Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Every tyrant fears a thinker more than an army."

– Voltaire

"Belief can be manipulated. Only knowledge is dangerous."

– Frank Herbert

"A dying culture invariably exhibits personal rudeness. Bad manners. Lack of consideration for others in minor matters. A loss of politeness, of gentle manners, is more significant than a riot."

– Robert Heinlein

1. Taiwan Gets Serious About Deterrence

2. Trump Leans on National Security to Justify Next Wave of Tariffs

3. Tulsi Gabbard Blindsided CIA Over Revoking Clearance of Undercover Officer

4. Judge blocks Kari Lake, tasked to dismantle VOA, from firing its director

5. Xi Prepares Meeting of Security Bloc to Rival US-Led World Order

6. The Answers are in the Mountains: Countering Chinese Aggression with Irregular Warfare

7. The Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff: Analyzing Hezbollah’s Organizational Degradation Under Multi-Domain Pressure (2023-2025)

8. Military Gaming to Stay Ahead, But Not the Kind You Think

9. From Shield to Spear: How Golden Dome Points the Way toward Breaking China’s Kill Web

10. Reconnaissance-Strike Battle in the Mojave Desert: How Centaur Squadron Prepares Army Units to Win the First Fight on Tomorrow’s Battlefield

11. FUNCTIONAL FITNESS: IMPROVING RETENTION AND FIGHTING “BRAIN DRAIN”

12. Pentagon terminates use of China-based engineers to support cloud systems

13. M1 Abrams Tanks Now Being Operated By A Second Ukrainian Unit

14. Russian, Chinese Submarines Sail Together in Sea of Japan

15. The Iran Nuclear Crisis Might Be Back On

16. The Path to a Good-Enough Iran Deal

17. The New Right is Wrong about Taiwan

18. Peace deal dead, new war drums beating for Ukraine

19. No, the conventional wisdom on China is not 'dangerously wrong'

1. Taiwan Gets Serious About Deterrence

It is imperative that Taiwan demonstrates it wants to defend Taiwan more than America (or more than the Elridge Colby faction).

Excerpt:

Taipei hopes to demonstrate to Washington that it’s a real security partner worthy of American support. The island has been too slow to add deterrence for an existential threat. And even Mr. Lai’s spending goal of 5% by 2030 might be insufficiently aggressive given Mr. Xi’s 2027 target for his forces to be ready.

Taiwan Gets Serious About Deterrence

Its defense budget might go even higher if the U.S. could ship the weapons.

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trump-tariffs-national-security-86cb5eea

By The Editorial Board

Aug. 28, 2025 5:50 pm ET

Taiwan’s President William Lai Ching-te Photo: ChiangYing-ying/Associated Press

As the world waits to see if President Trump can deliver abiding peace in Ukraine, a core lesson of that conflict is the importance of deterring another awful war a continent away. So note that Taiwan is now planning to spend more on its defense and reach 5% of GDP by 2030.

President Lai Ching-te has proposed a defense budget for next year that’s a little over 3.3% of the economy, up from roughly 2.5% in 2024. That’s close to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s new target of 3.5%. Mr. Lai said on social media that Taiwan “is serious in its commitment to peace through strength.” He’s reading the tides, across the strait toward the predator and across the Pacific toward the U.S.

Xi Jinping might be thinking better of an amphibious assault on the island after watching the underperformance of Vladimir Putin’s military in Ukraine. But Mr. Xi hasn’t backed off his goal of incorporating Taiwan under his rule, and the West remains unprepared for a crisis on an outlying island or a blockade.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies this summer released a war game with 26 iterations of a Taiwan blockade. “Almost all scenarios entail casualties,” it said. Taiwan ran out of natural gas in about 10 days. Some scenarios resulted in a shooting war and “the United States lost hundreds of aircraft and dozens of warships.”

Taipei hopes to demonstrate to Washington that it’s a real security partner worthy of American support. The island has been too slow to add deterrence for an existential threat. And even Mr. Lai’s spending goal of 5% by 2030 might be insufficiently aggressive given Mr. Xi’s 2027 target for his forces to be ready.

Mr. Trump and some of his staff have tossed around that Taiwan should be spending 10% of GDP, whether or not that is realistic. But making loud, public demands feeds the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative that America is an unreliable ally and Taiwanese resistance is futile. A better approach for Mr. Trump would be to ensure the U.S. lives up to its potential as a strategic partner.

There’s room to improve. The backlog of U.S. weapons sold to Taiwan but not yet delivered is more than $20 billion, according to a summer tally by George Mason University. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery estimates Taiwan might easily reach 4% of GDP on defense if the U.S. could fix its process for foreign military sales to deliver more weapons each year.

The Trump crowd campaigned on putting more attention on the Pacific. Will it make good? The White House isn’t yet proposing its own big boost in defense spending, even as America’s best allies are ramping up.

“Beijing’s aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan are not just exercises,” U.S. Indo-Pacific commander Adm. Samuel Paparo warned Congress this year. “They are dress rehearsals for forced unification.” One certainty is that the Trump Administration can forget about its other priorities or achievements if deterrence fails in the Taiwan Strait.

2. Trump Leans on National Security to Justify Next Wave of Tariffs

Economic warfare is a thing. It is part of political warfare.

1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures

[Page 669]

(as ERP), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269

Trump Leans on National Security to Justify Next Wave of Tariffs

Expanded steel and aluminum tariffs are just the start; new levies seen as likely for semiconductors, heavy trucks, commercial aircraft and more

https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trump-tariffs-national-security-86cb5eea

By Gavin Bade

Follow and Bob Tita

Aug. 28, 2025 9:00 pm ET

The Trump administration extended a 50% tariff to hundreds of imported finished goods containing steel and aluminum. Photo: karen pulfer focht/Reuters

Quick Summary

The Trump administration is broadening national security tariffs on steel, aluminum and other industries to reshore production.View more

The Trump administration plans to expand national-security tariffs on steel, aluminum and a variety of other industries in coming months in hopes of redirecting production in these sectors to the U.S. and thwarting potential legal threats in the trade war.

Tariffs on steel and aluminum were expanded this month, covering more than 400 new product lines with 50% levies and increasing compliance costs for companies. Those charges will likely be broadened further, along with expansions of existing tariffs on copper and automotive parts.

New levies on sectors like semiconductors, heavy trucks, pharmaceuticals and ingredients, processed critical minerals, and commercial aircraft and parts, among others, are also likely to be unveiled in coming months.

President Trump has imposed the national security tariffs alongside a broader set of levies: the reciprocal tariffs that Trump announced in April on virtually every nation, sparking months of negotiations with dozens of U.S. trading partners.

Trump’s team has tried to keep those negotiations focused only on the reciprocal levies, arguing the sectoral tariffs are non-negotiable because they are based on security imperatives.

Even so, major economies like the European Union, Japan and South Korea have secured commitments from the Trump administration to cap many of the national security levies at 15%—particularly on strategic sectors like automobiles—if the foreign governments meet certain conditions like lowering charges on U.S. goods.

Despite those commitments, Trump still holds near-unilateral authority over how national security tariffs are set or altered. That gives the administration an insurance policy if its reciprocal tariffs are struck down in court, people with knowledge of the administration’s plans say.

The U.S. is considering ways to provide relief from some tariffs for U.S. automakers. Photo: Michael Nagle/Bloomberg News

The reciprocal tariffs are based on a novel interpretation of presidential emergency authorities, and are subject to a court challenge that could force the administration to refund those duties to companies. The sector-specific tariffs, by contrast, are imposed under a separate legal authority that is far more established and durable—Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

A federal appeals court heard arguments on the reciprocal levies last month, and whichever side loses is expected to immediately appeal to the Supreme Court, which could rule as soon as June. In the meantime, the administration intends to broaden the coverage of Section 232 tariffs so they can remain in place, or be expanded, if the administration loses in court and needs to find another legal authority for its reciprocal duties.

“Section 232 is a tried and true method,” said Augustine Lo, a partner in Dorsey & Whitney’s national security group specializing in trade law. “Historically, the courts have given the president fairly wide leeway to conduct investigations and impose remedies.”

White House spokesperson Kush Desai said Trump “pledged to use tariffs to Make America Wealthy & Strong Again, and the Administration is committed to using every lever of executive power to deliver for the American people.”

Plans for some relief

At the same time, Trump’s team is considering ways to provide relief from some of those tariffs for a handful of large companies like U.S. automakers and tech firms, the people familiar with the plans say.

U.S. automakers have argued that despite 15% tariffs on Japan and Korea, it is still profitable to produce cars in those countries and ship them to the U.S.—in part because of higher input prices in the U.S. due to Trump’s steel, aluminum and parts tariffs.

Options the administration is considering for relief include expanding existing tariff rebates for automotive assemblers like Ford, Stellantis and General Motors, or applying quotas that allow a certain number of parts to enter the U.S. duty-free, according to people with knowledge of policy discussions. Trump has also floated exemptions from certain tariffs to large tech firms with U.S. operations, or giving some companies with U.S. operations more time before tariffs kick in.

The national security tariffs have also been far more impactful for targeted industries than the reciprocal duties, most of which were only recently imposed. American steel and aluminum producers have been enthusiastic supporters of tariffs on lower-price imported metal and encouraged Trump to add duties to imported finished metal products.

Steelmaker Cleveland-Cliffs waged a yearslong campaign for tariffs on imported steel in electrical transformers. Photo: Luke Sharrett/Bloomberg News

But many U.S. manufacturers—including automakers, their parts suppliers and other factory owners—have complained that they are paying billions of dollars in tariffs, along with higher prices for both domestic and foreign materials and components as the levies push up prices for steel, aluminum, copper and components made from those metals.

The additional items, announced Aug. 15, represent a major expansion of the national security tariffs on the steel and aluminum in finished goods that Trump imposed in March. Construction and farm equipment, factory robots, metal-cutting machinery, auto parts and other complex components are among the 400 items now subject to 50% tariffs on the metal contained in them.

The latest tranche of products brings the total value of imported finished products subject to U.S. metal tariffs to more $300 billion, according to Jason Miller, professor of supply chain management at Michigan State University.

“They’re just so sweeping in terms of their coverage,” Miller said. “We just keep picking up more and more. You’re now penalized for importing parts with a high percentage of steel and aluminum.”

Inclusion rounds of new duties

The expansion of the metals tariffs is just the first of many inclusion processes that will increase the coverage of national security tariffs. The administration plans to allow companies to petition for additional products to be covered by tariffs three times a year, with the next round opening in September, and another in January of next year. Additionally, the Commerce Department is considering inclusions for auto parts tariffs that could be unveiled in mid-September—one of four inclusion rounds planned each year—and the agency is also expected to open an inclusion process for copper tariffs by late October.

Other sector-specific tariffs, such as those planned on semiconductors, lumber, critical minerals and polysilicon used in solar panels are also likely to have inclusion rounds that expand their coverage over time. Already, Trump has announced plans to expand the lumber tariffs to imported furniture products, which would significantly expand the scope of the levies to a number of everyday consumer products.

Trump rolled out the duties on metal derivative products after steel and aluminum producers complained that companies were buying finished products with foreign metal to avoid buying American-made products with domestic metal.

Steelmaker Cleveland-Cliffs waged a yearslong campaign for tariffs on imported electrical transformers and components from Mexico and Canada. Cliffs makes the specialized electrical steel used in the transformers’ cores. The latest tariffs cover steel in imported transformers as well as auto exhaust components made of stainless steel, which Cliffs also produces.

Cliffs Chief Executive Lourenco Goncalves said earlier this month the tariffs give “us certainty that the American domestic market will not be undercut by unfairly traded steel embedded in derivative products.”

Ken Fedor, a vice president for sales in the U.S. for transformer manufacturer SGB-SMIT Group in the Netherlands, said the U.S. doesn’t produce enough electrical steel or transformers to accommodate the surging transformer demand from data-center operators and utility companies. Expanding production of large transformers in the U.S. will take years, he said.

“You just can’t ramp it up. It’s a highly skilled process. Everything is customized,” he said.

Caterpillar said Thursday that its tariff expenses this year could reach $1.8 billion. Photo: Justin Sullivan/Getty Images

He expects the tariff to increase the cost of the large imported transformers that SGB-SMIT builds by as much as 30%. The company makes them in the Netherlands and sells them mostly to U.S. electric utility companies for use at power generating plants and electrical substations.

The new tariffs on the metal in robotics gear will make it more expensive for U.S. companies to automate factory processes by deploying robots. The robot market in the U.S. is now largely supplied with hardware from robotics companies in Japan, South Korea, China and Germany. Automation to reduce labor costs has been an incentive for companies thinking about bringing manufacturing to the U.S. from overseas.

“If the costs go up, it’s going to make it harder for companies to justify bringing more manufacturing back,” said Jeff Burnstein, president of the Michigan-based Association for Advancing Automation, a trade group for robotics. “Right now, the tariffs look like this is a negative for the robotics industry and manufacturing in general for the U.S.”

Trump’s aggressive use of tariffs aims to encourage companies to manufacture more of their products in the U.S. by making imports more expensive. But the latest tariffs will likely increase costs for companies that operate plants in the U.S., especially if they use imported parts made mostly of metal, analysts said.

Texas-based construction and mining equipment maker Caterpillar said Thursday its tariff expenses this year could reach $1.8 billion, up from the $1.5 billion forecast earlier this month. The company said it raised its expense outlook in response to the expansion of tariffs. Caterpillar said it has increased production at its U.S. plants over the past decade and boosted exports of its U.S.-made machinery by 75% since 2016.

Automotive companies are also being hit hard by the tariffs, with Ford estimating in July that the levies would cost it $2 billion this year. It and other companies are petitioning for relief from the tariffs, either through exempting certain products or widening existing tariff rebates.

The Trump administration currently lets the automakers receive a rebate on the tariffs they pay for auto parts. But companies have asked the Commerce Department to expand the program to allow them to be refunded for other tariff costs as well, according to people with knowledge of the discussions.

Trump has also floated carve-outs for some large technology firms that would be subject to his tariffs on semiconductors, which are expected to be unveiled this fall. For companies that have committed to build factories in the U.S., “there will be no change,” Trump said at an August meeting with Apple CEO Tim Cook, who has committed to build new domestic production facilities. Trump has also said he may start pharmaceutical tariffs at a low level and increase them over time, giving companies time to relocate manufacturing.

Write to Gavin Bade at gavin.bade@wsj.com and Bob Tita at robert.tita@wsj.com

3. Tulsi Gabbard Blindsided CIA Over Revoking Clearance of Undercover Officer

Are we deliberately blinding ourselves?

Tulsi Gabbard Blindsided CIA Over Revoking Clearance of Undercover Officer

The naming of an agency Russian hand on a list of officials has alarmed people inside the spy agency

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/tulsi-gabbard-blindsided-cia-over-revoking-clearance-of-undercover-officer-47b7b160

By Brett Forrest

Aug. 27, 2025 8:45 pm ET

Tulsi Gabbard, director of national intelligence, and John Ratcliffe, director of the CIA, during a hearing in March. Photo: Tom Williams/Zuma Press

Quick Summary

DNI Gabbard included an undercover CIA officer on a list of 37 current and former officials stripped of security clearances.View more

Tulsi Gabbard, director of national intelligence, surprised Central Intelligence Agency officials last week when she included an undercover senior CIA officer on a roster of 37 current and former officials she stripped of security clearances.

Most of the 37 people had either participated in intelligence assessments related to Russia’s attempt to influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election or had signed a 2019 letter calling for President Trump’s impeachment.

Gabbard didn’t know the CIA officer had been working undercover, according to a person familiar with the fallout from the list’s release. Three other people with knowledge of the situation said that Gabbard’s office didn’t meaningfully consult with the CIA before releasing the list.

Gabbard’s office delivered the list of 37 people to the CIA the evening before the list’s release, according to three people familiar with the communications and emails read to The Wall Street Journal.

The national intelligence office didn’t seek the CIA’s input about the composition of the list, and the CIA had no foreknowledge of Gabbard’s posting on X the following day that revealed the names, including that of the covered CIA officer, according to two of the people familiar with the events.

In a memo announcing the revocations, Gabbard said she had acted on Trump’s orders.

Judge blocks Kari Lake, tasked to dismantle VOA, from firing its director

Michael Abramowitz was given an ultimatum: Relinquish his post or be fired. A judge ruled the Trump administration lacks the authority to remove him.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/08/28/voa-director-kari-lake-trump/

UpdatedAugust 28, 2025 at 8:03 p.m. EDTtoday at 8:03 p.m. EDT

4 min

Summary

413

Kari Lake, the acting CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, has sought to dismantle the Voice of America, but a judge ruled Thursday she lacks the authority to fire its director. (Ash Ponders/For The Washington Post)

By Scott Nover

A federal judge in Washington blocked the Trump administration Thursday from firing Michael Abramowitz as Voice of America’s director, weeks after administration official Kari Lake first attempted to remove him from the post.

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Abramowitz, a former Washington Post reporter who has led the U.S. government-funded broadcasting organization since last year, maintained that only a Senate-confirmed advisory board had authority to remove him as VOA director. But President Donald Trump removed all members of the board in January.

U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth, an appointee of President Ronald Reagan, agreed with Abramowitz on Thursday, having heard arguments in a hearing Monday. He ruled that without a majority vote from the Senate-confirmed board, Lake did not have the authority to remove Abramowitz.

In a statement, Abramowitz said he was “very gratified” by Thursday’s ruling. “It is especially urgent for Voice of America to resume robust programming, which is so important for the security and influence of the United States,” he said.

Follow Trump’s second term

“We fully intend to appeal this absurd ruling,” Lake wrote in a statement. “Elections have consequences, and President Trump runs the executive branch. I have confidence that the Constitution will eventually be enforced, even if not by Judge Lamberth and other radical district judges.”

In his ruling, Lamberth disagreed with the government’s position that the statute on the appointment and removal of the VOA director interferes with the president’s executive authority to remove “inferior officers” — those who don’t require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation.

The judge noted bipartisan concern in Congress about former U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) CEO Michael Pack, who served during the first Trump administration, when he removed the heads of federally funded networks including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia in 2020. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who now serves as an ex officio member of the board in question, was one of the senators who urged that positions like Abramowitz’s be better insulated from political pressure, a point Lamberth noted in court Monday.

Lamberth granted a motion for partial summary judgment, issued a permanent injunction blocking Abramowitz’s removal, and found the underlying statute constitutional.

Abramowitz was notified in an Aug. 1 letter from John A. Zadrozny, a senior adviser at the USAGM, which oversees VOA, that because he would not accept a job running a broadcasting station in North Carolina, he would be removed from federal employment.

Lake, a Republican politician who ran unsuccessful races for Arizona governor in 2022 and U.S. Senate in 2024, was tapped by Trump to lead the agency. But by firing the International Broadcasting Advisory Board, Trump removed the legal mechanism to instate Lake and to remove Abramowitz. Instead, Lake was given the title of senior adviser to the CEO of the USAGM before becoming its deputy CEO in July.

Abramowitz was placed on administrative leave in March along with more than 1,000 USAGM employees when Trump issued an executive order aimed at chiseling the agency down to its “minimum presence and function required by law.” Abramowitz sued Lake in federal court, arguing that her actions to tear down the agency — and, more recently, fire him — are illegal.

Lake then fired 500 contractors at the USAGM in May, attempted to fire more than 600 full-time staffers in June (which has been delayed, due to administrative problems) and further consolidated power at the agency in July by placing the agency’s acting CEO, Victor Morales, on administrative leave in July. Lake has since been its acting CEO.

The plaintiffs from Voice of America — Abramowitz, along with a group of journalists led by former White House bureau chief Patsy Widakuswara — recently asked Lamberth to hold the government in contempt for not following an April 22 preliminary injunction that ordered it to follow its statutory mandate. (A federal appeals court overturned other parts of Lamberth’s injunction, including a provision that ordered staffers back to work.)

Lamberth has been critical of the government throughout court proceedings. He stopped short of holding Lake in contempt but said she was “verging on contempt” and ordered her deposed in the coming weeks, along with two other USAGM officials.

In turn, Lake has publicly complained about Lamberth. “Of course I’ve got a judge here in Washington, D.C. — I’ve got five cases against me as I try to scale this monster, this beast back and rightsize it. I mean, I’ve got a judge who’s threatening me with contempt of court, throwing me in prison, if I don’t produce more of the propaganda that he wants me to produce,” Lake said on a radio show this month.

Lake is also planning to order a mass reduction-in-force that could see more than 500 agency employees — most of whom have been on paid administrative leave since March — terminated in the coming days.

correctionA caption in a previous version of this article incorrectly identified Kari Lake as deputy CEO of the USAGM. She is currently its acting CEO.

What readers are saying

The comments reflect strong disapproval of Kari Lake's actions and her association with Donald Trump, particularly regarding the attempt to fire Michael Abramowitz as Voice of America’s director. Many commenters express relief and gratitude for the federal judge's decision to... Show more

5. Xi Prepares Meeting of Security Bloc to Rival US-Led World Order

We should remember why they are meeting and forming this "CRInK alliance:" Fear. Weakness. Desperation. Envy

Xi Prepares Meeting of Security Bloc to Rival US-Led World Order

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-28/xi-sharpens-mission-for-bloc-built-to-rival-us-led-world-order?sref=hhjZtX76

In a photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Vladimir Putin meets Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana in 2024.Photographer: Pavel Volkov/Pool/AFP/Getty Images

By Bloomberg News

August 29, 2025 at 7:00 AM GMT+9

Updated on August 29, 2025 at 2:47 PM GMT+9

Takeaways by Bloomberg AI

Hide

Xi Jinping will gather his closest international allies for a landmark summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where many will be seeking reassurance after emerging scarred from conflicts.
China's president is likely to dwell on what's ahead for the SCO and set out his vision for global governance, with the political leaders of Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran seated together with him.
The summit offers opportunities for bilateral meetings, including talks between Putin and Xi, and between Modi and Xi, to discuss various issues, including energy exports, border detente, and the Ukraine war.

When Xi Jinping gathers his closest international allies for one of the landmark summits of his more than a decade-long rule, many will be seeking reassurance after emerging scarred from conflicts.

They may not get it: the security-focused bloc co-founded by China has been all but absent when its partners needed it most.

Instead, China’s president is likely to dwell more on what’s ahead for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation at a time when Donald Trump tries to hem in Beijing’s ambitions and upends US alliances with the likes of India. The spotlight will especially fall on any joint statement issued by the grouping and the tone it adopts on the US, along with the series of bilateral meetings expected to take place on the sidelines.

At the huddle that kicks off on Sunday, Xi is preparing to approve the SCO’s development strategy for the next decade and set out his vision for global governance, with the political leaders of Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran seated together with him at the same table for the first time in years. Some guests including Russian President Vladimir Putin will then follow Xi to Beijing to attend a military parade on Sept. 3.

“China is putting in a lot of effort and using its influence to make it one of the biggest SCO summits ever,” said Dylan Loh, assistant professor at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. “This is also a statement of intent and demonstration of China’s growing profile and power — particularly in the context of US-China competition and suggestions of domestic economic malaise.”

Play

9:29

WATCH: As Trump steps back, will BRICS step up?

The event will be the bloc’s largest ever, now that Belarus is its 10th full member. The lineup of global leaders headed to the Chinese port city of Tianjin — including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif — suggests the potential is there to break new ground.

Putin and Modi will be closely watched.

The summit offers Putin a chance to talk with Xi and Modi directly about the outcome of his meeting in Alaska with Trump and the prospect of reaching an agreement to end the war in Ukraine.

It’s a rare opportunity for Putin to meet with his two most important energy partners, especially after Trump doubled US tariffs on India as punishment for New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian oil.

Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi in Kazan in 2024.Photographer: Maxim Shipenkov/Pool/AFP/Getty Images

Together, China and India have purchased more than half of Russia’s energy exports since the start of 2023, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.

Chinese purchases are unlikely to change anytime soon, but Moscow faces a trickier predicament when it comes to gas.

Putin is likely to broach the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline once again when he meets with Xi. The project would take gas from the fields that formerly served Europe and supply China instead. But despite many years of discussion, Beijing hasn’t been willing to commit.

China and India Dominate Russian Energy Imports

Combined for more than 50% of purchases since start of 2023

Source: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air

Note: Imports measured in euros

Modi is also expected to meet with the Chinese leader on Sunday, giving the two an opportunity to chart a path forward. Normalization of the relationship and the border detente are likely to figure in the talks, Indian officials said, asking not to be named as the discussions are private.

India had previously objected to the SCO’s draft statement that circulated in June for lacking text condemning the militant attacks against Indian-administered Kashmir, for which New Delhi blamed Pakistan.

“If India lines up behind the joint statement in the end, it suggests more willingness to stand alongside the SCO — and implicitly against Washington,” said Jeremy Chan, a former US diplomat in China and Japan.

Chan, who’s now a senior analyst on the China and Northeast Asia team at Eurasia Group, added that “any language directly critical of the US would also be an important signal of a more meaningful pivot by Delhi toward Beijing and Moscow.”

Explainer: Why India Increasingly Needs China, and Vice Versa

Ukraine, Iran

Although the gathering was planned long in advance, world events of the past six months have given it far more attention and weight.

Following a major attack by Israel and the US, Iran faces a threat of UN sanctions being reimposed by key European nations. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan engaged in their worst clash in half a century in May.

Now, India is moving closer to its regional rival China, as Trump alienates New Delhi by imposing tariffs, while Islamabad is strengthening ties with Washington.

Pakistani officials will hold sideline talks with Xi and Putin, local media reported, but the country doesn’t plan to have a meeting with India, according to its Foreign Office. Iran’s Foreign Ministry has also confirmed a meeting between Pezeshkian and Xi.

Iran’s President Masoud PezeshkianPhotographer: Jeenah Moon/Bloomberg

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, a NATO member, has said his country considered joining. Though it’s been linked with the SCO since 2013 through a partnership agreement, full membership in the group would give Erdogan more leverage against the West.

Read more about foreign policy and trade war:China Was Ready for a Trade Fight, and the US Has a Lot to Learn
Trump Tariffs Seen Fostering New China-Global South Trade Order
Secret Xi Letter Revived India Ties After Trump Tariff Barrage
Xi Takes Push for Global Sway to Central Asia With Kazakh Visit

The challenge for Xi is how to reverse a quarter-century track record of deadlock that has cast doubt on the alliance’s ability to deliver when it matters. Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Bin made clear the Chinese side is well aware of the stakes, saying last week the SCO must be prepared to deliver “tangible results” as the organization embraces a “new look, a new pace, and a new level.”

Initially seen in the West as an eastern counterweight to NATO, the bloc has expanded by adding new members that are either far removed from its original focus on Central Asia or, as in the case of India and Pakistan, are themselves embroiled in strife.

The bloc defines its “main goals” as being centered around “strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighborly relations among the member countries.”

Yet the body has repeatedly failed to stand up for its members, with examples including the attacks by the US and Israel on Iran. A similar hands-off approach prevailed when it came to border clashes between India and Pakistan, as well as between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

“Recent history has shown that when a security crisis arises that affects a card-carrying member of the SCO — or an adjacent one — the SCO as an organization is nowhere to be found,” said Eurasia Group’s Chan. “When the going gets tough, China is absent even for its friends, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis.”

Even so, the group is of central importance to Xi as he taps it and other China-backed bodies such as BRICS in remaking the world order and helping Beijing stake out a leadership role, especially as a champion of the Global South.

The SCO has nearly doubled in membership since being founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Counting observers and dialogue partners such as Mongolia and Saudi Arabia, that number expands to 26 nations.

What’s often missing are “common interests and trust between key members” — on top of a “history of disputes, differences and suspicion” — according to Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University.

“All of this makes the SCO unlikely to coalesce into a bloc capable of challenging the US or Europe,” he said.

(Updates with details on Russia’s energy relationship with China and India starting in ninth paragraph.)

6. The Answers are in the Mountains: Countering Chinese Aggression with Irregular Warfare

Excerpt:

If war comes to Taiwan, its survival may be dependent on the indigenous tribes who for generations have called the Chungyang Shan (Central Mountain Range) their home. As policymakers consider an integrated deterrence strategy for Taiwan, the mountains offer a vital domain. Investing externally in these mountain populations to bolster their resilience and prepare them for prolonged guerrilla warfare is essential for shaping the operational environment. If occupied, an unconventional warfare campaign, akin to those waged by the Montagnards or Tibetans, could significantly disrupt Chinese pacification efforts and impose substantial, enduring costs.

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The Answers are in the Mountains: Countering Chinese Aggression with Irregular Warfare

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/29/the-answers-are-in-the-mountains-countering-chinese-aggression-with-irregular-warfare/

by MAJ Paul Rogers

08.29.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

Violence in the world’s highest mountains is once again shedding light on the volatility of mountainous geography. Last May, old conflicts reignited over the disputed Kashmir region high in the Himalayan mountains. Settled only by a fragile ceasefire after a series of tense escalations between India and Pakistan, old deterrence logic has been challenged by two nuclear-armed states battling over the mountainous headwaters that feed the majority of their populations. Nearby, China continues a quiet campaign of damming and re-routing rivers in the high-altitude plains of Tibet to “steal” land from Nepal and threaten downstream countries in Southeast Asia. According to a recent CSIS report, China’s construction of dams provide upstream control of Asia’s major rivers, enabling a form of Gray Zone coercion through the manipulation of downstream nations’ economies. Indeed, the glacier melt from the Himalayas provide nearly half of the world’s population with its most basic need: water. In Taiwan, some analysts suggest that a Chinese invasion would stall at the base of the island’s central mountain range, enabling the Taiwanese to “wage a guerilla warfare campaign”. In fact, 70% of Taiwan is covered by steep and densely forested mountains as high as 13,000 feet, which create numerous opportunities for irregular warfare.

Mountains form the core of many geopolitical challenges for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), creating a strategic imperative to challenge Chinese aggression in such terrain. As such, mountain-specialized Special Operations Forces (SOF) can effectively support and enable national resistance operations and unconventional warfare (UW) against Chinese aggression in militarily challenging mountainous regions like Tibet, Nepal, and Taiwan by leveraging the unique advantages of irregular warfare, fostering cultural resilience, and adapting mountain warfare tactics to indigenous partner forces.

The Mountain Battlefield: Enduring Challenges and Opportunities for Defense

Mountain battlefields are omnipresent within the competition continuum. Whether in crisis or conflict, irregular or conventional warfare, mountainous geography is its own domain and cannot be ignored. Utilizing a framework developed by the Irregular Warfare Center (see Figure 1 below), the role of regional geography is easily visualized between competition, crisis, and conflict. With the Gray Zone occupying the ambiguous borders between war and peace, irregular activities and warfare play the largest role in today’s complex environment.

Figure 1: DOD Irregular Approach to Campaigning

In terms of competition, mountainous battlefields like the disputed Kashmir borders between China and India are rife with irregular activities. The contested area, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is characterized by rugged and austere mountainous terrain which makes border demarcation nearly impossible. China exploits this ambiguous border by “deploying PRC-aligned nomadic tribes to cross and occupy land on India’s side of the LAC”, constructing “xiaokang” (well-off) villages to claim disputed land. Such salami style tactics

permit the slow reclamation of disputed land beyond the LAC, enabling China to take land while avoiding conflict. Despite treaties and international norms of sovereignty, irregular Chinese activities dominate this peripheral mountainous terrain.

In crisis, China’s weaponization of water control presents a serious issue to lower riparian states. The PRC-occupied Tibetan plateau known as “Asia’s water tower” controls eight transboundary river systems which supply water to three billion people in Southeast Asia. With more than 87,000 dams built on these rivers, China has weaponized critical infrastructure to coerce downstream states while redrawing boundary lines with Nepal by diverting the flows of rivers that mark them . Such a crisis of geopolitical leverage “poses a significant concern for lower riparian states, potentially shaping future conflict”. Simply put, China can pull the trigger to create a major crisis at any time, holding water hostage for billions of people.

Yet, the battlefields of competition and crisis do not resemble imagined kinetic or conventional warzones. Instead, these regions are political and economic battlefields, holding civilians and states at risk, and requiring a whole-of-government approach. A 2012 assessment of global water security from the Director of National Intelligence reported with high confidence that “water problems will contribute to instability in states important to US national security interests”. As water use has grown at twice the rate of population increase, state-sponsored Gray-Zone control of major mountainous headwaters will only exacerbate regional disputes in water-stressed nations. Chinese control of the Tibetan plain and its illegal territorial expansion into the mountainous border regions are stark examples of how a near-peer adversary can utilize irregular activities within the Gray Zone to secure their national interests in times of crisis.

In terms of open conflict, the PRC has not been in a declared conventional war since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War so the following is purely hypothetical. In the event China invades Taiwan or launches a conventional assault across the LAC in the Himalayas, it is important to visualize the modern mountainous battlefield. The mountains profoundly impact all warfighting functions, make operations exceptionally difficult, and have high expected casualties. Movement is tortuous, whether mounted or dismounted. Scarce and poorly maintained roads, steep slopes, cliffs, and deep snow all conspire to stop military operations. The LAC traverses through such terrain, among the highest mountains and glaciers of the Himalaya. The Siachen Glacier, home to the 1984 India-Pakistan clash over the LAC, was the world’s highest combat zone at 20,000 feet above sea level. In the Siachen Glacier valley, more soldiers have died from exposure than from bullets; with 30 to 50 percent of the fatalities from cerebral edema. In 2012, an avalanche near the glacier buried 124 Pakistani soldiers in one of the worst such incidents since World War One. Risk to forces is catastrophic, as “the main enemies of the soldier in mountain warfare are altitude, cold and terrain – not the hostile forces”.

In mountain battlefields, logistics, intelligence, command and control must all be decentralized. Narrow valleys confuse air defense radars, and aircraft are easily grounded by thin high-altitude air and severe weather. Not even artillery, drones, or Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) work properly. High altitudes, strong winds, and low temperatures affect ballistics and battery life, increasing the probability of error and causing shells to be less effective or dud in snow-covered terrain. In mountain conflicts, conventional forces dither, while irregulars can thrive.

Irregular Warfare Strategies in Mountainous Environments

Considering the limitations and challenges of mountainous terrain on the full spectrum of the competition continuum, understanding the people who call the mountains home is vital to the irregular warfighter. Only 10% of the world’s population reside in mountainous regions, yet mountains still “host a strikingly disproportionate share of the world’s conflict”. If 10% of the population are indeed considered “mountain people”, they would be compelling partners in irregular warfare. This thought is supported by interesting anthropological findings. One behavioral scientist found three themes which typically describe mountain people: fierce, uncivilized, and resistant to central authority. Matloff claims with ample evidence that “severe weather and physical barriers of mountain regions give rise to mental toughness, self-sufficiency, insularity, and a talent for improvisation”. Mountain tribes like the Gurkhas, Kurds, Chechens, Montagnards, Kashmiri, and the Taiwanese Atayal all personify these stereotypes. It is no wonder that famed political scientist James Fearon found that mountainous terrain was a condition that contributed to “significantly higher rates of civil war”.

Just as the rugged geography shapes its inhabitants, the inhabitants shape their communities through resilience. Sonn and Fisher describe community resilience as the positive capacity for groups to adapt to adversity, stress, and oppressive systems, challenging the notion that oppressed communities inherently lack competence or resilience. The idea of highly resilient mountain people, oppressed at the periphery of the states they belong to, but fortified by difficult lives in austere places, reinforces this theory on cultural resiliency. Geographical isolation in the mountains become the “alternate setting” where identities are safeguarded, and distinctly rugged cultures persist. As Judith Matloff writes in The War is in the Mountains, such remote and archaic communities can be enormously important to the future stability of the world, claiming “the mountain is friend to those who want to elude or destroy authority – the revolutionary, the poppy grower, and the jihadi, to name only a few”. Such communities persist even in the modern world, despite geographic isolation and scarce political involvement or modern services.

Considering the predisposition to violence and high levels of resiliency common to most mountain communities, it is with this lens that we can apply the Duclos “R2D2” framework. The framework, as seen in Figure 2 below, illustrates the relationship between Resilience, Resistance, Deterrence, and Defense (R2D2) throughout the varying statuses of conflict. Much like the Irregular Warfare Center’s interpretation of the competition continuum, the Duclos model depicts the scaling of irregular warfare. The red line shows how irregular warfare becomes more applicable in times of occupation, than in times of peace, but has an equal share with conventional warfare during times of war. Resilience is the connective tissue which fortifies a state’s ability to deter, defend, and resist. To understand this, Fiala’s Resistance Operating Concept provides a useful definition of resilience: “The will and ability to withstand external pressure and influences and/or recover from the effects of that pressure or influence”. Regardless of the method of warfare, a resilient community trained in irregular warfare enables the state to fight for its sovereignty, in peace (competition), war (conflict), and occupation.

Figure 2: The Duclos R2D2 Model

The will to resist is imperative in identifying who will be doing the resisting, and under what conditions. Supporting Sonn’s theory of cultural resilience, Haslam and Reicher find that strong social identities are critical to fomenting change. They argue that shared social identity can be the “basis for effective leadership and organization that allows them to counteract stress, secure support, challenge authority, and promote social change in even the most extreme of situations”. Since mountain people survive in the most extreme of environments, their strong communities can thrive against an oppressor, especially if provided with external support. Applied to the Duclos model, highly resilient mountain communities become especially useful in irregular or guerilla warfare.

Considering mountain communities possess the traits necessary to support resistance operations, it’s important to quickly revisit their relationship with physical space. In Arreguin-Toft’s How the Weak Win Wars, he argues that the two elements required for waging a successful guerilla warfare campaign are: physical sanctuary and a supportive population. As previously discussed, the mountains provide a key element of physical sanctuary. Likewise, the fiercely resilient communities who are inclined to resist authority, provide the supportive population.

Lessons from Historical and Contemporary Conflicts

Therefore, resilient communities of mountain people become the center of gravity when planning unconventional warfare operations along the mountainous peripheries of states like China. Yet, sending Special Operators to the mountains isn’t a novel idea. It is baked into SOF history. In fact, today’s Army Green Berets draw their lineage to an elite group of mountain warriors. The modern 1st Special Forces Regiment traces its roots to the 1st Special Service Force (FSSF), a joint Canadian-American unit established in 1942, referred to as ‘The Force’. Recognizing the hardiness and grit associated with men who earn a living in the mountains, specially selected recruits for The Force were considered ‘highly recommended’ if they were mountaineers, or had occupations like “lumberjack, forest ranger, hunter, trapper, north woodsman (guide), game warden, prospector and explorer”. With mountain men creating it’s backbone, and high altitude winter mountaineering training its focus, the Force became one of the most documented units of “super commandos” in World War II, earning themselves the moniker: ‘The Devil’s Brigade’. This model of recruitment could be easily applied to the LAC or other contested regions.

In Tibet, U.S. paramilitary operators with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sought out mountain communities to support the Dalai Lama against the PRC’s 1956 invasion. Codenamed ST CIRCUS, this operation became one of the CIA’s longest covert actions in history. Lasting from the early 1956 to 1972, ethnic Tibetan mountain tribes like the Golok, Kham, and Ando tribes fought as guerillas against the invading Chinese forces under Mao. Under ST CIRCUS, thousands of guerillas were flown from Tibet to Camp Hale, Colorado to be trained in mountain warfare and guerilla tactics before parachuting back into Tibet to conduct tactical operations against Chinese bases and supply lines. Though conducted by the CIA, ST CIRCUS serves as a realistic example of how Army Special Operations today can train, advise, and assist local mountain tribes in irregular warfare against peer adversaries or occupation forces, even if American boots aren’t allowed on the ground.

In Vietnam, the Green Berets built a highly effective alliance throughout the 1960’s with the indigenous tribes occupying the nations’ central highlands. Called the “Montagnards” (Mountain People), they had their own distinct languages, cultures, and social structures by virtue of being far removed from any kind of government control. Operating in the periphery during a time of war, the Montagnards were skilled fighters and executed an effective campaign of guerilla warfare against the North Vietnamese. Critical to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, the partnership between Green Beret and Montagnard had lasting strategic impacts. By focusing on Toft’s two elements for a successful guerilla warfare campaign (physical sanctuary and a supportive population), the Montagnard’s became fearsome partners.

Conclusion

Historical precedents demonstrate the critical role highly resilient indigenous mountain tribes can play as strategic partners in irregular warfare against peer-adversaries like China, particularly during periods of competition, crisis, or conflict. During competition and crisis, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) can enhance strategic deterrence by identifying and engaging mountain communities along China’s borders. With external support in intelligence gathering and disrupting of illegal infrastructure development, these tribes can effectively resist China’s expansionist tactics, such as the unchecked development of “xiaokang” villages. Drawing a parallel to ‘The Devil’s Brigade’ recruiting hardened mountain men, today’s Green Berets can cultivate partnerships with resilient mountain tribes in austere environments to counter illegal Chinese border expansion and coercive infrastructure development.

If war comes to Taiwan, its survival may be dependent on the indigenous tribes who for generations have called the Chungyang Shan (Central Mountain Range) their home. As policymakers consider an integrated deterrence strategy for Taiwan, the mountains offer a vital domain. Investing externally in these mountain populations to bolster their resilience and prepare them for prolonged guerrilla warfare is essential for shaping the operational environment. If occupied, an unconventional warfare campaign, akin to those waged by the Montagnards or Tibetans, could significantly disrupt Chinese pacification efforts and impose substantial, enduring costs.

Tags: China-Taiwan, Gray Zone, Green Berets, irregular warfare, IW, Mountain Guerrillas, mountain warfare, Operation ST CIRCUS, Resilience, resistance, Special Operations, Unconventional Warfare, UW

About The Author

MAJ Paul Rogers
Major Paul Rogers is a Special Forces Officer currently assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School where he is pursuing a Master’s Degree in Defense Analysis. He has deployed numerous times with 10th Special Forces Group to Eastern Europe in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve and previously commanded the Special Operations Mountain Warfare Training Center, the lead component of mountain warfare for USSOCOM.

7. The Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff: Analyzing Hezbollah’s Organizational Degradation Under Multi-Domain Pressure (2023-2025)

Excerpts:

Hezbollah’s experience between 2023 and 2025 represents more than tactical evolution—it demonstrates how advanced surveillance and precision-strike capabilities transform asymmetric warfare dynamics. The Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff model explains not merely what happened to Hezbollah, but why such comprehensive pressure was possible given the organization’s structural dependencies and adaptive constraints.

This analysis challenges several core assumptions within security studies. First, it demonstrates that material capability assessments provide inadequate indicators of organizational resilience when external dependencies concentrate critical vulnerabilities. The quantitative model reveals how Hezbollah’s impressive arsenal masked fundamental weaknesses in its support architecture. Second, it reveals that deterrence credibility in proxy relationships depends as much on perceived autonomy of weapons employment as on visible capabilities. Third, it illustrates how organizational success can create path-dependent constraints that prevent adaptation to changing operational environments.

The broader implications extend beyond Hezbollah to encompass proxy warfare’s future evolution. As state actors achieve greater surveillance and precision-strike capabilities, the operational security that historically enabled non-state actors to survive material disadvantage becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. For policymakers and military planners, this analysis suggests that proxy warfare campaigns should focus on network dependencies rather than material assets, as targeting logistics, communications, and command relationships may achieve strategic effects more efficiently than direct engagement with proxy military capabilities.

The case of Hezbollah’s experience ultimately demonstrates that in an era of pervasive surveillance and precision weaponry, whether future proxy organizations can resolve the sanctuary-vulnerability tradeoff remains a critical question that will likely define asymmetric conflict’s character in the decades ahead. The mathematical relationship between external support and organizational vulnerability provides a framework for assessing proxy resilience, while the comparative analysis reveals that adaptation strategies emphasizing indigenous capacity and operational decentralization offer greater long-term survival prospects than conventional military enhancement approaches.

Essay| The Latest

The Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff: Analyzing Hezbollah’s Organizational Degradation Under Multi-Domain Pressure (2023-2025)

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/29/the-sanctuary-vulnerability-tradeoff/

by Habib Badawi

08.29.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

The fragmented landscape of southern Lebanon in 2024-2025 represents a significant transformation of one of the world’s most sophisticated non-state military organizations. Hezbollah’s experience of substantial operational degradation within eighteen months constitutes a paradigm shift in asymmetric warfare dynamics, challenging core assumptions about proxy resilience and deterrent credibility. The 2024 conflict with Israel significantly weakened Hezbollah, resulting in the loss of key leaders and operational capabilities, marking an unprecedented period of organizational pressure for a group that had successfully deterred conventional military powers for two decades.

This study argues that Hezbollah’s degradation was neither accidental nor primarily the result of superior Israeli tactics, but rather the consequence of structural vulnerabilities embedded within its transnational support architecture. These vulnerabilities simultaneously constituted the source of its previous strength and the mechanism of its contemporary challenges—a phenomenon we term the Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff.

Theoretical Framework: The Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff

The Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff explains how external dependencies that enable proxy capabilities also create concentrated points of failure. This framework synthesizes insights from proxy warfare theory, resource dependence theory, and organizational path dependence to explain why Hezbollah’s external support network became a vector of vulnerability.

Contemporary proxy warfare theory conceptualizes state-sponsored non-state actors as instruments of indirect aggression, enabling patron states to project power while maintaining plausible deniability. Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah exemplifies this dynamic, operating as a strategic force-projection mechanism serving Tehran’s Forward Defense doctrine. However, this relationship evolved into what theorists call complex interdependence—a state of mutual vulnerability where both actors become constrained by their relationship.

For Hezbollah, this interdependence manifested as entrapped autonomy: the paradoxical condition wherein proxy actors acquire advanced capabilities while surrendering strategic decision-making autonomy to patron states. Iranian influence over precision-guided missiles meant that Hezbollah’s most potent deterrent assets remained subject to Tehran’s political calculus rather than Lebanese tactical requirements.

Quantitative Model of Proxy Resilience

To operationalize this theoretical framework, we developed a mathematical model that quantifies the relationship between external support and organizational vulnerability:

Proxy Resilience Index = (IC × ES) / (DC × AIC)

Where the variables are defined and measured as follows:

VariableDefinitionMeasurementSourceIndigenous Capacity (IC)Autonomous military capabilities without external supportBaseline weapons production, training facilities, command structurePrimary analysisExternal Support (ES)Material, technical, and financial assistance from patron statesWeapons transfers, funding, advisory personnelOpen-source intelligenceDependency Concentration (DC)Degree of reliance on specific supply chains or support networksPercentage of critical assets dependent on external sourcesIntelligence assessmentsAdversary Interdiction Capability (AIC)Opponent’s ability to disrupt proxy support networksSurveillance coverage, precision strike capacity, intelligence penetrationMultiple intelligence assessments

Note: Variable measurements utilize normalized scales (0-1) for standardization across different organizational contexts. Dependency Concentration employs an expanded scale (1-10) to capture extreme concentration effects.

This relationship demonstrates how increasing external support while enhancing immediate capabilities simultaneously reduces long-term resilience by concentrating critical dependencies. The model’s analytical utility becomes evident when applied to Hezbollah’s case, where high external support combined with extreme dependency concentration and advanced adversary interdiction capabilities produced significant resilience degradation despite moderate indigenous capacity.

The Communications Compromise: September 2024

Hezbollah’s operational challenges began with the September 17, 2024, communications compromise that simultaneously incapacitated thousands of operatives through weaponized communication devices. This operation represented more than tactical surprise; it exploited Hezbollah’s dependence on specific communication systems, transforming a perceived operational security advantage into strategic vulnerability.

According to the Lebanese Ministry of Health, more than 37 people were killed in the pager explosions, with experts noting that the explosions, unprecedented in their scale and nature, underscore vulnerabilities in communication networks. The psychological impact proved as significant as physical casualties, creating what we term anticipatory stress paralysis — a collective psychological state wherein organizational leaders, faced with pervasive uncertainty about system security, experience operational constraints that affect command effectiveness.

Multi-Domain Pressure Architecture

The communications compromise initiated a coordinated, multi-domain campaign targeting the theoretical vulnerabilities identified in this study’s framework. Israeli operations demonstrated a strategy of comprehensive pressure across multiple domains, simultaneously attacking physical capabilities, cognitive processes, and organizational legitimacy.

Physical Domain: Precision strikes targeted significant portions of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, focusing on logistical nodes and storage facilities. Beginning with targeted operations against senior leadership, Israeli forces systematically degraded Hezbollah’s command structure.

Cognitive Domain: Beyond the initial communications compromise, ongoing operations targeted the institutional knowledge base. The elimination of experienced operational personnel created institutional knowledge gaps — a critical loss of tacit organizational expertise, resulting from personnel targeting, impairing complex operational capabilities despite intact formal structures.

Organizational Domain: The September 27 elimination of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah represented the culmination of the leadership targeting strategy. Its significance extended beyond tactical disruption to encompass challenges to Hezbollah’s symbolic authority and the psychological framework sustaining organizational cohesion.

Temporal Analysis of Organizational Pressure

The systematic nature of pressure on Hezbollah becomes apparent through temporal analysis of the process, which proceeded through three distinct phases:

PhaseTime PeriodPrimary TargetsPressure MechanismEstimated ImpactNetwork DisruptionSep-Oct 2024Communications, logisticsMulti-domain targetingSignificant infrastructure damageLeadership TargetingNov 2024-Jan 2025Command structureDecapitation strategyMajor command disruptionOrganizational AdaptationFeb-Mar 2025Institutional coherenceSustained pressureOngoing organizational challenges

Note: Impact assessments represent estimated effects based on available intelligence analysis and operational reporting. Phase transitions demonstrate cascading effects consistent with complex systems theory.

This phased progression reveals how initial network disruption created conditions enabling subsequent leadership targeting, which in turn precipitated institutional adaptation challenges. The progression demonstrates characteristics consistent with complex systems theory, where disruption of critical nodes triggers cascading effects throughout interconnected networks.

Network Dependencies and Vulnerability Analysis

The Iran-Hezbollah logistics network represents a sophisticated transnational system facilitating the transfer of weapons, financing, and technical expertise. However, the network’s sophistication contains inherent vulnerabilities, with each component—from Iranian production facilities to Lebanese storage sites—representing potential interdiction points.

Transnational Logistics Network Analysis

Analysis of the Iran-Syria-Lebanon corridor reveals systematic vulnerabilities that enabled comprehensive network pressure:

Transfer ModeRoute/MethodCapacityVulnerability FactorEstimated Interdiction Rate (2024)OverlandBaghdad-Damascus-Beirut highwayHigh-volume conventional weaponsGeographic chokepoints60-70%Air CorridorIL-76 transport to Syrian airfieldsPrecision-guided missilesAir defense capabilities75-85%MaritimeContainer shipmentsFinancial transfers, dual-use technologyPort security measures45-55%Production FacilitiesSyrian-based manufacturingIndigenous missile productionFixed location targetingSignificant capacity reduction

Sources: Multiple open-source intelligence assessments. Interdiction rates calculated based on successful targeting operations versus attempted transfers through 2024.

The escalation pattern between Israel and Hezbollah showed sustained intensity, with incidents reflecting systematic targeting of network nodes rather than random engagement. The air corridor proved most vulnerable to interdiction due to advanced Israeli air defense capabilities and intelligence penetration of flight planning.

The maritime route, while showing lower interdiction rates, faced increasing pressure as security measures enhanced throughout 2024. Most significantly, targeting of Syrian production capacity eliminated pathways toward weapons independence, forcing greater reliance on increasingly vulnerable Iranian imports.

The Territorial Paradigm: From Sanctuary to Vulnerability

Hezbollah’s strategic thinking exemplified what geographers term the territorial trap — the intellectual error of conflating spatial control with strategic security. The organization’s tactical success in 2006 institutionalized an operational doctrine premised on static sanctuary — the assumption that geographical familiarity would provide sustainable operational security.

Evolution of the Territorial Sanctuary Concept

The transformation of Hezbollah’s sanctuary concept demonstrates how organizational success can create strategic vulnerabilities through institutional path dependence:

PeriodPrimary SanctuaryOperational BasisVulnerability ProfileStrategic Outcome2006Lebanese terrainIndigenous knowledgeGeographic dispersionTactical effectiveness2011-2020Syria-Lebanon nexusTransnational integrationNetwork dependenciesCapability expansion2020-2024Distributed infrastructureConventional positioningConcentrated targetingStrategic vulnerability2024-2025Adaptive dispersionSurvival operationsIsolation, degradationOrganizational pressure

Analysis demonstrates progression from geographic advantages to systematic vulnerabilities through sanctuary evolution. Strategic outcomes reflect the cumulative effects of territorial dependency patterns on organizational resilience.

This territorial mastery contained inherent future vulnerabilities. Success in 2006 institutionalized reliance on territorial defense optimized for previous-generation warfare, creating a victory paradigm wherein past military successes institutionalize tactical approaches that prove less adaptive to evolved threat environments.

The Syrian civil war’s eruption initiated sanctuary migration —the gradual displacement of Hezbollah’s operational center of gravity from Lebanese terrain to Syrian territory. This transformation represented more than a tactical deployment; it constituted a geopolitical morphosis wherein Hezbollah’s sanctuary became transnational, yet dependent upon Syrian governmental consent and Iranian coordination.

Comparative Proxy Resilience Analysis

Comparative analysis reveals significant variation in non-state actor adaptation to technological pressure. Unlike Hezbollah’s conventional enhancement strategy that created hierarchical vulnerabilities, other organizations demonstrated different adaptive approaches:

OrganizationAdaptation StrategyStructural CharacteristicsResilience FactorsOperational OutcomeHezbollahConventional enhancementHierarchical, centralizedExternal dependency, sophisticationSignificant pressureHouthisMaritime innovationDistributed, adaptiveIndigenous modification, cost-effectivenessOperational continuityHamasInfrastructure redundancyDecentralized networksOperational security, strategic depthStructural resilience

Comparative analysis based on organizational responses to technological pressure between 2020-2025. Operational outcomes are assessed through organizational coherence maintenance under sustained military pressure.

Houthi Maritime Innovation: Yemen’s Houthi movement successfully adapted through tactical innovation, developing cost-effective, anti-ship capabilities that achieved strategic effects despite material limitations through distributed command structures and indigenous weapon modification programs. Their estimated resilience index of 0.7 reflected low dependency concentration despite moderate external support.

Hamas Infrastructure Redundancy: Hamas demonstrated adaptive capacity through operational decentralization, with extensive underground networks providing operational security to maintain organizational coherence under sustained attack. Their resilience score of 0.6 stemmed from high indigenous capacity compensating for moderate external dependencies.

Hezbollah’s Adaptive Challenges: In contrast, Hezbollah’s organizational path dependence presented adaptation difficulties. Success in previous conflicts institutionalized tactical approaches and command structures that proved vulnerable to network-centric warfare, resulting in an estimated resilience index of 0.2-0.3 by late 2024.

Revolution in Military Affairs and Deterrence Dynamics

Hezbollah’s experience provides empirical evidence for theoretical arguments about the transformative impact of advanced surveillance and precision-strike capabilities on asymmetric warfare dynamics. The Israeli achievement of enhanced battlefield awareness through multi-intelligence fusion represents a qualitative shift in the information balance between state and non-state actors.

Capability-Credibility Paradox

Experience challenges core assumptions within deterrence theory regarding the relationship between capability and credibility. Analysis of Hezbollah’s deterrent assets reveals a paradoxical relationship between capability enhancement and deterrent reliability:

Deterrent AssetCapability EnhancementCredibility ImpactDependency RiskNet Deterrent EffectPrecision-Guided MissilesHighInitially positiveHigh external controlPotentially diminishedAdvanced Air DefensesHighMediumMedium technical supportConditionally effectiveIntelligence NetworksMediumHighLow external dependencySustainably effectiveFinancial ResourcesVariableMediumHigh external fundingVulnerability to pressure

Analysis demonstrates a paradoxical relationship between capability advancement and deterrent reliability. Net deterrent effects calculated through integration of capability, credibility, and dependency variables.

Classical deterrence theory suggests that visible capabilities enhance deterrent credibility by demonstrating potential costs to adversaries. However, Hezbollah’s experience demonstrates that externally dependent capabilities can become deterrent liabilities when their operational constraints become apparent.

Deterrence erosion resulted from three interconnected factors: capability degradation through targeting of weapons systems, constraint amplification as Iranian political controls limited effective weapons employment, and resolve questions following leadership elimination and communications compromise. The precision-guided missile arsenal, initially Hezbollah’s most credible deterrent, became potentially counterproductive as Israeli intelligence mapped Iranian control mechanisms and demonstrated capability to interdict weapons before deployment.

Strategic Implications and Future Proxy Warfare

Israel’s demonstrated ability to compromise supply chains has created concerns throughout Iran’s network of regional partners, fundamentally altering proxy warfare calculations. The comprehensive nature of pressure on Hezbollah—with thousands of incidents documented since October 7, 2023—demonstrates how technological advantages can neutralize traditional asymmetric warfare advantages.

The implications extend beyond tactical considerations to encompass fundamental questions about proxy warfare’s future evolution. Organizations facing similar technological pressure must resolve the sanctuary-vulnerability tradeoff by either accepting capability limitations in exchange for operational security or developing adaptive mechanisms that maintain resilience despite external dependencies.

For organizations that prioritized capability over resilience, external dependence potentially became the architecture of their own vulnerability. The most resilient proxy may not be the one with the largest arsenal, but the one capable of maintaining operational security and organizational autonomy despite external support relationships.

Strategic analysis notes that organizational assumptions can persist until challenged by operational realities, highlighting how Hezbollah’s leadership struggled to adapt to changed technological and strategic circumstances. The organization’s commitment to conventional military enhancement, while providing short-term tactical advantages, created structural vulnerabilities that enabled systematic pressure campaigns.

Methodological Limitations and Future Research

This analysis acknowledges several methodological limitations inherent in studying ongoing conflicts. First, the temporal proximity to events limits access to classified materials and comprehensive post-conflict assessments. Second, the quantitative model proposed requires validation against additional case studies to establish broader theoretical validity. Third, the analysis relies primarily on open-source intelligence, which may contain gaps or inaccuracies.

Future research should examine whether the Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff applies to other proxy relationships, particularly in different technological and geographical contexts. Additionally, longitudinal studies of organizational adaptation under sustained pressure could provide insights into resilience mechanisms not captured in this analysis.

Concluding Remarks

Hezbollah’s experience between 2023 and 2025 represents more than tactical evolution—it demonstrates how advanced surveillance and precision-strike capabilities transform asymmetric warfare dynamics. The Sanctuary-Vulnerability Tradeoff model explains not merely what happened to Hezbollah, but why such comprehensive pressure was possible given the organization’s structural dependencies and adaptive constraints.

This analysis challenges several core assumptions within security studies. First, it demonstrates that material capability assessments provide inadequate indicators of organizational resilience when external dependencies concentrate critical vulnerabilities. The quantitative model reveals how Hezbollah’s impressive arsenal masked fundamental weaknesses in its support architecture. Second, it reveals that deterrence credibility in proxy relationships depends as much on perceived autonomy of weapons employment as on visible capabilities. Third, it illustrates how organizational success can create path-dependent constraints that prevent adaptation to changing operational environments.

The broader implications extend beyond Hezbollah to encompass proxy warfare’s future evolution. As state actors achieve greater surveillance and precision-strike capabilities, the operational security that historically enabled non-state actors to survive material disadvantage becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. For policymakers and military planners, this analysis suggests that proxy warfare campaigns should focus on network dependencies rather than material assets, as targeting logistics, communications, and command relationships may achieve strategic effects more efficiently than direct engagement with proxy military capabilities.

The case of Hezbollah’s experience ultimately demonstrates that in an era of pervasive surveillance and precision weaponry, whether future proxy organizations can resolve the sanctuary-vulnerability tradeoff remains a critical question that will likely define asymmetric conflict’s character in the decades ahead. The mathematical relationship between external support and organizational vulnerability provides a framework for assessing proxy resilience, while the comparative analysis reveals that adaptation strategies emphasizing indigenous capacity and operational decentralization offer greater long-term survival prospects than conventional military enhancement approaches.

Tags: Hezbollah, irregular warfare, proxy war, proxy warfare, terrorism, Unconventional Warfare

About The Author

Habib Badawi
Dr. Habib Badawi is a Professor at Lebanese University and a freelance researcher in international relations. His work focuses on asymmetric warfare, cybersecurity, and regional security in the Middle East. He was honored as the Academic Personality of the Year 2018 for pioneering Japanese studies in the Arab world and currently coordinates U.S. history and civilization courses across all branches of Lebanese University.
ORCID: 0000-0002-6452-8379 - Scopus ID: 58675152100

8. Military Gaming to Stay Ahead, But Not the Kind You Think

Excerpts:

I visited the gaming center at West Point last spring. I was impressed with the setup and technological capabilities, but I was even more impressed by the insights shared with me by combat-experienced officers and non-commissioned officers overseeing the program. The positive impact on cadet leadership development was remarkable: improved communication skills, quicker decision-making, and faster adaptability to change. Notably, many intercollegiate athletes there are involved in military gaming.

Gaming isn’t about replacing traditional military training. It’s about enhancing it. Physical fitness, marksmanship, tactical execution, and discipline remain fundamental to military effectiveness and lethality. But in an era when warfare increasingly involves human-machine teaming, information warfare, and complex multi-domain operations, the U.S. military needs training tools that prepare soldiers for these realities.

Every military innovation is met with resistance from those who prefer traditional methods. However, history demonstrates that nation’s leading in training innovation consistently dominate future battlefields. The U.S. military has always been that leader — and by embracing gaming, America can ensure it stays at the forefront of military readiness and operational excellence.

Military Gaming to Stay Ahead, But Not the Kind You Think

August 29, 2025

Joseph L. Votel

August 29, 2025

Over nearly 40 years in uniform, I saw war shift from the massed battles we braced for in the Cold War, to pinpoint strikes on terrorists, and now to a battlefield ruled by autonomous machines, torrents of data, electronic deception, long-range missiles, and unblinking surveillance. As rivals sharpen their edge and field a generation raised on digital tools, the U.S. military should seize every advantage to stay ahead in training — especially one few expect: gaming.

The modern battlefield requires split-second decision-making, seamless coordination among distributed teams, the ability to see without being seen, and tools capable of quickly processing vast amounts of information, all under extreme pressure. As I have learned over the last year, as an advisor to August Interactive, a gaming studio, these are exactly the skills that well-designed military gaming programs can develop and refine.

Unlike traditional military wargaming — which typically involves structured, turn-based exercises on maps or models to explore campaign plans and strategic concepts — the gaming discussed here draws heavily on digital interactive platforms, including modified commercial titles and purpose-built military simulations. These environments — ranging from real-time strategy games to tactical shooters, flight simulators, and cyber-themed games — emphasize rapid continuous decision-making, high-pressure coordination, and immersive skill development. While both approaches aim to sharpen judgment and prepare leaders for complex scenarios, this form of military gaming leverages the speed, interactivity, and scale of modern gaming technology to cultivate competencies that are difficult to replicate in traditional wargaming formats. And they are also more engaging and fun, which is a good thing.

The U.S. military should formally embrace and invest in advanced digital gaming as a core training tool, leveraging its ability to build critical cognitive, coordination, and technical skills for modern warfare. Doing so will maintain America’s training edge against rivals who are already integrating gaming into their military preparation.

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Beyond Entertainment: Gaming as Tactical Training

Military gaming isn’t just about soldiers playing commercial video games during their free time. It’s about utilizing advanced simulation technologies to create realistic training environments that are too complex or too expensive to reproduce physically. The Army’s Synthetic Training Environment and CAE’s Naval Combat Systems Simulator for tactical training already demonstrate this concept, but the U.S. military should continue to set the global standard for training excellence by aiming even higher, and military gaming is the next needed evolution.

Consider the cognitive demands of modern warfare. Units must protect themselves from detection and attack while also creating opportunities to launch lethal effects. They must operate in areas dominated by layered threats, including electronic jamming, drones, sensors, and missiles. They must gain a decision advantage by acquiring, processing, analyzing, and acting on large amounts of data faster than their adversary. They must generate localized combat power to overcome the mass and momentum advantage of their enemies and then, just as quickly, disperse to reduce vulnerability. These scenarios can be practiced repeatedly and at greater scale in virtual environments, allowing leaders and soldiers to refine skills, tactics, and decision-making frameworks before lives are on the line, ensuring America retains its unmatched training advantage.

Getting Specific

Video games can develop several skills relevant to modern military applications, particularly in contexts involving sophisticated adversaries like China and Russia. The U.S. military has used modified commercial games for training, and some branches actively recruit gamers for certain roles requiring these skill sets. Some examples of games that can be used to teach critical skills include:

Strategic and Tactical Thinking

Real-time strategy games (StarCraft II, Command & Conquer, the Total War series, Age of Empires, Civilization VI, Hearts of Iron IV, Europa Universalis) develop multi-level strategic thinking, resource management, and the ability to adapt tactics quickly. These skills translate to operational planning and battlefield decision-making.

Situational Awareness and Multitasking

First-person shooters and tactical shooters (Warhammer, World of Warcraft, Rainbow Six Siege, the Arma series, Valorant, Apex Legends, Call of Duty, Overwatch, Insurgency: Sandstorm) enhance spatial awareness, threat detection, the ability to process multiple information streams simultaneously, and company to squad level tactics as well as tactical communication and movements, all critical for modern battlefield environments with complex sensor networks.

Precision and Fine Motor Control

While there’s understandable debate about games that feature first-person shooters, what players actually value and develop from these games goes beyond surface-level combat simulation. The real skills include extreme precision under pressure, split-second hand-eye coordination, micro-movements for accuracy, and the ability to maintain steady performance during intense situations. Games like Valorant and Rainbow Six Siege demand millimeter-precise aiming and timing. These fine motor skills and precision capabilities are valuable for operating sophisticated military equipment, from advanced weapon systems to delicate technical instruments.

Team Coordination and Communication

Multiplayer tactical games (Rainbow Six Siege, Counter-Strike: Global Offensive, Squad, Insurgency, Valorant, Overwatch, League of Legends, Dota 2) develop clear communication protocols, leadership under pressure, and coordinated team movements. These directly apply to small unit tactics and joint operations.

Electronic Warfare and Cyber Skills

Games involving hacking mechanics or electronic warfare elements (the Watch Dogs series, Cyberpunk 2077, the Deus Ex series, Hacknet, Uplink, Grey Hack, Tom Clancy’s Ghost Recon series) can introduce concepts relevant to information warfare — increasingly important given China and Russia’s emphasis on cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

Drone and Remote Operations

Flight simulators and games involving unmanned systems (DCS World, Microsoft Flight Simulator, War Thunder, the Falcon BMS mod, IL-2 Sturmovik, Elite Dangerous, Star Citizen) can develop hand-eye coordination and spatial reasoning for operating drones, which are central to modern military operations.

Stress Management and Decision-Making

Competitive gaming environments (StarCraft II, Counter-Strike, League of Legends, Rocket League, fighting games like Street Fighter or Tekken) train rapid decision-making under pressure and maintaining performance during high-stress situations.

Pattern Recognition

Strategy games and puzzle games (Chess.com, Tetris, the Portal series, The Witness, StarCraft II, the Civilization series, Europa Universalis IV) enhance pattern recognition abilities, useful for intelligence analysis and threat assessment.

Attracting the Next Generation

Military gaming also addresses a critical recruitment challenge. Today’s potential recruits are digital natives who grew up with sophisticated interactive entertainment. They expect technology to be intuitive, engaging, and responsive. By incorporating gaming elements into training and operations, the Defense Department should demonstrate to recruits that the U.S. military continues to lead in innovation, imagination, and critical thinking — values that ensure it remains the world’s most advanced fighting force. The Army’s recent success with esports teams and gaming-focused recruitment campaigns shows that this approach is effective. When young Americans see the military engaging with the technologies they use and understand, they’re more likely to view military service as a feasible career option.

Building Critical Skills

The most compelling case for military gaming lies not in its technology, but in the unique competencies it develops — skills that traditional training methods, despite their continued importance, struggle to replicate at scale and under realistic conditions.

Distributed Teamwork Across Distances

Modern military operations increasingly require seamless coordination between units separated by continents, not miles. I’ve witnessed firsthand how challenging it can be to maintain unit cohesion when your teams are scattered across multiple time zones, communicating through encrypted channels, and executing complex missions without ever meeting face-to-face. Gaming environments naturally teach this kind of remote collaboration, forcing participants to communicate clearly, share critical information efficiently, and execute intricate plans with teammates they may never see.

Rapid Adaptation

The most effective military gaming scenarios don’t follow predictable scripts. Rather, they constantly introduce new variables, unexpected complications, and evolving threats. This mirrors the reality of modern warfare, where enemies adapt their tactics daily and technology shifts the battlefield faster than doctrine can keep pace. Through repeated exposure to dynamic scenarios, soldiers develop the mental agility to pivot quickly when their initial plans meet unexpected resistance.

Systems Thinking

Today’s conflicts aren’t won or lost by individual heroics, but by understanding how technological, logistical, and human systems interconnect and influence each other. A single decision at the tactical level can cascade through intelligence networks, supply chains, and diplomatic channels. Well-designed gaming scenarios help soldiers visualize these connections and understand how their actions ripple through complex operational environments — a perspective that is difficult to develop through traditional field exercises alone.

Stress Inoculation for High-pressure Performance

While no simulation can perfectly replicate the stress of actual combat, competitive gaming environments can generate genuine pressure that affects decision-making and performance. The key is creating scenarios where failure has meaningful consequences within the training context, teaching soldiers to maintain their effectiveness when adrenaline is high and time is short. This isn’t about replacing combat experience. Rather, it’s about building the foundational resilience that helps soldiers perform when it matters most.

Learning from Adversaries

China and Russia aren’t dabbling. They are normalizing digital, game-like training at scale.

In February 2023, PLA Daily (please note I cannot responsibly link to these Chinese online sources because they may not be safe websites to visit in normal browsers) explicitly urged units to “upgrade existing video games and wargaming systems” and use intelligent simulation for human-machine confrontation training, highlighting virtual-real interaction and closed‑loop feedback — exactly the mechanics that modern digital games deliver.

Another PLA Daily feature in April 2023 described a virtual reality tactical assault shooting simulator and a “metaverse + game” training environment for small‑unit communication, movement, and decision‑making. Chinese military units report fielding VR and simulation labs at scale. Reports detail virtual reality parachute training for jumpers (2022), multi‑technology simulation platforms to accelerate skill generation (2022), and in April 2025 a People’s Liberation Army brigade built at least 10 simulation rooms using virtual reality to shorten training cycles across artillery, air defense, and reconnaissance specialties. The U.S. Defense Department has noted the Chinese military’s emphasis on more rigorous, realistic training, including simulated strikes — a sign of routine reliance on synthetic, game‑like environments to rehearse against U.S.‑relevant targets.

Russia is moving along a similar path, with official military schools codifying PC‑based simulator training for drone and anti-drone operators. The developers of another Russian video game, Squad 22: ZOV, claim it is recommended by the Russian military for training.

The lesson is straightforward: America’s competitors are blending commercial‑style game tech, virtual reality, and purpose‑built simulators into everyday force preparation, from small‑unit shooters and man-machine “blue force” confrontations to standardized PC‑simulator time for drone operators.

The Path Forward

For those who want the United States to keep its training edge, it is time to treat this not as a curiosity, but as core tradecraft — and resource it accordingly. To sustain America’s role as the world leader in military training and ensure that leadership extends into the next generation of warfare, here are three things U.S. defense leaders can do:

First, the Pentagon should dedicate funding and support for military gaming research and development. This involves forming partnerships with leading technology companies and universities to develop training systems that utilize the latest advances in artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and cloud computing.

Second, the Defense Department should develop standardized metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of gaming. Just as the department and services assess traditional training methods, they need rigorous evaluation tools to ensure gaming programs meet their intended goals.

Third, it is time for a cultural shift. Senior civilian and uniformed leaders should openly and repeatedly endorse gaming as a valid training tool, not a distraction from “real” military skills. This involves educating leaders about gaming’s potential and clearly communicating its role in larger training efforts.

The Bottom Line

I visited the gaming center at West Point last spring. I was impressed with the setup and technological capabilities, but I was even more impressed by the insights shared with me by combat-experienced officers and non-commissioned officers overseeing the program. The positive impact on cadet leadership development was remarkable: improved communication skills, quicker decision-making, and faster adaptability to change. Notably, many intercollegiate athletes there are involved in military gaming.

Gaming isn’t about replacing traditional military training. It’s about enhancing it. Physical fitness, marksmanship, tactical execution, and discipline remain fundamental to military effectiveness and lethality. But in an era when warfare increasingly involves human-machine teaming, information warfare, and complex multi-domain operations, the U.S. military needs training tools that prepare soldiers for these realities.

Every military innovation is met with resistance from those who prefer traditional methods. However, history demonstrates that nation’s leading in training innovation consistently dominate future battlefields. The U.S. military has always been that leader — and by embracing gaming, America can ensure it stays at the forefront of military readiness and operational excellence.

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Gen. (ret) Joseph L. Votel is the former commanding general of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command. He is a senior advisor to August Interactive, a games and immersive experiences studio. None of the games mentioned in this article were produced by August Interactive.

Image: Senior Airman Kristine M. Gruwell via Little Rock Air Force Base

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9. From Shield to Spear: How Golden Dome Points the Way toward Breaking China’s Kill Web

Excerpts:

Modern warfare favors those who sense fast, decide faster, and act fastest. Against a centralized and synchronized adversary, that advantage is magnified. By targeting operational coherence at its source, the United States could impose its own rhythm, turning the People’s Liberation Army’s strength into vulnerability. The shield that defends the homeland may instead sever command networks, blind sensors, scramble timing, and leave the kill web disjointed before it can act.

Golden Dome’s greatest power lies not in what it stops, but in signaling what space capabilities prevent. When space-based interceptors reach into the enemy’s system, they strike at the processes that coordinate China’s forces. They make the first strike less certain. They make the kill web less synchronized. They make the adversary less capable. In a Pacific conflict, the first move is the most lethal—and the weapon that can unravel the enemy’s coherence becomes the instrument of decisive advantage. The shield still defends.

The spear still strikes. Operational coherence is the linchpin—and space-based interceptors hold the key to severing it. If the system is fractured first, the war may never fully materialize. In modern war, the first strike is not only judged by what lands, but by also what never arrives.

From Shield to Spear: How Golden Dome Points the Way toward Breaking China’s Kill Web - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Matthew Smokovitz · August 28, 2025

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If the United States fights China on China’s terms, it may risk collapse in the opening hours. Such a war would not begin with a slow exchange of fire—it would be a race between the two sides to sever the other’s ability to think and act as a single, coordinated force. Beijing has spent decades forging its warfighting system into a tightly integrated brain and nervous system. Theater commanders fuse data from satellites, over-the-horizon radars, airborne sensors, and undersea arrays into a shared real-time picture. From this picture, precisely timed orders flow to air, sea, and missile forces. That operational coherence—seeing, deciding, and striking as one—is what turns scattered operational assets into a lethal, synchronized kill web.

That coherence is China’s greatest strength and its most brittle hinge. When missile salvos arrive just as bombers spring in from their launch points, when submarines maneuver without orders because their neural network tells them the enemy’s retreat path—this is operational synchronization in action. But when data flows stall, when timing errors creep in, that neural network misfires. Missiles still launch, radars still receive—but the system fights as a collection of disjointed parts. Strikes fizzle. Orders lag. Reflexes fail.

Traditionally, the United States has attacked such integrated systems by methodically rolling them back—destroying radars, missile batteries, and command centers one by one. In Desert Storm, in the Balkans, that worked. But against China’s kill web? It is a slow, costly path to disaster. Mobile launchers reposition before they are struck. Redundant sensors light back up. Alternate comms routes reroute data. The brain and nervous system remain intact even as its limbs are wounded.

This is where Golden Dome enters the discussion. Conceived as a homeland missile shield, Golden Dome envisions a multilayered architecture—with one layer even space-based—using both sensors and interceptors in orbit. This space layer is vital for defense—it is a vantage point above the battlefield no terrestrial platform can match. But as the concept takes shape, it makes clear that such a layer will possibly be necessary to countering China’s kill web. Space-based interceptors are not just tools to strike incoming missiles targeting the US homeland and its interests; they can also hold the enemy’s neural infrastructure at risk.

From orbit, interceptors may project effects across the kill web in a single sweep. Directed-energy weapons could blind or degrade intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, narrowing the commander’s field of vision. Cyber payloads could infiltrate fusion nodes, injecting phantom ships, ghost launchers, and false threats into their digital battlespace. Precision interference with navigation satellites could scramble missile salvo timing—delaying a strike by seconds or minutes, long enough to turn a coordinated hammer blow into scattered, ineffective fire.

These are not science-fiction fantasies. The United States already tests directed-energy weapons capable of sensor damage, interferes with navigation in civilian and military domains, and employs cyber effects to corrupt enemy command and control systems under its “persistent engagement” doctrine. While not fully mature or operationalized at scale, these technologies are progressing quickly. What is novel is envisioning them combined from orbit—simultaneously, preemptively, and across the entire network.

This strike is likely not gradual; it is instantaneous. Orbiting interceptors could plunge into the enemy kill web’s senses, scorching its eyesight. Then they scramble its synapses and timing. As the kill web stumbles, clandestinely placed unmanned systems move in. Autonomous surface vessels strike coastal radar sites. Air-launched drones swarm mobile missile batteries. Undersea drones cut seabed sensors and submarine comms—all while People’s Liberation Army detection struggles to keep time and space coherent.

The effects continue to snowball. Decision-makers are forced into fragmentary choices. A surface action group may move without air support. A missile battery may fire before the target enters range, or after it has passed. Aircraft may arrive only to find the windows of opportunity to strike have closed. The kill web, once a synchronized organism, becomes a lattice of failing parts. Openings spread. The advantage slides into United States hands.

This is a strategic shift from attrition to disruption, from destruction to paralysis. The goal is not to eliminate every node. The goal is to sever the neural connections that give the system its power. Operational coherence is the target. Weapons, sensors, and platforms may exist—but without coordination, they cannot fight as one. Space-based interceptors, with their speed and ability to exert simultaneous effects across the battlespace, appear the most effective instrument for doing this.

By accepting the premise that space-based assets seem critical to countering China’s kill web, the question then becomes: Which assets? One option, of course, is to plan and develop the capabilities separately from Golden Dome. A more cost-effective option, however, is simply to operationalize Golden Dome with such a use case in mind. Critics will argue using the Golden Dome offensively escalates conflict—that weaponizing a homeland defense asset is reckless. But escalation is not reversed by passivity. China’s doctrine emphasizes seizing the initiative; its kill web exists to do exactly that. Doing nothing cedes the opening salvo. Disrupting coherence is not reckless—it is precise, systemic, and deterrent. It targets the enemy’s central nervous system, not its cities. It renders the first strike less likely, not more. That is escalation control through denial.

Moreover, neither Golden Dome as a homeland defense system nor an implementation that enables offensive use during wartime violates the Outer Space Treaty, and the loudest critic of US plans to place systems like these in space is China—who is leaning ahead aggressively to enhance its own space-based military capabilities.

Regardless of whether the assets required to defeat China’s kill web are included in Golden Dome’s development or not, execution utilizing space-based effectors in wartime will demand resilient United States command and control—hardened against retaliation—and secure, redundant communications linking space effects to unmanned follow-on forces. Timing must be exact. Success is measured not simply by the destruction of individual nodes or munitions expended, but by the degree of operational coherence denied to the adversary.

In a Pacific war, victory won’t come from intercepting every missile or destroying every launch site. It will come from denying China the ability to fight as one coherent force. Space-based interceptors strike at the system’s brain and nervous system, disrupting information flow, timing precision, and unity of action—turning our conceptualization of space from that of a shield into one of a spear capable of ending the war before it begins.

Modern warfare favors those who sense fast, decide faster, and act fastest. Against a centralized and synchronized adversary, that advantage is magnified. By targeting operational coherence at its source, the United States could impose its own rhythm, turning the People’s Liberation Army’s strength into vulnerability. The shield that defends the homeland may instead sever command networks, blind sensors, scramble timing, and leave the kill web disjointed before it can act.

Golden Dome’s greatest power lies not in what it stops, but in signaling what space capabilities prevent. When space-based interceptors reach into the enemy’s system, they strike at the processes that coordinate China’s forces. They make the first strike less certain. They make the kill web less synchronized. They make the adversary less capable. In a Pacific conflict, the first move is the most lethal—and the weapon that can unravel the enemy’s coherence becomes the instrument of decisive advantage. The shield still defends.

The spear still strikes. Operational coherence is the linchpin—and space-based interceptors hold the key to severing it. If the system is fractured first, the war may never fully materialize. In modern war, the first strike is not only judged by what lands, but by also what never arrives.

Major Matthew “Niner” Smokovitz is a current fellow at the United States Air Force Academy, Institute of Future Conflict and a graduated instructor of the United States Air Force Weapons School.

The views expressed are those of the author, are based on personal open-source research, and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: NASA

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mwi.westpoint.edu · Matthew Smokovitz · August 28, 2025

10. Reconnaissance-Strike Battle in the Mojave Desert: How Centaur Squadron Prepares Army Units to Win the First Fight on Tomorrow’s Battlefield

Ah... those Krasnovians. We fight them at NTC and on paper at Leavenworth.

Excerpts:

Since 1994 the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has supported the NTC mission of preparing units to win the first fight of the next war. As Krasnovians, Bilasuvar Liberation Front militia, and now Donovians, the regiment has adapted and changed across thirty-one years of dedicated service to best prepare the Army for combat. Today, that adaptation takes the form of Centaur Squadron, a purpose-built reconnaissance and security formation that integrates real world-observations on battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures into a paradigm of a tactical reconnaissance-strike regime to challenge any Army formation unprepared for the reality of battle within the Mojave Desert. And like our predecessors who shared their observations with their rotational training unit counterparts to best prepare them for real-world operations, we look forward to sharing our own observations, lessons, and best practices with the Army.

The price of failure in combat has never been higher. We cannot be caught unready.

Reconnaissance-Strike Battle in the Mojave Desert: How Centaur Squadron Prepares Army Units to Win the First Fight on Tomorrow’s Battlefield - Modern War Institute

Kevin T. Black, Tarik Fulcher, Ethan Christensen, Daniel Gaston and Joshua Ratta | 08.29.25

mwi.westpoint.edu · Kevin T. Black

In 1981, the Army created the National Training Center and gave it a critical task: to prepare units to “win the first fight.” Central to that task is an OPFOR—the opposition force—that presents rotational training units with realistic military problems. But doing so is a moving target. The perpetually changing character of warfare demands a dynamic opposition force capable of developments in technology and in tactics, techniques, and procedures. How is the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment “Blackhorse” adapting to meet that imperative? And what can units expect when they encounter Blackhorse OPFOR at the National Training Center?

A few months ago, Major Zackery Spear and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Culler took to the digital pages of the Modern War Institute to call for the US Army to adopt reconnaissance-strike battle as a tactical construct in order to properly implement multidomain operations, as well as for the Army’s combat training centers like the National Training Center (NTC) to create dedicated reconnaissance-strike complex formations to teach rotational training brigades how to survive and win in such an environment. At NTC, this is not some far-off imagined future, but an emerging cornerstone of how the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment gives units their worst day in the desert. It takes the form of the regiment’s Centaur Squadron—a purpose-built reconnaissance and security formation that combines legacy manned and new unmanned platforms to answer priority intelligence requirements, continually challenge brigade combat teams across all nine forms of contact, and preserve Blackhorse combat power for key periods of operations while attritting and shaping a brigade prior to main body contact.

Reconnaissance and Strike on the Modern Battlefield

Professional discussions about combat training centers typically focus on how difficult a rotation can be for training units. But making it difficult is itself immensely challenging for the OPFOR unit, which must ingest observations from real-world conflicts and incorporate them rapidly into its own operating procedures.

For the Blackhorse Regiment, successful reconnaissance and strike operations have long been key to allowing the OPFOR to continuously challenge a variety of rotational training units, despite possessing just 40 percent of an armored brigade combat team’s combat power. Yet, while the regiment’s division and brigade tactical groups may possess plenty of sensors and indirect fires assets, successful employment of such diverse capabilities has become increasingly difficult in light of several observed factors.

First, the modern challenge in warfare’s information dimension is not one of scarcity but of abundance, synchronization, and dissemination. As repeatedly observed, the combined array and availability of sensors has rendered the battlefield increasingly transparent—particularly in the open spaces of the Mojave Desert. However, achieving such transparency is often more difficult than initially presumed, for two reasons. The first is that such a diverse array of sensors must be properly synchronized and allocated to not only correctly orient on requisite named and targeted areas of interest but also ensure assets such as a scout observation post and ground surveillance radar site are not colocated within the same condensed area of operations. The second reason is that while the battlefield may be easier to observe, it is not easier to interpret, both due to the impact of adversary deception operations and the need for large amounts of human and machine analytical power to decipher such a vast array of information and turn it into actionable intelligence. Even if successfully gathered and interpreted, this information must still be passed to the appropriate formations and decision-makers within windows of anticipated usefulness.

Second, the rotational brigade also has an array of sensors that must be denied the ability to collect on the OPFOR brigade tactical group (BTG). The transparent battlefield is a double-edged sword. Thus, while the rotational unit and its parent division headquarters may not have quite as many sensors as the OPFOR, they are nonetheless fully capable of not only answering brigade priority intelligence requirements but also identifying and targeting key Blackhorse capabilities and formations, from mechanized infantry platoons to rocket artillery batteries. Already outnumbered nearly eight to one, Blackhorse cannot afford any losses prior to main body contact and must therefore consistently win both the reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance fight. However, Blackhorse combat power limitations also demand that any security or counterreconnaissance mission must be executed as an economy-of-force task and not detract from already limited brigade and division tactical group (DTG) combat power.

Third, the DTG possesses a litany of strike assets, but their employment must be precise and produce measurable effects for the DTG and subordinate BTGs. While the traditional definition of strike within a reconnaissance-strike regime refers to indirect fires capability, the Blackhorse Regiment possesses additional kinetic and nonkinetic means to strike a rotational brigade, including multispectrum jamming, psychological warfare and information operations, and cyberattacks. Yet, use of these assets comes with a dilemma. Although attachment to the BTG may keep such enablers closer to the fight and poised to react to quickly changing battlefield conditions, in practice a BTG staff is nothing more than a battalion staff asked to operate one echelon higher than normal, which means it lacks both the expertise and the bandwidth to fully integrate such enablers. This is especially true for enablers that operate on different regeneration and effect cycles or have wide areas of impact, such as electronic warfare jamming equipment whose employment risks fratricide if not carefully coordinated and planned for. Conversely, centralization at the DTG risks desynchronizing their employment with subordinate unit maneuver and engaging in a deep fight with limited follow-on benefit in the close fight.

Finally, increased capability has demanded increased synchronization. For decades, Blackhorse prioritization of simple, flexible plans easily adaptable to changes in rotational unit battlefield deployment has enabled the regiment to repeatedly outmaneuver its opponents while gaining and maintaining decision dominance. However, as Blackhorse has added more capabilities, the resultant additional synchronization required for their employment has threatened such simplicity and flexibility and risks placing the BTG in a stand-up battle of attrition it is ill-postured to win.

Blackhorse Adaptation

For six months across the fall and winter of 2024–2025, leaders across the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment debated how these four central challenges risked creating an environment in which the regiment could no longer fulfill its mission of preparing units to win the first battle of the next war. Constrained by largely inflexible budgets and personnel limitations like most of the Army, the situation initially looked insurmountable—until the regiment realized that just as “yesterday’s weapons will not win tomorrow’s wars” neither would yesterday’s organizations. The unit’s leadership sought, as an initial and most consequential change, a new organization capable of solving such challenges through a unique meshing of key leaders and capabilities: Centaur Squadron.

Like the regiment’s mechanized infantry battalions, Centaur is formed by the merging of two troops within the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment: Killer Troop (an antitank troop) and the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop. While Centaur is a flexible organization tailorable to a specific mission set, its habitual task organization consists of three “Hot 3” antitank platoons and roughly a company of BTR-87 armored personnel carriers from Killer Troop, the regiment’s two scout platoons, and the UAS platoon from the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop. Killer Troop’s commander acts as Centaur commander and the headquarters troop commander serves as deputy commander.

As an adjacent unit to the BTG, Centaur Squadron works directly for the DTG, specifically the regimental targeting and integration cell (RTIC). The RTIC is where niche enablers including the regimental fires cell, information operations and electronic warfare section, and military intelligence company reside in a lean, hyperfocused targeting cell specifically tasked with enabling the destruction of the rotational brigade along five operational principles.

Flexible Task Organization. While the core of Centaur’s task organization remains the same, careful analysis of the mission variables will see the formation augmented with BTG mortar platoons, mechanized infantry platoons, and even dismounted infantry squads to assist in its reconnaissance and security mission.
Manned-Unmanned Teaming. Although cavalry scouts remain the premier regimental reconnaissance asset, attritable unmanned systems allow the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to extend the depth of its reconnaissance-strike complex and penetrate protected rear areas. This task is assisted by careful regimental unmanned aircraft system (UAS) distribution, based on subordinate element requirements, responsibility within the larger DTG/BTG fight, and capacity to manage UAS employment and synchronization.
Layered Reconnaissance. Despite the array of sensors on the modern battlefield, any individual sensor not only has hard, baked-in limitations, but is still prone to failure from mechanical malfunction, weather or terrain impediment, and adversary targeting and destruction. Thus, the regiment must still use the reconnaissance management techniques of cueing, mixing, and redundancy to gain and maintain persistent contact with an opposing brigade.
Intelligence-derived maneuver. The byproduct of persistent adversary contact is a consistent stream of reports that can overwhelm any headquarters not equipped with sufficient staff capacity to handle such a high volume of information. Within the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the RTIC leads the regimental intelligence effort to rapidly analyze gathered information, answer priority information requirements, package intelligence into digestible summaries tied to specific subordinate formation requirements, and disseminate such intelligence to requesting formations down to leading mechanized infantry platoons along the FLOT—the forward line of own troops. This ensures no leader across the regiment makes a decision in combat without the best possible intelligence.
Tactical control of operational-level enablers. While the RTIC alone possesses the inherent staff capacity to analyze the entirety of the battlefield, its direct management of exquisite regimental enablers risks desynchronization from the tactical fight and reduced effectiveness. Instead, while the RTIC translates the DTG commander’s targeting priorities into targeting guidance at the daily targeting working group based on input from enabler subject matter experts, precise tactical employment and positioning of such capabilities are left to the authority of Centaur leaders. These leaders’ forward location and detailed understanding of the squadron’s arrayal allows for a mission command–based approach to accomplishing the DTG commander’s intent.

While these five operational principles detail how Centaur thinks about fighting, the squadron uses a three-phase model to execute its fight during rotations. The first phase is deployment. This begins with rollout from the Fort Irwin cantonment area and ends once the squadron has fully occupied its security zone in front of the BTG. To ensure maximum survivability of all elements, scout platoon BRDM armored scout vehicles lead Centaur into its area of operations. Mounted observation posts are established by competitively infiltrating to observe templated named areas of interest, enabling ground combat elements to be pulled into cleared battle positions. Once these elements have occupied their battle positions, the final slice of the squadron, its UAS and electronic warfare attack/surveillance teams, move into sector. Selecting positions as close to the forward edge of the security zone as possible maximizes their effects across the depth of the rotational brigade.

Next comes reconnaissance and security operations. Once established in a security zone, Centaur maintains contact with the rotational brigade until it has reached its preplanned disengagement criteria, at which point it conducts an rearward passage of lines through the BTG. Mimicking observations from both the ongoing war in Ukraine and ongoing adversary adaptations, contact is maintained with the brigade through two contact zones: (1) a manned contact zone occupied by the majority of Centaur’s traditional ground combat power in an area about three to five kilometers deep, depending on terrain, and (2) an unmanned contact zone extending out another five to ten kilometers toward the rotational brigade. Importantly, while both manned elements exist in the unmanned zone and unmanned elements exist in the manned zone, Blackhorse uses these terms to indicate whether manned or unmanned systems compromise the primary reconnaissance-strike elements.

The final phase is over-the-shoulder support. Up until this point, Centaur Squadron has largely mimicked the role of a brigade or division cavalry formation operating in a security zone forward of the main body, just with slightly higher UAS usage and integration with higher-echelon enablers. However, it is during phase three that Centaur truly demonstrates its value to the regiment—and, notably, its value to the larger Army as a model, with its embrace of reconnaissance-strike battle. Even as its Killer Troop antitank capabilities and BTR platoons return to the DTG support area to prepare for follow-on missions, its UAS and electronic warfare attack/surveillance teams occupy subsequent positions within forward mechanized infantry battalion areas of operations. The regiment does not collapse the unmanned and manned contact zones, but rather shifts them with the progress of the rotational brigade, with defending mechanized infantry battalions taking the burden of the manned contact zone while a reduced Centaur Squadron maintains the unmanned zone. This presents the attacking brigade with an uncomfortable reality. Although the BTG’s main battle area doctrinally demands the massing of the rotational brigade’s combat power for a combined arms breach, Centaur’s ability to maintain multiple forms of contact with the brigade out to approximately fifteen kilometers of depth punishes such an approach. Centaur and the DTG thereby continuously shape and attrit an opposing brigade across the depth of its formation in concert with the BTG fight.

At end state, the rotational brigade has culminated short of its objectives. With the combination of Centaur’s reconnaissance-strike complex and the BTG’s prepared defense, the brigade’s ability to mass its superior combat power is disrupted and disintegrated and it is left vulnerable to a concentrated BTG attack against an isolated combined arms battalion. The squadron not only provides over-the-shoulder support to help disrupt the brigade cavalry squadron’s attempt at establishing a security zone, but also uses its UAS to penetrate the brigade’s security zone to target and collect on the brigade within its main battle area. This disrupts the rotational brigade’s defense and helps direct the attacking BTG towards the brigade’s most vulnerable battalion.

Since 1994 the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has supported the NTC mission of preparing units to win the first fight of the next war. As Krasnovians, Bilasuvar Liberation Front militia, and now Donovians, the regiment has adapted and changed across thirty-one years of dedicated service to best prepare the Army for combat. Today, that adaptation takes the form of Centaur Squadron, a purpose-built reconnaissance and security formation that integrates real world-observations on battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures into a paradigm of a tactical reconnaissance-strike regime to challenge any Army formation unprepared for the reality of battle within the Mojave Desert. And like our predecessors who shared their observations with their rotational training unit counterparts to best prepare them for real-world operations, we look forward to sharing our own observations, lessons, and best practices with the Army.

The price of failure in combat has never been higher. We cannot be caught unready.

Colonel Kevin Black is an armor officer who currently serves as the 71st colonel of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California. Previous assignments include command of 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, multiple staff assignments in the Pentagon, G3 for the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and operational deployments to Afghanistan, to Iraq, and in support of the Security Assistance Group Ukraine.

Lieutenant Colonel Tarik Fulcher is an armor officer who currently serves as the regimental deputy commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California. Previous assignments include executive officer to the commanding general of the Security Assistance Group Ukraine, US Army Europe and Africa G5 plans branch chief, School of Advanced Military Studies, and key developmental positions in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas.

Captain Daniel Gaston is an armor officer currently serving as an OC/T at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Previous assignments include commander of Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and commander of Dealer Company, 1/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California.

Captain Joshua Ratta is an armor officer who currently serves as the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California. Previous assignments include commander of Bravo Troop, 1/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; tank platoon leader, distribution platoon leader, tank company executive officer, and battalion maintenance officer with 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team at Fort Carson, Colorado.

Captain Ethan Christensen is an infantry officer who currently serves as the commander of Killer Troop, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California. Previous assignments include commander of Easy Troop, 2/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; Bradley platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, Regionally Aligned Forces Division (FWD) liaison officer, and Headquarters and Headquarters Company executive officer with 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 2rd Armored Brigade Combat Team at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Capt. Evan Cain, US Army

mwi.westpoint.edu · Kevin T. Black

11. FUNCTIONAL FITNESS: IMPROVING RETENTION AND FIGHTING “BRAIN DRAIN”

Excerpt:

The army’s functional areas represent a strategic investment in talent management that addresses contemporary retention challenges while building institutional capability. Rather than creating “brain drain” from basic branches, functional areas provide alternative career paths that retain officers. As the army continues evolving its talent management approach, functional areas should be viewed as a necessary relief valve to stem the tide of the “brain drain” to the civilian world. The changing talent landscape, especially officer demographics, generational desire for career autonomy, and empirical evidence, all argue for expanding rather than constraining officers’ career options. Functional area specialization provides a proven mechanism for achieving this objective while maintaining the army’s competitive advantage in an increasingly complex strategic environment.

FUNCTIONAL FITNESS: IMPROVING RETENTION AND FIGHTING “BRAIN DRAIN”

Paul Kearney , Dennis Halleran August 28, 2025

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/functional-fitness/

In fact, this article shows that the core tension isn’t between basic branches and functional areas, but between functional areas and leaving the Army.

The contemporary U.S. Army faces significant challenges in retaining high-quality officer talent. Studies indicate that only 47% of company-grade officers continue service beyond their initial active-duty service obligation), with particularly acute losses among West Point graduates and ROTC scholarship recipients—precisely those officers in whom the army has invested most heavily. The reserve components have long had a retention crisis, particularly for command billets. The retention crisis has prompted re-examination of the factors driving talented officers to pursue civilian careers, compensation differentials, limited career autonomy, family strain, and misalignment between individual talents and organizational assignments frequently cited as primary concerns.

Against this backdrop, critics have raised concerns about the Army’s functional area specialization program. Some, like David Barno have suggested it creates “brain drain” from basic combat arms branches like infantry, armor, and field artillery with the best officers from basic branches. Others like R.D. Hooker Jr. suggest that officers who go to functional areas are marginal performers, those who want to avoid the “hard” jobs in combat arms to coast with minimal effort, or both. These opposing viewpoints are asserted without empirical evidence. This article tests both assertions. Recent pilot surveys suggest that rather than depleting talent or providing safe haven for “quiet quitters,” functional areas serve as a critical retention mechanism that preserves institutional knowledge and maintains the army’s competitive advantage for both the service at large and for the basic branches. In fact, this article shows that the core tension isn’t between basic branches and functional areas, but between functional areas and leaving the Army.

OPMS and the Origin of Functional Areas

While the army’s branches have been evolving and changing with the character of war, the introduction of functional areas represented a significant departure from most previous evolutions. In the late 1990s, the army created and redefined functional areas under OPMS XXI to reform officer management for the 21st century. Previously, officers held dual specialties: their basic branch and a functional area designation. In theory, this was a way to ensure sufficient density of basic branch officers, while allowing officers to gain depth in particular niches.

Yet the OPMS XXI Task Force found that in practice dual-track approach (branch + FA) wasn’t delivering depth: “the current dual-track system is producing relatively few officers with true functional area expertise and experience.” The dual-track system not only failed to provide officers with depth in their functional areas, but the Task Force was also concerned that officers’ tactical proficiency was suffering. The Task Force noted that field-grade officers’ time in key developmental positions was shortened, and many were spending the preponderance of their field-grade years outside of their basic branch. In fact, about two-thirds of combat arms field-grade officers were serving outside their branch at any given time.

Twenty years later, in a study of the effects of OPMS XXI, Susan Bryant and Heidi Urben found evidence that OPMS XXI likely had a positive impact on retaining certain officer cohorts. Functional areas effectively acted as retention valves, keeping talented but non-traditional officers, many with advanced degrees and academic experience, in uniform when they might otherwise have exited.

The Retention Challenge: Understanding Officer Career Decisions

Recent research reveals that officer retention decisions are driven by factors fundamentally different than previous generations. Today’s officer corps consists predominantly of dual-career families, with well over 60% of military spouses employed or actively seeking employment. Most workers in the generations available for military service (18 years to around 45 years old) believe that dual incomes are essential for financial security. This demographic shift causes the “PCS Penalty,” where frequent relocations impose substantial financial and career costs on military families, potentially reducing lifetime earnings by $400,000 to $1.2 million.

Beyond these family considerations, research indicates that retention is fundamentally linked to three core psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Officers who experience control over their professional development, opportunities to excel in their areas of expertise, and meaningful connections to their work demonstrate significantly higher retention rates across all career fields. These findings align with Self-Determination Theory, which posits that satisfaction of these basic psychological needs is essential for sustained motivation and organizational commitment.

Current officer timelines often miss these three components. They often lack autonomy as officers have few opportunities to change career fields after their pre-commissioning branch selection. Competence, which refers to feeling opportunities to build one’s skills in line with interests, is missing for officers whose basic branch’s core competencies lie outside of their interests. Misalignment can occur over time; an officer may be well-suited for junior tactical roles as an Infantry Platoon Leader, but lack the organizational acumen to lead a 700+ soldier Infantry Battalion. An officer’s skills and interests may change just as the skills and talent required at Lieutenant and Colonel ranks are different. A comprehensive RAND study of army talent management found that misalignment between individual talents and job requirements contributes significantly to officer dissatisfaction and voluntary separation. Relatedness, or the feeling of connection between an officer’s efforts and the larger mission, is often missing as officers in tactical formations feel like cogs in a wheel rather than captains at the helm. Army War College research connected the tenets of self-determination theory and officer retention that “effective talent management reinforces and links officer development, retention, and accessions programs” and that “assigning officers to positions leveraging their innate and acquired competencies can directly improve officer career satisfaction and success.”

Understanding the “Brain Drain” and “Quiet Quitting”

The most significant criticism of this model of officer talent management is a concern that functional areas siphon away top talent from basic branches. If true, this would be a huge concern. If the best and smartest officers left their basic branch, particularly combat arms branches, to play with applied mathematics (like FA49- ORSAs) or set up imaginary combat (like FA57s – Simulations Officers), then the Army would be like the cliche warning against having an army in which the fighting is done by fools and the thinking by cowards.

Taking an opposite tack, other critics claim that officers who switch to functional areas do so to escape the hard work emblematic of combat arms service. These critics believe that officers who switch to functional areas are content with doing the bare minimum; they claim officers are “quiet quitting” in functional areas.

The critiques rest on two fundamental assumptions that are very different. The first critique rests on the testable assumption that functional area officers really are the best officers from their respective basic branches. The second critique can be tested by seeing if functional area officers’ career outcomes are changed after transitioning to a functional area. And last, the OPMS XXI assertion that the voluntary transfers to a functional area serve as a retention mechanism can be tested through a new pilot survey of functional area officers.

Empirical Evidence: Functional Area Performance

As for the first assumption, the evidence shows that functional area officers are not universally top performers in their basic branch. The RAND research looking at the voluntary transfer incentive program for functional areas showed that for the researched period of 2012-2019, “functional areas struggled to attract officers who meet the army’s quality threshold on military performance,” and “officers with low performance disproportionately apply for transfer to a functional area.” However, it should be noted that the quality of applicants actually selected varies greatly depending on the functional area, with some having more rigorous accession criteria than others. This finding undercuts the “brain drain” argument.

Quantitative analysis of promotion and retention data revealed that functional areas consistently outperform Army averages in officer retention metrics.

The second assumption would accept the above empirical findings, but also assume that these “quiet quitting” officers would continue to underperform. However, this same RAND study found different results when looking at post-transfer promotion rates. Quantitative analysis of promotion and retention data revealed that functional areas consistently outperform Army averages in officer retention metrics. Examining promotion rates from the same time period, the author found that multiple functional areas exceeded Army Competitive Category averages at both major and lieutenant colonel levels. Specifically, FAs 30, 29, 59, 50, 51, 48, 49, 34, and 52 exceeded average promotion rates to major, while FAs 47, 59, 34, 49, 51, 50, 48, 56, and 52 exceeded average promotion rates to lieutenant colonel. This suggests that switching from a basic branch officer to a specialization changed their performance. This could be due to a number of factors, including better talent/interest match, effective education/training qualification pipelines, or greater career autonomy.

Perhaps the starkest finding concerns the third assumption. Testing the OPMS assertion that functional areas serve as retention tools, we found significant support. In a short-run, pilot survey of army functional area officers, nearly two-thirds (62%) of functional area officers responded that if switching into a functional area were not an option, they would have either “absolutely” left service (24%) or “most likely would” have left service (38%). Write-in comments on the pilot survey also pointed to aspects of self-determination theory including autonomy (“Absolutely no interest in my basic branch career path. Overly restrictive and deeply uninteresting”), relatedness (“I’m allowed to engage in more meaningful work and projects with a larger impact”), and competence (“It allowed me to go to a specialty where my strengths are amplified rather than my weaknesses”). Many other comments explicitly referenced dissatisfaction with basic branches: “I didn’t choose my branch, the Army chose it for me,” and more colorful comments like, “I was [field artillery] because I screwed around at [leader development and assessment course] and a bunch of us got forced into being [field artillery]. And then I spend my time in Afghanistan being a second-rate infantryman, tagging along with a PL [platoon leader], but not actually getting to lead shit… If I could have left with any sort of savings, I would have… I was trapped and becoming a Sims officers [FA57] was the only way I could stay in the Army to retirement without wanting to take a toaster bath every night.” While this pilot would need to be expanded and include a better sample of functional area officers, it validated claims made by the 2017 Bryant & Urban study that functional areas are effective retention tools.

The Blended Retirement System: Structural Disincentives and the Need for Career Alternatives

Why be concerned about functional areas and officer retention now? Beyond debunking the claims of a combat arms “brain drain,” the army is in a critical window. The army’s transition from the traditional 20-year cliff-vesting pension to the Blended Retirement System (BRS) in 2018 has fundamentally altered the cost-benefit calculation for officer retention, inadvertently creating structural incentives that favor leaving the Army earlier. Under the legacy High-36 retirement system, officers who separated before completing 20 years of service received no retirement benefits, creating a powerful financial incentive to remain through the full career. The BRS, however, provides immediate vesting of government retirement contributions through the Thrift Savings Plan after just two years of service, with full portability upon separation. This reduction of opportunity costs for leaving at the 8-12 year mark (precisely the functional area transfer window) puts the army in a tough spot.

Here, the pilot study gives a peek into officers’ thinking. While 24% of functional area officers polled would have “absolutely” left the Army if transferring to a functional area was not available, when given the scenario of having a portable BRS retirement package (TSP-vesting), the number of respondents who would have “absolutely” left service doubled to 48% with an additional increase in total respondents who would have “absolutely” or “strongly considered” to 69%. This, again, requires further examination, but suggests that the choice is not between functional areas and basic branches, but between functional areas and leaving service; moreover, the maturation of the BRS may produce strong incentives for officers to leave. Without career flexibility, like changing into a functional area, officers who are dissatisfied with their basic branch will leave service entirely, representing a much worse brain drain.

Conclusion

The army’s functional areas represent a strategic investment in talent management that addresses contemporary retention challenges while building institutional capability. Rather than creating “brain drain” from basic branches, functional areas provide alternative career paths that retain officers. As the army continues evolving its talent management approach, functional areas should be viewed as a necessary relief valve to stem the tide of the “brain drain” to the civilian world. The changing talent landscape, especially officer demographics, generational desire for career autonomy, and empirical evidence, all argue for expanding rather than constraining officers’ career options. Functional area specialization provides a proven mechanism for achieving this objective while maintaining the army’s competitive advantage in an increasingly complex strategic environment.

Paul Kearney is an active-duty Army Strategist and GEN Andrew J Goodpaster Scholar completing his PhD at Duke University in Political Science. He holds degrees from the United States Military Academy, King’s College London, and Georgetown University.

Dennis Halleran is an active-duty Army strategist and GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster Scholar pursuing a PhD at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. His previous assignments include U.S. Africa Command and the Joint Staff J7. He holds degrees from Villanova University and the University of Florida.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Credit: Generated by Gemini

12. Pentagon terminates use of China-based engineers to support cloud systems

What were we thinking? Who does not recognize the threat posed here?

Excellent work by the Fourth Estate. This is why we have a press with an adversarial relationship with the government. Who else will hold it as well as the business community accountable?

Pentagon terminates use of China-based engineers to support cloud systems

The move comes after a ProPublica investigation that found a Microsoft program leveraging "digital escorts" to foreign-based tech experts could have exposed the Pentagon's networks to cybersecurity risks.

Mikayla Easley

defensescoop.com · measley · August 28, 2025

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced Wednesday that the Pentagon has ended a Microsoft program that allowed Chinese engineers to maintain the department’s sensitive cloud systems, and that it expects all DOD contractors to do the same.

The decade-old IT servicing model was brought to light in July following a ProPublica investigation, which found that Microsoft was using U.S.-based “digital escorts” that would take direction on how to fix issues with the Defense Department’s cloud systems from experts based overseas. While the digital escorts had necessary security clearances to work on the Pentagon’s networks, foreign engineers — many of which were based in China — did not.

Many of the digital escorts didn’t have the technical expertise to prevent Chinese engineers from inserting malicious code into the Pentagon’s classified networks, according to the report. As a result, Microsoft’s program could have unwittingly exposed the DOD to cybersecurity risks, Hegseth said in a video posted on X.

“The use of Chinese nationals to service Department of Defense cloud environments — it’s over,” he said. “We’ve issued a formal letter of concern to Microsoft, documenting this breach of trust, and we’re requiring a third-party audit of Microsoft’s digital escort program, including the code and submissions by Chinese nationals.”

Separately, Hegseth has directed another investigation into Microsoft’s digital escorts and the China-based engineers involved to determine whether there were any negative impacts to the Pentagon’s cloud systems as a result of the program.

“Did they put anything in the code that we didn’t know about? We’re going to find out,” he said.

Microsoft is one of the Defense Department’s key vendors for information technology and cloud systems. For example, the company is one of four primary contractors for the $9 billion Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability (JWCC) led by the Defense Information Systems Agency, and provides a number of services related to software and IT across other contracts.

Three days after ProPublica’s investigation was published, Microsoft spokesperson Frank Shaw said in a post on X that the company has made changes to its programs with the Pentagon to ensure it no longer leverages engineers based in China to provide technical assistance.

“Microsoft has terminated the use of any China-based engineering teams for DoD cloud systems and we will continue to collaborate with the US Government to ensure we are meeting their expectations,” a Microsoft spokesperson told DefenseScoop on Thursday. “We remain committed to providing the most secure services possible to the US government, including working with our national security partners to evaluate and adjust our security protocols as needed.”

Moving forward, the department will require all software vendors to identify and terminate any involvement from Chinese engineers with the Pentagon’s cloud capabilities, Hegseth said.

“We expect vendors doing business with the Department of Defense to put U.S. national security ahead of profit maximization,” he said.

Written by Mikayla Easley

Mikayla Easley reports on the Pentagon’s acquisition and use of emerging technologies. Prior to joining DefenseScoop, she covered national security and the defense industry for National Defense Magazine. She received a BA in Russian language and literature from the University of Michigan and a MA in journalism from the University of Missouri. You can follow her on Twitter @MikaylaEasley

defensescoop.com · measley · August 28, 2025

13. M1 Abrams Tanks Now Being Operated By A Second Ukrainian Unit

Excerpt:

It is unclear just how many Abrams Skala has received or how far along its troops are in the training process. However, given the tough fight in Pokrovsk, chances are we will soon see video emerging of these hulking armored weapons entering the fray.

M1 Abrams Tanks Now Being Operated By A Second Ukrainian Unit

The infusion of new armor, mostly likely from Australia, comes as most of Ukraine's U.S.-donated Abrams tanks have been lost.

Howard Altman

Published Aug 28, 2025 7:24 PM EDT

twz.com · Howard Altman

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

A Ukrainian assault regiment said on Thursday that it is now using donated M-1 Abrams tanks. This would be the second Ukrainian unit to have received the tanks since they first started arriving in the country two years ago.

The 425th Assault Regiment Skala announced the arrival of the tanks on its Facebook page. Until now, the 47th Mechanized Brigade Magura was the only Ukrainian unit operating these tanks. Skala, deployed to the Pokrovsk region of eastern Ukraine, is fighting some of the toughest battles of the war.

All indications are that Skala is operating Abrams tanks donated by Australia, the first batch of which arrived in Ukraine in July. Of the 31 M1s donated by the U.S., at least 22 have been lost, according to the Oryx open source tracking group. The Abrams losses are likely even be higher, because Oryx only accounts for instances where there is visual proof.

As we reported last October, Australia announced it would provide Ukraine with 49 M1s, a significant boost for Kyiv’s armored units, as they continue to face down Russia’s full-scale invasion. Because the tanks were originally sold to Australia by the United States, Washington had to approve the transfer to Ukraine.

The Australian Army was able to give up its M1A1 fleet because it is receiving 75 new M1A2 Abrams, in the highly capable SEPv3 variant. You can read more about Australia’s $2.5-billion M1A2 acquisition here.

The Australian variants provided to Ukraine “slightly differ from the baseline vehicles,” the Ukrainian Militarnyi media outlet reported.

“They have been upgraded to the M1A1 AIM SA version and received a number of regional modifications to meet customer requirements,” the outlet noted. “These vehicles have a new armor package without depleted uranium. The AIM SA electronics package includes a digital fire control system, thermal imaging and communications equipment better than that of the basic M1A1, as well as a satellite navigation system.”

DU armor is classified and tightly export controlled. Export variants are not equipped with it. The U.S.-supplied Abrams had to be reworked to remove the classified DU armor. Australia’s M1s are export configuration without it by default. You can read read more about DU armor in one of our stories here.

In addition, “the gas turbine engines of the Australian tanks have been reconfigured to use diesel fuel instead of JP-8 aviation kerosene,” which is standard for tanks provided by the U.S., Miltarnyi added. “This should simplify logistics for the Ukrainian army, whose armored vehicles are also standardized for diesel.”

An Australian Army M1A1 Abrams tank from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and an Australian Army soldier from the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment during Exercise Brolga Sprint 24 at Townsville Field Training Area, Queensland, in June 2024. Australian Department of Defense TPR Dana Millington

It is unknown yet if these tanks have actually made it to the battlefield. Skala’s video announcing the Abrams’ arrival uses archival video from the 47th Brigade, Militarnyi noted.

The utility of tanks on the drone-saturated battlefields of Ukraine has been questionable, given how vulnerable those on both sides of the fight have been, especially to the highly maneuverable first-person view drones. There were even unconfirmed reports that Ukraine temporarily withdrew its Abrams from the fight after losing so many. You can see one such encounter in the video below.

An Abrams tank withstands 9 FPV drones hits. Eventually, the tank was destroyed, but the tank crew successfully survived. pic.twitter.com/4NBKdg2zmW

— PS01 □ (@PStyle0ne1) July 7, 2024

Still, they have been playing a role in the fight for Pokrovsk, a key Ukrainian logistics hub and part of a defensive belt of towns in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. That’s where Russia has expended large amounts of personnel and equipment to capture small segments of territory.

“Since late last year, [Ukrainian troops] have been receiving deliveries of refurbished German-made Leopard 1A5 tanks,” Radio Free Liberty reported in February. “Soldiers on the front lines say the updated vehicles are highly maneuverable and give them an edge on the battlefield.”

Leopard variants are still in the fight for Pokrovsk.

“A powerful Russian force numbering 100,000 troops is determined to capture Pokrovsk,” Euromaidan Press reported earlier this month. “But the town is heavily defended by drones, artillery, infantry and even a few Leopard 2A4 tanks belonging to the bad-luck 155th Mechanized Brigade.”

Last week, a video emerged on social media of one of those tanks obliterating a building where a Russian sabotage group was holding out.

It is unclear just how many Abrams Skala has received or how far along its troops are in the training process. However, given the tough fight in Pokrovsk, chances are we will soon see video emerging of these hulking armored weapons entering the fray.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard's work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.

14. Russian, Chinese Submarines Sail Together in Sea of Japan

50% of the CRInK operating together.

Russian, Chinese Submarines Sail Together in Sea of Japan - USNI News

news.usni.org · Dzirhan Mahadzir · August 28, 2025

Russian submarine RFS Volkhov (B-603), shown here, and a PLAN submarine sailed together for the first time in early August 2025 in the Sea of Japan. The Russian submarine was spotted Aug. 20, 2025, transiting the Tsushima Strait. Japan Joint Staff Office photo.

Submarines from the Russian Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recently sailed together in the Sea of Japan, marking the two countries’ first joint submarine patrol.

Two Kilo-class submarines, supported by a surface warship and submarine rescue ship each, sailed in the Sea of Japan in early August, the Russian Navy Pacific Fleet announced Wednesday. The submarine patrol indicates an expansion of the bilateral military activities between Russia and China, which already conduct joint naval patrols and joint bomber flights.

Russian submarine RFS Volkhov (B-603) and a PLAN submarine set out on a patrol route in the Sea of Japan, transiting to the East China Sea before the two returned to their respective naval bases.

Volkhov returned to its base in Vladivostok, Russia, on Wednesday, after traveling more than 2,000 nautical miles. Corvette RFS Gromkiy (335) supported the submarine during its patrol. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) spotted the Russian group Aug. 14 and again Aug. 20 while transiting the Tsushima Strait. Volkhov was sailing surfaced at the time of the transit, JMSDF said.

The Japanese force also tracked PLAN destroyer CNS Urumqi (118) and submarine rescue ship Xihu (841) transiting the Tsushima Strait to enter the East China Sea on Aug. 13. Submarine Great Wall 210, which is believed to have been part of the task group, was not sighted, likely because it transited the strait submerged.

The submarine patrol began after an annual Russian-Chinese exercise, dubbed Maritime Interaction 2025 by Russia and Joint Sea 2025 by China. The Russian Navy and PLAN drilled in Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan from Aug. 1-5. Participating warships included the Russian Navy’s destroyer RFS Admiral Tributs (564), corvette Gromkiy, submarine rescue ship Igor Belousov and submarine Volkhov and the PLAN’s destroyers Urumqi and CNS Shaoxing (134), fleet oiler CNS Qiandaohu (886), and submarine rescue ship Xihu, as well as submarine Great Wall 210.

Chinese submarine identified as ‘Great Wall 210’ arrives in Vladivostok, Russia on July 31, 2025. Image via Russian State Media

During the exercise, the countries’ submarines and submarine rescue ships rehearsed a crew evacuation in Peter the Great Bay, the main marine entrance to Vladivostok, the Russian Ministry of Defense said. Russian submarine Volkhov descended to the bottom of the bay, simulating an emergency, while Chinese rescue ship Xihu responded to the situation. Igor Belousov carried out a similar exercise with the PLAN submarine.

Russia and China began joint naval patrols in 2021. The first patrol was considered provocative by Japan as the joint flotilla included 10 ships sailing in international waters off the coast of Japan’s main islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Both Russia and China said the patrols were in compliance with international law and not targeted at any country.

“During the cruise, the joint formation strictly abided by the relevant provisions of international law and did not enter the territorial waters of other countries. This joint maritime cruise aims to further develop the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership in the new era, enhance the joint action capabilities of both parties, and jointly maintain international and regional strategic stability,” read a China Ministry of National Defense statement at that time.

Since then, the two countries have conducted a joint naval patrol annually, with the exception of last year, which saw two patrols.

The joint patrol in 2023 took place near Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. The July 2024 patrol began south of South Korea’s Jeju Island, with the ships sailing through the Osumi Strait to enter the Western Pacific Ocean. They eventually transited the Philippine Sea before concluding the patrol in the South China Sea.

The October 2024 patrol saw the ships sail from Russia’s Sakhalin Island through the Pacific Ocean and the Philippine Sea before sailing between Okinawa and Miyako Island to enter the East China Sea. That patrol concluded with the ships docking at the port of Qingdao, China

Russia and China also conduct joint bomber flights, mainly in the vicinity of Japan. However, last year, the countries carried out a joint bomber flight in the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone in July.

Japan considers the Russian and Chinese military activities that take place in its vicinity as a threatening demonstration to Japan.

“These repeated joint activities are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are a grave concern from the perspective of the national security of Japan,” reads the latest iteration of Japan’s annual white paper, Defense of Japan 2025.

news.usni.org · Dzirhan Mahadzir · August 28, 2025

15. The Iran Nuclear Crisis Might Be Back On

The Iran Nuclear Crisis Might Be Back On

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Stephen Silver · August 29, 2025

Key Points and Summary – Three major European powers—the U.K., France, and Germany—have officially moved to reinstate UN sanctions on Iran by invoking the “snapback” provision of the 2015 nuclear deal.

-The move puts a 30-day clock on diplomacy to find a peaceful resolution before the sanctions, which target everything from Iranian assets to its ballistic missile program, are reimposed.

-Iran has condemned the action as “illegal and unjustified.”

-This diplomatic pressure is mounting on other fronts as well, with Australia expelling Iran’s ambassador after linking Tehran to terrorist attacks on its soil.

The New Iran Crisis?

After weeks of threats, the U.K., France, and Germany have sent a letter to the UN Security Council, announcing plans to invoke the “snapback” provisions to reinstate sanctions on Iran, Axios reported Thursday.

Those United Nations sanctions had been suspended for the last ten years, since the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2015, but will now be reinstated.

There is, however, a 30-day period in place before the sanctions officially take effect, during which further negotiations might still take place.

While the U.S. was not involved with this process, having pulled out of the Iran deal in 2018, Secretary of State Marco Rubio commented on the development.

The “remains available for direct engagement with Iran — in furtherance of a peaceful, enduring resolution to the Iran nuclear issue,” the Secretary of State said Thursday.

Per the AP, the reimposition of sanctions “would again freeze Iranian assets abroad, halt arms deals with Tehran and penalize any development of its ballistic missile program, among other measures, further squeezing the country’s reeling economy.”

“This measure does not signal the end of diplomacy: we are determined to make the most of the 30-day period that is now opening to engage in dialogue with Iran,” French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot wrote on X. “We remain committed to diplomacy to ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons.”

Iran Responds

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, per the AP, told his European counterparts that the snapback measure is “unjustified, illegal and lacking any legal basis.”

“The Islamic Republic of Iran will respond appropriately to this unlawful and unwarranted measure,” Araghchi added.

The parties had been in talks in recent months, but do not appear, as of yet, to have avoided a re-imposition of sanctions.

“Iranian leaders perceive a sanctions ‘snapback’ as a Western effort to weaken Iran’s economy indefinitely and perhaps stimulate sufficient popular unrest to unseat Iran’s regime,” the New York-based Soufan Center think tank wrote in an analysis this week.

“Tehran is employing a combination of threats and diplomacy to avoid triggering the sanctions snapback. Tehran publicly rejects an extension of Resolution 2232, calling it an illegitimate alteration of the 2015 JCPOA agreement. Iranian leaders claim the E3 has upheld U.S. secondary sanctions, and therefore ‘in effect abandoned any claims to JCPOA participant status.’”

The Institute for the Study of War also looked at what might happen next.

“It is unclear if the E3 will initiate the dispute resolution process outlined in the JCPOA or directly refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC,” ISW stated in its most recent Iran Report. “The dispute resolution process can take up to 35 days and involves a series of steps that aim to resolve non-compliance issues.[7] The E3 can choose to engage in the dispute resolution process and then refer the issue to the UNSC if it believes that Iran continues to show ‘significant non-performance.’”

Iran vs. Australia

Also this week, Australia expelled Iran’s ambassador.

As noted by The Atlantic, Australia “is not known for picking fights,” and hadn’t kicked out an ambassador since World War II.

“Shutting down the Iranian embassy, the Australian government declared Ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi persona non grata and ordered him and three other Iranian officials to leave within three days. Additionally, it designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organization,” the magazine analysis said.

Why did Australia do this? According to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Australia has “credible intelligence… linking Iran to several attacks on Australian Jews last year, including an arson attack on a kosher restaurant in Sydney.

“They’re just using cut-outs, including people who are criminals and members of organised crime gangs to do their bidding or direct their bidding,” Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Asio) chief Mike Burgess said, per The BBC.

About the Author: Stephen Silver

Stephen Silver is an award-winning journalist, essayist, and film critic, and contributor to the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Broad Street Review, and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. For over a decade, Stephen has authored thousands of articles that focus on politics, national security, technology, and the economy. Follow him on X (formerly Twitter) at @StephenSilver, and subscribe to his Substack newsletter.

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nationalsecurityjournal.org · Stephen Silver · August 29, 2025

16. The Path to a Good-Enough Iran Deal

Excerpts:

But there are significant obstacles to achieving such an agreement. U.S. President Donald Trump would need to reverse course on zero enrichment and then overcome domestic opposition, including the charge from his base as well as mainstream skeptics of negotiations with Iran that the new deal merely recycles the JCPOA. He would also have to withstand strong criticism from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a vocal advocate of eschewing talks with Iran, and cope with potential unilateral military actions by Israel that––intended or not––could complicate or derail negotiations.

Another potential obstacle is the “snap back,” a provision of the UN Security Council's Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. That provision enables JCPOA participants to respond to non-compliance by another participant by bringing back into force all previous UN Security Council sanctions against Iran that were suspended by the JCPOA. On August 28, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (known as the E3) initiated the 30-day snap-back process. If Iran agrees within thirty days to steps that, in the E3’s view, demonstrate Tehran’s willingness to reach a diplomatic solution—such as a resumption of U.S.-Iranian negotiations or the restoration of IAEA activities in Iran—the snap back would not be implemented. In that case, Resolution 2231 (and the right to invoke the snap back) would probably be extended beyond its October 18 expiration date. But if Iran does not agree to such steps, sanctions would be reimposed. Some Iranian lawmakers have warned that implementing snap-back sanctions could lead to Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT, an action that could preclude negotiation indefinitely. Any prospects for productive negotiations could thus depend on the outcome of talks between Iran and the E3 countries over the next month.

Iran, of course, will have a say on whether a new agreement is achievable. In theory, the Islamic Republic should welcome U.S. acceptance of its primary negotiating demand: that it be allowed have a civil nuclear program that includes enrichment. But accommodating Iran’s desire to retain some enrichment would not guarantee that a deal could be reached. Iranian negotiators may balk at restrictions on enrichment that deny them, perhaps permanently, a strategically important threshold nuclear weapons capability. They are also likely to resist monitoring arrangements that are more extensive and intrusive than they have accepted under the JCPOA. It would be a very tough negotiation.

It may not prove possible to negotiate an agreement with the strict limits on enrichment and the rigorous monitoring, inspection, and enforcement measures needed to reliably block Iran’s pathways to acquiring nuclear weapons or to resuming its status as a threshold nuclear weapon state. In that case, the Trump administration will have little choice but to leave the negotiating table and turn to military, economic, and other coercive tools to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. But if Washington must pursue that strategy, it would be of immense value in gaining the domestic and international support needed to sustain it to be able to show that it made a flexible and sincere effort to find a diplomatic solution first––and was turned down by an Iranian regime determined to preserve its nuclear weapons option.

The Path to a Good-Enough Iran Deal

Foreign Affairs · More by Robert J. Einhorn · August 29, 2025

How Washington and Tehran Can Bridge the Gap on Enrichment

Robert Einhorn

August 29, 2025

A tribute to Iranians killed in Israeli strikes, Tehran, July 2025 Majid Asgaripour / West Asia News Agency / Reuters

ROBERT EINHORN is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

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It is not clear whether the recent Israeli and U.S. military strikes have decreased or increased the likelihood of a nuclear-armed Iran. The attacks have certainly inflicted major damage to the country’s nuclear program. But they have not extinguished the Islamic Republic’s interest in nuclear weapons. They have amplified uncertainty about the quantity, location, and current condition of critical elements of Iran’s nuclear program. And they have failed to block Iran’s pathways to building a bomb, including by using its surviving equipment, materials, and expertise in a small, covert operation.

In the aftermath of the strikes, the Trump administration has resumed its pursuit of a new nuclear agreement that would prohibit uranium enrichment and its associated infrastructure in Iran––a “zero enrichment” outcome that would stymie any Iranian intention to build a bomb but that has been firmly rejected by Tehran, at least so far. If, after determined efforts, such an agreement cannot be achieved, the administration may seriously consider relying solely on military and intelligence means to thwart Iran’s efforts to revitalize its nuclear program, an approach strongly favored by the Israeli government. But a military option could lead to perpetual armed conflict in the region without reliably preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. A preferable option would be to negotiate an agreement that permits but strictly limits and rigorously verifies uranium enrichment in Iran.

Back to the Table

Since the ceasefire ending the 12-day war, the Trump administration has sought to resume its bilateral engagement with Iran. But Iran has not been ready to meet, in part due to divisions within Tehran’s elite on the merits of negotiations with the United States. Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, have insisted on preconditions that Washington is unwilling to accept, such as a U.S. guarantee that Iran would not be attacked while negotiations were underway. According to Reuters, however, regime “insiders” say that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and members of the clerical power structure have recently reached a consensus that resumed negotiations are vital to the survival of the regime. If that is the case, Iran and the United States are likely to find a formula for returning to the negotiating table before long.

An urgent U.S. priority in any resumed talks should be to restore International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring activities in Iran, which were suspended by a law signed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on July 2. In the wake of the June military strikes, the IAEA can no longer account for roughly 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which may have been buried under rubble or, as some believe, removed from storage facilities before the strikes. The agency also can’t account for an unknown number of centrifuges that were produced after Iran denied the IAEA’s access to centrifuge production workshops in 2021.

Iran remains adamant that it will not give up domestic enrichment.

Bringing all of Iran’s enriched uranium, centrifuges, and other potential components of a nuclear weapons program under IAEA surveillance and accountancy is essential to blocking Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons. IAEA experts visited Tehran on August 11 to discuss the modalities of resuming the agency’s activities in Iran, but they were not given access to the country’s nuclear sites. Although the Iranians are likely to soon grant the IAEA access to facilities that are not of proliferation concern, such as the Bushehr power reactor and the Tehran research reactor, they will continue withholding the kind of full cooperation essential to giving the IAEA a complete and accurate picture of their nuclear program. They may regard such cooperation as acceptable only as part of a comprehensive agreement and use the denial of cooperation as a bargaining chip to be played much later in the negotiations.

Resumed U.S.-Iranian talks could quickly focus on the issue that stalemated the first five rounds of negotiations during the second Trump administration: whether an agreement should ban all enrichment and enrichment-related infrastructure in Iran. The Trump administration says it remains firmly committed to its “zero enrichment” proposal, as the president’s special envoy Steve Witkoff told ABC News on August 18. It may believe that the threat of further military strikes if Iran tries to revive its nuclear program––combined with Iran’s current strategic vulnerability, economic weakness, and international isolation––means that Tehran has little choice but to abandon its enrichment program and perhaps even its nuclear weapons ambitions altogether.

Iran remains adamant, however, that it will not give up domestic enrichment. Iran’s nuclear program, and especially its enrichment program, is a source of national pride, a demonstration of technological prowess, and a symbol of defiance. Iranian officials also claim that it serves as an insurance policy against possible fuel supply cutoffs by possible future suppliers of enriched uranium to Iran. The program, moreover, is an overriding national priority that Iran has pursued at enormous economic and human costs, including the martyrdom of senior scientists and military leaders.

We can assume that Iranian advocates of acquiring nuclear weapons, whether within or outside the leadership, staunchly oppose an enrichment ban, regarding it as tantamount to abandoning their nuclear ambitions once and for all. With hard-liners arguing that capitulating to U.S. demands would be a national humiliation and betrayal, Khamenei may fear that accepting zero enrichment could destabilize the regime.

Seeking Solutions

Outside experts have suggested ways to close what appears to be an unbridgeable gap between the U.S. and Iranian positions on the enrichment issue. One such idea that has received attention in both official and think-tank circles is establishing a multilateral fuel cycle consortium that could produce enriched uranium to help meet the region’s civil nuclear needs. Proponents believe the involvement of more than one country in the ownership, management, and perhaps even the operation of an enrichment facility would promote transparency and reduce the opportunity for any one country to divert the facility to the production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

But finding a formula for a multilateral consortium that would be acceptable in both Tehran and Washington is likely to be very difficult. A consortium that sited an enrichment facility in a Gulf Arab country and excluded any domestic enrichment in Iran would have little appeal in Tehran. On the other hand, a consortium that permitted continued enrichment in Iran would have little appeal in Washington. Moreover, an enrichment facility managed and operated on a multinational basis, wherever it is located, could risk the dissemination of enrichment technology to additional countries, which would be a significant problem from a nonproliferation perspective.

With disagreement on enrichment blocking a comprehensive agreement, U.S. and Iranian negotiators have reportedly considered pursuing an interim agreement. Such an interim agreement would be a limited-duration arrangement that would set aside the enrichment issue for the time being, show progress on a small package of steps valued by one side or the other, and buy time to negotiate a final deal. Both sides might see an interim agreement as a way to keep the talks going rather than face the domestic political consequences of either failing to reach a comprehensive deal or making painful compromises to achieve one.

The two sides will have to come to grips with the enrichment issue.

The elements of a possible interim agreement in the wake of the Israeli and U.S. military attacks would probably be quite different from what may have been considered by negotiators before the June war. For example, the suspension of Iranian production of uranium enriched to 60 percent––which was previously recommended by outside experts as an element of an interim deal––would no longer be of much interest to the United States because such production has already been halted, at least temporarily, by the attacks.

In a postwar interim agreement, the United States might seek an Iranian commitment to accept a significant restoration of IAEA monitoring activities or to refrain from certain nuclear-related activities, such as preparations to resume enrichment at damaged facilities. In exchange, Iran might seek partial sanctions relief, the release of billions of dollars of Iranian funds held in overseas accounts, or a pledge by the United States not to attack or support an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities.

But with each side seeking to maximize its benefits and minimize its concessions, finding a mutually acceptable formula for an interim deal could prove very difficult. And even if one could be found, an interim agreement would probably not last very long. With Iran likely to withhold full cooperation with the IAEA during any interim agreement, the continued uncertainty about unmonitored Iranian nuclear activities could become intolerable for Washington. And Iran’s repeated failure to get major sanctions relief while still refraining from steps such as withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) could become intolerable for Tehran, especially its hard-liners.

Sooner or later, the two sides will have to come to grips with the enrichment issue. It is conceivable that the Iranians could eventually buckle under the threat of further military attacks and accept zero enrichment. But given the fierce hard-line opposition and the leadership’s fear of the potential domestic consequences of surrendering to Israel and the United States, that is very unlikely. And if the Iranians don’t buckle, the Trump administration will have to choose between two main options. The United States could rely on military and intelligence means to stop any Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Or it could revise its negotiating position to seek an agreement that permits enrichment in Iran with tight limits and strong verification.

The Downsides of Ditching Diplomacy

The military option would involve walking away from the negotiations, prioritizing intelligence collection to focus heavily on possible evidence of resumed nuclear activities, and, if necessary, using military force or covert operations to stop Iran from rebuilding its nuclear program and its degraded missile forces and air defenses. Israel would presumably take the lead in implementing this option but would have the support of the United States in terms of collecting intelligence, defending the approach diplomatically, and possibly participating in military or covert operations.

Supporters of this approach, including a significant number of officials and non-governmental experts in Israel and the United States, are confident that the deep penetration of Iran by Israeli intelligence and the dominance that Israel and the United States enjoy over Iranian airspace would enable the allies to detect evidence of resumed nuclear activities and, if necessary, strike Iranian targets with a high probability of success. Moreover, the absence of an agreement, in their view, would give Israel and the United States the ability to act promptly and decisively against Iran at a time of their choosing, without the delays and obfuscations associated with negotiated verification and enforcement procedures. And it would not involve compensating Iran with sanctions relief or throwing a lifeline to a regime struggling to stay afloat.

But pursuing the military rather than the diplomatic track has major downsides. The U.S. and Israeli military attacks were extremely successful against large, well-known nuclear facilities. But an Iranian effort to build an initial nuclear arsenal at much smaller, deeply buried secret sites would be much less vulnerable to preemptive strikes. Because forgoing negotiations would probably ensure that the IAEA’s lack of sufficient access would persist, such a covert program would be easier for Iran to pursue under this approach.

This strategy could require repeated military strikes well into the future. Such a “mowing the grass” approach may prompt Iranian retaliation against Israel, U.S. interests, and U.S. partner countries––which, in turn, would risk drawing the United States into another prolonged armed conflict in the Middle East. It would also alienate the United States’ Gulf partners, which fear regional instability and favor détente with Iran, and reduce prospects for greater regional normalization and integration. And ending negotiations and turning to military means could trigger Tehran’s withdrawal from the NPT and possibly a long-deferred decision to build nuclear weapons.

Course Correction

The better option for the United States would be to reconsider its zero enrichment proposal and, instead, seek to negotiate a tightly restricted and rigorously verified uranium enrichment program. A revised U.S. proposal could be based on the principle that Iran would be permitted to have an enrichment program capable of meeting only the realistic, near-term fuel requirements of a genuinely peaceful nuclear program––a position consistent with Iran’s longstanding (and disingenuous) claim that its program has always been exclusively peaceful. With Russia supplying fuel for the Russian-built power reactors at Bushehr and the operation of Iranian-designed power reactors still a long way off, Iran’s current enrichment requirements are very modest, perhaps confined for the time being to fueling the Tehran research reactor and possible new research and isotope production reactors, whose enriched uranium requirements are much smaller than those of nuclear power reactors.

Such an approach would require Iran to eliminate its current stocks of uranium enriched to over five percent in uranium-235, either by diluting them or transferring them to another country (as Iran’s excess inventory of enriched uranium was transferred to Russia under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). It would also call on Tehran to dismantle or transfer to another country for secure storage centrifuges in excess of the enrichment capacity needed for meeting near-term fuel production requirements.

Iran would be required to promptly convert uranium enriched to below five percent, whether newly produced or in its existing inventory, from the gaseous form, which could be fed into centrifuges and further enriched for nuclear weapons, to the powdered form, which is less readily usable in a weapons program and is the form needed for the process of fabricating nuclear reactor fuel or targets for isotope production. On-hand inventories of enriched uranium below five percent as well as natural uranium in the gaseous form would be limited to the amount required to meet near-term fueling needs.

The Iranian Consulate in Istanbul, July 2025 Dilara Senkaya / Reuters

Iran would be required to declare to the IAEA and provide a justification for any expanded enrichment capacity, such as more centrifuges, increased enriched uranium inventory, or new facilities, that it believed was needed to support actual, near-term additions to its civil nuclear program––a new nuclear reactor in an advanced state of construction, for example––rather than to support planned additions that would not materialize for quite some time. In addition, the agreement would permit enrichment only at a single, above-ground enrichment facility and would require the permanent closure of the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities.

To rebuild the IAEA’s––and therefore the international community’s––complete and accurate understanding of Iran’s nuclear program, especially in light of today’s major uncertainties, monitoring and inspection arrangements in a new agreement would have to include but go beyond the measures contained in the JCPOA. Iran would provide detailed information about unmonitored activities carried out after it suspended application of the IAEA Additional Protocol in 2021, such as the production of centrifuges. Equipment and activities related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons would be banned, with dual-use equipment and activities declared and verified. Advanced monitoring technologies including real-time, online enrichment monitors would be extensively used at the discretion of the IAEA.

Streamlined inspection arrangements would be required to facilitate prompt IAEA access to suspect sites, including military and other sensitive facilities. Expeditious dispute resolution and enforcement procedures could help ensure that the relevant authorities, such as the governments of the parties to the agreement, the IAEA Board of Governors, or the United Nations Security Council, are in a position to take timely and appropriate action to address matters of non-compliance.

Special measures would be needed to deter noncompliance, including the right of parties to the agreement to suspend sanctions relief and other benefits to a noncompliant party. A U.S. unilateral statement reserving the right to take any necessary steps, including the use of force, to respond to violations of the agreement could also help deter noncompliance, although such a statement would not be part of the agreement.

Accommodating Iran’s desire to retain some enrichment would not guarantee a deal.

A new agreement would, of course, include incentives for Iran, including sanctions relief and the release of Iranian funds still frozen in overseas accounts. Reversible commitments by Tehran would be matched by reversible incentives offered by Washington. Primary U.S. sanctions barring U.S. persons and entities from doing business with Iran could be relaxed, both to give American traders and investors opportunities available to their European and Asian counterparts and to give the United States a greater stake in the continuation of the agreement––which would address a key Iranian concern that a future U.S. administration could decide to withdraw from the agreement.

To be durable and to address concerns about the JCPOA’s “sunset provisions,” which terminated key restrictions after ten and 15 years, the agreement would be permanent or have a very long duration, such as 25 to 30 years. It could be negotiated bilaterally between Washington and Tehran, in consultation with interested third parties, and perhaps later be formalized as a multilateral agreement. To make it legally binding and enhance its durability, the agreement should take the form of a treaty, requiring an affirmative two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate, as compared to the JCPOA, which was a non-binding political commitment and did not require affirmative congressional approval.

In parallel with a nuclear agreement, there should be a separate commitment by Iran not to transfer ballistic missiles, rockets, and drones and associated equipment and technology to non-state entities, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Reinforcing such an Iranian commitment would be ongoing cooperation between the United States and its regional partners to block Iranian assistance to its proxy network, using such tools as intelligence sharing, interdictions, sanctions, diplomatic pressures, covert operations, and targeted military attacks.

Tough Talks Ahead

Although the United States and Israel have extraordinary intelligence capabilities, their intelligence services alone cannot provide confidence that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons. It will take national intelligence services plus a newly empowered, in-country presence of experienced IAEA personnel, with enhanced rights of access and advanced surveillance technologies, to provide such confidence. Only a new agreement negotiated with Iran can ensure that the IAEA will play such a role.

Restricting Iran’s enrichment program in a new agreement could substantially increase the time it would take Iran to break out of the agreement, if it decided to do so, and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. On the eve of the 12-day war, Iran’s breakout time was about a week. Restrictions along the lines suggested here would extend that timeline by several months. Together with enhanced IAEA monitoring measures capable of promptly detecting a breakout attempt, this would provide plenty of time for the United States or others to intervene, including with military force, to thwart such a move. Moreover, the recent military attacks by Israel and the United States will greatly boost the credibility and deterrent value of the threat to intervene to stop an Iranian effort to race for a bomb.

Protesting the U.S attack on Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran, June 2025 Majid Asgaripour / West Asia News Agency / Reuters

A new agreement would serve U.S. regional security interests––as well as those of the United States’ partners––much better than a strategy of mowing the grass. Instead of a confrontational regional environment characterized by periodic attacks against Iran and Iranian retaliation, a new agreement could bring greater stability and predictability. The United States would need to stay involved in regional affairs, both to assist its partners in defending against resurgent threats from Iran and its proxies and to press for strict Iranian compliance with the agreement. But the risks that the United States would be drawn into an armed conflict in the Middle East would decline significantly. Moreover, the United States’ Gulf partners would welcome the deal and the opportunities it could provide for closer regional economic and political ties. It would also reaffirm Iran’s adherence to the NPT and renunciation of nuclear weapons, which, together with verification measures to make those pledges credible, could help alleviate regional proliferation pressures.

But there are significant obstacles to achieving such an agreement. U.S. President Donald Trump would need to reverse course on zero enrichment and then overcome domestic opposition, including the charge from his base as well as mainstream skeptics of negotiations with Iran that the new deal merely recycles the JCPOA. He would also have to withstand strong criticism from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a vocal advocate of eschewing talks with Iran, and cope with potential unilateral military actions by Israel that––intended or not––could complicate or derail negotiations.

Another potential obstacle is the “snap back,” a provision of the UN Security Council's Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. That provision enables JCPOA participants to respond to non-compliance by another participant by bringing back into force all previous UN Security Council sanctions against Iran that were suspended by the JCPOA. On August 28, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (known as the E3) initiated the 30-day snap-back process. If Iran agrees within thirty days to steps that, in the E3’s view, demonstrate Tehran’s willingness to reach a diplomatic solution—such as a resumption of U.S.-Iranian negotiations or the restoration of IAEA activities in Iran—the snap back would not be implemented. In that case, Resolution 2231 (and the right to invoke the snap back) would probably be extended beyond its October 18 expiration date. But if Iran does not agree to such steps, sanctions would be reimposed. Some Iranian lawmakers have warned that implementing snap-back sanctions could lead to Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT, an action that could preclude negotiation indefinitely. Any prospects for productive negotiations could thus depend on the outcome of talks between Iran and the E3 countries over the next month.

Iran, of course, will have a say on whether a new agreement is achievable. In theory, the Islamic Republic should welcome U.S. acceptance of its primary negotiating demand: that it be allowed have a civil nuclear program that includes enrichment. But accommodating Iran’s desire to retain some enrichment would not guarantee that a deal could be reached. Iranian negotiators may balk at restrictions on enrichment that deny them, perhaps permanently, a strategically important threshold nuclear weapons capability. They are also likely to resist monitoring arrangements that are more extensive and intrusive than they have accepted under the JCPOA. It would be a very tough negotiation.

It may not prove possible to negotiate an agreement with the strict limits on enrichment and the rigorous monitoring, inspection, and enforcement measures needed to reliably block Iran’s pathways to acquiring nuclear weapons or to resuming its status as a threshold nuclear weapon state. In that case, the Trump administration will have little choice but to leave the negotiating table and turn to military, economic, and other coercive tools to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. But if Washington must pursue that strategy, it would be of immense value in gaining the domestic and international support needed to sustain it to be able to show that it made a flexible and sincere effort to find a diplomatic solution first––and was turned down by an Iranian regime determined to preserve its nuclear weapons option.

Foreign Affairs · More by Robert J. Einhorn · August 29, 2025

17. The New Right is Wrong about Taiwan

Excerpts:

More troubling is the New Right’s broader view of Taiwan. Sohrab Ahmari, a public intellectual, has argued that America’s true threats come from within, and that Taipei has no hope of evading Beijing’s aggression. Darren Beattie, who currently runs public diplomacy at the State Department, is on record saying that Taiwan will “inevitably” belong to China, and that it’s “not worth expending any capital to prevent.” Why should Taiwan take seriously the concerns of a political contingent in America that has already written off its survival? More fundamentally, why should America’s friends and allies consider the views of a political movement so disconnected with the voters they purport to represent? Whiton insists that “most Americans who follow foreign policy see Taiwan as a liability.” Those in the New Right are welcome to their own opinions, but not their own facts. In July, the Vandenberg Coalition published polling from Trump supporters on a range of issues, including Taiwan. A whopping 78% of MAGA conservatives agreed that Taiwan is a “vital national security interest” and that America should “prevent China from controlling Taiwan.” Why? Because the American people perceive that Beijing is the problem, not Taiwan. They understand that alienating allies empowers America’s enemies. If the New Right wants to speak for Americans, they should start by listening to them.

The New Right is Wrong about Taiwan - Providence

By Michael Sobolik on August 27, 2025

providencemag.com ·· August 27, 2025

Three weeks ago, a former Trump Administration official published a warning to Taiwan. According to Christian Whiton, a senior advisor under former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Taipei has “lost” President Donald Trump. Whiton’s screed is full of grievances, accusing Taiwan of “diplomatic slights” and “woke passions.” Beneath it all is Whiton’s frustration, and even offense, at Taiwan’s “inability to understand and relate to the New Right in America.”

It is a bold claim to speak on behalf of any American president, but particularly so with Trump. Tucker Carlson learned this lesson the hard way in June, when he accused the president of abandoning the “America First” movement by bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump’s response was swift: “I’m the one that decides” what “America First” means. The voters stood with the president. Shortly before the president ordered the strikes on Iran, polling from the Ronald Reagan Institute revealed that 90% of self-identified MAGA Republicans believed that “preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is important to U.S. security.” After the strikes, nearly 90% of Republicans expressed confidence in Trump’s handling of Iran.

The episode should have given pause to those in the New Right. Perhaps they were out of step with Trump and the movement he leads. Perhaps their analysis of the international threat climate was flawed (or, as Trump said, “kooky”). Dropping bunker-buster bombs on Fordow and Natanz did not, in fact, lead to World War III. The moment should have compelled those in the New Right to reflect on where they had gone wrong. Whiton, to his credit, recognized this need two months ago, when he criticized “people who want to force the president’s hand and who want to play politics” for “providing poor information.” His broadside against Taiwan, however, suggests that the New Right still has much to learn.

Whiton faults Taiwan’s President William Lai for not calling to congratulate Trump in November 2024, as Tsai Ing-wen did in 2016. “That Trump actually took the call,” Whiton argues, “made news since American leaders seldom talk to their Taiwanese counterparts given the lack of formal diplomatic relations.” Whiton mentions in passing the “controversy” that ensued from this phone call, but it was no passing matter for Taipei. Mainstream media outlets in America criticized Trump in 2016 for breaking with decades of protocol by accepting Taiwan’s call, and called it a gaffe. Chinese officials were also furious and demanded an apology. As Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin put it, the whole episode “ended up poisoning Trump on the issue of Taiwan.” President Lai understandably wanted to avoid another setback — especially since, as Whiton concedes, “Lai was advised by friends with ties to Trump not to attempt the call.” Taiwan can hardly be blamed for erring on the side of caution.

Whiton also attacks Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim as “a woman of the globalist Left.” His evidence? A 2022 Washington Post oped urging democracies “to stand shoulder to shoulder against authoritarian aggression,” specifically in defense of Ukraine. Hsiao’s logic was straightforward: if Ukraine falls to Putin, Xi Jinping will be emboldened to move on Taiwan. She was right to warn that “appeasement is not the path of peace.” Dismissing this common-sense position as “wokeness” says more about the New Right than about Taiwan.

Whiton also criticizes Hsiao for working with groups like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the International Republican Institute (IRI). Whiton dismisses them as “globalist organizations,” but never stops to ask how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views them. Beijing loathes these organizations — and has sanctioned them both — because they expose the CCP’s lack of political legitimacy. NED and IRI equip dissidents to expose CCP repression. Far from being “globalist,” it’s a competitive strategy that targets Beijing’s greatest weakness.

Why would the New Right pass up an opportunity to hit the CCP where it hurts most? Apparently, because Hsiao wore a face mask to President Biden’s inauguration: “Hsiao…declared on video from the cheap seats at the inauguration that ‘freedom is our common objective.’ She did so speaking through a face mask despite being outdoors — a symbol of the Taiwanese government’s unfortunate pandemic response that kept most Americans from visiting for years.” It seems especially petty in 2025 to keep a list of people’s masking choices at the height of the pandemic — and equally unfair to ignore Taiwan’s largely successful response to the pandemic.

To be sure, no relationship with allies or partners is perfect. Concerns about Taiwan’s low defense spending are longstanding and valid, though even Whiton admits that Taiwan’s divided government introduces real political difficulties. Moreover, Beijing’s campaign to isolate Taiwan politically has constrained the island-nation’s diplomatic options. It has no choice but to maintain friendly relations with Republicans and Democrats alike — as it has done since 1979, when Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. Demanding Taipei pick a side in American domestic politics betrays a shocking lack of appreciation of its precarious geopolitical position.

More troubling is the New Right’s broader view of Taiwan. Sohrab Ahmari, a public intellectual, has argued that America’s true threats come from within, and that Taipei has no hope of evading Beijing’s aggression. Darren Beattie, who currently runs public diplomacy at the State Department, is on record saying that Taiwan will “inevitably” belong to China, and that it’s “not worth expending any capital to prevent.” Why should Taiwan take seriously the concerns of a political contingent in America that has already written off its survival? More fundamentally, why should America’s friends and allies consider the views of a political movement so disconnected with the voters they purport to represent? Whiton insists that “most Americans who follow foreign policy see Taiwan as a liability.” Those in the New Right are welcome to their own opinions, but not their own facts. In July, the Vandenberg Coalition published polling from Trump supporters on a range of issues, including Taiwan. A whopping 78% of MAGA conservatives agreed that Taiwan is a “vital national security interest” and that America should “prevent China from controlling Taiwan.” Why? Because the American people perceive that Beijing is the problem, not Taiwan. They understand that alienating allies empowers America’s enemies. If the New Right wants to speak for Americans, they should start by listening to them.

Michael Sobolik is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute where he specializes in United States–China relations and great power competition with a focus on geopolitics, net assessments, and competitive strategies. He is also the author of Countering China’s Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance (Naval Institute Press, 2024), as well as a contributing editor of Providence: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy. Mr. Sobolik was previously a senior fellow in Indo-Pacific studies at the American Foreign Policy Council, as well as a legislative assistant to Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) in the United States Senate.

18. Peace deal dead, new war drums beating for Ukraine

Excerpts:

The British and French, and probably the Germans too, want to back up a victory such as Crimea might offer with deploying NATO troops into Ukraine to bail out Ukraine’s army, which otherwise might collapse.

There are indications that Germany is moving toward conscripting soldiers for their armed forces, stepping up the delivery of arms to Ukraine and building up an efficient delivery infrastructure that could support NATO armed forces fighting in Ukraine. It is not surprising that Germany’s main foreign customer for weapons is Ukraine.

There are many uncertainties, not the least of which is that Washington may again change direction.

Peace deal dead, new war drums beating for Ukraine - Asia Times

NATO still aims to ‘win’ its war against Russia and the US has apparently decided to back its European allies

asiatimes.com · Stephen Bryen · August 29, 2025

There is growing evidence that not only have the Ukraine peace talks stalled, but NATO has won over Washington to not only continue the war but to expand it.

While Russian President Vladimir Putin has flown off to meet with his two buddies, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, in China on an unprecedented four-day jaunt, NATO, with full US backing, is stepping up its effort to hand the Russian army a major defeat and, following that, introducing NATO troops to “stabilize” Ukraine.

What is the evidence? First and very noticeable is the US decision to ship 3,350 missiles to Ukraine, ostensibly to be paid for (someday?) by the Europeans (which ones are not defined). These are known as Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM), a type of air-launched cruise missile.

The Aviationist reports that “Ukrainian Air Force’s F-16s, Mirage 2000s and its fleet of Russian-origin MiG-29s, Su-25s and Su-27s would be able to operate it. This new weapon would be an addition to the AASM Hammer and GBU-39 SDB already employed by Ukrainian fighters.”

According to open source intelligence, ERAMs have a range of 250 miles (402 kilometers). However, that is the range once launched by an aircraft. Washington says it opposes Ukrainian missile attacks on Russian territory, and while it is restricting the use of long-range HIMARS, it is not restricting the use of ERAM.

ERAM reportedly carried a 500-pound (227-kilogram) warhead, far larger than any Ukrainian UAV and more than double any of the different HIMARS missiles (M31 Utility Warhead, ATACMS warhead). It may be that ERAMs can be fielded with cluster munitions, although much about the ERAM is uncertain.

Ukraine has also introduced a new cruise missile called Flamingo (FP-5). Developed by a Ukrainian company called Fire Point, the missile has a range of 3,000 kilometers and carries a massive one-ton warhead.

The Ukrainians say that the Flamingo is an entirely home-grown missile, but it is nearly identical to the FP-5 produced by the Milanion Group. Milanion is based at Tawazun Industrial Park, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

Milanion Group previously partnered with Ukraine Armor for making robotic vehicles. According to published information, Ukraine can produce around 20 Flamingos per month. The US allegedly has no control over the use of Flamingo.

H. I. Sutton, Covert Shores Diagram of Flamingo Cruise Missile.

None of these weapons, alone, can stop the Russian army, as NATO analysts nowadays understand. Thus, the current strategy employed by Ukraine against Russia’s critical infrastructure, aimed at raising the cost of the war and demoralizing the Russian public, is not enough to stop the advance of Russian forces.

In the past, NATO planners helped plan (using simulation models) and execute special offensives (including advanced real-time intelligence) to try and deter Russia. The most notable have been attacks in Crimea aimed at the port of Sevastopol and Russian military installations (especially air defenses), and other major offensives in Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, and Donetsk regions.

They were also involved in earlier successful campaigns such as the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region and the Battle of Kyiv. More recently, Ukrainian incursions into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in August 2025 represent a significant escalation and were successful for some months in holding Russian territory.

The Russians managed to roll back everything from 2023, but at significant cost. In addition, in Kursk, the Russians relied heavily on North Korean troops who took heavy casualties, so much so that Kim Jong Un sought to turn defeat into a sort of moral victory, holding highly emotional funeral ceremonies in Pyongyang.

NATO views Russia’s use of North Korean troops as an admission that Russia faces manpower shortages and instability in the Russian army, and that Russia is taking heavy casualties in the Ukraine war.

NATO may be reading Putin’s statements that he has no intention of attacking Europe now or in the future as an admission that he cannot attack Europe with an army that is too small and one that the Ukraine war has broken. Part of the pushback can be found in the Saratoga Foundation report, “A Systems View of Russia’s Early Failure in Ukraine.”

Now, Russian sources are reporting two developments that indicate that a new offensive will soon materialize, heavily supported by NATO, and aimed at Crimea. Those sources say that the US and its NATO partners have significantly increased overhead intelligence gathering, preparing for the coming attack.

Here is one Russian report on a Telegram channel called Archangel of Special Forces (АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА):

Since August 23, there has been an increase in reconnaissance flights in the immediate vicinity of our borders, including by aircraft that have not been observed in the region for a long time.

A US Air Force RQ-4B, which has not been in the Black Sea since July, conducted a night patrol southwest of Sevastopol.

A US Navy P-8A conducted reconnaissance in the direction of the Crimean Bridge, Sochi and the Novorossiysk naval base for three days in a row.

On August 25, the Artemis CL-650 aircraft, which has modern equipment, similar in some respects to the R-8A, worked in tandem with the R-8A. Their paired use is one of the ways to obtain the most accurate information about our air defense positions.

And a French E-3F AWACS aircraft flew in the Crimean direction – a rare guest, the appearance of which can be considered a sure sign of impending strikes.

In addition, Newsweek reports that a British Royal Air Force RC-135W Rivet Joint, an electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft, flew a two-hour sortie off the coast of Romania … about 150 miles west of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet garrison of Sevastopol, according to GPS signals captured on Flightradar24.

According to Status-6 (Military & Conflict News) a Russian Sukhoi fighter jet intercepted a US Navy Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft/ASW plane over the Black Sea on August 28. The Russians see US-led heavy surveillance operations as preparing for a major operation against Crimea.

The Ukrainian reconnaissance ship Simferopol

Russian mil bloggers say that Ukraine has been “preparing for this attack over the past few weeks. Landing craft have been ready for a long time, USVs were stationed in the waiting area at the mouth of the Danube. Even special forces of the GUR [Military Intelligence] arrived in the Odesa region as part of this preparation.”

Meanwhile, on August 28, the Russians sank the Simferopol, a Ukrainian reconnaissance vessel, near the mouth of the Danube River, using a sea drone.

All of this involves the US and NATO together, and despite high-level US statements that Ukraine should cede Crimea to Russia in any peace deal, it appears that the US and NATO are preparing for a major Crimea attack.

In plain terms, the Russians are reading these developments as a possible renewed attempt by the US and NATO to shift the “correlation of forces” in the Ukraine war with the intent of forcing major concessions from the Russians, not from the Ukrainians.

We will have to wait to see how a new offensive on Crimea will unfold (if it does) and if the Russians can counter a major attack there. But it does clearly signal that peace talks, at least for now, are dead and that NATO wants to “win” its war against Russia. It seems Washington has decided not only to go along with its European allies but to participate in a major way.

The British and French, and probably the Germans too, want to back up a victory such as Crimea might offer with deploying NATO troops into Ukraine to bail out Ukraine’s army, which otherwise might collapse.

There are indications that Germany is moving toward conscripting soldiers for their armed forces, stepping up the delivery of arms to Ukraine and building up an efficient delivery infrastructure that could support NATO armed forces fighting in Ukraine. It is not surprising that Germany’s main foreign customer for weapons is Ukraine.

There are many uncertainties, not the least of which is that Washington may again change direction.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · Stephen Bryen · August 29, 2025

19. No, the conventional wisdom on China is not 'dangerously wrong'

Excerpts:

We don’t hear Chinese officials announcing their intent to bully other governments, interfere in the politics of foreign states, carry out cyberattacks, hold foreigners as political hostages, conduct unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers in the air or at sea or imprison huge numbers of Uyghurs for flimsy reasons, although we know these actions occur in practice.

Similarly, actual PRC policies – including a massive military buildup, with the US as its pacing threat; diplomacy and strategic communications aimed at disparaging US regional and global leadership and at breaking up America’s alliances; a partnership with Russia to oppose America’s international agenda; and a plan to make China the world leader in emerging technologies – strongly suggest the very aspirations that Kang, Wong and Chen deny.

Even the PRC’s “internal” concerns can threaten or harm its neighbors.

Territorial disputes with neighbors involve potential military conflicts with most states in the region. The Chinese government takes a nineteenth century approach to solving them, blowing off modern norms such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which China is a signatory) and self-determination.

Assurances from Beijing are not trustworthy. The PRC has demonstrated aspirations that, if fulfilled, would cut into the national interests of other states.

The authors correctly argue that the US strategy for coping with the challenges presented by a rising China should not overly rely on military preparations, but should also include robust economic and diplomatic approaches. But it would also be a “dangerous” mistake to assume a powerful and unopposed China would remain mostly passive and cooperative.

No, the conventional wisdom on China is not 'dangerously wrong' - Asia Times

Authors of a new article fail to prove that China is essentially a status-quo power with limited and reasonable aims

asiatimes.com · Denny Roy · August 27, 2025

The US policy-making community has gravitated toward a belief that China under Xi Jinping’s leadership is aggressive – specifically, that Beijing wants to seize more territory and seeks to supplant the US role as regional strategic leader and global superpower.

A new article by David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong and Zenobia T. Chen in the prestigious journal International Security argues that this conventional wisdom is “dangerously wrong” and will unnecessarily worsen geopolitical tensions.

This article presumably puts forth some of the best arguments supporting one side of a debate that is vitally important as the US-China rivalry intensifies, making war look increasingly possible.

The authors fail, however, to prove their main assertion that China is essentially a status-quo power with limited and reasonable aims.

To make their case, the authors make three main arguments.

Priorities

First, they say China is focused on things other than expanding its power, influence and territory. Beijing “is concerned about internal challenges more than external threats or expansion,” they say. The PRC government wants only “domestic stability; sovereignty and territorial integrity; and social-economic development.”

Even if internal challenges are the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) highest priority, they can lead to aggressive or bullying behavior abroad. Take regime security, for example. Mao Zedong’s fear that the new CCP regime would not survive the political pressure of a US ally on its border – distinct from the threat of military invasion – was perhaps the crucial consideration in his decision to intervene in the Korean War in 1950.

In an extension of the internal issue of controlling Tibet, China has encroached into and built infrastructure in disputed parts of Bhutan as a means of punishing that country for hosting Tibetan refugees.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, concern with saving face for the PRC leadership led to several instances of low-level bullying. Beijing pressured Southeast Asian governments not to bar travelers from China, even though this would risk the health of these governments’ own citizens. Chinese diplomats demanded that foreign governments publicly praise China as payment for Chinese medical supplies. And China launched a campaign of economic coercion against Australia as punishment for requesting an investigation into the origins of the pandemic.

The controversial but persistent idea of Beijing possibly launching a diversionary war stems from the premise that its peculiar political environment could make China prone to fomenting an external conflict.

These peculiarities include the government’s cultivation of national grievance and selective hatreds, restrictions on political discussion, over-concentration of power in the hands of one or a few individuals, and the lack of mechanisms empowering society to expel leaders who prioritize regime security over public interests.

We’ve heard many times before that the Chinese don’t want to hurt anybody, they just want to raise their own living standards. This assertion, however, overlooks the historically common phenomenon of a country’s drive for economic development leading it to engage in imperialism.

The desire to gain control of economically-valuable resources partly explains China’s annexation of Tibet and attempt to assert sovereignty over the South China Sea. PRC resource-extraction arrangements in South America and Africa have drawn accusations of neo-colonialism.

Economic development also motivates other aggressive Chinese actions, including extensive overfishing of distant oceans (China is the world’s top perpetrator of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing) and massive government-sponsored industrial espionage (of which China is also the world’s top practitioner).

Territorial disputes

Second, the authors downplay China’s territorial disputes, which are the immediate likely triggers of a military conflict. China is not, they say, “an existential threat to the countries on its borders or in its region that it does not already claim sovereignty over.”

While this statement may be true, upon close examination it is not reassuring. It implies China may well be an “existential threat” to the countries whose territory Beijing does claim sovereignty over, most notably Taiwan.

The amount of disputed territory that China claims is so vast that it involves rival claimants India, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and the Philippines, not to mention the US, which patrols regional airspace and waters to highlight aspects of China’s non-compliance with the Law of the Sea. (Russia, which took a million square kilometers of Chinese land in the nineteenth century, gets a pass for now.)

With each of these countries, plus Taiwan, Beijing’s irredentism maintains permanent tensions and a danger of spontaneous and unplanned violence.

The danger China poses to its region is not limited to the “existential” scenario of territorial conquest. Rather, for most of the region the issue is Finlandization: Beijing using a combination of military and economic power to acquire veto power over the policies of its neighbors.

The authors argue that China’s territorial claims pre-date the founding of the PRC. This point is important because it challenges the neorealist expectation that the demands of a rising great power will increase along with its strength relative to the other countries in the international system. “China’s claims are the same today as they were in the mid-twentieth century when it was desperately poor,” they write.

China’s territorial claims have in fact increased in recent years, although modestly, and most notably in Bhutan. The reason recent new claims are small is because previous claims were already surpassingly vast. As a poor country, China had vast residual claims because it was a fallen former great power. As a resurgent great power, China is now in a position to re-take “lost” lands.

Thus, the real significance of China’s territorial claims is not that they are static, but rather that the relatively strong Xi-era China is moving more aggressively to unilaterally enforce its inherited claims through

the building of military bases on artificial islands and harassment of foreign vessels in the South China Sea;
the construction of military infrastructure in areas near the China-India border;
routine incursions by PRC government vessels near the Senkaku Islands
encroachments into South Korea’s part of the Yellow Sea, and
increased military pressure on Taiwan.

Because they say so

The authors’ third main argument is China will not seek regional or global hegemony because the PRC government says so.

The authors conducted a content analysis of authoritative Chinese sources: People’s Daily, Qiushi and speeches by senior officials. They found that “China’s top leaders consistently reiterate that China does not seek regional hegemony or aim to compete with the United States for global supremacy.” They note that Chinese schools and internal media repeat these same messages to the Chinese public.

From this they conclude that Xi’s China lacks “ambition to be a global or even regional leader” and “does not intend to challenge or displace the United States.”

The authors do a surprisingly poor job of addressing the obvious suspicion that CCP-approved discourse is not a reliable indicator of the Chinese government’s intentions.

China has a long tradition of combining a ceremonial strategic discourse – one that emphasizes morally upright behavior by the Chinese government – with ruthless strategic behavior.

The fact that PRC official discourse does not reveal certain intentions does not prove that the intentions don’t exist. Alternatively, it might indicate the government thinks the intentions sound dishonorable.

We don’t hear Chinese officials announcing their intent to bully other governments, interfere in the politics of foreign states, carry out cyberattacks, hold foreigners as political hostages, conduct unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers in the air or at sea or imprison huge numbers of Uyghurs for flimsy reasons, although we know these actions occur in practice.

Similarly, actual PRC policies – including a massive military buildup, with the US as its pacing threat; diplomacy and strategic communications aimed at disparaging US regional and global leadership and at breaking up America’s alliances; a partnership with Russia to oppose America’s international agenda; and a plan to make China the world leader in emerging technologies – strongly suggest the very aspirations that Kang, Wong and Chen deny.

Even the PRC’s “internal” concerns can threaten or harm its neighbors.

Territorial disputes with neighbors involve potential military conflicts with most states in the region. The Chinese government takes a nineteenth century approach to solving them, blowing off modern norms such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which China is a signatory) and self-determination.

Assurances from Beijing are not trustworthy. The PRC has demonstrated aspirations that, if fulfilled, would cut into the national interests of other states.

The authors correctly argue that the US strategy for coping with the challenges presented by a rising China should not overly rely on military preparations, but should also include robust economic and diplomatic approaches. But it would also be a “dangerous” mistake to assume a powerful and unopposed China would remain mostly passive and cooperative.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

asiatimes.com · Denny Roy · August 27, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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