Quotes of the Day:

“An arrogant person considers himself perfect. This is the chief harm of arrogance. It interferes with a person's main task in life – becoming a better person.” 

- Leo Tolstoy

“Do not speak ill of others, for it, tarnishes your own soul.”

- Democritus.

“There is no friend as loyal as a book.” 

- Ernest Hemingway.

Yesterday, on social media, I came across what apparently is the new definition of Irregular warfare. I have not seen an official statement from DOD or the Joint Staff on this yet. But here is what I found. A lot to unpack here.

Irregular warfare. A form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. Also called IW (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

1. From “irregular warfare” to Irregular Warfare – History of a Term

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1. From “irregular warfare” to Irregular Warfare – History of a Term

Some useful background on the evolution of irregular warfare. I provide a little more detailed look at the Special Forces doctrinal history at this link: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA299300. See Chapter Two for the literature review. My focus was on the history of SF doctrinal missions from the OSS to 1995 (when it was written) with the intent to examine the unconventional warfare mission that has been the Special Forces constant throughout its history and argue that the UW mission will remain the most relevant SF mission in the future. Today we can trace the same doctrinal missions to see the evolution of irregular warfare and justify the use of the term.

From “irregular warfare” to

Irregular Warfare

History of a Term

BY JARED M. TRACY, PHD

From Veritas, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2023

https://arsof-history.org/articles/v19n1_history_of_irregular_warfare_page_1.html?utm

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The term Irregular Warfare (IW) is pervasive in the modern Department of Defense (DoD) lexicon, but it has a lengthy history. In Cold War-era military publications, IW was not defined but its meaning was generally fixed. After 9/11, it gained popularity and formal definitions, but its meaning became more ambiguous, largely because of its connection to other concepts, especially in the special operations forces (SOF) arena.1 This was evident when the U.S. shifted from Counter-Violent Extremist Operations (C-VEO) to Great Power Competition (GPC) in recent years. This brief history of the term IW begins during the Korean War (1950-1953).

Army FM 31-20 (1951) linked irregular warfare with guerrilla warfare, namely Communist insurgencies.

In February 1951, the Army published Field Manual (FM) 31-20: Operations Against Guerrilla Forces. It relayed that the “term ‘guerilla warfare’ is used loosely to describe all kinds of irregular warfare.”2 Though undefined, IW was synonymous with guerrilla warfare. FM 31-21: Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare (October 1951) defined guerrillas as an “irregular force, organized on a military basis, supported chiefly by sympathetic elements of the population, and operating against established … authority.”3 IW was linked primarily to Communist-inspired insurgencies, with connotations of being a duplicitous form of warfare.

Captain Joseph Ulatoski (far left), commander Task Force KIRKLAND, a U.S.-led anti-Communist partisan unit headquartered off the Korean east coast, addresses a formation of recent airborne graduates on the island of Nan-do, 1952.

In the 1960s, terms such as Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counterinsurgency (COIN), and Special Warfare gained traction. Though seldom used by comparison, IW remained tied to Communist revolutionary doctrine. The U.S. Army Special Warfare Center’s “Readings in Counter-Guerrilla Operations” (1961) described IW as central to Mao Zedong’s philosophy.4 In 1961, the Army published FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces, in which “irregular forces” were synonymous with Communist adversaries who were to be operated against and destroyed, an idea also found in FM 31-21: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (1961).5 In 1962, scholar Raymond L. Garthoff argued that IW was “the essence of Marxist-Leninist theory [and] the base of Communist strategy.”6 Also in 1962, Hugh H. Gardner published Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1941-1945 (through the Office of the Chief of Military History). According to Gardner, Communist Greek partisans “employed irregular methods and their behavior cannot be judged by conventional standards.”7 While IW remained minimally or not defined, it was widely understood as the non-conventional approach used mainly by Communist guerrilla forces.

Army FM 31-15 (1961) reinforced the connection between enemy guerrilla forces and “irregular” forces.

Comparatively few sources claimed that the U.S. might use IW. A 1961 Office of the Secretary of Defense report advocated additional research into IW to “improve our allies’ ability to resist Communist aggression” and “provide the U.S. with increased understanding of and general capability in irregular warfare.”8 This idea was also in Joseph P. Kutger’s 1963 article, “Irregular Warfare in Transition.” Further, Kutger offered a definition of IW: “[it] comprises all those types of warfare alien to the conventional warfare … It is usually employed against an adversary as a means of minimizing his relative advantages, either in numerical strength or in the technology of his weaponry.”9 This article did not relegate IW to just enemy forces.

After Vietnam, IW’s meaning seemingly changed little, though it remained sporadically used and not defined. For example, FM 90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations (1986) made no mention of IW.10 However, things changed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq led to a spike in popularity for such terms as UW, COIN, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), stability operations (SO), nation-building, and full-spectrum operations. The term IW resurfaced and gained new prominence within the Army and DoD lexicon.

This image from U.S. Army Special Warfare (1962) depicted how farmers may become soldiers in order to wage or counter a guerrilla warfare campaign.

In 2005, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) issued a briefing called “Historic Analysis of Lessons Learned from Modern Irregular Warfare.” It explained that IW lacked a definition but was related to such terms as COIN, UW, FID, and terrorism. It also clarified that IW was something that the U.S. might do and not just counter.11 Months later, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict held a workshop to draft a definition of IW, compile a list of IW activities, and build the basis for a “consensus on what [IW] is and a roadmap to incorporate IW in DoD strategic thinking.” It linked IW with UW, COIN, FID, SO, Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Psychological Operations, terrorism/counter-terrorism (CT), Information Operations, intelligence/counterintelligence, Internal Defense and Development, and even transnational crime. IW’s proposed definition was: “a warfighting philosophy aimed at achieving strategic objectives by applying or countering an approach to war that seeks to erode an adversary’s power and will, primarily through the use of indirect, non-traditional means.”12 As the DoD worked toward a definition, IW’s historic link to enemy insurgencies was eroding.

In 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a working definition of IW: “A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or the legitimacy of … political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. [IW] favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of … capabilities to seek asymmetric advantages [to] erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” IW’s key elements were: (a) undermining or supporting an existing political authority; (b) mostly “indirect approaches”; and (c) eroding the power, influence, and will of adversaries. This definition paved the way for future refinements.

The same year, the USMC and USSOCOM collaborated on the latest “Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare,” which argued that IW aims to maintain or undermine “the legitimacy of a political authority [through] indirect approaches and nonconventional means to defeat an enemy by subversion, attrition, or exhaustion rather than direct military confrontation.” It employs “the full range of military and non-military capabilities to gain asymmetric advantages that erode an adversary’s power, influence and will until he is neutralized or defeated. IW is the preferred approach of insurgents, terrorists, and others who lack substantial conventional warfare capability as well as of nation-states who must mask their actions or whose national troops use IW in fighting irregular warriors.” This product argued that the key to U.S. victory “in the global long war in the years ahead is development of a … multi-agency capacity for irregular warfare,” one of the clearest endorsements of the need to embrace IW so far.13

On the heels of the 2008 DoD Directive 3000.07, the 2010 edition of JP 1-02 included an IW definition for the first time. Its inclusion of the qualifier “violent struggle” did not last long.

Within a decade after 9/11, IW had a formal definition. DoD Directive 3000.07 (2008) and Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2010) defined IW as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”14 This definition had three noteworthy aspects. First, it hearkened back to the earlier meaning by describing IW as a “violent struggle.” Second, it included state and non-state actors, meaning that virtually anyone could conduct IW. Finally, it broadened potential targets to “relevant population(s).” In other words, IW is a violent struggle between potentially anyone for legitimacy and influence over others. IW now had a definition, but its meaning was so broad as to be arguably useless.

The 2017 change to JP 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2013) upheld the definition in JP 1-02 and continued to contrast IW with traditional warfare. However, it introduced a slight contradiction when it stated that in IW, “a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the … capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force,” but also that “most U.S. operations since the [9/11] terrorist attacks have been irregular.”15 By this description, the U.S. was the “less powerful adversary seek[ing] to disrupt or negate the … capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force,” which was not true in Afghanistan or Iraq. This was indicative of the challenge of stabilizing IW’s meaning after 9/11.

In the IW annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, IW is explained as “a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy,” a marked departure from the term’s Cold War-era roots.

By the 2010s, the U.S. had entered a new era of strategic competition. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) signaled the pivot away from C-VEO to Great (or Global) Power Competition with other major powers, namely China and Russia. The NDS led to the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy in February 2019, followed by the more widely publicized Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy. These explained IW as “a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy” (dropping the qualifier “violent struggle”). According to the summary, “IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities” against an adversary. The list of IW-related activities had broadened further to include such activities as UW, FID, CT, COIN, CMO, stabilization, military information support operations (MISO), cyber operations, countering threat networks (CTN), and counter-threat finance (CTF).16 IW’s entanglement with other terms continued to complicate things (adding to the potential confusion with Information Warfare, also shortened to IW). IW had reached peak importance, but its meaning was broad, vague, and fluid; it could mean anything (mostly non-conventional) done by anyone to influence, delegitimize, or defeat anyone else.

A Ukrainian Special Forces (SF) soldier and a U.S. Army 10th SFG soldier move to an observation post during Exercise COMBINED RESOLVE 16 in Hohenfels, Germany, 8 December 2021. The exercise was designed to assess the readiness of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, while providing opportunities for SOF soldiers from the Ukraine, U.S., and Lithuania to hone irregular warfare skills.

In 2021, the J-7, Joint Staff, published its “Irregular Warfare Mission Analysis,” the “first comprehensive review of [IW] since 2007. The global strategic environment has significantly shifted … and the [DoD’s concept] of what [IW] is and how to employ it must shift also.” Contrary to older characterizations of IW, this report argued that IW “is as strategically important as traditional warfare.” It conceded that “IW is … complex, messy, and ambiguous,” and “does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition.” Though it did not define IW, it reiterated its ties with CT, UW, FID, COIN, and SO. Ironically, it called this association “confusing and counterproductive” before listing even more IW-related activities, such as UW, FID, CT, COIN, CTN, CTF, CMO, stability activities, MISO, and Civil Affairs, among others.17 This mission analysis did little to clarify IW’s meaning, but it was a major step toward reimaging IW in GPC and initiating what has been described as a DoD-wide “mindset shift” toward IW.

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Fittingly, the Army G-3/5/7 assigned the U.S. Army Special Operations Command as the IW proponent in February 2022. It was to develop “the necessary doctrine, training, leadership and education, personnel concepts and tenets for [UW], [CT], [COIN], and [FID].”18 Meanwhile, IW would retain flexible meaning across the DoD. For example, USSOCOM’s Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy (2022) frequently used but did not clarify such terms as “irregular threats,” IW capabilities, nor IW writ large.19

Members of the 320th Special Tactics Squadron, Royal Thai Army, share mountaineering techniques with their U.S. Army 1st Special Forces Group (SFG) counterparts in Thailand, 20 April 2022. A strong, forward-looking American-Thai defense alliance bolsters the U.S. national defense strategy of countering near-peer threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

In conclusion, over time, IW has become more popular and well-defined, but its meaning has become more fluid and ambiguous since 9/11. It went from describing Communist-inspired guerrilla insurgencies in the Cold War to a broad military-governmental approach against peer threats in GPC into the 2020s. It has expanded from a tactical focus to a strategic focus. It remains inseparable from such popular terms as UW, COIN, and FID, while its definition remains sufficiently vague to allow for great variances in interpretation. The question remains—will the popularity of the term IW force the DoD to further refine its meaning, or will it remain nebulous to allow greater flexibility in discussing and addressing the challenges of the modern international environment?

Epilogue

As this article was being finalized for publication in Veritas, the Army released the latest edition of FM 3-0: Operations (October 2022). This manual continued the post-9/11 trend of refining the definition of IW while leaving actual meaning up for interpretation. According to this manual, IW is the “overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.”20 The most concrete aspect of this description is that IW is something other than “military domination of an adversary.” Otherwise, it remains flexible enough to accommodate a variety of interpretations and applications.

ENDNOTES

1. This article lists only a representative sample of official documents since the early 1950s. There were dozens of others researched that made little or no mention of IW or “irregular” in general and which therefore have been omitted. The author acknowledges that the interpretations within this article, while based on relevant evidence, are tentative since not all official documents have researched. It is possible, though unlikely, that further investigation into additional DoD documents may yield significantly different results and change the overall conclusion of this paper. In addition, although the abbreviation IW is used throughout this article, it should be noted that until relatively recently, publications typically used the term “irregular warfare” in a more general sense (not capitalized) as opposed to its later formal codification as Irregular Warfare (capitalized).
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), FM 31-20: Operations Against Guerrilla Forces (Washington, DC: HQDA, February 1951), iii.
3. HQDA, FM 31-21: Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, DC: HQDA, October 1951), 2.
4. USASWCS, “Readings in Counter-Guerrilla Operations” (17 January 1961), copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
5. HQDA, FM 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces (Washington, DC: HQDA, May 1961), 3; HQDA, FM 31-21: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (Washington, DC: HQDA, 29 September 1961), 9.
6. School of Resident Studies, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology” (October 1962), 151-152, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
7. Hugh H. Gardner, Office of the Chief of Military History, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1941-1945 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 1962), 145.
8. Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report of the RDT&E Limited War Task Group (15 August 1961), 31-32, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC, emphasis added.
9. Air Training Command, U.S. Air Force, “Anthology of Related Topics on Counterinsurgency, Volume I: Irregular Warfare in Transition” (1 March 1963), 1, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
10. HQDA, FM 90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations (Washington, DC: HQDA, August 1986), copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
11. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Historic Analysis of Lessons Learned from Modern Irregular Warfare” (10 June 2005), copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
12. USSOCOM and ASD (SO/LIC), “Irregular Warfare Workshop Outbrief” (September 2005), copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
13. U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command and USSOCOM Center for Knowledge and Futures, “Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare” (2 August 2006), 7, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
14. DoDD 3000.07, “SUBJECT: Irregular Warfare” (1 December 2008), https://www.tecom.marines.mil/Portals/162/Docs/DOD%20Directive%203000.07%20IW.pdf; Joint Staff, JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 November 2014), 130
15. Joint Staff, JP 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 25 March 2013, Incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017), x, 1-5.
16. Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the [2018] National Defense Strategy (2020), 2, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Def.
17. Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition, Joint Force Development and Design Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff, “Irregular Warfare Mission Analysis” (19 October 2021), Foreword, 3, 6, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
18. Department of the Army G-3/5/7, “SUBJECT: Designation of Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command as the Army Functional Proponent for Irregular Warfare,” 28 February 2022, copy in USASOC History Office, Fort Bragg, NC.
19. USSOCOM, Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM, 2022), 1, 5-6.
20. HQDA, FM 3-0: Operations (Washington, DC: HQDA, October 2022), Glossary-8, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf.

2. 2 years after US withdrawal Afghanistan resistance group yearns for Western help as they take on Taliban

Is anyone conducting an assessment of this resistance potential? And more importantly is anyone conducting an assessment as to whether supporting this resistance would be in the US' strategic interests?

2 years after US withdrawal Afghanistan resistance group yearns for Western help as they take on Taliban

National Resistance Front is proving to be a thorn in the Taliban's side

By Chris Massaro Fox News

Published August 29, 2023 4:00am EDT | Updated August 29, 2023 4:04am EDT

foxnews.com · by Chris Massaro Fox News

Video

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The Taliban have doubled down with its extremist rule over Afghanistan since the withdrawal of U.S. forces almost two years ago, but a national resistance movement emerged immediately after with the hope of ending the Islamic regime in Kabul.

The Taliban’s growing repression, contrary to their assurances after seizing power in August 2021, has not stopped the National Resistance Front (NRF) from continuing operations against Taliban rule.

"Today, especially this fighting season, we have been successful in challenging the Taliban in many parts of Afghanistan beyond our base in the remote valleys of the Hindu Kush mountains," Ali Maisam Nazary, head of foreign relations for the NRF, told Fox News Digital.

The National Resistance Front is involved in a campaign to gain greater international recognition and support for their efforts to fight the Taliban. (Source: National Resistance Front))

TALIBAN HAVE A 2-FRONT WAR HEADED THEIR WAY

"We have launched successful guerrilla operations in eastern provinces like Nangarhar, Laghman and Nuristan. The same in the North and Central Afghanistan. The reason for this is that the people of Afghanistan are more convinced today than two years ago that an armed struggle is the only way to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan."

The NRF, led by Ahmad Massoud, remains the most formidable Afghan resistance unit fighting the Taliban, and its leader has vowed to continue the fight even after the loss of its rear base in the Panjshir Valley which the Taliban recaptured shortly after taking power in September 2021. Massoud’s father, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was a prominent Mujahidin rebel who fought against the Soviets in 1980s and was assassinated by al Qaeda operatives just two days before the 9/11 attacks.

"Currently, the Taliban finds itself entangled in multiple internal conflicts. Among these challenges, the Taliban likely views the NRF as a particularly substantial threat, given its recognition and inclusion of notable political figures," Fatemeh Aman, non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told Fox News Digital.

Newly recruited personnel joining Taliban security forces demonstrate their skills during their graduation ceremony in Herat on Feb. 9, 2023. The Taliban are going after the country's former military members "on a daily basis," a former military intelligence officer said in the new report. (Mohsen Karimi/AFP via Getty Images)

The Taliban have been able to take out some key figures within the NRF, but the group has had some success as well, and the asymmetric tactics they use on the battlefield resulted in the loss of some significant Taliban commanders.

"NRF attacks declined in the first half of 2023 compared to 2022 but have since increased from roughly one attack or fewer per week in the first half of 2022 to multiple attacks a week in the latter half of 2023 (July-August) so far," Peter Mills, Afghanistan researcher at the Institute of the Study for War, told Fox News Digital.

"Operationally the NRF has shifted from concentrating operations in the Panjshir Valley in 2022 in an effort to seize control of territory from the Taliban, to in 2023 focusing attacks in rural areas in provinces neighboring Panjshir, in an effort to undermine Taliban governance and control in those areas. While total NRF attacks are down in 2023 compared to 2022, this could possibly be due to a shift in operations and strategy," Mills added.

The NRF has been in a two-year campaign to gain greater international recognition and support for their efforts to fight the Taliban. The NRF has stepped up its political activity, gathering two conferences in Austria and Tajikistan among various opposition groups and members of the Afghan diaspora in the hopes of organizing a unified political opposition and outlining a democratic alternative for Afghanistan’s future.

AFGHAN CHARITY EDUCATING GIRLS AMID TALIBAN SCHOOL BAN

So far, the calls for greater international support, particularly from the United States, have fallen on deaf ears.

"The United States does not support armed conflict in Afghanistan. The country was at war for 44 years. We do not want to see a return to conflict in Afghanistan, and we hear from Afghans that they don’t either," a State Department spokesperson told Fox News Digital.

National Resistance Front fighters claimed to have launched successful attacks against the Taliban in Nangarhar, Laghman and Nuristan provinces. (Source: National Resistance Front)

Given President Biden’s focus on rallying NATO and the West to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia and the strategic importance placed on countering China in the Indo-Pacific, there does not appear to be any appetite from the current administration on renewing conflict in Afghanistan.

In the Taliban’s pursuit to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan after nearly 40 years of war, they are also accused of committing war crimes in the process, according to a new report from Amnesty International.

When the Taliban conquered Kabul, members of the security forces and ousted the Ashraf Ghani government who fled to the northern Panjshir province, once a hotbed of anti-Taliban resistance. In retaliation for the resistance and to enforce compliance from the population, the Taliban engaged in a campaign of collective punishment.

Amnesty International alleges the Taliban have committed war crimes and other gross violations of international law against civilian populations in Panjshir.

"In Panjshir, the Taliban’s cruel tactic of targeting civilians due to suspicion of their affiliation with the National Resistance Front (NRF) is causing widespread misery and fear," Agnès Callamard, Amnesty International’s Secretary General, said in a statement. Some of the Taliban’s brutal tactics include extrajudicial executions, torture, hostage-taking, unlawful detention and the torching of civilian homes.

National Resistance Front fighters stand behind the flag representing the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. (Ali Nazary, head of Foreign Relations of National Resistance Front of Afghanistan )

AFGHAN WOMEN SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH IRANIAN PROTESTERS, FACE HARSH TALIBAN CRACKDOWN

Resistance from the NRF remains spirited but is contained to certain pockets of the country. The NRF also lacks cohesion with other opposition groups which makes combating the Taliban even harder. Two years into their nascent insurgency, there is little hope that the NRF, along with other opposition groups, can actually topple the Taliban government.

"There is currently no serious challenge to Taliban rule in Afghanistan," Max Abrahms, professor of terrorism studies at Northeastern University, told Fox News Digital.

To mark the two-year anniversary of the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, the NRF urged neighboring nations to avoid establishing strategic or formal relations with them. Although the Taliban have not received recognition worldwide, the NRF also lacks external backing to fund its efforts, a key ingredient to sustaining a successful insurgent campaign.

Taliban fighters patrol on the road during a celebration marking the second anniversary of the withdrawal of U.S.-led troops from Afghanistan, in Kandahar, south of Kabul, Afghanistan, on Tuesday, Aug. 15, 2023. (AP/Abdul Khaliq)

"The problem for the NRF is the lack of international support. It is hard to see the resistance gaining any serious momentum without substantially more external support. The Biden administration touted its role in withdrawing American troops from Afghanistan and ending this so-called forever war. So it’s hard to imagine U.S. support for any armed group in Afghanistan under this administration, Abrahms said.

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foxnews.com · by Chris Massaro Fox News

3. FBI announces it has dismantled global network of hacked computers used in major fraud scheme

FBI announces it has dismantled global network of hacked computers used in major fraud scheme | CNN Politics

CNN · by Sean Lyngaas · August 29, 2023

CNN —

The FBI and European law enforcement agencies dismantled a massive network of hacked computers that had been used to defraud victims of hundreds of millions of dollars, agencies announced Tuesday.

The Justice Department seized over $8 million in cryptocurrency from the hackers and removed their malicious code from an unspecified number of infected computers in the US and around the world, according to the announcement, which said around 200,000 were infected in the US and 700,000 globally.

It’s a blow to a hacking tool known as Qakbot that Russian-speaking ransomware gangs had used to cause “significant harm” to health care providers and government agencies around the world, the Justice Department said. The department said law enforcement agencies in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom helped with the takedown.

The State Department also announced a reward of up to $10 million for information on the people behind the malicious software.

It’s the latest step in a more aggressive effort by the FBI in the last few years to target popular hacking tools that allow cybercriminals to fleece Americans out of millions of dollars. The goal is to use every possible legal authority to make business harder for cybercriminals who are still regularly disrupting American companies and local governments.

“This is a concerted effort to target the services that other cybercriminals are leveraging across the globe,” a senior FBI official said in an interview.

The tool the FBI targeted in this case, known as a botnet, is an army of infected computers that hackers often use for a variety of fraud as well as potentially disruptive hacks. It’s a cheap way to amass digital firepower that can knock critical services like schools or health care providers offline.

Qakbot has been around for about 15 years, but ransomware gangs’ use of the tool in recent years added urgency to the law enforcement effort to infiltrate the group’s infrastructure. The investigation culminated late last week, when the FBI redirected the botnet’s internet traffic through computer servers controlled by the bureau and then issued commands to some infected computers to uninstall the malicious software.

In the last 18 months, Qakbot was used in the initial stage of about 40 different ransomware attacks that led to $58 million in losses, Martin Estrada, the US attorney for the Central District of California, said at a news conference Tuesday. Qakbot’s victims have included a power engineering firm in Illinois, a defense firm in Maryland and a food distribution company in Southern California, Estrada said. Law enforcement officials are working to try to get the money stolen back to victims, he added.

In a statement shared with CNN, FBI Director Christopher Wray said the bureau and its international partners had “crippled one of the longest-running cyber criminal botnets.”

“With our federal and international partners, we will continue to systematically target every part of cyber criminal organizations, their facilitators, and their money – including by disrupting and dismantling their ability to use illicit infrastructure to attack us,” Wray said.

The hackers can rebuild their computer infrastructure after the takedown, but FBI officials are hoping that will take a while.

Qakbot “took them years to put together and it would be difficult and time consuming for [the hackers] to reconstitute in the same manner that they had before,” said the senior FBI official, who estimated that Qakbot had caused hundreds of millions of direct or indirect losses to victims since 2008.

Asked if there was more cryptocurrency held by the Qakbot operatives to seize, the FBI official said the takedown announced Tuesday focused on computing infrastructure, “but there’s other work to be done here, to include financial aspects.”

John Fokker, a senior executive at cybersecurity firm Trellix, who tracks Qakbot, said the people behind the botnet have over the years developed new evasion techniques to try to throw investigators off the trail. “It really depends on how eager they are to rebuild” their computer infrastructure, Fokker told CNN, when asked how soon Qakbot might resurface.

CNN · by Sean Lyngaas · August 29, 2023

4. Biden’s caution is Putin’s advantage — and it could be China’s too

Excerpts:

U.S. policy seems designed to ensure that Ukraine’s independence will be incomplete and will need to be maintained only while it is under Russian occupation and at war. What’s more, the fight is taking far longer than it needs to because of U.S. indecision and hesitancy in supplying what Ukraine needs to win. At the same time, the administration second-guesses Ukraine’s conduct of the counteroffensive and how it is fighting with the incomplete supply of weapons required for a break-through on the battlefield.

America’s role in Ukraine, under the policy of the Biden administration and under the hypothetical policy of a handful of Republicans in Congress and on the campaign trail, is constrained by the same degree of impatience and war-weariness that led to the defeatist Trump-Biden decisions on Afghanistan.

The policy prescriptions will encourage Putin to continue his aggression in Europe and Xi to pursue his own aggressive designs on Taiwan and the South China Sea. If a U.S. administration applies the same approach to supporting the defense of Taiwan that has characterized its policy on Ukraine, Xi can see a relatively risk-free path to the eventual absorption of Taiwan. Conquest of a Taiwanese island or two as a starting point would seem to fall under Biden’s rubric of avoiding an imagined “World War III” at all costs.

Biden needs to formalize and officialize his ad hoc statements on defending Taiwan. Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity is even more dangerous and counter-productive given Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the U.S.-NATO failure to deter or defeat it.

Biden’s caution is Putin’s advantage — and it could be China’s too

BY JOSEPH BOSCO, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 08/29/23 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4175306-bidens-caution-is-putins-advantage-and-it-could-be-chinas-too/?utm

To its credit, the Biden administration has essentially followed the Trump national security team’s transformative policy toward communist China. It has gone further by emphasizing multilateralism and alliance-building to bring in support from democratic allies and partners against the common challenge.

But there have been some costly exceptions.

The Biden team revived and revitalized the quadrilateral security relationship known as the Quad, among Japan, Australia, India and the United States. It established a trilateral security arrangement with Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S., dubbed AUKUS, which enabled the transfer of nuclear submarines and technology to Australia.

The AUKUS arrangement was accomplished, however, by Canberra’s secret collaboration with Washington and London in cancelling Australia’s preexisting conventional submarine deal with France, which precipitated an angry French response. Beyond the economic loss, injured Gallic pride lingered long after the event and may have contributed to President Emmanuel Macron’s dismissive comment in Beijing in April 2022, that Europe should not serve as America’s “followers” on Taiwan or get “caught up in crises that are not ours.”

A year earlier, Biden’s disastrous pullout from Afghanistan shocked not only France but other NATO allies: the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Canada. It surely encouraged Russian President Vladimir Putin’s quest to reconstitute the fallen Soviet Empire, which he has called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

Last week, by contrast, Biden pulled off a major success for multilateralism when he hosted South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at Camp David to sign a historic trilateral security cooperation agreement. While it did not specifically commit either Japan or the Republic of Korea to help defend the other against Chinese or North Korean aggression, it was a major step forward from their historical enmity of even a few years ago, when it could accurately be said of the Japan-South Korea relationship “the ally of my ally is my enemy.”

The Biden approach has stood in marked contrast to former President Trump’s denigration of Northeast Asian allies and admiration for America’s authoritarian adversaries.

In that context, the administration also deserves praise for working successfully with the government of the Philippines to achieve a partial reinvigoration of the U.S-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. The rapprochement resulted in the establishment of several new bases for the rotational stationing of U.S. forces to strengthen U.S.-Philippines interoperability, readiness and joint and combined training. Hopefully, the expanded military cooperation will be followed by restoration of a full U.S. presence in the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base.

Biden’s leadership of the NATO response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine eventually proved impressive, though it was too late and too weak to have deterred the invasion, which U.S. intelligence openly predicted months before it happened.

Biden’s paralyzing fear of provoking Putin into further escalation — ”it would be World War III” — has consistently prevented the United States from providing the weapons needed to liberate Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory and end the bloodshed and suffering sooner rather than later.

Initially, the other NATO members followed Washington’s lead and held back on aiding Ukraine too robustly and overtly. Ongoing reports of Russia’s Nazi-like war crimes, however, along with Putin’s and Xi Jinping’s declaration of a Russia-China “strategic partnership” just before Russia’s Ukraine invasion, alerted allies to the emerging global threat. Russia’s aggression is increasingly seen as an early phase of the existential danger to the rules-based international order. NATO members are now more inclined than Washington to help Ukraine succeed in its goal of retaking all its Russian-occupied territory.

Germany’s promised Leopard tanks have begun to arrive, but not America’s Abrams — supposedly part of the Washington-Berlin understanding that seemed to imply closely related deliveries.

Denmark and the Netherlands are now supplying Ukraine with F-16s while Biden continues to decline Kiev’s request and won’t even begin to provide F-16 training until close to the end of the year.

Washington clearly made the strategic decision to withhold the F-16s from contributing to Ukraine’s long-planned counter-offensive. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said last week, “The United States has been very focused on ensuring that Ukraine has what they need to be successful on the battlefield today, right? If they — if they are not successful in their counteroffensive, then everything else is largely a moot point. […] F-16s for Ukraine is about the long-term commitment to Ukraine. These F-16s will not be relevant to the upcoming counteroffensive.”

U.S. policy seems designed to ensure that Ukraine’s independence will be incomplete and will need to be maintained only while it is under Russian occupation and at war. What’s more, the fight is taking far longer than it needs to because of U.S. indecision and hesitancy in supplying what Ukraine needs to win. At the same time, the administration second-guesses Ukraine’s conduct of the counteroffensive and how it is fighting with the incomplete supply of weapons required for a break-through on the battlefield.

America’s role in Ukraine, under the policy of the Biden administration and under the hypothetical policy of a handful of Republicans in Congress and on the campaign trail, is constrained by the same degree of impatience and war-weariness that led to the defeatist Trump-Biden decisions on Afghanistan.

The policy prescriptions will encourage Putin to continue his aggression in Europe and Xi to pursue his own aggressive designs on Taiwan and the South China Sea. If a U.S. administration applies the same approach to supporting the defense of Taiwan that has characterized its policy on Ukraine, Xi can see a relatively risk-free path to the eventual absorption of Taiwan. Conquest of a Taiwanese island or two as a starting point would seem to fall under Biden’s rubric of avoiding an imagined “World War III” at all costs.

Biden needs to formalize and officialize his ad hoc statements on defending Taiwan. Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity is even more dangerous and counter-productive given Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the U.S.-NATO failure to deter or defeat it.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA

5. Replicator Is DoD's Big Play To Build Thousands Of Autonomous Weapons In Just Two Years

Replicator Is DoD's Big Play To Build Thousands Of Autonomous Weapons In Just Two Years

Replicator could significantly change how the U.S. military fights and is aimed squarely at overcoming China’s quantitative advantage.

BY

THOMAS NEWDICK, TYLER ROGOWAY

|

PUBLISHED AUG 28, 2023 7:49 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick, Tyler Rogoway · August 28, 2023

The Pentagon has unveiled its latest strategy to counter China’s rapid military progress, with a program named Replicator that intends to focus on fielding “thousands” of attritable autonomous platforms that will be characterized by being “small, smart, cheap, and many.” The initiative seeks to harness U.S. innovation as a way to counter the mass of China’s armed forces, while also, once again, putting the onus on uncrewed systems that will benefit from AI algorithms.

The Replicator program was announced today by U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks, speaking at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Emerging Technologies conference in Washington.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. Hicks. DoD photo by Lisa Ferdinando

As to the threat that Replicator is meant to overcome, Hicks was explicit about what she described as “the PRC’s biggest advantage, which is mass: more ships, more missiles, more people.” Hicks also identified the particular challenge posed by China’s rapidly diversifying anti-access/area-denial capabilities.

Two mockups of the Chinese DF-17 short-range ballistic missile, which carries a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle warhead. China Military

She added that there is a historical precedent for the kind of approach that Replicator espouses: “Even when we mobilize our economy and manufacturing base, rarely have America’s war-winning strategies relied solely on matching an adversary, ship for ship or shot for shot,” she said, before adding a barbed comment that seemed to refer to Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine: “After all, we don’t use our people as cannon fodder like some competitors do.”

In contrast, Replicator is intended to continue and build upon the U.S. ability to “outmatch adversaries by out-thinking, out-strategizing, and outmaneuvering them; we augment manufacturing and mobilization with our real comparative advantage, which is the innovation and spirit of our people.”

A rendering of different tiers of advanced drones flying together with a stealthy F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, providing one idea of what attritable autonomous systems might look like in the air warfare domain. Lockheed Martin Skunk Works

So, what will Replicator consist of once it becomes a reality?

Here, Hicks provided few details, other than to explain that the program seeks to “master the technology of tomorrow,” namely, “attritable autonomous systems in all domains.” The advantages of these kinds of platforms include that they are “less expensive, put fewer people in the line of fire, and [they] can be changed, updated, or improved with substantially shorter lead times. We’ll counter the PLA’s mass with mass of our own, but ours will be harder to plan for, harder to hit, harder to beat.”

Attritable, in this context, is normally taken to refer to a platform that’s inexpensive enough to be willing to lose on high-risk missions, while being capable enough to be relevant for those missions. More recently, however, the Air Force began to use the term “affordable mass,” on the basis that attritable suggests a greater willingness to actually lose these systems, which might not necessarily be the case in an operational scenario. There are other definitions of attritable, too, which you can read more about here. In the case of Replicator, it’s really not yet possible to get an ideas of what these platforms might cost, but, clearly, affordability, rapid iterative development cycles, and the possibility of mass production are all considerations at this stage.

Dating back to around 2019, this Air Force rendering was described as a “low-cost attritable Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV).” USAF

In terms of autonomous systems, Hicks said that Replicator will be “developed and fielded in line with our responsible and ethical approach to AI and autonomous systems, where the DoD has been a world leader for over a decade.”

As we have explored in the past, the U.S. military has been working on developing autonomous capabilities for decades now publicly, and there has certainly been significant work done in the classified realm, too.

Hicks’ reference to a “responsible and ethical approach to AI” suggests that Replicator may still include humans ‘in the loop,’ especially when it comes to certain sensitive tasks, above all, decisions about whether or not to employ lethal force. In this respect, it’s widely assumed that China, in particular, takes a somewhat different approach, something that Hicks apparently referred to, when she described “another comparative advantage we have over the PRC,” namely, that “these systems will empower our warfighters — not overpower or undercut their abilities.”

A close-up view of an ATLAS sensor turret — an experimental AI-driven target recognition system — on a U.S. Army M1 Abrams tank. DoD

Hicks brought up the example of the war in Ukraine to show how “emerging tech developed by commercial and non-traditional companies” can be “decisive in defending against modern military aggression.” Specifically, she pointed to Starlink satellite internet constellation, Switchblade loitering munition, and the use of commercial satellite imagery to influence the conflict.

The kinds of commercial and rapidly developed drones that Ukraine has used to great effect for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance, as well as targeting and attack, may provide one pointer to the sorts of systems that Replicator may yield, but the program is altogether much wider.

While the development of attritable and autonomous systems has often frequently been in the air warfare domain, Hicks was keen to point out that the same concepts have already been subject to Pentagon investment through all the military services, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Strategic Capabilities Office, and at the level of the different combatant commands themselves.

The development of attritable and autonomous systems already spans multiple domains, from “self-piloted ships to uncrewed aircraft and more,” and the same will be and the same will be the case for Replicator.

A U.S. Navy USV gets recovered aboard a ship while underway. USN

As well as bringing down costs, Hicks observed that the attritable concept also offers the significant benefit of allowing systems to be “produced closer to the tactical edge.” Such systems can be brought into battle faster than traditional defense technologies and once fielded, they can be used in more unorthodox ways, including outside the normal mission command chains, meaning that they can “empower the lowest possible echelons to innovate and succeed in the battle.”

A UVision Hero-400 loitering munition on a trailer-mounted catapult launch system during a U.S. Marine Corps test in 2022. USMC

Hicks also brought up another interesting function of Replicator’s attritable and autonomous systems, namely that they should have the ability to “serve as resilient distributed systems even if bandwidth is limited, intermittent, degraded, or denied.”

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Replicator is the speed and size envisaged, with Hicks outlining the goal of fielding attritable and autonomous systems “at a scale of multiple thousands, in multiple domains, within the next 18 to 24 months.” She admitted that this is “easier said than done,” and it’s one that will apparently require an altogether new approach to harnessing industry, almost certainly including non-traditional companies, for the benefit of the Pentagon.

In the past, the Air Force, in particular, has looked to so-called ‘digital engineering’ to help rapidly develop new aircraft that can be brought into production on an interactive basis. More recently, there have been suggestions that the concept isn’t likely to be so revolutionary in reality, with even the Air Force’s own boss, Frank Kendall, concluding that the digital engineering processes has been “over-hyped.” For Replicator, the Pentagon may have to look to other routes for rapidly developing and fielding new platforms.

Exactly what the kinds of systems that Replicator should produce will look like, and the particular missions they undertake, remains very much speculative at this point. However, Hicks emphasized the fact that these attritable and autonomous systems are not simply expected to supersede current systems overnight, but instead herald a longer-term shift in the way that the Pentagon prepares for and goes to war.

Hicks painted a picture of the future U.S. military as one in which “Americans still benefit from platforms that are large, exquisite, expensive, and few.” However, Replicator will “galvanize progress in the too-slow shift of U.S. military innovation to leverage platforms that are small, smart, cheap, and many,” with these also operating for benefit of, if not collaboratively with more expensive and less prolific systems. This is very much defines the Air Force and Navy's Next Generation Air Dominance efforts. In particular, the dichotomy between the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones that will accompany the extremely high-end manned NGAD aircraft into combat.

Hicks says there is still a place in the U.S. military for platforms that are “large, exquisite, expensive, and few” — like the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program. Lockheed Martin

Hicks hopes that Replicator is the program that finally tilts the balance in favor of this kind of warfare. With extremely ambitious targets as regards the volume and velocity of the program, that may be very hard to achieve, especially since attritable and autonomous systems already present plenty of operational challenges, even without the accelerated timeline.

And while details of the kinds of systems that Replicator is expected to produce are still to come, the program is already highly noteworthy, not least for the very central position given to the challenge posed by China’s growing military dominance in the Asia Pacific region and, in the future, likely elsewhere, too.

We can reasonably expect unmanned systems in the air, on the water, and below the waves of varying capabilities and complexities, none of which will be too 'exquisite' that it makes their development a long-term proposition or their price tag very high. But above all that, grand networking capabilities that can tie many of these systems together and keep controllers apprised of their activities will likely be the biggest challenge when it comes to operationalizing what Replicator produces to its full potential. The possibility for mesh networks spanning multiple domains over great area is likely also a critical aspect of this endeavor.

Projects like Lockheed Skunk Works' Speed Racer were designed to prove that relatively capable and adaptable autonomous systems can be built quickly and cheaply. (Lockheed Martin)

AI will not just be needed for autonomy, but also for parsing absolutely massive amounts of data produced by these systems which can quickly clog critical communications bandwidth 'pipes.' Parsing that data on-platform or at least in-theater before it is sent afar will be a major challenge and feature of any such concept. But above all else, the ability for disparate capabilities to collaborate autonomously in a diverse 'swarm or swarms' will be arguably the most impactful aspect of this emerging strategy. Overwhelming the enemy by volume and speed of action is definitely the critical play here.

Bottom line, this is a very big deal and not just in scope. This is a major part of the unmanned shift we have long been waiting for and predicting now coming into focus. It goes far beyond just near-term tactical and procurement changes. If it is realized as discussed, it will forever change the way the U.S. military fights and how it develops and procures weaponry.

As for the timing, two years from now puts the fielding of these assets at the heart of the time frame in which many are predicting China will make a move on Taiwan militarily. As such, Replicator could end up being as much a deterrence play as anything else. It's worth noting, that war gaming has shown that massive swarms of autonomous systems would be a decisive factor as to who wins a fight over the Taiwan Strait. You can read more about this here.

Repeated war gaming shows that large networked swarms of drones that can cover vast areas would be critical to winning a brawl over the Taiwan Strait. USAF/CDC

“We must ensure the PRC leadership wakes up every day, considers the risks of aggression and concludes today is not the day and not just today,” said Hicks. Time will tell to what degree Replicator is successful in helping achieve that.

Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

thedrive.com · by Thomas Newdick, Tyler Rogoway · August 28, 2023

6. Sea Change: ‘Bongbong’ Marcos and the Future of the South China Sea

Excerpts:

The point is that Marcos’ calculation is based on interests more than values. While Filipinos share a great deal in common with Americans, the decision-making calculus in Manila is unsentimental. Unlike South Korea, which under President Yoon Suk-yeol has adopted a “values-based” approach to the alliance, Marcos makes no bones about looking out for the Philippines.

“There is no right or wrong,” a young analyst from a neighboring Southeast Asian state told me during my recent visit to Manila, “there is only the national interest.” That realist sentiment captures both the logic of why smaller ASEAN states remain silent in the face of Chinese assertiveness and why Marcos is making a tougher stand in the South China Sea.

The Marcos strategy is not about declaring China bad and America good but about standing up for the sovereignty of the Philippines. A robust alliance with the United States, backing joint South China Sea patrols with other countries, and hiking defense spending are instrumental to helping Manila protect its maritime claims. But diplomacy remains the key to Manila’s approach.

Manila understands Xi Jinping’s gradualist approach to controlling the South China Sea. Unlike other ASEAN member states (except for Vietnam), Marcos is outspoken about China’s coercion and dissembling. But he also does not assume the United States will always have his back. As he told his inaugural audience, “We can trust no one else when it comes to what is best for us. Past history has often proven that.”

Sea Change: ‘Bongbong’ Marcos and the Future of the South China Sea

Marcos is overhauling Philippine strategy, and the strategic shift is as significant as any in the region.

By Patrick M. Cronin

August 25, 2023

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Fourteen months into President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.’s tenure, we are discovering that the Philippines’ future has profound implications for the region and the United States. The transformation of the Philippines into an increasingly active middle power under the younger Marcos may either uphold or upend peace in the South China Sea.

During his inaugural address last year, Marcos pledged to unite all 110 million Filipinos to “achieve the country” they deserve. Beneath a humble mien, he barely concealed his ambition of restoring the family name. The Marcos brand was badly tarnished after “People Power” banished his father from Malacañang Palace in 1986. Still, Marcos Jr. stressed on day one, “I am here not to talk about our past. I am here to tell you about our future.”

What has happened since June 30, 2022, is nothing short of a renaissance in Philippines-U.S. relations. Former President Rodrigo Duterte’s threats to the alliance were often full of bluster. Still, it is hard to disagree with the characterization that the Philippines under Marcos is the United States’ “new star ally.” Even so, it would be a mistake to assume that Marcos puts the U.S. national interest ahead of his country’s.

Marcos is overhauling Philippine strategy. Early in August, he approved a new national security framework centered on the “paramount” objectives of “national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.” Although Executive Order No. 37 is cryptic, the new policy replaces a longstanding national security fixation on land-based counterinsurgency and counterterrorism with an overriding focus on the protection of maritime sovereignty in the West Philippines Sea and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

The pivot was announced days after the Chinese Coast Guard used water cannons to block Philippine Navy-chartered civilian vessels from conducting a routine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal. Beijing has been using a variety of grey-zone tactics to obstruct and harass the Philippines whenever it seeks to preserve the rusting hull of BRP Sierra Madre, a World War II-era landing craft deliberately grounded in 1999 to create a Spratly outpost akin to what China had built up in nearby Mischief Reef.

Manila’s strategic shift is as significant as any in the region since Japan quietly began reorienting its posture with the release of the December 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines. That document, which followed a September incident in which a Chinese fishing trawler rammed two Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands (which China claims as the Diaoyu Islands), reversed the Cold War-era Self-Defense Force priority of defending Hokkaido and elevated the task of protecting the Southwest Islands (the Nansei Shoto). More will be clear by the end of the year, by which time Philippine officials are expected to finish a new national security strategy.

Is Marcos at risk of being pulled into a China-U.S. rivalry that could lead to a major regional conflict? Although China is more likely to pull the trigger over Taiwan than it is over disputes in the East or South China Sea, the entire maritime theater is drifting toward what could become an integrated air and sea battleground.

Like Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, Marcos wants to avoid conflict. His reinvigoration of defense ties with the United States is a means to keeping a lid on conflict, not starting one. But it is more than that. In addition to helping rehabilitate the family reputation, Marcos appreciates the leverage that comes with working with U.S. defense forces.

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Agreeing to new basing access sites facing the South China Sea and conducting muscular military drills are but two of the ways Marcos has sought to burnish the alliance. The Biden administration has reciprocated with robust declarations of joint action and forceful statements about invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty should any Filipino vessel or aircraft be threatened.

These are indeed heady days for bilateral defense cooperation. But this is also a historic relationship that has had its fair share of ups and downs. The Philippines forced the closure of U.S. bases in 1992, after which China seized the opportunity to seize Mischief Reef. The United States also failed to prevent China from commandeering Scarborough Shoal after a tense standoff with the Philippines in 2012. That failure is what prompted Manila’s resort to the Permanent Court of Arbitration to clarify China’s excessive claims, especially the “nine-dash line” claim to most of the South China Sea. But while that glacial legal process ended in a legal validation of Manila’s arguments, China accelerated a massive land reclamation and fortified outpost building project in the Spratlys.

Commemorating the seventh anniversary of the arbitral award in favor of the Philippines, Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo pronounced the matter “a settled landmark of international law.” China sharply disputes that and continues to delegitimize the 2016 ruling. During a brief public session of a recent Dialogue on the Governance of the South China Sea, Professor Sienho Yee of China Foreign Affairs University offered a dubious litany of historical and legal points in defense of Beijing’s sweeping “indisputable sovereignty” claims.

While underscoring the rule of law, the Marcos administration is speaking up. That is noteworthy in Southeast Asia, where the conduct of foreign policy is typically done the “ASEAN way,” in which confrontation is avoided through consensus-oriented diplomacy. Standing up to a big power like China requires gumption. If the United States has his back, of course, Marcos has some cover. But that could change should a future president define U.S. national interests more narrowly.

The point is that Marcos’ calculation is based on interests more than values. While Filipinos share a great deal in common with Americans, the decision-making calculus in Manila is unsentimental. Unlike South Korea, which under President Yoon Suk-yeol has adopted a “values-based” approach to the alliance, Marcos makes no bones about looking out for the Philippines.

“There is no right or wrong,” a young analyst from a neighboring Southeast Asian state told me during my recent visit to Manila, “there is only the national interest.” That realist sentiment captures both the logic of why smaller ASEAN states remain silent in the face of Chinese assertiveness and why Marcos is making a tougher stand in the South China Sea.

The Marcos strategy is not about declaring China bad and America good but about standing up for the sovereignty of the Philippines. A robust alliance with the United States, backing joint South China Sea patrols with other countries, and hiking defense spending are instrumental to helping Manila protect its maritime claims. But diplomacy remains the key to Manila’s approach.

Manila understands Xi Jinping’s gradualist approach to controlling the South China Sea. Unlike other ASEAN member states (except for Vietnam), Marcos is outspoken about China’s coercion and dissembling. But he also does not assume the United States will always have his back. As he told his inaugural audience, “We can trust no one else when it comes to what is best for us. Past history has often proven that.”

GUEST AUTHOR

Patrick M. Cronin

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute and a Scholar in Residence at Carnegie Mellon University.

thediplomat.com · by Patrick M. Cronin · August 25, 2023

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29.
• Russian sources continued to express concerns over Russian vulnerabilities in eastern and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov were buried on August 29 in St. Petersburg in separate cemeteries, likely to prevent the creation of a single pilgrimage site that would establish the deceased Wagner members as martyrs.
• Russian milbloggers accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the fifth consecutive day of attempting to conceal concerns over the mistreatment of a Southern Military District (SMD) brigade operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• These milblogger persistent complaints are likely an attempt to spark command changes that may favor Russian Airborne Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who reportedly oversees Russian forces in southern Ukraine.
• The Russian MoD may be reverting to more limited coverage of the war in Ukraine while attempting to censor complaints along the frontline and reports of Ukrainian advances.
• The United States State Department announced a new military aid package for Ukraine on August 29.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin is currently focused on promoting five main information operations against Ukraine, all of which ISW has observed.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area but did not make confirmed advances.
• The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 29 that the Russian MoD is still unlikely to meet its targets for volunteer recruitment, despite offering incentives such as high salaries and additional social benefits.
• Ukrainian sources reported that occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, AUGUST 29, 2023

Aug 29, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 29, 2023, 8:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on August 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut and about five kilometers southeast of Robotyne.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[2] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported on August 28 that Ukrainian forces continued to secure positions in Robotyne and are demining the area.[3] Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces could bring more troops to the Robotyne area and would have greater opportunities for maneuver.[4] Shtupun noted that Robotyne is near the highway to Tokmak, an important Russian ground line of communication (GLOC).[5] A Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces are continuing to commit a significant number of reserves, Airborne (VDV) elements, and TOS-1 thermobaric artillery systems to the area – likely indicating that Russian forces are worried about the vulnerability of their positions in Robotyne.[6] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intend to deplete Ukrainian offensive potential by fixing Ukrainian forces in engagements in the settlement of Robotyne.[7]

Russian sources continued to express concerns over Russian vulnerabilities in eastern and western Zaporizhia Oblast. One Russian milblogger claimed that the situation near Verbove (18km southwest of Orikhiv) is “very dangerous.”[8] Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky, reportedly defending the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, claimed that Russian forces in his sector are stretched in a long arc along the frontline, are having difficulties transferring reserves, and lack resources.[9] Khodakovsky claimed that Ukrainian efforts to cut off Russian transport routes would further complicate the situation.[10] Khodakovsky has previously highlighted concerns about the Russian defense in the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, specifically relating to poor Russian counterbattery capabilities, heavy Russian losses, exhausted Russian forces, and a lack of reserves.[11] The “Vostok” Battalion claimed that Ukrainian forces disrupted their logistics on August 28 by striking their rear area with drones.[12] The “Vostok” Battalion noted that Ukrainian shelling has wounded several of its personnel and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are failing to down Ukrainian aircraft and drones.[13] Khodakovsky’s and the “Vostok” Battalion’s complaints are likely those of tactical commanders focused on their own local issues on a sector of the front that is of lower priority to Russian theater commanders who are focusing efforts in western Zaporizhia. These concerns could well be valid, but senior Russian commanders could have contingencies in place should the situation here deteriorate that they have not troubled to communicate to Khodakovsky and his colleagues. Such tensions between de-prioritized tactical commanders and higher commanders are not uncommon in war.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov were buried on August 29 in St. Petersburg in separate cemeteries, likely to prevent the creation of a single pilgrimage site that would establish the deceased Wagner members as martyrs. Prigozhin’s and Chekalov’s funerals were held at the Porokhovskoye and Severnoye Cemeteries, respectively.[14] The funerals were closed to the public, and Russian police and National Guard (Rosgvardia) units secured the areas.[15] The Kremlin’s likely efforts to separate the Wagner burial sites to prevent their martyrdom in the public eye may prove ineffective as the official Telegram channel of Prigozhin’s press service, which had been inactive since June 26, publicly confirmed Prigozhin’s burial site on August 29 and called on anyone “wishing to say goodbye” to visit.[16] Wagner-affiliated sources did not comment on the future of the Wagner private military company, likely indicating a hesitancy within the organization to appoint a successor given the Kremlin’s and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to destroy the Wagner Group since the rebellion and the challenges any successor loyal to the Kremlin would likely face in securing his position within Wagner.[17]

Russian milbloggers accused the Russian MoD for the fifth consecutive day of attempting to conceal concerns over the mistreatment of a Southern Military District (SMD) brigade operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.[18] Russian milbloggers have continued to criticize the Russian MoD for mistreating elements of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District). The milbloggers also accused the Russian MoD of reportedly staging a response video in which five men claiming to be serving in the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade called on milbloggers to refrain from discussing the brigade’s alleged lack of artillery support and supplies in the Dnipro River delta area.[19] One milblogger noted the Russian military command began punishing servicemen of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for speaking out about these problems and added that state-affiliated milbloggers and propagandists are discrediting that concerns of a unit that is operating on a dangerous coastal frontline on the east (left) bank Dnipro River.[20] Milbloggers also claimed that these problems began after the Russian military command appointed a former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 100th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade commander with the alias “Skif” to command the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[21] Milbloggers claimed that “Skif” had previously “destroyed” the 100th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade while receiving state honors.[22] The Russian MoD notably has yet to silence these complaints, which may indicate that the Russian military command is unsure it can effectively do so at this time.

These milblogger persistent complaints are likely an attempt to spark command changes that may favor Russian Airborne Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who reportedly oversees Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command needs to immediately change its leadership if Russia wants to win the war and claimed that Ukrainian forces pose a threat to the allegedly mistreated 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[23] Ukrainian small-scale raids, however, do not pose a significant threat to the Russian grouping of forces in occupied Kherson Oblast – and milblogger concern is more likely aimed at discrediting unwanted commanders such as “Skif,” who was likely appointed by the Russian Chief of General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov or “Dnepr” Group of Forces (Kherson Oblast) Commander Colonel General Oleg Makarevich. Some of these milbloggers have previously complained about Gerasimov, Makarevich, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for failing to respond to Ukrainian threats in occupied Kherson Oblast, not providing boats to Russian forces, or blaming them for other military failures.[24] Some of these milbloggers had specifically attacked Makarevich, whom the Russian military command previously appointed to replace Teplinsky in January 2023 before Russian President Vladimir Putin reinstated Teplinsky in March-April 2023.[25] Some of these milbloggers also have a history of publicly praising Teplinsky and opposing Gerasimov’s or Shoigu’s efforts to remove Teplinsky from his position after the Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.[26] Teplinsky had been previously loosely affiliated with Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and had repeatedly been insubordinate to Gerasimov and Shoigu.[27] Teplinsky may have lost some authority since the rebellion or may be attempting to prevent Gerasimov and Shoigu from undermining his authority. These complaints may also be a part of an ongoing campaign to discredit Makarevich that existed prior to the rebellion and highlight that factional divisions within the Russian military command have continued past the rebellion.

The Russian MoD may be reverting to the more limited coverage of the war in Ukraine while attempting to censor complaints along the frontline and reports of Ukrainian advances. The Russian MoD recently changed its daily reporting style to reduce the daily amount of information it reports on the war.[28] The Russian MoD previously issued a daily situational report that differed from the individual situational reports from the press services of each Russian grouping of forces.[29] The press services of each Russian grouping of forces issued text directly copied from the overall daily situational report instead of their own original reports on August 29, however.[30] The Russian MoD has consistently attempted to institute an information policy that would provide limited information about the frontlines throughout the war.[31] The Russian MoD’s change in reporting, if this trend continues, may reflect its wider efforts to censor Russian reporting on the war and unify its own narrative.

The US State Department announced a new military aid package for Ukraine on August 29. The $250 million package includes AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, mine clearing equipment, HIMARS rockets, and Javelin anti-armor systems.[32]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin is currently focused on promoting five main information operations against Ukraine, all of which ISW has observed. The GUR reported on August 29 that the Russian Presidential Administration held a meeting on August 25 to approve the specific narratives that Russian media should promote in the information space.[33] The Russian narratives include claims that Ukraine is conducting mass mobilization regardless of age, gender, or health; claims that Ukraine’s Western partners are disappointed in Ukraine‘s prospects for victory; claims that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is failing; claims that the Ukrainian government is completely corrupt and is not fighting corruption and; claims that Russian authorities provide good living standards and conditions in occupied Ukraine.[34] Russian First Deputy Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko and Russian media representatives reportedly attended the meeting. ISW has observed all five false narratives in the Russian information space.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29.
• Russian sources continued to express concerns over Russian vulnerabilities in eastern and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and reported Wagner logistics and security head Valery Chekalov were buried on August 29 in St. Petersburg in separate cemeteries, likely to prevent the creation of a single pilgrimage site that would establish the deceased Wagner members as martyrs.
• Russian milbloggers accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the fifth consecutive day of attempting to conceal concerns over the mistreatment of a Southern Military District (SMD) brigade operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• These milblogger persistent complaints are likely an attempt to spark command changes that may favor Russian Airborne Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, who reportedly oversees Russian forces in southern Ukraine.
• The Russian MoD may be reverting to more limited coverage of the war in Ukraine while attempting to censor complaints along the frontline and reports of Ukrainian advances.
• The United States State Department announced a new military aid package for Ukraine on August 29.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin is currently focused on promoting five main information operations against Ukraine, all of which ISW has observed.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border area but did not make confirmed advances.
• The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 29 that the Russian MoD is still unlikely to meet its targets for volunteer recruitment, despite offering incentives such as high salaries and additional social benefits.
• Ukrainian sources reported that occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and reportedly advanced on August 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Lyman (west of Kreminna) directions, particularly near Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[36] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), Stepova Novoselivka (18km southeast of Kupyansk), Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Kotlyarivka (22km southeast of Kupyansk).[37] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces captured a position near Synkivka.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing up to one kilometer per day along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[39] Another Russian milblogger claimed on August 28 that the frontline has not changed significantly in the Kupyansk sector, that Russian forces are conducting positional offensive operations in the area, and that Russian forces have not captured Synkivka.[40]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 29. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka, Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), Kreminna, Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), and Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna).[41] Russian sources claimed on August 28 and 29 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Novoyehorivka, Yampolivka, Torske (15km west of Kreminna), and in the Serebryanske forest (10km southwest of Kreminna).[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on August 29 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces are advancing in unspecified areas in the Bakhmut direction.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[45] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing west of the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut).[47]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on August 29 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut) and Ozaryanivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps) units advanced to the heights near Klishchiivka.[49] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[50] Footage published on August 29 purportedly shows artillery units of the 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division operating north of Soledar (11km northeast of Bakhmut), the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) operating near Bakhmut, and the “Viking” Spetsnaz detachment operating near Klishchiivka.[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 29 but did not make confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[52] A former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) official claimed that LNR and DNR forces continue to advance on the western outskirts of Marinka and only have 400 meters left to capture.[53] ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claimed Russian advances, however.

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 29. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault near Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka)[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued positional battles on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, with neither side making new territorial gains in the area on August 29. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that positional battles are ongoing south of Velyka Novosilka, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces did not advance towards Zavitne Bazhannya (11km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces are repelling Ukrainian attempts to gain a foothold on the Staromayorske-Urozhaine line - 8km southeast and 8km south of Velyka Novosilka, respectively.[56] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Russian forces intensified airstrikes on Staromayorske in an effort to reduce Ukrainian offensive potential.[57] The Russian “Vostok” Battalion - which had previously lost its positions in Urozhaine due to lack of reinforcements - claimed that Ukrainian forces intensively shelled the unit’s positions around Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), resulting in casualties.[58] Geolocated footage showed elements of the Russian 30th Artillery Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) shelling Ukrainian forces north of Novodonetske.[59]

Ukrainian forces continued to advance east of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29, while continuing to secure positions in Robotyne. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes in the direction of Novodanylivka (4km southeast of Orikhiv) and Verbove (16km southeast of Orikhiv).[60] Shtupun added that Ukrainian forces made some unspecified advances southeast of Robotyne, and geolocated footage published on August 29 showed that Ukrainian forces made advances about five kilometers southeast of Robotyne.[61] Shtupun added that Ukrainian forces are continuing to secure positions and are undertaking stabilization measures in Robotyne. His comments were likely an effort to contextualize Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar’s statement on August 28 that Ukrainian forces have liberated Robotyne.[62] Russian sources claimed that fierce fighting is still ongoing on Robotyne’s southern outskirts.[63] North Ossetian “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania” volunteer battalion claimed that the intensity of fighting declined in Robotyne and that the central part of the settlement is still contested as of August 29.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on Verbove.[65] One Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division are repelling Ukrainian attacks east of Robotyne (closer to Verbove).[66]

A Russian source claimed on August 29 that Russian forces improved their positions near Verbove because of a successful counterattack. Rogov claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian forces away from Verbove and seized new unspecified positions.[67]

Ukrainian forces continued small scale raids across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on August 29. Geolocated footage published on August 29 showed Ukrainian servicemen raising a Ukrainian flag near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[68] A member of the Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Council, Serhiy Khlan, stated that this video of Ukrainian forces on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River was symbolic.[69] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Kozulyskyi Island (22km southwest of Kherson City).[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 29 that the Russian MoD is still unlikely to meet its targets for volunteer recruitment, despite offering incentives such as high salaries and additional social benefits.[71] The UK MoD reported that the Russian MoD paid lieutenants 81,200 rubles ($851) per month in February 2022 and currently pays junior Russian servicemen over 200,000 rubles ($2,096) per month.[72] ISW reported on August 3 that the Kremlin is attempting to establish favorable conditions to attract additional volunteers to service in the Russian military.[73]

Russian authorities continue efforts to coerce migrants living in Russia to fight in the war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian citizenship. Perm Oblast’s Kirovsky Raion Administration Head Mikhail Borisov announced on August 27 that Russian authorities conducted a joint raid in Kirovsky Raion, during which Russian authorities checked migrants’ citizenship documents, trade permits, employment contracts, and military registration status.[74] Borisov stated that Russian authorities issued summonses to the military registration and enlistment office to migrants who were not yet registered with the Russian MoD.[75] A prominent Russian milblogger amplified photos on August 28 of Russian authorities registering foreigners who have recently received Russian citizenship in Perm, likely during the joint raid that Borisov announced.[76] Russian opposition news outlet Mobilization News reported on August 29 that Russian police in Chelyabinsk Oblast detained and distributed military summonses to migrants from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.[77] A Russian milblogger amplified the narrative that migrants from Central Asian countries and the Caucasus, specifically, Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz migrants, need to “earn” a Russian passport through military service.[78]

Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian authorities are planning a new wave of mobilization in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Presidential Representative in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea reported on August 28 that Russian authorities plan to mobilize up to 30,000 servicemen and conscript up to 10,000 servicemen in occupied Crimea.[79] The report stated that occupation police officers or Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) personnel will hand out summonses and that Crimean occupation authorities are opening additional mobilization centers in preparation for the new wave of mobilization.[80] Ukrainian military expert Vladyslav Seleznyov stated that occupation authorities will likely announce mobilization after the local elections on September 10, similar to how Russian authorities did not announce “partial mobilization” last fall until after the regional elections.[81]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian sources reported that occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials sent children from Yasynuvata, occupied Donetsk Oblast to Chelyabinsk Oblast due to in-person education being “impossible” for an unspecified reason and because occupation authorities refused to allow remote schooling.[82]

A Russian opposition source reported that the United Russia party is pushing local collaborators, veterans, and Kremlin officials to participate in regional elections in the occupied territories. Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnie Istorii reported on August 28 that only 55 percent of United Russia’s candidates for regional elections in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts are local residents, compared to 89 percent of the Communist Party’s candidates and 85 percent of A Just Russia’s candidates.[83] Vazhnie Istorii reported that several Kremlin employees, State Duma deputies, and veterans of the war in Ukraine are running as United Russia candidates in the regional elections in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[84] Vazhnie Istorii discovered that several United Russia candidates listed Kherson City, which Ukrainian forces liberated in November 2022, as their place of residence.[85]

UNICEF reported that continued attacks on Ukrainian schools and low enrollment of Ukrainian refugee children in host country schools are detrimental to the education of many of Ukraine’s 6.7 million children. UNICEF reported on August 29 that Ukrainian children are experiencing widespread learning loss as a result of a fourth year of education disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.[86] UNICEF reported that constant attacks on Ukrainian schools leave children feeling distressed and have caused many children to fall behind in their school curriculum.[87] UNICEF reported that only one third of children living in Ukraine attend school fully in-person.[88] UNICEF reported that more than half of Ukrainian children who are refugees in seven unspecified countries are not enrolled in school due to language barriers, difficulty accessing schools, and previously overstretched national education systems.[89]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

A Ukrainian military official stated that Russian forces may use upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military exercises to increase Russia's military presence in Belarus. Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev reported on August 29 that Russian forces currently do not have ground forces in Belarus but may use the upcoming CSTO “Echelon,” “Poisk,” and “Vzaimodeystvye” exercises to increase Russia’s military presence in Belarus.[90] The CSTO announced that the “Echelon,” “Poisk,” and “Vzaimodeystvye” exercises will be a part of the joint operational-strategic “Combat Brotherhood-2023" exercise occurring from September 1 to 6.[91]

A Belarusian opposition figure claimed that the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has issued Wagner Group personnel Belarusian passports. Belarusian opposition leader Pavel Latushko claimed in an interview with the Polish Press Agency published on August 29 that the Belarusian MVD has issued Wagner personnel new passports under different names for a month possibly in preparation for sabotage activities.[92] Wagner personnel are unlikely to attempt to conduct sabotage activities against countries bordering Belarus as ISW has observed reports of Wagner personnel leaving Belarus and has assessed that Wagner is weakened following Prigozhin’s assassination.[93]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

8. US Strategic Command Hosts Former Iranian Official Who Bragged About Efforts To Assassinate US Leaders

US Strategic Command Hosts Former Iranian Official Who Bragged About Efforts To Assassinate US Leaders

Hussein Mousavian headlined STRATCOM's Deterrence Symposium

https://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-strategic-command-hosts-former-iranian-official-who-bragged-about-efforts-to-assassinate-u-s-leaders/

(Getty Images)

Adam Kredo

August 29, 2023

U.S. military leaders earlier this month hosted a former top Iranian official who came under fire last year for bragging about the hardline regime’s efforts to assassinate American leaders.

U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) tapped Hussein Mousavian, a former member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team who works as a Middle East security and nuclear policy specialist at Princeton University, to headline its 2023 Deterrence Symposium, a high-level powwow that brought the former Iranian official shoulder-to-shoulder with America’s top military brass.

Mousavian’s appearance at the mid-August gathering, which came to light on Monday after STRATCOM posted a video of the event, drew criticism from former U.S. officials and veteran Iran analysts who questioned why America’s premier military outfit would host someone who maintains close ties to the Islamic Republic.

In his remarks, Mousavian thanked Gen. Anthony Cotton for inviting him to the event and said he would present an "Iranian perspective" on the current threat landscape within the Middle East.

"I’m afraid you may not like it, but I think it’s important to know the other side," Mousavian said, adding that the United States must "rewrite their policy in the Middle East."

The Princeton professor went on to list what he described as unjustified American acts of aggression towards Iran dating back nearly a century and ending with former President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal.

"Iran complied completely [with the deal] with zero failure for three years, but the U.S. again broke the promise," Mousavian said. "Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear deal was really a disaster."

Trump "also had popular Iranian Revolutionary Guard General [Qassem] Soleimani assassinated," added Mousavian, who attended the late terrorist leader's funeral in Tehran.

"Mousavian helped lead the murderous Iranian regime’s efforts to obtain nuclear weapons so it could threaten the United States and our allies with annihilation," said Rep. Jim Banks, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. "Now he’s in semi-retirement at Princeton as a full time propagandist for the IRGC. Inviting him to spread lies at a U.S. military seminar is insanity."

"The decision to invite former Iranian ambassador Mousavian to speak to STRATCOM is unimaginably foolish," Gabriel Noronha, a former Iran adviser at the State Department, told the Washington Free Beacon. "He is a pawn and propaganda agent of the Iranian regime, which explains why he is allowed to travel back to Iran."

Mousavian, Noronha said, remains close with the Iranian regime, with former foreign minister Javad Zarif stating in 2016 that the former ambassador "continues to work hard" for Tehran’s interests while working at Princeton.

"Congress should investigate the decision-making process that led to this entirely inappropriate speaking invitation," Noronha said.

Mousavian’s perch at Princeton has long irked Iranian dissidents due to his alleged role in human rights crimes during his time as Iran’s ambassador.

Mousavian last year appeared to gloat about Iran’s death threats against former Trump administration officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his deputy, Brian Hook.

"I went to America and an American told me that Brian Hook’s wife can’t sleep, she cries and trembles, she told Brian, ‘They’ll kill you,’ since Hook was a partner in the death of Haj Qassem [Soleimani], that’s how much they were trembling," Mousavian was quoted as saying in a documentary film produced by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Advocacy groups like United Against a Nuclear Iran blasted Mousavian for sounding "gleeful" about the threats Iran poses to former American officials.

STRATCOM did not immediately respond to a Free Beacon request for comment.

Alireza Nader, a veteran Iran scholar based in Washington, D.C., said it is "outrageous and dangerous that U.S. STRATCOM invited a former regime official connected to the assassination of Iranian dissidents to be a speaker at its symposium, providing him access to America’s most senior military officials."

Princeton also recently drew scrutiny for hiring U.S. Iran envoy Robert Malley, who is currently the subject of an FBI investigation for his alleged mishandling of classified information. Malley has been suspended from his State Department duties as the probe continues.

Update 6:10 p.m.: This post has been updated with Mousavian's remarks.

9. A UN Body Sheds Light on the Fate of Disappeared Uyghurs

Conclusion:

By continuing its campaign of systematic imprisonment, even in defiance of U.N. bodies, the Chinese government continues to provide evidence that is engaging in ongoing crimes against humanity. To regain trust with the international community, the Chinese government should immediately release all those who have been victims of enforced disappearance.

A UN Body Sheds Light on the Fate of Disappeared Uyghurs

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has provided more evidence of China’s use of enforced disappearances in Xinjiang.

thediplomat.com · by William Nee · August 30, 2023

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A little-known United Nations body, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, is helping to shine a light on the extent of China’s enforced disappearances in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Starting from 2017, Chinese authorities intensified a large-scale campaign of repression that aimed to fundamentally transform the social, cultural, and religious life of this area, which has been traditionally inhabited by Turkic-speaking peoples.

As part of the crackdown, an estimated 900,000 to 1.8 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other predominantly Muslim people were sent involuntarily to high-security camps, which China labeled “vocational education and training centers.” Within these camps, torture, harsh interrogation, forced medication, and rape were common, according to research conducted by the U.N.’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The Chinese government says that it ended the camp system in 2019, claiming that those who had been subjected to internment had “graduated” and “found stable employment.” While these claims cannot be verified, independent research indeed indicates that the camp system has largely wound down, with some people being released and others being sent to prison.

But alongside the internment camp system, hundreds of thousands of people were sentenced to prison, with the Xinjiang government itself indicating that 540,826 people had been prosecuted in the region from 2017 to 2022. This is a high number in a region that is home to 25.8 million people, 14.9 million of whom are ethnic minorities.

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Very little is known about the fates and conditions of the people sentenced to prison during the crackdown. The Chinese government has made it nearly impossible for the outside world to know what is happening on the ground.

That’s why some of the recent opinions issued by the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) are so valuable: they offer a window into the fates of detained people.

The WGAD investigates alleged cases of arbitrary detention throughout the world. It sends urgent appeals and communications to the governments who have reportedly detained people in an arbitrary manner, to which these governments must then respond. Ideally, governments will take action to rectify any human rights violations.

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Over the past year, the WGAD has issued opinions on three cases involving Uyghurs, and the information contained in these opinions gives us insights into the fates of those sentenced to long prison terms in Xinjiang.

Crucially, all of the individuals that the WGAD issued opinions about were determined to have been arbitrarily detained and victims of enforced disappearance under international law. The WGAD has called for their immediate release.

But besides finding these Uyghurs to be arbitrarily detained, these U.N. opinions also contain some shocking details.

A Uyghur Cultural Figure Imprisoned For No Reason

One of the cases examined by the WGAD is that of Yalkun Rozi. A Uyghur literary critic who worked on the editorial board for the Uyghur Textbook Department of Xinjiang Education Press from 2001 to 2011, Rozi was sentenced to life in prison in 2018 on the charge of “splitting the State or undermining unity of the country.”

Rozi is far from alone. Many Uyghur cultural figures with no history of violent activity have been subjected to unfair trials – and the Chinese government cannot provide even the slightest reason why they were detained in the first place.

As the WGAD notes that in Yalkun Rozi’s case, “there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Rozi engaged in or incited violence.” The WGAD then essentially called the bluff of the Chinese government’s logic in failing to explain how a textbook editor could somehow merit being sentenced to life in prison for having “authored several books that had been in circulation in schools for more than a decade with the full approval of the authorities.”

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The WGAD also determined that Rozi “was denied appropriate legal assistance during his detention and subsequent trial.”

Ultimately, the WGAD concluded, “In the absence of any explanation by the Government as to the reasons for the arrest and detention of Mr. Rozi, or any rebuttal of the very serious allegations presented by the source, the Working Group concludes that the arrest and detention of Mr. Rozi was based on discrimination on the basis of him belonging to the Uyghur minority and belonging to the Muslim faith, in violation of article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

No Evidence Trials Even Took Place

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In another shocking finding from the WGAD, there is no proof that some Uyghurs sentenced to prison underwent trials at all.

In another batch of cases assessed by the WGAD, involving three detained Uyghur intellectuals – editor Qurban Mamut, entrepreneur Ekpar Asat, and retired physician Gulshan Abbas – the Chinese government did not respond to the U.N. body with any information whatsoever. Given the lack of public verdicts and no explanation of their detention, the WGAD concluded that “it is unclear if they have indeed stood trial at all.”

Also, the WGAD determined that it was highly likely that Asat and Abbas were detained solely for their foreign connections, and not for any internationally recognized crime. The WGAD opinion noted that Asat’s detention may have been related to his having taken part in the U.S. State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program in 2014. This is plausible since having connections overseas or having merely traveled overseas was a criteria the Chinese government used in deciding to detain Uyghurs during this period.

The opinion also notes that it is alleged that Abbas was taken away by authorities right after her overseas relative made a speech stating that Uyghurs were being systematically detained. This, too, is plausible given that the Chinese government has detained family members of overseas Uyghur journalists.

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Abbas “was imprisoned on charges of participating in terrorist activities, aiding a terrorist organization, and disrupting public order.” But there is no formal record of these charges, or any evidence against her, and China’s government refused to provide any information on the case in response to the WGAD’s request.

Operating in Total Secrecy

In another case from 2022, the WGAD issued an opinion on the case of an entire Uyghur family: Abdurashid Tohti, his wife Tajigul Qadir, and their two sons Ametjan Abdurashid and Mohamed Ali Abdurashid. The WGAD stated that it was “disturbed at the total secrecy which appears to surround the fate and whereabouts” of the four people, because the Chinese government refused to provide any information about the detained individuals.

The Chinese government claims to be operating in accordance with the “rule of law” and has pledged to “fully protect the public’s right to information” in court rulings in Xinjiang, but these pledges appear disingenuous when viewed through the practical experience of Uyghurs in actual cases.

Relatives of Abdurashid Tohti were told by the Chinese Embassy in Turkey that he had been sentenced to 16 years and 11 months’ imprisonment for the “crimes of disturbing social order and preparing to commit terrorist activities.” But no evidence was given. Similarly, Qadir was sentenced to a 13-year prison term for the “crime of preparing to commit terrorist activities” – again, without explanation.

To underscore the haphazard and random way in which the Chinese government has behaved in its crackdown on Uyghurs, the WGAD opinion notes that in the case of Ametjan Abdurashid, the government did not dispute the allegation that “prior to the court hearing, he was forced to choose from a list of offenses that are shown to persons belonging to the Uyghur minority and to plead guilty.”

Indeed, all four people were likely to have been subjected to an unfair trial, although, as in the cases above, there is no evidence that a trial even took place. The WGAD noted that “the charges against them are unknown and the dates of their trials, as well as details of those proceedings, if they ever took place, are equally unknown. The [Chinese] Government had an opportunity to clarify all this, but it chose not to do so.”

Day of the Disappeared

August 30 marks the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Numerous civil society groups have written an open letter to raise awareness of the Chinese government’s use of enforced disappearances and have urged the Chinese government to free disappeared human rights defenders, like lawyer Gao Zhisheng, as well as Uyghurs and Tibetan environmental defenders.

The world must particularly remember that the Chinese government has disappeared an enormous number of people in the Uyghur region since 2017 – potentially hundreds of thousands. Even now, years later, their loved ones often still do not know if their detained relatives are dead or alive.

If middle-aged people, like Abdurashid Tohti, age 54, or Gulshan Abbas, age 61, are given very long prison sentences – in prisons where hunger, torture, and lack of medical care are common – there is a good chance that these arbitrarily detained people could die in prison.

Chinese state media frequently dismiss the allegations that it has engaged in “crimes against humanity” or “genocide” in the Uyghur region as a bunch of “lies.”

But when confronted with real cases, such deflection becomes hard to sustain.

Can the Chinese government answer the basic questions raised by the WGAD? Can it provide information about the fate of Tajigul Qadir and her family? How is Ekpar Asat doing? Where is Gulshan Abbas?

As the WGAD notes, there is a pattern to the Chinese government’s behavior:

In its 30-year history, the Working Group has found China in violation of its international human rights obligations in numerous cases. The Working Group is concerned that this indicates a systemic problem with arbitrary detention in China, which amounts to a serious violation of international law. The Working Group recalls that, under certain circumstances, widespread or systematic imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty in violation of the rules of international law may constitute crimes against humanity.

By continuing its campaign of systematic imprisonment, even in defiance of U.N. bodies, the Chinese government continues to provide evidence that is engaging in ongoing crimes against humanity. To regain trust with the international community, the Chinese government should immediately release all those who have been victims of enforced disappearance.

William Nee

William Nee is the research and advocacy coordinator at the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD).

thediplomat.com · by William Nee · August 30, 2023

10. A Traveler’s Pocket Guide to Chinese Communist Party Doublespeak

A very interesting guide. I will defer to the China Hands to assess this. But it looks useful on my first read.  It might also be ueful for speechwriters who are looking for words to use to counter Chinese stataments. Return the doublespeak to them.

Download the handy chart at this link: https://scsp222.substack.com/api/v1/file/5e305c4c-93b2-4082-b12f-84b191f31c97.pdf

A Traveler’s Pocket Guide to Chinese Communist Party Doublespeak

https://scsp222.substack.com/p/a-travelers-pocket-guide-to-chinese?r=1qb0z5&utm_campaign=post&utm

2-2-2 AND NATSEC TECH BY SCSP

AUG 24, 2023

16

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Hello, I’m Ylli Bajraktari, CEO of the Special Competitive Studies Project. In this edition of 2-2-2, SCSP’s Liza Tobin, Channing Lee and David Lin decode underlying messages in PRC propaganda.

Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) re-opened after COVID lockdowns early this year, a steady stream of senior U.S. officials, foreign leaders, and corporate executives have traveled to China or sought other face-to-face engagements with PRC counterparts.

1 The U.S government has emphasized that “intense competition requires intense and tough diplomacy.” Both government and business leaders likely aim to use face-to-face meetings to strengthen their competitive edge in their respective domains and provide a degree of stability amid geopolitical tensions. More important than the meeting itself, however, is understanding the context and leveraging it for national or business advantage. U.S. and PRC diplomats famously battle over every detail of protocol for these meetings, from negotiating the right government level under which to conduct a meeting, to the logistics surrounding the stairs to plane and deplane from official aircraft. These dynamics are not new: decades of experience negotiating with the PRC since the 1970s should make Americans cognizant of Beijing's skill shaping optics and narratives and wary of taking its words at face value. 

President Nixon’s visit to China – and historic handshake with Mao Zedong – paved the way for modern U.S.-PRC engagement. Source: U.S. National Archives (1972)

Secretary Blinken met with PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang in June. Minister Qin has since been ousted by the CCP and replaced by Wang Yi, long-time top diplomat for the PRC. Source: U.S. Department of State (2023).

A Chinese slogan that became popular in the Mao era — 实事求是 (“seek truth from facts”) — captures the need to test theory against reality. During the PRC’s early years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invoked the phrase to push its version of the “truth” – with tragic results in the form of mass starvation and poverty. Such narrative engineering continues today, as the CCP twists language to revise history and shape public opinion both inside and outside China. Foreign interlocutors encounter this in meetings with PRC diplomats and executives who, regardless of personal views, must adhere to the CCP’s constructed and approved narrative – the “Party line” – and even demand that foreigners do likewise. 

Those who pursue dialogue with the PRC would do well to do their own version of “seeking truth from facts.” Learning to spot and interpret common CCP propaganda tropes can help foreign interlocutors avoid falling into traps and developing unrealistic expectations. After all, CCP propaganda is not only directed at PRC citizens – its target is global. 

Here are some frequently-used CCP expressions of the “truth” – alongside our effort to decode the underlying message:

To access the hyperlinks in the chart, please download the PDF version below.

PRC Propaganda Chart

176KB ∙ PDF file

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1

Cabinet-level visits and meetings this year include National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s meeting with foreign minister Wang Yi in Vienna in May, CIA Director Bill Burns’s visit to China the same month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit in June, and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry’s visits in July. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo recently announced she intends to visit China from August 27-30. U.S. tech executives visiting China this year have included Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Pat Gelsinger.

11. Air attack kills 2 in Kyiv while Russia accuses Ukraine of biggest drone attack of the war

Air attack kills 2 in Kyiv while Russia accuses Ukraine of biggest drone attack of the war

AP · August 30, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russian officials on Wednesday accused Ukraine of launching what appeared to be the biggest nighttime drone attack on Russian soil since the war began 18 months ago. The Kremlin’s forces also hit Kyiv during the night with what Ukrainian officials called a “massive, combined attack” that killed two people.

Drones struck hit an airport in western Russia’s Pskov region near the border with Estonia and Latvia, damaging four Il-76 transport aircraft that can carry heavy machinery, Russian state news agency Tass reported, citing emergency officials.

The airport strike, which was first reported minutes before midnight, started a massive fire, the regional governor and local media reported. Unconfirmed media reports said up to 20 drones may have targeted the airport.

More drones were shot down over the Oryol, Bryansk, Ryazan and Kaluga regions, as well as the region surrounding the Russian capital, according to the Defense Ministry. Three main Moscow region airports — Sheremetyevo, Vnukovo and Domodedovo — temporarily halted incoming and outgoing flights.

Aerial attacks on Russian soil have escalated in recent months as Ukraine pursues a counteroffensive to drive the invading forces out of its territory. Ukraine has increasingly targeted Russia’s military assets behind the front lines in the country’s east and south. The Kremlin has repeatedly accused the Ukrainian military of also launching drones toward Moscow.

Russia, meanwhile, used drones and missiles in its biggest bombardment of Ukraine’s capital in months, Ukrainian authorities said.

Two people were killed and another person was injured by falling debris, Serhiy Popko, the head of the Kyiv military administration, wrote on Telegram.

Russia launched Shahed exploding drones at the city from various directions and then followed with missiles from Tu-95MS strategic aircraft, Popko said. It was unclear how many were launched, but Popko called the attack the biggest on the capital since the spring.

In the aftermath, Kyiv resident Iryna Oblat pointed to debris in the street and shattered windows in surrounding buildings.

“Look where it hit, look what happened to the house,” she told The Associated Press. “Garages are on fire. We don’t know how many cars and garages were destroyed because firefighters and police won’t let us in.”

In Russia, Pskov regional Gov. Mikhail Vedernikov ordered all flights to and from the airport in the region’s namesake capital canceled for the day so the damage could be assessed during daylight.

Footage and images posted on social media showed smoke billowing over the city of Pskov and a large blaze. Vedernikov said there were no casualties, and the fire has been contained.

Pskov was the only region reporting substantial damage. In Kaluga, one drone was brought down and another hit an empty oil reservoir, causing a fire that was quickly extinguished, Gov. Vladislav Shapsha reported. Residential windows were shattered, Shapsha said.

In the Bryansk region, Gov. Alexander Bogomaz said six drones were downed overnight. One of them damaged an administrative building, he said, prompting a brief fire. Two were targeting a television tower, but were brought down. Russian media earlier on Wednesday cited local residents as saying they heard a loud explosion.

Two drones were downed over the Oryol region, Gov. Andrei Klychkov said. Two more were downed over the Ryazan region and one over the Moscow region, officials said.

The Oryol and Kaluga regions border Bryansk, and the Moscow region sits on top of Kaluga. Pskov, however, is about 700 kilometers (434 miles) north of Russia’s border with Ukraine, and was described by Russian media and military bloggers as an unlikely target.

Also early Wednesday, Russian-installed officials in Crimea, which Moscow annexed from Ukraine in 2014, reported repelling an attack of drones targeting the harbor of the port city of Sevastopol.

Fuel depots and airfields have been hit in drone attacks on Crimea or Russian-held regions that Moscow officials have blamed on Kyiv.

There was no immediate comment from Ukrainian officials, who usually refuse to take responsibility for any attacks on Russian soil.

Explosions in Ukraine were also reported in the southern city of Odesa and the Cherkasy region.

Ukraine’s air defenses destroyed 28 cruise missiles and 15 of 16 Iranian-made Shahed attack drones targeting the capital and multiple regions across the country overnight, the Ukrainian air force said in its daily Telegram update on Wednesday.

It said 43 weapons were downed in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy and the Odesa and Mykolaiv regions in the south of the country. The statement did not say what happened to the other drone.

————-

Litvinova reported from Tallinn, Estonia.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · August 30, 2023

12. U.S. to send $250 million in weapons to Ukraine

U.S. to send $250 million in weapons to Ukraine

BY TARA COPP

Updated 2:07 PM EDT, August 29, 2023

AP · August 29, 2023

FILE - Airmen with the 436th Aerial Port Squadron use a forklift to move 155 mm shells ultimately bound for Ukraine, April 29, 2022, at Dover Air Force Base, Del. The Biden administration will send an additional $250 million in weapons and ammunition to Ukraine as part of its ongoing support of Kyiv’s counteroffensive. The weapons will be drawn from existing U.S. stockpiles, officials said Tuesday, Aug. 29, and will include mine-clearing equipment, artillery and rocket rounds, ambulances and medical gear, among other items and spare parts. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon, File)

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WASHINGTON (AP) — The Biden administration announced Tuesday it will send an additional $250 million in weapons and ammunition to Ukraine as part of its ongoing support of Kyiv’s counteroffensive.

The weapons will be drawn from existing U.S. stockpiles and will include mine-clearing equipment, artillery and rocket rounds, ambulances and medical gear, among other items and spare parts, according to the State Department.

“The package will help Ukrainian forces on the battlefield and support its air defenses as Russia continues to launch brutal, brutal strikes against the people of Ukraine, including attacks this past week,” White House spokeswoman Karine Jean-Pierre said Tuesday.

The State Department said the package contained AIM-9M missiles for air defense, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System munitions, 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition and more than 3 million rounds of small arms ammunition.

The U.S. would have already run out of funding for the year to provide additional stockpile equipment to Ukraine but earlier this year realized the Pentagon had overvalued the equipment it had already sent, which freed up an additional $6.2 billion in funding.

Ukraine has already received more than $43 billion from the U.S. since Russia invaded last year. Those funds have provided weapons systems like howitzers and millions of rounds of ammunition to fight back against the much larger Russian military. Due to the intense and bloody land war, now in its 18th month, much of the ammunition and weaponry has already been used up.

—

Colleen Long in Washington and diplomatic writer Matthew Lee contributed to this report.

AP · August 29, 2023

13. Meta’s ‘Biggest Single Takedown’ Removes Chinese Influence Campaign

China certainly thnks influence operations are important and must believe it can achieve effects through social media. It must believe it is worth the very cheap investment in information and influence.

Meanwhile in the US it is easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist than it is to get permission to put an idea between his ears.

Meta’s ‘Biggest Single Takedown’ Removes Chinese Influence Campaign

By Sheera Frenkel

Reporting from San Francisco

Aug. 29, 2023

The New York Times · by Sheera Frenkel · August 29, 2023

The campaign began at least four years ago and spanned thousands of accounts on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X, Substack and Chinese websites, Meta said.

Meta said it had removed 7,704 Facebook accounts, 954 Facebook pages, 15 Facebook groups and 15 Instagram accounts tied to a Chinese campaign.Credit...Jim Wilson/The New York Times

By

Reporting from San Francisco

Aug. 29, 2023, 8:00 a.m. ET

On Feb. 27, an article claiming that the United States was behind the bombing of the Nord Stream underwater pipelines in the Baltic Sea was published on the Substack and Blogspot blogging platforms.

Within 24 hours, the article — and other versions of it — had been posted to more websites, including Reddit, Medium, Tumblr, Facebook and YouTube. Translations of the article in Greek, German, Russian, Italian and Turkish also began appearing online.

The posts were part of a Chinese influence campaign that stands out as the largest such operation to date, researchers at Meta said in a report on Tuesday. The effort, which the company said had started with Chinese law enforcement and was discovered in 2019, was aimed at advancing China’s interests and discrediting its adversaries, such as the United States, Meta said.

In total, 7,704 Facebook accounts, 954 Facebook pages, 15 Facebook groups and 15 Instagram accounts tied to the Chinese campaign were removed by Meta, which owns Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp. Hundreds of other accounts on TikTok, X, LiveJournal and Blogspot also participated in the campaign, which researchers named Spamouflage, for the frequent posting of spamlike messages, according to Meta’s report.

“This is the biggest single takedown of a single network we have ever conducted,” said Ben Nimmo, who heads Meta’s security team that looks at global threats. “When you put it together with all the activity we took down across the internet, we concluded it is the largest covert campaign that we know of today.”

“This is the biggest single takedown of a single network we have ever conducted,” said Ben Nimmo, who heads Meta’s security team that looks at global threats.Credit...Alexander Coggin for The New York Times

The Chinese campaign struggled to reach people and attract attention, Mr. Nimmo said. Some posts were riddled with spelling errors and poor grammar, while others were incongruent, such as random links under Quora articles that people could see had nothing to do with the subject being discussed.

Yet the operation is being disclosed at a delicate time in the relationship between the United States and China. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo is in China this week to talk with government officials and Chinese business leaders about trade relations. She is the fourth senior U.S. official to travel to China in less than three months.

The influence operation was the seventh from China that Meta has removed in the last six years. Four of them were found in the last year, said the company, which published details of the new operation as part of a quarterly security report.

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo arriving for a meeting in Beijing on Monday.Credit...Pool photo by Andy Wong

The effort appeared to “learn and mimic” Russian-style influence operations, Meta said. It also appeared aimed at a broad audience. At times, posts were in Chinese on websites such as the Chinese financial forum Nanyangmoney. At other times, posts were in Russian, German, French, Korean, Thai and Welsh on sites such as Facebook and Instagram, which are banned in China.

Chinese law enforcement appeared to work on the campaign from offices spread throughout the country, Meta said. Each office appeared to work in shifts, with activity in the midmorning and early afternoon, and breaks for lunch and dinner, the report said.

The accounts frequently posted identical messages on different social media platforms, in a timed effort to spread pro-China messaging online. The network was “wide and noisy,” Mr. Nimmo said, but struggled to reach people partly because “it was the same comment many times a day.”

“It was as if they copied them from a numbered list and forgot to proofread them before they posted,” he added.

While Meta has removed the campaign from Facebook and Instagram, many of the operation’s accounts on platforms like X, Reddit and TikTok remain online, according to a review by The New York Times.

The effort was discovered in 2019 by Mr. Nimmo and other researchers at Graphika, a company that studies social media. Meta said that it had removed elements of the operation in recent years, but that the campaign had kept returning with new accounts and tactics.

The operation initially focused on discrediting the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. In February 2020, the effort shifted to the outbreak of Covid-19, deflecting assertions that China was the origin of the virus and focusing blame on the United States.

In one instance, the operation published a 66-page research paper falsely claiming that Covid had started in the United States. It appeared on the website Zenodo, an online repository for researchers and academics to upload papers and data sets.

YouTube and Vimeo videos then promoted the research paper, along with posts on blogging platforms including LiveJournal, Tumblr and Medium that argued that the United States had hidden Covid’s true origins. Links to those posts were then published on Facebook and other social media sites, though many of the posts were not widely read.

In June 2020, the network began posting English-language videos on YouTube and TikTok that highlighted racial disparities in the United States, in an apparent effort to inflame divisions. Some of those videos went viral.

Meta also included links in its report to TikTok accounts that it said had been part of the Chinese operation. One of the most popular videos, which The Times viewed, showed a woman arguing in Chinese that life in Xinjiang, a far northwestern region of China, was peaceful. China has been under international scrutiny for carrying out repressive policies against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in the region.

The TikTok video was viewed more than 7,000 times.

Sheera Frenkel is a prize-winning technology reporter based in San Francisco. In 2021, she and Cecilia Kang published “An Ugly Truth: Inside Facebook's Battle for Domination.” More about Sheera Frenkel

The New York Times · by Sheera Frenkel · August 29, 2023

14. Democrat introduces bill to limit defense contractor, foreign government influence on Pentagon

Excerpts:

The proposed bill also seeks to ensure transparency on the issue by forcing contractors to submit detailed reports of their lobbying activities and requiring the Defense Department secretary to more routinely publish copies of unclassified Pentagon contracts.

In a similar vein, the legislation would limit the influence of foreign interests on the Pentagon, addressing concerns about retired military officials taking jobs abroad.

The Washington Post published an investigation last year that found more than 500 veterans, including generals and admirals, were hired for lucrative jobs around the world since 2015, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Persian Gulf states.

The bill from Kim would prohibit senior national security officials or intelligence government personnel from working on behalf of foreign governments or private firms connected to foreign governments.

Democrat introduces bill to limit defense contractor, foreign government influence on Pentagon

BY BRAD DRESS - 08/29/23 1:14 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4176819-democrat-introduces-bill-to-limit-defense-contractor-foreign-government-influence-on-pentagon/

Greg Nash

Rep. Andy Kim (D-N.J.) is seen during a press conference on Thursday, January 26, 2023 to introduce the Congressional Dads Caucus.

Rep. Andy Kim (D-N.J.) announced Tuesday that he has reintroduced legislation that would limit the ability of major defense contractors and foreign governments to hire former Defense Department officials and influence the Pentagon as lobbyists.

The Department of Defense Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act would impose a four-year ban on defense contractors hiring senior Pentagon officials and enact a similar ban on former Defense Department employees who managed their contracts.

It would also extend the prohibition of former military generals lobbying the Defense Department; require defense contractors to submit public, annual reports on the hiring of former senior department officials; and ban senior government officials from owning stock in major defense contractors that receive more than $100 million in revenue from the Pentagon.

Kim, the ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee’s Military Personnel subcommittee, said the Pentagon needs to “prevent conflicts of interest, root out corruption, waste, and fraud so officials can focus on the mission in front of them.”

“This bill is meant to reinforce those values and make sure that Americans know our defense force has their backs,” he said in a statement released Tuesday.

The Defense Department Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act is companion legislation to a bill reintroduced by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) in June.

It undoubtedly faces an uphill battle in Congress, where extensive legislation seeking to crack down on defense contractor influence has rarely seen the light of day.

Warren, who has tried for years to pass similar legislation with no success, said “national security is put at risk” when former senior military officials “sell their credentials to the highest bidder.”

“I’m renewing the push with Representative Kim to pass legislation that will root out corruption, rein in foreign influence, and ensure greater transparency over defense contractors and their interactions with [the Defense Department],” she said in a statement earlier this year.

Warren published a report in April that found about 672 instances of former government officials or military officials who went to work for contractors since 2021, most of whom became lobbyists. Boeing, Raytheon and General Electric hired the most, according to Warren’s report.

The proposed bill also seeks to ensure transparency on the issue by forcing contractors to submit detailed reports of their lobbying activities and requiring the Defense Department secretary to more routinely publish copies of unclassified Pentagon contracts.

In a similar vein, the legislation would limit the influence of foreign interests on the Pentagon, addressing concerns about retired military officials taking jobs abroad.

The Washington Post published an investigation last year that found more than 500 veterans, including generals and admirals, were hired for lucrative jobs around the world since 2015, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Persian Gulf states.

The bill from Kim would prohibit senior national security officials or intelligence government personnel from working on behalf of foreign governments or private firms connected to foreign governments.

15. Protest Rights are Under Assault. Activists Show How to Fight Back.

All students and practitioners of resistance, psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare should be studying this phenomena.

Protest Rights are Under Assault. Activists Show How to Fight Back.

justsecurity.org · by Brandee M. Butler · August 29, 2023

August 29, 2023

From Israel and Iran to China and France, massive protests are making international headlines. So too are the violent government crackdowns against them.

Around the world, people are taking to the streets to protest on a scale greater than ever before. Converging and overlapping factors—including crises in governance, economic volatility, rising inequality, and the accelerating impacts of climate change—are fueling social unrest and demands for change in nearly every region of the world.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), protests began to intensify in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. From 2009 and 2019, CSIS found that the average frequency of mass protests increased by over 11 percent. Researchers at the Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung similarly documented an increasing number of protests from 2006 through 2020. After a temporary lull in early 2020 due to the outbreak of Covid-19, protests surged again as anger mounted over government responses to the pandemic and systemic issues including racism and police violence. Since then, the accelerated pace of protests has continued. In 2023 alone, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Global Protest Tracker has recorded over 100 notable mass protests to date.

The right to protest is enshrined in international human rights law. But liberal and illiberal governments alike seem intent on suppressing the freedoms of assembly and expression. As protests have grown, governments have responded through force. Over the past decade, authorities around the world have adopted a common set of repressive tools and tactics to stifle protests and close civic space: As human rights movements grow in scope and power, authorities spread fear-based narratives and abuse counterterrorism and security laws to claim emergency powers, militarize their police, ban public protests, and overregulate independent media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other civil society groups. They employ new available surveillance technologies and spyware like Pegasus to monitor, discredit, and punish activists. And they invoke broad security or public health measures to arrest and detain people for peacefully protesting, publishing satire, or expressing political views in their art.

This pattern is so discernible that the Funders Initiative for Civil Society has dubbed it the “security playbook.” But by studying this playbook, frontline activists are devising new ways to defend the fundamental rights to influence political and social structures.

Here’s how allies in the international community—governments, legislators, donors, activists, and people who still believe in protecting fundamental human rights—can help.

Understanding the Global Security Playbook

At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, governments imposed alarming restrictions on fundamental freedoms in the name of public health and safety—some of which are still in place. Though seemingly well intentioned, many of these measures were quickly abused to stifle legitimate protest.

In the subsequent years, the world has witnessed more brutal crackdowns by authorities against protestors, including uprisings in Iran following the death of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, anti-war rallies in Russia, and demonstrations against draconian COVID-19 restrictions in China.

Attacks on fundamental civic freedoms are not just occurring in authoritarian states. Well-established democracies are clamping down on opposition too.

In May, the British government approved the controversial Public Order Act, which grants police unprecedented powers to restrict non-violent dissent. Human rights advocates have criticized parts of the new law, including enhanced stop-and-search provisions, that they say will disproportionately impact minority communities and exacerbate racist police violence. Recently, civic space watchdog CIVICUS downgraded the UK’s rating to “obstructed”—the same as Poland and Hungary.

Several states in Australia have implemented laws with harsh punishments, including imprisonment, for nonviolent protests that disrupt economic activity. Indigenous-led movements and climate justice protestors have been specifically targeted.

In Spain, the Citizen Security Law—the so-called “ley mordaza” or gag law—punishes critical or satirical speech, bans spontaneous protests in front of Parliament, and grants police extensive powers to punish demonstrators. Introduced following the 2013 anti-austerity protests, the law has ensnared rappers, Twitter users, and journalists since its approval in 2015. As intended, a high number of protestors have also been punished. Contentious efforts to reform the controversial law were abandoned by the Spanish parliament earlier this year.

In the wake of anti-racism demonstrations sparked by the murder of George Floyd in the United States, Republican lawmakers in the United States have introduced a litany of bills to punish public dissent. To date, 21 states have enacted legislation that restricts the right to peacefully protest, according to the International Center for Non-Profit Law. These bills range from criminalizing protests to making it easier for people to harm protesters without consequence.

How Civil Society Is Responding

All of these anti-protest measures share some key characteristics. The good news is that human rights activists have painstakingly mapped the common strategies and tactics many governments are using. Working off their findings, activists and allies can build strategies to push back and defend protest rights.

In Nigeria, for example, Spaces for Change and the Action Group on Free Civic Space—a collective of activists and lawyers—have extensively investigated and documented the tactics used by the Nigerian government to suppress free speech. The country has specifically targeted leaders of the #EndSARS protest movement, which called for disbanding a notoriously brutal unit of the Nigerian police. Activists have built a rich base of evidence that shows how the government has diverted massive financial resources, equipment, and technologies originally procured to fight terrorism to instead monitor the movement of citizens, track activities of civic actors online, intercept private communications, and limit the ability of protesters to organize.

Their contributions to understanding the security playbook have been pivotal. Advocacy by civil society, in large part based on the Action Group’s work, has led to important reforms to Nigeria’s Anti-Terrorism Act and Anti-Money Laundering Act, which had misapplied global standards to impose onerous regulations on nonprofit organizations.

In the Philippines, a team of independent researchers has exposed how former president Rodrigo Duterte’s administration used tactics from the security playbook to vilify activists and attack the right to protest. The local phenomenon of so-called red-tagging—labeling civil society actors as communists or terrorists to delegitimize them—enabled the government to mask repressive regulatory measures as necessary for national security. In their report, the researchers also explore how local activists have responded. Indigenous people–led groups have created safe spaces for deliberation on peace and security, mutual aid emerged as a powerful source of solidarity during the pandemic, and activist-led responses to cyberattacks have helped reclaim digital freedoms.

This critical research aims to reimagine the relationship between safety and security in the Philippines. The emerging strategies highlighted in the report are a potential blueprint for embattled activists in other countries, and a possible lever of change for donors and allies to support.

Earlier this year in Georgia, protesters staged massive demonstrations against a so-called foreign agents law—a common tactic in the security playbook that is used to cut off activists from funding by imposing strict regulations on critical foreign assistance and introducing intentionally broad or opaque regulatory frameworks for the government to exploit. The protests, sparked by civil society and independent media groups, moved Georgia’s parliament to formally revoke the draft bill. Other foreign agent laws are being considered in Kyrgyzstan, El Salvador, and even the European Union, where civil society groups are pushing back in hopes of a similarly successful response.

Using these collective, innovative, and community-driven strategies, human rights defenders are holding the line and protecting their right to protest—but barely. They urgently need support. So, what can their allies in the international community do to help?

Five Ways to Defend the Right to Protest

First and foremost, countries that proclaim themselves as democracies and defenders of open societies must lead by example. At the recent Summit for Democracy, governments made sweeping commitments to protect human rights defenders and keep space to protest open. Now, these states must close the gap between their rhetoric and their actions. The United States has an opportunity to step up by passing the Global Voices of Freedom Act. The European Commission can reject a planned registry for foreign-funded organizations, which more than 200 NGOs recently said would limit the bloc’s ability to support human rights abroad. Other governments can likewise demonstrate global leadership by addressing these issues at home.

Second, activists from marginalized communities must be able to access and participate in policymaking. Communities that are woefully underrepresented in the halls of power—including women, LGBTQ+ people, migrants, and racial or ethnic minorities—are often the canaries in the coal mine for human rights violations. They are among the first to be targeted, as well as the first to respond. By excluding them from high-level decision-making, governments and policymakers miss the chance to heed their early warnings. But when societies support their visions for change, it creates possibilities for more lasting and inclusive solutions.

Third, bilateral donors must commit resources to facilitate transnational alliances and coordination between civil society actors. Donor governments and private philanthropy should support civic space defenders to exchange learning and forge joint strategies with activists facing similar challenges in other countries or regions. This funding should be flexible rather than the typical project-based grants, to enable civil society groups to address threats as they emerge or change. It must be long-term, so that groups have time to tackle the underlying drivers of inequality instead of applying band-aid solutions. And it must prioritize safeguarding—long seen as an afterthought—so that activists can put in place measures to protect themselves from the intensifying backlash and persecution they face.

Fourth, the international community must not be afraid to leverage foreign policy initiatives to create openings for civic space. Integrating requirements for open civic space in the context of development aid, trade agreements, or other strategic relationships can be powerful levers—but only if states are willing to act. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a watchdog set up to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, provides an illustrative example. After governments abused its standards to target activists, FATF revised its framework and now penalizes states that misapply FATF’s policies. Policymakers must put teeth to these diplomatic tools and commitments by taking punitive action when conditions for open civic space are not met.

Finally, states should cooperate to better regulate and punish private sector companies that produce spyware used to perpetuate human rights abuses. The private surveillance industry has exploded in recent years with backing from private equity firms and lucrative deals with private and state actors, but regulations have not kept pace. The threats are so severe that the Committee to Protect Journalists and 180 other civil society groups recommend a global moratorium on the “development, export, sale, transfer, servicing, and use of spyware technologies until governments can put proper regulations in place.” There are also calls for an internationally regulated treaty that would allow sales only to governments that pledge to obey the rules of spyware use.

To further cooperation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recommends that governments, and specifically the European Union (EU), set up a list to track and sanction cybersurveillance companies that run afoul of the law. There is good precedent for sanctions. In 2021, the U.S. government blacklisted the NSO Group, the company behind the infamous Pegasus system, driving them to near bankruptcy. The United States, the EU, and other nations should use their economic leverage to restrict the use of spyware for malicious purposes and take measures to ensure legal accountability for illicit use of these products.

IMAGE: PORTLAND, OR – JULY 20: Mothers form the front line of a protest march toward Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse on July 20, 2020 in Portland, Oregon. Monday night marked 54 days of protests in Portland following the death of George Floyd in police custody. (Photo by Nathan Howard/Getty Images)

justsecurity.org · by Brandee M. Butler · August 29, 2023

16. A Strategic Strike Campaign – Ukraine Strikes Back - Farther and More Often

Deep attack is back.

Excerpts:

This strategic strike campaign is designed to influence public opinion in Russia. As President Zelenskyy has recently noted after a drone attack on Moscow:

Today is the 522nd day of the so-called 'Special Military Operation', which the Russian leadership thought would last a couple of weeks. Gradually, the war is returning to the territory of Russia - to its symbolic centres and military bases, and this is an inevitable, natural and absolutely fair process.

With the winter months approaching (watch for my article on this tomorrow), these strategic strike operations will only grow in importance and visibility. It is a way to keep fighting when ground maneuver becomes difficult in the wet, cold season. And it is a way to project progress in the war to Ukraine’s supporters during a period of low tempo in other operations.

I would offer a note of caution, however. While the long-range strike campaign being conducted by the Ukrainians is vital, it is not a silver bullet and will not in itself win the war. Military forces are complex organisations with many different capabilities in function, range, scale and impact. As such the evolving Ukrainian strategic strike campaign is just one part of a complex and highly networked system of humans, machines and information that Ukraine needs to win this war.

A Strategic Strike Campaign

Ukraine Strikes Back - Farther and More Often

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/a-strategic-strike-campaign?r=7i07&utm

MICK RYAN

AUG 29, 2023

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(Image:Microsoft Bing Image Creator)

In the past few hours, reports have emerged of strikes conducted in multiple regions across Russia and occupied Crimea. Today’s attacks are a demonstration of the evolving sophistication and capability of Ukraine’s conduct of strike operations. The Ukrainians are not only conducting strikes on an expanding list of targets but doing it at longer range.

Back in May, I published an article that explored Ukrainian adaptation and how the Ukrainian Armed Forces had continuously learned and evolved their conduct of strike operations throughout this war. Today, I offer an updated version of that earlier piece, taking into account the events of the past 24 hours as well as the array of other Ukrainian strike activities that have occurred since the middle of 2023.

As I noted in May, throughout the war the Ukrainian Armed Forces have undertaken a range of adaptations to their force posture, structure and processes to enhance their operational effectiveness. Their development of more complex, long-range strike capabilities stands out.

Ukraine Strikes Back - Farther

Long range strike has been a key evolution for the Ukrainians since the beginning of the Russian invasion. While this has principally been founded on ground-based rocket launchers, armed drones, cruise missiles from the UK and France (and hopefully soon from Germany), and uncrewed maritime strike vessels have also expanded the reach of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022. This is a logical next step. These long-range strikes are not just military operations, but a political necessity.

From the middle of 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Force have demonstrated the ability to absorb and use very precise, long range rocket systems against the Russians. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), an American truck mounted rocket launch platform, began to be deployed to Ukraine in June 2022. It is a lighter, more deployable version of the tracked M270 Mobile Rocket Launch System (MLRS) that was used during the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars. However, after the arrival of the HIMARS, several nations such as the United Kingdom and Germany also provided MLRS platforms to Ukraine.

The HIMARS and MLRS, because of their long range and precision, are weapons for attacking targets deep behind the front line of fighting. This makes them more of an operational level tool than a tactical one, where artillery is still the predominant form of fire support. These rockets fired by the HIMARS and MLRS, almost exclusively the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), have been used to destroy critical Russian communications nodes, Russian Army headquarters and command posts, locations where reserve Russian troops are houses and important logistics facilities.

Perhaps the most important impact of these long-range rocket launchers is that they permitted the Ukrainians – after a bloody campaign in the Donbas in mid 2022 - to return to fighting the Russians at a distance. This was a critical Ukrainian adaptation in the east, because the Russians had changed tactics to concentrate their forces in single large, high-attrition offensive. The Russians used their advantage in firepower in the Donbas and forced the Ukrainians into an attritional battle for the Donbas. The introduction of HIMARS changed the battlefield calculus in the fight for Ukraine.

A key target was command and control nodes, command posts with senior Russian commanders. These were not large targets and were outside the range of Ukraine’s existing 155mm and 152mm artillery systems. The ability to rapidly target these, once detected, and use the accuracy of the HIMARS rockets to inflict maximum destruction was vital. Additionally, many Russian supply depots, located close to railways, were proximate to civilian towns and cities The greater precision of the HIMARS missiles allowed the Ukrainian army to minimise collateral damage in their attacks against high-value Russian targets.

This change in Ukrainian capability also had a psychological effect on the Russians. More of the invading Russian force was at threat of attack from the longer range and more precise GMLRS rockets. Russian soldiers saw its impact firsthand, and on social media. The Russians had to quickly adapt, and disperse their already tenuous logistic system, making them even less efficient.

Beyond Ground Based Systems

But these ground-based systems have not been the only new long range strike weapons deployed by the Ukrainians. In 2023, their ability to strike the Russians was enhanced with long range aerial weapons. Initially, the Ukrainians modified old Soviet-era Tu-141 Strizh surveillance drones to conduct strike operations. The Strizh looks more like a cruise missile than a traditional reconnaissance drone. It is rocket launched from a trailer and flies a predetermined course at transonic speed. After some modification by the Ukrainians, these stop-gap cruise missiles were then used in long range strikes on the Engels and Dyagilevo Air Bases inside Russia in December 2022.

The Ukrainians, as they have done throughout this war, learned, and adapted. It has informed their long-range strike planning and execution. This came in very useful when more sophisticated and modern long-range weapons because available to the Ukrainian armed forces in 2023.

In 2023, a newer aerial long-range strike capability entered the Ukrainian inventories. The provision of the UK-built Storm Shadow missile was announced by the British Prime Minister in May 2023. The Storm Shadow is a stealthy missile launched from fighter aircraft and able to hit targets over 250 kilometres from its launch point. The Storm Shadow is designed to strike high value targets with its 400-kilogram penetrating explosive warhead. The missile extends the ability of the Ukrainian armed forces to strike operational level Russian targets and has forced adaptation from the Russians to disperse and defend their high value headquarters and logistics nodes.

Ukraine has also been developing indigenous solutions to its long-range strike requirements. Ukraine, in attempting to narrow the chasm between its long-range capabilities and those of Russia has expanded its array of indigenous drone programs for reconnaissance and attacking enemy fixed targets, vehicles and other drones. One Ukrainian company, AeroDrone, has stated that one of its models, called Enterprise and based on the frame of a light aircraft, can fly over 3,000 kilometres. Notwithstanding the provision of Western longer-range strike missiles such as Storm Shadow, it is likely that Ukraine will continue to develop its own strike drones as the war continues.

Over the past few months, these new systems as well as simpler commercial drones, have been used to attack strategic targets across the breadth of Russia. Multiple attacks have been executed on targets in Moscow, in May, July and August this year. Not only have physical targets been damaged but drones have forced multiple closures at Moscow airports. These attacks have avoided civilian casualties but have generated massive media attention – and probably a massive political headache for Putin and his military staff.

The Kerch Bridge has also suffered multiple attacks, including in July and August this year. This is a target with both political and military utility. It is a legitimate military target because of amount of military traffic that uses it to resupply Russian occupation forces in Crimea. It is also a political target because it was project personally overseen (and opened) by Putin. Attacking the bridge is attacking Putin. You can read more about the Kerch Bridge attacks here.

Finally, airfields have increasingly been targeted by the Ukrainians. While this campaign against Russian airfields began in 2022, it has broadened in the past few months. One of the most spectacular was the attack on 22 August this year which resulted in the destruction of a Tu-22M strategic bomber at Russia’s Soltsy-2 airbase. Most recently, Australian-made cardboard drones were used to attack an airfield in Kursk. And, of course, we have the overnight attacks which appear to have targeted the Pskov military airfield where Russia has its Il-76 equipped 12^th Military Transport Aircraft Division based.

These airfield attacks, which target aircraft as well as airfield infrastructure such as fuel installations, have military utility. Not only does it destroy capability, the attacks force a Russian reassessment of their air defence resources. Importantly, it could force redeployment of Russian air force assets further from Ukraine, limiting their utility.

(Image: Twitter/X)

Finally, it appears that a major producer of microelectronics – SILICON EL in Bryansk – was also struck in last night’s attack. This represents a further expansion of Ukraine’s target set for its strategic strike campaign. Given such products are used in an array of military systems, it is a legitimate target. Russia has been striking Ukrainian defence industry since the beginning of the war.

Another development that has allowed the Ukrainians to strike further is their continuous development of semi-submersible attack systems for the maritime domain.

Into the Maritime Domain

Perhaps the most spectacular achievement of the Ukrainians in the maritime domain was the sinking of the Russian Navy cruiser Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, in April 2022. In an operation that involved Ukrainian drones as well as Neptune missiles, the ship was struck by two missiles around 8pm on 13 April 2022. It was confirmed to have sunk by the Russians on 14 April 2022. Additional

But although the Russians have evolved their naval activities to make them less vulnerable to such strikes by land-based maritime strike weapons, the Ukrainians have also adapted. They have not given up on their intentions to strike Russian naval vessels, and at the minimum, restrict their freedom of movement in the Black Sea.

In October 2022, the Ukrainians conducted a surprise attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet with up to seven uncrewed surface vessels, supported by eight uncrewed aerial vehicles. An Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate and a Russian Navy mine countermeasure (MCM) ship were reportedly attacked by the Ukrainian kamikaze boats. In the wake of the attack, the Russian Ministry of Defence acknowledged only that there had been minor damage to the mine countermeasures vessel.

Subsequent attacks were conducted in March, April and May 2023, although there is believed to have been little damage caused by the Ukrainian kamikaze boats in these attacks. Another attack was conducted against a Russian naval ship in August, as well as an attack on a Russian tanker the same month.

The Ukrainians have developed at least three uncrewed surface vessels. The first is a five metre long, surface vessel that looks much like a covered speed boat. With an explosive warhead of up to 200kg, and an operational radius of nearly 400km, these USVs were the ones involved in the October 2022 attack at Sevastopol. A second USV developed by Ukraine is a semi-submersible vessel, which is smaller than the larger surface USV used in the October Sevastopol attacks. A third vessel is the Toloka Armed Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (UUV). A vessel with a tubular body and a large keel and horizontal stabilizers amidships, it was revealed in April 2023. Designed as a family of one-way kamikaze submersibles for attacking Russian warships, the Toloka’s have a range from 100 to almost 2000 kilometres depending on the variant.

A great resource on this evolving Ukrainian capability is H.I. Sutton, “Ukraine’s Maritime Drones (USV): What You Need to Know”, published at his excellent Covert Shores website. You can read it here.

This series of maritime strike vessels is an exemplar of the Ukrainians adapting their strategy to embrace an indirect approach against a conventional navy. With almost no likelihood of developing its own conventional naval fleet to fight the Russians, the Ukrainians have developed uncrewed capabilities. While ostensibly designed to sink or damage Russian surface warships, they are also intended to have the psychological effect of dissuading the Russian ships from putting to sea. Given that many of the missile attacks aimed at Russia originate from warships in the Black Sea, Ukraine is hoping to reduce the effectiveness of the Russia Black Sea Fleet.

A Strategic Strike Campaign

All this points to a growing sophistication in the Ukrainian strike capability. Indeed, we might now observe these operations as a separate strategic strike campaign, which is designed to generate political and strategic military effects for the Ukrainian conduct of the war. It plays an important part in degrading Russian military capability, forcing the redeployment of air defence radars and other systems, while also demonstrating to Ukraine’s supporters that it is serious about winning the war.

This strategic strike campaign is designed to influence public opinion in Russia. As President Zelenskyy has recently noted after a drone attack on Moscow:

Today is the 522nd day of the so-called 'Special Military Operation', which the Russian leadership thought would last a couple of weeks. Gradually, the war is returning to the territory of Russia - to its symbolic centres and military bases, and this is an inevitable, natural and absolutely fair process.

With the winter months approaching (watch for my article on this tomorrow), these strategic strike operations will only grow in importance and visibility. It is a way to keep fighting when ground maneuver becomes difficult in the wet, cold season. And it is a way to project progress in the war to Ukraine’s supporters during a period of low tempo in other operations.

I would offer a note of caution, however. While the long-range strike campaign being conducted by the Ukrainians is vital, it is not a silver bullet and will not in itself win the war. Military forces are complex organisations with many different capabilities in function, range, scale and impact. As such the evolving Ukrainian strategic strike campaign is just one part of a complex and highly networked system of humans, machines and information that Ukraine needs to win this war.

​17. Blind, See, Kill: The Grand Networking Plan To Take On China

Excerpts:

Finally, the Admiral offered more detail about what it will take, both in terms of diplomacy and technology, to get the U.S. and its regional allies all viewing the same battle 'picture' via advanced networking and communications:

"I think the first thing I would say is the sharing agreements across partner nations, right, all of our agreements are bilateral, and we're talking about a multinational way to link it. So we're gonna have to get to the agreements. We have to make sure that our partners trust that we will protect the things that are critical to them. We have to make sure that it's cyber-safe. We have to make sure that all of those nations understand what we're trying to do, how we're trying to do it, and how it betters the theater. So, the agreements piece is probably the longest pole."

"There are technology pieces that the team is working on... And oh, by the way, we've tried this before. The CENTCOM partner network... 33 nations or so we're trying to get to a single pane of glass ability to synchronize, communicate, coordinate, organize and operate. Right now I have 16 separate networks to do that, and I can't get two of my buddies on the same piece of glass. So it's a huge challenge."

"Technologies is a piece, agreements are a piece, and with all the great work that my team and the department has done on the allies and partner side, we think we can move this pretty quickly too."

Blind, See, Kill: The Grand Networking Plan To Take On China

A massive network is being constructed to give everyone from soldiers to allied countries a “single pane of glass” view of the battlefield.

BY

TYLER ROGOWAY

|

PUBLISHED AUG 29, 2023 6:56 PM EDT

thedrive.com · by Tyler Rogoway · August 29, 2023

Admiral John Aquilino, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), offered remarkably detailed comments on what he sees as critical future capabilities needed to fight and win a high-end conflict in his vast area of responsibility — namely against China.

Aquilino's remarks came from the National Defense Industrial Association's Emerging Technologies and Defense symposium in Washington, D.C. yesterday, which The War Zone attended. Joseph Dunford, a retired Marine four-star general and the ex-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hosted the discussion with the INDOPACOM boss.

Adm. John C. Aquilino, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has a very ambitious plan to connect all his forces and allies via a 'single pane of glass' interface. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Anthony J. Rivera)

The talk quickly ventured into the topic of how Aquilino is preparing for what could become an unprecedented fight in terms of the speed and the scale that said capabilities will be applied over a vast battlefield. What's clear is that networking and data-fusion remain the centerpiece of America's emerging warfighting strategy in this tense region. At the center of the Admiral's plans is a grand networking scheme that ties everyone in the battlespace together — including regional allies — and offers a single 'pane of glass' God's eye view of the battlefield to everyone from soldiers on desolate windswept islands, to allied warships, to commanders managing the conflict thousands of miles away.

Author's note: Long quotes in a direct transcript fashion were used for this piece as there was no better way to properly convey the complex concepts the Admiral was putting forward, how they relate to one another, and the extra color that his own words could only provide.

"The approach for the United States military... is one piece of the forms of national power that are required, because the PRC [People's Republic of China] problem will require all forms of national power, and it's referred to as 'integrated deterrence' by the Secretary of Defense. I can speak about the military arm. Although we're coordinated with some of the other portions of national defense... our approach is to provide for lethal combat power west of the international dateline that's prepared to respond, that's postured accordingly, that is tied with our allies and partners, and has the right capabilities to be able to deter. And let there be no doubt the goal is to prevent this conflict, not to have it."

"That said, the Secretary gave me a second mission and says if deterrence has failed, then you better be prepared to fight and win... When we talk about the capabilities needed, we talk about it through the lens of 'blind, see, and kill...' The ability to operate in contested space survivably and deliver the effects that we're tasked to do, that's the 'blind' piece. The 'see' piece has to have a persistent understanding of the battlespace, where everything is at every second to a targeting level quality."

"Think, click, and shoot."

The Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Cape St. George launches a Tomahawk cruise missile. (USN)

"Then the kill piece is the right weapons with the right numbers of weapons, and the network that links them to be able to affect and close the kill chain. And my argument is all of my geographic combatant commander brothers and sisters want and need that same capability. We refer to it in the terms of 'decision superiority.' And that means first, we have it today, but we need to accelerate it and we need to always stay in front of any adversary."

Dunford then asked Aquilino about the challenges China is putting up to U.S. power projection, and what he feels better or worse about today than five years ago in terms of confronting and overcoming those challenges.

"What I think is they're on their five year [plan], and if you go back three different budgets for them, or four years, over our 20 years in the desert, they focused very clearly on delivering a force capable to take on the United States. And the speed and acceleration that they have shown and they are delivering, right, when you talk about outputs, we all look at the Chinese to understand, truly, where they are, what they're doing. The largest military buildup since World War Two, both in conventional forces and then strategic-nuclear. J-20s are in full-rate production, ships coming off their industrial baseline at numbers that only replicate what we did in the Lehman time and the 600 ship Navy kind of time frame. Again, nuclear build up... is the largest and continuous we've seen. So those are the concerning pieces. And that's what we're walking into."

The massive expansion of China's Navy is one of many concerns for U.S. commanders to deal with. (PLAN)

"Now, on the optimism side, the department focusing on the PRC as the primary security challenger and the defense strategy-based budget that has been pushed forward, certainly is encouraging. The deputy's words on the delivery of outcomes with speed [Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks' speech earlier in the day which you can read more about here] is encouraging..."

On how allies play into all this, Admiral Aquilino offered these words:

"As we all know, the key, or one of our asymmetric advantages, as we work through this delivery of deterrence is our synchronization, information sharing and work together with our allies and partners. Five treaty allies in the region: Japan, Korea, Philippines, Australia and Thailand. The work that we do together everyday, and it is every day with those allies, is critical — the partners as well [as] the rest of the nations in the region. What you have seen occur is more integration, more multilateral operations and rehearsals, and practice together. It is an asymmetric advantage that we have, whether we're talking about the trilateral relationship between Japan, Korea and the United States, recently described and emphasized by the heads of state. Whether you're talking about the support and the additional sites in the Philippines that we will build out and practice in order for our forces to be able to operate together. The work in Australia with AUKUS tied with the United Kingdom to deliver once-in-a-generation warfighting capability, and then expand from technology and other areas besides submarines, where we can deliver warfighting effects. Again, it's really an asymmetric advantage. And probably... one of the key opportunities that we have to continue exploiting."

"So let me get into a couple of programs now, because the development and the initiation of the programs I'll talk about... First, we talk about a Joint Fires Network. So when I articulate 'blind, see and kill,' the Joint Fires Network is the mechanism by which we would integrate, synchronize, and utilize to deliver effects anywhere in the battlespace, and bring to PACOM [INDOPACOM] — that's over half the globe. Whether they be fires, effects or logistics requirements, and synchronize those actions across the board. And those are applicable to be supported and delivered to our allies and partners as well."

Joint Fires Network will tie forces together via datalinks to provide a common actionable tactical picture. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Sonja Wickard/Released)

"Second, is a mission partner environment. Think of that as the transport mechanism to deliver and synchronize, integrate and operate with our allies and partners. Think of a 'single pane of glass' with the ability for login attributes, classification, and FTO requirements to be able to communicate with my partners anytime, anyplace, anyday."

"Third is referred to as the Pacific Multi-Domain Training And Experimentation Capability (PMTEC)... So think about linking ranges from the west coast of the United States, to Alaska, to Australia, to Guam, and to further forward in Japan, and anywhere in the theater. So, if you think about the ability to train together, over the broad space needed, and utilize that range as an experimentation capability with our allies and partners, now you get right after what the deputy was talking about, on how you practice, rehearse, experiment, and ultimately deliver capability."

"And then lastly, we work through what we refer to as Stormbreaker, which is our ability to run through scenarios, to develop CONOPS to assess those CONOPS and plan at a speed that can't be done today, without 'stubby pencil' J5 planners, but to automate that set of capabilities."

Dunford then pushed for more info about the massive amounts of data and the processing, deconfliction, and display of that data under the 'Joint Data Integration Layer.' Dunford also noted that it is designed to overcome issues with interoperability and integration among disparate force elements.

"For us, it's the Assault Breaker Two team that is plugged in on Hawaii. Matter of fact, they have put the virtual team and built a simulation facility in the Pacific for us to use this. Here's the metric for me, 1,000 targets in 24 hours — targeting level quality, persistent, ready to go. Now that's supported by many of the ISR [information, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets... But really, what we're looking for is 'all source Intel' and the ability to distill it down to that wisdom we discussed. And boy, you're right, we still don't have enough ISR. But what I think this data-informed ability to pull it all together, you know, I go back to the aircraft shoot-down not long ago. And I think you were in the chair, right? How did we find out that the Russians actually shot that airplane down was by a social media post. We all have that data, because it all contributes. And then we have to weed through it to determine what's a value and how does it deliver to the fight."

Under the Admiral's ambitious plan, everything will feed into a deconflicted and refined common battlespace picture, from high-end ISR assets like this MQ-4C Triton to a swarm of unmanned surface vessels to space-based sensing and even data collected by sensors that are forward-deployed by small ground units. The distributed nature of battlefield data collection will be critical to winning a future fight, but parsing and fuzing all of it and transferring it around a vast battlefield will be major hurdles. (USN)

Asking for more specificity as to the over-arching network that will enable what could only be defined as a revolution in connected warfighting, Aquilino gave this very clear summary:

"So from the INDOPACOM perspective, we are purely focused on the kill chain and the ability to persist, sustain, and command the fight. So think 'F2T2EA' — find, fix, target track, employ and assess. That is the foundational set of actions that have to occur from the military warfighting capability sense. Now on top of that, the approach is to be able to deliver a common operational picture for every node in the battlespace — the same exact targeting level quality picture for everyone. And in that mesh node of delivery, any fighting formation is able to employ and carry out their responsibilities in the battlespace, whether there's an attempt to impact those command and control nodes. But that mesh allows it to occur. And again, the network that we're talking about, we refer to as the Joint Fires Network."

Project Manager Tactical Network, Program Executive Office for Command Control Communications-Tactical (PEO C3T), conducts Scalable Network Node (SNN) new equipment training for the 51st Expeditionary Signal Battalion (ESB) – converting the unit to a modernized ESB-Enhanced (ESB-E) formation – at Joint Base Lewis McChord, Washington. The SNN provides a significant reduction in the footprint requirements of an ESB-E. (Amy Walker, Project Manager Tactical Network, PEO C3T public affairs)

As to how very ambitious capabilities like the Joint Fires Network, and other emerging high-tech concepts, will go from great sounding ideas to operational realities at scale, Aquilino said the following:

"In the Pacific, we certainly need to scale. Again, I don't know if I tie those two together the emerging technologies and scale. I think what I would say is the emerging technologies in our construction of the Joint Fires Network, Mission Partner Environment, PMTEC and Stormbreaker, I would view it through the lens of pulling those emerging technologies into the open architecture, in places where we provide benefit, and then deliver those capabilities. The scaling of it... when we did our first experiment with the Joint Fires Network, we started with a eight nodes — in exercise Northern Edge Tac (sp?) One. In Northern Edge Tac Two we went up to 20 nodes. So, the key is to both inject emerging technologies that are advancing the capability, and then scaling it at a pace. So, I don't know if I tied the two together, but they certainly are interrelated and I just kind of gave you our approach on how to do this. And then in the next exercise-slash-experiment, we hope to increase that even more, and at some point, we'll pull in and plug one into one of our allies and partners. So the continued growth assessment on what was right, what was not right, and then [the] ability to adjust quickly. I think that's where it fits."

An F-117 aggressor recovers from a Northern Edge sortie, with Pantheon's 727 test jet and an B-1B in the background. Northern Edge is a critical set of test-focused war games that help prove emerging technologies and especially those surrounding networking. (USAF)

Finally, the Admiral offered more detail about what it will take, both in terms of diplomacy and technology, to get the U.S. and its regional allies all viewing the same battle 'picture' via advanced networking and communications:

"I think the first thing I would say is the sharing agreements across partner nations, right, all of our agreements are bilateral, and we're talking about a multinational way to link it. So we're gonna have to get to the agreements. We have to make sure that our partners trust that we will protect the things that are critical to them. We have to make sure that it's cyber-safe. We have to make sure that all of those nations understand what we're trying to do, how we're trying to do it, and how it betters the theater. So, the agreements piece is probably the longest pole."

"There are technology pieces that the team is working on... And oh, by the way, we've tried this before. The CENTCOM partner network... 33 nations or so we're trying to get to a single pane of glass ability to synchronize, communicate, coordinate, organize and operate. Right now I have 16 separate networks to do that, and I can't get two of my buddies on the same piece of glass. So it's a huge challenge."

"Technologies is a piece, agreements are a piece, and with all the great work that my team and the department has done on the allies and partner side, we think we can move this pretty quickly too."

Contact the author: tyler@thedrive.com

thedrive.com · by Tyler Rogoway · August 29, 2023

18. Air Force expanding number of bases in Pacific over next decade

Air Force expanding number of bases in Pacific over next decade

But the exact number depends on how much money the service gets in the future.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

The U.S. Air Force will increase its number of bases across the Pacific over the next decade, in an effort to spread out and become more survivable in conflict.

The service’s bases “will grow in increments that are visible through time, across probably two or three [future years defense programs] as we work through that,” said Brig. Gen. Michael Zuhlsdorf, the service’s deputy director of resource integration for engineering, logistics, and force protection.

But the total number of bases is dependent on how much funding the Air Force receives, Zuhlsdorf said Tuesday at the Mitchell Institute.

“You think about island chains that are either in the first island chain, there are some bases that are already set there, and then the second island chain, which is basically Guam, and all of those regions in there and so there's a number of different airfields that we're working through, and based on the resourcing that number will shift,” Zuhlsdorf said.

The Air Force has done analyses to figure out which bases could be used to “generate an air tasking order” based on the number of “spokes” in the area, Zuhlsdorf said. The service uses the term “hub-and-spoke” to describe bases in its Agile Combat Employment concept, or ACE, which was created to make the service more mobile in the Pacific.

In the ACE concept, a few airfields serve as central ports, or hubs, while several smaller airfields serve as spokes. The idea is to be able to distribute weapons and assets over a large area and to increase survivability, versus just having a few large airfields throughout the geographically enormous region.

But while there is general direction on ACE in the Pacific—where the concept originated—the service is leaving it up to individual commanders to institutionalize the concept, said Col. James Hartle, associate director of logistics, deputy chief of staff for logistics, engineering, and force protection.

“We really allow our units to try and define that for themselves. We've got a little bit of overarching guidance, now from the air staff to try to formalize the training for that, but ultimately we are putting the onus on our commanders [who] are in the field to execute their mission the best way that they know how, and obviously allowing us to get their requirements and working through that organized training and equipping element a little bit,” Hartle said.

Implementing the concept in the Pacific will look different from unit to unit, Hartle said, as each has different weapon systems and different locations they’ll be operating from.

“I think it's really a unique way that ACE has kind of evolved in really allowing the units to execute, grab those lessons learned, provide some guidance, but not so directive in nature that the left-right boundaries to do that are so tight that it's ineffective,” Hartle said.

The service has also been practicing its ACE concept outside of the Pacific—like when it recently surged fighters to U.S. Central Command to combat Russian aggression, said Col. Patrick Launey, chief of the logistics readiness division.

“We look at operations in Europe and the Middle East recently, CENTCOM and EUCOM, where the United States Air Force and Space Force was providing support. There were a lot of situations where we were employing aspects of agile combat employment into how we were going to posture and conduct operations,” Launey said.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

19. Four-star panel to weigh in on Pentagon’s rapid experiments

I would also include a panel of E-4 (Specialists). Although that is said partially tongue in cheek I do think we need young eyes and brains looking at the future. I am not confident old people (like myself) are really the best for decisions about the future. Yes experience is important but so is an understanding of the future of society which does not fit into our old traditional paradigms.

Four-star panel to weigh in on Pentagon’s rapid experiments

c4isrnet.com · by Courtney Albon · August 29, 2023

WASHINGTON — A panel of military leaders will convene this fall to decide which of the Pentagon’s joint, rapid experimentation projects should transition to the field, according to U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu.

For the last two years, Shyu’s office has been leading an effort known as the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve, designed to address high-need capability gaps shared across the military services through intensive prototype and demonstration campaigns. Defense Department officials haven’t talked in detail about the specific prototypes being tested through RDER, but the first round of capabilities is focused on addressing long-range fire needs in the Indo-Pacific region.

Shyu told reporters Aug. 29 that after a period of testing at Camp Atterbury in Indiana and as part of U.S. INDOPACOM’s Northern Edge exercise this summer, Shyu and her team will present the top-performing systems at a deputy’s management action group, or DMAG, meeting — a panel of four-star generals that includes Pentagon leaders, service officials and combatant commanders.

“We have a list of projects that are ready to go into fielding,” she said on the sidelines of the National Defense Industrial Association’s Emerging Technologies for Defense conference going on this week in Washington.

Shyu declined to detail the projects but noted that one of the efforts is of high interest to the Army and Air Force. During the upcoming meeting, DoD leaders will determine which service should lead that project and others. They’ll also decide how many systems to buy based on how much near-term funding is available.

The Pentagon requested $687 million for RDER in its fiscal 2024 budget — nearly double the $358 million it asked for last year. Congress appropriated $272 million for the program in fiscal 2023, which ends Sept. 30, up from $34 million the previous year, for the effort, which helped the department start the first series of demonstrations.

As the department approaches its first decision point for RDER projects, Shyu said the process for identifying promising prototypes and testing them in a relevant environment has worked well. It’s also a way to bring in allies and industry partners. The first demonstration series included the United Kingdom and Australia.

“This seems to work well for RDER because a lot of planning needs to happen before you can bring all your assets to a location,” she said.

Getting capabilities in the hands of military users has also been critical, Shyu said. During the demonstrations at Camp Atterbury, for example, members of the National Guard helped test RDER prototypes, offering feedback on how the systems performed. The Northern Edge exercises that followed helped measure the prototypes’ operational utility in realistic scenarios.

About Courtney Albon

Courtney Albon is C4ISRNET’s space and emerging technology reporter. She has covered the U.S. military since 2012, with a focus on the Air Force and Space Force. She has reported on some of the Defense Department’s most significant acquisition, budget and policy challenges.

20. Mark Lambert, a foreign service officer of more than 30 years, will oversee department’s China and Taiwan strategy, people familiar say

Yes, a highly respected professional. Those who work on Korea and broader Asia-Pacific issues have long known Mark.

Mark Lambert, a foreign service officer of more than 30 years, will oversee department’s China and Taiwan strategy, people familiar say

By Liza Lin

Follow

Aug. 29, 2023 8:59 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/state-department-set-to-name-new-top-china-policy-official-ab74d089?page=1

SINGAPORE—The U.S. State Department is set to name a senior career diplomat with experience trying to curb Beijing’s influence at the United Nations and handling North Korea as its new top official in charge of managing China policy, according to the people familiar with the matter. 

The selection of Mark Lambert, a current deputy assistant secretary in the Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, as the next deputy assistant secretary for China and Taiwan issues comes at a tumultuous time in relations between Washington and Beijing, and with the Biden administration’s China policy coming under heavy scrutiny from Republicans.   

Lambert fills a position vacated by Rick Waters, a veteran China hand who announced his resignation from the position in May. Waters had also been serving as head of the State Department’s new Office of China Coordination, known informally as “China House,” when he stepped down.  

The State Department is still debating whether Lambert should also take Waters’ previous role as coordinator at China House, a person familiar with the matter said. China House was set up within the State Department less than a year ago to streamline and coordinate U.S. policy making toward China, described by the department last December as “ the most complex and consequential geopolitical challenge we face.” 

The coordinator role is held up as it is unclear if the job requires Senate confirmation, the person said. If such political confirmation is required, then Assistant Secretary Daniel Kritenbrink—already confirmed by the Senate—would likely take the role, this person said.

A State Department spokesman said the department has no personnel announcements to make at this time.

“The Office of China Coordination remains an integral piece of the U.S. government’s efforts to responsibly manage our competition with the People’s Republic of China and advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system,” he said.

Reuters first reported the news of Lambert’s appointment, including uncertainty around whether he would also take the China House role.  

Lambert’s new assignment comes as U.S. and Chinese leaders are seeking to arrest a free fall in relations brought about by clashes over issues ranging from technology and trade to espionage and the status of self-ruled Taiwan, which Beijing claims as part of China. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo is visiting China this week, the latest in a string of visits by senior U.S. officials aimed at re-establishing high-level communications and lower tensions. 

The Biden administration’s China policy has come in the crosshairs of security hawks in Congress, especially Republicans, who see the White House as placing too high a priority on engaging with, rather than confronting, Beijing. Those criticisms amped up as the administration sought to restart high-level dialogue this spring not long after the appearance over the U.S. of a suspected Chinese spy balloon. 

Lambert, who presently oversees offices that manage relations with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, is a veteran of several stints in Asia, having served in China twice. He is seen within the department as a dependable and experienced manager, well-liked and respected by colleagues including Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, people familiar with Lambert say. 

He was part of a team that handled a high-profile diplomatic crisis when a U.S. EP-3 spy plane crashed into a China fighter jet in 2001, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot. China held the 24-man crew of the EP-3 for 11 days after the U.S. plane was forced to land on China’s Hainan Island after the collision.

Lambert also was the point person in a Trump administration initiative to counter China’s expanding influence at the U.N. and related organizations. He is credited with successfully orchestrating the election of a Singaporean to head the U.N.-established World Intellectual Property Organization in 2020 over a Chinese candidate backed by Beijing.

The resignation of Waters came just five months after China House was established, and only two weeks after Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman—in charge of China issues—said she would retire at age 73. 

Charles Hutzler and Vivian Salama contributed to this article.

Write to Liza Lin at liza.lin@wsj.com

21. US Food Supply Threatened by Extreme Drought ... And Extreme Rain

US Food Supply Threatened by Extreme Drought ... And Extreme Rain

Farmers face a three-pronged attack from climate change in the form of drought, extreme heat and pounding rain storms

Published 08/30/23 06:00 AM ET

Patrick Cooley

themessenger.com · August 30, 2023

When the crops in Tennessee farmer Alan Meadows’ fields went weeks without rain this summer, he fretted that his fall harvest wouldn't generate enough money to keep the farm going.

Strong rains earlier this month brought a different kind of restlessness as farmers in his region of West Tennessee worried heavy precipitation would wash away soil enriched with expensive fertilizer.

“Some farmers had 13, 14 inches of rain in a very short amount of time,” Meadows says. “The ditches and water structures are not set up for that type or rainfall event. It can't handle that much water at one time.”

Meadows grows corn, soybeans and wheat in the lush soil where the state’s flat lowlands run up against the Mississippi River.

But Meadows could be anywhere in America because the same forces are raising anxiety levels for growers across the country. As the world warms, the nation’s farmers face a three-pronged assault on their capacity to grow crops. Heavy rain washes away soil, drought robs crops of needed moisture and high heat can affect yields even when it does rain.

Scientists and agriculture experts say these problems will only grow worse as climate change accelerates, and the end result could be smaller harvests that push up food prices.

How Bad Is It?

Extreme weather is weighing on farmers' pocketbooks.

A lack of sunlight and flooding cost California’s strawberry farmers at least $100 million, the Los Angeles Times reported earlier this summer. And on Friday the U.S. Department of Agriculture said New Hampshire farmers could apply for disaster aid from July floods.

“If you have too much rain or it is not delivered in the time you need it, that’s going to be a problem,” says Jonathan Aguilar, a water resource engineer at Kansas State University.

On the other side of the equation, regions of the U.S. states have faced drought conditions for years on end. America's farmers are expected to abandon a third of the winter wheat crop, in part because of a Midwestern drought, the USDA reported in May.

John Van Horn grows corn, soybeans and alfalfa and raises cattle in the rolling hills of west central Iowa and says he has not seen a heavy rain in years.

“My crops do not grow as well as they should,” he says. “My pastures don't grow, and I have to feed my cattle.”

Why Is This Happening?

Warmer air can hold more moisture, meaning that water builds up in the air for longer, leading to less frequent but more intense rainfall, says Omanjana Goswami, an interdisciplinary scientist with the Food and Environment Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists.

“When droplets are sitting in the atmosphere, there isn't a steady state of rain,” she says. Water also vaporizes faster when temperatures rise, further saturating the air with moisture, Goswami adds.

Soil freshly loosened by a farmer’s plow will wash away during intense rains, taking precious nutrients with it in a process Aguilar called “leeching.”

What Can Be Done About It?

Crop yields are generally trending higher thanks to advanced planting techniques and a better understanding how weather affects agriculture. But the strategies to counter a warming world aren’t cheap.

Farmers can irrigate crops and plant drought resistant seeds, expensive propositions for farmers operating on paper-thin profit margins.

Van Horn uses drought resistant crops, but said that a lack of rain still hurts his bottom line. “I may have a reduced yield, but 20 years ago [without modified seeds] I would have had no yield,” Van Horn says.

Compounding the problem, farmers don’t always know when to use these techniques, Aguilar said. “The problem with drought is that it's unpredictable,” he says.

Heavy rain is comparably erratic, experts said, defying long-term forecasts and frustrating farmer’s ability to plan for the season. “Agriculture thrives and depends on predictability,” Goswami says. “Farmers should be able to have that information when they are able to plant seeds.”

For farmers, the only certainty is that extreme weather will cost them money.

“These things all play a part in final yields,” Meadows says. “They directly correlate to our bottom line.”

themessenger.com · August 30, 2023

22. Pentagon seeks missile defense integration with Australia

Pentagon seeks missile defense integration with Australia

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

A missile is launched from a United States military HIMARS system during joint military drills at a firing range in northern Australia as part of Exercise Talisman Sabre on July 22, 2023. AFP via Getty Images / ANDREW LEESON

U.S. and Australia deepen military partnership on technology.

|

August 29, 2023 06:08 PM ET

• Missiles
• Asia-Pacific
• International Relations

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

August 29, 2023 06:08 PM ET

• Missiles
• Asia-Pacific
• International Relations

The Pentagon’s top science and technology official is pushing to integrate United States and Australian missile defense capabilities, in the latest sign of the importance the Defense Department places on Australia in its efforts to counter China.

“I have mentioned this to my Australian partners when we were together about a month ago this summer, and they were very excited,” Heidi Shyu, the under secretary of defense for research and engineering, told reporters Tuesday at an NDIA event in Washington, D.C.. “So one of the next steps is: They're coming here to meet with me in September. We're going to start to flesh out the details. I've already spoken to the Missile Defense Agency and the [U.S.] Army because we're integrating our systems together in the defense of Guam. So there's significant interest from MDA and the Army. The next step is bringing the Australians in to figure out at what level do we integrate our systems,” she said.

Shyu spoke less than two weeks after the Biden administration announced a new trilateral accord with South Korea and Japan for ballistic missile defense.

“In mid-August, our three countries conducted a maritime ballistic missile defense warning test for the real-time sharing of missile warning data,” the White House said in a statement. That agreement is more squarely aimed at North Korean missiles, but that same alliance—and potentially threat warning capabilities and practices developed through it—could play a key role in a potential conflict with China.

U.S. officials and others have been warning that China has expanded its nuclear and non-nuclear missile capabilities. “After [Chinese President] Xi Jinping elevated China’s missile forces into a full branch of the People’s Liberation Army in 2015, the number of missile launchers deployed by the PRC has increased rapidly,” notes a July report from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation.

“The PLARF is now on track to deploy more than 1,000 ballistic missile launchers by 2028, including at least 507 nuclear-capable launchers, 342 to 432 conventional launchers, and 252 dual-capable launchers. At least 320 solid-fueled fixed ICBM silos and 30 liquid-fueled fixed ICBM silos are currently under construction in addition to China’s growing arsenal of mobile ICBM launchers. And this tally does not even touch launchers operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and the People’s Liberation Army Navy.”

The United States is also pursuing a three-way technology partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom called AUKUS, which is focused first on the co-development of a submarine but also on the co-development of other emerging technologies. Shyu said she’s been working to plan out what that three-way technology partnership will look like.

“The path that I propose is linking back together to show a portfolio of capabilities,” Shyu said. “That will be coming out soon,” she said, hinting at a possible White House announcement this fall.

​23. Deepfake Scams Are Growing and The Latest Batch Feature Elon Musk

Short video at the link (but it does not show the actual deep fake video): https://themessenger.com/news/deepfake-scams-are-growing-and-the-latest-batch-feature-elon-musk

Deepfake Scams Are Growing and The Latest Batch Feature Elon Musk

The videos also feature television personalities like Gayle King and Tucker Carlson

Published 08/29/23 09:20 PM ET|Updated 8 hr ago

Jenna Sundel

themessenger.com · August 30, 2023

Deepfake scammers have made off with millions of dollars using sophisticated AI to imitate celebrities, public figures and victims' friends and family. But an emerging trend shows one figure standing out most in the deepfake crowd: Elon Musk.

Nearly every scam reviewed in a new analysis of deepfakes by NBC News featured Musk in some respect.

According to NBC, the videos encourage people to invest in a non-existent, high-tech financial platform and feature manipulated clips of CBS News anchor Gayle King, former Fox News host Tucker Carlson and HBO host Bill Maher.

Most of the videos, found on primarily Facebook, have since been taken down or disclaimers have been added. When NBC asked Musk about the videos, he reportedly said: "Ugh, I can’t believe you sent me Facebook links.”

To be clear, there is no evidence tying Musk or other figures to these scams.

Dr. Nancy Mramor Kajuth, a licensed psychologist specializing in the effects of media, told The Messenger that it's likely scammers have singled out these figures because of their influence. NBC's report hypothesized that for Musk specifically, his experience in cryptocurrency investing makes him a more believable sponsor of risky financial products.

"Cybercriminals' motivation to create deepfakes may be based on a need to appear to be important, making false claims about themselves to persuade others to follow them or to feel important," Mramor said. "It may also make [scammers] feel powerful to be able to damage reputations or commit financial fraud."

A deepfake is a hyper-realistic image or video generated by artificial intelligence based on existing data. Several images created by artificial intelligence have gone viral recently, including an image of Pope Francis in a puffer jacket.

View post on Twitter

Despite sometimes being in good fun, deepfakes can pose serious danger. A recent study found that deepfake speech samples fool listeners 25% of the time.

Mramor warns that tech can erode trust and lead to "long-term erroneous views based on lies and misinformation."

"The psychological response is that people become less trusting of media and [public figures]may lose some social status if they are being impersonated before they can stop the damage," Mramor said.

While some deepfakes are highly sophisticated and nearly impossible for the naked eye to spot, the Department of Homeland Security created the following list of clues to spot a potential deepfake:

Elon Musk is featured in several recent deepfake videos.Chesnot/Getty Images

Spotting a deepfake photo or video

• Blurring evident in the face but not elsewhere in the image or video (or vice-versa)
• A change of skin tone near the edge of the face
• Double chins, double eyebrows, or double edges to the face
• Whether the face gets blurry when it is partially obscured by a hand or another object
• Lower-quality sections throughout the same video
• Box-like shapes and cropped effects around the mouth, eyes, and neck
• Blinking (or lack thereof), movements that are not natural
• Changes in the background and/or lighting
• Contextual clues – Is the background scene consistent with the foreground and subject?

Identifying deepfake audio or speech

• Choppy sentences
• Varying tone inflection in speech
• Phrasing – would the speaker say it that way?
• Context of message – Is it relevant to a recent discussion or can they answer related questions?
• Contextual clues Contextual clues – are background sounds consistent with the presumed speaker's location

Identifying fake text

• Misspellings
• Lack of flow in sentences
• Is the sender from a known number or email address?
• Phrasing – would the legitimate sender speak that way?
• Context of message – Is it relevant to a recent discussion?

themessenger.com · August 30, 2023

24. This special ops leader secretly ran a popular military meme page — here's how it helped him do his job

What can we learn from this? (besides the fact there are Sergeants Major with a sense of humor?)  I think there could be some important lessons from this.

This special ops leader secretly ran a popular military meme page — here's how it helped him do his job

foxnews.com · by Hannah Ray Lambert Fox News

Video

How the special ops leader behind a popular meme page stayed anonymous for years

A senior enlisted leader within the U.S. Special Operations Command secretly ran a massively popular meme page for years. How he says it made him better at his job:

FIRST ON FOX: As a senior enlisted leader within the U.S. Special Operations Command, Sgt. Maj. Matt Parrish had a secret weapon empowering him to better serve his community: memes.

"Across the military, humor has always been a great coping mechanism. It's always been something that's united us," Parrish said.

Parrish revealed to Fox News that he is the man behind the wildly popular "Another SF Meme Page." It’s a secret he’s kept for more than three years while holding one of the top positions in SOCOM. The only clue as to his identity was his avatar: a cartoon cat wearing a green beret.

As more service members and leaders leverage social media to bolster their influence within the military, the memeosphere is becoming ever more consequential. What began as a way to kill time during the COVID lockdown gave Parrish an unexpected finger on the pulse of the force and a tool to help both active-duty troops and veterans.

Parrish said humor has always provided a coping mechanism in the military. Whenever things seemed terrible on one of his deployments, someone would make "just the right joke at the right time that just turns your spirits around." (Courtesy Matt Parrish)

TENNESSEE STUDENT'S SUSPENSION OVER MEMES RESCINDED AFTER ORG FILES FIRST AMENDMENT LAWSUIT

Parrish enlisted after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the urgency of the Global War on Terror offered him a fast track to try out for special forces.

"As a young guy wanting to join and wanting to be surrounded by the best, I thought, man, what better ruler to put out there to try to join and be part of the Green Berets?" Parrish said.

Multiple combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq followed, then deployments to Central and South America. After years of high-intensity combat and the physical toll of the SOF lifestyle, Parrish became the first sergeant at USSOCOM Headquarters in 2018. Two years later, he took over SOCOM’s Preservation of the Force and Family, tasked with taking care of operators' physical, psychological and spiritual needs.

At the same time, the world was starting to shut down. Parrish spent his new surplus of free time scrolling through Instagram, laughing at military memes.

On a whim one Friday, he downloaded a meme generator, created a couple of his own posts and started an Instagram account. He called it Another SF Meme Page because "everybody seemed to be sprouting these things up."

As COVID continued to foil usual military operations, Parrish found a new sense of community online.

"I had just come from 13 straight years on a team, and I was missing some of that team room vibe of everybody poking fun at each other," he said.

WATCH: HOW THE SPECIAL OPS LEADER BEHIND A POPULAR MEME PAGE STAYED ANONYMOUS FOR YEARS:

Video

WATCH MORE FOX NEWS DIGITAL ORIGINALS HERE

The military has a unique brand of humor that’s often dark and crass. Because service members often use comedy to process challenging and traumatic experiences, it’s said that "nothing is sacred."

"He attacks everyone in his peer group," Marine veteran Zachary Bell — better known as "Veteran With a Sign" online — said of Another SF Meme Page. "That’s how you know he’s legit."

The intrinsically edgy humor is a big reason why no one except Parrish’s wife knew what he was doing. He didn’t want other leaders to face questions about his posts, especially those that ventured into politics, or give the impression that a senior enlisted Special Forces soldier was denigrating elected officials.

"I try to make it where it’s not hyper political because everything seems to be politicized now," Parrish said. "But if I see a video of a politician stammering over something, I’m captioning it, ‘When you get asked a question in a language test and you don’t remember the answer…’"

Bell said memes are like "modern day hieroglyphs." These are two of his favorites from Another SF Meme Page. (Courtesy Another SF Meme Page)

THE ARMY GAVE THIS OFFICER A FALSE CRIMINAL RECORD, STUNTING HIS CAREER. NOW HE’S GETTING BACKPAY

Parrish’s anonymity turned out to be an unexpected benefit both on the page and in his day job. As a sergeant major, he might be perceived as "out of touch" and have difficulty reaching the lower enlisted and younger non-commissioned officers.

But soldiers filled the meme page's inbox, looking to vent or solicit advice.

"As a leader, I had a better finger on the pulse of things happening down the line," Parrish said. "I was in charge of a global organization, and I was learning things that I wouldn’t have known as the senior enlisted leader, but some E-5 in Ranger Regiment would text me and share a problem, and I would go try to fix that."

When he learned members of a SOF unit were quarantined without adequate food, he and other meme pages rallied to get pizzas and other meals passed over the fence. People also felt comfortable opening up to the anonymous meme maker about mental health or struggles with religion.

"‘Hey man, I know you’re just a meme page, but I don’t know who else I would tell about this,’" Parrish recalled troops writing. "They knew because I was anonymous, I wasn’t going to tell on them."

"I started being able to witness to people and counsel them," he added. "And all of a sudden I had people that were coming back and saying, ‘Hey, I just got out of inpatient rehab. I went and took care of my substance abuse thing.’ Or, ‘Hey, I just got baptized and saved,’ and it was a result of me opening up to those things."

As the page grew, Parrish saw the potential for rallying people to support causes he cared about. In March 2020, he made a March Madness-style bracket, tagged 64 meme pages in it and let the voting begin.

"All of a sudden it just exploded," he said. "We were getting millions of impressions on this little page."

He realized he could capitalize on the traffic — for a cause. He called on his followers to donate directly to one of two military nonprofits: Special Operations Warrior Foundation, which provides college tuition to children of fallen special operators, or HunterSeven Foundation, which helps veterans get treatment for cancer and other exposure-related illnesses. If followers sent a screenshot of their donation, he’d give them a shout-out on the page.

It raised a few thousand dollars. But then in October, he launched Hallomeme Madness and raised about $11,000. The next March, the donations surged to $55,000. All told, Parrish estimates his followers have donated more than $100,000 to charity.

"It’s literally a fourth of our budget," HunterSeven Foundation Executive Director Chelsey Simoni told Fox News. "I can't relay how thankful I am to Matt and to everybody who supported the meme tournament. Whether it was $5 or $500, your donation made a difference in saving lives."

For the last three years, the only person who knew Sgt. Major Matt Parrish was running the massively popular meme page was his wife. (Courtesy Matt Parrish)

TO PROTECT VETERANS' MENTAL HEALTH, SENATORS AND VETS PUSH FOR MORE ACCESS TO SERVICE DOGS: ‘POWERFUL AVENUE'

Like the rest of the world, Simoni had no idea who was running the page until now. But the Army veteran had met Parrish before at presentations and even spoke with him on an episode of SOCOM’s official podcast, SOFcast.

"He’s a very serious, very stern, sergeant major," she laughed. "I never thought it would have been him, but he’s a hell of a guy."

And while Parrish was able to share one side of the military’s story on SOFcast, interviewing legendary special operators, generals and Medal of Honor recipients, the meme page shared the stories of the boots on the ground.

Parrish credits the power of humor with getting serious topics such as PTSD and suicide prevention across to a wider audience. Every time he considered shutting down the page, it seemed like another follower would message him and say how he’d impacted their life.

"It was like, okay, God's given me this opportunity that I would have never thought I'd have," he said. "Let's try to do as much as we can for good."

It’s one of the things he hopes doesn’t vanish now that he’s opening up about his identity. But he also knows anonymity can breed skepticism.

"There are a lot of people who fake who they are," he said. "Now that I’m retired, I want to use the page for good. I want to continue to use it to raise charity, raise awareness for these causes."

He wants his audience to know the true Matt Parrish — a seasoned Special Forces veteran who suffered more injuries than he can count, sought treatment for his own post-traumatic stress and is a devout Christian and family man.

"I want people to know, like, hey, it's legit, it's authentic, it is real."

Parrish retired from the Army earlier this year and is embarking on his next adventure, but a familiar one: hosting a new podcast called Prep for Impact through the nonprofit Green Beret Foundation, which serves Green Berets past and present as well as their families.

His new bosses didn’t know about his double life before asking him to join the team, but GBF CEO Charlie Iacono told Fox News he was thrilled to learn the truth.

"Matt’s sense of humor is spot on with how we should go about navigating our life and looking at life as the glass is half full," Iacono said. "It’s also very impressive that he’s been able to keep this a secret for so long in this age of digital sleuths."

Parrish recently retired from the Army and is about to launch a podcast called Prep for Impact through the Green Beret Foundation. (Fox News Digital)

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Now that his identity is out, Parrish said he hopes to be able to carry conversations over to the meme page from the podcast and vice versa, whether the topic is SOF, family, mental health or faith.

"I want to be able to broaden the discussion," he said. "To have a conversation that's very impactful as a podcast and then share some memes about it to generate thought."

To hear more from Parrish, click here.

Hannah Ray Lambert is an associate producer/writer with Fox News Digital Originals.

foxnews.com · by Hannah Ray Lambert Fox News

25. Exclusive: U.S military in talks to develop port in Philippines facing Taiwan

Exclusive: U.S military in talks to develop port in Philippines facing Taiwan

By Karen Lema and Poppy Mcpherson

August 30, 20236:29 AM EDTUpdated an hour ago

Reuters · by Karen Lema

MANILA, Aug 30 (Reuters) - The U.S. military is in talks to develop a civilian port in the remote northernmost islands of the Philippines, the local governor and two other officials told Reuters, a move that would boost American access to strategically located islands facing Taiwan.

U.S. military involvement in the proposed port in the Batanes islands, less than 200 km (125 miles) from Taiwan, could stoke tensions at a time of growing friction with China and a drive by Washington to intensify its longstanding defence treaty engagement with the Philippines.

The Bashi Channel between those islands and Taiwan is considered a choke point for vessels moving between the western Pacific and the contested South China Sea and a key waterway in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Chinese military regularly sends ships and aircraft through the channel, Taiwan's defence ministry has said.

Marilou Cayco, the provincial governor of the Batanes islands, told Reuters in a message she had sought funding from the U.S. for the building of an "an alternative port" there, which was intended to assist the unloading of cargo from the capital, Manila, during rough seas in the monsoon season.

She said the plans were to build a port on Basco island, where local authorities say high waves often make the existing port inaccessible, and that a decision could be made in October.

The Philippines has in the past year almost doubled the number of its military bases that U.S. forces can access, ostensibly for humanitarian assistance, and also has thousands of U.S. troops in the country at any given time, rotating in and out for joint training exercises. China has said these U.S. moves were "stoking the fire" of regional tensions.

The Chinese Embassy in Manila did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the proposed port in Basco.

Reuters Graphics

Two other Filipino officials, who requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to media, said U.S troops had visited Batanes recently to discuss the port.

One, a senior military official, said the Filipino armed forces were interested in radar and improving monitoring capabilities in the area.

Cayco confirmed the visit, saying they came "one time to assess" the proposed alternative port.

The move comes as Washington pursues closer ties with Asian nations to counter China in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Philippines, its former colony and treaty ally.

Kanishka Gangopadhyay, a spokesperson for the U.S embassy in Manila, said U.S. Embassy and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) experts had been engaging the governor and local government, "at their request, to discuss ways USARPAC can support engineering, medical, and agricultural development projects in the province."

He did not mention the port specifically.

MARCOS INCREASES U.S. ACCESS

Previous President Rodrigo Duterte had threatened to scrap the U.S.-Philippines alliance and realign the country with Beijing but relations between China and the Philippines have grown tense under the current president, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

Marcos, the son and namesake of the disgraced late strongman president, has sought closer ties with Washington, granting it access to four more military bases, including several close to Taiwan, though not in Batanes, and announced joint patrols in the South China Sea.

Marcos has said the bases under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) could prove useful if China attacked Taiwan.

Security officials in Manila said they believed any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would inevitably affect the Philippines, given its geographic proximity to Taiwan and the presence of over 150,000 Filipinos on the democratically-governed island.

Batanes also served as one of the training sites during this year's joint military exercises, known as Balikatan, which involved more than 17,000 Filipino and American troops, making it the biggest ever edition of the military drill.

At the time of the exercise, Cayco said she was seeking investment to build seaports and airports in the island province that is home to 18,000 people. The province could harbour Filipinos fleeing Taiwan if conflict breaks out there and residents have been worried about mounting tensions, according to local government officials.

The Philippines and China have also clashed in recent months over disputed waters in the South China Sea, with Chinese vessels firing water cannons on a Filipino vessel trying to send supplies to an outpost.

Cayco said she didn't have any conversation with the U.S. about EDCA or about radar installations.

She also said there had not yet been discussions about what access the U.S would have to the proposed port, but troops could use all ports in the area for regular military exercises like the Balikatan.

Jay Batongbacal, maritime affairs expert at the University of the Philippines, said the proposed port "would certainly be needed for the island’s defence in a worst case scenario."

"If I were a Chinese strategist, I would want to take the Batanes at minimum in order to ensure control of the Luzon straits and use the island to prevent the approach of adversary naval forces," he said.

Reporting by Poppy McPherson and Karen Lema; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Reuters · by Karen Lema

26. A Script for Congressional Testimony: The Critical Need for a Joint Interagency Task Force for Influence (JIATF-Influence)

(Notional) Conclusion:

Ladies and Gentlemen, the time for action is now. Our adversaries are not waiting; they are actively working to undermine us. The establishment of a Joint Interagency Task Force Influence is not just a strategic necessity; it is a national security imperative. The urgency of this matter cannot be overstated. Every day that we delay is a day that our adversaries gain ground in the information warfare landscape, eroding our strategic advantages and undermining the very foundations of our democracy.

I urge this committee to act swiftly in establishing and funding this critical initiative. The stakes are too high, and the cost of inaction is too great. We are at a pivotal moment in our nation's history, where our ability to adapt and innovate in the realm of influence operations will have long-lasting implications for our national security and global standing. This is not just about countering disinformation or propaganda; it's about safeguarding the integrity of our institutions, protecting the values that define us as a nation, and preserving the democratic ideals that we hold dear.

The establishment of JIATF-Influence will serve as a testament to our commitment to adapt and evolve in the face of new challenges. It will send a strong message to our adversaries that we are united, vigilant, and prepared to defend our interests in the complex domain of influence operations. This is not a partisan issue; it's an American issue that transcends political affiliations and unites us in the common goal of safeguarding our nation.

Thank you for your time and attention. I am open to any questions you may have, and I am committed to assisting this committee and the broader U.S. government in implementing this vital initiative.

A Script for Congressional Testimony: The Critical Need for a Joint Interagency Task Force for Influence (JIATF-Influence)

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/script-congressional-testimony-critical-need-joint-interagency-carr%3FtrackingId=pfi8cUtR71KDwU7UesHjnw%253D%253D/?trackingId=pfi8cUtR71KDwU7UesHjnw%3D%3D&utm

Brad Carr

Owner at Carr Media Productions, LLC | Executive Management Consultant / Coach | SOCOM MISO/PSYOP Proponent Analyst / Strategic Planner | Futurist | Retired Army Colonel | Disabled Veteran

11 articles Following

August 29, 2023

Open Immersive Reader

If given the opportunity, this is a testimony I would love to give to congress…

Introduction

Chairman [Chairman's Name], Ranking Member [Ranking Member's Name], esteemed members of the Senate Committee, and distinguished guests, I extend my deepest gratitude for inviting me to testify before you today. I stand before you not just as an expert in information warfare and interagency influence operations, but as a concerned citizen who understands the gravity of the challenges we face. Imagine, if you will, a world where the very essence of our democracy—our freedom of speech, our trust in institutions, and our national unity—is eroded, not by armies or traditional warfare, but by invisible forces that manipulate our thoughts, divide our communities, and destabilize our society from within. This is not a dystopian future; it is a reality we are grappling with right now.

The issue I bring before you today is not just timely but of utmost strategic importance: the urgent need for the United States to establish and adequately fund a Joint Interagency Task Force for Influence, or JIATF-Influence, as it is commonly referred to. This is not merely a policy recommendation; it is a clarion call for immediate action. We are at a critical juncture in our nation's history, a moment that demands decisive leadership and bold initiatives. The threats we face are evolving, and so must our strategies to counter them. The battlefield has never been limited to land, sea, or air; however, we seem to have forgotten the realm of information, perception, and public opinion is more powerful than the most conventional weapon. If we do not make some changes and decisions soon to re-prioritize the information fight, our democracy will pay a significant price.

My name is Brad Carr, and I focus on the intersection of technology, influence operations, and their implications for U.S. interests. I have dedicated years of research and analysis to understand the complexities of modern warfare, particularly the role of information as a tool for both defense and aggression. I have seen firsthand the devastating impact of influence operations on nations and their citizens, and I can say unequivocally that the United States is not immune. The time for complacency is over; the time for action is now. Today, I will delve into the historical context, the changing landscape of influence operations, the theoretical foundations, and the strategic imperatives that make the establishment of JIATF-Influence a national security priority. I will also provide a set of detailed recommendations for its implementation. Thank you for granting me the opportunity to speak on this critical issue.

The Changing Landscape of Influence Operations

           The Information Age and Its Implications

We find ourselves in the Information Age, an era where data and information have become as valuable as any physical asset. This digital revolution has not only transformed our daily lives but has also created new avenues for influence operations. The internet, social media, and other digital platforms have become battlegrounds where information is weaponized for strategic gains. The proliferation of smartphones and the ubiquity of internet access have made it easier than ever for state and non-state actors to disseminate disinformation, propaganda, and engage in cyber espionage. The stakes are high, and the U.S. must adapt to this new reality.

           The Weaponization of Information by Adversaries

Our adversaries, notably China and Russia, have weaponized information to an alarming degree. They have been investing heavily in sophisticated influence operations aimed at undermining the United States and its allies. These operations are multifaceted, targeting not just our military but also our political institutions, economic systems, and social fabric. They employ a range of tactics, from disinformation campaigns on social media to hacking into critical infrastructure. These operations are not isolated incidents but are part of a coordinated strategy to weaken our national security apparatus and erode public trust in our institutions.

           The Decline in U.S. Capabilities and the Need for Action

Regrettably, the United States has been lagging in this domain. There is an urgent need to reinvigorate the 'I' in DIME—Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic—as part of our national strategy. This decline in our capabilities is not just a strategic oversight; it's a national security risk that requires immediate action. Our current structures are ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of modern influence operations. We have multiple agencies working on similar issues, often in silos, leading to inefficiencies and a lack of coordination. This needs to change, and that change starts with the establishment of JIATF-Influence.

The Concept of JIATF-Influence

           Historical Context and Academic Backing

The concept of a Joint Interagency Task Force for Influence is not new. There have been several authors over the years developing various concepts from reinvigorating the US Information Agency (USIA) to creation of new organizations. I personally argued the concept in a paper I wrote, titled "Joint Interagency Task Force – Influence: The New Global Engagement Center." This paper has been cited and supported by various academic institutions and think tanks, emphasizing its importance and relevance. The concept was even wargamed by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Initiative Group. The paper argues for a unified approach to influence operations, one that brings together the capabilities and expertise of multiple agencies under a single umbrella. This is not just a theoretical construct but a practical necessity. The challenges we face are too complex to be tackled by any single agency. We need a coordinated, multi-agency approach, and JIATF-Influence provides the framework for that.

           The Need for a Unified Approach and Scope

In the paper, I make an argument for a Department of Defense-led influence joint interagency task force. This task force would be responsible for developing, planning, coordinating, synchronizing, executing, and assessing full-spectrum influence activities in a multi-domain environment. The scope of its operations would extend beyond military aspects to include diplomatic, informational, and economic dimensions, ensuring a comprehensive approach to influence operations. This is crucial because influence operations are not just about disseminating messages or conducting actions with psychological impact. They encompass a wide range of activities, including public diplomacy, strategic communications, and even economic sanctions. A unified approach allows us to leverage the full spectrum of national power in a coordinated manner.

           Theoretical Foundations and Strategic Importance

The theoretical foundations of the JIATF-Influence concept are rooted in the principles of integrated strategy, multi-domain operations, convergent thinking, and organizational principles built on Henry Mintzberg’s concepts. The strategic importance of such a task force cannot be overstated. It would serve as the cornerstone of our national strategy for influence operations becoming the lead element for the “I” in DIME, providing a unified and coordinated approach to counter the sophisticated operations conducted by our adversaries. In the age of information warfare, where the battle for perception and cognitive terrain is as important as the battle for physical territorial integrity, JIATF-Influence offers a way to integrate and synchronize our efforts across multiple domains and agencies. 

Why JIATF-Influence is Critical

           Interagency Coordination: The Silo Effect and the Need for Unity

One of the most significant challenges in influence operations is the lack of coordination among various agencies. Each agency tends to operate in its silo, leading to fragmented and often contradictory efforts. This phenomenon, known as the "Silo Effect," has been a major obstacle in the effective execution of influence operations. A JIATF-Influence would serve as a centralized body to coordinate these operations, ensuring that we speak with one voice and act in a unified manner. This is not just about efficiency; it's about effectiveness. A coordinated approach allows us to maximize the impact of our operations, making them more than the sum of their parts. 

           Technological Advancements: The Rise of AI and Big Data

Our adversaries are leveraging advanced technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data to enhance their influence operations. These technologies allow them to analyze vast amounts of data and tailor their operations accordingly. AI algorithms can predict human behavior, and Big Data analytics can provide insights into social trends, both of which can be weaponized for influence operations. The U.S. has been a leader in AI and Big Data, but we have not effectively integrated these technologies into our influence operations. This is a missed opportunity, and one that JIATF-Influence can rectify.

           The Need for Technological Parity and Innovation

A JIATF-Influence would facilitate the integration of such technologies into our own operations, thereby leveling the playing field. But merely achieving technological parity is not enough; we must strive for technological superiority. This would require significant investments in research and development to innovate new technologies and methodologies for influence operations. We cannot afford to be complacent; we must be at the cutting edge of technological advancements to stay ahead of our adversaries.

           Countering Peer Competitors: The Case of China's Three Warfares

China's Three Warfares strategy, comprising psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare, serves as a prime example of how a coordinated influence operation can be highly effective. This strategy is not just a theoretical concept; it has been operationalized and executed to further China's strategic objectives in various parts of the world. It has been particularly effective in the South China Sea, where China has used it to assert its territorial claims and undermine the credibility of international law.

           The Role of JIATF-Influence in Neutralizing Adversarial Strategies

A JIATF-Influence would enable us to develop counterstrategies to neutralize such operations. It would provide the strategic framework and operational capabilities to counter the Three Warfares and other similar strategies employed by our adversaries. This would involve not just counter-messaging but also proactive operations to undermine the effectiveness of adversarial influence operations. We need to go beyond reactive measures and adopt a proactive stance, and JIATF-Influence provides the platform for that.

Recommendations

           Immediate Establishment and Leadership

I strongly recommend the immediate establishment of JIATF-Influence through an Executive Order. The urgency of the situation cannot be overstated. An Executive Order would expedite the process and ensure that the task force is operational as soon as possible. Once established, it is crucial to appoint a competent leadership team that can guide the task force effectively. A senior military officer with experience in psychological operations should be appointed as the head, with deputies from other agencies to ensure a multi-faceted approach.

           Adequate Funding and Oversight

I recommend that Congress allocate sufficient funds to ensure the task force can effectively carry out its mission. Given the long-term nature of influence operations, multi-year funding is essential for continuity and long-term planning. To ensure that the allocated funds are used efficiently, a financial oversight committee should be established within the task force, including representatives from the Department of Defense, the Treasury, and other relevant agencies.

           Comprehensive Interagency Representation and Coordination

The task force should include representatives from all relevant agencies, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, CIA, State Department, Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Interagency liaison officers should be appointed to facilitate effective communication and coordination, and regular interagency meetings should be held to align and synchronize efforts.

           Integration of Advanced Technologies and Training

Advanced technologies like Artificial Intelligence should be integrated into the task force's operations. A portion of the budget should be allocated for research and development to stay ahead of our adversaries. Specialized training programs should be developed and implemented, and ongoing skill development should be a priority.

           International Collaboration

Finally, the task force should collaborate with like-minded countries and engage in multilateral platforms like NATO to enhance the effectiveness of influence operations.

Conclusion

Ladies and Gentlemen, the time for action is now. Our adversaries are not waiting; they are actively working to undermine us. The establishment of a Joint Interagency Task Force Influence is not just a strategic necessity; it is a national security imperative. The urgency of this matter cannot be overstated. Every day that we delay is a day that our adversaries gain ground in the information warfare landscape, eroding our strategic advantages and undermining the very foundations of our democracy.

I urge this committee to act swiftly in establishing and funding this critical initiative. The stakes are too high, and the cost of inaction is too great. We are at a pivotal moment in our nation's history, where our ability to adapt and innovate in the realm of influence operations will have long-lasting implications for our national security and global standing. This is not just about countering disinformation or propaganda; it's about safeguarding the integrity of our institutions, protecting the values that define us as a nation, and preserving the democratic ideals that we hold dear.

The establishment of JIATF-Influence will serve as a testament to our commitment to adapt and evolve in the face of new challenges. It will send a strong message to our adversaries that we are united, vigilant, and prepared to defend our interests in the complex domain of influence operations. This is not a partisan issue; it's an American issue that transcends political affiliations and unites us in the common goal of safeguarding our nation.

Thank you for your time and attention. I am open to any questions you may have, and I am committed to assisting this committee and the broader U.S. government in implementing this vital initiative.

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Brad Carr

Owner at Carr Media Productions, LLC | Executive Management Consultant / Coach | SOCOM MISO/PSYOP Proponent Analyst / Strategic Planner | Futurist | Retired Army Colonel | Disabled Veteran

Published • 21h

11 articles

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27. Is the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy sustainable?

Excerpts:

It’s a fine balancing act that could quickly unravel depending on how the war evolves. Straddle back the aid, and Russia’s prospects on the ground improve; outsource U.S. policy to Ukraine’s maximalist objectives, particularly in Crimea, and run the risk of a desperate Putin making even more desperate, dangerous decisions.

Biden, therefore, will have to be prepared for a scenario in which Russia’s defensive lines are simply too strong to break through. This is more likely than the full Russian troop withdrawal the Ukrainian government has been aiming for over the last year and a half.

The U.S. should adjust its policy accordingly, now, by dropping its support for maximalist Ukrainian war aims and pivot toward support for armed neutrality: consistent U.S. defensive support for the Ukrainian Army so it can keep the territory it presently holds and ensure Kyiv’s deterrent against Russian aggression is intact over the long haul.

Such a pivot will require compromises, but it’s the best way of bolstering Ukraine’s defensive needs in the least costly way possible. Meanwhile, Europe, which has more of a security imperative in boosting Ukraine’s victory or at least preventing its defeat, should use the time to exhibit primary leadership over this issue.

Tough but necessary choices are around the corner.

Is the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy sustainable?

federaltimes.com · by Daniel DePetris · August 29, 2023

On Aug. 24, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy delivered an inspirational speech in Kyiv’s St. Sophia Square to mark Ukraine’s Independence Day. His message was familiar to anyone who has heard or read a Zelenskyy speech since he became a wartime president. “We are fighting the enemy,” he told the crowd. “And we know what we are capable of. We are capable of winning! And we will prevail!”

Nearly 5,000 miles away, U.S. President Joe Biden is exhibiting clarity of his own. The White House has stated time and again that the U.S. will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” which if defined literally would mean his administration is prepared to arm and finance Ukraine’s war effort against Russia until Kyiv’s total and complete military victory. It’s a pledge Biden reaffirmed during his phone call to Zelenskyy on the same day the Ukrainian president gave his Independence Day speech.

Lofty aspirations, however, are often blunted by cold, hard reality. And the reality is that the Biden administration’s Ukraine strategy is increasingly being tested by political, policy and resource constraints.

In the weeks and months after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his full-scale invasion, the administration was able to tap into the deeply ingrained, justifiable outrage expressed on Capitol Hill to get Ukraine the military assistance it needed to defend itself. About three weeks after the first Russian missiles fell, Congress tacked on $13 billion in emergency aid for Kyiv to the 2022 omnibus. In total, Congress has appropriated $113 billion in aid to Ukraine in four tranches — about 60%, or $67 billion, was earmarked for military assistance.

But what was possible yesterday might not be possible today. Having passed the war’s 18-month mark, a growing crop of lawmakers are questioning whether the U.S. can keep up the current level of support in perpetuity.

Ukraine aid is a major topic of debate within the Republican Party writ large. While GOP congressional leadership remains largely onboard, the rank and file are either opposed to writing more checks or are tying additional aid to more stringent accountability measures such as the formation of a special inspector general.

Fifty-five percent of Americans surveyed by CNN in July said Congress shouldn’t authorize more war funding, while 51% said the U.S. has already done enough for Ukraine.

Battlefield dynamics need to be considered as well. While the war has never been easy on Ukrainian forces at the front, 2022 was a year when the Ukrainian Army vastly outperformed expectations. Helped by consistent U.S. weapons supplies and a bumbling Russian military that couldn’t shoot straight or maintain its supply lines, Ukrainian troops were able to accomplish repeated tactical successes.

In April 2022, Russian units were forced to abandon their drive toward Kyiv after weeks of being bogged down by a lumbering, poor logistical system. In September, Ukrainian forces humiliated the Russian Army in Kharkiv; two months later, in Kherson, Russian commanders concluded it was better to organize a retreat from the Dnieper River’s western bank than keep investing manpower and equipment into tenuous positions.

RELATED

When will the war in Ukraine end? Experts offer their predictions.

First were the helmets, then the Leopard tanks. The evolving approach of sending aid to Ukraine fits a conflict as fluid as it is unpredictable.

But this year is proving to be far harder and more complicated for Ukrainian troops. The 10-weeklong Ukrainian counteroffensive along three points of the 600-mile front line can best be described as grueling. Anybody who anticipated a replay of the Kharkiv episode set themselves up for disappointment. The days when whole chunks of Ukrainian territory could be reclaimed are likely long gone, replaced with a highly intense combat environment in which those on the offensive reclaim tiny bits of land at a high cost in men and materiel.

While it’s too early to say that Kyiv’s counteroffensive has failed, neither can one assume it will eventually succeed. The Ukrainian Army has to find a way to break through three layers of Russian defensive fortifications and, just as importantly, hold those positions without atrophying its forces or degrading its ability to defend against Russian counterattacks. The U.S. intelligence community is skeptical this can be done this year, if ever.

To date, the Biden administration has managed to accomplish two objectives:

1. Assist Ukraine as it resists Russia’s aggression.
2. Ensure NATO isn’t dragged into the conflict, preventing escalation with a nuclear-armed Russia.

It’s a fine balancing act that could quickly unravel depending on how the war evolves. Straddle back the aid, and Russia’s prospects on the ground improve; outsource U.S. policy to Ukraine’s maximalist objectives, particularly in Crimea, and run the risk of a desperate Putin making even more desperate, dangerous decisions.

Biden, therefore, will have to be prepared for a scenario in which Russia’s defensive lines are simply too strong to break through. This is more likely than the full Russian troop withdrawal the Ukrainian government has been aiming for over the last year and a half.

The U.S. should adjust its policy accordingly, now, by dropping its support for maximalist Ukrainian war aims and pivot toward support for armed neutrality: consistent U.S. defensive support for the Ukrainian Army so it can keep the territory it presently holds and ensure Kyiv’s deterrent against Russian aggression is intact over the long haul.

Such a pivot will require compromises, but it’s the best way of bolstering Ukraine’s defensive needs in the least costly way possible. Meanwhile, Europe, which has more of a security imperative in boosting Ukraine’s victory or at least preventing its defeat, should use the time to exhibit primary leadership over this issue.

Tough but necessary choices are around the corner.

Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a columnist at the Chicago Tribune.

28. Command by intent can ensure command post survivability

I think we should be better at operating through commander's intent than we are. Throughout my entire military career (dating back to 1977) PME has stressed operating through the commander's intent but we still see micromanagement and a focus on control versus command.

​Excerpts:

There are several other options to increase the command post’s survivability, such as the Cold War-style separation of antennas and command post, but it is slow to establish and make the command post stationary and vulnerable. Another way is to split the command post into smaller units, but then these need to communicate, and even if mobile, these subunits can be identified and targeted. By going through the different options, avoiding detection becomes an essential survival characteristic.

We wrote in C5ISRNET (https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2019/12/06/a-new-mindset-for-the-army-silent-running/) in 2019, “The Army mindset must change to mirror the Navy’s tactic of “silent running” used to evade adversarial threats. While there are recent advances in sensor counter-measure techniques, such as low probability of detection and low probability of intercept, silent running reduces the emissions altogether, thus reducing the risk of detection.”

The War in Ukraine has proved our case. The modern battlefield is like the ocean, there is nowhere to hide, so survival depends on the ability to avoid targeting and maintain a stealthy posture.

The age of commanders overlooking tactical action in a live drone video feed, engaging in constant communication, is gone. Today, and increasingly worse due to developments in sensor technology and drones, constant communications will unleash deadly violence and destruction upon the command post. Leading by delivered intent is a low-cost, retrograded tool that can be fielded today – by changing behavior and training the units.

Command by intent can ensure command post survivability

By Jan Kallberg and Stephen Hamilton

 Aug 29, 11:26 AM

c4isrnet.com · by Jan Kallberg · August 29, 2023

In a changing operational environment, where command posts are increasingly vulnerable, intent can serve as a stealth enabler.

A communicated commander’s intent can serve as a way to limit electronic signatures and radio traffic, seeking to obfuscate the existence of a command post. In a mission command-driven environment, communication between command post and units can be reduced. The limited radio and network traffic increases command post survivability.

The intent must explain how the commander seeks to fight the upcoming 12 – 24 hours, with limited interaction between subordinated units and the commander, providing freedom for the units to fulfill their missions. For a commander to deliver intent in a valuable and effective manner, the delivery has to be trained so the leader and the subordinates have a clear picture of what they set out to do.

The war in Ukraine has shown the tangible threat to command post survival, highlighted in the May-June 2023 “Military Review” article “The Graveyard of Command Posts,” (https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2023/Graveyard-of-Command-Posts/) a development that became visible in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 (https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/92-ground-warfare-in-2050-how-it-might-look/ ) where command posted that where sensed by sensors where targeted and destroyed.

Innovation is not only technology but also rethinking and adjusting how we act, our processes, and our tactics in a changing operational environment. So, the question is – how do you increase command post survivability? Our proposed way to rely on intent to carry the commander’s will, especially after the initial engagement phase, instead of constant communication should increase command post survivability. The limited electromagnetic activity will make it harder to identify command posts from other units, and the limited radio traffic will be mixed with the noise from the surrounding electromagnetic signatures.

In the era of counter-insurgency operations in the War on Terror, there was no threat from long-range fires supported by drones with electromagnetic sensors combined with localization by direction finding. The large-scale combat operations operational environment occurs over a larger area and can, in seconds, create a crescendo of destruction at an acquired target. How can the command by intent play out? Let us present one example.

In 2004, the III Corps Commander, then LTG Thomas Metz was able to leverage the Blue Force Tracker to have excellent visibility of BCTs within the 1st Cavalry Division in Fallujah, Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the 1 Marine Expeditionary Force did not have the Blue Force tracker, therefore the common operating picture was missing at the Corps level for the marine units. While in hindsight it seems if the 1 MEF had the same technology the blue picture would have been complete at the Corps level, the Marines were able to successfully execute the mission relying on commander’s intent.

While it is impossible to say what difference it would have made for the marines to have the Blue Force tracker, this scenario demonstrates that having a full common operating picture may not be necessary for a unit to perform successfully. In this scenario, there was not the threat of an adversary sensing electromagnetic emissions and targeting from them, therefore the Corps could utilize all available means of RF communications. In a fight against a near peer adversary, this may not be the case, and the commander may have to rely solely on intent to reduce the EMS footprint.

An Electronic Warfare Tactical Vehicle supports training for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, at the National Training Center in January 2019. (Steven Stover)

This brings up another point of consideration for command and control, or C2: there is an intertwined relationship between C2 and the ability to utilize the EMS for communication. A commander must consider how he or she can command across all modes of available communication, including no communication. This means that the Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency plan must not only include how to communication but also what can be communicated over the available means.

For instance, if a commander falls back to contingency comms which has only the bandwidth to send text messages versus full motion video and/or PowerPoint slides, then the commander must understand how to best utilize that mode of communication. The commander must be comfortable enough to degrade modes sometimes to the point of no communication (relying on intent) at various times depending upon the circumstances.

There are several other options to increase the command post’s survivability, such as the Cold War-style separation of antennas and command post, but it is slow to establish and make the command post stationary and vulnerable. Another way is to split the command post into smaller units, but then these need to communicate, and even if mobile, these subunits can be identified and targeted. By going through the different options, avoiding detection becomes an essential survival characteristic.

We wrote in C5ISRNET (https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2019/12/06/a-new-mindset-for-the-army-silent-running/) in 2019, “The Army mindset must change to mirror the Navy’s tactic of “silent running” used to evade adversarial threats. While there are recent advances in sensor counter-measure techniques, such as low probability of detection and low probability of intercept, silent running reduces the emissions altogether, thus reducing the risk of detection.”

The War in Ukraine has proved our case. The modern battlefield is like the ocean, there is nowhere to hide, so survival depends on the ability to avoid targeting and maintain a stealthy posture.

The age of commanders overlooking tactical action in a live drone video feed, engaging in constant communication, is gone. Today, and increasingly worse due to developments in sensor technology and drones, constant communications will unleash deadly violence and destruction upon the command post. Leading by delivered intent is a low-cost, retrograded tool that can be fielded today – by changing behavior and training the units.

Dr. Jan Kallberg is an assistant professor at the United States Military Academy. Col. Stephen Hamilton is the director of the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and an associate professor at the department of electrical engineering and computer science at the United States Military Academy. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, the U.S. Military Academy, or the Defense Department.

29. This is what it takes to become a legendary Marine Raider

Hooah. Or I should say: O-rah.

This is what it takes to become a legendary Marine Raider

sandboxx.us · by Steve Balestrieri · August 29, 2023

Being a U.S. Marine is not for the faint of heart. For nearly 250 years, the Marine Corps has answered our nation’s call in numerous conflicts across the globe and has traditionally been the U.S. military’s tip of the spear. And the most elite warriors of the Corps are the Marine Raiders.

Marine Raiders fall under Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), the Marine Corps special operations component of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). MARSOC is comprised of the Headquarters, Marine Raider Regiment, Marine Raider Support Group, and Marine Raider Training Center.

To become a Marine Raider, a candidate must first join the Marine Corps. Whether one is an officer or enlisted, MARSOC has a place for you. Commissioned Marines can volunteer to be a Special Operations Officer (SOO), while enlisted Marines can pursue roles as Critical Skills Operator (CSO) or Special Operations Capability Specialist (SOCS).

Marine Raiders fire the Mk 19 grenade launcher during a company training event in Jacksonville, N.C., Oct. 1, 2021. The Marine Raiders refined their marksmanship techniques on various weapons systems including sniper rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers prior to conducting team-level training. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Ethan Green/MARSOC)

To be eligible to become a Special Operations Officer, an officer must meet the following requirements:

• Be eligible to obtain and maintain a secret clearance;
• Have a minimum GT/GCT score of 110;
• Have a minimum PFT of 235;
• Be able to pass the MARSOC swim assessment;
• Meet the MARSOC medical screening criteria;
• Have no more than 24 months time in grade (TIG) as a captain (O-3) upon attending the Individual Training Course (ITC) Make a lateral move to the special operations officer MOS upon selection.

The requirements for enlisted Critical Skills Operators are a bit different:

• Be eligible to obtain and maintain a secret clearance;
• Have a minimum GT score of 105;
• Have a minimum PFT of 235;
• Have no more than two NJPs on current enlistment;
• Be able to pass the MARSOC swim assessment;
• Be eligible to reenlist;
• Meet the MARSOC medical screening criteria;
• Have no more than 18 months time in grade (TIG) as a sergeant (E-5) upon attending the Individual Training Course (ITC) Make a lateral move to the critical skills operator MOS upon selection.

A Marine Raider candidate must then pass Assessment and Selection and complete the Individual Training Course (ITC) at the Marine Special Operations School in Camp Lejeune, NC. Here’s how that plays out:

Assessment & Selection Phase 1

Marines in U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command’s Assessment and Selection Preparation and Orientation Course conduct a 3-mile hike September 27 aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C. ASPOC is designed to prepare Critical Skills Operator candidates for the challenges of the Assessment and Selection Course. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Thomas W. Provost/Released)

The three-week Assessment and Selection Preparatory and Orientation Course (ASPOC) begins the training pipeline. Candidates will be challenged mentally and physically during this phase.

Assessment & Selection: Phase 2

Assessment and Selection Phase 2 is a challenging three-week evaluation to identify Marines with certain attributes compatible with special-operations missions and with working in a small-team environment.

Individual Training Course (ITC)

The ITC training occurs in four phases and takes place over nine months of intensive training. Those four phases break down as follows:

Phase 1 – Basic Skills

Phase 1 trains and evaluates students in basic skills including land navigation, patrolling, mission planning, SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape), TCCC (Tactical Combat Casualty Care), fire support, and communications.

Phase 2 – Small unit tactics

Marines attending the Individual Training Course conduct patrols during the course’s culminating exercise, Raider Spirit. (Photo by Cpl. Thomas/MARSOC)

Phase 2 consists of small boat and scout swimmer operations, crew-served weapons training, demolitions, photography, and information collection and reporting.

Phase 3 – Close-quarters battle (CQB)

Phase 3 consists of rifle and pistol combat marksmanship, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) needed to serve as a Marine operator during assault operations.

Candidates will also conduct a series of full-mission profile precision raids on rural and urban objectives.

Phase 4 – Irregular warfare

In the final phase of ITC, Marine Raider candidates put all their newfound skills to use. The candidates will receive instruction on irregular warfare operations and on training, advising, and operating with a partner nation and irregular force.

Upon graduation, MARSOC enlisted Marines are awarded the primary MOS 0372, Critical Skills Operator. CSOs then go on to attend a six-month basic language course.

Special Operations Capability Specialists

Marines with Marine Raider Support Group conduct amphibious entry and recovery drills during the Special Operations Capabilities Specialist D (Multi-Purpose Canine Handler) Level 1 training course in Camp Pendleton, Calif., Jan. 6, 2021. The students learn amphibious techniques during the first week which provides basic waterborne capabilities and prepares them for the rest of the amphibious operations conducted during the course. The level 1 course familiarizes the students and dogs with visit board search and seizure operations, zodiac boats, amphibious operations (water entry/exit, scout swimming techniques), distance swimming, and helocasting. (U.S Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Ethan Green)

But while Critical Skills Operators and Special Operations Officers make up the fighting backbone of MARSOC, you can also earn the title of Marine Raider as a Special Operations Capability Specialist (SOCS). While the route to MARSOC is slightly different for these Marine Raiders, it isn’t without its own unique challenges.

These SOCS directly support Marine Raiders on the ground and from the tactical operations center in several ways, including intelligence, fire support, tactical communications, and K-9 operations. SOCS can be assigned to tactical and operational units. In total, there are 11 SOCS specialties, each with its unique attributes and contributions to the team.

SOCS start their journey in MARSOC with the Special Operations Forces Training Course, where they learn the fundamentals of the special operations trade. Those who make it through, proceed to the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) course. In SERE, SOCS learn how to escape enemy forces, survive in the wild, and resist interrogation. SOCS who graduate SERE become proficient in their specific MOS before getting assigned to MARSOC on a five-year tour.

Are you ready for the challenge of becoming a Marine Raider? Contact a Recruiter today.

Read more from Sandboxx News

• What exactly is MARSOC, the Marines’ elite special operations component?
• The history of MARSOC is the history of the Marine Raiders
• We asked AI to create images of top-secret new stealth aircraft and these were the results
• Famed Ukrainian pilot known as ‘Juice’ killed in crash
• Why aircraft carrier crews wear different shirt colors – and what they mean

sandboxx.us · by Steve Balestrieri · August 29, 2023

This is what it takes to become a legendary Marine Raider

sandboxx.us · by Steve Balestrieri · August 29, 2023

Being a U.S. Marine is not for the faint of heart. For nearly 250 years, the Marine Corps has answered our nation’s call in numerous conflicts across the globe and has traditionally been the U.S. military’s tip of the spear. And the most elite warriors of the Corps are the Marine Raiders.

Marine Raiders fall under Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), the Marine Corps special operations component of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). MARSOC is comprised of the Headquarters, Marine Raider Regiment, Marine Raider Support Group, and Marine Raider Training Center.

To become a Marine Raider, a candidate must first join the Marine Corps. Whether one is an officer or enlisted, MARSOC has a place for you. Commissioned Marines can volunteer to be a Special Operations Officer (SOO), while enlisted Marines can pursue roles as Critical Skills Operator (CSO) or Special Operations Capability Specialist (SOCS).

Marine Raiders fire the Mk 19 grenade launcher during a company training event in Jacksonville, N.C., Oct. 1, 2021. The Marine Raiders refined their marksmanship techniques on various weapons systems including sniper rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers prior to conducting team-level training. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Ethan Green/MARSOC)

To be eligible to become a Special Operations Officer, an officer must meet the following requirements:

• Be eligible to obtain and maintain a secret clearance;
• Have a minimum GT/GCT score of 110;
• Have a minimum PFT of 235;
• Be able to pass the MARSOC swim assessment;
• Meet the MARSOC medical screening criteria;
• Have no more than 24 months time in grade (TIG) as a captain (O-3) upon attending the Individual Training Course (ITC) Make a lateral move to the special operations officer MOS upon selection.

The requirements for enlisted Critical Skills Operators are a bit different:

• Be eligible to obtain and maintain a secret clearance;
• Have a minimum GT score of 105;
• Have a minimum PFT of 235;
• Have no more than two NJPs on current enlistment;
• Be able to pass the MARSOC swim assessment;
• Be eligible to reenlist;
• Meet the MARSOC medical screening criteria;
• Have no more than 18 months time in grade (TIG) as a sergeant (E-5) upon attending the Individual Training Course (ITC) Make a lateral move to the critical skills operator MOS upon selection.

A Marine Raider candidate must then pass Assessment and Selection and complete the Individual Training Course (ITC) at the Marine Special Operations School in Camp Lejeune, NC. Here’s how that plays out:

Assessment & Selection Phase 1

Marines in U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command’s Assessment and Selection Preparation and Orientation Course conduct a 3-mile hike September 27 aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C. ASPOC is designed to prepare Critical Skills Operator candidates for the challenges of the Assessment and Selection Course. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Thomas W. Provost/Released)

The three-week Assessment and Selection Preparatory and Orientation Course (ASPOC) begins the training pipeline. Candidates will be challenged mentally and physically during this phase.

Assessment & Selection: Phase 2

Assessment and Selection Phase 2 is a challenging three-week evaluation to identify Marines with certain attributes compatible with special-operations missions and with working in a small-team environment.

Individual Training Course (ITC)

The ITC training occurs in four phases and takes place over nine months of intensive training. Those four phases break down as follows:

Phase 1 – Basic Skills

Phase 1 trains and evaluates students in basic skills including land navigation, patrolling, mission planning, SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape), TCCC (Tactical Combat Casualty Care), fire support, and communications.

Phase 2 – Small unit tactics

Marines attending the Individual Training Course conduct patrols during the course’s culminating exercise, Raider Spirit. (Photo by Cpl. Thomas/MARSOC)

Phase 2 consists of small boat and scout swimmer operations, crew-served weapons training, demolitions, photography, and information collection and reporting.

Phase 3 – Close-quarters battle (CQB)

Phase 3 consists of rifle and pistol combat marksmanship, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) needed to serve as a Marine operator during assault operations.

Candidates will also conduct a series of full-mission profile precision raids on rural and urban objectives.

Phase 4 – Irregular warfare

In the final phase of ITC, Marine Raider candidates put all their newfound skills to use. The candidates will receive instruction on irregular warfare operations and on training, advising, and operating with a partner nation and irregular force.

Upon graduation, MARSOC enlisted Marines are awarded the primary MOS 0372, Critical Skills Operator. CSOs then go on to attend a six-month basic language course.

Special Operations Capability Specialists

Marines with Marine Raider Support Group conduct amphibious entry and recovery drills during the Special Operations Capabilities Specialist D (Multi-Purpose Canine Handler) Level 1 training course in Camp Pendleton, Calif., Jan. 6, 2021. The students learn amphibious techniques during the first week which provides basic waterborne capabilities and prepares them for the rest of the amphibious operations conducted during the course. The level 1 course familiarizes the students and dogs with visit board search and seizure operations, zodiac boats, amphibious operations (water entry/exit, scout swimming techniques), distance swimming, and helocasting. (U.S Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Ethan Green)

But while Critical Skills Operators and Special Operations Officers make up the fighting backbone of MARSOC, you can also earn the title of Marine Raider as a Special Operations Capability Specialist (SOCS). While the route to MARSOC is slightly different for these Marine Raiders, it isn’t without its own unique challenges.

These SOCS directly support Marine Raiders on the ground and from the tactical operations center in several ways, including intelligence, fire support, tactical communications, and K-9 operations. SOCS can be assigned to tactical and operational units. In total, there are 11 SOCS specialties, each with its unique attributes and contributions to the team.

SOCS start their journey in MARSOC with the Special Operations Forces Training Course, where they learn the fundamentals of the special operations trade. Those who make it through, proceed to the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) course. In SERE, SOCS learn how to escape enemy forces, survive in the wild, and resist interrogation. SOCS who graduate SERE become proficient in their specific MOS before getting assigned to MARSOC on a five-year tour.

Are you ready for the challenge of becoming a Marine Raider? Contact a Recruiter today.

Read more from Sandboxx News

• What exactly is MARSOC, the Marines’ elite special operations component?
• The history of MARSOC is the history of the Marine Raiders
• We asked AI to create images of top-secret new stealth aircraft and these were the results
• Famed Ukrainian pilot known as ‘Juice’ killed in crash
• Why aircraft carrier crews wear different shirt colors – and what they mean

sandboxx.us · by Steve Balestrieri · August 29, 2023

30. White House Mum on Hostages-for-Criminals Swap

White House Mum on Hostages-for-Criminals Swap

fdd.org · · August 29, 2023

Latest Developments

The Biden administration remains silent regarding Tehran’s claims that the United States plans to release five Iranian criminals held in U.S. prisons as part of a recent hostage deal with Iran. An August 24 Voice of America (VOA) report, however, identifies 11 Iranians who are facing, or have been convicted of, U.S. charges and may be considered for release. Their crimes include, among others, plotting assassinations, violating U.S. sanctions, working as an unregistered agent of Iran, and conspiring to sell weapons to Tehran. In addition to releasing Iranians in the United States, the deal would also provide Iran with at least $6 billion in sanctions relief.

Expert Analysis

“The Biden administration may release Iranian illicit procurement agents as part of a prisoner swap with Tehran. This would be a mistake and send a devastating message to U.S. law enforcement, particularly after the Obama administration released prisoners responsible for similar crimes. Washington should instead attempt to use coercive means to free prisoners held by Iran, refuse to pay a ransom, and demand a cessation of further hostage-taking.” — Andrea Stricker, FDD Research Fellow and Deputy Director of FDD’s Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program

“The regime in Tehran is already getting a financial bailout for the five American hostages. Now, we wait to see how many of the regime’s illicit procurement agents get bailed out too.” — Richard Goldberg, FDD Senior Advisor

Held in American Prison

The VOA report identified the following Iranians who may be candidates for release or clemency by the United States.

Dual U.S.-Iranian dual nationals Kambiz Attar Kashani and Behrouz Mokhtari, U.S. permanent resident Amin Hasanzadeh, and non-residents Mehrdad Ansari and Reza Sarhangpour Kafrani were convicted or are awaiting trial for violating U.S. or international sanctions.

Manssor Arbabsiar, a U.S.-Iranian dual national, was sentenced to 25 years in federal prison in 2013 for conspiring to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States.

Niloufar “Nellie” Bahadorifar, a U.S.-Iranian dual national, is on supervised post-sentence release for planned medical treatment after receiving a four-year sentence in April 2023 for providing funds to Iranian intelligence assets plotting to assassinate Iranian dissident journalist Masih Alinejad.

Reza Olangian, a U.S.-Iranian dual national, received a 25-year sentence and five years of supervised release in 2018 for conspiring to sell surface-to-air missiles and military aircraft parts to the Iranian government.

Kaveh Lotfolah Afrasiabi, a U.S. permanent resident, is on pre-trial release after being charged with working as an unregistered agent of Iran. He had previously pitched himself to policymakers and media as a neutral Iran expert while secretly being on the Iranian government’s payroll.

Malek Mohammad Balouchzehi, who has no legal status in the United States, is currently in federal detention awaiting sentencing in October. He had been convicted on international drug trafficking charges for conspiring to sell hundreds of kilograms of heroin in the United States.

Erfan Salmanzadeh, a U.S.-Iranian dual national, is currently in post-sentencing detention awaiting transfer to a federal prison. The Department of Justice convicted Salmanzadeh for setting off a bomb in his backyard, stashing a suicide vest, and plotting to blow up a local high school. On July 18, he was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison.

Two of the prisoners are nearing the conclusion of their prison terms: Ansari, whose sentence ends in December 2023, and Kashani, whose sentence ends in February 2024.

Related Analysis

“U.S. to Release $6 Billion to Iran in Exchange for Hostages,” FDD Flash Brief

“How Congress Should Respond to an Interim Iran Deal,” by Richard Goldberg and Behnam Ben Taleblu

fdd.org · by Krystal Bermudez · August 29, 2023

31. Putin struggles with falling ruble, rising prices as sanctions bite

Excerpts:

Oleg Ustenko, an economic adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said it is imperative for the West to take collective action. “We need significant downward pressure on the price cap, or the Russians will have enough cash on hand to continue this war,” Ustenko said.

Elina Ribakova, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute and director of International Programs at the Kyiv School of Economics, said that without further pressure on Russian oil revenue, the Russian authorities would probably weather any inflation spike, even if the rate heads toward low double digits.

“I don’t think inflation is going to be a big issue unless the government has to start printing money to support the budget,” Ribakova said. “If there is some success in tightening Russia’s evasion of the oil price cap, and Putin wants to hike social spending, then that will be challenging. If we see the budget deficit for next year is going to be around 6 to 7 percent of GDP, then that is going to be challenging.”

Others said the inflationary impact was already raising questions about the longer-term sustainability of Putin’s tactics. In a sign of the nervousness, Deputy Trade and Industry Minister Viktor Yevtukhov met with retail chiefs this month and demanded that they limit any price hikes, Russian newspaper Izvestia reported.

The increasing inflationary pressures risk turning Russia’s economic woes into political ones, Kluge said. “The question is how much inflation is the Russian population going to tolerate?”

Putin struggles with falling ruble, rising prices as sanctions bite

By Catherine Belton, Jeff Stein and Robyn Dixon

August 30, 2023 at 2:00 a.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Catherine Belton · August 30, 2023

LONDON — When Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed top economic officials last week after a bruising month in which the Russian ruble plummeted to a 16-month low against the U.S. dollar, the Russian president sought to set a confident tone. The Russian economy, he said, was growing again and wages were rising.

But despite the show of bravado, Putin could not avoid mentioning a growing weakness that is stalking the economy as Western sanctions bite ever deeper, and one that has been exacerbated by the ruble’s plunge.

“Objective data shows that inflationary risks are increasing, and the task of reining in price growth is now the number one priority,” Putin said, with a note of tension in his voice. “I ask my colleagues in the government and the Central Bank to keep the situation under constant control.”

Rapidly rising prices caused by a 20 percent drop in the value of the ruble between early June and mid-August and the government’s pouring of funds into Russia’s defense industry are bringing Russia’s war — and the impact of sanctions — home to many Russians for the first time, economists say.

“The Russian people have been isolating themselves from these political developments, but the inflation rate is something they can’t isolate themselves from because they have to pay,” said Janis Kluge, an economist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “It is a way in which politics really interferes in their lives, and this is the part which is worrying for the Russian leadership. Because no propaganda will make this go away.”

Russia’s Central Bank forecasts inflation will reach up to 6.5 percent by the end of 2023. But economists say the rapid ruble devaluation could fuel a further surge in prices over the next 3 to 6 months and the inflation rate could reach double digits by the end of the year, even after the Central Bank made an emergency hike this month to its key interest rate, now at 12 percent, to try to counter that.

With imports still making up to 40 percent of the average Russian consumer basket, two recent surveys show Russians have already started to reduce spending. One published Aug. 16 by Russia’s largest market research agency, Romir, found that 19 percent of respondents had begun cutting back on purchases of basic goods such as toothpaste, washing powder and food in July, compared to 16 percent the month before.

The ruble’s loss of more than a third of its value since November last year to a large degree is a result of sanctions imposed on Russia’s energy exports at the end of 2022, when the European Union banned most Russian oil imports and the G-7 group of nations imposed a price cap on Russian crude sales elsewhere, decreeing its oil could be sold for no more than $60 per barrel.

Even though Russian oil traders have sunk into the shadows, deploying phantom fleets seeking to sidestep the curbs, the measures, combined with a sharp reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe, have deprived the Russian budget of a key source of revenue, with income from energy exports falling 47 percent the first half of 2023, compared to the same time the previous year.

At the same time, Russia’s turn to gray import channels to avoid export controls — through countries such as Turkey, China and Central Asian states — have brought imports back to prewar levels, further putting pressure on the ruble.

Russian officials are grappling with the transformative economic consequences of Putin’s war against Ukraine, analysts say. The government has doubled its defense spending target for 2023 to more than $100 billion, pumping in more than $60 billion in budget funds into the defense industry in the first half of 2023, according to government figures disclosed this month by Reuters, to feed its war machine.

The spending spree has propped up the Russian economy against the most deleterious effects of Western sanctions, allowing the Kremlin to tout a return to overall economic growth, forecast by the Russian Central Bank at 1.5 to 2.5 percent, and by the International Monetary Fund at 0.7 percent, following a contraction of 2.1 percent last year.

But it is also creating a huge imbalance in the Russian economy, exacerbating inflation as defense enterprises work round-the-clock and worsening labor shortages caused in part by the mobilization of conscripts to the front in Ukraine and by the hundreds of thousands of Russians fleeing abroad since the start of the war.

A survey conducted by the Gaidar Institute in Moscow found that 42 percent of enterprises surveyed complained of a lack of workers in July. In a sign of increasing desperation, Putin last week decreed that restrictions on employing teenagers as young as 14 should be lifted, to cope with the labor shortages, according to a list of presidential orders published on the Kremlin’s website.

“Past assertions that sanctions would bring the Russian economy crashing down were wrong then and remain so,” said Mark Sobel, who served as deputy assistant secretary for international monetary and financial policy at the Treasury Department and is now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a D.C.-based think tank. “But the impact of Western actions against Russia has been crippling, and will be long-lasting.”

Despite the impact of oil export curbs, the Biden administration is resisting pleas from the Ukrainian government to slash the oil price cap from $60 to $30 per barrel, because it fears that could prompt Russia to cut oil production and cause gas price spikes, roiling the global economy just as the United States heads toward presidential elections in 2024, according to people familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. Any such maneuver would also require the support of European lawmakers, and risks undermining support for the Ukrainian war effort, these people said.

“That is the central tension they are wrestling with,” one of the people said.

A Treasury Department spokeswoman declined to comment.

Oleg Ustenko, an economic adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said it is imperative for the West to take collective action. “We need significant downward pressure on the price cap, or the Russians will have enough cash on hand to continue this war,” Ustenko said.

Elina Ribakova, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute and director of International Programs at the Kyiv School of Economics, said that without further pressure on Russian oil revenue, the Russian authorities would probably weather any inflation spike, even if the rate heads toward low double digits.

“I don’t think inflation is going to be a big issue unless the government has to start printing money to support the budget,” Ribakova said. “If there is some success in tightening Russia’s evasion of the oil price cap, and Putin wants to hike social spending, then that will be challenging. If we see the budget deficit for next year is going to be around 6 to 7 percent of GDP, then that is going to be challenging.”

Others said the inflationary impact was already raising questions about the longer-term sustainability of Putin’s tactics. In a sign of the nervousness, Deputy Trade and Industry Minister Viktor Yevtukhov met with retail chiefs this month and demanded that they limit any price hikes, Russian newspaper Izvestia reported.

The increasing inflationary pressures risk turning Russia’s economic woes into political ones, Kluge said. “The question is how much inflation is the Russian population going to tolerate?”

Stein reported from Washington and Dixon reported from Riga, Latvia.

The Washington Post · by Catherine Belton · August 30, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com