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Quotes of the Day:
"It seems to be a law of nature, inflexible and inexorable, that those who will not risk cannot win."
– John Paul Jones
"The pessimist complains about the wind; the optimist expects it to change; the realist adjusts the sails."
– William Arthur Ward
"It's not what you look at that matters, it's what you see."
– Henry David Thoreau
Greetings from Korea.
1. USFK's future on the line at upcoming Trump-Lee summit
2. North Korea sent me abroad to be a secret IT worker. My wages funded the regime
3. Commentary: South Korea’s new president tries to shake up the Korean Peninsula
4. Stolen Sovereignty: How US And Soviet Agendas Divided Postcolonial Korea
5. FM Cho says Lee-Trump summit unlikely to be delayed to next month
6. S. Korea, U.S. yet to iron out non-tariff barrier issues despite tariff deal
7. Tariff deal offers framework, but sticking points remain ahead of Korea-US summit
8. N. Korea urges loyalty to leader Kim ahead of 80th anniv. of Korean liberation
9. Lee calls for measures to curb fake news on YouTube
10. What made 'MASGA' breakthrough in S. Korea–US tariff talks
11. Looming Korea-US summit
12. Major S. Korean shipbuilders launch joint task force for massive U.S. investment project
13. [Editorial] Resetting the alliance
14. The Rise of the Most Powerful Woman in North Korea
1. USFK's future on the line at upcoming Trump-Lee summit
The major question I have is will they call for and establish a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance?
Next week (so far I have not seen the specific date), President Donald J. Trump will welcome President Lee Jae-myung of the Republic of Korea to the White House for their first bilateral summit since President Trump’s return to office and Lee’s election in 2024. The atmosphere should be cautiously optimistic but charged with weighty expectations. The leaders face a volatile Northeast Asia: a nuclear-armed North Korea under Kim Jong Un’s increasingly belligerent regime, a revanchist China conducting joint provocations, and growing demands for U.S. force posture reform.
This will be no routine summit. It will be a pivotal moment to decide whether the alliance would fracture under the weight of transactional politics and populist pressure—or evolve into a truly global strategic partnership.
The two leaders could and should the alliance’s evolution from a bilateral security arrangement forged in the crucible of war to a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance committed to peace, prosperity, freedom, and the rule of law across the Asia-Indo-Pacific and around the world.
The Presidents should underscore that the ROK-U.S. Alliance is rooted in shared democratic values, mutual trust, and the longstanding friendship between the Korean and American peoples. They should pledge to deepen and modernize this alliance to meet the complex challenges of the 21st century.
President Lee and President Trump should agree that the ROK-U.S. alliance must remain a pillar of the free and open Indo-Pacific and an engine of global stability.
They should emphasize that the U.S.-ROK alliance is not static—it is transformative. It is a platform for solving global challenges, upholding the international rules-based order, and supporting the aspirations of free peoples everywhere.
But this comes on the heels of the new trade agreement that required some hard negotiations. but there is one major bright spot and that could be South Korean contributions to shipbuilding.
However, there are some major friction points:
- Strategic alignment in the face of North Korean aggression and Chinese revisionism.
- The challenge of so-called "strategic flexibility" – the refocus and deployment of US troops in Korea for other contingencies throughout the Asia-Indo Pacific (and around the world (e.g., recent missile defense systems to the Middle East)
- Alliance tension over perceived democratic backsliding in South Korea, including the arrest of former President Yoon Suk-yeol.
- Neglect of information warfare, after both the U.S. and ROK governments shuttered key channels broadcasting truth into north Korea. (both Presidents' actions have kneecapped information capabilities to support th eKorean people in the north)
- Demands for 5% GDP military spending by South Korea and increased cost sharing for US forces in Korea
- Possible mutual demands to reduce or cancel ROK/US combined exercises (in the misguided attempt) to reduce tension with north Korea and China
My ideal outcome: The two leaders conclude that the ROK-U.S. alliance has never been stronger or more necessary. They will pledge to pursue a future-focused, values-based, and action-oriented partnership that advances peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, throughout the Indo-Pacific, and around the world, e.g., a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance.
They will reaffirm that the ultimate goal of the alliance is a free, peaceful, and unified Korea (note that President Trump and former President Moon made this statement in the Joint VIsion Statement on June 30,2017) - a Korea that is secure and prosperous, non-nuclear and democratic, and fully integrated into the international community as a beacon of freedom.
I would love for them to say this: "America First, Allies Always. Korea Unified, Peace Realized."
Sunday
August 3, 2025
USFK's future on the line at upcoming Trump-Lee summit
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-08-03/national/diplomacy/USFKs-future-on-the-line-at-upcoming-TrumpLee-summit/2367526?detailWord=
Published: 03 Aug. 2025, 19:00
Updated: 03 Aug. 2025, 19:25
Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, left, meets with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the U.S. State Department on July 31 in Washington. [AFP/YONHAP]
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun returned to Seoul on Sunday after meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, senior White House officials and congressional leaders, likely moving forward key agenda items for a summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump later this month.
The two heads are expected to discuss major defense issues, including the future of United States Forces Korea (USFK) and Korea's participation in U.S. efforts to deter China, which would touch on a significant foundation of the Korea-U.S. alliance that stems back to 1953.
Also at the center of the summit agenda is narrowing the gap between Washington’s demand for “alliance modernization” and the Lee administration’s envisioned “end state” for the alliance.
Related Article
Shortly after the two countries reached a tariff deal on Thursday, Seoul opened discussions on alliance modernization, including the role of USFK. The topic featured prominently in Thursday's during talks between Korea and the United States.
A senior government official said, “There may be changes to the role and character of USFK.”
When U.S. officials talk about “modernizing the alliance,” they are referring to strategic flexibility — that is, shifting the role of USFK toward countering China. The Korean government has so far deliberately avoided using that term.
The timing stands out because a senior U.S. official reportedly conveyed the position to Seoul during summit preparations — an indication that Trump may raise the issue of alliance modernization directly with Lee.
Helicopters sit on the tarmac at Camp Humphreys, a U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on July 16. [NEWS1]
At the heart of alliance modernization lies the recalibration of USFK's role.
Observers say Washington may seek to either revise the current cap of 28,500 troops — set this year under the National Defense Authorization Act — or expand the forces’ mission beyond the Korean Peninsula, deviating from the unit-specific operational roles currently outlined under the Korea–U.S. joint command structure.
If reductions occur, the most likely scenario would be for Washington to withhold rotational deployments, such as the Stryker brigade. The 28,500-troop cap has remained unchanged since 2006 under the George W. Bush administration.
“The South Korea-U.S alliance began primarily as a deterrent against North Korea,” said Kim Jung-sup, senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute. “But recently, South Korea has taken the lead on North Korea policy while the alliance’s weight has shifted toward deterring China through USFK. Expanding the mission against China without limits would be problematic. South Korea must clearly define its red lines.”
An Apache helicopter stands by at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, on July 9. [YONHAP]
As U.S. troop realignment is tied to Washington’s China strategy, observers expect Trump to press Lee on whether Seoul will make the alliance a central pillar of that effort. Washington’s push could also extend to the so-called MASGA — Make America Shilpbuilding Great Again — initiative. Lee’s response will likely shape the alliance’s envisioned “end state.”
Article IV of the 1953 South Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty allows the United States to “dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory” of South Korea through a mutual agreement, giving Washington room to interpret the scope of its troop deployments more broadly.
Article III also states that both sides shall act to meet the “common danger” in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific, outlining a joint commitment to collective defense of the region. The Trump administration could use this framework to argue that the alliance should jointly respond to potential U.S.-China conflicts in the Pacific.
Washington’s push to broaden the alliance’s scope is not limited to the Korean Peninsula.
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on July 21 that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty “extends to armed attacks on our armed forces, aircraft or public vessels, including our Coast Guard, anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea.”
U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, right, stands with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. during an honor cordon ceremony at the Pentagon on July 21 in Washington. [AP/YONHAP]
Washington rejected Seoul’s proposed “package deal” that linked trade and defense during the recent tariff talks and now appears poised to present additional demands during the summit. These may include increased defense cost-sharing or a revival of debates from Trump’s first term over joint military exercise expenses.
Trump has previously shown a tendency to view South Korea as a target for increased defense cost-sharing. With the Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military exercise scheduled for August, observers say he may link the issue of security expenses to the summit agenda.
North Korea, meanwhile, criticized the upcoming joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and also denounced trilateral drills involving Japan.
“To secure peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, the reckless military activities of the United States, Japan and South Korea must stop,” the state-run Rodong Sinmun wrote on Saturday, warning that “even a minor incident could easily escalate into a full-scale war.”
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY PARK HYUN-JU, LEE YU-JUNG [paik.jihwan@joongang.co.kr]
2. North Korea sent me abroad to be a secret IT worker. My wages funded the regime
The most evil mafia-like crime family cult we know as the Kim family regime.
North Korea sent me abroad to be a secret IT worker. My wages funded the regime
BBC
2 hours ago
Beth Godwin and Julie Yoonnyung Lee
BBC Trending & BBC News
Getty Images
Jin-su says over the years he used hundreds of fake IDs to apply for remote IT work with Western companies. It was part of a vast undercover scheme to raise funds for North Korea.
Juggling multiple jobs across the US and Europe would make him at least $5,000 (£3,750) a month, he told the BBC in a rare interview. Some colleagues, he said, would earn much more.
Before he defected, Jin-su - whose name has been changed to protect his identity - was one of thousands believed to have been sent abroad to China and Russia, or countries in Africa and elsewhere, to take part in the shadowy operation run by secretive North Korea.
North Korean IT workers are closely monitored and few have spoken to the media, but Jin-su has provided extensive testimony to the BBC, giving a revealing insight into what daily life is like for those working the scam, and how they operate. His first-hand account confirms much of what has been estimated in UN and cyber security reports.
He said 85% of what he earned was sent back to fund the regime. Cash-strapped North Korea has been under international sanctions for years.
"We know it's like robbery, but we just accept it as our fate," Jin-su said, "it's still much better than when we were in North Korea."
Secret IT workers generate $250m-$600m annually for North Korea, according to a UN Security Council report published in March 2024. The scheme boomed in the pandemic, when remote working became commonplace, and has been on the rise ever since, authorities and cyber defenders warn.
Most workers are after a steady paycheck to send back to the regime, but in some cases, they have stolen data or hacked their employers and demanded ransom.
Last year, a US court indicted 14 North Koreans who allegedly earned $88m by working in disguise and extorting US firms over a six-year period.
Four more North Koreans who allegedly used fraudulent identities to secure remote IT work for a cryptocurrency firm in the US were indicted last month.
Getting the jobs
Jin-su was an IT worker for the regime in China for several years before defecting. He and his colleagues would mostly work in teams of 10, he told the BBC.
Access to the internet is limited in North Korea, but abroad, these IT workers can operate more easily. They need to disguise their nationality not just because they can get paid more by impersonating Westerners, but due to the extensive international sanctions North Korea is under, primarily in response to its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes.
This scheme is separate from North Korea's hacking operations which also raise money for the regime. Earlier this year the Lazarus Group - an infamous hacking group understood to be working for North Korea, though they've never admitted to it - is thought to have stolen $1.5bn (£1.1bn) from cryptocurrency firm Bybit.
The BBC spoke to Jin-su on a video call from London. For his safety we are protecting his identity.
Jin-su spent most of his time trying to secure fraudulent identities which he could use to apply for jobs. He would first pose as Chinese, and contact people in Hungary, Turkey and other countries to ask them to use their identity in exchange for a percentage of his earnings, he told the BBC.
"If you put an 'Asian face' on that profile, you'll never get a job."
He would then use those borrowed identities to approach people in Western Europe for their identities, which he'd use to apply for jobs in the US and Europe. Jin-su often found success targeting UK citizens.
"With a little bit of chat, people in the UK passed on their identities so easily," he said.
IT workers who speak better English sometimes handle the applications process. But jobs on freelancer sites also don't necessarily require face-to-face interviews, and often day-to-day interactions take place on platforms like Slack, making it easier to pretend to be someone you are not.
Jin-su told the BBC he mostly targeted the US market, "because the salaries are higher in American companies". He claimed so many IT workers were finding jobs, often companies would unwittingly hire more than one North Korean. "It happens a lot," he said.
It's understood that IT workers collect their earnings through networks of facilitators based in the West and China. Last week a US woman was sentenced to more than eight years in prison for crimes connected to assisting North Korean IT workers find jobs and sending them money.
The BBC cannot independently verify the specifics of Jin-su's testimony, but through PSCORE, an organisation which advocates for North Korean human rights, we've read testimony from another IT worker who defected that supports Jin-su's claims.
The BBC also spoke to a different defector, Hyun-Seung Lee, who met North Koreans working in IT while he was travelling as a businessman for the regime in China. He confirmed they'd had similar experiences.
A growing problem
The BBC spoke to multiple hiring managers in the cyber security and software development sector who say they've spotted dozens of candidates they suspect are North Korean IT workers during their hiring processes.
Rob Henley, co-founder of Ally Security in the US, was recently hiring for a series of remote vacancies at his firm, and believes he interviewed up to 30 North Korean IT workers in the process. "Initially it was like a game to some extent, like trying to figure out who was real and who was fake, but it got pretty annoying pretty quickly," he said.
Eventually, he resorted to asking candidates on video calls to show him it was daytime where they were.
"We were only hiring candidates from the US for these positions. It should have been at least light outside. But I never saw daylight."
Back in March, Dawid Moczadło, co-founder of Vidoc Security Lab based in Poland, shared a video of a remote job interview he conducted where the candidate appeared to be using artificial intelligence software to disguise their face. He said that after speaking to experts, he believed the candidate could be a North Korean IT worker.
Get Real Security - a digital forensics company - told us it's highly likely the candidate (left) is using some kind of faceswapping or AI filter
We contacted the North Korean embassy in London to put the allegations in this story to them. They did not respond.
A rare escape route
North Korea has been sending its workers abroad for decades to earn the state foreign currency. Up to 100,000 are employed abroad as factory or restaurant workers, mostly in China and Russia.
After several years of living in China, Jin-su said the "sense of confinement" over his oppressive working conditions built up.
"We weren't allowed to go out and had to stay indoors all the time" he said. "You can't exercise, you can't do what you want."
However, North Korean IT workers have more freedom to access Western media when they're abroad, Jin-su said. "You see the real world. When we are abroad, we realise that something is wrong inside North Korea."
But despite this, Jin-su claimed few North Korean IT workers thought about escaping like he did.
"They just take the money and go back home, very few people would think about defection."
Although they only keep a small proportion of what they earn, it's worth a lot in North Korea. Defecting is also hugely risky and difficult. Surveillance in China means most are caught. Those few who do succeed in defecting may never see their families again, and their relatives could face punishment for them leaving.
Jin-su is still working in IT now he's defected. He says the skills he honed working for the regime have helped him settle into his new life.
Because he isn't working multiple jobs with fake IDs, he earns less than when he worked for the North Korean regime. But because he can keep more of his earnings, overall, he has more money in his own pocket.
"I had got used to making money by doing illegal things. But now I work hard and earn the money I deserve."
3. Commentary: South Korea’s new president tries to shake up the Korean Peninsula
Commentary: South Korea’s new president tries to shake up the Korean Peninsula
https://www.aol.com/commentary-south-korea-president-tries-125600826.html
Daniel DePetris, Chicago Tribune
Wed, July 30, 2025 at 8:56 AM EDT
Jeon Heon-Kyun/Getty Images AsiaPac/TNS
As the world rightly remains focused on the bloody battlefields of Ukraine and the humanitarian abomination that is Gaza, South Korea’s new president is trying to shake up the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, one of the most militarized regions on the planet. Whether he succeeds will depend on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s willingness to cooperate and the Trump administration’s support of the endeavor.
Lee Jae Myung, a former factory worker and opposition politician elected in June, came into office promising big things. His campaign, which came at a time when recently impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol was facing charges of instigating a coup, focused on getting South Korea back in order.
The country, one of Asia’s leading democracies, is still recuperating from months of political turmoil and constitutional crisis after a short-lived usurpation of power by Yoon fizzled courtesy of South Korean troops who held their fire and civilians who came out to protest.
Lee ran a campaign centered primarily on competence with a simple but compelling message: He’ll fix what his predecessor broke. This included changes to South Korea’s foreign policy as well, which Lee argued was far too hawkish and ideological under Yoon.
He wasn’t wrong; Yoon’s presidency, for instance, was a disaster for inter-Korean relations. The disgraced president’s North Korea policy leaned on the stick to the total exclusion of the carrot, with communication channels between South and North Korean officials falling apart and the one big security agreement the two adversaries signed in 2018 dying on the table. North Korea’s Kim shares the blame too, but there’s no question that Yoon’s hard-line policies pushed Pyongyang into a corner.
Bringing stability back to the Korean Peninsula is a tall order for any South Korean president sitting in the Blue House. Yet for Lee, it’s a necessity if the goal is to prevent a further degradation of the situation.
It didn’t take long for Lee to start putting out feelers to the Kim regime. In contrast to Yoon, who was a fan of preconditions and wouldn’t dream of handing the North Koreans anything that could be seen as a concession, the new administration in Seoul is doing what it can unilaterally to improve the odds of detente.
On June 12, for example, Lee ordered a stoppage to the propaganda broadcasts that South Korea beams into the North from loudspeakers close to the Demilitarized Zone. The anti-Kim leaflets that defectors and activists often send into the North, which drives the Kim regime crazy, are now viewed by the authorities in Seoul as akin to a hostile act whose rewards aren’t worth the trouble.
The radio broadcasts that provide the North Korean population with access to legitimate news outside the Kim regime’s control have declined by roughly 80%, a decision purportedly executed by South Korea’s spy agency. The South Koreans are talking about resuming individual tours to the North as well, which haven’t occurred since 2008. And the man in charge of Seoul’s inter-Korean file is scheduled to make a stop at the Panmunjom peace village in the inter-Korean border region.
Lee’s signal to North Korea is easy to grasp: The two nations need a relationship that’s on a more solid footing, and he is doing what he can to move it in that direction.
Of course, there’s only so much the South Korean president can do on his own. After all, it takes two to tango. If the North Koreans don’t reciprocate, then Lee’s initiative will likely cause him a world of hurt politically as conservative politicians lambaste his administration for being weak on a key foreign policy issue.
Unfortunately, at this stage, the Kim regime isn’t buying what Lee is selling. Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s powerful sister who often serves as Pyongyang’s spokesperson on critical matters, all but laughed at what the South Koreans are doing. Despite Seoul’s “sincere efforts,” she said, Lee is in reality no different than the other people who came before him.
“We clarify once again the official stand that no matter what policy is adopted and whatever proposal is made in Seoul, we have no interest in it and there is neither a reason to meet nor an issue to be discussed,” Kim Yo Jong remarked.
What to make of North Korea’s refusal to play ball? Some of this can be chalked up to the typical bluster we often hear from North Korean officials, where threats to envelop the South Korean capital in a sea of fire are never far away. Another explanation is that Kim Jong Un doesn’t need to do much of anything right now to elicit concessions from the South Koreans — so why give up something when you can get it for free?
But I suspect the bigger factor driving Pyongyang’s intransigence is strategic. North Korea is far less interested in reconciling with Seoul, let alone Washington, this year than it was during Trump’s first term. The global landscape between then and now is light years apart. Back then, the Kim regime was dealing with a stringent United Nations Security Council sanctions regime that limited the North’s ability to import and export key goods. Now, while the sanctions regime is still in effect, enforcement is a joke thanks to Russian and Chinese violations.
Back then, Pyongyang was relatively isolated; today, it’s enjoying a strategic relationship with Moscow that has paid off handsomely for the Kim family.
The hard thing about international relations is all the puzzle pieces have to fit for dramatic change to happen. On the Korean Peninsula, however, the puzzle pieces are still all over the table.
_____
Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.
4. Stolen Sovereignty: How US And Soviet Agendas Divided Postcolonial Korea
Colonels Charles Bonesteel and Dean Rusk chose the 38th parallel as a dividing line to present the Soviet domination of all of the Korean peninsula. Since there were no US forces in the region they had to use this tactic to prevent complete communist domination. Had they not done that we would be talking about Korea very differently today. Yes, it caused Korea to be divided. Yes it led to the decision by Kim with the support of Mao and Stalin to launch the Korean war. Yes, it has led to a hostile and nuclear armed north Korea that is the worst human rights abuser since WWII and that continues to seek the domination of the entire peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. But without this action there would have been no miracle on the Han and the republic of Korea would not have emerged as a Global Pivotal State that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, that is a partner in the arsenal of democracies that seeks a free and open Aisa-Indo_pacific and that support st eh rules based international order. So you can decide if their course of action was the right one.
Stolen Sovereignty: How US And Soviet Agendas Divided Postcolonial Korea – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · August 1, 2025
During the years from 1945 to 1948, Korea experienced a critical and disastrous period after gaining independence from Japanese colonial control, since the nation’s pursuit for unity and self-governance was crushed by the emerging Cold War powers. These grassroots movements towards establishing an independent unified government and restoring Korea faced complete failure despite the citizen’s widespread spontaneous support.
Foreign occupation by the United States and the Soviet Union became the main barrier to Korean unification, together with the growing ideological tensions that these powers intensified. The creation of a unified government proved impossible because the United States and the Soviet Union pursued their respective strategic and ideological interests at the expense of Korean self-determination. The U.S. Military Government in the South deliberately worked to destroy Korean self-governance attempts, which unintentionally led to an enduring split of the peninsula. The division of Korea established in 1945 persists as the main cause of the current Korean crisis, which includes ongoing geopolitical tensions and military standoffs alongside failed peace attempts in 2025.
The August 1945 Japanese surrender exposed a power vacuum , which enabled popular sovereignty to spread throughout the Korean peninsula. People’s committees formed organically throughout the nation as spontaneous grassroots movements to seize control of power. The Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) under Lyuh Woon-hyung demonstrated this shared Korean aspiration for independence. After Japan surrendered, the CPKI quickly established local committees, which proved both a strong national unity and impressive organisational capability. The broad support for its ideology demonstrated that numerous Koreans wanted an independent administration which would unite politicians from different political backgrounds.
On September 6, 1945, the People’s Republic of Korea (PRK) declared its existence, marking the peak of grassroots governance. The provisional government of the PRK established a unified authority which aimed to execute broad reconstruction plans and nationalise industries as well as carry out land reform. The movement demonstrated genuine efforts to unite political groups and reclaim national leadership because Koreans wanted to escape foreign domination. Decades of Japanese oppression had hardened the Koreans to reject any attempt at foreign dominance. The fast expansion of local committees alongside the establishment of the PRK showed how widespread Korean nationalism had become. They dreamed of an independent Korea that Koreans would lead to create an unbiased nation free from external interference.
The promising development of Korean self-government ended immediately when foreign forces entered the scene. The United States Military Government in Korea (USMGIK) under Lieutenant General John R. Hodge maintained a strict position which rejected the PRK’s legal validity. The choice proved to be a pivotal historical moment. The USMGIK chose to establish direct military rule over supporting existing Korean administrative structures alongside popular movements, which had shown significant organisation and popular support. The USMGIK’s refusal to validate the extensive organisational work and broad support for the CPKI and PRK among Koreans led to a basic breakdown of Korean-led unity initiatives. Many Koreans became dissatisfied with the American approach, which prevented communist influence , yet claimed Koreans lacked the capability for self-governance.
Because of this, many Koreans began to see the PRK as a more authentic representation of national desires against the American occupation. The Americans presented the grassroots movements as inexperienced or communist-influenced in a way that directly opposed the Koreans’ fundamental wish for self-governance. This created a profound sense of distrust and resentment among the populace, who saw their earnest efforts to build a new nation being dismissed and undermined by an outside power.
Many Koreans saw the USMGIK’s decision to dismantle these committees and its restoration of colonial Japanese officials to certain positions as evidence of American foreign control that ignored Korean aspirations for independence. The unilateral American intervention stopped local governance initiatives while creating ideological conflicts because PRK supporters started resisting the American occupation. The U.S. move to dismantle these local institutions created an opportunity for North and South Korea to establish independent political systems instead of building a unified national system.
The restoration of Japanese officials who served under colonial rule deeply frustrated Koreans because it seemed to reject the liberation victory they had achieved. The decision to keep the administrative structure appeared deliberate because it maintained the system Americans hated instead of allowing native government institutions to form. The American intervention in Korea halted natural Korean governance development while it deepened internal divisions between Korean ideological groups. The polarisation between different groups established during this period would eventually transform into open conflict beyond standard political disputes.
The United States prevented existing Korean governance systems from functioning in the South; at the same time, the Soviet Union implemented a different yet equally powerful approach in the Northern regions. The Soviet Union provided direct support to Koreans who fought against Japanese rule while working together with Soviet military forces. The communist influence led to swift local governance system development, which later became one unified central government. The Soviet Union secretly selected Kim Il-sung as Northern Administration because they saw him as a reliable communist who would build a political system that met their geopolitical needs. The Soviets showed exceptional diplomatic abilities by integrating local political elements which matched their doctrine to establish a Korean-led administrative structure. Through military support and economic backing, the Soviet Union helped the Korean People’s Army develop its central control of economic systems. The Soviet method involved empowering a specific faction which served their geopolitical interests instead of enforcing direct domination.
The Soviets established a political structure in Korea through their support of anti-Japanese resisters who shared communist beliefs while creating the appearance of spontaneous development. Many North Koreans accepted Soviet intervention because it appeared to have their consent, yet the American approach in South Korea seemed oppressive. Through their deep involvement in North Korean administration selection and military and economic support, the Soviet Union created a political system which perfectly matched their strategic goals and made North Korea into a Soviet satellite state.
The United States and the Soviet Union used distinct methods to achieve the same outcome of establishing separate political entities that served their interests and split the Korean peninsula. Both occupying powers employed different strategies that maintained Korean independence as a secondary goal while advancing their Cold War interests. The two superpowers followed different methods yet produced the same outcome: Korea became divided into two parts , which served as pawns in the global conflict. The U.S. demand for a non-communist South Korean government alongside Soviet support for communist North Korea eliminated the possibility of creating a unified sovereign Korean state. Ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union forced them to intervene against Korean aspirations for unity, thus establishing two separate political systems which opposed each other.
The newly independent Korean nation faced various complex problems throughout this difficult era. The positive expectations for Korean independence gave way to an unwanted foreign-made partition, which ignored the longstanding historical and cultural ties between Koreans. This period failed because the occupying powers did not work together to create an independent Korean government. The U.S. and the USSR pursued their worldwide interests by turning Korea into a battlefront instead of working toward Korean self-determination. Mutual suspicion and conflicting ideologies gave birth to the division because they prevented both countries from cooperating with each other.
The Cold War between capitalism and communism converted Korea into a key battleground of international powers after the war began. The escalating rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union led them to view Korea solely through the perspective of their intensifying competition. The strategic needs of these powers always took precedence over Korean self-determination during this period.
The occupying powers displayed inadequate knowledge about Korean political dynamics while holding biased views, which made their decisions worsen divisions instead of resolving them. They showed poor comprehension of Korean politics through their practice of grouping different nationalist beliefs under the simplistic categories of ”communist” or “anti-communist.” Their basic yet prejudiced comprehension resulted in policies which intensified existing societal cracks as well as generated fresh fractures instead of uniting the population. The U.S. South’s suppression of CPKI and the North’s exclusive support for Soviet-aligned ideology eliminated every chance for a unified Korean government to form. All Korean attempts at self-organisation and national unity faced either suppression by the occupying powers or their attempts at manipulation.
To conclude, the external forces that developed during this period caused both the Korean War and the enduring separation between North and South Korea. The historical episode demonstrates how outside forces can stop a nation from gaining independence and unity by creating enduring conflicts. The 38th parallel started as a temporary border during military surrender operations, but developed into a permanent divide which separated families and cultures and split the entire nation because of superpower rivalry.
The imposed separation between North and South Korea resulted in massive suffering during the Korean War and continues to make the peninsula a source of international conflict while keeping alive the legacy of national division caused by foreign intervention and ideological conflicts. After Japan’s defeat, Korea’s desire for authentic independence and national unity faced destruction at the hands of Cold War politics, which continue to affect the country. The period’s aftermath continues to affect modern East Asia while maintaining regional military tensions and preventing lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Jongsoo James Lee, The Partition of Korea After World War II: A Global History (2006)
- Bonnie B. C. Oh (ed.), Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948 (2002) – deep focus on U.S. occupation and local governance suppression
- Cuming, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Volumes 1 & 2 (Princeton University Press, 1981 & 1990)
eurasiareview.com · by Simon Hutagalung · August 1, 2025
5. FM Cho says Lee-Trump summit unlikely to be delayed to next month
It would be good to have the summit prior to the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise this month.
FM Cho says Lee-Trump summit unlikely to be delayed to next month | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 3, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Sunday last-minute coordination to set a date for a summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump is under way, noting the envisioned meeting will not be delayed to next month.
Last week, Trump announced that Lee will visit the White House in two weeks, as he announced Washington has agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs on South Korea to 15 percent from the proposed 25 percent in return for massive investments and market opening.
Cho made the remark as he arrived in Seoul after back-to-back visits to the United States and Japan for his first talks with his counterparts since the launch of the Lee administration in June.
Cho said his U.S. visit, which included meetings with senior officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, served as an occasion to reaffirm Washington's commitment to extended deterrence.
"(We) reaffirmed the steadfast South Korea-U.S. combined response posture, and extended deterrence and agreed to continue to cooperate going forward," Cho said.
When asked about the Trump administration's push to "modernize" the alliance, Cho said the move involves taking various necessary measures, such as strengthening defense capabilities in the face of a stern international security environment, while brushing off concerns such push will affect Seoul's ties with China.
Cho said in-depth talks over a possible role change of U.S. troops in South Korea did not take place, saying the two sides agreed to discuss additional matters in working-level talks going forward.
Addressing the possibility the U.S. may seek to reset security issues following the tariff deal, Cho said he believes the allies could reach mutually beneficial agreements in the defense sector.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun arrives at Incheon International Airport, west of Seoul, on Aug. 3, 2025, following his visit to Japan and the United States. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 3, 2025
6. S. Korea, U.S. yet to iron out non-tariff barrier issues despite tariff deal
It seems like a lot of announcements are made and agreements reached these days without all the details being hammered out first.
(News Focus) S. Korea, U.S. yet to iron out non-tariff barrier issues despite tariff deal | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 3, 2025
By Oh Seok-min
SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- Despite a recently clinched tariff deal, South Korea and the United States have not been able to fully resolve issues related to non-tariff barriers, particularly in the agricultural and digital sectors, as the deal did not specify sensitive issues, according to an industry source Sunday.
Last Thursday, Seoul and Washington announced a long-awaited agreement under which the U.S. will impose a 15 percent tariff on South Korean imports, against the initially threatened 25 percent, in exchange for South Korea's investment of $350 billion in the United States.
But non-tariff barriers, including those involving the digital sector and quarantines on agricultural products, as well as foreign exchange and security matters, were excluded from the deal.
A source close to the matter said the deal may "not solve the issues related to non-tariff barriers raised by the U.S."
The source said Seoul could be under further pressure from Washington with regard to issues of non-tariff barriers.
Although negotiating a 15 percent tariff was a relative success for South Korea, comparable to the U.S. deals with Japan and the European Union, top South Korean officials cautioned that challenges would remain during further negotiations with Washington.
"The real challenge lies ahead, as people say that the devil is in the details," Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol told a press briefing in Washington after the deal.
"We will use the framework established in this agreement to develop concrete strategies and respond proactively in the upcoming detailed negotiations with the U.S.," he added.
Protestors hold up a sign reading, "No Trump! No King!" at a press conference jointly organized by an anti-Trump civic group and a group of farmers near the U.S. Embassy in Seoul on July 31, 2025. (Yonhap)
The two sides appeared to have focused on securing a broad agreement ahead of the Aug. 1 deadline set by U.S. President Donald Trump, while leaving contentious issues, such as non-tariff barriers in the agricultural and digital sectors, unresolved.
Accordingly, it remains highly likely that the U.S. will continue to push for the removal of non-tariff barriers, either during the upcoming summit between President Lee Jae Myung and Trump or other discussions on the implementation of the deal.
South Korean officials made it clear that further opening of the Korean rice market was not discussed in the recently concluded trade deal, though White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said the trade deal provides market access to American rice, echoing U.S. President Donald Trump's earlier claim.
They also noted that U.S. demands concerning proposed regulations on online platforms and restrictions on the export of high-precision map data were also excluded from the deal.
"Despite the deal, we cannot be complacent, as new tariff or non-tariff pressures might arise," Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo said.
"We need to take this agreement as an opportunity to improve our domestic systems that need adjusting so as to respond more proactively to potential tariff and non-tariff pressures from the U.S."
U.S. President Donald Trump (5th from L) poses for a group photo with a South Korean trade delegation, including Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol (6th from L), at the White House in Washington, D.C., on July 30, 2025, after South Korea and the United States reached a deal that called for lowering tariffs on South Korea to 15 percent from the initially proposed 25 percent, in this photo taken from the official X account of the White House. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 3, 2025
7. Tariff deal offers framework, but sticking points remain ahead of Korea-US summit
Details, details. Those pesky details.
Tariff deal offers framework, but sticking points remain ahead of Korea-US summit - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint
- South Korea
- Politics
U.S. President Donald Trump gestures as he walks to Marine One on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, Friday. Yonhap-EPA
By Kim Hyun-bin
- Published Aug 3, 2025 4:17 pm KST
The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint
By Kim Hyun-bin
Published Aug 3, 2025 4:17 pm KST
Summit may increase US pressure on nontariff barriers
As President Lee Jae Myung prepares to meet U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington later this month, unresolved economic issues remain a significant part of the agenda, highlighting the complexity of the Korea-U.S. trade relationship in the wake of the recently announced tariff agreement.
Seoul and Washington on Wednesday announced a sweeping tariff agreement centered on a $450 billion investment and purchasing package, following months of protracted negotiations. Under the deal, Korea pledged $350 billion in investments and $100 billion in purchases of U.S. goods in exchange for a reduction in American tariffs on Korean products — including a cut on newly imposed duties from 25 percent to 15 percent and a similar rollback on automotive tariffs.
Despite the agreement, officials cautioned that the deal outlines a broad framework rather than a finalized settlement.
Key issues — particularly nontariff barriers affecting agricultural goods, digital services and other sectors — remain vague and unresolved. Experts warn that the Trump administration is likely to push Korea for further concessions on these fronts, including contentious areas such as online platform regulations and export controls on sensitive technologies.
Government officials have emphasized that sensitive agricultural sectors, including rice and beef, remain off-limits and were excluded from the agreement. Deputy Prime Minister Koo Yun-cheol dismissed U.S. calls to open Korea’s rice market as politically charged rhetoric aimed at American voters. Korean negotiators warned that revisiting these sectors could trigger domestic backlash and erode bipartisan support for the deal at home.
Still, the U.S. administration has publicly claimed that Korea agreed to historic openings on automotive and agricultural imports — a characterization Korean officials dispute, highlighting a significant communication gap that could complicate upcoming negotiations.
Sejong University professor Kim Dae-jong, a prominent expert on U.S. trade relations, noted that the agreement effectively undermines the existing Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The pact took effect in 2012 and has since served as a cornerstone of bilateral economic relations.
“Unlike Japan, which had no FTA with the U.S., Korea already enjoyed duty-free access. The imposition of a 15 percent tariff on Korean exports amounts to dismantling the core benefits of the FTA,” Kim said. “It’s regrettable that Korea is now subject to tariffs where previously there were none.”
He also warned that the summit could bring additional pressure from the U.S. on nontariff barriers.
“While the Korean government says it has protected markets like rice and beef, the U.S. claims those issues are settled. We’re likely to see clearer outlines of the deal and new demands that emerge during the summit,” Kim said. “Given that Japan opened up 75 percent of its rice market, there is a real possibility Korea may be pushed to expand market access for rice and beef.”
Amid mounting pressure from the Trump administration, Japan agreed to open its highly protected rice market to more American imports. The move came as part of a new trade deal that also included reductions in tariffs on Japanese cars and other goods.
The upcoming Lee-Trump summit is expected to revisit these unresolved economic issues, alongside broader discussions on alliance modernization and defense cost-sharing. Trump has publicly referenced “a large sum of money” related to Korean investments in the U.S., but details remain unclear, fueling speculation over investment commitments and tariff negotiations.
The summit will also address security cooperation, including discussions of Korea increasing defense cost contributions and the potential repositioning of U.S. forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula as part of a new alliance framework.
Kim Hyun-bin
Kim Hyun-bin began his journalism career at Arirang TV from 2012 to 2017, specializing in defense, foreign affairs and the economy. In 2018, he joined The Korea Times, covering society and business, and is currently responsible for embassy affairs.
8. N. Korea urges loyalty to leader Kim ahead of 80th anniv. of Korean liberation
Manufactured loyalty is there in north Korea. But such manufacturing does not contribute to the GDP.
N. Korea urges loyalty to leader Kim ahead of 80th anniv. of Korean liberation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 3, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Sunday invoked state founder Kim Il-sung as a "historic hero" of Korea's liberation and urged loyalty to his grandson, current leader Kim Jong-un, ahead of the 80th anniversary of the Korean Peninsula's liberation from the 1910-45 Japanese colonial rule.
The North's state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper invoked the state founder's role in the liberation struggle, praising him as "a legendary hero in fighting Japanese (colonial) rule" and a "historic patriot."
The article subsequently shifted its focus to the current leader, emphasizing that Kim Jong-un inherited the spirit of independence fighters, including Kim Il-sung, and claiming the country will remain invincible under his leadership.
The newspaper also recalled the current leader's horseback march to snow-covered Mount Paektu in December 2019, comparing it to the state founder's independence struggle, which is said to have been based on the mountain.
In a separate article, the newspaper also called for loyalty to Kim Jong-un, describing him as a "presence like the sky, whom the people should uphold with their whole heart and single-minded devotion."
The articles were published ahead of the 80th anniversary on Aug. 15 of the Korean Peninsula's liberation from 35 years of Japanese colonial rule. The subsequent 1950-53 Korean War left the peninsula divided into South and North Korea.
This file photo, published by the Korean Central News Agency on Dec. 4, 2019, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on a horse on Mount Paektu. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 3, 2025
9. Lee calls for measures to curb fake news on YouTube
And one of the most important sources of news for the Korean people in the South.
Lee calls for measures to curb fake news on YouTube | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 3, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung has instructed the government to draw up measures to fundamentally prevent the spread of fake news through online platforms, like YouTube, minutes from a Cabinet meeting held in June showed Sunday.
"There are too many instances where fake news is used to earn money," Lee was quoted as saying in the minutes from the June 19 meeting disclosed by the interior ministry. "Resorting to illegal actions to earn money should be fundamentally prevented."
Lee suggested imposing punitive measures, such as exemplary damages, on such YouTubers, urging the justice ministry to review relevant measures.
During the meeting, Lee asked then Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul about whether the Vietnamese people request an apology from South Korea, in an apparent reference to the massacre of civilians by South Korean troops during the Vietnam War.
He then said South Korea should do its best in its ties with Vietnam and ordered the government to review measures, such as accepting more foreign workers from the Southeast Asian country, as part of humanitarian efforts.
Lee also called on the land ministry to reform the public housing system to prevent property price hikes and retrieve returns from such housing projects to the public sector, according to the minutes.
In this file photo, President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a Cabinet meeting held at the presidential office in Seoul on June 19, 2025. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 3, 2025
10. What made 'MASGA' breakthrough in S. Korea–US tariff talks
The question for the summit is will President Lee get President Trump to say MASGA? This has the potential to be one of the greatest gifts to President Trump's foreign and economic policy and make one of the most significant contributions to the US defense industrial base and US national security. Will Korea's shipbuilding capabilities help save our Navy? (perhaps this last an over the top and extreme comment)
What made 'MASGA' breakthrough in S. Korea–US tariff talks
US Navy Secretary, Budget Director visit Hanwha Ocean facility before tariff agreement
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2025/08/03/CWWWZGF3LFGNHJKVHRSGBVCKVM/
By Jung Han-kook,
Kim Mi-geon
Published 2025.08.03. 11:31
Updated 2025.08.03. 11:32
Kim Dong-kwan (fourth from left), vice chairman of Hanwha Group, guided White House Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought (second from left) and U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Phelan (third from left) through key facilities at Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia on July 30 local time./Hanwha Group
On July 30 at around 2 p.m. local time, United States Secretary of the Navy John Phelan and White House Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought visited Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania — the only shipyard in the United States owned by a South Korean company.
Phelan, who leads U.S. Navy policy, and Vought, a key figure controlling the federal budget and overseeing the implementation of presidential pledges across government agencies, toured the facility with Hanwha Vice Chairman Kim Dong-kwan. They met local employees training in welding and were briefed on investment plans by Hanwha and other South Korean companies in U.S. shipyards. Roughly two hours after their departure, at 6:16 p.m., news broke that South Korea and the United States had reached an agreement in their tariff negotiations.
The unannounced visit underscored Washington’s determination to revive the nation’s shipbuilding industry. In the last century, America’s naval power — built on the strength of its shipyards — played a decisive role in securing victory in World War II and laid the foundation for a U.S.-led global free trade order. As President Donald Trump often notes, it was a central pillar in building a “great America.”
Last year, however, U.S. shipyards delivered only seven vessels. By compensated gross tonnage (CGT), the country’s share of the global shipbuilding market was just 0.1% — a level so diminished that “meager” barely describes it.
While the United States has fallen into the ranks of minor shipbuilding nations, China has tightened its grip on the maritime routes that carry 90% of global trade. China’s share of the global shipbuilding market now exceeds 50%, and its naval fleet has surpassed that of the United States in size. Beijing also controls 129 ports worldwide and dominates global maritime logistics data.
Carlos Del Toro, who served as U.S. Navy secretary under the Biden administration, warned, “No nation has ever remained a great naval power without also being a strong shipbuilding and maritime power.” With that lesson in mind, Washington responded to a South Korean proposal during the tariff talks — the “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” (MASGA) project — by finalizing the agreement.
shipbuilding
MASGA
Hanwha Ocean
Hanwha Philly Shipyard
11. Looming Korea-US summit
Conclusion:
As Lee prepares for his first major diplomatic engagement with the United States, his administration must firmly communicate that while Korea remains committed to the alliance, it cannot do so at the cost of national sovereignty or regional stability. Any efforts to modernize the alliance must be guided by a shared understanding of evolving security needs, not unilateral impositions.
For the Korea-U.S. alliance to endure as a pillar of peace and stability in East Asia, the United States must discard its increasingly aggressive negotiation posture and embrace a model of diplomacy anchored in mutual respect and fairness. Only through such an approach can both nations navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century while preserving the strategic trust that has sustained their partnership for decades.
Looming Korea-US summit - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint
- Opinion
- Editorial
ED Looming Korea-US summit
President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump / AP-News1
- Published Aug 3, 2025 2:57 pm KST
The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint
Published Aug 3, 2025 2:57 pm KST
Alliance requires mutual respect, not unilateral demands
The upcoming summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump, set to take place in Washington this August, arrives at a critical juncture. While the two leaders are expected to reaffirm the strength of the Korea-U.S. alliance, the context surrounding the meeting signals anything but routine diplomacy. Following a narrowly brokered tariff agreement, Trump is now expected to shift his focus toward pressing security and defense issues — what some in Washington are calling “alliance modernization.” These include increases in Korea’s defense spending, an expanded role for U.S. forces on the peninsula and heightened expectations for Korean involvement in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
At the heart of these developments lies a deeper concern: the unilateral and transactional approach the Trump administration continues to apply, even toward its closest allies. The recent tariff negotiations, in which the United States aggressively leveraged economic pressure to extract trade concessions from Korea, are emblematic of this style. The fear now is that similar tactics will be employed in the national security realm, where the stakes are far higher. Alliances, particularly one as longstanding and vital as that between Seoul and Washington, should not be reduced to a series of demands and obligations. They must be grounded in mutual respect, shared responsibilities and strategic balance.
One particularly troubling development is the growing pressure from the U.S. for Korea to take on a more assertive role in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. According to several reports, Washington has already begun gauging Seoul’s willingness to support a U.S.-led response in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis. While regional stability and shared democratic values are legitimate concerns, such expectations fail to acknowledge the unique geopolitical vulnerabilities South Korea faces — particularly its delicate relationship with China and its own existential threat from North Korea. Forcing South Korea into a binary geopolitical choice would not only strain bilateral relations but could also further destabilize East Asia.
Additionally, there are concerns that the U.S. will urge Korea to raise its defense spending up to 5 percent of its gross domestic product — far exceeding both current levels and global norms — by, for instance, increasing the amount of direct purchase of U.S. military weapons. Alongside renewed pressure to increase Seoul’s share of stationing costs for U.S. troops, these financial demands threaten to recast the alliance as merely transactional rather than a security partnership. Korea has long contributed generously to joint defense efforts, both financially and operationally. Treating its contributions as insufficient disregards Seoul’s longstanding commitment and undermines alliance solidarity.
Trump’s foreign policy has often been guided by a “pay-to-play” doctrine that sees alliances as business arrangements rather than strategic partnerships. This mindset may deliver short-term domestic gains, but it poses long-term risks. Allies subjected to coercive diplomacy may begin to question the reliability and fairness of the relationship. For Korea, a nation that has consistently upheld its role as a responsible partner in regional and global security, the expectation should not be obedience but genuine collaboration.
As Lee prepares for his first major diplomatic engagement with the United States, his administration must firmly communicate that while Korea remains committed to the alliance, it cannot do so at the cost of national sovereignty or regional stability. Any efforts to modernize the alliance must be guided by a shared understanding of evolving security needs, not unilateral impositions.
For the Korea-U.S. alliance to endure as a pillar of peace and stability in East Asia, the United States must discard its increasingly aggressive negotiation posture and embrace a model of diplomacy anchored in mutual respect and fairness. Only through such an approach can both nations navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century while preserving the strategic trust that has sustained their partnership for decades.
12. Major S. Korean shipbuilders launch joint task force for massive U.S. investment project
Putting action and money behind the words.
Major S. Korean shipbuilders launch joint task force for massive U.S. investment project | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 3, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 3 (Yonhap) -- Major South Korean shipbuilders have launched a joint task force to support the government's cooperation with the United States under a recently agreed-upon large-scale investment project in the U.S. shipbuilding sector, officials said Sunday.
The top three shipbuilders -- HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Hanwha Ocean Co. and Samsung Heavy Industries Co. -- along with the Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Association, have formed the TF and held an inaugural meeting recently, according to company officials.
Their focus will be on supporting the "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again" (MASGA) initiative, under which the Seoul government has proposed investing $150 billion in the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
It was part of a broader $350 billion investment package in the U.S. in exchange for Washington's lowering of reciprocal tariffs on South Korean imports to 15 percent from the initial 25 percent.
"There will be various ways to implement the Korea-U.S. shipbuilding cooperation, and the TF aims to support and facilitate those efforts," an official said. "The industry is working together with the government for the MASGA project through this task force."
The envisioned investment represents the largest single-industry fund in the package and is structured primarily to support Korean shipbuilders' investments in the U.S. through public finance.
The MASGA project includes plans to build new shipyards in the U.S., train shipbuilding personnel and rebuild related supply chains, as well as build American ships and cooperate on maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) projects, according to the Seoul government. But details are still being finalized.
The entity plans to intensify discussions on the project starting in mid-August, following the industry's summer vacation period.
"The TF could serve as a channel for collecting the industry's demands and delivering them to the government," the official added.
A ship under construction is seen at Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard in the city of Geoje, South Gyeongsang Province, on July 31, 2025. (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 3, 2025
13. [Editorial] Resetting the alliance
We need to pledge to create a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance
[Editorial] Resetting the alliance
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · August 4, 2025
Lee, Trump prepare for summit that may redefine Korea-US alliance
President Lee Jae Myung’s summit with US President Donald Trump this month is expected to mark a turning point in the Korea-US alliance. It will be their first in-person meeting since Trump returned to the White House in January, and it follows Seoul’s hard-won tariff deal that secured trade terms on par with those for Japan.
But economic parity is only part of the story. As security threats multiply and US foreign policy grows increasingly transactional, the summit presents an opportunity for South Korea to reanchor the alliance in predictability before global volatility intensifies.
Lee, a progressive leader with no personal ties to Trump, is engaging a counterpart known for breaking diplomatic conventions and questioning traditional alliances. But Lee’s emphasis on pragmatism — not flattery or defiance — is appropriate. His administration’s goal is to reset the terms of engagement on clearer, firmer ground with a White House that demands more and guarantees less.
At the top of the agenda is defense cost-sharing. During his first term, Trump demanded a fivefold increase in South Korea’s contribution to the costs for hosting US troops on the peninsula. While a 2021 agreement put the issue on pause, concerns remain that Trump may revive the demand. Lee’s team is preparing to resist sharp hikes and reframe the discussion around mutual benefits, not transactional arithmetic.
South Korea’s strategic importance cannot be reduced to dollars and cents. Its position between China and US-led alliances, combined with advanced defense and technological capabilities, makes it a regional linchpin. Hosting key military assets and conducting joint exercises strengthens collective readiness and reinforces the US presence in Northeast Asia.
Nuclear deterrence is another critical issue. With North Korea expanding its arsenal and deepening ties with Russia, Lee is expected to push for renewed clarity on the US nuclear umbrella. A credible extended deterrence framework remains essential to South Korea’s security, especially as Pyongyang shows no sign of restraint.
Another priority is trilateral coordination with Japan. The Camp David process in August 2023, under the previous Joe Biden administration, strengthened Korea-US-Japan cooperation on missile tracking and early warning systems. Trump has yet to indicate whether he supports this framework or sees it merely as a holdover. Seoul will press for assurance that trilateral security cooperation is not undermined by a return to one-on-one bargaining.
The recent tariff agreement offers a useful model. After months of low-profile negotiations, South Korea secured exemptions from certain US tariffs — a parity Japan already enjoyed. This outcome is viewed in Seoul as proof that diplomacy remains possible under Trump, if grounded in shared interests and quiet persistence. The challenge now is to apply that approach to defense, where uncertainty can be more damaging.
Some critics argue that Trump’s approach to alliances remains too mercurial. The broader question is how to “modernize the alliance” — Washington’s term for pressing allies to shoulder more of the defense burden and align with its strategy to keep China at bay. Whether Trump will engage Seoul in a serious, forward-looking conversation or pursue headline-driven concessions remains unclear.
It is also uncertain whether the Trump administration, absorbed in domestic politics, fully appreciates the risks of strategic drift in East Asia, where tensions could escalate without warning.
For Lee, the summit can be seen as a credibility test. His domestic critics are watching for signs of miscalculation or overreach. But if he returns with a firmer security road map, renewed deterrence commitments and no unpleasant surprises, he will have shown that South Korea can chart its course even amid unpredictable leadership in Washington.
The talks are unlikely to smooth every wrinkle, yet they could mark a step toward a more grounded and resilient alliance — one shaped by the demands of a volatile era.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · August 4, 2025
14. The Rise of the Most Powerful Woman in North Korea
A view from an Indonesian journalist in the Sri Lankan press.
The most evil woman in the world.
The Rise of the Most Powerful Woman in North Korea
slguardian.org · August 3, 2025
When the most powerful woman in North Korea declared earlier this week, with surgical clarity, that her nation would not return to dialogue with South Korea and would now only engage the United States on the basis of recognition as a de facto nuclear power, the geopolitical reverberations were profound. On the surface, it was a defiant reaffirmation of Pyongyang’s traditional posture. But beneath the steel language lay a significant ideological repositioning — not only in military terms, but in the very architecture of power within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Kim Yo Jong, long educated in Switzerland alongside her brother, the current Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, is no mere figurehead or ceremonial consort to dynastic politics. Her emergence as the regime’s primary spokesperson, strategist, and steward of military-diplomatic doctrine marks the first time in decades — if not ever — that such influence has been wielded openly by a female figure in one of the world’s most patriarchal societies. It is not just her words that command attention, but the authority with which they shape the DPRK’s vision of itself and its place in a world increasingly carved by new alliances and unconventional warfare.
I was recently reminded of her presence by Teguh Santosa, an Indonesian journalist of deep insight who has maintained longstanding ties with Pyongyang. I met him some time ago in Beijing, but spoke to him again this week. He recalled an encounter that now reads as a historical prelude. “I first saw her in April 2012,” he said, “during the unveiling of their father Kim Jong Il’s statue in Pyongyang. She seemed to play a vital role in ensuring the ceremony ran smoothly. She moved freely, managing every detail — from organising the elite ranks on the platform of honour to orchestrating the precise arrangement of the military formations.”
Indeed, her strategic poise today reflects that early apprenticeship. Her command over messaging is unmistakable, whether she is warning Seoul of “irreversible rupture” or framing Washington’s overtures as “only America’s wish.” Crucially, these statements were issued unprovoked — not in reaction to sanctions or military drills, but amid conciliatory gestures from South Korea’s new administration. The timing suggests not just retaliation, but design: a pre-emptive framing of future diplomatic parameters on Pyongyang’s own terms.
What makes this pivot all the more remarkable is that it coincides with North Korea’s most accelerated military evolution in decades. Recent intelligence assessments, notably those compiled by Ukraine’s HUR agency, paint a startling picture: elite North Korean troops have fought alongside Russian forces in the Ukrainian theatre. Some 4,000 have reportedly been killed or wounded — a staggering cost — yet in return, these forces have acquired practical combat experience, technological integration, and strategic training in the dynamics of modern war. They have mastered drone deployment, improved missile guidance systems, and enhanced their ability to camouflage and manoeuvre under aerial surveillance.
Such capabilities had once been theoretical or aspirational for Pyongyang. Now, under the shadow of war and forged in alliance with Moscow, they are real and tested. Military analysts believe North Korea’s KN-23 ballistic missiles have reached a new level of accuracy, drawing comparisons to Russia’s Iskander series — a troubling development for US and South Korean defence planners.
Perhaps even more unnerving is the prospect of deeper collaboration. Russia has reportedly shared technological frameworks, including those related to nuclear submarines and decoy systems for evading missile interception. Pyongyang, once isolated by choice and necessity, now emerges as a silent partner in a global triad: Russia, Iran, and North Korea — with China always watching.
But history must never be forgotten amid these alignments. For beneath the surface of military calculus lies an untold story of betrayal and blood that still casts a shadow on Northeast Asian strategy. During the Korean War, while Chinese soldiers perished by the hundreds of thousands on Korean soil — many in bitter, frozen silence — it was Joseph Stalin who emerged victorious in strategic terms. The Soviet Union, having supplied the ideological oxygen and military blueprints for the North’s invasion of the South, deftly avoided direct entanglement.
One of the most tragic episodes of that era unfolded at what is now known as P’aro-ho Lake. Originally named Dapeng Lake for its resemblance to a roc spreading its wings, the reservoir became a site of staggering carnage in May 1951. The 6th Infantry Division of the South Korean Army, under Brigadier General Jang Do-young, decimated the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s 63rd Army. In what South Korean sources describe as a modern-day “Sasu Victory,” an estimated 20,000 Chinese soldiers were killed and over 2,600 captured. The bodies of the fallen were buried not with ceremony but by machinery — pushed into the lakebed to be consumed by water. The lake, some claim, turned red. When Syngman Rhee later visited the site, he renamed it “Porok” — a symbol of defeating the so-called barbarians.
This trauma, while rarely acknowledged in Chinese or North Korean discourse, has left a residual legacy in the strategic calculus of both states. The Chinese bled, and Stalin triumphed. It is a bitter history — one that may explain why Pyongyang today, under the stewardship of its most influential woman, turns not to Beijing, but to Moscow, with an almost transactional clarity. Russia gives what North Korea desires: weapons technology, battlefield experience, and diplomatic recognition — not lectures, not conditional aid.
The ideological core of the regime remains unchanged: sovereignty, security, and survival. Yet the way it navigates its external relationships has evolved dramatically. The United States, still operating on the outdated assumption that denuclearisation can be negotiated, may soon find itself playing catch-up in a theatre it no longer understands. Pyongyang does not seek dialogue; it seeks recognition. Not as a rogue state, but as a legitimate nuclear power with global alliances, economic adaptability, and battlefield credentials.
And guiding much of this recalibrated worldview is a woman — discreet yet indomitable, shaped by Western schooling yet fluent in the dialectics of Juche ideology and realist geopolitics. Her rise marks a new era in North Korean politics. Not a softening, but a sharpening. Not liberalisation, but strategic modernisation. She may not speak often, but when she does, the world would do well to listen.
This is not merely a dynastic reshuffle, nor a symbolic gesture towards gender progress. It is, quite possibly, the most radical internal development within the DPRK in half a century — one that fuses nuclear ambition, historical grievance, and feminine authority into a uniquely potent force. The implications are too significant to ignore.
The bottom line: history in this region moves slowly — but when it turns, it turns with thunder. The rise of the most powerful woman in Pyongyang, Kim Yo Jong, if sustained, is not merely potent — it is the signal of that turning.
slguardian.org · August 3, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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