Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quote of the Day:

In ancient Greece, Socrates had a very well known reputation about wisdom… Someday, a man asked him: “Do you know what I've just heard about your friend?”

“Wait a moment” answered Socrates “Before you tell me, I'd like you to do a test, the 'Test of the three sieves'.

“The three sieves? Sure!” said the man.

Socrates continued “The first sieve is the truth. Have you verified that the story you're going to tell is true?”

“No… I've only heard about it…” said the man.

“Very well. So you don't know that it's the truth, let’s continue with the second sieve, the goodness one. Is what you want to tell me about my friend something good?”

“Oh no! The opposite!” He exclaimed excitedly.

“Well,” continued Socrates “you'd like to tell me bad stories about my friend, and you don't even know if they are true. Maybe you could still pass this test. There is only one sieve left, the usefulness one. Is it useful for me to know what this friend has done?”

“No, not at all.” The man said looking down.

“So” finished Socrates “the story you wanted to tell me is not true, not good and not useful. Why did you want to tell me that?”

The next time you want to tell something about someone, do this test...

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 26 (Putin's War)

2. How Ukraine is using resistance warfare developed by the US to fight back against Russia

3. China and US sign deal that could avert mass stock delistings

4. International Relations Theory Suggests Great-Power War Is Coming

5. The Status Quo Won’t Save Us From the Next Pandemic

6. Do more to prevent Chinese espionage

7. US hints to Gantz it’s preparing military option against Iran, Israeli official says

8. Breakthroughs for All: Delivering Equitable Access to America’s Research - The White House

9. Female Russian spy in Italy revealed by Bellingcat investigation

10. Spike in China tensions won't change U.S. Taiwan weapons policy, for now - sources

11. Danilov: Russia running massive psyop against Ukraine's top leaders, commanders

12. As Enterprise's keel is laid, Navy and industry advocate for another aircraft carrier 'block buy'

13. Why Guam’s Missile Defense Modernization Matters

14. This West Point coach-turned-infantry officer just finished Ranger School

15. Israel receives "positive hints" U.S. is developing military option against Iran

16. A Violent Stalemate Sets In as Battle Lines Harden in Ukraine’s East

17. Classified Material on Human Intelligence Sources Helped Trigger Alarm

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 26 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 26

Aug 26, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, George Barros, and Mason Clark

August 26, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces did not make any claimed or assessed territorial gains in Ukraine on August 26, 2022, for the first time since August 18, 2022.[1] However, Russian forces still conducted limited and unsuccessful ground attacks on the Eastern Axis on August 26.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that unspecified actors (but almost certainly Russian forces) reconnected part of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Ukrainian power grid on August 26.[2] Ukrainian nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom stated that unspecified actors reconnected one of the power units to the ZNPP and are working to add capacity to the ZNPP’s operations.[3] Russian forces remain in full control of the plant, though it is unclear why they would have reconnected the power unit.

Russian occupation authorities remain unlikely to successfully conduct sham referenda to annex Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation by early September, despite reports of advancing preparations for referenda. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky stated on August 26 that Russian authorities have completed administrative preparations for referenda and created election headquarters, drawn up voter lists, and created election commissions, which Skibitsky stated indicates that the preparatory process for referenda is “almost complete.”[4] Russian-backed occupation authorities in Zaporizhia Oblast announced that they have already audited polling stations, analyzed voter lists, and selected candidates for work in voter precincts and territorial election commissions.[5]

However, Russian occupation authorities are unlikely to be able to carry out referenda as they intend (with cooperation from local collaborators) by the purported September 11 deadline due to continued frictions within occupation administrations and ongoing partisan attacks. The Ukrainian advisor to the head of Kherson Oblast, Serhiy Khlan, stated on August 26 that the Kherson occupation administration is struggling to find people to head administrative units in charge of referendum preparations, likely due to a lack of willing locals and low levels of trust in Ukrainian collaborators.[6] Khlan notably stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have ordered occupation administrators to avoid importing Russian administrators to fill these roles in order to make the referendum process appear like a grassroots initiative with local support.[7] Ukrainian sources have previously reported that Ukrainian resistance and increasing partisan attacks are inhibiting preparations for the referendum.[8] While Russian authorities could hypothetically forcibly annex Ukrainian territories on an arbitrary date, they are unlikely to do so without holding staged referenda. All observed indicators suggest that Russian authorities seek to create a veneer of local support and participation before conducting the referenda to frame them as widely supported initiatives but face ongoing setbacks that will delay any annexation effort.

Key Takeaways

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that elements of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) reconnected to the Ukrainian power grid on August 26.
Russian occupation authorities remain unlikely to successfully conduct sham referenda to annex Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation by early September, despite reports of advancing preparations for referenda.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Izyum, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.
Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCS) and military infrastructure in Kherson Oblast which support operations on the west bank of the Dnipro River.
Russian federal subjects (regions) continued additional recruitment drives for volunteer battalions, which continue to deploy to Ukraine.
Ukrainian partisans and internal division continue to pose threats to Russian control of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack southwest of Izyum on August 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked toward Karnaukhivka, 25km southwest of Izyum.[9] ISW has previously reported that limited Russian ground attacks southwest of Izyum are likely spoiling attacks to disrupt Ukrainian forces, rather than attacks intended to take territory along an axis of advance.[10] Russian forces continued artillery strikes along the Izyum-Slovyansk line near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border and additionally shelled a technical college in Slovyansk.[11]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks toward Siversk on August 26 and fired on Siversk and surrounding settlements.[12]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 26. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attacked near Soledar and Bakhmutske, both within 10km northeast of Bakhmut.[13] Russian sources claimed that Russian and proxy troops, along with Wagner Group mercenaries, are fighting in Soledar and along the eastern approaches to Bakhmut.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian troops attempted to advance from Kodema, about 13km southeast of Bakhmut.[15]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on August 26. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attempted to improve their tactical position and advance toward Nevelske, less than 10km from the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City and directly adjacent to Russian-occupied Pisky.[16] Russian forces also continued artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.[17]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on August 26. Russian sources indicated that Russian and proxy troops are continuing to prioritize offensive operations in the Vuhledar area, about 35km southwest of Donetsk City.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes southwest of Donetsk City toward the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border.[19]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on August 26. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian troops continued offensive operations to contest positions north of Kharkiv City and conducted air and artillery strikes along the line of contact.[20]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast on August 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against Hulyaipole and Olhivske, roughly 20km northeast of Hulyaipole.[21] Russian forces continued heavy shelling along the line of contact, including near Hulyaipole and Huliaipilske on the T0814 highway and Orikhiv and Mala Tokmachka on the T0815 highway.[22]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to shell the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on August 26. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of shelling the ZNPP’s oxygen-nitrogen station and an area of special building No. 1 on August 25-26.[23] Ukrainian sources separately reported that Russian forces struck Nikopol, Marhanets, and Chervonohryhorivka, all on the opposite bank of the Dnipro River from Enerhodar.[24]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults in Kherson or Mykolaiv Oblasts on August 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on unspecified infrastructure facilities near Oleksandrivka (west Kherson Oblast), Lozove (near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River), and Olhyne (south of Kryvyi Rih on the T2207 highway).[25] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Vladyslav Nazarov reported that Russian forces struck the Mykolaivskyi district with S-300 anti-air systems.[26] Russian forces continued shelling along the line of contact.[27]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCS) and military infrastructure in Kherson Oblast which support Russian operations on the right bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces again struck the Antonivsky road bridge near Kherson City on August 26, likely disrupting Russian efforts to repair the bridge.[28] Footage from August 25 shows Russian forces operating pontoon bridges adjacent to the road bridge. [29] Satellite imagery from August 23 and August 25 shows significant damage to the Antonivsky road bridge from Ukrainian strikes.[30] Ukrainian forces also struck the Darivka road bridge over the Inhulets River, and Nazarov stated that the strikes rendered the bridge inoperable.[31] Nazarov also reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian force concentrations, ammunition depots, and equipment stores in Kherson Oblast, including command and control elements of the Russian 98th Airborne Division in Dudchany, Kherson Oblast.[32] Ukrainian forces conducted airstrikes against Russian air defense infrastructure in Novovoskresenske, northern Kherson Oblast, and Kherson City on August 25.[33]

Russian forces continued to redeploy military equipment from Crimea to Russia, likely in response to ongoing Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear areas in Crimea. Business Insider reported on August 26 that Russian forces transferred six Su-35S fighter jets and four MiG-31BM interceptors from Crimea to mainland Russia, most likely due to the threat of Ukrainian strikes.[34] A Russian milblogger agreed with the Business Insider report and claimed that Russian forces are strengthening air defenses in Crimea to counter Ukrainian strikes as current Russian air defenses are ineffective against small Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[35]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) are launching additional recruitment drives for volunteer battalions, which continue to deploy to Ukraine. Local Primorye outlet Primorskaya Gazeta reported on August 26 that Prymorskyi Krai’s 240-man-strong “Tigr” volunteer battalion (which is part of the Russian 155th Separate Naval infantry Brigade) participated in its first combat operation in an unspecified location in Ukraine.[36] ISW first reported on the ”Tigr” Battalion on July 16.[37] Russian media also reported that Bashkortostan’s “Shaimuratov” and “Dostavalov” volunteer battalions are completing their training and will deploy to Ukraine at an unspecified date in the near future.[38] Local Russian media also reported that a few dozen Russian volunteers of Tyumen Oblast’s “Tobol” and “Tayga” battalions deployed to training grounds for combat training ahead of deploying to Ukraine.[39] Russian sources also confirmed the first combat losses among Russian prisoners who recently joined the Wagner Group.[40]

Russian federal subjects continue to increase offered salaries for volunteer fighters. Nenets Autonomous Okrug Governor Yuri Bezdudny announced on August 26 that the Nenets Autonomous Okrug tripled its one-time enlistment payment from 100,000 ($1,642) rubles to 300,000 rubles ($4,928) for personnel who signed service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense.[41] Chuvash Republic Governor Oleg Nikolayev announced on August 26 that the Chuvash Republic will increase one-time payments to volunteer fighters of the “Atal” Battalion from 200,000 rubles ($3,285) to 300,000 rubles ($4,928).[42]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Ukrainian partisans continued to target occupation authorities and disrupt Russian preparations for annexation referenda. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on August 26 that unidentified Ukrainian partisans conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against Alexander Kolesnikov, the Deputy Police Chief of occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov also stated that Ukrainian partisans in Melitopol, Kherson Oblast damaged a referendum headquarters in Melitopol.[44] The targeting of collaborators by partisan groups is likely impeding Russian efforts to establish stable governing systems and pursue formal referendums in occupied territories.

Internal discord is likely also contributing to the instability of occupation regimes. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian-appointed Mayor of Mariupol Konstantin Ivashchenko left Mariupol on August 26 following an assassination attempt on August 25.[45] Ukrainian Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian Duma Deputy Dmytro Sablin and Russian-backed former Mariupol City Council Member Petro Ivanov ordered Ivashchenko’s assassination. Andryushchenko further reported that Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin appointed DNR authorities to investigate the assassination attempt rather than turning the case over to Russian authorities, as per previous cases in Russian-occupied territories.[46] ISW cannot independently confirm Andryushchenko’s statements at this time. However, if proven true, a rift between Russian and DNR authorities would suggest Russia will face increasing difficulty coordinating governance and responses to Ukrainian threats in occupied territories.

Russian and proxy authorities continue efforts to facilitate the social integration of occupied areas using inconsistent applications of incentives and threats. Education systems remain a prime target. Parents who refuse to send their children to Russian schools in occupied territories face fines ranging from 40,000 to 150,000 rubles ($663-$2,487), the revocation of their parental rights, the confiscation of their property, and police interference, depending on their location.[47] Parents who choose to send their children to Russian schools in occupied territories may receive a one-time 10,000-ruble ($165) payment, as ISW has previously reported.[48]

The Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab published a report locating at least 21 confirmed filtration facilities functioning in Donetsk Oblast alone on August 25.[49] The filtration facilities reportedly each serve one of four purposes: registration, holding, secondary interrogation, or detention of Ukrainian civilians. The Humanitarian Research Lab asserted that facility conditions include overcrowding, poor sanitation, insufficient food and water provision, denial of medical care, occasional use of electric shocks, and isolation tactics that “can constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under international humanitarian and human rights law.”[50]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[4] https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/smogut-okkupanty-provesti-referendum-otvet-1661515303.html

[8] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/22/okupanty-ne-mozhut-normalno-pidgotuvatysya-do-psevdoreferendumu-na-hersonshhyni/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/08/22/hersonshhyna-bojkotuye-psevdoreferendum/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/396; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_meli...

[34] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-pulling-fighter-jets-from-crimea-... de/politik/welt/explosionen-auf-der-krim-russland-zieht-laut-nato-geheimbericht-kampfflieger-aus-der-ukraine-ab/?_ga=2.141767218.1611788878.1661545380-1138732448.1661545380

[36] http://primgazeta dot ru/news/primorskij-otryad-tigr-prinyal-pervyj-boj-26-08-2022-06-11-55

[38] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1563037932474142720; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGWU5ytix_Q; https://prufy dot ru/news/society/126880-khabirov_pribyl_na_otpravku_vtorogo_dobrovolcheskogo_batalona_iz_bashkirii_imeni_dostavalova/

[39] http://tyumen-news dot net/society/2022/08/26/262028.html

[41] https://nao24 dot ru/obshestvo/33896-v-nao-do-300-tysjach-rublej-uvelichen-razmer-edinovremennoj-denezhnoj-vyplaty-dlja-voennosluzhaschih-zakljuchivshih-kontrakt-s-ministerstvom-oborony-rf.html

[42] https://cap dot ru/news/2022/08/26/v-chuvashii-edinovremennaya-denezhnaya-viplata-dob

[43] https://t.e/Bratchuk_Sergey/17655; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/10471; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39638; h...

[45] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/26/rosijski-gaulyajtery-na-pivdni-zalyshayut-region/; https://tsn dot ua/ato/u-mariupoli-vchinili-zamah-na-okupaciynogo-mera-mariupolya-ivaschenka-2139160.html; https://www.stopcor dot org/section-uanews/news-u-mariupoli-masshtabna-pozhezha-rosmns-ne-reague-gaulyajter-ivaschenko-perehovuetsya-v-likarni-25-08-2022.html

[47] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/26/u-mariupoli-okupanty-pogrozhuyut-shtrafamy-za-vidmovu-batkiv-vid-navchannya-ditej-v-rosijskyh-shkolah/; https://t.me/mariupolrada/10733; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/463

understandingwar.org

2. How Ukraine is using resistance warfare developed by the US to fight back against Russia

Truth in advertising from the acknowledgments of the Resistance Operating Concept, giving credit where credit is due. Note that per Cohen and Gooch all military failures are a result of a failure to learn, failure to learn, and failure to anticipate. This is an example of anticipation and having foresight.

The Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) originated as an initial effort under the guidance of Major

General Michael Repass, Commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). Mr. Byron

Harper took that guidance and began the Resistance Seminar Series in 2014, supported by the next SOCEUR

Commander, Major General Gregory Lengyel. They had the foresight to realize that it was necessary for the

United States and our allies to have a common understanding of national resistance, and cooperate in planning

for such an eventuality, based on Russian actions that continue today. Though developed with European

partners, this concept has worldwide application.

https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/25

Note this excerpt from the CNN piece below which will be controversial for some. But the ROC can support "unconventional deterrence" (per Bob Jones USSOCOM, J5) and for deterrence to work the enemy must know the threat he faces. And unconventional deterrence should become the third pillar of integrated deterrence: (1) nuclear deterrence, (2) conventional deterrence, and (3) unconventional deterrence. (See HERE.)

The existence of the resistance doctrine and parts of the planning around resistance is intentionally public, explained Stringer, intended to act as a deterrent against a potential attack, one more aimed at Russia's favored hybrid warfare instead of traditional military and nuclear deterrence. But the details of the plans and the organization within a country are tightly held.

How Ukraine is using resistance warfare developed by the US to fight back against Russia

CNN · by Oren Liebermann, CNN

(CNN)As the war in Ukraine has passed the six-month mark, US and European officials say Ukraine has successfully used a method of resistance warfare developed by US special operations forces to fight back against Russia and bog down its vastly superior military.

The Resistance Operating Concept was developed in 2013 following Russia's war with Georgia a few years earlier but its value was only realized after Russia's invasion of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula in 2014. It provides a blueprint for smaller nations to effectively resist and confront a larger neighbor that has invaded.

Russia's nearly bloodless takeover and annexation of the occupied territory stunned Ukraine and the west, intensifying a study of how to build a plan for total defense that included not only the military, but also the civilian population.

But Putin's wider war on Ukraine launched in February has been its proving ground.

The doctrine, also known as the ROC, provides an innovative and unconventional approach to warfare and total defense that has guided not just Ukraine's military, but also involved the country's civilian population as part of a concerted resistance against Russia's army.

"It's all hands on deck in terms of the comprehensive defense for the government of Ukraine," said retired Lt. Gen. Mark Schwartz, who was commander of Special Operations Command Europe during the doctrine's development. "They're using every resource and they're also using some highly unconventional means by which to disrupt the Russian federation military."

Planning a national resistance

Outnumbered, outgunned, and outmanned, Ukraine has nevertheless fought back against a Russian military that thought it would romp through the vast majority of the country within a matter of weeks, if not days.

"This is a way to turn the tables on a first world power," said Schwartz. "It's just incredible to watch that despite the unbelievable loss of life and sacrifice, what the will to resist and the resolve to resist can do."

In a series of recent attacks and explosions at Russian positions in Crimea, Kevin D. Stringer, a retired Army Colonel who led the development team for the resistance concept, sees signs of its use.

"Since you can't do it conventionally, you would use special operations forces, and those [forces] would need resistance support -- intelligence, resources, logistics -- in order to access these regions."

A Ukrainian flag flies in a damaged residential area in the city of Borodianka, northwest of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv.

A Ukrainian government report shared with CNN acknowledged Ukraine was behind the attacks on Russian bases and an ammunition depot. The attacks, far behind enemy lines, were beyond the range of the weapons the US and others have publicly sent to Ukraine, and videos of the explosions did not appear to show any incoming missile or drone. Russia blamed sabotage or detonating ammunition for the explosions.

"High probability would say it's very plausible that [the ROC] principles are playing out in actual warfare right now," Stringer said.

In early-April, Gen. Richard Clarke, the commander of US Special Operations Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the US had helped train resistance companies in Ukraine embedded with special forces over the past 18 months. When asked if he was seeing some of the success of that training in the current conflict, Clarke was direct in his answer.

"Yes, Senator, we are."

Resistance in Ukraine

Early in the conflict, the Ukrainian government created a website that explains different ways to resist. The site describes ways of using of nonviolent actions, including boycotting public events, labor strikes, and even how to use humor and satire. The goal is to disrupt the ability of pro-Russian authorities to govern while reminding the population of Ukraine's rightful sovereignty. The resistance doctrine suggests violent actions as well, including using Molotov cocktails, deliberately starting fires and putting chemicals in gas tanks to sabotage enemy vehicles.

Civilians take part in a military training course conducted by a Christian Territorial Defence Unit on February 19, 2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine.

The doctrine also calls for a broad messaging campaign to control the narrative of the conflict, prevent an occupier's message from taking hold, and keeping the population united. Videos of Ukrainian strikes against Russian tanks, often to a soundtrack of pop music or heavy metal, have gone viral, as have clips of Ukrainian soldiers rescuing stray animals. Whether intentional or not, it becomes part of the resistance, allowing Ukraine to frame the headlines in western media in their favor and often humanizing Ukrainian service members in ways the Russian military has abjectly failed to do.

At the forefront of the resistance is Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky, who has not let the conflict fade out of sight with nightly speeches and frequent international appearances. His visits near the front-lines make news around the world, while Russian President Vladimir Putin is rarely seen outside the Kremlin or the resort of Sochi.

The ongoing messaging barrage has spurred a groundswell of overseas support and successfully increased on western governments to supply more arms and ammunition to Ukraine.

Resilience and Resistance

Overall, the resistance concept provides a framework for increasing a country's resilience, which is its ability to withstand external pressures, and planning for resistance, defined as a whole-of-country effort to re-establish sovereignty in occupied territories.

"Resilience is society's strength in peacetime that becomes resistance in wartime against the aggressor," explained Dalia Bankauskaite, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis who has studied resistance planning in Lithuania.

Instead of providing each country the same set of plans, the doctrine is designed to be tailored to each country's population, abilities, and terrain. It is not intended to create or support an insurgency; its goal is to establish a government-sanctioned force that will carry out activities against a foreign occupier with the goal of restoring sovereignty.

At first, only Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland expressed real enthusiasm about the new doctrine. But after Russia's nearly bloodless takeover and annexation of Crimea stunned Ukraine and the west in 2014, interest in the resistance method rapidly grew.

Latvian Zemessardze, or National Guard, soldiers prepare to attack during a small-unit tactics exercise in June 2020 during implementation of the Resistance Operating Concept with NATO allies and partners near Iecava, Latvia.

Since its inception, at least 15 countries have taken part in some form of training on this resistance doctrine, according to Nicole Kirschmann, a spokeswoman for Special Operations Command Europe, where this was developed.

In mid-November, as the Biden administration was sounding the first public warnings about the potential for a Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hungary hosted a conference about the Resistance Operating Concept. The commander of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces was at the conference, Kirschmann told CNN, as well as nearly a dozen other countries.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has only increased interest in the concept.

"Baltic states, in particular, are actively talking in their parliaments about implementation of ROC at a national level," according to a US official.

Resistance in the Baltics

In May, nearly three months into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania's parliament adopted a new strategy for civil resistance that is much broader than strictly resistance against occupation.

Martynas Bendikas, a spokesman for the country's Ministry of National Defence, said that preparing for resistance includes developing the will to defend the country, improving citizens' military and non-military knowledge and skills, and more as part of a national defense.

The existence of the resistance doctrine and parts of the planning around resistance is intentionally public, explained Stringer, intended to act as a deterrent against a potential attack, one more aimed at Russia's favored hybrid warfare instead of traditional military and nuclear deterrence. But the details of the plans and the organization within a country are tightly held.

For Estonia, a country with a population of about 1.3 million people bordering northwest Russia, civil resistance has always been a part of the defense plan.

"There's no other option for every Estonian," said Rene Toomse, a spokesman for the volunteer Estonian Defense League. "Either you fight for independence if someone attacks you - if Russia attacks you - or you just die."

Estonia regularly updates and develops its defense plans, integrating its standing military with its general population and its volunteer forces, which Toomse said have seen a surge in applications since the beginning of Russia's invasion.

Estonian officials have studied the war in Ukraine to learn lessons about what has worked well against Russia, and where Ukraine's resistance could improve. Toomse says Estonians remember Soviet rule well, and those too young to remember are taught in school.

Ukraine has excelled at winning the information campaign, Toomse points out, using media posts across multiple platforms, a president who has become a vocal international figure, and a steady stream of information about how well Ukraine's forces are fighting, "even if they're not emphasizing their own losses."

But Toomse insists Estonia, if it faced invasion, would be more active in any occupied territory, using small, well-armed and well-trained units. "I imagine that we can do much more damage behind enemy lines than Ukraine has done," Toomse said. "All the logistics, all the convoys, are going to be constantly under attack."

CNN · by Oren Liebermann, CNN

3. China and US sign deal that could avert mass stock delistings

China and US sign deal that could avert mass stock delistings

CNN · by Reuters

Hong KongThe US audit regulator said on Friday it has signed an agreement with Chinese regulators, taking a first step toward inspecting and investigating registered accounting firms in China and Hong Kong.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) said it was the most detailed and prescriptive agreement the regulator has ever reached with China.

US regulators have for long been demanding access to audit papers of Chinese companies listed in the United States, but Beijing has been reluctant to let overseas regulators inspect accounting firms, citing security concerns.

The decision marks a major thaw in US-China business relations and will be a huge relief for hundreds of Chinese companies and investors who have invested billions of dollars in the firms that have a chance to retain access to the world's deepest capital markets.

By Friday, 163 companies, including Alibaba (BABA), JD.com (JD), and Nio (NIO) had been identified by the US regulator as facing trading prohibition risks for not complying with audit requirements.

Five state-owned Chinese companies to delist from New York Stock Exchange

In a statement, the PCAOB said the agreement would allow it "sole discretion to select the firms, audit engagements and potential violations it inspects and investigates — without consultation with, nor input from, Chinese authorities."

The US regulator added its inspectors would be able to "view complete audit work papers with all information included and for the PCAOB to retain information as needed."

"The PCAOB has direct access to interview and take testimony from all personnel associated with the audits the PCAOB inspects or investigates," it said.

China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) said the agreement was an important step towards addressing the auditing issue.

It added keeping Chinese companies listed in the United States benefited investors, companies and both countries.

The signing of the protocol between China and the United States signals that both sides have "made a crucial step to solve the audit regulatory issue of US-listed Chinese companies through enhanced cooperation," according to the CSRC statement.

"It is in line with the hope and expectation of the markets ... if cooperation afterwards satisfies each side's regulatory needs, there is hope that the audit issue will be resolved, and passive delisting will be avoided."

Current US rules stipulate that Chinese companies that are not in compliance with audit working papers requests will be suspended from US trading in early 2024, but that deadline could get brought forward.

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Gary Gensler said Chinese companies still faced delisting if their accounts could not be accessed by US authorities.

"Make no mistake, though: The proof will be in the pudding," he said.

"This agreement will be meaningful only if the PCAOB actually can inspect and investigate completely audit firms in China."

Major Chinese companies listed in the United States rose in premarket trading, with Alibaba up 2.6%, Pinduoduo gaining nearly 6% and Baidu up 3.3%.

"This is seen as a positive first step. However, things are not fully cast in stone yet, as seen from the various sudden reversals in the past," said Samuel Siew, market specialist at CGS-CIMB.

CNN · by Reuters

4. International Relations Theory Suggests Great-Power War Is Coming

I don't care if it works in practice - does it work in theory? - said every academic ever.

Seriously, this requires consideration and reflection.

Excerpt:

Finally, constructivist arguments about the pacifying effects of global norms were always plagued with doubts about whether these norms were truly universal. As China engages in genocide in Xinjiang and Russia issues bloodcurdling nuclear threats and castrates prisoners of war in Ukraine, we now have our gruesome answer.

Moreover, constructivists might note that the democracy versus autocracy cleavage in international politics is not simply an issue of governance but of ways of life. The speeches and writings of Xi and Putin are often ideological rants about the superiority of autocratic systems and the failings of democracy. Like it or not—we are back in a 20th-century contest over whether democratic or autocratic governments can better deliver for their people, adding a more dangerous ideological element to this competition.

Fortunately, there is some good news. The best understanding of international politics may be found in a combination of theories. Much of humanity prefers a liberal international order, and this order is only made possible by the realist military power of the United States and its democratic allies. Moreover, 2,500 years of theory and history suggest that democracies tend to win these hard-power competitions and autocracies flame out disastrously in the end.

Unfortunately, the clarifying moments that bend history in an arc toward justice often only emerge after major-power wars.

Let’s hope that today’s incoming students are not reminiscing at their graduation ceremonies about where they were when World War III began. But IR theory gives us plenty of reasons to be concerned.

International Relations Theory Suggests Great-Power War Is Coming

According to IR textbooks, the United States, Russia, and China are on a collision course.

AUGUST 27, 2022, 2:00 AM

Kroenig-Matthew-foreign-policy-columnist12

Matthew Kroenig

By Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Foreign Policy · by Matthew Kroenig · August 27, 2022

Kroenig-Matthew-foreign-policy-columnist12

Matthew Kroenig

By Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This week, thousands of university students around the world will begin their introduction to international relations courses for the first time. If their professors are attuned to the ways the world has changed in recent years, they will be teaching them that the major theories of international relations warn that great-power conflict is coming.

For decades, international relations theory provided reasons for optimism—that the major powers could enjoy mostly cooperative relations and resolve their differences short of armed conflict.

Realist IR theories focus on power, and for decades, they maintained that the bipolar world of the Cold War and the unipolar post-Cold War world dominated by the United States were relatively simple systems not prone to wars of miscalculation. They also held that nuclear weapons raised the cost of conflict and made war among the major powers unthinkable.

Chinese soldiers participate in a drill.

Members of special operations forces take part in a military drill in Yulin, South China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, on May 17.CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images

For decades, international relations theory provided reasons for optimism—that the major powers could enjoy mostly cooperative relations and resolve their differences short of armed conflict.

Meanwhile, liberal theorists argued that a triumvirate of causal variables (institutions, interdependence, and democracy) facilitated cooperation and mitigated conflict. The dense set of international institutions and agreements (the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc.) established after World War II—and expanded and depended on since the end of the Cold War—provided forums for major powers to work out their differences peacefully.

Moreover, economic globalization made armed conflict too costly. Why quarrel when business is good and everyone is getting rich? Finally, according to this theory, democracies are less likely to fight and more likely to cooperate, and the major waves of democratization around the world over the past 70 years have made the globe a more peaceful place.

At the same time, constructivist scholars explained how new ideas, norms, and identities have transformed international politics in a more positive direction. In the past, piracy, slavery, torture, and wars of aggression were common practices. Over the years, however, strengthening human rights norms and taboos against the use of weapons of mass destruction placed guardrails on international conflict.

Unfortunately, nearly all of these pacifying forces appear to be unraveling before our eyes. The major driving forces of international politics, according to IR theory, suggest that the new Cold War among the United States, China, and Russia is unlikely to be peaceful.

Supersonic jets fly over a Russian statue.

Russia’s MiG-31 supersonic interceptor jets carrying hypersonic Kinzhal missiles fly over Red Square during the Victory Day military parade in Moscow on May 9, 2018.KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV/AFP via Getty Images

Let us begin with power politics. We are entering a more multipolar world. To be sure, the United States is still the world’s leading power, according to nearly all objective measures, but China has risen to occupy a strong second-place position in military and economic might. Europe is an economic and regulatory superpower in its own right. A more aggressive Russia maintains the largest nuclear weapons stockpile on Earth. And major powers in the developing world—such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil—are choosing a nonaligned path.

Realists argue that multipolar systems are unstable and prone to major wars of miscalculation. World War I is a classic example.

Multipolar systems are unstable in part because each country must worry about multiple potential adversaries. Indeed, at present, the U.S. Defense Department frets about possible simultaneous conflicts with Russia in Europe and China in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, U.S. President Joe Biden has stated that the use of military force remains on the table as a last resort to deal with Iran’s nuclear program. A three-front war is not out of the question.

Wars of miscalculation often result when states underestimate their adversary. States doubt their opponent’s power or resolve to fight, so they test them. Sometimes, the enemy is bluffing, and the challenge pays off. If the enemy is determined to defend its interests, however, major war can result. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely miscalculated in launching an invasion of Ukraine, incorrectly assuming that war would be easy. Some realist scholars warned for some time that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was coming, and there is still the possibility that the war in Ukraine could spill across NATO’s borders, turning this conflict into a direct U.S.-Russia conflagration.

In addition, there is the danger that Chinese President Xi Jinping might miscalculate over Taiwan. Washington’s confusing “strategic ambiguity” policy as to whether it would defend the island only adds to the instability. Biden has said he would defend Taiwan, but his own White House contradicted him. Many leaders are confused, including possibly Xi. He might mistakenly believe he could get away with an attack on Taiwan—only to have the United States intervene violently to stop him.

Moreover, after several U.S. presidents have threatened “all options on the table” for the Iranian nuclear program without backing it up, Tehran might assume that it can make a dash for the bomb without a U.S. response. If Iran is mistaken in doubting Biden’s resolve, war could result.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu watch a parade.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu watch a parade of the participants of the Vostok 2018 military drills at Tsugol training ground not far from the Chinese and Mongolian border in Siberia on Sept. 13, 2018.ALEXEY NIKOLSKY/AFP via Getty Images

Realists also focus on shifts in the balance of power and worry about the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. Power transition theory says that the fall of a dominant great power and the rise of an ascendant challenger often results in war. Some experts worry that Washington and Beijing may be falling into this “Thucydides Trap.”

Their dysfunctional autocratic systems make it unlikely that Beijing or Moscow will usurp global leadership from the United States anytime soon, but a closer look at the historical record shows that challengers sometimes start wars of aggression when their expansive ambitions are thwarted. Like Germany in World War I and Japan in World War II, Russia may be lashing out to reverse its decline, and China may also be weak and dangerous.

Some people might argue that nuclear deterrence will still work, but military technology is changing. The world is experiencing a “Fourth Industrial Revolution” as new technologies—such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and communications, additive manufacturing, robotics, hypersonic missiles, directed energy, and others—promise to transform the global economy, societies, and the battlefield.

Many defense experts believe we are on the eve of a new revolution in military affairs. It is possible that these new technologies could, like tanks and aircraft on the eve of World War II, give an advantage to militaries that go on the offense, making war more likely. At a minimum, these new weapons systems could confuse assessments of the balance of power, contributing to the above risks of miscalculation.

China, for example, is leading in several of these technologies, including hypersonic missiles, certain applications for artificial intelligence, and quantum computing. These advantages—or even the false perception in Beijing that these advantages might exist—could tempt China to invade Taiwan.

A Ukrainian serviceman holds a weapon.

A Ukrainian serviceman takes part in the joint Rapid Trident military exercise with the United States and other NATO countries not far from Lviv, Ukraine, on Sept. 24, 2021, as tensions with Russia remain high over the Kremlin-backed insurgency in the country’s east.YURIY DYACHYSHYN/AFP via Getty Images

Even liberalism, a more optimistic theory in general, provides a reason for pessimism. To be sure, liberals are right that institutions, economic interdependence, and democracy have facilitated cooperation within the liberal world order. The United States and its democratic allies in North America, Europe, and East Asia are more united than ever before. But these same factors are increasingly sparking conflict on the fault lines between the liberal and illiberal world orders.

In the new Cold War, international institutions have simply become new arenas for competition. Russia and China are infiltrating these institutions and turning them against their intended purposes. Who can forget Russia chairing a meeting of the United Nations Security Council as its armies invaded Ukraine in February? Similarly, China used its influence in the World Health Organization to stymie an effective investigation into COVID-19’s origins. And dictators vie for seats on the U.N. Human Rights Council to ensure their egregious human rights abuses escape scrutiny. Instead of facilitating cooperation, international institutions are increasingly exacerbating conflict.

Liberal scholars also argue that economic interdependence mitigates conflict. But this theory always had a chicken-and-egg problem. Is trade driving good relations, or are good relations driving trade? We are seeing the answer play out in real time.

Putin Xi handshake

Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China

Pivoting to Asia and forgetting about Europe isn’t an option.

A group of German children stand atop building rubble to cheer a U.S. cargo plane as it flies over a western section of Berlin in 1948 as American and British forces airlift food and supplies to after Soviet forces surrounded and closed off the besieged city. Bettmann Archive/Getty Images

Why Superpower Crises Are a Good Thing

A new era of tensions will focus minds and break logjams, as Cold War history shows.

The free world is recognizing that it is too economically dependent on its enemies in Moscow and Beijing, and it is decoupling as fast as it can. Western corporations pulled out of Russia overnight. New legislation and regulations in the United States, Europe, and Japan are restricting trade and investment in China. It is simply irrational for Wall Street to invest in Chinese technology companies that are working with China’s People’s Liberation Army to develop weapons intended to kill Americans.

But China is also decoupling from the free world. Xi is prohibiting Chinese tech firms from listing on Wall Street, for example, because he doesn’t want to share proprietary information with Western powers. The economic interdependence between the liberal and illiberal worlds that has served as a ballast against conflict is now eroding.

Democratic peace theory says democracies cooperate with other democracies. But the central fault line in the international system today, as Biden explains, is “the battle between democracy and autocracy.”

To be sure, the United States still maintains cordial relations with some nondemocracies, such as Saudi Arabia. But the world order is increasingly divided with the United States and its status quo-oriented democratic allies in NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia on one side and the revisionist autocracies of China, Russia, and Iran on the other. One does not need a stethoscope to detect the echoes of the free world’s conflict against Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial Japan.

Iranian, Russian, and Chinese warships take part in a joint military drill.

Iranian, Russian, and Chinese warships participate in a joint military drill in the Indian Ocean on Jan. 21.Iranian Army Office/AFP via Getty Images

Finally, constructivist arguments about the pacifying effects of global norms were always plagued with doubts about whether these norms were truly universal. As China engages in genocide in Xinjiang and Russia issues bloodcurdling nuclear threats and castrates prisoners of war in Ukraine, we now have our gruesome answer.

Moreover, constructivists might note that the democracy versus autocracy cleavage in international politics is not simply an issue of governance but of ways of life. The speeches and writings of Xi and Putin are often ideological rants about the superiority of autocratic systems and the failings of democracy. Like it or not—we are back in a 20th-century contest over whether democratic or autocratic governments can better deliver for their people, adding a more dangerous ideological element to this competition.

Fortunately, there is some good news. The best understanding of international politics may be found in a combination of theories. Much of humanity prefers a liberal international order, and this order is only made possible by the realist military power of the United States and its democratic allies. Moreover, 2,500 years of theory and history suggest that democracies tend to win these hard-power competitions and autocracies flame out disastrously in the end.

Unfortunately, the clarifying moments that bend history in an arc toward justice often only emerge after major-power wars.

Let’s hope that today’s incoming students are not reminiscing at their graduation ceremonies about where they were when World War III began. But IR theory gives us plenty of reasons to be concerned.

Foreign Policy · by Matthew Kroenig · August 27, 2022

5. The Status Quo Won’t Save Us From the Next Pandemic

Will we answer the wakeup call? And many will ask can we trust the WHO?

Excerpts:

The WHO has proposed that it be at the center of the pandemic architecture, but we disagree. The organization must be equipped to play a major coordinating role in responding to pandemic threats, but those threats are too big and broad to be addressed by the health sector alone. Just about every sector of society and the economy has been affected by the pandemic, and just about every sector must contribute to the plans to stop new health threats from becoming social, economic, and health calamities. Thus, coordination goes well beyond what a single global health organization can offer. A broader ecosystem is involved.

A previous review conducted for the U.N. secretary-general in the wake of the Ebola crisis, and now the panel we co-chaired, have proposed that an independent, leader-level health threats council be created to promote coordination and accountability across countries and major institutions. Such a council would bring cohesion and oversight to the global architecture for pandemic preparedness and response.

Many discussions are still to be had about the form such a council would take—and whether, for example, it could be a joint council of the U.N. General Assembly and the WHO, or whether the U.N. secretary-general’s idea of an emergency council to manage a broader range of existential threats and complex emergencies might gain traction. But we remain convinced that such a council is a necessary part of the reformed global architecture for pandemic preparedness and response.

The world can’t travel back in time to December 2019 to thwart calamity, but the international community can act now to ensure that the experience of COVID-19 is never repeated. We cannot afford to settle for less than an ambitious and cohesive package of reforms. As former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously said, paraphrasing philosopher George Santayana, “Those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.”

The Status Quo Won’t Save Us From the Next Pandemic

Disease threats are not just the health sector’s problem.

AUGUST 27, 2022, 6:00 AM

By Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a former president of Liberia and a winner of the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize, and Helen Clark, a former prime minister of New Zealand and a former administrator of the United Nations Development Programme.

Foreign Policy · by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Helen Clark · August 27, 2022

It’s Dec. 30, 2019. A report from Wuhan, China, is circulating on the internet, warning that several people are struggling with an unexplained lung infection…

We all know what happened next.

SARS-CoV-2 became a runaway virus with the potential to become still more dangerous. To date, it has led to the deaths of an estimated 17 million people, and it’s expected to lead to a loss of at least $12.5 trillion in global output by 2024. It has worsened social cleavages, inequities, and trust in institutions around the world, exhausting and depleting health care workers and reversing years of progress toward achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.

Syrians walk past a colorful mural.

Syrians walk past a mural painted as part of a UNICEF and World Health Organization awareness campaign in the northeastern Hasakah province of Syria on Aug. 16, 2020. The mural displays tips on how to avoid COVID-19 after a spike in coronavirus infections in the area. DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP via Getty Images

It’s Dec. 30, 2019. A report from Wuhan, China, is circulating on the internet, warning that several people are struggling with an unexplained lung infection…

We all know what happened next.

In other words, the world learned—painfully—that we were not prepared to manage a new disease threat. And without change, it could all happen again. In fact, it could be even worse.

Pandemic threats are inevitable, but epidemics and pandemics are choices. World leaders now have a choice: prepare for the next pandemic—or risk a repeat of the disastrous last two and a half years.

Passengers stand under signs at an airport.

Passengers wait in a near-empty airport terminal to check in for a flight from Cape Town to Amsterdam, the only overnight international flight leaving South Africa’s second-busiest airport after other flights were canceled on Nov. 29, 2021. The South African government said the country was bearing the brunt of publicly announcing the new omicron variant of the coronavirus, as other nations placed it on the red list of countries deemed high risk.David Silverman/Getty Images

As co-chairs of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, which was established by the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to COVID-19, we spent many months studying how to prevent another pandemic like this one, and we continue to follow and report on progress in this area carefully. We believe there are five interlinked lines of action that the global community needs to take to prevent the next pandemic threat from devastating the planet once again.

First, countries must try to stop new infectious disease outbreaks from spreading beyond borders. Invisible viruses cannot be negotiated with, denied a visa or boarding pass, blocked from entry, arrested, or detained. But modern surveillance systems—if applied quickly and transparently—can help detect and halt them. For example, though New York state’s recent report of polio in its wastewater was not welcome news, it is much better to be transparent and take action than to let the disease fester and risk infections and spread.

If left to spread, a new disease—or even an existing disease like monkeypox—can cost, at best, billions of dollars to manage and, at worst, trillions of dollars, many millions of lives, and decades of development progress. A pandemic threat can ignite anywhere, and countries that detect and report one should be hailed—and not punished, as when unjustified travel bans were slapped on South Africa and neighboring countries when they reported the new omicron variant last year.

The WHO must confidently and rapidly alert the world to health threats of international concern. The organization moved in the right direction when it declared monkeypox a global health emergency. Countries should accept the WHO’s offers to help immediately investigate a new disease outbreak, no matter their income bracket or place of power in the world.

Second, the WHO must be strengthened so that it can perform its role as the directing and coordinating authority on matters of global health. The organization continues to require more sustainable core funding. Additionally, member states must act on its advice and work together to coordinate efforts against health threats rather than act purely in their own national interest.

Our panel has made recommendations to strengthen the WHO’s capacity and independence. These include limiting the most senior staff, including the director-general, to a single term of seven years so as not to be beholden to any country in a second-term campaign; stopping countries from foisting staff on the organization; and focusing more attention on quality technical support in its various country offices.

So far, the WHO’s member states have been slow to make changes. They have agreed to reform the organization’s funding to support its integrity and efficiency by reliably providing 50 percent of its core funding through unearmarked dues. This is as opposed to the current model, which resulted in more than 80 percent of core funding directed by voluntary donor funding, over which the WHO has very little control. (One thing to note: The increase in assessed dues to 50 percent won’t come until at least 2028.)

This is part of what needs to be done. The WHO also needs more authority. For now, it’s armed only with the existing International Health Regulations (IHRs), which, broadly, lay out the rules for how and when countries should report disease outbreaks and what the WHO can do in response. The IHRs hindered the speed of the global response to COVID-19, and work is underway to amend them—ideally with more precise timelines for reporting, clear responsibilities for countries to respond to WHO queries in a short time frame, and authority for the WHO to act on an outbreak even without a country’s permission.

A “pandemic treaty” currently being considered under the provisions of the WHO Constitution could help deliver some of what’s required to more effectively prevent and respond to pandemic threats—including clear agreements on sharing science, technology, and know-how on pandemic tools so that all countries benefit equitably. COVID-19 has made it all too clear that without such agreements, prevailing market forces allow for the wealthiest countries to buy lifesaving supplies such as ventilators, protective masks, and vaccines first for the highest prices, pushing poorer countries to the back of the line.

UNICEF employees stand next to COVID-19 vaccines.

UNICEF employees supervise the arrival of the first batch of coronavirus vaccines at Khartoum airport in Sudan on March 3, 2021. The first consignment comprises 828,000 doses of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine out of a total of 3.4 million doses expected in the coming months through COVAX, a U.N.-led initiative that provides vaccines to low-income countries. ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP via Getty Images

But most global treaties don’t produce results without including enforcement mechanisms. Here, positive incentives—such as rewarding countries that report outbreaks with immediate financial and technical help for responding—are important. Punishments, such as sanctions, are also required when countries fail to act in the common interest—like if a country fails to report a potential pandemic health threat as soon as it’s detected. Countries have provided inputs into the treaty’s basic outline, and the enforcements section is yet to be elaborated. A first draft is set to be discussed in December.

Overall, we are concerned that too much stock is being put into this treaty, which may not deliver. We are also concerned about the current planned pace of negotiation and agreement, which would not take effect until at least 2025. A treaty has a specific function and cannot fix the entirety of the international system for pandemic preparedness and response.

The third line of action is fiscal preparedness. Assessments from the World Bank and the World Health Organization estimate that about $30 billion is required globally every year to ensure all countries can adequately detect and respond to disease outbreaks. About two-thirds of those funds are expected from national budgets—and more than $10 billion must be made available in addition.

The new pandemic fund approved at the World Bank in June is an attempt to address this funding shortfall. Creation of this fund was one of the recommendations of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response. The fund has the potential to be a vanguard in modern governance, particularly in new ways of raising and allocating funds to pay for global health security, a global common good.

We have advocated for a global public investment model, whereby all countries contribute to and access what they need from the fund based on their GDP, state of readiness, and national finances. We are encouraged that a growing list of countries—including Indonesia, a lower-middle-income country—is contributing to the fund. But we also warn that this funding should not come from or replace countries’ traditional aid budgets. They must supplement money allocated to long-standing successful organizations such as GAVI and the Global Fund.

The pandemic fund, which is still in development, also needs a governance model that is inclusive of countries across income brackets, as well as of civil society. Sticking to an outdated charity donor-beneficiary model would be a missed opportunity to transform financing models. Lower-income countries and civil society should not have to demand a place at the table—they are key partners and should be there as a right.

A pedestrian passes artwork by the artist known as the Rebel Bear

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A new book compares different countries’ responses to the pandemic, and the conclusions are intriguing.

People wait in line to receive the monkeypox vaccine in New York.

Break Out the Condoms to Fight Monkeypox

Clear, honest messaging on sex is vital to stopping a potential epidemic.

New funds for pandemic preparedness and response need not only derive from this new pandemic fund. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can also improve modalities for response funding. Regional banks and regional organizations all have the ability to leverage and incentivize funding.

Fourth, all countries must have access to tools that thwart disease outbreaks. The deadly lag in delivering COVID-19 vaccines to people in lower-income countries continues to drive not only preventable deaths but also the continued transmission and evolution of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

Here, too, charity is not the answer. Charity has not worked during the COVID-19 pandemic, where vaccine supply—dictated by market forces—has barely trickled down to lower-income countries. It won’t work for the next disease threat either.

The Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A)—a program begun in April 2020 to hasten the global distribution of COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines—is currently under evaluation. That process must yield recommendations that lead to the creation of an end-to-end platform that ensures appropriate public health tools are developed and delivered everywhere they are needed. While mRNA vaccines, for example, have been a scientific achievement of huge merit, the requirement that they be transported in an ultracold chain makes delivery in warm, lower-income countries expensive and difficult. Medical countermeasures such as vaccines should exist to stop transmission and prevent deaths—and not become multibillion-dollar blockbusters for a handful of manufacturers, especially when public funding helped lay the table for success.

Finally, and most importantly, sustained global political leadership on pandemic preparedness and response is sorely lacking. Without it, the other four elements of needed reform could fail—and leave the door open to a new pandemic disaster. Preparing for and thwarting the next health threat is a job that will require the leadership of presidents and prime ministers who can mobilize whole-of-government and whole-of-society responses, coordinate across nations and regions, and promote accountability worldwide.

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus holds his head in his hand.

World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus attends a daily press briefing on the COVID-19 outbreak at his organization’s headquarters in Geneva on Feb. 28, 2020.FABRICE COFFRINI/AFP via Getty Images

Members of a World Health Organization team arrive at a museum.

Members of the World Health Organization team investigating the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic arrive at a museum exhibition about China’s COVID-19 fight in Wuhan, China, on Jan. 30, 2021. HECTOR RETAMAL/AFP via Getty Images

The WHO has proposed that it be at the center of the pandemic architecture, but we disagree. The organization must be equipped to play a major coordinating role in responding to pandemic threats, but those threats are too big and broad to be addressed by the health sector alone. Just about every sector of society and the economy has been affected by the pandemic, and just about every sector must contribute to the plans to stop new health threats from becoming social, economic, and health calamities. Thus, coordination goes well beyond what a single global health organization can offer. A broader ecosystem is involved.

A previous review conducted for the U.N. secretary-general in the wake of the Ebola crisis, and now the panel we co-chaired, have proposed that an independent, leader-level health threats council be created to promote coordination and accountability across countries and major institutions. Such a council would bring cohesion and oversight to the global architecture for pandemic preparedness and response.

Many discussions are still to be had about the form such a council would take—and whether, for example, it could be a joint council of the U.N. General Assembly and the WHO, or whether the U.N. secretary-general’s idea of an emergency council to manage a broader range of existential threats and complex emergencies might gain traction. But we remain convinced that such a council is a necessary part of the reformed global architecture for pandemic preparedness and response.

The world can’t travel back in time to December 2019 to thwart calamity, but the international community can act now to ensure that the experience of COVID-19 is never repeated. We cannot afford to settle for less than an ambitious and cohesive package of reforms. As former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously said, paraphrasing philosopher George Santayana, “Those who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.”

Foreign Policy · by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Helen Clark · August 27, 2022

6. Do more to prevent Chinese espionage

Conclusion:

Universities should focus on improving education quality and outcomes for all students, while simultaneously working with law enforcement and intelligence agencies to protect the fruit of their research. Failure to prevent intellectual property theft and illicit technology transfers could weaken American economic and national security interests.

Do more to prevent Chinese espionage

Politicians and universities must secure intellectual property

dallasnews.com · by Dustin Carmack1:49 PM on Aug 26, 2022 CDT · August 26, 2022

China is not a friendly competitor. It is very much a strategic threat, one that is actively working to undermine the United States and Western values of freedom and liberty. Yet too many universities and policymakers fail to recognize the danger.

Many universities have been blinded by dollar signs. They pay agents to recruit international students, primarily because they will pay full tuition. China is more than happy to pay the price. Prior to the pandemic, 35% of all foreign students in the U.S. were Chinese nationals. That number has since dropped by more than half, but Chinese students still fill a disproportionately large share of seats, especially in post-graduate STEM classrooms.

Innovations and technical advances generated by university-based research (along with private-sector research and development) have been a boon to U.S. security as well as our economy. But in its quest to become a global power, Beijing uses a variety of tactics — illegal as well as legal — to glean cutting-edge technology and intellectual property from university research systems, international laboratories and corporate research and development facilities.

As a result, China is catching up fast. Last fall, officials at the National Counterintelligence and Security Center warned that universities, business executives and state and local officials need to do a better job of protecting their intellectual property. Failure to do so, the Associated Press reported, “could eventually give Beijing a decisive military edge and possible dominance over health care and other essential sectors in America.”

The FBI estimates that the U.S. economy loses between $225 billion and $600 billion annually to pirated software, theft of trade secrets and counterfeit goods. Cybereason, a cybersecurity tech company, estimates that one Chinese state cyber operation has stolen “hundreds of gigabytes of intellectual property and sensitive data,” worth trillions of dollars, from 30 multinational companies.

But too many lawmakers aren’t paying attention. Congress recently passed the CHIPS Act, funneling hundreds of billions of dollars to tech research and workforce development. Yet the bill contains only limited provisions to protect the work it funds from foreign predations. More stringent provisions, crafted to restrict Chinese influence and espionage campaigns being carried out on campuses through Confucius Institutes and undisclosed Chinese funding, were blocked by Senate Democrats.

While CIA Director William Burns has acknowledged that China poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security and the biggest geopolitical challenge of our generation, the White House isn’t acting like it. The Biden administration has scrapped the Justice Department’s “China Initiative.” And just a few weeks ago, White House spokeswoman Karine Jean-Pierre refused to call China more than a competitor, even though the FBI opens a new counterintelligence investigation of Chinese espionage and intelligence efforts, including efforts to influence U.S. state and local leaders every 10 to 12 hours.

Our leaders need to treat the China challenge with the seriousness it deserves. And so do our universities. They should focus less on recruiting “highest bidder” students from China and more on teaching and research efforts that can produce STEM and technology advances to build a more secure, prosperous and free society both here and abroad. Their doors should be open to foreign students who seek to receive the best advanced education. But those doors must be opened in a research environment that takes security and accountability seriously.

Texas A&M University is showing just how tricky that balance can be. In May 2020, the university won multiple federal awards and more than $400 million in federal grants to conduct sensitive research in a variety of areas. Texas A&M was one of five entities to receive the prestigious Defense Counterintelligence & Security Agency Award for Excellence in Counterintelligence for the previous year. It is the highest honor given by the U.S. government in this category. More than 10,000 corporate and academic organizations were in the running, according to a university press release.

Three months later, a professor there, who was also a NASA researcher, was arrested on charges of conspiracy, making false statements and wire fraud. He allegedly hid his affiliations with a Chinese government program designed to advance that country’s high-tech development.

Universities should focus on improving education quality and outcomes for all students, while simultaneously working with law enforcement and intelligence agencies to protect the fruit of their research. Failure to prevent intellectual property theft and illicit technology transfers could weaken American economic and national security interests.

Dustin Carmack is a Heritage Foundation research fellow for cybersecurity, intelligence and emerging technologies. He wrote this column for The Dallas Morning News.

We welcome your thoughts in a letter to the editor. See the guidelines and submit your letter here.

dallasnews.com · by Dustin Carmack1:49 PM on Aug 26, 2022 CDT · August 26, 2022

7. US hints to Gantz it’s preparing military option against Iran, Israeli official says

US hints to Gantz it’s preparing military option against Iran, Israeli official says

timesofisrael.com · by Emanuel Fabian 26 August 2022, 6:30 pm Edit

Defense Minister Benny Gantz meets with US national security adviser Jake Sullivan in Washington DC, August 26, 2022. (Yossi Mai/Defense Ministry)

Defense Minister Benny Gantz told US President Joe Biden’s national security adviser Friday that Israel “needs” the US to have a credible military option against Iran, a senior Israeli official said to reporters Friday, amid reports of an emerging renewed nuclear deal between the Islamic Republic and world powers.

According to the defense official, Israel received “good hints” with regard to the US having a working offensive plan against Iran. He did not elaborate, but said it that would potentially ensure Tehran is more flexible during negotiations for the renewed accord. If not, the US would be ready to act against Iran alongside Israel, which has also been preparing a military option.

The official said the meeting between Gantz and Jake Sullivan in Washington was “intimate” and “positive.” He said Gantz emphasized Israel’s objection to the potential deal, which has been branded by Israel as “very bad.”

The official warned that Iran’s nuclear program has expanded significantly since 2018 when then-US president Donald Trump pulled out of the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The official said he personally viewed Trump’s move as a mistake.

The official said the situation had reached a point where there are only two scenarios: No agreement, allowing Iran to gradually expand its nuclear program further, or a bad deal that does not serve Israel’s interests.

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The official said Israel has two main concerns with regard to the potential deal: the so-called sunset clause, which will lift limitations on Iran’s nuclear program when the accord expires; and sanctions relief that would allow Iran to increase funding to its proxies.

The official added that Israel has attempted to influence the deal in certain aspects as much as possible, but “as of now, it is far from serving Israel’s interests as it sees it.” Israel seeks to make the deal “longer and stronger,” the official said.

Still, the official said Gantz’s objections were positively received by Sullivan. “I think that we are being listened to even if the Americans, in the end, don’t accept everything we want,” the official said.

The official said that Israel would still have its freedom to act against Iran, adding that whether an agreement is signed or not, Jerusalem would still continue its efforts against what it sees as hostile Iranian actions.

A readout issued by the US National Security Council spokesperson said “Sullivan emphasized President Biden’s unwavering commitment to Israel’s security, and the two exchanged views on ways to deepen the US-Israel security partnership, including via regional cooperation and coordination.”

“They discussed US commitment to ensure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon, and the need to counter threats from Iran and Iran-based proxies. They also discussed the need to ensure equal measures of security, freedom, and prosperity for Palestinians and Israelis alike, and the importance of ongoing follow-through on initiatives announced during President Biden’s trip to Israel,” the statement said.

Defense Minister Benny Gantz, left, meets with US CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla at the US Central Command Headquarters on August 25, 2022. (Courtesy CENTCOM)

On Thursday, Gantz met with US Central Command chief General Michael Kurilla, at CENTCOM’s headquarters in Florida. Gantz was briefed on the US’s plans for the days after a nuclear deal is agreed upon, or not. He was also given a tour of a fleet of refueling planes, used for long-range missions.

Gantz and Kurilla’s discussion focused on ways to increase cooperation between Israel and the US military, methods for countering the Iranian threat in the Middle East, and a “Plan B” to the nuclear deal.

Gantz warned Kurilla that if there is no deal, Iran would feel more “liberated” to act, and therefore Israel and the US would need to strengthen cooperation with regional allies in order to combat potential actions by Iran or its proxies.

Gantz also pressed Kurilla on the US’s capabilities to act in Iran, if Tehran pushes forward with developing a nuclear weapon. Last month, Biden told Israel’s Channel 12 news that he would use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons.

CENTCOM officially assumed responsibility for the US military’s relationship with Israel in September last year. Until then, Israel had been kept in the area of responsibility of the European Command (EUCOM) in order to prevent possible tensions between CENTCOM and the Arab and Muslim nations under its purview, many of which did not maintain formal ties with Israel and would therefore not want to be considered as mutual allies.

In recent years, however, CENTCOM’s Arab allies have increasingly developed relations with Israel, some informally, so the issue has largely faded.

“Israeli influence in the region is growing stronger,” the senior defense official told reporters on Friday.

“The region’s players are no less disturbed than we are by the emerging agreement. We have communication channels, and in many ways, they put their trust in us that we will convince and influence,” he said.

The official said such dialogue was taking place “under the umbrella of CENTCOM.”

Defense Minister Benny Gantz talks to US Air Force personnel at the air refueling wing at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, August 25, 2022. (Defense Ministry)

Provided a new deal is signed, Israeli officials say they expect Iran to significantly ramp up funding for its proxies in the Middle East, including the Lebanese Hezbollah terror group on Israel’s northern frontier.

Gantz was visiting the US the same week as a trip there by Israeli national security adviser Eyal Hulata, both carrying a message of displeasure from Jerusalem at the acceleration in talks toward reviving the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran

Iran said Wednesday that it had received the US’s response to its proposal for a return to the 2015 accord.

White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby declined to characterize the administration’s response to the latest proposal, but noted that “we are closer now than we were even just a couple of weeks ago because Iran made a decision to make some concessions.”

Prime Minister Yair Lapid told reporters on Thursday that Israel’s efforts to influence the outcome of negotiations had borne fruit, but that the accord was still “a bad deal” for Israel.

Mossad chief David Barnea called the emerging deal “a strategic disaster” for Israel, in recent meetings about the agreement. He said it would be “very bad for Israel” and the US “is rushing into an accord that is ultimately based on lies,” citing Iran’s ongoing claim that its nuclear activities are peaceful in nature.

Israel has long opposed the deal, arguing that Iran is seeking to build a nuclear bomb, and has published intelligence it says reveals the Iranian weapons program. Iran has denied any nefarious intentions and claims its program is designed for peaceful purposes, though it has recently been enriching uranium to levels that international leaders say have no civil use.

Agencies contributed to this report.

timesofisrael.com · by Emanuel Fabian 26 August 2022, 6:30 pm Edit

8. Breakthroughs for All: Delivering Equitable Access to America’s Research - The White House

Down with paywalls on academic journals! (Not quite, but...)

Breakthroughs for All: Delivering Equitable Access to America’s Research - The White House

whitehouse.gov

By: Dr. Christopher Steven Marcum, Assistant Director for Open Science and Data Policy

Dr. Ryan Donohue, AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellow and Senior Policy Advisor

President Biden has said that America can be defined in one word: Possibilities. There are few areas with greater prospects for realizing these possibilities than the investments that American taxpayers make by supporting groundbreaking federally funded research. In the last year alone, the American public has borne witness to extraordinary scientific achievements —transformative breakthroughs in medicine and vaccines, inspiring insights from the deepest depths of the ocean, and unprecedented glimpses into the farthest reaches of our universe.

This research, which changes our lives and transforms our world, is made possible by American tax dollars. And yet, these advancements are behind a paywall and out of reach for too many Americans. In too many cases, discrimination and structural inequalities – such as funding disadvantages experienced by minority-serving colleges and institutions – prevent some communities from reaping the rewards of the scientific and technological advancements they have helped to fund. Factors including race, age, disability status, geography, economic background, and gender have historically and systemically excluded some Americans from the accessing the full benefits of scientific research.

To tackle this injustice, and building on the Biden-Harris Administration’s efforts to advance policy that benefits all of America, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released new policy guidance today to ensure more equitable access to federally funded research. All members of the American public should be able to take part in every part of the scientific enterprise—leading, participating in, accessing, and benefitting from taxpayer-funded scientific research. That is, all communities should be able to take part in America’s scientific possibilities.

Previous public access policy guidance was articulated to federal agencies in the 2013 OSTP Memorandum on Increasing Access to the Results of Federally Funded Research (2013 Memorandum). The 2013 Memorandum provided unprecedented and transformative policy guidance that catalyzed a strong and ever-growing movement across the Nation and world to strengthen public access to research results. Of the over 20 agencies subject to the 2013 Memorandum, all have developed plans and implemented policies according to the provisions. We commend agencies for accomplishing these monumental steps toward a more open and trustworthy government.

Looking forward, there are two important ways in which we will build on the 2013 Memorandum and usher in the next chapter of federal public access:

Eliminating the optional 12-month publication embargo for federally funded peer-reviewed research articles. This provision has limited immediate equitable access of federally funded research results to only those able to pay for it or have privileged access through libraries or other institutions. Financial means and privileged access must never be the pre-requisite to realizing the benefits of federally funded research that all Americans deserve.
Strengthening the data sharing plans of the 2013 Memorandum by making data published in peer-reviewed research articles immediately available upon publication and other research data available within a reasonable timeframe. As President Biden has said when he was Vice President, data from federally funded research belong to the American public. Providing the data that support findings in scientific papers improves transparency and the ability of others to replicate, and build on, the primary research findings. Public access to federally funded research data also helps to level the playing field across a highly uneven funding landscape between academic disciplines – providing possibilities to scholars, students, and the public for secondary use of data that would otherwise be unavailable. The new guidance makes clear that responsible sharing of data requires agencies to ensure that privacy and security protections are maintained.

Ensuring that all Americans benefit equitably from this important policy change will require time, effort, and collaboration from agencies across the federal government. OSTP is announcing several resources to support this work:

Through the re-chartered National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Open Science (SOS), OSTP is leading a coordination process to ensure that public access policies are accompanied by support for more vulnerable members of the research ecosystem unable to pay rising costs associated with publishing open access articles, such as early stage investigators and researchers from minority serving institutions.
As a critical step in this process, today’s guidance allows researchers to include publication and data sharing costs in their research budget proposals. We are also working with agencies to expand efforts to combat existing inequities in funding: many federal agencies, including the Department of Energy, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation, have launched programs aimed at awarding grants to support early-stage researcher careers as well as increasing the racial and gender diversity of award applicants and the scientific workforce. Additionally, the SOS is exploring incentive structures to recognize institutions and researchers for supporting public access to their publications and data.
As a resource to help better understand potential economic impacts of these policy changes, OSTP also published the report Economic Landscape of Federal Public Access Policy, which was transmitted to Congress today. In order to help publishers and scholarly societies of all sizes with the change, OSTP and the SOS have committed to working alongside them, together with other key stakeholders including researchers, academic institutions, libraries, and other members of the public. Agencies have more than three years to fully implement updated public access plans to ensure this is a responsible and equitable transition.

This policy change lowers the barriers to accessing scientific results that are produced by researchers funded by the federal government and is a major advance to support equity in science. The public access policy of the United States Government should benefit all sectors of society and these updates help to achieve that goal and deliver equitable access to America’s research to foster endless scientific possibilities.

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whitehouse.gov

9. Female Russian spy in Italy revealed by Bellingcat investigation

Another story that would not be accepted for a novel or fiction movie. It can only be true!

The female Russian spy who infiltrated NATO: Honeytrap 'lured officials by posing as jewellery designer socialite' in Italy, investigators say

Olga Kolobova is a member of Russia's infamous network of deep-cover 'illegals'
She lived a double life, spying for the Kremlin as 'Maria Adela Kuhfeldt Rivera'
Kolobova assumed the 'Maria' alias as early as 2006 and travelled through Europe, southeast Asia and the Middle East, spending lots of time in Italy
She settled in Naples - the home of NATO Allied Joint Force Command - where she ran a jewellery store and befriended dozens of NATO and US military officials
Kolobova returned to Moscow in 2018 and was never caught by authorities
Bellingcat's investigation claimed she had access to many NATO officials who likely had access to sensitive information desired by her superiors at the Kremlin

By DAVID AVERRE FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 15:30 EDT, 26 August 2022 | UPDATED: 10:42 EDT, 27 August 2022

Daily Mail · by David Averre For Mailonline · August 26, 2022

The identity of a female Russian spy who operated for more than a decade as a jewellery-making socialite to gain access to NATO officials in Italy has been revealed in a shocking expose by Bellingcat investigators.

Olga Kolobova, a member of Putin's GRU military intelligence service, began spying as early as 2006 when she assumed the identity of 'Maria Adela Kuhfeldt Rivera'.

'Maria' introduced herself to all who came into contact with her as the daughter of a Peruvian mother and German father, born in Peru but later abandoned as a child in Moscow and raised by adoptive parents.

For years she travelled across Europe, moving to Malta and Rome in 2010 where she befriended Marcelle D'Argy Smith - former editor of Cosmopolitan magazine - before jetting to Paris and registering a trademark to open a jewellery company.

Returning to Italy in 2012, she married a Russian-Ecuadorian man but their romance was short lived.

He died mysteriously just one year later, leaving 'Maria' free to roam around Italy again before settling in Naples - the home of NATO's Allied Joint Force Command.

It is there that Peruvian-born 'Maria' established herself as a custom jewellery-maker and nightclub owner, whose fun-loving and outgoing nature allowed her to strike up friendships and romances with dozens of NATO employees and even high-ranking colonels.

But in actual fact, Kolobova is the daughter of a Russian military official who was flogging Chinese made knock-off jewellery while luring European and US security officials to unwittingly divulge sensitive information for her bosses in the Kremlin.

MailOnline has contacted NATO spokespeople for comment.

One of many people befriended and unwittingly duped by Kolobova (centre) was Marcelle D'Argy Smith (left), a former editor of Cosmopolitan magazine who met 'Maria' in Malta in 2010

'Maria' married a Russian-Ecuadorian man in 2012 but their romance was short lived. He died mysteriously just one year later

Kolobova is pictured here in an image shared on the Instagram profile used by 'Maria'

Operating under the alias 'Maria', Kolobova developed an extensive network of friends in Naples, Italy, and established friendships and relationships with several NATO employees and even high-ranking colonels ('Maria' is pictured to the right in this image found on Facebook)

Kolobova maintained multiple social media accounts while living as 'Maria' and posted a handful of photos of herself over the course of several years

Kolobova, now believed to be in her mid 40s, was part of Russia's infamous 'illegals' programme - a network of agents who undergo years of intense training to prepare them for long-term assignments abroad.

Once prepared, illegals are given carefully crafted fake identities and are inserted into a country where they spend years or even decades living a double life.

The deep cover agents are expected to build careers, cultivate relationships and in some cases even start a family and raise kids while secretly pursuing a far more sinister agenda on behalf of the Kremlin.

Their elaborate cover stories, high-levels of training and the length of their missions make them incredibly difficult to track down - and so it was that Kolobova operated successfully for more than a decade as 'Maria' until she returned to Moscow in 2018.

Kolobova was never caught by authorities, meaning she was likely recalled from Naples by her superiors in the GRU.

The final Facebook post shared by 'Maria' a few months after she left Italy said she had to 'reveal the truth' that she was suffering from cancer and underwent chemotherapy - likely a ploy designed to help her withdraw from her friendship groups with little suspicion.

Her real name was only revealed after Bellingcat investigators discovered the 'Maria' identity had been designated false by the Peruvian Ministry of Justice and that Russian domestic passports issued to the alias bore numbers closely matching those of other previously identified agents, including a GRU officer involved in the poisoning of Russian defector Sergey Skripal on British soil in March 2018.

It is unknown whether Kolobova's mission was a success or a failure, but Bellingcat investigators she mixed on a regular basis with NATO and US Navy officers, including some 'who would have had access to on-base photographs or confidential legal files and databases'.

The spy is believed to have attended a variety of events organised by NATO or the US military, including NATO annual balls, various fund-raising dinners and the annual US Marine Corps balls, as well as making countless house calls to the personal residences of many NATO officials.

In addition to her robust network of friends and romantic partners employed by NATO, Kolobova also travelled extensively throughout Europe, southeast Asia and the Middle East - destinations she claimed were related to her jewellery business Serein which seemingly granted her access to events attended by high-ranking foreign officials.

One image posted on the company's now deleted Facebook page but unearthed by Bellingcat seemingly showed 'Maria' shaking hands with Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the former Prime Minister of Bahrain, having gifted him a pair of custom-made cufflinks.

But many of the products shared on Serein's Facebook page and now defunct website appeared to match cheap, low-end jewellery made in China.

Adela Serein - the social media username used by Kolobova's 'Maria' alias, is tagged in a Facebook post celebrating the 2017 Ball of NATO's Joint Forces Command. Investigators say Kolobova attended countless NATO and US military events and befriended many officials

Kolobova is the daughter of a Russian military official, flogging Chinese made knock-off jewellery while luring European and US security officials to unwittingly divulge sensitive information

The last post shared on the Facebook profile of 'Maria', published shortly after she returned to Moscow having left Italy for the last time, claimed she had cancer and had undergone chemotherapy

Olga Kolobova, a member of Russia's GRU foreign intelligence service and the infamous network of deep cover 'illegals', began spying as early as 2006 when she assumed the identity of 'Maria Adela Kuhfeldt Rivera' (taken from Adela Serein's Facebook page)

Kolobova is not believed to have left Russia since her mission in Naples finished in 2018.

Bellingcat declared she has acquired two properties in Moscow - one in 2013 while 'Maria' travelled to Russia and one in 2020 - and said order records obtained from a Russian food delivery company showed the GRU agent had repeatedly ordered food to the offices of the Russian Pension Fund.

Her current activities are unknown, but it is unlikely that Kolobova has quit the spy game.

Phone records show that a number associated with the agent made a call to one of the GRU's top chiefs, Igor Kostyukov, in February of this year on Russia's 'Day of Defenders of the Motherland', a widely observed military celebration.

Not only did she manage to return to her homeland without getting caught, but investigators claim European and US secret service organisations were not even aware of Kolobova's existence.

'There is no evidence that Western counter-intelligence services or NATO's own internal security service were aware of the presence of a Russian military spy placed strategically close to NATO's Joint Force Command Center in Europe,' Bellingcat said.

The revelation of Kolobova's true identity will pose serious security questions to NATO and Western intelligence agencies, particularly amid the backdrop of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin's threat of severe consequences should Western forces join the fight.

Daily Mail · by David Averre For Mailonline · August 26, 2022

10. Spike in China tensions won't change U.S. Taiwan weapons policy, for now - sources

Excerpts:

White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell – asked during a recent briefing whether the administration was considering both invasion and blockade scenarios – said defense sales would be designed to meet "the evolving security circumstances that Taiwan faces."

Both scenarios, Campbell said, "are indeed taken into our calculus, and you will see that going forward."

Since 2017, U.S. presidents have approved more than $18 billion in arms sales to the Chinese-claimed island, the largest portion of that coming in the second half of the Trump administration. But new approvals have slowed under Biden, amid delivery backlogs and reports of disagreement between Washington and Taipei over what the island needs.

Spike in China tensions won't change U.S. Taiwan weapons policy, for now - sources

Reuters · by Patricia Zengerle

WASHINGTON, Aug 25 (Reuters) - China's aggressive military drills around Taiwan in response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit put Washington on edge, but not enough to spur an immediate sharp increase in weapons sales to the island, sources told Reuters.

President Joe Biden's administration and U.S. lawmakers stress their ongoing support for the government in Taipei, and there are items in the approval pipeline for Taiwan that could be announced in the coming weeks or months.

But the focus will be on sustaining Taiwan's current military systems and fulfilling existing orders - rather than offering new capabilities more likely to inflame already red-hot tensions with China, said three sources, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.

"I think there will be an attempt to push stuff to Taiwan, and not just weapons. Supplies, should there – God forbid – be an embargo. More munitions. Lower-level stuff," one source close to political-level talks on U.S.-Taiwan arms sales said.

Such approvals could be announced as soon as September, the sources said, noting it would be a signal that Beijing's blockade-style drills following Pelosi's early August visit had not shaken U.S. support.

Critics of the administration's approach argue those drills, China's largest ever around the island, should be a wake-up call to encourage Washington to do more for Taiwan. For its part, Taiwan on Thursday proposed a 13.9% year-on-year increase to a record $19.41 billion in its defense budget for next year. read more

A blockade, for example, would challenge one of the core tenets of the United States' Taiwan Relations Act, which defines any boycott or embargo toward Taiwan as a threat to greater security in the Western Pacific. The law also requires U.S. provision of equipment for Taiwan's self-defense.

White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell – asked during a recent briefing whether the administration was considering both invasion and blockade scenarios – said defense sales would be designed to meet "the evolving security circumstances that Taiwan faces."

Both scenarios, Campbell said, "are indeed taken into our calculus, and you will see that going forward."

Since 2017, U.S. presidents have approved more than $18 billion in arms sales to the Chinese-claimed island, the largest portion of that coming in the second half of the Trump administration. But new approvals have slowed under Biden, amid delivery backlogs and reports of disagreement between Washington and Taipei over what the island needs.

Taiwan's de facto ambassador to the United States, Hsiao Bi-khim, told Reuters last week that following China's drills there was still a "practice of continuing arms sales."

"I think what we are trying to do is ensure that these are regularized, normalized processes," Hsiao said.

"In earlier years they would put big packages together, wait a few years to make a big announcement. That's no longer the practice. Our requests are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and we will proceed as such," she said.

The White House National Security Council did not respond to a request for comment.

'A LOT ON THE LINE'

Support for Taiwan is strong from both Biden's fellow Democrats and Republicans in Congress, where lawmakers are writing several bills to strengthen ties. read more

"There's a lot on the line. Democracy's on the line," Democratic Representative Gregory Meeks, who traveled to Taiwan with Pelosi, told Reuters in an interview.

Meeks, who reviews major international arms deals as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, declined comment on the timing or scope of any new weapons announcement.

He said Taiwan's leaders had not expressed frustration about the pace of weapons deliveries.

On Friday, Taiwan's president, Tsai Ing-wen, told U.S. Senator Marsha Blackburn, the latest U.S. lawmaker to travel to the island, that recent U.S. visits had reinforced Taiwan's determination to defend itself. read more

Bonnie Glaser, a Taiwan expert at the German Marshall Fund think tank, said Taiwan's priority appeared to be securing deliveries of the substantial backlog of prior arms sales requests. Those include hundreds of shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers, the latter deal set for December 2028 completion, according to Pentagon contracting data.

China has never ruled out using force to bring Taiwan under its control, and says Washington's arms sales are what undermine the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. read more

Taipei says the People's Republic of China has never ruled the island and has no right to claim it.

U.S. officials want to ensure any weapons sold to Taiwan are appropriate – namely cheap, mobile, and resilient – to stave off any possible attack from much larger Chinese forces.

Taiwan signaled in May that it had abandoned a plan to buy advanced new anti-submarine warfare helicopters from the United States, saying they were too expensive, although Taiwan media said Washington had rejected the sale as not being in line with the island's needs. read more

The United States was never keen to sell the MH-60R helicopters to Taiwan, assuming they would be quickly destroyed in a conflict with China, according to three people familiar with talks.

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers has criticized the Biden administration's approach to new approvals as too restrictive, and saw no change forthcoming.

"I'm not expecting new notifications in the coming months bar more sustainment, and possibly some munitions," he said.

Reporting by Patricia Zengerle and Michael Martina; Editing by Mary Milliken, Daniel Wallis and Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Patricia Zengerle

11. Danilov: Russia running massive psyop against Ukraine's top leaders, commanders

Danilov: Russia running massive psyop against Ukraine's top leaders, commanders

ukrinform.net

That’s according to Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Ukrinform reports citing the NSDC press service.

According to the top security official, one of the narratives promoted by enemy propaganda is that the world is supposedly seeing the Ukraine war fatigue.

"This is not true. The whole civilized world supports us in our unity and integrity," he said.

The Secretary of the National Security Council also emphasized that the government has been working as one team since day 1 of the Russian large-scale invasion, and every day, meetings are held with the participation of key representatives of the security and defense sector, chaired by President Zelensky, to work out important decisions.

Danilov also emphasized that the current war cannot be "frozen" in any case, because the Russian Federation will further encroach on Ukraine’s lands sooner or later anyway.

"In this war, each country pursues its own interests, but it is necessary to prevent the conditional "Minsk-3" as Ukrainian society would not accept such a move," Danilov said, adding that the conditions of both "Minsk-1" and "Minsk-2" truce deals were absolutely unacceptable for Ukraine.

ukrinform.net

12. As Enterprise's keel is laid, Navy and industry advocate for another aircraft carrier 'block buy'

We need to continue adding "4.5 acres of sovereign U.S. territory" deployed around the world. (note slight attempt at humor - but I do support our aircraft carrier force, despite the criticisms).

As Enterprise's keel is laid, Navy and industry advocate for another aircraft carrier 'block buy' - Breaking Defense

The Pentagon claimed to save $4 billion via its last aircraft carrier block buy. Can it do it again?

breakingdefense.com · by Justin Katz · August 26, 2022

Part of the aft of the future USS Enterprise (CVN-80) being constructed inside the dry dock at HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding. (Justin Katz/Breaking Defense)

NEWPORT NEWS, Va. — As preparations here continue to lay the keel for the next Navy ship named the USS Enterprise, the Navy, its prime contractor HII and the industrial supply base have already begun crunching the numbers for a potential “block buy” for another two aircraft carriers.

“We know it’s the most efficient way to build the ship,” Capt. Brian Metcalf, the program manager for the Gerald Ford-class program, said while standing in HII’s Newport News shipyard today. “And it’s actually the most efficient way to buy the ship.”

The Enterprise (CVN-80) and the ship to follow it, the Doris Miller (CVN-81), were purchased by the Navy in a “block buy” agreement in late 2018. That phrase essentially means the service negotiated all the supplies and labor for both ships in a single agreement, resulting in what the Pentagon said was an estimated $4 billion in savings due to ordering in bulk and avoiding higher than anticipated inflation in recent years.

During a series of interviews today with Navy officials, executives from HII and representatives for the vast supply base necessary to build an aircraft carrier, everyone extolled the advantages of such a deal should the Navy decide to pursue another pair of Ford class ships, what would be CVN-82 and CVN-83.

“Think about what happened in the world over the last couple years with inflation,” said HII chief executive Chris Kastner. “We were able to place the vast majority of the orders for [CVN-81] before that inflation hit. It’s just smart buying by the Navy.”

The Enterprise and Doris Miller are the third and fourth Ford-class ships to be built, after the original Ford and the John F. Kennedy, and they will fulfill the original four-ship plan for the program. But, at least internally, the Navy is actively considering what additional buys may look like, as industry watches on with great interest.

Metcalf, the program manager, said the Navy has already provided the broader Pentagon with information about several scenarios, but is due to give lawmakers a definitive answer in fiscal 2023.

“The scenario that we believe is optimal is two ships, every eight years on four year centers,” he said. “With the advanced procurement funding, typically we’ve gotten two years. We’ve learned now that we probably need about three years… Lead times have gone up nationwide. If you order something, it takes a lot longer than it used to get here.”

In the context of buying aircraft carriers, the “centers” refer to the pace at which the ships are built. If two ships are bought on “four year centers,” then that means their scheduled milestones should line up in roughly four year intervals.

When the Navy and industry choose the center for their buys, they have to consider a gap that is long enough to allow for the ship’s construction schedule to not fall behind, while also small enough such that industry can keep its workforce busy.

Rick Giannini, chairman of an industrial base coalition focused on the aircraft carrier supply chain, told reporters here that the group in February surveyed 158 of its 2,000 member companies about potential centers.

“We found that 90 percent of the people felt that if their centers were at seven years it would be extremely difficult and cause major problems with their workforce,” he said. “If it went to six [year centers], it was 88 percent and down to five [year centers], it was still 61 percent of the of the industrial base.”

As for when and how the final decision will be made, that is an issue for which Congress will get the last word. With the Pentagon expected to select one of the “scenarios” Metcalf mentioned next fiscal year, it will likely become a major issue once lawmakers begin drafting the defense spending bill for fiscal 2024.

13. Why Guam’s Missile Defense Modernization Matters

But of course our adversaries know how indispensable all forward locations with a US presence are.

Excerpts:

Much as Okinawa was indispensable to the United States’ ability to fight the Vietnam War, and the Japanese mainland to supporting the U.S.-led war effort in Korea from 1950-53, so too is the ability of facilities on Guam to function potentially decisive as to whether or not the United States can wage war successfully in the Western Pacific today – whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, or in the South or East China Seas. In 1965, Commander of U.S. Pacific Forces Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp had emphasized that “without Okinawa, we couldn’t continue fighting the Vietnam war.” This applies similarly if not more so to Guam for possible U.S. wars in the 21st century.

While the U.S. military is expected to continue its parallel pursuit of both strengthening Guam’s missile defenses and dispersing assets more widely to reduce the extreme reliance on the island, so too are China and North Korea set to continue rapidly enhancing their assets to strike it. With both East Asian states having lacked this capability during the Korean War, when even U.S. bases in Japan were far beyond their retaliation range, the ability to strike U.S. bomber bases and key logistics hubs are particularly prized today.

Why Guam’s Missile Defense Modernization Matters

Guam is a vital node of U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific. It’s also a key target for enemy strikes.

thediplomat.com · by A.B. Abrams · August 27, 2022

Hosting two of the U.S. military’s most crucial facilities in the Pacific, Andersen Air Force Base and Guam Naval Base, the island of Guam has emerged as both an indispensable facilitator of the United States’ ability to project military force into East Asia and as a leading potential target for regional adversaries should war break out. Although considered near unassailable during the Cold War by any party other than the Soviet Union, advances in Chinese and North Korean capabilities have since left the territory increasingly vulnerable, leading the U.S. military to invest in developing alternative facilities. Notable examples include Wake Island, where major airfield expansion began in 2020, and northern Australia, where bases have hosted a growing marine presence and long-range bombers. The parallel emergence of a focus on “austere airfield” exercises on Guam itself may also allow U.S. Air Force assets to better retain some operational capacity if facilities are struck.

The North Korean Hwasong-12 and Chinese DF-26 ballistic missiles have both been dubbed “Guam Killer” weapons, with the former entering service in 2017 and most recently seeing its capabilities demonstrated during a test flight in January. North Korea’s new hypersonic glide vehicles, unveiled and tested from September 2021, have made the threat to U.S. facilities, possibly including those as far away as Guam, significantly greater. North Korean forces’ ability to strike Guam dates back to the 2000s with early variants of the Hwasong-10 ballistic missile, better known as the Musudan, but has since expanded considerably, including fielding of a growing submarine based ballistic missile strike capability.

Chinese capabilities are significantly greater still, and include the ability to launch a wide range of cruise and ballistic missiles and even gravity bombs from a fleet of over 250 H-6 bombers, some of which have flown near the island in shows of force during previous periods of high tensions. The H-6 was first seen carrying a hypersonic missile in 2020, and is speculated to also serve as a launch platform for the WZ-8 hypersonic drone. China’s growing fleet of tanker aircraft built around the new Y-20U jet has also raised the possibility that a wider range of air assets could operate as far as Guam in the event of a major war, while the country’s high endurance destroyers have begun to integrate hypersonic ballistic missiles of their own.

Although the ability to reliably defend against hypersonic glide vehicles is not expected to materialize for years to come, near-term advances in air defense capabilities can potentially improve Guam’s security against more conventional missile attacks using assets that make up the large majority of the Chinese and North Korean arsenals.

During an interview in the second week of August, head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency Vice Admiral Jon Hill revealed that the agency, Army, and Navy were cooperating in the field with at least some improvements expected to be in place before 2026. The admiral highlighted that under the Biden administration’s budget for fiscal year 2023, funds were allocated for missile defense, including developing a defense capability against hypersonic missiles, and that there was “crossover in what they do” with the Army’s cruise missile defense, allowing the services’ efforts to complement one another. Under the plans, radars would provide “persistent 360-degree coverage… because of the evolved threat,” although the number and combination of interceptors, sensors, command and control nodes, and other components have not been finalized.

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Guam’s current air defenses are built around the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) long-range anti-missile system first deployed to the island under the Obama administration, with a ground-based variant of the Navy’s Aegis system the Aegis Ashore, having been considered but rejected. The system would have provided Guam’s missile defenses with two of the most capable Western surface-to-air missiles ever designed, the SM-3 and SM-6, although the ground-based Aegis variant also faced rejection from Japan in 2020 after an initial interest was shown.

To complement longer ranged anti-ballistic missile systems such as THAAD or Aegis, the Israeli Iron Dome system has been tested on Guam. Although initially designed primarily for defense against rocket artillery, most famously those of Islamist militant groups in Gaza, the Dome can reportedly be used for cruise missile defense. While plans for large-scale Iron Dome acquisitions were canceled by the U.S. Army in 2021, shortly following performance failures in Israel itself, the Army’s Enduring Shield system currently under development is expected to provide a more capable alternative using ground-launched derivatives of the AIM-9X infrared guided air-to-air missile.

Even if all planned acquisitions are seen through, however, defenses deployed on land may well still represent only a fraction of the overall surface-to-air missile arsenals defending Guam – the bulk of which will likely be deployed from the Navy’s Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers operating nearby.

The importance of Guam became well-publicized during escalations in North Korea-U.S. tensions in 2017, when Pyongyang threatened to carry out strikes on American bases on the island. Meanwhile the U.S. Air Force increased munitions supplies and bomber deployments on Guam considerably for use in the event of a potential war. According to then-Defense Secretary James Mattis, the Trump administration was at the time considering launching large-scale nuclear strikes on its East Asian adversary which he predicted would “incinerate a couple of million people” in North Korea. With Pyongyang and Washington remaining technically at war, Guam is expected to continue to be a key focal point for a potential military clash due to its importance to the United States’ ability to wage war across an ocean on the Korean Peninsula and strike targets in the region.

Previously in 2013, in response to progress in the Hwasong-10 missile’s development, the Obama administration deployed THAAD systems to Guam as a precaution against North Korean strikes. After launching a cyber warfare campaign, which may have slowed but failed to stop refinement of Pyongyang’s first “Guam Killer” missile, the Obama administration in 2016 seriously considered launching an attack on the country. Had this been initiated, stronger defenses on Guam would have been vital to blunting North Korean retaliatory strikes, with the country at the time still unable to strike strategic targets on the U.S. mainland (which it only demonstrated the capability for in 2017).

Much as Okinawa was indispensable to the United States’ ability to fight the Vietnam War, and the Japanese mainland to supporting the U.S.-led war effort in Korea from 1950-53, so too is the ability of facilities on Guam to function potentially decisive as to whether or not the United States can wage war successfully in the Western Pacific today – whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, or in the South or East China Seas. In 1965, Commander of U.S. Pacific Forces Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp had emphasized that “without Okinawa, we couldn’t continue fighting the Vietnam war.” This applies similarly if not more so to Guam for possible U.S. wars in the 21st century.

While the U.S. military is expected to continue its parallel pursuit of both strengthening Guam’s missile defenses and dispersing assets more widely to reduce the extreme reliance on the island, so too are China and North Korea set to continue rapidly enhancing their assets to strike it. With both East Asian states having lacked this capability during the Korean War, when even U.S. bases in Japan were far beyond their retaliation range, the ability to strike U.S. bomber bases and key logistics hubs are particularly prized today.

thediplomat.com · by A.B. Abrams · August 27, 2022

14. This West Point coach-turned-infantry officer just finished Ranger School

Very cool story. "Hooah," Lt Strecker.

This West Point coach-turned-infantry officer just finished Ranger School

taskandpurpose.com · by Haley Britzky · August 25, 2022

It’s not totally uncommon to have a career change in your 20s. Maybe you realize the field you got a degree in isn’t what you expected. Perhaps you find something that pays way better. Or maybe you realize that while coaching college sports is fantastic, wouldn’t it be great to become a Ranger-qualified Army infantry officer? 1st Lt. Brianna Strecker knows the feeling.

Strecker was a West Point women’s softball coach when she realized she’d be crazy not to at least see what a life in uniform would be like. After being around soldiers and athletes for three years, she’d learned enough about the Army to know she wanted to try. And it wasn’t enough just to join. Strecker ultimately went into the infantry, joined the 82nd Airborne Division and became airborne qualified, and then went off to the ultra-grueling Ranger School, which she completed just last week.

“It helped me grow a lot,” Strecker said of joining the Army. “It helped me learn a lot. It challenged me in new ways. It made me really uncomfortable, and that was exactly what it’s intended to do.”

As a college student herself, Strecker played softball and was studying criminal justice. She was planning to pursue a career in that field when one of her mentors urged her to become a coach, telling her she’d be “doing the coaching profession a disservice” if she didn’t at least try, Strecker recalled. So she joined the same coaching staff that she’d been mentored by as a player and after a year was up, she moved on to coach at Tufts University.

Brianna Strecker, assistant coach for the West Point Women’s Softball Team. (Photo courtesy of 1st Lt. Brianna Strecker)

Her players at Tufts had an undefeated season, she told Task & Purpose, and she stayed on for two years before beginning to look for more full-time jobs in coaching. Strecker said she absolutely loved the leadership potential that coaching brought, and was offered a head coaching job in West Virginia when she saw a job opening at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

“I had seen one of the other West Point coaches out recruiting a bunch of times,” she recalled. “And I remember just thinking in my head, having 100 questions, being like, ‘A military academy? What does that entail?’ And I was so intrigued. I think standards, discipline, all those things have always been a huge part of my coaching philosophy as well, so I was really drawn to the idea of a military academy.”

Before she’d even applied for the West Point job — an assistant coaching position — she turned down the head coach offer. The rest, as they say, is history.

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The moment she stepped onto campus in 2016, Strecker said she “fell in love with all of it.” As someone with very little knowledge of the military, she had a lot to learn. But it “was the opportunity of a lifetime” and she was all-in, not just on coaching but on the recruiting requirements for the job as well. Over the three years she spent at West Point, she said she worked to learn as much as possible so she could help recruit future Army officers to the academy. And by doing so, she realized more and more that it would have been a great path for her if only she’d known about it.

Assistant Coach Brianna Strecker with West Point Cadets after “Branch Night.” (Photo courtesy of 1st Lt. Brianna Strecker)

“I was just like, this is incredible, and I kept thinking ‘man, I wish I had known about this,’ or I had more knowledge about this when I was making my own decisions as a college athlete,” Strecker said.

Apparently, she wasn’t the only one who saw the potential, and a mentor at West Point told her about Officer Candidate School. Before long she’d applied and been accepted, and in September 2019 she was off to basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. And as if basic training isn’t challenging enough, she was 28 years old and entering the Army under different circumstances than most. She had her own home, her own life, and a full-time career, which she uprooted in exchange for training alongside teenagers and young adults almost a decade younger than her.

“It was the hardest decision I ever had to make because I really love coaching more than anything else in the world,” she said. “And the whole reason I love it is because I had such a strong passion for leadership. And I think West Point, being the preeminent leadership institution in the country, just opened my eyes up to that even more. It was like oh, there’s a whole other level of leadership here.”

Basic training was uncomfortable, there’s no doubt about that, but Strecker knew that was the point. Just speaking to her, it’s clear she’s someone who thrives in those situations. She said it helped her grow in new ways she hadn’t experienced and was exactly the challenge she was looking for. Not to mention that she had a great support system, to the point where it was “almost embarrassing” how many letters she received at basic from former athletes and their families.

Trainees await transportation from the Solomon Center back to their units Jan. 3, 2020. The trainees had just arrived back on Fort Jackson from Victory Block Leave. (Robert Timmons/U.S. Army)

And while she hadn’t yet branched as an officer, she said her drill sergeants — who selected her as the soldier of the cycle — always made comments to her about going infantry. While enlisted soldiers go into specific military occupational specialties, or MOS’, officers “branch” into career fields like infantry, armor, aviation, or cyber. But having Strecker go into the infantry field seemed obvious to her drill sergeants with the way she led and performed physically and mentally. Her instructors at officer candidate school were no different, and when it came time to rank her branch choices, infantry was at the very top.

That would have been accomplishment enough, going from someone with zero military background to joining the infantry as a new Army officer. But it wasn’t enough for Strecker. She knew if she went into the infantry, she would push herself to go to Ranger School, an elite Army training course and one of the most grueling in the military. Not because the Army demanded it, but because she refused to not push herself to the limit.

“The majority of the people I’m leading are men,” she said. “So I think I knew that if that was a choice I was making, and I think as a leader in general, you have to do the hardest stuff possible if you expect the people working below you or your subordinates to do the hardest stuff possible. I would never have my guys do anything that I was not willing to do myself. And I think that for me was just a non-negotiable.”

That drive carried her through the intensive 61-day course she started in May, which takes soldiers to their physical and mental limits and then pushes them just a little further. Through the three phases of the course, Benning Phase, Mountain Phase, and Florida Phase, the soldiers are tested on their physical stamina and mental toughness. They’re tested on their ability to plan and execute combat patrol missions; waterborne operations; climbing and rappelling; land navigation; and basic battle drills.

Pennsylvania National Guardsmen lie on their backs and perform flutter kicks while being drenched with water during a Ranger Sapper Assessment Program April 23 at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. (Staff Sgt. Shane Smith/U.S. Army National Guard)

According to the Army, only 50% of Ranger students finish the first phase of training. Strecker was one of them.

The hardest part, she said, was functioning “at a really high level with no sleep and no food.” And you’re not just being graded by instructors, but by your peers as well, so there are “no off moments.” Especially as a woman in the course, Strecker said she worked that much harder to ensure there was never a doubt she could do this just as well as the men around her.

“My squad would always joke with me that I would carry too much because I never wanted to be judged for not carrying enough, or not pulling my weight,” Strecker said. “And so if there was something heavy or there was a weapon system that needed to be carried, I wanted to be the one to carry it because I never wanted there to be a reason that somebody would be like, ‘Well, she graduated but she didn’t really pull her weight,’ or, ‘she wasn’t really an asset.’ So every day I reminded myself: If you’re not an asset you’re a liability.”

That’s not to say there weren’t “what the hell am I doing here?” moments. Strecker joked that she would be surprised if someone didn’t have a moment like that during Ranger School. But she was close with her team and they helped push each other through. One of the most important lessons she learned from that training, she said, was the idea that if you’re a good teammate and show up for others, people will show up for you, too.

A group U.S. Army Ranger students, assigned to the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade, paddles their zodiac boat down the river to start their waterborne mission on Camp Rudder, Eglin Air Force Base, Fl., July 7, 2016. The Florida Phase of Ranger School is the third and final phase that these Ranger students must complete to earn the coveted Ranger Tab. (Sgt. Austin Berner/U.S. Army)

While Strecker got through the first two phases of Ranger School on the first try, she had to recycle on the Florida Phase and do it a second time to complete it. While it’s not uncommon for soldiers to do so, Strecker said it was “super challenging for me, mentally,” because she was so determined to finish. But even that ended up being an opportunity for growth that she was grateful for in the end.

“It challenged me in new ways,” she said, “but I also think I was a far better leader in my second Florida phase than I was in my first Florida phase. And I actually wouldn’t have changed it for anything because I think I took way more out of that phase than I did the first time through.”

When she finally finished just last week, Strecker said she was thrilled. Throughout the course she never really thought about graduating, she kept her eyes solely on the next task, the next day, the next objective. She still is, in fact. Strecker says she’s now considering pushing herself even further and going to the Army Sapper School. She took part in the branch detail program, which allowed her to join both the infantry and engineering branches, she said. But that will come later, or at least when she gets her “body back to its physical stamina that it was before Ranger School.”

1st Lt. Strecker being tabbed by her father, Michael Strecker, at her graduation from Ranger School. Her father retired from Law Enforcement with Badge number 113; while at Ranger School, 1LT Strecker was number 113. (Photo courtesy of 1st Lt. Brianna Strecker)

For now, Strecker said she’s just excited to be back with her unit at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, so she can bring what she learned during Ranger School to her platoon.

“I’ve been gone and I just want them to know like, I’m here, and I’m ready and I’m excited to start working with them,” she said. “The people in my company, the other leadership …. And my squad leaders and my joes, they’ve been so supportive and so awesome. So I’m just really excited to get back and get to work with them.”

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taskandpurpose.com · by Haley Britzky · August 25, 2022

15. Israel receives "positive hints" U.S. is developing military option against Iran

Israel receives "positive hints" U.S. is developing military option against Iran

Axios · by Barak Ravid · August 26, 2022

Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz received "positive hints" from White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan that the U.S. is developing a military option against Iran in parallel to the negotiations on a return to the 2015 nuclear deal, a senior Israeli defense official said in a briefing with reporters on Friday.

Why it matters: Since President Biden assumed office, and even more so after indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran on a nuclear deal resumed, Israel has pressed the administration to present a credible military threat against Iran, stressing this is the only way Tehran will be more flexible in the negotiations.

Driving the news: Gantz met with Sullivan at the White House on Friday and discussed the possible agreement on a return to the 2015 nuclear deal and Iran’s regional activity.

Gantz told Sullivan Israel opposes the emerging nuclear deal and reiterated the need for a credible U.S. military threat against Iran, according to the Israeli official.
The official said Gantz received "positive hints" about a possible military option when he pressed Sullivan on the issue, but the official would not elaborate.
"We feel there is a trajectory for deepening and strengthening the capabilities against Iran and the Americans understand deeply that it will give the Iranians an incentive to be more pragmatic about the nuclear deal and will strengthen their position," the official said.
The Israeli defense official added that even if a nuclear deal is signed, it is still important to create a credible U.S. military threat against Iran to deter it from continuing its aggression in the region. The official also stressed that Israel will maintain its freedom to act against Iran even if a deal is reached.

The White House did not immediately respond to questions about a possible military option, but National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said in a statement that "Sullivan emphasized President Biden’s unwavering commitment to Israel’s security, and the two exchanged views on ways to deepen the U.S.-Israel security partnership, including via regional cooperation and coordination."

"They discussed U.S. commitment to ensure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon, and the need to counter threats from Iran and Iran-based proxies," Watson added.

The big picture: The Israeli official said that the impression Gantz had from his meeting with Sullivan was that there is no deadline dictating the Biden administration's decision-making about the nuclear deal with Iran.

“This is not a done deal. Israel still sees a lot of room to make a difference and even to try and make the deal longer and stronger," the Israeli official said.
Gantz welcomed the series of airstrikes by the U.S. military against pro-Iranian militias in Syria in recent days and told Sullivan it is important that the U.S. continue using force against Iran's malign activity in the region even if the nuclear talks are still taking place, the Israeli official said.
Gantz arrived in Washington after a day of talks at the U.S. Central Command headquarters in Florida that also focused on countering Iran’s malign activity in the Middle East, the Israeli official said.

State of play: The U.S. on Wednesday sent its response to Iran's comments on the EU draft agreement that would restore the nuclear deal.

It's not clear whether there will be another round of negotiations.

Axios · by Barak Ravid · August 26, 2022

16. A Violent Stalemate Sets In as Battle Lines Harden in Ukraine’s East

Photos at the link.

WORLD

A Violent Stalemate Sets In as Battle Lines Harden in Ukraine’s East

Russia’s troops have been exhausted by grinding offensives and Ukrainian resistance, but despite a promised counterblow in the south, neither side is able to advance

By Matthew LuxmooreFollow

| Photographs by Serhii Korovayny for The Wall Street Journal

Aug. 27, 2022 7:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-violent-stalemate-sets-in-as-battle-lines-harden-in-ukraines-east-11661598000?mod=hp_lead_pos8

SLOVYANSK, Ukraine—Maj. Yuriy Bereza’s battalion spent months defending, then retreating from city after city in Ukraine’s east in the face of overwhelming Russian firepower.

Now, with Russia’s offensive stalled after a costly advance, Maj. Bereza’s 1,500 men are digging in, creating a nearly 10-mile line of trenches to defend this strategic city.

“We’re at the point where Russia can no longer advance, and we can’t advance yet,” Maj. Bereza said at a command post of the Dnipro-1 battalion of Ukraine’s National Guard on the outskirts of Slovyansk.

The war in Ukraine’s east has reached a new phase: a violent stalemate. Russia’s troops have been exhausted by grinding offensives and Ukrainian resistance, bolstered in recent weeks by long-range rocket launchers provided by the U.S. The Ukrainians aim to stymie the Russians in the east and probe in the south in search of a breakthrough.

Maj. Yuriy Bereza leads 1,500 men seeking to keep the invading Russian forces at bay.

The soldiers of Dnipro-1 have dug deep as they try to fortify the Ukrainian line.

Russian President Vladimir Putin set the conquest of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions as a central goal of his invasion. His forces captured Lysychansk and Severodonetsk in late June, securing most of Luhansk. Ukrainian and Western officials warned that Slovyansk, a major transport hub in Donetsk that was briefly occupied by Russian irregulars in 2014, would be next.

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But two months on, Russia has hardly advanced, and the city with a prewar population of 110,000 stands largely deserted but unbowed. Weary-looking Ukrainian servicemen on breaks from the front line just 5 miles away fill the two cafes still operating, stop for haircuts at its barber shop and take advantage of cellphone connection to call relatives. Shelling rings out in the distance.

“We used to come here once a week if we were lucky,” said a soldier from Vinnytsia in central Ukraine, smoking near the main square with members of his unit on a recent sunny afternoon. “Now we come more often, to check the news and take a couple hours off.”

The city of Slovyansk, a recent target in Russia’s eastern campaign, is mostly deserted.

Ukrainian servicemen take a break from their battle preparations in Slovyansk.

A telegraphed Ukrainian offensive in the south prompted Moscow to move thousands of troops there from the east.

Long-range Himars rocket systems supplied by the U.S. have allowed Ukraine to strike ammunition depots and command posts deep in the rear, complicating Russia’s resupply effort and limiting its ability to concentrate devastating artillery on Ukrainian defensive lines.

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“The war right now is in a transitional phase where Russian forces have lost much of the momentum they previously had and the battlefield appears relatively static,” said Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at CNA, a defense-research organization in Arlington, Va.

The U.S. on Wednesday promised a new military aid package totaling nearly $3 billion, but it didn’t include equipment such as tanks and armored fighting vehicles that Ukraine would need to mount a mechanized advance.

“That it’s become quieter here is a good thing,” said Maj. Bereza, a former lawmaker and veteran of earlier battles against Russian proxy forces since 2014. “But without offensive arms we can’t do anything.”

Maj. Yuriy Bereza consults a map at a base in Slovyansk.

Trenches have become a key part of the Ukrainians’ defenses against Russia’s artillery-heavy tactics.

Inside a bunker close to Russian lines, the 52-year-old monitors the battlefield on a set of screens that link to his iPad and relay images from cameras installed at his battalion’s positions. To his left is an annotated wall map titled Plan for the Defense of Slovyansk. Across the room, a computer processes intercepted Russian communications and feeds them to his troops.

The Dnipro-1 battalion under Mr. Bereza’s command is focusing its energies on entrenching around Slovyansk, Bakhmut and other settlements in Russia’s sights.

“The deeper we dig, the higher our likelihood of staying alive,” said a Dnipro-1 soldier overseeing fortification efforts between Slovyansk and Bakhmut. He tours a labyrinth of trenches that are dug deep into the earth and include rudimentary living quarters complete with shelves holding coffee jars, tinned food and religious icons.

Dnipro-1 soldiers say Russia maintains superiority in firepower and is still capable of dropping tons of shells a day just on Ukrainian positions around Slovyansk.

Soldiers in eastern Ukraine face the task of realizing Kyiv’s pledge to regain territory seized by Russia.

Capt. Serhiy Ivashenko says three members of his unit have died in the past month and a half.

“The situation has become easier but we can’t forget this is a very fragile balance,” said Capt. Serhiy Ivashenko.

During Ukraine’s fight for Rubizhne to the northeast, Capt. Ivashenko says, Russian forces were firing 100 artillery shells for every five discharged by his platoon. “We weren’t even able to poke our heads out of the trenches,” he said.

The Russian tactic of relentless artillery barrages means the Ukrainians don’t even see the enemy, he said.

“They stand at the maximum range that their artillery allows, scorch through 10 kilometers of earth, then move forward 10 and scorch the next 10,” he said. “They fire shells that simply destroy every living thing and every fortification, and it’s thanks to them that they move forward.”

In a message on Ukraine’s Independence Day on Wednesday, President Volodymyr Zelensky repeated a pledge to liberate parts of Ukraine taken by Russian forces, including eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

Natalia Tarasenko visits the grave of her husband, who died earlier this month while fighting for Ukraine.

“If there is going to be another chapter or phase in this war, it’s likely to be driven by Ukrainian actions more so than Russian ones,” said Mr. Kofman. “The main question is what Ukraine is going to do next.”

In the absence of a clear answer, an uneasy equilibrium prevails in Ukraine’s east.

At one of Dnipro-1’s bases north of Slovyansk, black ribbons tied to a metal pole commemorate comrades who have fallen in battle. In the past month and a half, Capt. Ivashenko says, three members of his unit have died.

Local residents are also feeling the toll. Natalia Tarasenko, a resident of nearby Kramatorsk, buried her husband, Vladyslav, last week at a cemetery outside the city where fresh plaques list the names of other fallen soldiers.

Mr. Tarasenko was working at a metal factory when he was called up to join Ukraine’s 81st Airmobile Brigade in late June. He died on Aug. 8 under a hail of Russian artillery near Bohorodychne, north of Slovyansk.

“They say the war has lessened,” Ms. Tarasenko said after she had laid a jar of her husband’s favorite coffee and flowers by his grave. “He is evidence that it hasn’t.”

New graves at a cemetery near Kramatorsk where soldiers and civilians alike have been buried.

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at Matthew.Luxmoore@wsj.com

17. Classified Material on Human Intelligence Sources Helped Trigger Alarm

I do not want to engage in any partisan debates and I have and will continue to refrain from engaging on this issue after this. But when I read about the amount and types of classified material allegedly recovered I cannot think of any justification based on objective analysis for maintaining these types of documents or not returning them to the National Archives or removing them from the Wite House in the first place. The types of classified information outlined below is truly disturbing from a national security perspective and it seems indefensible in any way in my opinion. TS/SCI, SAPs, HCS? Come on. Why should anyone have these documents outside a SCIF? I am looking for an objective defense of these actions and if I find one I will forward it but so far I can find none.

Classified Material on Human Intelligence Sources Helped Trigger Alarm

nytimes.com · August 26, 2022

Documents related to the work of clandestine sources are some of the most sensitive and protected in the government. F.B.I. agents found some in boxes retrieved from Donald J. Trump’s home.

Information from clandestine sources was included in some of the classified documents removed in January from Mar-a-Lago, former President Donald J. Trump’s home in Florida.Credit...Josh Ritchie for The New York Times

WASHINGTON — They risk imprisonment or death stealing the secrets of their own governments. Their identities are among the most closely protected information inside American intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Losing even one of them can set back American foreign intelligence operations for years.

Clandestine human sources are the lifeblood of any espionage service. This helps explain the grave concern within American agencies that information from undercover sources was included in some of the classified documents recently removed from Mar-a-Lago, the Florida home of former President Donald J. Trump — raising the prospect that the sources could be identified if the documents got into the wrong hands.

Mr. Trump has a long history of treating classified information with a sloppiness few other presidents have exhibited. And the former president’s cavalier treatment of the nation’s secrets was on display in the affidavit underlying the warrant for the Mar-a-Lago search. The affidavit, released in redacted form on Friday, described classified documents being found in multiple locations around the Florida residence, a private club where both members and their guests mingle with the former president and his coterie of aides.

Nothing in the documents released on Friday described the precise content of the classified documents or what risk their disclosure might carry for national security, but the court papers did outline the kinds of intelligence found in the secret material, including foreign surveillance collected under court orders, electronic eavesdropping on communications and information from human sources — spies.

Mr. Trump and his defenders have claimed he declassified the material he took to Mar-a-Lago. But documents retrieved from him in January included some marked “HCS,” for Human Intelligence Control System. Such documents have material that could possibly identify C.I.A. informants, meaning a general, sweeping declassification of them would have been, at best, misguided.

“HCS information is tightly controlled because disclosure could jeopardize the life of the human source,” said John B. Bellinger III, a former legal adviser to the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. “It would be reckless to declassify an HCS document without checking with the agency that collected the information to ensure that there would be no damage if the information were disclosed.”

C.I.A. espionage operations inside numerous hostile countries have been compromised in recent years when the governments of those countries have arrested, jailed and even killed the agency’s sources.

Last year, a top-secret memo sent to every C.I.A. station around the world warned about troubling numbers of informants being captured or killed, a stark reminder of how important human source networks are to the basic functions of the spy agency.

During the early part of last decade, the Chinese government dismantled the C.I.A.’s network of sources within China — crippling the agency’s spying operations in the country for years. Source networks in Iran and Pakistan have also been compromised, prompting the agency to ask its case officers and analysts to redouble the efforts to protect the identities of spies and informants.

Even a single source, if well placed, can be of amazing importance to the spy agency. When one informant, critical to the intelligence assessment that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia favored the election of Mr. Trump, had to be extracted and resettled in Virginia, the C.I.A. was, for a time, left somewhat in the dark about senior levels of Kremlin decision-making.

In 2010, when WikiLeaks and several news outlets, including The New York Times, published thousands of American diplomatic cables from State Department employees posted around the world, the greatest concern among American officials was the possibility that foreign sources aiding the United States might be identified by name in the documents.

When F.B.I. agents in May went through the 15 boxes of material turned over to the National Archives by Mr. Trump in January, a year after he left office, they quickly determined that they contained 184 documents marked as classified, including some labeled HCS — an especially troublesome revelation in the eyes of intelligence experts.

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“It is among the most sensitive information relating to human intelligence sources and very tightly held at the C.I.A.,” said George Jameson, a former senior C.I.A. officer and lawyer. “A compromise could result in harm to the source and the source’s information.”

An intelligence document marked HCS will contain details about the source of the information. Often such descriptions are very general, noting if a “clandestine source” has direct or secondary knowledge of the intelligence presented. But sometimes there are more direct descriptions to help policymakers properly assess the information, details that could allow people reading the document to identify the source — a prime reason the spy agency seeks to tightly control HCS documents.

The HCS designation is “used to protect exceptionally fragile and unique” human intelligence operations and methods “that are not intended for dissemination outside of the originating agency,” according to a 2013 directive from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

According to former officials, documents marked HCS have special handling requirements to make sure they are stored properly and not reviewed by people who are not cleared to see them.

“Although the president generally received finished intelligence that included HCS reporting, this would include source descriptions and context to establish the information’s reliability, details that would enable an adversary to narrow down from whom, and where, the secrets came,” said Douglas London, a former C.I.A. officer who was a top counterterrorism official during the Trump administration. “The more sensitive the information, the fewer the suspects or technical vulnerabilities for the adversary to investigate.”

In addition to the HCS markings, some of the documents were marked FISA, indicating information collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

“What this tells us is that there was possibly something from human beings, from spies, possibly something involving foreigners who are the only ones targeted under FISA and potentially there is very sophisticated sensitive information involved here,” said Glenn S. Gerstell, the former general counsel of the National Security Agency.

Ultimately, Mr. Gerstell said, understanding how sensitive any of the documents are, and what sources might be compromised, requires the documents to be examined by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Such an examination is one reason the Justice Department and the F.B.I. conducted the search at Mar-a-Lago to collect the material.

“One of the reasons they need to get these documents is to understand what is in there for the purpose of conducting a damage assessment,” Mr. Gerstell said. “We have surveillance tapes and we will see who had access. But the government also needs to see the documents so they can know what might have been compromised.”

The House and Senate Intelligence Committees have requested such a review, but it is not clear when the intelligence community will begin such an examination. On Friday, Senator Mark Warner, the Virginia Democrat who leads the Senate Intelligence Committee, reiterated his call for an assessment of the damage the mishandling of the documents may have caused.

“It appears, based on the affidavit unsealed this morning, that among the improperly handled documents at Mar-a-Lago were some of our most sensitive intelligence,” Mr. Warner said.

Until more about the nature of the documents is publicly known it is impossible to tell what, if any damage was done. But former officials stressed that counterintelligence experts often will take measures to protect sources or change collection methods if they believe a classified document could have been viewed by people not authorized to see it.

“It is a principle of counterintelligence that when you believe a code or classified material has been possibly compromised you have to assume the worst,” Mr. Gerstell said. “It is a powerful reason to know what is in the documents and who had access.”

nytimes.com · August 26, 2022

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If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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