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Quotes of the Day:
It's impossible to fear diversity and to enter the future at the same time."
- Gene Roddenberry
"The opinion of 10,000 men is of no value if none of them know anything about the subject."
- Marcus Aurelius
"I have striven not to laugh at human actions, not to weep at them, nor to hate them, but to understand them."
- Baruch Spinoza
1. The Camp David Summit Was a Success But Challenges Remain on China and North Korea
2. N. Korea fires 2 short-range ballistic missiles into East Sea: S. Korean military
3. N. Korea in active negotiations with Russia for arms deal: White House
4. N. Korea conducts military command drills in response to S. Korea-U.S. joint exercise
5. N. Korea to hold key parliamentary meeting on Sept. 26
6. Korea Military Academy to relocate bust of independence fighter amid debate over purported communist ties
7. Mearsheimer: North Korean nukes a ‘force for stability’ on Korean Peninsula
8. Deterrence is not enough in Northeast Asia
9. Russia and North Korea 'actively advancing' in arms deal negotiations, says US
10. An unsmiling Kim: North Korea’s media step up their game
11. Threats in Western Pacific Drawing South Korea, Japan Closer Together, Experts Say
12. Takeaways from the Camp David Summit • Stimson Center
13. AI in the Shadows: North Korea's Cyber Strategy and Our Data Privacy
14. Why Does China Claim that North Korea’s Provocations are “Legitimate Security Concerns?”
15. North Korea Conducts Tactical Nuclear-Strike Drill Amid U.S.-South Korean Military Exercises
16. Japan, S Korea, US closer but not close enough
17. Obscure new group offers $5M bounty for ‘critical info’ on North Korea
18. Behind the scenes of Kim Jong Un’s lavish banquet at elite Pyongyang resort
1. The Camp David Summit Was a Success But Challenges Remain on China and North Korea
Excerpts:
A senior South Korean official depicted the summit as establishing a “key framework” for a northeast Asia security cooperative body which, in turn, will strengthen policy coordination with ASEAN and Pacific Island countries. The leaders pledged to develop a maritime security mechanism to synchronize trilateral capacity building in southeast Asia and Pacific Island nations.
The U.S. has now strengthened another regional component of its Indo-Pacific strategy, along with the enhanced Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and U.S.) and Australia-UK-U.S. or AUKUS agreement to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. But while basking in the afterglow of a successful summit, the U.S. must work closely with its partners to ensure sufficient progress against the vicissitudes of electoral changes or resurgence of nationalist impediments.
Most worrisome will be Washington’s continually underfunded defense requirements constraining America’s ability to deter and defeat emerging security threats. As China rapidly augments its military forces, the U.S. Navy is shrinking and the Indo-Pacific continues to be underfunded relative to other theaters. Strong alliances and firm cooperative commitments are important, but they need sufficient military strength to back them up.
The Camp David Summit Was a Success But Challenges Remain on China and North Korea
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Klingner · August 30, 2023
The Camp David summit this month—joining the leaders of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan— achieved unprecedented, though potentially ephemeral, progress on solidifying trilateral policy coordination. U.S. President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged extensive cooperative measures in security, economic, technology, and societal sectors.
But concerns linger whether the progress is sustainable past electoral changes in Washington and Seoul and periodic flareups in South Korean nationalism over historic and sovereignty disputes with Japan. Supporters of the trilateral partnership hope the stars remain in alignment long enough to make sufficient advancement so as to become irreversible.
The United States has long sought for its two most important northeast Asian allies to resolve or sufficiently downplay sensitive historical issues to enable prioritization of the threats and challenges of the current millennium. But Washington had to tread lightly in its behind-the-scenes efforts lest it offend the sensitivities of either South Korea or Japan by pushing too strongly or appearing to take sides.
North Korea and China Played a Hand
Ironically, Washington was aided in its quest by years of egregious North Korean and Chinese behavior that cumulatively overcame Allied reluctance to push back against Pyongyang’s provocations and Beijing’s economic coercion. However, the election of Yoon Suk Yeol was the most significant catalyst for rapid rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo.
Yoon first sought to strengthen his country’s alliance with the United States to provide a firm foundation for engaging South Korea’s neighbors. He was then willing to endure vociferous domestic criticism over his “appeasement” toward Japan, South Korea’s former colonial oppressor, in order to forge coordinated policies with Tokyo toward common threats. Kishida appeared a reluctant partner, acquiescing to reciprocal measures but not matching Yoon’s boldness.
A Trilateral Bond Forged
Trilateral meetings blossomed among security and foreign policy officials and the three countries resumed military exercises in 2022 after a five-year hiatus. Later that year, the three leaders agreed to a real-time exchange of data on North Korean missile launches, though Seoul remained reluctant to integrate its missile defense system with that of the U.S. and Japan. In December, South Korea and Japan published national security documents that closely mirrored those of the United States, setting the stage for greater policy alignment and cooperation.
Despite these and other positive signals, the extent of the agreements achieved at Camp David was still striking. A “Commitment to Consult” agreement took pains to eschew any sense of obligation for Seoul and Tokyo to defend each other or even commit to concurrence when responding to a threat. Nevertheless, Seoul and Tokyo clearly edged closer to acknowledging a linkage between their security in a way unforeseeable even a few months prior.
The three countries formalized the new enhanced trilateral partnership through pledges of annual meetings of the leaders as well as ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and national security advisors. Similar commitments for annual meetings of finance, commerce, and industry ministers reflected an expansion of coordination on economic security – diplo-speak for diversifying away from overreliance on trade with Beijing and reducing susceptibility to Chinese economic coercion.
Summit Resolution
The documents most clearly articulated security actions in response to North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats. The U.S., South Korea, and Japan affirmed their continued commitment to complete denuclearization of North Korea and agreed to a structured multi-year plan of annual, named, large-scale multi-domain combined military exercises near the Korean Peninsula. The leaders also committed to greater intelligence sharing, greater cooperation to combat Pyongyang’s cyberthreats through which it funds its prohibited arsenals, and operationalizing the earlier commitment on North Korean missile launch data.
The multi-faceted China threat received only a cursory mention in one of the three Camp David documents and was limited to a reference to the Chinese navy’s recent confrontation with the Philippines. This may have been in deference to Seoul’s reluctance, even during the Yoon administration, to directly criticize Beijing for its transgressions.
That said, China is clearly an underlying current driving recent trilateral discussions and documents. Though typically limited to generic public expressions of concern against “unilateral attempts to change the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, the allies have engaged in more extensive discussions and planning to address Chinese security and economic challenges.
Summit Takeaway
Reading between the lines in the sections on economic security and broadening Indo-Pacific cooperation shows a concerted effort to coordinate economic security not only amongst the U.S., South Korea, and Japan but in concert with other partners throughout the Indo-Pacific.
A senior South Korean official depicted the summit as establishing a “key framework” for a northeast Asia security cooperative body which, in turn, will strengthen policy coordination with ASEAN and Pacific Island countries. The leaders pledged to develop a maritime security mechanism to synchronize trilateral capacity building in southeast Asia and Pacific Island nations.
The U.S. has now strengthened another regional component of its Indo-Pacific strategy, along with the enhanced Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and U.S.) and Australia-UK-U.S. or AUKUS agreement to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. But while basking in the afterglow of a successful summit, the U.S. must work closely with its partners to ensure sufficient progress against the vicissitudes of electoral changes or resurgence of nationalist impediments.
Most worrisome will be Washington’s continually underfunded defense requirements constraining America’s ability to deter and defeat emerging security threats. As China rapidly augments its military forces, the U.S. Navy is shrinking and the Indo-Pacific continues to be underfunded relative to other theaters. Strong alliances and firm cooperative commitments are important, but they need sufficient military strength to back them up.
A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor and former Deputy Division Chief for Korea at the CIA, Bruce Klingner is the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
19fortyfive.com · by Bruce Klingner · August 30, 2023
2. N. Korea fires 2 short-range ballistic missiles into East Sea: S. Korean military
I do not want to jinx anything, but my thought is north Korea, "is this all you have?" But Kim is smart enough to know he must never attack into strength. And this is likely more aimed internally to continue to generate the perception of the threat to justify the suffering and sacrifices of the Korean people.
(2nd LD) N. Korea fires 2 short-range ballistic missiles into East Sea: S. Korean military | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 31, 2023
(ATTN: RECASTS headline; ADDS more details throughout)
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Aug. 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea, South Korea's military said Thursday, in apparent protest against combined South Korea-U.S. military drills.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launches from an area in or around Sunan in Pyongyang between around 11:40 p.m. and 11:50 p.m. Wednesday.
The missiles each flew some 360 kilometers before splashing into the waters, the JCS said, with the allies' intelligence authorities conducting further analysis.
The JCS strongly condemned the launches, calling them "acts of significant provocation" that not only undermine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula but also in the international community.
On Wednesday, the allies staged joint air drills, involving at least one U.S. B-1B strategic bomber, over the Yellow Sea in connection with exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS), which began on Aug. 21 and is set to end Thursday.
Pyongyang has long accused the allies' military drills of being an invasion rehearsal against it, with the North's leader Kim Jong-un recently calling for a "drastic boost" in the country's missile production capability and for war contingency preparations in an "offensive" manner.
The JCS said it would thoroughly carry out UFS and other combined drills, while closely monitoring for signs of additional activity by the North.
The latest saber-rattling also comes after Pyongyang's failed launch of a purported space rocket, carrying what it claimed to be was a military reconnaissance satellite, last Thursday, which marked its second botched attempt this year.
The North last test-fired two short-range ballistic missiles on July 24.
A ballistic missile is launched toward the East Sea from the Jangyon area in South Hwanghae Province on March 14, 2023, in this file photo released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 31, 2023
3. N. Korea in active negotiations with Russia for arms deal: White House
Part of the axis of authoritarians coordinating efforts.
Russia must really be strapped for resources to turn to north Korea. And north Kora certainly needs hard currency (but probably does not want rubles).
Excerpts:
"The DPRK has said publicly that they will not sell (weapons) to Russia. But we remain concerned that the DPRK continues to consider providing military support to Russia's military forces in Ukraine," Kirby told the press briefing.
"Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu recently traveled to the DPRK to try to convince Pyongyang to sell artillery ammunition to Russia," he added. "Our information further indicates that following Shoigu's visit another group of Russian officials traveled to Pyongyang to follow up discussions about potential arms deals between the DPRK and Russia."
The NSC official noted that North Korea may also seek to provide raw materials for Russia's defense industrial base after Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanged letters calling for increased defense cooperation between their countries.
"These potential deals could also include the provision of raw materials that would assist Russia's defense industrial base, said Kirby, noting that "export controls and sanctions are very much targeted at trying to eliminate Russia's ability to have those kinds of raw materials and basic ingredients."
(3rd LD) N. Korea in active negotiations with Russia for arms deal: White House | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Duk-Kun Byun · August 31, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with more remarks from NSC spokesperson Kirby in paras 9, 12-13; CHANGES headline, lead)
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Aug. 30 (Yonhap) -- A group of Russian officials recently trip to North Korea, indicating a potential arms deal between the two countries, a U.S. National Security Council (NSC) official said Wednesday.
John Kirby, NSC coordinator for strategic communications, said the trip may be followed by high-level discussions that could lead to the provision of North Korean weapons to Russia for use in its war against Ukraine.
"We have new information, which we are able to share today, that arms negotiations between Russia and the DPRK are actively advancing," the NSC spokesperson told a virtual press briefing, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"Following these negotiations, high level discussions may continue in coming months. Now, among these potential deals, Russia would receive significant quantities and multiple types of munitions from the DPRK, which the Russian military plans to use in Ukraine," he added.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (2nd from L) presents Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (R) with a souvenir during their meeting at the headquarters of the North's Workers' Party in Pyongyang on July 27, 2023, in this photo captured from the North's official Korean Central Television on July 31. The Russian minister visited the North to attend a ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary on July 27 of the signing of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The reported trip to North Korea by Russian officials follows a high-profile visit by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang in July, which then prompted suspicions that the two close neighbors may be seeking to advance their military cooperation.
North Korea is said to have provided millions of infantry artillery shells and rockets to Russia late last year. North Korea has strongly and repeatedly dismissed the accusation.
"The DPRK has said publicly that they will not sell (weapons) to Russia. But we remain concerned that the DPRK continues to consider providing military support to Russia's military forces in Ukraine," Kirby told the press briefing.
"Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu recently traveled to the DPRK to try to convince Pyongyang to sell artillery ammunition to Russia," he added. "Our information further indicates that following Shoigu's visit another group of Russian officials traveled to Pyongyang to follow up discussions about potential arms deals between the DPRK and Russia."
The NSC official noted that North Korea may also seek to provide raw materials for Russia's defense industrial base after Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanged letters calling for increased defense cooperation between their countries.
"These potential deals could also include the provision of raw materials that would assist Russia's defense industrial base, said Kirby, noting that "export controls and sanctions are very much targeted at trying to eliminate Russia's ability to have those kinds of raw materials and basic ingredients."
"We will continue to identify, expose and counter Russian attempts to acquire military equipment from the DPRK or frankly any other state that is prepared to support its war in Ukraine," he added.
Kirby underscored that Russia's outreach to North Korea for weapons reflects the difficulties it currently faces.
"Why else would Mr. Putin had to be reaching out to ... rogue regimes? He is going to Iran, He's going to North Korea to try to get artillery shells and basic materials so that he can continue to shore up his defense industrial base," he told the press briefing.
White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre is seen taking questions during a daily press briefing at the White House in Washington on Aug. 30, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre stressed that any arms deal between North Korea and Russia would violate multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions that prohibit any transfer of weapons to or from the North.
" (An) arms deal between the DPRK and Russia would directly violate a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK to cease its arms negotiations with Russia, and we are taking action directly to exposing and sanctioning individuals and entities working to facilitate arm deals between Russia and the DPRK," she told a daily press briefing.
The report about a potential arms deal between Pyongyang and Moscow came hours after North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles into the East Sea, apparently to protest against a joint South Korea-U.S. military exercise that began Monday.
"We have been very clear about this. (We) condemn the DPRK's latest ballistic missile launch," Jean-Pierre said when asked about North Korea's latest missile launch.
"This launch is in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions and possesses a threat to the DPRK's neighbors and international community," she added.
The White House spokesperson called on North Korea to engage in dialogue, while reaffirming U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and Japan.
"We remain committed to a diplomatic approach to the DPRK and call on DPRK to engage in dialogue," she told the press briefing, adding, "Our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea Japan remains ironclad."
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Duk-Kun Byun · August 31, 2023
4. N. Korea conducts military command drills in response to S. Korea-U.S. joint exercise
Kim is trying to raise himself to the same level of the alliance. IMitation is the sincerest form of flattery. He is conducting his own version of Ulchi Freedom Shield.
My question for the intelligence analysis: Did we see any actual mobilization of forces? Mobilization of reserves? Or was this simply a command post exercise using computer simulation?
A good question here. See the 2+ minute video. Note the plan for occupation of all of the ROK. But note how the north describes it - as a counterattack after an invasion by the ROK/US alliance. The regime is trying to use the same verbiage and rationale for its operations as the alliance. The difference is the alliance does not have plans for an invasion of the north and is not postured for offensive operations as is the nKPA.
We must never forget that Kim Jong Un is conducting political warfare and blackmail diplomacy while developing advanced military capabilities. Those capabilities support his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies while developing the capability to attack and occupy all of South Korea and bring it under the domination of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Is this North Korea's strategy to occupy all of South Korea?
Youtube
https://youtu.be/nZylSGOxFXw
(LEAD) N. Korea conducts military command drills in response to S. Korea-U.S. joint exercise | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 31, 2023
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES with more details throughout)
SEOUL, Aug. 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has conducted military command drills aimed at occupying South Korean territory, state media reported Thursday, as South Korea and the United States are staging their combined military exercise.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un oversaw the drills during his visit to the training command post of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA) on Tuesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The North said it carried out the military command drill involving the entire army in response to Seoul and Washington's "provocative and dangerous" large-scale joint exercises simulating an all-out war against North Korea.
This photo, carried by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 31, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (L) visiting the training command post of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army the previous day as the country conducted military command drills involving the entire army on Aug. 29. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
South Korea and the U.S. are set to complete their Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise Thursday, which started its 11-day run on Aug. 21. On Wednesday, the allies staged joint air drills, involving at least one U.S. B-1B strategic bomber, over the Yellow Sea.
North Korea said its command drill was "aimed at occupying the entire territory of the southern half by repelling the enemy's sudden armed invasion and switching over to an all-out counterattack."
The North's leader stressed the need to deal heavy blows at the enemies' war command center at the initial stage of military operations in a bid to make them "dispirited," throw their combat actions into confusion and "paralyze their will" to fight a war, the KCNA said.
North Korea has called for bolstering its military power, including its naval forces, as Seoul, Washington and Tokyo have agreed to beef up their security cooperation to counter the North's nuclear and missile threats.
In a separate dispatch, the report said the KPA General Staff on Wednesday conducted a tactical nuclear strike drill simulating annihilating major command posts and airfields in South Korea, in response to Washington's deployment of its B-1B strategic bomber.
The missile unit of the KPA "correctly carried out its nuclear strike mission through air bursts at a preset altitude of 400 meters above the target island," the KCNA said.
North Korea was referring to the launch of two short-range ballistic missiles Wednesday night. The missiles each flew some 360 kilometers before splashing into the East Sea, according to the South Korean military.
The North's military warned the drill was aimed at sending a "clear message" to the enemies to show the North's "resolute punitive will and substantive retaliation capabilities" against them.
This photo, carried by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 31, 2023, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (C) visiting the training command post of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army the previous day as the country conducted military command drills involving the entire army on Aug. 29. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Is this North Korea's strategy to occupy all of South Korea?
Youtube
https://youtu.be/nZylSGOxFXw
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 31, 2023
5. N. Korea to hold key parliamentary meeting on Sept. 26
Another event to try to figure out what is going on inside the regime.
(LEAD) N. Korea to hold key parliamentary meeting on Sept. 26 | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 31, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in paras 7-8)
SEOUL, Aug. 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea plans to convene a key parliamentary meeting next month to mainly discuss organizational matters, state media said Thursday, amid speculation that its leader Kim Jong-un could replace the country's premier over flood damage.
The standing committee of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) decided the previous day to hold the ninth session of the 14th SPA on Sept. 26, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The upcoming session will discuss organizational matters and the issue of examining and adopting various laws, including those on ensuring the rights of disabled persons and irrigation, the report said.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 31, 2023, shows a plenary meeting of the standing committee of the Supreme People's Assembly in North Korea the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The SPA is the highest organ of state power under the North's constitution, but it actually only rubber-stamps decisions by the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).
The announcement came after the North's leader Kim strongly berated the country's premier, Kim Tok-hun, and the Cabinet last week over their "irresponsible" attitude in failing to prevent flood damage and "spoiling" the country's economic plans.
The North Korean leader's sharp-worded comments fueled speculation that he may replace the premier, who was appointed to the post in 2020, and reshuffle the Cabinet.
Still, Kim Tok-hun has been carrying out his official duty as premier, as state media reported that he attended an economy-related event on Wednesday.
Experts said the North Korean leader chastised the premier in an apparent bid to shift responsibility to the Cabinet for the faltering economy, aggravated by its prolonged COVID-19 border closure.
During Wednesday's meeting, participants also discussed a law on tourism including "revitalizing domestic tourism and expanding international tourism simultaneously," in a sign that the North may be preparing to accept foreign tourists soon.
After resuming flights to China and Russia following more than three years of strict virus restrictions earlier this month, the North recently lifted an entry ban imposed on its citizens staying abroad over COVID-19 concerns.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Aug. 8, 2023, shows North Korean Premier Kim Tok-hun (C) inspecting a farm at a county in North Hwanghae Province. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · August 31, 2023
6. Korea Military Academy to relocate bust of independence fighter amid debate over purported communist ties
I received this historical background from Dr. Tara O who is doing extensive research in this area.
Re Hong Beom-do. The article has a lot of wrong information about Hong. He betrayed Koreans and played an important role in destroying the Korean Independence Corps, acting on behalf of the Soviet Red Army. For his deeds, Lenin awarded him 100 rubles, a set of the Red Army uniform, and a gun engraved with Hong's name.
He was the head of one of multiple "Korean Independence fighter" groups. He had about 440 armed Koreans in his group. All the groups combined had about 3,500. So they were no match for the Kando forces (in Manchuria) or the Imperial Japan forces. That "pivotal" battle wasn't pivotal for Japan's rule ending in Korea. As you know, that happened when Japan surrendered in WWII to the US/Allies.
In 1921, various Independence fighter groups were lured to Svobodany (Free City), and promised support. When they got to Svobodny, they were massacred. Hong, who arrived with his armed followers, incorporated the majority of them into the Red Army.
Whoever was left were incorporated into the Red Army or sent to Siberia for hard labor. 2 of the leaders survived, but Hong himself shot them. This incident is referred to as the "Free City Massacre" (자유시 참변 in Korean). By this time, Moscow & Tokyo made a secret pact, and the Soviet Union betrayed those (Koreans) they initially supported. (That didn't end Korean loyalists to Marxism/Leninism.)
That ended "Korean Independence Corps" for good. So no serious "fighting the Japanese for Korea's Independence" after that, after 1921.
One group led by Kim Kwan-jin, suspicious, turned around and avoided the slaughter.
After that, Comintern (controlled by Moscow) told the Korean communists (members of Chosun Communist Party) in China that there is to be just 1 communist party per country, and ordered them to join the Chinese Communist Party. Then Mao used them to fight Kando forces /Japan, but they fought for the CCP and China and Mao.
Hong was purged by Stalin during his Great Purge, and ended up working at a movie theater in Kazakhstan before he died.
Moon brought him to Korea on ROKAF aircraft, gave him a hero's welcome, and interred his remains at the National Cemetery in Daejon.
There is a lot of literature in Korean on this, but not taught in the Korean education system, and the likes of Moon keep rewriting the history, and most people don't do a deep dive to find out the real story.
One of these days, I need to publish this.
Korea Military Academy to relocate bust of independence fighter amid debate over purported communist ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 31, 2023
SEOUL, Aug. 31 (Yonhap) -- The Korea Military Academy said Thursday it will remove the bust of revered independence fighter Hong Beom-do from its grounds following a heated debate over the defense ministry's push for the relocation.
The decision came as the ministry has recently been considering relocating the busts of Hong from the academy and its headquarters, both in Seoul, citing his past record of collaborating with Soviet communist forces.
"By considering the academy's identity and honoring (Hong) as an independence fighter, the bust of General Hong Beom-do will be relocated to an appropriate location outside the academy, where his independence movement achievements can be well displayed," the academy said in a statement.
It also decided to relocate the busts of five other independence fighters to other sites within its grounds, noting the relocation will consider opinions from the academy's graduates and staff members.
The push to relocate Hong's busts from the academy and the ministry's headquarters has sparked heated debate over its legitimacy, with the opposition Democratic Party and advocates for independence fighters strongly protesting against such considerations.
Hong is a historic and highly symbolic figure in Korea's fight against Japan's 1910-45 brutal colonial rule.
As top commander of Korean independence forces, he spearheaded victories in battles against Japanese forces, including the Battle of Fengwudong in Manchuria, China, in 1920. The following year, he moved to the Soviet Union, seeking refuge from Japan's forces.
He was forced to relocate to current-day Kazakhstan in 1937 under then Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's policy, along with many other ethnic Koreans. He died at the age of 75 in the Kazakh region of Kyzylorda in 1943, two years before Korea's liberation.
This file photo taken June 8, 2018, shows the busts of independence fighters, including that of General Hong Beom-do, at the Korea Military Academy in northern Seoul. (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · August 31, 2023
7. Mearsheimer: North Korean nukes a ‘force for stability’ on Korean Peninsula
Surprisingly (or perhaps not) Dr. Mearsheimer's comments have not really been addressed in the Korean media. I wonder if the Ministry of Unification regrets inviting him. But this is what you get when you go for a big name versus having the requisite knowledge to make a substantive contribution to the dialogue.
With all due respect to Dr. Mearsheimer I do not think he grasps the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. Or that he really understands how the regime is using its nuclear weapons program to support its political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies while still preparing to use force to dominate the peninsula. Sometimes theory does not apply well in the real world, at least where Kim is concerned.
Excerpts:
Mearsheimer expressed skepticism about the prospect of international cooperation on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as “the three great powers” — the U.S., China and Russia — remain at odds.
But he argued that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons can be a positive.
“I think (North Korean nuclear weapons) are by and large a force for stability in the region,” he said, adding that the U.S. nuclear umbrella covering South Korea balances out this threat.
He stated this is not an ideal situation, but compared it to the Cold War and said the threat of nuclear weapons played a big part in ensuring Washington and Moscow did not attack each other.
Mearsheimer’s remarks proved controversial at the forum, with other speakers distancing themselves from his line of argument.
Mearsheimer: North Korean nukes a ‘force for stability’ on Korean Peninsula
https://www.nknews.org/2023/08/mearsheimer-north-korean-nukes-a-force-for-stability-on-korean-peninsula/?utm
In Seoul, political scholar says US nuclear umbrella balances out DPRK weapons, drawing criticism from other experts
Shreyas Reddy August 30, 2023
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversees a missile launch | Image: KCNA (Oct. 10, 2022)
A leading American political scholar stated that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is irreversible and a “force for stability” on the Korean Peninsula on Wednesday, citing the lack of direct conflict between nuclear powers the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War.
John Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, delivered his assessment in a keynote speech at the Korea Global Forum 2023 in Seoul on Wednesday, organized by South Korea’s unification ministry.
He stated that Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear weapons as it considers them a necessary deterrent against the U.S. and other adversaries in an increasingly “dangerous” region.
“North Koreans have to worry about survival,” he said via video conference. “North Koreans have to worry about how to keep the wolf away from their country.”
Mearsheimer expressed skepticism about the prospect of international cooperation on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as “the three great powers” — the U.S., China and Russia — remain at odds.
But he argued that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons can be a positive.
“I think (North Korean nuclear weapons) are by and large a force for stability in the region,” he said, adding that the U.S. nuclear umbrella covering South Korea balances out this threat.
He stated this is not an ideal situation, but compared it to the Cold War and said the threat of nuclear weapons played a big part in ensuring Washington and Moscow did not attack each other.
Mearsheimer’s remarks proved controversial at the forum, with other speakers distancing themselves from his line of argument.
“It is completely disproportionate, and it is not rational,” Michael Kirby, the former chair of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK, said in a keynote address, stating that this logic would require arming all countries with nuclear weapons.
Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated that Kim Jong Un is unlikely to abandon nuclear weapons after declaring the DPRK’s nuclear status “irreversible” last year, but disagreed with Mearsheimer’s stance on stability.
He explained that the prevention of nuclear escalation during the Cold War due to the threat of mutually assured destruction was a result of circumstances rather than strategy and may not work for the Koreas.
“It would be nice on some level if all it took for nuclear stability to manifest between two adversarial states was the mere possession of nuclear weapons,” he said. “But the history of the nuclear age tells us something quite different.”
Panda emphasized that the goal must be preventing nuclear war, and added that any conflict on the peninsula involving conventional weapons carries the risk of nuclear escalation. As such, he said the U.S., South Korea and Japan must focus not just on deterrence, but also on risk reduction.
Thomas Schafer, a former German ambassador to North Korea, also differed with Mearsheimer on the subject of international cooperation to tackle the issue of denuclearization.
He stressed the importance of U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation and sustained efforts from democratic countries worldwide. But he also called for increasing cooperation with China, stating it too has a stake in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
“China remains necessary to persuade Pyongyang to moderate its attitude,” he said.
Mearsheimer is well-known for his criticism of U.S. foreign policy and realist takes on “great power politics,” famously blaming Washington for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
HUMAN RIGHTS
The forum took place as President Yoon Suk-yeol’s government looks to shift the unification ministry’s role in inter-Korean matters, particularly by reducing exchanges and cooperation and slashing the ministry’s budget and workforce.
Under new unification minister Kim Yung-ho, who took charge last month, the ministry has increased its criticism of DPRK human rights abuses, and this was prominent at the forum.
In a message delivered by vice minister Moon Seoung-hyun, Kim called on the international community to increase pressure on the North Korean regime and hold it to account.
“This is a task for which we, as members of the human race, should all take responsibility and work together,” he said.
He added that Seoul will take the lead in raising awareness at home and abroad and in preparing U.N. resolutions on North Korean human rights issues.
Kim also repeated Seoul’s concerns that North Korea’s reported plans to partially reopen its borders with China could lead to the repatriation of defectors against their will, and called for active cooperation with Beijing to prevent this.
Former chair of the Commission of Inquiry Kirby said little has improved in North Korea since his 2014 reporthighlighted “shocking crimes against humanity” in the country, but added that the DPRK’s border closures since Jan. 2020 present an obstacle for understanding the current situation.
“We won’t know whether they are substantially different until and unless the international community can have access to North Korea to see for itself,” he said.
Kirby’s comments on the DPRK’s isolation followed a message at the start of the forum from U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urging Pyongyang to further ease border restrictions after its recent decision to allow North Koreans stuck abroad to return home.
“I urge the DPRK to also allow the re-entry of our personnel and the broader international community, which would benefit the people and strengthen communication channels,” he said. He also reaffirmed the forum’s other main theme by calling for the “complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
8. Deterrence is not enough in Northeast Asia
From our good friend Professor Yoon.
Excerpts:
The most formidable challenge to the Japan–Korea–US partnership, however, is domestic political pressure, especially in South Korea. Critics of Yoon’s decision to thaw relations with Japan believe that the president is naive and that South Korea is paying dearly for joining this group while getting very little in return. For Yoon, convincing these naysayers will be critical to the success of his presidency: his margin of victory in the presidential election was just 0.74%, and after almost 16 months in office, his approval rating stands at only 37.6%.
There are three ways that the US and Japan could help South Korea solve this challenge. First, while strengthened security cooperation is certainly an important foreign-policy achievement, the group must accelerate the implementation of their agreements on economic and technological assistance. Making visible progress on these fronts and delivering tangible benefits to Yoon’s critics could help shift public opinion towards a more favourable view of the new partnership.
...
Second, if China continues to engage in coercive commercial diplomacy against South Korea, the US response will matter a great deal to South Koreans.
...
Third, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida must be proactive in improving ties with South Korea. While Kishida has been cooperative, many believe that his actions are not commensurate with the political risks taken by Yoon.
| The Strategist
aspistrategist.org.au · by Yoon Young-kwan · August 30, 2023
On 18 August, the leaders of the United States, South Korea and Japan met at Camp David for their first trilateral summit. The resulting agreement to deepen military and intelligence cooperation has steered Northeast Asian geopolitics into uncharted territory.
In view of the rising threat from North Korea, deteriorating ties with China, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, US President Joe Biden’s administration has pursued a bold and systematic regional strategy. Multilateral coalitions like this one, the reinvigorated Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the US) and the relatively new AUKUS arrangement augment the traditional hub-and-spoke model of security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific, with the US at the centre of each.
From the US perspective, the strained relationship between South Korea and Japan—America’s most important allies in East Asia—has long been a strategic obstacle. Since he was Barack Obama’s vice president, Biden has been eager to help the two countries—long at odds over historical disputes and territorial issues—mend fences.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s audacious decision early in his presidency to normalise relations with Japan offered Biden a rare opportunity. Specifically, Yoon decided in March not to seek money from Japan to compensate South Korean victims of forced labour during World War II—a proposal that, at the time, only 35% of Koreans supported and around 59% opposed.
Forging closer ties with Japan is crucial for Yoon to achieve his foreign-policy goal of making South Korea a pivotal global player. Former South Korean president Park Geun-hye, for example, struggled to pursue her ambitious Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative while maintaining a hostile relationship with such a large and important neighbour. Whether Yoon can smooth over their differences and cement more positive bilateral ties remains to be seen.
China and North Korea will likely push back against the effort to institutionalise cooperation between the US, South Korea and Japan. But, to reach its full potential, this new deterrence structure must be accompanied by an openness to dialogue with both countries.
To guard against misunderstandings and prevent further escalation of the situation in Taiwan, which is China’s central concern, the US must step up its efforts to re-establish military communication channels with China. Likewise, South Korea and the US, supported by Japan, should communicate to North Korea that they are ready and willing to engage in diplomatic dialogue; the enhanced trilateral deterrence posture envisioned at Camp David won’t achieve regional peace on its own.
The most formidable challenge to the Japan–Korea–US partnership, however, is domestic political pressure, especially in South Korea. Critics of Yoon’s decision to thaw relations with Japan believe that the president is naive and that South Korea is paying dearly for joining this group while getting very little in return. For Yoon, convincing these naysayers will be critical to the success of his presidency: his margin of victory in the presidential election was just 0.74%, and after almost 16 months in office, his approval rating stands at only 37.6%.
There are three ways that the US and Japan could help South Korea solve this challenge. First, while strengthened security cooperation is certainly an important foreign-policy achievement, the group must accelerate the implementation of their agreements on economic and technological assistance. Making visible progress on these fronts and delivering tangible benefits to Yoon’s critics could help shift public opinion towards a more favourable view of the new partnership.
Second, if China continues to engage in coercive commercial diplomacy against South Korea, the US response will matter a great deal to South Koreans. Former US president Donald Trump’s administration did nothing when China sanctioned South Korea for its deployment of a US THAAD anti-missile system in 2016. Whether the three countries can act together on this issue will be a key factor in deciding the group’s future. Moreover, the Biden administration could also turn South Korean public opinion against the Japan–Korea–US security agreement if it enacts more legislation that discriminates against foreign companies, as both the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act do.
Third, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida must be proactive in improving ties with South Korea. While Kishida has been cooperative, many believe that his actions are not commensurate with the political risks taken by Yoon. They also fear that inappropriate, and often crude, comments about Japan’s long occupation of South Korea made by some members of Kishida’s Liberal Democratic Party could undermine Yoon’s attempt to extend an olive branch.
The challenge of winning over public opinion in South Korea pales in comparison to the risks for the region if Trump wins the US presidential election in 2024. In that case, the infant Japan–Korea–US partnership may have no future. To solidify his diplomatic achievements and to prevent a policy reversal in Northeast Asia, Biden must fully implement every aspect of the agreements reached at Camp David before next November.
Yoon Young-kwan, a former minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Korea, is chair of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2023. Cropped image: US Department of Defense.
aspistrategist.org.au · by Yoon Young-kwan · August 30, 2023
9. Russia and North Korea 'actively advancing' in arms deal negotiations, says US
Russia and North Korea 'actively advancing' in arms deal negotiations, says US | CNN
CNN · by Sam Fossum,Kevin Liptak · August 30, 2023
CNN —
Russia and North Korea are “actively advancing” their negotiations over a potential arms deal that would provide significant ammunition for different types of weapons systems, including artillery, in the latest indication that the Kremlin is desperate to obtain further materiel for its faltering invasion of Ukraine, according to newly released US intelligence.
The news of the potential deal comes despite North Korea’s public claims to the contrary.
The Biden administration said Wednesday that they remain concerned that the two pariah states are in the middle of arms negotiations and that, following Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s trip to North Korea last month, a second delegation of Russian officials have visited Pyongyang for further discussions on a potential deal.
In addition to the second delegation, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have exchanged letters “pledging to increase their bilateral cooperation,” according to National Security Council strategic communications coordinator John Kirby.
“We remain concerned that the DPRK continues to consider providing military support to Russia’s military forces in Ukraine and we have new information which we are able to share today that arms negotiations between Russia and the DPRK are actively advancing,” Kirby said. “Following these negotiations, high level discussion may continue in coming months.”
A view of a missile displayed during a military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice in Pyongyang, North Korea, July 27, 2023, in this image released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency.
KCNA/Reuters
Putin thanks North Korea for supporting Ukraine war as Pyongyang displays its nukes in parade
The public disclosure of the new intelligence is the latest example of how the Biden administration plans to continue to publicize Russia’s efforts to avoid Western sanctions and source weapons for its war, as well as put North Korea on notice that the US is closely monitoring these efforts. It is also the most detailed evidence provided in recent months of Russia’s outreach to North Korea to help fuel its invasion of Ukraine.
“Under these potential deals Russia would receive significant quantities and multiple types of munitions from the DPRK, which the Russian military plans to use in Ukraine. These potential deals could also include the provision of raw materials that would assist Russia’s defense industrial base,” Kirby said, pledging that the US would take direct action to sanction any entities involved in a potential deal and urged Pyongyang to cease the negotiations.
Earlier this month, the US Treasury sanctioned a sanctions evasion network aimed at supporting arms deals between Russia and North Korea.
Kirby also said Russia’s attempts to source weapons from places like Iran and North Korea was a clear signal of Moscow’s distress.
“There is no other way to look at that than desperation and weakness, quite frankly,” Kirby said.
Linda Thomas-Greenfield, US ambassador to the United Nations, also accused Russia and North Korea of negotiating an arms deal during a Security Council Stakeout on Wednesday.
Greenfield called it “shameful” and a violation of Security Council resolutions approved by Russia.
At the end of last year Pyongyang delivered infantry rockets and missiles to Russian mercenary group Wagner for their troops in Ukraine and Western officials have said that Iran has supplied Russia with weapons for use in Ukraine. Iran and North Korea have both denied these claims.
CNN’s Richard Roth contributed reporting.
CNN · by Sam Fossum,Kevin Liptak · August 30, 2023
10. An unsmiling Kim: North Korea’s media step up their game
If you cannot beat them, join them. Kim cannot compete with South Korean and western music and culture so the Propaganda and Agitation department must develop his own imitation.
An unsmiling Kim: North Korea’s media step up their game
Once ridiculed, propaganda outlets mimic Western style, pacing
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, August 30, 2023
SEOUL, South Korea — Fans of North Korea’s state media should brace for fewer images of a beaming Kim Jong-un and less focus on matters that, to Western eyes, are amusingly weird and wacky.
Aware that some images and media segments from the isolated, authoritarian state have become objects of ridicule in the wider world, Pyongyang propaganda czars are raising their game, a leading South Korean scholar said.
Despite their sometimes alternative-universe takes on the news, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and other North Korean outlets are scrutinized by outsiders for signs of what the opaque, often inscrutable Kim regime wants its population to know.
“My analysis does not show any traces of freedom of North Korean media control from the state,” Tatiana Gabroussenko, a professor of North Korean studies at Seoul’s elite Korea University, said in a briefing for foreign reporters. “However, that does not mean North Korean media stays completely unchanged and does not experience any transformation.”
Propaganda by no means has disappeared from the daily North Korean news diet. The top stories from KCNA and other state media outlets Wednesday included a new issue of stamps marketing the regime’s 75th anniversary, the strong state of the economy and the government’s disaster relief efforts, a congratulatory message from Mr. Kim to the nation’s centenarians, and an article in the Minju Joson newspaper praising Mr. Kim as a “peerless patriot who opened up the new era of a dignified, powerful nation.”
Ms. Gabroussenko, who has spent 30 years viewing North Korea’s strictly controlled media landscape, said the current generation of news managers is taking lessons from capitalist counterparts overseas.
“Recently, we see them actively imitating foreign media to make North Korean versions more emotional and appealing,” she said. “They are pioneering new forms or genres, imitating Hollywood, South Korean dramas and TikTok.”
Coils of yellow goo
Many around the world were struck by the “Top Gun”-style production values of a 2022 video featuring the portly Mr. Kim, decked out in a black leather jacket and sunglasses, co-starring with a giant intercontinental ballistic missile and its transporter-erector launcher. Pacing in slow-motion in front of the weapon’s impressive hangar, Mr. Kim and his generals count down the seconds on their watches before the missile rises majestically into the heavens.
Even mainstream Western media could not resist running that clip, in full, on their sites.
The North’s new coverage also mirrors details of overseas news. A recent photo of a briefing for Mr. Kim in front of another missile blurs out the face of a strategic forces official, presumably for security reasons.
The emerging trend may disappoint overseas viewers, dulling the uniqueness of the official media’s adulatory coverage of Mr. Kim and life in North Korea.
A viral set of images from 2014 shows Mr. Kim beaming in apparent delight as coils of yellow sludge are excreted from a pipe at a lubricant factory. A set of photos showing him grinning broadly amid a group of apparently star-struck female soldiers sparked ridicule abroad, as did another featuring the North Korean leader sandwiched between huge stacks of medicinal mushrooms.
The North is phasing out such unintentionally comic images.
“My feeling is North Koreans are very careful at seeing what the world writes about them when they became the object of fun,” Ms. Gabroussenko said.
Even Mr. Kim’s grin is less omnipresent. “There are no more cheesy political smiles, more natural images,” she said.
The new look was evident in the North’s coverage of Mr. Kim’s trip to flooded areas struck by a typhoon this month. Rather than flashing his pearly whites, the national leader looks grave as locals tell him of the damage.
The state hierarchy is suppressing its long-standing practice of “on-the-spot guidance,” in which Mr. Kim briefs reverential officials and officers as they dutifully scribble down his wisdom in notebooks.
“Now, more and more leaders and officials are involved in the same thing,” Ms. Gabroussenko said.
The turgid nature of propaganda is also getting a makeover. Because of the shortened attention span of the YouTube and TikTok generation, North Korean editors are slashing their reports into faster-paced, bite-sized chunks.
Ms. Gabroussenko noted that news segments of the regime’s typical collectivist themes are now just two minutes long. Coverage of items such as a couple who adopt an ill girl, a woman who marries a disabled soldier or citizens heroically donating blood for burn victims would have merited 80-minute reports in the past. Broadcasts of sports, parades and industrial achievements are also getting quicker editorial hooks.
Some trends are in flux. In 2015, the song “Three Years of War” featured lyrics and a video detailing the horrors of war — bombs falling, a dead mother, a sobbing child — that were strongly at odds with the triumphalist tone of the state’s prior Korean War content. The timbre swiftly reverted with the revival of an old song with upbeat music called “Pretty Girl” about a maiden who hurls herself under an enemy tank.
“The words and the images were completely incongruent,” Ms. Gabroussenko said.
The reporter’s job
Like their global colleagues, media content generators in Pyongyang want their stories well presented and widely viewed, but other comparisons fall short.
North Korean journalists are “not creative individuals running around the place. They are serious people,” the professor said. “When a journalist visits a workplace or a home, it is almost equal to the visit of a [Workers’] Party inspector. They should be treated with great respect.”
Reporters have little benefit in presenting a unique vision, specialist knowledge or a scoop.
“There is no concept of a hot fact which they have to hunt after,” Ms. Gabroussenko said. “Sensationalism is considered bad in North Korea. … The ultimate rule is working for social harmony and stability of society.”
So accustomed are they to this approach that North Koreans who defect south are sometimes shocked at displays of social freedom, such as the mass protests against President Park Geun-hye in 2016 and 2017.
“They considered this sensationalism a little bit disturbing,” she said. “They asked how a president could work in such a destabilized society.”
Ms. Gabroussenko said a closer comparison of North Korean journalists would be to public relations professionals in the West.
“It would be most precise to compare them to an advertising agent, to do things in the most creative, active, interesting form and try to develop all forms of media for that,” she said.
Upgrades in production are stylistic, not indicative of substantive shifts in the Kim regime.
It’s “a revolution in form, but not content,” Ms. Gabroussenko said.
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
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11. Threats in Western Pacific Drawing South Korea, Japan Closer Together, Experts Say
Threats in Western Pacific Drawing South Korea, Japan Closer Together, Experts Say - USNI News
news.usni.org · by John Grady · August 30, 2023
Sailors aboard a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense ship in formation with USS Benfold on Aug. 28, 2023, JMSDF Photo
Joint Chinese-Russian naval exercises near Japan and recent North Korea firing missiles underscore the importance of the historic agreement recently reached at Camp David between the U.S., Japan and South Korea, the White House’s former top official for the Indo-Pacific said Tuesday.
Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell pointed out that as the presidents of the United States and Korea were meeting with the prime minister of Japan in an “unprecedented” trilateral summit, China and Russia were conducting naval exercises designed to send a clear signal to Tokyo that Beijing’s and Moscow’s interests in Northeast Asia are closely aligned.
“The security environment is concerning to all three,” he said.
Joining Campbell at the Center for Strategic and International Studies event, Japanese ambassador Tomita Koji said the three nations are working to create connections to handle changing threats.
The United States has separate security treaties with Japan and Korea.
The three nations agreed to share missile launch data, Tomita added. A little more than a year ago, Tokyo and Seoul were again in a diplomatic and trade dispute, threatening the intelligence sharing among the three allies.
Earlier this year, former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday told a Korean-American relations group that sharing this intelligence is “no longer a luxury but a necessity” and the two nations, with separate alliances with the United States, needed “to get beyond poking each other in the eye.”
“The trilateral meeting was possible because of the bilateral relations” between Japan and Korea, Tomita said. “Now we can talk about what we can do together” in areas like overseas development assistance, technology development and security. Campbell called the March meeting in Tokyo between Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol “courageous” in overcoming years of hostility between the two nations.
In addition to Pyongyang’s missile firings, Campbell cited growing cyber threats and China’s provocations in the South China Sea and along its border with India as security challenges the leaders discussed. He said they agreed “a challenge to any one of these countries [United States, Japan and Korea] is a challenge to the other.”
The agreement reached at Camp David is not a mutual defense treaty, like NATO, and will not go to the Senate for approval. The ambassadors and Campbell cited caveats the three nations accepted.
Cho Hyundong, Korea’s ambassador to the United States, said at the CSIS event that “the three leaders re-affirmed the goal of the denuclearization” of the peninsula and a desire to resume talks with Pyongyang without pre-conditions.
Instead of talks, “we’re witnessing new provocations” with repeated missile tests, he added.
Campbell said that since the 2019 talks between former President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ended abruptly in Hanoi, “we’ve had no real dialogue with North Korea through any mechanism.” He added that North Korean’s goal now is not to signal terms for new negotiations, but “about modernizing their arsenal.”
On the reception of the Camp David summit and agreement, the two ambassadors said support for better relations between Seoul and Tokyo, as well as the trilateral arrangement with Washington, have broad support domestically.
Campbell summarized the meeting with President Joe Biden at Camp David as “three equal, powerful nations meeting on equal terms.” Washington was “no longer the older brother” in the talks, he added. The agreement creates a mechanism for annual trilateral summits and also for the three defense and security leaders and foreign ministers to meet regularly.
“The three countries are the engines of the global economy,” Cho said. They account for 31 percent of global domestic production and are leaders in high-technology manufacturing and research. Combined, “they are a force for good,” he added.
Related
news.usni.org · by John Grady · August 30, 2023
12. Takeaways from the Camp David Summit • Stimson Center
Takeaways from the Camp David Summit • Stimson Center
stimson.org · by Joaquin Matamis · August 25, 2023
Charting a New Era in Trilateral Relations
Jenny Town
Senior Fellow and Director
The August 18 Camp David Summit marked a new era in trilateral relations among the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), and Japan, underscoring tectonic shifts in the regional security dynamics in Northeast Asia over the past years. As U.S.-China relations have become more adversarial and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have continued to advance, the impetus for trilateral security cooperation among the United States and its key Asian allies has become palpable, and the leadership in Seoul and Tokyo especially have forged a path for it to take hold.
Even with this newfound rapprochement between South Korea and Japan, it was clear from the summit’s Joint Statements that the sustainability of cooperation was of central concern. Efforts to regularize and institutionalize multiple levels of trilateral meetings and consultations, including an annual leaders’ summit, reflect how fragile this cooperation has been in the past and set forward a plan for making the process more resilient to domestic political fluctuations in all three countries. While Seoul and Tokyo have been able to push past some of the historical and nationalistic disputes for now, those issues are far from resolved and will continue to test the durability of ROK-Japan relations. Moreover, while the Biden administration has been eager to restore and strengthen U.S. alliances around the world, that too could change in the future, as we saw under the Trump administration. Developing institutions, patterns, and habits of cooperation now may help leaders in all three countries justify continued collaboration in the future, beyond these three leaders.
While there are clear mutual benefits to greater trilateral cooperation, it does not come without risk. In the past, Seoul has been hesitant to engage in such clear alignment and the appearance of a trilateral alliance forming to avoid damaging its relations with China, a critical economic partner. However, with this summit, a new sense of collective security among the three allies has emerged, including a trilateral commitment to consult and coordinate responses on regional challenges, provocations, and threats. Already, this new arrangement has been criticized by both China and North Korea for shifting the balance of power in the region. How that plays out in the coming months and years, both in terms of how Beijing and Pyongyang ramp up their own defenses and security cooperation, as well as how they plan to test the resolve of the trilateral commitments, is yet to be seen.
Moving forward, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have sent a clear message about the current strength and depth of their bilateral alliances (U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Japan) and the political will to work together toward common interests and goals. How long that can last, however, will depend largely on how much support can be won in each of their respective publics, especially when tested.
Efforts to Shape the Indo-Pacific Landscape
Yuki Tatsumi
Senior Fellow and Co-Director
The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Summit on August 18 was a historic occasion that signifies the top-down, summit-level commitment, elevating the trilateral framework as one of the anchors to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. By institutionalizing the trilateral framework, the summit also reflects the three leaders’ efforts to stymie potential attempts to abandon the commitments made at Camp David. Over the last few decades, the United States has sought to utilize this trilateral framework to deal with security threats in Northeast Asia. However, such efforts have often been met with bad blood in the Japan-ROK relationship, whether from historical issues or from happenstance like the 2018 radar lock-on dispute.
Additionally, reluctance from leaders—U.S. President Donald Trump and ROK President Moon Jae-in for instance—has further inhibited closer trilateral cooperation.
Given what we have seen in the domestic politics of each country, it was a very wise decision for the three leaders to adopt safeguard measures against potential volatility in the relationship, as it makes the trilateral cooperation more predictable. Furthermore, the two deliverables—the “Spirit of Camp David” joint statement and the Camp David Principle—collectively brought ROK firmly into the broader Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. Prior to the Yoon administration, one of the challenges in the U.S.-ROK alliance has been to broaden its scope beyond the bilateral security treaty, which has historically focused solely on North Korea. With the trilateral framework encompassing the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-ROK alliance will naturally follow suit, departing from its historically narrow focus on the Korean Peninsula.
The direct reference to China and the Taiwan Strait in the deliverables—though the tone was measured—was also significant, as it signaled three countries’ commitment to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. For example, the United States, Japan, and ROK are now embarking on initiatives with the explicit goal of countering China’s predatory economic activities in the Indo-Pacific, such as increased economic security cooperation and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Moreover, their symbolic gestures of reiterating their shared commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific without any unilateral attempt to use force to change the status quo as well as the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait should not be understated.
Moving forward, it will be interesting to see the dynamics of the U.S.-Japan-ROK framework interacting with other regional minilaterals that are also anchored in U.S. regional alliances, such as the Quad. As many of these minilateral frameworks have similar cooperative agendas—such as maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia and Pacific Islands—ensuring synergy among them will be critical for advancing their shared goals of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Photo: The Republic of Korea Office of the President. Official Photographer: Kim Yong Wii.
stimson.org · by Joaquin Matamis · August 25, 2023
13. AI in the Shadows: North Korea's Cyber Strategy and Our Data Privacy
Charts and graphs at the link below.
This requires an ongoing evaluation of our social contract. As threats evolve and become more dangerous what level of sacrifice of individual liberties are we willing to make in return for collective security provided by our government? There is no simple formula to determine that.
AI in the Shadows: North Korea's Cyber Strategy and Our Data Privacy
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/ai-in-the-shadows-north-koreas-cyber-strategy-and-our-data-privacy
8/30/2023
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By Tiana Lakhani, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations and Research
At the 2016 World Economic Forum, a landmark term was coined—the “Fourth Industrial Revolution.” This conceptual framework has grown to symbolize a new era, one that is characterized by rapid technological advancements and their profound implications on the global socio-economic and political landscapes. Artificial Intelligence (AI), as a cornerstone of this revolution, has been rapidly adopted globally, prompting urgent discussions about potential threats and opportunities.
In the context of these discussions, one nation draws peculiar attention: North Korea, universally recognized as the most isolated and enigmatic country in the world. The question that arises is, how does North Korea, cloaked in secrecy and governed by a tightly controlled regime, engage with this global phenomenon? Is the inclusion of AI into North Korea's cyber strategies a futuristic aspiration, or could it be an emerging reality hidden in the obscurity of this enigmatic state? The prospect of AI playing a role in North Korea's cyber landscape might not be as distant as it appears.
The Korean Peninsula has long been stuck in a military impasse, a situation that is decidedly unfavorable for North Korea. Faced with a desire to alter this status quo, yet constrained by the high risks associated with conventional military methods, North Korea has turned to cyber capabilities as an alternative. This strategic pivot represents an asymmetric strategy that allows North Korea to bypass the deadlock via a path of lesser resistance, defined by low-intensity, low-cost, and low-risk operations. This provides an effective way of circumventing harsh sanctions that target sources of funding for their missile and nuclear programs. Experts believe that North Korea has fostered a robust organizational structure capable of executing consequential cyber operations, as demonstrated by their alleged involvement in the Sony attack in 2014. Contrary to what one might expect from such a secluded nation, North Korea boasts a surprisingly strong technological base that reinforces its cyber capabilities.
AI has the potential to augment spear-phishing campaigns by automating attacks, tailoring deceptive messages, and creating counterfeit identities, strengthening cyberattack capabilities. This technology could be attractive for North Korea to leverage, as it represents an extension of their existing cyber strategies, enabling more sophisticated and targeted approaches for financial gain. This could affect the right to privacy on a global scale.
However, it is essential to recognize that the application of AI in this context is still in the early stages, with limitations in scalability and effectiveness. By investigating this intersection of technology and cybersecurity, this essay concludes that careful monitoring of advancements, encouraging international cooperation, applying further pressure on complicit nations such as China, and utilizing “naming-and-shaming” strategies are effective in combatting these emerging threats. This essay contributes to a measured understanding of the evolving landscape of cyber warfare and underline the importance of a coordinated, global response.
Technological Landscape and Cyberattacks Pre-AI Integration
Image A: Timeline of North Korean Cyberattacks. (Image created by Tiana Lakhani.)
Image A reveals a discernible shift in strategic focus in the evolution of North Korea’s cyber activities. The period between 2009 and 2013 was predominantly characterized by the deployment of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which are disruptive attacks that paralyze computer networks. There was a strategic transition from 2014 to 2017, where North Korean cyber operations exhibited a mix of espionage and financial gain objectives. However, after 2017, there was a dramatic refocusing towards financial gain. This shift coincides with a period of severe economic contraction in North Korea, with 2020 marking the most significant shrinkage in the country’s economy in 23 years. This demonstrates a strategic pivot from the deployment of DDoS attacks towards cyber operations aimed explicitly at financial gain. This underscores maturation in North Korean cyber strategies and sheds light on the regime’s interest in these activities as a low-risk revenue stream in the coming years.
Image B: Cyberattacks by Type. (Image created by Tiana Lakhani.)
The sheer financial impact of North Korea's cyber warfare activities underscores its urgency as a global concern, as revealed in Image B. Their cyber operations have cost the international community staggering sums, and the range of their operations has proven remarkable. Yet, these figures only begin to scratch the surface of their impact, failing to account for the equally significant, yet intangible, costs associated with data breaches, data theft, and the ensuing erosion of trust in digital systems.
Beyond financial institutions and corporate entities, North Korea's hacking operations have breached personal devices, thereby gaining unauthorized access to private information, and have even infiltrated healthcare systems, as evidenced by an incident involving the U.K.’s National Health Service. Such transgressions not only threaten our individual privacy and security, but also have wider implications for the integrity and resilience of our increasingly digital society.
Furthermore, the potential integration of AI into North Korea's cyber arsenal could significantly exacerbate these threats. AI technologies can automate and scale hacking activities, thereby augmenting their speed, sophistication, and impact. The fusion of AI with cyber warfare capabilities hence stands to dramatically inflate both the frequency and severity of cyberattacks, rendering this issue all the more pressing. In the face of such a multi-faceted threat, a comprehensive, globally coordinated response is warranted and required.
Image C: Cyberattacks by Region. (Image created by Tiana Lakhani.)
An analysis of North Korea's cyberattack strategies reveals discernible patterns and priorities that vary across different geographic regions, as showcased in Image C. South Korea, for instance, absorbs the majority of North Korea’s malicious cyber activity in Asia, accounting for half of all such incidents. The character of these incursions in Europe is more differentiated. North Korea directly targets the financial sectors of less developed nations like Poland, while it seeks to exploit valuable data in more advanced countries, such as the U.K., as evidenced by the 2017 ransomware attack.
The United States has experienced a notable shift in North Korean cyber aggression. Initially, North Korea's activities, starting in 2009, were primarily aimed at disrupting political systems, as revealed in Image A. However, there has been a reorientation towards financial gain in recent years, with U.S. companies becoming increasingly targeted. Furthermore, North Korea has found a profitable avenue in cryptocurrencies, amplifying their gain from cyber operations. Other developing nations like Chile and Mexico have also suffered significant financial losses, estimated at around $30 million.
The potential integration of AI into North Korea's cyber capabilities is a worrisome prospect. AI could amplify the reach, scale, and sophistication of these attacks, increasing both the number of targets and the severity of damage. Given North Korea's evolving strategies and targets, the integration of AI would likely enable them to infiltrate more secure systems, automate complex attacks, and ultimately exacerbate the global threat they pose.
Post-AI Weaponization: Scenario Analysis
Stage 1: Spear-phishing
Stage 2: Luring – “building a rapport”
Stage 3: Malware link is sent and downloaded by recipient
Spear-phishing serves as the “Trojan Horse” for North Korean hackers, granting them the initial access necessary to launch DDoS attacks, engage in espionage, or enact acts of sabotage for financial gain. Upon closer examination, two principal strategies emerge wherein the integration of AI could significantly enhance the efficacy of these nefarious activities: the automation of attacks and the creation of counterfeit personas.
By leveraging AI's autonomous problem-solving skills, as evidenced by Large Language Models (LLMs) and the Algorithm Distillation (AD) technique, North Korean attackers could automate the process of sending deceptive emails or messages. This could involve a complex task decomposition where the AI breaks down the large task of sending spear-phishing emails into smaller, manageable subgoals, making the attack process more efficient and widespread. Furthermore, AI's ability for self-reflection and learning from past experiences could be exploited to refine and improve attack strategies based on past successes or failures, making future attacks more effective. This could also involve using AD to train the AI systems more efficiently in various phishing tactics, allowing it to adapt and improve its strategies over time by refining tactics based on these learning histories and retaining important knowledge for long-term use in North Korea’s cyber strategies.
Noted security expert Bruce Schneier's recent proof-of-concept research unveils an innovative threat model that could be leveraged by North Korea given their history in producing wide scale attacks like WannaCry 2.0. This model highlights vulnerabilities in AI systems, including LLMs. This emerging form of automated attack is indicative of the evolution in cyber threats, where unsuspecting users unknowingly trigger deceptive commands embedded in multimedia content such as images or sound clips. When queried about these manipulated inputs, an AI chatbot either unveils the hidden prompt or follows the concealed instructions, sparking a range of harmful consequences. This is critical. It essentially means that attackers can manipulate systems like ChatGPT into performing actions that it normally should not, like executing harmful commands. Moreover, these strings can transfer to many closed-source, publicly-available chatbots, significantly amplifying the risk across widely used commercial models.
Lastly, another study reveals how OpenAI’s GPT-3 and AI as-a-service products can automate spear-phishing by creating highly targeted emails. By employing machine learning and personality analysis, the study was able to generate phishing emails that were tailored to specific individual traits and backgrounds, resulting in messages that sounded “weirdly human.” Given that grammar errors often betray North Korean hackers, AI's capability to correct such mistakes, along with its inclusion of precise regional details like local laws, amplifies the authenticity of phishing endeavors. Despite the small sample size and the homogenous nature of the study, the research succeeded in demonstrating the potential of AI to outperform human-composed messages in spear phishing. This approach's success in creating convincing, individualized phishing emails highlights the alarming potential for AI to be used for malicious purposes in North Korea’s state-sponsored cyberattacks, and underscores the need for further exploration and defense strategies.
Beyond automation, the rise of generative AI platforms such as Generated.Photos and ThisPersonDoesNotExist.com poses a complex threat. These platforms that craft convincing fake personas are more than a novel tech curiosity. They are a potential cybersecurity nightmare. For as little as $2.99, these lifelike avatars can be tweaked and animated, lending authenticity to fictitious profiles. While useful for legitimate purposes like video game development, North Korean hackers could exploit these tools to fabricate deepfakes for fraudulent schemes. A study even revealed that fake faces created by AI are considered more trustworthy than images of real people. Imagine a world where phishing scams and social engineering attacks are not perpetrated by crude caricatures, but instead by AI-generated personas that are indistinguishable from real people. This is a formidable gateway that North Korea could exploit, turning ingenuity into a clandestine weapon for cyber subterfuge.
The potential implications extend beyond visual representations. AI-generated software is also capable of impersonating voices, a technique that has already been utilized in isolated fraudulent activities. For example, scammers were reported to have impersonated a chief executive’s voice to facilitate a fraudulent transfer of $243,000 from a U.K.-based energy firm, as detailed in the Wall Street Journal.
Image D: Scenario Analysis for AI-integrated cyberattacks. (Image created by Tiana Lakhani.)
While these developments and their implications underscore the growing complexity of cybersecurity in the age of AI, it is vital to approach the subject from a balanced perspective. The potential risks, though significant, must be weighed against the current state of technology, its accessibility, and the existing safeguards. The interplay of these factors should guide ongoing research, policy considerations, and risk management strategies to ensure that technologies are not exploited for malicious ends.
Next Steps
The immediate focus should be on discerning insights from previous cyberattacks to prepare for the potential of AI-integrated cyber warfare. As indicated earlier, North Korea's motivations for pursuing cyberattacks, particularly for financial gain, appear to be growing in the context of their economic challenges and an expanding nuclear program. Background discussions with experts in the field, including Jenny Jun, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University, sheds further light on the unique characteristics and concerns associated with North Korea's approach to cyber warfare. Jun stated,
What makes me most worried about North Korea’s cyber threat is that they are sometimes not afraid to launch operations that are brazen and destructive with a singular determination to achieve the task at hand, even if it means that their operations are less discreet as a result. For example, in 2018 North Korea reportedly destroyed 9,000 workstations and 500 servers through a wiper attack on Banco de Chile, in order to obfuscate investigation of a $10 million fraudulent SWIFT 1 transaction in a bank heist. Not only do such techniques increase the extent of the victim’s damage, they are indicative of a certain North Korean mindset that has a disregard for diplomatic consequences as a result of attribution.
Her insights allow us to understand the urgency of understanding North Korea's approach and their behavior in the context of these advancements in AI. It is crucial to develop robust countermeasures to safeguard against an evolving and potentially more dangerous threat landscape.
The right to privacy stands as a critical human rights concern for the foreseeable future. North Korea's conduct in cyber warfare clearly violates protection against interference with privacy in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which North Korea has ratified. Further, the enigmatic nature of cyberattacks renders attribution highly elusive. Dr. Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, a legal analyst at Seoul-based NGO Transitional Justice Working Group, elucidated this paradox, noting the complex challenges of identifying culprits and attributing responsibility in cyber warfare. He stated,
A hacker squad distributing malware has deniability that a military unit lobbing artillery shells over the border does not. The work of AI-curated identities presents a further legal conundrum since, to quote the Nuremberg judgment, crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. Who should be put on trial? Clearly not the abstract AI-curated identities, but then their human creators or operators could plead that they never ordered an attack on a particular target.
Shin's insights cast a stark light on the legal quagmire that defines cyber warfare. International law's enforcement becomes a Herculean task, especially against a nation like North Korea, which has repeatedly flouted agreements it has ratified and dismissed international norms.
It is vital to recognize that the majority of North Korean hackers operate beyond their own borders, particularly in nations like China. This presents a perhaps underutilized strategic angle: the potential to exert diplomatic pressure on countries where these nefarious activities are being orchestrated, and imposing targeted sanctions against responsible individuals and entities in these countries. Shin, who recently testified at a congressional hearing, shed light on this issue. The hearing addressed China's complicity in North Korea's misdeeds, a subject that could create substantial discomfort in Beijing, as the Chinese government is keenly aware of its international reputation.
Shin noted, "Beijing's entanglement in these activities places them in a precarious position; they do not wish to suffer reputationally due to their association with North Korea's wrongdoings." He further emphasized the necessity of collaborating with like-minded governments committed to halting these cyberattacks. While acknowledging the complexity of this endeavor, he asserts, “it is important to work with other cooperative governments who have interest to stop the cyberattacks from happening. It is not going to be easy, but it is something we can try.”
As we traverse this complex landscape, it is evident that forming a united front is not just a choice, but a necessity. The ever-evolving tapestry of North Korea's cyber strategies stands as a testament to the urgency of innovative responses. By bringing into focus an internationally coordinated effort and a strategic emphasis on those who are complicit, like-minded nations can seek a path towards dismantling the legal and geopolitical challenges that arise. This approach underscores the importance of collective resilience and adaptability, which are critical for shaping the contours of a safer, more secure cyberspace.
Tiana Lakhani is a rising junior at Stanford University, majoring in International Relations and planning for a prospective MA in East Asian Studies in her senior year.
14. Why Does China Claim that North Korea’s Provocations are “Legitimate Security Concerns?”
From the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. No author byline. (Probably Choi Kang)
Excerpts:
China argues that joint ROK-US military exercises provoke North Korea and elevate the regime’s concerns about its security. However, despite the suspension of major joint exercises until mid-2022 following President Trump’s announcement after the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore in June 2018, North Korea persisted in developing nuclear weapons and missiles. Throughout 2022, North Korea conducted a record-breaking total of 40 missile tests, launching 65 missiles. China, along with Russia, has consistently blocked discussions on North Korean provocations at the United Nations Security Council. Despite being a permanent member of the Security Council, China is suspected of obstructing the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. Observing China’s stance, it is difficult to dismiss the notion that their intention is not the denuclearization of North Korea, but rather achieving the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under the Communist flag.
...
China does not seem to want to ease North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns” but rather has something else in mind. What China really wants is the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the dismantlement of the ROK-US alliance under the excuse of North Korean demands. China will be giving up its responsibilities and stature as a permanent member of the UN Security Council if it persists in achieving its selfish aims by advocating North Korea’s demand for “easing its legitimate security concerns.” Such a position held by China may destabilize the South Korea-China diplomatic relations of the past 31 years. If China ignores South Korea’s ‘legitimate security concerns’ while solely focusing on its own interests, it is difficult to expect South Korea-China relations to develop based on mutual respect.
Why Does China Claim that North Korea’s Provocations are “Legitimate Security Concerns?”
en.asaninst.org
During a United Nations Security Council meeting held on July 13 on the North Korea’s test launch of a 15,000km range intercontinental ballistic missile, the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Zhang Jun, stated, “The US and other countries have long regarded the DPRK as a security threat and are obsessed with the sanctions and pressurization, which has put the DPRK under enormous security threat and existential pressure. The DPRK’s ‘legitimate security concerns’ have never been addressed.” Ambassador Zhang’s assertion presupposes that North Korea is a ‘rational organization’ and that the cause of North Korea’s provocations lies in the hostile policies of external powers, including the United States. It is an unfounded assertion, “putting the cart before the horse.” China’s position is that North Korea is not bad and that we should sympathize with her and give in to her demand.
North Korea has been arguing that its nuclear development was aimed at acquiring “nuclear deterrence for self-defense.” That is, North Korea needs nuclear weapons because South Korea, by carrying out combined military exercises, is colluding with the United States which is bent on attacking North Korea with nuclear weapons. North Korea believes that Libya and Iraq collapsed because they did not have nuclear weapons, and China seems to share a similar stance. However, the underlying reasons for the downfall of these regimes primarily originate from internal repression through fear, economic inability to overcome poverty, and the erosion of legitimacy in maintaining power, while externally their actions challenged the international order based on universal values and norms like liberal democracy and human rights.
The international community’s position on the North Korea’s nuclear problem is different from China’s claim. After North Korea conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile test in 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1695, which urged the international community to impose sanctions on North Korea; the subsequent ten resolutions that have been adopted to address North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations condemn its actions and include sanctions measures. On August 10, the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held in Vienna, Austria. At this meeting, 74 countries, including the Republic of Korea, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Argentina, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Turkey, adopted a joint statement stating that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) continuous development of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, including ballistic missile launches at an unprecedented frequency and in an unprecedented manner since 2022 and the so-called satellite launch using ballistic missile technology, which are in clear violations of multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.” It went on to state that “We condemn the continued escalatory actions taken by the DPRK through a record number of unlawful ballistic missile launches […] threatening the safety and sovereignty of neighbouring countries, and undermining regional and international peace and security […] [We] reaffirm that the DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT.”
Whenever there is a military provocation by North Korea, China, instead of telling North Korea to stop the provocation and accept denuclearization talks, urged South Korea to exercise patience and self-restraint, while criticizing South Korea for taking minimum self-defense measures. In 2017, when the decision was made to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system to safeguard South Korea against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, China responded with economic and cultural retaliatory measures such as boycotting South Korean products and banning South Korean TV dramas and music.
China argues that joint ROK-US military exercises provoke North Korea and elevate the regime’s concerns about its security. However, despite the suspension of major joint exercises until mid-2022 following President Trump’s announcement after the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore in June 2018, North Korea persisted in developing nuclear weapons and missiles. Throughout 2022, North Korea conducted a record-breaking total of 40 missile tests, launching 65 missiles. China, along with Russia, has consistently blocked discussions on North Korean provocations at the United Nations Security Council. Despite being a permanent member of the Security Council, China is suspected of obstructing the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. Observing China’s stance, it is difficult to dismiss the notion that their intention is not the denuclearization of North Korea, but rather achieving the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under the Communist flag.
China has been insisting on ‘parallel progress’ and ‘dual suspension’ policies as a solution to North Korea’s denuclearization. While ’dual suspension’ indicates the suspension of both the ROK-US joint military exercises and North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities, Pyongyang clearly violated this arrangement, but China has not criticized North Korea for it. Since the primary goal of the ROK-US joint military exercises is to deter and defend against North Korean aggression, the need for such exercises will be reduced if North Korea reduces its conventional threats, including the 1.3 million soldiers and over 7 million reserve troops. China is showing a contradictory posture, ignoring Pyongyang’s military threat to South Korea while arguing only for the suspension of the ROK-US joint military exercises.
China lacks an objective stance regarding who disrupts peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Armistice Agreement of July 1953 was intended to create a framework for an armistice by specifying the “cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force,” but North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement over 430,000 times since its entry into force up to the present, and also carried out a number of serious provocations that could have escalated into a war. North Korea’s provocations include the 1968 Blue House raid by 31 armed North Korean infiltrators; the seizure of the US Navy intelligence gathering vessel, USS Pueblo in international waters; the infiltration by over 120 armed North Korean commandos in Uljin-Samcheok who massacred dozens of civilians; the 1969 shootdown of a U.S. Navy EC-121 surveillance aircraft over international airspace; the 1976 Panmunjom Axe Murder incident that claimed the lives of two UN-affiliated U.S. officers while overseeing tree-trimming operations in the southern sector of the Joint Security Area (JSA); the deadly 1983 Rangoon bombing in Burma orchestrated by North Korean agents resulting in the deaths of 17 high-ranking South Korean officials, including Foreign Minister Lee Beom-seok; the 1996 Gangneung submarine infiltration incident, during which 26 North Korean special operation forces infiltrated the Gangneung area and killed 18 South Korean military personnel, police officers, and civilians; the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan corvette in a North Korean torpedo attack, leading to the deaths of 46 South Korean sailors; the 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island resulting in four fatalities; and the 2015 incident in which North Koreans laid wooden box land mines on the southern side of the DMZ, resulting in the maiming of two South Korean soldiers on patrol. China’s acknowledgment of North Korea’s responsibility in these incidents has been exceedingly rare. China instead advocated “exercising restraint” by both sides. China’s “parallel progress” aims to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula simultaneously, yet for a peace regime to be realized, the Armistice must first be upheld. China’s adoption of a “bothsides-ism” stance regarding North Korea’s overt provocations that directly threaten the Armistice framework is a denial of historical facts.
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is not aimed at self-defense. North Korea’s 2022 adoption of a Nuclear Forces Policy Law stipulates the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons without being attacked, effectively declaring its intent to use nuclear weapons to attack South Korea, Japan, and the United States.
China does not seem to want to ease North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns” but rather has something else in mind. What China really wants is the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the dismantlement of the ROK-US alliance under the excuse of North Korean demands. China will be giving up its responsibilities and stature as a permanent member of the UN Security Council if it persists in achieving its selfish aims by advocating North Korea’s demand for “easing its legitimate security concerns.” Such a position held by China may destabilize the South Korea-China diplomatic relations of the past 31 years. If China ignores South Korea’s ‘legitimate security concerns’ while solely focusing on its own interests, it is difficult to expect South Korea-China relations to develop based on mutual respect.
en.asaninst.org
15.North Korea Conducts Tactical Nuclear-Strike Drill Amid U.S.-South Korean Military Exercises
Note: "The U.S. B-1B strategic bomber is no longer nuclear capable."
However, I believe that Kim Jong Un believes it is nuclear capable as do most people when it is called a strategic asset.
North Korea Conducts Tactical Nuclear-Strike Drill Amid U.S.-South Korean Military Exercises
Pyongyang test-fired two ballistic missiles late Wednesday evening, in what it said was a successful test
By Timothy W. Martin
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Updated Aug. 30, 2023 7:37 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-conducts-tactical-nuclear-strike-drill-amid-u-s-south-korean-military-exercises-1c9e7013?page=1
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, leader Kim Jong Un speaks during a visit to the country’s navy headquarters. PHOTO: KCNA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
SEOUL—Kim Jong Un reviewed North Korea’s war plans aimed at overwhelming a U.S. and South Korean invasion, as Pyongyang flashes more military might in opposition of Washington-Seoul combined exercises.
On Wednesday, the U.S. and South Korea had staged combined air drills that involved an American B-1B strategic bomber. The 11-day combined exercises ending Thursday have angered North Korea, which views the annual drills as rehearsals for war.
Citing the B-1B’s appearance in the drills, North Korea conducted a tactical nuclear-strike drill, which simulated an attack on key South Korean facilities. Pyongyang said it had successfully test-fired two ballistic missiles designed to make “scorched-earth strikes” at South Korean command centers and operational airfields.
Seoul and Tokyo officials said the missiles, fired just before midnight local time, had traveled more than 217 miles and splashed into the waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.
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North Korean state media released footage showing Kim Jong Un visiting the Navy command with his daughter on Sunday. This comes amid ongoing annual exercises held by the U.S. and South Korea. Photo: KCNA/Reuters
The White House said the missile launches were a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and a threat to North Korea’s neighbors.
“Our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remains ironclad,” White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters Wednesday.
Pyongyang had last test-fired a weapon last week, when its second attempt at launching a homegrown spy satellite into orbit failed. North Korea said it would try again in October.
North Korea in recent months has sought to up its rhetoric toward the U.S. and South Korea. Kim, the 39-year-old dictator, has increased the number of his public appearances at military sites, vowing to bolster his country’s forces. Those come as North Korea’s economy remains weakened due to Covid-19 border shutdowns that have begun to ease this month.
This week, Kim visited a military-training command center, where he was briefed on an army exercise meant to sharpen the country’s readiness for war, North Korea’s state media reported on Thursday.
The operational plans include repelling a U.S. and South Korean invasion with an all-out counterattack, then occupying South Korea, state media said.
The ongoing U.S.-South Korea military exercises “constitute a clear revelation of their scheme for invading” North Korea, Kim was quoted as saying during his Tuesday visit.
“Modern war is a showdown characterized by the campaign of brains,” Kim said. “Victory or defeat in war is decided first by [the] brains of the commanding officers before the start of fighting.”
Chieko Tsuneoka contributed to this article.
Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
Corrections & Amplifications
The U.S. B-1B strategic bomber is no longer nuclear capable. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said it is nuclear capable. (Corrected on Aug. 31)
16. Japan, S Korea, US closer but not close enough
Excerpts:
The most glaring unaddressed question is the lack of a regional economic strategy to accompany the security focus. Talks of supply chain coordination and cooperation on technology research skilfully sidestepped the lack of consensus on how to deal with China and technology transfer.
Missing was any discussion of the most obvious way to counter China’s claim to economic leadership — the expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership to include South Korea.
Imprisoned by US domestic politics, the White House is unable to give substance to this emergent partnership. It will instead try to offer a different version of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework when the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference gathers in San Francisco in November 2023.
But that may merely offer yet another glimpse of how political survival, in all three countries, triumphs over strategic necessity.
Japan, S Korea, US closer but not close enough
Camp David summit moved the dial on trilateral cooperation but forming a collective security agreement still faces many high hurdles
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · August 31, 2023
The August 18, 2023 summit that brought together the leaders of Japan, South Korea and the United States at Camp David was rightly hailed as a breakthrough moment in consolidating trilateral security ties, especially after years of near-frozen relations.
US officials stressed the importance of creating enduring institutions and structures among the three countries. These institutions could be nested within other Indo-Pacific regional creations like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the newer AUKUS security pact and cooperation with the Philippines.
The summit documents offered both a vision of partnership and a variety of practical agreements. They include everything from annual leadership summits to meetings at the ministerial and official levels to coordinate on economic security, supply chains and cyber security, as well as classic security steps such as joint military exercises.
Perhaps the most striking outcome of this summit was the assertion of shared security interests that bind Japan and South Korea and their alliances with the United States.
While it falls short of a collective security agreement, the two-paragraph “commitment to consult” on responses to “regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security” was itself a stunning achievement.
Those “challenges” and “threats” were made clear, beginning with the most obvious one that unites the three – North Korea. This was followed by Russia’s assault on the international order in Ukraine and, in a somewhat muted fashion, China.
But the high-flown rhetoric trumpeting a new “alliance” conceals political realities that were swept under the rug at Camp David. All three leaders face serious challenges at home that undercut the promises made at the summit.
Within mere days, the limits of the partnership were put on display with the discharge of radioactively tainted water from Japan’s disabled Fukushima Daiichi power plant. The beginning of the release on August 24 has already created serious political problems in both South Korea and Japan.
A Japanese technician checks radiation levels at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, in his determination to improve relations with Tokyo, offered sweeping support for the decision to begin the release of stored water. But he faces overwhelming disapproval for this decision in South Korean polls.
The Fukushima issue likely increases the chance of Yoon’s defeat in 2024’s parliamentary elections, an outcome that could make Yoon and his administration early lame ducks. Back in Tokyo, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is waiting for a bump from the Camp David summit. But he is experiencing a deepening slide in opinion polls.
The Fukushima release faces opposition within Japan, including from fishermen and others worried about boycotts of Japanese products in China and South Korea. Talk of an early parliamentary election in Japan, intended to consolidate Kishida’s claim to long-term leadership, is now on hold.
In Washington, President Joe Biden is already embroiled in an election campaign that threatens to bring Donald Trump and his isolationist views back to power. The Camp David summit was barely noticed amid the constant flow of domestic political news, though it mostly received welcome praise in the media.
Senior US officials are aware of the fragility of the progress gained and the danger of overselling the outcomes. In a post-summit briefing, National Security Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell, who is widely acknowledged as the architect of the summit, was notably cautious. He emphasized that “we cannot get ahead of the political context that each of us deals with.”
Political constraints were more evident in the brief press conference that concluded the summit than in the official documents. The three leaders offered upbeat summaries of the agreements. But the reporters present, one from each country, pushed back.
The US reporter asked how confident allies can be in Washington’s pledges of extended deterrence against nuclear threats from North Korea when Trump, who may return to office, was ready to withdraw from the Korean peninsula.
He asked Yoon how much confidence Japan and the United States can have in rapprochement when most South Koreans disapprove of the handling of wartime justice issues. And he asked Kishida what he would tell Japanese people who oppose “an economic Cold War with China.”
The South Korean reporter was even sharper, describing Japan’s response to Yoon’s efforts at mending relations as “passive efforts to resolve our issues that still remain.” Meanwhile, the Japanese reporter raised the issue of the Fukushima release.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida are trying hard to maintain ‘positive momentum.’ Image: Twitter
The answers were at best evasive, mostly content to repeat bland pledges of cooperation and partnership. But Kishida notably took the opportunity to soften any impression that China was their common foe, referring to Japan’s efforts to maintain “positive momentum” in their relations.
The most glaring unaddressed question is the lack of a regional economic strategy to accompany the security focus. Talks of supply chain coordination and cooperation on technology research skilfully sidestepped the lack of consensus on how to deal with China and technology transfer.
Missing was any discussion of the most obvious way to counter China’s claim to economic leadership — the expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership to include South Korea.
Imprisoned by US domestic politics, the White House is unable to give substance to this emergent partnership. It will instead try to offer a different version of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework when the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference gathers in San Francisco in November 2023.
But that may merely offer yet another glimpse of how political survival, in all three countries, triumphs over strategic necessity.
Daniel Sneider is Lecturer of International Policy and East Asian Studies at Stanford University and a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.
Related
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · August 31, 2023
17. Obscure new group offers $5M bounty for ‘critical info’ on North Korea
A lot to unpack here. Just another organization trying to do something against north Korea? Is someone trying to conduct unconventional warfare? Or is the a north Korea intelligence/deception operations to see how they can snare?
But here is the buried lede. Is the Rewards for Justice program non-responsive?
March of Liberty also said it supports “the safe escape of the people of North Korea” and offers assistance on the “path to freedom.”
The group’s offer of a $5 million reward for tips about North Korea bears a strong resemblance to the U.S. State Department’s Reward for Justice (RFJ) program, which also offers up to $5 million for the “disruption” of DPRK illicit activities that could fund its weapons program.
Similar to RFJ, March of Liberty operates tip lines on Telegram, Signal, WhatsApp and other messaging apps. When NK News contacted one of the tip lines, March of Liberty requested “every detail of the information you have, along with your identity and location.”
“It is true that we copied the RFJ a lot,” March of Liberty told NK News in an email. “However, we have seen many cases where people contacted the RFJ for help but did not get any responses. So we have created our own program. If you actually try to get in touch with RFJ, it won’t be easy either,” an anonymous person wrote.
When asked why potential whistleblowers and North Koreans considering defection should trust the group, March of Liberty stated that the disclosure of their Bitcoin wallets shows their intentions are “genuine.”
Obscure new group offers $5M bounty for ‘critical info’ on North Korea
March of Liberty says it seeks to ‘emancipate’ North Koreans, but experts caution much about group remains unknown
https://www.nknews.org/2023/08/obscure-new-group-offers-5m-bounty-for-critical-info-on-north-korea/?utm
Ifang Bremer August 30, 2023
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A collage of March of Liberty's website homepage and its logo | Image: March of Liberty, edited by NK News
An obscure new organization called March of Liberty has offered rewards up to $5 million for “critical information related to North Korea” to “emancipate” the country’s citizens, in a campaign that appears to imitate a U.S. State Department counterintelligence program.
But while an NK News investigation suggests the group has real cryptocurrency assets for paying out rewards, experts cautioned against taking the organization’s intentions at face value, suggesting that March of Liberty could serve as a front for North Korean or other intelligence agencies.
In a press release, the group described itself as an “international secret association” offering rewards for intelligence on key DPRK individuals (including the ruling Kim family), core technologies related to nuclear development, human rights abuses and North Korean cyber activities.
March of Liberty also said it supports “the safe escape of the people of North Korea” and offers assistance on the “path to freedom.”
The group’s offer of a $5 million reward for tips about North Korea bears a strong resemblance to the U.S. State Department’s Reward for Justice (RFJ) program, which also offers up to $5 million for the “disruption” of DPRK illicit activities that could fund its weapons program.
Similar to RFJ, March of Liberty operates tip lines on Telegram, Signal, WhatsApp and other messaging apps. When NK News contacted one of the tip lines, March of Liberty requested “every detail of the information you have, along with your identity and location.”
“It is true that we copied the RFJ a lot,” March of Liberty told NK News in an email. “However, we have seen many cases where people contacted the RFJ for help but did not get any responses. So we have created our own program. If you actually try to get in touch with RFJ, it won’t be easy either,” an anonymous person wrote.
When asked why potential whistleblowers and North Koreans considering defection should trust the group, March of Liberty stated that the disclosure of their Bitcoin wallets shows their intentions are “genuine.”
March of Liberty shows its crypto reward assets on its website | Image: March of Liberty
On its website, March of Liberty links to a cryptocurrency wallet containing 34 bitcoins, which together are valued between $800,000 and $1 million depending on the exchange rate. It remains unclear whether the crypto wallet actually belongs to March of Liberty, but blockchain records show the account received the 34 bitcoins in August, aligning with the timeline of when most of the group’s online accounts were created.
The group declined to disclose to NK News who founded the movement or who its funders are “to ensure the safety” of its members “in the face of direct threats from North Korea.”
March of Liberty’s website offers a few inconclusive clues about the organization’s possible location or the identities of those behind the group. For instance, the Korean-language section of the website uses North Korean spellings for words like “computer” (콤퓨터), rather than the South Korean spelling (컴퓨터).
Martyn Williams, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center and manager of the North Korea Tech website, told NK News that the organization’s tip line uses “a Thai cellphone number, which might indicate its location or the original location of the site’s creator.”
“It could be a tourist SIM card, but I am unsure how long those numbers last,” he said.
However, Williams also noted that the organization does not accept WeChat or Kakao messages, platforms commonly used by North Korean escapees.
As a result, “the true backers are a complete mystery,” he said. He advised “caution” to anyone considering interaction with March of Liberty, raising the possibility that the group could be a front created by the North Korean government.
“If this organization really wants secret information, they are going to have to demonstrate who they are and why they can be trusted rather than simply expect people to send them stuff with the vague promise that they might get paid,” he said, stating the group is being too secretive to attract significant sources of information.
He also noted the fact that North Korea has a diplomatic presence in Thailand as possible evidence that “it could even be a North Korean play.”
Sokeel Park, ROK country director at Liberty in North Korea, a non-governmental organization that helps North Koreans defect, agreed that the group’s secrecy could hinder its ability to gain trust.
“In this field, the risks are high and trust is low. Establishing a relationship, credibility and trust takes time; there are no shortcuts,” he said.
The group has emerged at a sensitive time, as North Korea gradually reopens after years of self-imposed pandemic border closures, and amid concerns that thousands of North Koreans in Chinese detention centers might face forced repatriation and human rights abuses.
Park said that if the group’s intentions are genuine, rewards and support for discontent North Koreans who think about undermining the regime or defection “could contribute to positive change in North Korea.”
But for now, the group’s origins and intentions remain a mystery, as it has left few online traces that could identify its backers. However, “there will be actions that will prove and announce our identity in the near future,” March of Liberty told NK News.
Edited by Bryan Betts
18. Behind the scenes of Kim Jong Un’s lavish banquet at elite Pyongyang resort
Photos and imagery at the link: https://www.nknews.org/pro/behind-the-scenes-of-kim-jong-uns-lavish-banquet-at-elite-pyongyang-resort/
Think about this versus the sacrifice and suffering of the Korean people in the north.
Behind the scenes of Kim Jong Un’s lavish banquet at elite Pyongyang resort
North Korean leader flaunted Spanish hams and wine coolers with wife and daughter, despite DPRK’s chronic food problems
Colin ZwirkoAugust 30, 2023
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Kim Jong Un and his daughter sit at the main table at a banquet reportedly held on Aug. 27 | Image: KCTV (Aug. 29, 2023)
North Korean state TV has aired new footage of a lavish banquet held Sunday for top navy brass at a luxurious Pyongyang resort, showing leader Kim Jong Un enjoying privileged access to delicacies like Spanish ham with his wife and daughter, while dining among scale models of nuclear missiles and being serenaded by sailors.
The coverage is the latest example of Kim flaunting his lavish lifestyle even as state media reports on his concern over chronic “food problems” in the largely impoverished nation.
The move raises questions over his intentions and possible blowback, though the Kim family’s history of publicly living large suggests there is unlikely to be an upheaval over the matter.
A MOVEABLE FEAST
NK Pro analysis shows that Sunday’s banquet celebrating Navy Day took place at the upscale Air Koryo Kobangsan Hotel located along the Taedong River in east Pyongyang, based on a comparison of satellite imagery with state TV footage of the nighttime banquet.
State media did not disclose the location, but showed scenes of Kim and his family being welcomed by top political and military officials outside a luxurious garage at the hotel, where their Mercedes limousine was parked. The main event took place in a large tent on the resort’s northeast lawn, NK Pro analysis shows.
It followed Kim and his daughter’s visit to navy command headquarters in northern Pyongyang earlier in the day, where the DPRK leader vowed to deploy nuclear weapons to naval units.
The tent was lit with chandeliers and string lights. Bright neon lights strobed behind the royal family’s table, in a display of Kim’s familiar kitsch aesthetic.
Full KCTV coverage of the banquet reportedly held on Aug. 27 | Video: KCTV (Aug. 29, 2023)
State TV attempted to blur out the Spanish ham leg (top) but other photos showed a chef carving up meat for guests (bottom right) | Images: KCTV, KCNA (Aug. 29, 2023); edited by NK Pro
Scale models of weapons such as the Hwasong-18 ICBM (left, middle) and KN-25 600mm MLRS (right) were prominently displayed at the banquet | Images: KCTV (Aug. 29, 2023); edited by NK Pro
Only Kim Jong Un, his wife and daughter were seen with a mysterious blue bottle of apparent foreign origin | Image: KCTV (Aug. 29, 2023); edited by NK Pro
Likely wine bottle coolers appear only in front of Kim and his wife and daughter (right) and not with his sister Kim Yo Jong (left). The royal family’s special swivel chairs are also indicated on the right. | Image: KCNA (Aug. 29, 2023); edited by NK Pro
Kim’s wife Ri Sol Ju appeared to be in charge of holding on to Kim’s zipper-style tie after he took it off (indicated in yellow on the right) | Images: KCTV (Aug. 29, 2023); edited by NK Pro
A giant scale model of the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) mid-launch was the tent’s centerpiece, while smaller models of other nuclear weapons systems were displayed at buffet tables on either side. Such weapons models have often appeared at the leader’s banquets over the years.
At one point in the broadcast, KCTV attempted to blur out the presence of a large leg of Spanish-style ham, possibly to obscure a foreign brand name, or to hide its presence entirely as a rare and luxurious food item amid nationwide food shortages.
As for the drinks, Kim showed off his special status by only allowing what appear to be electronic wine bottle coolers for himself, his wife and daughter. Even his sister Kim Yo Jong did not get one.
His daughter, believed to be named Kim Ju Ae and no older than 12 years old, had the same wine and shot glasses as the adults surrounding her but with different colored liquids, suggesting they were non-alcoholic drinks.
Small blue bottles featuring what appears to be Japanese writing — possibly a bug spray or disinfectant like other foreign products the leader has used before — also only appeared in front of the three top Kims in their special swivel chairs.
The young Kim stared off blankly at times as her dictator dad shed his zipper-style necktie to mingle with his generals, his wife later carrying the tie when they left. But the potential successor also sang along as top navy officials serenaded them with old songs in front of their table.
A TOP-TIER VENUE
NK Pro previously revealed details of the Kobangsan Hotel’s remodeling as national carrier Air Koryo took charge of the resort, including the construction of a new elite horse track and other equestrian facilities.
The resort appears to occasionally host important government events, after North Korea held another tent-based banquet there in May for the new Chinese ambassador. A Chinese Embassy readout called it the Kobangsan Guesthouse (库房山招待所 / 고방산초대소), and published photos of Ambassador Wang Yajun and DPRK foreign minister Choe Son Hui fishing in its pond.
This comparison shows matching appearances of stone walking paths, a pond and garage areas seen in satellite imagery of the Air Koryo Kobangsan Hotel and state TV footage of the banquet | Images: KCTV (Aug. 29, 2023); Google Earth (April 1, 2023); edited by NK Pro
A wide map showing a horse track on the resort grounds as well as locations seen in state TV footage of the recent banquet | Image: Google Earth; edited by NK Pro
A smaller tent than the one used this past week appeared in a similar spot next to the Kobangsan Hotel pond on April 27 this year | Image: Planet Labs; edited by NK Pro
A structure was built around the same spot in April 2022 before being taken down later that year | Image: Google Earth (July 22, 2023); edited by NK Pro
New Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Wang Yajun at a banquet with foreign minister Choe Son Hui inside a tent at the Air Koryo Kobangsan Hotel | Image: Chinese Embassy in the DPRK (May 9, 2023)
New Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Wang Yajun fishes with foreign minister Choe Son Hui at what appears to be the same pond seen next to the tent at this week’s Kim banquet | Image: Chinese Embassy in the DPRK (May 9, 2023)
Stepping-stone walkways seen on the ground inside the tent in this week’s KCTV footage can be seen here in this older photo of another part of the resort grounds nearby | Image: Young Pioneer Tours
Planet Labs satellite imagery shows that a smaller tent also appeared around the same spot next to the pond between April 24 and 27, possibly in relation to the April 25 army foundation day holiday, while a permanent structure was built there in April 2022 but was demolished by late October 2022.
The tent used for the Kim family’s Navy Day banquet on Sunday appeared to be similar in size and shape to one used for another extravagant banquet Kim and his wife put on to celebrate the Sept. 9 national day holiday last year.
Kim also hosted large-scale outdoor banquets on the front lawn of his party headquarters office building for the Sept. 9 holiday in 2021 and on the sidelines of the April 25 military parade last year.
Additionally, Kim hosted a banquet at the Yanggakdo Hotel, a typical pre-pandemic foreign tourist hotspot, for the military ahead of its Feb. 8 parade this year, where his wife Ri Sol Ju sported a Hwasong-17 nuclear missile necklace. It marked the first time for his daughter to attend such an event.
And in one of the most recent overt examples of the Kims flaunting their privilege, state TV coverage of the Feb. 8 military parade included footage of the royal family and top officials enjoying a chocolate fondue fountain and cocktails while mingling on couches before the event started.
Kim Jong Un and his daughter have already been shown watching major missile tests from two of their Pyongyang mega-mansion complexes this year, and Kim has launched missiles from numerous other mansions in previous years.
State media has shown glimpses of the Kim family’s network of palaces around the country over the decades, including indoor pools covered by pyramid-shaped glass structures at one of their Pyongyang compounds, while foreign guests of the Kims have also released photos and details of their luxurious lifestyles.
Edited by Bryan Betts
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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