Quotes of the Day:
"Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored."
- Aldous Huxley
"Wars are fought one battle at a time.
Battles, you win one bullet at a time."
-The Manchurian Candidate (2004)
"Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans, the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces, the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field, and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities."
-Sun Tzu ( from best to worst: attack Strategy, Alliances, Fielded Forces, Siege Cities)
1. Biden Foreign Policy Tracker Korea
2. 'Operation Miracle' complete with 390 Afghan arrivals (South Korea)
3. Could South Korea Be The Next In Line After Afghanistan’s Fall – OpEd
4. No 'unusual activity' from Pyongyang on conclusion of US, South Korea military drills
5. The U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Its Meaning for S.Korea
6. Young Koreans lash out at heavy-handed China
7. A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea
8. Biden’s North Korea Policy : Alliance Transformation before Denuclearization
9. Debating North Korea: US and Chinese Perspectives
10. Afghan crisis reignites debates on refugee acceptance in Korea
11. North Korea Detainees Reveal Torture Methods For Violations Including Snoring
12. Unification minister promises efforts for wise use of inter-Korean cooperation fund
1. Biden Foreign Policy Tracker Korea
Korea
By David Maxwell
Previous Trend: Neutral
Ambassador Sung Kim, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, arrived in Seoul to meet with his South Korean counterpart. Kim met separately with his Russian counterpart, who was also visiting Seoul. Kim and South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong discussed ROK-U.S. humanitarian assistance to the North as well as prospects for resuming the peace process. Kim also stated that the United States harbors no hostile intentions toward North Korea and is prepared to negotiate. The ball remains in North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s court to respond. ROK-U.S. combined military exercises continued into their second week. So far, there has been no provocation from North Korea. The ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (on cost sharing) has been approved in committee and is now awaiting National Assembly approval, which will allow funds to be released to support U.S. Forces Korea. The U.S. missteps in Afghanistan have undoubtedly stoked concerns in Seoul. The Biden administration has worked to reaffirm the importance of Asian allies and U.S. commitments in Asia. South Korea will receive 391 Afghan evacuees and provide them the status of “persons of special merit” rather than refugees. The Taliban hope for South Korean diplomatic recognition and economic engagement, but that is unlikely.
2. 'Operation Miracle' complete with 390 Afghan arrivals (South Korea)
Excerpts:
The first group of 377 was comprised of people from 76 families. Adults numbered 146 and minors 231. Among the minors, 110 are under the age of six, according to the Ministry of Justice.
Upon their arrival, the first group took the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for Covid-19 at the airport and 360 tested negative. The results for the other 17 were borderline, but the government decided to quarantine them all together at the training center of the National Human Resources Development Institute (NHI) in Jincheon, South Chungcheong. The 17 will take another test within 24 hours of the initial test.
According to the ministry, all the evacuees will be quarantined at the Jincheon facility for two weeks according to the government’s social distancing measures. After they are released from quarantine, they will stay at the facility for about six more weeks to prepare for settlement in Korea.
The government created a team of 40 Justice Ministry workers and 12 disinfection workers to operate the facility. A medical team of doctors and nurses dispatched from the Justice Ministry’s Correctional Bureau and the Ministry of National Defense will reside in the facility to support them.
The police also dispatched a unit and the Justice Ministry also sent 14 guards to monitor the facility.
The ministry will offer Korean language, culture and law and order programs to help the evacuees’ settle. Financial support will be decided later through discussions within ministries.
Friday
August 27, 2021
'Operation Miracle' complete with 390 Afghan arrivals
Afghan evacuees arrive at Incheon International Airport on Friday. After a first group of 377 arrived on Thursday, the Korean military completed its evacuation operation on Friday by bringing in a second group of 13 . [YONHAP]
Korea completed the evacuation of Afghans who supported its activities in their homeland, dubbed “Operation Miracle," by airlifting a total of 390 people over a three-day period.
A second batch of 13 Afghans were airlifted from Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, Thursday evening and arrived at Incheon International Airport on Friday. The first group of 377 Afghans arrived on Thursday.
While the government announced Thursday that a group of 378 arrived in Korea, the actual number was 377, the Foreign Ministry said Friday. In total, 390 Afghans were evacuated to Korea.
According to the ministry, 391 were initially airlifted from Kabul on two military aircraft on Wednesday and arrived in Islamabad. When their identifications were scrutinized once again during the stopover, the government discovered that one person was not on its evacuation list.
“That person was sent back to Kabul through a military aircraft and handed over to the U.S. military,” the Foreign Ministry said.
The first group of 377 was comprised of people from 76 families. Adults numbered 146 and minors 231. Among the minors, 110 are under the age of six, according to the Ministry of Justice.
Upon their arrival, the first group took the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for Covid-19 at the airport and 360 tested negative. The results for the other 17 were borderline, but the government decided to quarantine them all together at the training center of the National Human Resources Development Institute (NHI) in Jincheon, South Chungcheong. The 17 will take another test within 24 hours of the initial test.
According to the ministry, all the evacuees will be quarantined at the Jincheon facility for two weeks according to the government’s social distancing measures. After they are released from quarantine, they will stay at the facility for about six more weeks to prepare for settlement in Korea.
The government created a team of 40 Justice Ministry workers and 12 disinfection workers to operate the facility. A medical team of doctors and nurses dispatched from the Justice Ministry’s Correctional Bureau and the Ministry of National Defense will reside in the facility to support them.
The police also dispatched a unit and the Justice Ministry also sent 14 guards to monitor the facility.
The ministry will offer Korean language, culture and law and order programs to help the evacuees’ settle. Financial support will be decided later through discussions within ministries.
BY SER MYO-JA [ser.myoja@joongang.co.kr]
3. Could South Korea Be The Next In Line After Afghanistan’s Fall – OpEd
I really tire of these OpEds. Korea is not Afghanistan. Our actions in Afghanistan do not foreshadow any change in policy and strategy toward Korea.
Could South Korea Be The Next In Line After Afghanistan’s Fall – OpEd
The unthinkable has finally hit home hard. Joe Biden’s botched and ill-prepared Afghanistan pullout has become the worst diplomatic and military blunder in US history. It has practically killed Biden’s political life and irrevocably damaged the credibility of the Biden-Harris White House.
The Taliban wants to stick to the Aug. 31st evacuation deadline. If the US fails to evacuate its citizens and Afghan allies by then, which the State Department admits is more likely, a hostage crisis will be looming for the stranded in Afghanistan. The picture is uglier than a nightmare.
Western countries and also India have been frantic about evacuating their nationals and emptying their embassies. But China, Russia, and Turkey have kept their embassies open in Kabul. Pakistan even welcomed the Taliban’s return. That plainly tells who stands behind the Taliban.
The real concern is that, as Newt Gingrich put it, “Biden surrendered to the Taliban” and the Biden White House has become their hostage, which opens the door to unprecedented defeats in US foreign policy in the coming days.
What caused the rapid meltdown of the Afghan government and its US-trained armed forces? When you have no perceived or tangible common values to uphold and defend, you have no will to fight and shed blood. With its territory encompassing numerous ethnic and linguistic groups, Afghanistan is inherently prone to conflict and has difficulty with centralized governance. Their multiethnic and cultural divergences accept no common values and ideological identities that apply across the board.
On the other hand, it is cautiously predicted in a latest in-depth analysis that the Taliban, in the absence of foreign invaders that caused ethnic factions to come together under one banner, may soon collapse, due to internal conflict, and Afghanistan will more likely become ethnic statelets. In that case, continuous civil war among the Afghans can spill over to the neighboring countries such as Tajikistan, Pakistan, and China’s Xinjiang province.
Days after Kabul fell into the hands of the Taliban, the Voice of America quoted current and former State Department officials as saying that the US will not be able to defend South Korea unless their people are willing to defend their country and freedoms.
The timing of their warning is quite telling and seems eerily prescient. There are compelling reasons why South Korea may be the next in line after Afghanistan’s fall.
First, South Korea has long lost its ideological identity established in its 1948 Constitution. Their governments have pursued ideological assimilation with North Korea since Kim Dae-Jung took power in 1998. The bloody riot in Kwangju in 1980 that aimed for subversion of the government was repackaged as a civil movement for democracy, and through the remaking, a new generation of anti-US political leaders has been created and trained.
Second, the current Moon administration has accelerated their effort to eliminate internal hurdles to forming an inter-Korean coalition government. The lawmakers have altercated the existing Constitution with core Communist values and crafted bills that restrict individual freedoms and rights. National resistance against that is either minimal or has been ineffective.
Third, the South Korean military no longer identifies North Korea as their main enemy or threats against whom to defend their people and nation. Following the Inter-Korean Military Agreement of Sept. 19, 2018, the South’s Defense Department removed their troops and all surveillance and security measures from the inter-Korean border and introduced a new no-fly zone over it.
Fourth, the South Korean governments have only done their minimum towards the US forces stationed there and stepped back from joint military readiness with the US. Moon has sabotaged the US military’s efforts to build THADD missile defense units in South Korea, citing Beijing’s concern, and infuriated the Trump administration by letting anti-US South Korean protesters block all land roads to the proposed missile sites, which forced the US to use airlift only.
Fifth, the majority of South Koreans have been misled with the belief that the US troops will not withdraw from South Korea because Korea’s geopolitical importance is vital to the American interests and strategic points. The US interests are for the region, not South Korea in particular. If the Korean Peninsula has any strategic importance to the US, it was mostly during the Cold War era which saw the need to contain the Soviet Union’s advancement.
Sixth, Japan is the most dependable US ally in the region. The two nations have ramped up joint military drills in response to the regional geostrategic needs. They both see the importance of Taiwan for their regional security. By contrast, South Korea has further alienated Japan and aligned more tightly with the Chinese Communist Party.
Seventh, and most importantly, there is an increasing probability that the fate of Kabul may be repeated in Seoul one day. Seoul is vulnerable to sudden attacks from North Korean commandos. If Seoul and its critical infrastructure fall in their hands overnight, will Moon order his generals a fight back and ask the US forces for help? Or will he order a ceasefire and a surrender to North Korea, as Ghani did in Kabul in favor of “peace and no bloodshed”? What choice is left for the US if that happens?
Some concerned South Koreans already know the answer as that is what they see as increasingly more likely. Will South Korea have another presidential election this time? Should the Biden White House have to launch another massive evacuation operation overseas?
*Max S. Kim received his PhD in cognitive science from Brandeis University and taught at the University of Washington and the State University of New York at Albany. Besides his own field of profession, he occasionally writes on regional affairs of the East Asia, including the two Koreas.
4. No 'unusual activity' from Pyongyang on conclusion of US, South Korea military drills
As expected. I will not be surprised if the regime offers this as a "concession" to kick off negotiations - it restrained itself from conducting a provocation over the exercises despite its prior threats; therefore it should be rewarded by the ROK and US. Keep in mind that from 2017 on President Trump gave Kim Jong-un "credit" for not conducting a nuclear or ICBM test. His measure of success for his policy was no tests of nukes and ICBMs. We should expect Kim to continue to try to get credit. This is in keeping with the KFR strategy to try to get something for nothing.
No 'unusual activity' from Pyongyang on conclusion of US, South Korea military drills
South Korea and the United States concluded their Combined Command Post Training, an 11-day computer-simulated military exercise, Thursday, Aug. 26, 2021. (Stars and Stripes)
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — U.S. and South Korean forces completed a joint training exercise with little apparent notice from North Korea, which had complained the drills were a provocation, a Defense Ministry official said Friday.
The two allies on Thursday concluded their Combined Command Post Training, a computer-simulated military exercise. A four-day preliminary crisis management session was also conducted prior to the drills.
“South Korea and the U.S. ended the [command-post exercise] for the second half of this year after achieving training goals,” a South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff official told Stars and Stripes on the customary condition of anonymity Friday.
The official said the two countries “successfully” finalized the training “while … in difficult overall conditions, such as the COVID-19 situation.”
Despite Pyongyang frequently railing against such joint drills, “there has been no unusual activity from North Korea during the training,” the JCS official added.
A separate Defense Ministry official confirmed the account to Stars and Stripes and added that North Korean troops have been conducting their own summer training.
Both U.S. and South Korean military officials declined to provide details of the exercise, including the number of troops involved.
U.S. Forces Korea spokesman Col. Lee Peters, citing the command’s policy of not commenting on the drills, said the “U.S. alliance remains committed to providing a credible military deterrence while maintaining a robust combined defense posture to protect [South Korea] against any adversary or threat.”
In recent years, the U.S. and South Korea have dramatically scaled back the number of troops for the annual drills. The allies postponed their last computer-simulated drill in February 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic.
Despite the allies dialing back their drills, North Korea has sent heated statements through its state-run Korean Central News Agency in recent months. The regime routinely claims the drills are a precursor to a hostile invasion of its country.
Earlier this month, senior North Korean official Kim Yong Chol said the command-post exercise was an “unfavorable prelude further beclouding the future of the inter-Korean relations.”
However, the U.S. views the drills as “purely defensive in nature,” State Department spokesman Ned Price told reporters on Aug. 10.
North Korea did not respond to calls on the inter-Korean military and joint liaison office hotlines Friday, according to the Defense and Unification ministries. The North has been unresponsive to Seoul’s attempts to communicate through the hotlines since Aug. 10.
David Choi
Yoo Kyong Chang
5. The U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Its Meaning for S.Korea
Excerpts:
The question I have received from many is how this U.S. withdrawal will affect the U.S. commitment to South Korea. Some expected a pullout if Trump won a second term, but they did not expect such a response under Biden; moreover, they are worried that if the U.S. can pull up such deep stakes in Afghanistan, then what's to prevent them from doing so in South Korea?
There are three important reasons why there should be no conclusions drawn from Afghanistan for the fidelity of U.S. commitments to South Korea. First, there is no better measure of success to sustain a policy. Afghanistan, by most metrics, has not been a successful engagement.
...
Second, Biden's withdrawal from Afghanistan is based in a deeply held view about the futility of the U.S. commitment -- a view that he certainly does not have with regard to South Korea.
...
Third, for those who ask the question "Will the U.S. pull out of South Korea after Afghanistan?" is to confuse the premise with purpose. It's not that the Afghan pullout will lead to a South Korea pullout. On the contrary, the Afghan pullout means that the U.S. will stay in South Korea.
The U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Its Meaning for S.Korea
By Victor Cha, a professor at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow in Human Freedom at George W. Bush Institute, and Korea Chair at CSIS in Washington, D.C.
Around Washington, D.C. these days, the only topic of conversation in foreign policy circles is the U.S. decision to withdraw from its two-decade military engagement in Afghanistan. The initial film footage of chaos at the airport and the rapid collapse of the government to the Taliban led many to two conclusions. First, a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions would follow as the Taliban would take revenge against those Afghans trying to leave the country and those who helped the U.S. military. Second, the U.S. withdrawal would set off repercussions around the world among U.S. allies about the longevity and resilience of U.S. security commitments. While the first of these concerns is grave and requires serious attention by the international community, I will focus on the second of these conclusions.
The amount of material and human resources that the United States has invested over four presidencies into Afghanistan is phenomenal. According to the Costs of War Project, the U.S. has spent $2.26 trillion, including $815.7 billion on the military costs of fighting the war. It has spent over $80 billion to train Afghan security forces which we see crumbling like a house of cards with the U.S. withdrawal. Another $36 billion was spent on reconstruction projects. 2,442 U.S. troops have been killed and 20,666 wounded in the war and $296 billion in medical costs has been expended for veterans of the war.
One would expect that with the scale of investment of resources and, in particular political capital, that the United States would not see a "cut and run" strategy as feasible as it would represent an astounding failure of U.S. policy. Yet, the decision by the Biden administration to withdraw on the twentieth anniversary of the Afghanistan invasion was defended with a political conviction that would impress many unilateralists.
The question I have received from many is how this U.S. withdrawal will affect the U.S. commitment to South Korea. Some expected a pullout if Trump won a second term, but they did not expect such a response under Biden; moreover, they are worried that if the U.S. can pull up such deep stakes in Afghanistan, then what's to prevent them from doing so in South Korea?
There are three important reasons why there should be no conclusions drawn from Afghanistan for the fidelity of U.S. commitments to South Korea. First, there is no better measure of success to sustain a policy. Afghanistan, by most metrics, has not been a successful engagement. This is certainly the personal view of Biden (see next point), and the view of most analysts. It fit the definition of a "quagmire" -- that is, the scale of investments itself entrapped the United States into a never-ending spiral where the answer to problems was to invest more money. By contrast, South Korea is a shining success of U.S. security commitments. It has not only deterred a second North Korean invasion, but also created new equities that benefit both allies in all sorts of areas like climate, green growth, global health, development assistance, emerging technology, and supply chain resilience, as evidence by the recent May 21 summit between presidents Biden and Moon.
Second, Biden's withdrawal from Afghanistan is based in a deeply held view about the futility of the U.S. commitment -- a view that he certainly does not have with regard to South Korea. When the Obama administration in 2009 considered surging 17000 additional troops in Afghanistan, then-Vice President Biden, according to press reports, was one of the strongest advocates against the policy because he believed that the U.S. inherited a situation in which the U.S. had lost sight of its strategic goals and was now just throwing more money and military resources at the problem. Biden believed that the invasion of Afghanistan was necessary to remove the Taliban, but he believed that the U.S. lost focus on the mission there once it opened a second front war in Iraq, and that this then allowed an insurgent resurgence of the Taliban in the theater. Biden was also skeptical that the U.S. could engage in successful nation-building in Afghanistan, and that it did not have a reliable counterpart to work with in the country despite all U.S. efforts. Finally, Biden did not believe that the Taliban posed a homeland security threat to the United States.
Biden certainly does not have the high levels of skepticism about the U.S. commitment in South Korea that he holds in Afghanistan. On the contrary, his decision to invite South Korea as one of his first head of state guests to the White House demonstrated the value he places in the relationship and the longevity of the security commitment.
Third, for those who ask the question "Will the U.S. pull out of South Korea after Afghanistan?" is to confuse the premise with purpose. It's not that the Afghan pullout will lead to a South Korea pullout. On the contrary, the Afghan pullout means that the U.S. will stay in South Korea. Biden's thinking is that he no longer wants the U.S. to be tied down in this quagmire. He wants to free up U.S. resource and political attention from Afghanistan to focus U.S. interests on other issues and areas of the world. Biden said as much when he noted that he would not hand an unfinished war in Afghanistan to the next U.S. president (even if this will be him). One of the areas of critical strategic focus for Biden is rejuvenating U.S. alliances around the world, as well as the pivot to Asia. South Korea sits at the intersection of both of these priorities.
China has mocked the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as another example of declining U.S. hegemony. Nothing could be further from the truth. Afghanistan is a sign of a U.S. strategic reorientation that aims to consolidate strength and rebuild American globalism in support of the liberal international order from which allies like South Korea has benefited so handsomely.
6. Young Koreans lash out at heavy-handed China
Koreans have the least negative view of the US. Even "other" is more negative than the US.
Young Koreans lash out at heavy-handed China
Korean university students and exchange students from Hong Kong protest against the enactment of the National Security Law in Hong Kong in front of China's embassy in central Seoul, May 27, 2020. Korea Times photo by Choi Won-sukThis article is the first in a three-part series to highlight growing anti-China sentiment in Korea and the current state of relations between the two countries. ― ED
Anti-China sentiment intensified during COVID-19 pandemic
By Park Han-sol
Back in November 2019, there were multiple instances of on-campus conflicts between Korean and Chinese students surrounding the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Some Koreans showed their open support for the movement through statements that they posted on the school's bulletin boards, which angered some Chinese students and led to in a war of words or even physical clashes in some cases.
Similar confrontations between supporters of Hong Kong activists and mainland Chinese students have taken place in other countries as well ― in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.
In "Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World" (2020), the two authors, Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, claim that certain incidents involving the collective action of mainland Chinese students against the pro-Hong Kong rallies could be considered as state-sponsored.
"…Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CCSAs) do have ties to the (Chinese Communist) Party and the Chinese government," the book reads. "At the University of Queensland, one pro-Hong Kong student was assaulted. The next day, the Chinese consul general (in Australia) issued a statement praising the patriotic actions of the Chinese students, drawing a rebuke from Australia's foreign minister."
A string of heavy-handed, nationalistic actions taken by China has resulted in a growing antipathy toward the country, particularly among younger Koreans. Having witnessed the Chinese government denying its role in the production of fine dust pollution, a major environmental problem ― especially in springtime ― that often sweeps through the greater Seoul area, causing people to suffer from various respiratory disorders, and Chinese fishers working illegally in Korea's maritime territory in the West Sea, Koreans have been simmering with discontent for the past several years.
Given that the Chinese city of Wuhan is believed to be the origin of the COVID-19 outbreak, Beijing's poor handling of the virus has become the latest source of discontent among younger Koreans.
"I think that anti-China sentiment has intensified in Korea, particularly after the COVID-19 outbreak," said a 23-year-old university student in Seoul who asked to be identified only by his surname of Jung. "From reading news articles, I personally came to believe that Wuhan is where the virus originated from. The fact that people's lives have changed completely due to the pandemic, and many are suffering the consequences, seem to be the source of the recent surge in such negative feelings."
Human rights issues are another source of discontent among Korean Millennials and Generation Z toward China.
"China continues to oppress ethnic minorities within its borders, and tries to assert its claims on the South China Sea, not by taking diplomatic actions but by building artificial islands," Kim Tae-il, an international studies major at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, told The Korea Times. "How can a nation with such a track record be considered a normal country in the present era?"
Lee Yun-kyu, a senior majoring in political science and diplomacy at Ajou University, referred to the country's ongoing crackdown in Hong Kong. "China has paid no regard to maintaining the universally accepted values of freedom and human rights."
Six other interviewees, all in their mid-20s through early 30s, echoed such sentiments, each citing different sociocultural events that ended up fueling their negative feelings toward China ― including the recent feud between the origins of kimchi and hanbok (traditional Korean dress) and Beijing's growing influence over the Korean entertainment scene.
According to a joint survey conducted in June by the daily newspaper the Kukmin Ilbo and the polling company Global Research, 51.7 percent of 1,000 respondents between the ages of 18 and 39 put China at the top of their list of countries they view negatively. This figure is significantly higher than that of Japan (31.2 percent) ― which has long been an easy target for criticism due to its 1910-45 colonial occupation of Korea ― as well as that of North Korea (12.6 percent).
This relatively strong anti-China sentiment among younger Koreans even materialized into a widespread boycott against a drama series that had featured Chinese-style props earlier this year.
SBS drama series "Joseon Exorcist" / Courtesy of Studio Plex, Crave Works, Lotte CultureworksIn late March, the fantasy period drama series, "Joseon Exorcist," got off on the wrong foot with its viewers. Although the story was set during the early Joseon Kingdom era (1392-1910), featuring real royal historical figures of the period, some of the characters were adorned with unabashedly Chinese-style costumes, hairstyles and food props ― including mooncakes and century eggs.
Just a day after the second episode aired, a petition calling for the immediate cancellation of the show "for its distortion of Korean history" was posted on Cheong Wa Dae's website, gathering over 247,000 signatures. The petition was followed by over 5,000 similar complaints filed to the Korea Communications Standards Commission. This public backlash ultimately pushed the broadcaster SBS to cancel the show altogether less than a week after its premiere.
The forced cancellation of "Joseon Exorcist" from domestic TV has was an unprecedented turning point in consumer-driven actions. There had previously been no historical drama series canceled due to viewers' outrage.
The key roles behind the campaign were played by younger, digital-savvy Koreans. The screenshots taken from the fantasy thriller series' scenes featuring Chinese props spread quickly across popular online communities favored by those in their 20s and early 30s, resulting in collective action against the show, the broadcaster and even its corporate sponsors.
"There were a number of internet communities that were very active from the start in their boycott against Joseon Exorcist. And these communities are largely led by users in their 20s," said Joo Chang-yun, a professor of communications and media at Seoul Women's University.
He said that people in their 20s can be described as the "generation of rage." "Facing a tough labor market and high youth unemployment, they view themselves as the victims of the continued economic downturn. The feelings of frustration and deprivation have caused them to be much more sensitive to certain issues, which they deem to be threats to their identities and wellbeing," he said.
"For example, back in 2010, a clash between feminists and misogynists flared up online when the employment rate of women narrowly exceeded that of men for the first time ever. This gender-based conflict was a kind of outlet through which young males let out their anger."
Joo said that the current anti-China sentiment can also be another case of bubbling-over rage, this time taking the form of Korean nationalism.
As to why anti-China views are on the rise among the younger people ― in comparison to anti-Japan views, which are typically expected to be held by Koreans, due to Japan's former role as Korea's colonizer ― he explained that there is a difference in terms of how "imminent the threat feels to them."
"In the case of Japan, the conflict is largely fixated on past ideological issues ― sex slavery, forced labor and Dokdo, for example." Korea claims the Dokdo islets as the nation's easternmost territory, while Japan disputes the claim.
However, when it comes to China, the conflict is based on issues resulting from Beijing's currently growing influence in political, economic and cultural spheres, he noted. This situation means that the country's presence has become an inescapable force felt in the everyday life of younger Koreans.
"China's claims of ownership over kimchi and hanbok, as well as Chinese investment in the Korean entertainment scene… These elements are all closely connected to young Koreans' everyday lives, and therefore they feel more of an imminent threat to them," Joo explained.
7. A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea
The report was developed by a working group led by Dr. Jieun Baek of Harvard. In the video are remarks by Graham Allison and Andrew Kim (former director of the CIA Korea Mission Center). On the panel that is moderated by Dr. Baek is Markus Garlauskas, Greg Scarlatoiu, Dr. Sue Mi Terry, and myself (all members of Dr.Baek's working group). We have what I think is a very good discussion about the report, north Korean human rights and the importance of information and influence activities.
A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea
This online session was be a report launch for "A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach to Promote Human Rights and Pursue Denuclearization." This report is based on the insights of a working group of ten members that convened throughout the spring of 2021 to produce policy recommendations on North Korea for the Biden Administration.
The North Korean nuclear threat remains one of the most persistent and complex foreign policy issues facing the United States today. The growing risk that the Kim regime’s nuclear and missile programs pose to the U.S. underscores the need to consider every tool of statecraft available to pursue the United States’ policy objectives on North Korea. The Biden administration has emphasized the importance of alliances and core values of democracy in its foreign policy approach. Given this emphasis, public diplomacy—activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences—should be considered an essential tool in achieving our long-term policy objectives in North Korea. Public diplomacy has the potential to spur domestic change in North Korea—change that could result in improved human rights conditions, leading to behavioral change in the Kim regime, and eventually denuclearization.
This report proposes three recommendations for how the USG can adopt a public diplomacy policy with North Korea:
Recommendation 1: The White House affirm that public diplomacy is a critical tool in the long-term pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives in North Korea.
Recommendation 2: Identify and empower a lead to strengthen the direction, coordination, and accountability of U.S. public diplomacy efforts on North Korea.
Recommendation 3: Expand existing efforts to inform, understand, and empower North Koreans.
SHOW LESS
8. Biden’s North Korea Policy : Alliance Transformation before Denuclearization
Our good friend Dr. Go provides some interesting analysis but I fundamentally disagree with this point. while the ROK can play an important role in the US's strategy for a free and open INDOPACIFIC, I do not think that is the main focus of US Korean policy and I do not think the administration has any intention of neglecting the north Korea threat and the "Korea question."
But available evidence indicates that Biden’s North Korea policy is more of a strategy to manage alliance relations with South Korea and entice it to embrace U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It reflects the fact that North Korea is no longer a top policy priority for the United States in the era of great power competition. The re-orientation of North Korea policy away from its namesake is the product of Biden administration officials’ skepticism over North Korea’s denuclearization prospects, as well as the assessment that Trump’s personal diplomacy with North Korea has been fruitless. But the real game changer is the fact that U.S. strategic focus has shifted from counterterrorism and rogue states such as North Korea and Iran to confronting near peer adversaries, particularly China.
Biden’s North Korea Policy : Alliance Transformation before Denuclearization
- Issue/Region :
- Foreign Relations,Nuclear Issues/Korean Peninsula,US-Canada
- Expert :
-
Go Myong-Hyun / Center for Foreign Policy and National Security
Introduction
Diplomacy with North Korea has always been an intractable challenge for the United States. After the collapse of the Six Party Talks in 2008, the United States attempted several different approaches with the same goal of North Korea’s denuclearization. Obama administration’s “strategic patience”, while ultimately ineffective, reflected hard-learned lessons of decades of North Korea’s broken promises. The Trump administration that followed faced series of serious North Korean provocations from the moment it inaugurated. In response, it formulated the “maximum pressure and engagement” approach, which paid an unprecedented level of attention to North Korea. Now, the newly inaugurated Biden administration has finalized its own North Korea policy review and shared the results with U.S. allies. Only broad sketches of the new policy trickled out so far and additional facets of the policy are only being inferred from the statements issued at the G7 meeting in London and US-ROK summit. Overall, the reaction to the policy review has been underwhelming, as many observers correctly perceive it to be vague and lacking in originality.
While Biden’s North Korea policy is unambiguous in its stated goal, namely the Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, or CVIA, it is vague when it comes to actual details on how such a seemingly impossible goal could be achieved. Perhaps this vagueness is a subterfuge: the policy review is supposed to communicate American intentions about North Korea to allies, stakeholders, and Kim Jong Un himself. But fleshing out policy details could allow North Korea to anticipate Biden administration’s moves and prolong the impasse. After all, taking advantage of the short political cycles of its opponents is Pyongyang’s forte.
But available evidence indicates that Biden’s North Korea policy is more of a strategy to manage alliance relations with South Korea and entice it to embrace U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It reflects the fact that North Korea is no longer a top policy priority for the United States in the era of great power competition. The re-orientation of North Korea policy away from its namesake is the product of Biden administration officials’ skepticism over North Korea’s denuclearization prospects, as well as the assessment that Trump’s personal diplomacy with North Korea has been fruitless. But the real game changer is the fact that U.S. strategic focus has shifted from counterterrorism and rogue states such as North Korea and Iran to confronting near peer adversaries, particularly China.
It is the latter objective that is driving Biden administration’s foreign policy, which has been inherited from Trump administration’s National Security Strategy of 2017, but with an important twist. One of the key differences between Trump and Biden administrations lies with the respective administrations’ views of alliance. While Trump famously regarded U.S. allies as free-riders, Biden rightly sees them as “force multipliers” that support the United States around the world. U.S. military couldn’t possibly agree more, given that it considers alliances and partnerships to be the “backbones of global security”.
With the military and political leadership finally in full agreement on the strategic direction of the United States, the Biden administration is forging ahead at full speed to revitalize and reorient the alliance for the era of great power competition. Biden’s North Korea policy should be interpreted in this light rather than as a standalone policy specific to North Korea.
While the policy is arguably devoid of new ideas, it serves as a device to firmly anchor South Korea in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy in exchange for Biden’s commitment to prioritize dialogue with North Korea over the military alternative. In a word, what lies at the core of Biden’s North Korea policy is not the namesake target but the alliance- not only South Korea and the United States, but a triad that includes Japan.
The restoration of deterrence to the center of North Korea policy by the Biden administration is a welcome change from the chaotic diplomacy of the Trump era. The lowered prioritization of denuclearization is influenced by the perception that North Korea is unlikely to abandon its nuclear arsenal and the quiet assessment that North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats can be fully deterred, leading to a lessening of urgency for dialogue with Pyongyang. As a result, North Korea is likely to perceive Biden’s North Korea policy to be a return to the strategic patience of the Obama era.
Biden’s North Korea policy also challenges Seoul. The alliance relation has been restored, but is also transformed. South Korea will now have to reassess its own approach to North Korea and China within the Indo-Pacific strategy framework rather than striking an independent path. Therein lies the complexity and challenges of Biden’s North Korea policy for South Korea.
9. Debating North Korea: US and Chinese Perspectives
An Interesting letter exchange. More substance in these letters than inthe Trump-Kim exchanges.
Debating North Korea: US and Chinese Perspectives | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
The deteriorating US-China relationship is hindering prospects for meaningful cooperation on persistent security challenges, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear issue. The threat perception gap, different long-term objectives and increasing mutual suspicion between the two major powers continue to widen despite mutual interest in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Both countries view the other as an obstacle to progress—China is seen as prioritizing DPRK regime security over the nuclear nonproliferation regime and nuclear threats, while the US is seen as a destabilizer plotting to contain China. As the region waits to see if and when North Korea will reengage, the US and China should engage now on overcoming obstacles to cooperation and on a possible road map for sustained denuclearization negotiations.
The following exchange of views between Susan Thornton, Project Director of the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and Li Nan, Senior Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, highlights the differing perspectives, mutual suspicions and lingering contradictions between the US and China on North Korea policy and the prospects for future negotiations.
***
Dear Nan,
I regret that we have been unable to connect in person for more than a year, but as you know, the new US administration has completed its North Korea policy review. It will no doubt have considered China’s role in trying to make progress on this intractable issue, and since Americans have been out of touch with Chinese views, I thought it would be beneficial and timely to have this exchange.
As you know, Washington policymakers have become quite negative on prospects for US-China cooperation on the DPRK issue. The biggest problem, of course, is the current deteriorating US-China relationship and the mutual suspicion of intentions that goes along with that. This is a difficult obstacle to overcome, although we are currently cooperating to try to resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal, so such cooperation is theoretically possible, even if difficult.
Beyond the current bilateral difficulties, though, there are a number of American frustrations and suspicions about China’s role in DPRK denuclearization efforts. The most enduring complaint is that China prioritizes stability of the North Korean regime over the denuclearization process and thus the upholding of the nonproliferation regime. China is reluctant to apply sanctions pressure, for example, for fear of impending DPRK collapse. But surely, China can see that there is no danger of sanctions pressure causing collapse, since the DPRK itself sealed the border to outside trade because of COVID-19.
This brings me to another sore point, which is Beijing’s persistently insufficient effort to enforce the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime. Whether limited vigilance at the border crossing or lack of enforcement on ship-to-ship transfers, it seems to many outsiders that Beijing is not serious about sanctions enforcement. Tensions and disagreements in this area are bound to dog any hoped-for cooperation, as Americans view Chinese sanctions enforcement as a litmus test of seriousness about contributing to collective denuclearization efforts.
Lastly, many in US policymaking circles see DPRK and Chinese interests aligned in trying to drive wedges between the US and its Northeast Asian allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Biden administration has demonstrated keen intent to work with its allies to solve problems, and while China has shown interest in being involved in future DPRK negotiations, the US will be looking at the cost/benefit calculation of Chinese involvement.
Of course, China might have its own reservations at this point about the ability of the US government to conduct a coherent negotiation with North Korea, and many have wondered whether the US goal is still denuclearization. I believe the Biden administration will answer these concerns. The question, as always, will be how to move the North Koreans, a prospect that seems as difficult as ever.
Best,
Susan
***
Dear Susan,
China has also been frustrated with prospects for cooperation with the US due to the deteriorating bilateral relationship. China believes the US is not willing to solve the North Korean nuclear issue, and is thus prepared to tolerate the DPRK threat for the sake of building up its alliance against China. Washington, on the contrary, believes Beijing is not willing to address the nuclear issue because it is using Pyongyang as leverage against America and its allies. Because of these different views, plus mutual suspicion of each other’s intentions, China and the US have not had any impetus to make real progress on cooperation.
China and the US also have different views of the DPRK’s relationship with the other. On the one hand, the United States thinks that the DPRK is a “puppet of China.” Thus, Washington believes the only way to force Pyongyang to submit is by exerting pressure on Beijing. On the other hand, China is worried about the possibility of closer US-DPRK relations for the purposes of containing China, similar to the establishment of People’s Republic of China (PRC)-US diplomatic relations to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Both China and the US have vivid “camp thinking”—or what the Chinese like to call “Cold War thinking”—that allows the DPRK to play us off one another.
China’s strategic interests in the Korean Peninsula are to maintain amicable relations with both Koreas and to ensure a stable and nuclear-free peninsula. China is seriously concerned about the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, and that it might encourage other countries in the region to develop its own nuclear programs, which is against China’s security interests. There is no doubt that China takes a strong stance on this issue, as demonstrated by the four China-DPRK summits held since 2018. It is also why China has not conducted military exercises with the DPRK and has never provided military assistance to the DPRK, in contrast with the US-ROK alliance. And much to the DPRK’s dissatisfaction, China’s Ministry of Commerce still enforces sanctions that prevent the exports of chemicals and metals considered “strategic assets” to the DPRK.
Although China has given strong political support to the DPRK, China continues to implement the main sanctions that constrain the sustainable development of the DPRK until it can abandon its nuclear and missile programs. There is no doubt that smuggling across the China-DPRK border has been getting worse, but that does not mean the Chinese government is not serious about sanctions enforcement. Also, there are various other channels in which the DPRK can obtain hard currency, which is another issue that needs to be addressed by the international community.
It is necessary for China and the US to cooperate on the North Korean nuclear issue now, especially as the COVID-19 pandemic continues. In the ROK, the Moon administration is still putting all efforts into engaging with the DPRK to ensure stability of the peninsula. However, the recent US-ROK joint statement made no mention of the prospects for multilateral cooperation on the issue. Words alone, without any real action, will not lead to progress. We missed the chance for multilateral cooperation at the Hanoi Summit, and we are missing another opportunity for cooperation today.
Best,
Nan
***
Dear Nan,
I was very interested to hear of Chinese concerns about a possible US-DPRK axis against China and, in response, I would just say that, of all the things that might keep your government officials awake at night, this should not be one of them. It is positive that, although China suspects that the US is using the DPRK issue as an excuse together with its allies to undermine China’s security, China is nevertheless willing to work with the US toward denuclearization provided the approach is consistent with maintaining the stability of the peninsula. I would like to hear more about what kind of stability you have in mind, but I grant that it is hard to see how a unified Korea of any sort happens without significant turmoil.
I have heard Chinese interlocutors argue in favor of US-China cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, in favor of a road map for denuclearization that would outline a step-by-step approach, and for a simultaneous dual track on denuclearization and addressing North Korean security concerns. You indicate that Pyongyang, while regressing in terms of internal repression and state control of the economy, will be more motivated by economic enticements from the outside once it comes out of the pandemic and that this presents an opportunity. I hope you are right; we are still waiting to see. The problem has always been, though, that such economic enticements pale in comparison to what Pyongyang sees as its existential security shield: nuclear weapons capability. The DPRK has shown incredible resilience in the face of sanctions and has even gone as far as to close its border with China, further isolating itself during the pandemic. It is also the case that such economic enticements are exceedingly difficult to offer and bestow, given the objectionable practices of and low trust in the North Korean regime.
Assuming that North Korea’s bottom line is regime security and that regime security in North Korea does not depend much on the plight of average citizens, I worry that economic incentives are not worth much in the eyes of Kim Jong Un. President Donald Trump gave Kim Jong Un a great deal of respect and face on the world stage, but got nowhere. Has the denuclearization “game” become an integral part of North Korea’s national identity? What enticements or pressure points have we overlooked in the effort to get Kim Jong Un to abandon his nuclear program?
Lastly, like you, I am worried about the regional security environment amid a persistent DPRK nuclear program. We cannot count on other regional states to hold off on their own development of nuclear weapons capability if North Korea’s program appears permanent. In this and other respects, time is not on our side.
Best,
Susan
***
Dear Susan,
As to what stability would look like in China’s view, the first priority is “no chaos and no war.” After the “Fire and Fury Crisis” in 2017, China wondered whether the US could have a consistent policy towards the Korean Peninsula and the DPRK, and whether it prioritized stability on the peninsula as China always has. China believed war could be imminent. Thus, China sees the US as the one trying to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, similar to how the US currently sees China as the destabilizer in cross-Taiwan Strait relations. Also, a unified Korea resulting from the absorption of North Korea by South Korea will probably lead to turmoil. Many North Koreans cannot accept the ROK’s system, and there is the chance that a conservative South Korean government may seek revenge when unified with the North. Therefore, China hopes to achieve unification based on peaceful self-determination, and an end-of-war declaration and peace agreement are critical.
According to the report from the Eighth Party Congress, Kim Jong Un believes the DPRK’s economic weakness mainly results from the system, which shows that there is an impetus for reform. In recent months, Kim Jong Un frequently criticized the system and reshuffled the bureaucracy, showing how ambitious he is in trying to reform the system to make a more stable foundation for the economy. As you said, the DPRK has shown incredible resilience in the face of sanctions, so sanctions are not existential from the North Korean perspective. But since Pyongyang cannot achieve economic success immediately, it will continue to blame external factors, such as sanctions, for limited progress in order to manage expectations.
It is politically difficult for the US, and even for the ROK, to offer economic assistance. However, China will provide economic support and encourage the DPRK to reform. Hopefully the DPRK can realize that the only way to achieve sustainable development is to drop its nuclear program and join the international community.
I agree time is not on our side, but I still think we should have patience. I also believe that North Korea cannot permanently keep its nuclear program because if it would like to achieve sustainable development, the sanctions regime is its biggest obstacle. If maintaining the nuclear program becomes useless or a burden, I believe it will abandon the program. Until that day comes, the DPRK will continue to wait and see if the US will demonstrate goodwill before coming back to the negotiating table. In the meantime, China will continue to uphold its position on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and for DPRK-US and DPRK-ROK talks on a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula.
Best,
Nan
- [1]
“Second-day Sitting of 2nd Plenary Meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee Held,” KCNA, February 10, 2021.
- [2]
“Press Statement by Kim Yo Jong, First Vice Department Director of Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea,” KCNA, July 10, 2020.
-
[1] As a result, the DPRK has to consolidate its regime by uniting the people and ramping up anti-Western propaganda. Despite COVID-19, the DPRK has shown tenacity, even without substantial economic assistance from China and Russia. This raises the question of how much does the DPRK actually rely on China and Russia.
- [2]
10. Afghan crisis reignites debates on refugee acceptance in Korea
Excerpt:
Although the government brought 391 such people to the country as "persons with special merit" and is seeking to revise an enforcement ordinance on immigration to grant them long-term stay permits, fears and ill feelings toward them have risen here. The Afghan crisis has also stirred a further debate over whether Korea should accept other fleeing Afghans as refugees, with political parties and citizens showing different responses to the matter.
Afghan crisis reignites debates on refugee acceptance in Korea
Family members of Afghans who helped the Korean government's activities in their country arrive at Incheon International Airport, Thursday. A total of 378 Afghans, out of 391 to be airlifted, arrived in South Korea on Thursday as part of Seoul's efforts to evacuate locals who worked at Korea's embassy and other government facilities in the war-torn nation, as well as their families. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
Public sentiment not much changed since 2018 Yemenis' asylum seeking on Jeju
By Jung Da-min
The crisis in Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal has stirred debate in Korea as to whether the country should take in Afghans fleeing the Taliban takeover and grant them refugee status.
On Aug. 24, the Korean government announced that it has sent three military transport planes to the Middle Eastern region to evacuate Afghans who had helped the Korean government's activities there. Those who worked at organizations run by the Korean government such as the embassy, hospitals or vocal training centers and their family members had were afraid for their lives under the Taliban due to their cooperation with the Korean government.
Although the government brought 391 such people to the country as "persons with special merit" and is seeking to revise an enforcement ordinance on immigration to grant them long-term stay permits, fears and ill feelings toward them have risen here. The Afghan crisis has also stirred a further debate over whether Korea should accept other fleeing Afghans as refugees, with political parties and citizens showing different responses to the matter.
Afghans who helped the Korean government's activities in their country line up to board a military aircraft at Kabul airport, as part of the operation to evacuate them to Korea amid growing fears of possible Taliban retaliation against those who have aided the United States and its allies, in this photo released Wednesday. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign AffairsThe progressive minor opposition Justice Party is so far the only political party to have said Korea should actively seek ways to help other Afghan evacuees by accepting them as refugees. But the country's two major parties, the ruling liberal Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) and the main opposition conservative People Power Party (PPP), have said a more cautious approach is needed on the matter of opening the door for refugees.
Likewise, public opinion is also divided. While those who oppose accepting refugees cite fear of crime or the economic burden as reasons, those who support the idea say such concerns over refugees are based on misinformation or wrong beliefs.
A South Korean diplomat looks for Afghans who helped the Korean government's activities in their country to get them on a military aircraft at Kabul airport, as part of Korea's operations to evacuate them to Korea, in this photo released Wednesday. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Three years ago, a similar debate surfaced after 561 Yemenis seeking asylum from a civil war in their home country landed on Jeju Island in the summer of 2018, with the number of Yemenis on the island surging from 52 in 2017 and 10 in 2016.
Although the number of Yemenis who applied for refugee status in 2018 stood at 484, only accounting for 0.03 percent of the total 16,173 asylum seekers here, media reports of the possibility of more Yemenis arriving on Jeju brought about a backlash against refugees and asylum seekers in the country.
Recent surveys on perceptions of refugees showed Koreans still have negative sentiments against refugees.
In a survey by Embrain Public in May, 59.5 percent of 1,000 respondents said they believe crime rates in major European countries rose after an influx of refugees around 2015. But according to statistics of Eurostat, the number of crimes such as murder or robbery in 27 European countries dropped by 30 percent to 34 percent in 2018 compared to 2012.
Afghans who helped the Korean government's activities in their country board a military aircraft at Kabul airport, as part of Korea's operations to evacuate them to Korea, in this photo released Wednesday. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign AffairsIn another survey conducted by Hankook Research on 1,016 Korean adults at the request of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in late November 2020, 53 percent of the respondents were against the country receiving and protecting refugees, compared to 33 percent who were in favor.
For reasons given in opposition, 64 percent cited the financial burden to the country; 57 percent, concerns over crimes; 49 percent said they were just coming here to find jobs; and 46 percent cited differences in culture and religion, when multiple answers were allowed.
The negative sentiment against refugees among Koreans is reflected in the country's low rate of granting refugee status.
A direction sign for the reception desk for refugee applications is seen at the entrance of Seoul Immigration Office in Yangcheon District, Wednesday.
Yonhap
According to an analysis by local civil organization NANCEN Refugee Rights Center based on data from the Ministry of Justice, the percentage of those granted refugee status stood at 0.4 percent in 2020, or only 52 out of 11,892 who completed the authorities' review process to determine refugee status.
The percentage remained the same from the previous year and was much lower than the figures in the European Union in 2020, which stood at 32 percent, according to the European Asylum Support Office.
A Korean diplomat with the Korean Embassy in Afghanistan, rights, hugs an Afghan national who had worked at the embassy, during Korea's operation to evacuate Afghans who helped the Korean government's activities there, in this photo released Wednesday. Courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11. North Korea Detainees Reveal Torture Methods For Violations Including Snoring
Group punishment of 1000 squats for snoring.
Excerpts:
After one detainee was heard snoring, all 12 detainees in a single cell were asked to ‘extend their hands forward and do 1,000 squats. I was young so it was okay, but those who were older fainted on the spot’, an interviewee said.
‘In the fixed position, you had to be on your knees with the rest of your body off the ground, with your hands extended forward; you had to stay like that for hours. If you moved, they made you stick your hands out and hit them with a cane,’ another former detainee said.
Guterres has recommended North Korea ‘take immediate steps to address the serious human rights challenges in the country and end violations’ and allow international access to assist citizens in the COVID-19 pandemic with vaccines and other efforts.
North Korea Detainees Reveal Torture Methods For Violations Including Snoring
Warning: contains graphic content
PA Images
A new report has revealed North Korea’s ‘torture’ and ‘other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ of detainees.
Compiled by UN Secretary General António Guterres, it’s due to be presented to the General Assembly in September, giving an overview of the ‘situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ with gathered intelligence and first-hand accounts.
In addition to surveying any incidents between August 2020 and July 2021, it also includes accounts from 2010 and 2019. North Korea has not contributed to the report.
PA Images
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted interviews with recent escapees in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), outlining a number of human rights challenges that the North must address, Guterres said.
Advert
One section of the report specifically concerns inhumane treatment, with ‘consistent and credible accounts of the systematic infliction of severe physical and mental pain or suffering upon detainees, through beatings, stress positions and starvation’.
People are said to have been beaten during interrogations to ‘forcibly extract confessions, as a means of discipline (e.g. for failing to sit absolutely still for prolonged periods or failing to criticise fellow detainees sufficiently harshly during group criticism sessions) and upon the failure to pay bribes’.
One woman recalled being beaten by a Ministry of State Security officer with firewood ‘so the skin on my face tore open, my chin became dislocated and four of my teeth were knocked out’, she said. Another woman was forced to kneel, ‘and they beat me on my thigh. I could not walk properly for a year’.
Some detainees were also asked ‘to place their heads on the bars [of the cell] and the guards would beat us with a club… we were just like punching bags to them’.
Minor infractions are also punished with severe punishment. ‘There was a 70-litre tub filled with water, and they made us splash that water over the floor and sit on top of it, which would soak our trousers and freeze our bodies over,’ one female former detainee said.
PA Images
After one detainee was heard snoring, all 12 detainees in a single cell were asked to ‘extend their hands forward and do 1,000 squats. I was young so it was okay, but those who were older fainted on the spot’, an interviewee said.
‘In the fixed position, you had to be on your knees with the rest of your body off the ground, with your hands extended forward; you had to stay like that for hours. If you moved, they made you stick your hands out and hit them with a cane,’ another former detainee said.
Guterres has recommended North Korea ‘take immediate steps to address the serious human rights challenges in the country and end violations’ and allow international access to assist citizens in the COVID-19 pandemic with vaccines and other efforts.
12. Unification minister promises efforts for wise use of inter-Korean cooperation fund
I would like to know what is the description of wise use of these funds.
Unification minister promises efforts for wise use of inter-Korean cooperation fund | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Lee In-young said Friday the government will make the best use of the inter-Korean cooperation fund to open dialogue with North Korea and address challenges, including the coronavirus.
The state fund was first created in 1991 for economic cooperation and exchanges with North Korea. About 1.67 trillion won (US$1.5 billion) is set aside in the fund as of the end of July, according to unification ministry data.
"The government will make consistent efforts and gather wisdom to address the difficulties facing South and North Koreans from COVID-19 and natural disasters so that the inter-Korean cooperation fund can play its role on the path to resuming dialogue," he said during a speech at a seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the fund's establishment.
Inter-Korean relations remain stalled amid little progress in denuclearization talks between Pyongyang and Washington.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
