Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"War: a massacre of people who don't know each other for the profit of people who know each other but don't massacre each other."

--Paul Valery

Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off very once in a while or the light won’t come in.”

- Isaac Asimov

“I propose to raise a revolution against the lie that the majority has the monopoly of the truth.”

- Henrik Ibsen

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 2 (Putin's War)

2. How the C.I.A. Tracked the Leader of Al Qaeda

3. ‘It's Jason Bourne Shit’: How the US Killed the Leader of Al Qaeda

4. Veterans slam Republicans for playing politics with their healthcare

5. Senate confirms new leaders of SOCOM and AFRICOM, including Marine Corps’ first Black four-star general

6. China Rattles a Much Bigger Saber as It Prepares Live-Fire Drills Around Taiwan

7. Ukraine war: Russia accuses US of direct role in Ukraine war

8. Ukraine's Guerrilla War Against Russia Is Making Putin Pay a High Price

9. Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan highlights America’s incoherent strategy

10. As Pelosi visits Taiwan, don’t miss the action on China in Congress

11. U.S. kills Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri in drone strike

12. Pelosi has succeeded in highlighting Taiwan

13. Opinion | Nancy Pelosi: Why I’m leading a congressional delegation to Taiwan

14. National security adviser: Strike on al Qaeda leader ‘undoubtedly’ made US safer

15. Kirby: US has ‘visual confirmation’ of al Qaeda leader’s death in missile strike

16. It's time for a US-EU industrial strategy on China - even if it costs industry.

17. Pentagon’s secret communications network to get upgrade from Booz Allen

18. Russian forces 'can't cope' with the 'unpredictability' of Ukrainian troops, top enlisted leader says

19. The Putin Regime in Russia: The Intersection of Autocracy, Plutocracy, and Criminality

20. Aim Higher: The U.S.-Philippine Alliance Can Do More

21. The U.S. just killed 9/11 mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri: Should Americans feel safer with him gone?

22. The Next Taiwan Strait Crisis Has Arrived

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 2 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 2

Aug 2, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Layne Philipson, Katherine Lawlor, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 2, 9 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces have likely decided to attack Avdiivka frontally from occupied Donetsk Oblast territory rather than waiting for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their prepared defensive positions as a result of Russian envelopment operations northeast of the settlement. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Kremlin-sponsored sources have published videos suggesting that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of their positions around the Butivka Coal Mine ventilation shaft southwest of Avdiivka.[1] Ukrainian forces have held positions around the Butivka Coal Mine ventilation shaft since 2015 and have described the location as the closest Ukrainian position to Donetsk City and a key defensive outpost for Avdiivka.[2] Russian forces have likely captured the Ukrainian position, given the Ukrainian General Staff‘s vague reports of ”partially” successful Russian advances in the area.[3] Russian forces are also continuing assaults on Pisky, west of Avdiivka, and will likely attempt to seize the E50 highway connecting the two settlements. Russian forces had previously attempted to break through Avdiivka’s northeastern outskirts but have not made significant progress in months.

The Russian Defense Ministry is likely trying to assuage distress that Ukraine’s effective use of the US HIMARS is causing Russian military personnel and milbloggers with inaccurate claims of destroying HIMARS launchers. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces have destroyed six US-provided HIMARS and other Western-supplied military equipment in Ukraine in a conference call with the Russian Armed Forces leadership on August 2.[4] The Russian Defense Ministry also released a video claiming to have destroyed a building that housed two HIMARS launchers in Kharkiv Oblast on August 1.[5] Ukrainian Southern Command Chief Andriy Kovalchuk said that Russian forces did not destroy any HIMARS, and an unnamed Finnish official called Russian claims ”wishful thinking.”[6] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) also reported that Russian defense authorities are covering up Russian servicemember casualties by transporting wounded Russians in civilian cars and misreporting the number of casualties caused by Ukrainian HIMARS strikes in the media.[7] Ukrainian HIMARS strikes have prompted many milbloggers and military correspondents to express concern over the effectiveness of air defense systems and the threats to Russian logistics, and these strikes are likely demoralizing Russian servicemen on the ground.[8]

A representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 2 that Russia has refused to provide detailed information on which Ukrainian POWs were killed or injured in the July 28 Olenivka prison attack. GUR Representative Andriy Yusov said that Russia has not responded to requests by Ukraine’s Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs for information about casualties from the likely Russian-perpetrated attack on the Russian-controlled prison that killed at least 53 Ukrainian POWs.[9] Yusov said that of casualties that Russia has posted online some were supposed to be in hospitals or being readied for prisoner exchanges and were not supposed to be at the Olenivka prison. Yusov noted that Ukraine cannot confirm the veracity of online casualty lists at this time, however. Ukraine’s Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs urged families of POWs to avoid sharing personal details about themselves or their captured loved ones with individuals or unofficial organizations soliciting those details, warning that sharing information could pose a risk to surviving POWs.[10] Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Irina Vereshchuk said that Russia has not responded to requests to return the bodies of killed POWs to Ukraine as of August 2.[11]

Initial and unconfirmed reports from August 2 suggest that Iran may have sent the first batch of UAVs to Russia for field testing. A US-based open-source intelligence (OSINT) Twitter account citing unofficial Iranian sources claimed that Iran sent a batch of UAVs to Russia, along with Iranian pilots and technicians who will train for the use and repair of Russian Su-35 aircraft.[12] While ISW cannot independently confirm this claim, it is consistent with recent reports that Tehran and Moscow are pursuing greater aviation cooperation in order to circumvent international sanctions on Russia and Iran and support Russian operations in Ukraine.[13] If true, this claim suggests that Iran may be receiving Russian Su-35 aircraft in return for the drones, which could have been part of an agreement signed by Moscow and Tehran on July 26.[14] The agreement stipulated that Iran would increase the volume of passenger flights to Russia and additionally repair Russian aircraft.[15] Tehran may seek to use this agreement to facilitate the acquisition of Russian combat aircraft.

A Russian missile strike reportedly damaged a Ukrainian air defense system in Lviv Oblast on August 2.[16] The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that Russian forces launched eight Kh-101 (Kh-555) missiles in the direction of central, southern, and western Ukrainian Oblasts from their positions in the Caspian Sea.[17] The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that Ukrainian air defense forces intercepted seven of the eight missiles.[18]

Key Takeaways

Unconfirmed social media reports suggest that Iran may have sent the first batch of drones to Russia and sent pilots and maintenance personnel to train on the Russian Su-35, potentially suggesting that Iran may seek to use recent aviation agreements to facilitate the acquisition of Russian combat aircraft.
Russian forces conducted unsuccesful offensive operations northeast and northwest of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk and east of Siversk.
Russian forces made marginal gains southeast of Bakhmut and continued offensive operations to the northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
Russian forces made incremental advances around Avdiivka and are continuing attempts to push southwest of Avdiivka.
Russian forces launched two assaults in northern Kherson Oblast and are continuing to redeploy troops to the Southern Axis.
Russian federal subjects are forming new volunteer battalions in Novosibirsk, Saratov, Ulyanovsk, and Kurgan Oblasts, and are changing time periods for enlistment compensations.
Ukrainian civilians are continuing to resist the Russian occupation with acts of civil disobedience and partisan sabotage as the Kremlin considers longer-term methods of population control in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk along the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted reconnaissance-in-force near Dovhenke and Dolyna, 25 and 20km northwest of Slovyansk, respectively.[19] Russian forces continued to shell settlements near the oblast border and struck Kurulka, Dolyna, Barvinkove, Adamivka, Krasnopillya, and Mazanivka.[20]

Russian forces conducted a ground assault east of Siversk on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful attack in Ivano-Darivka, about 5km southeast of Siversk.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian troops failed to advance from Novoluhanske (southeast of Bakhmut) in the direction of Ivano-Darivka, which likely suggests that Russian forces attempted to advance on Ivano-Darivka from a southwestward direction.[22] Russian troops continued to conduct air and artillery strikes in the vicinity of Siversk.[23]

Russian forces made incremental advances southeast of Bakhmut and continued ground attacks to the northeast and southeast of Bakhmut on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces had “partial success” along the Vidrozhennya-Kodema line, about 20km southeast of Bakhmut.[24] Russian forces conducted a series of unsuccessful offensive operations southeast of Bakhmut, namely around Roty, Vershyna, Klynove, and Travneve, and northeast of Bakhmut around Volodymyrivka and Yakovlivka.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian aviation reportedly increased the intensity of air strikes in the general area of Bakhmut.[26] Russian forces continued to shell Bakhmut City and surrounding settlements.[27]

Russian forces made advances around Avdiivka and will likely continue to prioritize assaults southwest of the settlement. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Militia claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces out of their defensive positions around the Butivka Coal Mine ventilation shaft, southwest of Avdiivka, on August 2.[28] Ukrainian forces have held defensive positions near Butivka Coal Mine ventilation shaft since 2015, and the area has been subjected to continuous shelling throughout the years.[29] Ukrainian forces have also previously defined Butivka as a strategic defensive location and the closest Ukrainian position to Donetsk City.[30] Kremlin-sponsored outlet Izvestia published footage reportedly from the Butivka mine ventilation area, which indicates that Ukrainian forces likely withdrew from the area.[31] Russian Telegram channel Svarschiki previously claimed that Russian forces have been pushing Ukrainian forces from their positions in the area on July 31, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces had partial success when advancing in the Avdiivka area on the same day.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on August 2 that Russian forces had partially advanced in the direction of Donetsk City-Pisky and continued launching unsucessful frontal assaults on Avdiivka.[33]

Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operation on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border in Novopil.[34]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces conducted multiple unsuccessful offensive operations along the Kharkiv City Axis on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces withdrew after attempting to advance from Ternova to Bayrak, approximately 48km northeast of Kharkiv City, and Dementiivka, approximately 67km north of Kharkiv City.[35] Russian forces launched an airstrike on Verkhnii Saltiv and continued conducting tank, tube, and rocket artillery strikes on Kharkiv City and settlements to the north, northeast, and southeast.[36]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults in northern Kherson Oblast on August 1 and August 2, likely in an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from advancing into Russian occupied positions. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched an unsuccessful attack on Trydolyubivka (just south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border) and conducted a failed reconnaissance-in-force operation in Bilohirka, situated on the western bank of the Inhulets River.[37] Russian forces continued to launch airstrikes and shell Ukrainian positions near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River and on the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[38] Kherson Oblast Administration Head Dmytro Burtiy reported that Ukrainian forces liberated seven more unnamed settlements in Kherson Oblast on August 2.[39]

Russian forces continued to accumulate and transfer forces to southern Ukraine from other axes. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Vadym Skibitsky reported that a battalion tactical group (BTG) of Russian airborne troops arrived in Crimea and will deploy to the frontlines in the near future.[40] Skibitsky had previously reported that Russian forces started redeploying airborne troops from Donetsk Oblast to occupied Kherson Oblast territories, and the BTG will likely support Russian efforts to suppress Ukrainian counteroffensives in the region.[41] Skibitsky added that Russian forces are expanding air defense systems in Crimea and are regrouping forces in the Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblast directions, which likely indicates that Russian forces are intending to defend their positions from Ukrainian counteroffensives throughout the Southern Axis. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command noted that there have not been any changes to the Russian force composition in Kherson Oblast as of August 2, however.[42] Ukrainian Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushenko also published footage of a convoy of Russian engineering equipment and personnel carriers moving through Mariupol in the Zaporizhia Oblast direction.[43]

Russian forces continued to fire at Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts with MLRS and air defense systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces fired S-300 air defense missiles and Uragan MLRS systems at Mykolaiv City and launched 16 rockets from Smerch MLRS at the Kryvorizka Power Station.[44] Russian forces also shelled other settlements in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts with MLRS and tube artillery.[45] Russian forces did not fire on Nikopol on August 2, however they are likely to resume attacks on the settlement. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken also noted that Russian forces are continuing to use the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) just south of Nikopol, as a “human shield” for their military base, as Ukrainian forces will not fire at the NPP in self-defense.[46]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and positions in Kherson Oblast, setting conditions for a counteroffensive in the region. Geolocated footage showed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots in Arkhanhel’s’ke and Starosillya, both situated on the T2207 GLOC in northwestern Kherson Oblast and the eastern Inhulets River bank.[47] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces hitting Russian mortar positions in Soldatske (approximately 30km northwest of Kherson City) with a likely US-provided Phoenix Ghost loitering munition.[48] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian aviation also hit three Russian strongholds in Oleksandrivka and Maksymivka, indicating that Ukrainian aviation continues to operate northwest and north of Kherson City.[49] Social media footage also showed a series of explosions in Chornobaivka, a settlement just northwest of Kherson City that Ukrainian forces have struck on numerous previous occasions.[50]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) are likely changing conditions for volunteer battalion recruits to receive one-time enlistment payments. The Republic of Bashkortostan specified that recruits will receive their one-time enlistment payment of 200,000 rubles (approximately $3,300) but the funds will be frozen until 90 days after their enlistment.[51] The Republic of Bashkortostan also noted that recruits will receive their daily payments of 2,000 rubles (approximately $32) for service after their training at the end of each month. ISW has previously reported that 40 servicemen from the Chuvash ”Atal” volunteer battalion complained that they have not received their promised enlistment bonuses and post-training period payments. Federal subjects are likely beginning to adjust their payment schedules.[52] New battalions such as Saratov Oblast’s two unnamed units advertised that the recruits will receive enlistment bonuses of 150,000 rubles (approximately $2,400) after three months of service.[53] The federal subjects are likely trying to prevent Russian recruits from obtaining the enlistment payments and deserting prior to deploying to Ukraine. The federal subjects may also be unable to generate funds to immediately pay recruits, however.

Novosibirsk, Kurgan, Saratov, and Ulyanovsk Oblasts are forming new volunteer battalions. Novosibirsk Oblast is recruiting men between 18 and 50 years of age for an unnamed volunteer battalion and is offering 300,000 rubles (about $4,900) for enlisting.[54] Kurgan Oblast Youth Cossack Organization Head Vladimir Yarushnikov reported that local officials are discussing the formation and recruitment process for an unnamed battalion.[55] The Ulyanovsk City Administration also announced the formation of two reserve-volunteer battalions ”Sviyaga” and ”Simbirsk” that would have 200 recruits each.[56] Saratov local outlet Versiya Saratov reported that Saratov City Administration announced recruitment for two unnamed volunteer battalions based on the ”order from Russian Defense Ministry.”[57]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Ukrainian civilians are continuing to resist the Russian occupation with acts of civil disobedience and partisan sabotage. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 2 that Ukrainian civilians chased 40 Russian doctors out of abandoned homes in which they tried to settle in Berislav, Kherson Oblast.[58] Russian occupation authorities have been forced to import Russian civilian doctors on temporary military tours to treat injured Russian servicemembers because many Ukrainian medical staff members either evacuated occupied areas or refuse to collaborate with Russian occupation forces. Russian officials have offered doctors increased salaries and veteran status to move to occupied Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported on August 2 that many schools in occupied areas will be unable to open by September 1, the ordinary start of the school year, because Ukrainian children and their families have either evacuated or are unwilling to attend Russian-run schools.[59] The Center reported that many Ukrainian teachers are also refusing to participate in the Russian curriculum, forcing Russian occupation authorities to import teachers from Russia and occupied Crimea.

The fire set by Ukrainian partisans on July 30 in a field near Russian-occupied Bezimenne, about 20km east of Mariupol, successfully damaged Russian military equipment at a nearby military base, according to an August 1 update by exiled Mariupol mayoral advisor Petro Andryushenko.[60] Ukrainian sources had reported the effort to damage Russian equipment and fortifications and to prevent Russian occupation authorities from looting Ukrainian grain on July 30.[61]

The Kremlin is likely considering longer-term methods to subdue the occupied Ukrainian population beyond the increased securitization on which ISW has previously reported. State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov said on Russian state-controlled television on August 1 that “the biggest problem [Russia faces in Ukraine] today is people … If we want these territories to be with us, to have a future as part of the Russian Federation … we need to deal with the children.”[62] Kartapolov advocated for taking Ukrainian children from their homes to Russian military boardings schools and universities. He argued that the Kremlin ”has to do this because then people will believe we are serious and that Russia is here for a long time—forever."

Russian officials like Kartapolov are increasingly blatant in demonstrating their intention to annex occupied Ukrainian territories. Russian Kherson Occupation Administration Deputy Head Kirill Stremousov said on August 2 that authorities will continue to allow Kherson residents to use the Ukrainian language, but that “Kherson Oblast will become a worthy part of Russia by forming a people’s government.”[63]

[2] https://ukurier dot gov.ua/uk/articles/nulova-poziciya-na-fronti/

[17] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/08/02/raketna-ataka-z-kaspiyu-zbyto-sim-iz-vosmy-krylatyh-raket/

[18] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/08/02/raketna-ataka-z-kaspiyu-zbyto-sim-iz-vosmy-krylatyh-raket/

[29] https://fakty dot com.ua/ua/videos/ostanni-tyzhni-terorysty-nache-oskazhenily-na-shho-vorog-peretvoryv-shahtu-butivka/; https://ukurier dot gov.ua/uk/articles/nulova-poziciya-na-fronti/

[30] https://ukurier dot gov.ua/uk/articles/nulova-poziciya-na-fronti/

[39] https://suspilne dot media/266864-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-160-tekstovij-onlajn-2/?anchor=live_1659447588&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[53] https://nversia dot ru/news/meriya-saratova-priglashaet-zhiteley-prinyat-uchastie-v-specoperacii-i-publikuet-rascenki/

[54] https://rberega dot info/archives/86304

[55] https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/5490176

[56] https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/5490176

[57] https://nversia dot ru/news/meriya-saratova-priglashaet-zhiteley-prinyat-uchastie-v-specoperacii-i-publikuet-rascenki/

[58] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/02/u-beryslavi-meshkanczi-prognaly-rosijskyh-likariv-yakyh-okupanty-rozselyaly-v-pokynutyh-budynkah/; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/746

[59] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/02/okupanty-v-hersoni-ne-zmogly-znajty-dostatnyu-kilkist-ohochyh-navchatys-chy-praczyuvaty-v-yih-shkolah/

understandingwar.org

2. How the C.I.A. Tracked the Leader of Al Qaeda

We are seeing a lot of reporting in multiple media outlets on this operation. Is this information being deliberately provided for public consumption by the intelligence community? What is the effect we are trying to achieve?

How the C.I.A. Tracked the Leader of Al Qaeda

By Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt

Aug. 2, 2022

The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · August 2, 2022

The U.S. search for Ayman al-Zawahri had spanned decades. His presence on a balcony at a safe house in Kabul presented an opportunity to strike.

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Ayman al-Zawahri, left, listening to Osama bin Laden during a news conference in Khost, Afghanistan, in 1998. Al-Zawahri became Al Qaeda’s leader after Bin Laden’s death.Credit...Mazhar Ali Khan/Associated Press

By Julian E. Barnes and

Aug. 2, 2022

WASHINGTON — Intelligence officers made a crucial discovery this spring after tracking Ayman al-Zawahri, the leader of Al Qaeda, to Kabul, Afghanistan: He liked to read alone on the balcony of his safe house early in the morning.

Analysts search for that kind of pattern-of-life intelligence, any habit the C.I.A. can exploit. In al-Zawahri’s case, his long balcony visits gave the agency an opportunity for a clear missile shot that could avoid collateral damage.

The hunt for al-Zawahri, one of the world’s most wanted terrorists, stretches back to before the Sept. 11 attacks. The C.I.A. continued to search for him as he rose to the top of Al Qaeda after the death of Osama bin Laden and after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan last year. And a misstep during the chase, the recruitment of a double agent, led to one of the bloodiest days in the agency’s history.

Soon after the United States left Kabul, the C.I.A. sharpened its efforts to find al-Zawahri, convinced he would try to return to Afghanistan. Senior officials had told the White House they would be able to maintain and build informant networks inside the country from afar, and that the United States would not be blind to terrorism threats there. For the agency, finding al-Zawahri would be a key test of that assertion.

This article is based on interviews with current and former American and other officials, independent analysts who have studied the decades-long hunt and others briefed on the events leading up to the weekend strike. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive intelligence used to find al-Zawahri.

For years al-Zawahri was thought to be hiding in the border area of Pakistan, where many Qaeda and Taliban leaders took refuge after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. He was wanted in connection with the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and the C.I.A. had tracked a network of people who intelligence officials thought supported him.

The examination of that network intensified with the U.S. exit from Afghanistan last year and a belief among some intelligence officials that senior leaders of Al Qaeda would be tempted to return.

The hunch proved right. The agency found out that al-Zawahri’s family had returned to a safe house in Kabul. Though the family tried to ensure they were not being watched and to keep al-Zawahri’s location secret, intelligence agencies soon learned he too had returned to Afghanistan.

“There was a renewed effort to figure out where he was,” said Mick Mulroy, a former C.I.A. officer. “The one good thing that might have come out of withdrawing from Afghanistan is that certain high-level terrorist figures would then think it is safe for them to be there.”

The safe house was owned by an aide to senior officials in the Haqqani network, a battle-hardened and violent wing of the Taliban government, and it was in an area controlled by the group. Senior Taliban leaders occasionally met at the house, but American officials do not know how many knew that the Haqqanis were hiding al-Zawahri.

If some senior Taliban officials did not know that the Haqqanis had allowed al-Zawahri to return, his killing could drive a wedge between the groups, independent analysts and others briefed on the events said.

The hunt for al-Zawahri continued despite the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan last year.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times

It is not clear why Al-Zawahri moved back to Afghanistan. He had long made recruiting and promotional videos, and it may have been easier to produce them in Kabul. He also may have had better access to medical treatment.

No matter what the reason, his ties to leaders of the Haqqani network led U.S. intelligence officials to the safe house.

“The Haqqanis have a very long relationship with Al Qaeda going back to the mujahedeen days,” said Dan Hoffman, a former C.I.A. officer. “They provide Al Qaeda with a lot of tactical support that they need.”

Once the safe house was located, the C.I.A. followed the playbook it wrote during the hunt for Bin Laden. The agency built a model of the site and sought to learn everything about it.

Analysts eventually identified a figure who lingered on the balcony reading, but never left the house, as al-Zawahri.

U.S. officials quickly decided to target him, but the location of the house posed problems. It was in the Sherpur neighborhood of Kabul, an urban area of closely spaced houses. A missile armed with a large explosive could damage nearby homes. And any sort of incursion by Special Operations forces would be prohibitively dangerous, limiting the options for the U.S. government to conduct a strike.

The search for al-Zawahri carried huge importance for the agency. After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the C.I.A. base in Khost Province became home to a targeting group dedicated to tracking both Bin Laden and al-Zawahri. It was one of the leads developed by the C.I.A. to track al-Zawahri that proved disastrous for the agency’s officers at that base, Camp Chapman.

C.I.A. officers hoped Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian doctor and propagandist for Al Qaeda, would lead them to al-Zawahri. He provided American officials with information about al-Zawahri’s health, convincing them his intelligence was real. But he was in fact a double agent, and on Dec. 30, 2009, he showed up at Camp Chapman with a suicide vest. When it exploded, seven C.I.A. officers were killed.

For many, the Khost attack intensified efforts to find al-Zawahri. “To honor their legacy, you carry on with the mission,” Mr. Hoffman said.

In 2012 and 2013, the C.I.A. focused the hunt on Pakistan’s North Waziristan region. C.I.A. analysts were confident they had found the small village where al-Zawahri was hiding. But intelligence agencies could not find his house in the town of about a dozen compounds, making a raid or drone strike impossible.

A Pakistani soldier on guard at the border with Afghanistan in North Waziristan. The C.I.A. searched the area for al-Zawahri, but was unable to find his house in 2012 and 2013.Credit...Caren Firouz/Reuters

Still, the U.S. hunt forced al-Zawahri to remain in the tribal areas of Pakistan, possibly limiting the effectiveness of his leadership within Al Qaeda.

“Anytime anything related to Bin Laden or Zawahri hit the intel channels, everyone stopped to pitch in and help,” said Lisa Maddox, a former C.I.A. analyst. “It was the C.I.A.’s promise to the public: to bring them to justice.”

On April 1, top intelligence officials briefed national security officials at the White House about the safe house and how they had tracked al-Zawahri. After the meeting, the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies worked to learn more about what they called al-Zawahri’s pattern of life.

One key insight was that he was never seen leaving the house and only seemed to get fresh air by standing on a balcony on an upper floor. He remained on the balcony for extended periods, which gave the C.I.A. a good chance to target him.

Al-Zawahri continued to work at the safe house, producing videos to be distributed to the Qaeda network.

A senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive decisions leading to the strike, said the intelligence presented to the White House had been repeatedly vetted, including by a team of independent analysts tasked with identifying everyone who was staying at the safe house.

As options for a strike were developed, intelligence officials examined what kind of missile could be fired at al-Zawahri without causing major damage to the safe house or the neighborhood around it. They ultimately decided on a form of Hellfire missile designed to kill a single person.

William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, and other intelligence officials briefed President Biden on July 1, this time with the model of the safe house, the senior official said.

At that meeting, Mr. Biden asked about the possibility of collateral damage, prodding Mr. Burns to take him through the steps of how officers had found al-Zawahri and confirmed his information, and their plans to kill him.

Mr. Biden ordered a series of analyses. The White House asked the National Counterterrorism Center to provide an independent assessment on the impact of al-Zawahri’s removal, both in Afghanistan and to the network worldwide, said a senior intelligence official. The president also asked about the possible risks to Mark R. Frerichs, an American hostage held by the Haqqanis.

In June and July, officials met several times in the Situation Room to discuss the intelligence and examine the potential ramifications.

President Biden announced the airstrike that killed al-Zawahri during a broadcast at the White House on Monday.Credit...Al Drago for The New York Times

The C.I.A. plans called for it to use its own drones. Because it was using its own assets, few Pentagon officials were brought into the planning for the strike, and many senior military officials learned about it only shortly before the White House announcement, an official said.

On July 25, Mr. Biden, satisfied with the plan, authorized the C.I.A. to conduct the airstrike when the opportunity presented itself. Sunday morning in Kabul, it did. A drone flown by the C.I.A. found al-Zawahri on his balcony. The agency operatives fired two missiles, ending a more than two-decade-long hunt.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Adam Goldman and Michael Crowley contributed reporting.

The New York Times · by Eric Schmitt · August 2, 2022

3. ‘It's Jason Bourne Shit’: How the US Killed the Leader of Al Qaeda

Wow. Someone is really talking out of school. The release of this information cannot be sanctioned.

‘It's Jason Bourne Shit’: How the US Killed the Leader of Al Qaeda

Vice · by Pallavi Pundir · August 2, 2022

The operation that killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri with a drone strike in a posh Kabul neighbourhood was partially the work of a US military unit so clandestine that its actual name is a state secret, according to three NATO officials briefed on the operation.

“It was a huge operation led by the CIA as is typically the case for something like this and everyone plays a specific role,” said a senior NATO military official who works closely with the US on counter-terrorism. “But at the tip of the operation are the people who have to get actual eyes on the target, and that’s where [Task Force] Orange comes in.”

Founded in 1980 and initially called the Intelligence Support Activity before its name became a secret and started being frequently changed, the unit works within the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and is charged with collecting real-time intelligence to prepare for specifically planned operations. Within JSOC, the unit is currently known as Task Force Orange.

“The CIA can tell you a lot about a country and the personalities of its government and opposition, but they’re not designed to figure out things like is there a specific person in that specific house, which way do the doors open, how high are the fences,” said the NATO official, who was not authorised to speak publicly. “That’s what Orange does to prepare for an operation, whether it’s a drone strike like with [Zawahri] or sending in a team of shooters as with [Osama] bin Laden or Baghdadi. They collect the specific details and they do it in person from close up, it’s probably the closest thing in real life to that Jason Bourne shit.”

Zawahri in jail in Egypt in 1982. PHOTO: Getty Images

The announcement of the killing said that US intelligence had observed Zawahri’s family relocating from the tribal belt in Pakistan to Kabul in April this year. Rumors that the Americans were tipped off by the Taliban or its powerful Haqqani faction as part of some secret deal were described by two officials as “plausible.”

“This is where it gets complicated, to be honest,” said an intelligence official from the EU country who declined to be named. “The US controls a lot of money the Taliban need to run the country and while I am sure Zawahri had his supporters, it really only takes one person to decide they’d like $25 million or whatever the reward is. So it could have been a policy by the Taliban but the Americans have left a powerful intelligence apparatus.”

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They added: “If it was betrayal, the operation would still need to be done the normal way, which is in April when the family moved, operators from Orange and CIA would have established a presence in the neighbourhood to be able to continually monitor the building and establish what they call a ‘pattern of life.”

The family would have been carefully monitored on any electronic devices, although it’s doubtful Zawahri allowed any devices near him or he’d have been killed years earlier, and by carefully watching to determine how many people lived in the home, where they did their shopping, how they dispose of trash that might contain DNA evidence, and monitor purchasing patterns in local markets for signals that could be useful in determining a picture of life inside the house.

“Then Zawahiri himself shows up and it becomes a case of how to get him without getting anyone else,” said the first official. “Orange and CIA personnel would then watch to see if he ever left the house, which he did not, but they established a pattern that he would go out on his balcony every morning for a few hours.”

And using a drone-launched missile that eschews explosives for sword-like blades to prevent collateral damage, at 6:18AM am on Saturday the 30th of July, the pattern of life became one of death.

Vice · by Pallavi Pundir · August 2, 2022

4. Veterans slam Republicans for playing politics with their healthcare

My comments were directed broadly at Congress for all the medical issues they long avoided dealing with from Agent Orange to Gulf War Syndrome to this.

But note Dennis Downey's June Heston's comments. The issue and problems are bigger than just this vote and the burn pit issues.

Excerpts:

Dennis Downey, a 29-year special forces veteran, says the problem is bigger still. His research of US military deployments globally is piecing together worrying evidence of cases of ‘some very strange cancers’, he said.

It is a work in progress, but Downey says troops are exposed to dangerous chemicals from metals in bullets and other everyday military items that gradually build up and lead to inflammation and increased risk of cancer.

Heston says she expects the to pass, but says she will not stop there. Providing sick veterans with the care and cash they need is not enough, as uniformed Americans are still breathing in toxic fumes in global hotspots.

‘We still have to work on the fact that they're still using burn pits to dispose of garbage,’ she said, urging the generals to roll out next-generation high-tech incinerators that get rid of waste, limit fumes and produce energy at the same time.

The focus on burn pits and poor support for veterans comes at a tough time for the U.S. military, which is struggling to attract new recruits and faces a shortfall of some 10,000 soldiers this year and bigger problems down the road.

Veterans slam Republicans for playing politics with their healthcare

Veterans to Republicans: You've burned us — American service members and their families tear into GOP for blocking toxic pit bill providing care and life-saving cancer treatment — but for some it's already too late

Veterans slam 'infuriating' Republicans for delaying a bill to help those exposed to toxic smoke in U.S. military burn pits
Bill would benefit nearly 3.5 million veterans sickened by pit fumes in Iraq and Afghanistan
Former service members, relatives and advocates told DailyMail.com that politicians were abandoning those in uniform
Some demand rollout of next-generation incinerators to limit exposure to hazardous fumes
Scandal comes as the military struggles to attract recruits and faces a shortfall of 10,000 soldiers this year

By JAMES REINL, SOCIAL AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT, FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

PUBLISHED: 13:03 EDT, 2 August 2022 | UPDATED: 16:04 EDT, 2 August 2022

Daily Mail · by James Reinl, Social Affairs Correspondent, For Dailymail.Com · August 2, 2022

Veterans and their relatives were on Tuesday increasingly angry at Republican politicians over a stalled bill to help those exposed to toxic smoke from U.S. military burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq.

DailyMail.com spoke to former service members and their families. They urged senators to speedily pass the burn pit bill, some calling for even tougher action to stop military personnel from having to inhale burned toxic fumes in the future.

The draft initially passed the 100-member Senate with broad, bipartisan backing, but 25 Republicans pulled their support at a procedural vote on Wednesday, ostensibly over funding, leaving it five votes short of the 60 needed for passage.

Senators were on Tuesday discussing an amendment and moving towards a vote. John Stewart, a celebrity comedian, has rallied with veterans at the Capitol and urged Republicans to hurry up and 'do the right thing'.

June Heston, whose husband Brig Gen Mike Heston died in 2018 after a nearly two-year battle with a rare pancreatic cancer, called the U-turn ‘infuriating’ and slammed Republicans for ‘delaying health care and benefits for veterans and their families’.

Brig Gen Mike Heston died in 2018 after a nearly two-year battle with a rare pancreatic cancer after breathing in smoke fumes from burn pits during his deployments in Afghanistan

Since the death of her husband Brig Gen Mike Heston in 2018, widow June Heston has campaigned for other sick burn pit veterans to get the help they need, and wants the military to do more to clean up its war-zone waste-disposal systems

A U.S. military equipment manager tosses waste uniforms into a burn pit at Balad Air Base in Balad, Iraq, in 2008. Toxic fumes are linked to cancer, but sick veterans have struggled to get the support they need

‘If it was one of their spouses, children, family members, loved ones or friends that were in this situation, they would vote differently,’ Heston told DailyMail.com from her home in Vermont.

‘They're putting money over people's lives, and that is not okay.’

If enacted into law, the multibillion-dollar bill would benefit nearly 3.5 million veterans who developed cancer and other illnesses after being exposed to fumes from vast open fire pits — some as large as a football field.

They torched everything from tires to batteries, explosives, human excrement and chemicals.

Troops returning from Afghanistan and Iraq suffered from lethal respiratory illnesses and rare cancers after breathing the fumes, but were often denied coverage or faced protracted, costly legal fights in order to prove their eligibility.

Joe Kauffman, a Marine veteran, also wants more support for veterans who inhaled deadly smoke on foreign bases until the mid-2010s. Some 80 percent of disability claims linked to burn pits were rejected by the Veterans Administration.

Joe Kauffman used hazardous burn pits to incinerate tires and other waste when he served as a Marine in Iraq. He now campaigns as an official with the group Disabled American Veterans

Former marine Joe Kauffman, 37, worries that years down the line he could develop an illness due to breathing toxic fumes at burn pits in Iraq, and wants the government to take care of his family if he gets sick

The 37-year-old says he ‘didn't think anything of it’ when, as a young Marine, he burned tires, diesel fuel and other unwanted gear in a pit at Al Taqaddum Airbase, west of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, in 2008.

‘We didn’t wear protective equipment, no one was any the wiser,’ he told DailyMail.com.

But Kauffman has since learned of growing numbers of service people — some close to him — who developed asthma, other breathing issues and even cancer from inhaling noxious fumes in war zone pits.

That’s a big worry for the married Pennsylvania dad-of-two.

‘You don't know what’s gonna happen years down the road,’ he said.

Passage of the Honoring Our PACT Act, which expands support for those exposed, would be ‘peace of mind, knowing that your family will be taken care of’, said Kauffman, now a campaign officer with Disabled American Veterans (DAV).

Jon Stewart, a celebrity comedian, joined veterans, military family members and advocates in Washington to push Republicans to support millions of veterans exposed to toxic substances during their service overseas

The debate around burn pits is understood to be personal for President Joe Biden, whose late son, Beau Biden, served overseas near waste-burning pits that emitted toxins and then died of a brain tumor in 2015

DailyMail.com spoke with other veterans and organization for former service members, DAV, The Independence Fund and The Veterans of Foreign Wars, which all urged politicians to deliver.

David Maxwell, a 30-year Army special forces veteran, said the scandal was part of a broader history of poor support for servicemen sickened by the Vietnam War-era herbicide Agent Orange or Gulf War syndrome from the 1990–1991 campaign.

‘It’s a continuing pattern of how the politicians are willing to punt these serious medical issues for many veterans,' said Maxwell.

David Maxwell, a 30-year Army veteran, is now a North Korea expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank

‘Congress needs to take a hard look at itself and how it supports veterans.’

Dennis Downey, a 29-year special forces veteran, says the problem is bigger still. His research of US military deployments globally is piecing together worrying evidence of cases of ‘some very strange cancers’, he said.

It is a work in progress, but Downey says troops are exposed to dangerous chemicals from metals in bullets and other everyday military items that gradually build up and lead to inflammation and increased risk of cancer.

Heston says she expects the to pass, but says she will not stop there. Providing sick veterans with the care and cash they need is not enough, as uniformed Americans are still breathing in toxic fumes in global hotspots.

‘We still have to work on the fact that they're still using burn pits to dispose of garbage,’ she said, urging the generals to roll out next-generation high-tech incinerators that get rid of waste, limit fumes and produce energy at the same time.

The focus on burn pits and poor support for veterans comes at a tough time for the U.S. military, which is struggling to attract new recruits and faces a shortfall of some 10,000 soldiers this year and bigger problems down the road.

Research this month from the Military Family Advisory Network (MFAN) found that the number of military personnel who would advise others to enlist sank nearly 12 points to 62.9 percent between 2019 and 2021.

Three quarters of those surveyed were in debt, more than half could not save, 61 percent had trouble paying rent and a troublesome 17 percent said they were so cash-strapped they could not always put enough food on the table.

Army chiefs have described ‘unprecedented challenges’ in bringing in new recruits, leading to a shortfall of some 10,000 soldiers this year and bigger problems down the road. Pictured: Army recruiters at a career fair in Michigan

Daily Mail · by James Reinl, Social Affairs Correspondent, For Dailymail.Com · August 2, 2022

5. Senate confirms new leaders of SOCOM and AFRICOM, including Marine Corps’ first Black four-star general

I understand the USSOCOM Change of Command will be August 30th. Best wishes to General Bryan Fenton.

Excerpts:

Fenton will be the first Green Beret in nearly 20 years to lead Special Operations Command, and Langley will break a racial barrier that stood in the Marine Corps for 246 years. More than 70 white men rose to the Marine Corps’ top ranks in that time.

Fenton and Langley told senators that they were prepared to counter new terrorist threats posed by the expanding reach of violent extremist organizations as well as counter the rising influence of China and Russia in the developing world.

Fenton, a career Special Forces officer, has served as commander of Joint Special Operations Command since 2021 and previously worked as a senior adviser to the defense secretary, deputy commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and deputy commanding general for the 25th Infantry Division.

He joined the Army in 1987 as an infantry officer and has deployed to Bosnia, Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq and Libya.

Senate confirms new leaders of SOCOM and AFRICOM, including Marine Corps’ first Black four-star general

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · August 2, 2022

Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Michael Langley, right, and Army Lt. Gen. Bryan Fenton, left, talk July 21, 2022, after a Senate Armed Services Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington to examine their nominations to lead Africa Command and Special Operations Command respectively. The Senate unanimously voted for the promotions on Monday, Aug. 1, 2022. (Mariam Zuhaib/AP)

WASHINGTON — The Senate has confirmed Army Lt. Gen. Bryan Fenton to lead Special Operations Command and Lt. Gen. Michael Langley to lead U.S. military forces in Africa as the first Black four-star general in Marine Corps history.

Senators unanimously voted for the promotions on Monday night after the upper chamber’s Armed Services Committee praised the men for their “exceptional” qualifications at a confirmation hearing last month.

Fenton will be the first Green Beret in nearly 20 years to lead Special Operations Command, and Langley will break a racial barrier that stood in the Marine Corps for 246 years. More than 70 white men rose to the Marine Corps’ top ranks in that time.

Fenton and Langley told senators that they were prepared to counter new terrorist threats posed by the expanding reach of violent extremist organizations as well as counter the rising influence of China and Russia in the developing world.

Fenton, a career Special Forces officer, has served as commander of Joint Special Operations Command since 2021 and previously worked as a senior adviser to the defense secretary, deputy commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and deputy commanding general for the 25th Infantry Division.

He joined the Army in 1987 as an infantry officer and has deployed to Bosnia, Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq and Libya.

During his confirmation hearing, Fenton committed to supporting the Pentagon’s efforts to better mitigate, investigate and report civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. A January report commissioned by Congress found “considerable weaknesses” in how the military assessed and responded to civilian deaths.

The issue is particularly relevant for special operations because they are often tasked with making instantaneous decisions with limited information, said Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“We take it as a moral and strategic obligation, senator, to avoid casualties and do all that we can, even in the friction and fog of war,” Fenton said in response.

He also told senators that he remained confident in the ability of the U.S. to employ an “over-the-horizon” strategy consisting of drone strikes, special operations force raids and other remote operations to contain terrorism in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of American troops last year.

“[It is] a challenge, and it is harder, but it is absolutely doable there,” Fenton said.

Two Hellfire missiles fired by a U.S. drone killed Ayman al-Zawahri, the leader of al-Qaida and key plotter of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, in Kabul this weekend. No U.S. troops were on the ground, and no one else was killed or injured in the strike, the White House announced Monday.

Langley said during his confirmation hearing in late July that the global security environment was “the most challenging I’ve seen throughout my 37 years [of service].”

He did not mention that he was on the cusp of making Marine Corps history.

The son of an Air Force noncommissioned officer, Langley grew up on racially diverse bases. He said last year that he did not experience discrimination until his father retired in the early 1970s and moved the family to “cowboy country” in Texas.

“Yes, we had challenges at an early age, and I think that prepared me for leadership of all Marines, regardless of color, regardless of creed, religion, orientation,” Langley said. “That experience at a young age prepared me to be a platoon commander years after that.”

Langley was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1985. He has commanded at every level, from platoon to regiment, and served overseas in Afghanistan, Japan and Somalia.

He now leads Marine Forces Command and Marine Forces Northern Command and is the commander of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic in Norfolk, Va. Prior to that posting, Langley led U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa from Germany. He stepped into the role after his predecessor was removed for allegedly using a racial slur for Black Americans in front of troops.

Langley has outlined several priorities for the roughly 6,000 U.S. troops that he will lead in Africa, including fostering military and diplomatic ties with countries coming under Russia’s and China’s influence and tackling insurgencies in West Africa's Sahel region. He warned senators last month that population growth is fueling new ideologies on the continent, and militant groups are metastasizing.

“It is more of a problem today,” Langley said of the terrorist threat.

The mounting power of al-Shabab, a militant group aligned with al-Qaida, prompted President Joe Biden to reverse President Donald Trump’s decision last year to withdraw all U.S. service members in Somalia. Biden announced in May that he will send 500 special operations troops to the country for a permanent presence.

Langley called the move a "positive step" in a written response to a set of questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee.

"A stable and prosperous African continent is increasingly important to the United States — politically, economically, and militarily — and will become even more so in the future,” he wrote.

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · August 2, 2022

6. China Rattles a Much Bigger Saber as It Prepares Live-Fire Drills Around Taiwan

China Rattles a Much Bigger Saber as It Prepares Live-Fire Drills Around Taiwan

Combined use of ships, planes and missiles will highlight Beijing’s gains in weaponry and coordination of forces

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rattles-a-much-bigger-saber-as-it-prepares-live-fire-drills-around-taiwan-11659517757?mc_cid=81121a5000

By Chun Han WongFollow

Aug. 3, 2022 5:09 am ET

HONG KONG—Beijing is preparing live-fire military exercises this week in areas encircling Taiwan, a significant step up from its responses to previous crises and one that underscores China’s fast-growing combat capabilities.

China revealed the drills minutes after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi arrived in Taipei late Tuesday. They are to run from Thursday to Sunday in waters and airspace across six zones that collectively surround the democratically self-ruled island, which Beijing claims as its own.

WHAT’S NEWS

Pelosi Vows ‘Ironclad’ Defense of Taiwan, as China Plans Live-Fire Drills

00:00

The People’s Liberation Army said naval, aerial, strategic-missile and other forces conducted joint training on Wednesday to the north, southwest and southeast of Taiwan in the run-up to the live-fire drills, which would involve the use of long-range weapons and conventional missiles.

While the designated live-fire zones mainly lie in international waters, some of them are close to Taiwan’s major ports and overlap with what Taipei claims as its territorial waters, which means the drills could disrupt civilian shipping. Depending on the launch sites and missile types, experts say the PLA projectiles could fly over Taiwan—a gesture that would be seen as a major escalation—on their way to waters east of the island.

Pelosi Meets Taiwan’s President: ‘We Will Not Abandon Our Commitment’

Play video: Pelosi Meets Taiwan’s President: ‘We Will Not Abandon Our Commitment’

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen welcomed House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in Taipei on Wednesday amid growing U.S.-China tensions. Pelosi reiterated her support for cooperation between both governments. Photo: Taiwan Presidential Office/Reuters

Beijing’s response thus far hasn’t featured any direct use of force or resulted in any high-risk close encounters with other militaries—a risk that some observers had flagged ahead of Mrs. Pelosi’s trip. Even so, Western defense analysts said the show of force appears far more extensive than what China deployed during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the tensest military standoff between Chinese and American forces in recent decades. That showdown, which featured Chinese missile firings and landing drills, was set off after Taiwan’s president traveled to the U.S.

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“These announced exercises are not only unprecedented in scope but also likely in scale,” said M. Taylor Fravel, a professor and director of the MIT Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Whereas the 1995-96 drills focused on amphibious assaults, this week’s exercises seem aimed at showcasing the PLA’s ability to blockade Taiwan and conduct a range of aerial, maritime and ground attacks, he said.

This “reflects capabilities that the PLA simply did not have in 1995-96,” Mr. Fravel said, pointing in particular to improvements in technology and training that China has built up over decades of military modernization.

The PLA’s choice of weaponry in the drills will convey its own message, said J. Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior adviser with the International Republican Institute, a Washington nonprofit whose board is dominated by Republican Party heavyweights. While the main intent appears to be coercing Taiwan, Beijing could choose to send “a clear message of deterrence” against any U.S. military intervention in a future conflict, for instance by firing ballistic missiles designed to destroy American aircraft carriers, he said.

The military exercises appear aimed at showcasing the PLA’s ability to blockade Taiwan.

PHOTO: TINGSHU WANG/REUTERS

“Beijing wants to impose a psychological cost on Taiwan to negate the benefits of the Pelosi visit and to make the U.S., Taiwan and other potential partners think twice about future repeats of such high-level engagement,” Mr. Cole said.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry condemned the PLA drills, saying Wednesday that they violate the island’s sovereignty and pose a threat to international waterways and flight routes. Beijing’s choice of live-firing zones represents “an attempt to threaten our important ports and urban areas, and unilaterally undermine regional peace and stability,” the ministry said.

The ministry said Taiwanese forces tracked 21 sorties flown Tuesday by Chinese warplanes—including jet fighters and surveillance aircraft—into the southwestern part of the island’s air-defense identification zone. It dismissed Chinese reports that PLA Su-35 fighters had flown over the Taiwan Strait late Tuesday, calling the assertion a falsehood and Chinese disinformation. Chinese state media reported the Su-35 flights shortly before Mrs. Pelosi arrived in Taipei, using phrasing that could either mean the jets were flying across the strait or through it.

Beijing has in recent years ramped up what experts call “gray-zone warfare” against Taiwan—a swath of operations aimed at intimidating the island and wearing down its defenses without resorting to open conflict. It comprises amphibious-assault drills, naval patrols and warplane sorties alongside nonmilitary methods such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and diplomatic pressure.

The near-constant stream of PLA aircraft and warships operating near Taiwan has forced the island’s military to intercept them at a taxing pace, raising fuel and maintenance costs, wearing out personnel and equipment, and eroding their combat readiness. Taiwan has reported a string of fatal military accidents over recent years, including the two deadly air-force plane crashes this year.

Taipei has acknowledged these shortcomings while stepping up efforts to modernize its military in recent years, acquiring advanced jet fighters, tanks and missiles in big-ticket arms deals with the U.S. and committing to higher defense spending. Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen has also pledged to embrace asymmetric warfare techniques to counter the PLA’s numerical superiority and technological strengths.

Write to Chun Han Wong at [email protected]

7. Ukraine war: Russia accuses US of direct role in Ukraine war

No surprise for Russian propaganda. I am surprised it has taken them this long to develop this theme.

Ukraine war: Russia accuses US of direct role in Ukraine war

BBC · by Menu

Published
12 hours ago

About sharing

Ukraine's Guerrilla War Against Russia Is Making Putin Pay a High Price

19fortyfive.com · by ByAlexander Motyl · August 2, 2022

The War in Ukraine Takes an Interesting Turn: Ukrainian opposition—by both violent and non-violent means—to the Russian occupation continues.

In the period from July 6 to August 2, at least 33 resistance incidents occurred. Of these, 17 involved acts of non-violent protest, while 16 involved violence against persons or property. The most such incidents occurred in Kherson province, where the Ukrainian armed forces are preparing a counter-offensive. Nine incidents took place in the Donbas; four apiece in Zaporizhzhya province and the Crimea; one in Kharkiv province.

Occupied Crimea’s addition to the list is a significant change from previous months. It may portend growing self-confidence on the part of Russia’s opponents on the peninsula and could play an important role in mobilizing resistance if Ukraine decides to recapture Crimea.

July 6, Kherson: bomb explosion near railroad station, ammunition dump destroyed.

July 6, Severodonetsk, Luhansk province: leaflets opposed to Chechen armed units appear in the city.

July 8, Nova Kakhovka, Kherson province: collaborator Serhii Tomko, deputy head of local police force, shot and killed.

July 9, Nova Kakhovka: pro-Ukrainian signage appears in city.

July 10, Sevastopol, occupied Crimea: anti-Russia leaflets appear in city.

July 11, Velykyy Burluk, Kharkiv province: collaborator Yevhen Yunakov assassinated in car-bombing.

July 11, Kherson: bomb disarmed, intended to kill collaborator Volodymyr Saldo, head of Russian-controlled province administration.

July 11, Zaporizhzhya province: shots fired at collaborationist head of Melitopol district administration, Andrii Sihuta.

July 11, Sudak, occupied Crimea: a group of Russian soldiers assaulted by local residents, possibly Crimean Tatars, with one Russian being severely beaten.

July 11, Simferopol, occupied Crimea; Kherson; Melitopol, Zaporizhzhya province: Yellow Ribbon resistance movements emerges.

July 12, Kherson province: Col. Aleksei Avramchenko shot and killed, possibly by partisans.

July 14, Mariupol, Donetsk province: “Satelit” plant set on fire.

July 16, Kherson: blue-and-yellow ribbons appear in city.

July 16, probably Sevastopol, occupied Crimea: wanted posters appear, offering $15,000 for information on or “liquidation” of Captain Anatoly Varochkin, who ordered the July 14th missile strikes on civilians in Vinnytsia.

July 20, Mariupol, Donetsk province: pro-Ukrainian leaflets appear in city.

July 20, Kherson and Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhia province: anti-Russian graffiti appears in both cities.

July 21, Kherson: pro-Russian billboard defaced, anti-Russian graffiti appears, Ukrainian flag hoisted in public place.

July 22, Kherson: pro-Ukrainian leaflets and graffiti appear in city.

July 22, Mariupol, Donetsk province: Ukrainian national symbol appears in city center.

July 23, Kherson: pro-Russian banners defaced.

July 25, Chaplynka, Kherson province: pro-Ukrainian symbols appear in village.

July 25, Berdyansk, Zaporizhzhya province: explosion near Pivdenhidromash plant, possibly the work of the resistance.

July 27, Kherson: one collaborationist policeman killed, one wounded in car bomb explosion.

July 27, Kherson province: partisans kill “group of occupiers.”

July 28, Kherson: partisans distribute leaflets urging population to leave city in advance of Ukrainian offensive.

July 29, Sevastopol, occupied Crimea: anti-Russian posters appear in city.

July 29, Kherson: pro-Ukrainian signs appear in city.

July 29, Mariupol, Donetsk province: Nemesis resistance group sets fire to grain fields to prevent Russian confiscation of grain.

July 30, Kherson: Yellow Ribbon resistance movement offers rewards for information on planned Russian events.

July 30, Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhya province: several explosions in front of hotel housing Russian troops; at least six wounded. Possibly the work of the resistance.

July 30, Svyatove, Luhansk province: partisans destroy rail signaling and communications devices.

August 1, Krasne, Kherson province: Russian flag above the village council building burned; pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian graffiti written on door.

August 2, occupied Crimea: anti-Russian leaflets appear.

August 2, Luhansk: provincial governor, Serhii Hayday, claims Luhansk partisans have destroyed vital infrastructure.

August 2, Troitske, Luhansk province: anti-Russian leaflets appear.

The Berdyansk Partisan Army continues to distribute calls for information regarding Russian troop movements and collaborators on its Telegram site. Interestingly, two more organized groups have emerged: Yellow Ribbon, in Simferopol, Kherson, and Melitopol; and Nemesis, in Kherson. Their emergence may herald growing involvement in guerrilla activities by Ukrainians and growing coordination between the resistance and the armed forces.

Expert Biography: Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

19fortyfive.com · by ByAlexander Motyl · August 2, 2022

9. Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan highlights America’s incoherent strategy

This is the nature of the American political system. Congress can act on its own which can confuse friends, partners, allies, as well as adversaries. It is a feature not a bug.

Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan highlights America’s incoherent strategy

The Biden administration’s policy is a mess

The Economist

ONE WAY to view Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan is as a bold assertion of principle. China has taken to bullying countries that maintain even the most innocent ties with the island, which it claims. Lithuania, population 2.6m, has felt China’s wrath for simply allowing Taiwan to open an office with an official-sounding name in Vilnius, its capital. Ms Pelosi, the speaker of America’s House of Representatives, has been threatened, too. China says its army “will not sit idly by” if she visits Taiwan—something she has every right to do, and that Newt Gingrich, her predecessor as speaker, did in 1997. Perhaps her trip will inspire others to stand up to the bully.

Another view, though, is that the trip is a symptom of America’s incoherent approach to China—the country’s single most important opponent in the long run. If so, a trip designed to convey strength risks instead showing up the Biden administration’s confusion and lack of purpose.

One problem is Ms Pelosi’s timing. To be sure, there are moments when America must confront China to make clear that it will assert its interests, press its rights and defend its values. But such moments are often fraught with the risk of escalation. America should choose them carefully.

This is a sensitive period for China’s leader, Xi Jinping, who faces big domestic challenges while preparing for a Communist Party congress at which he is expected to secure a third five-year term as the party’s leader, violating recent norms. Mr Xi has nurtured an aggressive form of nationalism and linked “reunification” with Taiwan to his goal of “national rejuvenation”. Now is a dangerous time to test his resolve just for the sake of it.

Another problem is Ms Pelosi’s apparent lack of co-ordination with Joe Biden. When asked about her plans, the president cited military officials who thought the trip was “not a good idea right now”. Once it was leaked, he faced only bad options: bless Ms Pelosi’s travels and risk a confrontation with China; or prevent her from going, caving in to Chinese threats (and opening himself up to Republican criticism). True, Congress is a separate branch from the executive, but Taiwan policy is too important for turf wars. In the end Ms Pelosi has made Mr Biden look irresolute and lacking in authority.

Worst, Ms Pelosi’s trip risks exposing how unsure the administration is of its Taiwan policy. If, heaven forbid, the visit escalates into an international security crisis, the fault will lie with China. But the situation will also test Mr Biden and his team, who are already dealing with the war in Ukraine. Are they prepared?

Mr Biden has vowed more than once to defend Taiwan from invasion, disregarding a long-held position of “strategic ambiguity” under which past presidents purposely avoided definite commitments. Some in Washington support this new clarity, especially as China grows more confident—and more capable of defeating America in a fight over Taiwan. But after each promise the president’s aides walk it back, turning strategic ambiguity into strategic confusion.

America is right to want to defend Taiwan from invasion. The country is a pro-Western democracy of 24m people that plays an important role in the global economy, producing the world’s finest computer chips. It is also a pillar of the American-led order in the region. But declaring that intention does little to deter China, which already assumes America would protect the island. If anything, the drawing of a clear line tells Mr Xi how far he can go, encouraging the “grey zone” tactics China uses to harass Taiwan. It has, for example, flown ever-larger numbers of warplanes near Taiwanese airspace several times this year. Rather than grandstanding, Mr Biden should focus on preventing an invasion by improving Taiwan’s military capability.

This starts by asking his generals to have a frank discussion with their Taiwanese counterparts. Taiwan needs to do more to combat corruption and waste in its armed forces, and to improve training and recruitment. Its top brass have been loth to give up some of their expensive kit and instead embrace a “porcupine” strategy, by which Taiwan would use smaller, more mobile and concealable weapons to wage asymmetric war.

America should make it clear that it is willing to help. It could, for example, upgrade its training mission in Taiwan, offer it Israel-style military aid to buy American weapons, and create financial incentives for it to choose more asymmetric options. The next time America conducts exercises with its other Asian allies it should invite Taiwan to observe (or join). They should all follow America and Japan in developing plans for the next big crisis.

That need not come this week. The Biden administration rightly notes that Ms Pelosi’s trip does nothing to change the status quo. Ms Pelosi should try to do some good while she is there, by warning against both China forcefully occupying Taiwan and Taiwan embracing independence. At the same time, she should voice energetic support for her Taiwanese hosts.

China will respond, possibly with military action that could include sending warplanes over Taiwan or even firing missiles into waters off the island, as well as economic and diplomatic measures to isolate it further. The Chinese response could play out over weeks and months, if not years. Over that time, the real test of America’s commitment will not be headline-grabbing visits but whether it helps Taiwan become more resilient. ■

The Economist

10. As Pelosi visits Taiwan, don’t miss the action on China in Congress

Excerpts:

As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers the bill tomorrow, the title on sanctions may need to be amended or dropped. While the bill’s attempt to use sanctions to strengthen deterrence against Chinese aggression is laudable, the current draft lacks sufficient clarity on what would trigger the sanctions, and the bill’s sanctions may not be strong enough to achieve the desired effect.

If the bill is passed by the committee, Menendez will either seek to have it considered as a stand-alone bill on the floor or try to include it in the National Defense Authorization Act. Both approaches entail certain challenges, but the latter may be difficult if the bill passed by the committee includes the sanctions language, especially if it is not amended from its current formulation.

One hopes that Pelosi’s trip this week does not result in military conflict. If deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is not strengthened without delay, we may not be so lucky, or ready, next time.

As Pelosi visits Taiwan, don’t miss the action on China in Congress

By Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery (ret.) and Bradley Bowman

Defense News · by Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery (ret.) · August 2, 2022

All eyes are understandably on Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan this week as Beijing issues threats and rattles its saber. But those interested in supporting the free people of Taiwan and pushing back on increasingly aggressive behavior from Beijing should not miss an important legislative development unfolding simultaneously on Capitol Hill.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is meeting Aug. 3 to consider S.4428, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, a bill introduced by committee Chairman Bob Menendez, D-N.J., and Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C. In a joint press release, their offices describe the legislation as “the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. policy towards Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.”

As Menendez and Graham rightly note in their bill, the “security of Taiwan and the ability for the people of Taiwan to determine their own future is fundamental to United States interests and values.”

The problem is Beijing believes that the relative ability of Taiwan and the United States to defend those interests and values has declined precipitously and is weaker than ever. Not surprisingly, as the People’s Liberation Army has become more powerful and the Chinese Communist Party’s confidence has grown, Beijing has employed its military forces more aggressively near Taiwan.

Chinese warplanes reportedly made 969 incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in 2021, more than double the previous year’s total. In one day alone last year, Beijing sent 56 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ.

If Washington and Taipei permit the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait to continue to erode, Beijing may decide in the next few years that it can accomplish its political objectives on the island with military force. In fact, Adm. Philip Davidson, then the top U.S. military officer in the Indo-Pacific, warned in March 2021 that Beijing could conduct military aggression toward Taiwan “in the next six years.”

Even if Beijing backs down this week during Pelosi’s trip, Americans should not assume that things will turn out so well next time if the United States doesn’t act quickly to reverse dangerous trends.

The United States and Taiwan, therefore, should urgently build their combined military strength to change Beijing’s assessment of the relative combat power of the potential combatants, and thereby deter the Chinese Communist Party from initiating aggression.

Such an approach would support American interests and values, but it would also be consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, a long-standing pillar of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Indeed, the law states that Washington shall “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and maintain the American military capacity necessary to ensure “the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”

A U.S. government plane carrying Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and her delegation arrives Aug. 2, 2022, in Taipei, Taiwan. (Annabelle Chih/Getty Images)

Thankfully, there is growing appreciation in Congress regarding the need for urgent action, as demonstrated by the proliferation of Taiwan-related bills. In addition to the Menendez-Graham bill, Sen. Jim Risch, R-Idaho, Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., and others have introduced their own bills attempting to strengthen deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

The Menendez-Graham bill, however, is particularly noteworthy because Menendez is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As the Aug. 3 markup may demonstrate, he enjoys disproportionate power to obtain committee approval and advance the bill to the full Senate for consideration.

The Menendez-Graham bill includes elements of the other Taiwan bills and some unique attributes of its own, with the most significant elements included in Title II of the legislation. Sections within that title would create, among other things, a Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative, a Comprehensive Training Program, Military Planning Mechanisms and multiple iterative assessment efforts.

China conducts military exercise opposite Taiwan

China said it was conducting military exercises Saturday off its coast opposite Taiwan.

The security assistance program would provide $4.5 billion over four years in much-needed appropriations. This will enhance Taiwan’s own growing contribution to its defense. Taiwan’s defense spending as a percentage of its gross domestic product has grown from less than 2% to about 2.3% over the past four years ($17.3 billion in defense spending on a projected GDP of $764.2 billion) and is expected to grow even more as Taipei pays to acquire the numerous U.S. systems approved for sale under the Trump and Biden administrations.

Importantly, the provision requires that Taiwan’s defense spending continues to grow to unlock U.S. funds. For those who think that Taiwan is a rich country and should handle Chinese aggression on its own, it’s good to remember China’s GDP is more than 20 times that of Taiwan.

The supporters of the bill, however, may want to make explicitly clear that the security assistance funding will be used to buy weapons from the United States, strengthening our own defense-industrial base and enabling better interoperability between the two forces.

Title II would also create a foreign military loan program for Taiwan as well as authorize and fund a “War Reserve Stockpile” for Taiwan, similar to the one that exists in Israel — another beleaguered democracy supported by the United States.

In addition, Title II would establish a much-needed program for U.S.-Taiwan training; it includes a detailed section on U.S.-Taiwan military planning. As we have argued before, combined training and planning that particularly emphasizes the coordination of U.S. and Taiwanese air and naval forces is the most cost-effective way to improve war-winning capabilities. American and Taiwanese forces can have the best weapons available, but they will both be much more effective in a crisis if they have trained, operated and planned together before the shooting starts.

As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers the bill tomorrow, the title on sanctions may need to be amended or dropped. While the bill’s attempt to use sanctions to strengthen deterrence against Chinese aggression is laudable, the current draft lacks sufficient clarity on what would trigger the sanctions, and the bill’s sanctions may not be strong enough to achieve the desired effect.

If the bill is passed by the committee, Menendez will either seek to have it considered as a stand-alone bill on the floor or try to include it in the National Defense Authorization Act. Both approaches entail certain challenges, but the latter may be difficult if the bill passed by the committee includes the sanctions language, especially if it is not amended from its current formulation.

One hopes that Pelosi’s trip this week does not result in military conflict. If deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is not strengthened without delay, we may not be so lucky, or ready, next time.

Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior director of its Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation. Bradley Bowman serves as senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the FDD think tank.

11. U.S. kills Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri in drone strike

U.S. kills Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri in drone strike | FDD's Long War Journal

longwarjournal.org · by Bill Roggio · August 2, 2022

Al Qaeda emir Ayman Zawahiri was confirmed killed in a U.S. drone strike in Kabul on Sunday in the first air strike conducted in Afghanistan since U.S. forces completely withdrew from the country last year. Zawahiri’s death came less than two weeks after a United Nations report confirmed the Al Qaeda leader to be alive, “communicating freely,” and consulting with the Taliban.

Zawahiri, 71, was one of the most wanted men in the world as the deputy and then successor to Osama bin Laden. Alongside bin Laden, Zawahiri helped plot and execute the 9/11 attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington D.C. The United States placed a long-standing $25 million reward for information or intelligence that led to Zawahiri’s capture.

Zawahiri had been at the helm of Al Qaeda since bin Laden was killed in 2011 in a special operations raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, helping shepherd the next iteration of the terrorist group, while maintaining strong ties to the Taliban.

“Justice has been delivered,” President Joe Biden said on Monday. “This terrorist leader is no more.”

Zawahiri’s death is being hailed as a counterterrorism success, but that narrative masks the fact that Afghanistan has become a safe haven for top Al Qaeda leaders following the withdrawal from the country and the abandonment of the Afghan government.

That the 71-year-old Zawahiri was killed in Kabul – reportedly in a house owned by a top aide to senior Taliban leader Sirajuddin Haqqani – provided irrefutable evidence that Al Qaeda was operating in Afghanistan with the express permission, protection and support of the Taliban.

For further proof, shortly after the news of Zawahiri’s death broke on Monday, the Taliban released a statement “strongly” condemning the drone strike, saying it “violated” international principles and the Doha Agreement.

“On the second day of the first month of the current year 1444 Hijri, an air strike was carried out on a residential house in Sherpur area of Kabul city. The nature of the incident was not revealed at first. The security and intelligence agencies of the Islamic Emirate investigated the incident and found that the attack was carried out by American drones. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan strongly condemns this attack on any pretext and calls it a clear violation of international principles and the Doha Agreement. Such actions are a repetition of the failed experiences of the past 20 years and are against the interests of the United States of America, Afghanistan and the region. Repeating such actions will damage the available opportunities.”

Just weeks before Zawahiri’s demise, the United Nations stated that Al Qaeda’s “leadership reportedly plays an advisory role with the Taliban, and the groups remain close.” Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul’s posh Sherpur neighborhood, where an explosion was reported to have taken place on July 31, would have allowed him to be in close contact with top Taliban leaders.

Previous news of Zawahiri’s demise had been greatly exaggerated. As recently as 2020, Zawahiri was reported to be killed. That has given Al Qaeda plenty of time to consider Zawahiri’s successor.

Who will it be? Last month’s UN report provided insight on Al Qaeda’s line of succession. Saif al Adel, the longtime Al Qaeda leader and veteran, is second behind Zawahiri. Next in line are Abdal-Rahman al-Maghrebi, a top Al Qaeda leader, Yazid Mebrak, the emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Ahmed Diriye, the leader of Shabaab, which is Al Qaeda’s branch in East Africa.

Al Adel has long been a top leader in Al Qaeda, and he is known to have sheltered in Iran along with other key terrorist leaders. He is now also believed to be inside Afghanistan.

Maghrebi, a native Moroccan, is Zawahiri’s son-in-law, and has served in a number of senior roles within Al Qaeda. The State Department has described him as the “longtime director” of As Sahab, Al Qaeda’s central media arm and the “head” of the group’s “External Communications Office,” where he “coordinates activities with” Al Qaeda’s “affiliates.” Maghrebi has also been Al Qaeda’s “general manager in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2012,” a key role as top Al Qaeda leaders shelter in the region.

The presence of Mebrak and Diriye in the chain of succession should come as no surprise. Al Qaeda began diversifying its leadership and giving key leadership roles to its branch leaders as the U.S. stepped up its targeted killing of top Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan beginning in the mid-2000s. For instance, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula emir Nasir al Wuhayshi served as Al Qaeda’s general manager before he was killed in a drone strike in Yemen in 2015. Nasser bin Ali al Ansi, another key AQAP leader, served as Al Qaeda’s deputy general manager before he was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2015. And Mebrak’s predecessor, Abdelmalek Droukdel, was Al Qaeda’s third in command before he was killed in a French raid in Mali in 2020.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

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longwarjournal.org · by Bill Roggio · August 2, 2022

12. Pelosi has succeeded in highlighting Taiwan

Wed, Aug 03, 2022 page8

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/08/03/2003782874

Pelosi has succeeded in highlighting Taiwan

By Tommy Lin 林逸民
US House of Representatives Speaker and China hawk Nancy Pelosi’s rumored plan to visit Taiwan as part of her tour of Asia has sparked debate among US politicians, infuriated China and invigorated Taiwan. As Pelosi was expected to arrive last night, Taiwanese were all on tenterhooks and looking forward to her visit.
Pelosi’s proposal to visit Taiwan has put its sovereignty on the map.
The planned visit has upended Washington’s political divide while causing a fervor in the global media. Even European countries that seldom participate in Indo-Pacific affairs were concerned about the visit.
In the US, even though they are both Democrats, Pelosi’s moral courage played in sharp contrast to US President Joe Biden’s indecisiveness and feeble response, when he said: “The military thinks it’s not a good idea right now.”
However, Biden decided against asking Pelosi to cancel her trip, largely because of his respect for the independence of the US Congress and democracy.
The contrast between the two politicians has shown that supporting Taiwan is the US’ mainstream idea of justice, while “strategic ambiguity” is increasingly a thing of the past.
Pelosi’s push to visit Taiwan received encouragement from the Republican Party. Former House speaker Newt Gingrich gave as an example his meeting with then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) in 1997.
Asked about the possibility of Pelosi traveling to Taiwan amid China’s threats, US Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said solemnly that Pelosi would be handing China a “victory of sorts” if she backed off from the expected trip to Taiwan.
Since the robust support for Taiwan by the administration of former US president Donald Trump and due to Taiwan’s critical role in the global semiconductor supply chain, the US media have covered Taiwan more than ever before. Pelosi’s plan to visit has put Taiwan in the media’s spotlight, thereby improving Americans’ understanding of the nation.
Meanwhile, she has driven Beijing to distraction. Beijing’s hostility has only exposed its self-deception and underscored that it is an emperor with no clothes.
As China has always claimed sovereignty over Taiwan in the global community, Pelosi’s plan to visit would offer an invaluable opportunity for China to prove its claim. If true, all China would need to do would be to deny Pelosi admission. However, China resorted to threats and saber rattling, making one thing clear to the global community: Taiwan is an independent, sovereign state.
Whether Pelosi visits Taiwan is up to her alone. Only Taiwan holds the right to control its borders, while China can only huff and puff and reveal itself as a paper tiger.
China’s aggression has only exposed its own flaw, as the US must have investigated and implemented the necessary precautions for a visit by Pelosi, and concluded that China has no plans to invade Taiwan.
Nonetheless, if there was a last-minute change of plan, there is no need for discouragement, as Pelosi’s planned visit has already succeeded in putting Taiwan on the global map.
Tommy Lin is director of Wu Fu Eye Clinic and president of the Formosa Republican Association.
Translated by Rita Wang

13. Opinion | Nancy Pelosi: Why I’m leading a congressional delegation to Taiwan

Conclusion:

By traveling to Taiwan, we honor our commitment to democracy: reaffirming that the freedoms of Taiwan — and all democracies — must be respected.

Opinion | Nancy Pelosi: Why I’m leading a congressional delegation to Taiwan

The Washington Post · by Nancy Pelosi · August 2, 2022

Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from California, is speaker of the House of Representatives.

Some 43 years ago, the United States Congress overwhelmingly passed — and President Jimmy Carter signed into law — the Taiwan Relations Act, one of the most important pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific.

The Taiwan Relations Act set out America’s commitment to a democratic Taiwan, providing the framework for an economic and diplomatic relationship that would quickly flourish into a key partnership. It fostered a deep friendship rooted in shared interests and values: self-determination and self-government, democracy and freedom, human dignity and human rights.

And it made a solemn vow by the United States to support the defense of Taiwan: “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means … a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”

Today, America must remember that vow. We must stand by Taiwan, which is an island of resilience. Taiwan is a leader in governance: currently, in addressing the covid-19 pandemic and championing environmental conservation and climate action. It is a leader in peace, security and economic dynamism: with an entrepreneurial spirit, culture of innovation and technological prowess that are envies of the world.

Yet, disturbingly, this vibrant, robust democracy — named one of the freest in the world by Freedom House and proudly led by a woman, President Tsai Ing-wen — is under threat.

In recent years, Beijing has dramatically intensified tensions with Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has ramped up patrols of bombers, fighter jets and surveillance aircraft near and even over Taiwan’s air defense zone, leading the U.S. Defense Department to conclude that China’s army is “likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force.”

The PRC has also taken the fight into cyberspace, launching scores of attacks on Taiwan government agencies each day. At the same time, Beijing is squeezing Taiwan economically, pressuring global corporations to cut ties with the island, intimidating countries that cooperate with Taiwan, and clamping down on tourism from the PRC.

In the face of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) accelerating aggression, our congressional delegation’s visit should be seen as an unequivocal statement that America stands with Taiwan, our democratic partner, as it defends itself and its freedom.

Our visit — one of several congressional delegations to the island — in no way contradicts the long-standing one-China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S.-China Joint Communiques and the Six Assurances. The United States continues to oppose unilateral efforts to change the status quo.

Our visit is part of our broader trip to the Pacific — including Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan — focused on mutual security, economic partnership and democratic governance. Our discussions with our Taiwanese partners will focus on reaffirming our support for the island and promoting our shared interests, including advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. America’s solidarity with Taiwan is more important today than ever — not only to the 23 million people of the island but also to millions of others oppressed and menaced by the PRC.

Thirty years ago, I traveled in a bipartisan congressional delegation to China, where, in Tiananmen Square, we unfurled a black-and-white banner that read, “To those who died for democracy in China.” Uniformed police pursued us as we left the square. Since then, Beijing’s abysmal human rights record and disregard for the rule of law continue, as President Xi Jinping tightens his grip on power.

The CCP’s brutal crackdown against Hong Kong’s political freedoms and human rights — even arresting Catholic Cardinal Joseph Zen — cast the promises of “one-country, two-systems” into the dustbin. In Tibet, the CCP has long led a campaign to erase the Tibetan people’s language, culture, religion and identity. In Xinjiang, Beijing is perpetrating genocide against Muslim Uyghurs and other minorities. And throughout the mainland, the CCP continues to target and arrest activists, religious-freedom leaders and others who dare to defy the regime.

We cannot stand by as the CCP proceeds to threaten Taiwan — and democracy itself.

Indeed, we take this trip at a time when the world faces a choice between autocracy and democracy. As Russia wages its premeditated, illegal war against Ukraine, killing thousands of innocents — even children — it is essential that America and our allies make clear that we never give in to autocrats.

When I led a congressional delegation to Kyiv in April — the highest-level U.S. visit to the besieged nation — I conveyed to President Volodymyr Zelensky that we admired his people’s defense of democracy for Ukraine and for democracy worldwide.

By traveling to Taiwan, we honor our commitment to democracy: reaffirming that the freedoms of Taiwan — and all democracies — must be respected.

The Washington Post · by Nancy Pelosi · August 2, 2022

14. National security adviser: Strike on al Qaeda leader ‘undoubtedly’ made US safer

National security adviser: Strike on al Qaeda leader ‘undoubtedly’ made US safer

BY CHLOE FOLMAR - 08/02/22 11:28 AM ET

The Hill · August 2, 2022

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan appeared on two news shows on Tuesday, where he said that the death of al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri “undoubtedly made the United States safer.”

“He was the man who was the most inspirational figure, the strategic leader, someone who sent guidance regularly to affiliates around the world, someone who sent out messages inspiring his followers to attack and kill Americans and harm the United States,” said Sullivan on ABC News’s “Good Morning America.”

Sullivan went on to describe al-Zawahiri as “someone who tried to hold together a global network of terrorists that could continue to threaten both America and Americans, and taking him out has undoubtedly made the United States safer.”

Al-Zawahiri, who led al Qaeda for a decade after the death of Osama bin Laden, was killed in a drone strike this weekend in Kabul, Afghanistan.

President Biden claimed that no one other than al-Zawahiri was killed in the strike, adding that “justice has been delivered, and this terrorist leader is no more.”

Al-Zawahiri was a key planner of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, as well as bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that occurred in the late 1990s.

GOP targets Sinema while going all out to block Democratic bill Strike on 9/11 al Qaeda leader highlights fallout from Afghan withdrawal

“We do believe he was playing an active role at a strategic level in directing al Qaeda and in continuing to pose a severe threat against the United States and American citizens everywhere,” Sullivan said on NBC’s “Today.”

Sullivan emphasized in both segments his belief that the killing of al-Zawahiri justifies Biden’s rocky withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan last year.

“It has proven the president right when he said one year ago that we did not need to keep thousands of American troops in Afghanistan fighting and dying in a 20-year war,” Sullivan said on “Good Morning America.”

The Hill · August 2, 2022

15. Kirby: US has ‘visual confirmation’ of al Qaeda leader’s death in missile strike

Kirby: US has ‘visual confirmation’ of al Qaeda leader’s death in missile strike

BY ZACH SCHONFELD - 08/02/22 11:08 AM ET

The Hill · · August 2, 2022

White House national security spokesman John Kirby on Tuesday said the United States has “visual confirmation” that a CIA drone strike killed al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and officials would not need further corroboration.

Speaking with Brianna Keilar on CNN’s “New Day,” Kirby said the operation over the weekend, as President Biden announced Monday, killed al-Zawahiri on the third floor balcony of his safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan.

“We do not have DNA confirmation, Brianna. We’re not going to get that confirmation,” Kirby said. “Quite frankly, Brianna, based on the multiple sources and methods that we have gathered the information from, we don’t need it.”

Following Biden’s announcement, a senior administration official told reporters that the U.S. intelligence community has “high confidence” that the person killed was al-Zawahiri.

The official said the strike was conducted with Hellfire missiles on Saturday night Eastern time, which is Sunday morning in Kabul.

On Tuesday, Kirby echoed other officials who have said the strike did not injure or kill any civilians, adding that it caused minor damage to the building’s structure.

“The strike was done in a very precise, very deliberate and very constrained way to do exactly what it was intended to do: kill one man,” Kirby said on CNN.

Kirby also touted the operation as proof the United States can continue thwarting terrorist threats in Afghanistan after Biden pulled U.S. troops from the country last summer in what was largely seen as a chaotic withdrawal.

“If I’m an al Qaeda leader in Afghanistan right now, I bet you I’m thinking that it’s not quite the safe-haven I once thought it was,” Kirby said.

GOP targets Sinema while going all out to block Democratic bill Strike on 9/11 al Qaeda leader highlights fallout from Afghan withdrawal

He added that al-Zawahiri’s setup in Kabul constituted a violation of the Doha Agreement, a peace deal between the United States and the Taliban that commits the group to preventing al Qaeda operations in areas under their control.

“The strike itself is a measure of accountability,” Kirby said.

“The strike itself tells them, shows them how serious we are about our desire never to see Afghanistan become a safe haven again for the launch of attacks against our homeland, and it shows them the degree to which we’re capable of doing this without boots on the ground,” he added.

The Hill · · August 2, 2022

16. It's time for a US-EU industrial strategy on China - even if it costs industry.

Excerpts:

This sounds like a lot to do, but there are reasons for optimism. The US and Europe managed to get on the same page when it came to Huawei and 5G. Yes, it was done with a lot of kicking and screaming. Still, it happened. And given China’s support for Russia in wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the European nations are eyeing Beijing more skeptically than in the past.

It won’t be easy, but the important things never are. Leaders in Washington and Europe seem to agree that the global contest for the next 50 years will be an industrial one; now they need to drag their industrial bases into consensus.

It's time for a US-EU industrial strategy on China - even if it costs industry. - Breaking Defense

"If the US and Europe are going to be on the same page when challenging China’s geopolitical goals, they must ensure that their industrial bases are, too," write the authors of this new op-ed.

By NATHAN PICARSIC and EMILY DE LA BRUYERE

on August 02, 2022 at 11:15 AM

breakingdefense.com · by Nathan Picarsic · August 2, 2022

Airbus is one of the many firms with strong industrial ties between Europe and China. (Guang Niu/Getty Images)

China has never been shy about using economic ties to try and reach geostrategic goals, and for many years it found a willing partner in the nations of Europe. But in 2022 that ground has shifted, and skepticism in Europe towards Beijing is now growing. Nathan Picarsic and Emily de La Bruyere, senior fellows at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, argue below that now is the time for the US and Europe to come together for an industrial/geopolitical strategy of their own for dealing with China.

On June 27, Airbus announced that it would establish an innovation center in Suzhou, China to cooperate with local players on advanced technologies ranging from hydrogen energy infrastructure to aerospace intelligence. Four days later, China’s three leading State-owned airlines committed to purchasing almost 300 Airbus jets, the largest order by Chinese carriers since 2020.

These recent developments reflect a broader trend of Airbus engagement with China, Chinese government science and technology development, and Beijing’s military-civil fusion system. Such entanglement underscores the uphill battle that Washington faces in coordinating with allies, including those in the EU, to compete with Beijing. Airbus’s footprint in China also makes clear that for the US and Europe to compete effectively, they will have to recognize that today’s international contest is a contest for and by industry — and respond accordingly, together.

Over recent years, the US and Europe have made remarkable progress in coordinating to resist China’s global offensive. Take, for example, NATO’s new strategic concept and the Trade and Technology Council established under the Biden administration. But that progress risks being rendered hollow by Beijing’s indirect influence over key industrial champions, as China uses its enormous domestic market and production base both to acquire technology, including dual-use-relevant technology, and to develop coercive leverage in the critical sectors and supply chains undergirding the globalized system.

Washington, Europe, and NATO are wising up to this reality. But, as the Airbus case proves, none can respond effectively without coordination — among themselves and with their industrial bases. US Entity Listing and identification of Chinese military companies might prevent Boeing, Lockheed, and Raytheon from doing business with AVIC, Huawei, and China Mobile. But those measures do not stop Airbus. They might even encourage it: Airbus’s incentive to dive headfirst into the Chinese market increases as US companies retreat, no matter the long-term costs of doing so.

If the US and Europe are going to be on the same page when challenging China’s geopolitical goals, they must ensure that their industrial bases are, too. It’s a big challenge, but there are a number of ways to approach this issue.

Airbus And China: A Case Study

According to Airbus leadership, the company delivered 142 aircraft to China in 2021, accounting for 23 percent of global deliveries that year. Also according to Airbus, all of its current civil aircraft models use components produced by Chinese companies, and Airbus operates at least 12 subsidiaries or joint ventures in China. Those run the gamut from production and assembly facilities to a satellite technology joint venture with the Chinese Academy of Sciences that provides imagery for the Chinese government.

Airbus and Chinese government research institutes have jointly launched at least 10 research and development projects and six laboratories covering fields ranging from advanced materials to digital solutions, image recognition to 3D printing, 5G and the Beidou satellite system. In addition to the recently-announced Suzhou innovation center, Airbus has an innovation center in Shenzhen, China, and has used it to sign partnerships with Chinese military-tied companies like Huawei and China Mobile.

The bulk of the Airbus footprint in China is operated in partnership with AVIC, a state-owned aerospace conglomerate that the Department of Defense has identified as a Communist Chinese military company and that the Commerce Department has placed on the Entity List, restricting the export of critical technology to the company. The Airbus-AVIC partnership includes at least three joint ventures engaged in aircraft engineering, manufacturing, and assembly; extensive supply relationships; and technological sharing. Airbus and AVIC subsidiary XAC cooperate on plane wings, making China the only country outside of Europe with which Airbus partners on wing technology.

But the real icing on the cake of the AVIC-China partnership is this: Airbus directly holds a 5% share of AviChina, AVIC’s Hong Kong-listed arm. Put otherwise, Airbus is one of the major shareholders in a Chinese State-owned defense conglomerate. US companies are restricted from doing business with this entity, but Airbus, a global champion and market leader in its own right, boasts a substantive — and growing — tie-up with this core, backbone military player that directly operationalizes Chinese President Xi Jinping’s international industrial ambitions.

Per the Airbus China CEO, “Airbus is a member of the Chinese aviation industry family. We will always be committed to the development of China’s power to achieve a win-win situation.”

The consequences: Critical, military-relevant technology is at risk of being transferred to the Chinese government with ease. So is capital. Moreover, key elements of the US and allied defense industrial base rely, increasingly, on China.

This dynamic is very good for China. It is very bad for US security — as well as US workers and the US industrial base. It is equally bad for Europe’s.

Beijing’s bid for global control involves subverting the West broadly, not just Washington. Part and parcel of that ambition is a project to cannibalize market share in key industrial sectors, including aerospace. Beijing is not acquiring expertise from and influence over Airbus simply so that it can out-compete the United States military. It is also doing so to support its domestic champions — think COMAC and AVIC — so that they can dominate the protected Chinese market and eventually gobble up global markets.

A United Political-Industrial Front

In today’s international contest, industry — including civilian industry — is security. This reality is reflected in the push to bring more commercial sources of technology into the US defense industrial base just as it is in Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy. If the US, Europe, and their larger network of allies and partners are going to resist China’s global offensive, they must learn to coordinate in commercial domains, and form an industrial united front, not just a diplomatic, informational, or military one.

Defensively, this means enhanced alignment on technology export controls, foreign investment screening, and outbound investment monitoring. The EU and UK should take the initiative to impose restrictive measures on Chinese military and military-civil fusion companies. US processes for identifying those — like, for example, the indicators itemized in section 1260H of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act — and accompanying information should be shared with and applied by allies and partners.

There is a more proactive angle, too. Allied regulators and private sectors need to coordinate to condition capital markets to reward positive behavior — behavior that supports the longer-term interests of US and European industrial bases rather than pawning them to China in exchange for short-term profits. Today, markets reward Airbus for inking a new sales or supply deal with China. They fail to price in the future costs of doing so; costs that begin with industrial dependence and technology transfer and end with a stronger COMAC and weaker Airbus. Greater corporate transparency around long-term risks for shareholders — as could be compelled, for example, by regulatory requirements to disclose supply chain dependencies —could help reverse this dynamic. So could allied regulations prohibiting investment in Chinese military companies, which could help to nudge short-term interests into alignment with long-term ones.

The US and Europe also need to invest, in a coordinated fashion, in upstream production to ensure that industrial champions — including but not limited to the civil aviation sector — do not have to depend on Chinese inputs. Upstream inputs of interest include known and urgent dependencies, like critical minerals. They also include aluminum, iron, and steel; wing flaps and machine tools; and the industrial infrastructure undergirding all of these.

This sounds like a lot to do, but there are reasons for optimism. The US and Europe managed to get on the same page when it came to Huawei and 5G. Yes, it was done with a lot of kicking and screaming. Still, it happened. And given China’s support for Russia in wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the European nations are eyeing Beijing more skeptically than in the past.

It won’t be easy, but the important things never are. Leaders in Washington and Europe seem to agree that the global contest for the next 50 years will be an industrial one; now they need to drag their industrial bases into consensus.

Nathan Picarsic and Emily de La Bruyere are co-founders of Horizon Advisory and Senior Fellows at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

17. Pentagon’s secret communications network to get upgrade from Booz Allen

Pentagon’s secret communications network to get upgrade from Booz Allen

Defense News · by Colin Demarest · August 2, 2022

WASHINGTON — The Defense Information Systems Agency extended its Thunderdome cybersecurity contract with Booz Allen Hamilton, citing lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine war and the need to better secure the Pentagon’s communication system for secrets.

The addition of six months to the deal accounts for the inclusion of the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network, or SIPRNet, in the zero-trust program and the “complete development, testing and deployment planning for the original unclassified prototype,” DISA said in an announcement July 28.

SIPRNet is a communications network used by the Defense Department to transmit classified information across the world. DISA, the Pentagon’s top IT office, described the framework as “antiquated” and in need of updating.

The agency awarded Booz Allen a $6.8 million contract in January to develop a Thunderdome prototype, its approach to zero-trust cyber protections. Folding in SIPRNet is a significant evolution. The extension lengthens the pilot to a full year, with completion now expected at the start of 2023.

“With this additional time, we can conduct operational and security testing that was not originally planned for in the initial pilot,” Jason Martin, director of DISA’s Digital Capabilities and Security Center, said in a statement. “It will also permit us the necessary time to strategize on the best way to transition current Joint Regional Security Stacks users who will be moving to Thunderdome.”

The Pentagon in 2021 decided to sunset Joint Regional Security Stacks — meant to reduce cyberattack surface and consolidate classified entry points — in favor of the zero-trust Thunderdome approach, C4ISRNET previously reported.

The six-month add-on comes amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was preceded by cyberattacks that jeopardized command and control and forced offline government websites. Ukrainian networks continue to be buffeted, with hackers often targeting the defense, financial and telecommunications sectors.

Pentagon finds hundreds of cyber vulnerabilities among contractors

The campaign launched in April 2021 with 14 participating companies and 141 publicly accessible assets to probe. Interest quickly ballooned; 41 companies and nearly 350 assets were eventually admitted.

Such attacks, DISA said in its announcement, highlight the importance of SIPRNet and the Pentagon’s need for a modernized, classified network with steadfast data protections. Defense Department systems are under constant attack, as is the defense industrial base.

“DISA has made clear that we will not forget that the ‘fight’ is fought on SIPRNet,” said Christopher Barnhurst, the agency’s deputy director. “While we have been working on developing a zero trust prototype for the unclassified network, we realized early on that we must develop one, in tandem, for the classified side. This extension will enable us to produce the necessary prototypes that will get us to a true zero trust concept.”

SIPRNet is already undergoing several other renovations. The secure network was among those accessed by Chelsea Manning, the former U.S. Army intelligence analyst who provided thousands of military and diplomatic documents to WikiLeaks.

Zero trust is an approach to cybersecurity that assumes networks are always at risk and, thus, continuous validation of users and devices is necessary. The model is often likened to “never trust, always verify.”

President Joe Biden last year ordered federal agencies to move toward zero trust and to produce the requisite plans. His executive order included several other cybersecurity provisions, as well. The Biden administration followed up in January with a memorandum focused on improving the cybersecurity of Defense Department and intelligence community systems.

“Thunderdome will be a completely comprehensive and holistic approach to how the network operates,” DISA said, “a major shift from the current architecture.”

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its NNSA — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

18. Russian forces 'can't cope' with the 'unpredictability' of Ukrainian troops, top enlisted leader says

All warfare is based on deception. And it is a good thing to create dilemmas for the enemy by being unpredictable.

But the important thing here is that the Senior NCO of the Ukrainian Air Force is talking about what Ukrainian NCOs are doing and the importance of NCOs to warfighting.

When Ukraine completes its defeat of Russia a case will be able to be made that it was Ukrainian NCOs who made the critical contributions to victory.

Russian forces 'can't cope' with the 'unpredictability' of Ukrainian troops, top enlisted leader says

Business Insider · by Christopher Woody

A sergeant with a Ukrainian reconnaissance platoon in a frontline village on July 6.

Vyacheslav Madiyevskyi/Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images

After five months of fighting, Ukraine's military has forced Russia to reduce its ambitions.
Much of Ukraine's battlefield success is owed to its more capable noncommissioned officers.
With strategic competition increasing, Western militaries are emphasizing the role of skilled NCOs.

Get a daily selection of our top stories based on your reading preferences.

In the five months since Russia launched its attack, Ukraine's military has relied on its enlisted leaders to frustrate Moscow and force it to reduce its ambitions after heavy losses and limited progress.

Speaking to senior enlisted leaders from 65 countries on Monday, Chief Master Sgt. of the Ukrainian Air Force Kostiantyn Stanislavchuk attributed the effectiveness of those noncommissioned officers — which refers to troops who have risen through the enlisted ranks but have not been commissioned as officers — to a training process that was revamped after Russia's 2014 invasion in order to emphasize leadership and the ability to think and act independently.

"I believe the sergeant corps plays an important role in this" success, Stanislavchuk said at the Senior Enlisted Leaders International Summit hosted by the US Air Force outside Washington, DC. "After all, the actions of small army units are managed by our junior commanders."

"The sergeants of the armed forces, without waiting for instructions from the above, took the initiative" to conduct "independent, small operations" and act "independently and resourcefully," Stanislavchuk said through a translator. "In this way, the defense forces are comparatively different from the enemy, where generals are forced to personally raise their subordinates to attack."

Ukrainian troops carry RPGs and sniper rifles toward Irpin, northwest of Kyiv on March 13.

Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Russia's reliance on generals for battlefield decision-making was quickly identified as a shortcoming in Ukraine. The deaths of several senior Russian officers has been attributed to their need to be close to the front lines, in addition to operational lapses that made them vulnerable.

While Russia's military has tried to professionalize its noncommissioned officer corps in recent years, its mentality remains one in which "they look at their officers as filling most traditional NCO roles," US Air Force Lt. Col. Jahara Matisek said at the summit on Tuesday.

"So that's why you would see a much higher kill count with their officers," added Matisek, an instructor at the US Naval War College.

Stanislavchuk contrasted Ukraine's approach to NCOs with that of the Russians', who he said "adhere to the Soviet approach" in which "the individual does not play any role."

"The Russians can't cope with the unpredictability of the Ukrainians," Stanislavchuk said, adding that Russians "act according to a plan, they follow the letter to the order," and "their junior commanders and NCOs lack intelligent initiative."

Ukraine also used that Soviet approach following the Cold War, leaving it ill-prepared for Russia's 2014 invasion.

After that conflict, Kyiv began an effort to improve "the multi-level system of training for the sergeant corps to comply with training requirements for professional sergeants in NATO member states," Ukraine's Ministry of Defense wrote in February 2017. That effort drew heavily from the US military's training for enlisted leaders.

Chief Master Sgt. of the Ukrainian air force Kostiantyn Stanislavchuk.

US Air Force

The four-level training process that emerged begins with basic NCO training, Stanislavchuk said. "As they get through those different levels, you get to see who are actually able to become better NCOs who are leaders, dedicated to the work, dedicated to the service, or who are actually really much better to be at the technical level."

"Due to the newer system, we actually get to spend a little more time with the officers, and they get to see the NCOs are not just there to follow orders. They're also there to make decisions," Stanislavchuk added.

That improved training and a high level of motivation has allowed Ukraine to impose heavy costs on Russia, Stanislavchuk said, giving updated totals for Russian losses that included some 41,000 casualties, 5,800 tanks and armored vehicles destroyed, and more than 400 planes and helicopters shot down.

Ukrainian troops have also brought down more than 730 unmanned aerial vehicles — including operational and tactical drones and "not just the ones you can buy in the store," Stanislavchuk said.

Despite Russia having a larger and more technologically advanced air force, Ukraine has denied it control of the air over Ukraine, which Stanislavchuk attributed to extensive planning prior to the war and quick decisions in its early hours that allowed Ukraine's air force to preserve aircraft and personnel by moving them out of the line of fire.

"The vast majority of the planes also managed to get into the air," Stansilavchuk said. "With that, it was possible to save the main combat potential of the air force from its destruction."

A Ukrainian MIG-29 at an air base outside Kyiv on November 23, 2016.

Efrem Lukatsky/AP Photo

Intensifying competition with Russia and China has prompted the US military to put more emphasis on its own talent management and on developing junior leaders who can take initiative, especially in environments where communications with higher-level commanders are disrupted.

The US Air Force in particular has focused on distributing its operations to counter the growing reach of adversaries, coupling it with an effort to develop "multi-capable" airmen who can perform several duties at remote outposts in order "to minimize the footprint and stay agile," an officer said last year.

High-quality NCO leadership is seen as essential to those operations and to countering the ambitions of adversaries more broadly, Chief Master Sgt. of the US Air Force JoAnne Bass said on Monday.

"A strong NCO corps" is a strategic deterrent to China, Bass told the audience. "It's the people that win wars. It's the people that are the deterrents."

Business Insider · by Christopher Woody

19. The Putin Regime in Russia: The Intersection of Autocracy, Plutocracy, and Criminality

Download the 17 page paper HERE

18 hours ago

The Putin Regime in Russia: The Intersection of Autocracy, Plutocracy, and Criminality

https://www.cofutures.net/post/the-putin-regime-in-russia-the-intersection-of-autocracy-plutocracy-and-criminality

C/O Futures Dark Globalization Research Note Series

Robert J. Bunker and Kevin Hammill

2 August 2022

The rise of rampant criminality in Russia—initially operating at both the lower to moderate levels of society and exemplified by organized criminal groups (the Vory)—and the concomitant emergence of a plutocracy—operating at the higher levels of society and exemplified by the oligarchs—were both precipitated by the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The wealth and power accumulation of these two groups resulted from the structural void left by the immense weakening of sovereign state institutions under the transitional Boris Yeltsin administration spanning mid-1991 through the end of 1999. With the rise of the Putin regime in early 2000, the Russian state immediately began the path of reasserting authority over the criminal and business elites (often the same individuals) who were operating with immense levels of societal impunity. The subordination of criminals and plutocrats to the needs and dictates of the Russian state—co-opted itself by Putin along with former KGB (and successor FSB; Federal Security Service) officials and other friends and associates—signifies the rise of a new form of authoritarianism. This new form is reminiscent of pre-revolutionary czarist-like power structures but also draws upon the Soviet experience (and its highly developed secret police institutions) making it increasingly well suited to the realities of 21st century conflict...

The Putin Regime in Russia Bunker Hammill

.pdf

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20. Aim Higher: The U.S.-Philippine Alliance Can Do More

Yes, more can be done. Interesting description of the two evolutions of the alliance. But the authors are correct that if the alliance is to move beyond these two evolutions it will require broader political and institutional engagement.

Excerpts:

To date, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has successfully completed two evolutions. During the Cold War, it functioned as a bifurcated security arrangement whereby the United States assumed responsibility for the external defense of the Philippines, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines focused on internal security. That era ended with the shuttering of the American bases in 1992. After 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines heralded a new version of the alliance focused on counterterrorism. This version relied on the temporary deployments of U.S. forces to the Philippines as part of joint exercises and training missions to address non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters. While there have been efforts to leverage these defense diplomacy activities to enhance external defense, such endeavors are futile without broader political and institutional engagement.

Aim Higher: The U.S.-Philippine Alliance Can Do More - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Gregory H. Winger · August 3, 2022

Over its 70-year lifespan, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has proven itself to be among the most adept survivors in world affairs. Despite frequent periods of discord, the alliance has successfully undergone several evolutions and remained a regional fixture across multiple geopolitical eras. Recent assessments have centered on the electoral victory of Ferdinand “BongBong” Marcos Jr. and how he will affect the alliance as president. However, the focus on the Marcos family belies the perils faced by the U.S.-Philippine alliance. Specifically, the partnership’s success in withstanding the open hostility of President Rodrigo Duterte has bred a self-defeating complacency about the alliance that threatens its utility.

To address strategic competition with China and emerging threats like cybersecurity, the alliance needs to develop new capacities for common defense based on integrated alliance efforts. This is not just a question of military capabilities, but the political and institutional maturation of the alliance into a truly mutual security partnership. The alliance is capable of such an evolution, but to date both Washington and Manila have been loath to invest the time, resources, and political capital necessary to make this prospect a reality. Ultimately, whether the partnership is allowed to succumb to its own malaise is a decision, not an inevitability.

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Survival Is Insufficient

The Duterte presidency was the most challenging period in the U.S.-Philippine alliance since the 1992 base closures. Duterte held a deep, personal animosity toward the United States and repeatedly assailed the alliance throughout his tenure. He repeatedly threatened to abrogate essential agreements like the Visiting Forces Agreement and undermined key alliance activities. Despite the damage inflicted during the Duterte presidency, the alliance is arguably stronger now than when he assumed office. Not only has Duterte’s reproachment with China foundered, but alliance operations like the building of cooperative security locations have made significant progress.

This outcome was not the case of Duterte or Beijing failing, but rather the alliance itself succeeding. Alliance supporters in both governments, and especially within the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Department of National Defense, rallied to support the partnership and sustain bilateral activities. From military assistance during the siege of Marawi to disaster response and COVID-19 relief, the alliance repeatedly and successfully demonstrated that the pact has not outlived its usefulness and remains a vibrant partnership. While many candidates in the recent presidential election recycled Duterte’s rhetoric of an “independent” Philippine foreign policy, no major candidate echoed his attacks on Washington or calls to renounce the alliance.

Unfortunately, the alliance’s success in rebuffing the dangers posed by an adversarial president has become its own hazard. Surviving the Duterte presidency was essential, but it also engendered complacency. There is much to do in order to make the U.S.-Philippine alliance fit for a 21st-century purpose. Since the 1992, the alliance has subsisted on regularized defense diplomacy activities and informal institutions. This approach has been successful at fashioning an elastic alliance that can survive frequent political maelstroms and conduct non-traditional security missions. However, the current alliance model has failed to build the political consensus and institutional capacity necessary to respond to strategic threats like China or actualize an integrated defense posture.

Toward a 21st-Century Alliance

Both the United States and the Philippines have increasingly come to recognize China as their primary military threat. Duterte’s appeasement strategy toward Beijing failed to yield either significant development aid or meaningful concessions in the South China Sea. Instead, China’s continued antagonism within the South China Sea despite Duterte’s friendliness demonstrated that the Chinese and Philippine positions in the maritime dispute are irreconcilable, with China being unwilling to alter its territorial claims to amicably resolve the issue. This realization has been captured within Philippine national security dialogue, which has increasingly stressed the need to develop a credible military deterrent.

As Washington’s own stance toward China has hardened, the Philippines have emerged as a central link in American defense plans. The Philippine archipelago is a geographical hinge between East and Southeast Asia, and in the event of an armed conflict between the United States and China, the Philippines would be an essential staging area for U.S. forces. These considerations have become particularly acute following statements by President Joe Biden concerning the defense of Taiwan. If China were to invade Taiwan, the Philippines would likely serve a role akin to Poland in the Russo-Ukrainian War, with Luzon and the northern islands like the Batanes group serving as critical links between American allied territories and the primary theater of combat.

Alliance capabilities have not kept pace with this convergence. Through its use of grey zone tactics like maritime militias and cyber operations that occur below the threshold of an “armed attack,” China has been able to reshape security conditions in the region in ways that actively skirt the Mutual Defense Treaty and undermine the ability of the alliance to respond. Instead of fostering new alliance mechanisms to counter these grey zone tactics, bilateral discourse within the alliance has too often centered on military kit which at best paper over the policy and institutional deficiencies. Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana voiced specific frustration at the inability of the alliance to address these emerging threats in September 2021. Lorenzana called for “revisions and additions in MDT [Mutual Defense Treaty] and other relevant Philippine-U.S. defense agreement[s] to ensure we have maximum possible cooperation and interoperability to deal with so-called ‘gray zone’ threats.”

To date, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has successfully completed two evolutions. During the Cold War, it functioned as a bifurcated security arrangement whereby the United States assumed responsibility for the external defense of the Philippines, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines focused on internal security. That era ended with the shuttering of the American bases in 1992. After 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines heralded a new version of the alliance focused on counterterrorism. This version relied on the temporary deployments of U.S. forces to the Philippines as part of joint exercises and training missions to address non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters. While there have been efforts to leverage these defense diplomacy activities to enhance external defense, such endeavors are futile without broader political and institutional engagement.

Good Policy Beats Good Rhetoric

For a mutual security arrangement to be possible, the foreign policy discourse in Manila must better reflect geopolitical conditions as well as its own national objectives. As the Duterte presidency demonstrated, championing an “independent” foreign policy makes for good political rhetoric but poor policy. Accepting Philippine alignment with the United States is not an invitation for subservience. It is instead a manifestation of the Philippines’ own national interests in promoting both a free and open Indo-Pacific as well as the rules-based international order. Moreover, it accurately recognizes that the benefits afforded to Manila by the Mutual Defense Treaty also carry responsibilities that cannot be ignored for the sake of convenience.

Manila also cannot expect Washington to take Philippine defense more seriously than it does itself. This requires spending more on its armed forces to meet the regional average and recognizing that institutional deficiencies will not be solved by merely adding different equipment. In the best traditions of the worst delivery drivers, for over 20 years Philippine defense reform has managed to be just around the corner and yet never quite arriving. Recent changes like the establishment of a fixed term for the Armed Forces of the Philippines chief of staff are essential steps to improving defense institutions. However, such reforms should extend far deeper. Notably, expanding the defense budget will not substantively improve Philippine security if the money is immediately consumed by a bloated pension system. Correcting such structural flaws requires a concerted effort from a dedicated reform commission that is empowered to implement reforms on armed forces personnel, force structure, and managerial systems, and not merely make recommendations. Currently the Philippines can only make a limited contribution to security in the Indo-Pacific. But, by modernizing its defense institutions, Manila can help make the mutual defense agreement truly mutual and bolster regional security through enhanced domain awareness and integrated deterrence.

The burden of effort does not fall on Manila alone. Recent strategic documents from the Biden administration have stressed the importance of Washington’s Indo-Pacific alliances, but have either marginalized or omitted the Philippines. Not only does this dismissiveness neglect the critical role the Philippines would play in the defense of Taiwan, it also raises a question of agency. Is the American devaluation of the alliance because Washington believes it is unimportant or rather because the alliance itself has not been made useful? We believe that it is the latter and that there remain important steps that Washington can take to revitalize the partnership beyond the usual conversation about military capabilities and capacity building.

Critically, American inaction after the failed Scarborough Shoal negotiations in 2012 significantly undermined confidence in American credibility. Subsequent affirmations of America’s “ironclad” commitments or promises like those offered by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to respond to attacks on Philippine forces are irrelevant if they are not believed. Remedying this crisis in confidence is an essential task for U.S. policymakers and a key step to countering complaints from Manila that Washington privileges non-allies like Vietnam over its own historic partner. This will require actions and not just policy pronouncements. Notably, while Pompeo reaffirmed existing American defense commitments, Washington’s reluctance to engage in a substantive review of the Mutual Defense Treaty to address grey-zone threats undermined the salience of those assurances. Moreover, while the United States does not take a stand on the competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, in the face of continued Chinese harassment of Philippine vessels, the U.S. should consider assuming, escorting, or reflagging supply efforts to the BRP Sierra Madre in line with the alliance’s mutual support commitments.

Washington should also accept that security affairs do not occur in a vacuum and the two allies should start working as true partners. When talking about Taiwan, the South China Sea, trade, and cybersecurity, Manila and Washington cannot count on ad-hoc approaches. Bilateral consultation at senior levels should be a fixture of and not an appendage to alliance management. Additionally, while the Biden administration’s bevy of regional initiatives is welcome, expecting Manila to constantly compete for the time, resources, and attention of its own treaty ally is insulting and detrimental to the alliance.

To date, Marcos has both trumpeted the importance of a productive partnership with China while simultaneously vowing to not “abandon even one square inch of [Philippine] territory.” Although Marcos’ attempt to have his cake and eat it too in foreign affairs is less threatening to the alliance than Duterte’s open animosity, this balancing act is not without costs. Marcos’ oscillating will likely fall victim to the same irreconcilabilities with Beijing that thwarted Duterte and succeed only in delaying essential reforms and providing fodder to those in Washington who believe that Manila is an unreliable ally not worth having. Instead of retreading the same ground as during the Duterte administration, both governments ought to accept that while the partnership is not always pleasant, it is mutually beneficial and in need of significant renovations to be made effective. Ultimately, the task facing leaders is not deciding whether the U.S.-Philippine alliance will survive, but whether it will matter in the coming decades.

Become a Member

Gregory Winger is an assistant professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Cincinnati.

Julio S. Amador III is the president of the Foundation for the National Interest, a fully independent institution devoted to the pursuit and promotion of Philippine national interests.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Gregory H. Winger · August 3, 2022

21. The U.S. just killed 9/11 mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri: Should Americans feel safer with him gone?

Excerpts:

G: Do you think the strike is more about vengeance than stopping anything he might have actually been doing?

RG: I hesitate to say that it’s primarily about vengeance — and this may sound disparaging, and I certainly don’t really mean it that way — but it may have to do as much as anything with bureaucratic inertia. By which I mean, this man has been high on the list, and he is the head of what remains a significant terrorist organization, and so when given the opportunity to strike him, you know, it’s almost a bureaucratic necessity to do so.

G: I take it that in your assessment, and perhaps others’ as well, this is not a moment when we as Americans should suddenly feel safer than we did a day ago, right?

RG: I think that the practical operational impact of this strike is limited so, no, I would not feel a great deal safer. I might feel somewhat safer.

As I like to say, in terrorism, as in most aspects of life, nothing succeeds like success, and the opposite is also true. So having lost bin Laden, having lost Zawahiri, that could have some long-term effects on al-Qaeda’s ability to attract people to the cause, their ability to get money that can then be dispensed to other groups. So I wouldn’t say that it has had no effect at all. But I suspect that certainly the short-term effect is marginal.

G: What about al-Qaeda now? It’s been — mercifully — sort of quiet on this front. And to the extent we hear about attacks, we tend to hear more about ISIS. How would you assess the risk or the threat of al-Qaeda generally and to the United States in particular?

RG: Al-Qaeda now has become kind of amorphous. And so many of the sub-organizations that are affiliated with al-Qaeda are essentially independent now. They may take some top-level guidance, but they’re essentially independent entities. What remains of what I guess we might have called core al-Qaeda, it remains in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but from what I understand, they are not all that operationally active. They remain dangerous but mostly because they are a source of funding to others.

I think their greatest value to the extremist cause, and the greatest threat emanating from them, has to do with their ability to collect money and to dispense it to others who are operationally active in a way that al-Qaeda central, if you will, no longer is.

The U.S. just killed 9/11 mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri: Should Americans feel safer with him gone?

A former CIA counterterrorism chief on the strike, its impact and the state of al-Qaeda today.

Tom Nagorski

Global Editor

August 2, 2022

grid.news · by Tom Nagorski

Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, was a wanted man for more than 20 years. When a U.S. drone strike killed him over the weekend, he had been living with family members in Afghanistan, back where he and Osama bin Laden had plotted the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

President Joe Biden said Monday that “justice had been delivered” and vowed to track enemies of the United States “no matter how long it takes, no matter where you hide.”

It had taken a long time — and the hiding place is as much of a story as the drone strike itself. U.S. officials said al-Zawahiri had been tracked in Kabul for months: an effort to confirm his identity and to minimize the risk to civilians in any attack. Biden authorized the strike last week, and officials said no others had been killed.

Al-Zawahiri had a long career as a militant. He was jailed in 1981 for his involvement in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and was said to have been further radicalized by his time in Egyptian prisons. He became bin Laden’s chief aide as they created al-Qaeda, and then the organization’s top operational leader, credited with masterminding the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and then the 9/11 attacks. The killing of bin Laden in 2011 left al-Zawahiri in charge of the global organization.

His death raises several questions — about al-Qaeda’s current structure, the threat it poses to the U.S., the U.S. ability to carry out strikes in Afghanistan a year after its troops left that country and not least the question of what al-Zawahiri’s presence for months in Afghanistan says about pledges by the Taliban to combat terrorism in the country it now rules.

For answers and analysis, Grid turned to Robert Grenier, who was CIA station chief for Pakistan and Afghanistan on Sept. 11, 2001, and served from 2004 to 2006 as the agency’s head of counterterrorism.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Grid: You have had as much experience with this man and this issue as anyone. What was your initial reaction when you heard the news?

Robert Grenier: Well, I guess my initial reaction was, “It’s about time.” This has been a long time coming. I recall that there was a very near miss — I want to say in late 2005, where we thought that we’d gotten him, and indeed he acknowledged subsequently the attempt on his life. I have no idea how many near misses there may have been since then, but this has been a long time in coming.

When I was director of counterterrorism, we were of course very much focused on bin Laden and on Zawahiri, and at the time we used to talk about trying to cut off the head and cut off the hands; bin Laden and Zawahiri were the “head” of the organization. The “hands” were another matter — the operations people. In those days, the head of operations for al-Qaeda carried a very short half-life. There were a series of those individuals who ended up being killed.

Bin Laden and Zawahiri were in hiding — from around November, December of 2001 onward. Zawahiri would put out occasional video or audio statements, but he kept a very low profile. And so they were providing, if you will, a sort of executive-level guidance for the organization. They were really not actively involved in the fight. So there was even some question in my mind, apart from his value as a symbol, and here I’m talking about particularly bin Laden but also Zawahiri to some degree, it wasn’t clear to me what practical effect it would have if we were able to kill either of them.

And I think now even more so — it’s an open question as to how much the death of Zawahiri really affects the battle space.

G: For those who may not remember the name, or may never have known the name, why did Ayman al-Zawahiri matter to al-Qaeda?

RG: His direct involvement with al-Qaeda dated to the 1990s, when Zawahiri, who was the head of the so-called Egyptian Islamic Jihad, merged his organization with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. And that was a major coup at the time for bin Laden because the Egyptian Islamic Jihad was a serious organization. And Zawahiri became as a result the deputy to bin Laden.

Zawahiri was actively involved in building the organization and later building the network. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, for instance. Zawahiri was the principal contact with the branch in Iraq.

But he was the No. 2 behind bin Laden, and he stepped in as at least the titular head of al-Qaeda after bin Laden met his demise.

G: Do you think the strike is more about vengeance than stopping anything he might have actually been doing?

RG: I hesitate to say that it’s primarily about vengeance — and this may sound disparaging, and I certainly don’t really mean it that way — but it may have to do as much as anything with bureaucratic inertia. By which I mean, this man has been high on the list, and he is the head of what remains a significant terrorist organization, and so when given the opportunity to strike him, you know, it’s almost a bureaucratic necessity to do so.

G: I take it that in your assessment, and perhaps others’ as well, this is not a moment when we as Americans should suddenly feel safer than we did a day ago, right?

RG: I think that the practical operational impact of this strike is limited so, no, I would not feel a great deal safer. I might feel somewhat safer.

As I like to say, in terrorism, as in most aspects of life, nothing succeeds like success, and the opposite is also true. So having lost bin Laden, having lost Zawahiri, that could have some long-term effects on al-Qaeda’s ability to attract people to the cause, their ability to get money that can then be dispensed to other groups. So I wouldn’t say that it has had no effect at all. But I suspect that certainly the short-term effect is marginal.

G: What about al-Qaeda now? It’s been — mercifully — sort of quiet on this front. And to the extent we hear about attacks, we tend to hear more about ISIS. How would you assess the risk or the threat of al-Qaeda generally and to the United States in particular?

RG: Al-Qaeda now has become kind of amorphous. And so many of the sub-organizations that are affiliated with al-Qaeda are essentially independent now. They may take some top-level guidance, but they’re essentially independent entities. What remains of what I guess we might have called core al-Qaeda, it remains in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but from what I understand, they are not all that operationally active. They remain dangerous but mostly because they are a source of funding to others.

I think their greatest value to the extremist cause, and the greatest threat emanating from them, has to do with their ability to collect money and to dispense it to others who are operationally active in a way that al-Qaeda central, if you will, no longer is.

G: Can we talk about what we know about the circumstances surrounding the strike? We’re coming up on a year now since the U.S. withdrawal and the fall of Kabul. There are no U.S. troops and therefore no U.S. assets, or perhaps limited assets on the ground, to do this sort of thing. What does the news tell you about intelligence inside Afghanistan?

RG: I’m sure — I mean, without knowing the details — that our ability to collect real-time intelligence on the ground is not what it was. And the fact that they were able to build up an intelligence picture sufficient to support the strike, and to do it in a way where they were able to avoid civilian casualties, that’s significant. So clearly there is still some capability there. Precisely how that was generated, how much of it was due to human sources on the ground, how much of it was due to overhead surveillance, I simply don’t know.

We’re being told this was a CIA strike. I think it would necessarily have had to be a CIA strike, because it’s not at all clear to me that the U.S. military would have had the authority to carry out such a strike. So even if this was a U.S. military drone, I believe it would have had to have been operating under CIA authorities.

The military can operate only in declared war zones. Afghanistan is no longer that. The CIA, however, has the authority under a presidential finding to make strikes across borders even in countries where we are not at war officially. Recall that when the strike occurred against bin Laden, in Pakistan, that was a U.S. military strike, it was U.S. Special Forces that launched that strike, but they were — the term of art is “chopped” — they were chopped to CIA authority in order to make that strike because we were not at war with Pakistan.

I’m sure the Taliban doesn’t care whether it was U.S. military or CIA — they don’t care, they’re just saying this is a violation of their sovereignty, and so they object to it.

G: A question about Afghanistan. On the one hand, the president said that this is a success in the cause for justice and shows the ability for the U.S. to do this from a distance without troops on the ground; on the other hand, the idea that Zawahiri was there and apparently there for several months, doing whatever he was doing with impunity — what should we take from the fact that he was there and chose to be there presumably for some time?

RG: The Taliban has made it clear all along since the peace deal was negotiated that they would provide asylum — I’m not sure if that was the word that they used, but they would essentially provide political asylum to members of al-Qaeda who were there on their soil and essentially had no place to go. At the same time, they were saying that no one will be allowed to use Afghanistan as a platform to launch terrorist operations against other countries. And I think the Taliban up until the present day had been very consistent about that.

They would probably have considered Zawahiri essentially a guest but would profess that he was not able to do anything operationally from their territory. I think there are a great many people who would be skeptical about that, but that’s their line. And interestingly, this White House seems to suggest that the Taliban is living up to its commitments. Now, there may be some political expediency on the part of the White House in that, because if the Taliban were not living up to its commitments, then presumably the United States would be expected to do something. And that’s something that I’m sure the White House would prefer not to get involved in right now.

Interestingly enough, there is some risk to the U.S. in launching such an overt strike like this in that it could potentially induce the Taliban — to the extent that it is trying to control extremist elements on its soil — to be less careful in doing so in the future. So this is one of the things that I know the White House has to be and is concerned about.

G: There are initial reports suggesting CIA Director Bill Burns, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and others have known about this — or at least about Zawahiri’s presence there for several months. Would there have been any thought given to whether this strike was worth those risks you mention?

RG: I think that if in fact they knew about this for months, then I have no reason to doubt that they were doing what we used to call “working up the target.” Meaning, once you find him, you want to determine what his pattern of activity is, you want to know where he is, who else might be with him, so as to avoid the possibility of collateral casualties.

I suspect that they were able to do in this case what they clearly were not able to do during the evacuations from Kabul last year, when there was that horrible strike right at the Kabul airport that the Islamic State launched, and very shortly after that there was a U.S. drone strike that turned out to be a horrific mistake and killed many civilians. At the time, I, and I suspect a lot of other former intelligence professionals, were shaking our heads and saying, “Well, I guess they didn’t work up the target.” And the reason, I’m sure, was because they didn’t think that they had time. And so it caused them to advance the timetable and perhaps take risks that they normally wouldn’t or shouldn’t have taken.

In this case, I think they were able to work up this target. And if in fact he was taken out without civilian casualties, that’s the way that it should be done.

G: There’s a formulation of Biden’s and others in the administration they call “over the horizon” — namely that the U.S. can accomplish its counterterrorism goals without having folks on the ground. And I think there’s been a lot of skepticism about this. Is this strike a win for proponents of that strategy?

RG: Well, obviously, the White House for various reasons, including political ones, has wanted to stress the fact that we could continue to protect ourselves from elements based in Afghanistan despite the military withdrawal from that country. And it’s hard to argue with success, so clearly they succeeded in doing it in this case. Just how far “over the horizon” this particular drone was, I just don’t know.

But yes, in this sense the strike was a success, and I suspect that the White House will want to tout this as evidence that it can do what it has said that it could do since the withdrawal.

That said, I think we would all have to concede that it’s much harder to do this on a routine basis given our no longer having a platform in the region.

Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.

grid.news · by Tom Nagorski

22. The Next Taiwan Strait Crisis Has Arrived

Conclusion:

Where we go from here will depend on whether there is still room for mutual understanding between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This would require all three to confront the core unresolved issues underlying the cross-strait dilemma, rather than focus exclusively on rhetorical posturing and deterrence games. One online U.S. commentator has insisted that Beijing cannot be allowed to “control the narrative” on Pelosi’s visit in an attempt to justify its actions and shift the blame to Washington for any escalation. But neither should Washington and Taipei expect that they will be able to control the narrative and escape some responsibility for creating the crisis we now face.

The Next Taiwan Strait Crisis Has Arrived

Where we go from here will depend on whether there is still room for mutual understanding between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.

The National Interest · by Paul Heer · August 2, 2022

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 2022 has begun. It is not yet clear how it will unfold, or when and how it will abate. What is clear is that it was wholly avoidable. And it probably will deepen the gulf in the U.S.-China relationship, which was sorely in need of efforts to arrest the downward spiral.

Whether Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi should be visiting Taiwan is now a moot point. But it nonetheless matters that the visit was never going to achieve anything of positive substance, at least nothing worth the risks. As scholar Shelley Rigger, one of the leading American experts on and supporters of Taiwan, said: “I’m begging someone to explain to me how Nancy Pelosi going to Taiwan right now makes Taiwan safer. We have an obligation to our partner to consider whether its security is enhanced or diminished by the actions we take.” Yet it appears obvious that Pelosi’s decision to visit was driven primarily by domestic politics, as was President Biden’s apparent unwillingness to dissuade Pelosi from making the trip. If any potential strategic consequences were considered, they appear to have been outweighed by political considerations.

Instead, the discourse has shifted to which side—Beijing or Washington—bears responsibility for the crisis that will now preoccupy both. And, predictably, both sides are entirely blaming each other, when it should be obvious that there is more than enough responsibility to go around. The warning signs, and the explicit warnings themselves, were plentiful but ignored or dismissed. So the schoolyard cries of “he started it” and “it’s all his fault” carry no weight.

Several specious rhetorical arguments have been used to attempt to justify Pelosi’s trip in the face of Chinese threats. Congressman Ro Khanna insisted that “the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t get to dictate the travel schedule of the Speaker of the House.” Indeed, there is a voluminous catalog of affirmations that “the Chinese can’t tell us what to do.” But this bypasses the possibility that Washington might have its own very good reasons for not doing something Beijing doesn’t want it to do—and should base its decisions on those reasons, regardless of Beijing’s preferences. Khanna’s argument also overlooks the extent to which Washington itself is often telling the Chinese what to do or not do.

Then there is the argument made by Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin: “If China does something aggressive when the Pelosi delegation visits Taiwan, that’s China starting a crisis, not the United States. The Chinese government should take a deep breath and relax.” Washington cannot be denied any agency in contributing to this crisis. And there can be no doubt about what Washington’s response would be if Beijing told it to “take a deep breath and relax” rather than react to something China did contrary to U.S. wishes.

Finally, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told CNN that “there’s no reason for the Chinese rhetoric” against Pelosi’s trip and “there’s no reason for any actions to be taken” by Beijing in response. This is based on the premise that the Pelosi visit is consistent with longstanding practice in the conduct of “unofficial” American relations with Taiwan under Washington’s “One China” policy. Many observers have noted that U.S. congressional delegations frequently visit Taiwan and that there was precedent in then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s visit in 1997. But this entirely disregards the present historical and political context of Pelosi’s visit. It comes in the wake of the serious downturn in U.S.-China relations; the cumulative developments in Chinese, American, and Taiwan politics over the past twenty-five years that contributed to that downturn; and especially the cumulative erosion of Washington’s “One China” policy over that period.

Many specialists in the scriptural study of the founding documents of the “One China” policy—the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and Washington’s Six Assurances to Taipei—have made the case (especially in the past week) that Pelosi’s visit “in no way contradicts” those documents and upholds Washington’s non-support for Taiwan independence or “changes to the status quo” on the Taiwan Strait. But that case, frankly, is simply not persuasive or credible. This is partly because Taiwan already claims independence, and partly because Beijing, Washington, and Taipei all have different definitions of “the status quo.” It is also partly because U.S. policy on interaction with Taiwan has changed incrementally and unilaterally over the past thirty years. Finally, Pelosi is traveling on a U.S. military aircraft and her own office today issued a statement referring to her visit as “official.”

Perhaps most importantly, Beijing has already rejected the U.S. explanation. Indeed, it is precisely because Washington has declared that Pelosi’s visit is normal and that Beijing has “no reason” to react that Chinese leaders feel compelled to do so. It is worth recalling that Beijing reacted vehemently to then-Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the United States partly because the Clinton administration had initially told Beijing it was opposed to granting Lee a visa on the grounds that it would violate the “One China” policy, but then allowed the visit after deciding it would be consistent with that policy. Washington thus should not be surprised if Chinese leaders conclude, as they did in 1995, that Beijing must now take actions to demonstrate that it has red lines on the Taiwan issue and to insist that the “One China” policy has reliable substance. And today, China is delivering that message with capabilities and leverage that it did not possess in 1995—indeed, capabilities that Beijing was prompted by the events of 1995 to pursue.

Washington appears to have underestimated or dismissed the possibility of a severe Chinese reaction to Pelosi’s visit, calculating that Beijing would not assume the risks of escalating it into a crisis—including the potential domestic political risks to Xi Jinping on the eve of the upcoming 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress, where he seeks “reelection” to an unprecedented third term—or would not dare challenge and provoke the United States, and thus would accept the argument that Pelosi’s visit was symbolic and consistent with the “One China” policy. If so, Washington miscalculated on all three counts. Beijing sees the need, and it obviously is prepared to accept the risks of demonstrating its red lines. Xi clearly believes that his domestic credibility requires him to push back firmly rather than acquiesce and retreat. And Pelosi’s visit obviously has prompted Beijing to draw a line in the sand.

Where we go from here will depend on whether there is still room for mutual understanding between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This would require all three to confront the core unresolved issues underlying the cross-strait dilemma, rather than focus exclusively on rhetorical posturing and deterrence games. One online U.S. commentator has insisted that Beijing cannot be allowed to “control the narrative” on Pelosi’s visit in an attempt to justify its actions and shift the blame to Washington for any escalation. But neither should Washington and Taipei expect that they will be able to control the narrative and escape some responsibility for creating the crisis we now face.

Paul Heer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).

Image: Reuters.

The National Interest · by Paul Heer · August 2, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

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If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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