​Quotes of the Day:

"Wars are not paid for in wartime, the bill comes later."

– Benjamin Franklin

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. In fact, it's the only thing that ever has." 

– Margaret Mead

"As in many wars, Japan’s unstated goals were more important than it stated goals. Expelling China from Korea and reforming Korea were elements of an overarching agenda to overturn the East Asian balance of power, taking over parts of the disintegrating Qing empire before Russia could and containing Russia thereafter. Like Prussia, Japan was a rising power on the march – a nightmare for dominant powers like China which cleave to a status quo of their own creation. Japan, like Prussia, intended to overturn the regional balance and make itself pre-eminent. Moreover, Japan envisioned a new regional order, based not on the tributary system, but on imperialism.”

– S. C. M. Pain, The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War

1. Kim and Putin to Join Xi in Show of Unity at Beijing Military Parade

2. Unification First: Colonel David Maxwell on Human Rights, Information, and a Free Korea

3. Navigating the new normal: Strategic simultaneity, US Forces Korea flexibility, and alliance imperatives

4. Five questions (and expert answers) about where the US-South Korea alliance goes from here

5. What North Korea Learned From the Battlefields of Kursk

6. Trump Should Stay Out of South Korean Politics

7. With Russia’s help, North Korea expands its nuclear weapons capability

8. North Korea shuns denuclearization talks following first Trump-Lee summit

9. Kim Jong Un watches special forces drills, calls for supplying new sniper rifles

10. Hanwha to invest $5 billion to improve infrastructure at Philadelphia shipyard

11. US-ROK conclude 11 days of military drills that drew North Korea’s scorn12. 

12. North Korean IT workers use AI to mask lack of skills, boost criminal schemes

13. Are Japan, South Korea, and Poland on the Verge of Getting Nuclear Weapons?

14. N. Korea's Kim set for debut on multilateral diplomatic stage in China; focus on possible 3-way summit with Putin, Xi

15. FM Cho notes 'close attention' to be paid to N.K. leader's planned China visit

16. U.S. can have USFK 'strategic flexibility' while ensuring extended deterrence for S. Korea: Sen. Kim

1. Kim and Putin to Join Xi in Show of Unity at Beijing Military Parade

​This is nearly unprecedented. Only twice before did Kim il Sung ever participate in a major celebration in Beijing. And none of the three leaders ever participated in any major event in Moscow.

Kim Il‑Sung attended the Chinese National Day Parade in Beijing on: 28 September 1954, marking the 5th anniversary of the PRC and again 1 October 1959, for the 10th anniversary of the PRC.

These were significant state celebrations and featured full-scale military displays.

​Korea watchers have long assessed that the Kim's only like to attend bilateral events in which they can be perceived as an equal and not part of a group of leaders in order to enhance their reputation and legitimacy. 

This appears to be a clear indication that the CRInK is formalizing and strengthening its relationship if not forming an alliance. And yes, I am sure that Kim Jong Un is assessing that this will enhance his reputation as a "world leader" and "global power."

How are we going to employ our information instrument of national power to counter this? More importantly can the people who are responsible for employing our information instrument find ways to exploit this. Can they develop themes and messages that will appeal to various target audiences and undermine the legitimacy of the CRInK?

We should remember why the CRInK exists: fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.

They fear the "silk web" of alliances of free and democratic countries.

They have inherent internal weaknesses that threaten their authoritarian/totalitarian dictators' power and control.

They are desperate for support of their various malign endeavors.

They envy the "silk web" of alliances of free and democratic countries.

Kim and Putin to Join Xi in Show of Unity at Beijing Military Parade

Chinese leader takes opportunity to present his country as a global power

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/kim-and-putin-to-join-xi-in-show-of-unity-at-beijing-military-parade-98948203

By Brian Spegele

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 and Dasl Yoon

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Aug. 28, 2025 4:18 am ET

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The reclusive North Korean leader will make a rare trip abroad to appear at China’s military parade alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Photo: KCNA/Korea News Service via AP; Yan Yan/Zuma Press; Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Reuters

Quick Summary

• Kim Jong Un will join Vladimir Putin at China’s military parade in Beijing, showcasing unity against the West.View more

BEIJING—North Korean leader Kim Jong Un plans to join Russia’s Vladimir Putin at China’s grand military parade in Beijing next week, in a show of unity and defiance of the West. 

The parade on Wednesday will be hosted by Chinese leader Xi Jinping and is set to be the trio’s first event together, providing powerful optics as Beijing asserts itself as a leader of countries seeking to upend the U.S.-led international order.

Yet the potential for the three countries to build on the moment faces limits, as each pursues its own agenda with the U.S. A summit between President Trump and Xi before the end of the year is possible, as China seeks a reduction of U.S. tariffs.

Trump is also holding out the possibility of better ties with both Russia and North Korea. He met Putin recently in Alaska to discuss the war in Ukraine and earlier this week said he would like to meet Kim again, after meeting the North Korean leader three times during his first term.

Beijing revealed Kim’s inclusion on Thursday when it unveiled the guest list for the parade. Trump won’t be attending, nor will most European leaders. Instead, Xi is set to be joined by the leaders of countries including Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. South Korea will be represented by the speaker of the country’s National Assembly.

The parade will commemorate the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II and is an opportunity for China to show off its growing military might, as thousands of troops march past Tiananmen Square alongside some of China’s latest weapons.

For Kim, the event marks a shift as it would be his first time joining a multilateral gathering of leaders and his first visit to China since 2019. While Xi attended Putin’s Victory Day gathering in Moscow in May, North Korea sent a handful of military officers.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivering a speech last December, in an image provided by the North Korean government. Photo: KCNA/AP

Much of North Korea’s recent diplomatic focus has been on forging closer ties with Moscow, including sending troops to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Improving relations with Beijing carries the prospect of additional economic support for North Korea beyond what Moscow has been able to offer.

The deployment of North Korean troops to fight alongside Russian soldiers had strained Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing. While China is a close partner of Russia and has provided it with economic support to blunt the effects of U.S. sanctions, China also opposes any moves that could expand the war.

In one sign of the frayed ties, China and North Korea skipped major celebrations of their 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties last year, after marking their 70th anniversary together in 2019.

But exchanges between China and North Korea picked up this year, and trade between the countries has surged. In July, China’s ambassador to North Korea attended festivities marking the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, after missing the event last year.

On the issue of nuclear weapons, China and North Korea remain divided, with North Korea insisting it won’t give up its pursuit of a nuclear arsenal. In May 2024, North Korea blasted China, Japan and South Korea for a joint declaration, after a three-way summit in Seoul, in which they agreed to pursue denuclearization.

Write to Brian Spegele at Brian.Spegele@wsj.com and Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

2. Unification First: Colonel David Maxwell on Human Rights, Information, and a Free Korea

This is a 45 minute interview with the great interns of the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). It is at this link: https://youtu.be/xLP3bn7Z8TA

Unification First: Colonel David Maxwell on Human Rights, Information, and a Free Korea

16 views Aug 22, 2025 #NorthKorea #HumanRights #Freedom

In this exclusive HRNK interview, Colonel David Maxwell (Ret.), Board Member of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), shares his insights on the path toward a free and unified Korea.

Drawing from over 30 years of military service and academic research, Colonel Maxwell emphasizes that lasting peace and denuclearization are only possible through unification grounded in human rights and freedom for the Korean people in the North.

Key topics include:

• Why unification must precede denuclearization

• The critical role of information access for North Koreans

• The resilience and ingenuity of the Korean people

• Paths to unification: peaceful transition, regime collapse, internal change

• The importance of preparing for integration and supporting escapees

• Lessons from history and the universal right to self-determination

Colonel Maxwell underscores that the true Nobel Peace Prize will belong to those who help free and unite the Korean people, not simply to those who negotiate temporary deals.

This interview is part of HRNK’s mission to shine a light on North Korea’s human rights abuses and to promote principled, sustainable solutions for the Korean Peninsula.

Learn more about HRNK’s work: https://www.hrnk.org

#NorthKorea #KoreaUnification #HumanRights #DavidMaxwell #HRNK #Freedom #Denuclearization #KoreanPeninsula

3. Navigating the new normal: Strategic simultaneity, US Forces Korea flexibility, and alliance imperatives

​Excerpts;

Moreover, there is growing concern in Seoul about US interest in enhancing USFK’s strategic flexibility to address contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula. Although key military leaders including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John D. Caine, the USFK commander, General Xavier T. Brunson, and the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, have publicly underscored the continuing need for the US presence on the Korean Peninsula for credible deterrence against North Korea, the issue of strategic flexibility is reemerging as a critical topic within the alliance.

This is particularly true amid Washington’s prioritization of its military readiness vis-à-vis China. Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, currently leading the drafting of the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, has repeatedly emphasized—prior to entering office—the need to reorient USFK to better address what he regards as the primary threat: China. Robert Peters, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, has also recently urged that “all geographic combatant commands should be directed to plan for a China contingency.” Such calls underscore the United States’ growing strategic rationale behind transforming USFK into a force better aligned with transregional deterrence priorities. The United States has reaffirmed the ROK-US alliance as “ironclad,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, and emphasized the alliance’s capacity to “continue to thrive” under Seoul’s new leadership of President Lee Jae-myung. Yet the US perception of a congested threat environment in the Asia-Pacific region, its priority focus on China, and its vision of a more flexible USFK all point to the potential for alliance fissure.

...

Conclusion

The second Trump administration’s priorities and the evolving reality of strategic simultaneity—exacerbated by the growing threats from North Korea, China, and a realigned Russia bolstered by North Korean military support—have ushered in an era of transformation for the ROK-US alliance. As Washington reallocates both attention and US military assets toward transregional challenges, Seoul faces mounting pressure to absorb a greater share of operational responsibility, strategically recalibrate its force posture, and align its defense planning with a shifting alliance architecture. If mismanaged, this shift could lead to alliance fragmentation, fatigue, or hollow deterrence. However, as this article contends, if managed carefully and strategically leveraged, the anticipated transformation of USFK presents Seoul with a critical window of opportunity: to deepen the alliance’s CNI, refine the division of labor, and lay the foundation for a more adaptive and strategically credible alliance.

The future of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula—and indeed, the wider Indo-Pacific region—will hinge on Seoul’s ability to reframe US force realignments not as unilateral disengagements but as catalysts for indigenous capability development, coevolution in defense planning, and new forms of assurance through extended deterrence mechanisms.

Navigating the new normal: Strategic simultaneity, US Forces Korea flexibility, and alliance imperatives

By Bee Yun Jo

atlanticcouncil.org · syyoo · August 27, 2025

Defense Policy Korea Nuclear Deterrence Security Partnerships United States and Canada

Issue Brief August 27, 2025 • 11:37 am ET

Bottom lines up front

• Seoul should anticipate a possible transition of US Forces Korea toward fewer ground forces and a more flexible US presence overall.
• Mismanaging such a transition risks alliance fatigue, fragmentation, or hollow deterrence.
• US demands should not be depicted as unilateral disengagements but as catalysts to deepen conventional-nuclear integration of the alliance, seek new assurances, and refine the division of labor to create a more adaptive and credible alliance.

The recent summit between South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and US President Donald Trump, despite looming anticipation of large-scale changes in the alliance, such as restructuring of US Forces Korea (USFK), ended with Trump touting his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Yet as Trump hinted about seeking “ownership” of military bases, his demands for greater burden-sharing from Seoul remain. This particularly reflects Washington’s apparent shift toward a “China-first” strategy as reportedly outlined in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance. South Korea can expect continued pressure to assume greater regional security responsibilities, with alliance discussions over key issues such as troop reduction, strategic flexibility, and wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer. Echoing the latest call of Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, to upgrade the ROK-US alliance from “ironclad” to “titanium,” I also contend in this paper that the brewing changes in the alliance can provide momentum for a renewal befitting the changing security environment. With specific focus on the possibility of USFK reduction or adjustments, I contend that while strategic simultaneity fragments traditional alliance roles, it also generates new imperatives and opportunities for conventional-nuclear integration and refining the division of labor to create a more adaptive and credible alliance.

Strategic simultaneity and USFK transformation

The concept of strategic simultaneity has posed new questions for alliance structures. Amid rising tensions with both a US nuclear peer and a near peer—the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) also is expanding its nuclear weapons capabilities, assisted by its mutual defense pact with Russia. These factors demand the sustained attention and readiness of US forces in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, the US military has ongoing commitments of support for Ukraine and in the Middle East, leading to a reprioritization of resources.

Faced with such a congested security environment, the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula appears to be at the edge of transformation. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, reported in May that the approximately 4,500 troops of USFK’s Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)—which currently rotates into South Korea every nine months—could be withdrawn for possible redeployment to Guam or even the US southern border for domestic missions. The retirement of twenty-four A-10 aircraft by September 2025 also necessitates reconfiguration of the forces.

In Seoul, these possible USFK adjustments arouse concerns, particularly given the backdrop of Trump’s approach to alliances. The withdrawal of the SBCT, for instance, would leave the Eighth Army—which commands US Army forces in South Korea—without any maneuver elements. Although artillery, Apache helicopters, missile defense units (e.g., Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are expected to remain, this shift increases the burden on the ROK military to fill operational gaps, especially in early-phase ground operations. The Stryker team, designed for rapid response and equipped with real-time targeting sensors, plays a key role in ground warfare; its absence would degrade US immediate tactical responsiveness in South Korea.

Moreover, there is growing concern in Seoul about US interest in enhancing USFK’s strategic flexibility to address contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula. Although key military leaders including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John D. Caine, the USFK commander, General Xavier T. Brunson, and the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, have publicly underscored the continuing need for the US presence on the Korean Peninsula for credible deterrence against North Korea, the issue of strategic flexibility is reemerging as a critical topic within the alliance.

This is particularly true amid Washington’s prioritization of its military readiness vis-à-vis China. Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, currently leading the drafting of the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, has repeatedly emphasized—prior to entering office—the need to reorient USFK to better address what he regards as the primary threat: China. Robert Peters, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, has also recently urged that “all geographic combatant commands should be directed to plan for a China contingency.” Such calls underscore the United States’ growing strategic rationale behind transforming USFK into a force better aligned with transregional deterrence priorities. The United States has reaffirmed the ROK-US alliance as “ironclad,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, and emphasized the alliance’s capacity to “continue to thrive” under Seoul’s new leadership of President Lee Jae-myung. Yet the US perception of a congested threat environment in the Asia-Pacific region, its priority focus on China, and its vision of a more flexible USFK all point to the potential for alliance fissure.

New mission for alliance: Strategic reconfiguration

In short, Seoul should anticipate a possible transition toward fewer ground forces and a more flexible US presence. Washington’s increasing emphasis on airpower and missile defense over heavy ground units suggests a redefinition of US priorities in the region. The upcoming withdrawal of legacy platforms and restructuring of USFK may reflect this shift. The current administration’s apparent interest in the transfer of wartime operational control will accelerate such a shift.

What’s important for the alliance, however, is to ensure that the transformation constitutes a strategic reconfiguration rather than fragmentation. Both Seoul and Washington’s stakes are too high to diminish deterrence and the extended deterrence values of the alliance. Therefore, even though US military forces are stretched thin in a multi-adversary environment, Seoul does not have the luxury of foregoing the combined deterrence and extended deterrence mechanisms of the ROK-US alliance. The DPRK’s continued nuclear threats, the revived DPRK-Russia mutual defense pact, and China’s increasing encroachment at sea and air have also congested Seoul’s security environment.

To reconfigure the alliance without risking a kind of deterrence vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul and Washington should pursue new initiatives for conventional-nuclear integration and refined division of labor in the region. To elaborate, since the 2023 Washington Declaration and the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), South Korea and the United States have focused on improving the conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) of their forces, including US nuclear weapons. For South Korea, the motivation behind pursuing CNI has centered on two key objectives. First, CNI enables the ROK to specify and expand its conventional role, by which it can seek to better lock in the US security commitment to provide, per the State Department’s NCG fact sheet, the “full range of US capabilities including nuclear.” Second, by delineating its conventional responsibilities, South Korea can upgrade both its operational and hardware capabilities. Altogether, CNI is an effort to signal the alliance’s credible resolve and capability to deter DPRK.

First and foremost, this CNI context would enable Seoul to ensure that any reduction of USFK troops or withdrawal of US legacy platforms is followed by the United States’ continued provision of extended deterrence and also to push for new US assurance measures. Seoul should seek to reaffirm the declaratory policy that, should North Korea employ nuclear weapons in an attack, the United States will employ “the full range of US capabilities” and bring about “the end of the Kim regime.” Sustaining the operation of key deterrence coordination mechanisms such as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group and NCG, as well as regular maintenance of combined training and exercises, will be critical.

Second, regarding capability, the legacy platforms can be replaced with new and advanced capabilities. Indeed, with the retirement of the A-10 aircraft, there is proposed permanent deployment of one F-35A squadron at Kunsan Air Base, with rotation of another squadron. The F-35, with its stealth and electronic warfare capabilities, offers better survivability and precision strike options against critical targets than the A-10. Technologically, it surpasses the F-16 in versatility, integrating electronic warfare and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor suites for multi-role missions. More importantly, the anticipated deployment of F-35As may be a window of opportunity for Seoul and Washington to discuss possible utilization of F-35As for dual-capable aircraft (DCA) missions—given their capability of deploying and operating US tactical nuclear weapons. Flexible and temporary deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons, as well as Seoul’s participation in DCA missions, could be the next steps of alliance transformation as well. Moreover, the United States also is prepping for consolidation of sixty-two F-16s into two “super squadrons” at Osan Air Base (one super squadron is already in place). The consolidation of the F-16 fleet into super squadrons reflects a new US approach to maximizing combat readiness by integrating aircraft and personnel for rapid, high-intensity operations. For Seoul, such consolidation at Osan Air Base would shorten response times to North Korean threats by more than 100 kilometers—e.g., Kunsan to Kaesong in 5 minutes 20 seconds at Mach 2, Osan to Kaesong in 2 minutes 30 seconds. Its effect on the adversary is already salient as Rodong Sinmun, the official Party newspaper of North Korea, in May condemned the first super squadron’s establishment as “a dangerous military move aimed at preemptive strikes against our state.” In addition, with Trump’s push for a missile defense system dubbed the Golden Dome—with an earmark of $25 billion in the FY2026 defense budget—Seoul may also seek to reinvigorate missile defense cooperation. As recent Israel-Iran conflict demonstrated, missile defense is not only a central means to enhance deterrence (and extended deterrence) by denial but also to damage limitation and survivability or resilience if deterrence fails.

Third, aside from capabilities, thinking about a larger scope of deterrence beyond the Korean Peninsula may be necessary for Seoul as well. As the US burden to deter multiple, simultaneous threats grows heavier, it serves South Korea’s strategic interest to actively contribute to efforts aimed at reinforcing the credibility and resilience of US regional deterrence, including its nuclear umbrella. While Seoul remains committed to its preference for a Korean Peninsula-centric posture, it must also recognize that reluctance to engage in broader regional deterrence initiatives may weaken US resolve, erode deterrence coherence, and embolden adversaries to exploit perceived gaps, especially under Trump’s approach to alliances.

Last but not least, the transformation of USFK—and the broader evolution of the ROK-US alliance—will serve as a powerful external driver compelling Seoul to undertake a comprehensive overhaul of its national defense posture. As USFK shifts toward a more agile and airpower-oriented configuration, with fewer ground forces, the onus will fall increasingly on South Korea to fill capability gaps across multiple domains. This will likely require a significant increase in defense spending, acceleration of military procurements, and deep structural reforms in force structure, doctrine, and training—particularly in areas such as ISR and missile defense. Close strategic synchronization—as urged by Ham Hyeong-pil, director for the Center for Security Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis—with an evolving US force posture would help secure Washington’s continued political and operational support for Seoul’s force modernization efforts. Above all, strategic synchronization will be critical to ensure that any reduction in the scale or change in role of USFK does not lead to a deterrence vacuum, which could embolden adversaries such as North Korea, China, or even Russia to test the credibility of the alliance.

Conclusion

The second Trump administration’s priorities and the evolving reality of strategic simultaneity—exacerbated by the growing threats from North Korea, China, and a realigned Russia bolstered by North Korean military support—have ushered in an era of transformation for the ROK-US alliance. As Washington reallocates both attention and US military assets toward transregional challenges, Seoul faces mounting pressure to absorb a greater share of operational responsibility, strategically recalibrate its force posture, and align its defense planning with a shifting alliance architecture. If mismanaged, this shift could lead to alliance fragmentation, fatigue, or hollow deterrence. However, as this article contends, if managed carefully and strategically leveraged, the anticipated transformation of USFK presents Seoul with a critical window of opportunity: to deepen the alliance’s CNI, refine the division of labor, and lay the foundation for a more adaptive and strategically credible alliance.

The future of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula—and indeed, the wider Indo-Pacific region—will hinge on Seoul’s ability to reframe US force realignments not as unilateral disengagements but as catalysts for indigenous capability development, coevolution in defense planning, and new forms of assurance through extended deterrence mechanisms.

Fellow

Bee Yun Jo

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Korea

4. Five questions (and expert answers) about where the US-South Korea alliance goes from here

Five questions (and expert answers) about where the US-South Korea alliance goes from here

atlanticcouncil.org · jcookson · August 26, 2025

On Monday, US President Donald Trump welcomed South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to the White House. That Trump’s welcome would be warm was very much in doubt, as shortly before the meeting the US president posted on social media “WHAT IS GOING ON IN SOUTH KOREA?” But when the two leaders sat down together, there was no sign of contention—and several signs of what to expect substantively for the US-South Korea alliance going forward. Below, Atlantic Council experts answer five pressing questions about what the two leaders discussed, from US forces in Korea to Korean-aided US shipbuilding stateside.

1. What did this meeting tell us about the future of the US-South Korean relationship?

Overall, the public comments in the Oval Office and what is known so far of the private discussions suggest that fears of a break in the relationship were overblown. In fact, it appears that a new approach for the alliance is already taking shape under these two leaders.

Sensitive issues raised by journalists in the Oval Office press availability that could easily have derailed the conversation—or at least been perceived as key sticking points—were deflected effectively by the two leaders. For example, Trump demurred when asked about cutting back US Forces Korea (USFK), and though he held firm on the need for greater cost-sharing for the US military presence there, Lee did not contest the point. Far from showing differences on their approaches to China—one topic where many commentators expected a disconnect—the leaders joked about traveling together to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping. How these topics were handled with reporters does not mean, for example, that finding agreement on the future shape of USFK or on an alliance posture toward China will necessarily be easy. But it does suggest that these thorny issues will not be as bitterly contentious as some might have thought.

Several potential themes for enhanced alliance alignment also emerged from the meeting. Defense industrial cooperation—in particular, working together on shipbuilding—is clearly becoming a primary focus of the alliance. Lee and Trump also seem to share the view that North Korea’s development of its nuclear and missile capabilities has led to a deterioration of the security situation on the peninsula. At the same time, Lee’s deference to Trump on North Korea issues—with Lee referring to himself as a “pacemaker” following Trump’s lead as “peacemaker” was noteworthy. Despite the clear desire of Lee and his supporters to reduce South Korea’s reliance on the United States for its security, Lee appears comfortable with continued US leadership on the approach to North Korea and he may be signaling that Seoul will not seek to get out ahead of Washington on North Korea diplomacy.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

2. What did Trump’s comments indicate about the future of US force posture in South Korea?

The Trump-Lee summit was widely anticipated as a watershed moment for the US-South Korea alliance. Expectations centered on contentious issues: the potential reduction of USFK, the expansion of strategic flexibility, and the long-pending transfer of wartime operational control, all under the rubric of “alliance modernization.” Yet the meeting ended with less clarity on these issues than ambiguity. Trump emphasized his “very good relationship” with Kim Jong Un, and he expressed interest in another summit with the North Korean leader later this year. This announcement overshadowed the hard-security deliberations and left allies wondering what direction Washington truly intends to pursue.

For Seoul, this uncertainty carries both risks and opportunities. On one hand, any discussion of USFK drawdowns stirs concerns that Pyongyang could interpret the move as weakening deterrence. On the other hand, alliance modernization could yield a more adaptive posture if framed around enhanced capabilities—such as advanced airpower, missile defense, and unmanned systems—rather than troop numbers alone.

The summit provided no concrete answers to important questions about what’s next for USFK, leaving Seoul to push for assurances that US capabilities will remain firmly committed to the peninsula. The question of strategic flexibility similarly remains unresolved. While Washington seeks freedom to redeploy forces for contingencies beyond Korea, Seoul fears becoming entrapped amid intensifying US-China competition. Anxieties in South Korea are likely to continue after the summit due to the absence of specific commitments during the meeting. The issue of operational control, too, appears to remain unsettled.

In the end, the Lee–Trump summit highlighted the gravity of alliance transformation but left more questions than answers. The task now is to ensure that ambiguity does not devolve into drift, but instead becomes an opening for deliberate, sustained dialogue to shape a stronger, more credible alliance.

—Bee Yun Jo, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and research fellow in the Security Strategy Division at the Sejong Institute.

3. Both leaders showed a willingness to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. What could come out of that?

The leaders’ willingness to meet with Kim is very much in line with what both of them had expressed separately before the summit. Some of their comments suggested that they may be setting the stage for a coordinated approach toward diplomacy with North Korea, which is important to ensure solidarity and avoid seams that Pyongyang or Beijing could exploit.

Not much may come of this willingness and coordination, however, because of the North Korean leader’s belligerence, intransigence, and stubborn refusal to give up his nuclear-weapons program. Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister and top international spokesperson, recently underscored that Pyongyang must be accepted by Washington as a nuclear weapons power, and she scoffed at the Lee administration’s attempts to reach out. Given that Trump reemphasized denuclearization as his goal for diplomacy with North Korea, and that he praised Lee’s approach to the North—even as he emphasized his positive relationship with Kim Jong Un—his comments could be seen by Pyongyang as a direct, if polite, rebuff to Kim Yo Jong’s recent statements.

Whether or not Kim takes them up on their offer to engage, Lee and Trump showing a clear willingness to meet helps put the onus back on the North Korean leader for the diplomatic impasse, helping to underscore to Beijing and other critics that it is not a lack of willingness on the part of the United States that is the roadblock to dialogue.

—Markus Garlauskas

4. What progress was made on US-South Korean trade, and shipbuilding in particular?

On trade issues broadly, both leaders expressed satisfaction. The summit reaffirmed the framework announced in July, which set US tariffs on South Korean goods at 15 percent. Trump noted that the Korean side had raised concerns prior to the meeting but emphasized that the deal would be finalized without changes.

Most notably, the meeting elevated shipbuilding to the top of the agenda. Trump said: “In World War II, the US built one ship a day, but now the US shipyard is quite devastated,” stressing the need to revive US shipbuilding. The July framework already included South Korea’s $150 billion pledge to rebuild US shipyard capacity with Korean expertise. At the summit, Trump went further, signaling possible coproduction: Korean firms building ships at American yards with US labor.

South Korea, for its part, deliberately spotlighted shipbuilding as the centerpiece of cooperation. Lee even visited Hanwha’s Philadelphia shipyard to underscore the commitment. Lee branded the initiative with the slogan “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA),” cleverly echoing Trump’s own rhetoric. In effect, the phrase could also be read as “Make America and South Korea Great Again,” reinforcing the broader alliance narrative.

Yet significant challenges remain before this partnership can be fully realized. Legally, any coproduction at US shipyards must comply with domestic laws, such as the Buy American Act and the Jones Act, raising questions about how to implement cooperation without delays or disputes. Geopolitically, China is watching closely. Beijing’s state media has already warned that if South Korean shipbuilding products are used in US military operations, Seoul could face serious consequences.

Thus, while the Trump–Lee summit produced visible progress on trade and shipbuilding, success will depend on navigating legal barriers and geopolitical pressures.

—Sungmin Cho is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

5. What signals did the leaders send about the future of the US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation?

Ahead of the US-South Korea presidential summit, Lee seemed determined to fulfil his campaign promise to broker new diplomatic opportunities through a pragmatic foreign policy, particularly on inter-Korea relations. Diplomacy is important, though security must come first. Any effort by Lee to advance renewed North-South Korean relations will likely hinge on reinforcing South Korea’s bilateral and multilateral partnerships with the United States and Japan.

Lee has repeatedly called Japan an “important partner” for cooperation and declared his aims to solidify US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Even during his National Liberation Day address—a yearly commemoration of South Korea’s liberation in 1945 from Japanese occupation—Lee balanced historical remembrance alongside the importance of seeking forward-looking relations with Japan.

Breaking with a six-decade tradition, Lee’s first bilateral visit was not to Washington but to Tokyo—a move designed to signal Lee’s intent to restart and bolster trilateral US-South Korea-Japan relations. Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba only days before his summit with Trump, Lee declared the swift resumption of South Korea-Japan shuttle diplomacy and reaffirmed both nations’ commitments toward North Korea and the “complete denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

Interestingly, Trump may be Lee’s biggest ally in promoting renewed North-South Korean relations. During the presidential summit, Trump heavily emphasized his interest in meeting with the North Korean leader—presenting historical parallels to US-South Korean relations during Trump’s first term. However, it remains to be seen how these early overtures from Washington and Seoul will be perceived in Pyongyang.

As the Trump-Lee partnership moves forward, they must not forget a core lesson from past North Korea strategies: Engagement cannot come at the expense of maintaining strong, credible US-South Korea deterrence and joint military readiness in the region. Lee’s post-summit pledge to increase defense spending and technical cooperation underscores his commitment to modernizing the US–South Korea alliance and strengthening joint strategies against rising threats in the Indo-Pacific.

As Lee and Trump navigate a complex diplomatic landscape, their ability to balance engagement with credible deterrence will define the next chapter of security and stability on the Korean Peninsula. If managed wisely, the renewed momentum in US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation could offer a rare window for pragmatic progress in inter-Korean relations—without compromising regional security.

—Kayla T. Orta is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

***

All eyes were on the Lee-Trump Summit as the US president publicly called out the South Korean government mere hours before the two presidents were scheduled to meet. Many were unsure of the reception Lee would receive due to concerns regarding trade deals, USFK posture, and more. But Lee’s charm and pragmatic diplomacy had a strong effect, and both presidents seemed pleased with the initial outcomes.

A major question still lingers, however, on the future of US-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation under the new kaleidoscope of leaders.

Days before the White House summit, Lee visited Tokyo to meet with Ishiba. Making Japan his first trip abroad in office was a first for any Korean president, and it was a strong statement of his willingness to “seek forward-looking, mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan.” Following this summit in Tokyo, both leaders committed to work together with the United States for the “complete denuclearization of North Korea.” This statement, in conjunction with Trump expressing his desire to speak with the North Korean leader, with Lee’s encouragement, shows early signs of continued support for trilateral cooperation in the security realm.

While these signs are undoubtedly encouraging, time will tell how this momentum will hold up to forthcoming conversations on the USFK posture and burden-sharing, an apparent mismatch of expectations for how to engage with Beijing, and Ishiba’s uncertain future following the Liberal Democratic Party’s recent election troubles.

—Lauren D. Gilbert is a deputy director with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

5. What North Korea Learned From the Battlefields of Kursk

​A useful roll-up.

Excerpt:

VI. Summary

What began as limited exposure to Russia’s war in Ukraine has grown into a conduit for technology transfer, operational experience, and doctrinal adaptation. The evidence now ranges from loitering munitions and mobile ATGMs to air-defense systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and ballistic missile technologies. For the Korean Peninsula, this trajectory points to the emergence of a more capable, modernized North Korean force, one no longer confined to the outdated playbooks of the mid-20th century. Globally, the risk extends further: Pyongyang has long been a supplier to sanctioned states and non-state actors, and the spread of these tools could amplify instability well beyond Northeast Asia. While it remains uncertain how far North Korea can scale and replicate these lessons across its armed forces, given its severe financial constraints, it is clear that this experience will not be buried.

What North Korea Learned From the Battlefields of Kursk

An Analysis of North Korean Military Footage

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/what-north-korea-learned-from-the?triedRedirect=true

Frontelligence Insight

Aug 27, 2025

substack.com · Frontelligence Insight

North Korea’s direct involvement in the war with Ukraine on Russia side was never about charity or ideological solidarity - it was a calculated move. Beyond the political and economic gains, Pyongyang appears to have extracted practical military lessons, so vital for a force whose training, equipment, and doctrine have lagged far behind modern standards for decades. State-supervised drone trials and public directives to mass-produce attack drones signal that the regime is actively translating these lessons into tangible modernization efforts.

A recent 19-minute propaganda video from Pyongyang hints at the possible direction the military might be heading. While filled with typical propagandist tropes, the combat and training footage reveals some interesting details. It shows multi-layered drone deployments at both tactical and operational levels, mobile ATGMs adapted to light vehicles, and, most notably, expanded ISR and communications capabilities. These moments, captured in the video, form the core of Frontelligence Insight’s analysis breakdown today.

Table of Contents

I. Drone Warfare

II. North Korea’s Anti-Tank Capabilities

III. Battlefield Communications and C2

IV. Infantry Fire Support

V. Looking Past the Propaganda

VI. Summary

This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

I. Drone Warfare

By 2025, drones had become the defining weapon of the Russo-Ukrainian war, responsible for more than three-quarters of battlefield casualties. When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” For Pyongyang’s troops, this was uncharted territory: a type of warfare unlike anything they had faced before, and one unfolding on a scale unprecedented in modern combat.

Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments. First, North Korean units had to master countermeasures against drones. Second, they needed to learn how to employ drones offensively and defensively - striking equipment and personnel. Finally, they needed to learn how to conduct drone-based surveillance: gathering intelligence from constant aerial observation, processing that data, and integrating it into command-and-control systems

Infantry drill to counter drones

Less than three minutes into the propaganda video, North Korean soldiers are shown practicing anti-drone drills - firing at targets in the sky and countering one drone with another. This is not especially revealing; captured handwritten notes from the battlefield had already confirmed that Pyongyang’s infantry was being trained to shoot down drones.

What stands out, however, is what comes next. The footage eventually shifts to offensive drone operations, with FPV drones striking Ukrainian vehicles and buildings in Kursk Oblast.

One particular scene is especially telling: an FPV pilot wearing goggles is supported by a second operator monitoring the video feed on a nearby device. The wiring setup suggests that a reconnaissance team equipped with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building, feeding real-time surveillance to a local command post.

This detail is significant. It offers concrete evidence that North Korean forces are not only experimenting with drones but integrated tactical UAVs into their combat operations in Kursk. They appear to have trained specialists, and have an understanding of how to link surveillance assets with UAV strike platforms, as well as how to provide ISR support to command.

II. North Korea’s Anti-Tank Capabilities

The propaganda video also offered a rare look at North Korea’s little-known anti-tank system, which could be the Bulsae-4. However, we do not have high confidence in this identification. We also see slightly older Bulsae-2 (or possibly Bulsae-3) variant. Of particular interest was the adaptation of the Bulsae-4(?) launch platform for use on light SUVs.

Unidentified North Korean missile (possibly Bulsae type)

Traditionally, these missiles are fired from the M-2010 armored personnel carrier, North Korea’s local version of the Soviet BTR-80A. In the footage, however, the system has been mounted on a pickup truck. This adaptation suggests that Pyongyang could deploy a larger number of mobile ATGM units at lower cost, bypassing reliance on fewer, more resource-intensive armored vehicles.

The missile itself is designed for precision strikes, featuring large stabilizers and ability to use top-attack trajectory that targets the most vulnerable areas of armored vehicles. An optical seeker allows an operator to guide the missile in real time.

Bulsae-2 (Possibly 3)

The video also featured a demonstration of the better-known Bulsae-2 (or possibly Bulsae-3), North Korea’s adaptation of the Soviet 9K111 ATGM. In the footage, the missile is fired at a small building, likely part of a controlled training exercise or staged propaganda display. Unlike the newer Bulsae-4, which has a reach of roughly 10 to 25 kilometers, the Bulsae-2’s effective range is far more limited, around 2.5 kilometers.

III. Battlefield Communications and C2

Drones can provide powerful ISR capabilities, but their effectiveness depends on established communication between the command post and ground units that can act on real-time intelligence. In the propaganda video, North Korean forces are seen using the Russian-made Azart tactical radio - a sixth-generation handheld system featuring digital modes, frequency hopping, and GPS/GLONASS synchronization.

Photo on the left: sample of the R-187 Azart by Vitaly Kuzmin. Photo on the right: a North Korean soldier with an Azart.

This does not imply that North Korea is unfamiliar with modern communication devices, as many are produced by North Korean company Glocom or Chinese manufacturers, but it does suggest that Pyongyang might have a better idea of practical role played by communications in modern warfare, as well as the battlefield impact of electronic warfare on communications.

Screenshot from the video showing a command post, with screens visible in the top-right section.

The footage also shows command posts employing mapping software alongside interfaces for live drone streaming, creating a makeshift but functional battlefield awareness system.

For analysts and specialists monitoring North Korea, our team recommends keeping an eye on the country’s communications and battlefield awareness systems, as these areas are likely to undergo changes.

IV. Infantry Fire Support

On the conventional battlefield, North Korean units deployed in Kursk appeared largely familiar with standard infantry tactics, following a “by-the-book” approach.

While the footage offers limited insight into infantry units tactics, other combat recordings suggest that North Korean forces have gradually shifted away from the traditional Soviet-style “infantry company in assault” model, instead organizing into smaller tactical teams - a method widely adopted by Russian units in the war.

The propaganda video offered a glimpse of North Korea’s fire support capabilities, showing assets such as Type-75 107mm multiple rocket launchers and light mortars deployed to back infantry operations.

The Type-75 is a North Korean copy of China’s Type-63 multiple rocket launcher and can fire both Korean and Chinese-produced ammunition. It features 12 tubes, capable of launching a salvo up to 8.5 kilometers, though its effective range is considerably shorter. The system’s main advantages are its light weight and ease of deployment, allowing flexible positioning. Its drawbacks, however, are significant: the Type-75 is relatively inaccurate and outdated by modern standards, which keeps it a somewhat exotic weapon on today’s battlefield.

Interestingly, North Korean forces were not the only users of these weapons. Light 60mm mortars and Type-75 rocket launchers of North Korean origin have appeared in Russian units as well. Facing increasing equipment shortages due to attrition, Russian forces have been relying on these systems, which Ukrainian troops have regularly documented since 2024.

V. Looking Past the Propaganda

While this report focuses on the specific propaganda video, it is worth noting several known cases that demonstrate Russia’s impact on North Korean military. The partnership seems to be boosting Pyongyang’s capabilities, with potential consequences not just for the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula, but also more broadly. As a frequent supplier of weapons to sanctioned states and non-state actors, including groups such as Hamas, North Korea’s improvements could have implications well beyond the region.

In 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un personally attended a test of new drones, declaring that the country had the “full possibility and potentiality to produce and introduce various types of drones.”

Among presented systems, the first was a loitering munition with X-shaped wings. Footage suggests the system is operator-controlled via an optical channel with radio signal transmission, and launched from tubes in a manner reminiscent of U.S. Switchblade drones.

Photo: Korean Central News Agency

The second drone had a delta-shaped airframe that visually resembled Israeli Harop . Like the Harop, it is launched with a rocket booster before switching to a propeller engine for sustained flight.

Although it’s unclear whether North Korea’s new drone designs stem primarily from indigenous reverse engineering or direct assistance from Russia, we know that Russia is directly aiding with multiple drone programs. In February 2025, Japan’s public broadcaster NHK reported that Moscow and Pyongyang had struck an agreement under which Russia would provide technical assistance for the development and mass production of multiple drone types. By June, Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov publicly stated that Russia was helping North Korea manufacture the Garpiya and Geran: long-range kamikaze drones modeled after Iran’s Shahed-136. That same year, Pyongyang also dispatched specialists to Moscow’s Technopark for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

According to an MSMT report, Russia’s support for North Korea has extended well beyond drones. Moscow has reportedly transferred at least one Pantsir air-defense system to the DPRK, while also providing data feedback from North Korean ballistic missile launches - assistance that appears to have improved Pyongyang’s missile accuracy and overall performance. The same report notes that Russia has delivered advanced electronic warfare equipment, including jamming systems, along with operational expertise on how to employ them effectively.

VI. Summary

What began as limited exposure to Russia’s war in Ukraine has grown into a conduit for technology transfer, operational experience, and doctrinal adaptation. The evidence now ranges from loitering munitions and mobile ATGMs to air-defense systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and ballistic missile technologies. For the Korean Peninsula, this trajectory points to the emergence of a more capable, modernized North Korean force, one no longer confined to the outdated playbooks of the mid-20th century. Globally, the risk extends further: Pyongyang has long been a supplier to sanctioned states and non-state actors, and the spread of these tools could amplify instability well beyond Northeast Asia. While it remains uncertain how far North Korea can scale and replicate these lessons across its armed forces, given its severe financial constraints, it is clear that this experience will not be buried.

Links and Sources

1. Frontelligence Insight [@frontel_asia]. (2025, August 25). Video footage from the Korean Central Television. https://x.com/frontel_asia/status/1959896855279759448

2. Min Seok, K. (2017, March 2). What the Glocom scandal tells us about the N. Korean military’s new capabilities. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2017/03/what-the-glocom-scandal-tells-us-about-the-n-korean-militarys-new-capabilities/

3. Schroeder, M. (2023). North Korean small arms and light weapons: Recognition guide. Small Arms Survey. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/North-Korean-Small-Arms-and-Light-Weapons_Recognition-Guide_EN.pdf

4. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. (1997, May). North Korea country handbook (MCIA-2630-NK-016-97). United States Department of Defense. https://nuke.fas.org/guide/dprk/nkor.pdf

5. Moss, M. (2025, July 13). Russia deploys Type 75s in Ukraine. The Armourer's Bench. https://armourersbench.com/2025/07/13/russia-deploys-type-75s-in-ukraine/

6. Militarnyi. (2025, June 5). Russian military starts arming with 60mm mortars from North Korea. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russian-military-starts-arming-with-60mm-mortars-from-north-korea/

7. mag_vodogray. (2025). Telegram. https://t.me/mag_vodogray/12946

8. Park, B. (2024, November 15). N. Korea's Kim orders mass production of suicide attack drones: KCNA. Yonhap News Agency. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241115001052315

9. Kang, T. (2025, February 10). North Korea likely to produce drones with Russian support this year. Radio Free Asia. https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/02/10/north-korea-russia-drone-support

10. Altman, H. (2025, June 9). Russia giving North Korea Shahed-136 attack drone production capability: Budanov. The War Zone. https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-giving-shahed-136-attack-drone-production-capabilities-to-north-korea-budanov

11. Sokolin, A. (2025, February 13). North Korean aviation officials tour leading Russian drone training center. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2025/02/north-korean-aviation-officials-tour-leading-russian-drone-training-center/

12. Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT). (2025). https://msmt.info/Publications/detail/MSMT Report/4195

substack.com · Frontelligence Insight

6. Trump Should Stay Out of South Korean Politics

​Excerpts:

Indeed, Lee could not maintain his own credibility if he yielded to foreign pressure over the judgment on someone who planned to jail Lee and many of those serving in his administration. Policing South Korean politics should be up to the South Koreans, not Washington.

President Trump was right to drop the issue. Perhaps he is beginning to recognize the benefits, and limits, of diplomacy. Arrogance by a nation that purports to lead the free world is both unbecoming and dangerous. “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” intoned the historian Lord Acton, and that aphorism applies to the United States. The president was elected to govern America, not anointed to run the affairs of other nations—including those of a proud, nationalist people like the South Koreans.

Trump Should Stay Out of South Korean Politics

The White House meeting with President Lee Jae Myung on Monday went better than many feared.

The American Conservative · Doug Bandow · August 28, 2025

President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung held their long-anticipated summit on Monday. The meeting was overdue but had to wait for the Republic of Korea to restore stable governance by electing a replacement for the ousted Yoon Suk-yeol.

By all accounts, the session went well. Lee said that the two leaders “had very good conversations” and the experience “was beyond my expectations.” Acting as Flatterer-in-Chief, the South Korean president spread praise of Trump thick and wide.

However, Jeongmin Kim of NKNews reports the summit “nearly veered off course before it began, exposing just how vulnerable the U.S.-ROK alliance is to Trump’s impulsive messaging and the disinformation networks surrounding him.” Indeed, Lee later said he had feared “a Zelensky moment.” Three hours before the two presidents were scheduled to meet, Trump spluttered on Truth Social: “WHAT IS GOING ON IN SOUTH KOREA? Seems like a Purge or Revolution. We can’t have that and do business there.” He then told reporters that he “heard that there were raids on churches over the last few days, very vicious raids on churches by the new government in South Korea.”

Lee, along with members of Washington’s “blobby” Korea policy community, held their collective breath. There was much for the two presidents to talk about, starting with the broad if disputed trade agreement reached in response to Trump’s protectionist assault. Alliance management, too, was on the agenda. South Korean National Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back has been pushing for a “future-oriented comprehensive strategic alliance.” Also of pressing concern was policy toward North Korea, a special priority in Seoul, with Unification Minister Chung Dong-young proposing to scale back joint military exercises. That is also a priority, albeit a less pressing one, in Washington, with Trump seeking a reprise of his first-term summitry.

Luckily, when Trump and Lee met, the former dismissed his own prior outburst, explaining that he was “sure it’s a misunderstanding.” Trump added: “I feel very warmly toward South Korea.” There was speculation that Trump had been referring to raids on the Unification Church in connection with a corruption investigation of former first lady Kim Keon-hee.

Perhaps even more important have been complaints in MAGA circles about the current government’s prosecution of the ousted president Yoon for last December’s autogolpe. Last month, Fred Fleitz, vice chairman of the American First Policy Institute and former National Security Council staffer in the first Trump administration, posted on X: “The perception that former President Yoon is being persecuted or unfairly prosecuted will be received very badly by the Trump administration.” He reportedly told Lee’s national security adviser, Wi Sung-lac, that Yoon should not be investigated or prosecuted “unfairly.” Fleitz explained to the Chosun Ilbo that “the perception that former President Yoon is being unfairly treated, persecuted, or given an excessive sentence would be viewed very negatively in the U.S.” He added, “Although the situations differ, Trump also faced political persecution after leaving office. Many in Trump’s circle are closely watching South Korea’s political situation, especially the recent presidential election and its aftermath.”

When speaking to visiting parliamentarians, Fleitz apparently voiced concerns about judicial integrity. Na Kyung-won, a member of Yoon’s People Power Party, commented: “The fact that they addressed the fairness of legal proceedings involving the former president from a human rights perspective struck me as a significant message to the ruling party and administration.” Of course, Trump’s first term was notable for its lack of “a human rights perspective” and of concerns over “the fairness of legal proceedings.” After Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi murdered and dismembered, Trump infamously gloated that “I saved his ass” and “was able to get Congress to leave him alone.” If the liberal Lee was being prosecuted by the conservative Yoon administration, it is unlikely that Fleitz or anyone else associated with Trump would object.

Fleitz said he was speaking for himself, but he is part of a group of American conservatives, including China doomsayer Gordon Chang and Liberty University Professor Morse Tan, who have been promoting dubious claims that Beijing rigged South Korea’s National Assembly elections last year, one of Yoon’s justifications for seizing power, and also manipulated this year’s presidential poll. Indeed, Tan has advanced these views in South Korea as well. The reporter Jeongmin Kim said, “The resulting feedback loop between conservative U.S. and ROK political media raises questions about the extent to which domestic disinformation can distort alliance management.” Critical sentiments have evidently infiltrated the White House, which indirectly included a seeming caveat when congratulating Lee on his victory in June: “The U.S.-ROK Alliance remains ironclad. While South Korea had a free and fair election, the United States remains concerned and opposed to Chinese interference and influence in democracies around the world.”

Added to the dubious claim of Chinese interference is Trump’s identification with foreign coup plotters on the political right. For instance, he imposed a 50 percent tariff on Brazil for prosecuting former president Jair Bolsonaro for allegedly attempting to seize power there. “This happened to me, times 10,” Trump declared, adding that he “will be closely monitoring the witch hunt of Jair Bolsonaro, his family, and thousands of his supporters. Leave Bolsonaro alone!” There is, however, no doubt that Bolsonaro’s followers sought to overturn the election, while his involvement in the resulting “criminal organization” is contested. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, understandably rejected Trump’s demand.

It would be even more disturbing for Trump to endorse Yoon. Despite desperate attempts to minimize the disgraced former president’s culpability, he plotted with friendly generals and political cronies to dismantle South Korean democracy and return to military rule, which was more brutal than most Americans realize. General Park Chung-hee seized control in 1961. Although he modernized and liberalized the economy, sparking the ROK’s dramatic economic take-off, he established a savage dictatorship. His pretense of democracy fooled no one. The reference website Facts and Details documents:

Park cracked down on intellectuals, students, religious leaders, workers and justified his actions by accusing them of collaborating with Communists. Dissidents were followed and had their tax records scrutinized. Church meetings were monitored by men who “never sing hymns, refuse the collection plate and frequently take pictures of worshipers.” Teachers were arrested for failing to teach their students that Park’s regime was the leader of the world’s greatest liberal democracy. Park ran South Korea with an iron fist. He ruthlessly cracked down on unions and the press, routinely imprisoned and purged anyone who spoke up against him, and used the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to torture and silence and opponents. At one time it was estimated that there were 30,000 KCIA agents.

Park was assassinated in 1979. Soon taking power through another coup was the equally vicious Chun Doo-hwan. Amid growing public protests he stepped down in 1987. Choi Jin, director of the Institute for Presidential Leadership in Seoul said after Chun’s death: “His positive achievements are far outweighed by his negative legacies—the illegitimate way he came to power and the dictatorial streak that ran through his term.” The low point of his rule was the violent suppression of demonstrations in the city of Gwangju, into which he “sent special forces, including tanks and helicopter gunships … . Soldiers beat civilians in the streets, and tanks and helicopters fired indiscriminately.” Hundreds were killed. Years later he was convicted of sedition and mutiny and sentenced to death, though that penalty was eventually commuted.

Unexpectedly, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Oh-rang, who died resisting Chun’s coup, has returned to public view. Two weeks ago a Seoul court ruled that the state “is responsible for paying compensation for the mental suffering suffered by the bereaved family due to the manipulation of the substantive truth about the circumstances of Lieutenant Colonel Kim’s death by the rebels and related public officials after Lieutenant Colonel Kim’s death.” A similar tragedy was avoided in December only because soldiers were unwilling to wage war on their countrymen.

Yoon bears heavy responsibility. He called out the troops and planned to disperse the national legislature, seize critical media, arrest leading political figures (including Lee, then leader of the Democratic Party, and Han Dong-hoon, head of Yoon’s own PPP), torture National Election Commission members, and even execute other figures. There also are credible allegations that Yoon loosed drones upon the North in hopes of provoking a military response, to justify his declaration of martial law.

For all this he offered no serious defense: The president acted, the troops moved, and the participants confessed. When facing impeachment and under indictment, he hid in the presidential residence behind friendly crowds. So egregious was his conduct that members of his own party provided the extra votes required to impeach him. Since his ouster by the Constitutional Court, dominated by conservative appointees, he has increasingly engaged in self-parody. Earlier this month, reported CNN, Yoon “again refused to attend questioning by investigators Friday, using a new method to resist: He took off his prison uniform and lay down on the floor at his detention room.”

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Moreover, the now-opposition PPP demonstrates shocking indifference to Yoon’s assault on a democracy barely four decades removed from military rule. The party recently chose as chairman lawmaker Jang Dong-hyuk, who called the attempted coup “God’s will” and threatened to expel those who backed impeachment. For other South Koreans, however, the fairness demanded by Fleitz requires punishment of Yoon. Park Sang-hyuk, a DP spokesman, observed: “in accordance with a just legal order, if convicted of insurrection, he will face either the death penalty or life imprisonment and spend the rest of his life behind bars.”

Indeed, Lee could not maintain his own credibility if he yielded to foreign pressure over the judgment on someone who planned to jail Lee and many of those serving in his administration. Policing South Korean politics should be up to the South Koreans, not Washington.

President Trump was right to drop the issue. Perhaps he is beginning to recognize the benefits, and limits, of diplomacy. Arrogance by a nation that purports to lead the free world is both unbecoming and dangerous. “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” intoned the historian Lord Acton, and that aphorism applies to the United States. The president was elected to govern America, not anointed to run the affairs of other nations—including those of a proud, nationalist people like the South Koreans.

The American Conservative · Doug Bandow · August 28, 2025

7. With Russia’s help, North Korea expands its nuclear weapons capability

​I think the jury is still out on all this though we can only speculate without access to intelligence. But I do not think we should doubt that Kim has been able to make improvements and advancements. As noted he certainly intended to and told us so. He may be waiting for just the right time to show us those "improvements." Or he may want to keep us guessing in the hopes that we will seek arms control negotiations which would allow him to keep "some" nuclear weapons. This of course would be a victory for his political warfare strategy.

Excerpts:

At the start of 2021, Kim announced a five-year plan to build more nuclear-capable weapons, a wish list that seemed far-fetched at the time. The leader of one of the world’s poorest countries aspired for some capabilities only a few major military powers had mastered.Following

With his January deadline fast approaching, analysts say, Kim has made surprising progress: He now has a credibly upgraded arsenal, even if many of the technologies are not quite ready to use.

Kim, it turns out, had impeccable timing. One year after announcing his goals, Russia launched a war against Ukraine — paving the way for a new era of friendship between Pyongyang and Moscow.

“I think most of the people who listened to his presentation [in 2021] said, ‘Maybe one or two of those things, but a whole bunch of them? Not likely,’” said Bruce Bennett, a North Korea military expert at Rand, a national security think tank. “Kim came a lot further than many people expected. I think the Russian help has been important.”

Wednesday’s parade will be Kim’s third time meeting with Putin since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as the two leaders, both under heavy Western sanctions, unite in solidarity.

With Russia’s help, North Korea expands its nuclear weapons capability

Kim Jong Un will attend a huge military parade in China, where he can admire the weapons his regime aspires to make. With Putin’s help, he’s making progress.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/28/north-korea-russia-nuclear-missile-advances/

August 28, 2025 at 4:15 a.m. EDTYesterday at 4:15 a.m. EDT

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last year. (Gavriil Grigorov/Pool/AFP/Getty Images)

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

SEOUL — Just three days after President Donald Trump sketched out an idea to meet with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un again, Kim responded by accepting a different kind of invitation — to Beijing, where he will join Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping in a show of defiance against the Western-led global order.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

Kim will be among the 26 heads of state attending China’s enormous Victory Day military parade next week to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Beijing announced Thursday. Xi will showcase his efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army to counter the United States — complete with hundreds of increasingly high-tech tanks, missiles and anti-drone systems.

Kim has not been to China since 2019, and the parade could serve as further inspiration for the North Korean leader, who is pursuing a military upgrade of his own — with a considerable amount of help from Putin.

At the start of 2021, Kim announced a five-year plan to build more nuclear-capable weapons, a wish list that seemed far-fetched at the time. The leader of one of the world’s poorest countries aspired for some capabilities only a few major military powers had mastered.

Following World news

Following

With his January deadline fast approaching, analysts say, Kim has made surprising progress: He now has a credibly upgraded arsenal, even if many of the technologies are not quite ready to use.

Kim, it turns out, had impeccable timing. One year after announcing his goals, Russia launched a war against Ukraine — paving the way for a new era of friendship between Pyongyang and Moscow.

“I think most of the people who listened to his presentation [in 2021] said, ‘Maybe one or two of those things, but a whole bunch of them? Not likely,’” said Bruce Bennett, a North Korea military expert at Rand, a national security think tank. “Kim came a lot further than many people expected. I think the Russian help has been important.”

Wednesday’s parade will be Kim’s third time meeting with Putin since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as the two leaders, both under heavy Western sanctions, unite in solidarity.

Kim, center, aboard the warship Choe Hyon in Nampo, North Korea, this month in a government-issued photo. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service/AP)

North Korea doesn’t have much the world wants, but it had plenty of the artillery that ammunition-hungry Russia needed and was willing to send thousands of troops into battle to help Putin’s war effort. Moscow is believed to be reciprocating with weapons technology and economic support.

Together, this means Kim doesn’t need the United States as it did in the decades it used its nuclear ambitions as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Washington.

That will make it much more difficult for Trump to reprise the relationship he tried to forge with Kim in his first term in pursuit of a denuclearization deal — despite the U.S. president’s praise for the North Korean leader this week.

Instead, a new concern is arising: As Kim grows increasingly confident in his growing nuclear arsenal and support from Putin, he may be willing to take more risks and provocations to get what he wants politically, particularly toward South Korea.

“In the future, if the North Koreans detect the right timing, they can really cause a huge amount of instability in the region,” said Go Myong-hyun, senior research fellow at Seoul’s Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank affiliated with South Korea’s spy agency.

Portraits of Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a welcome ceremony in Pyongyang last year in a photo provided by the Russian state-owned agency Sputnik. (Gavrill Grigorov/Pool/AFP/Getty Images)

With Russia by its side, North Korea can now make rapid progress in areas that previously seemed out of reach. This makes North Korea — and its threats to the United States and its allies — more formidable than ever, Go said.

There’s still a lot that remains unknown about the North’s capabilities. Pyongyang has not tested a nuclear device since 2017 and, Vann H. Van Diepen, a former senior nonproliferation official at the State Department, said the results of weapons tests since 2021 have been a mixed bag or impossible to verify.

But experts warn that each failed launch gives Pyongyang a chance to learn from its mistakes and fix them. “They clearly want to show that they’ve got a diversified, and therefore survivable, force,” Van Diepen said, referring to North Korea’s ability to not only survive an attack but also to seriously retaliate with nuclear weapons.

What is even more certain, experts say, is Moscow’s assistance.

Since 2023, when Kim and Putin met at a cosmodrome in Russia’s Far East in a public display of transactional affection, North Korea already appears to have received air defense systems and antiaircraft missiles from Russia — much-needed upgrades to North Korea’s antiquated air force.

“What we need to be extremely wary of is whether North Korea’s technology advances explosively with Russia’s help,” said Yang Uk, a North Korean military expert at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul. “That would lead to a proliferation of technology that we can’t roll back.”

Here are some of the developments North Korea has made since Kim laid out his ambitious plans in 2021.

A Yonhap News TV broadcast in Seoul shows Kim inspecting the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the production base of weapons-grade nuclear materials. (Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/Sipa USA/AP)

A range of nuclear warheads

For more than a decade, North Korea has been working to make nuclear warheads small enough to fit on top of a missile.

In March 2023, Pyongyang unveiled the Hwasan-31, a tactical nuclear warhead. It was only 18 inches in diameter, suggesting the North was making progress on miniaturization, according to the Open Nuclear Network, an NGO that analyzes nuclear risks.

It hasn’t tested this small warhead by detonating it. Nor has it proved that it has mastered the difficult reentry technology that would enable the warhead-tipped missile to withstand the extreme heat and vibrations involved with coming back into the Earth’s atmosphere and delivering the warhead to a target.

Kim also wants to complete the development of a “superlarge” hydrogen bomb, which is far more destructive than atomic bombs, but the status of this project is unknown.

His regime last carried out a nuclear test in 2017, detonating what it said was a hydrogen bomb. The explosion was recorded as a 6.3-magnitude earthquake, lending credibility to North Korea’s claims.

But Pyongyang has not pressed ahead with nuclear tests, perhaps because of warnings from China, the North’s main trading partner, experts say.

The regime does, however, appear to have continued producing weapons-grade uranium. North Korea last year released photos of Kim visiting a uranium-enrichment facility, underscoring his growing nuclear ambitions.

Multiple warheads on one missile

One area where North Korea has made clear and demonstrable progress is in missiles. Over the past four years, it has fired intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the mainland U.S., as well as “tactical” ones that fly shorter distances and could be used to strike nearby South Korea and Japan.

In 2023, it successfully launched a military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after two failed tests — a capability it has long sought, and which Putin publicly said he’d help it develop.

OCT. 31, 2024

LOFTED TRAJECTORIES

4,350 miles

Flew for 86 minutes

To avoid other countries, North Korea launches test missiles at a much higher-than-normal trajectory — nearly straight up — so missiles come down in the Sea of Japan (East Sea).

MARCH 24, 2022

3,850 miles

JULY 12, 2023

3,728 miles

MARCH 15, 2023

3,728 miles

NOV. 29, 2017

2,796 miles

JULY 28, 2017

2,300 miles

JULY 4, 2017

1,740 miles

MAY 14, 2017

1,300 miles

International Space

Station orbit:

250 miles

SOUTH KOREA

RUSSIA

CHINA

TAIWAN

JAPAN

Pacific

Ocean

—PHILIPPINES

Trajectories shown

are approximate.

—Guam (U.S.)

Sources: CNS North Korea Missile Testing Database and Japan Ministry of Defense

THE WASHINGTON POST

Now, Kim wants to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), which would allow a single missile to direct several nuclear warheads to different targets.

This is challenging technology, but it could overwhelm the missile defense systems of the United States and its allies because they have to deal with missiles being launched at multiple locations at the same time, experts say.

A test in June last year showed North Korea is serious about developing multiple-warhead missiles: The regime fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile with what it claimed were three independently targeted warheads and a decoy. The South Korean military found the booster most likely failed after launch, exploding midair and scattering into pieces, but Van Diepen wrote that Kim clearly thought he was making enough progress to warrant a flight test.

North Korea is likely to continue testing this technology, and help from Russia could significantly speed up its progress, experts say.

Yonhap News shows Kim inspecting a shipbuilding project in North Korea. (Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/Sipa USA/AP)

Nuclear-powered submarine

In March, Pyongyang revealed images of the hull of what it claimed was its first nuclear-powered submarine underway, one of Kim’s priorities under his five-year plan.

A nuclear-powered submarine, which can stay underwater far longer than a diesel-powered one, would be an impressive feat.

But such a submarine is expensive and requires highly sophisticated technology, including a nuclear reactor inside the vessel. North Korea is likely years away from being operational, experts say. In fact, only six countries have mastered it. One of them is Russia — and many experts said Moscow may be willing to lend a hand.

Lami Kim, an international security expert at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, said the Putin-Kim friendship could be a game changer: “Now, with Russia’s support, I think it is actually possible that North Korea will be able to build them.”

There’s precedent: In the 1980s, the Soviet Union helped India, which launched its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in 2009.

Hypersonic glide vehicle

North Korea has been developing hypersonic weapons, which travel at least five times the speed of sound and at low altitudes, and are difficult to track and intercept. They are also much easier to maneuver than traditional ballistic missiles.

This cutting-edge technology is being developed by major military powers — including China, Russia and the United States — and since 2021, North Korea has tested several of what it claimed were hypersonic missiles.

The next step is for North Korea to successfully launch a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which even the world’s best militaries are competing to master. They are highly maneuverable after they are released from their rocket boosters — and therefore harder to shoot down.

Kim appears to be making some headway. In January, North Korea tested the Hwasong-16B, a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile, which could reach Guam and the Philippines. Pyongyang said it successfully test-fired the missile, which flew more than 930 miles at 12 times the speed of sound. Seoul called the distance estimate a “deception,” though its former defense minister said the North is making progress and “will succeed one day” given how much it has prioritized the project.

Kim, center, and his daughter, right, attend the unveiling of a naval destroyer in North Korea in April. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service/AP)

Drones

Kim has already demonstrated a variety of reconnaissance drones under his plan, which allow North Korea to surveil and collect sensitive information on South Korean forces and facilities.

North Korea’s drone capabilities are developing rapidly, while Seoul’s drone strategy has been woefully lagging, said Lami Kim, the international security expert — leaving South Korea potentially vulnerable to a threat responsible for extensive carnage in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, North Korea has gained experience in confronting Ukrainian drones. It’s not only using drones to spy, but it is also producing ones that can strike, including by carrying GPS-guided bombs.

Russia and North Korea are even cooperating on the production of the Geran drone, a Russian version of the Iranian-made Shahed, according to the Ukrainian intelligence agency.

Russian instructors are working in North Korea and training North Korean drone pilots, according to a Telegram post in July by Andriy Kovalenko, head of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council’s Center for Countering Disinformation.

What readers are saying

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Comments 167

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

Michelle Ye Hee Lee is The Washington Post's Tokyo bureau chief, covering Japan and the Korean peninsula. follow on X@myhlee

8. North Korea shuns denuclearization talks following first Trump-Lee summit

​Actually, I think KJU is just setting the conditions for arms control negotiations in support of his political warfare strategy. He may think he has us (South Korea and the US) right where he wants us.

North Korea shuns denuclearization talks following first Trump-Lee summit

Stars and Stripes · David Choi · August 27, 2025

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un observes a weapons test in this image released by the Korean Central News Agency in August 2024. (KCNA)

North Korea’s official state media on Wednesday denounced as a “naïve dream” a pledge the South Korean president made on his first official visit to Washington, D.C. — to rid the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons.

The Korean Central News Agency published a scathing review of Lee Jae Myung’s remarks Monday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in which he said that President Donald Trump shares his goal of ridding the peninsula of nuclear weapons.

Lee’s first state visit to the White House earlier that day included a closed-door session with Trump.

KCNA described Lee’s goal as an “absurd hope” and likened it to “trying to catch a cloud floating in the sky.”

“We once again remind him of the fact that our position as a nuclear weapons state is an inevitable option that correctly reflects the hostile threat from outside,” the unsigned review states.

North Korea amended its constitution in 2023 to enshrine its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The communist regime has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006, most recently in 2017, and is believed to possess up to 50 nuclear weapons, according to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s report June 2024.

Pyongyang claims its nuclear weapons program deters hostile policies and military threats from South Korea and the United States.

“In order to change our nuclear policy permanently fixed in the supreme law … it is necessary to change the world and the political and military environment on the Korean Peninsula,” KCNA reported Wednesday.

KCNA’s report criticized Lee and South Korea’s alliance with the U.S. but did not address Lee and Trump’s meeting.

Immediately following his speech Monday, Lee told a discussion panel that his meeting with Trump went “beyond my exceptions.”

“We increased our understanding, and I received a lot of encouragement from President Trump,” Lee said. “So, our meeting surpassed the planned time.”

Prior to meeting with Lee, Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that he was in good standing with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and that he looked forward to meeting Kim again “in the appropriate future.”

Trump’s attempts to denuclearize North Korea fell apart in 2019 during his second summit meeting with Kim in Hanoi, Vietnam.

Trump said negotiations broke down over Kim’s request for a complete lifting of sanctions in exchange for North Korea dismantling a nuclear processing facility. KCNA disputed the account and reported it had only requested a partial sanctions relief for the facility closure.

David Choi

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Stars and Stripes · David Choi · August 27, 2025

9. Kim Jong Un watches special forces drills, calls for supplying new sniper rifles

​Everybody wants to do cool guy stuff, even and especially KJU.

But please do not imply that there is a cause and effect relationship between Ulchi Freedom Shield in the ROK and the north's training. 

("Every person who confuses correlation with causation ends up dying.")

 It conducts its annual summer training cycle but no one calls out the regime for doing so. The Propaganda and Agitation Department (and the international media) use the ROK/US combined readiness exercises that are focused on the defense eof the ROK to illustrate a hostile alliance policy when it is the regime , with its offensive campaign plan and nuclear weapons that demonstrate a real hostile policy toward the ROK, the US and the region. But no one really calls out KJU on this. They just want to balem the ROK/US alliance.

I wonder if the call for new sniper rifles is because KJU is following USSOCOM's news about fielding new weapons chambered in 6.55mm?

Kim Jong Un watches special forces drills, calls for supplying new sniper rifles

North Korean military exercises come amid annual joint US-ROK drills and deployment to Russia's war

https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/kim-jong-un-watches-special-forces-drills-calls-for-supplying-new-sniper-rifles/

Colin Zwirko August 28, 2025

Kim Jong Un oversaw special forces drills on Aug. 27 | Image: KCNA (Aug. 28, 2025)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw special forces drills on Wednesday and called for supplying the military with new sniper rifles, according to state media, just days after acknowledging deaths by soldiers from similar units fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Thursday that Kim inspected “sniper and special operations unit soldiers organized for special missions,” calling them “hunters who kill enemy soldiers with 100% accurate sniping skills on the battlefield.”

He said a “new-generation” sniper rifle is currently being supplied to special forces units, and demanded new “quality camouflage uniforms” fit for various environmental conditions be supplied to the units “starting this year.”

NK Pro previously reported in April that the “new” sniper rifle model appears to be a rebrand or close copy of a model made by Austrian gunmaker Steyr Arms.

North Korea deployed snipers to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine, though NK News analysis of new battlefield footage released by Pyongyang last week suggested they were using a version of the Russian Kalashnikov Chukavin and not the new model promoted Thursday.

Kim poses with snipers | Image: KCNA (Aug. 28, 2025)

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North Korean TV aired a photo last Friday of a DPRK soldier using what appears to be a Russian Kalashnikov Chukavin model (compared on left) while fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine | Images: KCTV (Aug. 22, 2025), Kalashnikov, edited by NK News

Photos included with the report show Kim posing with snipers after inspecting target practice. Soldiers also conducted a martial arts and strength training performance for Kim, as has become traditional at such drills.

The DPRK leader also said he and the Central Military Commission (CMC) will “review the issue of organizing a central sniper training center directly under the Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Staff in the future.”

The inspection came as North Korea has condemned annual joint U.S.-ROK Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) military exercises numerous times this month, though Thursday’s report did not mention them.

NK News analysis of images included with the report suggest the drills took place at a base belonging to KPA Unit 525 south of Pyongyang — a unit that previously conducted mock infiltrations of the South Korean presidential Blue House. 

Edited by Kristen Talman. Anton Sokolin contributed reporting to this article.

Last updated on Aug. 28 at 12:10 p.m.. KST with details about North Korean snipers in Russia

10. Hanwha to invest $5 billion to improve infrastructure at Philadelphia shipyard

​MASGA.

Hanwha to invest $5 billion to improve infrastructure at Philadelphia shipyard - Breaking Defense

The investment will be used for the installation of two additional docks and three quays to increase capacity at Hanwha Philly, according to the announcement.

breakingdefense.com · Mike Yeo · August 27, 2025

MELBOURNE — South Korea’s Hanwha Group announced a $5 billion plan to build additional infrastructure at Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia as part of South Korea’s commitment to boost US shipbuilding capability.

The investment will be used for the installation of two additional docks and three quays to increase capacity at Hanwha Philly, according to the announcement. The company is also reviewing the build-out of a new block assembly facility at the shipyard, which it hopes will annual production volume tenfold, from less than two vessels to up to 20.

Hanwha announced the infrastructure plan Tuesday following a naming ceremony for the US Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) third National Security Multi-mission Vessel (NSMV) at Hanwha Philly Shipyard.

The ceremony for the ship, which would be used by MARAD as a training vessel, was attended by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro, Sen. Todd Young and other senior officials.

Speaking at the ceremony, Hanwha Vice Chairman Dong Kwan Kim emphasized the importance of joint partnership in bolstering the shipbuilding industry.

“Today’s christening ceremony is the embodiment of our two nations working side by side to reindustrialize for the sake of shared security and prosperity,” said Kim, according to the announcement. “We are creating good manufacturing jobs, building the world’s most advanced ships, and fostering a new skilled workforce right here in America.”

This investment in Hanwha Philly Shipyard is part of a $150 billion pledge to American shipbuilding by South Korea signed by the two countries in a deal in July.

The shipyard is expected to play a key role in future collaboration between the US and South Korea and will produce Liquefied Natural Gas carriers, naval modules and blocks, and in the long-term, naval vessels.

It will also build 10 medium-range oil and chemical tankers for the US subsidiary of Hanwha’s shipping arm, Hanwha Shipping. The first tanker is expected to be delivered in 2029 and will be designed to support the Jones Act — which requires goods transported by water between two US ports to be carried on vessels that are built, flagged, crewed and owned in the US — as well as fleet renewal and other strategic initiatives.

Hanwha acquired the shipyard for $100 million in 2024, and said in today’s announcement that it plans to transform it into a digitally-enabled, high-efficiency shipyard with world-class automation and smart shipyard technology through its investments.

Hanwha shipyards in South Korea have also maintained and overhauled US naval vessels. Hanwha Ocean previously completed the overhaul of the Military Sealift Command’s dry cargo ship USNS Wally Schirra in March. And it has won contracts for the overhaul of the oiler USNS Yukon and another dry cargo ship, the USNS Charles Drew.

breakingdefense.com · Mike Yeo · August 27, 2025

11. US-ROK conclude 11 days of military drills that drew North Korea’s scorn

​This is readiness training for the defense of the Republic of Korea and US national interests, the primary one being the prevention of war on the Korean peninsula which if it happens will have global catastrophic effects.

But we should never fear KJU's (or Kim Yo Jong's) rhetoric. He is actually acknowledging the effect of this training on him. While he is of course trying to gain propaganda benefit for use in his internal stability campaign to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north, he is reading the message loud and clear that the ROK/US alliance is the superior military force and even with help from Russia and a small number of the nKPA learning lessons from operations in Kursk (the ones who do not die fighting for Putin), the nKPA cannot stand up to the overwhelming combat power of the ROK/US alliance.

Our CFC/USFK and component PAOs are doing a good job of getting the message out here and informing and educating multiple target audiences here, in the north, at home, and around the world of the important work our combined military personnel are doing.

US-ROK conclude 11 days of military drills that drew North Korea’s scorn

Allies trained maritime infiltration, river crossings, countering WMDs and more during Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise

https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/us-rok-conclude-11-days-of-military-drills-that-drew-north-koreas-scorn/

Joon Ha Park August 28, 2025

U.S. and ROK forces armored vehicles drive across a rapidly constructed bridge during a joint river-crossing exercise for Ulchi Freedom Shield drills on Aug. 27, 2025. | Image: ROK army

The U.S. and South Korea concluded their annual large-scale summer exercise on Thursday, capping 11 days of drills that included training on maritime infiltration, river crossings and countering weapons of mass destruction to bolster readiness against North Korean threats.

Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) kicked off on Aug. 18 and featured drills across land, sea, air, space, cyber and intelligence domains, according to a U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) press release. 

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added in Thursday’s defense ministry briefing that the scenarios reflected “lessons learned from the changing character of modern warfare,” strengthening the allies’ ability to conduct joint operations while also improving the ROK government’s wartime preparedness.

One of the capstone drills was a river crossing in Gyeonggi Province from Aug. 25-27, involving about 300 troops from the ROK Army’s 7th Engineer Brigade and U.S. 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-U.S. Combined Division units, the ROK army said in a press release on Wednesday.

More than 130 South Korean vehicles and bridging systems and 20 U.S. Stryker armored vehicles worked to construct a man-made crossing for armored units.

U.S. and ROK special operations forces also staged a maritime infiltration exercise off Anmyeon Island, according to a separate ROK army Special Warfare Command (SWC) release. 

About 40 personnel from the ROK SWC’s Gwiseong unit and the U.S. 7th Air Force’s 604th Air Support Operations Squadron participated, supported by two U.S. F-16s and two UH-60 helicopters. The training was designed to “strengthen combined special operations capabilities through wartime mission rehearsal,” the SWC said.

ROK and U.S. special forces personnel conduct a maritime infiltration drill during the latter stages of the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise period | Image: ROK Special Warfare Command (Aug. 28, 2025)

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Thursday’s CFC press release also detailed broader allied training. 

The U.S. 8th Army conducted extensive ground maneuvers with the ROK army, while the U.S. 7th Air Force and ROK air force flew “thousands of sorties” integrating fifth-generation fighters for air superiority, close air support and interdiction.

U.S. Space Forces Korea also worked with the ROK air force’s space unit to validate space support, and the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet partnered with the ROK navy to expand maritime operations.

U.S. and South Korean marines operated as a Combined Marine Component Command to bolster amphibious readiness and command-and-control integration, while special operations units rehearsed how to counter weapons of mass destruction.

“As with all professional military training, this annual defensive exercise ensured the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains prepared to meet evolving security challenges,” the CFC press release said.

This year’s exercise was conducted on a similar scale to previous years, but the allies rescheduled about half of the 40 planned field training exercises (FTX) to next month. 

The South Korean military attributed the delay to “extreme heat,” though some speculated that North Korea’s strong objections to the drills may also have been a factor.

The allies omitted any direct mention of North Korea in their official statements or press releases, despite regularly reaffirming that Pyongyang remains the primary security threat to the Korean Peninsula.

Shin Seung-ki, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, told NK News the lack of explicit DPRK references reflects “caution about provoking North Korea,” noting Seoul’s recent calls for reconciliation and U.S. President Donald Trump’s push to renew contact with Pyongyang.

He added that shifts in the scale and public framing of joint drills are routine under different administrations and reflect policy direction, rather than any major departure. 

“This is nothing particularly unusual,” Shin said, emphasizing that the exercises are planned in advance to ensure the alliance can deter the DPRK in a crisis.

U.S. President Donald Trump welcomes South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to the White House on Aug. 25, 2025. | Image: ROK Presidential Office

NORTH KOREA REACTIONS

While the allies maintained their drills are defensive in nature, North Korea routinely criticizes joint exercises and again issued a series of strong denunciations of UFS. 

On Aug. 11, Defense Minister No Kwang Chol slammed the allies as “military warmongers” in response to the announced drill plans, warning that Pyongyang would take countermeasures if the annual exercises crossed “the boundary line.”

A day after the drills began, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that leader Kim Jong Un inspected the country’s largest new warship under development on the west coast and denounced the exercises as “the clearest expression of a will to provoke a war.” 

On Aug. 20, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, issued a statement warning that North Korea would take an “immediate” and “preemptive diplomatic response” to South Korea’s ongoing military cooperation with the U.S., without specifying any concrete measures.

North Korea escalated its military signaling further on Aug. 24 by test-firing two upgraded surface-to-air missiles, with Kim Jong Un observing the launch at an undisclosed location. 

The DPRK military’s First Vice-Chief of General Staff Kim Yong Bok also issued a statement on Tuesday condemning UFS and threatening to make the allies “pay a dear price” if the drills continue, singling out the deployment of U.S. F-35 fighter jets for the drills.

Edited by Bryan Betts

12. North Korean IT workers use AI to mask lack of skills, boost criminal schemes

​Just a thought: I wonder if counterintelligence and security personnel should be trained in detecting AI used to make infiltrators into systems and organizations?

It seems like one obvious technique to defend against this is to return to old school procedures and never hire anyone remotely without a face to face interview.

North Korean IT workers use AI to mask lack of skills, boost criminal schemes

Report finds AI tools like Claude allow DPRK to eliminate training ‘bottleneck’ and fast-track fundraising for regime

https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korean-it-workers-use-ai-to-mask-lack-of-skills-boost-criminal-schemes/

Shreyas Reddy August 28, 2025

North Korean students using computers at the Grand People's Study House in Pyongyang | Image: NK News (Oct. 2019)

North Korean IT workers and cybercriminals have turned to the artificial intelligence (AI) tool Claude to augment their illicit activities, according to a new report, opening up a “new paradigm” to fast-track less skilled operatives into sanctions evasion and espionage schemes.

In its Threat Intelligence Report published on Wednesday, the generative AI tool’s parent company Anthropic said it discovered North Korean operatives using Claude to “fraudulently secure and maintain remote employment positions” at various American Fortune 500 technology companies.

The U.S. firm explained that the IT workers used Anthropic’s models to fabricate “elaborate” false identities, complete technical and coding assessments as part of the application process and then perform technical tasks once hired.

The report noted that Pyongyang’s deployment of such workers overseas to earn foreign currency predates the rise of generative AI tools, but it explained these new technologies have effectively eliminated the “bottleneck” posed by the need for yearslong training at elite universities.

Anthropic found that programming and development tasks account for as much as 90% of these workers’ Claude usage, effectively creating “a new paradigm where technical competence is simulated rather than possessed.”

“Operators who cannot otherwise write basic code or communicate professionally in English are now able to pass technical interviews at reputable technology companies and then maintain their positions,” the report said.

According to Anthropic, North Korean IT workers’ AI-assisted operation to secure jobs is a multi-phase operation, starting with the crafting of false personas with convincing professional backgrounds and researching cultural references to appear authentic.

During the subsequent application and interview phase, the actors use AI to tailor resumes to specific jobs, draft cover letters, prepare for interviews and assist during coding assessments.

Once hired, they continue using AI to deliver actual work, communicate with team members and respond to code reviews, with Anthropic observing that approximately 80% of the remote workers’ Claude usage appears linked to active employment.

The AI firm’s screenshots of simulated Claude conversations modeled on the North Korean workers’ interactions showcased clear shortcomings in their skills and knowledge, with many queries featuring spelling and grammatical errors and lacking relevant technical knowledge.

Given these workers’ deficient skills,Anthropic concluded that AI has become the “primary enabler” of Pyongyang’s revenue generation by helping less skilled operatives successfully infiltrate Western technology companies.

Released the same day the U.S. imposed new sanctions targeting DPRK IT worker schemes, the report underscores the challenge posed by these individuals raising hundreds of millions of dollars for North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

To curb North Korean IT workers’ AI-enhanced activities, Anthropic banned their accounts and said it has since improved its tooling to better identify such illicit activities based on known indicators of compromise.

Anthropic also reported that it successfully prevented a separate North Korean malware distribution campaign, automatically detecting and banning accounts before they could be used for malicious purposes.

Linked to Pyongyang’s Contagious Interview campaign targeting developers through fake job offers and coding assessments, North Korean cybercriminals reportedly attempted to create accounts with the aim of upgrading their signature BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret and OtterCookie information-stealing malware.

The report suggested they may have also sought to use Claude to develop trojanized technical assessments, crafting phishing lures for LinkedIn and Github outreach, setting up fake interviews to deliver the malware and generating malicious programs for the JavaScript package manager npm.

Anthropic is the latest AI developer to report incidents involving Pyongyang’s cybercriminals.

OpenAI, the developer of numerous AI tools including ChatGPT, previously banned accounts linked to North Korean phishing schemes, while Google similarly observed DPRK operatives using its AI assistant Gemini to research targets and develop code.

However, OpenAI’s purge also demonstrated North Korean actors’ resilience, as they bounced back from a wave of deletions in early 2024 by establishing new accounts to continue modernizing their cyber espionage and remote work operations.

Edited by Bryan Betts

13. Are Japan, South Korea, and Poland on the Verge of Getting Nuclear Weapons?

​interesting speculation.

Excerpts:

These are the countries that should be monitored with the greatest scrutiny if one wants to identify the next power to elbow its way into the global nuclear weapons club. The nonproliferation system has had a good run since the signing of the NPT in 1968. Indeed, it has had a longer run than anyone had the right to expect. However, the world is changing rapidly, and we likely must deal with a new international system that has a larger number of nuclear players.

That development will test the arguments embraced by respected realist international relations scholars, especially the late Kenneth Waltz and Professor Christopher Layne, currently the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Waltz, Layne, and others have argued that nuclear proliferation might actually prove stabilizing rather than destabilizing by recreating the cold-war era’s global dynamic of mutual assured destruction in multiple regions.

Time will tell.

Are Japan, South Korea, and Poland on the Verge of Getting Nuclear Weapons?

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Ted Galen Carpenter · August 28, 2025

The Treaty

Published

8 hours ago

Fat Boy Nuclear Bomb At U.S. Air Force Museum. Photo Credit: Harry J. Kazianis/National Security Journal Original Photo.

In April and again last month, Kim Yo-Jong, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s sister and influential policy adviser, demanded that President Trump explicitly acknowledge and accept that her country possesses a nuclear arsenal. Her comment has increased speculation throughout the international community about which other nations might follow the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) into the once-exclusive club of nuclear weapons powers. It is an important question, and the probable consequences vary significantly from case to case.

The Nuclear Weapons Challenge

Some of the most likely candidates have been discussed for many years, but others are relatively recent entrants. The former category includes major powers such as Japan and Germany. Indeed, if the United States had not emphasized its emphatic commitment to extended deterrence to shield those countries, both Tokyo and Berlin might well have opted to follow London and Paris to build their own independent deterrents. A similar dynamic influenced the decisions of secondary, but quite technologically capable, U.S. allies such as South Korea and Taiwan to remain nonnuclear.

During the 1960s, it was widely assumed both among international affairs experts and general populations throughout the world that by the early twenty-first century as many as two dozen countries would possess nuclear arsenals. Washington’s passionate support for the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) helped slow the probable proliferation trends, especially among key U.S. allies. The incentives for all of those governments to continue relying on U.S. extended deterrence pledges, though, have gradually weakened for multiple reasons.

The emergence of additional nuclear-weapon powers, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, and most recently, North Korea, has created a less stable and unpredictable strategic environment.

The addition of the DPRK causes obvious worries for both Japan and South Korea, and it strengthens domestic sentiment in those countries for an independent nuclear deterrent. The long-standing animosity between India and Pakistan unsettles the entire surrounding region, as does the rivalry between India and China. Leaders in Japan and South Korea understandably wonder if Washington’s extended deterrence commitment can truly deter a volatile regime like that in Pyongyang—especially now that North Korean missiles can reach the U.S. homeland.

Why Do States Want Nukes Now? Ask America

Domestic political changes in the United States also foster doubts about the U.S. commitment to Washington’s allies in East Asia and Europe. Even during his first term as president, Donald Trump issued warnings that the U.S. defense commitment to allies was not unconditional.

His principal motive was to pressure those allies to assume more of the collective defense burden by increasing their own military spending. Abandoning the allies Trump viewed as a drastic alternative, not the preferable option, but his hectoring and criticisms created uneasiness.

Trump’s return to the White House following the 2024 presidential election squelched the brief sense of relief that officials and populations in allied countries had experienced after his defeat in 2020 and the elevation of Joe Biden with his utterly conventional views regarding the sanctity of Washington’s alliances. The confrontational rhetoric and harsh trade policies toward traditional U.S. allies and security dependents that Trump quickly adopted during the initial months of his second term have already revived uneasiness about the U.S. relationship among countries in both Europe and East Asia. That development is leading to a reassessment of nuclear weapons policy in Japan. Seoul, as well as Tokyo, still hopes to terminate Pyongyang’s nuclear buildup, but those hopes grow fainter and fainter even as the level of confidence in Washington’s security guarantees diminishes.

A more volatile security environment, combined with greater uncertainty about the reliability of Washington’s security commitments is sparking renewed interest in several countries about developing independent nuclear capabilities. It is a prominent topic of discussion again in both South Korea and Japan. New entrants are also making an appearance with respect to that issue. There appears to be significant and growing sentiment in Poland that the country must “have access to nuclear weapons” to adequately provide for its own defense against a looming Russia. It is not yet clear what the term “access to” means in operational terms.

Are Polish leaders talking about something akin to French President Emmanuel Macron’s comment earlier this year that he would consider extending the protection of his country’s nuclear deterrent to France’s nonnuclear NATO partners in Central and Eastern Europe? Do Polish leaders instead have in mind authorizing the United States (or Britain or France) to deploy nuclear weapons in Poland? Or does Warsaw want control over such weapons regardless of which nuclear NATO ally retains official ownership? At the moment, such details remain unclear. However, there is no longer any doubt that Poland wants a nuclear weapons capability in some form.

Another rising European power, Turkey, also is showing interest in developing that capacity, to the approval of public opinion. Such an attitude should create considerable uneasiness. Ankara is displaying aggressive ambitions on multiple fronts. It is working closely with the new Islamist government in Damascus to eradicate the last remaining Kurdish self-governing enclaves in northeast Syria along the Turkish-Syrian border. Ankara’s military assertiveness has spiked to the point of generating tense aerial confrontations with Israeli planes also operating in Syrian airspace.

Turkey’s ongoing effort to play an outsized diplomatic and economic role in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia also indicates surging great power ambitions. Although Ankara has yet to express explicit intentions to build a nuclear arsenal, it has indicated interest, and the country has the technological capabilities to do so. Crossing that line may be the final phase of Turkey fully joining the ranks of the world’s great powers.

What Happens Next?

These are the countries that should be monitored with the greatest scrutiny if one wants to identify the next power to elbow its way into the global nuclear weapons club. The nonproliferation system has had a good run since the signing of the NPT in 1968. Indeed, it has had a longer run than anyone had the right to expect. However, the world is changing rapidly, and we likely must deal with a new international system that has a larger number of nuclear players.

That development will test the arguments embraced by respected realist international relations scholars, especially the late Kenneth Waltz and Professor Christopher Layne, currently the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Waltz, Layne, and others have argued that nuclear proliferation might actually prove stabilizing rather than destabilizing by recreating the cold-war era’s global dynamic of mutual assured destruction in multiple regions.

Time will tell.

About the Author: Ted Galen Carpenter

Ted Galen Carpenter is a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and a contributing editor at The National Security Journal. He is the author of 13 books and more than 1,300 articles on national security, international affairs, and civil liberties. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).

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Written By Ted Galen Carpenter

Ted Galen Carpenter was a senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011.

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Ted Galen Carpenter · August 28, 2025

14. N. Korea's Kim set for debut on multilateral diplomatic stage in China; focus on possible 3-way summit with Putin, Xi

​No, not a threeway. (sorry I could not resist an attempt at humor).

(News Focus) N. Korea's Kim set for debut on multilateral diplomatic stage in China; focus on possible 3-way summit with Putin, Xi | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 28, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Aug. 28 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is set to make his multilateral diplomatic debut by attending an upcoming military parade in China next month, marking an unprecedented appearance by the head of the reclusive state.

Pyongyang and Beijing made simultaneous announcements that Kim will visit the Chinese capital for the Sept. 3 event marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, which China marks as its victory over Japan's aggression.

It will mark Kim's first attendance at a multilateral gathering, joined by leaders of countries with amicable relationships with China, including Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Kim's planned attendance at the forthcoming event is considered very rare and unprecedented, as North Korea has stood by its unique leadership system in which its leader must be the central figure on any occasion.

Kim Il-sung, the current leader's grandfather and North Korea's founder, took part in many multilateral meetings, but neither Kim Jong-un nor his father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, have ever traveled abroad for such events.

This file photo, released by the Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 15, 2025, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un making a speech during a celebration marking the 80th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan's colonial rule. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Kim's decision to attend the military parade comes at a time when the North has been closely aligning with Russia on the military and other fronts since its troop deployments in support of Moscow's war against Ukraine.

For Kim, attending the event gives him a chance to stand alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin on Tiananmen Square, projecting himself at home and abroad as the leader of a normal state on a par with other world powers.

"Kim can show off that there's a North Korea-China-Russia bloc established, that his regime is not a pariah in diplomacy," Park Won-gon, a professor at Ewha Womans University, said by phone.

"And China certainly sees eye to eye with the North on this point, especially when South Korea is stepping up to cement its trilateral relationship with the United States and Japan," Park said.

China has expressed displeasure over President Lee Jae Myung's remarks during his trip to Washington earlier this week suggesting South Korea should align more closely with the U.S. on both security and the economy, which was seen as signaling a shift away from considering Beijing as a key economic partner.

To Trump, who met Kim multiple times during his first term, the North Korean leader can send a message that he will not easily resume personal diplomacy with Washington, as Pyongyang has the backing of China and Russia, despite Trump's repeated boasts of having a good relationship with Kim.

"From China's perspective, Kim's attendance offers a chance to reaffirm its geopolitical influence on the Korean Peninsula, despite conciliatory overtures from Seoul and Washington," Park noted.

This composite photo, released by the Korean Central News Agency, Xinhua and Tass, shows (from L to R) Chinese President Xi Jinping, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Observers say Kim may also seek to use the event to mend strained ties with Beijing, as the North prepares to navigate its next steps after a possible end to the war in Ukraine.

The key question now will be whether the leaders of North Korea, China and Russia will hold a three-way summit during the anniversary celebrations. If held, the gathering would likely mark a symbolic post-Cold War moment, with the three neighbors closing ranks in response to the expanding cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.

Following the announcement of Kim's planned visit to China, the foreign ministry in Seoul said it expects relations between Pyongyang and Beijing will develop in the direction of "promoting peace, stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

The ministry reiterated that South Korea is open to resuming inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation.

It will mark Kim's first visit to China in six years, following his last trip in 2019, and the first attendance by a North Korean leader at the Chinese military parade in 66 years.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 28, 2025

​15. FM Cho notes 'close attention' to be paid to N.K. leader's planned China visit

FM Cho notes 'close attention' to be paid to N.K. leader's planned China visit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 28, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Aug. 28 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Thursday that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's planned attendance at the upcoming military parade in China warrants close attention, vowing continued efforts to bring Pyongyang back to dialogue.

Cho made the remark during an interview with Yonhap News TV, hours after the North announced that Kim will travel to Beijing to attend the Sept. 3 celebration marking the end of World War II, known as Victory Day in China.

Kim's planned attendance is significant as it will mark the first time the North Korean leader will join other world leaders on a multilateral stage, fueling speculation of a three-way summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"North Korea also has incentives, or reasons to come out to the international community, and especially since U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed his willingness to hold talks (with Kim), it appears likely that North Korea will eventually agree to dialogue with the United States," Cho said.

"In this sense, the announcement on Kim attending China's Victory Day should closely be watched," he said.

Cho said the government will closely work with relevant countries, including China, to bring Pyongyang back to the dialogue table, with the ultimate goal of denuclearizing the North.

"(Denuclearization) is not easy," he said. "But it's our crucial diplomatic objective to create a situation where North Korea would not need to keep its status quo of possessing nuclear (weapons)," Cho said.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun speaks during bilateral talks with his Indonesian counterpart at the foreign ministry in Seoul on Aug. 21, 2025. (Yonhap)

Asked about the progress in talks with Washington on the bilateral nuclear energy pact, Cho called it "very meaningful" that Seoul and Washington agreed at this week's summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump to explore ways to revise the pact.

"We feel the need to be able to reprocess (spent nuclear fuel) or enrich (uranium) so that we can produce fuel for nuclear power plants on our own," he said. "To achieve that, we need to revise the agreement or pursue other ways in coordination with the U.S., which makes this agreement to discuss in that direction particularly meaningful."

South Korea and the U.S. revised their 1974 nuclear energy pact, known as the "123 Agreement" in 2015 to accommodate Seoul's request for the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and enrich uranium for peaceful use.

The revised pact permits very limited spent fuel reprocessing and enrichment of uranium to below 20 percent with U.S. consent, effectively barring South Korea from producing its own nuclear fuel for civilian energy supply purposes.

U.S. concerns over nuclear proliferation have affected the terms of the agreement.

The 2015 revision opened the way for the allies to conduct joint research on the "pyroprocessing" technology for spent nuclear fuel for recycling, considered posing fewer proliferation risks, but questions have remained over its economic feasibility.

"We should approach this from an industrial and environmental point of view. The U.S. will never accept (it) if we keep talking about going nuclear on our own or that we should have potential nuclear capabilities through the revision," Cho said.

"We will explain this well (to the U.S.), and I believe discussions will move in that direction," he added.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 28, 2025

​16. U.S. can have USFK 'strategic flexibility' while ensuring extended deterrence for S. Korea: Sen. Kim

U.S. can have USFK 'strategic flexibility' while ensuring extended deterrence for S. Korea: Sen. Kim | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 29, 2025

By Song Sang-ho and Cho Joon-hyung

WASHINGTON, Aug. 28 (Yonhap) -- The United States can maintain "strategic flexibility" of its troops in South Korea while also ensuring nuclear deterrence to protect the Korean Peninsula, a U.S. senator said Thursday, noting that America's security posture should be "nimble" enough to respond to evolving security needs in the Indo-Pacific.

Sen. Andy Kim (D-NJ) made the remarks during a press conference amid concerns in Seoul that Washington's apparent move to expand the operational scope of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) under the concept of "strategic flexibility" could weaken USFK's longstanding focus on deterring North Korean threats.

"We can have strategic flexibility while also having extended deterrence," Kim said, referring to the U.S.' commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear arms, to defend its Asian ally.

"We can assure South Korea of our deterrence capabilities (to) be able to help protect the Korean Peninsula while also making sure we are having that strategic flexibility for addressing any contingencies, any issues that come up in the Indo-Pacific," he added.

Sen. Andy Kim (D-NJ) speaks during a meeting with Korean reporters at the Capitol in Washington on Aug. 28, 2025. (Yonhap)

Kim called the Indo-Pacific a "very dynamic and potentially dangerous" region, emphasizing the need for the U.S. to address evolving security needs in the region, in an apparent show of his support for the strategic flexibility concept.

The role and operational scope of USFK is part of ongoing efforts to "modernize" the Seoul-Washington alliance as U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is apparently seeking to ensure that USFK personnel and assets can be mobilized for operations outside the Korean Peninsula, including those related to contingencies involving China.

On the USFK troop number, Kim indicated his opposition to any unilateral drawdown.

"Personally, I don't think we should be changing the troop levels unless there's some other agreement that is made between United States and South Korea," he said.

He added, "What I constantly say is that I don't want to see South Korea surprised by any announcements (by the U.S.) When it comes to troop levels or security, they are a strategic ally. They deserve to be consulted and talked to."

Commenting on Monday's summit between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Trump, the senator said he was glad to see a "strong working relationship" between the two presidents, Trump's commitment to visiting South Korea during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit later this year, and the leaders' desire for trilateral cooperation with Japan.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 29, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com