Quotes of the Day:

"It is not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters."

– Epictetus

"If you can't explain it simply, you do not understand it well enough."

– Albert Einstein

"We lie loudest when we lie to ourselves." 

– Eric Hoffer

1. SOCOM getting new commander after Frank Bradley earns Senate confirmation

2. What is Irregular Warfare?

3. The Pentagon’s New Isolationism

4. Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman and Senior Advisor, Sean Parnell, on a Reduction in Force at the Defense Technical Information Center

5. Testing the Waters: Modernization of People’s Liberation Army

6. Renewable Realignment: Europe’s Shift to Renewable Energy and its Implications on US Global Strategy

7. Special Operations News – August 4, 2025

8. The Intelligence Intellectuals: Social Scientists and the Making of the CIA (Georgetown Studies in Intelligence History)

9. When it comes to our Special Forces, we should take a leaf out of America's book (A view from the UK)

10. US Marines train beach landings Down Under with old allies, new rides

11. Army plans to grow Patriot battalions, plus one for Guam

12.  US defense industry vulnerable to China, government watchdog warns

13. How to write a defense strategy that sticks

14. The Secret of George Washington’s Revolutionary Success

15. Drones Aren’t Swarming Yet — But They Could

16. From Tactical Trench Killers to Strategic War Winners: Doctrine, Operational Art, and Tomorrow’s Drone-Enabled Maneuver Warfare

17. A Fight Over a West Point Job Reveals Two Visions of America Under Trump

1. SOCOM getting new commander after Frank Bradley earns Senate confirmation

Perhaps this is a useful summary of his vision and philosophy. I just hope that the human domain is included in his vision even if DOD does not recognize humans as a domain.

While I of course give him the benefit of the doubt, especially since I never served with him, it does not seem as if a publication like this from JSOU would be of interest to him.

Resilience and Resistance: Interdisciplinary Lessons in Competition, Deterrence, and Irregular Warfare

https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/284

Excerpts:

“The changing, accelerating pace of technology, the ubiquitous information environment, and the advent of man-machine teamed autonomy on the battlefields of the world today are absolutely changing the character of warfare … in our very eyes,” he said last week during his confirmation hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee.

He added that legislative proposals such as the FORGED Act and SPEED Act, and other initiatives to reform DOD acquisitions and speed up the fielding of new tech, are “critical to allowing us to use the innovative spirit of our operators to be able to capture those problems and opportunities we see on the battlefield and turn them into new man-machine teamed approaches.”

Bradley also called for “fusing all-domain capabilities” to gain advantages over adversaries, endorsing the so-called “irregular triad” concept that includes SOF, space and cyber capabilities.

“The pervasive technical surveillance environment presents both unique challenges and unprecedented opportunities. Recognizing this, I am committed to strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the combined strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF’s operational effectiveness in support of national security objectives,” Bradley wrote in response to advance policy questions from senators ahead of his confirmation hearing.

“My vision encompasses integrating technological advancements across all domains — physical and virtual — including surface and subsurface maritime platforms; autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned systems; next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; stand-off precision effects; and modernized mission command systems,” he added.

SOCOM getting new commander after Frank Bradley earns Senate confirmation

The Navy SEAL will get his fourth star and take the reins of U.S. Special Operations Command.

https://defensescoop.com/2025/08/01/adm-frank-bradley-socom-commander-senate-confirmed/

By

Jon Harper

August 1, 2025

Listen to this article

3:37

Learn more.

Colonel Isagani Criste, commander of the Philippine army's First Scout Ranger Regiment, presents a gift to Vice Adm. Frank Bradley, Joint Special Operations Command commanding officer, during a key leader engagement in the Philippines, July 9, 2023. (Courtesy photo from DVIDS)

U.S. Special Operations Command is getting a new leader after Thursday night’s voice vote by the Senate to confirm Vice Adm. Frank Bradley as its commander.

Bradley, a Navy SEAL officer who most recently commanded Joint Special Operations Command, will also get a fourth star.

He was nominated for the role by President Donald Trump in early June.

Bradley will take the reins at SOCOM — which has been an early adopter of many cutting-edge technologies like AI within the Defense Department — as America’s special operations forces work to modernize and prepare for competition with more advanced adversaries.

“The changing, accelerating pace of technology, the ubiquitous information environment, and the advent of man-machine teamed autonomy on the battlefields of the world today are absolutely changing the character of warfare … in our very eyes,” he said last week during his confirmation hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee.

He added that legislative proposals such as the FORGED Act and SPEED Act, and other initiatives to reform DOD acquisitions and speed up the fielding of new tech, are “critical to allowing us to use the innovative spirit of our operators to be able to capture those problems and opportunities we see on the battlefield and turn them into new man-machine teamed approaches.”

Bradley also called for “fusing all-domain capabilities” to gain advantages over adversaries, endorsing the so-called “irregular triad” concept that includes SOF, space and cyber capabilities.

“The pervasive technical surveillance environment presents both unique challenges and unprecedented opportunities. Recognizing this, I am committed to strengthening the Space-SOF-Cyber triad, leveraging the combined strengths of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM to ensure SOF’s operational effectiveness in support of national security objectives,” Bradley wrote in response to advance policy questions from senators ahead of his confirmation hearing.

“My vision encompasses integrating technological advancements across all domains — physical and virtual — including surface and subsurface maritime platforms; autonomous uncrewed systems; counter-unmanned systems; next-generation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; stand-off precision effects; and modernized mission command systems,” he added.

Bradley is a U.S. Naval Academy grad who later earned a master’s degree in physics from the Naval Postgraduate School.

According to his Navy bio, he was among the first U.S. servicemembers to deploy to Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

He later served as commander of Special Operations Command Central, which oversees joint special operations throughout the Middle East region, and Naval Special Warfare Development Group, among other leadership positions in the SOF community. He also served with SEAL Team Four and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team Two.

Bradley’s staff duty positions have included assistant commander, Joint Special Operations Command, JSOC J-3 technical operations division chief and deputy J-3, vice deputy director for global operations for the Joint Staff J-3, executive officer for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and deputy director for CT strategy for the Joint Staff J-5, according to his bio.

He will succeed Gen. Bryan Fenton, a career Green Beret officer, as SOCOM commander.

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X (the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) @Jon_Harper_

2. What is Irregular Warfare?

There is a short video at the link below.

What is Irregular Warfare?

Understanding the Military Science!

https://robertburrell.substack.com/p/what-is-irregular-warfare?publication_id=3009244&post

Robert Burrell, PhD

Aug 04, 2025

This short video showcases two lessons from Chapter 1 of Resilience and Resistance (Joint Special Operations University Press, 2025). An explanation below.

The first lesson demonstrates the relationships between deterrence, conventional war, competition, and irregular warfare. These four important conflict zones interact with one another and the contact layers give rise to grey zone activities (border between peace and war) and hybrid warfare (border between direct force and asymmetric means). Grey zone and hybrid are crucial battlegrounds which current U.S. military doctrine completely ignores or misunderstands. An illustration follows.

Figure 1. Relationships of Conflict in a Two Deminsional Framework

The second lesson details the four components of internationalized intrastate conflict and visually represents the heartbeat and dynamics of irregular warfare. I spoke about this recently on the At the Boundary Podcast from the University of South Florida. Both the resistance node and the government (or resilience node) combat each other directly for control over resources and control of the narrative. Meanwhile, both try to influence the population’s loyalties. The population can also influence both resistance and the government, which is why the arrows on the lines are two sided. Meanwhile, both resistance and resilience attempt to garner support from the international community. External supporters to intrastate conflict also have agency and can influence the outcome of the conflict. Surviving and winning in this dynamic and rapidly shifting environment requires understanding, adaptation, and determination. Illustration follows.

Figure 2. Four Dynamic Nodes of Internationalized Intrastate Conflict

These frameworks represent only two of the many irregular warfare concepts shared in my new book, which can profoundly change the way the U.S. Government plans national strategy, drafts foreign policies, and executes defense activities. You can read the book for free! Just click here!

Cheers,

Rob

3. The Pentagon’s New Isolationism

Excerpts;

But the U.S. military has had a symbiotic relationship with think tanks for years. While government employees and military officers are mired in day-to-day operations and focused on tactical warfare, outside scholars have the time and space for engaging in strategic thinking and coming up with solutions to thorny problems. Some think tanks have created positions for serving officers, and the Pentagon has also created internal positions for think tankers, in part to facilitate an exchange of ideas. “So often in government, you are choosing between awful options. You think you have found the least-bad options, and places like think tanks allow you to test that conclusion,” Mara Karlin, a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities, told me.

Several real policy changes have emerged from that arrangement. Scholars at the American Enterprise Institute, a right-leaning think tank, produced a proposal that served as a blueprint for the 2007 surge in Iraq, at a time when the security situation in the country was deteriorating. A 2022 Center for Strategic and International Studies war-game exercise found that, in a hypothetical situation in which China invaded Taiwan, the United States would be in grave jeopardy in a matter of weeks—the Chinese could successfully sink an aircraft carrier, attack U.S. bases in the region, and bring down American fighter jets. The exercise spurred Pentagon officials to reassess the military planning for a potential conflict in the region.

American officials have also made important statements and announcements at security-focused conferences. In the days before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, then–Vice President Kamala Harris appeared at the Munich Security Conference to outline U.S. fears of imminent war. Earlier this year, Vice President J. D. Vance also attended the Munich Security Conference, where he blasted American allies and cast doubt on the idea that the United States would remain Europe’s security guarantor. This year, Hegseth himself appeared at the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore, where he outlined U.S. strategy to combat threats from China. (Breaking with long-standing military norms of nonpartisanship, Hegseth also spoke to young conservatives at Turning Point USA’s Student Action Summit last month.)

Later this year, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum will host a major national-security conference that usually draws Cabinet secretaries, industry leaders, and America’s top generals and admirals. Several past defense secretaries have delivered the keynote speech. A phrase often invoked at the conference is peace through strength, which Reagan introduced into the modern lexicon during the 1980 presidential election, and which became a mantra of his administration’s defense policy. It has also become one of Hegseth’s favorite phrases for describing the military under Trump. And yet, by Hegseth’s own directive, no one knows whether he or the troops he urges to embrace that approach will be able to attend the conference that celebrates it.

The Pentagon’s New Isolationism

An already insular Defense Department is sealing itself off from outside thinkers.

By Nancy A. Youssef

The Atlantic · by Nancy A. Youssef · August 4, 2025

Last month, a group of seven U.S. generals and admirals—including the top admiral in charge of U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific region—prepared to travel to the Aspen Security Forum, in Colorado. Security officials had spoken at the annual conference for years, including during Donald Trump’s first term, and were set to discuss topics such as the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, the future of AI, and threats from China. But a day before the forum began, the officers’ staff got calls from the Pentagon telling them to stay away. On social media, Sean Parnell, the Defense Department’s top spokesperson, later made clear why: The forum, he said, was “hosted by an organization that promotes the evils of globalism, disdain for America, and hatred for our great president, Donald J. Trump.”

Aspen, it turned out, was only the beginning. Within days, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had ordered the DOD to vet all future event attendance by any defense official. In a statement to Politico, Parnell declared that the move was meant to “ensure the Department of Defense is not lending its name and credibility to organizations, forums, and events that run counter to the values of this administration.” (The Aspen Institute, which sponsors the security forum, describes itself as nonpartisan.)

Parnell’s characterization of the new policy was vague, but it represented an abrupt departure from long-established DOD practices, and an important shift in the way that the military engages with the outside world: A Pentagon that has already grown more insular under Hegseth could end up cutting itself off from thinkers and ideas beyond the building, or at least those with which the administration disagrees.

Tom Nichols: The Pentagon against the think tanks

Military personnel and conference planners I spoke with described the decision as the latest battle in a broader war on ideas at the Pentagon under Hegseth. Earlier this year, the DOD eliminated the Office of Net Assessment, which had been created in the 1970s as a hub for strategic analysts to produce internal assessments of U.S. readiness against potential foes. Hegseth, who himself keeps a small group of advisers, was behind both decisions, defense officials told me.

Troops and civilians attend hundreds of events annually on behalf of the Pentagon, and have been doing so for decades. Whether gatherings on heady topics such as economic warfare and “gray zone” tactics or highly technical symposia about combatting rust on ships and the future of drone warfare, these events keep the military plugged into ideas from scholars and industry. Particularly since the Iraq War, the military has said that it wants to seek out ways to challenge its assumptions and solicit outside views—to make officers think through their plans and strategies and the second- and third-order effects of their decisions. Conferences are some of the main venues for this kind of exchange, though not the only ones; officers from dozens of other nations sit alongside American counterparts at U.S. war colleges, for example.

Previous administrations have required military personnel to secure approval to attend conferences. The difference, this time, is the apparently partisan slant to the vetting process. By prohibiting DOD personnel from engaging with viewpoints that the administration disagrees with, defense officials and conference planners told me, the Pentagon risks groupthink that could have real consequences.

Pete Mansoor, a retired Army colonel who served as executive officer to General David Petraeus during the 2007 surge in Iraq, told me he believes that Hegseth’s emphasis on “lethality” over the kind of strategic thinking often fostered at conferences and think tanks could prove dangerous. “The fact that officers stopped thinking strategically and only thought about lethality resulted in a war that was almost lost in Iraq,” Mansoor, now a senior faculty fellow at Ohio State University’s Mershon Center for International Security Studies, said. “I’m sure the Russian army also stresses lethality,” he continued, “but they have educated their generals on the basis of a million casualties” in Ukraine.

Read: Trump’s cosplay Cabinet

If the department continues to ban conference attendance in a substantial way, it will also make U.S. forces more like their Russian and Chinese counterparts, which in many cases can seek outside views only through state-sanctioned academics. “When did our ideas become so fragile that they can’t stand up to someone who has alternate views?” one defense official asked me. (The official requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about this issue.)

The Defense Department review of conference attendance is having an immediate impact. Only after the policy was announced did Pentagon officials realize how many conferences military personnel attend, leading to a scramble to draft formal guidance across the force, defense officials told me. A DOD spokesperson was unable to tell me when such guidance will be released, and responded to a request for comment by pointing me to Parnell’s statement about the review. In the meantime, military personnel are preemptively canceling their attendance at conferences. Some inside the Pentagon have even canceled internal meetings, fearful of running afoul of the new ban on “events” and “forums” not approved beforehand. National-security experts at think tanks, which often host security conferences, told me they are now unsure how much they can engage with American service members and the civilians working alongside them.

Also unclear is whether the policy applies to industry-related conferences, some of which are sponsored by private companies that spend millions of dollars to host them. Adding to the confusion, it was not initially clear whether the policy applied to one of the services, the Coast Guard, which falls under the Department of Homeland Security, not the DOD; a Coast Guard spokesperson told me that the service is working to align its policy with current DOD guidance.

Some military leaders dislike attending conferences and think-tank events, of course. Appearing in public forums can mean facing political questions and potentially giving a career-ending answer. Moreover, some leaders argue, think tanks are not always the best source of new ideas, particularly given that so many of their staff members once worked in government themselves. To tackle national-security threats, generals and admirals should be focused on warfare, not speaking to those who have never been on the front lines, the argument goes.

Read: The Pentagon’s policy guy is all in on China

But the U.S. military has had a symbiotic relationship with think tanks for years. While government employees and military officers are mired in day-to-day operations and focused on tactical warfare, outside scholars have the time and space for engaging in strategic thinking and coming up with solutions to thorny problems. Some think tanks have created positions for serving officers, and the Pentagon has also created internal positions for think tankers, in part to facilitate an exchange of ideas. “So often in government, you are choosing between awful options. You think you have found the least-bad options, and places like think tanks allow you to test that conclusion,” Mara Karlin, a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities, told me.

Several real policy changes have emerged from that arrangement. Scholars at the American Enterprise Institute, a right-leaning think tank, produced a proposal that served as a blueprint for the 2007 surge in Iraq, at a time when the security situation in the country was deteriorating. A 2022 Center for Strategic and International Studies war-game exercise found that, in a hypothetical situation in which China invaded Taiwan, the United States would be in grave jeopardy in a matter of weeks—the Chinese could successfully sink an aircraft carrier, attack U.S. bases in the region, and bring down American fighter jets. The exercise spurred Pentagon officials to reassess the military planning for a potential conflict in the region.

American officials have also made important statements and announcements at security-focused conferences. In the days before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, then–Vice President Kamala Harris appeared at the Munich Security Conference to outline U.S. fears of imminent war. Earlier this year, Vice President J. D. Vance also attended the Munich Security Conference, where he blasted American allies and cast doubt on the idea that the United States would remain Europe’s security guarantor. This year, Hegseth himself appeared at the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore, where he outlined U.S. strategy to combat threats from China. (Breaking with long-standing military norms of nonpartisanship, Hegseth also spoke to young conservatives at Turning Point USA’s Student Action Summit last month.)

Later this year, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum will host a major national-security conference that usually draws Cabinet secretaries, industry leaders, and America’s top generals and admirals. Several past defense secretaries have delivered the keynote speech. A phrase often invoked at the conference is peace through strength, which Reagan introduced into the modern lexicon during the 1980 presidential election, and which became a mantra of his administration’s defense policy. It has also become one of Hegseth’s favorite phrases for describing the military under Trump. And yet, by Hegseth’s own directive, no one knows whether he or the troops he urges to embrace that approach will be able to attend the conference that celebrates it.

*Illustration Sources: Marat Musabirov / Getty; Javier Zayas Photography / Getty; cveltri / Getty; Svetlana Ievleva / Getty.

The Atlantic · by Nancy A. Youssef · August 4, 2025

4. Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman and Senior Advisor, Sean Parnell, on a Reduction in Force at the Defense Technical Information Center

For most this is an obscure center within DOD. It publishes all the research conducted by DOD and makes it available throughout DOD as well as the public.. This includes all the theses and research papers as well as a central repository for all military journal publications and the like. Many of us make use of its services for research and it is one way that DOD shares its research and knowledge internally and externally. It is unknown from this release what functions will continue other than it seems duplicative efforts will be reduced. If this is no longer going to be the central repository for DOD information I am not sure how the "user experience" will be improved.

Here is the link to to the SECDEF memo announcing the RIF. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Aug/04/2003770585/-1/-1/1/RATIONALIZATION-AND-TRANSFORMATION-OF-THE-DEFENSE-TECHNOLOGY-INFORMATION-CENTER.PDF

Release

Immediate Release

Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman and Senior Advisor, Sean Parnell, on a Reduction in Force at the Defense Technical Information Center

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4263705/statement-by-chief-pentagon-spokesman-and-senior-advisor-sean-parnell-on-a-redu/

Aug. 4, 2025 |   

The Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, has directed a personnel reduction within the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). This decision eliminates duplicative functions and will refocus DTIC to its core statutory mission of administering a library of technical information and improving the user experience. This effort will save taxpayers over $25 million as part of the Department's commitment to broader efficiency initiatives and to streamline operations.

Forty (40) mission-essential personnel will be retained in order to fulfill DTIC's statutory mission, all other civilians will receive a Specific Notice of reduction-in-force. The Department remains committed to continued reform and reducing bureaucracy.

5. Testing the Waters: Modernization of People’s Liberation Army

Excerpt:

Optimism on the part of the PLA in the capabilities of cutting-edge technology entails several dangers that could hinder its ability to wage war. Although the PLA’s technological prowess and breakthroughs are widely hailed in China as a paradigm change in future warfare, their utility depends on how well they are implemented and used in Chinese warfighting doctrine. Outside observers must comprehend that intelligentization might not provide the PLA with all the benefits it anticipates.

Opinion / Perspective| The Latest

Testing the Waters: Modernization of People’s Liberation Army

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/04/testing-the-waters-modernization-of-peoples-liberation-army/

by Gaurav Sen

|

08.04.2025 at 06:00am

Beginning in 2015, China launched broad military reforms under President Xi to institutionalize China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for a common future. As a result of these reforms, the Strategic Support Force (SSF, or PLASSF) was established, a new command-and-control structure was established, regional commands were replaced with a theater command system, the army’s strength and influence were reduced, cadre training and education were improved, and other changes were made. These modifications, which have a solid historical foundation, are the basis of the PLA’s fighting prowess. Despite repeated efforts, the PLA is having trouble integrating jointness into the military.

According to Chairman Xi, the modernisation of the PLA should be finished by 2035, and by 2049, it should be a “world-class force”. The foundation of these initiatives is jointness. The term jointness describes the process of combining all the military services into a single, cohesive organization that is stronger than the sum of its components. Within this framework, each service can highlight their strengths while minimizing their limitations through effective cooperation. But encouraging jointness involves several difficult tasks, such as creating a shared culture, getting past narrow service interests, and coordinating many operational initiatives. China still has a long way to go before realizing its goals. Chinese strategist criticizes technology problems, interservice rivalries, and incompetent operational commanders as inhibitors to achieving jointness throughout the PLA.

Authors note that advancing a joint force continues to face technical difficulties. Assuring that the services’ technology is consistent will promote interoperability and is one of the most crucial elements in making sure they can coexist. Along with that, scholars claim that for the PLA to fulfil its jointness objectives, there needs to be a “single information technology system standard”. Mid-level operational commanders, according to Chinese analysts, are not prepared for modern combat. The phrase “Five Incapables” perfectly expresses this concern. According to the official Chinese slogan, officer cadres are incapable of accurately assessing fighting situations, comprehending the goals of the top authority, making operational judgements, sending troops, or handling certain situations. This theme has been reinforced by Xi personally, who feels the PLA must solve this issue. In fact, since 2015, it has been the PLA’s most often spoken catchphrase. This demonstrates how often political leadership, rather than the military itself, provides diagnoses of the PLA’s limitations.

Many visible signs of the PLA’s jointness issues support the establishment’s concerns. For instance, the National Defense University, one of the most important military institutions in the PLA, just opened the Joint Operations Academy, which seems to be experiencing something of a curricular revolution. The institution aims to be at the forefront of developing cadres for joint warfighting. Since the institution’s establishment in 2017, the curriculum has undergone many changes. Both students and teachers have become weary of the rapid speed of change, with professors lamenting that they are no longer sure what and how to educate their uniformed students regarding joint warfare. The other military universities and training commands most certainly have comparable issues if the National Defense University is having trouble preparing its students for jointness. The majority of PLA officers have little practical experience leading joint operations.

The seemingly unrestricted optimism that Chinese analysts have for the possibilities of cutting-edge technologies is revealed in their discourse on intelligentization. They urge the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to improve the tactical commander’s decision-making powers and the use of intelligent self-driving weapons to take the role of soldiers on the battlefield. The PLA thinks that intelligentization would profoundly alter future combat and present a unique opportunity to get ahead of Beijing’s enemies in terms of development in addition to offering a solution to its problems with jointness. The majority of Chinese scholars advocate for strong central decision-making frameworks in their debates on intelligentization. These theorists want operational commanders to expertly guide the intelligent swarming of unmanned warfare systems to accomplish campaign goals with the guidance of cutting-edge algorithms. Chinese scholars assert that this strategy will centralize command authority on a select group of generals who can remain secure away from the front lines of battle, which is in direct opposition to the contemporary idea of mission command. The failure of any operational commander in this scenario, however, may be devastating at a time of war.

The underlying fragility that still exists in AI and autonomous systems seems to be missed by intelligentization theory proponents. Chinese strategists’ visions of the PLA’s future are mostly centered on cutting-edge technology, with little attention paid to potential risks and strategies for mitigating them. If these goals are achieved, the PLA’s ability to command its soldiers could be seriously hampered by a well-timed electronic warfare assault from an opponent. Chinese policymakers who are speaking about intelligentization seem to place too much faith in what AI and cutting-edge technology are capable of. According to these authors, intelligent machines will someday be more capable of making decisions than people. The PLA does not yet appear to have addressed or absorbed this doubt, even though the excitement around AI may be beginning to fade amid the realization that AI is “neither artificial nor intelligent”. The PLA will also need to improve the technical expertise of its officers and infantry corps to keep developing and implementing AI in battle as intelligentization initiatives advance and more command choices can be outsourced to computers. Contrarily, this can lead to a wider division of labor within the PLA, with core members being underused due to automated decision-making and under-skilled for technical tasks.

Optimism on the part of the PLA in the capabilities of cutting-edge technology entails several dangers that could hinder its ability to wage war. Although the PLA’s technological prowess and breakthroughs are widely hailed in China as a paradigm change in future warfare, their utility depends on how well they are implemented and used in Chinese warfighting doctrine. Outside observers must comprehend that intelligentization might not provide the PLA with all the benefits it anticipates.

Tags: China, intelligentization, People's Liberation Army, PLA, PLASSF

About The Author

• 
  
• Gaurav Sen
• Gaurav Sen is a Senior Research Fellow at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is the author of the book ‘Peril of the Pacific : Military Balance and Battle for Taiwan’. His research interests include Indo-Pacific Security and cross strait relationship. He can be reached at gaurav31_isl@jnu.ac.in

6. Renewable Realignment: Europe’s Shift to Renewable Energy and its Implications on US Global Strategy

Excerpt:

The United States must take steps to support the European Union’s transition to renewable energy. By supplying intellectual capital and raw materials, the United States benefits strategically and economically. Russia and China are actively trying to expand their influence in the European energy market. This geopolitical realignment will weaken the transatlantic alliance if the United States does not present itself as a stable and reliable partner. By proving ourselves to be a steadfast and dependable ally to Europe, the United States can maintain dominance over the creeping soft power of both China and Russia in the European energy markets. Forging immutable bonds with Europe will guarantee an energy-resilient future for both continents.

Essay| The Latest

Renewable Realignment: Europe’s Shift to Renewable Energy and its Implications on US Global Strategy

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/04/renewable-realignment/

by Jason Warnken

|

08.04.2025 at 06:00am

Background

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 exposed Europe’s energy vulnerability and functioned as a catalyst, accelerating the shift toward the use of renewable energy. In 2011, Germany resolved to phase out its nuclear energy program. The consequence was more reliance on Russian oil and gas for electricity generation. It was abundant and affordable. After sanctions were levied against Russia by the international community, European nations abruptly cut their ties to Russian energy imports out of necessity. This transition alters global markets and presents challenges and opportunities for the United States. In the interim, countries like Germany rely heavily on Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), imported primarily from the United States, to bridge the gap until renewables can be increased.

While this stopgap measure is a boon for the American export market, the United States should begin to plan for a future where Europe reduces its consumption of American LNG as it scales up renewable energy. President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act into law on December 18, 2015 which lifted the longstanding ban on United States LNG exports starting in 2016. This overturned the ban that was in place since 1975, quickly leading to the United States becoming the largest exporter of Liquified Natural Gas globally. Europe’s transition toward renewable energy represents a turning point in global energy dynamics and presents significant strategic implications for the United States.

European Dependance on Russian Oil and Gas

The geopolitical landscape of the European Union is complex. The Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of the energy supply chain to regional conflict. In the years prior, Russia worked to lock Europe into a dependent relationship. Austria, Latvia, Germany, and Italy were the European nations most dependent upon the supply of Russian gas. The Nord Stream 1 and 2 projects aimed to bypass Ukrainian delivery fees. In the ramp-up to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia demanded that the European Union (EU) members pay for its gas in Russian Rubles and open accounts in Russian banks to prop up the Russian economy and provide a hedge against international sanctions.

This strategy faltered, however, and the EU began a hard transition away from Russian fossil fuels. Natural gas imports from Russia fell from 40% (as much as 80% in the cases of Austria and Latvia) of total gas imported before the invasion of Ukraine to around 10% in 2024 due to international sanctions. The subsequent result was a significant spike in energy prices in Europe. This price spike, while it has subsided and is projected to trend lower due to an oversupply of American LNG through 2030, is driving European Union nations to move to secure their energy independence and expand the use of renewables.

Challenges to Renewable Energy Implementation

While cooperation between nation-states allows for more diverse ways to fulfill the energy needs of a nation, moving toward energy independence provides for greater national security by eliminating dependence on potentially hostile states and reducing supply chain vulnerabilities. The sabotage of the Nord Stream Pipeline in 2022 drew a circle around the vulnerability of Europe’s oil and gas supply chain. While attribution for the sabotage of this infrastructure is unclear, the Russian Federation is highly suspected by NATO due to the coordination and timing of the demolition. This act of sabotage highlights the tenuous relationship Europe has with its energy producing partnerships. Complete energy independence is unobtainable for Europe due to a lack of fossil fuel deposits and critical minerals used in the production of batteries. Thus, European nations must always foster codependent relationships with potential adversaries to provide for their energy needs. Even if the EU could develop a 100% renewable energy infrastructure, the materials and batteries needed to construct the grid would have to be sourced externally.

The European Commission Green Deal has made net zero emissions by 2050 a goal. However, the speed of adopting renewable energy projects has been disparate between EU nations. Onerous regulatory burdens and permitting processes play a part in the slow rollout. Additionally, variations in regulation across the 27 member states of the European Union have caused a discrepancy in adoption. For example, wind projects can face a nine-year delay in getting permitting approval for grid connection. Challenges to the proliferation of solar energy exist as well. Bottlenecks created by outdated grids have caused solar energy growth to slow to a crawl on the continent.

Germany has been an early adopter of renewable energy, and their planned transition to 80% renewable energy by 2030, known as the “Energiewende,” is well underway. However, Germany is the EU’s largest energy consumer and still relies heavily on coal, oil, and natural gas. Denmark is another nation that began its transition away from fossil fuels early. Due to the rising cost of oil in the 1970s, they began to explore wind options to supply their energy needs. Today, they continue to expand their use of wind and geothermal technologies to provide energy to their citizens.

Germany’s Energiewende has highlighted key infrastructure challenges that should be addressed by the United States and other European nations as we expand our use of renewables. A primary issue is grid congestion, particularly in northern Germany, where wind energy exceeds transmission capacity. Grid congestion can occur due to intermittent energy spikes from renewable sources like wind and solar. This causes an excess of electricity that cannot be distributed effectively. These distribution bottlenecks have necessitated costly investments in grid expansion and optimization. This includes integrating smart-grid technology and demand-response systems. This allows consumers to grant permission for utility companies to make adjustments to thermostats and other Wi-Fi enabled appliances in exchange for financial incentives. Additionally, energy storage remains a challenge, as intermittent energy sources like wind and solar require scalable battery solutions to ensure a stable energy delivery. Countries scaling up their renewable energy systems should prioritize grid modernization and invest in energy storage to maximize renewable efficiency. Without an expansion in energy storage capacity, reliance on fossil fuels will persist, undermining emissions reduction goals. The United States is a hub for technological development and can play a key role in bringing cutting-edge energy storage innovations to the European market.

Economic Competition and Strengthening Alliances

The Trump administration’s confrontational stance towards NATO, Ukraine, and Europe may drive the EU to take steps to distance itself from dependence on the United States of America as both a trading partner and a military ally. The United States can position itself as a reliable trading partner by supporting the European transition to renewable energy. Europe’s use of Russian oil and gas was a marriage of convenience, geographic location, and economic expediency. It allowed for a reliable and affordable flow of fuels until war exposed the vulnerability of its supply.

China has attempted to make inroads in Europe’s infrastructure investments, including in the renewable energy sphere. Chinese investment in European electrical grids has raised national security concerns. Chinese investment in Germany’s renewable projects spiked in 2013 but has since fallen as national security concerns over Chinese control of the grid were highlighted. If the United States cedes its position as a partner in Europe, China will undoubtedly attempt to position itself as a viable alternative source of critical components.

Despite the national security concerns, if the United States continues implementing erratic and unpredictable trade policies, i.e., tariffs, the EU may be forced to source grid materials from our adversaries. In the arena of global competition, Russia and China will move to ingratiate themselves with our trading partners if we are deemed to be an untrustworthy and unstable partner.

Conclusions and Recommendations

A European transition to renewable energy represents a global shift in energy dependence. As a key stakeholder in international energy market dominance, it poses challenges and opportunities for the United States. To maintain a position as a global leader in energy, the United States must make aggressive investments in the renewable market. The United States has always been a driver of science and innovation, and aggressive investment into the research and development of battery technology, grid resilience, and energy distribution should be a national priority.

While mining is energy-intensive, the United States should invest in critical mineral exploration and extraction to compete with China in the global battery market. The United States has Lithium deposits in Nevada that are currently undergoing regulatory approval for extraction. Deep sea mining is another emerging area that the United States can move to exploit. China dominates the market in critical mineral extraction and battery manufacturing capacity. The European Union will exponentially increase the need for batteries and essential imports of minerals as they ramp up renewable energy supply across all sectors, from transportation to electricity generation. The United States will lose its status as an economic leader if it cannot compete in this critical market.

The United States must take steps to support the European Union’s transition to renewable energy. By supplying intellectual capital and raw materials, the United States benefits strategically and economically. Russia and China are actively trying to expand their influence in the European energy market. This geopolitical realignment will weaken the transatlantic alliance if the United States does not present itself as a stable and reliable partner. By proving ourselves to be a steadfast and dependable ally to Europe, the United States can maintain dominance over the creeping soft power of both China and Russia in the European energy markets. Forging immutable bonds with Europe will guarantee an energy-resilient future for both continents.

Tags: Economic Warfare, Energy, Energy Security, grand strategy, Renewable Energy, strategy

About The Author

• 
  
• Jason Warnken
• Jason Warnken is a Masters Student at the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security conducting research on the strategic implications of sea level rise and severe weather on New York City Fire Department infrastructure. He has completed the Climate Security Fellowship through the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College, Stanford University, and The George Washington University.

7. Special Operations News – August 4, 2025

Special Operations News – August 4, 2025

https://sof.news/update/20250804/

August 4, 2025 SOF News Update 0

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: U.S. Air Force CV-22 Ospreys assigned to the 353rd Special Operations Wing Operations Wing in transit to Clark Air Base, on July 26, 2025. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Cedrique Oldaker)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it 2 or 3 days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News (and a little bit of intel)

SOF Week 2025 Event Report. USSOCOM and the Global SOF Foundation co-sponsored the annual convention for the SOF community in May 2025. The event showcased technology and capabilties that are essential to SOF warfighter success, brought together members of the international SOF enterprise, and provided the opportunity for professional development and relationship building. GSOF has published its SOF Week 2025 Event Report to summarizes the events and accomplishments of SOF Week 2025. August 2025, PDF, 8 pages.

SOF and Matrix Operations. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in military operations will result in the ability to conduct simultaneous optimization across all domains and functions instead of the traditional approach of sequential coordination. Special operations forces will also need to employ AI in its advisory framework of Train, Advise, Assist, and Enable. “AI Beyond the OODA Loop: Matrix Operations and the Future of Specil Operations”, by Duc Duclos, Small Wars Journal, August 1, 2025.

Spies and “Moscow Rules”. A playbook for Cold War spying was developed in the decades before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The “Moscow Rules” was intended to keep spies and agents safe during the Cold War when Moscow surveillance was a smothering embrace of hostile scrutiny. “Moscow Rules: A Crash Course in Espionage for Fledgling Spies”, Spyscape, August 2025.

3rd SFG(A) in Botswana. Soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) Special Forces Regiment (SFR) trained together during a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) at Thebephatshwa Air Base, Botswana, in June, 2025. The JCET’s intent was to strengthen BDF’s operational expertise and capacity to quickly respond to crises.

Protecting UK Special Forces. Morale in UK SF is sagging at a time that they are being scrutinized for their actions on dangerous deployments in Northern Ireland, Iraq, and Afghanistan. “When it comes to our Special Forces, we should take a leaf out of America’s book”, Forces News, August 4, 2025.

Senior CIA Official’s London Tour Cancelled. Tom Sylvester, considered to be one of the Central Intelligence Agency’s best career spies, has been retired out of the CIA. He was enroute to become the station chief in London when his posting was cancelled. The London position is considered the agency’s most prestigious overseas posting. Some former CIA employees are calling this a political move that is now common place at the agency for the past six months – and harmful for U.S. national security. Read more here from CODEWORD, August 3, 2025. See also “Veteran C.I.A. Official to Retire After Losing Out on London Job”, The New York Times, July 28, 2025.

SEAL and SWCC Training. The training for Navy SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen are highly selective and physically challenging. However they differ in their tactical mission and training focus. “How Navy SEAL and SWCC Training is Alike and Different”, Military.com, July 28, 2025.

Operator Syndrome. Special operations forces service members engage in training and operations that test the limits of human potential. They have a unique capacity to endure challenges, compartmentalize pain, and accomplish the mission. However, there is a cost – injuries and health challenges that are frequently associated with “allostatic load”, PTS, and/or TBI. This array of health challenges and injuries is also known as “Operator Syndrome”. Read more in “Quick Reads on Allostatic Load (aka Operator Syndrome)”, Military Special Operations Family Collaborative (MSOFC), July 11, 2025.

SOCOM Cdr Nomination Confirmed. A Navy SEAL will get his fourth star and take command of the United States Special Operations Command. Apparently the road to SOCOM command is through JSOC! “SOCOM getting new commander after Frank Bradley earns Senate confirmation”, Defense Scoop, August 1, 2025.

Spy Movie Props. In 1977, THE SPY WHO LOVED ME was released in the United States. Underwater scenes of James Bond’s Lotus Esprit submarine were filmed using a custom-built wet sub piloted by a former U.S. Navy SEAL. After filming was complete, the sub was placed in a storage unit where it eventually was forgotten. It was rediscovered when the contents of the unit were bought for $100 at an auction. The sub is now owned by Elon Musk. (U.S. Naval Institute)

https://x.com/NavalInstitute/status/1952138652932354161

353rd SOW Supports Relief Efforts. Within six hours of notification, Airmen from the 353rd Special Operations Wing shifted from training operations in northern Japan to deployment for crisis response operations in the Philippines. While participating in Resolute Force Pacific 2025 in Misawa, Japan, the 353rd SOW received orders to conduct life-saving efforts in response to severe flooding across Northern Luzon. “Airmen rapidly deploy to support Philippine disaster relief efforts”, DVIDS, August 1, 2025.

Exercise Tiger Shark. US Navy SEALs trained alongside Bangladesh Navy Special Warfare Diving and Salvage (SWADS) and the Bangladesh Army’s Para-Commando Brigade (PCB) in a recent exercise in Bangladesh. The three-week long exercise conducted training in combat medicine, water rescue, patrolling tactics, close quarters combat, and marksmanship.

SOF History

• On August 6, 1756, General Howe authorized Robert Rogers to raise a battalion of Rangers for service with the British Army.
• On August 2, 1962, Co D, 7th Special Forces Group (A) departed Fort Bragg for Panama.
• In 1966, the United States Air Force was tasked with providing the military forces of Laos with covert air support through a series of clandestine operations in conjuction with the CIA. This was known as Project 404 and would eventually lead to the formation Raven Forward Air Controllers. Read more in “Project 404: The USAF and CIA’s Secret War in Laos”, by Alec Smith, Grey Dynamics, August 3, 2025.
• On August 2, 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. President Bush ordered the U.S. military to begin Operation Desert Shield on August 7, 1990. In January 1991, Operation Desert Storm was launched – the liberation of Kuwait and invasion of southern Iraq.
• “Navy SEALs and the 1990 Gulf War”, by Tom Hawkins, Navy SEAL Museum
• https://www.navysealmuseum.org/outside-the-wire/article-8
• August 6, 2011. A U.S. Chinook helicopter, call sign Extortion 17, was shot down by the Taliban resulting in 38 deaths (30 Americans and 8 Afghans). There were no survivors. Of the U.S. fatalities were Navy SEALs who were part of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU). Five U.S. Army helicopter crewmen perished a;pmg with one U.S. military working dog.

National Security and Info Ops

USAR Aviation Units Cut. The Department of the Army is set to eliminate all of the Army Reserves helicopter units by the end of the summer. It is part of a broader push to moderize the force in the direction of drones, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies. “The Army Reserve Is Gutting Aviation Units. Thousands of Soldiers Are Being Left in the Lurch”, Military.com, July 31, 2025.

Raunchy U.S. Military Aircraft Call Signs. If you check out flightrader24 on a consistent basis you will find every once in a while some U.S. military aircraft depicted with some ‘off color’ call signs. “Here’s why raunchy military call signs keep showing up on flight trackers”, Task & Purpose, January 10, 2023.

Role of Strategic Communication in Wartime. More and more technology, transparency, and disinformation is influencing conflict dynamics and global perceptions. The 2025 India-Pakistan skirmish and Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb highlight the critical role of narratives in modern conflicts where drones, social media, and OSINT are instrumential in shaping outcomes. “Narratives Under Fire: Information Warfare Lessons from India-Pakistan and Ukraine-Russia”, by TanMengKit, Small Wars Journal, July 31, 2025.

Lessons From Ukraine. An American special ops training in Ukraine says that the U.S. needs to put the Middle East and Central Asian wars in the rear view mirror and concentrate on conventional war and air superiority. (Business Insider, August 1, 2025)

Golden Dome References. Want to know more about the U.S. homeland missile defense architecture? The proposed plan to defend against ballistic, cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks has been described as the Golden Dome concept. The Congressional Research Center (CRS) has compiled a list of references and publications on the topis of Golden Dome, air and missile defense, related defense agencies, and threat assessments. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48584

Pentagon Feuds. The Defense Secretary has made a series of missteps and feuded with top generals. This has raised concerns among some Republicans on Capitol Hill about his ability to run the department. “Hegseth’s Latest Battle: Infighting Inside the Pentagon”, The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2025. (subscription)

AI to Track Social Media. An artificial intelligence system is being developed to monitor and analyze Russian-affiliated social media platforms. Called ODCR Assistant, this Ukrainian program will automate open-sourc data collection and will filter relevant information for further analysis. “Ukraine Develops AI to Track Russian Troops Through Social Media”, by Ivan khomenko, United24 Media, July 31, 2025.

Strategic Competition

Competition in the Arctic. Vast resources are available for exploitation in the Arctic region. Currently there is a behind-the-scenes power struggle for dominance in the far north between superpower nations. However, the U.S. is on the losing end of this fight for resources. “The Arctic Great Game: and Why America Risks Losing It”, by Heather A. Conley, Foreign Affairs, June 24, 2025.

A Militarized Arctic. Russia is rapidly militarizing the Arctic region – along with China. The two nations are exploiting NATO weaknesses and are setting the stage for the Arctic to be a future site of international competition. Russia has three dozen icebreakers, the U.S. has two; that should be an indicator. Climate change is opening up the Arctic region to rare earth minerals, energy reserves, and new shipping routes for maritime traffic. There are worries amongst the Nordic countries that once the Ukraine war winds down Russia will pick up its military activities in the Far North. “Why are Russia and China Militarizing the Arctic?”, by David Kirichenko, National Interest, July 29, 2025.

Russia and the Baltic States. Eric Shiraev and Holger Molder explain the situation facing Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in light of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy for more than two decades. The authors of this article advocate for a new approach on forecasting what Vladimir Putin intends to do with the Baltic states. “Decoding Vladimir Putin’s Baltic Strategy”, National Interest, July 30, 2025.

China and Beyond the “Second Island Chain”. Oceania spans more than 3,000 square miles and has some of the world’s most important sea lanes. The region plays an important role in Indo-Pacific security and will be a key geographic area in the event of a military confrontation with China. While small and remote, these small islands have great strategic value. China is paying attention to this important area; it is time for the U.S. to notice and respond. “Beyond the second island chain: It’s time to mitigate strategic risk in oceania”, by George Fust, Modern War Institute at West Point, August 1, 2025.

Lithuania’s History – a Russian Revision. The Kremlin appears to be recasting the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states 85 years ago as a benign political development. Russia released a new publication earlier this year titled The History of Lithuania that delegitimizes Lithuania’s statehood that dates back centuries. This propaganda piece by Russian “historians” promotes the narrative that Lithuania is oppressing its Russian-speaking minority and promoting anti-Russian and fascist ideologies. This is a tactic Russia used to justify the invasion of Ukraine. “Lithuania Is in Russia’s Crosshairs”, by Agnia Grigas, National Interest, July 31, 2025.

Report – The Axis of Upheaval. A report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) provides an analysis of the growing military cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. July 2025, PDF, 35 pages. https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/axisofupheaval-july2025-final.pdf

Europe and Asia

The U.S. – South Korea Alliance. The United States maintains a significant military presence in South Korea. This partnership ensures a South Korea is defended against North Korean aggression; but it also enables both nations to project influence and uphold a free and open Asia-Indo-Pacific. The alliance serves as a counter to the actions of China that are supported by North Korea and Russia. “Why the U.S. must sustain forward stationed forces in Korea”, by David Maxwell, United Press International, August 1, 2025.

Great Game 2.0. The term the “Great Game” referred to the contest between Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century over influence in Central Asia. Now, Central Asia and the Caucasus is being contested but with different players. Russia is still in the game but so is China and Turkey. “Central Asia: The Great Game 2.0”, National Interest, July 30, 2025.

Armenia – Azerbaijan Peace Deal? Two countries seemingly at odds with each other for a few decades may soon sign a peace agreement. Both are former Soviet Union republics that broke away from Russia’s grasp in the early 1990s.

Bessarabia in Eastern European Geopolitics. Alexandra Gizhitas describes the enduring strategic importance of a historically contested region at the crossroads of Eastern Europe. She traces the history of the region from 19th-century wars through Soviet annexation and into modern Russian strategic planning. “Shadow States and Shattered Frontiers: Strategic Relevance of Bessarabia in Eastern European Geopolitics”, Small Wars Journal, August 1, 2025.

Africa

U.S. Strikes in Somalia. Over 50 airstrikes have been conducted by the U.S. in the past year against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia targets. This is the most airstrikes conducted in the country in years and may very well outpace the 63 strikes conducted in 2019. Most of the strikes have been against ISIS targets. “Somalia sees sharp rise in US strikes against ISIS and al-Shabab”, Stars and Stripes, July 28, 2025.

History of Eastern Congo. A recent peace agreement has settled things down in the eastern portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); however this region has long been a troubled area of the DRC. It has been subjected to centuries of international intervention by European powers, as well as its African neighbors. This article provides a timeline that traces the role of the outside forces since the end of the colonial era (beginning in 1960). “Eastern Congo: A Legacy of Intervention”, Council on Foreign Relations, August 2025.

Sudan – Role of Gulf States. The United Arab Emirates and other Arabian Gulf states are actively supporting factions in the Sudan civil war. At stake are the natural resources the country can provide once peace is restored. These Gulf states import almost 80% of the food they consume and Sudan’s livestock and agriculture sectors are an important economic consideration for the future. The UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) while other Gulf states support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Read more in “The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan’s war”, by Jonas Horner, European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), July 30, 2025.

Books and Videos

Video – Inside the elite UK commando task force training to support NATO, ITV News, YouTube, 3 mins, August 1, 2025. Info on the Special Operations Maritime Task Group. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmK4uf7YhgI

Video – VOA Signing Off. The Washington, D.C. branch of Voice of America is signing off.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qBF9dMDF7_TxtTAzYgFMug1HIxsID-j1/view

Video – Emerald Warrior 25.2: Free Fall Insertion and FARP Operation. U.S. Air Force Air Commandos assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command conduct a military free fall insertion and forward arming and refueling point operations in California as part of Emerald Warrior 25.2, July 28, 2025. Supported by U.S. Special Operations Command, Emerald Warrior is a joint, combined special operations exercise. DVIDS, July 29, 2025, 3 mins.

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/972386/emerald-warrior-252-free-fall-insertion-and-farp-operation

New Book – Vigilance is Not Enough: A History of United States Intelligence. Mark M. Lowenthal has wrote a book about the development of U.S. intelligence over time. Published May, 2025. Available at Amazon.com.

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Upcoming Events

August 19-21, 2025

Indo-Pacific Irregular Warfare Symposium

Bangkok, Thailand

October 2025

Virtual MOG Mile

Three Rangers Foundation

October 7-9, 2025

Global SOF Europe

Athens, Greece

October 13-16, 2025

Special Operations Association Reunion (SOAR)

Las Vegas, Nevada

October 14-17, 2025

Special Forces Association Conference

Las Vegas, Nevada

November 16, 2025

Inaugural Charleston Trident Swim

Charleston, South Carolina

November 17-20, 2025

2025 Modern Warfare Week – Fort Bragg

Global SOF Foundation

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

• Russia
• SOF

About SOF News

1171 Articles

SOF News provides news, analysis, commentary, and information about special operations forces (SOF) from around the world.

8. The Intelligence Intellectuals: Social Scientists and the Making of the CIA (Georgetown Studies in Intelligence History)

Given our recent perceived anti-intellectual focus within our US national security community I offer this book that unfortunately will not be published until January 2026.

The Intelligence Intellectuals: Social Scientists and the Making of the CIA (Georgetown Studies in Intelligence History)

Savings Pre-order Price Guarantee. Terms

$119.95

FREE delivery Monday, January 5

This title has not yet been released.

The untold story of how America's brightest academic minds revolutionized intelligence analysis at the CIA

https://www.amazon.com/Intelligence-Intellectuals-Scientists-Georgetown-Studies/dp/1647126436/ref=nosim?tag=siljon-20

In the early days of the Cold War, the United States faced a crisis in intelligence analysis. A series of intelligence failures in 1949 and 1950, including the failure to warn about the North Korean invasion of South Korea, made it clear that gut instinct and traditional practices were no longer sufficient for intelligence analysis in the nuclear age. The new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Walter Bedell Smith, had a mandate to reform it.

Based on new archival research in declassified documents and the participants' personal papers, The Intelligence Intellectuals reveals the neglected history of how America's brightest academic minds were recruited by the CIA to revolutionize intelligence analysis during this critical period. Peter C. Grace describes how the scientifically sound analysis methods that they introduced significantly helped the United States gain an advantage in the Cold War, and these new analysts legitimized the role of the recently created CIA in the national security community. Grace demonstrates how these professors―such as William Langer from Harvard, Sherman Kent from Yale, and Max Millikan from MIT―developed systematic approaches to intelligence analysis that shaped the CIA's methodology for decades to come.

Readers interested in the history of the Cold War and in intelligence, scholars of intelligence studies, Cold War historians, and intelligence practitioners seeking to understand their craft's foundations will all value this insightful history about the place of social science in national security.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Powered by social science and social scientists, the Central Intelligence Agency always had an analytical edge over its authoritarian rivals. The Intelligence Intellectuals tells how the scientific method became key to US intelligence analysis. Grace's brilliant history addresses the issues and personalities that shaped the creation of the CIA."―James J. Wirtz, Naval Postgraduate School

"In this important book, Peter C. Grace highlights the crucial role social science, and scholars themselves, played in shaping the intelligence work of the early CIA. A must read for anyone interested in how and why intelligence in the United States functioned, and functions, as it does."―Daniel Bessner, Anne H.H. and Kenneth B. Pyle Associate Professor in American Foreign Policy, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, and author of Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual

"A masterful account. Thoroughly researched, Peter Grace's book joins Cloak and Gown and Book and Dagger in showing how Ivy League academics silently crept into the world of intelligence analysis and eventually took it over."―Greg Herken, author, The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington

"The young CIA did more than stage coups―it helped American leaders understand the real Soviet threat. Peter Grace and The Intelligence Intellectuals show how the new agency combined academic brains and military skill to make US intelligence a reliable compass for navigating the Cold War."―Michael Warner, US Department of Defense

"Arrestingly well-researched and rich in biographical detail, this remarkable book reveals that America's top spies believed in social science and hoped universities could rescue the early CIA from intelligence failure. Peter Grace excels at putting these leading thinkers into a wider context and demonstrating their importance to history."―Richard Aldrich, professor, University of Warwick, author of GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency

"This book provides fascinating insights into the intellectual and institutional labor that went into the creation of the US national security state at the onset of the Cold War. Grace focuses on Sherman Kent, the former Yale historian who created the strategic intelligence approach to tackle the thorny question of trying to understand the capabilities and intentions of the Communist adversary―with a growing emphasis over time on capabilities (both military and economic). Balancing social science methodology with the needs of policymakers was no easy task. The stakes were high: there was a real fear of a general war with the Soviet Union in the early 1950s."―Peter Rutland, Wesleyan University

"This is a terrific history of the CIA's early struggle to become a world-class intelligence agency, a quest that demanded the talents of a handful of professors and their social science skills. With admirable clarity and penetrating research, Grace shows how the CIA righted itself after a rocky start, learning how to track―and predict―the immense global forces at work in the early Cold War."―David Hoffman, author, The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal

"This is both a fascinating history of the people and purposes that shaped the US approach to peacetime strategic intelligence analysis after 1945 and a reminder of the importance of a sound methodology and high integrity to make it work effectively."―Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of war studies, King's College London

About the Author

Peter C. Grace is a lecturer on politics and international relations at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He is one of the volume editors of New Zealand's Foreign Policy under the Jacinda Ardern Government.

9. When it comes to our Special Forces, we should take a leaf out of America's book (A view from the UK)

Excerpts:

The threat to this country is probably at its highest since the Cold War – if not higher – with the added threats from terrorists, bad actors and those who want to harm our very way of life. 

Therefore, it must make complete sense to protect those who protect us, most especially our Special Forces, security services and our military.

This is something the Americans get right.

US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth spoke recently at the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) week with such clarity, dignity and support for US special forces that you could hardly believe he is the same person who leaked his Signal account of attacks on the Houthis to the world, or even the person in charge of the most powerful military machine on the planet.

At the same time, UK Special Forces are being scrutinised for their actions on dangerous deployments in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan – and having their identities splashed all over the internet.

This must stop lest their strategic impact be diminished.

...

It is about time our current crop of leaders realise the importance of these military icons and fully support the very people who will always take a bullet for them.

The great man Winston Churchill is not around, sadly, when we really need him again, but his epitaph for our SF should ring constantly in the ears of our politicians, like the tinnitus does for most of us who have dodged the enemies' bullets.

"We sleep soundly in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm."

When it comes to our Special Forces, we should take a leaf out of America's book

https://www.forcesnews.com/opinion/when-it-comes-our-special-forces-we-should-take-leaf-out-americas-book

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon

4th August 2025 at 9:52am

British Special Forces protect us from danger and safeguard our international standing – so why can't we treat them like the Americans do?

The threat to this country is probably at its highest since the Cold War – if not higher – with the added threats from terrorists, bad actors and those who want to harm our very way of life. 

Therefore, it must make complete sense to protect those who protect us, most especially our Special Forces, security services and our military.

This is something the Americans get right.

• Secretive world of UK Special Forces and its selection process revealed for the first time
• UK Special Forces are the best of the best and we must give them our support
• Europe must take the lead to secure lasting peace as US falters on Ukraine

US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth spoke recently at the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) week with such clarity, dignity and support for US special forces that you could hardly believe he is the same person who leaked his Signal account of attacks on the Houthis to the world, or even the person in charge of the most powerful military machine on the planet.

At the same time, UK Special Forces are being scrutinised for their actions on dangerous deployments in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan – and having their identities splashed all over the internet.

This must stop lest their strategic impact be diminished.

US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth meets troops at Fort Bliss in Texas (Picture: US DOD)

Respect and reverence in everyday life

Americans respect and treasure their military, whereas the British approach is most ably summed up by Rudyard Kipling's poem, Tommy this an' Tommy that.

Soldiers get free access to business class lounges in the US and board the aircraft first. Everyone says "thank you for your service".

Almost the opposite is true in this country – we are even told not to wear uniform in public. Regiments are barred from taking tanks to village shows for fear of offending a small minority.

If Hegseth can realise that Special Forces need to operate in the shadows and do things that ordinary humans cannot imagine in order to "make America safe again", why on earth are we hounding the very people who have prevented numerous 7/7s and saved the lives of so many, not just Brits, in far-flung corners of the globe?

Play Video

Gen Sir Roly Walker, Chief of the General Staff, wants to make the British Army "more Special Forces"

A strategic and diplomatic powerhouse

The Americans know, as did David Stirling, the founder of the SAS, that these warriors can have a strategic impact that a thousand tanks and fighter jets never can.

Pound for pound, our Special Forces are the best investment the British taxpayers make for the security of this country. 

Hegseth also stated how important British SF have been since Special Operations Executive missions with the US, from World War Two to this very day.

Our Special Forces are the number one military ask, a group of elite soldiers the president of the US always wants. He knows they are the best, and they help to keep us as the US's closest ally. 

Morale in the US Special Forces is sky high, thanks to determined support from POTUS and the Secretary of Defence. Conversely, morale in UK SF is sagging.

It is about time our current crop of leaders realise the importance of these military icons and fully support the very people who will always take a bullet for them.

The great man Winston Churchill is not around, sadly, when we really need him again, but his epitaph for our SF should ring constantly in the ears of our politicians, like the tinnitus does for most of us who have dodged the enemies' bullets.

"We sleep soundly in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm."

Retired Colonel Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is a former commander of the UK Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Regiment

10. US Marines train beach landings Down Under with old allies, new rides

US Marines train beach landings Down Under with old allies, new rides

Defense News · by Gordon Arthur · August 1, 2025

ROCKHAMPTON, Australia — In the dawn light of July 24, Japanese and American amphibious vehicles churned through the sparkling coastal waters of the Coral Sea, before emerging onto the sands of a central Queensland beach in Australia.

Two hours to the east, another amphibious lodgment was occurring simultaneously at Freshwater Beach. This time the main participants were Australia and South Korea.

The two events, part of a combined joint forcible entry operation, formed the culminating activity for Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025, held in Australia from July 13-27. They were the most sophisticated amphibious landings ever attempted in the eleven iterations of Talisman Sabre so far.

“We maintained a high operational tempo during Exercise Talisman Sabre 25, which was designed to provide intense training to ensure our forces are capable, interoperable, deployable on short notice and combat ready,” Rear Adm. Tom Shultz, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group Seven (ESG-7) and therefore in charge of the U.S. amphibious contingent, told Defense News.

Shultz said the Navy “embraced cooperation and interoperability,” demonstrated by interactions with 14 ships and expeditionary forces from six nations.

RELATED

US, allies drill pop-up missile positions to keep Chinese ships at bay

Various anti-ship missile firings demonstrated the ability of the U.S. and its allies to hit maritime targets from land-based launchers.

An important subplot to the July 24 landings was the first ever touchdown of the Marine Corps’ new Amphibious Combat Vehicle in Australia. These 8x8 ACVs are being inducted into the U.S. service as a much-needed replacement for the AAV7A1 family of vehicles that has soldiered on for 50 years.

Marines stopped using the AAV7A1 family for amphibious operations after a fatal accident in California in 2020. The deployment of ACVs with the Okinawa-based 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit – or 31st MEU – thus marked an important return of armored amphibious operations to the Indo-Pacific region.

1st Lt. Brooks Wright, the ACV Platoon commander, said his unit swam five ACVs ashore during Talisman Sabre landings.

Wright described the ACV as a “fabulous vehicle.” He explained that it “adds a lot of combat power for the Marine Corps, and allows us to do a lot of things we haven’t been able to do the last couple of years without the AAV around.”

He said the ACV represented a significant upgrade for the Marines; it does “everything that we advertise that we’re able to do – the ship-to-shore movement, getting troops to shore, and then pushing inland to objectives”.

Lt. Col. Andy Hornfeck, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines – currently acting as the 31st MEU’s battalion landing team – described four main lines of effort for the formation during Talisman Sabre 2025.

The first was a MEU live-fire assault on Townshend Island using the full repertoire of weaponry available. This included F-35B fighters, AH-1Z Viper helicopters and M777 artillery pieces, for example.

The MEU then transitioned into force integration training with partners, which featured useful “cross-pollination” of skills, according to Hornfeck.

Thirdly, the 31st MEU conducted two assaults in Queensland’s Bowen region, including an air assault and small-boat raid.

The final effort was the combined joint forcible entry operation, where the MEU had British and Dutch personnel attached to the pre-landing reconnaissance force.

Hornfeck said the Marines worked more slowly and deliberately than if they were acting alone, since it was important to stay synchronized with their Japanese partners.

“Fighting as a coalition is challenging,” he acknowledged. Nonetheless, he deemed Talisman Sabre a realistic experience.

Elsewhere, the U.S. Marine Corps’ 2,500-strong Marine Rotational Force—Darwin (MRF-D) conducted a series of “island hopping” movements across the Outback by air.

First, MRF-D captured an airstrip at Timber Creek, 375 miles south of Darwin. Next up was Nackeroo, and finally the MRF-D seized an airfield at Cloncurry.

These efforts mimicked the Pacific island-hopping campaign of World War II, and these are tactics the U.S. military would use against China in the event of a war.

Laced with missiles and troops, the First Island Chain – extending south from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to Indonesia – is a natural geographic barrier of islands and land masses that would form a critical line of defense to contain the People’s Liberation Army.

About Gordon Arthur

Gordon Arthur is an Asia correspondent for Defense News. After a 20-year stint working in Hong Kong, he now resides in New Zealand. He has attended military exercises and defense exhibitions in about 20 countries around the Asia-Pacific region.

11. Army plans to grow Patriot battalions, plus one for Guam

One of the best examples of high demand, low density resources. We need more air and missile defense capabilities.

Army plans to grow Patriot battalions, plus one for Guam

Defense News · by Todd South · August 4, 2025

The Army is planning to grow its operational Patriot air-and-missile defense force from 15 to 18 battalions, plus a composite battalion which includes Patriot capability in Guam, an Army spokesperson told Defense News in a statement.

In 2023 the service announced a plan to add a 16th battalion, but it will now bolster a force stretched thin with two additional battalions.

Vice Chief of Staff Gen. James Mingus announced earlier this month that the Patriot force would grow by “up to four” battalions.

Additionally, the Army is planning to build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense battalion for Guam. The Guam Defense System battalion is a composite battalion that will include the Integrated Fire Protection Capability, or IFPC, and the Integrated Battle Command System-enabled Patriot with the Lower-Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor, or LTAMDS.

IFPC is designed to provide defense against rockets, artillery, mortars, cruise missiles and drone threats at fixed and semi-fixed sites. The IBCS system is the newly fielded command-and-control system meant to tie shooters and sensors together on the battlefield.

The Raytheon-developed LTAMDS radar, now in low-rate production, is designed to replace the Patriot radar, offering a 360-degree range of protection against various types of missiles.

“The battalion is purpose built for the defense of Guam and not counted in the total number of 18 Patriot battalions,” the Army spokesperson said.

The Raytheon-built Patriot is in ever increasing demand globally. Ukraine has depended on the system for several years as it continues to beat back the Russian invasion which began in February 2022. The U.S. and other countries continue to make commitments to supply additional Patriot systems to the war-torn country.

The Patriot system also defended Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar against Iranian missiles in June.

All new Patriot systems that come off the line for the U.S. Army will be equipped with the LTAMDS radar and IBCS.

“It greatly expands the range, the altitude, and it’s a 360,” Mingus said recently at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “So you could take those same 15 Patriot battalions we have today, give it IBCS and LTAMDs, and fundamentally when you operationally employ it, it’s immediately doubling that capability.

“You would have the equivalent of about 30 Patriot battalions because instead of having to deploy as batteries, you can break them up and disperse them in a much more tactical way.”

About Todd South and Jen Judson

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

12. US defense industry vulnerable to China, government watchdog warns

The question is how can we reduce the vulnerabilities?

US defense industry vulnerable to China, government watchdog warns

Defense News · by Zita Fletcher · August 1, 2025

The U.S. defense industrial base and all branches of the U.S. military depend heavily on materials produced by China to make and use critical weapon systems, creating national security risks, a government watchdog warned in a recent report.

The Defense Department relies on a global network of over 200,000 suppliers for its weapon systems and military equipment and uses the Federal Procurement Data System database to flag materials and components originating from hostile countries.

However, this database currently “provides limited information about the countries of origin,” a July 24 Government Accountability Office report found, and federal contractors are not currently contractually obligated to tell DOD where all of their manufacturing components originate from.

Of over 99 materials total identified by DOD in shortfall for fiscal 2023, none were made in the U.S., GAO noted.

The result is that many components used in key weapon systems and military equipment are being manufactured by China and other countries with adversarial aims to the United States.

“These suppliers may cut off U.S. access to critical materials or provide ‘back doors’ in their technology that serve as intelligence pathways,” GAO said.

China, a global supplier of critical mineral components used in microelectronics and battery production, illustrated that risk in 2024 when it imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium — two minerals described by GAO as “critical for military-grade electronics.”

In another instance cited by the watchdog, manufacturing of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was brought to a standstill due to the discovery of Chinese components during production. Although the fighter is being produced with the aid of seven allied partner nations — including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and several European Union countries — magnets included in the warplanes originated from China.

“The F-35 prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, identified prohibited Chinese magnets in the F-35 supply chain and notified DOD in 2023 and 2024. DOD subsequently paused manufacturing for several months to identify alternative suppliers,” according to the report.

Meanwhile, the U.S. naval shipbuilding industry — particularly with regard to submarine production — is also being impacted by its reliance on foreign supplies, GAO found. Submarines require titanium casting for critical vessel components, but the U.S. at present lacks the capacity to cast titanium due to limited supply as well as outdated equipment to forge it into weapon systems.

“The U.S. has only one foundry that can produce large titanium casting required for some key weapons systems,” the report noted.

Although DOD has noted the risk of foreign dependency, GAO said, it has taken no action to implement any recommended improvements, which would include efforts toward more detailed and transparent tracking of the country of origin of critical military components.

“One untested approach that DOD officials stated could give DOD more visibility into foreign dependency risks is to contractually require suppliers to provide the information,” the report said. “While some DOD officials assert the information is readily available, others stated this approach may be too costly or that suppliers may not be willing to provide information.”

About Zita Ballinger Fletcher

Zita Ballinger Fletcher previously served as editor of Military History Quarterly and Vietnam magazines and as the historian of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. She holds an M.A. with distinction in military history.

13. How to write a defense strategy that sticks

First we need political leaders who want and know they need a comprehensive defense strategy.

My thoughts on a process of how to develop a national security strategy based on lessons and methodology of President Eisenhower's Solarium Project are here. Whether NSS or NDS, we need a disciplined process.

Project Solarium 2.0: Can Eisenhower’s Cold War Strategy Work Today?

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/project-solarium-2-0-can-eisenhowers-cold-war-strategy-work-today/

Not Ike's strategy but a process based on his methodology adapted for the modern era.

Excerpts from the article below:

Consistency across strategic guidance is often surface-level; strategic guidance documents will repeat words and phrases from the defense strategy, but not always provide any more detail. And sometimes subordinate guidance will drop ideas or concepts the defense strategy called for. Some of these changes may reflect deliberate changes in thinking on the strategy, but more often it has to do with who is writing these different guidance documents and what they see as their priorities.

The Secretary of Defense should drive the key priorities for the department, and a lot can be done through force of personality and through having other leaders “singing from the same hymn sheet.” Priorities can include who the United States is most concerned about (China, most likely), what capabilities are most important to develop, where the United States needs to ensure greater readiness and modernization, and where to take risk.

Strategy is about choices. Poorly written strategy can confuse and allow for too much business as usual. (“Slap that label on the program and call it good!”) Well-written strategy won’t cure all the ills but will give the secretary and his leadership team the yardstick by which to measure decisions.

How to write a defense strategy that sticks

Seek clarity always, specificity sometimes—and produce a yardstick that can be used to measure decisions.

By Quentin E. Hodgson

Senior Researcher, RAND Corporation

August 1, 2025

defenseone.com · by Quentin E. Hodgson

Drazen Zigic

Get all our news and commentary in your inbox at 6 a.m. ET.

Stay Connected

Ideas

Seek clarity always, specificity sometimes—and produce a yardstick that can be used to measure decisions.

|

August 1, 2025

• Commentary
• Strategy
• Pentagon

By Quentin E. Hodgson

Senior Researcher, RAND Corporation

August 1, 2025

• Commentary
• Strategy
• Pentagon

Defense strategy has become a booming enterprise, yet its core themes often boil down to a single word—or just a few. Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure in the Pentagon was defined by “transformation,” while Lloyd Austin’s strategy emphasized “campaigning” and “integrated deterrence.” Robert Gates captured his focus succinctly when he warned that the Defense Department was plagued by “next-war-itis”: prioritizing future conflicts over the wars it was already fighting. In the first Trump administration’s defense strategy, Jim Mattis emphasized increasing lethality in the U.S. military, and the return of long-term strategic competition with Russia and China, which came to be known as “great power competition”—or GPC for short—from a single mention in the 2017 National Security Strategy. The 2018 defense strategy does not use the term at all in its unclassified summary.

Pete Hegseth’s Pentagon is gearing up to develop its own defense strategy after issuing a classified interim strategic guidance document this spring. The word or phrase that will come to characterize the new defense strategy will emerge soon enough. Crafting good strategy, however, is about more than catchy labels or bumper stickers. It requires carefully written strategic guidance that leaves little room for ambiguity. A good defense strategy provides clear direction to the department’s many components, including the military services, the combatant commands, and myriad agencies.

Some labels tend to take over while simultaneously losing their meaning. In the early 2000s, it seemed just about every program had a “transformation” label slapped on it to align with Rumsfeld’s vision. The Army called its Crusader self-propelled artillery program transformational, even though at a projected 70 tons, the civilian leadership of the Pentagon saw it as more of a legacy program. Integrated deterrence under Secretary Austin suffered from a lack of focus and definition, leading to jokes that briefings on the 2022 National Defense Strategy should have included “stay tuned for more details” as placeholder slides. These examples highlight how quickly a defense strategy’s key term can move from a rallying cry to an ineffectual catch phrase.

To overcome over-labeling in defense strategy it is important to remember that defense strategy serves multiple purposes: it provides direction to the DoD on priorities for planning and investments; reinforces collective defense with partners and allies; and it tries to influence adversaries. Collectively, this is a tall order, and defense strategy language is important both in terms of the specific words chosen, and how they are used. For example, as the principal author of Robert Gates’ defense strategy, I discovered after its publication in May 2008 that partners and allies counted how many times their country appeared in the document to determine where they fall on the list of U.S. priorities. Each word should have meaning, and those writing defense strategy need to think through how the guidance will be read and acted on, both inside the Pentagon and beyond.

Defense strategies have suffered from a lack of precision and the use of filler words that are intended to imply strength or focus but rarely provide much clarity or meaning. “Robust” is a particular favorite. But if a defense strategy calls for “robust partnerships” or “robust defenses,” what is the reader supposed to infer from that? Some partnerships are just for show and some defenses are expected to fail, while others are not?

In project management, objectives are supposed to be crafted in a SMART way: specific, measurable, achievable, resourced, and timebound. Using SMART objectives for priority objectives can help constrain what I call the “zone of reasonable interpretation” in strategic guidance. As guidance, “develop rapid deployment capabilities for the Indo-Pacific theater” leaves much for interpretation. A more focused guidance could be: “By 2027, Indo-Pacific Command, in coordination with the Department of State, will agree with Japan, Korea and Australia on access and facility construction to support deployment and forward basing of a fighter wing of 5th-generation aircraft that can also support nextgeneration aircraft when available.” It says who should do what and by when.

Not all guidance needs to be written with such specificity, nor should it be for two reasons. First, it would create a defense strategy of immense length that would be challenging to coordinate and gain buy-in from key components of the bureaucracy. Second, it would quickly be overtaken by events. Luckily, the DoD does not lack for subordinate guidance, but that guidance must not only remain consistent with the tenets of the defense strategy; it must provide additional direction commensurate with the intended audience and focal areas.

Consistency across strategic guidance is often surface-level; strategic guidance documents will repeat words and phrases from the defense strategy, but not always provide any more detail. And sometimes subordinate guidance will drop ideas or concepts the defense strategy called for. Some of these changes may reflect deliberate changes in thinking on the strategy, but more often it has to do with who is writing these different guidance documents and what they see as their priorities.

The Secretary of Defense should drive the key priorities for the department, and a lot can be done through force of personality and through having other leaders “singing from the same hymn sheet.” Priorities can include who the United States is most concerned about (China, most likely), what capabilities are most important to develop, where the United States needs to ensure greater readiness and modernization, and where to take risk.

Strategy is about choices. Poorly written strategy can confuse and allow for too much business as usual. (“Slap that label on the program and call it good!”) Well-written strategy won’t cure all the ills but will give the secretary and his leadership team the yardstick by which to measure decisions.

Quentin E. Hodgson is a senior international and defense researcher at RAND. He previously was a civil servant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in a variety of policy positions and was the principal author of the 2008 National Defense Strategy.

14. The Secret of George Washington’s Revolutionary Success

Not everything is done with heroic historical action. Most of the time basic blocking and tackling (and good order and discipline but also creative thinking and enlightened leadership) is needed for and the foundation of success.

An excellent read from Eliot Cohen. Lessons that still apply today. (which is why history remains so important to the military profession).

The Secret of George Washington’s Revolutionary Success

The American Revolution was won by dramatic deeds, but also by decidedly undramatic efforts.

By Eliot A. Cohen

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · August 3, 2025

In August 1775, nothing particularly dramatic was happening among the roughly 14,000 soldiers of the Continental Army besieging the British army in Boston. Indeed, nothing particularly dramatic happened for the next six months. And then, in March 1776, the British suddenly evacuated Boston. Which is why the months of apparent calm deserve a close look.

The semiquincentennial of American independence has begun: The anniversaries of the battles of Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill are behind us; the reenactment of Ethan Allen’s Green Mountain Boys’ storming Fort Ticonderoga was a smashing success. Other big moments await, culminating, no doubt, in a big party on July 4, 2026. One hopes and expects that there will be plenty of hoopla, because that is the American way.

But 250 years ago today, the real and unspectacular work of American independence was under way. The Continental Army, created in June of 1775, had warily welcomed its new leader, George Washington, without much fuss. A slaveholding Virginia gentleman and loosely religious Anglican was going to lead an army that was mainly made up of New Englanders—including both psalm-singing, Bible-quoting descendants of the Puritans and dissenting freethinkers. For his part, Washington was appalled at what he saw: militia units that elected their own officers and called them by their first names, free Black men carrying weapons, money-grubbing Yankees (as opposed to land-grubbing Virginia gentry), and general squalor. “They are an exceeding dirty and nasty people,” he told his cousin Lund Washington.

Lindsay Chervinsky: The ‘dirty and nasty people’ who became Americans

What happened that summer outside Boston was of monumental importance. If this was to be an American army and not just an assembly of colonial militias, then Washington would have to be the first American general, and not just a provincial. He would have to create a system out of chaos, and hold together a force against a dangerous enemy. Although slightly outnumbered and bottled up in Boston, which connected to the mainland by only the narrowest of peninsulas, the British army was tough, cohesive, professional, and eager to avenge its unexpected defeats and Pyrrhic victories.

Washington did the work in many ways—by organizing the army in divisions and brigades, inspecting the troops, regularizing discipline, hammering home the importance of digging latrines, and quarantining soldiers who had smallpox. It helped that he looked the part of a military leader: tall, well turned out, graceful, and the best horseman in the colonies, by most accounts. No less important, he was able to transcend his aversion to those strange New Englanders.

Two men utterly unlike his social set in Virginia quickly became his most trusted subordinates: Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island, a Quaker with a talent for organization, and a tubby Boston bookstore owner, Henry Knox, who became the chief of artillery. The former was eventually made quartermaster of the army and then commander of the southern army, where he displayed a flair for field command. The latter brought 59 heavy-artillery pieces from Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga to the army outside of Boston in the dead of winter, before developing the artillery arm into the equal of its British opponent.

Washington quickly realized that his most talented military leader was a third New Englander, the Connecticut merchant Benedict Arnold, who, until he committed treason, was the best field commander on either side of the conflict. In the autumn of 1775, Washington sent him off on a daring march through the Maine wilderness that very nearly wrested Quebec from British control.

The commander in chief needed a headquarters guard—what we today call a personal security detail—and so in March 1776, the army created a unit known as the life guard. Washington selected men from each army unit, which meant that the life guard’s personnel skewed in favor of New Englanders; as its first commander, he chose a Massachusetts man, Caleb Gibbs, who lasted until 1780. He chose southerners, too, for crucial positions, and not all of them gentlemen—Daniel Morgan of Virginia, for example, was a roughneck leader of riflemen who formed an elite corps. The point was clear: This was an American army, and talented men, no matter their background, could win their leader’s trust and rise up the ranks.

Washington remains in some ways the most remote of America’s national heroes; he is more distant from us than Abraham Lincoln because of his greater austerity and reserve. He mastered his volcanic temper, prudently handled both his subordinates and his superiors, and knew the value of dignity and a certain distance in exercising command. He was brave but not particularly gifted as a tactical leader, and he was prone to devising overly aggressive and complicated plans, but these did not matter as much as the larger leadership qualities that he had brought with him to Boston. Small wonder that many years later, men who were his intellectual superiors—Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams—worked for him. His story shows why character and good judgment are far more important in a leader than mere intelligence.

Despite wonderful writing about Washington in recent books, including Ron Chernow’s 2010 biography and the first two volumes of Rick Atkinson’s trilogy on the history of the Revolution, Americans do not value him as we once did. The fault lies across the political spectrum. For some (think of the 1619 Project), the fundamental sin of slavery overwhelms every aspect of biography. Washington controlled several hundred enslaved people on his Mount Vernon estate; he often treated them badly, and as of 1775, he felt no shame about that.

Being a plantation owner was part of his identity, but not all of it, and more important: Like some of the other Founders, he became uneasy about reconciling the ideals of the Revolution with the practice of holding men and women as chattel—which is why he manumitted all of his slaves in his will.

At a deeper level, this view of American history cannot help but crush patriotic pride in what remains, in retrospect, an astounding achievement. The Revolution culminated not in despotism but in a new political order based on liberty and self-government, built on ideals that, described with exceptional eloquence by another slaveholder, Jefferson, eventually blew up the evil institution on which their way of life rested.

George Packer: A view of American history that leads to one conclusion

A different form of relentless present-mindedness afflicts the current administration, which seeks to purge national parks and museums of references to the darker sides of American history, beginning with slavery but also including the slaughter and dispossession of American Indians, and various forms of discrimination and persecution thereafter. In everything from signage to artwork, the Trump administration reaches for pabulum and kitsch, a false and unidimensional depiction of the American past.

As for academic historians, although some exemplary ones are at work—including Gordon Wood and David Hackett Fischer—the contemporary trend is to shun great individuals in favor of subaltern history. There is not much place for a commanding general in a pantheon composed of people overlooked by previous generations.

That summer and fall in Cambridge and the other towns surrounding Boston, George Washington’s work made a difference. It reminds us that American independence was won by dramatic deeds, to be sure, but also by mastering—slowly and painfully—the undramatic things, such as insisting on rank insignia and saluting, managing gunpowder production, and digging latrines properly. It reminds us that there is such a thing as individual greatness, and that it can make all the difference. And particularly in an age of self-righteous scorn, we would do well to recall how Washington’s lifelong struggles with himself—his prejudices, his emotions, his upbringing and background—contributed to final victory. We can still profit by the example.

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · August 3, 2025

15. Drones Aren’t Swarming Yet — But They Could

Excerpts:

More broadly, to avoid fielding vulnerable and ineffective distributed military systems, the Department of Defense should clearly articulate initiatives to research, test, and procure distributed systems infrastructure independent of cloud provider dependencies. This is necessary because relying on distributed systems infrastructure in the cloud requires more bandwidth than deployed operators can count on. It also constitutes a single point of failure. Program Executive Offices and requirements developers should stipulate that distributed software infrastructure be cloud-independent and locally self-contained.

The field of research into cloud-independent, local distributed systems is shockingly underdeveloped, and the demand signal for it is vague and subject to confused messaging. But that capability is a foundational technological prerequisite to the U.S. military’s modern warfighting approaches. Indeed, each of the services’ official operating concepts are based on the assumption that some distributed infrastructure layer will enable dispersed groups of platforms to coordinate at machine speed.

That’s because swarming — collaborative, autonomous, machine-speed adaptation to changing circumstances — represents a step change in military operational development, and the kind of capability that will win future wars. Anyone who agrees with the premise underlying these concepts should be asking their congressmen, acquisition executives, and political leadership for a plan to build “cloud-independent, resilient distributed systems” into collaborative autonomy and every mission critical piece of defense infrastructure.

Nevertheless, without a clear understanding of the current and desired future capabilities, the United States risks expending immense resources designing systems and strategies that are misaligned, vulnerable, and unprepared for future challenges. Swarming is the next step in a momentous progression of operational capabilities, and it is within reach for whichever side gets serious about it.

Drones Aren’t Swarming Yet — But They Could - War on the Rocks

Emma Bates and S. Ryan Quick

August 4, 2025

warontherocks.com · August 4, 2025

Despite the hype, drone swarming doesn’t exist yet. That’s because the U.S. Department of Defense has been focused on platform capability inputs like hardware, manufacturing, and GPS, while so far neglecting the architectural question of how drones are supposed to work together. The “swarming” on offer today consists of robotic maneuver en masse. However, a transformative strategic leap forward is within reach: resilient, collaborative, autonomous problem solving at machine speed, without any single point of failure. Achieving that vision of swarming will require shifting acquisition priorities toward distributed systems infrastructure, not just quantity or quality of platforms.

BECOME A MEMBER

What Swarming Is and Isn’t

We are experts in distributed systems, collaborative autonomy, and military modernization strategy. We’ve both had security clearances. We’ve interviewed at least a hundred subject matter experts across the public and private sectors. We have seen no evidence of true drone swarming, anywhere. Those mind-blowing Chinese drone light shows? Not swarming. Leader-follower autonomous teaming? Not swarming. One hundred drones operated by a single person? Not swarming. A genuine swarm is singular, not plural. It is overwhelming not just in its scale, but in its unity and resilience. It adapts intelligently to changing circumstances at machine speed. It achieves more than the sum of its parts. It’s a distributed system.

The U.S. defense industry has so far failed to deliver distributed systems for useful, resilient, collaborative swarming behavior among autonomous platforms. By calling groups of their product “swarms” or characterizing their behavior as “swarming,” defense contractors have robbed that concept of meaning, confused their customers, and blunted the demand signal that should be fostering a breakthrough capability. If no competitor ever developed a true distributed swarm, this wouldn’t matter. But we know that’s not the case.

Swarming is the next step in a historic evolution of winning approaches to warfare. Military operations have advanced in sophistication over time, from unstructured melee through concentrated mass and mechanized maneuver. Starting in the late 20th century, decisive weaponry and infrastructure froze conflict and forced it to the unfortunate margins where maneuver still reigned. As the 21st century unfolds, surprisingly crude tools and tactics have grown relatively more effective against expensive infrastructure, and in 2025 arguably a new winning approach is to field numerous small, autonomous, and inexpensive platforms.

Every step in warfare development improves on three core factors that determine which side in a conflict will succumb to defeat. The first is moving violence further away from the warfighter, so that fewer die, and the people maintain their will to fight. The second is wise investment, so that resources last longer and the people maintain their ability to fight. The third is destructive effectiveness, so that an adversary experiences high costs and their people lose the will or ability to fight. Smaller improvements in weaponry, force protection, and tactics are decisive only when opposing forces are operating at the same developmental stage.

Swarming represents the next developmental stage, right around the corner technologically but still out of reach in practice. The deployment of numerous small, autonomous, and inexpensive platforms has accomplished great things over the past few years, but that has amounted to the combination and automation of earlier developmental stages — mass and maneuver. The platforms are individuals, plural in the sense that each requires remote control by a pilot or individual onboard intelligence.

Of course, robotic maneuver en masse is important. The attrition of autonomous devices instead of people is more acceptable because it does not result in human deaths. The devices can hold a surprising amount of the enemy’s blood and treasure at risk. And, of course, it’s disruptive to a U.S. military culture that has emphasized presence and technical sophistication. But robotic maneuver en masse is nothing more than a machine version of what humans would do, on foot or in manned platforms. It’s only a gesture in the direction of a step change.

Each true step change in warfare development doesn’t just improve on what came before it — it defeats it. Mass beats melee through attrition and organization. It destroys effectively with greater numbers to expend before exhaustion. Maneuver beats mass by attacking weak points and creating surprise and confusion. It creates a high destructive return on investment and often circumvents massed forces. But an uncoordinated fleet of small autonomous devices can only beat maneuver through greater mass and faster maneuver.

Short of nuclear weapons, what would defeat a large group of autonomous devices that can maneuver exceptionally well? A swarm. It would have to be a distributed, intelligent system that dynamically adapts to changing circumstances in real time, without reliance on a central controller, a designated leader drone, or even an internet connection. The military force that achieves true swarming first will not just win battles — it could overwhelm entire systems and strategies that have not anticipated coordinated and adaptive attack, self-healing networks, or swarm intelligence. And that is possible now.

Imagine a battle between two drone swarms, Red and Blue. On the Blue side, 500 drones maneuver in perfect sync under the control of a single human operator, executing pre-scripted formations. Each drone makes decisions autonomously to target a nearby enemy and avoid collisions. The group resembles a machine-speed marching band, almost blotting out the sun with their numbers and tight coordination.

By contrast, the Red side is different. Its own 500 drones collaboratively assess the situation and assign targets on a one-to-one ratio, conserving ammunition and minimizing unintended damage. The primary actor is not any individual drone, but the group as a whole, because the group leverages swarm intelligence to act as one. It organizes itself like a colony of ants, a hive of bees, or even a slime mold, achieving the “hive mind” associated with science fiction characters like the Borg of Star Trek or the Buggers in Ender’s Game. Its common operating picture stays in sync over ad hoc short-range connections, even as communications back to human operators and headquarters are jammed.

While the Red side is demonstrating swarming capability, the Blue side falls short. Instead, the Blue side is maneuvering robotics en masse, allowing one human to operate multiple drones simultaneously in a one-to-many model or imposing hierarchy in a leader-follower model. When the situation changes unexpectedly, the Blue drones have no way to adapt at machine speed, all at once, in real time, the way the Red swarm can. And, by maintaining centralized control, the Blue side suffers from a vulnerable single point of failure.

Swarming is such an important strategic advancement that to conflate it with intermediate improvements in massing and maneuver is misleading and dangerous. This is not just a linguistic or hypothetical concern — now that the term has been so diluted, the demand signal for true swarming is too unclear for industry to act on. Based on three years of interviews with subject matter experts across the public, private, and academic sector, we assess that the U.S. defense technology industry is uniformly driving toward the Blue approach: massing and maneuvering robots as mere surrogates for humans, not true swarming.

By contrast, when policymakers hear the term “swarming,” they tend to envision the Borg, a hive of ants, or something like starling murmuration. They’re anticipating a future swarming capability like the Red side. Policymakers don’t realize that they need to communicate all the Blue approaches and vulnerabilities they don’t want. If that distinction remains unclear, then policymakers lose the opportunity to send the demand signal they intended, and the U.S. military loses the opportunity to field the best fighting force.

How is Swarming Possible?

Achieving true swarming requires incorporating distributed systems infrastructure that can provide a common operating picture and spread out the locus of control across the swarm. This is the characteristic that makes a swarm strategically game-changing: distribution of its situational awareness and control across many synchronized leader nodes, instead of one. The swarm creates a consistent, self-healing common operating picture by periodically synchronizing the state of the system and jointly deciding what to do next. When done well, this approach maintains coordination despite the expectation that individual nodes will fail and network communications will falter. Distributed systems are well understood in hyperscale data center engineering. Emerging research (especially in China) is beginning to apply distributed architectures to autonomous systems in the physical world over wireless connections.

The computer science and mathematics required to accomplish that can be very counterintuitive for defense integration teams rooted in AI, robotics, or automation. Those fields of expertise are organized around centralized systems that assume a single central processor absorbs all sensor inputs and directs the remaining parts of the system. This is the foundation for one-to-many and leader-follower approaches to collaborative autonomy. It is more easily scalable than a distributed system, but it’s also more easily defeated.

Why AI Isn’t Enough

AI cannot create swarming because intelligence and architecture are not the same thing. A group of highly intelligent drones, each powered by advanced AI, will not swarm unless they can agree — continuously and reliably — on a shared picture of the world. That agreement is the domain of distributed systems. AI can enhance swarming, but it cannot enable swarming on its own. In short, AI can make many platforms smarter, but only distributed systems can make a swarm coherent.

Recommendations for Acquisition Policymakers

Acquisitions and research, development, testing, and evaluation leaders should include the language of distributed systems in any initiatives that they intend to involve true swarming. For example: “The solution should leverage a consensus-based state management and data safety infrastructure layer to enable secure, distributed operations at scale.”

This is necessary because solicitations and requests for proposals almost always conflate problems that distributed systems solve with different problems that have network, application, or AI solutions. Almost every public call for collaborative autonomy “swarming” capabilities from the Department of Defense or the services describes goals in alignment with a distributed system, but only requests network or application solutions and leaves system characteristics vague. Because of this, distributed systems providers don’t receive a clear demand signal and don’t engage. Those that do engage struggle to communicate the difference their solution would make, and they eventually give up.

As an example of this confusion, all 25 U.S. Army officers and civilian modernization professionals we interviewed for this research cited “bandwidth constraints” that prevent a resilient and consistent common operating picture at the edge. However, bandwidth is a network constraint. Increased bandwidth would not enable a local common operating picture. It would simply enable local devices to leverage a remote common operating picture via hyperscale cloud providers. Resilient and scalable distributed systems can and should be implemented locally, without that dependence on a cloud connection. End users on the ground don’t need to understand this distinction, but it’s important that modernization and acquisition professionals do.

More broadly, to avoid fielding vulnerable and ineffective distributed military systems, the Department of Defense should clearly articulate initiatives to research, test, and procure distributed systems infrastructure independent of cloud provider dependencies. This is necessary because relying on distributed systems infrastructure in the cloud requires more bandwidth than deployed operators can count on. It also constitutes a single point of failure. Program Executive Offices and requirements developers should stipulate that distributed software infrastructure be cloud-independent and locally self-contained.

The field of research into cloud-independent, local distributed systems is shockingly underdeveloped, and the demand signal for it is vague and subject to confused messaging. But that capability is a foundational technological prerequisite to the U.S. military’s modern warfighting approaches. Indeed, each of the services’ official operating concepts are based on the assumption that some distributed infrastructure layer will enable dispersed groups of platforms to coordinate at machine speed.

That’s because swarming — collaborative, autonomous, machine-speed adaptation to changing circumstances — represents a step change in military operational development, and the kind of capability that will win future wars. Anyone who agrees with the premise underlying these concepts should be asking their congressmen, acquisition executives, and political leadership for a plan to build “cloud-independent, resilient distributed systems” into collaborative autonomy and every mission critical piece of defense infrastructure.

Nevertheless, without a clear understanding of the current and desired future capabilities, the United States risks expending immense resources designing systems and strategies that are misaligned, vulnerable, and unprepared for future challenges. Swarming is the next step in a momentous progression of operational capabilities, and it is within reach for whichever side gets serious about it.

BECOME A MEMBER

Emma Bates is the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Cachai, a pre-seed software startup licensing self-contained distributed systems infrastructure for national security systems. She previously worked at the Defense Innovation Unit, U.S. Army Futures Command, and the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

S. Ryan Quick is the founder of professional services firm Providentia Worldwide. He has spent decades solving the hardest problems at the intersection of distributed systems, hyperscale, Web3, distributed cybersecurity, and data safety for clients like Oak Ridge National Lab, Samsung, L3Harris, Paypal, and Ebay.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · August 4, 2025

16. From Tactical Trench Killers to Strategic War Winners: Doctrine, Operational Art, and Tomorrow’s Drone-Enabled Maneuver Warfare

Excerpts:

Advancing this art will require bold experimentation in wargames and exercises. It means intentionally pairing drones with infantry, armor, and mechanized units, using drones not as an afterthought but as a central part of operational design. By doing so, drones will be moved beyond being extremely effective tactical nuisances and transformed into the decisive tool of twenty-first-century warfare.

The trenches in Ukraine are reminiscent of the mud of Flanders, but the drone hum above them signals a change ahead, just as the tank vibrations in the soggy fields of France did more than a century ago. Drones have proven capable of killing soldiers in trenches, but that is not enough. Winning a modern war requires not just capturing positions but dismantling entire systems, dislocating and then destroying the enemy.

Just as tanks crawled through the mud at Cambrai before roaring through France in 1940, drones today buzz and strike in the skies above Ukraine as a prelude to what they might yet become. The question is not whether drones can kill—it is whether we can wield them to break armies.

The contingencies dominating defense planning today may be defensive, but moments will come when offensive action may be the only way to achieve our goals. We must look beyond Ukraine’s trenches and toward the operational art of tomorrow, asking how drones can enable maneuver warfare that fractures enemy systems, exploits openings at speed, and collapses adversaries before they can react.

The window is narrow, the pace of change is quickening, and the stakes are extraordinarily high. The military force that first masters drone-enabled operational breakthrough will not merely win the next battle, but redefine the practice of warfare itself.

The hum in the sky is growing louder—and with it comes the chance to transform war before it transforms us.

From Tactical Trench Killers to Strategic War Winners: Doctrine, Operational Art, and Tomorrow’s Drone-Enabled Maneuver Warfare - Modern War Institute

Antonio Salinas, Mark Askew and Jason P. LeVay | 08.04.25

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Antonio Salinas · August 4, 2025

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

Throughout history, the dream of a decisive victory has often been shattered when technology surpassed doctrine. In World War I, the promise of the swift victory envisioned in Germany’s Schlieffen plan was dashed by machine guns and artillery, resulting in a stalemate that transformed the European battlefields into a maze of trench lines. Even when tanks emerged by 1916 as the potential antidote, crossing no man’s land and supporting infantry at battles such as Cambrai, without the appropriate doctrine and coordination they failed to turn tactical victories into operational breakthroughs.

Twenty-three years later, in 1939, tanks were no longer just a novelty for infantry support; when paired with close air support, they shaped decisive maneuvers and enabled breakthroughs. It was not only the machines that changed warfare, but also doctrine and organization, which allowed them to destroy large enemy formations rather than simply seize territory.

This historical context is a powerful framework with which to understand the role of drones on today’s battlefields—and those of tomorrow. Drones are proving to be a devastating tool of attrition in and around the trench lines of Ukraine, but they may soon enable the next evolution in maneuver warfare. Similar to tanks in World War I, drones have emerged as tactical novelties and delivered terrifyingly lethal—but limited—effects. And like tanks in World War II, if enhanced with the appropriate doctrine, organization, and operational concept, drones will help establish the conditions for offensive breakthrough and exploitation.

Drones have already shown they can kill squads in trenches and disable vehicles, tactical actions that contribute to attrition. Attrition alone, however, even at scale, is neither quick nor affordable for most Western militaries, including that of the United States, to achieve decisive outcomes. One alternative to this approach is dislocating and collapsing enemy formations and the critical subsystems that those formations rely on to remain combat effective. This means breaking the enemy forces’ command and control, severing their logistics, and isolating enemy units so that they are unable to regroup or reinforce critical parts of an area of operations. At the same time, friendly forces exploit these opportunities to rupture enemy defenses and destroy critical parts of enemy forces’ warfighting system faster than they can react. In this way, operational successes, if repeatable, can compound into favorable strategic outcomes.

Rather than viewing attrition and maneuver as opposing models of modern warfare, maneuver can complement attritional approaches by enabling the rapid destruction of enemy capability. By creating and exploiting vulnerabilities, maneuver enables the efficient destruction of enemy capabilities at a favorable cost, potentially leading to the destruction of entire brigades, divisions, and corps in detail. In this approach, victory in ground combat depends upon setting the conditions for operational breakthroughs, and in modern times, this means developing the drone’s full potential for offensive maneuver warfare.

Russia’s struggle to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine highlights three enduring but now intensified main operational challenges. First, modern states can defend broad fronts, producing a lack of assailable flanks, which forces attackers to risk costly penetration maneuvers. Second, the enormous cost of penetration operations makes exploitation challenging. Third, defenders can respond with rapid precision fires and counterattacks that can stall offenses before attackers can achieve operational effects. Given this challenging context, maneuver requires more than just speed; it demands isolating, dislocating, and disrupting the enemy system on a large scale.

Drone-enabled maneuver may provide a solution to all three by bypassing flanks, overwhelming static defenses, and, importantly, enabling the isolation of key sectors to prevent enemy reserves from repositioning, setting the stage for successful exploitation. The air littoral, then, becomes the new assailable flank for ground combat.

To harness the potential of drone-enabled maneuver warfare, security experts should be careful not to draw narrow conclusions based on the observations of first-person-view drones in Ukraine’s trench warfare. This would be akin to watching tanks slog through the mud at the Somme and assuming that they could never enable the destruction of enemy armies.

Drones are set to do for twenty-first-century warfare what tanks achieved in the twentieth century—if employed effectively at the operational level. If drones evolve from tools of attrition into instruments of drone-enabled operational art, they will lead a new era of maneuver warfare by quickly and accurately dismantling enemy systems as our doctrine describes. The challenge—and the opportunity—is in transforming drones from tactical nuisances into decisive force multipliers that could cause operational and strategic collapse.

The hum in the sky is growing louder, bringing not only firepower but the dawn of drone-enabled operational breakthroughs.

Ukraine: Drones in Trench Warfare

The battlefields in Ukraine have demonstrated that drones can carry out various missions, but their ability to enable rapid maneuver and exploitation remains limited. Thus far, the war in Ukraine has showcased the most extensive employment of drones in military history—providing lethal previews across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Drones are performing roles in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, in targeting, and even in deep strikes against Russian air bases. However, despite their widespread use and ability to create casualties, they remain largely disconnected from a cohesive framework of operational maneuver. We have yet to see drones used to create, exploit, and sustain battlefield ruptures that lead to the collapse, encirclement, or destruction of major formations. Undeniably, drones have accelerated attrition, provided excellent fire control, and killed tens of thousands of combatants. They just have not enabled the type of shock that ties tactical disruptions into operational gains.

Yet, this does not mean they are incapable of doing so. As seen in the employment of tanks during World War I, the initial deployment of weapon systems is not always accompanied by the best doctrine. There has already been a limited glimpse of the promise of drone-enabled maneuver in Russia’s recent drone-enabled operations near Kursk. The challenge, therefore, lies not in what drones can do tactically or even operationally, but rather in writing, training on, equipping for, and executing doctrine that transforms tactical effects into operational and strategic successes.

The next stage of maneuver warfare evolution will not take twenty-three years to develop. It may occur within a year or two, as the world’s armies race to equip, organize, and train themselves for the drone-enabled battlefield.

The military force that first packages drone tactics into a concept of operational maneuver will shred opposing armies. The promise—and the threat—of the coming drone-enabled maneuver warfare is real, and it is closer than we think.

From Mechanized to Drone-Enabled Maneuver Warfare

Mechanized maneuver warfare in World War II was never solely about tanks. It represented a German style of warfare focused on speed, shock, and encirclement. As military historian Rob Citino has noted, Blitzkrieg did not suddenly emerge in 1939; it was the modern expression of Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) and Kesselschlacht (the “cauldron battle”), meant to encircle and eliminate enemy forces. Since the eighteenth century, German military thought emphasized rapid maneuver to enclose and destroy the enemy, aiming to end wars quickly by collapsing armies rather than capturing territory. Allied planners had to reckon with Germany’s successful employment of this new capability that significantly enhanced their preferred way of war—a lesson that, despite Germany’s ultimate inability to coordinate battlefield operations with a viable strategy to end the war on favorable terms, US thinkers should consider when developing concepts of employment for a new capability.

So how can the United States employ drones to enhance the American way of war? Drones now offer the potential to conduct maneuver warfare by enabling units to create and capitalize on opportunities to crush the enemy’s flank on the air littoral. Though not traditionally understood as a flank, the air littoral—the contested low altitude airspace up to one thousand feet—can function as a new maneuver space that exposes seams and enables new axes of attack.

For decades, ground forces have held their breath at critical moments, waiting for close air support to arrive and suppress enemy defenses. When used wisely, drones can provide persistent, responsive, and precise close air support that comes not in hours, but in minutes. This would enable forces to maintain air superiority over the air littoral, but more importantly, to sustain shock, maneuver, and tempo on the ground. In this way, drones could become the airborne hammer that ushers in the next era of maneuver warfare.

There are already early indications of how drones can be used for more than just limited strikes on trenches and vehicles. Ukrainian attacks on Russian airfields and Israel’s strikes on Iranian air defenses hint at a future where vehicles act as land-based aircraft carriers, delivering precise airpower deep into enemy territory. These operations offer a preview of what the next stage of air and land warfare will look like.

Drone-enabled maneuver warfare will require heavy drones—unmanned aircraft systems in groups 2 and 3—which are vehicle-portable, runway-independent, and capable of carrying larger payloads and operating over greater ranges than typical first-person-view drones. These drones can vary from single-use loitering munitions to tactical multirole platforms designed for repeated use and persistent presence. While drones already conduct strike missions, most cannot deliver payloads capable of creating decisive effects to support fast-moving ground operations, so larger drones would expand their lethal potential beyond foxholes and trenches. These heavy drones would provide decisive firepower at critical points, similar to how tanks and dive bombers did during World War II by isolating and destroying vital parts of the enemy’s forces.

Drones and the units transporting them must become fully integrated with fast-moving armored, mechanized, and infantry forces, providing constant reconnaissance and strike capabilities without delays from centrally controlled close air support. These drones will scout ahead, suppress defenses, isolate enemy formations, and execute precision strikes, allowing advancing units to maintain momentum and adapt in real time. Instead of calling for air support, formations will carry their own airpower directly into the advance.

Vehicles acting as small, highly mobile, land-based drone carriers—mobile launch platforms embedded at the battalion and company levels—will enable saturation attacks to be launched on demand, creating corridors of chaos and opportunities for maneuver forces to exploit. However, it is important to recognize that drone-enabled success is not guaranteed; drones face significant vulnerabilities in contested environments, including jamming, drone-on-drone attrition, and degraded performance in dense vegetation, high winds, or adverse weather conditions. Drone-enabled maneuver will have to fight for freedom of movement in the air littoral. Still, when integrated with ground maneuver and supported by electromagnetic support, drones provide a flexible maneuver strike option that, while vulnerable, can create windows of opportunity.

Most critically, command structures must fully incorporate drone strikes into operational maneuvers. The goal will be not only to destroy frontline positions but also to disrupt enemy command systems and rear areas, thereby creating conditions for rapid isolation, encirclement, and the systemic collapse of the enemy.

In practice, before the lead penetrating ground units initiate their attack with traditional line-of-sight weaponry, they would be preceded by ground-based drones and loitering munitions capable of isolating enemy units, preventing their ability to reposition, receive reinforcements, emplace additional countermobility obstacles, or benefit from their operational fires. The goal of these shaping operations is not only to overwhelm the point of attack but also to give friendly forces enough time and a sufficiently large mobility corridor to exploit any tactical success and seize operationally significant objectives.

To facilitate rapid brigade and division maneuvers, drone-enabled engineer battalions can deploy drone-delivered line charges to quickly and effectively clear minefields at scale. Equipped with drones capable of carrying and deploying modified mine-clearing line charges, these units can fly the charges over suspected or confirmed minefields and detonate them precisely, creating lanes for armored and mechanized forces without exposing sappers to direct fire or artillery. This drone-enabled breaching force would allow a division to clear multiple paths simultaneously across a broad front, maintaining momentum in the assault and reducing bottlenecks at minefields. A brigade or division can transform what was once a slow and hazardous breaching process into a swift, coordinated operation that preserves combat power and sustains operational tempo.

While both Russia and Ukraine already possess some of the tools required for this model of employment, neither side has yet been able to achieve decisive results. One important reason we have yet to see drones be used in an operational breakthrough is the relative inability of both sides to control the air littoral. Without control of this space, and ideally the air above it too, it becomes very difficult to avoid becoming fixed by the enemy’s fires and to prevent the arrival of the enemy’s reserves, which can hobble operational tempo and momentum.

Building the Drone-Enabled Division

To implement this vision, we need to rethink our force structure. A modern US Army division typically includes two to three brigade combat teams, division artillery, a combat aviation brigade, a sustainment brigade, and a division headquarters. Although all brigade combat teams will probably become drone-enabled with organic drone assets, the key advancement requires a drone strike brigade specifically designed for decisive, heavy drone operations.

The drone strike brigade would consist of six specialized battalions, each equipped with heavier drones to perform specific missions. A heavy drone strike battalion would operate large drones for deep, precise strikes on the battlefield. A heavy drone isolation and interdiction battalion would focus on securing the attack corridor, maintaining air littoral superiority and flank security, and providing fire support against enemy counterattacks. A drone carrier battalion would run modified vehicles—for instance, the trucks that carry the high-mobility artillery rocket system—as mobile, land-based drone launchers to saturate the air littoral. The brigade would also include a drone reconnaissance and electronic warfare battalion to deliver continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as dominate the electromagnetic spectrum. A drone-enabled engineer battalion would use drones to reduce and emplace minefields, improve mobility, and carry out area-denial operations. Lastly, a dedicated drone sustainment battalion would facilitate high sortie rates through logistical support, maintenance, and resupply tailored to drones’ specific needs.

This structure would transform the division into a drone-enabled maneuver force capable of executing deep, system-isolating or fracturing strikes while maintaining a high operational tempo. As proof of concept, some of these capabilities could also be replicated in a brigade by introducing this capability into a battalion, with its specialties serviced by companies.

Drone-enabled maneuver warfare will require much more than new tools. Most importantly, it will require new ways of commanding, integrating, and maneuvering across echelons. To succeed, drone units must train and move alongside maneuver formations, expanding and protecting their share of air littoral dominance. This means rethinking command structures so that drone capabilities are not merely siloed as fire support assets; rather, they must be woven into combined arms planning cycles and rehearsals, from the squad to the division.

Operation Cobra and the Highway of Death—All at Once

Drone-enabled maneuver warfare at the operational level will blend the most decisive and devastating elements of some of the twentieth century’s sharpest military shocks—such as Operation Cobra and the Highway of Death—into a scalable, repeatable, and portable operational art.

Operation Cobra, the 1944 Allied breakout from Normandy, demonstrated the destructive power of air support in weakening defensive lines, paving the way for armored forces that turned a stalemate into a quick collapse within days. The Highway of Death during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 demonstrated the precision of modern airpower when used relentlessly against retreating forces, destroying columns almost without challenge.

One of the most critical aspects of drone-enabled maneuver is not only the ability to strike, but also the capacity to provide persistent, reliable, and actionable intelligence in real-time. A dedicated drone brigade could provide beyond-line-of-sight intelligence across the depth of the battlefield, enabling commanders to see and understand enemy movements in real time. This continuous stream of intelligence would allow leaders to identify movements and fractures in enemy formations as they develop and exploit them while the enemy is unbalanced.

Drone-enabled maneuver warfare will transform the battlefield’s patterns of violence into an advanced dance of maneuver combat. Long-range, expendable, heavier strike drones—could suppress and demolish adversary defenses on a larger scale and at greater depth than we have seen in today’s wars. The heavy drones will demolish forward defenses like Cobra’s carpet bombing, but with precision that keeps corridors open for maneuver forces. As defenders try to reposition or retreat, drones will turn roads into deadly traps, echoing the Highway of Death on a larger scale.

In drone-enabled maneuver warfare, the most severe moments of twentieth-century air-land combat will no longer be rare, theater-altering events. They will become routine, scalable operations for rapidly destabilizing and collapsing an enemy’s system with terrifying speed and efficiency.

Developing Drone Operational Art

The path to drone-enabled maneuver warfare demands the development of a drone doctrine and operational art: the deliberate design and employment of drone-enabled campaigns that turn tactical victories into operational breakthroughs and strategic successes. Operational art, as the connection between tactics and strategy, has traditionally involved using maneuver to destabilize an opponent’s front, cut communication lines, and disrupt the enemy system’s coherence. Drones must now be integrated into this framework, not as isolated strikes, but as vital tools for causing disruption, paralysis, and exploitation on a large scale.

This will involve developing concepts for massing drones at crucial points, not just for harassment, but to create pathways for exploitation. It requires turning kill boxes into operational mobility corridors where drone swarms can target enemy armor and infantry, logistics convoys, and artillery redeployments, keeping the enemy reactive and pinned even beyond the front line.

Developing drone operational art also requires rethinking timing and tempo. Campaign plans could shift from traditional cycles of fire and maneuver to a continuous, rolling advance, with drones applying constant pressure while ground forces exploit openings without pause. This approach forces the defender into a state of continuous crisis, accelerating collapse. While the battlespace in Ukraine is saturated with drones, collapse has not occurred because the existence of technology alone is not enough.

We are seeing the employment of this capability in its earliest form. Just like with tanks, what we are seeing right now may only be a fraction of the capability that an adversary with large-scale production capability may be bring to bear in the future. Moreover, these systems are easier to produce, extremely affordable relative to armor, and available in many cases as a dual-use technology that can rapidly be repurposed. When this new scale is combined with doctrine that is written, trained, and rehearsed by armies and enhanced with more mature AI capability, drones will be able to achieve their full potential as a key ingredient in restoring the viability of offensive maneuver.

Advancing this art will require bold experimentation in wargames and exercises. It means intentionally pairing drones with infantry, armor, and mechanized units, using drones not as an afterthought but as a central part of operational design. By doing so, drones will be moved beyond being extremely effective tactical nuisances and transformed into the decisive tool of twenty-first-century warfare.

The trenches in Ukraine are reminiscent of the mud of Flanders, but the drone hum above them signals a change ahead, just as the tank vibrations in the soggy fields of France did more than a century ago. Drones have proven capable of killing soldiers in trenches, but that is not enough. Winning a modern war requires not just capturing positions but dismantling entire systems, dislocating and then destroying the enemy.

Just as tanks crawled through the mud at Cambrai before roaring through France in 1940, drones today buzz and strike in the skies above Ukraine as a prelude to what they might yet become. The question is not whether drones can kill—it is whether we can wield them to break armies.

The contingencies dominating defense planning today may be defensive, but moments will come when offensive action may be the only way to achieve our goals. We must look beyond Ukraine’s trenches and toward the operational art of tomorrow, asking how drones can enable maneuver warfare that fractures enemy systems, exploits openings at speed, and collapses adversaries before they can react.

The window is narrow, the pace of change is quickening, and the stakes are extraordinarily high. The military force that first masters drone-enabled operational breakthrough will not merely win the next battle, but redefine the practice of warfare itself.

The hum in the sky is growing louder—and with it comes the chance to transform war before it transforms us.

Antonio Salinas is an active duty US Army officer and PhD student in the Department of History at Georgetown University. Following his coursework, he will teach at the National Intelligence University. Salinas has twenty-seven years of military service in the US Marine Corps and US Army, where he has served as an infantry officer, assistant professor in the Department of History at the US Military Academy, and strategic intelligence officer, with operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is the author of Siren’s Song: The Allure of War , Boot Camp: The Making of a United States Marine, and Leaving War: From Afghanistan’s Pech Valley to Hadrian’s Wall.

Mark Askew is an active duty Army officer and military historian. He has over twenty years of military service as an armor officer, assistant professor in the Department of History at the US Military Academy, and Army strategist, with operational experience in Iraq. Askew has a PhD in military history from Texas A&M University and currently serves at US Army Futures Command.

Jason P. LeVay teaches joint doctrine at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and is a doctoral student in the Security Studies program at Kansas State University. He earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Washington and holds graduate degrees from Yale University and the National Intelligence University.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image: A soldier assigned to the 1st Infantry Division launches a HERO-120 loitering munition system at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, Jan 23, 2025. (Credit: Pfc. Christopher Bailey, US Army)

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Antonio Salinas · August 4, 2025

17.  A Fight Over a West Point Job Reveals Two Visions of America Under Trump

Sigh....I previously asked the question below about this person and someone used their "research assistant" (AI) to provide this to me:

You asked:

Can anyone make a case for why this person should be influencing personnel decisions in our national security community? Why does this person have so much influence? What are this person's qualifications? (all rhetorical questions but I would not mind seeing if anyone can make the case).

ChatGPT answered:

What qualifies her to advise on national security hires?

No formal credentials or government experience: Pension of influence stems from her activism, social media presence, and ideological alignment—not from any traditional national security or intelligence background Vanity Fair+15Wikipedia+15The Daily Beast+15WIRED+1The Straits Times+1.

Self-styled researcher and ideological watchdog: Loomer claims to run her own firm, Loomered Strategies, which produces opposition research targeting individuals she deems insufficiently loyal to Trump’s “America First” agenda The Guardian+3The Straits Times+3AP News+3.

 So why does Trump listen?

Loyalty to the MAGA movement: Loomer positions herself as an unwavering Trump loyalist and frames her efforts as protecting him from ideological infiltration Yahoo NewsAP News.

Public tactics that yield results: She has reportedly prompted the firing of multiple top officials—particularly in the National Security Council (NSC), NSA, and DOJ—by highlighting past criticisms, alleged political alignment with establishment Republicans, and social media statements The Guardian+12The Daily Beast+12CNN+12.

Trump’s public remarks: He’s referred to her as “a very strong person” and “a very good patriot,” saying, “sometimes I listen to recommendations like I do with everybody… then I make a decision,” thereby acknowledging her input while minimizing formal influence keyt.com+6CNN+6The Washington Post+6.

 How did she gain access to Trump?

Personal connection to Trump: Loomer says she has a direct phone line to the president, and her access originates from Trump himself—not the White House aides. She maintains that advisers attempted to block her access, but Trump continued engaging with her directly CNN+3Yahoo News+3keyt.com+3.

Campaign and travel proximity: She traveled alongside him during key campaign events—boarding his private plane, attending rallies, and appearing at a 9/11 memorial service—though her access was sometimes limited by advisers due to controversies, including her prior conspiracy claims keyt.comnewspressnow.comCNN.

Oval Office pitch/personal meeting: In early April 2025, she brought a packet of opposition research listing roughly a dozen officials she urged Trump to remove. That meeting, attended by top aides and staffers, preceded the dismissal of multiple NSC members, including the NSA Director and senior NSC policymakers The Guardian.

 Summary Table

TopicKey DetailsQualificationsNo formal security background—relies on activist research and ideological vetting.Why Trump listensShe frames herself as a loyalist watchdog facing internal bias, and her critiques have coincided with actual firings. Trump publicly downplays but acknowledges her input.How she gained accessPersonal phone line—campaign travel proximity—access via Trump bypassing aides—Oval Office meeting with research in-hand.

 Why does this matter?

• Informal influence on personnel decisions: Loomer has emerged as a non‑staff actor effecting high-level staffing changes based on ideological loyalty. These moves have raised concern among Trump aides and GOP critics, though Trump seems to find her loyalty useful—at least for now AP News+2The Daily Beast+2Yahoo News+2.
• Appeals of external critics: Her outsider style contrasts with traditional advisers, giving Trump a more public and combative channel for rooting out perceived “Biden holdovers” or establishment

A Fight Over a West Point Job Reveals Two Visions of America Under Trump

Jen Easterly, who had served in Republican and Democratic administrations, was headed to the academy. Then a right-wing activist stepped in.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/03/us/politics/west-point-easterly-trump-loomer.html?utm

The Army secretary announced that Ms. Easterly would no longer serve as the Robert F. McDermott Distinguished Chair in the department of social sciences at West Point.Credit...Ben Curtis/Associated Press

By Greg Jaffe

Reporting from Washington

Published Aug. 3, 2025

Updated Aug. 4, 2025, 12:15 p.m. ET

Hours after West Point pulled its offer to have her teach cadets, Jen Easterly posted a short essay in which she laid out what happened to her and what it meant for the country.

“This isn’t about me,” she wrote last week. “This is about something larger.”

Over three decades, Ms. Easterly, 57, had compiled an impeccable résumé as a West Point graduate, a Rhodes Scholar and an Afghanistan war veteran. She had served as a key aide on President George W. Bush’s National Security Council and led a critical cybersecurity agency under President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

Now she was blackballed — in her own words, “a casualty of casually manufactured outrage that drowned out the quiet labor of truth and the steady pulse of integrity.”

The source of the casual outrage arrayed against her was Laura Loomer, a right-wing agitator and self-described “Islamophobe,” who has become a powerful and largely unaccountable enforcer in President Trump’s Washington.

“Wow @PeteHegseth! Looks like some of your underlings are trying to screw you,” Ms. Loomer wrote on X on July 29. She accused Ms. Easterly of using her position leading a cybersecurity agency in the Biden administration to “silence Trump supporters” who questioned the integrity of U.S. elections.

The next day, Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll, an Iraq war veteran and Yale Law School classmate of Vice President JD Vance, announced that Ms. Easterly would no longer serve as the Robert F. McDermott Distinguished Chair in the department of social sciences at West Point.

Ms. Easterly’s rise in elite policy circles over three decades and her sudden fall at the hands of Ms. Loomer, 32, tell the story of how Washington is changing during Mr. Trump’s second term and why it might never be the same.

And it raises big questions about the ways power and influence are currently wielded in Washington; what it means to be a patriot; and whether loyalty to Mr. Trump or any sitting president should be a prerequisite for government service.

Editors’ Picks

In Colombia, the Bike Ride Starts Before Dawn

Superman’s Earthly Birthplace? It’s Cleveland, and It’s Embracing Its Hero.

He Was Getting Weaker and More Confused. Could It Be His Drinking?

Image

Laura Loomer accused Ms. Easterly of using her position leading a cybersecurity agency in the Biden administration to “silence Trump supporters” who questioned the integrity of U.S. elections.Credit...Greg Kahn for The New York Times

In December 1989, with the Soviet Union crumbling, Ms. Easterly joined four other soon-to-be college graduates on PBS’s MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour to discuss the decade that was ending and her hopes for the future. Her parents had both served in senior positions in the Reagan administration. She was finishing her final year at West Point and had been selected for a prestigious Rhodes scholarship to study at Oxford University.

Ms. Easterly talked about the importance of public service and the spread of democracy and pluralism worldwide. Asked about her goals, she said, “I want to be the first woman chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Then she quickly amended her answer. “By that time,” she said, “I probably won’t be the first woman.”

Nearly 32 years later, just days after Kabul fell to the Taliban in August 2021, Ms. Easterly sent a message to her staff at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. In it, she described her husband’s struggles with PTSD upon his return from the war in 2009 and her decision to leave the Army at the end of her third combat deployment because she feared that her continued absences were hurting her young son.

“I’ve found the events of the past week more than heartbreaking — heart-rending, really,” she wrote.

She found solace in the belief that American soldiers had fought for something bigger than themselves, bigger than even the Afghan people. They were fighting in defense of “the most profound idea in human history,” she told her team. “The idea that men and women are born free and by their birth alone entitled to liberty and justice.”

Ms. Easterly did not respond to requests for comment for this article.

Ms. Loomer, a podcaster and persistent social media presence, has run for Congress, but never served in government. Senior White House officials, who view her as unmanageable and often toxic, have blocked her from serving in the Trump administration.

But her unwavering loyalty to Mr. Trump and deep, often conspiratorial, doubts about the federal government have vaulted her to a position of influence in Mr. Trump’s orbit. “On a daily basis, I communicate with the most powerful and wealthiest people in the world,” she recently told The New York Times.

Her rise was also fueled by the post-9/11 wars, which cost trillions of taxpayer dollars and hundreds of thousands of American, Iraqi and Afghan lives. Their failure, over the course of more than 20 years, highlighted the massive blind spots of the country’s political and foreign policy elite.

Ms. Loomer’s view of the country and its future reflects that legacy of long and costly failure. “I feel like Western civilization is in a death spiral,” she told The Times.

She often describes Mr. Trump as the country’s only real hope of redemption and casts herself as his fiercest advocate.

At least a half-dozen White House officials have been pushed out after Ms. Loomer pressed for their dismissal. A senior administration official said the departures were not necessarily Ms. Loomer’s work, but Mr. Trump has repeatedly praised her as a “true patriot” and ideological enforcer.

“I play to an audience of one,” Ms. Loomer said.

To some, Ms. Loomer’s role in bringing down Ms. Easterly stands as an object lesson for the U.S. military and others in who survives in today’s Washington. Ms. Easterly had been appointed to her position by Brig. Gen. Shane Reeves, West Point’s dean.

“A Homecoming Worth Celebrating,” he announced on social media on July 29. On July 30, Ms. Easterly’s appointment was rescinded.

“Now some TV commentator keen to score political points can humiliate even very senior officers,” said Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel, Vietnam veteran and emeritus professor in history and international relations at Boston University. “And, of course, those officers allow themselves to be humiliated with the secretary of defense as either bystander or co-conspirator. It is an extraordinary moment.”

Ms. Easterly expressed similar concerns in her recent social media post. “When outrage is weaponized and truth discarded, it tears at the fabric of unity and undermines the very ethos that draws brave young men and women to serve and sacrifice,” she warned.

She closed with a message to West Point’s cadets that echoed the hope she had expressed decades earlier as a 21-year-old cadet on NewsHour.

“The world needs your strength, your courage, your warrior spirit, your will to win,” she wrote. “But it also needs your empathy, your intellect, your humility, your integrity.”

Ms. Loomer often speaks of an America that is corrupt and crumbling, despoiled by an arrogant and out-of-touch elite. “There is a CIA Coup of the Trump admin taking place right now,” she wrote in a Saturday post on X.

In her message to West Point’s cadets, Ms. Easterly described the country in more optimistic terms. “I believe in our great nation, our great experiment to continually form a more perfect union,” she wrote.

Both she and Ms. Loomer were sharing their visions of America. For the moment, Ms. Easterly was the outsider.

Greg Jaffe covers the Pentagon and the U.S. military.

A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 4, 2025, Section A, Page 13 of the New York edition with the headline: West Point Rescinds Offer After Trump Confidant Casts Doubt on Loyalty. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com