenges. As administrations transition, the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy collectively reflect the priorities and values of the elected leadership, influencing not only military readiness but also diplomatic relations and economic policies.
Ultimately, the cyclical nature of national strategy serves as a reminder that the health of a nation’s defense and security is linked to the will of its populace, highlighting the critical role of leadership in navigating the complexities of a dynamic global environment. As we look to the future, a nuanced understanding of this cycle will be essential for ensuring that the United States remains a steadfast force for stability and peace in an unpredictable and dynamic world.
13. Seawolf-Class: The U.S. Navy's Great Mistake Can't Ever Be Fixed
I had no idea. I defer to our naval experts for comment nd assessment of this article.
Seawolf-Class: The U.S. Navy's Great Mistake Can't Ever Be Fixed
The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · August 24, 2024
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's Seawolf-class submarines are among the most advanced undersea vessels, designed to counter Soviet threats and equipped with powerful Mark 48 torpedoes, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Tomahawk cruise missiles. However, only three were built due to their high cost, with the Navy instead prioritizing aircraft carriers.
-Critics argue this was a shortsighted decision, especially given the growing anti-access/area-denial capabilities of China and Russia, which could render carriers less effective.
-With only two operational Seawolf submarines currently available, the U.S. may find itself at a strategic disadvantage in future conflicts.
Seawolf-Class Submarines: America's Missed Naval Revolution?
The U.S. Navy’s Seawolf-class submarines are widely considered to be the best vessels to ever “run silent, run deep.” At $3.5 billion per sub, these undersea demons keep Russian and Chinese war planners up at night.
Seawolf-class submarines are usually equipped with powerful heavyweight 533-mm Mark 48 torpedoes. They are armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles as well, and the platform can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets on land. Seawolf-class subs can cruise underwater at an astonishing 35 knots, or 20 knots when rigged for silent running.
Designed in 1983 to respond to Soviet attack submarines such as the ubiquitous Akula class, the Seawolf class was intended to replace aging Los Angeles-class attack submarines. Washington planned to build and deploy around 30 of these technological marvels over the course of a decade.
After 41 years of existence, however, only three Seawolf-class subs are in service.
The reason there are so few of these lethal submarines is their high cost per unit. Back in the 1990s, the Seawolf class accounted for about 25% of the U.S. Navy’s entire construction budget. Of course, given the nightmare fuel that the Seawolf-class serves up to America’s two biggest geostrategic challengers — Russia and China — it strains credulity that either Congress or the Pentagon would believe that the money could have been better spent.
Alas, they did think that.
The Navy’s Wastefulness is Unbelievable
Rather than investing in the dynamic Seawolf class, the U.S. government opted instead to invest in the Navy’s lavishly funded aircraft carrier program. At an initial cost of $13 billion per ship, and an additional $700 million per year, America’s Navy decided to build the Ford-class aircraft carrier. For the same cost, at $3.5 billion per unit, the Navy could have built four more Seawolf-class submarines.
Because of the advent and refinement of the anti-access/area-denial capabilities of America’s main strategic rivals, all of the investment into new aircraft carriers is basically a waste. If China or Russia can seriously threaten the safety of American aircraft carriers, Washington will keep those assets far removed from any war zone, creating a hulking gap in its power-projection capabilities.
Had the Navy been smarter and simply invested those funds in the far more useful Seawolf class, they could afford to risk losing some of these assets in combat. As it stands now, however, with just three units in the fleet and no others coming down the pipeline, the Seawolf class could essentially be made extinct by damage in combat against a great power rival.
Only Two Operational Seawolf Subs
The USS Connecticut is one of the three Seawolf-class subs in the fleet. In 2021, the submarine was patrolling the South China Sea, operating very near China’s sophisticated submarine base on Hainan Island. While performing its mission in international waters, the submarine crashed into an underwater mountain and suffered nearly catastrophic damage. It limped back to port and has been undergoing a refit. The Connecticut is not expected to return to service for at least another year.
That means that the U.S. fleet has only two Seawolf-class subs right now.
One of the Seawolf-class submarines, the USS Jimmy Carter, was selected to be used for special operations missions. It was extended to 100 feet long in 2005. The Jimmy Carter’s capabilities are noteworthy, even for a submarine of this class. Should China successfully invade Taiwan, one could see the Jimmy Carter being covertly deployed to drop Special Forces operators and weapons behind enemy lines in occupied Taiwan, where they would support the inevitable Taiwanese insurgency against the Chinese invaders.
Seawolf-Class Submarine: Wasted Assets
But that is one sub. Imagine if the Pentagon had followed through on its plan for a minimum of 30 Seawolf systems. The Seawolf-class submarine is probably far more relevant to any potential war with China or Russia than the entire U.S. aircraft carrier fleet. Building up this class of submarine is probably impossible now – America’s declining defense industrial base cannot support the demand. (The shoddy state of American shipyards is one of the reasons the Connecticut is taking so long to repair)
The Navy missed the boat on the Seawolf-class submarine revolution. It is now about to pay the ultimate price for its shortsightedness when it favored the interests of big defense contractors and their preference for carriers over the national interest in shifting the Navy’s focus toward submarines.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · August 24, 2024
14. Preparing for a Less Arrogant America
I would be for a less arrogant Amercan foreign policy if we followed Yi Sun Shin's advice:
‘Be flexible without weakness.
Be strong without arrogance.
Be kind without vulnerability.
Be trusting without naïveté.
Have invincible courage.”
–Admiral Yi Sun Shin
Preparing for a Less Arrogant America
A close reading of two books by authors who advise Kamala Harris reveals a vision for a humbler approach to foreign policy.
August 20, 2024, 6:00 AM
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(7)
By Michael Hirsh, a columnist for Foreign Policy.
Foreign Policy · by Michael Hirsh
- Foreign & Public Diplomacy
- Politics
- United States
A drawing of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump overlapping with the words "Election 2024"
Stay informed with FP’s news and analysis as the United States prepares to vote.
Over the past three and a half years, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris has faithfully echoed her boss, U.S. President Joe Biden, by invoking pretty much the same hegemonic worldview that every American president has embraced since World War II. As Harris put it in a 2023 speech—quoting a favorite phrase of Biden’s—“a strong America remains indispensable to the world.”
But the United States may be downgraded to a humbler status if Harris is elected president in November, based on the thinking of her chief advisors.
In their written work, Harris’s national security advisor, Philip Gordon, and deputy national security advisor, Rebecca Lissner, have sketched the outlines of a new worldview in which Washington frankly acknowledges its past excesses and dramatically lowers its ambitions. Or as Lissner put it in An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for 21st Century Order, the 2020 book she coauthored with another Biden administration official: The United States should give up on strategic primacy and the “increasingly obsolete post-Cold War ‘liberal international order.’”
Instead of seeking to remain the unquestioned hegemon, the United States should seriously downsize its global role, wrote Lissner and her co-author, Mira Rapp-Hooper, who is currently Biden’s National Security Council director for East Asia and Oceania. It’s past time for Washington to discard the “messianic” goal of transforming the world in its image—the United States’ basic policy approach going back to Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. Instead, it should ratchet down to a much narrower role: merely preserving an open global system in which the United States can prosper.
Standing outside at an airport, Rebecca Lissner, seen in profile wearing in a white coat carrying a bag and folder, and Ike Irby, in a gray suit and green tie with his hands on his hips, listen as Kirsten Allen, wearing a black short-sleeve top and glasses, gestures to them. Three men and a car are seen behind them.
From left: Rebecca Lissner, a deputy national security advisor to Harris, and policy advisor Ike Irby speak with communications director Kirsten Allen before departing the airport in Houston, Texas, on Aug. 1. Kevin Lamarque/AFP via Getty Images
“As the unipolar moment wanes, so too must any illusions of the United States’ ability to craft order unilaterally and universally according to its own liberal preferences,” Lissner and Rapp-Hooper wrote. “Insisting upon the United States’ international leadership role but departing from reliance on primacy as the cornerstone of a messianic liberal mission, a strategy of openness departs from post-Cold War liberal universalism, Cold War-style containment, and the traditional alternative of retrenchment.”
The book cover for An Open World by Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper
Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, Yale University Press, 216 pp, $26, September 2020
This new approach would mean a lot of accommodation of autocratic and illiberal regimes and a discarding of ideological crusades or containment strategies—all in the pragmatic interest of keeping trade open and bolstering cooperation on critical issues such as climate change, future pandemics, and artificial intelligence regulation. To put it simply, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper argued that policies of containment and hegemony should be supplanted by the far more modest goal of ensuring an “accessible global commons.” The United States has one critical task left as the “indispensable” superpower, they wrote: It is “the only country that can guarantee an open system.”
Gordon would likely agree—at least about leaving behind, at long last, the messianic strain in U.S. foreign policy. His own 2020 book, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, is a fierce dissection of various failed U.S. efforts in the region dating back 70 years to the CIA-orchestrated ouster of Iranian President Mohammad Mossadegh.
Though he lumped in Afghanistan—which is technically in central Asia—with the failed U.S. interventions in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria, Gordon was right to see a common theme: regime change almost never works. And like the proverbial lunatic who tries the same thing over and over thinking he might get a different result, U.S. policymakers never seem to learn the right lessons, he argued.
In every case, from 1953 (Mossadegh), to two disastrous episodes in Afghanistan (the 1980s and post-9/11), to the catastrophic invasion of Iraq in 2003, and to fitful efforts in Egypt, Libya, and Syria after the 2011 Arab Spring, Gordon identified a pattern.
Philip Gordon, a man wearing a suit and tie leans, toward Kamala Harris, a woman in a blazer and white blouse. They are seated at a table behind microphones and placards that say "United States." Four flags from various nations are visible behind them.
U.S. National Security Advisor Philip H. Gordon speaks with Vice President Kamala Harris during a meeting with Caribbean leaders at the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles on June 9, 2022. Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images
“As different as each episode was, and as varied as were the methods used, the history of regime change in the post-World War II Middle East is a history of repeated patterns,” he wrote, “in which policymakers underestimated the challenges of ousting a regime, overstated the threat faced by the United States, embraced the optimistic narratives of exiles or local actors with little power and vested interests, prematurely declared victory, failed to anticipate the chaos that would inevitably ensue after regime collapse, and ultimately found themselves bearing the costs—in some cases more than a trillion dollars and thousands of American lives—for many years or even decades to come.”
Gordon noted that critics, especially the few remaining neoconservatives in Washington, would argue that in some cases regime change had worked very well. This is most notably true in the case of postwar Germany and Japan. But he argued persuasively that these were unique circumstances: two highly advanced countries after a devastating world war. And had it not been for the strange annealing effect of the subsequent 40-year-long Cold War, even the successful transformations of Germany and Japan might not have worked as completely as they did because U.S. patience would have grown thin very quickly—as it has in subsequent cases. A faster U.S. withdrawal from Europe and Japan might well have undercut the effort to fundamentally change Berlin and Tokyo.
The book cover of Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East by Philip H. Gordon
Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East, Philip H. Gordon, St. Martins Press, 370 pp, $29, October 2020.
Grim and exhaustive as Gordon’s assessment is, it actually understates the case for change. That’s because, added all together, these failed U.S. attempts at transformation contributed mightily to the growing obsolescence of the current liberal international order that so concerns Lissner and Rapp-Hooper.
The history that Gordon recounts is a history that keeps on giving. Today the number-one menace keeping the United States tied down in the Middle East is the very same Islamic Republic of Iran that rose to power fueled by its opposition to the American “Great Satan,” produced by the 1953 coup and empowered by the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In fact, a U.S. Army study completed in 2018 found that “an emboldened and expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor” in George W. Bush’s Iraq war—the exact opposite of what Bush and his neoconservatives sought.
The vicious spiral set in motion by these misguided policy choices undermined U.S. legitimacy—or its primacy, to use Lissner’s and Rapp-Hooper’s term—as global overseer. The unnecessary and fraudulently justified invasion of Iraq, and the drain on U.S. resources and attention that resulted, laid the groundwork for Washington’s 20-year failure in Afghanistan (which led to Biden’s declaration in August 2021 that he was putting an end to “major military operations to remake other countries,” which of course put the president in accord with Gordon’s advice). The Iraq catastrophe also exposed U.S. military vulnerabilities on the ground in the worst way, tutoring Russia, China, and the rest of the world in how to outmaneuver and fight what was once considered an unassailable superpower. Moreover, the Iraq and Afghanistan debacles projected an image of panicky U.S. retreat, from which Russian President Vladimir Putin may have drawn encouragement to invade Ukraine. (Putin also invoked the unilateral U.S. invasion of Iraq to justify his own aggression in Ukraine.)
As counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen wrote in his book, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, also released in 2020, the rising challenge to U.S. hegemony from countries such as China and Russia is linked to the United States’ “repeated failure to convert battlefield victory into strategic success or to translate that success into a better peace.” Over the past two decades, the lone superpower has allowed itself to get bogged down in a “seemingly endless string of continuous, inconclusive wars that have sapped [its] energy while [its] rivals prospered,” Kilcullen wrote.
And so the postwar international system, at least as once conceived, went down the tube as Beijing and Moscow began to declare that U.S. hegemony was no longer acceptable to them.
Beyond that, these failures helped to create the deep divisions in the American polity that led Lissner and Rapp-Hooper to conclude that traditional U.S. leadership is no longer tenable. Together these titanic errors of policy also helped to discredit the political establishment in Washington and open the way for former U.S. President Donald Trump and his “America First” neo-isolationism.
There were, to be sure, other U.S. failures that undermined U.S. legitimacy as global leader, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper wrote—especially the 2008 financial disaster generated by Wall Street greed and the fecklessness of Washington regulators. But it’s clear that—far more than any fundamental flaws within the international system itself—it was largely the excesses of America’s postwar agenda and the arrogance with which it was pursued that squandered the world’s trust.
Gordon didn’t go quite as far as Lissner and Rapp-Hooper in his conclusions. Known as a passionate trans-Atlanticist—he served as assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs in the Obama administration—Gordon acknowledged that “the regime change temptation will never go away.” He wrote: “The bias of American political culture, resulting from the country’s record of achievement and belief in its own exceptionalism, is to believe every problem has a solution.” Rather than reconfiguring U.S. policy entirely, he suggested that in most cases when it comes to rogue regimes “the best alternative to regime change looks a lot like the Containment strategy that won the Cold War.”
Kamala Harris, wearing a dark suit, is seen from behind and slightly above as she walks down the center aisle of a Capitol chamber, smiling and shaking hands with people on either side of her. Some of the audience members are clapping and reaching out to her.
Harris arrives for an address by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a joint meeting of Congress at the U.S. Capitol in Washington on Dec. 21, 2022. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
So where does this all leave us? There’s no use trying to unwind history and restore the old system. In many ways, despite their different conclusions, Gordon’s and Lissner’s books fit together like two big pieces of a puzzle: Thanks to the policy disasters detailed by Gordon (in which he took part, as a National Security Council official under then-President Barack Obama), some sort of humbler approach, along the lines proposed by Lissner and Rapp-Hooper, may be needed. And this strategy will likely be bipartisan to some degree.
Indeed, in their writings there is little doubt that Gordon and Lissner—the two chief foreign policy advisors to the woman who could soon be the next U.S. president—are in the process of codifying, perhaps for decades to come, the anti-interventionist impulse becoming ingrained in both political parties.
If Trump is elected instead of Harris, of course, he’s unlikely to embrace Lissner’s strategy of openness—at least not openly. (Trump continues to rhetorically demean U.S. allies and tout new tariffs as his main foreign-policy instrument.) What Trump is likely to do, however, is to continue to downgrade the United States’ global policeman role. Trump was instrumental in setting in motion the withdrawal from Afghanistan and, as Gordon wrote, also eager to pull out of Syria. Indeed, it is striking that after five years of dithering by Obama over whether to help the Syrian rebels, it was Trump who best put his finger on the problem. He questioned why the United States was helping to topple Syria’s dictatorial leader, Bashar al-Assad, when, as Gordon quoted Trump as saying, “Syria was fighting ISIS, and you have to get rid of ISIS. … Now we’re backing rebels against Syria, and we have no idea who these people are.”
Lissner and Rapp-Hooper’s prescriptions may be ambitious, but at the same time they are refreshingly modest in scope. Nothing has gotten Washington into more trouble over the decades than its continuing eruptions of hubristic policy. These extended from Wilson’s quixotic desire to make the world “safe for democracy” after World War I to then-Defense Department official Paul Wolfowitz’s uber-hawkish defense policy guidance from 1992, which embraced a frank post-Cold War policy of preventing the rise of rival military powers. It was this sort of thinking by Wolfowitz and his fellow neoconservatives that later helped justify the Iraq War.
Lissner and Rapp-Hooper’s open world concept also jibes with the changing calculus of our times: In economic terms, the divide between left and right wing is all but gone; instead, as Fareed Zakaria wrote in his 2024 book, Age of Revolutions, for the two political parties the old left versus right divide has been replaced by a struggle between those who want to keep the United States open to the world versus those who want to close it down more than ever. It is no accident that trade skeptics on the progressive left in the United States have come to lionize Trump’s former trade representative, Robert Lighthizer, for his tariff policies. (In his 2023 book, No Trade is Free, Lighthizer makes a point of thanking U.S. union leaders and acknowledging Lori Wallach—a progressive trade expert—as “a longtime friend and co-conspirator.”)
So Lissner and Rapp-Hooper may have chosen just the right battlefield to die on—or not. If we can salvage some degree of openness, we can save something of the old system. As they wrote: “Openness does not, of course, incorporate the totality of American strategic objectives. Other threats, like nuclear proliferation, disease, or terrorism, may menace vital U.S. interests. Yet closed spheres of influence—whether exercised regionally or in particular domains—present the greatest danger to the United States’ security and prosperity” because they preclude necessary international cooperation.
In a new book, Fareed Zakaria explores how much the times are a-changin’. At risk, he says, is the entire global system.
Black Americans have always sought international connection in service of promoting freedom.
Another fundamental problem that Lissner and Rapp-Hooper hint at is that the United States may no longer be up to the task of fully managing the international system it created. There is a growing mismatch between the complexity of this world system and the level of knowledge in the U.S. populace because of laggard education and dysfunctional political systems. Americans may simply no longer understand the system—how global free trade works, how military alliances keep them safe—well enough to maintain it. At the very least, Americans now have very little sympathy for that system.
The United States’ domestic polarization may also wreak havoc on some of the solutions Lissner and Rapp-Hooper propose. The authors propose a plan to “harness the private sector for national advantage” and bring the tech sector and Washington closer together. “The next administration should consider elevating the Office of Science and Technology Policy to a National Emerging Technology Council (NETC) on par with the National Security Council and National Economic Council,” they write. Yet the leaders of the United States’ tech sector have long tried to keep their distance from Washington—especially on defense policy–except for a few oddball pairings such as Elon Musk and Donald Trump.
Perhaps the most fundamental question is whether the international system is really as obsolete as Lissner and Rapp-Hooper suggested. Yes, many problems the duo analyzed four years ago remain, including the increasing irrelevance of the World Trade Organization. But some of their views are dated. Lissner and Rapp-Hooper tended to echo the fears of Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who warned in a 2019 essay in Foreign Affairs, “Competition Without Catastrophe,” of the menace of “China’s fusion of authoritarian capitalism and digital surveillance.” Similarly, Lissner and Rapp-Hooper wrote that “China is at the forefront of a new model of ‘techno-authoritarianism’ that could confer considerable competitive advantages.” Yet in the four years since the book’s publication, it’s become far clearer that China under President Xi Jinping has only fallen behind thanks to this new model, with its economy seriously stagnating and Xi pleading for more foreign investment.
Moreover, in the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Washington has been forced to revert, to some extent, to its old role of global enforcer. This has proved especially true as the European Union has fallen behind the U.S. economically. As the Carnegie Endowment concludes in a new report that highlights how difficult it is to bring about strategic change in U.S. foreign policy, “the administration’s response to that crisis has been to expand America’s security role in Europe and thereby create a new status quo.” Much the same can be said of the United States’ role in the Middle East following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, as Biden found himself sending carriers and submarines to the Mediterranean and forced to defend Israel from the air.
Rebecca Lissner and Philip Gordon walk past an ornate display of giant hand fans and plants as they walk to a state dinner. Lissner wears a pink and black formal gown with large puffy sleeves, and Philip Gordon wears formal black tie garb. Both are smiling slightly.
Lissner and Gordon arrive to attend a state dinner in honor of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the White House in Washington, D.C., on April 10. Ting Shen/Pool/Sipa USA
Yet we are also clearly moving into some kind of a new anti-interventionist era wherein Washington’s default mode—regardless of who occupies the White House—will be to stay out of global conflicts wherever and however possible. And it seems likely that if Harris wins, Gordon and Lissner will be major players. Gordon, to be sure, is more of a traditionalist who would be reluctant to tamper too much with the United States’ global security role. But it’s noteworthy that Lissner had a significant role drafting Biden’s national security strategy—and yet she chose to join the vice president’s staff in 2022 to influence policy for the next generation.
Asked whether Harris embraces Gordon’s and Lissner’s views, an aide to the vice president said only that Harris “is advised by a range of people with diverse views, and their previous writings reflect their personal views. Anyone looking to understand the vice president’s worldview should look at what she has said and done on the world stage.”
As for Harris’s current superior, perhaps Biden’s most enduring legacy—one that a President Harris would surely continue—will be that he sought to conduct a sort of halfway-house foreign policy that bridges the global policeman era and this new era of restraint. Biden has also attempted to find a workable compromise between the old consensus on globalization and the emerging cross-party consensus in favor of protectionism and industrial policy. As foreign-policy expert Jessica T. Mathews argued in Foreign Affairs, Biden has “unambiguously left behind the hubris of the ‘unipolar moment’ that followed the Cold War, proving that the United States can be deeply engaged in the world without military action or the taint of hegemony.”
Joe Biden stands behind a lectern, looking up and gesturing, his mouth open as he speaks. Kamala Harris stands next to him, smiling as she looks toward him. A U.S. and presidential flag are seen hanging from staffs behind them.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Harris host a signing ceremony for the “Consolidated Appropriations Act,” which includes billions in humanitarian, military, and economic assistance to Ukraine, in Washington on March 15, 2022.Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
At the same time, however, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’s attack on Israel, Biden has often gone back to invoking the old postwar view of the United States’ role, calling the United States the “arsenal of democracy” (FDR’s phrase) and declaring that “American leadership is what holds the world together.”
And given the ongoing crises around the world—especially in Europe, the Middle East, and possibly East Asia if the Taiwan issue heats up—it’s highly questionable whether the United States can adjust downward when there is no other major power that even comes close to approaching Washington’s global sway. If it can, then maintaining global openness may be a worthy—and perhaps achievable—goal.
Foreign Policy · by Michael Hirsh
15. ‘Great Game’ Unfolds in Pacific as US, China Vie for Backing
‘Great Game’ Unfolds in Pacific as US, China Vie for Backing
By Michael Heath
August 21, 2024 at 8:30 AM EDT
Updated on August 21, 2024 at 6:35 PM EDT
Island nations scattered across the Pacific Ocean are at the center of an intensifying competition between China and the US for maritime routes, deep-water ports and other strategic assets in what the Lowy Institute calls a new “Great Game.”
The countries’ proximity to key shipping lanes and the communication cables that criss-cross the Pacific floor, together with fisheries and seabed minerals, also encourage the rivalry, Lowy said in a report on Wednesday. But it’s the region’s maritime location between Asia, North America and Australia that is set to keep it at the forefront of major powers’ defense strategies.
Southern Waters
Pacific island nations near or below the equator
“The Pacific’s geopolitical landscape is increasingly crowded, with multiple powers vying for influence,” report authors Mihai Sora, Jessica Collins and Meg Keen said. “China is expanding its reach through diplomatic relations, infrastructure projects, and development finance, while traditional partners such as Australia and the US strive to maintain their influence.”
That’s a significant turnaround for island leaders who used to complain that western nations didn’t pay enough attention to the region. Lowy warns the new strategic focus is set to challenge good governance and transparency, given opportunities for local political actors to advance narrow interests over what best serves the people of the Pacific.
Read: Why US and China Compete for Sway in South Pacific: QuickTake
The Pacific region is further grappling with rising sea levels due to climate change, as well as a lost decade of development following Covid.
China is now a significant player in the Pacific via development finance, diplomatic outreach and infrastructure such as ports, airports and telecommunications. It’s also pushing to play a greater role in key sectors such as the military, policing, digital connectivity, and media, according to the report from the Sydney-based institute.
The US and its allies are also catching up. Since 2017, 18 new embassies have been established in the Pacific, including American outposts in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, while four have closed. Australia, which has opened six new Pacific posts since 2017, is the only country with a resident diplomatic presence in every sovereign Pacific nation.
“The frenetic tempo of global diplomatic outreach to the Pacific underscores the intensity of competition,” Lowy said. “But this sustained engagement can quickly overwhelm local systems” and may not bring “tangible benefits.”
Read more on strategic jockeying in the PacificSolomon Islands Names Ex-FM Manele Leader in Win for ChinaNew Zealand, US Pledge Closer Ties Amid China Tension in PacificUS Alerts Pacific After Report of Chinese Police in KiribatiAustralia’s Climate Refugee Accord Is Model for World, UN Says
Beijing’s loans and infrastructure investments have allowed it to bolster its presence at the expense of Taiwan, which has lost three diplomatic partners in the Pacific to China since 2019.
In 2022, China signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands, triggering concerns among western nations. That prompted the US and Australia to bolster security and other agreements with countries including Papua New Guinea. Canberra also signed an agreement with Tuvalu allowing its people to relocate to Australia as climate change worsens.
Rapid population gains and urbanization are straining services in Pacific nations and young people often have poor employment and education prospects, according to Lowy. PNG’s population is estimated to reach 22 million by 2050, from around 10 million currently, it said.
Ports and Infrastructure
The “Great Game” reference harks back to the 19th century competition for influence in Central Asia between the British Empire and Russia’s tsarist rulers.
One of the problems of great power attention in the Pacific is that local needs like poverty reduction, education, health and other key areas are ignored in favor of strategic projects like deep-water ports and communications infrastructure. Or locally, politicians use development funds to build stadiums and other high-profile projects at the expense of more pressing needs.
The number of individual donors to the Pacific increased to 82 in 2021 from 31 in 2008 and some Pacific Islanders are concerned about the capacity of regional architecture and national systems to manage and coordinate this activity, Lowy said.
“The extent of corruption in the Pacific, including ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests, has seen no material improvements across the years,” the Lowy report showed.
(Adds rapid population growth in 11th paragraph.)
16. Air Force Academy restricted all cadets to base as classes started, leading to meat shortages
Air Force Academy restricted all cadets to base as classes started, leading to meat shortages
Stars and Stripes · by Mary Shinn · August 24, 2024
U.S. Air Force Academy cadets of the class of 2028 undergo basic training, July 2, 2024. (Dylan Smith/U.S. Air Force)
(Tribune News Service) — The Air Force Academy restricted all cadets to the base as classes were getting started in early August to reinforce standards of cleanliness and personal appearance.
Cadets speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal said the restriction led to a shortage of meat at campus dining facilities because many upperclassmen often go off campus for meals.
Social media was also awash in complaints about the inability to leave the base and low morale in recent days. During restrictions to base cadets can still leave for certain activities, such as attending church services. But they are not allowed to leave to eat at restaurants or go grocery shopping.
The campus-wide restriction to base started on Aug. 7, according to the official memo from the Commandant of the Cadets Gen. Gavin Marks obtained by The Gazette. It was lifted on Friday after cadets made significant progress in meeting the expectations in the memo, the academy said.
In the document, Marks not only restricted cadets to base, but he also closed Hap’s Place, a bar on base, to cadets and required all cadets to wear uniforms at all times unless they were asleep or signed out to leave the base and on their way off base.
The document said that cadets had to clean squadron assembly rooms, storage rooms, quads and outdoor cooking equipment. It also said the cadets must achieve high scores in personal appearance and room inspections.
In a statement to The Gazette, the academy said it was focused on a return to basics.
“Emphasis areas will include customs and courtesies, uniform and grooming standards, and overall training and discipline. Most of this does not involve new standards, but instead focuses on accountability with respect to existing standards and raising the bar along our commissioning path,” said academy spokesman Lt. Col. Brian Maguire.
“Have we gotten any good news since last year?” a cadet asked on social media, referencing all the changes.
The academy said in its response that while dining facilities had run out of steak, chicken and fish remained available. It is also adjusting its food orders to meet demand, the school said.
“We are conducting a thorough review of all food options available on USAFA to ensure we provide the quality, quantity and variety of food, bounded by nutritional and caloric requirements, for Cadets,” Col. Amy Glisson, 10th Air Base Wing Commander said in a statement.
The restriction to base was ordered shortly after Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind took over as superintendent at the academy on Aug. 2. The general, who previously led Air Force Special Operations Command, promised in his assumption of command speech to make the academy experience more demanding.
(c)2024 The Gazette.
Visit The Gazette at www.gazette.com.
Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.
Stars and Stripes · by Mary Shinn · August 24, 2024
17. A new Asian order
A generational struggle. Perhaps it would be better to describe our "strategic competition" with the malign actors of the Dark Quad as a generational struggle.
Excerpts:
Finally, no president has addressed the American people to announce that they must gird themselves for a generational struggle against its biggest ever rival. American political leaders do give speeches about China, and countless policy documents put China at the centre of US strategy. But no president has yet sought to persuade the American public that the US needs to launch a national struggle that will be bigger than the cold war.
What about AUKUS? Doesn’t the almost unprecedented transfer of nuclear technology to Australia signal America’s deep commitment to regional hegemony? First of all, AUKUS was an Australian idea, not American. And what a deal for America! It promises to bring hundreds of billions of dollars into the US shipbuilding and arms industries, and will ultimately give US what is effectively an adjunct to its own Pacific fleet.
What would a generation struggle look like? Sunday morning stream of consciousness follows:
If this is the Chinese strategy: "China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions."
Perhaps these are some considerations for the generational struggle against China and the other members of the Dark Quad.
Strong deterrence - we want to prevent conflict and war BUT we cannot show fear of it and we cannot have a policy of "preventing escalation at all costs" as this current administration has in place. Fear of escalation is a demonstration of our strategic weakness. We have to understand that there are times to escalate to de-escalate. We have to have the strategic sense to know when.
Adopt JFK's dictum: "never fear to negotiate but never negotiate out of fear." Maintain global strategic strength to sustain a superior negotiating position.
Conduct proactive aggressive political warfare rather than "strategic competition" to protect, sustain, and advance US interests in conjunction with mutual defense and mutually supporting political warfare in conjunction with our friends, partners, and allies (some (e.g., UK or 5 Eyes) more than others ). This does mean protecting the rules-based international order (I cannot yet imagine something that could replace it that would be in our interest).
Regarding the Dark Quad (China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea): recognize that we cannot impose external change on any of them. We have to sustain our strength and defense capabilities to deter them from engaging in direct conflict or war. We must deal with the reality of their malign activities and work to defeat the effects of those activities while conducting our own political warfare activities to continuously create conditions (dilemmas ) that will keep them off balance - we need to sustain the initiative and not cede it to them. We need to recognize that this will be the strategic order for the long term until there is internal change in these countries where they collapse or change due to their own internal contradictions. The bottom line is we have to both create the conditions where possible but also let the conditions develop naturally that will cause these countries to fail due to their own internal contradictions. We cannot "fix" everything ourselves. We cannot "try" too hard. But we can protect, sustain, and advance our interests. If we focus on that we can live with a certain level of the status quo while recognizing that eventually our enemies will change or collapse based on their own internal contradictions.
A new Asian order • Sam Roggeveen
Rather than American or Chinese ascendancy in Asia, we’re likely to be facing a “long in-between.” Where does that leave AUKUS?
Sam Roggeveen 23 August 2024 1663 words
insidestory.org.au · by Administrator · August 23, 2024
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What vision of Asian order underpins AUKUS?
Some people will regard this question as a category error. AUKUS is a technology program and nothing more. As defence minister Richard Marles said in April 2024, “AUKUS is not a security alliance. That’s not what it is. AUKUS is a technology-sharing agreement.”
Marles is narrowly correct: AUKUS, in and of itself, is not a security treaty. But prime ministers and presidents wouldn’t typically fly around the world to attend a launch event in San Diego for a mere technology-sharing agreement, as Rishi Sunak, Anthony Albanese and Joe Biden did in March last year.
AUKUS is far from anodyne and apolitical. Right down to its highly enriched uranium reactor core, it is about geopolitics and about the US–Australia alliance. In fact, it’s the most important thing to happen to ANZUS since it was founded in 1951. Australian nuclear-powered submarines are the most prominent feature of the agreement, but we shouldn’t forget the basing arrangements: HMAS Stirling in Western Australia will host up to five American and British submarines, while the Tindal air force base will be expanded to accommodate US bombers including the B-52 and B-2. If the United States goes to war with China, operations will be conducted from these bases, and several others.
So, AUKUS is clearly geopolitical, and it does imply a certain vision of regional order. But what kind of order? Ultimately, this is a question about American power: what sort of order will Washington try to forge in Asia? Actually, that question implies too much agency on Washington’s part, and too little on the part of its rival, China. I would argue that the more appropriate formulation is, “What type of order can the United States live with?”
Two alternative views about America’s objectives for AUKUS have been presented in the Australian debate, both of them by AUKUS critics. One is that AUKUS is about reinforcing US hegemony in Asia, and the other is that, even if hegemony is the ostensible purpose of AUKUS, the US doesn’t have the resolve to be regional hegemon or even to maintain its presence in Asia. Ultimately, Washington is likely to retrench.
The first view has been put by former prime minister Paul Keating, who described AUKUS in March 2023 as an attempt to screw into place “the last shackle in the long chain which the Americans have laid out to contain China.” On another occasion, Keating said “no mealy mouthed talk of stabilisation… or the resort to soft language will disguise from the Chinese the extent and intent of the commitment to United States hegemony.”
The other view comes from Hugh White, who argues that China will win the contest for strategic leadership in Asia, and America will lose: “America will cease to play a major strategic role in Asia, and China will take its place as the dominant power.”
White is prepared to believe that the US thinks AUKUS helps it to reinforce its strategic leadership in Asia. But he believes the US is mistaken about the scale of the task it faces. China’s rise makes it impossible to preserve the old US-led order, and American attempts to perpetuate that order are therefore doomed. This makes AUKUS an Australian bet on the losing side of the struggle for leadership in Asia. China will take America’s place as Asia’s dominant power.
Yet there is little evidence that the US is truly committed to hegemony or to containing China. Instead, we mainly see signs of inertia. As we examine America’s record, keep in mind what we have been witnessing in China since the 1990s: the explosive growth of the Chinese economy and alongside it perhaps the most rapid military modernisation of any nation since the second world war.
In response, what has the US done?
We have seen no substantial change to America’s force structure in Asia since the end of the cold war: troop numbers and equipment levels are roughly the same. Nor have we seen any substantial change in the US-led security architecture in Asia. An “Asian NATO” remains a dim prospect. The US hasn’t retrenched from Europe or the Middle East to reinforce its Asian position. It offered no resistance to Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea in the early 2000s, and under Trump it cancelled involvement in a major regional economic initiative, the Transpacific Partnership.
Finally, no president has addressed the American people to announce that they must gird themselves for a generational struggle against its biggest ever rival. American political leaders do give speeches about China, and countless policy documents put China at the centre of US strategy. But no president has yet sought to persuade the American public that the US needs to launch a national struggle that will be bigger than the cold war.
What about AUKUS? Doesn’t the almost unprecedented transfer of nuclear technology to Australia signal America’s deep commitment to regional hegemony? First of all, AUKUS was an Australian idea, not American. And what a deal for America! It promises to bring hundreds of billions of dollars into the US shipbuilding and arms industries, and will ultimately give US what is effectively an adjunct to its own Pacific fleet.
If we’re looking for evidence of US commitment to the region, we’d want to see costly signals, policy moves that create risk and carry financial burdens. AUKUS is not a costly signal.
In sum, where others see America’s determination to stare down China in a contest for regional supremacy, with Australia by its side, I see mostly inertia.
But inertia works in both directions: it prevents the escalation Keating implies but also the retrenchment Hugh White has forecast. That’s because retrenchment requires a conscious decision — in fact, a series of them, made not just by a president but also by their party, Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, the rest of the Washington foreign policy establishment, and America’s allies. All would need to be aligned to make this huge shift in American policy.
None of these power centres has a clear interest in supporting US retrenchment, and there is no powerful political force coalescing around this objective. Inertia, on the other hand, only requires that those same institutional forces do nothing. And doing nothing is exactly what large bureaucracies are comfortable with. In fact, nothing is roughly what the US security establishment has been doing in Asia since the 1990s.
Of course, doing nothing doesn’t mean nothing changes. China gets a vote too. So, while the US has chosen inertia over the last thirty-odd years, China has built a huge navy and air force, thus shifting the regional balance of power towards Beijing. And while the US has chosen inertia, China has built military bases in the South China Sea, thus turning that part of the region into a Chinese lake. Someday, the same might happen in Taiwan. China will make a move, and the US will again choose inertia. But even if Taiwan falls, inertia is likely to stop wholesale American retrenchment. The US can maintain its most solid bases of support in Japan, South and Australia because those countries will still prefer to be protected than go their own way.
In these circumstances, what kind of regional order do we get? I would describe it as a steady drift away from American hegemony but stopping short of Chinese hegemony, a “long in-between” if you will. America’s role in the region will become, wholly and solely, a matter of protecting the territorial integrity of its treaty allies.
That’s a limited aim that can be achieved at acceptable risk and cost; all it demands is that the US maintain enough presence in Japan, Korea and Australia to sink Chinese ships and shoot down its aircraft. Such a posture doesn’t demand that the US maintain military superiority over China and doesn’t require that the US be able to defeat China decisively in a war. All it asks is that the US has sufficient forces to blunt any aggressive Chinese intent towards its allies.
Again, the reason to favour this scenario is because it is easy. The US doesn’t have to do much, or say much, to achieve it. Indeed, while it clings rhetorically to maximalist objectives, in practice it has been quietly backing away from them since the end of the cold war, and implicitly conceding a sphere of influence to China. Such concessions cost the US taxpayer nothing, don’t harm the interests of any major interest group, and don’t make America less secure.
Would China accept a more constrained US role of this kind, or would it push for full US withdrawal? The answer depends on how you calculate the benefits China would get from complete American retrenchment. If the consequences of American withdrawal from Asia are large, China has an incentive to fight hard for it and take big risks to achieve it. If the consequences are minor, then China doesn’t have those incentives.
My guess is that if the US continues to drift into the minimalist strategy described here, China will choose to live with that, not because it is content with an indefinite US role in Asian affairs but because even if the US withdrew, Beijing wouldn’t suddenly have free reign over the entire region.
Yes, China is likely to become something like a hegemon in continental Southeast Asia, because no rival power has the will or means to stop it. But in maritime Asia, which is what the US and its allies care about most, Beijing’s ambitions will be blunted because, even with all its resources, projecting power over Asia’s vast seas is so difficult and costly. The American strategist John Mearsheimer calls it “the stopping power of water,” and it will exercise a decisive influence over Asia’s new order. •
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Sam Roggeveen
Sam Roggeveen is Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program. His latest book, The Echidna Strategy, was published in 2023 by Black Inc. This article is an adaptation of a paper he delivered at the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia’s AUKUS Symposium on 15 August.
insidestory.org.au · by Administrator · August 23, 2024
18. Palantir taps former GOP Rep. Mike Gallagher as new defense business head
Palantir taps former GOP Rep. Mike Gallagher as new defense business head - Breaking Defense
Gallagher, who departed Congress in April, started at Palantir in June and sees it as a continuation of a mission of "preventing World War III."
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · August 22, 2024
U.S. Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) testifies during a Republican-led forum on the origins of the COVID-19 virus at the U.S. Capitol on June 29, 2021 in Washington, DC. The forum examined the theory that the coronavirus came from a lab in Wuhan, China. (Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)
WASHINGTON — Former GOP Rep. Mike Gallagher, a defense hawk who led the House select committee on China, has joined Palantir Technologies as the new head of its defense division, the company announced today.
Gallagher, who resigned from Congress in March and departed in April, started at Palantir in June. Doug Philippone, a venture capitalist who led the company’s defense arm since 2008, will stay with Palantir as an adviser, a spokesperson told Breaking Defense.
Over his four terms in the House, the Wisconsin Republican and Marine Corps veteran built a reputation around his national security bonafides, serving on the House Armed Services Committee and emerging as one of the biggest critics of China’s technological and military buildup, as well as a major supporter of US military aid for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. His positions on foreign and domestic politics, which included opposition to the proposed impeachment of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, sometimes left him at odds with hard-right GOP members more closely aligned with former President Donald Trump.
One of Gallagher’s final accomplishments included introducing a bill that would ban social media app TikTok in the United States unless its Chinese owners sell their stake in the company. That bill was passed by Congress in April as a part of a larger foreign aid package that was signed into law later that month.
In an interview with Defense One, Gallagher said his priorities at Palantir would include building on the company’s recent string of contract awards — including a win on the Army’s TITAN contract that makes Palantir the first software company to act as a prime on a hardware platform — as well as growing the company’s space portfolio and increasing its involvement in AUKUS.
“I view this as an opportunity to continue that mission, the mission of defending the country, of preventing World War III, in the private sector. And I think those are the stakes. I don’t think that’s an overstatement,” he said.
Today’s announcement confirms reporting by Puck News and other outlets in March that Gallagher would join the defense tech firm.
“Mike’s unique talents have helped to shape U.S. policy towards our adversaries. I am delighted he is joining Palantir, and am certain he will play an invaluable role for Palantir and our mission partners,” Palantir CEO Alex Karp said in a statement.
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · August 22, 2024
19. Army progressing toward Theater Information Advantage Detachments deployments
Are we now separating information and influence? From this brief article (and it is the only thing I have seen on this new TIAD concept) it seems like we are only focused on information warfare from a cyber and technical advantage perspective but not on influence. I do not see any PSYOP professionals as part of these detachments.
Army progressing toward Theater Information Advantage Detachments deployments - Breaking Defense
The urgency to stand up the TIADS comes from an increase in peer adversaries like China as they attempt to disrupt the US' critical infrastructure and other vulnerable realms, Commander of the Army Cyber Command Gen. Maria Barrett said.
breakingdefense.com · by Carley Welch · August 23, 2024
Sgt. James Hyman, Expeditionary Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) operator, 11th Cyber Battalion, gathers information from sensors to develop cyber effects, during an Operational Readiness Assessment for the battalion here, March 29, 2023. (Photo by Steven Stover/780th Military Intelligence Brigade)
TECHNET AUGUSTA 2024 — The Army is making strides towards standing up its Theater Information Advantage Detachments (TIADS), a new kind of unit that seeks to monitor the information warfare efforts of adversarial nations like China and Russia at the field level.
Thanks to the hefty amount of equipment and personnel needed, these organizations are scheduled to stand up in fiscal year 2026. Lt. Gen. Maria Barrett, commanding general of Army Cyber Command, said this week that the service has received positive feedback to the idea internally.
She said that other “theaters were already itching to get this capability, so much so that organically, they pulled people from different areas in order to really start, jump-start their campaign of learning,” Barrett said, as she closed out the 2024 TechNet Augusta conference. These “different areas” referred to the redesignation of the US Army Pacific’s G39 staff, a group responsible for information activities, to the TIADs.
In February, the Army Force Structure Transformation plan approved the creation of three TIADS — one detachment in Europe, the other in the Pacific region and an interterritorial detachment for the Army Cyber Command.
“Army Cyber will take the civilian TDA [tables of distribution and allowance] and that will form the basis of a digital protection and reconnaissance center that will conduct targeting support and digital force protection tasks for the TIADs when they stand up,” Barrett said.
She said there will be 12 cyber teams, with 65 soldiers each, involved in the effort, which will include the Expeditionary Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities Teams, all part of the 11th Cyber Battalion. She added that when that structure is complete, they will add a “patrial build” of a second battalion which is “similar” to the 11th Cyber Battalion.
“This really reflects the commitment of the Army to bring together an integrated team of cyber, EW [electronic warfare], signals, data systems engineers, io [information operations], intel and psyops,” Barrett said.
“If you think about all the things that we are layering in over the next few years, this is going to be a renovation that’s going to be going on for a while. We’re going to be moving a lot of walls, and as we lay in those capabilities, we’re going to go out and make sure that they’re implemented correctly and that people understand their role in that picture,” she later added.
The urgency to stand up the TIADS comes from an increase in efforts from peer adversaries like China as the country attempts to disrupt the US’ critical infrastructure and other vulnerable realms, Barrett said.
“We’re also seeing attacks in cyber pick up — the attacks against the DIB [defense industrial base]. Either we’re getting better visibility into them or they are on the increase. Attacks against operational technology have also gone up, critical infrastructure, and I would be completely remiss if I did not mention the PRC’s Volt Typhoon,” she said referring to the Chinese state-sponsored hacker group known to go after US critical infrastructure.
breakingdefense.com · by Carley Welch · August 23, 2024
20. Amber Strapponi ’26: Inside the Secure World of Cybersecurity with Joint Special Operations Command
Amber Strapponi ’26: Inside the Secure World of Cybersecurity with Joint Special Operations Command
https://www.vmi.edu/news/featured-stories/amber-strapponi-26-inside-the-secure-world-of-cybersecurity-with-joint-special-operations-command.php
LEXINGTON, Va. Aug. 22, 2024 — A base inside of a base is where Amber Strapponi ’26 spent nearly a month of her summer. With coding, cybersecurity, and high-level clearances, she experienced something new to her over the summer.
The computer science major, with a concentration in cybersecurity, took an internship with the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a technical unit for the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). She was stationed at Fort Liberty in North Carolina for 28 days. She and Dominick Olhava, a cadet from the University of Northern Iowa, were the first cadet interns JSOC has ever had.
No outside phones, computers, or technology were allowed. Strapponi said she was working alongside those with high-level security clearances. She spent her days focused on security policies on their platform development team and strengthening the security posture of ARK, their custom-built Kubernetes platform.
USSOCOM is a unified combatant command within the Department of Defense that oversees the special operations capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces. The JSOC prepares assigned, attached, and augmentation forces and conducts special operations against threats to protect the Homeland and U.S. interests abroad.
Through her internship she was able to deepen her skills in new coding platforms she’d never touched before.
“It was the coolest thing I've ever done,” she said. “There's a lot of it I can't talk about because it was under clearance, but I got to program security policies that will be used on their custom platform. These policies will be used across all JSOC. It's very cool, because I can say that I got to help on that project.”
She found out about the internship through VMI’s Army ROTC department. There was a list of different opportunities and JSOC stood out to Strapponi. She had previously worked on a project with the VMI Cyber Defense Lab on an electroencephalogram wheelchair. The skills she gained from that project can be applied to other zero-day technologies.
Strapponi said the internship was unlike anything she’s ever experienced. One takeaway was being able to see one of the largest Faraday cages, which is an enclosure used to block some electromagnetic fields.
“It's like a zero room. Imagine this room, but the inside has spiky foam, and the outside it's metal, so nothing inside exists outside. All the technology in there, it doesn't exist outside of that room, which is really cool,” she said.
One of her favorite parts of the internship was seeing the server room on base.
"I'm pretty sure they had everything that has ever existed in there. Just seeing everything they had, probably billions and billions of dollars' worth of technology,” she said.
The bonds she made with fellow interns from other senior military colleges were also meaningful.
"Walking around post, we were finding all the other cadets. We organized a cadet taco night,” she said. “It's cool to kind of get everybody together.”
She hopes the experience she gained at her internship will allow her to apply to a unit similar to it once she graduates and commissions into the U.S. Army. She’s even able to come back, potentially next summer, to do another internship.
“I would say this internship has put me ahead in life and even at VMI in general,” she said.
It allowed her to gain an exuberant amount of practical experience she could apply later down the road.
"This was on a platform I'd never even heard of, in a coding language I had never even used so, I was learning. It was just awesome,” she said. "I've never been in a true cybersecurity lab. I wasn't even familiar with a lot of the current technologies used, especially from a military standpoint. We're at the point now we can connect to the internet without actually having a connection to the internet.”
Laura Peters Shapiro
21. “Operation Unsinkable” - The Army's Ambitious Plan to Stay Afloat in the Pacific
Okay. This an irreverent satire on our Army (and really on our defense strategies writ large).
Enjoy, because if we cannot laugh at ourselves who can we laugh at?
“Operation Unsinkable” - The Army's Ambitious Plan to Stay Afloat in the Pacific
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/operation-unsinkable-the-army-s-ambitious-plan-to-stay-afloat-in-the-pacific
The following article is a satirical piece and not based on actual events or plans by the US Army. Or any other military branch. Except maybe the Marines.
As the U.S. Military eagerly prepares for a war it wants to avoid while manifestly ignoring the competition it claims is necessary to avoid it, the Navy has found itself thrust back into the budgetary limelight. “Given all the water in the Pacific Ocean, we’re counting on a large set-piece battle against China to be a real fiscal winner,” said the excited Navy CNO Admiral Lisa Franchetti. After slogging through decades of war in inconveniently land-locked desert countries, the Navy is relishing the opportunity to finally divest its tan uniforms and fight over countries with beachfront property.
The Defense Department seems to agree. Secretary Lloyd Austin said, “America has been throwing money at a land war for two decades, and look where that’s gotten us. Now it’s time for a strategic shift. So we’re going to instead throw a ton of money at whatever shiny new stuff the two remaining shipbuilders not yet owned by the Chinese say we should buy. That’s how America can dominate a fight in the Pacific. Against China.”
Suddenly feeling left out of the party, Army Chief of Staff General Randy George has “floated” an audacious plan to ensure its participation in a fight in the Taiwan Strait. Called OPERATION UNSINKABLE, it is an initiative to retrofit tanks to allow large-scale division armored maneuvers in the Pacific and ensure continued budgetary relevance for the Army. “Gentlemen,” General George said in a press conference, “great power competition is now the name of the game… competition for dollars against the Navy, that is. And we’re gonna win!”
The Spark of Inspiration
The genesis of Operation Unsinkable occurred during a Pentagon briefing dominated by discussions of naval maneuvers and carrier strike groups. A disgruntled Armor officer watching the briefing commented, “Why are we counting on the Squids to stop the Chinese horde? They only like twelve boats, and they’re all missile bait. We have like 8,000 tanks, and could turn that damn island into a fortress!” The officer was quickly escorted from the room by Shore Patrol, but not before the comment gave inspiration to Major General Pat “Foghorn” Thompson, a proponent of unconventional armor strategies.
“Why can’t we just make an Abrams Main Battle Tank swim, son?” said General Thompson while stuffing a dip in his lip. “It’s a big metal tub, not that different from the stuff those Navy boys have. Looky here, if them squids can do it, the Army can do it better. By God, we will come alfoatin’ at them commie bastards with guns blazing!” Thus, Operation Unsinkable was born, with the mission to transform the Army’s land machines into seaworthy amphibious vessels. After two years of grueling development and a mere $436M investment, the effort has successfully produced a game-changing new technology the Army calls the “Buoyant Omni-domain Assault Tank” (B.O.A.T).
The Trials and Tribulations of Operation Unsinkable
The Army’s B.O.A.T. project began with an ill-fated prototype called the “Aqua-Abrams,” an attempt to equip a 70-ton M1A2 Abrams tank with buoyancy modifications. The Army’s engineers embarked on a series of increasingly desperate attempts to achieve this goal, though after repeated failures, each solution became more absurd than the last.
The B.O.A.T. engineering team’s initial approach was to attach giant inflatable bags to the tanks. While the design had promise, the team was challenged to obtain the bags through the Army’s lethargic procurement system. Ever the innovator, General Thompson found a workaround by ordering 20,000 unicorn-clad toddler arm floaties from Amazon using his government travel card. Unfortunately, test engineers discovered that the cheap Chinese-made inflatables had difficulty repelling an armor-piercing anti-tank fire, to the cost of six lost test tanks.
This failure inspired General Thompson’s team to look to non-inflatable solutions. Engineers duct-taped hundreds of colorful foam pool noodles around the prototype tank, and were overjoyed as the Aqua-Abrams floated ever so briefly. Upon encountering the wake from a passing jet-ski, however, the floatation halo exploded into a confetti of foam noodles, sending another tank to the bottom, much to the amusement of several Naval officers gleefully observing the test from a nearby beach bar.
The Final Solution: The B.O.A.T.
After this disappointing series of failures, the Army finally embraced a more pragmatic solution: setting the tanks on an ingenious foundation called a “Hydrodynamic Underbody Lift Layer” (H.U.L.L). These H.U.L.L.s are creatively crafted in a V-shape for stability, and equipped with an engine that drives a small submerged version of an aircraft propeller. Initial trials were unsuccessful as the tanks would roll off into the water, so engineers removed the tracks and welded the body to the hull. While this meant the tank would no longer be able to maneuver on land, General Thompson noted “I’m no engineer, son, but tracks ain’t no use on water. We gotta be lean and mean to secure the Army’s place in the fight…we’ve got commies to kill and Congressional dollars to put in the Army’s piggie bank.”
The General continued, “Our H.U.L.L. floatation tech led to this here thing we call a B.O.A.T. system.” The General added, pointing at a rudimentary sketch of what appeared to be a tank perched atop an aluminum fishing boat. “Our new B.O.A.T. allows the Army to conduct division-scale armored land maneuvers on parts of the battlefield that for some stupid reason are covered in water. This capability will be a real game-changer when we argue for money to Congress.” Foghorn made sounds like laughing before concluding, ”Let’s see the Navy compete with that. Yee-Hawa!”
Buoyed by their success, the General’s team is doubling down with their next innovative project. Spokesman CWO 3 Pete Liyer said, “We all know that armored formations can be vulnerable to enemy infantry, and therefore require infantry support, but our initial trials have unveiled… challenges… getting infantry patrols to stay in formation with the B.O.A.T.s. So today, I am pleased to announce that the Army has contracted Northrop Grumman to provide a prototype of the first-ever Seaborne Hybrid Infantry Platform (S.H.I.P). This will be the foundation for the future of combined arms.” The General then directed one of the crew to get busy painting the nearby B.O.A.T.s grey to better blend in with the surrounding maritime environment. Foghorn yelled loudly at the men, “Camouflage is continuous, boys. Slather that paint on real’ good.”
A spokesman for Northrop said the company would most likely subcontract procurement of the S.H.I.P.s to the Bass Pro Shop corporation with a markup of about 130% for wasting their time on this stupid idea, noting that they have actual aircraft carrier projects they needed to overpromise and underdeliver on.
Training and Integration
To support its new maritime capability, the Army is also looking to establish a training command and division headquarters at a location it calls the “National Aquatic Vanguard Yard” (N.A.V.Y.) located at Fort Shafter in Hawaii. In the N.A.V.Y. program, soldiers will be trained not only in the operation of the B.O.A.T. system, but also in how to deal with the unique challenges of the new operating environment. Courses include underwater engine repair, advanced paddling, and “Surviving the Splash,” a rigorous obstacle course that pits soldiers against such maritime threats as seasickness and ocean life encounters.
Secretary Austin weighed in on the effort while recovering from Congressional testimony earlier in the day. “Operation Unsinkable represents the Army’s unrelenting drive to innovate and adapt to the most important competition of our day – the competition for resourcing in between the services. The Army must transform into a true all-domain force to remain the priority in future budget requests. The B.O.A.T. project is a bold and only marginally quixotic effort to ensure the service is ready to do its part in the joint fight. And of course, the best way to ensure an effective joint operation is to ensure it’s all under the control of the Army.”
Disclaimer: This article is a work of satire. The US Army does not currently have any known plans to create floating tanks and the events described are entirely fictional. But we at Strategy Central are reasonably confident that someone in the Army Staff will probably read this and think it’s a good idea.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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