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Quotes of the Day:
"Every tyrant fears a thinker more than an army."
– Voltaire
"Belief can be manipulated. Only knowledge is dangerous."
– Frank Herbert
"A dying culture invariably exhibits personal rudeness. Bad manners. Lack of consideration for others in minor matters. A loss of politeness, of gentle manners, is more significant than a riot."
– Robert Heinlein
1. Judge blocks Kari Lake, tasked to dismantle VOA, from firing its director
2. N. Korea's Kim likely to use bulletproof special train for his upcoming trip to China
3. Lee's approval rating rises following summit talks with Trump, Ishiba: poll
4. S. Korea seeks 8.2 pct rise in defense budget for 2026
5. Unification ministry seeks to restore 2026 budget for inter-Korean cooperative projects to over 1 tln won
6. South Korea pumps new energy into US shipbuilding efforts
7. South Korean army disposes of leftover wartime grenades found in Seoul
8. The Kim dynasty returns to multilateral diplomacy
9. Editorial: Kim Jong-un finds leverage in a gathering of authoritarians
10. N. Korea rejects S. Korean reconciliation efforts with military buildup\
11. The China–Russia–North Korea Nexus: Implications for Regional Security and the War in Ukraine
12. N. Korean officials force unpopular labor mobilizations, leaving local leaders to face public anger
13. N. Korea and Russia expand prosecution ties, sparking human rights concerns
14. Billions from bullion: The hidden history of North Korea’s gold sales in the UK
15. South Korea boosts defense and engagement spending, changing tack on North Korea
16. North Korea’s economy grows at fastest pace in eight years: BOK report
17. North Korean cosmetics makers becomes latest firm looking to sell beer in Russia
18. Book review: ‘Reading North Korea’ reveals power of watching Pyongyang’s words
1. Judge blocks Kari Lake, tasked to dismantle VOA, from firing its director
So in the court documents is the line below (it is the last sentence of the document). So it appears the Trump administration is making the decision to continue to broadcast into north Korea. I truly hope my beloved Korean Service will be back online soon.
"PATSY WIDAKUSWARA, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
KARI LAKE, et al.,
Defendants."
"MICHAEL ABRAMOWITZ et al.,
Plaintiffs, v.
KARI LAKE, et al.,
Defendants."
"Case 1:25-cv-00887-RCL Document 77 Filed 08/28/25 Page 1 of 4"
"Finally, Defendants hereby notify the Court that Defendants have made the decision to take steps to resume broadcasting in North Korea."
Judge blocks Kari Lake, tasked to dismantle VOA, from firing its director
Michael Abramowitz was given an ultimatum: Relinquish his post or be fired. A judge ruled the Trump administration lacks the authority to remove him.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/08/28/voa-director-kari-lake-trump/
UpdatedAugust 28, 2025 at 8:03 p.m. EDTtoday at 8:03 p.m. EDT
4 min
Summary
413
Kari Lake, the acting CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, has sought to dismantle the Voice of America, but a judge ruled Thursday she lacks the authority to fire its director. (Ash Ponders/For The Washington Post)
By Scott Nover
A federal judge in Washington blocked the Trump administration Thursday from firing Michael Abramowitz as Voice of America’s director, weeks after administration official Kari Lake first attempted to remove him from the post.
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Abramowitz, a former Washington Post reporter who has led the U.S. government-funded broadcasting organization since last year, maintained that only a Senate-confirmed advisory board had authority to remove him as VOA director. But President Donald Trump removed all members of the board in January.
U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth, an appointee of President Ronald Reagan, agreed with Abramowitz on Thursday, having heard arguments in a hearing Monday. He ruled that without a majority vote from the Senate-confirmed board, Lake did not have the authority to remove Abramowitz.
In a statement, Abramowitz said he was “very gratified” by Thursday’s ruling. “It is especially urgent for Voice of America to resume robust programming, which is so important for the security and influence of the United States,” he said.
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“We fully intend to appeal this absurd ruling,” Lake wrote in a statement. “Elections have consequences, and President Trump runs the executive branch. I have confidence that the Constitution will eventually be enforced, even if not by Judge Lamberth and other radical district judges.”
In his ruling, Lamberth disagreed with the government’s position that the statute on the appointment and removal of the VOA director interferes with the president’s executive authority to remove “inferior officers” — those who don’t require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation.
The judge noted bipartisan concern in Congress about former U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) CEO Michael Pack, who served during the first Trump administration, when he removed the heads of federally funded networks including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia in 2020. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who now serves as an ex officio member of the board in question, was one of the senators who urged that positions like Abramowitz’s be better insulated from political pressure, a point Lamberth noted in court Monday.
Lamberth granted a motion for partial summary judgment, issued a permanent injunction blocking Abramowitz’s removal, and found the underlying statute constitutional.
Abramowitz was notified in an Aug. 1 letter from John A. Zadrozny, a senior adviser at the USAGM, which oversees VOA, that because he would not accept a job running a broadcasting station in North Carolina, he would be removed from federal employment.
Lake, a Republican politician who ran unsuccessful races for Arizona governor in 2022 and U.S. Senate in 2024, was tapped by Trump to lead the agency. But by firing the International Broadcasting Advisory Board, Trump removed the legal mechanism to instate Lake and to remove Abramowitz. Instead, Lake was given the title of senior adviser to the CEO of the USAGM before becoming its deputy CEO in July.
Abramowitz was placed on administrative leave in March along with more than 1,000 USAGM employees when Trump issued an executive order aimed at chiseling the agency down to its “minimum presence and function required by law.” Abramowitz sued Lake in federal court, arguing that her actions to tear down the agency — and, more recently, fire him — are illegal.
Lake then fired 500 contractors at the USAGM in May, attempted to fire more than 600 full-time staffers in June (which has been delayed, due to administrative problems) and further consolidated power at the agency in July by placing the agency’s acting CEO, Victor Morales, on administrative leave in July. Lake has since been its acting CEO.
The plaintiffs from Voice of America — Abramowitz, along with a group of journalists led by former White House bureau chief Patsy Widakuswara — recently asked Lamberth to hold the government in contempt for not following an April 22 preliminary injunction that ordered it to follow its statutory mandate. (A federal appeals court overturned other parts of Lamberth’s injunction, including a provision that ordered staffers back to work.)
Lamberth has been critical of the government throughout court proceedings. He stopped short of holding Lake in contempt but said she was “verging on contempt” and ordered her deposed in the coming weeks, along with two other USAGM officials.
In turn, Lake has publicly complained about Lamberth. “Of course I’ve got a judge here in Washington, D.C. — I’ve got five cases against me as I try to scale this monster, this beast back and rightsize it. I mean, I’ve got a judge who’s threatening me with contempt of court, throwing me in prison, if I don’t produce more of the propaganda that he wants me to produce,” Lake said on a radio show this month.
Lake is also planning to order a mass reduction-in-force that could see more than 500 agency employees — most of whom have been on paid administrative leave since March — terminated in the coming days.
correction
A caption in a previous version of this article incorrectly identified Kari Lake as deputy CEO of the USAGM. She is currently its acting CEO.
What readers are saying
The comments reflect strong disapproval of Kari Lake's actions and her association with Donald Trump, particularly regarding the attempt to fire Michael Abramowitz as Voice of America’s director. Many commenters express relief and gratitude for the federal judge's decision to... Show more
2. N. Korea's Kim likely to use bulletproof special train for his upcoming trip to China
Will he have a better result than his train ride to Hanoi in 2019? I fear that will be the case.
N. Korea's Kim likely to use bulletproof special train for his upcoming trip to China | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 29, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is likely to use his personal bulletproof special train when he travels to Beijing to attend China's large-scale military parade next week, sources said Friday.
Kim is scheduled to attend a high-profile military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on Wednesday to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1945, which it observes as its victory day over Japan.
No information has been made available so far about when and how Kim will depart Pyongyang for Beijing. But attention has been drawn to what mode of transport and route the highly security-conscious leader will take.
Kim is more likely to use his customized special train than "Chammae-1," the private plane Kim reportedly used for long-distance domestic trips in his early years in office.
This file photo from March 28, 2018, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C, in black suit) and his wife, Ri Sol-ju (R behind Kim) arriving in Beijing on his special bulletproof train. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
For his four previous visits to China between 2018-2019, Kim traveled twice by the train and twice by the aircraft. Trips by train lasted four days, while those by air lasted two days.
In recent years, however, no cases of Kim using the aircraft have been confirmed, a phenomenon possibly attributable to the plane's old age.
Chammae-1 was again not used when Kim flew to Singapore in 2018 for his first summit with U.S. President Donald Trump. He had to borrow a plane from China for the trip at that time.
Amid no signs of North Korea acquiring a new airplane to replace Chammae-1, Kim's personal train is expected to be his mode of transport for the upcoming trip to China.
"Considering various circumstances, Kim is expected to use his special train for the upcoming trip to China," said a source well-versed in North Korean affairs.
In a potential sign backing the prediction, the Zhonglian Hotel in Dandong, a Chinese city near the North Korean border, reportedly suspended reservations for foreign tourists during the period before and after the parade.
Located along the train route from North Korea to China, the hotel has a track record of suspending bookings for foreign tourists when Kim traveled to China.
Although the possibility of Kim borrowing a plane from China again cannot be entirely ruled out, he is unlikely to rely on Chinese assistance for his first appearance on the stage of multilateral diplomacy.
Kim's special train is reportedly armed with bulletproof plates and a mortar for security, as well as communication lines, global positioning system equipment and other amenities. A Russian official who boarded the train described it as a "perfect moving fortress" during a media appearance in 2011.
However, due to poor rail conditions in North Korea, the train moves at an average speed of around 60 kilometers per hour, making overseas trips long and time-consuming.
This 2018 file image shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's plane, Chammae-1. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 29, 2025
3. Lee's approval rating rises following summit talks with Trump, Ishiba: poll
Can this be sustained?
Lee's approval rating rises following summit talks with Trump, Ishiba: poll | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 29, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung's approval rating rose this week, a poll showed Friday, driven by positive assessments of recent trips to the United States and Japan for summits with U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
In a Gallup Korea survey of 1,000 adults conducted Tuesday through Thursday, 59 percent gave a positive evaluation of Lee's performance, up 3 percentage points from the previous week.
It was the first rebound in three weeks after declines sparked by his special pardons for several controversial political figures earlier this month.
Among respondents with a positive view, 21 percent cited Lee's diplomacy, followed by the economy at 12 percent and overall performance at 11 percent.
The ruling Democratic Party's approval rating stood at 44 percent, while the main opposition People Power Party fell 2 percentage points to 23 percent.
The survey had a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) speaks during an extraordinary Cabinet meeting at the presidential office in Seoul on Aug. 29, 2025. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · August 29, 2025
4. S. Korea seeks 8.2 pct rise in defense budget for 2026
S. Korea seeks 8.2 pct rise in defense budget for 2026 | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · August 29, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry on Friday requested an 8.2 percent increase in the defense budget for next year in a bid to introduce cutting-edge weapons systems and raise wages for entry-level military officers.
The defense ministry sought a budget of 66.29 trillion won (US$47.8 billion) for next year, up 8.2 percent, or 5.05 trillion won, from this year's 61.59 trillion won, according to the government's budget proposal.
If finalized, it would mark the largest defense budget in history and the fastest on-year growth since 2008, when defense spending jumped by 8.7 percent from a year earlier.
The proposed 5 trillion-won rise also marked the largest-ever increase, it noted.
This file photo, provided by South Korea's Air Force on Feb. 19, 2025, shows the country's homegrown KF-21 Boramae fighter jet. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Under the proposal, the ministry aims to expand spending on introducing high-tech weapons, including advanced fighter jets, robots and drones, in a bid to better prepare for "future warfare."
It plans to allocate 2.4 trillion won to the further development and mass production of South Korea's homegrown KF-21 Boramae fighter. It also aims to increase the budget for investing in sophisticated defense technology to 800 billion won from this year's 500 billion won.
The proposed budget also calls for raising the pay of entry-level military officers by up to 6.6 percent and expanding compensation for veterans and patriots.
During his visit to Washington earlier this week, President Lee Jae Myung vowed to increase defense spending in a bid to bolster the country's security posture.
South Korea is under growing pressure from the United States to boost defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). South Korea's defense spending for 2025 accounted for 2.32 percent of GDP.
The government plans to summit a budget proposal of 728 trillion won for next year to the National Assembly for approval.
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · August 29, 2025
5. Unification ministry seeks to restore 2026 budget for inter-Korean cooperative projects to over 1 tln won
"once-vibrant joint inter-Korean economic projects?"
Unification ministry seeks to restore 2026 budget for inter-Korean cooperative projects to over 1 tln won | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 29, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry on Friday requested over 1 trillion won (US$721.8 million) in next year's budget to fund cooperative projects with North Korea, as the government seeks to restore now-dormant inter-Korean exchanges and economic projects.
The Lee Jae Myung administration approved its 728 trillion-won budget proposal for 2026 during a Cabinet meeting earlier in the day, which includes 1 trillion won for the "inter-Korean cooperation fund" out of the unification ministry's total allocation of 1.24 trillion won.
The proposed budget for the unification ministry represents a 20.2 percent increase from this year, while the allocation for inter-Korean cooperation is up 25.2 percent on-year.
If approved by the National Assembly as proposed, the 2026 inter-Korean cooperation fund will top 1 trillion won for the first time in three years.
Next year's proposed budget for the fund, aimed at financing inter-Korean economic projects to promote mutual peace and prosperity, includes 221.1 billion won earmarked for building railway, roads and other infrastructure in North Korea.
A unification ministry official said the allocation reflects the government's plans to expand investments aimed at fostering the foundation for the two Korea's "peaceful coexistence."
Currently, however, the two Koreas are not engaged in any joint economic or cooperative projects amid strained ties.
Since taking office in June, President Lee has repeatedly extended overtures to North Korea to improve relations, while Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said he will seek to restore now-suspended joint economic projects with the North.
The ministry's 2026 budget, meanwhile, eliminates the 3 billion-won allocation for financing civic groups' activities promoting North Korean human rights, which was included in this year's budget.
Businesspeople call for the enactment of a special law to compensate for losses from the suspension of once-vibrant joint inter-Korean economic projects, during a press conference in front of the presidential office in Seoul in this July 11, 2024, file photo. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · August 29, 2025
6. South Korea pumps new energy into US shipbuilding efforts
MASGA.
South Korea pumps new energy into US shipbuilding efforts
Defense News · Zita Fletcher · August 28, 2025
Two South Korean shipbuilding titans are throwing their weight into new efforts to revitalize U.S. shipbuilding, with two impactful business decisions announced this week.
Hanwha Group, South Korea’s seventh largest business conglomerate, announced on Aug. 27 a $5 billion investment in Hanwha Philly Shipyard, which it acquired last December.
The company will install two new docks and three quays, plus build out a new assembly facility to boost shipbuilding capacity from two vessels to at least 20 per year. The shipyard will produce LNG carriers, naval modules and eventually U.S. naval vessels.
Present at the announcement in Philadelphia was South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, who also took part in a ceremony to christen a new training vessel for the U.S. Maritime Administration.
“The Republic of Korea’s shipbuilding industry is setting out to take on a new challenge to contribute to strengthening U.S. maritime security and rejuvenating America’s shipbuilding industry,” said Lee at the event.
Additionally, the HD Hyundai conglomerate, the owners of South Korea’s largest shipyard, announced this week the merger of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and HD Hyundai Mipo.
The merger will consolidate its shipbuilding facilities located in Ulsan and expand HD Hyundai’s output as it seeks further cooperation with the United States.
HD Hyundai is a leader in producing an array of vessels, including submarines, and is reportedly looking to expand its production of icebreakers.
South Korea is a global heavyweight in shipbuilding, combining longtime tradition with technologically sophisticated shipyards that can churn out vessels at high speed with the power of smart technology and automated tools.
As the U.S. seeks to expand its maritime power to keep pace with an increasingly aggressive China, South Korean manufacturers are stepping in to help kick-start the effort.
Jobs will be created to benefit the U.S. workforce as Hanwha Philly commences its efforts to overhaul and modernize the shipyard, the company announced.
“We are creating good manufacturing jobs, building the world’s most advanced ships and fostering a new skilled workforce right here in America,” Hanwha Vice Chairman Dong Kwan Kim said per a release.
“This is just the beginning. Hanwha is committed to being a partner in building the next chapter of American shipbuilding.”
About Zita Ballinger Fletcher
Zita Ballinger Fletcher previously served as editor of Military History Quarterly and Vietnam magazines and as the historian of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. She holds an M.A. with distinction in military history.
7. South Korean army disposes of leftover wartime grenades found in Seoul
Just imagine what will be found in the DMZ when it is finally open?
South Korean army disposes of leftover wartime grenades found in Seoul
Stars and Stripes · David Choi and Yoojin Lee · August 28, 2025
These M26 grenades were found within a rice cooker inside a dumpster at Wooshin High School in Seoul, South Korea, Aug. 23, 2025. (Guro Fire Station)
Three hand grenades discovered at a high school in South Korea’s capital and on a hill inside the city prompted two separate emergency responses by the South Korean army within a week, according to spokesmen from local fire stations.
A janitor at Wooshin High School, in the Guro District of western Seoul, found a pair of Korean War-era M26 grenades Saturday within a rice cooker inside a dumpster, a spokesman for the Guro Fire Station said by phone Thursday.
Army explosive ordnance disposal technicians retrieved the grenades about 90 minutes later, the spokesman said.
Police determined that a faculty member found the grenades on the campus July 29 and kept them in the rice cooker believing they were not a threat, the spokesman said.
An M26 grenade weighs 16 ounces, about a third of it in explosives, and detonates within 4 to 5 seconds after being triggered, according to a U.S. Army technical manual dated June 1966.
The South Korean army did not immediately respond to a request for comment by phone Thursday. South Korean government officials speak to the media on the customary condition of anonymity.
Following the incident, the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education held an emergency meeting Monday to review safety protocols at its schools, according to a news release from the office the same day.
“We take this case seriously, and we will prioritize students’ right to learn and their safety,” office superintendent Jeong Geun-sik said in the release. “We will do our utmost to preemptively eliminate danger in schools and provide a safe educational environment.”
In a separate incident Wednesday 15 miles east of the school, a passerby found an unspecified grenade near Daemo Mountain, a 960-foot hill in the Gangnam District with scenic views of the capital city, according to a Gangnam Fire Station spokesman.
The person placed the grenade on a pile of stones before calling the police, said the spokesman by phone Thursday. Military explosive technicians retrieved the grenade and no injuries were reported, he said.
Unexploded ordnance dating to the 1950-53 Korean War is occasionally unearthed throughout South Korea.
A 1,000-pound AN-M65 general-purpose bomb was discovered March 7, 2024, at a construction site in Cheongju city, approximately 60 miles south of Seoul. The detonator was removed without incident, the South Korean air force said at the time.
Up to 2 million unexploded mines and ordnance remain in the Demilitarized Zone dividing the Korean Peninsula, the U.N. Command says on its website.
David Choi
David Choi
David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Yoojin Lee
Yoojin Lee
Yoojin Lee is a correspondent and translator based at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. She graduated from Korea University, where she majored in Global Sports Studies.
Stars and Stripes · David Choi and Yoojin Lee · August 28, 2025
8. The Kim dynasty returns to multilateral diplomacy
Kim is very calculating.
Excerpts:
Analysts read the move as calculation rather than spectacle. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang has relied on Moscow for critical support, sending artillery shells and even manpower in return for oil, food, and sensitive technologies. That partnership emboldened North Korea. But with ceasefire negotiations now underway, the regime appears to be hedging.
“Once Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin began exploring a settlement, Pyongyang had to prepare for what follows,” observed Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute. Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies added: “If Russia turns back to Europe after the conflict, North Korea cannot afford to be left exposed. China will once again have to be its main backer.”
The arithmetic is unambiguous: more than 90 percent of North Korea’s trade flows through China. However useful Moscow has been, only Beijing can sustain Pyongyang’s fragile economy. With major anniversaries approaching—not least the October commemoration of the Workers’ Party’s 80th founding—Kim needs Chinese aid to project an image of resilience at home.
The Kim dynasty returns to multilateral diplomacy
For the first time since 1980, a Kim will appear on a global stage, recalibrating between Russia's fading utility and China's enduring weight
https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/08/29/JXB5LM2PDBBQ7END4ETS7GFLBI/
By Kim Dong-ha,
Park Su-hyeon
Published 2025.08.29. 09:04
Kim Jong-un’s decision to attend China’s Sept. 3 military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of its World War II victory marks a sharp break with his family’s long-standing diplomatic reticence. Neither his father, Kim Jong-il, nor his grandfather, after the mid-1980s, appeared at large-scale multilateral events. For the first time in 45 years, a Kim dynasty leader will stand alongside foreign heads of state—this time with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrive at Rungrado 1st of May Stadium to attend a mass gymnastics performance during Xi’s state visit in June 2019, as crowds cheer./Xinhua-Yonhap
Analysts read the move as calculation rather than spectacle. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang has relied on Moscow for critical support, sending artillery shells and even manpower in return for oil, food, and sensitive technologies. That partnership emboldened North Korea. But with ceasefire negotiations now underway, the regime appears to be hedging.
“Once Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin began exploring a settlement, Pyongyang had to prepare for what follows,” observed Cheong Seong-chang of the Sejong Institute. Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies added: “If Russia turns back to Europe after the conflict, North Korea cannot afford to be left exposed. China will once again have to be its main backer.”
The arithmetic is unambiguous: more than 90 percent of North Korea’s trade flows through China. However useful Moscow has been, only Beijing can sustain Pyongyang’s fragile economy. With major anniversaries approaching—not least the October commemoration of the Workers’ Party’s 80th founding—Kim needs Chinese aid to project an image of resilience at home.
Beijing and Moscow, for their part, also have incentives. As Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo deepen trilateral security cooperation, China and Russia are tightening their own coordination, using institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which convenes in late August and early September. Kim’s presence in Beijing signals his willingness to join the optics of a nascent anti-Western bloc. Russia’s embassy in Pyongyang was explicit, hailing the parade as proof that Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang are “ready to build a new international order.”
Sohn Yul, president of the East Asia Institute, noted that “as the U.S.–South Korea–Japan trilateral framework takes clearer shape, and President Lee Jae-myung moves away from the old formula of ‘security with the United States, economy with China,’ Beijing has grown uneasy.”
North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, second from right, watches a military parade from Tiananmen Gate in Beijing with Chinese President Mao Zedong, right, during celebrations marking the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1, 1954. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and other foreign dignitaries also attended./Beijing Times archives
Kim’s turn toward multilateralism underscores a generational shift. Kim Il-sung frequently mingled with Mao Zedong, Nikita Khrushchev, and Ho Chi Minh at parades in Beijing and Moscow, even traveling to Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1980. But after a near-crash of his aircraft en route to Zimbabwe in 1986, the dynasty recoiled from such gatherings. Kim Jong-il went further, eschewing global summits entirely and traveling abroad only in secrecy.
Kim Jong-un has gradually broken that mold. He announced summit plans with Putin in advance, publicized calls with the Kremlin, and sought to present diplomacy less as covert maneuver than as routine statecraft. His appearance in Beijing will allow him to project the image of a “normal” head of state, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with two of the world’s most powerful autocrats.
Doo Jin-ho of the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy noted, “Pyongyang’s participation in forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may no longer be unthinkable.”
9. Editorial: Kim Jong-un finds leverage in a gathering of authoritarians
Leverage and positioning.
Excerpt:
Global politics are in flux, from Trump’s tariff wars to talk of a Ukraine settlement. Kim’s first appearance on a multilateral stage may be less about ceremony than about positioning. For South Korea, it is a reminder that security risks are multiplying in step with shifting alliances.
Editorial: Kim Jong-un finds leverage in a gathering of authoritarians
By The Chosunilbo
Published 2025.08.29. 09:03
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will attend China’s military parade in Beijing on Sept. 3, marking the 80th anniversary of its World War Two victory, Beijing has confirmed. More than 20 heads of state are expected, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Vietnam’s president. South Korea will be represented only by parliamentary speaker Woo Won-shik.
For Kim, this is unprecedented. Neither his father, Kim Jong-il, nor his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, ever appeared on a multilateral diplomatic stage, though Kim Il-sung once joined the Non-Aligned Movement summit. It will also be the first time the leaders of North Korea, China and Russia have stood together in one setting.
Ties between Pyongyang and Moscow are warmer than at any point in recent memory, cemented by North Korea’s troop deployment to Russia and Moscow’s supply of fuel, food and even advanced weapons technology. By contrast, relations with Beijing have been conspicuously cool. China quietly removed a commemorative plaque marking a stroll Kim once took with President Xi Jinping, and has curbed the entry of North Korean laborers, a vital source of hard currency. With 95% of its trade running through China, Pyongyang cannot afford prolonged estrangement. The parade invitation offers Kim a chance to repair the relationship without loss of face.
Kim visited China three times in 2018, around his first summit with then-U.S. President Donald Trump, and again in 2019 ahead of the failed Hanoi meeting. Trump recently told South Korean President Lee Jae-myung he hoped to meet Kim again this year. North Korea has held back from direct attacks on Trump, leaving the door open. If Kim is to attempt another high-stakes bargain over nuclear arms, he will want powerful backers behind him.
Lee, for his part, has used recent summits to reaffirm the U.S.-South Korea alliance and deepen trilateral cooperation with Japan. During his trip to Washington, he sought to move beyond the old formula of “security with the United States, economy with China,” which had long fueled perceptions of Seoul leaning toward Beijing. China’s announcement of Kim’s attendance came just after Lee’s return, underscoring Beijing’s unease at Washington’s effort to cast U.S. forces in Korea as part of a wider containment strategy.
In 2018, Kim at least spoke of “denuclearization.” Today, he stresses North Korea’s identity as a nuclear power. Russia has weakened U.N. sanctions enforcement, giving him more room to maneuver. The emerging alignment of North Korea, China and Russia highlights an authoritarian convergence that unsettles Seoul.
Global politics are in flux, from Trump’s tariff wars to talk of a Ukraine settlement. Kim’s first appearance on a multilateral stage may be less about ceremony than about positioning. For South Korea, it is a reminder that security risks are multiplying in step with shifting alliances.
10. N. Korea rejects S. Korean reconciliation efforts with military buildup
Hardly a surprise.
This is part of his blackmail diplomacy strategy - the use of increased tensions, threat, and provocations to gain political and economic concessions. It is also part of his political warfare strategy to not only drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance but also to set conditions for when he wants to resume talks. That date will likely be when he feels he has extorted the ROK/US alliance
N. Korea rejects S. Korean reconciliation efforts with military buildup
Before recent South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, North Korea distributed educational materials to the military emphasizing the need to overpower South Korea with military force
By Seulkee Jang - August 29, 2025
dailynk.com · August 29, 2025
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un touches tank armour as he tours a military equipment facility at an unspecified location in North Korea, in this image released May 4, 2025 by the Korean Central News Agency.
North Korea is working overtime to counter South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s conciliatory messages, launching an intensive propaganda campaign to maintain the narrative of hostile relations even as Seoul extends peace overtures.
A high-ranking source in Pyongyang told Daily NK recently that North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau and Bureau 10 of the Workers’ Party of Korea (formerly the United Front Department) are vigorously pushing propaganda and psychological operations against South Korea. Their goal: perpetuate the hostile relations narrative under the strategy of redefining South Korea as a foreign country.
After declaring inter-Korean relations hostile and belligerent during a Central Committee plenary session in late 2023, North Korea has been systematically eliminating concepts of “one Korean nation” and reunification while insisting there’s no chance for improved relations.
But the new South Korean administration under Lee has moved to block propaganda balloon launches into North Korea and halt loudspeaker broadcasts along the border. Seoul has even promised to respect the North Korean system and avoid hostile behavior. This threatens to shift responsibility for strained inter-Korean relations squarely onto Pyongyang’s shoulders.
“The North Korean regime apparently feels burdened by South Korea’s appeals for peace and better relations with the U.S. in bilateral meetings, at multilateral events and before the international community. Pyongyang may feel particularly uncomfortable with South Korea’s emphasis on North Korea’s denuclearization in this context,” said Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
For these reasons, recent comments by Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, have stressed that the South Korean government continues its hostile policy despite conciliatory gestures. Kim has made three public comments since Lee’s inauguration: on July 28, Aug. 14 and Aug. 20.
Kim Yo Jong dismisses reconciliation as ‘pipedream’
Kim’s latest remarks came during “a consultative meeting with major director generals of the Foreign Ministry” on Aug. 19, as reported by Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 20.
“The ambition for confrontation with the DPRK has been invariably pursued by the ROK, whether it held the signboard of ‘conservatism’ or wore a mask of ‘democracy,'” Kim said, dismissing Lee’s remarks about restoring trust between the two Koreas as “a fancy and a pipedream.”
Notably, Kim described the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises that began on Aug. 18 as a “war drill for aggression.”
“We should pay attention to the fact that through the current joint military drill, which is being staged again while making a sign of reconciliation, the ROK is examining a new combined operation plan for ‘removing’ the nuclear and missile capabilities of the DPRK at an early stage and expanding the attack into its territory,” Kim warned.
Essentially, Pyongyang is undermining the South Korean government’s restoration efforts by setting unreasonable conditions — such as Seoul calling off joint military exercises with the U.S. — primarily for an international audience.
“This is the internal strategy: If the U.S.-South Korea exercises are actually halted, North Korea will downplay that as something Seoul should have done anyway, rather than a friendly gesture. If the exercises proceed, North Korea will treat that as grounds for fortifying the country and a pretext for retaliating against any provocations,” the source explained.
According to the source, North Korean authorities actively exploit the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises to criticize Seoul’s conciliatory gestures in foreign messaging while using them to reinforce the regime by legitimizing military buildup in domestic messaging. They do this knowing full well that South Korea would never accept demands to halt joint exercises.
“We can keep using the U.S.-Korea exercises to build our military and expand civil-military cooperation. The party is saying the time has come for the whole country to hold civil defense drills,” the source said.
“I think that, for now, the chances of inter-Korean relations being restored or dialogue resuming are close to zero. There’s no seat for Seoul at the table in dialogue with the U.S., either,” the source stated flatly.
Before the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, North Korean military leadership distributed educational materials to the entire military emphasizing the need to overpower South Korea with military force.
A source in the North Korean military said the materials, distributed by the defense ministry on Aug. 16, stated that “the Korean People’s Army must regard South Korea as a hostile state designated for conquest and totally dominate it with military force” and that “the military must remain in total combat readiness, monitoring every step taken by the enemy, no matter what measures are taken by the party.”
These materials are presumably designed to keep soldiers’ ideological loyalty and discipline sharp as South Korea continues extending an olive branch.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · August 29, 2025
11. The China–Russia–North Korea Nexus: Implications for Regional Security and the War in Ukraine
Download the 7 page report here. https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/ASPI_CCA_SICS_RdTable_04.pdf
Excerpts;
Against this backdrop, the roundtable brought together experts from China, South Korea, and the United States to examine the evolving China–Russia–North Korea dynamic from multiple angles, including China’s strategic calculus, its positioning on the Ukraine war, and how the trilateral alignment is viewed in Seoul and Washington. Presentations and discussions focused on four core areas:
- Deepening North Korea–Russia ties and China's perspective
- China–Russia relations in the context of the Ukraine war
- South Korea’s perspective on the trilateral relationship
- The United States’ assessment of implications for regional and global security
The roundtable adhered to the Chatham House Rule.
The China–Russia–North Korea Nexus: Implications for Regional Security and the War in Ukraine
Roundtable Summary Report
KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV via Getty Images
August 13th, 2025
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Full Report
In June 2025, the Sungkyun Institute of China Studies (SICS) and the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis (CCA) co-hosted a closed-door roundtable to assess the growing strategic alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea. Questions around the trilateral relationship have taken on a new level of strategic importance in the wake of Russia’s protracted war in Ukraine, deepening North Korea–Russia military cooperation and intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition. The strategic convergence of these three powers — each with longstanding tensions with the West — has raised difficult questions for regional security and policy planning in Seoul, Washington, and beyond.
Since 2022, North Korea and Russia have significantly deepened their cooperation, particularly around the latter’s war in Ukraine. Pyongyang has provided Moscow with artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and other munitions in clear violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. This military support has grown in scale and symbolism from initial covert shipments to high-level visits and a formal mutual defense treaty, signed in 2024. In return, Russia has reportedly offered North Korea food aid, military technology, and energy assistance, as well as deployed North Korean personnel to support Russian forces on the front lines in Ukraine. Their strategic partnership has now extended into economic and scientific cooperation, including the resumption of joint energy projects and agreements on defense and technology sharing. With Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 visit to Pyongyang and the signing of the aforementioned treaty, the North Korea–Russia partnership has entered a new phase of strategic alignment.
Against this backdrop, the roundtable brought together experts from China, South Korea, and the United States to examine the evolving China–Russia–North Korea dynamic from multiple angles, including China’s strategic calculus, its positioning on the Ukraine war, and how the trilateral alignment is viewed in Seoul and Washington. Presentations and discussions focused on four core areas:
- Deepening North Korea–Russia ties and China's perspective
- China–Russia relations in the context of the Ukraine war
- South Korea’s perspective on the trilateral relationship
- The United States’ assessment of implications for regional and global security
The roundtable adhered to the Chatham House Rule.
12. N. Korean officials force unpopular labor mobilizations, leaving local leaders to face public anger
Will there be a tipping point? What will be the causes of resistance?
N. Korean officials force unpopular labor mobilizations, leaving local leaders to face public anger
https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korean-officials-froce-unpopular-labor-mobilizations-leaving-local-leaders-to-face-public-anger/
"When the higher-ups preach about self-reliance, the neighborhood watch unit leaders practice their own version of self-reliance," a source told Daily NK
By Eun Seol -
August 29, 2025
dailynk.com · August 29, 2025
A neighborhood office in Chongam district, Chongjin, North Hamgyong province, is forcing people to participate in mandatory labor in the second half of the year under the banner of “self-reliance.” This has sparked widespread public anger, with neighborhood watch unit leaders bearing the brunt of people’s frustration.
“Neighborhood watch unit members in a Chongam district neighborhood attended a study session on Aug. 12 where the neighborhood office head called for mass mobilizations, loudly demanding that everyone participate in daily road clearing,” a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong province said recently. “But the response was lukewarm, so when the study session ended, the neighborhood office head made the neighborhood watch unit leaders stay behind for ‘additional study.'”
The session centered on the slogan, “Let’s overcome today’s difficulties and march together down the path of Juche with the banner of self-reliance held high.” What really irritated people, however, was the neighborhood office chief’s demand that they “conscientiously” participate in mobilizations for construction sites, military support programs, and resource collection efforts.
“People tolerated the study session since it was the usual propaganda, but when the lecturer told them to earnestly carry out multiple tasks that would make their lives miserable, most people just stared glumly,” the source said. “They were particularly annoyed at being told that 100% of neighborhood watch unit members had to help clean the roads.”
When the audience didn’t respond enthusiastically, the neighborhood office chief held a separate meeting with just the neighborhood watch unit leaders after the main session. He again demanded that all unit members participate in road cleaning, saying, “With Party Foundation Day (Oct. 10) and the Ninth Party Congress coming up, the district party branch will only be satisfied if they see the streets filled with lots of people working.”
Local Leaders Caught Between State Demands and Public Anger
This puts the neighborhood watch unit leaders in an impossible position, forcing them to absorb all the public anger and resentment.
Members of one neighborhood watch unit in Chongam district bombarded their unit leader with complaints after he relayed the neighborhood office chief’s orders. The unit leader tried to calm his members by telling them to “just carry on as usual.”
In this context, “carrying on as usual” meant going through the motions in a halfhearted way. The suggestion could be interpreted as a call to minimize the actual work by secretly organizing teams to rotate duties on assigned days while reporting that absent members were either sick or working on other assignments.
“People have no choice but to complain to the neighborhood watch unit leaders they see every day,” the source said. “So these leaders have to play both sides—calming people’s anger and resistance while explaining to their superiors why they can’t mobilize enough workers.”
With neighborhood watch units essentially being treated as shock labor brigades under slogans like “Nothing is impossible” and “Willpower is the key to solving problems,” balancing demands from above with complaints from unit members ultimately comes down to each unit leader’s skill at managing people, the source said.
“When the higher-ups preach about self-reliance, the neighborhood watch unit leaders practice their own version of self-reliance,” the source said. “These days, since unit leaders must deal with their members’ anger while keeping their superiors happy, they have to become master negotiators just to survive.”
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dailynk.com · August 29, 2025
13. N. Korea and Russia expand prosecution ties, sparking human rights concerns
According to the UN Commission of Inquiry the Kim family regime is conducting the worst human rights violations and crimes against humanity on a scale not seen since WWII. Nothing good is going to come from this and similar activities.
N. Korea and Russia expand prosecution ties, sparking human rights concerns
Previously, Russia had tried to follow international protocols regarding defectors' asylum requests, provided they weren't facing criminal charges
By Jeong Tae Joo - August 29, 2025
dailynk.com · August 29, 2025
A recent visit by North Korean prosecutors to Russia has opened discussions on expanded judicial cooperation between the two countries, raising alarm about potential threats to defectors and human rights protections.
“The delegation from the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office that went to Russia at the beginning of this month exchanged views with Russian prosecutors about modernizing the centralized prosecutorial system and increasing international cooperation. The trip was tied to a law enforcement overhaul happening inside (North Korea) ahead of the Ninth Party Congress,” a source in North Korea told Daily NK recently.
The delegation submitted a detailed report on their Russian discussions to the Workers’ Party of Korea on Aug. 19, covering several key areas of potential collaboration.
First on the agenda was cooperation on digitizing the judicial system. The delegation explored adopting elements of Russia’s modern digital law enforcement programs, including electronic record keeping, digital evidence processing and AI analysis. Both sides also exchanged documents outlining future working-level cooperation.
The report also covered people-to-people exchanges between the two prosecution services. The North Korean delegation proposed organizing working-level training programs at Russia’s prosecution academy and other institutions, with both sides agreeing to exchange formal proposals in early October. Essentially, North Korea wants to tap into overseas expertise to strengthen its prosecution capabilities.
Additionally, the two sides discussed signing a memorandum of understanding about exchanging legal information between their countries.
“The Workers’ Party believes an MOU would symbolize our deepening ties and expanding cooperation between our judicial organizations,” the source explained.
Criminal enforcement cooperation raises red flags
The report revealed that both sides had extensive discussions about criminal law enforcement cooperation. They talked at length about establishing systems for joint investigations into cybercrime, drug smuggling, and attempts by North Korean workers in Russia to escape or engage in other criminal behavior.
The situation of North Korean workers in Russia carries particular weight in these discussions.
Previously, Russia had tried to follow international protocols regarding defectors’ asylum requests, provided they weren’t facing criminal charges. But as North Korea and Russia have strengthened their relationship since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities are increasingly arresting and repatriating North Korean defectors while sharing information about people already granted asylum.
“From an international law perspective, North Korea and Russia could claim their prosecution and law enforcement discussions are simply state-to-state crime cooperation. But if their cooperation agenda includes repatriating North Korean workers in Russia and North Korean defectors, that would clearly violate the international refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement — not forcibly returning people who face mistreatment,” said Kim Tae Won, a research fellow at the Korean Institute for National Unification, in a phone interview with Daily NK.
“Russian repatriation of defectors in cooperation with the North would face criticism as an obvious violation of international human rights law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. If that cooperation becomes part of criminal discussions at the International Criminal Court related to the war in Ukraine, Russia could face even harsher international criticism,” Kim added.
North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported earlier that a working-level delegation from the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, led by Vice-Director Yun Kwang Won, had left Pyongyang International Airport for Russia on Aug. 4 and returned to North Korea on Aug. 8.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · August 29, 2025
14. Billions from bullion: The hidden history of North Korea’s gold sales in the UK
Billions from bullion: The hidden history of North Korea’s gold sales in the UK
Decades before turning to crypto, the DPRK raked in billions for its coffers through a far more conventional source
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/billions-from-bullion-the-hidden-history-of-north-koreas-gold-sales-in-the-uk/
Daniel Salisbury August 29, 2025
Images: Helmut Zozmann and Stevebidmead via Wikimedia Commons, Eric Lafforgue, edited by NK News
Editor’s note: This article is the first in a three-part series that explores the evolving role of gold in North Korea’s foreign currency strategy.
Long before North Korea turned to cybercrime and covert shipping to evade international sanctions, it was quietly reaping billions from a far more conventional source: gold.
Newly unearthed British government records from the 1970s to the 1990s reveal the huge scale of North Korean gold bullion sales and suggest Pyongyang may have mined and refined — and potentially sold — up to a billion dollars’ worth of gold a year.
Much of this was sold in the British capital, with the DPRK likely making between US$1-2 billion on the London market between 1983 and 1993 through a series of above-board gold trading operations at an office in Mayfair, and later in Swiss Cottage in Camden.
This lucrative business took place while North Korea repeatedly renegotiated and stalled payments on its extensive foreign commercial debts — estimated by British officials to be between $1.3-2 billion in the mid-1970s shortly after the country defaulted.
Closely linked to the regime’s secretive Office 39, the operation offered North Korea a lifeline at a time of mounting debt and diplomatic isolation, while also foreshadowing the regime’s long-standing reliance on overseas financial networks to sustain itself under economic pressure.
An armored car in London | Image: Oxyman via Wikimedia Commons
GOLD STARS AND ARMORED CARS
North Korea’s lucrative gold sales in London during the final decade of the Cold War were largely orchestrated by the Korea Daesong Group and its financial arm, Korea Daesong Bank.
The roots of this operation trace back to the late 1970s. According to an internal British government memo, a representative from a U.K.-based private lender noted in a meeting with a British government official that Korea Daesong Bank had raised the idea of setting up an office in London. Perhaps reflecting the broader views of British industry at the time regarding the reliability of the debt-strapped country, the lender noted his belief that the North Koreans “should be kept at arm’s length.”
After failing to set up an office in the City of London, in 1982 Korea Daesong Bank set up a bank in Vienna called the Golden Star Bank. North Korea’s only bank in Europe, it would later shut its doors in 2004 after the host government alleged the bank engaged in money laundering, espionage and trade in radioactive materials.
It was through Golden Star Bank that North Korea began to sell bullion on the London market.
Colin McAskill, a British entrepreneur who was involved in North Korea’s efforts to procure marine technology from the U.K., recalled in a 2020 interview that he first met the chairman of Korea Daesong Group and Korea Daesong Bank in Pyongyang after building trust through the sale of speedboats to the leadership in the 1970s.
The president of Golden Star Bank, Pak Gwang Ho, had — according to McAskill — started selling bullion on the London market through a London-registered bullion dealing company called Credit Lyonnaise Rouse in the early 1980s.
McAskill admitted to serving as a liaison between Pak and the owner of Credit Lyonnaise Rouse, arranging to have a dealing room “fully kitted out with Bloomberg and Reuters equipment” set up in Mayfair and staffed by four North Koreans with “appropriate visas and work permits” he had sponsored.
The means by which the bullion itself was transferred to London from North Korea is an archetypal story of Cold War intrigue. As recounted by McAskill, the gold bullion was shipped from the DPRK to East Berlin — a European hub of North Korean procurement and other activities.
According to McAskill, Credit Lyonnais Rouse sent an armored car to collect the shipment and payment was credited to the North Koreans’ account in London when the gold crossed Checkpoint Charlie into West Berlin.
Decades later, the U.S. Treasury designated Korea Daesong Bank in 2010 for its involvement in “facilitating North Korea’s illicit financing projects”. It also noted that the entity was “owned or controlled by Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party” — a shadowy organization that has worked for decades to generate funds for the Kim regime’s personal slush fund.
The torch-lighting ceremony at the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul | Image: Ken Hackman via Wikimedia Commons
BLACKMAIL AND OLYMPICS
By the mid-1980s, North Korea’s gold operations had become a significant — and closely monitored — component of its foreign currency strategy. A 1987 British government memo documenting a meeting with McAskill described him as “a freelance representative of the North Korean government,” with deep involvement in Pyongyang’s bullion trading activities.
The meeting record notes McAskill described North Korean gold output as 60 million tons a year, likely a mistranscription of 60 tons.
Gold prices between 1982 and 1990 ranged between $10,000 and $15,500 per kilogram. The sale of 60 tons could have netted the Kim regime anywhere between $600 million and $930 million a year (between $1.9 billion and $3 billion in 2025 value).
However, the sales in London formed just a fraction of this. In a 2006 interview with CNBC, McAskill noted that North Korea was selling around a ton a month on the London market for 10 years — 120 tons total over a decade, which would likely have netted the regime somewhere between US$1.2 and $1.8 billion (between $2.7 and $5.7 billion in 2025).
A CIA report on “North Korea’s Approach to the West” from 1987 notes the country’s earnings from gold sales declined in the early 1980s, as prices declined. The report suggests that by boosting exports, the DPRK raised gold earnings over $100 million a year in 1982-1984, before prices declined again in 1985.
Most of the gold was sold to West Germany, except in 1985 when 40% went to Japan. A separate 1985 CIA report on “North Korean Trade with Japan” suggests that sales to West Germany in the early 1980s were worth $130 million annually.
The 1987 CIA report, which does not mention sales in London, includes a chart suggesting that total DPRK sales between 1979 and 1985 was of almost 50 tons of gold worth around $600 million.
A British official recalled in the 1987 meeting record that McAskill showcased “the more distasteful side of North Korean politics” — reporting a kind of golden blackmail.
He noted that if Pyongyang did not receive funds from Western sources to boost North Korean gold output, the country would likely divert resumed gold shipments to an alternative center and deprive London of the lucrative operation.
He also allegedly said North Korea had it in its power to disrupt the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games — a concern seen elsewhere around this time — “for example by opening the newly built Kumgangsam dam 12 miles north of the demilitarized zone.” A British official noted in jest that “this would at least facilitate the rowing events.”
McAskill’s message suggested that “only the Bank of England’s good grace and influence on the banks concerned [those involved in the debt renegotiations] could save the 1988 Olympics from impending disaster!”
Another British government document from 1987 notes that North Korea did indeed suspend gold bullion shipments to London as part of efforts to exert pressure in the debt renegotiation process. As a British official noted, bullion was “their only lever, if it is such.”
A London market in 2020 | Image: Paul Hudson via Flickr (CC BY 2.0)
FLOWING FUNDS BUT NOT TOWARD DEBTS
North Korea continued to hold out on paying its debts into the 1990s, while simultaneously continuing bullion sales on the London market.
In 1990, the largest syndicate, representing $900 million equivalent of debt, initiated formal proceedings before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, and the arbitrator formally ordered the Foreign Trade Bank of Korea to pay the full debt amount plus costs.
In 1992, a consortium of banks representing 104 lenders issued a statement noting: “Unlike virtually every other distressed sovereign debtor, the North Koreans have, for the remarkably long period of eight years, made no payments whatsoever, and have used ‘negotiations’ as a stalling tactic.”
Throughout the period — within the U.K. government and among the banks — there was belief that North Korea had the ability to pay, largely due to their lucrative bullion business in London. However, the funds flowed into the regime coffers and were likely used for foreign purchasing and procurement activities.
In 1991, Daesong Bank set up a London-based company to continue the bullion sales — Daesong Investment Company Ltd (DIC).
The operation was clearly viewed by North Korean officials — including the diplomats based at the DPRK representative office to the London-based U.N. International Maritime Organisation (IMO) — as an official North Korean government body. A record of a British official’s discussion with a departing DPRK diplomat from the IMO suggests he referred to it as the “Korean Investment Office.”
DIC operated from an anonymous office block next to Swiss Cottage tube station and opposite the iconic Ye Olde Swiss Cottage pub in Camden, North London. As a Nov. 1992 British government document notes, Korea Daesong Bank was: “marketing North Korean gold openly in London through Daesong Investment Company… The amount of gold trading is in the region of only 3-4 tonnes [per annum] but at one time it had been considerably more than this.”
According to early 1990s gold prices, sales of 3-4 tons of gold would be raising North Korea somewhere between $38.4 and $51.2 million per annum (around $84 to $119 million in 2025).
END OF A GOLDEN ERA
In the 2020 interview, McAskill noted that the gold shipments and sales had ceased by Nov. 1993.
“When it became clear that the U.S. was getting desperate and would resort to some dirty tricks and possibly seize or block the funds, I reluctantly advised Pyongyang to stop shipment,” he said.
The story showcases how North Korean operatives were able to benefit from London — and especially its bullion markets — long before the country finally established an embassy in the capital in 2003.
By highlighting the importance of gold bullion sales in the country’s past revenue generation the story also raises questions regarding the scope of largely unknown gold sales in the DPRK’s efforts to raise foreign currency during the U.N. sanctions era.
Edited by Alannah Hill
15. South Korea boosts defense and engagement spending, changing tack on North Korea
A South korea liberal government has to raise defense spending to at least match his engagement spending to sustain popular support.
South Korea boosts defense and engagement spending, changing tack on North Korea
Record military funding, revived inter-Korean cooperation budgets highlight dual-track approach under Lee Jae-myung
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/south-korea-boosts-defense-and-engagement-spending-changing-tack-on-north-korea/
Joon Ha Park | Shreyas Reddy August 29, 2025
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung during an in-flight press conference on ROK Air Force One | Image: ROK Presidential Office (Aug. 25, 2025)
South Korea has announced sharp increases in its budgets for defense and inter-Korean relations, underscoring President Lee Jae-myung’s focus on boosting Seoul’s self-sufficiency in deterring North Korean threats while pushing for renewed engagement with Pyongyang.
The new plan, approved at a Cabinet meeting on Friday, paves the way for the current government to reverse course on former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s policies, which framed North Korea as South Korea’s “main enemy” and left little room for engagement.
Seoul will prioritize advancing homegrown military capabilities with a record defense budget, an apparent push to enhance readiness against DPRK attacks and reduce reliance on U.S. forces whose focus may soon shift to rivals such as China.
At the same time, the new administration seeks to elevate inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges to pre-Yoon levels, reinforcing Lee’s pursuit of peace and reconciliation with Pyongyang.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung gazes at a model of B-2A bomber in the Oval Office during his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on Aug. 25, 2025 | Image: White House Photo by Daniel Torok, Emily J. Higgins
DEFENSE
Seoul proposed a record 66.3 trillion won ($48 billion) defense budget for the fiscal year 2026, an increase of about 5 trillion won from 2025 and the largest annual hike in the country’s history. The 8.2% rise marks the fastest growth in defense spending since 2008.
Of the total, $33 million (46.1 trillion won) will be spent on force operations such as troop welfare and training, up 6.3% from 2025. Another $14.5 million (20.2 trillion won), a 13% increase, will be devoted to force improvement, including research, development and procurement of advanced weapons systems. Part of the expanded defense budget is allocated to go toward strengthening South Korea’s “three-axis” system to deter North Korea’s nuclear threat.
The budget underscores Seoul’s drive to field homegrown, high-tech capabilities. Funding for the KF-21 Boramae fighter program will double to $1.7 billion (2.4 trillion won), covering both production and the development of missiles and engines. The Lee administration also earmarked $45.7 million (63.6 billion won) to begin research on a next-generation stealth fighter.
The sharp rise follows President Lee Jae-myung’s pledge in Washington on Monday to increase defense spending after his summit with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Lee said South Korea would “take on a more leading role in safeguarding its own security on the Korean Peninsula” by investing in advanced assets and technologies to build a smarter military capable of 21st-century warfare.
South Korea’s defense budget is projected to keep rising, topping $50 billion (70 trillion won) in 2028 and reaching $54.8 billion (76.2 trillion won) by 2029, with an average annual growth rate of 5.6%, according to the finance ministry.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pins medals Hero of the Republic medals on the portraits of dead soldiers from the Russia-Ukraine war | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Aug. 22, 2025)
UNIFICATION
South Korea’s unification ministry announced a sharp increase in its 2026 budget, earmarking more than 1 trillion won ($740 million) for the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund in what it described as a fiscal foundation for reviving dialogue and potential cross-border exchanges with North Korea.
Coupled with other general spending, the ministry’s total budget for next year amounts to around $892 million (1.2 trillion won), a 2.8% year-on-year increase.
A unification ministry official told reporters Thursday that the 2026 budget is designed to advance the government’s vision of “a Korean Peninsula of peaceful coexistence and prosperity.”
The plan, the official said, reflects three priorities: restoring inter-Korean dialogue and reciprocal cooperation, expanding citizen participation in unification policy and building the foundations of a peace economy.
A key feature is the augmented cooperation fund, which had steadily declined from over $1 billion (1.2 trillion) won in 2021 under former President Moon Jae-in to $575 million (798.1 billion won) this year under Yoon, and the ministry said the increase is necessary to reinforce fiscal readiness for renewed talks and cooperation with Pyongyang.
In particular, the ministry will devote $167 million (232.2 billion won) to economic cooperation, more than doubling this year’s funding, to cover infrastructure for joint projects, insurance programs and cooperation loans, which officials said would help prepare for the creation of an eventual inter-Korean economic community.
The emphasis on cooperation reflects Lee’s focus on promoting exchanges with Pyongyang in order to improve inter-Korean relations, in sharp contrast to Yoon’s slashing of funding and attempts to eliminate departments working toward peace with the DPRK.
Humanitarian programs, meanwhile, represent the new budget’s largest share, with about $491 million (681 billion won) going to livelihood support, climate and environmental cooperation, as well as aid for vulnerable groups in the North.
Other areas include a tripling of the budget for preparing summit, high-level and working-level talks to $4.3 million (6 billion won), restoring the budget to 2021 levels under Moon, and a combined $4.5 million (6.3 billion won) for nationwide dialogue programs, peace and unification cultural activities, research, youth education and unification-centric civic organizations’ activities.
Support for North Korean defectors will be $58 million (80.7 billion won), a 100 million won decrease, which the ministry linked to a downward trend in defections as North Korea tightens border controls.
Notably, the budget eliminated $2.1 million (2.9 billion won) allocated by the previous administration to emphasize human rights in North Korea and promote a “liberal democratic unification” agenda, signaling Lee’s shift away from Yoon’s spotlighting of DPRK rights abuses.
Edited by Alannah Hill
16. North Korea’s economy grows at fastest pace in eight years: BOK report
North Korea’s economy grows at fastest pace in eight years: BOK report
South Korea’s central bank attributed 3.7% growth to state projects, manufacturing and closer cooperation with Russia
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-koreas-economy-grows-at-fastest-pace-in-eight-years-bok-report/
Anton Sokolin | Jooheon Kim August 29, 2025
Visitors checking out smart TVs produced by Kwangmyong Ragwon Technology Development Co. during the 2025 autumn trade fair | Image: KCNA (Nov. 20, 2024)
North Korea’s economy grew almost 4% in 2024, its fastest pace in eight years, thanks in part to stronger economic cooperation with Russia, South Korea’s central bank said Friday.
According to a report by the Bank of Korea (BOK), North Korea’s real gross domestic product (GDP) reached $26.6 billion (36.97 trillion won) last year, up 3.7% from the year prior.
North Korea’s economy grew for a second consecutive year following a 3.1% expansion in 2023, with last year’s growth marking the highest in eight years since 2016.
For the second year in a row, the country’s growth rate also exceeded that of South Korea, which recorded 2% in 2024.
“Domestically, the push for state-led policy projects was strengthened, and externally, expanded North Korea-Russia cooperation led to significant growth in manufacturing, construction, and mining,” BOK official Park Chang-hyun said during a briefing.
Meanwhile, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) assessed in April that North Korea has generated economic benefits worth around $20.6 billion (28.7 trillion won) as a result of the war in Ukraine.
Alongside a noticeable expansion in trade and cooperation with Russia, the central bank attributed the performance to intensified efforts under state initiatives such as the five-year national economic development plan and the 20×10 policy.
By industry, manufacturing, mining and construction sectors all saw notable growth, while agriculture, forestry and fisheries contracted. Manufacturing rose 7%, up from 5.9% the previous year, led by heavy and chemical industries, which jumped 10.7% due to expanded production capacity and increased arms exports. Primary metal products, machinery and chemicals were key contributors.
Construction recorded a sharp increase of 12.3%, compared to 8.2% in 2023, driven mainly by residential building projects. Mining output also surged 8.8%, with gains across coal, metals and non-metals.
In contrast, agriculture, forestry and fisheries declined by 1.9%, reversing the previous year’s modest growth of 1%. The fishing industry grew slightly, but this was offset by downturns in livestock and forestry.
North Korea’s economic structure also saw some shifts. The share of agriculture decreased to 20.9%, while manufacturing and mining fell to 30.5% and services dropped to 29.8%t. Meanwhile, the electricity, gas and water sector increased its share to 7.2%, and construction rose to 11.6%.
Nominal gross national income (GNI) stood at $31.9 billion (44.4 trillion won) in 2024, just 1.7% of South Korea’s $1.8 trillion (2,593.8 trillion won). Per capita GNI in the North rose 8.2% to around $1,200 (1.72 million won), still only about 3.4% of the South’s.
North Korea’s total trade volume, excluding inter-Korean exchanges, was $2.7 billion in 2024, down 2.6% from the previous year. Exports rose 10.8% to $360 million, driven by processed feathers and wigs. Imports, meanwhile, fell 4.4% to $2.34 billion, with major decreases in fertilizers and grains.
There were no recorded trade exchanges between the two Koreas in 2023 or 2024. Inter-Korean trade, which reached $332.6 million in 2016 before the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, has since dwindled to zero.
The trade figures are in line with a July report from the ROK government’s Korea Trade Promotion Agency (KOTRA), with the organization finding that North Korea slightly reduced its trade deficit with China last year, while expanding ties with a range of foreign partners, including distant ones like Argentina, Austria, Nigeria and the Netherlands.
Notably, KOTRA reported that North Korea extensively engaged in sanctioned trade, supplying electronics and machinery to India, while shipping cars or their parts to the Netherlands. Pyongyang also sent restricted items like iron to Indonesia, while trading textiles, industrial equipment and electronics with Mozambique and Senegal.
Commenting on the KOTRA report, Rudiger Frank, director of the European Centre for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna, said that the most striking feature of Pyongyang’s external economic exchanges is its “massive trade deficit.”
“Since 1990, the cumulative shortfall has exceeded $36 billion. Aside from some unverified speculation, we have no clear understanding of how North Korea has been financing this deficit,” the expert previously told NK News.
Mirroring his previous assessment of the 2023 BOK figures, Frank expressed skepticism about Seoul’s trade estimates, explaining that such reports often rely on “data from China’s customs authorities.”
“It is up to the reader to assess how likely it is that China would publish accurate data on such a politically sensitive trade relationship,” he concluded.
Last year, the researcher stated that the main problem with similar reports is the “assumption of a strong correlation between North Korea’s foreign trade and its GDP,” which is unlikely to be applicable to the DPRK.
Edited by Alannah Hill
17. North Korean cosmetics makers becomes latest firm looking to sell beer in Russia
"Communist capitalism?" (with Juche characteristics?)
North Korean cosmetics makers becomes latest firm looking to sell beer in Russia
Korea Thaesong registers trademark with Russian authorities, though it's unclear if they maintain brewing facilities
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korean-cosmetics-makers-becomes-latest-firm-looking-to-sell-beer-in-russia/
Anton Sokolin August 29, 2025
A glass of beer at a North Korean hotel in Jan. 2018 | Image: NK News
A North Korean company best known for making cosmetics has set its eyes on the Russian beer market, official trademarks documents show, becoming the latest in a series of suppliers looking to sell brews to the DPRK’s military ally.
Korea Thaesong Trading Company applied to register its brand in Russia on Aug. 19, according to the intellectual property watchdog Rospatent, with the firm submitting a logo representing the word star (별) written in Korean.
Korea Thaesong Trading Company’s machine-translated trademark application with Russian authorities on Aug. 8, 2025 | Image: Rospatent, edited by NK News
While the company primarily focuses on cosmetic products, including collagen-based goods and nutritional supplements, according to the NK Pro corporate database, its Rospatent papers show that the company seeks brand protection for its beer products.
It is unclear when the company tapped into beer or whether the firm actually maintains any active brewing facilities. It’s possible that the company may merely be looking to protect its brand in Russia for now, rather than planning to begin selling its goods there in the near future.
Thaesong (태성) is often confused with Korea Taesong Trading Corporation (조선대성무역회사 or Daesong), which is sanctioned by the U.N., U.S. and EU for its connections to the Korean Mining Development Trading Corporation, the North’s primary weapons dealing arm.
Dozens of North Korean companies have pushed to enter the Russian market in recent years, as the two countries’ flourishing military cooperation over the war in Ukraine bolsters broader economic ties.
Last month, for instance, two DPRK exporters of X-ray machines, physical therapy devices and other medical equipment filed trademark applications with Rospatent, a likely step toward selling the goods to Russia.
But beer and alcohol have arguably been the most prominent goods that North Korea looks to export, with DPRK products beginning to appear for sale in the neighboring country.
NK News previously reported that a Vladivostok-based company began selling North Korean Tumangang beer, produced by a brewery located in the border town of Rason. A one 0.5 liter can costs around $1.9-2.5, according to the distributor Vostok-Energia.
North Korean Tumangang beer on an aisle at a Eurofresh supermarket in Vladivostok | Video: Vostok Intur via Telegram, edited by NK News
Other North Korean beer brands that have made inroads into Russian in recent months include Mangyongdae Kyonghung Food Factory, one of the DPRK’s most innovative breweries, and Taeha beer, likely made by Unha Daesong Trading Company.
The country’s flagship Taedonggang beer similarly registered its brand with Rospatent in 2024. Naegohyang Trading Company, a large DPRK alcohol and tobacco conglomerate known for ties with the North Korean military, also applied for brand protection with Rospatent in recent months.
Such business contacts have gained momentum since Pyongyang emerged as one of Russia’s staunchest supporters on the international stage, even deploying troops to help Moscow fight Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region.
Edited by Bryan Betts
18. Book review: ‘Reading North Korea’ reveals power of watching Pyongyang’s words
north Korean propaganda has provided a lot of hints about the regime's policy direction and strategy over the years. We just need to listen and pay attention (and approach analysis with a clear understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.)
Book review: ‘Reading North Korea’ reveals power of watching Pyongyang’s words
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/book-review-reading-north-korea-reveals-power-of-watching-pyongyangs-words/
Isozaki Atsuhito argues that DPRK propaganda remains one of the most reliable tools for understanding the regime
Stephen Mercado August 27, 2025
Image: NK News
In “Reading North Korea: A Korea Watcher’s In-depth Commentary,” author Isozaki Atsuhito makes a compelling case that the best clues to Pyongyang’s thinking often lie in plain sight.
Isozaki, a professor at Japan’s prestigious Keio University, has emerged in recent years as a prodigious producer of insightful works on the DPRK. In addition to editing “Dissecting North Korea,” he has co-authored the popular “Introduction to North Korea” and written his own impressively detailed “Tourism in North Korea.”
The author has accumulated a wealth of experience in the course as a university professor and an analyst for Japan’s foreign ministry. He has traveled to the DPRK a dozen or so times since his first trip there in 1994, and as a trained card dealer, he has even spent time at Rason’s Imperial Hotel and Casino.
His latest book is a collection of articles originally published via jiji.com, the website of the Japanese news agency Jiji Press, between Sept. 2021 and Feb. 2025 under the title “Isozaki Atsuhito’s Korea Watching.”
This rich collection of essays argues that careful, methodical reading of North Korea’s own media can yield insights unavailable through other means — if approached without prejudice.
Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe | Image: The Kremlin
NUKES AND DIPLOMACY
The articles in “Reading North Korea” do not appear in chronological order but by theme, with the book divided into five chapters: (1) Nuclear Missiles and Diplomacy; (2) Relations Between Japan and North Korea; (3) North Korea Seen Via Friendly Countries; (4) Strengthening the Power Base; and (5) Intelligence Methods.
Isozaki offers a number of arguments of interest to those who follow Korean affairs. In the first chapter, he sees Pyongyang developing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles with the intent to deter a dangerous U.S., although Kim Jong Un could play those programs as cards in future negotiations with Washington. The author refers at several points to the “lessons” that Pyongyang has taken from the U.S. attacks in recent decades against several regimes without a nuclear deterrent in the Middle East and North Africa.
The author also observes that Pyongyang, long adept at balancing its ties between China and Russia, now clearly favors Moscow.
In the book’s second chapter, the author suggests that Japan has gained little from its hardline policies on the DPRK in recent decades. He notes that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi succeeded through active diplomacy, including his 2002 summit in Pyongyang, to force Kim Jong Il to admit to abducting Japanese citizens and to bring several of the victims home to Japan.
Prime Minister Abe’s subsequent hardline policy of sanctions in his eight years in office brought back not a single missing Japanese abductee. Isozaki also voices concern over Tokyo’s diminishing influence in recent years on international diplomatic developments related to Pyongyang.
In his chapter on countries friendly to North Korea, the author offers some interesting perspectives.
The DPRK sent fighter pilots to aid North Vietnam in its victory over South Vietnam in the 1960s, while South Korea dispatched combat troops to aid the losing side. However, Isozaki notes that the ROK today dominates the DPRK in Vietnam, which hosts something like 200,000 South Korean residents versus only several dozen from the DPRK. The author compares the imposing Lotte Center, a 65-story skyscraper in Hanoi, with the few North Korean restaurants that failed to flourish there.
The chapter also shows Isozaki to be a world-class traveler. He enriches his articles on the DPRK’s relations with Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, Syria and Vietnam with observations and photographs from his trips to those countries.
In the book’s fourth chapter, Isozaki ponders the meaning for regime stability of the many changes observed in Pyongyang’s upper ranks and the public appearances of Kim Jong Un’s daughter since 2022. The author interprets the rapid succession of personnel shuffles as indicating that Kim Jong Un has a firm grip on power. Isozaki sees the daughter’s reported appearances at public events as signaling an intent to keep the Kim family atop the power structure in Pyongyang for another generation.
Image: NK News
SOURCES AND METHODS
In the fifth chapter, which focuses on intelligence methods, as well as elsewhere in the book, Isozaki argues for the importance of using open sources from Pyongyang to understand North Korea.
In one article, he describes Radio Press (RP) as a Japanese “treasure” for those monitoring the DPRK and other former Communist bloc countries. Former monitors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Radio Room, established in 1941 to track American, British and other foreign radio broadcasts, launched RP in 1946, after Washington had terminated the Radio Room and other Japanese intelligence organs following Tokyo’s surrender to the Allied powers the previous year.
RP’s “North Korea Directory” and other publications have since proven a tremendous resource to Japanese academics, government analysts and newspaper reporters who follow the DPRK. For the author, RP is “an indispensable organ of open-source intelligence.”
Isozaki sees the ability to read Korean as essential. He argues that just as experts in international affairs must know English and scholars of French literature must know French, “it goes without saying that learning Korean is indispensable when researching North Korea.”
He notes that Pyongyang restricts freedom of movement and access to individuals in the country, limiting the possibilities for field work as a means to understanding North Korea. Relying on South Korea media also poses problems for him. In one article, he dismisses analysis from the ROK National Intelligence Service suggesting that Kim Jong Un has three children as “unconfirmed information.”
Isozaki analyzes information from Rodong Sinmun, the daily newspaper of the ruling Workers Party of Korea (WPK), as well as from the nation’s constitution, the WPK journal Kulloja and other Pyongyang sources of information. In one of his articles, he compares the number of references to Russian leader Vladimir Putin in Rodong Sinmun to those to China’s Xi Jinping from Jan. to Aug. 2024 as an indicator of the relative weight that the DPRK was giving to each country in that period; the count was 113 to 33 in Russia’s favor.
The author also takes into account the authoritativeness of media statements in reading published tea leaves. He assigns greater weight to an important statements (담화) appearing under the name of Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s influential younger sister, or that of the director of the WPK United Front, than to lesser statements published in the name of “an MFA Japan Research Institute researcher” or a “DPRK Olympic Committee representative.”
Image: NK News
JUDGING WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The author is by no means a fan of Pyongyang. He writes that, unlike scholars of French literature — who often share a deep affection for both France and its literary tradition — those who research the DPRK “are required to keep a sense of distance from the object of their studies.”
That said, he writes of approaching Pyongyang without prejudice as the best means to make sense of what is already a “black box.” Prejudice only makes everything darker.
Isozaki opens his book by challenging readers to identify “X,” a country that (1) is one of only nine nuclear powers, (2) is one of only five with intercontinental ballistic missiles, (3) borders on China, (4) has waged war with neighboring country “Y,” (5) has made global headlines at times for its problems in human rights, and (6) suffers from poverty, with a GDP per capita of only 2,000 dollars. Many readers will immediately think of North Korea. Isozaki notes that the correct answer is India.
The author ends his book by expressing the hope that his articles provide readers “an opportunity to confront prejudices concerning North Korea” and offer them “multifaceted perspectives.”
In my view, Isozaki has succeeded. Open sources of the DPRK by no means constitute a crystal ball to reveal all within the black box, but they are some of the more reliable pointers, readily available, to Pyongyang’s view of the world and the regime’s intentions.
The articles in this book show what a researcher can achieve with such an approach.
Edited by Alannah Hill
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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