Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But, since no one was listening, everything must be said again.”

– Andre Gide, (1869-1951)

"Self-education is, I firmly believe, the only kind of education there is. The only function of a school is to make self-education easier; failing that, it does nothing.”

– Isaac Asimov

"You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war."

– Bonaparte

1. Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?

2. Trump to Lead White House Meeting on Ending Gaza War

3. Chinese Spies Hit More Than 80 Countries in ‘Salt Typhoon’ Breach, FBI Reveals

4. Denmark Summons U.S. Envoy Over Suspected American Influence Campaign in Greenland

5. AI Enhanced Risks to Irregular Warfare

6. Book Review: Operational Level Lessons from Ukraine

7. On the Frontlines of the World’s First Robot War

8. China bets on military industrial might to outproduce and outlast rivals like the US

9. Army transformation plan could undermine infantry brigades: Watchdog

10. How Taiwan is preparing for Chinese attack with acting, fake blood and mock missile strikes

11. Judge orders Kari Lake to answer questions about Voice of America under oath

12. New Rifles Chambered In 6.5mm Creedmoor Heading To U.S. Special Operations Armories

13. How to Arm Ukraine for Negotiations

14. Iran’s Roads Not Taken – Tehran, Washington, and the Failures That Led to War

15. Protecting Soldiers, Preventing Harmful Behaviors, and Boosting Combat Readiness—with Data

16. Clausewitz in theory and practice: Revisiting the politics of war

17. Make America Great, Secure, and Maritime Again

18. The US Is Unprepared for the Next War

1. Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?

This Is from my good friend and CAPS colleague in the UK, Ms. Jihyun Park, who is from north Korea.

This short essay covers a lot of ground: Russia, US, China, Ukraine, north Korea, and South Korea.

Excerpts:

Today’s authoritarianism is not the crude communism of the 20th century. It cleverly absorbs elements of capitalism and hides its brutality behind a polished façade.

Trump fails to see this duplicity. Nor does he recognize that authoritarian forces often cloak themselves in campaigns against homosexuality and abortion, while in reality enforcing brutal practices such as persecuting LGBTQ people or imposing forced abortions.

In his talks with Putin, Trump laments the daily loss of soldiers’ lives—but he misses the deeper truth of the dehumanized system behind Russian society. (It is always important to distinguish between authoritarian regimes and their people.)

The above excerpts are very insightful and important and need to be highlighted because those of us who never experienced authoritarianism find it hard to recognize this. We need voices like Ms. Park's to help us understand.

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Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?

freedom88-

31분 전

https://m.blog.naver.com/freedom88-/223985645468

Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?

Russia still refuses to accept a peace agreement with Ukraine.

The Kremlin insists that any deal must guarantee Ukraine’s exclusion from NATO and a ban on the deployment of Western troops.

What’s interesting is that while Moscow has been sending somewhat positive signals toward the United States, it continues to maintain a hostile stance toward Europe.

Just days ago, China sent a congratulatory message to Ukraine—something no other former Soviet republic has done since the USSR’s collapse.

Yet only a few days later, at China’s upcoming Victory Day celebrations, both Putin and prominent South Korean politicians are expected to attend.

So, will global affairs unfold according to Trump’s vision, or are we witnessing the dawn of a new conflict?

Trump claims that meeting Putin will bring an end to the Russia–Ukraine war, and the U.S.–Russia summit has already wrapped up.

But Trump lacks a deeper understanding of totalitarian dictatorships and communism.

Today’s authoritarianism is not the crude communism of the 20th century. It cleverly absorbs elements of capitalism and hides its brutality behind a polished façade.

Trump fails to see this duplicity. Nor does he recognize that authoritarian forces often cloak themselves in campaigns against homosexuality and abortion, while in reality enforcing brutal practices such as persecuting LGBTQ people or imposing forced abortions.

In his talks with Putin, Trump laments the daily loss of soldiers’ lives—but he misses the deeper truth of the dehumanized system behind Russian society. (It is always important to distinguish between authoritarian regimes and their people.)

Trump seems to believe that ending wars is simply a matter of arranging the right sequence of meetings and applying enough pressure.

This is the same mindset with which he met Kim Jong-un three times. Superficially, North Korea paused its missile launches, but in reality, the regime went so far as to declare itself a nuclear state in its constitution—a triumph for Pyongyang while Washington was left empty-handed.

Trump also fails to grasp Putin’s obsession with the legacy of the Soviet Union, or that Ukraine is fighting not for mere territory but for its sovereignty.

That is why he does not hesitate to publicly belittle Ukraine’s president, who is defending his nation’s independence. In any agreement between nations, the most crucial element is not the bargaining chips, but an accurate grasp of reality. Without that, no peace strategy can hold.

Trump threatened that if Putin refused to halt the war, he would face “serious consequences.” But so far, Trump has never followed through on any such warning.

Why, then, should the Kremlin take his words seriously this time?

If anything, Trump frames U.S. involvement in Ukraine less as a defense of freedom and more as an opportunity for arms deals and financial gain.

Putin, a former KGB agent, has clung to power for 25 years. In that time, he has launched multiple wars, crushed domestic dissent, and even assassinated his critics.

He has used chemical weapons on the streets of Britain, compared himself to Peter the Great, and rehabilitated the image of Ivan the Terrible.

Most experts agree that Putin is anything but sentimental. Yet Trump continues to praise him as one of the strongest leaders in the world.

More troubling is the fact that even after the U.S.–Russia talks, Moscow has not stopped bombing Ukrainian cities.

On August 21, Russia even attacked an American factory in western Ukraine. This act alone undermined Trump’s claim that Putin truly seeks peace. Still, Trump remains captivated by him, treating him much the same way he treated Kim Jong-un.

On August 22, Trump even floated the idea of inviting Putin to the 2026 World Cup, telling reporters: “President Putin has always respected me and our country, but he has not respected other nations.” But what does that really mean?

It shows that Trump views international order not through the lens of principles, but through his own political interests and personal relationships.

Putin’s so-called “respect” for Trump and America has nothing to do with democracy or human rights. It is simply about power and mutual convenience. For Trump, peace is not about values—it is just another transaction.

That is why his approach is unlikely to change Putin’s authoritarian nature. Instead, it risks dividing the international community further and prolonging Ukraine’s suffering.

True peace does not stem from the temporary “respect” of authoritarian leaders. It comes only from the shared resolve of the international community to defend sovereignty and human dignity.

This is much like when South Korea claims to “respect” the North Korean regime. On the surface, it looks like dialogue and diplomacy, but in reality, it only conceals the true nature of dictatorship—ultimately weakening democracy and human rights.

In the end, we must face the fact that “respect” can be not a guarantee of peace, but a tool to legitimize authoritarian rule.

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2. Trump to Lead White House Meeting on Ending Gaza War

Excerpts:

Efforts to forge a joint U.S.-Israeli plan come as Israel is facing growing domestic and international pressure to end the war amid a dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza and concerns over the well-being of hostages still being held by Hamas.

Ahead of the meeting, Trump’s Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff said the White House believes it could end the Israel-Hamas war by the end of the year.

“It is a very comprehensive plan we are putting together on the next day, and many people are going to see how robust it is and how well-meaning it is and it reflects President Trump’s humanitarian motives here,” Witkoff said in a Fox News interview on Tuesday.

Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, a close confidant of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, will lead the discussion from the Israeli side, according to a person familiar with the matter. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also acting national-security adviser, was due to meet with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar separately on Wednesday.

Trump to Lead White House Meeting on Ending Gaza War

The talks come as Israel attempts to head off European countries recognizing a Palestinian State

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-to-lead-white-house-meeting-on-ending-gaza-war-86f15ef2?mod=hp_lead_pos10

By Robbie Gramer

Follow, Anat Peled

Follow and Summer Said

Updated Aug. 27, 2025 2:57 pm ET

Smoke billowing after an Israeli army operation in Gaza City on Tuesday. Photo: omar al-qattaa/AFP/Getty Images

President Trump will chair a meeting at the White House aimed at breaking the impasse on negotiations between Israel and Hamas and mapping out a postwar plan for Gaza, three officials said.

Wednesday’s meeting, which will include the president’s top national-security aides and senior Israeli officials, is an attempt to renew efforts to bring about an end to the war ahead of the United Nations summit next month as Israel looks to head off an effort by other Western nations to recognize a Palestinian state.

Efforts to forge a joint U.S.-Israeli plan come as Israel is facing growing domestic and international pressure to end the war amid a dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza and concerns over the well-being of hostages still being held by Hamas.

Ahead of the meeting, Trump’s Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff said the White House believes it could end the Israel-Hamas war by the end of the year.

“It is a very comprehensive plan we are putting together on the next day, and many people are going to see how robust it is and how well-meaning it is and it reflects President Trump’s humanitarian motives here,” Witkoff said in a Fox News interview on Tuesday.

Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer, a close confidant of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, will lead the discussion from the Israeli side, according to a person familiar with the matter. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also acting national-security adviser, was due to meet with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar separately on Wednesday.

White House special envoy Steve Witkoff arriving earlier this month to meet families of hostages held captive in Gaza. Photo: Ariel Schalit/AP

Israel wants to come up with a postwar Gaza plan before the U.N. General Assembly in September, the person familiar with the plans said, when several countries including France and Canada plan to recognize a Palestinian state. The U.S. and Israel have both sharply condemned this plan, saying the push for statehood would reward Hamas for its Oct. 7, 2023, terrorist attacks that triggered the war.

Israel announced earlier this month that its security cabinet had approved five principles for ending the war, including demilitarizing Gaza, Hamas disarming and stepping down for an alternative civilian administration and continued Israeli security control of the enclave.

Hamas has rejected those conditions. Arab mediators and families of hostages say the conditions are unrealistic and aimed at sabotaging a deal.

No new plans or details about a comprehensive deal to end the war in Gaza or what the enclave will look like after the fighting ends have been presented to Arab countries by Israel or the U.S., Arab mediators said.

The U.S. has worked closely on possible cease-fire deals and postwar planning with Arab countries, who have taken the lead on negotiations between Hamas and Israel.

“President Trump has been clear that he wants the war to end, and he wants peace and prosperity for everyone in the region. The White House has nothing additional to share on the meeting at this time,” a White House spokesperson said.

A senior U.S. official said former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, have joined a meeting to brief Trump on plans for postwar Gaza that could include U.S. involvement in the enclave. Axios previously reported on their involvement in the meeting.

The senior official said the plans include options for Gaza’s stabilization and governance as well as economic assistance, but declined to delve into specifics.

Israel has long said that a central goal of its war is to remove Hamas as a military and governmental power in Gaza. Hamas earlier this month rejected an Arab proposal that would end the war if it gave power of the enclave over to an international force.

Instead, Hamas said it would accept a 60-day cease-fire proposal that was nearly identical to one known as the Witkoff plan, and which Israel had accepted before talks fell apart in July when Israel pulled out. As part of the proposal, 10 hostages were to be released in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners. The two sides were to enter talks about reaching a lasting truce on the first day of the agreement.

Israel hasn’t given a clear response to mediators about that offer but Israeli officials have repeatedly suggested incremental steps won’t halt the war. “This war will not end until all the hostages are released,” Israeli ambassador to the U.N. Danny Danon told reporters on Wednesday. “This war will not end until Hamas is defeated.”

Chinese Spies Hit More Than 80 Countries in ‘Salt Typhoon’ Breach, FBI Reveals

The campaign also touched some 600 companies and went beyond conventional espionage, an FBI official says

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/chinese-spies-hit-more-than-80-countries-in-salt-typhoon-breach-fbi-reveals-59b2108f

By Aruna Viswanatha

Follow and Sarah Krouse

Aug. 27, 2025 10:30 am ET

The headquarters of the FBI, which released information about the hacking campaign. Photo: Eric Kayne/Zuma Press

Quick Summary

A Chinese espionage campaign, dubbed ‘Salt Typhoon,’ targeted telecom firms in over 80 countries, far exceeding initial estimates.View more

A Beijing-linked yearslong espionage campaign that hit U.S. telecom companies and swept up Donald Trump’s phone calls actually targeted more than 80 countries, reaching across the globe to a far greater extent than investigators initially understood.

The scope of the intrusion allowed Chinese intelligence officers to potentially surveil U.S. citizens’ private communications and track their movements around the globe, Brett Leatherman, the FBI’s top cyber official, said in an interview. The agency estimates that the intruders likely obtained more than one million call records and targeted the telephone calls and text messages of more than 100 Americans.

“This is one of the more consequential cyber espionage breaches we have seen here in the United States,” he said.

The hackers were also able to access information from systems the federal government uses for court-authorized network wiretapping requests, one of the aspects of the breach that most concerned U.S. officials. “It should really set off alarm bells for all Americans,” Leatherman said.

The “Salt Typhoon” campaign dates back to at least 2019 but was only discovered by U.S. authorities last year. It allowed China-linked actors to access U.S. customer call data, private communications for a limited number of individuals, sensitive law-enforcement information and technical network information that could inform future attacks, The Wall Street Journal reported last year.

“If you are able to exfiltrate similar information globally you can start to aggregate that data and start to understand a much different intelligence picture than what you would get if you just targeted and compromised one country,” Leatherman said.

Networks run by major U.S. wireless carriers were among those breached, the Journal previously reported.

Verizon Communications said earlier this year that a “nation-state threat actor” had accessed its network as part of a broader attack and that it had contained the incident. AT&T said late last year that “the People’s Republic of China targeted a small number of individuals of foreign intelligence interest” and that in the few instances in which information was impacted, it complied with its notification obligations.

T-Mobile US said late last year that it detected attempts to infiltrate its systems by bad actors. Its defenses “worked as designed to prevent any access to or exfiltration of customer or sensitive information,” a T-Mobile spokeswoman said in a statement.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has notified roughly 600 companies that the espionage activity indicated some interest in them for reasons including their commercial relationships and network vulnerabilities. In some countries, there have been compromises of telecommunication networks to varying degrees, while in others, the degree of access is unclear.

U.S. officials last year described the breach as a damaging and well-executed espionage operation by Beijing. Investigators now believe the activity was broader and more indiscriminate than previously understood, and beyond what countries usually understand to be espionage, Leatherman said. The activity potentially allowed Chinese spies to use cellphone geolocation data to track Americans’ movements, including outside the country, he said.

“That global indiscriminate targeting really is something that is outside the norms of cyberspace operations,” Leatherman said.

Beijing has denied involvement in the campaign and accused U.S. spy agencies and cybersecurity firms of secretly collaborating to piece together false evidence to frame China. A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, Liu Pengyu, said the U.S. hadn’t produced “conclusive and reliable evidence” that Salt Typhoon was linked to the Chinese government.

“China firmly opposes and combats all forms of cyber attacks and cyber crime,” he said.

The FBI believes that the intruders are largely contained and that it is now better equipped to spot their activity. On Wednesday, it released a memo that provided new details of the Salt Typhoon intrusions, including technical information about the hackers designed to help companies find them in their networks. The document was signed by other U.S. agencies and intelligence and cybersecurity services in other countries, including the U.K., Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland and Poland.

The hackers got into networks by exploiting a range of known vulnerabilities in software and devices connected to the networks, including routers, the memo said.

Write to Aruna Viswanatha at aruna.viswanatha@wsj.com and Sarah Krouse at sarah.krouse@wsj.com

4. Denmark Summons U.S. Envoy Over Suspected American Influence Campaign in Greenland

I hope we are better than this. We should not be trying to recruit resistance in a friendly country, a NATO ally.

If we are compromised in a "friendly country" (a NATO allied country much less) how are we supposed to execute necessary operations with CRInK?

Excerpts:

The influence campaign seeks to recruit people both in Greenland and Denmark to the separatist movement and to sow division between the island and Copenhagen, according to DR.

“Any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kingdom will of course be unacceptable,” Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen said in an emailed statement. “We are aware that foreign actors continue to show an interest in Greenland and its position in the Kingdom of Denmark. It is therefore not surprising if we experience outside attempts to influence the future of the Kingdom in the time ahead.”

Denmark also summoned the U.S. chargé d’affaires in May after The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. was stepping up its efforts to gather intelligence regarding Greenland and to identify people who support the U.S. objectives for the island. It couldn’t be learned whether the newly reported influence network goes beyond such efforts, or whether it is acting under direct instructions from Washington.

The U.S. doesn’t currently have an ambassador in Copenhagen because Trump’s appointee, PayPal co-founder Ken Howery, hasn’t been approved by the Senate.

The latest disclosure puts Copenhagen back on a diplomatic collision course with the U.S., historically a firm ally. Despite previous Danish protests, the Trump administration has never denied allegations that it is trying to influence public opinion in Greenland.

The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Denmark Summons U.S. Envoy Over Suspected American Influence Campaign in Greenland

Trump has repeatedly said he wants to control the mineral-rich Arctic island where the U.S. has stepped up intelligence-gathering efforts

https://www.wsj.com/world/suspected-american-influence-campaign-in-greenland-prompts-denmark-to-summon-u-s-envoy-40e464ba

By Sune Engel Rasmussen

Updated Aug. 27, 2025 11:23 am ET

President Trump has said the U.S. could purchase the strategically located island. Photo: Oscar Scott Carl for WSJ

Quick Summary

Denmark summoned the U.S. envoy over an alleged covert influence campaign in Greenland.View more

The Danish government has summoned the top U.S. envoy to Copenhagen over an alleged covert influence campaign in Greenland aimed at driving a wedge between Denmark and the autonomous territory that President Trump has sought to control.

Danish public broadcaster DR on Wednesday reported that at least three Americans in Greenland, with links to Trump and in positions to influence American security and foreign policy, are on a secret mission to collect names of citizens who support the president’s objectives on the island.

Trump has said the U.S. could purchase the mineral-rich, strategically located island and hasn’t ruled out taking it by force. Greenland forms a self-ruling part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member that controls the island’s foreign and security policy.

The influence campaign seeks to recruit people both in Greenland and Denmark to the separatist movement and to sow division between the island and Copenhagen, according to DR.

Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen Photo: roni rekomaa/Reuters

“Any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kingdom will of course be unacceptable,” Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen said in an emailed statement. “We are aware that foreign actors continue to show an interest in Greenland and its position in the Kingdom of Denmark. It is therefore not surprising if we experience outside attempts to influence the future of the Kingdom in the time ahead.”

Denmark also summoned the U.S. chargé d’affaires in May after The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. was stepping up its efforts to gather intelligence regarding Greenland and to identify people who support the U.S. objectives for the island. It couldn’t be learned whether the newly reported influence network goes beyond such efforts, or whether it is acting under direct instructions from Washington.

The U.S. doesn’t currently have an ambassador in Copenhagen because Trump’s appointee, PayPal co-founder Ken Howery, hasn’t been approved by the Senate.

The latest disclosure puts Copenhagen back on a diplomatic collision course with the U.S., historically a firm ally. Despite previous Danish protests, the Trump administration has never denied allegations that it is trying to influence public opinion in Greenland.

The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

Conclusion

AI applications demand a new framework for thinking about irregular warfare as a whole, not just in terms of a single discrete technology. Rather than viewing AI as simply another tool in the irregular warfare toolkit, practitioners must recognize it as a force multiplier that amplifies both capabilities and volatility. The historical pattern of tactical success leading to strategic failure in irregular warfare is likely to accelerate in an AI-enabled environment, where operations unfold at machine speed but human judgment remains essential for strategic direction. We should also take the opportunity to pause and critically assess what we hope to accomplish through the conduct of irregular warfare in general to ensure that we apply AI in a way that maximizes its benefits and minimizes its risks.

The challenge ahead isn’t whether or not to integrate AI into irregular warfare operations—that integration is already underway. The challenge is developing the conceptual frameworks and operational disciplines necessary to harness AI’s power while managing the instability it could create within a target population. Success will require practitioners who can think several moves ahead while remaining prepared to adapt rapidly when operations develop in unexpected directions. Mastering AI-enabled irregular warfare means learning to wield a double-edged sword that grows sharper and more unwielding with each technological advance.

Essay| The Latest

AI Enhanced Risks to Irregular Warfare

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/27/ai-enhanced-risks-to-irregular-warfare/

by Tyler Fleming

08.27.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract

The practice of irregular warfare has a checkered history when it comes to long-term outcomes. It is extremely difficult to forecast how fighting over the will and support of a population will lead to unintended consequences in the years and decades that follow any irregular warfare operation. The introduction of AI into the information-centric style of fighting is poised to increase the speed of irregular warfare beyond the ability of human operators to control, potentially damaging populations and causing irreversible second- and third-order effects at an unsustainable rate.

Introduction

Current literature describing the intersection of artificial intelligence and irregular warfare has largely focused on AI as a capability enhancer in a new competitive space. One publication emphasizes AI’s potential as “the newest weapon” in irregular warfare, and another frames AI applications as “an evolution, not a revolution.” However, these perspectives, while valuable and true, don’t address a critical reality: AI doesn’t simply add new capabilities to irregular warfare—it also amplifies the field’s most problematic characteristic.

AI has incredible potential, but it also creates a paradox for irregular warfare practitioners. While AI promises to enhance the speed and penetration of our influence campaigns, it simultaneously amplifies the inherent unpredictability that has always haunted irregular warfare outcomes, especially over the long term. When addressing AI related risks, the most dangerous course appears to be falling behind in the tech race, but it is largely unacknowledged that AI’s very advantages—speed, scale, and precision—directly compound irregular warfare’s tendency toward unintended consequences. We need to assess what risks to the mission could be associated with the successful adoption of AI. As military and intelligence communities increasingly integrate AI tools into their operations, they must grapple with how these technologies will fundamentally alter the defining characteristics of irregular warfare as an information-centric activity and recognize the heightened unpredictability of their operational effects.

The Information Battlefield Accelerates

As a struggle for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population, information has always been the primary weapon in irregular warfare. Whether enabling partner forces to execute missions or shaping target populations, success depends on controlling both the quality and quantity of information flows. No matter what kind of operation is being conducted, how the target population responds will determine whether or not it was successful. Whether it’s an overt presence of military advisors or an unseen cyber operation, how information around their actions is delivered and interpreted is key.

AI is poised to revolutionize this information battlefield. Machine learning algorithms can generate convincing text, images, and videos at scale, while natural language processing enables real-time analysis of social media sentiment and automated content generation tailored to specific audiences. These capabilities offer irregular warfare practitioners powerful new tools to influence and control their battlespace by allowing them to craft and disseminate targeted messages with unprecedented speed and precision.

However, this technology-driven acceleration cuts both ways. These advanced algorithms shape how populations consume information through social media platforms, creating an environment where audiences can move instantaneously between information sources. Information is consumed in seconds with dubious levels of comprehension, causing disinformation to go viral on a daily basis. Meanwhile, trust in traditional sources of dependable information continues to erode. With distrust in media reaching historic highs globally, we face an increasingly fragmented information landscape where competing narratives can rapidly gain traction or evolve in unexpected ways.

For irregular warfare practitioners in particular, this presents a fundamental challenge: how can they effectively employ their techniques and tactics in an increasingly chaotic information environment? Even more critically, how can they forecast operational outcomes or assess effects when AI enables both friendly and adversarial actors to operate at machine speed?

The Unpredictability Problem Compounds

The inherent unpredictability of human response toward efforts to shape their perceptions is the defining characteristic of irregular warfare. Unlike conventional warfare, where destroying enemy forces produces relatively clear outcomes, the will of populations that are targeted by irregular warfare presents a much more volatile and unpredictable target. Because these operations work through indirect methods, they frequently produce second- and third-order effects that can spark new conflicts, erode public trust, or trigger sudden socio-political changes that may not align with the original objectives.

AI promises to compound this unpredictability problem. The same technologies that enable rapid information dissemination also accelerate the speed at which populations can respond to political, military, and economic events in their information space. Social media algorithms provide immediate feedback and response to any perceptible activity, triggering a procedurally-generated lens through which a given population will interpret any given irregular warfare action, whether it is overt, covert, or clandestine. In such an environment, irregular warfare operations can trigger cascading effects with minimal warning time for course correction.

Historical Lessons in Unintended Consequences

The history of irregular warfare is full of examples of successful operations that produced catastrophic, long-term consequences. For example, US support for Mujahideen forces against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan achieved its immediate objective of bleeding Soviet resources and ultimately contributing to Soviet withdrawal. However, it also contributed to the conditions that eventually produced the Taliban and provided safe haven for Al-Qaeda’s planning of the September 11 attacks. But such unintended consequences are hardly unique to the US. Years of Russian political warfare in Ukraine before 2014 initially appeared successful in maintaining influence over Ukrainian politics. However, these same activities ultimately sparked the Maidan Revolution and a cascade of events leading to the largest European war since World War II. China’s use of maritime militia fleets to assert control over resources in the South China Sea achieved some tactical successes in pushing back neighboring fleets and occupying disputed islands but has also generated regional animosity and international pushback, leading to increased militarization and the potential for larger conflicts. Even the rapid and effective 2013 French counterterrorism intervention in Mali using special operations and partner forces devolved into a lumbering COIN operation that unexpectedly contributed to the dissolution of French influence across the entire Sahel region.

In each case, operationally successful irregular warfare campaigns created conditions for strategic failures. The practitioners achieved their immediate objectives but lost control of the broader narrative and long-term outcomes in ways that few could have predicted. Each of these campaigns unfolded over years – or even decades – but the modern irregular battlefield could see campaigns begin and end within days and still carry the same indelible consequences.

AI as Force Multiplier and Risk Amplifier

As AI capabilities advance, irregular warfare practitioners must prepare for operations that unfold at unprecedented speeds. Machine learning algorithms can analyze vast datasets to identify influence opportunities, generate targeted content, and adapt messaging in real-time based on audience responses. These capabilities offer significant advantages in terms of operational tempo and precision. That is, of course, if the US is able to effectively harness and deploy AI capabilities to the irregular warfighter, which remains to be seen at scale.

However, the same speed that enables increasingly effective operations also compresses decision-making timelines and reduces opportunities for human oversight. AI-driven misinformation, social media dissemination, and, of course, intentional influence operations can rapidly spiral beyond their intended scope, creating viral effects that human operators may struggle to control or redirect. The technology that promises to make irregular warfare more effective also makes it more volatile.

Managing the Double-Edged Sword

Despite these risks, irregular warfare will only become more prevalent as AI lowers barriers to entry and provides new capabilities to both state and non-state actors. The key for practitioners will be developing frameworks for managing AI-enabled operations while maintaining a strategic perspective on long-term consequences.

This requires several critical adaptations. First, practitioners must develop new assessment methodologies that account for AI-accelerated timelines and viral effects. Analysts, operators, and campaign planners must take into account the potential for irregular effects to spiral in unexpected ways, or to linger in a population for better or worse. This reality must be incorporated into training, exercises, operational planning, and execution. After-effects must also be analyzed, though traditional battle damage assessment frameworks designed for kinetic operations poorly capture the dynamic nature of information effects in AI-mediated environments. Preparations must be put in place to collect and analyze data over long periods of time throughout the lifecycle of an irregular warfare campaign.

Speaking of data, operators need enhanced monitoring capabilities to detect unintended consequences early in their development. Fundamentally, this means they need access to a variety of data sources at scale and at speed. It is not enough to determine effects after an operation has ended; irregular operators need to be able to adapt to a changing battlespace in the same way that a maneuver company needs to address changes in enemy fire. Traditional government acquisition processes are not designed to quickly procure data for delivery to operational end users, and industry standard seat-licensing schemes limit data sharing and encourage information silos. Whether it is informing a human operator or feeding an LLM, data is the lifeblood of AI-enabled irregular warfare, and government procurement offices are the beating heart.

Finally, the irregular warfare community must accept the uncomfortable reality that AI will make their operations simultaneously more powerful and more unpredictable. Success in this environment demands unprecedented data processing requirements, and warfighters must be properly equipped for rapid decision-making. AI tools can also help by providing real-time analysis to enable faster course corrections in the midst of an operation. The case for AI applications is extremely valid, and it is not a matter of if we use it, but whether or not we can employ this technology more effectively than our opponents. However, governments must also commit resources for persistent population damage assessments to identify new threats and opportunities as they develop over time across the irregular warfare continuum.

Conclusion

AI applications demand a new framework for thinking about irregular warfare as a whole, not just in terms of a single discrete technology. Rather than viewing AI as simply another tool in the irregular warfare toolkit, practitioners must recognize it as a force multiplier that amplifies both capabilities and volatility. The historical pattern of tactical success leading to strategic failure in irregular warfare is likely to accelerate in an AI-enabled environment, where operations unfold at machine speed but human judgment remains essential for strategic direction. We should also take the opportunity to pause and critically assess what we hope to accomplish through the conduct of irregular warfare in general to ensure that we apply AI in a way that maximizes its benefits and minimizes its risks.

The challenge ahead isn’t whether or not to integrate AI into irregular warfare operations—that integration is already underway. The challenge is developing the conceptual frameworks and operational disciplines necessary to harness AI’s power while managing the instability it could create within a target population. Success will require practitioners who can think several moves ahead while remaining prepared to adapt rapidly when operations develop in unexpected directions. Mastering AI-enabled irregular warfare means learning to wield a double-edged sword that grows sharper and more unwielding with each technological advance.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of any agency, organization, or company.

Tags: Artificial Intelligence (AI), irregular warfare, Unconventional Warfare

About The Author

Tyler Fleming
Tyler Fleming spent ten years as a non-commissioned officer enabling Army special forces with dedicated intelligence collections and targeting operations. He holds a M.A. in International Security from George Mason University, and is currently working to transform the way government acquires and shares data across the military and intelligence communities.

6. Book Review: Operational Level Lessons from Ukraine

Book Reviews| The Latest

Book Review: Operational Level Lessons from Ukraine

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/27/book-review-operational-level-lessons-from-ukraine/

by Lawrence Cline

08.27.2025 at 06:00am

Tactical and Strategic Insights from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Western Security and Defence in the 21st Century, Thomas-Durell Young and Jarosław Gryz, editors, Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 2025, 287 pages, ISBN 9781804131558.

Tactical and Strategic Insights from the Russo–Ukrainian War offers a very wide-ranging analysis of the ongoing operations in the country. As with any book dealing with contemporaneous situations, things can shift significantly between the time of research and authorship and the date published. Nevertheless, the analysis in this volume remains very useful for those studying the conflict. One significant strength of the book is that many of the contributors are from what are now ‘frontline states’, and they offer a somewhat different perspective on how to view developments in the war.

Krisztián Jójárt opens the topics by discussing Russian military theory and its impact on the initial phases of the invasion of Ukraine. He stresses that the course of the war has been far different from what Russian military science would have predicted: “Human wave attacks and the preparation of extensive fortifications were not what most of them imagined as being attributes of a future war” (p. 9). Jójárt argues that “Russian military thinkers have written extensively about the significance of the indirect approach, asymmetric methods, and non-military means in warfare, concluding that an indirect strategy will be the dominant form of war” (p. 13).

The discussion of Russian military theory and its connection with the ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine is useful, but there are two issues that arise with some of the Western analysis. First, there certainly has been a clear (if circumscribed) intellectual ferment within the Russian military on new forms of warfare, much of which followed a similar movement in Western militaries. Western discussion on Russian military theory is based largely on the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, named after Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and based on an article he wrote in 2016. It is important to note that much of this article focuses on defending against Western use of ‘new’ forms of warfare. Likewise, there is little evidence that it has become anywhere near being adopted as a formal doctrine. Viewed more broadly – and in many ways as applicable to the US military as to Russia – converting a doctrine to a usable operational strategy can be very difficult.

Zsolt Lazar offers an interesting chapter on how to use open-source material to assess the course of the war. His focus is as much on process as it is on the results of the analysis. He describes two main tools. The first is NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), useful for detecting ‘hot spots’ indicating military activity. The second is data from the Oryx website that provides detailed open-source imagery. He notes that “Forbes lauded Oryx as ‘the most reliable source in the conflict’, setting the gold standard for estimating equipment losses by reporting only visually confirmed losses.” (p. 37) Lazar then provides a detailed description of how these tools were used to create data sets, giving near-real-time results. Perhaps the major usefulness of this chapter is its demonstration that available open-source material can be leveraged to create useful analysis. This certainly is applicable not only to academic approaches such as this book, but also to governments. Smaller countries that do not have the collection resources of major powers increasingly have the ability to tap into resources that can give them a more accurate intelligence picture.

The remainder of the book offers an analysis of specific aspects of the ongoing war. All the chapters are useful, but several stand out for addressing issues that often can be overlooked. In his chapter, “Battlefield Communications in the Russo–Ukraine War: The First Six Months”, Glen Grant notes that “There is little or no standardisation amongst them [the various Ukrainian security forces] in training, or communications, and virtually no connectivity between them.” (p. 59) In part, this was due to the communications architecture, with the communications system focused on higher to lower echelons, with very limited thought given to lateral communications. More significantly, the communications equipment was woefully inadequate. Some units – particularly those that had received foreign military support – entered the war well equipped, but the majority had to make do with what they could find. This, of course, was complicated by the (partial) incorporation of volunteer battalions that had come equipped with whatever they could buy or receive as donations from civilian groups.

Even within regular units, there has been a plethora of communications systems, including Harris radios and the ubiquitous Motorola handheld radios. In many cases, these are incompatible with other radios and are frequently unencrypted. Even in these cases, Motorolas sold out and units had to scramble to buy even more inferior radios (p. 64). What, in many ways, became the fallback position for soldiers were mobile phones and secure apps; the latter remained possible because the Ukrainian civilian workers generally have managed to keep the internet operating. As Grant notes, the Starlink system “came literally as a lifesaver to the Ukrainian forces, allowing stronger communications where radio coverage and range were simply inadequate” (p. 67). This is a very accurate description, but relying on a backbone communications system whose availability depends on the vagaries of a single person can be uncomfortable. Perhaps the key takeaway from Grant’s discussion is that countries that rely on mass mobilization for their defense must plan their communications architecture around a much larger force than usual, adequately resource this system in advance of mobilization, and train their personnel before conflicts emerge.

Zhirayr Amirkhanyan in “Operational Fires: Lessons Observed” argues that “artillery is back in its historical place as the primary combat effect on the battlefield” (p. 99). Although such precision munitions such as Excalibur rounds, HIMARS, and MLRS have proven their value, ‘dumb’ munitions continue to be critical. He cites a senior adviser to General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as claiming that “’anti-tank missiles slowed the Russians down, but what killed them was our artillery. That was what broke their units.’” (p. 105-106). The Russians typically have continued to use massed artillery (albeit at further range), at the tactical and operational level, but the Ukrainian forces have found that using one or two artillery pieces that can be redeployed quickly has been successful. One issue the Ukrainians have faced has been keeping their artillery pieces operational; their rate of fire has been so extensive that “over a third of Ukraine’s artillery systems are unavailable due to maintenance and repair needs” (p. 104).

This chapter also provides a very useful and detailed description of the various targeting systems the Ukrainians have modified for their use, along with some “homegrown” systems. One particularly novel approach has been “[a] mobile phone application developed by Ukrainians, which operates alongside Google Meet, allows citizens to report the presence of Russian troops, either through the chain of command or directly to artillery units. Subsequently, this data is shared with NATO partners, whose satellites and other assets provide more precise targeting information” (p. 108). Such an approach that, in some ways, can be akin to civilians acting as forward observers clearly can come with problems, but other countries that facing the prospect of “total war” might find it of interest.

Roman Kolodii concludes that “the technical features of cyber-space as an operational domain did not decisively shape the Russo–Ukrainian cyber-war… These findings have important implications for our understanding of cyberwar, as they seem to validate the standpoint of cyber-war sceptics who doubt cyber-warfare’s decidedly disastrous potential” (p. 175-176). The chapter by Marlena Zadorożna focuses specifically on information operations. Although space does not permit a detailed review, other chapters on logistics, urban operations, the conduct of the air campaign, and naval operations also provide very valuable insights.

It might be surprising to some that the use of UAVs in the war is not given great prominence in the book, although their use is mentioned in a supporting role in several chapters. In some ways, this is an advantage for the analysis provided by the authors. UAVs have been given extensive coverage, and in some ways have drowned out other critical lessons from the war. The contributors to this volume have raised critical issues surrounding the Ukraine campaign to date. This book should provide considerable value to defense planners in what are now front-line states and those responsible for training and advising them.

Tags: Book review, intelligence, Russia, Russia-Ukraine War, Ukraine

About The Author

Lawrence Cline
Lawrence E. Cline, PhD, is a part-time faculty member with Colorado State University Global and is the book review editor for Small Wars & Insurgencies. He has written extensively on insurgencies, terrorism, and intelligence. He is a retired US Army military intelligence officer and Middle East Foreign Area Officer, with operational service in Lebanon, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, and Iraq.

7. On the Frontlines of the World’s First Robot War

On the Frontlines of the World’s First Robot War

By Ibrahim Naber08/27/2025 05:00 AM EDT

Ibrahim Naber is a foreign correspondent who has spent more than a year reporting from Ukraine. In 2025, he received the George Weidenfeld Prize for his coverage of global conflict and crisis zones.

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/08/27/ukraine-drones-war-russia-00514712

Politico

The War Issue

Three years of grinding war between Russia and Ukraine has dramatically changed the way militaries large and small fight. And the innovations keep coming.

By Ibrahim Naber08/27/2025 05:00 AM EDT

Ibrahim Naber is a foreign correspondent who has spent more than a year reporting from Ukraine. In 2025, he received the George Weidenfeld Prize for his coverage of global conflict and crisis zones.

The launch of an FPV kamikaze drone, loaded with explosives, by the Ukrainian army from a high-rise building on the front lines. | Viktor Lysenko for POLITICO

NEAR KHARKIV, Ukraine — The Ukrainian soldiers couldn’t believe what they were seeing. One of their aerial drones had spotted two Russian soldiers trapped in a dugout.

“Our main mission was to destroy the shelter along with the enemy,” said Vladyka, the commander of the drone crew in the 3rd Assault Brigade, in an interview with POLITICO Magazine at a hidden training site 20 miles from the front lines in eastern Ukraine. Working closely with first-person-view (FPV) drone pilots, the team launched a ground-based kamikaze drone rigged with three anti-tank mines directly into the tree line that concealed the enemy’s dugout. “The blast was powerful,” Vladyka, 35, said, “a very strong explosion.”

As the team loaded a second ground drone with explosives, the Russians suddenly emerged from the entrance of their hideout. They had scrawled a message in blue Cyrillic letters on a makeshift white poster and were frantically waving it skyward at the hovering drone: “We want to surrender.”

That’s when the 3rd Brigade recorded a video of something that they believe had never happened before: The first successful assault carried out exclusively by robots.

Courtesy of the 3rd Assault Brigade

“We flew up to them and signaled them to follow us,” said one of the UAV operators who goes by the call name Major. “They understood everything right away.” The Russians followed the aerial drone across open ground toward Ukrainian lines, where they were taken into custody. “Our comrades put them face down on the ground and took them,” Major, 33, said. The 21-year-old operator of the ground robot (call sign LaCoste) said he was still surprised by how quickly the Russians made the decision to surrender. “Although I understand their motivation: a small vehicle pulls up to them and there’s a bunch of explosives. Enough to destroy a dugout,” he said.

The rapid advancement and widespread use of inexpensive observation and strike drones — in the air and on the ground — have transformed warfare in Ukraine since 2022 and is one of the biggest reasons Ukraine has managed to bring its far larger adversary to a stalemate. What is surprising, however, is how the pace of innovation has continued — yielding small tactical breakthroughs like the soldiers’ surrender and also technological leaps that have fundamentally altered battlefield tactics across the entire war zone. In recent months, the so-called kill zone — the zone of sustained and lethal exposure to enemy fire — has expanded far beyond the range of a rifle or a mortar. Soldiers on both sides are in constant danger when they are as far as six to nine miles from the contact line. Packs of inexpensive kamikaze drones — each barely a half foot across and packing the explosive punch of a grenade or land mine — now hunt virtually every type of target: fortified positions in tree lines, armored vehicles, individual infantrymen. Drones are responsible for a staggering 60 to 70 percent of killed and wounded soldiers in Ukraine, according to combat medics. The defense on both sides is adapting as well. Entire stretches of frontline streets are now draped in netting to shield against aerial attacks. This expansion of the kill zone has depopulated near-frontline cities like Kostiantynivka in eastern Ukraine. Many residents have been killed and even more have fled, dwindling a pre-war population of 70,000 to only a few thousand who endure dozens of daily Russian drone strikes.

Top: The drone crew of the 3rd Assault Brigade, from left, LaCoste, Major and Vladyka, stand at a hidden training site 20 miles from the front lines in eastern Ukraine. Center, bottom: Vladyka, the commander of the crew, steers a ground drone at the training site. | Viktor Lysenko for POLITICO

That expansion has also had severe military consequences. Access roads are under constant surveillance and attack by drones, making traditional resupply and the transport of troops to frontline positions nearly impossible in some areas. Infantry and assault units on both sides operate primarily in groups of 10 people maximum, and large-scale mechanized advances have become rare due to devastating losses inflicted by drone strikes. As a result, many tasks that were once carried out by soldiers are now done by unmanned devices. According to Ukrainian media reports from March, the Ministry of Defense plans to deliver 15,000 ground robots to the battlefield by the end of this year — a severalfold increase compared to the previous year. Some brigades also independently order ground drones from manufacturers using donated funds from civilians — a practice that has become common in Ukraine.

For Vladyka’s unit of the 3rd Assault Brigade, robotic systems have become essential to maintaining their logistics. “Even basic tasks like delivering water, bringing ammunition, evacuating wounded or fallen soldiers have become too risky to carry out manually,” the commander says, as he steers a Targan 2K ground drone — basically, a large four-wheeled storage bin — across a field in eastern Ukraine using a remote controller. Its range is about 9 miles on rough terrain, with a top speed of 7 miles per hour. His unit mainly uses this robot for evacuation missions (it can carry one man) but it can also transport large aerial drones, including quadcopters and “Vampire” hexacopters (six rotors). Unmanned resupply operations take place not only on the ground, but also through the air. This summer, POLITICO Magazine accompanied soldiers from the 12th Brigade on a mission near Kostiantynivka, where they used a $25,000 Heavy Shot drone to fly packages of ammunition and water to encircled comrades near the Russian-occupied town of Toretsk. After several successful flights, however, Russian FPV drone operators spotted the aircraft and destroyed it directly over the Ukrainian position.

The use of unmanned systems has become existential for Ukraine — not least because of its limited resources in the fight against a much larger country with four to five times its population. “The goal is to preserve lives, because our human resources are limited. That’s why we focus on this,” Vladyka said. Mine-laying and demining — for the first years of this war the domain of trained engineers and sappers working just behind the front — have become nearly impossible for humans under the constant threat of drones. The robots use a claw at the end of an extendable arm to pluck mines from the ground. “We’re putting a lot of effort to make their work easier and, most importantly, to prevent our people from getting wounded or killed just because they have to enter dangerous zones,” Vladyka said. That’s why his unit is investing heavily in automation. Earlier this year, operators from the Khartia Brigade reported they deployed 180 mines in an unmanned operation, allowing them to secure the area against Russian assaults.

Courtesy of the 3rd Assault Brigade

This also applies to unmanned offensive operations — like the assault that forced the two Russian soldiers to surrender. Recently, Vladyka, the 3rd Assault Brigade’s commander, said his unit pulled off a similar coup when one of its ground drones stole a Russian PKM 7.62 mm machine gun directly from an enemy position. “We got the coordinates, got a photo, went and took it away” before the Russians knew what had happened, he said. The crew has kept the machine gun as a battlefield trophy.

Although unmanned systems are operated remotely, the belief that operators like him work in safety is a misconception, Major said. “Actually, our job is no less dangerous than the infantry, although we are a few kilometers farther away,” he explains. “If the enemy detects us, we … are the number one target for them.” As soon as they are detected, his crew is hit with whatever the Russians can throw at them — including, most recently, a heavy KAB glide bomb. “So, is it dangerous to perform our duties?” Major said. “Always, always.”

A Secret Meeting with ‘Achilles’

Ukraine’s elite drone commanders rank high on Russia’s most wanted list. To meet one, I was given a set of coordinates that led into an abandoned patch of forest in eastern Ukraine. After a 20-minute wait, a dusty pickup truck appeared, flashed its lights briefly — a silent signal to follow. A few moments later, the vehicle stopped, and a tall, broad-shouldered man in camouflage trousers stepped out. In his left ear, he wore a gold earring; on his right hip, a pistol: Yurih Fedorenko, known by his call sign Achilles, is the commander of the 429th Separate Regiment of Unmanned Systems, which goes by the same nickname. At 34, Fedorenko is considered one of the rising stars of the Ukrainian military.

“I’m now responsible for several thousand soldiers,” said Fedorenko, leading the way deeper into the forest toward a small clearing, well off any path. “That’s why these meetings are a bit more complicated than they used to be.” Just days earlier, the Russian military had reportedly planned to kill him and several other drone commanders with an airstrike in eastern Ukraine. The claim was made on Facebook by Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, commander of the entire Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces. “We valued your attempt to take us all out yesterday. Keep smoking your bamboo,” he wrote beneath a group photo that includes Fedorenko. Fedorenko confirmed the incident to me but appeared unfazed. The group, he said, had already left the danger zone before any airstrike could hit.

Being hunted by the Russians is proof you matter on the battlefield. In fact, it is elite drone regiments like “Achilles” whose presence — or absence — can determine whether defensive lines hold or collapse. Russia maintains the advantage along the entire front and captured around 310 square miles of territory in July, a figure likely to grow in August following a breakthrough near the city of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces continue to resist the Russian advance, but for many months now they have only been able to slow it down.

“Our units are the ones directly changing the course of the war. Wherever our teams operate — that’s where the front line stands,” Fedorenko said. Their impact reaches far beyond immediate contact zones. “Right now, we are striking deep into their operational space — 50, 60, even 70 kilometers in — targeting deployment zones, repair workshops, ammunition depots and more. The more we destroy the enemy in the rear, the less resistance we face on the front line.”

In addition to cheap FPV drones, which can carry only a grenade-sized charge, Ukraine has long deployed more expensive ‘bomber’ drones with greater range and payload — able to drop explosives powerful enough to destroy fortified enemy positions and ammunition depots. The military has also expanded the range of its strikes to just over 600 miles inside Russia, using homemade long-range drones of the An-196 Liutyi variety — propeller-driven aircraft with a wingspan of about 21 feet that carry warheads of roughly 110 pounds. Yet these Ukrainian attacks remain a response and are far smaller in scale than Russia’s strategic air campaigns. In July, for example, Russia launched a record 728 Shahed (Geran-2) kamikaze drones in a single night — each carrying nearly 200 pounds of explosives and crashing indiscriminately into homes and factories across Ukraine.

Courtesy of the 3rd Assault Brigade

Fedorenko described to me a comprehensive strategy of dismantling Russian capabilities from the inside out: “We have the capability to detect, observe and destroy enemy infantry advancing toward our frontline positions. We ‘knock out their eyes’ — meaning their drone pilots. We ‘cut off their sting’ — we target and eliminate their strike drones. We strike their artillery that fires at our positions. We are cutting the ‘bloodline of war’ — their logistics.”

The story of Fedorenko’s regiment exemplifies the evolution and rise of drones in this war. Originally formed as a volunteer rifle company within the territorial defense forces after Russia’s full-scale invasion, its breakthrough came in the summer of 2022 with the integration of aerial reconnaissance drone teams. These teams worked in close coordination with artillery units — including during the blitz offensive in Kharkiv region in the fall of 2022, when Ukrainian forces overran Russian positions and reclaimed some 2,300 square miles of territory in just a few days. It remains Ukraine’s biggest military success to date.

For much of the war, Ukraine was the driving force behind innovation in drone warfare — but over time, Russia has caught up and, in some areas, pulled ahead. Between 2023 and 2024, however, Ukrainian units like Achilles were among the first to deploy low-cost strike drones at scale. By last year, both Ukraine and Russia were reportedly producing more than 1.5 million FPV drones annually. In April 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a major ramp-up in drone manufacturing. Ukraine, too, aims to multiply its production. “The drones here are not just cutting edge — they are bleeding edge,” retired U.S. General David Petraeus told me in May at the Kyiv Security Forum, one of his multiple trips since the war began. “With more money, Ukraine could produce four to five million drones this year.”

This roughly matches the scale that Fedorenko defined as the bare minimum for Ukraine’s competitiveness. “In total, we’re talking about 350,000 drones per month,” he said. “Then, we will be able to objectively reach parity with the enemy, even outpace them in some areas, and maintain a sustained tempo of destroying their forces on the battlefield.” His estimate is partly based on Russia’s ability to recruit between 25,000 and 30,000 new soldiers each month — more than enough to offset battlefield losses. “We need at least two drones per enemy soldier plus additional drones for enemy drone pilots, logistics, artillery, storage facilities and so on,” Fedorenko said. “The more drones we have, the better.”

Few technologies highlight the intersection of geopolitics and drone mass production more clearly than fiber-optic drones, the latest game-changer in remote-control warfare. First deployed by Russia in summer 2024, these systems resemble conventional FPV models loaded with explosives. But instead of relying on radio signals — which can be jammed — they are tethered to the operator via miles of ultra-thin fiber-optic cable, making them highly resistant to electronic warfare. As long as the cable remains intact, the drone stays under full control and can only be neutralized by direct fire. For infantry on the ground, fiber-optic drones are a nightmare they can’t escape unless they can shoot them down.

Battlefields in Ukraine now often look like Spider-Man had cast his web across them. The widespread use of fiber-optic drones has given Russia an operational edge. “Most of the key components — such as fiber-optic spools — come from China. Fedorenko claims Russia is supplied by China at a ratio of nine to one compared to Ukraine. “Thanks to Chinese resources, Russia managed to scale up this production several times faster,” he said. “Right now, we’re partially catching up in terms of production volume. We still need at least another six months just to approach parity.”

Top: Fedorenko sits surrounded by an arsenal of drones in the Donetsk region in May 2024. Center: A fiber-optic drone is seen during a test flight in the Kyiv Oblast in December 2024. Bottom: Houses and streets are covered with an anti-drone net in Orikhiv in July 2025. | Viktor Fridshon/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images; Mauricio Lima/The New York Times via Redux Pictures; Andriy Andriyenko/Ukraine 65th Brigade via AP

At the same time, as new weapons enter the fight, some legacy systems have seen their traditional roles shrink. Fedorenko noted that in recent assaults in the Kupiansk region, Russian armored columns failed to even reach the front line — destroyed by Ukrainian drones before making contact. Yet he draws a key distinction: “Armored vehicles haven’t lost their relevance — they’ve lost their combat power. That’s a fundamentally different thing.” If Ukraine can blind enemy UAVs, knock out radar systems and disable air defenses, he argued, armored vehicles like the American-made Bradley can again play a decisive role — delivering infantry to the front line and enabling tactical breakthroughs. “That’s why experts from NATO are actively studying the experience of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” he added. “And I’m convinced that our partners will soon have the quantity of unmanned systems needed for modern warfare — and for defending against Russia.”

In Class at the ‘Killhouse Academy’

The shortage of infantry in frontline regions remains one of Ukraine’s most pressing existential threats, soldiers and commanders agree. The Ukrainian government has kept the minimum age for mobilization at 25, despite previous calls from U.S. officials to lower it. That makes attracting new recruits a matter of survival for an army heavily outnumbered by Russian forces. Some brigades have learned how to market the war. On a road trip across the country — past gray, Soviet-style concrete apartment blocks and seemingly endless fields of yellow sunflowers — billboards for Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade appear at nearly every turn. On one, an alien and its spaceship land on a battlefield, above the slogan: “We prepare you for every scenario.” Another shows a soldier lounging in a beach chair, piloting a kamikaze drone. The caption reads: “Summer, FPV.”

On a hot summer day, 15 men sit not on a beach but in front of screens in a classroom somewhere near Kyiv, steering unmanned ground systems across a simulated battlefield. At first glance, it could be a Call of Duty video game tournament. In reality, it is part of their preparation for combat. The training software — built in part from actual combat footage taken from this war — is one of the tools used here at “Killhouse Academy,” the name emblazoned in large letters on one wall. This is the training school of the 3rd Assault Brigade — a kind of Ukrainian combination of West Point and MIT for future elite drone pilots.

Walking across the academy grounds feels like stepping into an adventure park for soldiers. In a vast hall, recruits fly FPV drones through a course of tires suspended from the ceiling. Next door, young men navigate mine-clearing robots and cargo ground drones over gravel tracks and grassy fields. “These unmanned systems are now often the last chance for wounded soldiers to be evacuated,” says Volodymyr, a UGV instructor at the 3rd Assault Brigade’s school. Sometimes help also comes from the sky. A recent video published by the Rubizh Brigade — a unit of Ukraine’s National Guard — shows an aerial drone that normally carries a large bomb delivering an e-bike to the frontline. A wounded Ukrainian soldier — previously trapped and under Russian attack — escaped on the bike, saving his life.

Killhouse Academy is the training school of the 3rd Assault Brigade — a kind of Ukrainian combination of West Point and MIT for future elite drone pilots. | Ivan Zakharenko for POLITICO

According to Volodymyr, more than 90 percent of all unmanned ground vehicles on the battlefield are currently used for logistics, with the rest deployed for assaults and other operations. “I believe this ratio will become more balanced in the future,” he told me. The instructor gestured toward a robotic system in the workshop of the Killhouse Academy, which is equipped with a Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher. “This variant is also capable of providing direct support in assault operations,” he said. The robot can support troops with precise fire at ranges of just over a mile.

The biggest promise in drone warfare is artificial intelligence. One of the most visible trends at Ukrainian frontlines is the growing use of semi-autonomous target guidance — ranging from programmed tracking to AI-enhanced systems — especially among elite FPV strike teams. The system allows drones to lock onto a target and complete their mission even if the operator loses signal — a major advantage in environments saturated with electronic warfare. When I met him in the remote forest, Fedorenko explained that Ukrainian drones now fly at a certain altitude where the control signal is strongest, lock onto the target, and then switch to autonomous mode to strike both static and moving ground vehicles. And with thousands of new AI-enabled guidance kits now being delivered to Ukraine, such capabilities are expected to become far more widespread and sophisticated in the coming months.

Ukrainian developers believe that AI will soon solve one of the biggest challenges in the drone war: connectivity. In the Zaporizhzhia region, POLITICO observed a 65th Brigade unit using a modification of a drone that operates using a chain of transmitters that enable it to fly at higher altitudes, thereby extending the radio horizon to 25 miles.

The manufacturer of this drone, the Ukrainian firm Twist Robotics, also offers integrated AI software capable of automatically detecting enemy targets. The system is trained on thousands of hours of photos and videos of real combat, drawn mostly from public sources — themselves largely from the war after 2022 — as well as from non-public battlefield material. “When you show the AI a million tanks from different seasons and locations, eventually it can distinguish a tank from a bush,” said founder and CEO Viktor Sakharchuk, a former software developer.

A long-anticipated but so far unrealized vision in the drone war is the deployment of swarms — groups of unmanned aircraft working together to strike targets autonomously. Sakharchuk calls this “drone group tasking” and says the technology is no longer far off. “We’ll soon see two or three drones attacking in a group. And we will see larger drones carrying smaller ones deep into enemy territory and launching them automatically.”

“We have now reached the point in this war where cheap, low-tech drones have reached their limit,” he said. “Within a year, 90 percent of successful drone operations will be influenced by AI.”

But for now, the Ukrainian officer whose name is synonymous with drone warfare sounded a cautionary note about the transformation of the modern battlefield. The idea that unmanned systems could fully replace artillery or infantry is a misconception, said Fedorenko.

“In poor weather — heavy rain, strong wind, or snow — drones often cannot fly or gather clear imagery. “Who will kill the enemy? The artillery,” he said. “It fires in any weather. It will fulfill the task. No one will replace artillery in the next 50 years.” The same applies to infantry: It is still human beings who operate tanks and firearms, he said.

Full-scale robotic wars remain science fiction — for now. “That’s why people continue to be the main capital of war.”

Politico

8. China bets on military industrial might to outproduce and outlast rivals like the US

China's military weapons

China Military

The Front Line | China bets on military industrial might to outproduce and outlast rivals like the US

Vast defence factories including ‘aerospace city’ are fusing civil and manufacturing capacity to supercharge the country’s armed forces

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3322933/china-bets-military-industrial-might-outproduce-and-outlast-rivals-us

Amber Wangin Beijing

Published: 6:00am, 24 Aug 2025Updated: 3:22pm, 25 Aug 2025

China is on a mission to turn its military into a modern fighting force. In the second of this four-part series, we look at how its massive defence industry can support China’s military goals, and during wartime could be further bolstered by the civilian manufacturing sector.

In the northeastern city of Shenyang, the future of China’s defence manufacturing capacity is rapidly taking shape – an enormous new aviation industrial complex that will eventually occupy an area about the size of 600 football fields.

Video of the site was aired on a provincial television news programme in early July, part of a feature about the provincial governor’s visit to the headquarters of the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. The firm, which owns the collection of new complexes, makes China’s main carrier-based fighter, the J-15, as well as the country’s most advanced J-35 stealth fighter and prototypes for a sixth-generation jet.

In the report, Wang Xinwei, governor of Liaoning province, pledged to build a “world-class aerospace city”.

Details of what the production lines would eventually look like were not revealed, and Beijing has been tight-lipped on such military facilities. However, the scope of the complex has raised eyebrows.

While the development of the military weapons used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has seen rapid progress, the country’s industrial capacity to mass produce such weapons in the event of possible protracted warfare has also gained attention amid the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Beijing has maintained a massive defence industry to support its military goals, which during wartime could be further bolstered by the civilian manufacturing sector, experts have said.

They have pointed out that these strengths could be key to winning conflicts, including one in the Taiwan Strait, as rivals such as the United States see their defence industries bogged down by budgets and red tape.

Industrial base, industrial scale

“China’s defence industry remains formidable and has increased its incorporation of information and digital technologies. Impressive examples include China’s carrier programme, advanced surface ships, stealth aircraft, hypersonic missiles and satellite programme,” said Timothy Heath, a senior international defence researcher at the US-based Rand Corporation.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Industry Database, at least four of China’s state-owned arms companies ranked among the top 25 globally in 2019, based on the value of arms sales. They included Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco), and China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC).

The US Navy estimates that China’s shipbuilding capacity is roughly 230 times larger than that of America. According to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in March, China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder constructed more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire US shipbuilding industry has completed since the end of World War II.

China’s leading position in global shipbuilding stretched to 14 consecutive years, according to a news release by BRS Shipbrokers in May 2024, with its top five shipyards – CSSC, COSCO, Jiangsu Hanjiang Group, Nantong Xiangyu and Yangzijiang Shipbuilding Group – accounting for 62.9 per cent of the global order book.

China has the largest navy in the world, with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants, according to the Pentagon.

China launched its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012. It has since built two more, including the Fujian – which is equipped with an electromagnetic catapult and expected to enter service this year. A fourth aircraft carrier – likely to be nuclear-powered – is reportedly being built in the northern port city of Dalian.

IN A MINUTE: New footage of China’s next-generation aircraft carrier #shorts

The Pentagon’s 2024 report said the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy’s fleet of aircraft together constituted the “largest aviation forces” in the Indo-Pacific region and the third largest in the world at more than 3,150 aircraft, around 2,400 of which were warplanes.

Meanwhile, the top Chinese military aircraft manufacturers are reporting significant increases in profit, with pledges to further expand production.

Several of AVIC’s core subsidiaries have reported strong financial results. Its Shenyang branch, the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, said in 2023 that it aimed to invest 8.6 billion yuan (US$1.2 billion) to build a production site 4.2 sq km (1.6 square miles) in size over the next five years. It is believed to be the same one that appeared in last month’s news programme.

According to its 2024 annual report, AVIC’s Xian Aircraft Industrial Corporation, which produces bombers and large transport aircraft like the Y-20, recorded revenue of 43.2 billion yuan, up 7.2 per cent year-on-year.

AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, manufacturer of the J-20 stealth fighter and a leading contender for China’s sixth-generation combat aircraft programme, reported 1.78 billion yuan in revenue, up 6.1 per cent over the previous year. The company said it had entered a new phase of “intelligent cost control” and high-autonomy manufacturing.

A senior researcher shed light on the new efficiencies in an interview with state broadcaster CCTV in July. Sun Cong, chief designer of the J-15, said the planes were “being made like mobile phones as the functions are now software-based, so the systems and software could be designed separately [to boost efficiency]”.

Despite China’s slowing economic growth, its defence spending has been stable, growing 6.8 per cent in 2021 to 7.2 per cent in 2025.

“With global instability and conflicts flaring up in multiple regions, maintaining stability requires a strong defence capability,” said Fu Qianshao, a military analyst formerly with China’s air force.

“That means accelerating the development and deployment of advanced weaponry, expanding production capacity, and ensuring that the most cutting-edge systems enter service to meet the needs of national defence.”

Fu said that China had sped up its weapons research and development timelines in recent years to meet military modernisation goals.

“The traditional model – where a new generation of equipment might take five to 10 years to design – no longer meets the demands of modern military modernisation,” he said.

China’s defence capacity is underpinned by its strong overall manufacturing base, which, according to a Rand Corporation report last year, accounted for around 25 per cent of global manufacturing output, half of which was considered dual-use.

Lu Li-Shih, a Taiwanese analyst and a former Taiwanese navy captain, credited the vigour to industrial initiatives such as “Made in China 2025” – a national plan launched a decade ago to upgrade the manufacturing sector – and military-civil fusion (MCF), which not only encourages greater civilian contributions to the military but also enables military state-owned enterprises to support the broader economy.

“Aircraft production lines in China are designed for dual use – when military demand rises, they produce military aircraft; when demand falls, they can switch to civilian production,” Lu said. “This is the essence of China’s military-civil integration.”

The MCF strategy is aimed at accelerating the integration of civilian and military industrial bases, promoting the mutual transfer of technologies and resources between the two sectors to enhance both national defence and economic development.

It was elevated to a “national strategy” in 2015. Since then, thousands of private companies have been urged to participate in defence procurement to support the PLA’s goal of achieving a “world-class” military by 2049.

Who’s winning the US-China rivalry?

The support China’s military receives from a strong industrial base contrasts sharply with recent trends seen in the US military.

In a keynote address in 2022, Cameron Holt, a retired US Air Force major general who was then deputy assistant secretary for contracting, said that the Chinese military was acquiring weapons “five to six times” faster than the US, according to a report in The National Interest.

It noted that while some US military hardware programmes may see rapid progress in their early stages, they could be hampered by budget adjustments – in essence, too much bureaucracy.

For instance, according to a July report by Breaking Defence, the engine system for the F-47 sixth-generation fighter jet was likely to face a two-year delay and would not be completed before 2030. The report quoted a US Air Force representative as saying that the hold-up reflected “supply chain challenges”.

The US Navy’s next generation attack submarine’s development was also expected to be “significantly delayed”, from financial year 2035 to 2040, according to a report to Congress sent by the Congressional Research Service in July. Such a delay could have an impact “on the future US ability to maintain undersea superiority and fulfil US Navy missions”, the report said.

Meanwhile, the next Ford-class aircraft carrier was facing a two-year delay – to March 2027 – USNI News reported in July.

Fu said American plans were not always adhered to. “Many US plans look good on paper but are abandoned before completion. Without a full development-production-sustainment cycle, it leads to massive waste in new weapons development. So even though the US has the world’s largest defence budget, its production capacity lags far behind China’s,” he said.

China’s supply chain was also a strength, he added.

“Manufacturing cannot operate without the support of a broad and complete industrial chain – for example, materials production is not strictly part of the defence sector, but is crucially related,” Fu said. “A comprehensive and self-sufficient industrial system is essential. Without it, even basic items like artillery shells cannot be produced independently,” he added.

China’s supply chain advantages include its near monopoly on rare metals that are critical for manufacturing various missiles and munitions. According to the Rand Corporation, 18 of 37 minerals relevant to defence applications are concentrated in China.

According to the 2023 CSIS report, the country was also the global leader in cast products and produced more than the next nine countries combined, including more than five times as much as the US.

Heath, from Rand, said the US defence manufacturing base had declined considerably as its supply chain was globalised to reduce costs.

“Chinese defence industries also often carry out dual-use production to include civilian-use platforms such as merchant ships to offset costs. US leaders are aware of the gap in defence industrial capacity and have debated ways to revise supply chains and restore some of the lost manufacturing capacity,” Heath said.

Research and development, and skilled personnel and engineering talent also matter. China’s R&D spending for science and technology has risen 10 per cent this year to 398.1 billion yuan, funding that will primarily benefit areas like semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing.

However, China’s shortcomings in advanced chips remains a key gap with the US, as the country continues to rely on certain foreign capabilities – such as advanced semiconductor fabrication tools and software – to produce AI hardware.

Recent lessons for a Taiwan conflict

Mainland China’s defence industrial capacity provides a potential advantage in military operations against Taiwan, according to think tank reports and analysts.

Recent regional conflicts highlight the importance of maintaining a robust stockpile. According to a CNN report on July 28, the US used up roughly 25 per cent of its high-end THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missile interceptors during June’s 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran, raising concerns about its ability to sustain future missile defence operations.

The war in Ukraine has been a stark reminder that any protracted conflict today is likely to take the form of an industrial war, which would require a defence industry capable of manufacturing enough munitions, weapons systems and material to replace depleted stockpiles, according to a 2023 report by CSIS.

Taiwan seals deal for Ukraine combat-tested drone software to counter Beijing

In nearly two dozen iterations of a CSIS war game that examined a US-China conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the US typically expended more than 5,000 long-range missiles in three weeks of conflict, the report noted.

In terms of anti-ship missiles, the CSIS report said, “in every iteration of the war game, the United States expended its inventory of long-range anti-ship missiles within the first week of the conflict”. It took nearly two years to produce a long-range anti-ship missile, according to the report.

While Beijing has never acknowledged having a timeline for military action against Taiwan, it has also never ruled out the use of force to reunite the island it views as part of China.

The United States, like most countries, does not recognise the self-governed island as an independent state. However, Washington is opposed to any attempt to take Taiwan by force and is committed to arming it for defence.

Beijing has intensified its military exercises around the island since August 2022 when then US house speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island.

“The defence industry provides China the ability to manufacture weapons and equipment to replace losses that are difficult for other militaries to replicate due to the lack of integrated defence industrial production networks,” Heath said.

Missiles and drones in particular are critical to modern warfare, and China has the ability to produce both in large numbers, an important factor in sustaining combat power, he added.

According to the Pentagon, China surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of mid-2024 and will have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, many of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels. China will continue to grow its force through at least 2035, it added.

“Parameters are important, but production capacity is even more crucial,” Chinese military analyst Du Wenlong said on his social media account in July, as he highlighted the role of mainland China’s pulse assembly lines in producing its warplanes and missiles.

Although Taiwanese analyst Lu believed that the mainland was likely to resolve the Taiwan issue swiftly – before US aircraft carriers could intervene – he argued that US forces were more likely than the PLA to face ammunition depletion.

He also said that PLA exercises near Taiwan were ideal for assessing its ammunition consumption levels, allowing estimates to be made during these drills and stockpiles to be prepared in advance.

The South China Morning Post has reported that the PLA has sent more military aircraft near Taiwan since William Lai Ching-te was sworn in as its leader in May 2024.

The aircraft have crossed the de facto median line more often and engaged in more operations, as observed in daily manoeuvres.

Amber Wang

Amber Wang is a reporter for the China desk, and focuses on Chinese politics and diplomacy. She joined the Post in 2021, and previously worked for The New York Times and Southern

9. Army transformation plan could undermine infantry brigades: Watchdog

Here is the referenced CRS report:

2025 Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) Force Structure and Organizational Proposals: Background and Issues for Congress

https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R48606.html

This report has a lot of detailed information and background history. I am not sure it is as negative as portrayed by the headline of this article though it does ask tough questions as CRS should.

Army transformation plan could undermine infantry brigades: Watchdog

militarytimes.com · Michael Peck · August 26, 2025

The U.S. Army’s new plan to become a leaner, more modern force may actually undercut combat readiness, warns a congressional watchdog.

The Army Transformation Initiative, or ATI, could affect “the availability of Army forces to support Combatant Command requirements and the effectiveness of Army ground operations, as well as the effectiveness of ATI-proposed changes to existing headquarters units,” according to a report by the Congressional Research Service, or CRS, which is Congress’ in-house think tank.

The specifics of ATI have yet to be finalized in the wake of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s April directive that called for transforming the Army “at an accelerated pace by divesting outdated, redundant, and inefficient programs, as well as restructuring headquarters and acquisition systems.”

Hegseth’s directive was quickly followed by a letter to the force from Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George, which outlined a plan to convert Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, or IBCTs, to Mobile Brigade Combat Teams “to improve mobility and lethality in a leaner formation.”

The letter also vowed to cancel the procurement of “outdated crewed attack aircraft such as the AH-64D [helicopter], excess ground vehicles like the HMMWV [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle] and JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle], and obsolete UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] like the Gray Eagle,” as well as canceling programs “that deliver dated, late-to-need, overpriced, or difficult-to-maintain capabilities.”

Army aviation would also take a hit, with Army Reserve helicopter units being inactivated, active-duty combat aviation brigades losing an air cavalry squadron apiece and medevac units having fewer helicopters. However, the Army would field more drones and long-range missiles, the M1E3 tank and the Future Long-Range Assault Helicopter.

CRS questions whether converting IBCTs into Mobile Brigade Combat Teams would affect the Army’s 14 active component IBCTs and 20 National Guard IBCTs “with potential operational impacts in terms of organization and capabilities for Army infantry formations.” Downsizing medevac helicopters “could affect casualty evacuation operations and patient survivability.”

Interestingly, CRS also suggests that the combatant commands may have been frozen out of the ATI process.

“It also is not known if Combatant Commanders played any role in the development of ATI or had the opportunity to express their respective concerns over proposed ATI changes,” the report said.

In particular, reports that the Army may eliminate four of its six Security Force Assistance Brigades, “which primarily support Combatant Commander’s security force assistance efforts,” could have operational implications, the report noted.

Congress has already complained that the Army has yet to provide details and cost savings for ATI. Nor does the Army even have metrics to assess whether ATI is working.

“We need to see your homework,” Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in June.

“Without measures of effectiveness and a subsequent evaluation, ATI might be viewed by some as transformation for the sake of transformation,” CRS concluded.

10. How Taiwan is preparing for Chinese attack with acting, fake blood and mock missile strikes

How Taiwan is preparing for a China attack with acting, fake blood and fake missile attacks

2 days ago

Tessa Wong

Asia Digital Reporter•@tessa_wong

BBC

How Taiwan is preparing for Chinese attack with acting, fake blood and mock missile strikes

16 minutes ago

Tessa Wong

Asia Digital Reporter•@tessa_wong

BBC

It was just another Friday morning on the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, a few kilometres from the coast of China, when an air raid siren pierced the calm.

At a local government office, people switched off their lights and dove under tables. Others fled to an underground car park. At a nearby hospital, staff rushed to treat people staggering in with bloody injuries.

But the blood was fake, and the casualties were volunteer actors. Together with the government workers, they were taking part in mandatory civil defence and military drills held across Taiwan last month.

The purpose? Rehearsing their response to a possible attack by China.

Tessa Wong/ BBC

Drills rehearse military and civilian response to a Chinese attack

China has long vowed to "reunify" with self-governing Taiwan and has not ruled out the use of force. It is a threat that Taiwan is increasingly taking seriously. President William Lai, who took office last year, is behind one of the strongest pushes in years to strengthen defence.

One of his biggest challenges, however, is convincing his own people of the urgency. While his defence drive has garnered support, it has also sparked controversy.

"We do need these defence drills, I believe there is some threat from China," says Ben, a finance professional who works in Taipei. "But the chances of a Chinese invasion are low. If they really wanted to attack us, they would have done so already."

Like Ben, most people in Taiwan – 65% according to a survey released in May by the military-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Strategic Research (INDSR) - believe it is unlikely that China will attack in the next five years.

This is despite the US warning that the threat to Taiwan was "imminent" and that Beijing is readying its military to be capable of invading by 2027.

Taiwan's military preparations

Lai and his government often repeat a particular phrase to explain what is driving them: "By preparing for war, we are avoiding war." They have stressed that they are not seeking conflict but exercising Taiwan's right to build up its defences.

As well as having initiated major military reforms, they also want to increase defence spending by 23% next year to NT$949.5bn (£23bn; $31bn), which would be more than 3% of their GDP, following US pressure to invest more in defence. Lai has pledged to increase it to 5% by 2030.

Ritchie B Tongo/ EPA/Shutterstock

President William Lai and his government have initiated major military reforms

Following a lengthening of its mandatory conscription programme, Taiwan has now increased pay and benefits for the military, and introduced more rigorous training.

These measures are aimed at addressing the perennial problems of troop shortages and low morale - soldiers previously complained of poor training and were nicknamed "strawberry soldiers" for their perceived softness.

The annual Han Kuang war games, which rehearse a military response to a Chinese attack, have been revamped to replace scripted exercises with more realistic simulations.

This year's edition was the longest and largest ever, with 22,000 reservist troops taking part, about 50% more than last year. Besides tackling grey zone warfare and disinformation campaigns, one main focus was to prepare for urban warfare.

RITCHIE B TONGO/EPA/Shutterstock

Taiwan has now increased pay and benefits for the military

Soldiers rehearsed fending off enemy troops on the mass transit system, expressways and city suburbs. In Taipei, they practised loading missiles onto attack helicopters at a riverside park, and transformed a school into a battle tank repair station.

But the government is also preparing its citizens for invasion, upping the frequency and scale of civil defence drills.

Practice evacuations, raids and rescues

One of the largest ever, called the Urban Resilience Exercise, was held last month.

Over several days, every major urban area across Taiwan took turns to hold air raid drills. Residents in designated districts had to head indoors, while hotels, shops and restaurants had to pause business. Passengers could not get on or off trains and planes. Anyone caught flouting orders risked getting a fine.

Ritchie B Tongo/ EPA/Shutterstock

In Taipei, people practised putting out fires and lowering themselves down buildings

In downtown Taipei, emergency teams and volunteers practised evacuating injured people, putting out fires, and lowering themselves down buildings which had been dressed up to look as if they had been hit by missiles. Medical teams triaged evacuees in a car park, wrapping up wounds and stringing up bags of saline for IV drips under tents.

Some Taiwanese approve. "I think it's a good thing. Because I do believe the threat has increased," says office worker Stanley Wei.

"Look at how China keeps surrounding us," he says, pointing out how China has been holding drills to encircle Taiwan with warships.

"I believe in a peaceful co-existence with China, but we need to increase our defence as well," says Ray Yang, who works in IT. "Before the Ukraine War, I didn't care about this [prospect of a Chinese attack]. But after Ukraine happened, I've started to really believe this could happen."

Tessa Wong/ BBC

Some Taiwanese, including Stanley Wei, think the drills are a good thing

Some, however, are dismissive. "Even if the attack comes, what can we do?" argues Mr Liu, an engineer.

"I'm not sure they would invade anyway. This threat has always existed."

'Why would they hurt us ordinary folk?'

On Kinmen, the scepticism is even more prevalent.

The tiny island, which saw deadly clashes between Chinese and Taiwanese forces in the late 1940s and 50s, is considered a frontline of any possible attack. But with the improvement of cross-strait relations and economic links, many on Kinmen view their proximity to China as a boon, not a bane.

Much of Kinmen's economy is now geared towards serving Chinese tourists who take ferries across the narrow waterway from Xiamen, the nearest Chinese city.

Tessa Wong/ BBC

Yang Peiling witnessed Chinese forces from Xiamen shelling Kinmen in 1958

Yang Peiling, 77, runs a shop in Kinmen selling traditional snacks. As a young girl, she witnessed Chinese forces from Xiamen shelling her island during the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.

"We were on the mountain gathering wild vegetables, then we saw them shooting cannons and hitting Kinmen," she recalls. "[People] cried 'Xiamen is waging war.' Everything turned red."

Ms Yang and her family survived by hiding in mountain caves. Others from her village were killed.

Decades on, she welcomes day trippers from Xiamen at her shop. "China won't attack us now," she argues. "We are all Chinese, we are all one family. Why would they hurt us ordinary folk?"

Down the road at a souvenir store, shop assistant Ms Chen agrees. "If they blow up our buildings and kill us, what's the point of claiming a land like that? They would gain a Taiwan that has nothing, and that brings them no advantages."

This view - that invading Taiwan would be far too costly and pointless for China - is held by many Taiwanese. Beijing has repeatedly stressed it wants "peaceful reunification", seen by some as a signal it wants a Taiwan that is intact.

Ritchie B Tongo / EPA/Shutterstock

President William Lai argues that China is planning to "annex" Taiwan

But Lai argues that China is a "foreign hostile force" that is planning to "annex" Taiwan, and is continuing its "political and military intimidation".

Another factor that has long reassured the Taiwanese is that the US is bound by law to preserve Taiwan's security. Though polls suggest this sense of reassurance has waned during President Donald Trump's current administration, some still believe the US would aid Taiwan in the event of an attack - and China would be reluctant to be drawn into a direct military conflict with America.

"This isn't a naïve and innocent view that China doesn't present a threat to Taiwan and would never attack Taiwan," said Shen Ming-shih, a defence analyst with the INDSR.

"Yes, Xi Jinping does have strategic warfare intentions for Taiwan. But China's current military strength does not match America's," he says.

Shufu Liu / Office of the President/Anadolu via Getty Images

President William Lai has said that China is a "foreign hostile force"

There is also a belief that the international community would come to Taiwan's aid given its outsized importance in the global semiconductor industry, he adds.

But after facing decades of threats, there is also now "a sense of Beijing as the boy who cried wolf," says Wen-ti Sung, a political scientist with the Australian National University's Taiwan Center.

"Psychologically, you can't take every threat seriously without going insane. So people tune out to prioritise their mental health."

The debate around whether China will invade

Whether China will invade has long been an existential debate in Taiwan. But the urgency of this question has spiked with a recent escalation in tensions, particularly with William Lai's election last year.

Lai, who insists that Taiwan was never part of China, and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are reviled by the Chinese government as "separatists".

Beijing has accused Lai's government of deliberately antagonising them, particularly with the defence drive. Last month, China's defence ministry called the Han Kuang exercises "nothing but a bluffing and self-deceiving trick played by the DPP authorities to hijack Taiwan compatriots onboard its 'Taiwan Independence' war chariot".

Any formal declaration of independence by Taiwan could trigger military action from China, which has a law stating it will resort to "non-peaceful means" to prevent the "secession" of Taiwan. Lai maintains Taiwan is already a sovereign nation and therefore has no need to formally declare independence.

Getty Images

China has increasingly sent its warplanes and ships into Taiwanese airspace and waters

Besides turning up its rhetoric, China has also increasingly sent its warplanes and ships into Taiwanese airspace and waters.

China has never confirmed the US claim that it is readying its military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. But it has been clearly beefing up its army, navy and weaponry, which will be shown off in a much-publicised parade next month.

Experts are divided on whether China is really planning to invade soon. But many agree that the tensions, coupled with China's military moves, increase the possibility of confrontation.

Beach landings, missile attacks and cable sabotage

There are myriad ways China could attack. Besides landing on Taiwan's beaches or launching missile attacks, it could also stage air and sea blockades, or sever undersea communication cables. Many of these scenarios are illustrated in a Taiwanese government-funded TV series depicting a fictional Chinese invasion.

But some, particularly the Taiwan government, believe a subtler invasion may already be taking place: one where China is trying to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Taiwanese in the hopes they would one day choose unification.

PEDRO PARDO/AFP via Getty Images

Experts say there are myriad ways China could attack

Officially, China has been encouraging trade and economic ties with Taiwan, as well as cultural links.

Unofficially though, according to analysts and Taiwan officials, Beijing has also invested in disinformation campaigns and influence operations. One study by the V-Dem Institute of Sweden's University of Gothenberg found that for many years, Taiwan has been the most targeted place in the world for disinformation campaigns initiated by a foreign government.

In March, Lai warned of China's deepening influence in Taiwan's economy, culture, media, and even the government, and announced several measures to tighten security.

A number of Taiwanese soldiers and military officials have been jailed for allegedly spying on behalf of China. Members of the DPP – including a former aide to Lai – have also been charged with spying.

Meanwhile, Taiwanese celebrities friendly to China, social media influencers and Chinese spouses of Taiwanese citizens have come under close scrutiny, with some deported or forced to leave.

Lai has also backed a deeply controversial grassroots movement aimed at kicking out opposition politicians perceived as being too close to China.

'Lai is crazy in the way he talks to China'

There are some signs of public support of the defence drive. The INDSR survey found more than half of Taiwanese approve of increasing defence spending, with even more supporting US weapons purchases.

But there is also unease. One view is that the defence drive and Lai's rhetoric are provoking China, which could lead to war.

Tessa Wong/ BBC

One view is that the defence drive could provoke China

"I feel China is very simple," says Ms Chen, the Kinmen shop assistant. "As long as you don't tell them you want independence, they won't do anything to you.

"But William Lai is crazy in the way he talks to China. It will stoke their fury. You never know, one day Xi Jinping may get very unhappy and attack us."

Polls consistently show that most Taiwanese people want the "status quo", meaning they neither want to unify with China, nor to formally declare independence.

The political opposition, dominated by the Kuomintang (KMT) party, accuses the DPP government of using the prospect of a Chinese invasion to fearmonger so it can gain political support.

Alexander Huang, the KMT's director of international affairs, characterised the DPP government as "verbally intimidating the Chinese unnecessarily and damaging the stability in the Taiwan Straits".

Still, others argue that Taiwanese need to take a firm stand against China.

"[Citizens] have to acknowledge that China is a threat to Taiwan, and can use force, and that it is currently preparing to do so," said Dr Shen.

"And so national security officials and the military must first prepare for this."

Hackers, secret cables and security fears: The explosive fight over China's new embassy in the UK

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Top image credit: Ritchie B Tongo/ EPA/Shutterstock/ EPA -EFE/REX

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11. Judge orders Kari Lake to answer questions about Voice of America under oath

sigh....

Every article I read about what is happening to VOA (and my beloved Korean Service) it makes my blood boil.

Judge orders Kari Lake to answer questions about Voice of America under oath

August 26, 20255:00 AM ET

David Folkenflik

NPR · David Folkenflik · August 26, 2025

Trump adviser Kari Lake holds up a photograph, which she says shows an empty Voice of America (VOA) newsroom, as she speaks during a U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on June 25, 2025. Joe Raedle/Getty Images North America

A senior federal judge ordered Trump administration official Kari Lake to submit to questioning under oath in ongoing litigation over her efforts to effectively dismantle Voice of America despite Congressional mandates that it be maintained.

U.S District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth said Lake was "verging on contempt of court" for failing to comply with his repeated orders to make information available about her intentions for the future of the federally funded international broadcaster.

He said Lake and two aides had to testify by Sept. 15 and provide the court with detailed information she had, to date, withheld about Voice of America and its federal parent, the U.S. Agency for Global Media. One of the aides is Frank Wuco, a political appointee who helped to investigate Voice of America journalists for ideological bias at the end of President Trump's first term.

Sponsor Message

In a comment emailed to NPR, Lake rejected the judge's power in the case to have the final say over her actions.

"Time and again, we've seen district court judges overstep their authority," Lake told NPR. "It's wrong, but sadly, it's become the norm. The current case against USAGM is a great example of why we need to restore constitutional checks and balances."

Lake is being sued in a pair of related cases brought by Voice of America's director, several journalists, a senior executive of its parent agency, and assorted unions and press advocacy groups.

During Monday's two-hour court hearing, Lamberth blasted a U.S. Justice Department attorney for his handling of the defense, saying he was offering only vague assurances that the government had acted responsibly instead of substantive responses.

"That's just a hide-the-ball answer," Lamberth tersely told Michael Velchik, a senior counsel for the U.S. Justice Department who made his first court appearance in the case Monday.

Velchik cited the president's executive powers under the Constitution and said given the historic efforts to reduce the size of government, it was understandable that communicating precise information in real time would be difficult for Lake and the agency.

Lamberth repeatedly interrupted Velchick and Abigail Stout, another government attorney, over the actions that Lake and her team had taken without informing him. Among those actions: asking Congressional leaders for new funding for the agency, cycling out senior executives, suspending most of her workforce, seeking to fire the director of Voice of America and striking a deal to carry coverage from the right-wing TV outlet One America News Network.

Sponsor Message

Lamberth also took issue with the merits and means of many of those moves - for example, the deal with OANN. "I thought the idea of Voice of America was not to take sides," said Lamberth, a conservative Republican first appointed to the bench by President Ronald Reagan in 1987.

Lake arrived at the agency in February after years as a local news anchor in Phoenix and two failed bids for U.S. Senator and governor in Arizona on a pro-Trump platform. Since arriving in Washington, D.C., she has cited a March executive order from President Trump in slashing Voice of America and the network's parent agency, the U.S. Agency for Global Media, to the bone.

She reiterated that mandate in an appearance on the pro-Trump outlet Real America's Voice Monday night.

Lake fired hundreds of contract workers and placed hundreds of full-time employees on permanent paid leave, while informing them their jobs would soon end. Where Voice of America used to broadcast in 49 languages, it broadcasts in four today. Less than 10% of its journalists remain on the job. Voice of America's director, White House bureau chief and press freedoms editor, and the agency's chief strategy officer - all of whom are suing Lake - are among those on paid leave.

Lamberth has previously ruled that Lake has acted hastily, violating legal and constitutional safeguards.

An appellate court knocked down two of his orders but left intact a third: that Voice of America be brought back to full power so it can provide, as the law compels, "news which is consistently reliable and authoritative, accurate, objective, and comprehensive." He said simply having journalists on paid leave and on call to return temporarily, if needed, does not fill that mission.

Congress had stipulated that the U.S. Agency for Global Media has limited ability to shift around or reduce funding. Yet Lake also sought to kill funding for Voice of America's sister networks, such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and the Middle East Broadcast Networks. Other judicial rulings have required her to re-open the flow of payments for those networks, which are technically not-for-profits.

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In court filings on behalf of Lake and the government, attorneys for the U.S. Justice Department cited Trump's Article II executive powers under the Constitution to say that he could make whatever decisions he wanted over federal agencies.

Lamberth has previously written that he believes Lake was simply putting people on leave to stall for time, hoping to run out the current fiscal year that ends Sept. 30 and to convince Congress not to fund the international broadcasters in coming years.

The U.S. government launched Voice of America in 1942 to broadcast accurate news reports into Nazi-controlled territory. During the Cold War, it flourished, along with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as a show of soft power. It beamed news and music programs that advertised the appeal of American culture, but also modeled democratic discourse to people living under authoritarian regimes.

The plaintiffs who brought the case against the Trump administration say its actions violate Congress' intent and the black letter of the law.

On Monday, the judge seemed to embrace their thinking. He asked numerous times how Lake could be complying with federal law - even under Trump's order to do the minimum required by law - when it mandated broadcasts in Korean and there were no such Korean-language offerings. Velchik said he contested that interpretation - pointing to the law saying that Voice of America was intended to help fulfill foreign policy imperatives.

"Who gets to decide?" Velchik argued. "Not me. Not the plaintiffs. Not the court."

"Congress has a constitutionally provided role," Lamberth interjected.

And he repeatedly asked why he was not told of the plans to fire Voice of America Director Michael Abramowitz, how former U.S. Agency for Global Media Acting CEO Victor Morales was ousted, and who was currently serving as Voice of America's acting director in Abramowitz's absence.

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The federal attorneys did not have answers. At one point, his response having been found wanting by Lamberth, Vilchik asked the judge if he should simply repeat his answer once more.

The plaintiffs argue the White House cannot order the firing of Voice of America Director Michael Abramowitz because such a move requires the approval of a super-majority of a bipartisan advisory panel for international broadcasting. Trump dismissed the members of the panel upon taking office and has not moved to appoint new members, who would require confirmation by the U.S. Senate. (U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio remains on the board by virtue of his primary job.)

Abramowitz's attorney, William Schultz, said that an effort to switch Abramowitz to a job overseeing a handful of staffers at a shortwave radio facility in North Carolina constituted a removal, whether or not he accepted the transfer - which he did not do.

Lamberth asked pointedly about Lake's position as well.

Lake, initially announced as a senior adviser at the agency, has styled herself as the agency's acting CEO since at least late July, as NPR reported earlier this month and she attested in a sworn declaration filed to the court.

Neither the White House, Lake, nor the agency have provided any documentation of her appointment to that acting position, despite specific and repeated requests from NPR. Under the terms of the relevant statute, Lake does not appear to be eligible to fill the chief executive position on an acting basis.

The permanent position requires Senate confirmation.

Under the law, an acting CEO must have been the acting chief deputy of the CEO before the vacancy arose, or confirmed to a different federal position by the U.S. Senate, or a senior agency executive for at least 90 days prior to the departure of the last Senate-confirmed CEO, Amanda Bennett. Bennett left on the day of Trump's inauguration in January.

NPR · David Folkenflik · August 26, 2025

12. New Rifles Chambered In 6.5mm Creedmoor Heading To U.S. Special Operations Armories

New Rifles Chambered In 6.5mm Creedmoor Heading To U.S. Special Operations Armories

The new Mid-Range Gas Gun-Assault will give U.S. special operators a rifle option for greater reach, accuracy, and ballistic performance.

Joseph Trevithick

Published Aug 26, 2025 7:16 PM EDT

120

flip.it · Joseph Trevithick

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) recently awarded a contract for new rifles chambered to fire the 6.5mm Creedmoor round to Lewis Machine & Tool (LMT). The Mid-Range Gas Gun-Assault (MRGG-A) rifles will give special operators greater reach, as well as improved accuracy and terminal performance against targets at those longer ranges.

The Pentagon quietly announced the deal for the MRGG-As (sometimes also referred to as Medium-Range Gas Gun-Assault or Mid-Range Gas Gun-Assaulter rifles) in its daily contracting announcement on August 22. The contract, which covers “medium range gas gun-assault kits, spare parts and accessories, new equipment training, and engineering change proposals,” has a maximum ceiling of $92 million and runs through August 14, 2035.

A picture of an MRGG-A “Factory Reference Rifle” that LMT has offered for commercial sale, reflecting the configuration of its guns for SOCOM. LMT

LMT’s MRGG-A is a member of its Modular Ambidextrous Rifle System-Heavy (MARS-H) family, which are commonly described as AR-10-style rifles. The original Armalite AR-10 is the larger predecessor to the widely recognized AR-15/M16 pattern. Like the AR-10, as well as many AR-15/M16 variants and derivatives, all of the MARS-H versions listed on LMT’s website at the time of writing use the so-called direct impingement operating principle. This means that when the gun is fired, some of the gas that propels the bullet down the barrel is siphoned off and blown directly against the main action to cycle it. Variations on the AR-15/M16 pattern that use a physical gas piston instead are increasingly common. A piston keeps propellant gas, and the particulate matter within it, away from the gun’s action, reducing the chance of fouling and offering other maintenance and reliability advantages. These rifles are typically heavier and more expensive than their DI counterparts, though.

The MRGG-A configuration LMT has shown publicly has a 14.5″ barrel built into an upper receiver with a ‘monolithic’ Picatinny type rail for optics and other accessories that runs the full length of the top of the rifle. The sides of the handguard have additional accessory attachment points utilizing the increasingly popular M-LOK system from Magpul. The gun has ambidextrous controls and is capable of semi-automatic and fully-automatic fire.

LMT has also shown MRGG-As with scopes from Nightforce Optics, as seen in the picture at the top of this story. Back in 2021, Nightforce announced it had secured a contract from SOCOM for ATACRTM 4-20×50 F1 scopes “to augment multiple systems in the SOCOM inventory and… to support the MRGG (Mid-Range Gas Gun) once it is fielded.” In U.S. service, those optics are also referred to as Ranging-Variable Power Scopes (R-VPS).

SOCOM’s MRGG effort traces back to the late 2010s and was subsequently split into two separate subcomponents, the MRGG-A and the MRGG-S (for sniper). It has also been presented in the past as primarily intended for use within the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community, which includes the U.S. Navy’s SEAL teams, though it is unclear if this is still the case.

In 2023, SOCOM chose a separate AR-10-esque design with a 20-inch barrel from Geissele Automatics to become the MRGG-S. The Pentagon’s contracting notice at the time noted that, despite the name, the MRGG-Ss would be used in the “sniper support weapon” and “designated marksman rifle” roles.

The 2023 video below from Geissele Automatics offers a brief overview of the company’s MRGG-S rifle.

The MRGSS-S takes “advantage of advances in ammunition and weapons technology to improve the intermediate range sniper rifle lethality, reliability and performance when suppressed during 50-1,500 meter engagements,” the Pentagon’s notice added.

The shorter-barreled MRGG-A will still offer special operators in the assault role a significant boost in capability when it comes to range and terminal effectiveness. SOCOM has said in the past that rifles chambered in 6.5mm Creedmoor, in general, could double a shooter’s probability of scoring a hit on targets up to 3,280 feet away (1,000 meters).

As a comparison, the 5.56x45mm M4A1 carbine, modified versions of which remain in use in the U.S. special operations community, has a maximum effective range of around 1,640 feet (500 meters), according to the U.S. Army. The 7.62x51mm M110, a designated marksman rifle in service across all branches of the U.S. military, as well as various U.S. federal government law enforcement agencies, can reach out to just under 2,625 feet (800 meters).

A US Army Green Beret with the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) carries a modified M4A1 during training. US Army

A US Marine fires an M110 rifle. USMC

The difference is wild! My new 6.5 creedmoor vs 5.56 pic.twitter.com/DtsKOk0jYp

— MunneY AKA Joey (@ImMunneY) May 31, 2016

The MRGG-A is also heavier and bulkier than the M4A1. The U.S. special operations community does have a wide array of small arms options it can issue depending on the operational requirements, including if there is an expectation of close-quarters combat inside buildings or other confined spaces.

With all this in mind, SOCOM has also been looking into new light machine guns chambered in 6.5mm Creedmoor in recent years. The cartridge is seeing increasing interest elsewhere, too. In March, the U.S. Secret Service notably put out a contracting notice seeking information about potential 6.5 Creedmoor rifles to supplant its M110s.

There has been a broader drive within the U.S. military in recent years toward rifles firing larger cartridges with greater reach, as well as increased lethality at those ranges, driven heavily by combat experiences in Afghanistan during the Global War on Terror era. Concerns about improving adversary body armor had also been a factor. This is what led the U.S. Army to adopt the M7 rifle, which has been the subject of some controversy recently, as well as the companion M250 light machine gun. The M7 and M250 are chambered to fire the 6.8x51mm cartridge. Army special operations forces were involved in developmental testing of the M7 and M250, but it remains to be seen how widespread those guns might be issued within the broader special operations community.

A member of the US Army, wearing a gas mask, trains with an M7 rifle. US Army

In the meantime, U.S. special operators are now set to get new 6.5mm Creedmoor MRGG-A rifles from LMT.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Joseph Trevithick

Deputy Editor

Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.

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flip.it · Joseph Trevithick

13. How to Arm Ukraine for Negotiations

Excerpts:

Negotiations over security guarantees must be completed before Zelensky agrees to a prolonged Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. The details of a deal could be kept secret until the border negotiations between Putin and Zelensky are completed and then announced after the new dividing line between Ukraine and Russia is established. But Zelensky and the Ukrainian people cannot agree to such significant concessions without knowing what they are getting in return. Zelensky and his citizens have good reason not to trust the United States right now, given that Trump has periodically cut off military assistance to Ukraine and has thus far not implemented new sanctions on Russia. The United States and its allies must commit to providing meaningful security guarantees before any progress is made on the borders. Forcing Ukraine to cede territory before negotiating security guarantees could embolden Putin to restart the war to derail further talks.

Negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine remains a long shot. But if any diplomatic resolution brokered by the United States and Europe is to have a chance, it will require an approach from Trump more disciplined and creative than he has shown so far. He must not only convene two separate negotiations; he must get the order right.

How to Arm Ukraine for Negotiations

Foreign Affairs · More by Michael McFaul · August 27, 2025

For a Durable Peace, Trump Must Get the Order of Talks Right

Michael McFaul

August 27, 2025

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House, Washington, D.C., August 2025 Alexander Drago / Reuters

MICHAEL MCFAUL is Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute, Professor of Political Science, and a Hoover Fellow at Stanford University. From 2012 to 2014, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Russia. He is the author of the forthcoming book Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder.

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The Trump administration’s week of Russian-Ukrainian diplomacy yielded mixed results. At his Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, U.S. President Donald Trump treated an imperial dictator and indicted war criminal like a revered dignitary. His main goal for the summit—a cease-fire—was rejected outright by Putin, and his most modest objective for the meeting—a commitment by Putin to meet directly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, with Trump in attendance—has thus far been rebuffed by Moscow, as well. A subsequent summit in Washington, attended by Zelensky and other European leaders, was more productive, as the group discussed potential U.S. and European security guarantees for Kyiv. Before that meeting, the American commitment to security guarantees was ambiguous.

Trump’s intuition that a deal will require land swaps and security guarantees is correct; Putin will agree to end the war only if he feels that he has won Ukrainian territory, and Zelensky will never agree to cede territory without the promise of protection from a future Russian invasion. But Trump’s improvisational attempt to negotiate over both subjects at the same time, with the same groups of leaders, is wrong-headed. Rather than discussing these two issues with everyone all at once, Trump needs to organize two sets of separate negotiations. The order in which these negotiations occur will be key to their success. Trump and his team must first reach an agreement on security guarantees among Ukraine, other European countries, and the United States. Only then should Washington encourage a conversation between Zelensky and Putin about de facto territorial concessions that could bring an end to the war.

Such a diplomatic two-step will not be easy. Indeed, the United States and Europe may have to present a security guarantee convincing enough to get Ukraine to agree to an unpopular compromise: the continuation of Russian occupation of Ukrainian land. But if Trump and European leaders can hold successful negotiations with Zelensky before the Ukrainian president sits down with Putin, they have a chance to craft a lasting peace.

TAKING THE LEAP

An agreement to bring an end to the war hinges on the ability of Putin and Zelensky alone to reach an agreement on borders and land swaps. Neither European leaders nor Trump should be involved in these discussions; neither has the authority to give away Ukrainian land.

The negotiation will be very difficult. Putin would have to abandon his maximalist position that Ukraine withdraw its soldiers from the parts of the Donbas that it currently controls. Zelensky will never agree to cede territory to Russia formally—doing so would be political suicide and could even trigger a coup by his own soldiers—but he could instead commit to pursuing reunification only through peaceful means. In other words, Russia would retain its currently conquered territory for now and potentially for much longer. But the de facto ceding of territory temporarily is preferable to the de jure handing over of land permanently. In fact, it is a necessary condition for an end to the war.

Still, agreeing to cede any amount of land to Russia would be an immense political risk for Zelensky, one that could easily lead to his ouster in the next Ukrainian presidential election. The idea remains extremely unpopular among Ukrainians. For Trump to convince Zelensky, his government, his generals, and the Ukrainian people to accept such a sacrifice, the Ukrainian president would need something substantial in return, and he would need it up front.

INSURANCE POLICY

Before Trump can entice Zelensky to risk his political future on a potential land swap, he must convince him that the United States and its allies in Europe are willing to credibly deter a future Russian invasion. Trump has regrettably already taken off the table NATO membership for Ukraine, which would represent the most credible security guarantee, since Moscow has never attacked a NATO member. So for now, the best options are security guarantees negotiated between a coalition of the willing and Ukraine, which must include Washington and European countries pledging to help make the Ukrainian army the best-armed fighting force on the continent, and a commitment among all the parties to the agreement that they would consider an attack on Ukraine to be an attack on all of them. To make the security guarantee credible, European soldiers should be stationed in Ukraine, and American fighter aircraft and other weapons should be repositioned closer to Ukrainian borders in Poland and Romania.

Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff reported that Trump and Putin discussed security guarantees in Alaska. But if the United States and Europe are to offer Ukraine a truly credible deterrent, Russia cannot be involved in these talks. Trump and European leaders should not repeat the disaster of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for a toothless assurance that Russia would not attack it (and would, in fact, protect it). Seeking Moscow’s permission for security guarantees would also signal weakness from NATO members and represent a tacit acceptance that Ukraine is part of Putin’s sphere of influence. Russia’s demand that it be included as security guarantor against its own aggression must thus be rejected categorically.

A precedent exists for ironing out European security arrangements without consulting Moscow: Washington and Europe did not ask Stalin for the Soviet Union’s permission to found NATO in 1949. Six years later, the alliance extended an invitation to West Germany without seeking Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s blessing, despite opposition from some American strategists, most vocal among them U.S. Secretary of State George Kennan, who feared it could provoke a major conflict between the Soviet Union and NATO. President Bill Clinton did not give Russian President Boris Yeltsin a veto over adding new members to NATO. Nor did President George W. Bush seek Putin’s permission to expand NATO membership to the Baltic countries and others.

ORDER OF OPERATIONS

Negotiations over security guarantees must be completed before Zelensky agrees to a prolonged Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. The details of a deal could be kept secret until the border negotiations between Putin and Zelensky are completed and then announced after the new dividing line between Ukraine and Russia is established. But Zelensky and the Ukrainian people cannot agree to such significant concessions without knowing what they are getting in return. Zelensky and his citizens have good reason not to trust the United States right now, given that Trump has periodically cut off military assistance to Ukraine and has thus far not implemented new sanctions on Russia. The United States and its allies must commit to providing meaningful security guarantees before any progress is made on the borders. Forcing Ukraine to cede territory before negotiating security guarantees could embolden Putin to restart the war to derail further talks.

Negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine remains a long shot. But if any diplomatic resolution brokered by the United States and Europe is to have a chance, it will require an approach from Trump more disciplined and creative than he has shown so far. He must not only convene two separate negotiations; he must get the order right.

Foreign Affairs · More by Michael McFaul · August 27, 2025

14. Iran’s Roads Not Taken – Tehran, Washington, and the Failures That Led to War

Excerpts:

If Trump does not want Iran to follow the example of North Korea and become a nuclear state—and does not want to continue to go to war with Iran to prevent that outcome—then his administration must look for a diplomatic solution. Iran, likewise, does not want war with the United States, and it cannot quickly or easily build an arsenal of nuclear weapons to deter Israeli and U.S. attacks. Tehran has little choice but to take diplomacy seriously. Iran and the United States have been at similar junctures before, picking between confrontation and compromise. The two countries should embrace diplomacy not only to conclude an urgent deal on Iran’s nuclear capabilities but also to build trust and chart a new course for their relations. Nuclear diplomacy should be just the beginning—the floor, not the ceiling, of the relationship.

The Trump administration believes that the 12-day war has inflicted enough punishment on Iran to force true soul-searching among Iranian leaders. But if Tehran is to arrive at the right conclusions—and feel able to relinquish its nuclear ambitions and its aggressive regional policy—then it must see diplomacy as a credible path to realizing gains that have thus far eluded it. As unlikely as it may seem, Trump’s bombing campaign could lead to a breakthrough, but only if both countries can put their history of missteps behind them and approach diplomacy with vision and patience.

Iran’s Roads Not Taken

Foreign Affairs · More by Vali Nasr · August 19, 2025

Tehran, Washington, and the Failures That Led to War

Vali Nasr

September/October 2025 Published on August 19, 2025

Hokyoung Kim

VALI NASR is Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the author of Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History.

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The 12-day war in June, which saw the United States join Israel in bombing Iran, was the culmination of four decades of mistrust, antipathy, and confrontation. Since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic has not wavered in its anti-Americanism, and the United States has unfailingly responded by exerting greater pressure on Iran. The two have come close to outright conflict before. In 1987 and 1988, the United States destroyed offshore oil platforms and Iranian naval vessels and then mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger plane. Iran interpreted those acts as the opening salvos of an undeclared war. Washington’s attention, however, soon turned to Iraq and the Gulf War. But the hostility between Iran and the United States persisted and has only become more pronounced in the decades that have followed the 9/11 attacks. The 2020 killing of the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, after a spate of Iranian provocations in the region, brought the two countries to the precipice. U.S. President Donald Trump pushed hostilities over the edge this year when the United States struck three Iranian nuclear sites with dozens of cruise missiles and 30,000-pound bombs.

Tehran and Washington seem to be implacable foes. The revolutionary regime in Iran has long cast the United States as its archenemy, the Great Satan that undermined the country’s independence by backing a military coup in 1953 and the authoritarian excesses of the monarchy that followed. In 1979, the revolution’s leaders worried that the United States would continue to interfere in Iran and stymie the great transformation underway. To prevent that outcome, the Islamic Republic decided that the United States should be extricated not just from Iran but from the broader Middle East. These assumptions set Tehran’s foreign policy on a collision course with Washington. Iran has supported states and militant groups around the region with the aim of threatening the United States and its Israeli and Arab allies. In turn, the United States has pursued a strategy of containment and pressure that has included U.S.-led regional alliances, U.S. military bases, and a tight noose of sanctions suffocating Iran’s economy. Finally, this year, that strategy widened to include overt American strikes on Iranian territory.

Many observers perceive this history as a single, unbroken thread of conflict and hostility stretching from 1979 to the present. And yet today’s hostility was not inevitable. More peaceful paths were possible, and indeed, with the right decisions in Tehran and Washington, Iran and the United States could still find ways to lower tensions and even normalize their relations. On several occasions in the twenty-first century alone, Iran and the United States had the opportunity to climb down from their mutual hostility. At each juncture, however, American or Iranian policymakers chose to foreclose those possible openings. But that history of missed chances does not condemn the two countries to a future of ever-deeper conflict. Instead, it offers a reminder that even today, Iran and the United States may yet be able to reconcile.

The 12-day war has demonstrably weakened Iran. Tehran’s strategy is no longer sustainable in the wake of the battering that it has suffered. In this moment, Washington could continue boxing Iran into a corner and allow Israel to occasionally “mow the grass,” striking Iranian nuclear and military targets to keep punishing the country and block any progress toward building a bomb. Or it could see the aftermath of the 12-day war as an opportunity to engage in that fitful American pastime when it comes to Iran: diplomacy. Now, Washington has the chance to set its relations with Tehran on a different path, to pursue fresh bargains that could change both Iran’s foreign and nuclear policies and the balance of power within Iran’s ruling establishment. The U.S. and Iranian governments have failed to take those turnings before, but even now, policymakers should not be fatalistic. The past, no matter how freighted with lost opportunities, need not be prologue.

A FALSE DAWN IN AFGHANISTAN

For at least a little while after 9/11, it seemed possible that relations between Iran and the United States could improve. Both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mohammad Khatami condemned the terrorist attacks, and Iranians held candlelit vigils in the streets of major cities and observed moments of silence in soccer stadiums. The strategic interests of Iran and the United States were suddenly aligned. Reeling from the assault, the United States maintained as its most urgent priority the elimination of al-Qaeda. Iran’s Shiite clerical regime viewed the Sunni radicalism of al-Qaeda and its hosts, the Taliban, with deep concern. Only three years earlier, in 1998, the Taliban had killed up to 11 Iranian diplomats and journalists in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, an atrocity that spurred Iran to mobilize troops on its border with Afghanistan. After years of antagonism, Iranian and U.S. officials found that they had some goals in common.

Iran had long backed the Taliban’s principal foes, the Northern Alliance. Only days before the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda operatives posing as journalists killed Ahmad Shah Masoud, the Northern Alliance’s legendary leader, an assassination that signaled an imminent Taliban offensive to wipe out the Northern Alliance once and for all and consolidate control of Afghanistan. Shiite Iran feared the regional ascendance of Sunni radicalism in the form of the puritanical Taliban, an ambitious al-Qaeda, and other militant factions, as well as further instability on its eastern border—Iran was then, and remains now, home to many Afghan refugees. Some estimates in recent years have placed the figure as high as eight million, roughly ten percent of the population.

Through forms of cooperation that seem incredible today, Iran abetted the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps offered intelligence assistance to the United States and provided logistical support, facilitating battlefield coordination with Northern Alliance forces. U.S. diplomats Ryan Crocker and Zalmay Khalilzad attended meetings with Iranian counterparts and top IRGC officers, including senior commanders, possibly even Soleimani. Just over two months after the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban had been chased out of Kabul and other major cities. The Taliban’s so-called emirate in Afghanistan was no more.

Iran and the United States could still normalize their relations.

Iran had a vested interest in shaping the government that would replace the Taliban. It worked closely with the United States at the Bonn conference in December 2001 that decided the future of Afghanistan. The two countries shared the same goals of crafting a new political order in Afghanistan that would unite and stabilize it through an inclusive democratic government. James Dobbins, who led the U.S. efforts at the conference, later credited his Iranian counterpart, the diplomat Javad Zarif, for building the consensus among all Afghan factions over forging a new constitution and holding democratic elections to form a new government in Kabul. And Zarif in turn credited Soleimani, the Revolutionary Guards commander, for securing compromises from the Northern Alliance to facilitate agreement in Bonn.

In retrospect, this rare collaboration was an opportunity to improve relations between Iran and the United States. Working together in Afghanistan could have served as a significant confidence-building measure, as well as the impetus for the de-escalation of tensions and then potentially even the gradual normalization of relations. Success in Afghanistan could have placed the relationship on a different course.

That did not come to pass. In January 2002, almost immediately after the Bonn conference, Israel intercepted an Iranian arms shipment to Hamas. For Iran, cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan did not constitute a reorientation of Iranian strategy that would apply to all aspects of Iran’s regional policy. What happened in Afghanistan was just a tentative opening that had yet to fully bear fruit; Tehran would not so quickly reverse its Middle East policy, and it would still build up its proxies. U.S. President George W. Bush signaled outrage and alarm. He then decided against using the opening in Afghanistan to embrace Iran and gently push for change in its regional policy. Instead, he cast Iran as an implacable enemy and dispensed with the goodwill generated by developments in Afghanistan. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, Bush famously included Iran among the members of the “axis of evil.”

Fresh from what seemed a swift and sure victory in Afghanistan, a buoyant Washington devoted its energies to the prosecution of the so-called war on terror. And in that war, Iran could only be a target, not an ally; its cooperation in Afghanistan no longer counted for much. After all, as many U.S. officials believed, Islamist ideology became a global phenomenon because of the success of Iran’s revolution in 1979 (never mind that the Iranian regime’s resolute Shiism separated it from the Sunni militancy of groups such as al-Qaeda). Islamism, according to this view, would not be defeated until the Islamic Republic had been toppled. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in March 2003, many Iranians feared that it was only a matter of time before American forces came for them. In the words of Hassan Kazemi Qomi, Iran’s first ambassador to Baghdad following the U.S. invasion and the fall of Iraq’s ruler Saddam Hussein, “After Iraq was Iran’s turn.” So Iran tried to placate the United States. In May 2003, Khatami, the country’s reformist president, sent Washington a proposal for talks and a road map to resolve “all outstanding issues between the two countries,” including, notably, Iran’s nascent nuclear program and its broader policy in the Middle East. The White House did not even acknowledge receiving the offer.

People protesting the U.S attack on Iranian nuclear sites in Tehran, June 2025 Majid Asgaripour / West Asia News Agency / Reuters

The rebuff led the Islamic Republic to harden its positions and prepare itself for conflict. In stark contrast to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion of Iraq produced no opening with Iran, but rather placed the two countries at odds. With good reason, given the number of Bush administration officials who viewed Tehran as a grave threat, Iran believed it had to protect itself. In the chaos that followed the fall of Saddam, Iran possibly partnered with Syria to deepen the quagmire that the United States now faced in Iraq. The Sunni insurgency, supported by Syria, and the Shiite militias, supported by Iran, battled U.S. forces. As violence consumed Iraq, the American project there was doomed to failure.

Iranian leaders thus averted what they feared most: a triumphant U.S. military in Iraq continuing its campaign east into Iran. But American views of Iran only grew darker. Iran, for its part, concluded that it could best manage the American threat by bogging down U.S. resources in various theaters around the Middle East. Exhausted by protracted conflict, the United States would grow weary of the region and not seek war with Iran. Washington’s decision to pull forces out of Iraq in 2011 seemed to vindicate this line of Iranian thinking. The more U.S. officials talked of leaving the region, the more Iran saw wisdom in its strategy.

This strategy also had the effect of transforming the balance of power within Iran. The security forces at the forefront of the fight against Washington gained control of Iran’s foreign policy. In the crucible of Iraq, the Quds Force, the expeditionary division of the IRGC that oversees unconventional military and intelligence operations, grew from one of its smallest units into an expansive regional force that would dominate Iran’s foreign policy decision-making. The Quds Force commanders, Soleimani and his deputy Esmail Qaani, had worked with U.S. counterparts in Afghanistan in 2001. During the Iraq war, they would turn the force into a military network to battle the United States across the Middle East.

BREAKOUT OR BREAKTHROUGH?

The false dawn in relations with the United States after the 9/11 attacks convinced Iranian leaders that Washington would never be willing to accommodate revolutionary Iran. Tehran understood U.S. policies, including the building of military bases in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia and the strengthening of sanctions on the Iranian economy, as all aimed at engineering regime change in Tehran. In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war, Iran’s rulers surmised that they had to resist and deter the United States through enacting aggressive regional policies, building a nuclear program, and strengthening Iran’s drone and missile capabilities. The country’s economy, state institutions, and politics had to be organized in the service of that resistance.

Another revelation had further poisoned the well: Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Its nuclear program had come to light as the United States was preparing for the Iraq war. At the time, after the inclusion of Iran in the “axis of evil,” U.S.-Iranian relations were already on a downward slope. The discovery of a clandestine nuclear program only increased the prospect of conflict. Iran assumed that the United States would make this nuclear program a casus belli, as it had in its justification of the invasion of Iraq. Washington, for its part, did not want a member of the “axis of evil” to acquire nuclear capabilities. But by the end of the Bush administration in 2009, U.S. officials had grown disinterested in military solutions to their Iran problem as the United States continued to founder in Iraq. Diplomacy, not war, would have to contain Iranian nuclear ambitions. And so opened another opportunity for Iran and the United States to edge away from conflict toward a more peaceful relationship.

The United States could have taken this path sooner. In 2003, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom negotiated a deal with Iran that would have halted the growth of its still small nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The Bush administration forced the deal to collapse in 2004, insisting that Iran give up the entirety of its nuclear program and offering no concessions in return.

Nuclear diplomacy should be the floor, not the ceiling, of the relationship.

In hindsight, the veto proved a mistake. Unconstrained, Iran’s nuclear program continued to expand as the anti-American bombast and Holocaust denial of the new Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, made diplomacy much more difficult. Tehran also grew further convinced that Washington was not interested in meaningful diplomatic engagement, even on the nuclear issue. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator in 2003, Hassan Rouhani, would try his hand at nuclear diplomacy when he became president in 2013, after he succeeded Ahmadinejad. But in 2004, he and other Iranian leaders concluded that the United States had so swiftly dismissed the European-negotiated deal because Iran’s program was too small to be worthy of American diplomacy and concessions. Iran would need a much bigger program to compel the United States to the negotiating table. That presumption undergirded Iranian activities during the Obama, first Trump, and Biden administrations. And at each turn, failure to forge a lasting nuclear deal would only encourage Iran to expand its program even more.

Had Washington supported the European effort, Iran’s nuclear program would likely have remained small, and the deal itself might have had transformative consequences. It could have led Tehran to fear Washington less, and as a result, Iran would then have behaved differently in Iraq and not so readily courted American enmity. Instead, the U.S. veto further convinced Tehran that its reading of American intentions was correct. Washington would be impressed only by might. To deter the United States, Iran had to both build a larger nuclear program and widen its asymmetric warfare in Iraq and beyond.

Iran was right to assume that a larger nuclear program would change Washington’s calculations. By 2011, Iran’s program had grown significantly, and although estimates vary, it was still not close to the breakout stage. That failed to reassure Israel. Spooked by the pace of Iran’s progress, Israel threatened to attack Iran to prevent it from getting any closer to a bomb. But the last thing the Obama administration wanted was entanglement in another Middle Eastern war. It determined that the only way to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power was through diplomacy.

President Barack Obama paved the way for negotiations by first increasing economic sanctions on Iran in 2010 but then adopting a different tone, making it clear to Tehran that Washington was not seeking regime change. Obama understood that sweeping ultimatums and coercion would not get Iran to dispense with its nuclear program. The United States thus agreed to negotiate limits on Iran’s program in exchange for sanctions relief.

Khamenei attends a mourning ceremony after Iran's war with Israel, in Tehran, July 2025 Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader / Reuters

For their part, Iran’s rulers were conflicted about Obama’s offer. The IRGC and its political allies were skeptical that the Obama administration would differ much from its predecessor. They thought diplomacy would not yield meaningful results but would signal weakness and divert attention from the threat that the United States posed to Iran. But a moderate faction, led by Rouhani, who became president in 2013, argued that successful diplomacy with the United States would lower tensions, ease pressure on Iran’s economy, and reset relations between the two countries. This faction hoped that diplomacy would yield the positive outcomes that had eluded Iran in its prior attempts at rapprochement with the United States: its cooperation in Afghanistan in 2001, its offer of talks in 2003, and the nuclear deal signed with Europe in 2003 but scotched after Washington refused to go along with it.

Two years of intense talks followed among Iran, China, Russia, the United States, and the three European powers that had negotiated the prior deal. They culminated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In exchange for sanctions relief, the JCPOA placed strict limits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear activities for at least a decade and subjected those activities to stringent international inspections. There has been much debate since on whether the deal effectively curbed Iran’s nuclear ambitions and whether the United States could have made sterner demands on Iran at the negotiating table—a doubt echoed in Tehran by the deal’s detractors there who believed that Iran had given too much away in exchange for too little. But the deal did roll back Iran’s program, and in 11 separate reports, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, attested to Iran’s compliance with the terms of the JCPOA. The JCPOA was significant in another important way: it represented a breakthrough in U.S.-Iranian relations. After decades of hostility, the United States and Iran had finally concluded a deal and, at least as far as Iran was concerned, successfully implemented it.

The JCPOA was a major accomplishment in trust building. Had it lasted, the deal could have served as the basis for subsequent agreements on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its regional policies. The relaxation of sanctions on the Iranian economy could have changed political dynamics within Tehran by strengthening the hand of moderate factions reliant on middle-class votes and weakening the influence of conservatives and hard-liners in foreign policy decisions. In time, relations between Iran and the United States could have moved toward greater normalization.

And yet the deal did not deliver the widening thaw that some of its proponents hoped for. Agreeing to the JCPOA did not immediately change Iran’s broader strategy. The IRGC and its political allies in the parliament and in powerful parastatal economic and political institutions thought that despite the diplomatic breakthrough, there was no evidence of fundamental change in U.S.-Iranian relations. The United States still posed an urgent threat and had made no effort to change that perception. Hard-liners in Tehran pointed to the furious domestic opposition to the JCPOA in the United States as proof that U.S. policy toward Iran would remain unchanged. In the months following the signing of the deal, Washington dragged its feet in lifting sanctions on Tehran, and that steadily soured the mood in Iran. Iranian hard-liners argued that it had all been a ruse to strip Iran of its nuclear assets, making it vulnerable to U.S.-backed regime change. Iran should therefore continue with those regional policies—such as its commitment to supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and various militias in Iraq—that since 2003 had been indispensable in deterring American aggression.

The convulsions of the Arab Spring further complicated Iran’s calculus. Tehran saw the popular unrest that swept across the Arab world as a new opportunity to expand its regional footprint. That opportunity came with new dangers. The fall of Assad in Syria, an Iranian ally, would have been a significant strategic loss. It would have isolated and weakened Iran’s Lebanese proxy Hezbollah. A resurgent Sunni government in Syria backed by Western powers and other Arab powers could have rolled back Iran’s gains in Iraq, too. Iran sensed that the United States was trying to hack off the tentacles of the octopus—before chopping off its head in Tehran. Iran’s rulers, particularly the IRGC and its political allies, concluded that the real aim of American efforts to topple Assad was the end of the Islamic Republic. The IRGC would resist that outcome at all costs. As its commander in charge in Syria put it, “What we lose in losing Syria exceeds what we have at stake in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.” Iran thus forcefully intervened in Syria to save Assad starting in 2011, and in the same year also threw its full support behind Houthi forces in Yemen that had gained the upper hand in civil war there.

Iran did not cause the JCPOA to collapse. The United States did.

Tehran, in effect, chose a precarious balancing act: it shrank its nuclear program but protected and expanded its regional footprint in confrontation with the United States and its Arab allies, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Those allies saw little benefit in the nuclear deal but had much to fear from Iran’s regional power play. They wanted the United States to focus on containing Iran’s regional influence rather than just the country’s nuclear program. They joined hands with Israel, which also opposed U.S. diplomacy with Iran, to lobby against the JCPOA in Washington almost as soon as the deal was signed in 2015. These efforts were rewarded when Trump formally removed the United States from the JCPOA in 2018.

Iran’s foreign policy between 2014 and 2018 was deeply conflicted. In the words of Zarif, the foreign minister during that period, Iran was paralyzed by a struggle between diplomacy and the battlefield—the latter being his euphemism for the IRGC and its regional strategy—and it suffered for “favoring the battlefield over diplomacy.” For its part, U.S. policy fixated on the actions of the Revolutionary Guards rather than on what nuclear diplomacy had just achieved. Washington did not consider then the possibility of using success at the negotiating table as the basis for influencing Tehran’s regional posture. It succumbed to the idea that the JCPOA was insufficient because it had not encompassed Iran’s regional policies. Rather than abandon diplomacy to punish Iran for its regional behavior, the United States could have held on to its diplomatic gains even as it pushed back against Iran’s regional policies. In other words, it could have stayed in the JCPOA and used that leverage to pursue a further deal that would have curtailed Iranian aggression in the region.

If the United States had followed this path, Iran’s nuclear program would have remained limited by the parameters established by the JCPOA; even after Israeli and American bombing, Iran’s nuclear program is probably much closer to breakout than it was in the past decade, at least in terms of know-how and the ability to rebuild an advanced program. The longer the deal had stayed in effect, the more trust it would have built between Iran and the United States, which Washington could then have used to influence Tehran’s regional behavior.

A successful nuclear deal could have lowered Iranian perceptions of a threat from the United States. That, in turn, would have allowed Iran to roll back its troublesome regional activities and even discuss limits on its missile program. The economic gains that would have come with remaining in the JCPOA would have convinced Iran to comply with the deal and not use the cover of diplomacy for further provocations. Despite frustration in Tehran with the slow pace of sanctions relief, Iran did not cause the JCPOA to collapse. The United States did. That remains the most significant lost opportunity for repairing relations between the two countries.

A FATEFUL WITHDRAWAL

The disintegration of the JCPOA drastically escalated tensions between Tehran and Washington. After scrapping the deal, Trump imposed intense sanctions on Iran as part of a campaign of “maximum pressure.” The stated aim of that campaign was to force Iran back to the negotiating table. But Iran perceived Trump’s ploy as nothing short of a bid to bring about regime change by strangling the country’s economy and degrading its state institutions to encourage popular rebellion. Iran responded by vigorously resuming nuclear activity, enriching uranium beyond levels allowed by the JCPOA. It also took more aggressive actions across the Middle East in 2019, starting with an attack on oil tankers in the waters of the United Arab Emirates in May, then the downing of a U.S. drone in June, and then an attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia in September. This escalation of violence spurred a seismic event: Trump ordered the killing of Soleimani, the Quds Force commander, in January 2020, while the general was in Iraq. His death outraged Iranians. The Islamic Republic retaliated by striking a military base in Iraq that housed American troops. Iran and the United States then stood on the brink of war. In under five years, the hope of a new opening in relations had given way to open conflict.

The election of Joe Biden as president in 2020 and the return of a Democratic administration in 2021 could have halted the spiraling tensions. During the campaign, Democratic candidates, including Biden, had signaled their willingness to revive the JCPOA. Once in office, however, Biden demurred. Rather than revert to the Obama-era policy, he embraced Trump’s position of maximum pressure. The administration insisted that Iran had to first fulfill all its obligations under the JCPOA, and only then would the United States consider returning to the deal. In the meantime, maximum pressure sanctions would remain in place. The early months of the Biden administration coincided with the tail end of Rouhani’s presidency. Rouhani and his team had been architects of the JCPOA and wanted to see it restored. But they did not find a willing partner in Biden. What Tehran saw was continuity; Biden, like his predecessor, wanted regime change in Iran.

The United States did agree to talks with Iran in Vienna in April 2021. But by then, Iran had concluded that there would be no real change in U.S. policy. Iranian leaders announced that the country would start enriching uranium to 60 percent purity. The escalation was alarming because it would bring Iran much closer to breakout. In the face of this threat, the Biden administration changed course to put greater emphasis on talks with Iran, discussing concrete steps that would bring the United States back into the JCPOA and remove sanctions on Iran in exchange for its full compliance with its obligations under the deal. By then, however, the Rouhani presidency was at its end. He was soon to be replaced by a hard-line opponent of the JCPOA, Ebrahim Raisi.

It was in this context that Iran decided to back Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine in 2022. Iran had developed close intelligence and military ties with Russia during the Syrian civil war (Russia also took the side of Assad), but it now saw its strategic partnership with Moscow as vital to surviving determined American efforts to isolate and crush the Islamic Republic. This support for Russia, in turn, alienated Europe and gave Washington even more reason to pressure Tehran. U.S.-Iranian relations thus became entangled with the United States’ and Europe’s clash with an expansionist Russia. Had the Biden administration concluded a deal with Iran before Russia attacked Ukraine, Tehran would have seen too much at stake in its relations with Europe to contemplate helping Russia in Ukraine. But since Biden was not willing to break with Trump’s policy to restore the deal agreed to by Obama, Iran decided it needed to strengthen its ties with Russia, and that in turn made the job of diplomacy all the more difficult. Both Iran and the United States trusted the other even less than before, and Washington had to contend with a more intractable Tehran. Indirect talks between Iran, the United States, and other JCPOA signatories could not produce a breakthrough. The Biden administration would not guarantee that a deal would last, since any agreement could be undone after a change of government, and the hard-liners at the helm in Tehran were unwilling to risk another U.S. withdrawal from a negotiated deal.

FROM THE RUBBLE

In the subsequent years, Iran’s regional position has unraveled significantly. After the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 2023, Israel has systematically pummeled Iranian proxies in the region, doing serious damage to Hamas in Gaza and defanging Hezbollah in Lebanon. The collapse of Assad’s regime, in December 2024, left Iran without one of its most useful regional allies and raised the prospect of the emergence of an anti-Iranian, Sunni-led Syria. In 2024 and 2025, Israeli forces struck deep into Iranian territory, exposing huge intelligence vulnerabilities in Iran’s security establishment as well as the Islamic Republic’s relative inability to hurt Israel with its arsenal of missiles and drones. And yet even after the devastation unleashed on Iran’s nuclear sites by Trump, much remains unknown about the state of the Iranian nuclear program and the possibility that Iranian leaders, bludgeoned into a corner, could still scramble to develop a bomb.

President Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the national security team meet in the White House Situation Room in Washington, D.C., June 2025 Daniel Torok / Reuters

If Trump does not want Iran to follow the example of North Korea and become a nuclear state—and does not want to continue to go to war with Iran to prevent that outcome—then his administration must look for a diplomatic solution. Iran, likewise, does not want war with the United States, and it cannot quickly or easily build an arsenal of nuclear weapons to deter Israeli and U.S. attacks. Tehran has little choice but to take diplomacy seriously. Iran and the United States have been at similar junctures before, picking between confrontation and compromise. The two countries should embrace diplomacy not only to conclude an urgent deal on Iran’s nuclear capabilities but also to build trust and chart a new course for their relations. Nuclear diplomacy should be just the beginning—the floor, not the ceiling, of the relationship.

The Trump administration believes that the 12-day war has inflicted enough punishment on Iran to force true soul-searching among Iranian leaders. But if Tehran is to arrive at the right conclusions—and feel able to relinquish its nuclear ambitions and its aggressive regional policy—then it must see diplomacy as a credible path to realizing gains that have thus far eluded it. As unlikely as it may seem, Trump’s bombing campaign could lead to a breakthrough, but only if both countries can put their history of missteps behind them and approach diplomacy with vision and patience.

Foreign Affairs · More by Vali Nasr · August 19, 2025

15. Protecting Soldiers, Preventing Harmful Behaviors, and Boosting Combat Readiness—with Data

Protecting Soldiers, Preventing Harmful Behaviors, and Boosting Combat Readiness—with Data - Modern War Institute

Jon Bate, Stephanie Hightower and Caleb Gage | 08.27.25

mwi.westpoint.edu · Jon Bate · August 27, 2025

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Harmful behaviors such as violence, substance abuse, and suicidal ideations profoundly affect both individual soldier well-being and military unit cohesion, corroding the foundation of our combat readiness and pulling leaders away from their primary mission: preparing for combat. Too often, leaders have only reactive solutions available, such as ordering safety stand-downs after a harmful behavior has occurred. What if, instead of simply responding to such events, they could predict where it was most likely to occur and proactively intervene?

This question sparked a multiyear grassroots effort called Project Prevention. A brigade data analytics and innovation team in the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado developed a new data-centric method to proactively identify units at risk and enable timely, preventive interventions. The result was the Unit Risk Forecasting Tool (URFT), which applies predictive data analytics to give leaders an additional tool to keep their soldiers ready to train and fight.

Over the past year and a half, this tool identified the specific companies/batteries/troops within a brigade that were at increased risk of harmful behaviors in a given week, enabling dozens of opportunities for leaders to proactively step in to address the root causes fueling the risks. It was a low-cost investment in combat readiness with a documented empirical impact on the health and readiness of the force. It does not replace, but rather augments and focuses, human intuition—helping highlight otherwise unnoticed risk trends that busy leaders may have missed. By systematically analyzing existing data and applying rapid data modeling, the URFT functions as an advanced early-warning system, monitoring the subtle, almost invisible atmospheric changes within a unit that signal a coming storm.

The tool is currently scaling more widely across Army units, but we have only scratched the surface of its potential to both help soldiers and increase military readiness. Deepening the data architecture, refining the risk algorithm, and adapting the tool to specific unit needs can amplify its future impact.

Finding the Signal in the Noise: The Momentum Effect in Harmful Behaviors

The project began by trying to determine whether harmful behaviors occurred at random or followed some type of logic. To find out, the team built a comprehensive dataset spanning over two years of serious incident reports (SIRs), which include reportable harmful behaviors such as DUIs, weapon offenses, acts of violence, and suicide-related events.

As we sifted through this mountain of information, a stunningly clear pattern began to emerge from the noise—trouble rarely strikes just once. Rather, company-sized units that had experienced a recent surge in SIRs were significantly more likely to see additional harmful events in the near future. We termed this phenomenon the momentum effect.

Specifically, our initial data model indicated that a company that reported two or more serious incidents within the past three weeks showed a risk of another incident in the current week that was approximately three times higher than units without a string of SIRs. This discovery suggested that a cluster of incidents is not merely a string of bad luck, consistent with military folklore that bad news comes in threes. Rather, such trends are a symptom of deeper, unresolved issues, such as stress from a difficult training cycle, a toxic leadership climate, or low unit morale.

Armed with this insight, the team immediately moved to translate it into a practical tool for leaders. They developed a simple but effective automated alert system using Microsoft Power Automate. Now, when a unit’s incident count crosses that statistically significant threshold, its command team automatically receives an email alert. This simple alert acts as a digital tap on the shoulder, compelling leaders to look closer, initiate conversations with subordinate leaders, and ask the hard questions. It also allows them to move beyond blanket solutions and instead focus specialized resources—like chaplains, behavioral health specialists, or substance abuse counselors—where they are needed most.

This targeted approach produced results during a division-level pilot program in 2024. The team’s analysis estimated that URFT use reduced SIRs across the participating brigade compared to control brigades by 10 to 20 percent over the course of the year. This translated into roughly fifty avoided harmful behaviors, including an estimated twenty fewer suicide-related events, ranging from ideations to attempts.

Making Better Predictions: The Leading Indicators of Harmful Behaviors

Predicting risk based solely on past incidents was useful, but doing so is like driving while looking only in the rearview mirror. To make the URFT more forward-looking, we needed to enrich the dataset with leading indicators of harmful behaviors.

Building version 2.0 required us to begin pulling weekly data from the Army Vantage Data Analytics Platform, a massive repository of soldier information. This allowed us to create a much richer, more holistic snapshot of each unit, encompassing twenty-eight weekly observations for over eight hundred data points between July 2024 and January 2025.

We added company-level variables like the total number of officers, the number of noncommissioned officers, the number of junior enlisted personnel, average Army Combat Fitness Test score, the percentage of soldiers medically ready for deployment, and the primary function (simplified to combat, support, or headquarters).

Adding these unit variables allowed us to apply more sophisticated data models to find the hidden connections in the data. We reran the previous model, alogistic regression, which functions like a simple risk flag by weighing the different factors and estimating the probability that a unit will experience at least one serious incident in the next two weeks.

The team also used a second, more nuanced model called a Poisson regression. This tool acts less like a simple flag and more like a detailed weather forecast that predicts not just if it will rain, but how much rain is expected. It forecasts the likely number of incidents a unit might face, giving leaders a much clearer picture of the potential severity of the situation.

To further enhance predictive power, the team implemented a rudimentary form of artificial intelligence through a machine learning model known as XGBoost. We trained the software on 70 percent of the data we had gathered, allowing the algorithm to learn the incredibly complex and subtle interplay between all the variables. Then, we tested it on the remaining 30 percent of the data it had never seen before. The machine learning model showed it could correctly identify almost all units that genuinely experienced an incident—although the relatively high false positive rate suggests need for better data—making its forecasts useful for command teams who need to act on credible intelligence.

Actionable Insights: Engaged Leadership is a Key Prevention Tool

Running the new dataset through the three models not only confirmed the predictive power of the momentum effect but also unlocked another key insight: Leadership is a key factor in reducing harmful behaviors. While the presence of past incidents was a powerful predictor, the data revealed an even more critical factor. The models showed that as the ratio of noncommissioned officers to junior enlisted soldiers increased, the predicted number of harmful incidents significantly decreased.

This result provided evidence supporting a timeless military principle—noncommissioned officers are the first line of defense for their soldiers. They are the sergeants who live and work with young soldiers every day, who are responsible for their training, discipline, and morale. They are best positioned to spot the earliest signs of personal struggle—financial distress, marital problems, or a dip in motivation—and intervene with mentorship and support.

Of note, the model revealed a critical interaction: A large population of junior soldiers was not, in itself, a predictor of high risk, so long as there was a correspondingly strong cadre of noncommissioned officers to lead them. Effective supervision, the data showed, is a protective factor. Interestingly, some factors the team hypothesized would be significant, like a unit’s average fitness score, proved to have little to no predictive power, allowing leaders to focus on what truly matters. Additional data will allow us to uncover additional leading indicators and make more accurate predictions.

From Data to Action: Real-World Impact and the Road Ahead

The practical application of these findings is already transforming the way commanders lead their formations. The Unit Risk Forecasting Tool provides actionable intelligence that allows leaders to strategically allocate their most precious resources: time and attention.

Rather than waiting for a crisis to command their focus, they can now proactively engage with units flagged by the URFT, bringing in the right support systems to address underlying issues before they escalate into harmful behaviors. The next leadership challenge is to refine the design of these interventions to most effectively treat the root causes of risk identified by the data.

Encouraged by the project’s initial success, the team is working to expand the data sources fueling the URFT, incorporating broader information from across Fort Carson and, eventually, additional Army installations. A larger and more diverse dataset will inevitably lead to greater predictive accuracy.

The ultimate goal is to deploy these predictive models on a secure, user-friendly digital platform that can provide automated alerts to leaders Army-wide. The challenges are significant, as this requires robust data architecture and continuous collaboration with data owners across the entire institution to ensure a steady flow of high-quality information.

But by identifying and addressing potential problems before they escalate, command teams can save invaluable time that can be reinvested in preparing their units for complex combat missions. Moreover, this methodology applies far beyond harmful behaviors and could be adapted to predict combat-related events, logistical shortfalls, or maintenance issues.

Project Prevention is more than just a clever use of data; it represents a step forward in data-centric military leadership. Fusing the timeless principles of engaged leadership with the powerful tools of modern data science can achieve significant progress on one clear goal: to prepare for combat and safeguard the Army’s most valuable asset—American soldiers.

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Bate is a US Army infantry officer serving in the Joint Staff J5. He previously commanded 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. He has served in the 101st Airborne Division, in the 1st Armored Division, and as an assistant professor of economics in the US Military Academy Department of Social Sciences. A Goodpaster Scholar in the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program, he holds a master in public policy from the Harvard Kennedy School and PhD in political science from Stanford University.

Lieutenant Colonel Stephanie Hightower serves as a physician at Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii, under US Army Medical Command and the Defense Health Agency (DHA). Prior to this assignment, she served as a practicing pulmonologist and intensive care physician at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center where she also led organizational wellness initiatives within the DHA. A Fulbright Scholar, she holds a master of science in global health from the University of Oxford and an MD from the George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Sciences.

Captain Jonathon “Caleb” Gage is an officer in the US Army, serving as a data systems engineer (FA26B) with 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado. A 2019 graduate of the United States Military Academy, he earned a degree in geospatial information science before beginning his career in the infantry and later transitioning to his current technical specialty. His work focuses on the collection, organization, and formatting of data to ensure it is accessible and actionable for commanders and analysts. His efforts enable the Army to leverage data-driven insights to enhance operational decision-making and mission success, contributing to the Army’s ability to adapt and innovate in an increasingly complex and technology-driven environment.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Matthew Chlosta, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Jon Bate · August 27, 2025

16. Clausewitz in theory and practice: Revisiting the politics of war

For those with an interest in Clausewitz. . We forget how leaders of wars of liberation were influenced by Dead Carl.

You can read the PDF of the book at this link.

https://clausewitzstudies.org/hold2/DerbentT-Clausewitz-and-the-Peoples-War-1st-Printing2024.pdf

From the introduction:

Two decades after it was first published by Aden, and after a year’s work in close collaboration with the author, Foreign Languages Press is pleased to present the new, final edition of Clausewitz and the People’s War.

Clausewitz in theory and practice: Revisiting the politics of war

https://www.counterview.net/2025/08/clausewitz-in-theory-and-practice.html

Wednesday, August 27, 2025

By Harsh Thakor*

Carl von Clausewitz remains one of history’s most original military thinkers. His writings extend beyond particular conflicts and elevate the study of warfare to a broader theoretical level. By examining the relationship between war and politics, the interaction between governments, military leadership, and society, and the dynamics that drive escalation, he created a body of work that has continued to shape discussions of strategy since the 19th century.

Interestingly, his ideas found their most attentive readers not only among professional military officers but also among those engaged in movements of popular resistance and unconventional warfare. While his influence on Lenin has been widely discussed, the connections to Engels, Mao, Giáp, and others are less well known. The first French edition of Clausewitz and the People’s War explored these links and examined revolutionary warfare through new perspectives.

The recent republication of Clausewitz and the People’s War and Other Politico-Military Essays by Foreign Languages Press, two decades after its original appearance, seeks to renew this discussion. This revised and expanded edition includes dedicated chapters on leaders such as Mao and Giáp, drawing on newly available sources such as Giáp’s memoirs and Mao’s reading notes.

The author, T. Derbent, has long studied the adaptation of Clausewitz’s ideas in modern contexts and has produced extensive research on how they intersected with various political and military traditions. His work traces both the intellectual relationship between Clausewitz and later theorists and the ways in which specific military doctrines drew on or diverged from Clausewitzian principles.

The book situates Clausewitz alongside a range of figures, including Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, and Che Guevara, and examines how elements of their military concepts were informed by his ideas. It includes essays such as Lenin and the War, Towards a Proletarian Military Doctrine, and reflections on Marighella, as well as a detailed glossary and historical charts designed to make the material more accessible. The approach combines historical documentation with analysis, giving readers tools to compare different strategies across movements and periods.

Derbent emphasizes that Engels was the first to seriously engage with Clausewitz’s theories within a broader political framework, while Lenin’s interpretation of On War brought new clarity to the political character of warfare. Trotsky remained sceptical of any rigid doctrine, while Stalin’s rejection of Clausewitz after the Second World War contrasted with the continued application of his principles by Soviet generals.

Mao’s formulation of protracted people’s war drew on Clausewitz as well as Chinese traditions, and Giáp in Vietnam applied similar principles in anti-colonial struggles. Later movements in Peru and Nepal also reflected this lineage, even while adapting it to their own circumstances.

The collection concludes with reflections on later movements, including the Red Brigades, noting both continuities and divergences from Clausewitzian strategy. By tracing these debates, Derbent’s work provides readers with a broad framework to evaluate how theories of war have been understood, reinterpreted, or contested in different contexts.

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*Freelance journalist

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17. Make America Great, Secure, and Maritime Again

MASGA from Korea.

We need a JAROKUS shipbuilding consortium.

Excerpt:

Such economic clusters would usher in an era of maritime innovation, strengthening the allied maritime industrial base. This would bring America off the bench and provide opportunities for thoughtful integration with partners such as Japan and South Korea.

Make America Great, Secure, and Maritime Again

By William Cahill & Jacqueline Deal

August 27, 2025

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/08/27/make_america_great_secure_and_maritime_again_1131180.html

It is 2035, and an array of new and revitalized cities along America’s coastlines and waterways are arising to rekindle industry. Leveraging the nation’s incredible maritime geography, these urban centers feature advanced shipyards, manufacturing hubs, cultural centers, and luxury real estate, all organized around the energy and logistical infrastructure of the future.

Imagine Detroit reborn: small, modular nuclear reactors power a humming, cutting-edge shipbuilding industry along with a range of factories connected by air, sea, and land, as advanced drones ferry cargo between them. This revived manufacturing hub employs someone from nearly every extended family, and the abundant clean energy fueling it in turn underpins high-quality education, healthcare, and public transport services for residents. Detroit leads the reindustrialization of the U.S. economy, amplifying manufacturing independence, resilience, and national security.

This future is within reach; the raw material exists to support many more maritime boomtowns, combining new logistics modes with living well on America’s ocean coasts and the Great Lakes and rivers irrigating the Midwest. Executing a strategy to achieve this potential starts with identifying which aspects of business as usual must evolve.

Moving cargo on the water is by far the most efficient means of transportation and accounts for 80% of global trade. But the United States can't use its abundant coastlines and rivers to reinvigorate domestic supply chains – or, if necessary, to sustain a wartime economy – largely because it makes and crews so few commercial ships. Last year, the United States delivered zero, while China delivered over 900. This deficit poses a massive and growing risk to national competitiveness and security.

A perfect storm is brewing. As China seeks to dominate critical markets and supply chains, the United States “protected” its shipbuilding and maritime logistical capabilities nearly out of existence, while allowing its leading research labs and firms to send their know-how to the adversary. Now, China has become the world’s leading manufacturer of everything from ships to micro-electronics and missiles, and critical U.S. infrastructure is in its crosshairs.

Warding off this threat depends on building maritime freedom cities. These new coastal population, technology, and logistical hubs will provide both demand and capabilities for the U.S. industrial base, deepen U.S. resilience, and complicate adversary targeting. Fortunately, this solution is emergent.

Even before the One Big Beautiful Bill’s passage, President Trump had steered the ship of state toward a mix of tariffs, tax incentives, and regulatory relief to help American manufacturers. The bill advances this agenda and includes a down payment on the Defense Department’s Golden Dome initiative to protect the homeland from Chinese missiles.

The next step is to build the freedom cities the President pitched during his last campaign to “reopen the frontier, reignite American imagination, [and provide] … a new shot at home ownership and in fact, the American dream.” In one speech, then-candidate Trump linked America's primary geopolitical threat with deindustrialization and social malaise.

The administration is now positioned to address these interlinked challenges by designating locations on all three U.S. coasts (Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of America), as well as cities around the Great Lakes and its tributaries, tax-free air and maritime opportunity zones. Each city could generate sustainable, growth-oriented demand for advanced marine vessels, many of which could support dual-use capabilities and infrastructure.

Such economic clusters would usher in an era of maritime innovation, strengthening the allied maritime industrial base. This would bring America off the bench and provide opportunities for thoughtful integration with partners such as Japan and South Korea.

Meanwhile, representatives of hostile foreign adversaries such as China should be excluded from relevant labs and start-ups. Long-overdue investments in research security and counterintelligence must be made so that American research and development doesn’t continue to help Beijing tighten its hammerlock over global maritime trade.

Life on the water in support of hands-on industries has inherent attraction. If you build it, they will come and thereby contribute to the great rebuilding effort that the President has already begun. To the relief and excitement of Americans – and the disappointment of our adversaries – America is poised to return to the fundamental business of industry, homeland defense, and maritime innovation.

William Cahill is cofounder of Applied Maritime Sciences and former director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council and maritime adviser on the Council of Economic Advisers. Jacqueline Deal is president of the Long Term Strategy Group and senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

18. The US Is Unprepared for the Next War

Do not denigrate the intellectual capacity needed to fight and win wars.

We have to outproduce our enemies. We have to outfight our enemies. ANd both require that we outthink them

Excerpts:

The U.S. Army has studied the conflict and just last month published a compendium on examining the changing nature of war. That’s useful and good. But intellectual knowledge alone won’t help you in the next fight. We’ve got to make profound and fundamental changes now to have a chance to avoid disaster when next we fight on the ground. If the Pentagon was taking this seriously, leaders wouldn’t have merely published a report. They would be urgently changing our fighting doctrine, systems of equipment, types of ordnance and the like to enable and equip our troops to successfully wage war in this new world of conflict.

Yet there is little evidence they’ve done any of those things.

History is filled with the wreckage of once-powerful armies that failed to change with the times and suffered avoidable defeats in subsequent wars. If we are to avoid that sad tradition, major changes must be made, immediately and with urgency. Otherwise, we will pay in blood later for what we should have done today.

The US Is Unprepared for the Next War

military.com · Military.com | By Daniel L. Davis Published August 25, 2025 at 2:04pm ET · August 25, 2025

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Earlier this year, speaking at a press conference in Qatar, President Donald Trump categorically declared that “nobody can beat us.” He continued, “We have the strongest military in the world, by far. Not China, not Russia, not anybody!”

We do have a strong military, but we are woefully unprepared to fight a modern war. That’s because, despite all of the major technological advances in warfighting in recent years, manpower is still absolutely critical, and understanding how those boots on the ground interact with emerging drone warfare is still in its infancy in the U.S. military.

Ground warfare has evolved over the past three and a half years since Russia invaded Ukraine. I've spent considerable time studying this conflict from strategic, operational and tactical angles, and I’ve conducted multiple interviews with combatants on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. The picture that emerges explains not only why Russia’s progress is slow and Ukraine is gradually losing ground, but also why the U.S. would face serious challenges if forced into a similar fight today.

Some have argued that Russia has failed to completely conquer Ukraine because Russian generals and soldiers are of poor quality. That conclusion ignores the genuinely game-changing nature of drones on the conduct of land warfare.

There isn’t one category or type of drone that is game-changing by itself, but rather the categories of drones and the ways they can be employed in concert with other drones and legacy platforms and soldiers. There are primarily four main classes of drones: first-person view (FPV) drones that fly explosive charges directly into vehicles or soldiers, bomber drones that fly over a target and release bombs, missile-carrying drones, and reconnaissance drones.

Despite endless talk about game-changing weapons, only the widespread deployment of drones has truly altered the nature of this war. Armored vehicles remain essential for transporting infantry to the front, but they can’t move in large numbers without suffering catastrophic losses. Traditional armored charges – such as the type I participated in during Desert Storm’s Battle of 73 Easting – are deadly in today’s battlefield conditions. Russia has increasingly turned to motorcycles to improve frontline mobility – not because they offer protection, but because their speed and maneuverability improve their chances of defeating drone attacks. No armored vehicle can dodge an FPV or fiber optic-guided drone, but a motorcycle might.

As a result, every inch of ground in modern war is contested: by various types of drones, artillery strikes, missiles, rockets, air attacks, armored vehicle cannons, and infantry attacks. Both sides in the Russia-Ukraine War have suffered high vehicle losses. Fighters from both Russia and Ukraine have told me that stepping out of a trench – for any reason, even to eat or relieve themselves – is extraordinarily dangerous.

Any movement above ground can be spotted and targeted by drones within minutes. Reconnaissance drones scan likely targets and guide attack drones to strike. Others simply loiter above the battlefield, waiting for an opportunity.

This is why manpower is still the decisive factor: Drones and air attacks can be devastating, but it takes boots on the ground to either take territory or hold it. This is where Russia’s biggest advantages have come into play in this war of attrition. Russia has millions more men of military age to draw from than Ukraine, and Moscow has chosen to limit its manpower losses and play up its firepower advantages.

Rather than launching costly frontal assaults, Russian forces now frequently flank Ukrainian positions and cities, saturating them first with artillery and glide bombs, then using drones to pin down defenders, and only then send in the infantry to seize territory.

This has sobering implications for the United States and NATO. We do not know how to fight this kind of war. Only recently has the Pentagon begun taking drone warfare seriously – something that should have happened after the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Better late than never, perhaps, but the deeper problem is cultural and doctrinal. We still think in terms of maneuver warfare, “shock and awe,” and rapid dominance. Those concepts no longer apply in peer-on-peer conflicts like this one.

Russia needed nearly two years to discard its outdated views on modern war. It adapted. We haven’t. Earlier this month, the Ukrainian military even mocked the U.S. Army’s newly updated field manual for the “Tank Platoon,” saying flat-out that our doctrines are detached from current battlefield realities.

Today’s U.S. armed ofrces no doubt have skills, quality personnel, and good equipment. But we are far behind in understanding how to fight modern wars. It took both Russia and Ukraine the better part of a year and a half to fully recognize how all the classes of drones have changed the nature of war. Both sides paid an exorbitant price in blood to learn those lessons.

The U.S. Army has studied the conflict and just last month published a compendium on examining the changing nature of war. That’s useful and good. But intellectual knowledge alone won’t help you in the next fight. We’ve got to make profound and fundamental changes now to have a chance to avoid disaster when next we fight on the ground. If the Pentagon was taking this seriously, leaders wouldn’t have merely published a report. They would be urgently changing our fighting doctrine, systems of equipment, types of ordnance and the like to enable and equip our troops to successfully wage war in this new world of conflict.

Yet there is little evidence they’ve done any of those things.

History is filled with the wreckage of once-powerful armies that failed to change with the times and suffered avoidable defeats in subsequent wars. If we are to avoid that sad tradition, major changes must be made, immediately and with urgency. Otherwise, we will pay in blood later for what we should have done today.

– Daniel L. Davis is a retired Army lieutenant colonel with four combat deployments. He is presently a senior fellow with Defense Priorities and host of the Daniel Davis Deep Dive show on YouTube.

military.com · Military.com | By Daniel L. Davis Published August 25, 2025 at 2:04pm ET · August 25, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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