Quote of the Day:

In ancient Greece, Socrates had a very well known reputation about wisdom… Someday, a man asked him: “Do you know what I've just heard about your friend?”

“Wait a moment” answered Socrates “Before you tell me, I'd like you to do a test, the 'Test of the three sieves'. 

“The three sieves? Sure!” said the man. 

Socrates continued “The first sieve is the truth. Have you verified that the story you're going to tell is true?”

“No… I've only heard about it…” said the man.

“Very well. So you don't know that it's the truth, let’s continue with the second sieve, the goodness one. Is what you want to tell me about my friend something good?”

“Oh no! The opposite!” He exclaimed excitedly.

“Well,” continued Socrates “you'd like to tell me bad stories about my friend, and you don't even know if they are true. Maybe you could still pass this test. There is only one sieve left, the usefulness one. Is it useful for me to know what this friend has done?”

“No, not at all.” The man said looking down.

“So” finished Socrates “the story you wanted to tell me is not true, not good and not useful. Why did you want to tell me that?”

The next time you want to tell something about someone, do this test...

1. Voice of America: [Washington Talk] “The ‘bold initiative’ that North Korea rejected… Will the power come back?”

2. [WHY] South Koreans and their apparent lack of concern over their northern neighbors

3. S. Korean firms ink follow-up contracts with Poland to export K2 tanks, K9 howitzers

4. 'Courage Index' accuses Korea's largest companies of cowardice toward Russia

5. (South Korea) Police to dispatch more officers to international organizations

6. Yoon expected to meet Biden next month at UN General Assembly

7. Ex-defense security chief gets 3-year prison sentence in retrial of power abuse case ("info ops")

8. ‘Inflation Reduction Act’ should be reconsidered (South Korean OpEd)

9. The Reach of the Regime: Re-defections and North Korea’s Propaganda Videos

10. Ukraine-style wars (in Northeast Asia)

11. North Korea's Submarine Fleet: Underwater Coffins or Threat to the U.S. Navy?

12. They once fought to defend South Korea. 70 years later, these foreign veterans are choosing to be buried there

13.  S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases drop below 100,000

14. S. Korea, China vow stronger ties on supply chains during ministerial talks

15. N. Korean military prepares for joint military-civilian events to celebrate Chuseok

16. South Korea is building stealth drones that could take out North Korea's air defenses

1. Voice of America: [Washington Talk] “The ‘bold initiative’ that North Korea rejected… Will the power come back?”

Jiha Ham hosts Ambassador DeTrani and me for a 25 minute discussion on Korean security issues for broadcast into Pyongyang.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zhzT7oDZYiM&list=RDCMUC8d0ZgFEl4AUdyAKGE8O3yg&start_radio=1

[Washington Talk] “The ‘bold initiative’ that North Korea rejected… Will the power come back?”

539 views Premiered 66 minutes ago It has been two weeks since the South Korean government released the 'Bold Initiative', but North Korea's backlash and controversies in South Korea raise doubts about the progress of this initiative. Two Russian bombers crossed South Korea's air defense identification zone as the US and South Korea resumed joint military exercises. Analyze with experts. Host: Jiha Ham / Interview: Joseph Detrani (Former Deputy Representative of the Six-Party Talks of the United States), David Maxwell (Senior Researcher, Foundation for Defense of Democracy and Global Peace Foundation)

2. [WHY] South Koreans and their apparent lack of concern over their northern neighbors

One major reason is the success of the Armistice, deterrence, and the effectiveness of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. This has bred complacency among many of us. Those of us who worry about war (and regime collapse) are accused of being "chicken little" and the "boy who cried wolf."

Excerpt:

"From a psychological view, it appears that our people have gotten used to the threat just as a person gets used to chronic back pain," Choi said. "When fresh pain arises, one runs to the doctor — like our government and media reacting every time there is a new incident involving North Korea — but then quickly learns to live with it."

Lee, who said she only thinks about North Korea "when it pops up on Naver," described herself as feeling "numb" to the military threat posed by Pyongyang. "I think about it for a bit [when I see news stories], but even then I don't feel much of a sense of danger."

Saturday

August 27, 2022

 dictionary + A - A 

[WHY] South Koreans and their apparent lack of concern over their northern neighbors

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/27/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-nuclear-weapons/20220827070006818.html

A Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is launched from Pyongyang International Airport on March 25. [YONHAP]

Tens of thousands of deaths in Seoul alone, and possibly a million casualties in South Korea: This is the likely death toll of just the first few weeks of a second Korean War, according to various experts.

Today, 25 million people in the South live within 30 miles of North Korean artillery embedded deep in the northern slopes above the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that divides the Korean Peninsula. Even more worrisome are the North's approximately 20 nuclear weapons and its advancing ballistic and cruise missiles, not to mention its undisclosed but likely existent cache of biological and chemical weapons.

Back in 1994, before the North possessed nuclear weapons or the missiles to deliver them, the U.S. intelligence estimate of a million deaths in the South was enough to stop the Clinton administration from launching pre-emptive strikes to eliminate the regime's nuclear facilities.

Almost thirty years, dozens of missile launches and six nuclear weapons tests later, Pyongyang's state media still issues apocalyptic threats to "completely annihilate" Seoul — but South Koreans appear to tune them out, while South Korean military officials respond to every North Korean provocation with the now predictable refrain: "Our military maintains a constant state of readiness."

So are South Koreans genuinely not concerned about North Korea — and are they confident they will be protected should the unthinkable happen?

Do South Koreans even think about North Korea? 

On the surface, South Koreans appear less concerned about what goes on north of the DMZ and more preoccupied with domestic issues, like those surrounding real estate policy and the economy.

Despite a flurry of North Korean missile tests in the lead-up to the March presidential election, two out of three South Koreans surveyed in a Feb. 3-4 poll of 1,006 adults by the Korea Society Opinion Institute (KSOI) and the Kukmin Ilbo newspaper said the North Korean missile launches over the previous month would not influence their choice for the country's next president.

"Who has time to worry about North Korea? I think we're all just busy trying to make ends meet," said Lee Young-sun, a 50-year-old restaurant chef, when asked about how often she thinks about North Korea.

Lee, who described herself as politically apathetic, said, "If I have to pick one issue that I thought about during the election, it would be unemployment and real estate prices."

Kim Dong-min, a 28-year-old IT worker, described a similar set of priorities. "I was worried mostly about economic policy during the lead-up to the presidential elections," he said, adding that "things have been tough for millennials."

According to a poll of 1,000 adults by Ipsos and the Korea Economic Daily from Jan. 20 to 23, Lee and Kim's concerns were in line with 44.6 percent of respondents, who ranked real estate policy as the most important issue for the next presidential administration, followed by prosecution and judicial overhaul at 14.9 percent and unemployment at 11.4 percent. Only 7 percent checked North Korea policy as their top priority.

The low ranking of North Korea as an election issue seems to indicate that South Koreans barely think about their northern brethren at all — and there is some evidence to show that this may be at least somewhat true.

In a poll conducted by U.S.-based think tank 38 North in September 2020, the majority, or 54.5 percent, of 1,200 South Korean respondents said they never think about North Korea, while 41 percent said they thought about their neighbor once or twice a week. According to the same survey, an even larger majority of 69.17 percent of the respondents said they never think about North Korea's nuclear weapons.

"Honestly, I never think about North Korea," said Cho Sung-hyun, a 29-year-old South Korean student based in New York. When asked the same survey question, Kim answered succinctly: "Zero."

Choi Kyung-hui, chief of the Seoul-based South and North Development (SAND) think tank, says the lack of interest in the North Korean military threat is likely tied to the lengthy peace that has held since the armistice was signed, all but officially ending the 1950-53 Korean War.

"While the war did not end with a peace treaty, hostilities have not broken out again in the past 70 years," Choi remarked. "The only people who remember the war now are elderly people in their 70s or older, and they are in the minority."

Choi also noted that repeated warnings about North Korea under South Korea's authoritarian leaders during the Cold War has dulled the public perception of an active threat from Pyongyang.

"The North Korea issue was exploited in the past for domestic political purposes, so its mention to younger generations who have grown up without their own wartime memories can come across as nothing more than a scare tactic," she explained.

But Park Ju-hwa, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), cautioned that survey responses may not only vary depending on how questions are worded, but also obfuscate the depth of South Korean feelings regarding North Korea.

"North Korea is a matter of little interest to South Koreans, but, ironically, they are still highly sensitive to what happens to the North," Park said. "For example, when KINU asked in a survey, 'Is there a need for reunification?' there were large intergenerational disparities, with more older people saying yes and more younger people saying no. But when we asked people, 'What should inter-Korean relations look like in the future?' most respondents picked the scenario where people could travel freely across the peninsula," he explained.

In a word, even if survey responses suggest South Koreans don't give much thought to North Korea or its nuclear weapons, that is likely not the whole picture.

South Korea and the United States hold a joint Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) firing drill at an unspecified location on June 6. [JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]

Do South Koreans not fear a possible war?

Despite the impression of calm, there is evidence that South Koreans do care — and worry — about the military threat posed by North Korea.

According to a July 25 survey by SAND that questioned 1,000 adults, not only did 71.6 percent of respondents say that they had little or no trust in the North Korean regime, 45.9 percent said they believed it possible that Pyongyang could try and start another war — a figure close to the 49.9 percent who said they believed such a scenario to be impossible.

The fact that almost half of South Koreans believe a second Korean War could occur seems strange considering 38 North's finding that over 90 percent never or barely think about their ominous neighbor — a phenomenon that Choi attributes to South Koreans having grown accustomed to the long-running threat.

"From a psychological view, it appears that our people have gotten used to the threat just as a person gets used to chronic back pain," Choi said. "When fresh pain arises, one runs to the doctor — like our government and media reacting every time there is a new incident involving North Korea — but then quickly learns to live with it."

Lee, who said she only thinks about North Korea "when it pops up on Naver," described herself as feeling "numb" to the military threat posed by Pyongyang. "I think about it for a bit [when I see news stories], but even then I don't feel much of a sense of danger."

Cho said he felt society was moving past North Korean issues due to disillusionment. "I heard a lot more about North Korea in school and through the news when I was a kid in the early 2000s, because everyone at the time seemed hopeful that reunification might happen soon." recalled Cho, but added he has since lost interest "because [the North Korean government] keeps lashing out, so their word is meaningless now."

Park from KINU had a slightly different explanation for South Koreans' lack of interest in North Korea despite their awareness of the possibility of war.

"There have been so many provocations by North Korea over the years, such as the North's planting of a landmine near a South Korean guard post in 2015, or their sixth nuclear test in 2017, but not one has led to a full resumption of hostilities," he explained.

"South Koreans are not only accustomed to this cycle of provocations, but they also feel a sense of helplessness because they believe there is not much we or anyone can realistically do to stop North Korea from doing what it wants," he added.

Are South Koreans confident they can be defended?

During times of high inter-Korean tensions — such as now, when a seventh nuclear test is widely expected — or in 2016, when the North had just conducted its fifth nuclear test, the South Korean government has reminded the public that is has a contingency plan to pre-emptively eliminate Pyongyang's most lethal weapons and leadership if an imminent attack is detected.

First divulged to South Korean lawmakers in 2016 and recently mentioned again under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, Seoul's deterrence-through-punishment strategy vis-à-vis Pyongyang is composed of three components: Kill Chain, which relies on surface-to-surface missiles and earth-penetrating weapons launched from stealth aircraft to destroy North Korean missiles before they can be fired; Korea Missile Defense (KMD), which would destroy incoming missiles mid-air with a mixture of Patriot missiles, Korean medium-range surface-to-air missiles and the U.S.-led Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) system; and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), which would target individuals in North Korea's leadership and military command.

Not many surveys on the public approval of this "K3" strategy exist. The most recent — a poll commissioned by conservative online media outlet Dailian from Jan. 14 to 15 — found that 60.9 percent of respondents agreed with the basic premise of pre-emptively striking North Korea should preparations for an attack on the South be detected.

But whether South Koreans believe their country can adequately defend itself in the case of a North Korean attack is a different question.

"I don't think we should launch a pre-emptive attack on the North," said Cho, who said he preferred a "show of force" in response to a major provocation because he saw the South Korean military as "not very strong."

Kim, who recently completed his mandatory two-year stint serving in the Army, said his experience showed him Seoul was not ready for war. "Our soldiers aren't equipped or trained well enough to fight against the hardened North Korean military," he said. His sentiments were echoed by Lee, who shook her head when asked if she has faith in South Korea's military, answering, "Not particularly."

They are not outliers in their feelings about the South Korean military's capabilities. According to SAND's July survey, just 41.6 percent of respondents said they saw the South Korean government as adequately prepared for war.

While this figure appears to indicate low public confidence in Seoul's ability to defend itself, Park cautioned that the survey result again requires context to ascertain South Koreans' sense of security.

"The SAND poll was taken at a time when President Yoon's approval ratings were hovering around 30 percent," Park said. "If anything, it shows that people still rate the military's capabilities higher than the government's competence in other areas," he added.

Another factor in South Koreans' resilience in the face of the North Korean threat, despite their apparently lukewarm confidence in their government's military capabilities, is their country's defensive alliance with the United States.

According to an Asan Institute survey conducted in March, 88.9 percent of respondents said they believed the United States would intervene in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, suggesting overwhelming faith that the country would not be alone in the event of war.

"Both historically and strategically, we have an invaluable alliance with the United States," said You Jae-hyuk, a 30-year-old lawyer. "I believe our two countries share many cultural and economic values, and our cooperation is beneficial to both sides." 

Cho said he felt more confident about South Korea's defense with the United States as the country's ally. "The U.S. military is the most powerful in the world, and I'm certain North Korea wouldn't try to attack us when they know that kind of force is on our side," he said.

Belying such confidence, however, are changes in support for the continued presence of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) in South Korea according to the state of inter-Korean relations.

According to the Asan survey, public support for the USFK was above 80 percent in both 2016 and 2017, years in which tensions ran high and North Korea conducted multiple major weapons tests. After declining to 76.3 percent in 2018 and 72 percent in 2020 — a period of high diplomatic engagement between the two Koreas and the United States — support for the U.S. military presence rose once more to 82.1 percent this year after talks broke down and North Korea resumed testing missiles.

The level of public support for the USFK's continued deployment to South Korea could be thus interpreted as an indicator of how much South Koreans believe, in that moment, that the U.S. military is necessary for their country's security.

Kim, who earlier said he views the South Korean military as ill-prepared for war, remarked, "The U.S. military is our surest means of protection."

How might South Koreans' feelings change in the future?

South Koreans on the whole appear to be psychologically resilient, or perhaps resigned, to the security threat emanating from North Korea, but this may change if they are served a fresh reminder of the North's destructive potential in the form of a seventh nuclear test.

In a February report, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs issued a finding that 71 percent of South Korean survey respondents supported the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program, suggesting that despite their apparent indifference to the North, the South Korean public is strongly dissatisfied with the status quo and lacks confidence in deterrence through the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Cho said South Korea's lack of its own nuclear deterrent sat uneasily with him. "If they keep their nuclear weapons but we don't develop our own, we're choosing to rely on someone else to protect us," he said.

While Lee said she doesn't know enough about nuclear armament, the Russian invasion of Ukraine this past year weighed heavily in her thoughts on the subject.

"When I look at Ukraine, which I read gave up nuclear weapons many year ago, it doesn't seem like someone else's tragedy," she said. "That could be us."

Yet others remained skeptical that Seoul pursuing its own nuclear weapons would add to the country's security.

"I disagree with the idea of us, or any other country becoming a nuclear weapons state," said Kim. "Adding more weapons — especially deadlier ones — could make war a more tempting prospect, and it's important that we still try to resolve problems through dialogue."

Others, like You, expressed concern over the consequences of Seoul breaking the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"I fear there is more to lose diplomatically and militarily if we were to become a nuclear weapons state because it would sour our relationships with other countries," he said, adding, "I believe there is more to be gained if Korea worked on its reputation as a global peacemaker."

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

3. S. Korean firms ink follow-up contracts with Poland to export K2 tanks, K9 howitzers

The global pivotal state is stepping up.

Just a little irony. During the Cold War, the Poles, along with the Czechs, were located on the north Korean side of the DMZ as part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) (the Swiss and Swedes were of course on the South side). And now Poland is a member of NaATO and making arms deals with the South.

(LEAD) S. Korean firms ink follow-up contracts with Poland to export K2 tanks, K9 howitzers | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · August 27, 2022

(ATTN: REWRITES 3rd para with Polish ministry's tweet; ADDS photo)

SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- Two South Korean defense firms have signed contracts -- worth US$5.76 billion in total -- with Poland to implement last month's deals to export K2 battle tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers, Seoul's arms procurement agency said Saturday.

Hyundai Rotem Co. and Hanwha Defense inked the executive contracts with Warsaw's Armament Agency on Friday to supply K2 tanks and K9 howitzers, respectively, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA)

DAPA did not disclose the terms of the contracts. But Poland's Ministry of National Defense tweeted that the contracts called for the delivery of 180 K2 tanks in the 2022-25 period and of 212 K9 howitzers in the 2022-26 period.

The contracts were follow-up arrangements to last month's "framework" contracts that set the basic contours of the export deals. The signing event took place at a Polish mechanized unit in Morag, northern Poland.

Under the framework contracts, Poland is committed to procuring 980 K2 tanks and 648 K9 howitzers, as well as 48 FA-50 fighter jets, from the companies and Korea Aerospace Industries, according to Warsaw. It has described the deals as one of the country's "most important and largest" defense orders in recent years.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · August 27, 2022

4. 'Courage Index' accuses Korea's largest companies of cowardice toward Russia

I had not previously heard about the "courage index" or the moral rating agency (though when I saw the name of the agency I thought it would be some organization trying to ban books, movies, and expression of questionable moral value according to someone's misguided definition)

'Courage Index' accuses Korea's largest companies of cowardice toward Russia

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

gettyimagesbankBy Park Jae-hyuk

Samsung, SK, Hyundai Motor and LG have been called out for their failure to denounce Russia's invasion of Ukraine by a London-based corporate watchdog, in analysis released Wednesday.

The Moral Rating Agency (MRA), set up to urge global enterprises to cut their ties with Russia, said that it has measured corporate statements to release its "Courage Index."

It put together a list of 88 companies that have been avoiding denouncing Russia, among the 122 largest companies that were active in trading or investment there at the time of its Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.

According to the agency, there were 34 denouncers among the 122 companies, although three of them have continued their operations in Russia. None of the Korean firms were classified as "courageous" denouncers.

"While most of the cowards among Western companies opted for 'mealy-mouthed' statements, East Asian companies ― Chinese, Korean and Japanese ― tended to opt either for silence, making excuses or even 'reverse boycotting,'" the MRA said in a press release.

Samsung and LG Electronics, both of which suspended shipments to Russia, were classified as "mealy-mouthed" corporations.

"Samsung was a case of one step back and one step forward. It made its move after the Ukrainian government called for it to take action," the MRA wrote on its website. "Like Samsung, LG was a mealy-mouther for what it didn't say about the war."

Hyundai Motor, which suspended its manufacturing in Russia, was among the companies that made excuses, citing "supply chain interruptions" as the reason for suspension.

SK Group was criticized for remaining silent about the invasion.

"SK failed to disclose its commercial position on Russia, despite making a financial contribution to help children in Ukraine," the MRA said. "This large importer of crude should make an announcement that clarifies it will cut its importing as well as exports of lubricants that it is engaged in."

The MRA did not talk about POSCO, which was mentioned by the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute as the only Korean firm among 242 companies that have continued operations in Russia. The institute said last week that POSCO was operating through a Russian subsidiary, while Samsung, Hyundai Motor, LG Electronics, Korean Air and HMM suspended their businesses there.

Despite growing pressure from international organizations, Korean companies have remained cautious about commenting on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and their business plans there.

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

5. (South Korea) Police to dispatch more officers to international organizations

​I am a broken record: Another example of the global pivotal state stepping up on the world stage.

​

Friday

August 26, 2022

 dictionary + A - A 

Police to dispatch more officers to international organizations

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/26/national/defense/korea-police-international-organization/20220826111520482.html

Korean National Police Agency's office [YONHAP]

Police will increase the number of officers dispatched to international organizations to strengthen investigative capabilities amid a rising number of cross-border crimes, officials said Friday.

Under the plan, more officers will be dispatched to various international organizations and law enforcement agencies, such as United Nations Peacekeeping and the International Criminal Police Organization, according to the National Police Agency (NPA).

The NPA said it also plans to sign a business agreement with the United Nations Development Programme, a United Nations agency tasked with helping countries eliminate poverty, in September.

"There is an increasing need for international cooperation amid a recent rising number of crimes based overseas, such as voice phishing scams," said an NPA official, who asked not to be named.

The NPA has declared it will clamp down on narcotics trafficking and other crimes on the dark web that need consistent policing cooperation with international authorities.

Yonhap 

6. Yoon expected to meet Biden next month at UN General Assembly

​Maybe they can meet across the street at the Trump World Tower. which overlooks the UN to block its view of parts of NY City. (Trump World Tower, 845 United Nations Plaza

Condo located in Turtle Bay/United Nations, between East 48th Street & East 47th Street) (apologies for the snarky remark) (https://observer.com/1999/07/dug-in-trump-battles-walter-cronkite-group-over-his-big-big-tower/).

Yoon expected to meet Biden next month at UN General Assembly

koreaherald.com · by Shin Ji-hye · August 26, 2022

By Shin Ji-hye

Published : Aug 26, 2022 - 13:21 Updated : Aug 26, 2022 - 14:00

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President Yoon Suk-yeol (left) and President Joe Biden at the Korean Air and Space Operations Center at the US Air Force Base in Osan, Gyeonggi Province, in May. (Yonhap)

President Yoon Suk-yeol is expected to meet with US President Joe Biden next month in New York on the occasion of 77th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The White House said on Thursday (local time) that Biden plans to visit New York for three days from Sept. 18 to attend the UN General Assembly. He is expected to attend the conference during Sept. 19-20 and meet with leaders of the major nations.

As President Yoon is also expected to attend the UN General Assembly for the first time since taking office, he is likely to meet with Biden in New York, the second time since they had a bilateral summit in May in Seoul.

When UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres visited Seoul earlier this month, he requested Yoon attend the UN General Assembly. Yoon told him the Korean government would play its role in climate change, development cooperation, building peace and human right to befit its status.

When the two leaders of Korea and the US meet, they are expected to exchange opinions in multiple issues, including North Korea’s nuclear weapons, building peace on the Korean peninsula and expanding bilateral economic cooperation.

They are also likely to talk about the “audacious initiative” proposed by President Yoon that aims for North Korea’s denuclearization. The Yoon administration promised economic support if the North gives up its nuclear weapons. The North officially refused it, adding it would never sit face-to-face with the Yoon administration to discuss its denuclearization.

US Department of State Spokesperson Ned Price said in a daily press briefing last week, “We have been clear about our support for the bold or the ambitious plan that the South Korean administration has put forward.”

“It’s a plan that’s entirely consistent with our approach to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, to its ballistic missile program in that it sees the potential for practical, incremental advancements towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” added Price.

By Shin Ji-hye (shinjh@heraldcorp.com)

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7. Ex-defense security chief gets 3-year prison sentence in retrial of power abuse case ("info ops")

Not the correct way to conduct information and influence activities. Against the wrong target audience and for non-national security reasons and for partisan political purposes.

Despite all my advocacy for information and influence activities I have to acknowledge that this is why so many are afraid of them. Democracies are afraid of these types of operations specifically for this kind of abuse. And this is why it will always be easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist than to get permissio to put an indea between someone's ears.

Ex-defense security chief gets 3-year prison sentence in retrial of power abuse case

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · August 26, 2022

By Yonhap

Published : Aug 26, 2022 - 16:08 Updated : Aug 26, 2022 - 16:08

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(Defense Security Command)

A former chief of the Defense Security Command (DSC) indicted in 2018 for the military's allegedly illicit online political maneuvers was sentenced to three years in prison in a retrial by an appellate court Friday.

The Seoul High Court gave the sentence to Bae Dek-sig, who led the DSC from 2010-2013, after finding him guilty of abuse of power and ordered his immediate detention.

Bae was first indicted four years ago over the allegations that his command ran a team that posted about 20,000 online comments favorable to the conservative governments of Lee Myung-bak and his successor, Park Geun-hye, for two years beginning in March 2011.

The court said Bae's act of giving illegal and unfair instructions to write online political comments cannot be justified.

Bae had previously received a three-year imprisonment from a district court and his sentence was reduced by an appellate court to an imprisonment of eight months suspended for two years.

But the Supreme Court ordered his retrial in September last year and sent the case to the Seoul High Court, saying his instruction related to the writing of online political comments constitutes an abuse of power. (Yonhap)

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8. ‘Inflation Reduction Act’ should be reconsidered (South Korean OpEd)

Alliance friction.

‘Inflation Reduction Act’ should be reconsidered

donga.com

Posted August. 27, 2022 07:31,

Updated August. 27, 2022 07:31

‘Inflation Reduction Act’ should be reconsidered. August. 27, 2022 07:31. .

Exports of Korean electric vehicles inevitably will be dealt a blow due to the enforcement of the “Inflation Reduction Act,” which subsidizes only electric vehicles made in North America. The law is designed to provide a subsidy of about 10 million won only to the buyers of electric vehicles that are finally assembled in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. For South Korea, where there is no production plant in North America, the export of electric vehicles, which is expected to be 100,000 units a year, will be disrupted.

The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act aims to secure jobs by excluding China from the global supply chain and increasing production in the U.S. The Joe Biden administration, which was launched with the slogan of “Diplomacy for the Middle Class,” is trying to win over the hearts of the Americans by going beyond the ‘China slap’ and outrightly supporting its own industry, having its eye on the November midterm elections.

This ‘America First’ legislation is expected to cause great damage to Korean automakers. Although Hyundai Motor has so far made 10 billion dollars in investments in the U.S., such efforts will likely be dismissed. What was committed by President Biden to Hyundai Motor Chairman Chung Eui-sun during his visit to Korea in May, saying “thank you” and “you will not be disappointed,” must have been empty promises.

The Inflation Reduction Act is a violation of the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which prohibit differential treatment between domestic and imported products. The United States excluding Korea is preposterous as well as it intends to subsidize products from Canada and Mexico, which are countries with which it signed trade agreements. Considering that South Korea is a key economic and security ally that has created more than 100,000 jobs in the United States, it will only be a right thing for the U.S. to reconsider its discriminatory measures.

The Korean government is asking the U.S. counterpart to exercise maximum flexibility in law enforcement. The Korean government should also become more assertive. To prevent Washington from enacting similar discriminatory legislation, Seoul should demand that the U.S. rectify the violation of the FTA. If necessary, the Korean government should not only file a complaint with the WTO, but also collaborate with European countries. In particular, so as to prevent the situation of "No good deed goes unpunished" from happening any further, the government, businesses, and related organizations should join forces to prepare a preemptive response by reviewing our economy, trade and diplomacy as a whole for potential areas of damage.

한국어

donga.com

9. The Reach of the Regime: Re-defections and North Korea’s Propaganda Videos

Conclusion:

In April 2022, the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies reported that “18.59% of the 312 defectors surveyed who had left North Korea between 2017 and 2019 answered in the affirmative when asked whether they ‘regret coming to South Korea.’”[28] While this is a worryingly high proportion, it also indicates that most escapees who have recently arrived in South Korea do not regret their decision to leave North Korea. There are a number of steps the South Korean government can take to counter North Korea’s attempts to pressure escapees to return, according to Nam Jae-sung.[29] These include creating economic incentives for vocational training, providing subsidies to companies that employ escapees, improving screening procedures to better identify North Korean agents, and strengthening the police presence in localities with a large escapee population.

While all of these measures can help address concerns about economic and physical security, they do not directly address escapees’ desire for belonging. North Korea’s state media deftly exploits this vulnerability through a well-coordinated media campaign, augmented by espionage efforts that target escapees. The number of escapees who re-defect remains small compared to those who remain in South Korea. However, the substantial attention given to re-defectors by North Korea indicates their importance to the regime in tightening its control over North Korean society and preventing further attempts to escape.

The Reach of the Regime: Re-defections and North Korea’s Propaganda Videos

https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/the-reach-of-the-regime-re-defections-and-north-koreas-propaganda-videos

By Yuhan Kim, former HRNK Research Intern

Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research

August 25, 2022

On New Year’s Day of 2022, South Korean border guards were shocked to discover security footage of a North Korean defector clambering over the high barbed-wire fences of the Demilitarized Zone, but unusually, back into North Korea.[1]

The North Korean government has paid close attention to such incidents. For many years, the regime has attempted to convince defectors to return. It has produced propaganda videos featuring defectors’ families and “re-defectors,” and it has used its agents to persuade or even coerce defectors in South Korea into returning. Moreover, the North Korean government has taken an interesting public stance toward those who have returned. Instead of being immediately punished upon return, re-defectors are shown on state TV in interviews in which they speak about the difficulties of life in South Korea.

​These interviews of re-defectors should not be dismissed as just another bizarre propaganda operation. Such efforts to utilize re-defectors for the regime’s own purposes not only have a certain degree of effectiveness on North Korean citizens, but also create a dangerous sense of insecurity in the defector community in South Korea.

Re-defection Push Factors

Cases of re-defection, where North Koreans who have escaped to South Korea return to North Korea, are uncommon but not exceptionally rare. According to the South Korean government, only 30 defectors of 34,000 are confirmed to have returned to North Korea in the past decade. This is around 0.08% of the total number of escapees. However, the actual figure is likely far higher.[2] A news article from 2020 notes that there are some 900 escapees whose whereabouts are unknown to the South Korean government.[3] Most are suspected to have gone to China, and according to a leader in the escapee community, “Those who have not been in contact for a long time after going to China should be considered to have entered North Korea.”[4] It is relatively easy for North Koreans to willingly reenter North Korea, usually by going to the North Korean embassy in China.

It is well known that many North Koreans who resettle in South Korea struggle to make ends meet. In many cases, the work skills and educational background of defectors do not match those needed to stay afloat in South Korea’s highly competitive society. As Andrei Lankov notes, “the skills that helped them survive in the cut-throat world of cross-border smuggling operations and the Chinese illegal labor market are useless in South Korea. Hence, defectors, suffering from low income, alienation, and real or perceived discrimination, form a sort of permanent underclass that might even become semihereditary.”[5] Even those with seemingly marketable skills often find life in South Korea difficult.

Hyeonseo Lee, who is a prominent escapee and the author of The Girl with Seven Names, divides escapees into two levels of adjustment, based on their background while in North Korea:

Among the 27,000 North Koreans in the South, two kinds of life have been left behind: the wretched life of persecution and hunger, and the manageable life that was not so bad. People in the first group adjust rapidly. Their new life, however challenging, could only be better. For the people in the second group, life in the South is far more daunting. It often makes them yearn for the simpler, more ordered existence they left behind, where big decisions are taken for them by the state, and where life is not a fierce competition.[6] 

​Lee’s mother, who was once a government office worker in North Korea, worked in South Korea as a motel cleaner. The work was hard toil. Lee’s aging mother injured her back within a few weeks. Economic hardships, the downgrading of social status, and the immense burden that comes with the freedom to choose creates formidable challenges for escapees seeking into integrate into South Korean society. These hardships could be more bearable if there was a community or family to lean on, but most defectors gave up all they had to come to South Korea and find themselves alone. Experiencing discrimination also makes defectors long for the familiarity and comfort of family. Even those with family in South Korea feel a similar sense of longing. Lee writes how her mother “began to miss her brothers and sisters so much that she would weep for them every night after work,” so much so that one day, her mother confessed that she wanted to return North.[7]

The man who crossed back into North Korea on New Year’s Day this year was a gymnast named Kim Woo-joo. He had entered into South Korea the same way, by using his physical abilities to climb over the barbed wire fence.[8] Yet in South Korea, Kim found himself working the night shift as an office cleaner.

Re-defections Induced by the North Korean Government

Not all escapees return willingly, however. Perhaps one of the most bizarre cases is the disappearance and reappearance of Lim Ji-hyun. Lim was one of many so-called “celebrity defectors” who work in the South Korea media and entertainment industry by sharing their experiences in North Korea. Lim was a former North Korean soldier who had escaped to South Korea in 2014. Since then, she became a rising star on Korean media and talk shows such as “Moranbong Club.” Lim suddenly disappeared in April 2017, leaving $20,000 in her South Korean bank account. Even her close friends in the escapee community did not know her whereabouts.

To everyone’s surprise, in July of that year, she reappeared on North Korean TV alongside another former escapee, Kim Man-bok. In the video, she discussed her media work in South Korea, apologizing for how it had discredited North Korea. In fact, most of the 30-minute video segment focuses on denouncing the “Moranbong Club” as an anti-DPRK show that is full of lies, with South Korean producers prompting escapees to exaggerate and falsify their stories.[9] She stated, “The team tells us, defectors from the north, to say just as how it is written in the script from beginning to end, things that we have never known, seen, and felt…I just read the script written by the enemies and thus committed anti-DPRK crimes that can never be redeemed.”[10] Furthermore, Lim also testified to the difficulties of life in South Korea, stating “First I went around pubs and other places to earn money but nothing went as well as I wished. The only treatment that awaited women like me who betrayed my homeland was only physical and mental pain in the South Korean society in which everything is decided by money.”[11]

Lim Ji-hyun appeared two more times in such videos, once in August 2017 and again in February 2018, when she countered claims that she had been kidnapped. She has not been heard from since. Lim’s disappearance fueled a great deal of speculation. One North Korean escapee, Lee Jun-ho, claimed that everything had been a set-up by North Korea from the start. In other words, Lim had been sent as an agent for the express purpose of gaining media attention in South Korea, so that she could return to the North at the height of her popularity to achieve a propaganda coup for the North.[12] Lee’s speculations are not unfounded, for there have been prior incidents of spies posing as escapees.[13] Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that Lim was a spy. The North Korean government saw her as enough of a threat to attempt a smear campaign against her in 2016, as they often do against escapees with celebrity status in South Korea.[14]

The Disappearance of Song Chun-son

On November 9, 2021, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service revealed that a North Korean woman named Song Chun-son, codenamed “Chrysanthemum,” was being charged with leaking an escapee’s personal information to North Korea’s Ministry of State Security.[15] Song’s story reveals the North Korean government’s reach into the escapee community and its efforts to convince defectors to return and denounce the South.

In 2003, Song left North Korea for China, where she married a Chinese man. Four years later, she was apprehended and sent to a labor camp for two years.[16] After her release, Song worked as a broker who facilitated remittances from escapees to their families in North Korea. She was caught by the North Korean authorities and threatened with prison time unless she cooperated. She divulged the contact information of a client to a North Korean agent, who then used that escapee to connect with three other escapees. The agent put the escapee’s family members on the phone with them, and managed to convince one, Kang Chol-woo, to return to North Korea with his escapee girlfriend in 2016. In November of that year, he appeared on state television to speak about his re-defection.

This incident sheds light into how the North Korean government taps into informal channels of communication between South and North Korea, using them to threaten escapees in the South and family members who remain in the North.[17] The Chrysanthemum case also overlaps with the case of Lim Ji-hyun in one aspect. It is suspected that the North Korean government infiltrated channels of communication that are used to send remittances. Park Tae-joon, a spokesperson for the Seoul Metropolitan Police, stated that “Ms. Lim was told that a large sum of money, around $10,000, that she had tried to send home to her parents through a Chinese middleman had gone missing. She hurried to China to retrieve it, but we think it was a trap.”[18]

Analyzing the Effectiveness of North Korea’s Propaganda Videos

North Korea’s strategy of showing re-defectors on state media cannot simply be dismissed as bizarre and irrelevant propaganda. Unfortunately, there is an element of truth to the claims made by those who have re-defected. Even Lim’s statement about South Korean media fabricating and exaggerating stories about North Korean society has a kernel of truth to it. TV programs centered around North Korean escapees have come under criticism for exoticizing North Koreans, simplifying their narratives, and portraying North Korea as excessively backwards and foreign.[19] In order to get higher ratings and compete with other similar programs, reality TV or talk shows focusing on escapees and North Korea tend to seek out the most sensational stories.[20] This, in turn, may incentivize escapees who are applying for the show to exaggerate their audition stories to land a coveted role. North Korea, in turn, criticizes these programs and the defectors who appear on it. One such program, “Ije mannaro gapnida,” reportedly motivated a female North Korean student studying in Beijing to escape to South Korea in 2013.”[21]

North Korea’s re-defector conferences may be more effective than initially thought, particularly against North Koreans who have had exposure to outside information. Countless memoirs by escapees have attested to how exposure to outside information inspired a search for a better life outside of North Korea.[22] In 2014, 85.1% of all defectors were from the provinces of North Hamgyong, South Hamgyong, and Ryanggang, which lie on or near the Sino-North Korean border.[23] Outside information is easier to access in these regions, and it is also easier to escape than from interior regions of North Korea. However, when manipulated by the North Korean regime, prior exposure to South Korean media can potentially dissuade individuals from leaving. A 2015 study by Park Jeong-Ran and Kang Dong-Wan highlights the potential adverse effects that exposure to South Korean media can have North Korean citizens’ perceptions of South Korea. South Korean media often focuses on negative aspects of South Korean society, sensationalizing violence and corruption while highlighting social issues related to inequality and injustice.[24]

Because North Koreans are also increasingly aware of the difficulties of life in South Korea, seeing remarks by re-defectors on state TV can reinforce those perceptions. Green, Denney, and Gleason conducted interviews with North Korean escapees about the effectiveness of the regime’s press conferences with re-defectors. One escapee noted that remarks by re-defectors on North Korean state TV can “garner a sympathetic ear from North Korean residents who know about South Korea.”[25] This escapee added that an acquaintance who had planned to leave North Korea together backed out at the last minute, apparently due to concerns about making a living in South Korea.[26]

Another escapee remarked that “Even without the government, it is already well known from people who have defected that North Korean people are marginalized in South Korea and have trouble finding work and making a living. People have known that for a while.”[27] North Korea’s re-defector conferences can thus reinforce what many North Koreans have heard from trusted friends and family about the challenges of life in South Korea.

Concluding Remarks

In April 2022, the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies reported that “18.59% of the 312 defectors surveyed who had left North Korea between 2017 and 2019 answered in the affirmative when asked whether they ‘regret coming to South Korea.’”[28] While this is a worryingly high proportion, it also indicates that most escapees who have recently arrived in South Korea do not regret their decision to leave North Korea. There are a number of steps the South Korean government can take to counter North Korea’s attempts to pressure escapees to return, according to Nam Jae-sung.[29] These include creating economic incentives for vocational training, providing subsidies to companies that employ escapees, improving screening procedures to better identify North Korean agents, and strengthening the police presence in localities with a large escapee population.

While all of these measures can help address concerns about economic and physical security, they do not directly address escapees’ desire for belonging. North Korea’s state media deftly exploits this vulnerability through a well-coordinated media campaign, augmented by espionage efforts that target escapees. The number of escapees who re-defect remains small compared to those who remain in South Korea. However, the substantial attention given to re-defectors by North Korea indicates their importance to the regime in tightening its control over North Korean society and preventing further attempts to escape.

Yuhan Kim is a rising junior at Yale University, pursuing a double major in history and political science.

[1] This article is based on an essay that was originally submitted as an academic assignment at Yale University in May 2022. It is published here with the instructor’s permission.

[2] “Seoul: North Korea Defector Likely Made Rare Border Crossing Back,” Associated Press, January 3, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/01/03/1069839447/seoul-north-korea-defector-likely-made-rare-border-crossing-back.

[3] Jeong Rak-In, “목숨 건 탈북 이후 다시 북으로 간 사람들” [Those Who Have Returned North After Risking Their Lives to Escape], Sisa Journal, August 4, 2020. https://www.sisajournal.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=203229.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Andrei Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise: North Korean Refugees in South Korea.” Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 1 (2006): 129.

[6] Hyeonseo Lee, The Girl With Seven Names (London: Harper Collins, 2015), 281.

[7] Lee, The Girl With Seven Names, 282.

[8] Justin McCurry, “‘Second Thoughts’: What Makes North Korean Defectors Want to Go Back?,” The Guardian, January 16, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/16/second-thoughts-what-makes-north-korean-defectors-want-to-go-back.

[9] “Truth Clarified by Jon Hye Song Who Had Been Misused for Anti-DPRK Smear Campaign,” Uriminzokkiri, August 8, 2017.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Seon-young Kim, “Defector returns to North Korea, appears on propaganda video,” YTN News, July 21, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RwD515lcbSs.

[13] Jeong, “Those Who Have Returned North After Risking Their Lives to Escape.”

[14] Abigail Haworth, “Vanishing Act,” Marie Claire, February 17, 2021. https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/a35365775/lim-ji-hyun-north-korean-defector/; “The Loathsome Witch to be Thrown into the Boiling Oil of Hell,” Uriminzokkiri, May 8, 2015.

[15] Choe Sang-hun, “She Fled North Korea for Freedom. Then She Was Arrested,” The New York Times, November 29, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/29/world/asia/north-korea-defectors-south-korea.html.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Kim Soo-am, “Bukhan-ui Park In-Sook jaeipbuk seonjeon baegyeong mit uido-wa daeung banghyang” [Assessing North Korea’s Intentions in Propagandizing Park In-Sook’s Re-defection and Possible Responses], Korea Institute for National Unification Online Series 12, no. 27 (2012). https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/2053/1/0001449881.pdf.

[18] Haworth, “Vanishing Act.”

[19] Christopher Green and Stephen Epstein, “Now On My Way To Meet Who? South Korean Television, North Korean Refugees, and the Dilemmas of Representation,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 41, no. 2 (2013). https://apjjf.org/2013/11/41/Stephen-Epstein/4007/article.html.

[20] Seyi Rhodes, “Unreported World: North Korean defectors become TV stars in the South,” Channel 4, October 25, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2EPQRKLriQ.

[21] Green and Epstein, “Now On My Way To Meet Who?”

[22] Examples include The Girl with Seven Names by Hyeonseo Lee and Long Road Home by Kim Yong.

[23] Christopher Green, Steven Denney, and Brian Gleason, “The Whisper in the Ear: Re-Defector Press Conference as Information Management Tool,” Korea Economic Institute of America (2015): 6. https://keia.org/publication/the-whisper-in-the-ear-re-defector-press-conference-as-information-management-tool/.

[24] Park Jeong-Ran and Kang Dong-Wan, “A Study on the North Koreans’ Acceptance of South Korean Media and Their ‘Distorted Images of South Korea’,” Unification Policy Studies 21, no.1 (2012): 239–70.

[25] Green, Denney, and Gleason, “The Whisper in the Ear,” 7.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ko Byung-chan, “Nearly 1 in 5 N. Korean defectors say they regret coming to S. Korea,” Hankyoreh, April 26, 2022. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1040480.html.

[29] Nam Jae-Sung, “Study on Countermeasures to Curb North Korean Defector’s Return to the North,” Korean Terrorism Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2017): 93–114.

10. Ukraine-style wars (in Northeast Asia)

An attack on Taiwan requires sustaining a strong deterrent in Korea. That said, would Kim acquiesce to a Chinese request (or demand) that Kim attack the South in the face of the strength of the aROK/US alliance? Or would he assess the conditions as sufficient for an attack believing the US was distracted? 

Excerpts:

An attack on Taiwan would have implications for Korea. Like Taiwan, South Korea also invites comparisons to Ukraine. Hu Shi-jin, who recently retired as editor of the Global Times, an English-language paper and website under the thumb of the People's Daily, the bible of the Chinese Communist Party, has written recently that Korea could be "like Ukraine."

"If South Korea chooses a path that is hostile to its neighbors," he warned, "the end of that path could be Ukraine." The website News Directory 3 interpreted Hu's commentary to mean, "If South Korea adopts a hostile policy to China, the situation could be similar to that of Ukraine, which became a battlefield due to the Russian invasion."

For that very reason, of course, South Korea would rather not risk China's ire, but China's bullying may prove too much for the conservative government of President Yoon Suk-yeol.

...

Still, the fact that a prominent Chinese commentator, writing for a party newspaper, should compare the fate of South Korea to that of Ukraine is disturbing. In a power struggle for the region, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un would both love to crown their careers by realizing expansionist ambitions close to their own territory.

Ukraine-style wars

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

By Donald Kirk

Russia's invasion of Ukraine evokes unpleasant comparisons for Northeast Asia. It's easy to envisage China invading Taiwan or enabling a North Korean invasion of South Korea.

Neither of these scenarios is going to play out right away, but then, a few short years ago, who was predicting Russia would invade Ukraine? China's President Xi Jinping, looking for reelection, by acclamation, if possible, to a third five-year term at the congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November, will probably settle ― for now ― for intimidation exercises. They're to show that his People's Liberation Army (ground, navy and air elements), could take over the island at any time but is holding off, testing to see the responses of the U.S., Taiwan, Japan and South Korea too.

In a waiting game, 72 years since Mao Zedong's Red Army took over the mainland, China has time on its side. That does not mean that Xi, the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao, will be willing to wait forever. He may set the end of his third five-year term in 2027 as the deadline for showing his might as the man who recovered the lost island province.

The fact that Taiwan is separated from the mainland by the Taiwan Strait, 130 to 180 kilometers wide, obviously presents an obstacle to an invasion force but Taiwan's real defense, in an all-out war, lies in the commitment of the United States.

That may seem strange since the U.S. has no troops in Taiwan, not even advisers and no treaty binds Taiwan to the U.S. as an ally as it does to Korea and Japan. That's because of the "One China" policy, under which Washington recognizes Beijing as the government of all China, including Taiwan. In the absence of an American embassy, the American Institute on Taiwan fulfills the same functions. Taiwan can also buy hundreds of millions of dollars in arms from the U.S. and others.

Some analysts say Taiwan, armed to the teeth with 300,000 troops, would be like a "porcupine" under attack. That is, the island, with 23.6 million inhabitants, bristling with weapons like the needles on a porcupine, would sting and prick its attackers into whining retreat. That scenario, while fun to consider, is a little optimistic. Airpower and naval gunfire could grind down those "needles" to shreds.

An attack on Taiwan would have implications for Korea. Like Taiwan, South Korea also invites comparisons to Ukraine. Hu Shi-jin, who recently retired as editor of the Global Times, an English-language paper and website under the thumb of the People's Daily, the bible of the Chinese Communist Party, has written recently that Korea could be "like Ukraine."

"If South Korea chooses a path that is hostile to its neighbors," he warned, "the end of that path could be Ukraine." The website News Directory 3 interpreted Hu's commentary to mean, "If South Korea adopts a hostile policy to China, the situation could be similar to that of Ukraine, which became a battlefield due to the Russian invasion."

For that very reason, of course, South Korea would rather not risk China's ire, but China's bullying may prove too much for the conservative government of President Yoon Suk-yeol.

South Korea is already upset by the insistence of China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi ― when meeting Korea's Foreign Minister Park Jin in Beijing ― that Korea must not countenance more of those dreaded Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles the Americans have implanted on a former golf course 200 kilometers south of Seoul. The South has said it's not up to China to set a limit on the number of missiles it needs or wants for THAAD against high-flying hypersonic missiles that North Korea may be capable of firing.

China, as tensions worsen, could promise North Korean leader Kim Jong-un the aid he needs for invading the South and then back up the invasion with its own army, as it did when it rescued the North from oblivion in the Korean War. At this stage, this scenario is far-fetched. North Korea, weakened by COVID-19 and sanctions imposed after its nuclear and missile tests, is in no condition to go to war. Nor is China issuing dire threats of the sort it's making against Taiwan.

Still, the fact that a prominent Chinese commentator, writing for a party newspaper, should compare the fate of South Korea to that of Ukraine is disturbing. In a power struggle for the region, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un would both love to crown their careers by realizing expansionist ambitions close to their own territory.

Donald Kirk (www.donaldkirk.com) writes from Seoul and Washington.

The Korea Times · August 25, 2022

11. North Korea's Submarine Fleet: Underwater Coffins or Threat to the U.S. Navy?

Never underestimate the adversary.

Conclusion:

The KPN submarine fleet may not have the numbers or technological capabilities that PRC’s PLA Navy does. But the Hermit Kingdom’s subs are still quite lethal, and any USINDOPACOM naval war planner who chooses to take them lightly does so at his/her own peril.

North Korea's Submarine Fleet: Underwater Coffins or Threat to the U.S. Navy?

19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · August 26, 2022

North Korea’s Submarine Fleet: Just How Dangerous? After having published a recent article on the status of the submarine fleet of one of the United States’ strong East Asian allies – that being Taiwan’s – it would only be appropriate for 19FortyFive also to analyze the submarine fleet of one of America’s critical adversaries in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR).

No, not the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but rather the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK); given the headline-grabbing acts of intimidation waged by the PRC against Taiwan, it’s easy to lose sight of the DPRK’s own ever-increasing bellicosity.

So then, if the Korean War were to resume – remember, technically the war never actually “ended” in the first place – naval war planners will need to consider just what sort of challenges are posed by North Korea’s subs. Let’s take a look, one species at a time.

Sang-O-Class Diesel-Electric Coastal Submarine

Out of the estimated 64 to 86 total number of submarines in the Korean People’s Navy (KPN), the Sang-O-class boats comprise the biggest chunk, with 40 believed to be in service. The original Sang-O variant – which debuted in 1991 – features a top speed of 9 knots, a hull length of 111 feet (34 meters), a beam width of 12.4 feet (3.8-meters), and a surface displacement of 275 tons. The 2005-vintage Sang-O II-class is slightly longer, faster, and heavier than its predecessor, with a top speed of approximately 15 knots, a 127-foot (39 meters) length, and 340-ton displacement.

The older Sang-O class was involved in one of the most infamous incidents in the post-Cold War history of the Korean Peninsula, an incident that could’ve conceivably re-sparked a full-scale shooting war: the Gangneung submarine infiltration incident of September 18, 1996, in which one of the boats was used in an effort to infiltrate 26 North Korean Gongbi (communist guerrilla) into the ROK to attempt an assassination against then-South Korean President Kim Young-sam. Fortunately, the mission failed. In the aftermath 24 Communists died, one went MIA, and one was captured.

Romeo-class Type 033 Diesel-Electric Submarine

With a guesstimated 20 in-service, this is the second-most numerous boat in the KPN’s submarine fleet. The Type 033 is the Chinese-built variant of the Soviet-designed Project 633 (NATO reporting name “Romeo”), produced between 1962 and 1984. The Romeos displace 1,475 tons whilst surfaced, are 251 feet (76.6 meters) in length, and 22 feet (6.7 meters) wide at the beam and are the KPN’s only submarines capable of long-range patrols. This sub would presumably be used by North Korean Special Operation Forces – considered by some experts to be the toughest SOF units in the world – for special maritime missions.

In addition, back on October 2021, naval analyst H.I. Sutton made reference to a so-called “ROMEO-Mod” ballistic model submarine: “First revealed on July 23, 2019, it is unclear whether this boat has been launched yet (at the time of writing). Footage has shown Kim Jong Un inspecting the submarine, probably in Sinpo on the east coast. Although described as ‘newly built’ in propaganda, it is clearly a rebuilt ROMEO class submarine. Three missile tubes have been added to a new sail.”

Yugo and Yono-Class Diesel-Electric Midget Submarine

Whilst the term “midget” is nowadays considered to be too politically incorrect to be used for vertically-challenged people in America, evidently, it remains acceptable to apply the label to nonhuman objects. In any event, the KPN has anywhere from five to 20 of these mini-subs in its arsenal, which were based on Yugoslavian designs of the 1960s. Displacing 76 to 95 tons surfaced, 65 to 72 feet (20 to 22 meters) long, and 9 feet (2.75 meters) beam, one of these boats is strongly suspected to have been the culprit in the March 26, 2010 sinking of the ROK Navy Pohang-class corvette Cheonan.

Sinpo/Gorae (“Whale) Class Diesel-Electric Submarine

This “Whale” is the newest and largest submarine designed and built for the KPN, launched in 2014. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), this metaphorical new kid on the block “likely features diesel-electric propulsion, but does not feature an Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) system. This limits the Gorae’s capability as a survivable, second-strike nuclear deterrent, as it cannot remain submerged for more than a few days without surfacing.” The boat boasts a top speed of 10 knots, a length of 219 feet (66.75 meters), a beam width of 22 feet (6.7 meters), and a surfaced displacement of 1,455 tons.

Most significantly, back on October 22, 2021, the DPRK used its new Gorae to conduct a much-ballyhooed launch of a KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Vann H. Van Diepen of the Henry L. Stimson Center’s 38 North project opines that “The launch and associated announcements have much greater political than military significance.” However, it’s not something that can be simply blown off altogether.

Bottom Line

The KPN submarine fleet may not have the numbers or technological capabilities that PRC’s PLA Navy does. But the Hermit Kingdom’s subs are still quite lethal, and any USINDOPACOM naval war planner who chooses to take them lightly does so at his/her own peril.

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). In his spare time, he enjoys shooting, dining out, cigars, Irish and British pubs, travel, USC Trojans college football, and Washington DC professional sports.

19fortyfive.com · by Christian Orr · August 26, 2022

12.  They once fought to defend South Korea. 70 years later, these foreign veterans are choosing to be buried there

Service and sacrifice in Korea does change a person. These veterans have a blood connection.

Photos at the link: https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/un-cemetery-busan-korea-war-intl-hnk/

They once fought to defend South Korea. 70 years later, these foreign veterans are choosing to be buried there

CNN · by Jessie Yeung, CNN

(CNN) — For more than 30 years, British veteran James Grundy made an annual 5,500-mile journey to South Korea, to visit the graves of bodies he had recovered as a young man thrust into war.

Grundy was just 19 when he joined the Korean War in 1951, according to the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea (UNMCK). As part of a recovery unit, he recovered fallen soldiers from battlefields across the Korean peninsula and transported them for burial at the cemetery, located in the southern coastal city of Busan.

The cemetery remains the only UN cemetery in the world -- and for many, a final site of reunion between veterans, widows and loved ones lost in the Korean War.

It was established in 1955 after the South Korean government offered the land for the UN's permanent use, to honor the troops and medical personnel sent from 22 countries under the UN flag during the war.

The United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea (UNMCK) in Busan on August 21.

Jessie Yeung/CNN

Though most of those countries repatriated the bodies of their fallen, more than 2,300 people from 11 nations are currently interred there, according to UNMCK.

Many of those soldiers were later joined by loved ones who wished to be buried together, including their widows and other family members.

Today, the cemetery is an idyllic 35-acre stretch of green grass and water features, with a memorabilia hall, monuments dedicated by various countries that participated in the war, and a remembrance wall engraved with all the names of UN troops who died during the conflict.

Whenever Grundy buried the bodies he recovered, "he promised, 'I'll come back to you. I won't forget you,'" said his adoptive granddaughter, Brenda Eun-jung Park. "That's why he came back to Korea every year, to keep his promise."

Starting in 1988, he made annual trips to the cemetery -- until the pandemic halted travel. In May, though Grundy was battling cancer and growing weaker, "he insisted to come to Korea" for a final visit, Park said.

James Grundy, affectionately called "Uncle Jim," and his niece Sharon Hewitt.

Sharon Hewitt

"It was the only pleasure... (in) his life," she added. "He wanted to come back once more."

Grundy died in August in the UK. His ashes will be flown to the UN cemetery where he will be interred, as instructed in his will. "He wanted to rest in peace in the cemetery with his comrades," Park said.

A quick history

The Korean War -- sometimes referred to as "the Forgotten War," despite the millions of lives lost -- broke out in June 1950 after North Korean troops invaded South Korea.

The United States called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, which decided just two days after the invasion to send troops to Korea -- the only time in the organization's history that combat troops have been dispatched in the name of the UN.

The 22-nation "United Nations Command" helped turn the momentum of the war, with US-led forces advancing toward China's border with North Korea. But Chinese troops intervened, pushing the UN back down the peninsula.

Both sides reached a stalemate along the 38th parallel, where the border between the two Koreas sits today. An armistice signed on July 27, 1953, stopped the conflict. However, the war never officially ended because there was no peace treaty -- and its impact lingers to this day.

An American corporal watches as a 9-year-old Korean girl places a bouquet of white roses on the grave of one of his fallen comrades at a UN memorial near Busan, South Korea, in 1951.

Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

For some veterans, the UN cemetery represents both the cost of the war, and the deep ties they forged with other soldiers and with South Korea itself.

Boyd L. Watts, an American veteran who joined the war at 18 years old, told the Korean publication Haps Magazine he had been visiting Busan at least once a year since 1991.

It amazed him how much the country had developed in just a few decades, he said -- a theme also underscored at the cemetery. At a memorial service hall, a video for visitors highlights South Korea's transformation from a war-torn nation into a flourishing modern metropolis -- made possible by the sacrifice of UN troops, it said.

South Korean honor guards carry flags of the UN allied nations during a memorial ceremony for UN veterans of the Korean War, at the UN Memorial Cemetery in Busan on November 11, 2020.

Jung Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Images

Other veterans who made return visits to Busan have echoed the sentiment.

Johan Theodoor Aldewereld, who served as a private first class and fought hand-to-hand against North Korean soldiers, returned to South Korea in 2016 -- his first time back since he was discharged during the war. According to a report by South Korean news agency Yonhap, Aldewereld said he was profoundly moved by the country's economic revival.

He died the following year, and was interred at the cemetery -- following his will, which stated he wanted his ashes "buried in the Republic of Korea where my comrades lie in eternal sleep," according to Yonhap.

Final resting place

As the small group of surviving veterans age, a growing number -- hailing from places around the world -- have asked to be buried at the cemetery, beside friends and fellow comrades in a foreign country they had once fought to defend.

Watts, the American veteran, told Haps Magazine in 2010: "They got a lot of us old fogies buried out there ... I'd like to be a part of it." His wish was granted after his death in 2020, with family, friends and representatives of the US military and embassy attending the ceremony.

Another US veteran, Russell Harold Johnstad, served in the Military Police during the war and was buried at the UN cemetery in 2020.

The United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea on August 21.

Jessie Yeung/CNN

"Mr. Johnstad was at first opposed to the idea of his being buried at the UNMCK, saying he felt he was not as deserving as others who lie there, but his wife and family were able to persuade him to change his mind," said the UNMCK in a statement on its website.

The most recent overseas veteran to be buried at the cemetery is John Robert Cormier from Canada, who died in 2021 and was interred in June this year. He was just 19 when he arrived in Korea for the war, returning to the battlefield even after suffering a life-threatening injury, according to the UNMCK.

It had been his "adamant wish" to be interred at the cemetery, said the UNMCK after his ceremony, adding: "He would have missed his 380 (Canadian) comrades who waited for him here, and today they are once again together."

Today the cemetery, located not far from the coast, remains a popular destination for war history travelers, accessible by bus and subway. Free to enter, it also holds a UN flag raising and lowering ceremony every day, with special events to commemorate key dates like the outbreak of the Korean War.

Top image: The United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea, located in Busan, on August 21. Credit: Jessie Yeung/CNN

CNN · by Jessie Yeung, CNN

13.  S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases drop below 100,000

​Some slightly good news.

(2nd LD) S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases drop below 100,000 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · August 27, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS latest tally in paras 6-7)

SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's new COVID-19 cases dropped below 100,000 on Saturday, while the number of critically ill patients reached the highest level since late April.

The country added 95,604 new COVID-19 infections, including 398 from overseas, bringing the total caseload to 22,898,523, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said.

It marked a decline from the previous day's 101,140 and the first time daily infections have fallen below 100,000 since Monday when there were 59,019 new cases.

The country reported 86 COVID-19 deaths, bringing the death toll to 26,499, the KDCA said. The fatality rate stood at 0.12 percent.

The number of critically ill patients came to 579, the most since late April.

As of 9 p.m. Saturday, the country had reported 82,073 additional infections, down 8,965 from the same time the previous day, according to health authorities and provincial governments. Daily virus cases are counted until midnight and announced the following morning.

Daily infections tend to fall on weekends due to fewer tests.

Daily infections jumped to 150,212 on Tuesday before dropping to 139,310 on Wednesday and 113,359 on Thursday. The KDCA earlier said it expected the number of daily infections to continue to decline through this week or next week.

The recent decline in new infections raised cautious optimism that the latest virus wave may have peaked. But authorities remain on high alert over a possible resurgence in the COVID-19 pandemic this fall.

Of the locally transmitted 95,206 cases, Seoul reported 14,578 and Gyeonggi Province that surrounds the capital added 22,826. Incheon, a port city 27 kilometers west of Seoul, identified 4,718 new cases.

Since the first local confirmation of COVID-19 on Jan. 20, 2020, the country has gone through multiple major waves of the virus.

The latest wave came during the height of the summer vacation season, fueled by the highly transmissible omicron subvariant BA.5 and eased virus curbs.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · August 27, 2022​

14. S. Korea, China vow stronger ties on supply chains during ministerial talks

S. Korea, China vow stronger ties on supply chains during ministerial talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · August 27, 2022

SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and China agreed Saturday to boost cooperation and communications on supply chains by setting up a new high-level consultative body, Seoul's finance ministry said.

The agreement was made during the 17th Korea-China Meeting on Economic Cooperation held virtually between South Korea's Finance Minister Choo Kyung-ho and He Lifeng, the minister in charge of China's National Development and Reform Commission.

Under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed during the meeting, Seoul and Beijing agreed to set up the new director-level entity on supply chains, which is meant to discuss related issues "in time" when any supply disruptions take place and to enhance policy consultations, according to the ministry.

It is the first MOU of its kind between the two neighboring nations.

"The two sides also vowed to strengthen cooperation in new industry fields, such as the hydrogen industry. South Korea asked for the Chinese government's extra attention to ensure stable and predictable environments for corporate activities," the ministry said in a release.

The ministers also vowed to make joint efforts for the development of their service industries by carrying out various joint research projects and deepening communications.

Seoul called for actual progress in their service and investment negotiations under the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), particularly in such sectors as cultural content and game industries, and China proposed stronger cooperation in healthcare and sporting fields, according to the ministry.

Choo also sought China's support for South Korea's bid to host the 2030 World Expo in Busan, according to the ministry. The Seoul government finalized detailed documents for the bid this week.

The previous session of the ministerial meeting was held in October 2020 via teleconferencing, and the next meeting will take place in South Korea in 2023, the ministry said.

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · August 27, 2022

15. N. Korean military prepares for joint military-civilian events to celebrate Chuseok

Tp repair relations or so the military can extract resources from the civilian population?

N. Korean military prepares for joint military-civilian events to celebrate Chuseok

The events appear aimed at repairing military-civilian relations, which grew estranged during the COVID-19 lockdown

dailynk.com

FILE PHOTO: North Korean soldiers are seen in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)

The North Korean military is currently preparing for joint military-civil activities in which family members of fallen soldiers can take part in grave tending and memorial services around Chuseok (Korean Thanksgiving).

“The political departments in each military unit received orders from the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] on Aug. 20 to take charge of organizing joint activities around this coming Chuseok for the family members of soldiers killed in action,” a source in the North Korean military told Daily NK on Tuesday.

According to the source, family members of soldiers who died in the line of duty over the past few years have not been able to personally visit the units of the deceased or even attend their funerals because of COVID-19 measures that restricted travel around the country.

The source explained that COVID-19 measures prevented travel documents from being issued except in extraordinary circumstances. As a result, the only consideration shown to parents of deceased soldiers was notifying them of their children’s death.

Leading up to Chuseok, the KPA General Political Bureau informed political departments at military units that joint events were being organized to comfort family members who had not been allowed to visit the graves of their relatives over the past three years because it is the responsibility of the state and the Workers’ Party to look after the family members of fallen soldiers.

These Chuseok plans appear aimed at restoring military-civilian relations — which grew estranged during the COVID-19 lockdown — as well as assuaging public dissatisfaction and instilling positive feelings for the public in the military.

In line with the General Political Bureau’s orders, the political departments at each military unit have selected one or two dozen members to represent the families of soldiers who have died in the line of duty over the past few years and asked those individuals and members of local party committees for their help.

Local party committees are reportedly working with security organizations to issue travel documents and authorization numbers in advance.

However, the General Political Bureau has only ordered that these joint events be held at units stationed in the interior of the country, excluding units on the border with China and on the front with South Korea.

Some bereaved family members have responded bitterly to the news of these joint events, the source said.

“The families of numerous deceased soldiers weren’t even allowed to attend their funerals during the pandemic, and now that victory over the pandemic has been declared, they think it’s unfair that only a few representatives will be allowed to take part in the grave tending and memorial services at the military units,” he explained.

Some soldiers have also bemoaned the fact that joining the army basically means a permanent separation from their families, considering that soldiers are not even sent back home after death.

Most soldiers who die while in the service are buried on hills near their unit. It is uncommon for those soldiers to later be buried elsewhere because it is taboo in North Korea to move the graves of unmarried individuals who pass away before their parents do.

Soldiers complain that no one will perform the traditional rituals if they die because they will be buried near their unit instead of being sent back to their families, the source said.

“The Ministry of Defense and the Emergency Anti-epidemic Command have emphasized that anti-pandemic measures must be strictly followed in the grave tending and memorial services that are being held as joint military-civilian events for Chuseok,” the source said.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

16. South Korea is building stealth drones that could take out North Korea's air defenses

South Korea is building stealth drones that could take out North Korea's air defenses

Business Insider · by Park Chan-kyong

North Koreans in Pyongyang in 2011.

Getty Images

• Korean Air will develop stealth UAVs for use in a "manned-unmanned teaming system."
• The UAVs could also perform their own missions, including surveillance, electronic interference, and precision strikes.
• The stealth military drones could also help take out North Korea's dense anti-aircraft defense system.

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Fresh from the successful development of its home-grown KF-21 fighter jet, South Korea has set its sights on developing "stealth" unmanned military drones that could contribute to neutralising North Korea's dense anti-aircraft defence system.

The Korean Agency for Defence Development (ADD) selected Korean Air earlier this month as the preferred bidder over Korea Aerospace Industries, developer of the indigenous KF-21, for its "stealth unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron development project," Korean Air said last week.

"ADD began developing the UAV squadron in November last year and has completed the basic design. The agency plans to work on the detailed design with Korean Air," the company said.

Korean Air will develop a "manned-unmanned teaming system" in which one manned aircraft is backed by three to four stealth UAVs in jointly carrying out various missions including air combat, air-to-ground attacks and surveillance.

"The squadron of UAVs will not only support and escort a manned aircraft, but will also be able to perform its own missions including surveillance, electronic interference tactics and precise strikes," it said.

The announcement comes as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine makes it clear that drones are becoming an integral part of war machines, with thousands of military UAVs used in the conflict by both sides to hit targets or to direct artillery fire onto them.

The Korean Agency for Defense Development began working on a UAV squadron in November 2021.

Korean Air

"UAVs will obviously serve as a decisive factor in every war and all countries including the superpowers — the United States, China and Russia — are all out to develop such man-unmanned teaming systems," said Shin Jong-woo, a defence analyst at the Korea Defence Forum.

South Korea has been developing UAVs including unmanned attack helicopters and surveillance planes in the past decade or so.

"But it's another matter to develop highly-sophisticated manned-unmanned teaming systems that will employ top-of-the-line artificial intelligence and extremely complicated software that will take a lot of time and effort," he told This Week in Asia. "It's anyone's guess when South Korea can develop such a system."

Another defence analyst, Lee Il-woo at the Korea Defence Network, said the concept of "loyal wingman" aircraft — unmanned vehicles accompanying manned aircraft into combat missions — had gained traction globally. This includes the US Air Force's Skyborg programme that envisages expendable unmanned aircraft assisting manned fighters.

Unmanned aircraft such as the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie and Boeing Australia MQ-28 Ghost Bat had been developed in accordance with this concept, Lee said.

"The massive use of UAVs has a clear appeal to South Korea as well, because it has no reliable means of its own to electronically neutralise North Korea's dense anti-aircraft defence system," Lee said, adding South Korea currently relied on US assets for this purpose.

The merits of drones included negligible maintenance costs and the exemption of years of pilot training necessary for manned aircraft, he said.

Military airplanes and ammunition on display at the Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition on October 14, 2019.

AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

"They can carry out combat missions in the front while manned vehicles can stay back safely from hostile firing. This could drastically increase the air force's operational range," Lee said.

"But I think it will take at least 10 years for South Korea to combine its KF-21 (manned fighters) with workable UAVs for a manned-unmanned teaming system." The US could integrate its stealth F-35s with UAVs in a few years' time, he said.

South Korea currently has 40 F-35A fighter jets and will buy 20 more from the US as part of its F-X project focused on acquiring foreign stealth fighter jets from 2023 to 2028.

However, both Lee and Shin raised questions over suggestions that stealth UAVs could be used to "decapitate" North Korea's leadership.

South Korea's conservative government has made no secret that it would consider pre-emptive strikes against the North's missiles and possibly its senior leadership if an imminent attack is detected.

"UAVs are too small to carry bunker-busting bombs while one F-35 can carry two 900kg bombs to destroy concrete bunkers," Lee said, adding stealth fighters did not need to be accompanied by slow drones for striking targets behind enemy lines.

Business Insider · by Park Chan-kyong

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

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