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Quotes of the Day:
“Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. The fearful are caught as often as the bold.”
– Helen Keller
"To suffer without complaint is the only lesson we have to learn in life"
– Van Gogh
"Polish your wisdom: learn public justice, distinguish between good and evil, study the ways of different arts one by one."
–Miyamoto Musashi
Apologies for the consulate news and commentaries. As most know Korean Airlines rarely has WiFi.
1. John Batchelor Show ROK 8.15 Unification Doctrine Interview
2. The Growing Threat from North Korea by The Hon. Michael Kirby
3. Human Security Risk: Tired Mountain Syndrome
4. North Korean floods again: Will the Kims ever learn?
5. North Korea orders all students abroad to return home for ideological education
6. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint special operations drills
7. Premier US military CBRNE command participates in Ulchi Freedom Shield in South Korea
8. S. Korea, U.S. wrap up key summertime military exercise against N. Korean threats
9. Yoon says S. Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation to continue despite leadership changes
10. Hanwha Ocean wins maintenance deal for U.S. Navy
11. Families of victims of N. Korea's abduction, detention urge int'l solidarity to address issue
12. S. Korea to expand support for civic groups' radio broadcasting projects for N. Koreans
13. Sullivan stresses U.S.' commitment to 'complete' Korean Peninsula denuclearization1
14. [Exclusive] 13 North Korean Submarines Registered for the First Time in IMO… “Intention for Overseas Operations”
15. China Reminds South Korea That Time Isn’t On Its Side
16. If South Korea Goes Nuclear, So Will the World
17. Putin and Kim Jong Un's new alliance is proving to be a win-win
18. North Korea fires missiles in demonstration for Russia
19. Unification Ministry pledges more female speakers after British envoy withdraws from male-dominated forum
20. Kim’s significant change should come before another Washington-Pyongyang summit
21. South Korea gets closer to NATO in the Indo-Pacific
22. Unification ministry issues English version of report on N. Korea's economic, social situation
23, S. Korea, US to hold high-level talks on N. Korea deterrence next week
24. Gov't tracks 4,071 perpetrators, victims in N. Korean human rights probe
25. Unification ministry approves civic groups' bid for N. Korean contact over flood damage relief
1. John Batchelor Show ROK 8.15 Unification Doctrine Interview
In this 10 minute radio interview with John Batchelor and Gordon Chang I discuss the 8.15 Unification Doctrine and the conference I participated in in Seoul hosted by the Korean Institute of National Unification and the Ministry of Unification.
Listen to it here: https://audioboom.com/posts/8562952-rok-unification-david-maxwell-vice-president-of-the-center-for-asia-pacific-strategy-gordong?fbclid=
ROK: UNIFICATION: David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HIL
ROK: UNIFICATION: David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL
https://www.newsweek.com/south-korea-shares-blueprint-unification-north-1940218.
1950 KOREA
2. The Growing Threat from North Korea by The Hon. Michael Kirby
As all Korea watchers know, Justice Kirby led the groundbreaking reporting on north Korean human rights abuses and comimes against humanity in the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry. No one is more qualified to comment on north Korean human rights and the UN and its processes than Justice KIrby,
Excerpts:
The U.N. Security Council needs to re-engage with North Korea. Members should request the U.N. Secretary General and relevant U.N. agencies to provide further briefings on the humanitarian crisis and the ongoing evidence of links between rights abuses and North Korea’s weapons program.
Yet the council itself is now deadlocked on all North Korea matters, including with respect to weapons proliferation and international peace and security, unable to reach consensus even in response to recent missile launches.
It’s up to the U.N. General Assembly to insist on regular reporting on the linkages between North Korea’s weapons development, its threat to international peace and security, and the human rights situation. A strong General Assembly resolution is a first step.
Recently, at the 2024 International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights in Washington D.C., experts gathered to discuss the urgent need for accountability 10 years after the Commission of Inquiry report. After the Second World War, the world promised never again to look away from the gravest human rights abuses. We should be clear-sighted and accept that we cannot divorce international peace and security in North Korea from the egregious abuse of the human rights of its people. Continuing to allow such an ill-governed, abusive, and unstable state to threaten our fragile planet may be the greatest human rights abuse of all.
The Growing Threat from North Korea
justsecurity.org · by The Hon. Michael Kirby · August 29, 2024
August 29, 2024
A decade ago, I chaired a United Nations commission of inquiry that delivered a major report on the human rights situation in North Korea. Our findings were transmitted to the highest levels of the U.N. and to governments around the world. Yet, the shocking abuses we documented — executions, enslavement, forced labor, torture, forced abortions, and rape and other sexual violence, among other atrocities — have continued.
In fact, new reports, such as one recently by Human Rights Watch, suggest that such abuses are growing worse even as North Korea has steadily increased its proliferation of nuclear warheads and missiles. The U.N. system has largely failed to address the crisis. While other problems and conflicts have dominated the world’s attention, the situation in North Korea is too serious to ignore.
On March 17, 2014, after a year of investigatory hearings, interviews, and evidence collection, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea presented a 372-page report to the U.N. Human Rights Council (summary and detailed reports available here). It documented decades of systematic and widespread rights violations by North Korea’s government. We concluded that many of the abuses met the high legal threshold required for proof of “crimes against humanity.”
The U.N. General Assembly voted a few months later to transmit our full report, formally, to the U.N. Security Council. In December 2014, that body held its first debate on North Korea’s human rights record, and on whether to refer the situation there to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, as we had recommended. But since Russia and China would likely veto the recommendation, no action was taken. Still, the U.N. Human Rights Council set up an office in Seoul to continue to gather evidence of abuses.
What action has been taken since? Not much. Amid threatened vetoes by Russia and China, failed diplomatic overtures by the Trump administration, the Covid pandemic, and other global crises, North Korean human rights largely fell off the radar. Competing issues captured world attention and still do.
‘Shoot-on-Sight’ Orders
North Korea, however, remains in crisis. As the March report from Human Rights Watch outlined, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has since 2020 almost entirely sealed the country’s northern border with China and Russia to transit and trade. It has been fortified with hundreds of miles of new fences, enforced with “shoot-on-sight” orders.
At the same time, the authorities have tightened control over every aspect of society, imposed overbroad and excessive restrictions on freedom of movement, restricted economic activity and communication, and instituted new ideological controls and harsher punishments. Since at least 2021, reports have emerged of starvation and serious shortages of food and essential goods.
It now appears that Kim Jong Un has used the last 10 years to reestablish a system of centralized economic control in North Korea, similar to what existed during the Cold War. Citizens are terrorized into obedience and remain completely dependent upon the state to survive. Kim has turned the horrendous situation that existed when he took power — a closed society without basic rights, suffering from chronic deprivations — into a fully totalitarian dystopia, similar to the society ruled by his grandfather, Kim Il Song in the 1950s to 1970s.
Kim Jong Un has also escalated North Korea’s hostility and defiance toward the U.N. system and most of its member States, launching an increasing number of long-range missiles and conducting nuclear detonations in 2013, 2016, and 2017, the last of which may have been a thermonuclear fusion device, a technology allowing smaller warheads. Its reactors are reportedly producing both uranium and plutonium. North Korea now possesses credible nuclear strike capacities threatening Japan, South Korea, China, and even possibly the United States.
In addition, North Korea’s weapons program itself has involved massive human rights abuses, as it prioritizes spending on nuclear arms over food and other essentials and uses forced labor in the military and the defense industries. In turn, it sells deadly weapons to other abusive regimes for revenue production. On a broader level, massive rights violations and prioritization of the regime’s survival are precisely what enabled it to develop nuclear weapons in the first place. Decades of failures to address those abuses have encouraged North Korea to entrench its totalitarian rule.
Include Human Rights in Future Negotiations
In the end, North Korea’s human rights crisis is just as inescapable as its nuclear threats. This is another reason why it is vital that North Korea’s human rights issues return to their rightful place among the top items on the U.N. Security Council’s agenda. Human rights must be included in any future negotiations with Pyongyang. Doing so will be beneficial for practical reasons related to verification and transparency — many experts now acknowledge that rights issues are central for successful negotiations, since any sustained diplomatic progress or durable verification of agreements will require North Korea to restore access to U.N. inspectors and improve real cooperation with the U.N. system. That means the kind of transparency that is currently foreclosed by such a repressive regime. Monitoring will also inevitably entail noting the weapons systems’ connections with rights abuses.
The world should not ignore these interconnections any longer. The threats that Kim Jong Un poses to the world are directly connected to the threats he poses to the people of North Korea. His nuclear threats are human rights threats. Concerned governments should support reengagement with Kim Jong Un to address the escalating security threats and the country’s humanitarian and human rights situation.
The U.N. Human Rights Council in April requested that the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights prepare a follow-up to the Commission of Inquiry report, to facilitate better understanding of new developments since 2014. This is a positive step. But the threat posed by North Korea now goes beyond the mandate of the Human Rights Council in Geneva.
The U.N. Security Council needs to re-engage with North Korea. Members should request the U.N. Secretary General and relevant U.N. agencies to provide further briefings on the humanitarian crisis and the ongoing evidence of links between rights abuses and North Korea’s weapons program.
Yet the council itself is now deadlocked on all North Korea matters, including with respect to weapons proliferation and international peace and security, unable to reach consensus even in response to recent missile launches.
It’s up to the U.N. General Assembly to insist on regular reporting on the linkages between North Korea’s weapons development, its threat to international peace and security, and the human rights situation. A strong General Assembly resolution is a first step.
Recently, at the 2024 International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights in Washington D.C., experts gathered to discuss the urgent need for accountability 10 years after the Commission of Inquiry report. After the Second World War, the world promised never again to look away from the gravest human rights abuses. We should be clear-sighted and accept that we cannot divorce international peace and security in North Korea from the egregious abuse of the human rights of its people. Continuing to allow such an ill-governed, abusive, and unstable state to threaten our fragile planet may be the greatest human rights abuse of all.
IMAGE: A North Korean guard in a watchtower on the border in the North Korean village of Hyesan, as seen from Changbai in China’s northeast Jilin province. (Photo by PEDRO PARDO/AFP via Getty Images)
The Hon. Michael Kirby
Michael Kirby is an international jurist, educator, and former judge. He was a justice of the High Court of Australia from 1996 to 2009, and was chair of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on North Korea in 2013-14.
justsecurity.org · by The Hon. Michael Kirby · August 29, 2024
3. Human Security Risk: Tired Mountain Syndrome
It is good to hear young voices in the north Korean human rights community.
Graphic/chart at the link: https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/human-security-risk-tired-mountain-syndrome?utm
I have often wondered if nuclear tests create earthquakes in north Korea.
Excerp:
The underground tests have caused earthquakes in previously stable regions, raising the specter of a catastrophic eruption of Mount Paektu. Such an event could release radioactive material across neighboring countries, endangering millions. North Korean nuclear scientists, those that are described in Robert Collin’s work, are driven by fear of reprisal, which means these tests could continue unchecked. This places the citizens of North Korea, already vulnerable, at severe risk from potential radioactive exposure, highlighting the urgent need for denuclearization. North Korea's denuclearization is not just a geopolitical imperative but a human rights necessity. It would mitigate the immediate threat of a nuclear-triggered volcanic eruption and prevent the long-term environmental and health crises that could devastate millions of lives. International pressure, particularly from China, which has expressed concern over the regional fallout, must focus on ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions to ensure the safety and well-being of the entire region. The international community's pressure to denuclearize North Korea is not only essential to prevent a catastrophic radioactive disaster but also crucial in securing the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people.
Human Security Risk: Tired Mountain Syndrome
nkhiddengulag.org
By Gary Tetreault, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca & Raymond Ha
Introduction
The dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear testing extend beyond immediate geopolitical tensions to significant human rights and environmental concerns. The nuclear tests conducted at North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear testing site have resulted in what is called “Tired Mountain Syndrome.” The short-term consequences of these tests may lead to the collapse of Mt. Mantap. However, the long-term effects may lead to an eruption of Mount Paektu, a mountain that is considered holy in North Korea. North Korea’s nuclear testing poses more than just a national security problem. It endangers the human rights and human security of North Korea’s population. For instance, it is believed to have caused earthquakes that otherwise would not have occurred. If continued, nuclear testing at the Punggye-ri testing facility may contribute to the eruption of Mount Paektu or the collapse of Mt. Mantap, which could have catastrophic consequences for both North Korea and neighboring countries. However, no nuclear scientist would report this to the Supreme Leader in fear of punishment.
Punggye-ri
The Punggye-ri nuclear test facility is North Korea’s sole known nuclear test site, located 17.2 km north of Punggye-ri village in North Hamgyong Province, on the southern slopes of Mount Mantap. Extending 10 km south along a river valley, it was established in the early 2000s and hosted six underground nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and 2017, using two of four known tunnels. Despite announcing its closure in 2018, recent evidence suggests the site is prepared for a seventh test, which could occur at any time. Notably, all six of North Korea's nuclear tests were conducted at the Punggye-ri site, situated in Kilju County in the northeastern part of the country. However, the most vulnerable group in North Korea remains its citizens, as they continue to be exposed to high levels of radioactive material coming from tests that are being conducted at Pungye-ri. Commercial satellite images of North Korea's Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in 2022 reveal ongoing operations throughout the facility. The support infrastructure and instrumentation surrounding Tunnel No. 3 suggest it is ready for testing if a decision is made. Still, no significant activities, like increased vehicle traffic or personnel surges near the tunnel, would suggest an imminent test. A satellite image of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility from April 2, 2024, reveals that the road to Tunnel No. 3's portal has been cleared of snow, indicating ongoing low-level activity. This suggests North Korea is committed to maintaining Tunnel No. 3, and the overall facility and activity at Tunnel No. 3 is concerning, as North Korea has completed preparations for a seventh nuclear test there.
Tired Mountain Syndrome Effects
Tired mountain syndrome occurs when underground nuclear testing causes fractures and weakens the surrounding rock structure, leading to increased permeability and a higher risk of releasing radionuclides and radioactive contamination into the environment. This contamination can have severe costs to people and their quality of life, including increased health risks such as cancer and other radiation-related illnesses. North Korean defectors from regions near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site displayed signs of possible radiation exposure. In the event of Mt. Mantap’s collapse, due to the testing, the surrounding area will face a significant amount of debris exposure from the eruption, heavily damaging the environment, quality of life, and future crop harvest, potentially creating another famine and debris from the eruption extending past North Korea’s border as far as Japan. Exposure to harmful radioactive fallout can occur directly or indirectly. Radioactive material can enter the body if radioactive dust lands on the skin. Many people and animals in the downwind counties around the Nevada testing site in the United States were exposed to harmful toxins in this way. Inhalation of suspended radioactive material is also a significant risk in the downwind region. High-altitude winds can carry radioactive material far from the test site, depositing it on the ground if precipitation occurs. In the case of Mt. Mantap, as tired mountain syndrome softens the soil, the soil is expected to travel down to where the population lives. Although most farmland is not conducted in North Hamgyong province, satellite images show agricultural fields. In the days following a nuclear test, radioactive material can settle on crops and pastures. Continuation of the nuclear tests may exacerbate the process of the collapse of Mount Mantap, worsening the quality of life for the North Korean population. The environmental damage can also disrupt local ecosystems, contaminate water supplies, and lead to the displacement of communities, further deteriorating living conditions for the people living in North Korea.
Health risks
For the people of North Korea, the human health cost caused by radiation in the environment can be particularly severe and affect the people living there for generations. The country's limited healthcare infrastructure is ill-equipped to deal with radiation-related health issues, exacerbating the suffering of affected individuals. Regarding human health exposure, The United States exemplifies a substantial increase in thyroid cancer incidence over recent decades, primarily influenced by iodine irradiation. Similar upward trends have been observed in other parts of the world and can be extended to North Korea. In 2017 and 2018, the Ministry of Unification and the Korea Institute of Radiological & Medical Sciences (KIRAMS) conducted radiation exposure tests on North Korean escapees from areas near the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. A total of 40 individuals were tested, 30 in 2017 and 10 in 2018. The results showed that nine of them (4 in 2017 and 5 in 2018) exhibited worrying chromosomal abnormalities, representing 22.5 percent of the total tested. In July 2016, escapees from Kilju County reported health issues. 13 individuals who had lived in Kilju County for several years following North Korea's first to third nuclear tests were among those who reported these health problems. In August 2016, Dr. Choi, a North Korean escapee, informed the media that these escapees were experiencing physical abnormalities, including headaches, weight loss, and decreased sensory function.
Table 3 taken from Mapping the Risk and Effect of Radioactive Contamination of Groundwater Sources from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in North Korea
The psychological toll of living in a contaminated environment adds to the overall human suffering in North Korea. The psychological tolls have been from the direct consequences of nuclear testing and the contaminated environment that ordinary North Korean citizens have been subjected to. It is concerning due to the North Korean regime going to great lengths in concealing the potential risk of living in the area to the residents. A potential collapse of the mountain could lead to the displacement of those living around the area while leaving the Kim regime, escaping responsibility for those it harmed by its nuclear testing. The regime’s prioritization of nuclear testing over the well-being of its citizens constitutes a violation of the right to health and a safe environment. These health concerns violate the people’s physical and mental right to health as laid out in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, which North Korea ratified on September 14, 1981.[16] Article 12 of the ICESCR states, “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” This is a legal obligation that North Korea is bound to follow under its constitution, as specified in Article 15: “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall champion the democratic national rights of Koreans overseas and their rights recognized by international law as well as their interests.” [17]
However, the constitution means little to the Kim regime. While the constitution may exist, more emphasis is put on its ruling ideology imposed on North Korean society.[18]
Mount Paektu eruption
The intersection of North Korea's nuclear activities and the geological instability of Mount Paektu presents a significant threat to the health of the North Korean population, in addition to the associated risk of nuclear testing. Nuclear testing occurring at Pynggye-ri and the collapse of Mt. Mantap are the short-term effects if North Korea continues its testing activities. Still, concerns about Mt. Paektu's recent activity and how nuclear testing may lead to an eruption have been raised. These tests could exacerbate the region's vulnerability to catastrophic events at Punggye-ri. Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corporation, expressed concern that a sufficiently large test by North Korea could trigger an eruption at Mount Paektu. He told CNN that such an eruption could be massive, potentially killing thousands or even tens of thousands of people in both China and North Korea.[19] While it is uncertain if an enormous nuclear explosion would trigger the volcano, Bennett noted that this possibility has long worried the Chinese, who fear Kim Jong-un's actions could cause the volcano to erupt. According to the Smithsonian’s Global Volcanism Program, approximately 1.6 million people live within 100 kilometers (62 miles) of the volcano, only about 115 to 130 kilometers (70 to 80 miles) from North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site.[20] North Korea's nuclear weapons program might accelerate this possibility. A separate study by Tae-Kyung Hong in 2016 indicates that the country's underground weapons tests are generating powerful pressure waves directed towards Mount Paektu's massive magma chamber.[21] The magma is absorbing this pressure, and it is possible that if the volcano is already on the brink of eruption, these additional pressure waves could trigger it.[22] Research conducted between 2000 and 2002 and from 2006 to 2010 revealed no surface deformation of Mount Paektu, indicating it is dormant. Despite this, several indicators suggest the possibility of an imminent eruption.[23] These signs include seismic unrest around the volcano, deformation detected by GPS, unusually high gas emissions, and increased thermal activity in hot springs near the summit. In Seung-Gu Lee’s research from 2021, two types of bottled mineral water from wells located in the northern (Baeksansu, BSS) and southern (Baekdusansu, BDS) areas near Mount Paektu (Changbai) were collected to monitor the chemical compositions of groundwater near a potential volcanic area. Research indicated that the chemical composition of mineral water might be altered due to crustal activity such as earthquakes or volcanic activity.[24]
The consequences of the eruption
The volatile geological conditions at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site have drawn parallels to the potential eruption of Mount Paektu, highlighting the region's vulnerability to catastrophic natural events. The National Institute of Environmental Research of Korea has examined the potential power of Mount Paektu and indicated that its global impact could be as catastrophic as Mount Tambora, a volcano in Indonesia eruption. Volcanic ash and gas could obscure the sun, reducing East Asian temperatures by 2 degrees for two months.[25] The fallout of volcanic ash could have lasting health effects and cause significant secondary damage to the economy and livelihoods. Health risks from volcanic ash, including respiratory issues, skin irritation, and eye problems, threaten the fundamental right to health. The necessity for evacuation and displacement disrupts communities, leading to the loss of homes and livelihoods, infringing on the right to adequate housing and economic stability. North Korea would face severe disruptions and exacerbating poverty, threatening the Kim regime. Damage to crops and water supplies from the eruption of Mount Paektu could lead to food shortages, undermining the right to food and clean water. Volcanic eruptions significantly impact climate, altering temperature and precipitation, which affects agriculture. Historical Chinese records show this, especially after significant eruptions at low latitudes post-1800s. For example, in 1817, Yunnan experienced no rain during critical rice flowering.[26] These events show how cold and drought conditions led to failed harvests. Mount Paektu sits at a higher elevation outside the range the report suggested. However, any disruption to North Korea’s already fragile food system, an eruption of Mount Paektu would have significant disruption to the lives of the people in North Korea. The destruction of infrastructure, including roads, buildings, and essential services, would impede access to necessary resources. Crops are susceptible to severe climate anomalies such as floods, droughts, and temperature extremes. For instance, if sudden temperature extremes occur during crucial stages of plant development, like flowering, crop yields can be severely affected.[27] This will exacerbate food security challenges in North Korea, , especially among rural citizens who currently facing severe food shortages.[28] Kim Jong-un has stated that food shortages are a “serious political issue,” and a potential eruption could lead to a massive threat to his regime as the eruption's effects would increase food insecurity.[29]
The Human Rights Violation
North Korea's nuclear testing at the Punggye-ri site presents severe human rights violations, particularly considering Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR, which North Korea ratified.[30] The radioactive contamination from these tests jeopardizes the right to an adequate standard of living by threatening local agriculture, food security, and overall living conditions. This negligence is compounded by the government's exacerbation of famine and the food crisis, as it denied the existence of the problem, imposed tight controls to hide the disaster's extent, and hindered the equitable distribution of food aid by restricting freedom of movement, even for the search of food.[31] In the event of Mount Mantap's collapse, many people will be left alone, without the capability to leave in search of a new home, and will completely rely on the will of the North Korean regime to find a new home and food. This environmental degradation contravenes the Covenant's mandate to improve food production methods and efficiently utilize natural resources.[32] Additionally, the structural instability caused by the tests endangers housing and infrastructure, risking displacement and further degrading living conditions. Moreover, the health risks from radiation exposure, including increased rates of cancer and other illnesses, highlight significant violations of the right to health. This negligence violates both the spirit and the letter of the Covenant, emphasizing the need for international intervention to ensure North Korea's compliance and to protect the fundamental human rights of its population.
The underground tests have caused earthquakes in previously stable regions, raising the specter of a catastrophic eruption of Mount Paektu. Such an event could release radioactive material across neighboring countries, endangering millions. North Korean nuclear scientists, those that are described in Robert Collin’s work, are driven by fear of reprisal, which means these tests could continue unchecked. This places the citizens of North Korea, already vulnerable, at severe risk from potential radioactive exposure, highlighting the urgent need for denuclearization. North Korea's denuclearization is not just a geopolitical imperative but a human rights necessity. It would mitigate the immediate threat of a nuclear-triggered volcanic eruption and prevent the long-term environmental and health crises that could devastate millions of lives. International pressure, particularly from China, which has expressed concern over the regional fallout, must focus on ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions to ensure the safety and well-being of the entire region. The international community's pressure to denuclearize North Korea is not only essential to prevent a catastrophic radioactive disaster but also crucial in securing the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people.
Gary Tetreault is a first-year Master of Global Affairs student at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto. Previously, he completed a Bachelor of Arts, double majoring in International Relations and Asian Studies with a minor in Japanese studies. He was also an assistant language teacher in the JET Programme based in Tottori, Japan. As a research intern at HRNK, Gary aims to deepen his knowledge of contemporary issues in North Korea. He intends to apply his primary focus on Asian security and global policy to the challenges in North Korea. Gary seeks to gain a comprehensive understanding of the intricacies of U.S. policy towards North Korea and to explore the security implications of human rights violations on the Korean peninsula.
[1] Robert Collins, Slaves to the Bomb: The Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024), 74
[2] Jacob Bogle, Switchback: Evidence of a Connection between Kwan-li-so No. 16 and the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility? (Washington, D.C: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023), 2
[3] Jacob Bogle, Switchback: Evidence of a Connection between Kwan-li-so No. 16 and the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility? (Washington, D.C: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023), 2
[4] Jack Liu, Olli Heinonen, Peter Makowsky. 2023. "North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: No Signs of an Imminent Test." 38 North. April 11. Accessed June 10, 2024. https://www.38north.org/2023/04/north-koreas-punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site-no-signs-of-an-imminent-test-2/.
[5] Jack Liu, Olli Heinonen, Peter Makowsky. 2023. "North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: No Signs of an Imminent Test." 38 North. April 11. Accessed June 10, 2024. https://www.38north.org/2023/04/north-koreas-punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site-no-signs-of-an-imminent-test-2/.
[6] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun. 2024. Recent Activity Observed at Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility. Washington DC: center for strategic and international studies.
[7] Adushkin, Vitaly V. 2021. The Containment of Soviet Underground Nuclear Explosions. Open File Report, Reston: U.S. Department of the interior Geological Survey.
[8] Times, The Korea. 2024. Possible radiation exposure suspected among some N. Korea defectors. Febuary 29. Accessed June 13, 2024. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/06/103_369748.html.
[9] Meyers, Keith Andrew. 2018. Investigating the Economic Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Testing. Arizona: The University of Arizona.
[10] Hui, Mun Dong. 2024. "Satellite imagery shows construction of new factory in N. Hamgyong Province." Daily NK. June 11. https://www.dailynk.com/english/satellite-imagery-shows-construction-new-factory-north-hamgyong-province/#google_vignette.
[11] Meyers, Keith Andrew. 2018. Investigating the Economic Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Testing. Arizona: The University of Arizona.
[12] Prăvălie, Remus. 2014. Nuclear Weapons Tests and Environmental Consequences: A Global Perspective. Bucharest: AMBIO.
[13] group, Transitional Justice working. 2023. Mapping the Risk and Effect of Radioactive Contamination of Groundwater Sources from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in North Korea. Special report, National Endownment for Democracy. Page 50
[14] group, Transitional Justice working. 2023. Mapping the Risk and Effect of Radioactive Contamination of Groundwater Sources from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in North Korea. Special report, National Endownment for Democracy. Page 50
[15] group, Transitional Justice working. 2023. Mapping the Risk and Effect of Radioactive Contamination of Groundwater Sources from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in North Korea. Special report, National Endownment for Democracy. Page 51
[16] United Nations Treaty Collection. 1966. December 16. Accessed june 11, 2024. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en.
[17] Constitute. 2016. 2016.”, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)’s Constitution of 1976 with Amendments through2016. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2016.pdf?lang=en.
[18] Robert Collins, Slaves to the Bomb: The Role and Fate of North Korea’s Nuclear Scientists (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024), 1
[19] Berlinger, Joshua. 2017. Could North Korean nuclear test lead to volcanic eruption? May 2. Accessed June 3, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/02/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test-mt-paektu/index.html.
[20] Berlinger, Joshua. 2017. Could North Korean nuclear test lead to volcanic eruption? May 2. Accessed June 3, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/02/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test-mt-paektu/index.html.
[21] Tae-Kyung Hong, Eunseo Choi, Seongjun Park & Jin Soo Shin. 2016. "Prediction of ground motion and dynamic stress change in Baekdusan (Changbaishan) volcano caused by a North Korean nuclear explosion." Scientific reports (Sci rep 6).
[22] Andrews, Robin. 2017. Could North Korea Accidentally Trigger A Volcanic Eruption? August 23. Accessed June 3, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/robinandrews/2017/08/23/heres-how-north-korea-could-accidentally-trigger-a-volcanic-supereruption/?sh=2e663c7bd558.
[23] Arief R. Achmad, Seulki Lee, Sungjae Park, Jinah Eom & Chang-Wook Lee. 2020. "Estimating the potential risk of the Mt. Baekdu Volcano using a synthetic interferogram and the LAHARZ inundation zone." Springer Link 755-768. Page 756
[24] Seung-Gu Lee, Dong-Chan Koh , Kyoochul Ha , Kyung-Seok Ko , Youn Soo Lee , Youn-Young Jung. 2021. "Geochemical Implication of Chemical Composition of Mineral Water (BottledWater) Produced Near Mt. Baekdu (Changbai),." MDPI page 2
[25] Son, Yejin. 2023. The New York Times. april 13. Accessed june 3, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/13/learning/an-awakening-of-a-geological-giant-the-next-deadly-eruption-of-mount-baekdu.html.
[26] Zhixin Hao, Danyang Xiong, Jingyun Zheng, Liang Emlyn Yang and Quansheng Ge. 2020. "Volcanic eruptions, successive poor harvests and social resilience over southwest China during the 18–19th century." (Environmental Research Letters covers).
[27] Michael J. Puma, S. Chon and Y. Wada. 2015. Exploring the potential impacts of historic volcanic eruptions on the contemporary global food system. Bern: Pages Past Global Changes.
[28] Un, Lee Chae. 2024. "S. Hamgyong Province’s rural areas suffer from severe food shortages." Daily NK. April 4. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://www.dailynk.com/english/south-hamgyong-province-rural-areas-suffer-severe-food-shortages/.
[29] Yim, Hyunsu. 2024. North Korea's Kim warns that the failure to provide food is a 'serious political issue'. January 24. Accessed 05 22, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-warns-failure-provide-food-serious-political-issue-2024-01-25/.
[30] General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Geneva, United Nations Human Rights office of the High Commissioner, 1966)
[31] Paolo Cammarota, Legal Strategies for Protecting Human Rights in North Korea (Washington D.C: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2007), 84
[32] General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Geneva, United Nations Human Rights office of the High Commissioner, 1966)
4. North Korean floods again: Will the Kims ever learn?
Spoiler alert: NO.
North Korean floods again: Will the Kims ever learn? - Asia Times
Floods devastate the country almost like clockwork and the dynastic leaders habitually respond ineffectually
asiatimes.com · by Bradley K. Martin · August 29, 2024
North Korea has spent August coping with the aftermath of late-July flooding from heavy rains that destroyed river embankments as well as homes and other structures in the northern part of the country. The floods swept away uncounted numbers of people, many of whom are still missing.
Flooding is a perennial problem in the country and the Kim family regime has had eight decades to devise effective ways of dealing with it. The regime has worked on changing the optics but, in substance, it appears that not a lot about its responses has changed. Third-generation leader Kim Jong Un keeps following his grandfather’s and father’s well-thumbed playbook.
In a series of articles published over the course of August by Osaka-based AsiaPress, the regime can be seen to have emphasized once again these playbook responses:
- Mobilize the masses.
- Rebuild with the same old shoddy construction.
- Find scapegoats to blame and punish.
- Turn disaster into Kim personality cult propaganda.
AsiaPress cited state media as having reported that
Kim Jong-un visited the affected areas on July 29, ordering relief and restoration efforts. In Sinuiju and other areas. The military was mobilized and rescued about 5,000 people. While the actual extent of damage is unclear, it appears that there have been significant casualties and flooding of farmland in the affected areas.
AsiaPress keeps in touch with “reporting partners” inside North Korea through Chinese cell phones smuggled into the country. Here is some flood reporting that quotes such a source.
The Hyesan reporting partner belongs to the Socialist Women’s Union of Korea, which is mainly made up of housewives. The local women’s union chapter appealed for donations of relief supplies such as clothing and blankets for flood victims, but “because everyone’s life is difficult, all that was collected by the morning of August 1 were three sets of work clothes, five pairs of old shoes, and one used blanket,” the partner reported.
At a meeting, the local women’s union chapter’s chairwoman got angry, demanding “sincere participation in the support efforts” due to the poor results, but the aid efforts are reportedly lackluster because people who are struggling themselves can only give so much.
Meanwhile, only the families of officials are rushing to donate pots, clothes, rice, and cash, and the reason for this is due to fear, not caring for those in need.
According to state media, Kim Jong Un inspected the disaster-stricken area of Sinuiju on July 29 and July 30, accompanied by top officials of the ruling Workers’ Party. At a meeting, Kim reportedly criticized officials for dereliction of duty and inadequate initial response, saying “unacceptable loss of life occurred” and that they would be “severely punished.” Several officials including the … head of the national police agency were reportedly dismissed.
Upon hearing this news, officials in Ryanggang Province were reportedly thrown into turmoil. The Hyesan reporting partner explained:
“After learning that Kim Jong Un fired officials in Sinuiju, party officials in Ryanggang Province are mobilizing en masse. They’re making a fuss about investigating the damage and mobilizing junior officials to sites where restoration efforts are ongoing. The families of officials are clamoring to donate rice and cash to support the workers mobilized for repair work.”
Flood damage from heavy rains is frequent in North Korea, so repair work on river levees and waterways is carried out almost every year in various locations. Workers from factories and businesses, as well as residents, are mobilized and assigned sections for the work. AsiaPress understands that a “blame game” over responsibility for construction work in areas affected by this heavy rain has already begun. The Hyesan reporting partner explained the situation as follows:
“It seems that the Hyesan Mine, which was in charge of repairing the levee in the Gasan Village area, will be held responsible. Seeing the central government handing out punishments indiscriminately, lower-level officials are also punishing innocent people recklessly. No matter how hard they work on repairs, there’s no way piling up soil and stones alone can stop a flood.”
A week into August, AsiaPress asked the Hyesan reporting partner what measures the authorities were taking and how the recovery efforts were going. She replied:
No food has been distributed yet. We heard that the state-run grain shops would distribute rice, but it hasn’t happened yet. At Hyesan Mine, they’re supposedly distributing three kilograms of corn to each worker, but how are they supposed to live on just that?
There were orders to strengthen flood recovery support efforts, and officials, as well as regulatory agencies, are all mobilized to focus on recovery work. Especially in rural areas, the people’s committee (local government) seems so busy to directly report all field damage situations to the central government. They’re taking photos and tallying up the damage.
Separately, officials are demanding that each household in the people’s units voluntarily contribute 3,000 won each. But no one is paying.
Employees at enterprises are being mobilized for levee repair work, but without cement, they’re just piling up stones. It’s obvious they will collapse again after being done this way….
I heard that all Ryanggang Province party officials submitted self-criticism reports, saying the flood damage was not the central party’s responsibility but an accident caused by local officials’ expediency and defeatism. They were told to write what party policies they implemented and what was lacking.
[The authorities] put out broadcasts and give lectures to commend people who have contributed support or been mobilized. They propagate the idea that helping each other in difficult times is a fine communist tradition and an expression of patriotism.
But only those who earn good money can afford to give support, and they’re doing it to get their names listed. Those with difficult lives can’t contribute much, so they become cautious because if they do contribute, they might be suspected of why they have the means [to provide support].
Homeless to Pyongyang
AsiaPress asked that reporting partner about Kim Jong Un’s announcement that he would bring homeless flood victims to Pyongyang (excluding those whose loyalty to the regime is considered shaky) and about Kim’s rejection of aid offers from South Korea, Russia and international organizations. She replied:
I’m not sure why they’re taking them to Pyongyang. Maybe it’s for show? …
Regarding the refusal of external aid, there’s a backlash, with people saying, “We’re ‘beggars.’ How are we supposed to manage with just pride?”
Later in August, the central apparatus saw that soliciting contributions from ordinary citizens would not suffice. “North Korean authorities have reportedly announced that ‘flood victim support will be handled by the Workers’ Party and the state,'” AsiaPress reported. “This appears to be the government’s response to growing discontent among ordinary citizens who have been effectively forced to contribute supplies like clothing and bedding for victims.”
The outlet quoted another reporting partner, in North Hamgyong Province, as having provided this information on August 12:
Reportedly, flood victims are being taken to Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the state claims it will restore damaged houses and provide all household appliances. The goal is to have new houses occupied by September 9, with all affected households to be moved in by October 10.
Restoration of damaged houses is proceeding with total mobilization from officials to ordinary citizens. Each province is mobilization their “Urban Construction Corps,” with people previously mobilized for other tasks now all redirected to flood recovery efforts.
The party organ Rodong Sinmun reported that some 13,000 flood victims arrived in Pyongyang on August 15. “When we asked our reporting partners living in the northern region, it became clear that there is significant dissatisfaction and backlash among residents, with many calling it an ’empty show,'” AsiaPress reported.
“On August 21, we asked reporting partner A, who lives in Musan County, North Hamgyong Province, if they were aware of the ‘Pyongyang evacuation’ of flood victims.” A’s reply:
Everyone knows that flood victims were taken to Pyongyang. The government is probably scared of losing public support because so many people died pitifully. People around here are all laughing, saying it’s just a “show.”
Many people have died, and many bodies haven’t been found. The Workers’ Party organizations say to take care of the bereaved families, but once someone’s dead, it’s over. There’s a lot of backlash, with people asking what’s the point giving a few kilograms of corn after death. If they had money to take people to Pyongyang, they should have set up flood prevention measures in advance. People are saying behind closed doors that anything done after this much damage is just for propaganda.
On August 15 when the flood victims arrived in Pyongyang, AsiaPress noted, Kim Jong Un encouraged them, saying, “All of you, who are present here, as precious members of our people, have remained faithful to our Party all your lives, working with devotion for the prosperity and development of our state; even when left homeless in the aftermath of an unexpected disaster, you treasured your trust in our party more than your personal property or houses that had been lost, and your confidence in it remains fundamentally unchanged.”
In fact, the AsiaPress article observed, “it seems that public sentiment is already turning away.” AsiaPress concluded its six-part report with a comment from its reporting partner B, the one who lives in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province:
“Until now, when fires or floods occurred,” B noted, “people would first carry out portraits” of the Kim rulers” – which citizens are required to protect literally with their lives. “But this time, many people were taking out household items like TVs, solar panels and transformers. It seems people’s consciousness is changing.”
Bradley K Martin is the author of Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, a history of the country during the reigns of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Martin is also the author of Nuclear Blues, a novel set in North Korea during the current reign of Kim Jong Un.
asiatimes.com · by Bradley K. Martin · August 29, 2024
5. North Korea orders all students abroad to return home for ideological education
There is nothing that Kim fears more is the Korean people in the north knowing the truth about the regime and the outside world.
North Korea orders all students abroad to return home for ideological education
The government is worried that the students have been exposed to freedom too long, observers say.
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-students-abroad-china-russia-return-order-08282024142621.html
By Chin Min Jai for RFA Korean
2024.08.28
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (C) meets with Korean students as he pays a visit to Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok, Primorsky region, Sept. 17, 2023.
KCNA via KNS/AFP
Read this story in Korean: "러 체류 북 유학생, 귀국 명령에 최근 탈북”
North Korea has ordered all its students abroad to return home for ideological training – to reverse the outside influence the students have been exposed to while overseas, a North Korean escapee who resettled in South Korea told Radio Free Asia.
The escapee, who requested to be identified only by the pseudonym Kim for personal safety, told RFA Korean that he learned of the order from another escapee who recently arrived in South Korea.
“He said that he had been studying abroad in Russia. Then the authorities ordered him to return,” Kim said. The order came from supreme leader Kim Jong Un in July, his friend said.
That prompted Kim’s friend to flee Russia for South Korea, he said.
It isn’t known exactly how many North Korean students are studying in China and Russia, but probably several hundred, according to South Korean media outlet KBS. Many were there since before the pandemic hit in 2020.
Apparently officials in Pyongyang are afraid that because they’ve been out of the country for so long, they may have been influenced by the outside world – that is, they have become used to living in situations where their government is not in complete control of their lives.
It had been common practice for students to be ordered to periodically return in small numbers for loyalty classes, but these did not occur during the pandemic, so Pyongyang now wants to send them all for intensive ideological inspections en masse, according to South Korean media.
Take a moment to explore our North Korea coverage:
China arrests 15 North Korean escapees near Laos
North Korea bans karaoke, saying it smacks of ‘rotten’ capitalist culture
South Korea appoints escapee as ‘governor’ of North Korean province
North Korea punishes students and officials for watching banned Korean War film
North Korean students in China and Russia experience more freedom than in North Korea, and this has caused many to go into hiding to avoid coming home, said Cho Han-Bum, a researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification.
“These people experienced freedom abroad for a longer period, and because they stayed abroad for a long time, there were many cases in which they violated the rules of the North Korean authorities, whether voluntarily or not,” he said. “So, if they return home, there is a greater chance of being punished.”
The North Korean government is very worried about losing control over the students who have been abroad for many years, Kim Geumhyuk, a former North Korean student in China who fled to South Korea in 2012, told RFA.
“Five years is a very long time,” he said. “I believe that the North Korean authorities must have a greater fear (of the students) than the students (have of them,) considering that these students have been outside the scope of North Korea’s control for five years. So, most of them will have antipathy toward the North Korean system.”
The authorities are worried that these students could influence society in a way that is detrimental to the current ruling structure, or could share information and facts that the government has tried to keep hidden, he said.
Cho predicted that the student recall order could lead to a series of escapes.
“Those people who are in China and Russia, such as diplomats, elite students, and workers are more likely to escape from North Korea,” he said. “If students who were hiding in Russia receive help, it is likely that they will come to South Korea.
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.
6. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint special operations drills
The UNC/CFC/USFK PAO is doing a good job ensuring that all the components of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command are getting a chance to demonstrate how they are contributing to deterrence and the defense of the ROK.
S. Korea, U.S. stage joint special operations drills | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 29, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States have conducted combined special operations drills aimed at enhancing reconnaissance and capabilities to strike targets, the South's Army said Thursday, amid efforts to bolster deterrence against North Korean threats.
The five-day exercise began Saturday at the Army's Special Warfare School in Gwangju, 32 kilometers southeast of Seoul, involving troops from the Army Special Warfare Command, the Air Force Combat Control Team and the U.S. 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade.
South Korean commandos staged training on securing a target area, striking a facility and eliminating enemy forces. The troops departed the training area using U.S. UH-60 and CH-47 helicopters and South Korean choppers, the Army said.
The drills took place in conjunction with the allies' annual summertime Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, which ended its 11-day run earlier Thursday.
A South Korean commando of the Army Special Warfare Command takes part in combined special operations drills with U.S. troops at the Army's Special Warfare School in Gwangju, 32 kilometers southeast of Seoul, in this undated photo provided by the Army on Aug. 29, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
A South Korean commando of the Army Special Warfare Command uses a heavy-duty cutting machine to cut open a door during combined strike drills with U.S. troops at the Army's Special Warfare School in Gwangju, 32 kilometers southeast of Seoul, in this undated photo provided by the Army on Aug. 29, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 29, 2024
7. Premier US military CBRNE command participates in Ulchi Freedom Shield in South Korea
Again, we are seeing many different capabilities showcased during Ulchi Freedom Shield. Kudos to the Public Affairs personnel.
Premier US military CBRNE command participates in Ulchi Freedom Shield in South Korea
army.mil · August 29, 2024
American Soldiers from the 59th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Company (Hazardous Response) "Mountain Dragons" are bolstering the Republic of Korea-U.S. Alliance combined defense posture during a rotational deployment near the Korean Demilitarized Zone. Since arriving in South Korea in July 2023, the Fort Drum, New York-based CBRN company has trained with maneuver forces for a wide variety of combat missions. (Photo Credit: Courtesy file photo) VIEW ORIGINAL
CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea – The U.S. military’s premier deployable and multifunctional Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) command participated in Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) 24 in South Korea, Aug. 19 - 29.
American Soldiers and Army civilians from the 20th CBRNE Command trained with Eighth Army and Combined Forces Command units during the exercise.
Conducted to strengthen Republic of Korea-U.S. Alliance, UFS 24 is a routine and defensive-oriented exercise designed to strengthen security on the Korean Peninsula and stability in Northeast Asia.
The annual exercise integrated live training and constructive simulations that brought together South Korean, U.S. and multinational member states.
The training events focused on conducting multi-domain operations leveraging land, sea, air, cyber and space assets and non-kinetic effects.
20th CBRNE Command Soldiers and Army civilians deploy from 19 bases in 16 states to confront and defeat the world’s most dangerous hazards in support of joint, interagency and multinational operations.
Headquartered on Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, the 20th CBRNE Command is home to 75 percent of the U.S. Army’s active-duty Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) specialists and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians, as well as the 1st Area Medical Laboratory, CBRNE Analytical and Remediation Activity, Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination Teams and Nuclear Disablement Teams (Infrastructure).
Soldiers and Army civilians from the 20th CBRNE Command routinely deploy to South Korea for exercises and send a Chemical Corps company to support rotational forces.
One of the 20th CBRNE Command’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination Team supported the annual exercise.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination Teams (WCT) deploy and provide combatant commanders, lead federal agencies or supported commanders with specialized CBRNE staff support and technical expertise.
U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Derek N. Lipson, Special Operations Command-Korea commander, presented Soldiers from the WCT with the Korea Service Defense Medal for their service during the exercise.
Maj. Steven M. Modugno, 20th CBRNE Command public affairs director, said the 20th CBRNE Command routinely trains with South Korean CBRN Defense Command forces on the Korean Peninsula and at combat training centers in the United States.
“It is always an honor to train together with ROK military partners during exercises on the Korean Peninsula,” said Modugno, a native of Santa Clarita, California, who previously served with the South Korea-based 2nd Infantry Division. “For more than 70 years, U.S. troops have proudly stood shoulder-to-shoulder with our South Korean allies on Freedom’s Frontier and defended liberty together.”
army.mil · August 29, 2024
8. S. Korea, U.S. wrap up key summertime military exercise against N. Korean threats
Ahhh.... It is always a good feeling to leave CP TANGO after ENDEX.
(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S. wrap up key summertime military exercise against N. Korean threats | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 29, 2024
(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 3, 8-10, 12)
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States on Thursday wrapped up a major combined military exercise after its 11-day run as the allies sought to bolster their joint defense readiness against evolving North Korean military threats.
The annual Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, which began on Aug. 19, came amid persistent concerns over Pyongyang's weapons development and heightened inter-Korean tensions worsened by the North's recent trash balloon campaign.
Based on an all-out war scenario, the main computer simulation-based command post exercise involved around 19,000 South Korean troops, in a similar scale to the previous year, according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
South Korean troops took part in 48 concurrent field training events, such as amphibious landing and live-fire drills, up from 38 field events conducted last year.
In particular, this year's exercise, which included the government-led Ulchi civil defense drill, involved a scenario simulating a North Korean nuclear attack for the first time. The joint military exercise did not incorporate such a scenario.
The defense ministry also held its first-ever meeting with relevant agencies on responses to wartime disinformation amid growing concerns over the hybrid warfare threat.
In this AP photo, South Korea's police special operations unit conducts an anti-terror drill as part of the Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise between the U.S. and South Korea in Seoul on Aug. 20, 2024. (Yonhap)
"South Korea and the U.S. assessed that their capability and posture to overwhelmingly respond to any North Korean threat were reinforced through the UFS exercise and combined field training events," the JCS said, vowing to maintain a firm combined defense posture through close cooperation.
The allies will continue to conduct planned combined field training, such as the Ssangyong (double dragon) amphibious landing exercise under way, it added.
In a separate release, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) said the summertime military exercise successfully concluded in yet another affirmation of the allies' "ironclad" commitment to defend their homelands.
"This year's exercise featured live, virtual, constructive and field-based training, involving personnel from all military services and other federal agencies. This training enhanced the alliance's readiness and ability to respond to a broad range of security challenges," the USFK said.
North Korea, which has used the allies' joint drills as a pretext for provocations, has condemned the UFS exercise as the "most offensive and provocative war drills for aggression."
Last year, the North fired short-range ballistic missiles on the penultimate day of the exercise, in addition to a military command post drill involving the scenario of occupying South Korean territory and a botched attempt to launch a military spy satellite.
But it did not conduct major provocations, such as ballistic missile launches, during this year's drills.
Instead, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un oversaw a test for suicide drones on Saturday, calling for the development and production of such weapons to enhance war preparedness.
On Tuesday, Kim also attended the test-launch of a 240mm multiple rocket launcher, with a new guidance system, which could put Seoul and its adjacent areas in target range.
South Korea and the U.S. describe their drills as defensive in nature.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (sitting) oversees a test-fire of a 240mm multiple rocket launch system (MRLS) being produced at defense industrial enterprises under the Second Economic Commission on Aug. 27, 2024, in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 29, 2024
9. Yoon says S. Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation to continue despite leadership changes
Sustained trilateral cooperation regardless of which political parties are in office is really key to the mutual security of all three nations for the long term.
(LEAD) Yoon says S. Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation to continue despite leadership changes | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 29, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with comments on North Korea in last four paras)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said Thursday that South Korea's security cooperation with the United States and Japan will continue regardless of leadership changes as the framework benefits all three nations.
Yoon reaffirmed the commitment to the trilateral cooperation established during the historic Camp David summit a year ago, which was designed to strengthen joint responses to North Korea's threats and other regional security challenges.
"The South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation framework is very important not only to the Indo-Pacific but also the global economy and security, benefiting all three nations," Yoon said in a televised press conference. "A change in the leadership will not change this framework, and it will be upheld through the official diplomatic agreements."
Last month, the defense chiefs of the three nations signed a memorandum of cooperation on the trilateral security cooperation framework to solidify their continued commitment to deterring North Korean threats.
President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during a press conference at the presidential office in Seoul on Aug. 29, 2024. (Yonhap)
Yoon's comments came in response to concerns about the future of this framework, particularly given that U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida are nearing the end of their terms.
Observers have speculated that the U.S. foreign policy under the Biden administration could shift if former President Donald Trump returns to the White House. Trump previously engaged in nuclear talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un between 2018 and 2019 while pressuring Seoul to sharply increase its share of the cost for stationing 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea.
Yoon expressed confidence in the U.S.' "extended deterrence" commitment to defending South Korea with both conventional and nuclear capabilities, as outlined in the Washington Declaration, adopted during his summit with Biden in May 2023.
"The integrated extended deterrence between South Korea and the U.S. is becoming increasingly effective as the alliance is strengthened," Yoon noted.
President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during a press conference at the presidential office in Seoul on Aug. 29, 2024. (Yonhap)
Yoon also reiterated his belief that the U.S. will adhere to its long-standing goal of North Korea's denuclearization, addressing security concerns that arose after the Democratic Party's new policy platform omitted such a goal.
Security experts have warned that Pyongyang might interpret the omission as an opportunity to seek Washington's acknowledgment of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power, potentially shifting negotiations from denuclearization to arms control.
"I absolutely do not believe that the U.S. will accept North Korea's violation of the NPT," he said, referring to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty meant to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. "Such an acceptance would be completely inconsistent with the U.S.' established stance and strategy."
North Korea has insisted it is "free from any NPT obligations" as it legally withdrew from the treaty in 2003.
Yoon acknowledged talks have been ongoing regarding Kishida's planned visit to South Korea, saying he would welcome the visit if confirmed.
He expressed a desire to continue dialogue on bilateral relations if a new prime minister is picked in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's leadership election next month.
"Whoever becomes the next leader, I am committed to continuing cooperation for the future and maintaining the synergy between South Korea and Japan," Yoon said.
On relations with North Korea, Yoon said the newly unveiled "unification doctrine" based on the principle of freedom aims for a peaceful reunification, asking for the international community's support and solidarity with the vision.
"The essence of a liberal system is that it does not engage in an aggressive war except when it must defend itself," he said. "Our Constitution is fundamentally based on the premise of reunification and is not meant to perpetuate division."
So far, Pyongyang has not responded to Yoon's offer to open a dialogue channel or his announcement of the unification doctrine during the Aug. 15 Liberation Day address.
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain high due to North Korea's ongoing weapons tests and recent campaigns involving balloons being sent across the border. Pyongyang has launched more than 3,600 trash-carrying balloons since May in a tit-for-tat move against balloons carrying anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent by North Korean defectors in South Korea.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 29, 2024
10. Hanwha Ocean wins maintenance deal for U.S. Navy
Hanwha Ocean wins maintenance deal for U.S. Navy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · August 29, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- Hanwha Ocean Co., a major South Korean defense and shipbuilding company, said Thursday it has secured a deal from the U.S. Navy for the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) service of a 40,000-ton logistics support vessel.
Under the contract, the U.S. Navy's logistics support ship will receive regular maintenance at Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard in South Korea, where it will undergo comprehensive maintenance and inspection, the company said.
According to Hanwha Ocean, the deal marks the first time for a South Korean shipyard in winning a regular overhaul deal for a U.S. Navy vessel.
Hanwha Ocean said the deal will help the company enter the U.S. MRO market involving the American Navy, which is valued at approximately 20 trillion won (US$15 billion) annually.
This photo provided by Hanwha Ocean Co. shows the company's shipyard in South Korea's southern coastal city of Geoje. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · August 29, 2024
11. Families of victims of N. Korea's abduction, detention urge int'l solidarity to address issue
Families of victims of N. Korea's abduction, detention urge int'l solidarity to address issue | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 29, 2024
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- Families of victims of North Korea's abduction and detention on Thursday called for international solidarity to resolve the issue of enforced disappearances by the North, as they appealed for efforts to confirm the fate of their family members and secure their safe return.
The joint call was made at a public hearing, hosted by the unification ministry, on the occasion of the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances that falls on Aug. 30.
The event also brought together diplomats from 15 countries, which have established diplomatic ties with both South and North Korea, as well as from the United States and the Philippines.
Choi Jin-young (L), son of Choi Chun-gil, a South Korean missionary detained in North Korea, speaks at a public hearing in Seoul on Aug. 29, 2024, designed to call for international solidarity to address the North's abduction and detention. (Yonhap)
The hearing came as the United Nations Human Rights Council is set to hold a universal periodic review (UPR) of North Korea in November. UPR is a mechanism that calls for each U.N. member state to go through a peer review of its human rights record every 4.5 years.
At the public hearing, families of the victims appealed for the diplomatic corps' support for the issue of the North's abduction and detention to be highlighted at the upcoming UPR.
Choi Jin-young, son of Choi Chun-gil, a South Korean missionary abducted by the North in 2014, called on North Korea to confirm the fate of his father and other detained South Koreans and also immediately return them home.
Currently, six South Koreans are being detained in North Korea, including three missionaries -- Kim Jung-wook, Choi Chun-gil and Kim Kook-kie -- whose whereabouts and fates are unknown.
"I am desperately asking for support from diplomats from countries having diplomatic ties with North Korea," Choi said. "I am thinking about my father every moment and am not letting it go. So I hope you could deliver my words to my father, if possible -- Please, do not lose a thread of hope."
Kim Jeong-sam, an elder brother of missionary Kim Jung-wook, also asked for the foreign diplomats present to help raise awareness about the issue of the six detained South Koreans in their countries.
Vice Unification Minister Kim Soo-kyung called on North Korea to apologize for its crime against humanity and proactively resolve it.
"North Korea should not miscalculate that it could conceal this crime with the weight of passing time," Kim said in a speech read by Choi Sun-young, policy adviser to the unification minister.
Separately from the six South Koreans detained in the North, 516 South Koreans have yet to return home among an estimated 3,835 people who were kidnapped by North Korea after the 1950-53 Korean War.
At least 60,000 prisoners of war (POWs) are also estimated to have not come back home or gone missing after being detained in North Korea. A total of 80 POWs have returned home since 1994, but only nine had been alive as of March.
This photo, taken Aug. 29, 2024, shows a public hearing, hosted by the unification ministry, designed to call for international solidarity to address the North's abduction and detention. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 29, 2024
12. S. Korea to expand support for civic groups' radio broadcasting projects for N. Koreans
One of the key elements to support the new 8.15 Unification Doctrine. But so much more needs to be done in the information domain.
S. Korea to expand support for civic groups' radio broadcasting projects for N. Koreans | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · August 29, 2024
By Kim Han-joo
SEOUL, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea plans to expand its support for civic groups' radio broadcasts targeting North Korean residents in a bid to help North Koreans access external information, the unification ministry said Thursday.
The government plans to increase its support for the production of content and the training of personnel for radio broadcasts in the private sector as part of a new unification blueprint.
The initiative is one of seven key measures outlined by President Yoon Suk Yeol during his Liberation Day speech on Aug. 15 to promote a greater inflow of outside information and culture to North Korean residents.
As a result, government subsidies for private organizations that conduct radio broadcasts targeting North Korean residents are expected to increase significantly next year.
However, the ministry did not specify the amount of funding.
In recent years, North Korea has been stepping up surveillance and punishment of its people by implementing three so-called evil laws to prevent North Koreans from accessing outside information.
One of the laws calls for punishing those who bring in outside culture and information with 10 years of hard labor. Punishment is tougher in the case of those watching and distributing South Korean films and music, with some cases of execution.
President Yoon Suk Yeol announces a vision for unification with North Korea during a ceremony commemorating the 79th Liberation Day held at the Sejong Center for the Performing Arts in Seoul in this file photo taken Aug. 15, 2024. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · August 29, 2024
13. Sullivan stresses U.S.' commitment to 'complete' Korean Peninsula denuclearization
As I have written many times:
Although denuclearization of the north remains a worthy goal, it must be viewed as aspirational as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The conventional wisdom has always been that denuclearization must come first and then unification will follow and that there should be no discussion of human rights out of fear that it would prevent Kim Jong Un from making a denuclearization agreement. Today even a blind man can read the tea leaves and know that Kim Jong Un will not denuclearize despite the fact that his policies have been an abject failure. His political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies completely failed because Presidents Yoon and Biden, like their predecessors, refused to make the political and economic concessions he demanded just to come to the negotiating table: namely to remove sanctions. It is time for the U.S and the ROK/U.S. alliance to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom and seeks unification first and then denuclearization. Everyone must come to the understanding that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses is through unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK and U.S. must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and focus all efforts on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea- ultimately a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
The bottom line is we must be committed to the complete denuclearization of north Korea but realize that the path to denuclearization goes through unification first.
Sullivan stresses U.S.' commitment to 'complete' Korean Peninsula denuclearization | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 30, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) -- National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Thursday that he reaffirmed the United States' commitment to the "complete" denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula during his talks with top Chinese officials in Beijing this week.
Sullivan made the remarks during a press conference in the Chinese capital amid lingering concerns in South Korea over the absence of references to the denuclearization goal in recently adopted Democratic and Republican policy platforms.
During his trip there this week, he held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia -- meetings that he cast as "constructive, candid and substantive."
"In all of my meetings, I stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait; emphasized the United States' commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Sullivan said in the press briefing according to a transcript released by the White House.
"I reaffirmed the United States' commitment to our Indo-Pacific allies including our concerns about destabilizing actions against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea," he added.
U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan attends a press conference at the U.S. embassy in Beijing on Aug. 29, 2024 in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
During their recent national conventions, both the Democratic and Republican Parties adopted new policy platforms that did not have any reference to the denuclearization objective for the Korean Peninsula.
The omission has raised concerns in Seoul that Pyongyang could misconstrue it as an opening to seek U.S. acknowledgment of the North as a de facto nuclear power and negotiations on arms control rather than on denuclearization -- an anathema to Seoul.
Sullivan's trip to China came as Washington apparently seeks to stably manage relations with Beijing ahead of the Nov. 5 presidential election.
He unveiled a plan for President Joe Biden and Xi to speak over the phone in the coming weeks as part of efforts to enhance bilateral communication and relations.
"We believe that keeping lines of communication open is critical," he said. "And to that end, we began planning towards a leader-level call in the coming weeks where I expect these discussions to continue."
On the possibility of Biden and Xi meeting in person, Sullivan noted the likelihood of the two leaders attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Group of 20 (G20) summits slated to take place in Peru and Brazil -- both in November -- respectively.
"It is likely that both President Biden and President Xi will be at APEC and the G20 later this year," he said.
"I don't have any announcements to make on either President Biden's travel or a potential meeting, but the likelihood is they'll both be there, and if they are, it would only be natural for them to have the chance to sit down with one another."
The security advisor reiterated that his visit to China was part of efforts to manage the bilateral relationship "responsibly."
"Under President Biden's leadership, the United States has and will continue to advance its interests and values, look out for its friends," he said. "And as we do, we believe that competition with China does not have to lead to conflict or confrontation. The key is responsible management through diplomacy."
In their talks, Sullivan and Chinese officials also discussed various issues related to technology, Russia's war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and other areas.
"We remain deeply concerned about China's support for Russia's defense industrial base and its impact on both European and transatlantic security, not to mention on Russia's brutal aggression against Ukraine," he said.
He vowed to continue to take necessary action "to prevent advanced U.S. technologies from being used to undermine our national security without unduly limiting trade or investment."
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 30, 2024
14. [Exclusive] 13 North Korean Submarines Registered for the First Time in IMO… “Intention for Overseas Operations”
VOA has really been at the forefront of reporting this. Other media outlets are writing the stories based on this report.
This is a Google translation of the VOA report.
Photos and charts are at the link.
[Exclusive] 13 North Korean Submarines Registered for the First Time in IMO… “Intention for Overseas Operations”
2024.8.28
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7759322.html
North Korea released photos of the 'Kim Gun-ok Hero Ship' construction ceremony held on September 8, 2023, attended by Chairman Kim Jong-un.
North Korea has registered about 10 submarines with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the first time. Analysis suggests that this is North Korea giving legitimacy to its submarine force and foreshadowing overseas operations. Reporter Ham Ji-ha reports.
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[Exclusive] 13 North Korean Submarines Registered for the First Time in IMO… “Intention for Overseas Operations”
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North Korea registered 13 of its submarines with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on the 27th.
According to the IMO's Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS), a total of 13 submarines are registered as North Korean ships, including Shark 2-class submarines 1 to 11, the Sinpo-class submarine 8.24 Hero, and the Sinpo C-class submarine Kim Gun-ok Hero.
Registration information for the North Korean submarine 'Kim Gun-ok Hero' listed in the International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) on the 27th. Data = GIGIS
Each submarine was given a unique IMO identification number, and the registration entity was listed as the ‘North Korean Government Navy.’
This is the first time that North Korea has registered its submarine force with the IMO, and thus, it is also the first time that a North Korean submarine has been given a unique identification number.
11 Shark Class 2 ships, 2 SLBM-capable ships registered
Among the submarines registered this time, 11 of them named Shark 2-class are small submarines operating off the coast of the Korean Peninsula.
Registration information for the first North Korean submarine, Shark 2-class, listed on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) on the 27th. Data = GIGIS
North Korea reported the construction years of Shark 2-class submarines No. 1 through No. 3 as 2004, No. 4 through No. 7 as 2005, and the remaining No. 8 through No. 11 as 2006.
However, these are modified versions of existing Shark-class submarines, and their actual construction year is known to be the 1990s.
Registration information for the North Korean submarine '8.24 Hero' listed in the International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) on the 27th. Data = GIGIS
8.24 Hero is well known as the submarine that North Korea revealed in the past when it conducted a test launch of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The year of construction is listed as 2016, but other specifications such as weight tonnage have not been disclosed.
The Kim Gun-ok Hero submarine was built in 2023, making it the most recent submarine unveiled that day.
North Korea previously held a launching ceremony at the Sinpo Shipyard in September last year and unveiled the Kim Gun-ok Hero. At the time, it attracted attention for its large size, but it was presumed to have been modified from an existing Romeo-class (1,800 tons) submarine.
North Korea claims that the Kim Gun-ok Hero is a tactical nuclear attack submarine, and in fact, the submarine is known to have 10 launch tubes capable of launching SLBMs.
Sudden registration question … possible intention to inform the outside world
It is unknown why North Korea suddenly assigned IMO identification numbers to 13 submarines and reported this to the IMO. Also, the reason why it registered only a portion of its total 70 submarines is currently unknown.
Bruce Bennett, Senior Researcher, RAND Corporation.
Bruce Bennett, a military expert and senior researcher at the Rand Corporation, told VOA in a telephone interview on the 27th that he thought it might be to “raise awareness of their submarines.”
[녹취: 베넷 연구원] “Well, I think they're trying to get recognition of their submarines to get people to pay attention to the fact that they've actually got some capabilities.”
The purpose is to draw people's attention to the fact that North Korea has submarine capabilities.
This is North Korea's first IMO registration of a submarine, but there have been several previous instances of warships being registered.
North Korea previously registered the Yalu-class frigate '661' with the IMO, which was revealed through the media last year.
However, contrary to North Korea's explanation that it was the latest model, the IMO data clearly showed the previous registration information of No. 661, that is, it was a used frigate used by Ukraine and Russia in 1992, which became a hot topic.
In addition, North Korea has registered two Nampo-class frigates with the IMO, which are yet to be built, with the intention of launching them in 2026. The fact that North Korea has given IMO numbers to warships that are not yet finished being built is interpreted as an intention by North Korea to make its warship-building capabilities known to the outside world.
Therefore, it is noteworthy whether North Korea has registered a large number of submarines with the IMO in order to show off its submarine operation capabilities.
Expert: “ Possibility of North Korea-China-Russia Submarine Training ”… “ Questions Still Remain ”
There was also an interpretation that this was a measure taken in consideration of joint submarine training with China and Russia.
Senior Researcher Bennett analyzed that many of the submarines revealed this time are so old that overseas operation is virtually impossible, but they are quite possible off the coasts of China and Russia, and that North Korea's sudden registration of submarines could be a preparatory process for this.
Bruce Bechtol, Professor, Angelo State University, USA
Another military expert, Bruce Bechtol of Angelo State University, also told VOA that there could be joint military exercises involving submarines between North Korea and Russia, or between North Korea and China, or between all three countries.
In particular, he said it was “interesting” that North Korea only registered a Shark-2 class submarine and two new SLBM submarines, which he said could be because it only registered submarines participating in exercises.
[녹취: 벡톨 교수] “And when I say international exercises, those would have to be with obviously either China or Russia or both. I mean, they could do an exercise involving all three of those count. But that could be one reason why they're doing it. Getting to that question, why just the Sang-O class submarines and the two new SLBM submarines and none of the rest of their submarines? So it's very interesting they didn't assign all of their submarines, they just assigned some of their submarines. So that I think that leads us to the possible assessment that they may be looking to do international exercises…they could do something in Vladivostok area, right? That's not that far away. So they could certainly do something like that.”
While the Shark-class submarines don’t have long submersible lives, “they can do something (like training) in the Vladivostok area, which is not too far away,” Bechtol explained.
Neil Watts, former member of the UN North Korea Sanctions Committee.
“Warships are not required to register with the IMO, and navies generally do not register unless they are auxiliary merchant vessels,” said Neil Watts, a former South African navy captain who served on the UN Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts. “I find it very puzzling why North Korea would go through such an unnecessary process.”
[녹취: 와츠 전 위원] “It's a very curious situation, why they would go through this unnecessary administration for submarines, since warships aren't required to be registered under the IMO and navies typically don't do it unless it's part of their auxiliary merchant marine ships. So I'd be curious to know what their intentions are with this. Particularly for most of them are most of the submarines are many submarines which operate in close coastal waters, so they would not be expected to undertake any international voyages. It’s a very curious situation.”
He added, “Most of (North Korea’s) submarines are not expected to make international voyages as they operate in coastal waters.”
In fact, the resolution adopted by the IMO in 1987 requires ships exceeding 100 tons in deadweight to be registered with the IMO and assigned a unique IMO identification number, but warships are an exception.
“ Submarines ‘ aging ’ will make it difficult to demonstrate capabilities ”
Meanwhile, military experts also noted that it would be difficult for North Korea to demonstrate its actual capabilities as its submarines have been under construction for over 30 years.
In particular, it was assessed that it is still unclear whether the Kim Gun-ok Hero ship that North Korea unveiled last year and the August 24 Hero ship that previously test-fired SLBMs are capable of being deployed in actual combat rather than for training purposes, as they are merely modified versions of old submarines.
Senior Researcher Bennett said the two submarines, which can carry ballistic missiles, “are still conventional diesel-powered,” and while North Korea may want to operate them outside of North Korean waters, he said it would be “not a good idea from a stable operational standpoint.”
[녹취: 베넷 선임연구원] “The other two submarines that carry ballistic missiles are still conventionally powered diesel powered submarine. North Korea might hope that it could take them out of its waters, but even then, logistically sustaining them? probably not a great idea. So, I would expect these are submarines that will be used somewhere close to North Korea.”
Therefore, the explanation is that it will be difficult to operate in waters other than those close to North Korea.
In addition, in the case of the Kim Gun-ok Hero, although North Korea touted it as the latest submarine, it was analyzed that it has not been proven how stable it would be in terms of actual operation as it is an abnormal modification of an existing Romeo-class submarine.
Professor Becktol said of the “8.24 Hero,” “North Korea has tested this submarine with one launch tube several times and has even proven that it is capable of launching solid-fuel ballistic missiles.”
[녹취: 벡톨 교수] “Well, for the Sinpo one, the one with only one tube, they've tested that one a lot. So, I think that submarine has shown already that it is capable as far as that solid fuel missile. So yes, the original submarine that the North Koreans built that has one launch to that one certainly could attack South Korea tomorrow… The problem with that is they have one just one and it has just one launch.”
He added that the submarine could attack South Korea as early as tomorrow.
But Professor Becktol pointed out that “the problem is that there is only one launch tube,” which means that only one launch is possible.
This is Ham Ji-ha from VOA News.
15. China Reminds South Korea That Time Isn’t On Its Side
China Reminds South Korea That Time Isn’t On Its Side
Forbes · by William Pesek · August 29, 2024
Rhee Chang-yong, governor of the Bank of Korea.
SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg
In a recent take on challenges facing South Korea, central bank Governor Rhee Chang-yong warned about all the usual suspects.
Near-record household debt? Check. An ultralow birthrate? Yes. Surging costs of child-rearing and education? Indeed. Policy uncertainty from Washington to Tokyo? Absolutely.
But buried in the fray was Rhee diagnosing the biggest threat to Asia’s fourth-biggest economy: time. Or, as he put it: “We don't have much time for structural reforms” in Seoul.
There are a couple of ways to dissect Rhee’s observation. One is that political squabbling among government policymakers leaves little latitude for bold moves to raise South Korea’s competitive game in the globe’s most dynamic neighborhood.
Another: bewilderingly fast changes in Asia and beyond means there’s very little time for Seoul to dillydally.
China, for all its troubles, has been speeding up Asia’s economic clock — and exponentially so. As China’s influence, market share and production capabilities increase, it makes it that much harder to keep pace with the region’s top export power and adjust policies accordingly.
Not realizing that things are ticking faster and faster outside its walls explains why Japan Inc. is having so much trouble adapting to rapidly shifting global dynamics. South Korea, too, is having its own challenges keeping an eye on the time.
Since April 2022, Rhee has been a solid steward of South Korea’s economy. Just as political dysfunction in Washington and Tokyo put the Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan in the driver’s seat, the Bank of Korea is more often than not the institution that regulates the economic system.
Rhee, a former top International Monetary Fund and Asia Development Bank, turned heads globally in August 2021. He was Asia’s first major central banker to tighten post-Covid. It was a courageous and prescient move that limited South Korea’s inflation challenge in 2023 and 2024.
Yet now Rhee’s options are somewhat hemmed in by what he calls a “vicious cycle.” The dual threats posed by surging real estate values and elevated household debt are feeding off each other. This has Rhee wary about easing even as inflation wanes. Why add fuel to these bubbles?
It hardly helps that South Korea’s sizable, open and trade-driven economy is in the middle of something of a quadruple-decker sandwich. In times past, South Korea was “sandwiched” in between wealthy Japan and low-cost China, as the late Samsung Group head Lee Kun-hee observed in 2007.
Today, South Korea is squeezed between a Japan that’s tightening, a China that’s cutting rates and a Fed in Washington talking more than it’s acting on interest rates, causing extreme dollar volatility. It’s a rough place to be.
That’s largely because a succession of South Korean governments since 2007 slow walked moves to loosen labor markets, cut bureaucracy, level playing fields, incentivize innovation, empower women and internationalize the business environment.
Remember that a decade before that, after the 1997 Asian crisis, Seoul promised to reduce the power of family-owned conglomerates, or chaebols, towering over the place. They were still hogging much of the economic oxygen in 2007. They still are today.
Sure, South Korea’s startup scene is a sight to behold. But finding space to thrive and grow to disruption-level scale is more the exception than the rule.
If only Lee Myung-bak, president from 2008 to 2013, had carried out plans to generate 7% growth and make South Korea one of the seven largest economies via supply-side reforms. Instead, it was a talking point.
The same with Park Geun-hye, president from 2013 to 2017. South Korea’s first female leader promised to build a more “creative economy.” She talked a great game of making space for startups to generate energy from the ground up, but achieved little.
Park’s successor, Moon Jae-in, put few wins on the scoreboard to rein in chaebols and pivot toward “trickle-up economics.”
Since May 2022, President Yoon Suk Yeol has waxed on about a devising “fair and innovative” economy. With approval ratings in the low 30s, voters are giving Yoon’s economic retooling efforts rather poor marks.
It fits with the pattern. Government after government got bogged down by political squabbling and short-term concerns. Rather than recalibrate growth engines, leader after leader has relied on the BOK to paper over economic cracks.
Yet we’re talking about 15-plus years Seoul should’ve used to build economic muscle. South Korea can’t get back this time during which government officials and lawmakers should’ve been increasing productivity, better utilizing the female half of the population and encouraging young entrepreneurs to take big risks.
This gets us back to Rhee, whose job might be infinitely easier today had Seoul done its jobs in years past.
In June, Rhee gave a speech to commemorate the BOK’s 74th anniversary. There, he detailed many of the headwinds bearing down on South Korea —headwinds over which his team has no control. They include harnessing the power of new technologies like cloud services and artificial intelligence.
Yet South Korea also confronts many “old economy” troubles. South Korea, Rhee said, is “facing numerous structural problems that have accumulated and deepened over time, such as a low birth rate, an aging population, regional imbalances and overconcentration in the capital region, pension depletion and old-age poverty, education issues, income and asset inequality, and dualism in the labor market.”
All require bold and innovative solutions in the best of times. Yet that loud ticking noise reminds us that South Korea doesn’t have a moment to wait.
Forbes · by William Pesek · August 29, 2024
16. If South Korea Goes Nuclear, So Will the World
Perhaps.
But before we reach that danger I think the problem is that the debate about the ROK pursuit of its own nuclear weapons actually supports Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy to divide the ROK/US alliance and force troops off the Korean peninsula. This will make conflict very likely. But after this happens and Kim breaks the ROK/US alliance, the Professor Brands analysis may very well come to fruition.
If South Korea Goes Nuclear, So Will the World
Allies in the Middle East and Pacific could well seek the bomb if they feel abandoned by the US.
August 28, 2024 at 5:00 PM EDT
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-08-28/if-south-korea-goes-nuclear-so-will-the-world?sref=hhjZtX76
By Hal Brands
Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
uclear nonproliferation is one of America’s greatest, and most underrated, strategic achievements. Almost 80 years after Hiroshima, fewer than 10 countries possess the world’s deadliest weapons — a testament to international cooperation and US power. On a recent trip to Seoul to participate in the annual Munhwa Future Report, hosted by the Munhwa Ilbo newspaper, I got a glimpse of what makes the nonproliferation regime so resilient, and what could eventually bring it down.
Nuclear weapons are clearly on the collective South Korean mind these days. Last year’s Washington Declaration between presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol committed the US to make South Korea a closer partner in planning for the potential wartime use of nuclear weapons. Analysts and politicians now debate whether Seoul should seek the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula after nearly three decades. According to opinion polling, a strong majority of South Koreans even want the country to build its own nuclear weapons.
The sentiment is understandable. North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenals are growing more fearsome. South Korean analysts I spoke to fear that the north’s dictator, Kim Jong Un, could soon boast a true nuclear triad of land-based missiles, nuclear-missile submarines and nuclear-armed aircraft. They also worry that Kim’s new alliance with Russia will bring technological aid for the development of his missiles.
Once North Korea’s arsenal outstrips America’s homeland missile defenses, the thinking goes, the US won’t fight to defend Seoul if doing so could bring nuclear strikes on America itself. Then there is the Donald Trump factor. The publicly unstated, but unmistakable, fear is that a second Trump presidency would rupture the alliance with Washington, leaving South Korea alone and vulnerable.
Still, the odds are against South Korea building the bomb anytime soon. South Korea would find it hard to pay for nuclear weapons without gutting its conventional forces. Quitting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (or NPT) could put South Korea in the company of the world’s rogues. The US came down hard when Seoul thought seriously about acquiring nukes in the 1970s; a new push could seriously damage the alliance today.
Yet the South Korean nuclear debate remains noteworthy, for what it reveals about the larger nonproliferation regime.
That global order is enshrined in the NPT, an accord signed by nearly all the world’s countries. But international cooperation, in this instance, has rested on a foundation of US power.
For decades, the US has threatened potential proliferators with sanctions, isolation and even military action. It has cultivated international norms and agreements meant to keep the nuclear club small and elite. Most important, America has offered its allies military protection that makes it unnecessary for them to acquire nuclear arms. In doing so, it has held back the international anarchy in which countries everywhere might conclude that those weapons represent their only means of survival.
That only nine countries have nuclear weapons — of the dozens that have the technological capacity and other resources to build them — is a marker of this strategy’s success. But a scan of the contemporary international landscape highlights three factors that could eventually rupture that regime.
One is the shifting military balance. The US and its allies still dominate their enemies conventionally in Europe and the Middle East. But in Asia, an epochal change is underway.
China’s buildup is putting frontline states under ever-greater pressure. If that expansion of Beijing arsenal continues for another decade, key countries — perhaps Japan or Australia — could reluctantly conclude that conventional resistance is hopeless and nuclear weapons are a vital means of defense.
Global Nuclear Balance in 2024
The US military says China may have 1,000 warheads by 2030
Source: Federation of American Scientists
A second factor is aggression by nuclear-armed predators against non-nuclear prey. Russia has brutally assailed Ukraine, which gave up its nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Moscow then used its arsenal to deter the US from intervening directly. That Ukraine has held its own in this war has limited the global fallout. But a world in which countries with the bomb repeatedly brutalize countries without it will quickly become a far more nuclearized world. If China was to invade Taiwan — and the US was unable or unwilling to stop it — proliferation pressures could increase dramatically.
The final factor, and what most concerns South Korean officials — a potential American withdrawal — is what would most devastate the non-proliferation regime.
As long as US alliances are strong and credible, US allies have better, cheaper options than nuclear self-help. Even if Iran goes nuclear, for instance, stronger US security guarantees for Saudi Arabia — and support for the kingdom’s civil nuclear program — can probably keep it from doing likewise.
But if the US pulls back, erstwhile allies from Eastern Europe to East Asia might feel that they face a choice between nuclear proliferation and national suicide — which is why debates about acquiring those weapons have gotten louder in the age of Trump.
If Trump wins in November, he probably won’t actually quit US alliances: Then he would lose the ability to gripe about them. But he will continue to sow doubt about America’s geopolitical commitments, and some of his once-and-perhaps-future advisers say proliferation by US allies wouldn’t be so bad after all.
A second Trump presidency would be an era of nuclear anxiety. And if the US someday removes the power and commitment that sustains the nonproliferation order, that order could crumble in many places at once.
Brands is also a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, the co-author of “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China” and a member of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. He is a senior adviser to Macro Advisory Partners.
More From Hal Brands at Bloomberg Opinion:
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This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
17. Putin and Kim Jong Un's new alliance is proving to be a win-win
I have a different view.
Sure, the improving nK-Russian relationship has caused fear in the international community. But we should consider what is driving the cooperation of this axis of dictators or the “Dark Quad” (per Christopher Ford) of China, Russia, north Korea, and Iran. That is fear, weakness, desperation, and envy. They fear the “silk web” of alliances of like-minded democracies who seek to uphold the international order. The “silk web” is made of alliances, “mini laterals” and security arrangements of the 5 US treaty allies in the INDOPACIFIC to the QUAD, AUKUS, and the NATO IP 4 (INDOPACIFIC 4 – Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea). The Dark Quad cannot hold a candle to the strength of this silk web. They are weak because of the internal contradictions of each totalitarian political system, and they are at risk domestically from their own people. Russia and north Korea in particular, are desperate for assistance in multiple areas. But ironically, they envy the alliances and organizations that uphold the rules based international order. But they know that their transactional relationships cannot compete with the values based alliances that oppose them. And this transactional nature is particularly acute with north Korea because it has proven to be the most unreliable partner who since 1950 has chosen to play all sides against each other. Just as granddaddy Kim Il Sung masterfully play Mao and Stalin against each other, Xi and Putin know it is only a matter of time before Kim Jong Un takes actions that both find intolerable. Kim Jong Un is the worst malign actor among the most bad actors in the world. But it is the Korean people in the north who are best positioned to change the conditions inside north Korea with the help of the ROK and the support of the US, Japan, and the international community (e.g., the 8.15 Unification Doctrine).
Putin and Kim Jong Un's new alliance is proving to be a win-win
Business Insider · by Tom Porter
Military & Defense
Analysis by Tom Porter
2024-08-29T11:59:14Z
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North Korea's Kim Jong Un and Russia's Vladimir Putin at a military parade in Pyongyang in June, 2024. GAVRIIL GRIGOROV via Getty Images
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- A few months in, the North Korea-Russia alliance appears to be working out for both sides.
- According to a report, Russia is getting millions of artillery shells it needs to fight Ukraine.
- But the alliance carries risks for both leaders.
Earlier in the week, South Korea's intelligence services offered a glimpse of the upgraded alliance between Russia and North Korea in action.
North Korea has been sending vast shipments of artillery ammunition to Russia, a lifeline in the invasion of Ukraine that has isolated it from much of the world.
North Korea since 2022 sent 13,000 shipping containers to Russia that may contain up to 6 million shells, according to an intelligence report cited by a South Korean lawmaker.
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It is a vastly larger cache than Ukraine's collection of Western allies has managed to pull together, despite being vastly wealthier.
Ukraine's European allies fell well short of a goal of delivering 1 million shells to Ukraine in the year to May 2024.
The North Korean supply line means Russia can continue sustaining its grinding war of attrition in Ukraine for the foreseeable future, say analysts, as it seeks to corrode international support for Kyiv and waits for Ukraine to run out of ammo.
And on the other hand, North Korea is receiving technology to help it advance despite being a pariah state.
A new use for old guns
Old-fashioned munitions have become vital once more in Ukraine, where fighting often resembles the grueling trench warfare of World War I. And with both sides firing thousands of rounds a day, volume counts.
Unlike the sophisticated precision-guided weapons provided to Ukraine by its Western allies, shells don't rely on GPS systems for guidance, so can't be countered by electronic warfare units that scramble their coordinates.
They're something that North Korea has in large supply.
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"While in most respects the DPRK lags behind NATO states in military technology, mass production of artillery shell ammunition doesn't require sophistication," Jacob Parakilas, a defense analyst at RAND Europe, told Business Insider.
He said that since 1953 North Korea has been preparing for a resumption of an "existential" war with the US, building up massive stockpiles.
The unquenchable need for ammunition in Ukraine means that North Korea's large stash found an unexpected new value, allowing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to broker a deal with Russia's President Vladimir Putin that's proving fruitful for both sides.
In return for crates of old-fashioned shells, Kim's getting valuable military technology from the Kremlin.
"Russia can offer some fairly important incentives in terms of technology transfer, which Pyongyang may judge to be more valuable than a portion of its armaments reserve," Parakilas said.
According to reports, Russia may be providing North Korea with satellite technology that enables it to surveil and more accurately target military sites belonging to the US and its allies in east Asia.
Russia has also used its diplomatic power as a permanent UN Security Council member to shield North Korea, using its veto in April to hobble the commission that monitors North Korea's nuclear program.
Most of the globe has long sought to isolate North Korea and pressure it to dismantle its nuclear weapons. The Kremlin's new stance is an abrupt U-turn.
And Kim may be able to leverage Russia's need for shells still further to secure more technology its antiquated military badly needs.
"North Korea's air force, for example, is woefully small and desperately in need of more modern aircraft to be a viable fighting force," Parakilas explained.
A precarious alliance
But while both leaders are reaping short-term gains, there are problems on the horizon that could derail the alliance.
While North Korea is delivering the shells Russia needs in volume, their quality is often shoddy, and there are doubts over North Korea's capacity to keep up the deliveries.
"Ukrainian sources suggest that the shells Russia has received from the DPRK are dated — some allegedly manufactured in the 1970s and 1980s — and are of poor quality, having a high rate of failure," said Daniel Salisbury, an expert on arms proliferation at King's College London.
And Putin's decision to draw closer to Kim is endangering his relationship with his most important ally, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
Analysts told Business Insider in June that Xi is watching the security alliance between Russia and North Korea warily, concerned that it could upset the balance of power in east Asia and spark a conflict China would sooner avoid.
A Cold War alliance renewed
But for now, it's a relationship that both pariah leaders are reaping benefits from, renewing an alliance formed decades ago when the Kremlin helped arm North Korea in its fight against the US and its allies in the Cold War.
"Much of the matériel it has produced during that time will still be at least minimally viable for Russian purposes, since the bulk of its weaponry is Soviet-designed and therefore compatible with what Russian forces use," said Parakilas.
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Business Insider · by Tom Porter
18. North Korea fires missiles in demonstration for Russia
north Korea will sell its military capabilities to anyone because the regime needs hard currency and other in kind military technology support. It has sold just about everything in its arsenal short of nuclear weapons (so far). So, it will likely sell any type of missile or any weapons to Russia just as it has already sold its updated and re-engineered Russian Iskander system back to them. The irony is that the north is taking Russian equipment, adding its own capabilities and then selling it back to the Russians.
North Korea fires missiles in demonstration for Russia
Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · August 28, 2024
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North Korea on Tuesday test-fired multiple rocket launch system, according to state media, in what could have been a demonstration for Russia, which has been firing North Korean artillery in its war against Ukraine.
The test of the truck-mounted 240-millimeter missile launcher took place the day after South Korea reported that it believed the number of shipping containers carrying munitions to Russia had doubled since February.
Photos accompanying the Korean Central News Agency report show the new transporter erector launcher, which is reportedly in the production phase, firing rockets off the coast as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and defense officials look on.
This photo released by North Korean state media shows the country test-firing a new 240-millimeter launcher. The U.S. and South Korea believe the North has sent Russia thousands of shipping containers' worth of arms to... This photo released by North Korean state media shows the country test-firing a new 240-millimeter launcher. The U.S. and South Korea believe the North has sent Russia thousands of shipping containers' worth of arms to be used in Ukraine. Korean Central News Agency
The media outlet wrote that the platform, with its greater maneuverability and upgraded new missile guidance system, "proved to be advantageous in all indices" compared to the currently deployed artillery equipment that will be phased out as directed by Kim.
Newsweek contacted the North Korean Embassy in China outside of office hours for comment.
The Kim regime has conducted dozens of rocket tests since 2022 as it modernizes its military capabilities, including short- and medium-range missiles, some of which it says are nuclear-capable, hypersonic missiles and cruise missiles.
Washington and Seoul have voiced concerns over the North Korean-Russian weapons trade.
In a report revealed to the public on Tuesday, South Korean intelligence said that more than 13,000 containers' worth of suspected arms, or enough to transfer more than 6 million 152-millimeter artillery shells, had been tracked heading for Russia from the North Korean port of Najin. That's twice the number of shipping containers Seoul's defense ministry reported in February.
Moscow and Pyongyang have denied that the weapons transfers have taken place, though Ukraine has reported North Korean missiles being used in the country, including in attacks on civilians such as one that killed a father and his young son in Kyiv earlier this month.
Russian and North Korea have publicly moved to deepen military and diplomatic ties.
Russian President Vladimir Putin in June paid a state visit to North Korea, his first to the country in 24 years. During Putin's stay, he and Kim signed a military cooperation agreement that pledged aid in the event either is attacked.
South Korea condemned the pact and threatened to reconsider its policy of not furnishing Ukraine with weapons.
Earlier this year, Russia used its veto in the United Nations Security Council to terminate a panel of experts monitoring U.N. sanctions on the reclusive country.
Newsweek reached out to the Russian Foreign Ministry with a written request for comment.
Micah McCartney
Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian security issues, and cross-strait ties between China and Taiwan.
You can get in touch with Micah by emailing m.mccartney@newsweek.com.
Micah McCartney is a reporter for Newsweek based in Taipei, Taiwan. He covers U.S.-China relations, East Asian and Southeast Asian ...
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Newsweek · by Micah McCartney · August 28, 2024
19. Unification Ministry pledges more female speakers after British envoy withdraws from male-dominated forum
Unification Ministry pledges more female speakers after British envoy withdraws from male-dominated forum
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-08-29/national/diplomacy/Unification-Ministry-pledges-more-female-participation-after-British-envoy-withdraws-from-maledominated-forum/2123739
Published: 29 Aug. 2024, 16:36
Updated: 29 Aug. 2024, 16:37
The all-male line-up of speakers listed on the Global Korea Forum's website before British Ambassador Colin Crooks withdrew from the event. [SCREEN CAPTURE]
The Unification Ministry said Wednesday it will try to invite more female experts to speak at its events after British Ambassador to Korea Colin Crooks withdrew from a ministry-organized forum on Sept. 3 that predominantly features male panelists.
The disappearance of the ambassador’s profile from the lineup of speakers on the website of the Global Korea Forum was first observed by Raphael Rashid, a regular contributor to The Guardian and freelance journalist, in a post uploaded to X on Tuesday.
A spokesperson from the British Embassy in Seoul told the Korea JoongAng Daily on Wednesday that the ambassador “is unable to take part in the Global Korea Forum next week” but did not give an explicit reason for his withdrawal.
However, the spokesperson noted that the embassy “is committed to gender equality,” adding that it “believes that events are enriched by the diversity of perspectives of those participating.”
An official from the Unification Ministry told the Korea JoongAng Daily on condition of anonymity that it had received word from the British Embassy that Crooks would not be able to attend, and that it “respects” the embassy’s position.
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The official said that the ministry “understands the importance of gender equality and is working constantly to invite competent experts to its international conferences.”
The official also said that the ministry “does not discriminate based on nationality or gender” when sending out invitations to potential panelists, adding that “many female experts were unable to accept their invitations to the Global Korea Forum due to pre-existing commitments, such as academic conferences, university lectures, overseas trips and other personal reasons.”
The only female expert listed in the Global Korea Forum’s online speaker line-up on Wednesday was Yonsei University professor Chun Ja-hyun, who is scheduled to speak during the conference’s third session.
The section of the website that features the forum’s panelists was inaccessible on Thursday.
Chun was not listed as a speaker on the forum’s website at the time the British ambassador withdrew from the event.
The Unification Ministry official told the Korea JoongAng Daily that it is working to invite more female experts to the Global Korea Forum and other events in the future, including a seminar in November.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
20. Kim’s significant change should come before another Washington-Pyongyang summit
Buried lead: Senator Coons a likely candidate for SECSTATE in a Harris administration if she is elected.
Excerpt:
Democratic Senator Chris Coons said in a telephone interview with The Dong-A Ilbo on Tuesday (local time) that a significant shift in North Korea’s leadership should happen prior to another summit talk between Washington and Pyongyang.
Does this mean that the current leadership needs to change its behavior or that there needs to be a change in the current leadership?
Kim’s significant change should come before another Washington-Pyongyang summit
donga.com
Posted August. 29, 2024 07:26,
Updated August. 29, 2024 07:26
Kim’s significant change should come before another Washington-Pyongyang summit. August. 29, 2024 07:26. by 워싱턴=문병기 특파원 weappon@donga.com.
Democratic Senator Chris Coons said in a telephone interview with The Dong-A Ilbo on Tuesday (local time) that a significant shift in North Korea’s leadership should happen prior to another summit talk between Washington and Pyongyang. He, a likely nominee for Secretary of State if Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris wins the election this November, added that exchanging “love letters” with a dictator is not the right thing to do, describing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as a “brutal dictator.” He was harshly critical of the “dictator” oppressing residents, abducting and attacking visitors from overseas, and posing a nuclear threat to regional security.
Senator Coons argued that South Korea, the United States, and Japan should build greater security cooperation with a Harris administration in office, considering the closer ties among North Korea, China, and Russia. He assessed their trilateral ties as a critical threat to democratic values and security across Asia, stressing that Seoul’s alliance with Washington and Tokyo serves as an anchor in the Indo-Pacific region, which makes it all the more important for the three countries to find ways to safeguard freedom. He also maintained that the three governments should expand joint drills to show their enemies how closely they cooperate for the sake of freedom and openness across the Pacific region.
Senator Coons plans to visit South Korea for trilateral economic dialogue among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo scheduled next Wednesday. He is expected to discuss ways to enhance trilateral cooperation among the three allies on security and economic matters with a variety of political, government and economic leaders. Meanwhile, he highlighted that it takes technological skills, innovation, and trust for South Korea to outcompete China in the fields of AI and aerospace, adding that AI-driven innovations could not happen in the United States without economic ties with South Korea’s large companies such as Samsung, Hyundai, SK, and LG.
한국어
donga.com
21. South Korea gets closer to NATO in the Indo-Pacific
AP4 or IP4.
Excerpts:
Regionally, South Korea’s engagement with NATO in the Indo-Pacific requires navigating complex geopolitical sensitivities, particularly with ASEAN member states and other regional actors who may have differing views on NATO’s involvement in Asia. Ensuring that South Korea’s NATO engagement complements, rather than complicates, existing regional security arrangements will be critical.
The sustainability of South Korea’s partnership with NATO will depend on both parties’ ability to achieve tangible outcomes from their cooperation. This includes overcoming bureaucratic, political, economic, and cultural obstacles that may hinder effective collaboration, while ensuring the partnership remains mutually beneficial.
South Korea’s growing involvement with NATO reflects a strategic effort to diversify its security partnerships, strengthen its role in global security governance, and address emerging threats in the Indo-Pacific. This partnership aligns with Seoul’s broader foreign policy goals of diversification and proactive global engagement. However, it also introduces challenges that require careful management.
As global and regional security dynamics continue to evolve, South Korea’s partnership with NATO is likely to deepen further, shaped by the interplay of national interests, regional security concerns, and broader geopolitical shifts.
South Korea gets closer to NATO in the Indo-Pacific - Asia Times
Disrupting the current power equations and the status quo carries both potential benefits and risks for Seoul
asiatimes.com · by Lakhvinder Singh · August 30, 2024
South Korea’s traditional security concerns have primarily centered on addressing immediate regional challenges, particularly the persistent threat posed by North Korea, within the framework of its longstanding alliance with the United States. However, recent developments suggest a strategic expansion of Seoul’s diplomatic and security objectives, as it seeks to engage more actively with international organizations such as NATO and other key regional actors like India and Australia.
This shift reflects South Korea’s recognition of the necessity for a more diversified security posture in response to an increasingly complex and interconnected geopolitical environment, signaling a significant evolution in its approach to both regional and global security dynamics.
In July 2023, South Korea’s participation in the NATO summit held in Washington marked its third consecutive invitation as an Indo-Pacific partner, alongside Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
This involvement underscores a profound shift in South Korea’s security policy, which for over 75 years had been predominantly focused on its bilateral alliance with the United States. Historically, this relationship was considered sufficient to ensure South Korea’s security and maintain regional stability, leading Seoul to rely on the US as its primary defense guarantor without actively pursuing additional security partnerships.
However, South Korea’s strategic outlook is undergoing a significant transformation in response to the evolving regional security landscape. The rise of China’s military capabilities, North Korea’s advancing nuclear weapons program and the increasing military cooperation among China, Russia and North Korea have collectively prompted Seoul to reassess its reliance on the United States as the sole pillar of regional stability.
South Korea’s expanding engagement with NATO is emblematic of this recalibration of its foreign and security policy, reflecting a broader strategic realignment aimed at enhancing its security through diversified partnerships.
Historical context and evolution
The relationship between South Korea and NATO began evolving in the early years of this century, transitioning from limited engagement to a comprehensive partnership focused on shared global security interests. South Korea’s formal ties with NATO were first established in 2005 with the creation of a dedicated mission, followed by its designation as a “global partner” in 2012. This status facilitated deeper cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, counterterrorism and non-proliferation, reflecting the shared commitment of both parties to addressing pressing global security challenges.
Since then, South Korea has actively participated in various NATO-led initiatives, including joint military exercises and high-level dialogues. Notably, it contributed to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and has collaborated with NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defencs Center of Excellence (CCDCOE). South Korea’s involvement in the 2021 “Locked Shields” cyber defense exercise further highlighted its commitment to enhancing global cybersecurity.
These efforts align with South Korea’s broader strategic objective of elevating its role as a global security contributor. The increase in South Korea’s defense spending, rising from 2.4% of GDP in 2005 to 2.7% in 2023, further underscores its growing investment in national defense and its desire to contribute meaningfully to global security efforts.
Key drivers of engagement
The factors driving South Korea’s increasing engagement with NATO are multifaceted and interconnected. Shared concerns regarding regional stability, particularly in response to North Korea’s nuclear provocations, rising military tensions in the South China Sea and the growing threat of cyberattacks, have facilitated enhanced cooperation between South Korea and NATO. This convergence of security interests has enabled collaboration in non-traditional security areas such as cybersecurity, maritime security, and counterterrorism.
Additionally, while South Korea remains firmly committed to its alliance with the United States, its engagement with NATO represents a strategic effort to diversify its security partnerships. This diversification strategy reflects South Korea’s desire to enhance its diplomatic flexibility and expand its security options in response to the rapidly changing global security environment.
As a middle power with considerable economic and technological capabilities, South Korea is increasingly positioning itself as an active participant in global security governance. Its engagement with NATO allows it to extend its influence beyond the Korean Peninsula, contributing to international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts.
Moreover, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a focal point of global geopolitical competition, driven by the growing attention of both the United States and NATO to the region in response to China’s assertive policies. By strengthening its ties with NATO, South Korea aligns itself with a broader coalition dedicated to preserving a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific.
Key areas of cooperation
Currently, collaboration between South Korea and NATO has expanded far beyond security issues and strategic alignment. It now encompasses a range of practical areas that reflect shared security interests and global challenges. Cybersecurity has become a key area of cooperation, with South Korea and NATO exchanging knowledge and technical expertise to counter the increasing prevalence of cyber threats.
In the realm of counterterrorism, both partners have engaged in the sharing of intelligence and the development of strategies to combat extremism and terrorism. Non-proliferation remains a critical component of the partnership, with NATO supporting diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and South Korea contributing to discussions on arms control and the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Maritime security is another area of focus, with both parties collaborating on safeguarding international waters and countering piracy, particularly in strategically important regions such as the South China Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
South Korea’s participation in NATO-led military exercises has enhanced interoperability and operational readiness, while joint research in defense technology has driven innovation in areas such as missile defense, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence.
Crisis management and humanitarian assistance are also becoming central to the partnership, with both partners emphasizing coordinated efforts in responding to natural disasters and large-scale emergencies. Energy security has emerged as another growing area of cooperation, with a focus on protecting critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, terrorism, and political instability.
Impacts on regional security dynamics
South Korea’s deepening engagement with NATO has significant implications for the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. This partnership introduces an additional layer of security for South Korea at a time when US strategic focus is increasingly diverted toward crises in other parts of the world, such as Ukraine and the Middle East. However, this expanded cooperation necessitates careful diplomatic and strategic management to avoid potential divergences or disruptions to the status quo and the established balance of power in the region.
South Korea’s closer ties with NATO have raised concerns in China, Russia and North Korea, which perceive NATO’s increasing presence in the Indo-Pacific as part of a broader strategy to contain their influence and interests in the region. These three countries have already begun to strengthen their bilateral and trilateral relationships, further complicating the regional security landscape.
The possibility of a conflict akin to the Ukraine crisis erupting in the Indo-Pacific cannot be entirely dismissed. While South Korea is endeavoring to maintain a balanced diplomatic stance, avoiding overt antagonism toward China and Russia, its deepening relationship with NATO introduces additional variables into the regional power dynamics. Disrupting the current power equations and the status quo carries both potential benefits and risks for South Korea. Consequently, South Korea may need to carefully assess the extent to which it seeks NATO’s involvement in its regional security affairs.
To address South Korea’s concerns, which are pushing it toward actions that risk disrupting the prevailing security equations in the region and potentially triggering an arms race or conflict, other regional security actors, such as India, Japan, and Australia, may need to recalibrate their security policies to assuage South Korea’s apprehensions and to maintain the balance of power, peace, and stability.
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Enhancing their collaboration with South Korea could reassure it that it has the support of regional powers regarding its external security needs. Strengthening these security partnerships could reduce the perceived necessity for South Korea to seek security guarantees from external actors, which might provoke China, Russia, and North Korea into adopting further extreme measures, potentially escalating tensions and increasing the risk of a nuclear crisis in the region.
Challenges ahead
The deepening NATO-South Korea partnership, while beneficial, faces significant challenges. Domestically, opinions in South Korea are divided over closer ties with NATO, particularly regarding the impact on the country’s foreign policy and national security priorities. The lack of domestic consensus is one of the most significant obstacles to this growing partnership. Pro-China factions within South Korean politics are increasingly uneasy about deepening relations with NATO, complicating the government’s strategic calculations. The current government, under President Yoon, must navigate these internal divisions carefully while pursuing expanded international engagements.
Regionally, South Korea’s engagement with NATO in the Indo-Pacific requires navigating complex geopolitical sensitivities, particularly with ASEAN member states and other regional actors who may have differing views on NATO’s involvement in Asia. Ensuring that South Korea’s NATO engagement complements, rather than complicates, existing regional security arrangements will be critical.
The sustainability of South Korea’s partnership with NATO will depend on both parties’ ability to achieve tangible outcomes from their cooperation. This includes overcoming bureaucratic, political, economic, and cultural obstacles that may hinder effective collaboration, while ensuring the partnership remains mutually beneficial.
South Korea’s growing involvement with NATO reflects a strategic effort to diversify its security partnerships, strengthen its role in global security governance, and address emerging threats in the Indo-Pacific. This partnership aligns with Seoul’s broader foreign policy goals of diversification and proactive global engagement. However, it also introduces challenges that require careful management.
As global and regional security dynamics continue to evolve, South Korea’s partnership with NATO is likely to deepen further, shaped by the interplay of national interests, regional security concerns, and broader geopolitical shifts.
Lakhvinder Singh is director of peace and security studies at the Asia Institute in Seoul.
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asiatimes.com · by Lakhvinder Singh · August 30, 2024
22. Unification ministry issues English version of report on N. Korea's economic, social situation
Something to study over the weekend although it will take me more than Labor Day Weekend to fully absorb the 378 page report. Thank you to MOU for providing this English version. Hopefully there will be a lot of useful information to cite in future papers when looking at the potential for internal resistance and change inside north Korea.
https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/Publications/nk_realities/
Report on North Korea's Economy and Society as Perceived by 6,351 Defectorsdownload
-
Chapter 1IntroductionChapter 2Current State and Changes in the North Korean EconomyChapter 3Current State and Changes in North Korean SocietyChapter 4Perceptions of ResidentsChapter 5Conclusion
Unification ministry issues English version of report on N. Korea's economic, social situation
The Korea Times · August 30, 2024
This image, provided by the Ministry of Unification, shows the cover of the English version of the ministry's report on North Korea's economic and social situation, Aug. 30. Yonhap
The unification ministry said Friday it has published the English version of its report on North Korea's economic and social situation in a bid to help the international community better understand evolving changes in the North's society.
In February, the ministry released the 280-page report on North Korea's economic and social situation for the first time. The report is based on in-depth interviews with 6,351 North Korean defectors conducted between 2013 and 2022.
The report showed more North Koreans voiced skepticism about whether the Kim Jong-un family's hereditary power succession is legitimate. It also outlined various changes in North Korean society, including the collapse of the food rationing system and an increase in experiences of accessing outside information.
"With the publication of the English version, we hope that the international community can understand the North Korean regime and the reality facing North Koreans and joint efforts to improve the situation," the ministry said.
The hard copy of the English report will be distributed to foreign diplomatic missions in South Korea, international organizations, nongovernment organizations and related experts. Its PDF version has been uploaded on the website of the unification ministry (www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/Publications/nk_realities). (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · August 30, 2024
23. S. Korea, US to hold high-level talks on N. Korea deterrence next week
Sustained high level engagement continues. This is important.
S. Korea, US to hold high-level talks on N. Korea deterrence next week
The Korea Times · August 30, 2024
South Korean and U.S. officials hold a joint news conference at the foreign ministry in Seoul, Sept. 15, 2023, right after their fourth Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group meeting to deter North Korean provocations. From left are acting Under Secretary for Policy Sasha Baker and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins of the United States, and Vice Foreign Minister Chang Ho-jin and Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul of South Korea. Yonhap
South Korea and the United States will hold vice-ministerial talks in Washington next week on deterrence efforts against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, Seoul's foreign ministry said Friday.
The fifth meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) will take place Wednesday (local time), with a focus on assessing the progress on the allies' efforts to deter North Korea's military threats, the ministry said in a release.
The talks will also address ways to bolster coordination between the two countries to enhance the "extended deterrence" against the North in light of the current security landscape, the ministry said.
Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to mobilizing all of its military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend its ally.
The talks will be led by First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun; Cho Chang-rae, deputy defense minister for policy; Bonnie Jenkins, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security; and Cara Abercrombie, acting deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.
The EDSCG dialogue was resumed in September 2022, more than four years after it was suspended under the previous Moon Jae-in government amid the former liberal president's rapprochement efforts with Pyongyang.
President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden agreed to reactivate the talks during their May summit in 2022 as part of joint efforts to address the North's evolving nuclear and missile threats. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · August 30, 2024
24. Gov't tracks 4,071 perpetrators, victims in N. Korean human rights probe
Seems like the number of victims should be about 25 million.
There has to be more to understand this reporting:
The ministry did not provide further details on the respective number of perpetrators and victims.
Gov't tracks 4,071 perpetrators, victims in N. Korean human rights probe | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 30, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has so far tracked a total of 4,071 perpetrators and victims of North Korea's human rights violations in an ongoing investigation meant to serve as potential evidence in holding human rights abusers accountable, the unification ministry said Friday.
The figure marks an increase from 3,817 people on the list of perpetrators and victims of North Korea's human rights abuses as of end-July last year, the ministry said in a policy report submitted to the National Assembly.
The ministry did not provide further details on the respective number of perpetrators and victims.
By law, details of the ministry's probe of North Korean defectors are transferred to the justice ministry's archive on North Korea's human rights record. The justice ministry identifies perpetrators and victims to use the data for holding rights abusers accountable later.
In an assessment of the overall rights situation in North Korea, the ministry said human rights violations have worsened under the North Korean regime's tightened control of its residents.
It also said food rights of North Korean people have worsened due to the regime's monopoly on grain distribution.
Under the North Korean Human Rights Act, the government submits an annual report of policy developments on improving North Korean human rights to the National Assembly.
This undated file photo shows the plaque of the Center for North Korean Human Rights Records. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 30, 2024
25. Unification ministry approves civic groups' bid for N. Korean contact over flood damage relief
Unification ministry approves civic groups' bid for N. Korean contact over flood damage relief | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 30, 2024
SEOUL, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Friday it has given the green light to civic groups' requests for contact with North Koreans over flood damage relief, marking its first approval of civilian humanitarian aid bids in nine months amid strained inter-Korean relations.
The ministry said it has approved the requests by nine nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to come in contact with North Koreans over humanitarian assistance related to the North's latest floods in border areas.
It marked the first time since last November that the conservative administration of President Yoon Suk Yeol has approved NGOs' bid for civilian humanitarian assistance.
"Despite the current inter-Korean situation, the government has approved the contact requests by the civic groups solely for flood damage relief on the judgment that it is very important for flood-hit North Koreans to get back to their life as soon as possible," Kim In-ae, deputy spokesperson at the ministry, told a press briefing.
The official said the approval was given only for the purpose of flood damage supplies, adding that the government is reviewing civic groups' attempt to come in contact with the North in a principle-based manner.
North Korea is struggling to recover from massive flood damage in its border areas along the Amnok River. Heavy rains in late July flooded large areas of the country's North Phyongan, Jagang and Ryanggang provinces.
Despite the ministry's approval, it remains uncertain whether North Korea would accept South Korean civic groups' aid offer, given Pyongyang's hostile stance against Seoul.
Earlier this month, the unification ministry offered to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea over its flood damage. But North Korea has remained unresponsive to Seoul's offer.
This photo, provided by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on July 31, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) inspecting flood-hit areas of Uiju County of North Phyongan Province on a rescue boat. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
This photo, taken Aug. 23, 2024, shows Kim In-ae, deputy spokesperson at the unification ministry, speaking at a regular press briefing in Seoul. (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 30, 2024
26.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
