Quotes of the day:

“Orwell and Churchill recognized that the key question of their century ultimately was not who controlled the means of production, as Marx thought, or how the human psyche functioned, as Freud taught, but rather how to preserve the liberty of the individual during an age when the state was becoming powerfully intrusive into private life. The historian Simon Schama has described them as the architects of their time. They were, Schama said, “the most unlikely of allies.” Their shared cause was to prevent the tide of state murder that began rising in the 1920s and 1930s, and crested in the 1940s, from continuing to rise.”

– Churchill and Orwell: The Fight for Freedom by Thomas E. Ricks

"What sweetness is left in life, if you take away friendship? Robbing life of friendship is like robbing the world of the sun." 

– Cicero

"Man, unlike any other thing organic or inorganic in the universe, grows beyond his work, walks up the stairs of his concepts, emerges ahead of his accomplishments." 

– John Steinbeck

1. Moscow’s Spies Were Stealing US Tech — Until the FBI Started a Sabotage Campaign

2. China takes foreign spy hostility to new levels; proactive strategy proposed for U.S.

3. Austin was ‘surprised’ by 9/11 plea deals, Pentagon says

4. Retired Army officer sues government over clerical mistake that cost him promotions, pay

5. U.S. Faces New Challenges as Potential Iran Attack on Israel Nears

6. How the U.S. and Mexico Drove Border Crossings Down in an Election Year

7. Transforming war: A strategic integration of unmanned aerial systems by Florent Groberg

8. Bloomberg News Parts Ways With Reporter Involved in Article About Evan Gershkovich’s Release

9. What Russia’s arrest footage of Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan really tells us

10. Analysis: Mass arrests and conflicting narratives following the Haniyeh assassination

11. How the U.S. military cultivated — and then lost — a key African ally

12. An Army officer is one of the stars of the U.S. women's Olympic rugby team

13. Army officer and West Point grad crowned Miss USA

14. The US Strengthens the Second Island Chain

15. Strategically important Myanmar military HQ appears to fall to the resistance, in a blow to regime

16. Watch: AC-130J gunship pummels Navy vessel during Rim of the Pacific

17. AFSOC Turns Rural Highway into Runway for Historic AC-130J Touchdown

18. How To Pose as a Reasonable Critic of Israel (With a Little Help From the Media)

19. Taiwan is making a TV show about a Chinese invasion. And it’s hitting close to home

20. Opinion Biden’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy has made America’s future more secure

21. USSOCOM hosts quarterly 1st SOF Truth day on transitioning from the military

22. China's special forces launch spy drone that flaps wings like a real bird

23. Several US personnel injured in rocket attack on Iraq base, official says

24. The U.S. Finally Wakes Up on Venezuela

25. Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura (graphic novel)

26. How to Make Military AI Governance More Robust

27. Lessons Never Learned: The US Army Disinterest in the 1912–13 Balkan Wars and Today’s Professional Military Discourse

28. China’s Real Economic Crisis

29. 'Land of Bad:' JTAC and Delta Force-centered movie is worth a watch

30. From my veins to the frontlines (Ukraine)

31. Opinion | The next president must restore our faith in America by Jamie Dimon ·

1. Moscow’s Spies Were Stealing US Tech — Until the FBI Started a Sabotage Campaign

Some history of the good old days?  Is this still relevant? Are there lessons for today or has the "half-life? runout?

Excerpts:

But such tech-focused sanctions-evasion schemes by America’s foes offer opportunities for U.S. intelligence, too — including the opportunity to launch ultra-secret sabotage campaigns to alter sensitive technologies before they reach their final destination.

There is a long but shadowy history of U.S. covert action in this domain. A reputed explosion of a major oil pipeline in Siberia in 1982 may have been the fruit of a White House-directed campaign to infiltrate the Soviets’ technology supply chains. And, at least since the George W. Bush administration, U.S. spy agencies have overseen programs to seed faulty tech into Iran’s nuclear enrichment and missile programs, as well as sabotage North Korea’s missile capabilities. But most sabotage campaigns remain shrouded in secrecy, and details about their actual mechanics are few and far between. With U.S.-Russia relations at their lowest ebb since the 1980s — and with Moscow more voracious for prohibited American technology than in decades — it is a good bet that U.S. intelligence agencies are currently rethinking ways to infiltrate Russia’s illicit supply chains, to stymie their war machine.

During the Cold War, FBI spy hunters like Rick Smith were thinking hard about the issue, too. “At the time, there was a lot of interest in technology transfer,” recalled Smith. So his chance run-in, at that local watering hole, with a tech entrepreneur who had sprawling business connections in Europe — well, that presented some tantalizing possibilities.

...

But the Austrian was just getting started. After the Intering operation was blown, the tech entrepreneur, now untethered from the FBI, continued his profitable wheeling and dealing in 1980s Silicon Valley. Eventually, after the Cold War, he moved back to Europe, amassing a sizable fortune there in real estate.

For Appel, even if the Bulgarians hadn’t sniffed out the Austrian as a U.S. intelligence plant, the operation may have already been entering a sort of inevitable denouement. “If you have a really, really good source, it’s very, very unusual for it to go on for an extended period of time,” he reflected.

Indeed, according to Appel, these sorts of operations possess a pre-determined, almost naturalistic logic to them. “Every single case of this kind has a half-life,” Appel said. “In other words, it’s like an atomic particle. At some point, it’s not going to be emanating radioactivity anymore.

“It’s going to come to an end.”

Moscow’s Spies Were Stealing US Tech — Until the FBI Started a Sabotage Campaign

Politico

During the early days of Silicon Valley, a tech industry entrepreneur teamed up with the FBI to ship faulty devices to Moscow.

Illustrations by Valentin Tkach for POLITICO

By Zach Dorfman

08/04/2024 07:00 AM EDT

Zach Dorfman is a national security journalist. A former senior staff writer at the Aspen Institute, he is a past recipient of the Gerald Ford Prize for Defense Reporting.

One day at the dawn of the 1980s, an FBI agent in his 30s named Rick Smith walked into the Balboa Café, an ornate, historic watering hole in San Francisco’s leafy Cow Hollow neighborhood. Smith, who was single at the time, lived nearby and regularly frequented the spot.

As he approached the oak wood bar to order a drink he suddenly spotted a familiar face — someone Smith had met about a year before, after the man had walked into the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. He was Austrian by birth, but a denizen of Silicon Valley, an entrepreneur who operated as a middleman between American tech companies and European countries hungry for the latest hi-tech goods.

The Austrian had visited the consulate to drum up business behind the Iron Curtain. The tech entrepreneur may not have put much thought into how closely the building was being watched by FBI spy hunters. And why should he? At the time, there wasn’t necessarily anything suspicious about trying to conduct commerce with the Soviets. In 1979, for instance, there was $4.5 billion in legal trade between the U.S. and Soviet Union; about $200 million of that was in high-tech goods. But bureau counterintelligence routinely blanketed the consulate with surveillance. And their interest was piqued. After the FBI clocked the Austrian’s visit to the consulate, Smith had reached out.

International businesspeople could be important sources for the FBI. They had access to people who would never knowingly speak to a U.S. government official, and to all sorts of information of interest to U.S. intelligence. Some could even become secret agents of the U.S. spy services.

During their initial meeting, Smith and the Austrian, rough contemporaries, hit it off. The Austrian was a sophisticated and worldly man, well dressed, proper in demeanor. An athlete and an avid skier, he spoke flawless English alongside his native German.

The tech entrepreneur had seemed interested in assisting the bureau. But his case fizzled out. This sort of thing wasn’t unusual. In the counterintelligence world, leads dry up all the time. But now, at the bar, Smith decided to seize on this serendipitous encounter. “I got a good memory for faces, and reintroduced myself,” Smith told me recently. “And we started talking.”

Smith couldn’t have known it then, but this chance encounter would have momentous implications. It would sow the seeds for a major counterintelligence campaign — an FBI-led operation that sold the Soviet Bloc millions in secretly sabotaged U.S. hi-tech.

At the time, the Cold War had been heating up. For decades, the U.S. had forbidden the export of “dual use” technology — items with civilian as well as military applications — to the Soviet Bloc. Sanctions tightened further after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979.

By the early 1980s, the FBI knew the Soviet Union was desperate for cutting-edge American technology, like the U.S.-produced microchips then revolutionizing a vast array of digital devices, including military systems. Moscow’s spies worked assiduously to steal such dual use tech or purchase it covertly. The Soviet Union’s ballistic missile programs, air defense systems, electronic spying platforms, and even space shuttles, depended on it.

The Soviets “saw Silicon Valley as a critical area to infiltrate precisely because they needed to access as much of this technology as they could,” said Chris Miller, author of Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. “And there was no better place to get knowledge of it, and try to acquire the tools and the chips involved.”

The CIA assessed that, in the late 1970s, Moscow’s spies had illicitly acquired thousands of pieces of Western microelectronics worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The Soviets “were stealing us blind,” said Milt Bearden, a retired senior CIA official who ran the agency’s Soviet operations. “It was a vacuum cleaner of tech theft.”

While the Soviet Union might have imploded over three decades ago, this underlying dynamic hasn’t really changed. Russia’s intelligence services are still scouring the globe for prohibited U.S. tech, particularly since Moscow’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Current sanctions have only stanched, but not stopped, the flow of prohibited goods. A constellation of countries, including former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have become major transshipment hubs for contraband ultimately making its way to Russia. Russia has reportedly even covertly imported household items like refrigerators and washing machines to rip out the microchips within them for use in military equipment.

But such tech-focused sanctions-evasion schemes by America’s foes offer opportunities for U.S. intelligence, too — including the opportunity to launch ultra-secret sabotage campaigns to alter sensitive technologies before they reach their final destination.

There is a long but shadowy history of U.S. covert action in this domain. A reputed explosion of a major oil pipeline in Siberia in 1982 may have been the fruit of a White House-directed campaign to infiltrate the Soviets’ technology supply chains. And, at least since the George W. Bush administration, U.S. spy agencies have overseen programs to seed faulty tech into Iran’s nuclear enrichment and missile programs, as well as sabotage North Korea’s missile capabilities. But most sabotage campaigns remain shrouded in secrecy, and details about their actual mechanics are few and far between. With U.S.-Russia relations at their lowest ebb since the 1980s — and with Moscow more voracious for prohibited American technology than in decades — it is a good bet that U.S. intelligence agencies are currently rethinking ways to infiltrate Russia’s illicit supply chains, to stymie their war machine.

During the Cold War, FBI spy hunters like Rick Smith were thinking hard about the issue, too. “At the time, there was a lot of interest in technology transfer,” recalled Smith. So his chance run-in, at that local watering hole, with a tech entrepreneur who had sprawling business connections in Europe — well, that presented some tantalizing possibilities.

Smith says the Austrian didn’t take much convincing. That night, over drinks, the two began hatching a plan, one refined over many meetings in the months that followed. Working under the FBI’s direction, the Austrian agreed to pose as a crook, a man willing to sell prohibited technology to the communist Eastern Bloc.

It was the start of Operation Intering — a never-before-reported massive, multiyear, transcontinental effort. Along the way, the FBI and the Austrian would seed faulty tech to Moscow and its allies; drain the Soviet Bloc’s coffers; expose its intelligence officers and secret American conspirators; and reveal to American counterspies exactly what tech the Soviets were after. (This article is based on extensive interviews with five former FBI and CIA officials with knowledge of Operation Intering and similar U.S.-authored covert sabotage operations, as well as contemporaneous supporting court documents and media reports. An FBI spokesperson declined to comment.)

Because of Intering, the Soviet Bloc would unknowingly purchase millions of dollars’ worth of sabotaged U.S. goods. Communist spies, ignorant that they were being played, would be feted with a literal parade in a Warsaw Pact capital for their success in purchasing this forbidden technology from the West. But as the operation gained momentum, it would become increasingly risky — including to the life of the Austrian himself.

Successful double agent operations don’t just materialize out of the ether. They take concerted patience, assiduous planning — and some measure of luck.

With Intering, the bureau first tried to get their new asset in cahoots with some unsuspecting Soviet officials abroad. “That was the goal: to put him in [direct] contact with the Russians,” said Smith. (Other former FBI officials interviewed for this story corroborated the Austrian’s role in the operation. All declined to provide his true name, and other efforts to identify him were unsuccessful.) This was, of course, much easier said than done, as Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers were constantly sniffing around for Western spies.

Initially, the Austrian, who wasn’t a trained spy, needed some coaching from his FBI overseers. “Once I determined that I thought he could pull it off, then we had to orchestrate how to do it, each step of the way,” recalled Smith. But the Austrian was a quick study — independent-minded and “terrific for the role,” said Smith. He “knew what he was doing.”

The FBI sent the Austrian home to Vienna, a key Cold War spy capital infamous for its cloak-and-dagger antics. The city was neutral ground, a place where Communist and Western officials could operate in relative comfort and safety. There, the Austrian made an appointment with the Soviet Embassy and prepared to pitch selling Moscow cutting-edge Silicon Valley microelectronics and computer technology.

At first, Moscow’s spies didn’t bite. “They expressed some interest, but they wanted classified information, basically,” Smith said. “He couldn’t provide that.” Ostensibly uninterested in the tech offered by the Austrian, the Soviets instead passed him off to their Eastern Bloc allies. But it was all a ruse. The Soviets did covet the microelectronics and other prohibited tech, they just wanted the scheme run through their Eastern Bloc lackeys.

He was directed to the East Germans, who in turn brought in the Bulgarians, another Soviet Bloc ally. But U.S. intelligence knew who the ultimate recipient of this forbidden technology would be: Moscow. “Eastern Bloc countries got from the Russians a wish list of things they would like them to target,” recalled Bill Kinane, a retired longtime San Francisco-based FBI counterintelligence agent who helped supervise the Intering operation.

By using its allied services, the KGB put distance between itself and these technology-transfer operations. It allowed the Russians to free up resources to pursue other espionage targets. Moscow also knew that the West didn’t scrutinize trade with Eastern European countries the same way it did with the Soviet Union itself.

The Austrian’s connections now presented a major opportunity. The Bulgarians, and their East German and Russia allies, were going to get that forbidden tech. But not before the FBI tampered with it first.

Getting the operation up and running took some time. But by 1982, Intering was humming on all cylinders.

The bureau couldn’t do it alone. It needed technical experts. Trusted intermediaries. Cooperation from other U.S. and foreign government agencies. The FBI also needed to set up shop somewhere to sabotage the parts en route to the Bulgarians. London was a key transshipment point where U.S. officials would intercept the and sometimes subtly tweak the hardware. It was all “altered by engineers,” recalled Smith.

The operation spanned countries and continents. An employee of the East German electronics behemoth Robotron, who worked as a secret U.S. intelligence source, provided information to U.S. officials. A Netherlands-based tech broker called Traco Supplies served as a major conduit for shipments. The Bulgarians used a front company called INCO to import the prohibited technology. One transhipper was based in Toronto; Smith traveled there as part of the operation.

A critical end-broker to the Bulgarians, a company called Cosmotrans, had a storage facility in Zurich, Switzerland; Smith traveled there, too, coordinating with Swiss intelligence. “It was a long, involved process,” recalled Smith. Some of the shipments even seemed to wind their way through China.

And the operation really did appear to be a windfall for the Bulgarians — and, by default, their Soviet masters. To U.S. intelligence, it was clear that the Soviets didn’t just want to steal or illicitly purchase Western microelectronics to insert into their military hardware. They wanted to covertly duplicate the entire U.S. computer industry.

“The Soviets couldn’t produce domestically the types of ultra-complex and precise chip-making tools that they needed, and that the U.S. and Europe and Japan could,” said Chris Miller, the Chip War author.

Indeed, by 1981 Soviet and Bulgarian intelligence had initiated a series of secret agreements whereby Bulgaria’s spies would procure export-prohibited hi-tech machine tools needed for factories in Russia that would produce data storage devices and other advanced manufacturing products, according to research by Jordan Baev, a Bulgarian academic who has plumbed his county’s cold-war era intelligence archives.

Operation Intering coincided with this Soviet-led campaign. Beginning in 1982, the FBI shipped disk drive testing equipment from two Arizona-based firms, Pace Industries and the Luctor Corporation, to the Bulgarians. (These drives enabled computers to permanently store and retrieve data.) Via the Austrian, the bureau brokered a deal to send Eastern Bloc spies hard-disk coating equipment from California-based Tempus Industries.

The FBI also covertly sold the Bulgarians “servowriters,” critical tools for manufacturing hard drives, from the San Diego-based Megatek corporation. In 1983, another shipment of servowriters, this time purchased via the San Jose-based General Disk Corporation, and valued at a quarter of a million dollars, was sent to the Bulgarians — but sabotaged beforehand.

That same year, the FBI shipped $3 million worth of computer-related equipment, from Hewlett Packard and Oregon-based firm Tektronix, to the Eastern Bloc. That’s worth over $9 million in 2024 dollars. (Tektronix and HP Inc., Hewlett Packard’s legal successor, did not return requests for comment.)

There were many other FBI-controlled shipments. Some of the tech was subtly altered before the Bulgarians could get their hands on it. Some was rendered completely unusable. Some of it was shipped unadulterated to keep the operation humming — and allay any suspicions from the Eastern Bloc about what might be going on.

And some of it never made its way to the Bulgarians at all. In one case, the bureau intercepted a $400,000 order of computer hardware from the San Jose-based firm Proquip and shipped out 6,000 pounds of sandbags instead.

Throughout the operation, these companies were totally clueless that their products were being sold — ostensibly illegally — to the Eastern Bloc, let alone that they were being tampered with as part of a transcontinental spy game. “They were all unwitting,” said Smith.

Intering was an immense effort, and the San Francisco-based FBI agents couldn’t pull off the operation on their own. The operation was too sprawling, too complex, too sensitive to be managed out of one office. Washington had to be brought in, too. The White House, Pentagon, and Justice Department all had to give their sign-off.

“We were in a position to guarantee that the technology, even though it would be illegal to export, it could safely find its way to the end user in Eastern Europe, whether it was East German or Bulgarian — you never knew exactly who’s loading dock was going to end up on,” recalled Ed Appel, a former senior FBI official. Appel helped run Intering from Washington, where he then oversaw Bulgarian and East German operations for the bureau.

But not all the players in Washington were onboard, recalled Appel. Defense Department officials were queasy about sending Moscow prohibited U.S. technologies, even if much of it had been tampered with.

By departmental disposition, the Pentagon was generally skeptical of double agent tech-transfer operations. “They just didn’t like the idea of letting the FBI run a particular operation like that,” recalled Appel.

To the uninitiated, it looked like the FBI was serving up state-of-the-art U.S. tech — the cream of U.S. innovation — right into the hands of America’s geopolitical foes. Even if some of these parts were sabotaged, other tech had to work correctly. There was always the fear — a real, legitimate fear — that so much pristine tech would be exported that the operation would inadvertently end up benefiting the U.S. adversaries it aimed to thwart. And what, worried some U.S. officials, if some of the altered technology shipped during Intering wasn’t actually sabotaged sufficiently to prevent its use?

The bureau tweaked the hi-tech in a variety of ways. Some suffered what appeared to be “accidental” wear-and-tear during the long journey to the Eastern Bloc, recalled Appel. Other times, the FBI would tamper with the electronics so they would experience “chance” voltage overloads once Soviet Bloc operatives plugged them in. The sabotage could also be more subtle, designed to degrade machine parts or microchips over time, or to render hi-tech tools that required intense precision slightly, if imperceptibly, inaccurate.

In all these cases, the bureau had to hope that its sabotage operations worked well enough to truly disable the shipments — though perhaps not too well, in order to evade suspicion.

And what of the technology that wasn’t tampered with at all? The FBI had to let some unadulterated hi-tech through to the Soviet Bloc. After all, if the Austrian’s cover was to remain intact, he had to provide legitimate goods in order to win the trust of his “partners” on the other side. What, then, pondered FBI officials, was the proper ratio of doctored versus unaltered technology necessary to maintain the charade?

There were always other sorts of dangers, too, to these sorts of operations — including to life and limb of unsuspecting recipients of that doctored hi-tech. By sabotaging such technology, a spy service might endanger innocent lives. A blown electrical grid in wintertime could mean people freeze to death. Fritzed traffic lights could lead to car accidents.

In the case of Intering, once the tech made it from Silicon Valley out to the Eastern Bloc, the U.S. was generally blind to how it was employed. “We were worried they were going to use it in a hospital or something,” said former FBI agent Bill Kinane. “We had a lot of discussions and meetings about whether this was an ethical thing to do or not to start with.”

Ultimately, the FBI was confident that the tech wasn’t ending up in civilian infrastructure, and was all being funneled to the Soviet military and intelligence agencies. “The Russians only wanted those things to take them apart and figure out how they worked,” said Kinane. Still, the bureau could never be 100 percent certain where all the sabotaged parts would end up.

The Austrian was also in a treacherous position. He needed to maintain his cover, to demonstrate his legitimacy, over and over, to his Soviet Bloc interlocuters, while somehow also providing faulty goods on behalf of a meddling foreign intelligence agency. “At every step of the operation, you have to have the source prove his bona fides to the other side, he has to be able to produce something, or else they’re not going to keep on using them,” recalled Appel, the former Washington-based FBI agent. “Of course, we were acutely aware of the danger to him,” said Appel.

Soon, that danger became more than an abstract concern.

By 1983, Intering was in full bloom. The Austrian had a good rapport with two Bulgarian intelligence officers who were running the tech-transfer operation on Moscow’s behalf. He was getting paid. And the Austrian told Smith, his FBI handler, that the Bulgarians were getting serious props from their Communist bosses. “Everybody was happy, for a while,” recalled Smith.

The Bulgarian spies “were taking all the credit for getting all this technology from the United States, which was state of the art,” recalled Smith. “Even though it wasn’t classified, it was the stuff — I mean this was semiconductor stuff in 1980. So they thought their reputation was enhanced.”

To celebrate their victory, the Bulgarians threw a parade. A literal parade in Sofia, the country’s capital, of the tech they’d purchased from their Austrian fixer in San Francisco. “When it got there, they had a big parade to show it off, that they got these semiconductors,” said Smith.

But the FBI had tampered with the shipment in London. It was all worthless. “What we wanted to do was engineer the process, but give them fake stuff to discredit them,” said Smith. Infuriated at their embarrassment, the Bulgarian spies demanded a meeting with the Austrian in Vienna. And that’s when, for the FBI, the alarm bells started to ring.

“They were pissed off,” said Smith. “And they told him that he was either compromised by the FBI and that’s the reason it was altered, or he was in on it from the beginning. And he was in on it from the beginning.”

The Bulgarian operatives demanded the Austrian travel to Sofia for further consultations. This was out of the question, recalled Smith. “I said, ‘Don’t say no. Say shit no,’ because, that would’ve been the end of the world. And the FBI’s lost sources that way.”

This wasn’t an empty threat on the Bulgarians’ part. If the Austrian had agreed to cross the Iron Curtain and travel to Sofia, there’s no telling what they or their Soviet allies might have done. Bulgaria’s enemies weren’t even safe in the West: In 1978, Sofia’s spies had assassinated a prominent dissident on the streets of London using a poison-tipped umbrella.

The FBI couldn’t risk using the Austrian as an agent anymore. He was blown. Operation Intering had successfully seeded millions of dollars of sabotaged technology to Moscow and its allies. “It couldn’t have worked out any better,” said Smith. But now it was finished.

If you knew where to look, however, there were aftershocks. In 1983, federal prosecutors in southern California charged an entire clandestine network of illegal tech exporters: two Californians (the network’s American suppliers), a Dutch co-conspirator, and two Bulgarian government officials. Another related indictment targeting illegal tech exporters dropped a few years later.

Intering created investigative leads for these prosecutions. But you wouldn’t know it from the news stories at the time. Counterintelligence operations sometimes quietly transform, in their afterlife, into criminal probes. Indictments are akin to a ray of light that illuminate a sliver inside a dark chasm, but leave the rest in shadow.

When prosecutors in California busted these Bulgarian tech export rings, there was no mention of Intering. No mention of sabotaged computer equipment. And certainly no mention of the Austrian.

If the Austrian was a kind of ghostly presence in these prosecutions, invisibly hovering over them, he was also something of a mystery to those who worked with him closely. Why did he agree to work secretly for the FBI? To this day, his motivation isn’t entirely clear, even to the bureau agents who ran the case.

“He did all this for the sheer fun of doing it,” said Kinane. “And, like most Austrians, he hated the Russians.”

Smith saw the Austrian as acting more in an entrepreneurial spirit. But that wasn’t a dealbreaker. “If it benefited him, I don’t care. I mean, as long as he’s not stealing, or killing people, I don’t care what he is doing.”

In the world of counterintelligence, operatives are used to working with all sorts of people — upstanding and unsavory, altruistic and self-interested, ideological and mercenary. And the Austrian was, in many ways, an exemplary asset. Over time, Smith and Kinane became friendly with him, even going on jogs and skiing together.

But FBI officials also understood that, in the end, the Austrian was looking out for himself — and that his interests wouldn’t always align with the bureau’s. The FBI couldn’t keep track of all their source’s international doings. And that made them nervous.

What, worried bureau agents, if the Austrian were striking side deals with the Bulgarians or other Eastern Bloc states, unknown to the FBI? They couldn’t find dispositive proof of such activity, but their fears persisted. “One of the concerns was that he continued to use our cover to get involved in this stuff, then he beats the system,” said Smith.

Tensions between the bureau and its star Austrian source were probably inevitable, given the dynamics of the relationship, according to Ed Appel. The Austrian was “in the transshipment business, he wants to do legitimate stuff, but now he’s got people that want illegitimate stuff — and he’s got a way to do that, using the FBI,” said Appel. “So our trust in him, just as the Bulgarians’ trust in him, or East Germans’ trust in him, is critical,” recalled Appel. “And that can’t last forever.”

In any case, the Austrian certainly did well for himself during the whole affair. He made money twice over: first, as an ostensible agent of the Eastern Bloc, selling them lucrative, prohibited hi-tech; and then again, as an asset of the FBI. “I paid him as a source and he got paid based on the transfers,” said Smith. “So he made out pretty good.” Ultimately, the bureau paid the Austrian roughly $100,000 for his work as a U.S. intelligence asset. “He was worth every dime,” said Smith.

But the Austrian was just getting started. After the Intering operation was blown, the tech entrepreneur, now untethered from the FBI, continued his profitable wheeling and dealing in 1980s Silicon Valley. Eventually, after the Cold War, he moved back to Europe, amassing a sizable fortune there in real estate.

For Appel, even if the Bulgarians hadn’t sniffed out the Austrian as a U.S. intelligence plant, the operation may have already been entering a sort of inevitable denouement. “If you have a really, really good source, it’s very, very unusual for it to go on for an extended period of time,” he reflected.

Indeed, according to Appel, these sorts of operations possess a pre-determined, almost naturalistic logic to them. “Every single case of this kind has a half-life,” Appel said. “In other words, it’s like an atomic particle. At some point, it’s not going to be emanating radioactivity anymore.

“It’s going to come to an end.”

Politico

2. China takes foreign spy hostility to new levels; proactive strategy proposed for U.S.

Speaking of counterintelligence and strategy:

Excerpts:

Ms. Van Cleave said Russian intelligence activities, along with those of the Chinese, Iranians and many other hostile powers, remain at disturbingly high levels.

“It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration and the Congress will create a strategic CI program — as the new strategy promises — and commit the resources needed to get the job done,” Ms. Van Cleave said.

The strategy was produced by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

It includes a secret implementation plan directing specific actions and initiatives for agencies, the NCSC said in announcing the strategy.

Michael Casey, director of the center, said the new strategy will help counterspies to “outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, protect America’s strategic advantages, and invest in the future to meet tomorrow’s threats.”

“Developed with our partners across the U.S. government, the strategy provides a comprehensive vision and direction for the [counterintelligence] community to address increasingly complex foreign intelligence threats,” he said in a statement.

China takes foreign spy hostility to new levels; proactive strategy proposed for U.S.

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

Premium

By - The Washington Times - Friday, August 2, 2024

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

Spying and technology theft by Chinese intelligence operatives pose the most significant threat by hostile foreign spy services, according to a national counterintelligence strategy made public recently.

The threat is increasingly sophisticated and difficult to detect because of foreign spies’ use of high technology, the strategy states in a 24-page report released Thursday.

For the first time, the strategy calls for adopting “a strategic counterintelligence program” to disrupt or compromise foreign spies who work to damage U.S. national security before they can act.

The program will be conducted in the United States and against foreign intelligence activities overseas, the report said.

The approach is different from past efforts that were largely tactical and defensive in nature, such as reacting to spying operations after the activities were detected.

On the use of advanced spy technology, the report said the know-how is easy to operate, less expensive and available commercially, allowing sophisticated and less sophisticated spy networks to conduct aggressive activities.

“Adversaries are using cutting-edge technology — such as advanced cyber tools, biometric devices, unmanned systems, high-resolution imagery, enhanced technical surveillance equipment, commercial spyware and artificial intelligence (AI) — to further their espionage, counterespionage and influence missions,” the strategy said.

In addition to China, spies from Russia, Iran, North Korea and other foreign state and non-state groups seek to “cause grave harm to the United States, its people and institutions,” the report said.

China’s operations are “the most significant” among the foreign spy threats, the report said.

Adversaries’ spies also are increasing cooperation among their services, the report said.

Defending against these threats has become more complex, with a growing array of public and private targets and methods that include connected devices and remote platforms.

Counterintelligence is the task of identifying and neutralizing foreign spies operating as diplomats, business people, media representatives and other forms of cover.

The FBI is the United States’ lead domestic counterspy service and works with the CIA, which conducts counterintelligence abroad. The Defense Intelligence Agency at the Pentagon also is a counterspy service. Military services and other agencies also have counterintelligence elements.

Foreign spies have imposed large-scale damage to national security by penetrating agencies with spies and recruiting Americans to provide secrets.

Damaging spy cases since the 1980s and continuing through the 2020s include foreign-recruited traitors within the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy and Air Force.

Counterintelligence services also are charged with protecting Americans at home and abroad from sabotage, assassination, or other intelligence activities and operations, the report said.

President Biden said in the report that the strategy will be used throughout the government to deter, detect and disrupt foreign spy activities.

“Foreign intelligence and security services and their proxies persist in seeking to acquire our most sensitive information, technology and intellectual property,” said Mr. Biden, noting that the new approach provides “strategic direction” to counterintelligence agencies.

The strategy was published after Tonya Wilkerson, the nominee to be the Pentagon’s senior policy official for counterintelligence, disclosed to Congress that U.S. counterintelligence agencies were shifting to an offensive, proactive posture in confronting foreign spy threats.

The new program seeks to “outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, protect America’s strategic advantages, and invest in the future to develop the capabilities and resilience needed to meet the current threats and challenges and those to come,” the report said.

The report said foreign spy threats are unprecedented in breadth, volume, sophistication and impact.

FBI Director Christopher A. Wray has said the bureau conducted more than 2,000 investigations in recent years related to Chinese espionage and other intelligence operations.

The main Chinese intelligence services include the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security, along with the intelligence units of the People’s Liberation Army.

Foreign spy activities include stealing secrets, sensitive data, intellectual property and technical and military capabilities. Spies also seek to disrupt U.S. foreign policy and intelligence operations.

A key threat is foreign intelligence services’ efforts to compromise or damage critical infrastructure in the United States, the report said. Foreign spy services are preparing for attacks against energy, communications, transportation and financial nodes.

“Their capabilities and pre-positioning efforts are increasing the risk of a large-scale disruption during periods of conflict or tension, which could include degraded military readiness, major economic losses, loss of life, or eroded confidence in key institutions,” the report said.

A targeted attack on critical infrastructure could cause billions of dollars in losses, the report said. Infrastructure disruptions in one sector could have cascading effects on others.

“Our adversaries’ efforts are likely aimed at influencing or coercing U.S. decisionmakers in a time of crisis by holding critical infrastructure at risk of disruption,” the report said.

China and Russia have been detected making cyber intrusions into the networks that control critical infrastructure, U.S. officials have said.

Foreign intelligence operations are attempting to influence American policies and to undermine democracy, the report said.

“These activities represent immediate threats to our national security, economic well-being, physical safety, democratic processes, and societal cohesion,” it stated.

The report said another problem is that many foreign intelligence activities are undetected despite counterspy efforts.

“To combat the expanding foreign intelligence threat more effectively, we need to know more about our adversaries’ plans, intentions, techniques, activities and vulnerabilities and better share that information with key decisionmakers,” the report said.

New strategic counterintelligence efforts will include more human, technical and open-source intelligence gathering on the range of spies and support networks.

Another goal is to go on the offensive against foreign spies through coordinated offensive activities defined as identifying, deceiving, exploiting and disrupting intelligence activities.

The strategy will expand defensive counterintelligence and make greater efforts to thwart cyberattacks and cyberespionage.

Regarding foreign influence activities, the new strategy calls for protecting democracy and undermining spies’ attempts to sow social tensions in the United States.

Additional measures will be taken to protect U.S. technology from theft.

“Countering the wide array of evolving threats will require a whole-of-society approach that increases coordinated actions by federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and increases engagement and cooperation with our allies and partners — including the private sector, academia, and an informed public,” the report said.

The report urges all government departments and agencies to step up counterintelligence activities and resources.

Michelle Van Cleave, a former senior U.S. counterintelligence official, said the new strategy is well crafted but will be worthless unless agencies have the means to implement it.

“Ever since the Cold War ended, America’s CI resources have become an afterthought — and it shows,” she said.

“For example, the U.S. could not offer to trade Russian spies to secure the release of American hostages Putin was holding because — unlike our allies — the U.S. did not have any to trade.”

Ms. Van Cleave said Russian intelligence activities, along with those of the Chinese, Iranians and many other hostile powers, remain at disturbingly high levels.

“It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration and the Congress will create a strategic CI program — as the new strategy promises — and commit the resources needed to get the job done,” Ms. Van Cleave said.

The strategy was produced by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

It includes a secret implementation plan directing specific actions and initiatives for agencies, the NCSC said in announcing the strategy.

Michael Casey, director of the center, said the new strategy will help counterspies to “outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, protect America’s strategic advantages, and invest in the future to meet tomorrow’s threats.”

“Developed with our partners across the U.S. government, the strategy provides a comprehensive vision and direction for the [counterintelligence] community to address increasingly complex foreign intelligence threats,” he said in a statement.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2024 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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3. Austin was ‘surprised’ by 9/11 plea deals, Pentagon says

Austin was ‘surprised’ by 9/11 plea deals, Pentagon says

by Brad Dress - 08/05/24 1:01 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4811330-defense-secretary-surprised-911-plea/?utm

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was “surprised” by the announcement of a plea deal between a U.S. military commission and three accused plotters of the 9/11 attacks, a Pentagon spokesperson said Monday, adding that Austin wants to see the case go to trial

Austin, who revoked the plea deal Friday, “was certainly surprised as we all were,” said deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh.

“This is not something that the secretary was consulted on,” Singh told reporters at a Monday briefing. “We were not aware that the prosecution or defense would enter the terms of the plea agreement.”

The Office of Military Commissions reached the plea deal Wednesday with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, also known as KSM, and two of his alleged accomplices in the 9/11 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people. Austin was returning from a trip to the Indo-Pacific at the time the deal was announced.

Singh said although Austin respects independent prosecutorial decisions, he believed it was too big of a case not to intervene.

“This is a case of such significance that the secretary felt it was appropriate for the authority to rest with him,” she said.

Austin made the decision on his own, Singh added, saying she was not aware of President Biden being involved.

Mohammed is accused of being the chief mastermind of the attacks and has been detained since 2003.

All three defendants are held at the infamous Guantánamo Bay facility in Cuba, along with two others who did not reach the plea deal last week but are also accused of plotting the 9/11 attacks.

The plea deal angered Republicans, who accused the Biden administration of not standing up to terrorists. The White House said it was not aware of the deal before it was struck.

Some families also expressed concerns about the plea deals, though others have welcomed it and were frustrated by Austin’s revocation. The U.S. military commission has long struggled to get cases to trial and reach convictions.

But Austin believes there should be a trial in the 9/11 case, Singh said.

“He believes that the families and the American public deserves the opportunity to see military commission trials carried out in this case,” she said, acknowledging that the case has been delayed for many years, as some question if a trial can ever be reached. “But this is what he believes is the best course of action.”

4. Retired Army officer sues government over clerical mistake that cost him promotions, pay

We want bureaucrats to be good stewards of taxpayer money but we also want to see common sense and fairness. I wish they apply good stewardship to the huge defense contracts and cost overruns rather than target the individual.

I wonder what hter good would be in terms of "more to the story" that could make bureaucracy look good or that DFAS is in the right to be able to do this to a service member. It sure doesn't look like it from this article.

So many wrongs just keep it being wrong. They never make a right.

Retired Army officer sues government over clerical mistake that cost him promotions, pay

Stars and Stripes · by Rose L. Thayer · August 5, 2024

Ronald Schow as a captain during his 2004 deployment to Iraq. (Photo provided by Ronald Schow)

When the Army selected Ronald Schow for an early promotion to lieutenant colonel in 2011, service officials realized they made a mistake five years earlier.

Schow’s previous promotion to major had never been submitted to the Senate for confirmation, as required by law. His name had been left off the list that the Army sent to Congress in October 2006. Yet, the Army still sent Schow a promotion order that he and his unit believed to be accurate, and he was pinned with a major’s golden oak leaf on the chest of his uniform.

Eventually, the Army decided to revoke the rank and return Schow to a captain — the rank at which he retired in 2017 after years of trying to rectify the error.

After exhausting all administrative options to gain a major’s retirement pay, Schow filed a lawsuit last year in Federal Claims Court to get $180,000 in back pay and retirement pay that he would have received if he had retired as a major.

However, he said he’s not able to sue for negligence that led to lost earnings from not being promoted to lieutenant colonel because of the limitations service members have in suing the military. A Supreme Court decision known as the Feres Doctrine blocks troops from suing for anything that occurred to them in the military that is related to their service.

“It was terrible. Everyone thought this was an administrative issue, but it turned out to be a legal issue. There’s no precedent for demoting an officer without kicking [him or her] out of the Army,” said Schow, who lives in Indiana and is representing himself in court. “Not only did we lose money during the years where I got demoted, we lost money during the years where I should have been promoted. And to be honest, it’s affected my post-retirement prospects.”

The loss of promotions isn’t easily definable in a cover letter, and Schow said he doesn’t intentionally bring it up to employers. He said he never wants to appear disgruntled.

A judge last month ruled the lawsuit could move forward despite a Justice Department attempt to have it thrown out because of the amount of time that has passed since it began. The court’s decision on the lawsuit is expected early next year.

The Army labeled the seven years that Schow spent as a major as a de facto status, meaning in practice he was a major. This allowed him to keep the pay and benefits that he earned during that time based on a century-old Supreme Court ruling.

Schow argued in court documents that the Supreme Court ruling should also require the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, known as DFAS, to use his time as a major to calculate his retirement pay. It’s known as the high-36 retirement rule, which uses the three highest-earning years of base pay to calculate retirement. The Army requested the agency do so when it submitted information for Schow’s retirement, though the service has no authority over the decision.

DFAS refused to consider the rank.

“The salary you’re allowed to retain for your de facto service as a major is not to be included in the calculation of your retired pay base,” the agency wrote in a March 2018 denial of Schow’s original claim. “While the Army’s de facto status determination allowed you to keep the pay you had received, you are not legally entitled to that pay.”

DFAS declined to comment on Schow’s case, citing the pending litigation.

Matt Freeman, a former Army attorney, has been helping Schow with his legal paperwork at no cost because he said he loves an underdog story.

“I’ve honestly never come across anything in my career, really my life, where somebody just got put in a bad place. I cannot get any traction, and Ron can’t get any traction, for people to do something for him,” Freeman said. “The fact that no one really tried to find a good way for Ron to be promoted, it’s pathetic.”

The Army did not respond to a request for comment on Schow’s situation or on the frequency at which similar mistakes occur.

How it happened

The circumstances that led to officials separating Schow’s name from the other promotable captains in 2006 began two years prior in Iraq.

Schow was an infantry company commander in the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment out of Fort Lewis, Wash. He and his soldiers fought their way from Fallujah to Mosul, enduring some of the most dangerous and demanding fighting of the war. The unit was at Forward Operating Base Marez on Dec. 21, 2004, when a man wearing an explosive vest under an Iraqi security uniform detonated his bomb in the dining facility, killing 14 soldiers, four civilian contractors and four Iraqi soldiers. Another 72 people were injured.

Two days later, Schow’s company hit a roadside bomb that destroyed his Stryker armored vehicle. Schow’s gunner lost both his legs in the blast. Schow took the gunner’s bloody boot and used it to slap an Iraqi man who the unit believed was behind the bomb.

“This momentary lapse of judgment occurred shortly after the incident, and the detainee was not harmed. Other than this incident, there were no prior lapses in judgment, and none after the incident as well,” then-Col. Robert Brown, Schow’s brigade commander at the time of the incident, wrote in a 2006 letter of support for promoting Schow.

Schow was reprimanded for the incident, and the Army selected him for promotion to major soon after.

A 2012 administrative investigation into Schow’s promotion stated any promotable officer with a detainee incident on their record had to be separated from the list for the Army secretary’s individual review and approval. This was done to ensure that officers with legally objectionable actions in their past were not promoted, according to the report.

Schow and one other captain were singled out that cycle and ultimately approved for promotion by the secretary, according to the investigation. However, the two names never made it back onto the list sent to the Senate for confirmation.

The other captain’s name, and most other names besides Schow’s, were redacted from the report that Schow received through an open records request.

The administrative investigation revealed a longtime civil servant was hospitalized during the promotion cycle, and a relatively new civilian employee mishandled the paperwork. Instead of a date for Senate confirmation, Schow’s orders stated “N/A.”

In early 2007, the hospitalized employee returned to work at Human Resources Command and noticed the mistake, according to the investigation. A group of personnel in the command and the Directorate of Military Personnel Management decided since the officers had already been promoted, revoking the orders would not be in the best interest of the service.

“This would cause embarrassment to the officers, their families, the [secretary of the Army] and the Army,” an employee told investigators. “The easy and right way to do this was to submit a separate scroll to the Senate for confirmation. … This was not done, and this is where the major breakdown occurred.”

The investigation determined human error caused the mistake rather than a systemic issue.

“As the [Army secretary] had approved them, both should have their names forwarded to the Senate for confirmation, and neither should be informed of the administrative oversight,” the report stated in its conclusion.

But that didn’t happen.

Rank revoked

Schow, who transferred from infantry to acquisitions at about the time that he became a major, said he learned of the mistake and the subsequent investigation in November 2012 when his commander inquired why Schow’s promotion to lieutenant colonel didn’t go through. Schow got the news in the hospital where he was recovering from appendix surgery.

Initially, the Army said it would allow Schow to keep his rank while it sought a solution. But after five months, the service reversed course.

Ronald Schow with then-Brig. Gen. Brian Cummings at his retirement ceremony in October 2017. The Army made a clerical error when promoting Schow to major in 2006 and revoked his rank, forcing him to retire as a captain. (Photo provided by Ronald Schow)

Retired Maj. Gen. Brian Cummings, who was Schow’s commander at Fort Belvoir, Va., at the time, had the unfortunate job of informing Schow of the demotion, which occurred April 26, 2013. He told Schow to wear civilian clothes to work so he didn’t have to put on a lesser rank in front of others.

“You deserve all the dignity,” Cummings said he told Schow that day. “You did all the right things to fix this, and you can’t do anything about your situation. You should not be looked down upon by your peers.”

Schow remained a captain while the Army reworked and returned his promotion paperwork to the Senate Armed Services Committee for confirmation to major. He said he was told by his commanders that the detainee infraction was the deal-breaker for senators, but he’s not certain he believes it. He also said he’ll never know how much liability the Army accepted for the mistake.

“Ultimately, what the promotion without Senate confirmation meant is that the Army was in violation of Article 2 of the Constitution,” Schow said, referencing the requirement for the Senate to confirm certain officer promotions. “No one knew what to do with it. And as organizations do, they protected themselves. They try to minimize their risk while still doing whatever they were supposed to do. I think a lot of the lengthy timelines you see are a byproduct of that.”

Cummings disagreed. He said he wasn’t in the meetings personally, but he knows Army leaders were going over to the Senate and trying to convince them to confirm Schow.

“We must always hold our soldiers accountable, and when we do so we must be sure to apply actions with reasonable consequences. In Ron’s case, his initial punishment was appropriate, and he accepted his punishment respectfully,” Cummings said. “In the years that followed when the administrative mistake had been discovered, he wasn’t given the grace he so well deserved.”

After the Senate’s legislative session closed in 2016, Schow said the Army could have resubmitted him for confirmation, but he was exhausted. He retired in October 2017 as a captain.

In a memo explaining Schow’s promotion history for retirement pay, the Army called on DFAS to consider the de facto rank that it used to allow Schow to keep his seven years’ worth of major’s pay and entitlements.

“The only time the high 36 is not used is if the member was reduced in grade for punitive actions (conduct). That circumstance does not apply to Capt. Schow’s case,” the memo read.

DFAS disagreed.

Schow submitted his first request to DFAS to adjust his retirement pay in February 2018, according to court documents. This began a back-and-forth of denials and appeals that continued through October 2019 when Schow reached the end of his options outside of a lawsuit.

Freeman, the attorney, has helped Schow sort through each of these paths along the way.

“I’m still here because somebody has to stick up for him,” he said. “The Army has totally failed him.”

The difference in pay that Schow would receive if the court forces DFAS to change his retirement is roughly $400 a month — not life changing, Schow said. But it’s about more than the money. The entire situation left him feeling voiceless and shook the values he had placed on the Army — an institution to which he dedicated two decades of his life.

“I was always a good soldier when this whole thing was going down. Then I realized that I’m really going to get screwed. I want to make the Army accountable, not just because I want to embarrass the Army. The only way that you make organizations better is you bring the bad stuff to light,” Schow said.

He also thinks about his family — his wife and child — and what has been taken from them financially and emotionally.

“The amount of emotional energies and calories that this thing has sucked out of our family is massive,” he said. “Since I’ve retired, it’s just been a continual low throb of activity.”

Stars and Stripes · by Rose L. Thayer · August 5, 2024

5. U.S. Faces New Challenges as Potential Iran Attack on Israel Nears

U.S. Faces New Challenges as Potential Iran Attack on Israel Nears

Biden administration mounts last-ditch appeal to Tehran, while also pushing to keep cease-fire talks alive

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-faces-new-challenges-as-potential-iran-attack-on-israel-nears-8af9309a?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Michael R. Gordon

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, Alexander Ward

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 and Lara Seligman

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Updated Aug. 5, 2024 11:27 pm ET

President Biden is looking to secure the cease-fire and with it the release of Hamas’s hostages. Photo: Susan Walsh/Associated Press

WASHINGTON—The Biden administration is working to blunt a potential Iranian attack on Israel, but it faces an array of fresh challenges as it seeks to replicate the success it had in April when a multinational coalition helped Israel intercept a barrage of Iranian missiles and drones.

U.S. officials said they have since the weekend started seeing Iran moving missile launchers and conducting military drills, which could indicate Tehran is preparing for an attack in the coming days. Iran has signaled it plans to retaliate against Israel for the killing of a senior Hamas leader in Tehran.

Biden administration officials also are concerned that an Iranian assault might be accompanied this time by strikes from Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia and Tehran’s other proxies in an attempt to overwhelm Israeli defenses. 

The U.S. is now confronted with defending Israel from yet another Iranian attack if deterrence fails, while also pursuing its efforts to bring back stability to the region. The prospect of a conflagration could derail President Biden’s already faltering push for a Gaza cease-fire, which has become central to his Middle East diplomacy and foreign-policy legacy.

Top U.S. officials are urging Tehran not to escalate the conflict and are pushing to secure the support of Arab nations amid veiled Iranian threats to states that contribute to Israel’s defense. 

On Monday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on Iran, Tehran’s proxies and Israel to de-escalate, in a last-ditch appeal to prevent a broader conflict. 

U.S. Prepares ‘for Every Possibility’ as Iran Vows to Retaliate

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Iranian prosecutors said they had opened a formal investigation into the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s top political leader. Photo: AFP/Getty

“We are engaged in intense diplomacy pretty much around the clock with a very simple message: All parties must refrain from escalation,” said Blinken. “It’s also critical that we break this cycle by reaching a cease-fire in Gaza.”

Just over two weeks ago, Blinken had expressed hope that the cease-fire talks were “inside the 10-yard line and driving to the goal line” after months of stop-and-start negotiations. 

The Biden administration’s goal to secure the cease-fire and with it the release of Hamas’s hostages, some of them Americans, was at the top of the agenda when Biden and Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House on July 25. U.S. officials think the cease-fire, in turn, will help calm the region, set the stage for defusing tensions along Israel’s northern border and be a step toward the eventual establishment of diplomatic ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

But last week, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in a targeted attack in Tehran. Israel didn’t provide advance notice to the U.S. that it was planning to kill Haniyeh, which once again has spurred American officials into a diplomatic effort to avoid a wider war. 

Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris met in the Situation Room on Monday with senior aides for a briefing on the latest developments and what a potential Iranian attack could look like. Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and national security adviser Jake Sullivan were among the top officials around the table.

For Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the assassination of the Hamas leader in Tehran was a particular affront. Israel’s killing of a senior paramilitary Iranian commander and other Iranian officers, which sparked the April attack, took place in Damascus, Syria. 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaking to Congress last month. Photo: Saul Loeb/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

U.S. officials think Iranian officials have been discussing the scope of their attack against Israel and the potential involvement of proxies. Hezbollah has also been considering how to respond to an Israeli airstrike in Beirut last month that killed a top-ranking commander. One question is whether Iran and Hezbollah will time their attacks to coincide. 

The Biden administration has been careful not to publicly criticize Israel’s Tehran operation, but it has been pressing all sides to de-escalate.

“I think the Biden administration is frustrated by what it sees as Israeli unilateral operations that do not sufficiently take into account American interests,” said David Schenker, who served as the State Department’s top official for the Middle East during the Trump administration

Biden spoke Monday with Jordan’s King Abdullah II about efforts to de-escalate the situation and push for a cease-fire, and Blinken phoned his Qatari and Egyptian counterparts about the current crisis to calm tensions. Jordan, whose foreign minister made a rare visit to Tehran on Sunday, and Saudi Arabia separately informed Iran that it couldn’t violate their airspace during an attack.

As another attack potentially approaches, Western officials and analysts still assess that Iran, Hezbollah and Israel don’t want an all-out war, although they acknowledge any military operation carries the risk of miscalculation. 

The administration is trying to deter and if necessary prepare for an escalation nonetheless, sending a squadron of F-22 jet fighters and an aircraft carrier strike group to the region. Gen. Erik Kurilla, the head of U.S. Central Command, is now in Israel, just as he was in April during the last confrontation. The U.S. has also set up a joint team with the Israelis in Tel Aviv to coordinate missile defense, as it did in April. 

People take part in a march in Lebanon to protest against the killings of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh and a top Hezbollah commander. Photo: Mahmoud Zayyat/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

“We’re preparing to defend Israel in an April-like manner,” a U.S. official said. 

Further inflaming tensions, several U.S. personnel were injured on Monday in a suspected rocket attack by Iran-backed militants against U.S. and coalition forces at Al Asad Airbase, Iraq, according to the Pentagon. 

Dennis Ross, who served as a top official on the Middle East in Democratic and Republican administrations, said the threat of escalation has probably put the push for a cease-fire on hold for now. But Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar might be more open to a cessation in hostilities if the Israeli military continues to make gains in Gaza, Ross said.

“I do accept that Iran is putting enormous pressure not to do a deal now, and Sinwar for his own reasons won’t do a deal now,” Ross added. “That doesn’t mean there will never be a deal.”

But others say the Biden administration might be caught in a vicious circle. It insists only a cease-fire can halt an uptick of violence in the Middle East, but Iran’s expected attack is derailing efforts to reach that agreement. 

Key sticking points for a potential cease-fire agreement have yet to be resolved, including how to ensure a six-week cessation of fighting becomes an enduring pause. 

Killing Haniyeh, a key interlocutor for the cease-fire talks, might have further complicated the negotiations. Meanwhile, Netanyahu appears emboldened after a coveted White House visit and a fiery speech to Congress late last month. 

Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race has added uncertainty to an already tense environment, leaving all the parties to prepare for a new president in the White House come November. Harris, the Democratic presidential nominee, has signaled she might be tougher on Israel than Biden has been.

Nancy A. Youssef contributed to this article.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

6. How the U.S. and Mexico Drove Border Crossings Down in an Election Year

Some good news with a splash of cold water.

But I think the important lesson is that the SU and Mexico must work together and cooperate to curb border crossings.

How the U.S. and Mexico Drove Border Crossings Down in an Election Year

Illegal migration has plummeted to the lowest monthly level since 2020. But the situation might not last.

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/how-the-u-s-and-mexico-drove-border-crossings-down-in-an-election-year-6672071f?mod=hp_featst_pos3

By Michelle HackmanFollow

 in Phoenix and Santiago PérezFollow

 in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Mexico

Aug. 5, 2024 5:00 am ET

When illegal migration surged across the U.S.-Mexico border last fall, Phoenix’s largest migrant shelter was so busy that cots filled the cafeteria and lined the hallways. Today the shelter, housed in a converted elementary school, is empty.

The U.S. has experienced a stark decline in illegal border crossings in the past six months, thanks to a newly sprung security gantlet migrants encounter traveling to the U.S. border through Mexico.

On the Mexican side, security checkpoints dot highways. Mexico’s National Guard patrols the southern banks of the Rio Grande, aiming to prevent mass concentrations of migrants. Thousands of asylum seekers caught heading north have been put on buses and sent back to southern Mexico near Guatemala. Aid organizations liken the busing strategy to the board game Chutes and Ladders, as migrants are moved around the country. The policy aims to discourage them from heading north. Many decide to return to South America, migrants say.

The Americans also have a new tool. An order issued by President Biden in June disqualifies migrants from winning asylum if they enter the U.S. illegally. As a result, many more of them can be deported quickly, and far fewer have been released into the U.S.

The moves mark an unprecedented level of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico, both motivated by presidential elections this year, to bring down illegal border crossings in hopes of diverting attention away from the issue.

The effort has worked beyond anything the U.S. could have predicted, at least so far. The progress gives Vice President Kamala Harris a potential counter to efforts by former President Donald Trump and his allies, who are painting her as the face of failed U.S. policies on immigration.

The U.S. recorded about 57,000 illegal crossings in July, according to a person familiar with unpublished government data, down from around 250,000 in December, when they reached an all-time high. That is the lowest monthly figure since 2020, when crossings were still relatively low because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

“This is just what the administration wanted,” said Andrew Selee, president of the Migration Policy Institute, a nonpartisan Washington think tank. “Not that Democrats are going to win on this issue, but that chaos at the border won’t be on the front pages anymore.”

A caravan of migrants in July after crossing Mexico’s border with Guatemala. Photo: Isaac Guzman/AFP/Getty Images

A facility set up for migrants in the Tucson, Ariz., area was closed late last month. Photo: Ash Ponders for WSJ

The effort faces a big test. Thousands of migrants continue arriving in Mexico daily, most of them Venezuelans who can’t be deported by Mexico or the U.S. because the authoritarian government of President Nicolás Maduro has refused to take them back.

There is also a rising risk of a new Venezuelan migrant exodus because of social turmoil after the country’s presidential election was marred by fraud allegations.

In the U.S., Republicans have quickly shifted to attacking Harris’s role in setting immigration policy, yoking the vice president to Biden’s record and referring to her as Biden’s “border czar.” (Republicans have adopted the term to describe the assignment Biden gave Harris in 2021 to address the causes of migration from Central America.) That theme was the subject of Trump’s first ad against Harris, which began airing last week.

Chutes and Ladders

Mexico’s government has implemented a large program to relocate arriving migrants and prevent mass concentrations along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Calif.

Ariz.

N.M.

Tijuana

Ala.

Miss.

Ciudad Juárez

Texas

La.

Piedras Negras

MEXICO

Reynosa

Monterrey

Mexico City

Villahermosa

Tuxtla Gutiérrez

Northbound

Southbound

San Pedro Tapanatepec

GUATEMALA

Busing by Mexican immigration authorities

Ciudad Hidalgo

Walking

Public transportation

Source: staff reports

Emma Brown/WSJ

Voters still rank illegal immigration among their top issues of concern in the presidential election. Some big cities including Chicago and New York are grappling with the long-term reality of housing and feeding tens of thousands of migrants living in public shelters. 

A recent Wall Street Journal poll, conducted after Biden relinquished his spot on the Democratic presidential ticket, shows voters still favor Trump over Harris on immigration policy, 53% to 40%.

A barrier and a sponge

The coordinated effort to stem migration came after border communities including Eagle Pass, Texas, were overwhelmed late last year by the arrival of thousands of migrants who crossed the shallow waters of the Rio Grande, many of them with children in tow. Thousands were arriving in northern Mexico on any given day atop freight trains.

Late last year Biden dispatched Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas to Mexico City over the Christmas holiday. Mexico vowed to change course, according to people familiar with the discussions.

The Mexican government virtually ended a program of granting humanitarian visas for arriving asylum seekers. Those visas were intended to give them an option to live in Mexico instead of heading to the U.S. Mexican authorities said the visas were often used by migrants to travel to the U.S. border and lower risks of detention.  

It also deployed a fleet of buses to relocate migrants from the U.S.-Mexico border to the country’s south. Under its “Chutes and Ladders” program, more than 60,000 migrants have been relocated since then from northern border states to such cities as Villahermosa in the southern Tabasco state, according to estimates by the Institute for Women in Migration, a Mexican advocacy group. And it stepped up efforts to bus thousands of migrants away from its border with Guatemala to an area further into Mexico, to avoid mass concentrations.

“Mexico now functions as a barrier and as a sponge,” Selee said.

A group of migrants arriving on the Texas side of the Rio Grande in June 2023. Photo: Sergio Flores for WSJ

Migrants retrieving their luggage last month in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Mexico, after traveling by bus from near the Guatemala border. Photo: Luis Antonio Rojas for WSJ

Between 15 and 20 government-run buses arrive each evening in the southern city of Tuxtla Gutiérrez after a 250-mile journey from near the southern border with Guatemala, where there are large groups of arriving migrants.

Near the parked buses, a line of taxis wait for migrants, who are usually charged double or triple what residents pay. Some drivers work as lookouts for human smugglers who have taken advantage of the stricter measures to become an alternative for many migrants heading north. 

“We have seen that many families simply decided to leave Tuxtla Gutiérrez on foot,” said José Amaya, an upholsterer who left Venezuela with his wife and three children a few weeks ago. In recent days, a caravan of about 2,000 migrants set out on foot from the border with Guatemala. These groups are usually disbanded by immigration authorities in southern Mexico.

Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has said that the measures aim to protect the U.S.-bound migrants. Many of those who have made it to the U.S. have told shelter managers that they were forced to bribe Mexican officers to do so.

José Amaya and his family last month after they made their way to southern Mexico from Venezuela. Photo: Luis Antonio Rojas for WSJ

International organizations estimate that the number of U.S.-bound migrants entering Mexico every day is more than double the close to 1,500 asylum seekers who are legally entering the U.S. with the CBP One app, the main portal to claim asylum in the U.S. Migrant-aid groups say there are as many as 100,000 migrants stranded in Mexico and subject to the government’s busing program.

The López Obrador administration is trying to avoid becoming a factor in the U.S. election, rather than explicitly elevating the Democrats, Selee said.

Still, a Trump victory would likely be more problematic for Mexico than a win by a Democratic candidate, said Antonio Ocaranza, a former presidential spokesman and a Mexico-based political consultant. Former and current senior Mexican officials fear mass deportations to Mexican soil and a resumption of the expansion of the border wall.

Despite the country’s neutrality, López Obrador has occasionally taken direct shots at Republicans. “Some Republicans use the immigration issue for electoral and political purposes,” he said at a recent news conference.

The political cooperation has run in both directions. When the U.S. government notified Mexico in late April that it planned to ban those crossing the border illegally from qualifying for asylum, López Obrador asked Biden to hold off on issuing the policy until after Mexico’s presidential election, according to U.S. officials familiar with the discussions. Biden issued the policy two days after the Mexican vote, which López Obrador’s protégé, Claudia Sheinbaum, won.

A spokesman for López Obrador didn’t return requests for comment.

“I think what is really important to understand, in my view, is that this executive order cannot be viewed in isolation,” Homeland Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said in an interview. “It needs to be viewed in the context of other actions we have taken, and that our international partners have taken.”

“We agreed on a joint strategy” that includes an expansion of areas where asylum-seekers can apply for CBP One appointments, Mexican Foreign Minister Alicia Bárcena said Friday, referring to the high-level bilateral meeting late last year.

Thousands of migrants continue to arrive in Mexico daily. VIDEO: LUIS ANTONIO ROJAS FOR WSJ

U.S. policy

The Biden administration had been trying and largely failing to suppress illegal border crossings for years before the president’s latest executive actions.

During this latest effort, U.S. officials benefited from the reduced migration flow after Mexico stepped up enforcement. When Border Patrol facilities were at or above capacity, as they had been for much of the past few years, it became the Border Patrol’s priority to move migrants out of its custody as quickly as possible to make room for more. The fastest route was to print up paperwork for migrants with a court date—and release them.

Once their numbers were reduced, Border Patrol agents had more time to spend on each case, meaning they had time to coordinate quick deportations or transfers to Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention centers.

It also became much tougher for migrants who wanted to claim any form of humanitarian protection from doing so. Until the change, agents routinely assumed migrants planned to ask for asylum. Under the new policy, agents were instructed not to ask. If migrants tell agents they fear going home, they are supposed to receive a screening interview for a temporary form of protection that would prevent them from being immediately deported.

Several advocates and shelter operators who have interviewed deported migrants said that agents are rebuffing their requests.

A representative for U.S. Customs and Border Protection didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Pedro De Velasco, director of education and advocacy at the Kino Border Initiative, an organization that runs migrant shelters in Mexico just south of the Arizona border, said that he has interviewed migrants and that one of them said: “The border patrol agent told us there is no longer asylum, asylum is no longer an option.”

A room at a Phoenix facility set up to accommodate migrants was empty late last month. Photo: Ash Ponders for WSJ

Migrants outside an immigration center in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Mexico. Photo: Luis Antonio Rojas for WSJ

The area of Arizona south of Tucson was one of the stretches of the border hardest-hit by last fall’s surge. Churches and migrant shelters across the state were running 24-hour operations to receive migrants.

Today they are nearly all empty. Some have closed or shifted operations to serve other vulnerable groups, such as homeless people.

The largest shelter in Phoenix, where officials were housing an average of 250 migrants a day last fall in a space meant to accommodate a hundred, has played host to just 40 migrants in the past two months.

The Biden administration is still taking a significant number of asylum seekers, approximately 45,000 a month, through CBP One.

Republicans have pointed at that decision as a reason the administration’s policy hasn’t truly changed, despite its claims.

“What they’ve done is enshrined the status quo and tried to call it a solution,” said Ben Toma, the Arizona House speaker.

Risks loom

Despite the strategy’s success so far, cracks are forming in the logistical and legal hurdles both countries have thrown up. In the U.S., Biden’s new policy is being challenged in court, and many legal observers expect it won’t survive given that a nearly identical Trump policy was ruled unlawful in 2018. 

Even if the policy remains in place, the new rules are less equipped to handle migrants who can’t be deported because many come from places as far away as Africa. ICE can detain these migrants for a short time—something that is increasingly possible with the lower numbers. But under U.S. law, they can’t be detained indefinitely if deportation isn’t possible. And under Mexican law, migrants can’t be detained for more than 36 hours in Mexico.

By far the largest and most complex challenge for the U.S. and Mexico is Venezuela, home of one of the largest asylum-seeking nationalities, primarily because the Venezuelan regime refuses to accept deportation flights.

A makeshift camp in the parking lot of a shopping mall in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Mexico. Photo: Luis Antonio Rojas for WSJ

A playroom at the Phoenix facility for migrants was quiet late last month. Photo: Ash Ponders for WSJ

More than eight million Venezuelans, or close to one-third of the country’s population, have emigrated after an unprecedented economic collapse. They are now the world’s biggest refugee group, ahead of Ukrainians and Syrians who fled their war-torn homelands, according to international organizations. Some 700,000 Venezuelans have emigrated to the U.S. over the past four years, according to U.S. data.

“We know that with a possible Trump victory there are risks of mass deportations. We are very alert,” said Yenzi Granadillo, a tall Venezuelan of athletic build who sold motorcycle parts before leaving his country with his mother and sister. To avoid deportation risks by illegally crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, he plans to use the CBP One app to request asylum.

He said he knew their goal was politically fraught with difficulty. “The reality is that the high number of migrants is affecting some communities in the U.S.,” Granadillo said shortly after arriving in Tuxtla Gutiérrez on a bus carrying migrants from the border with Guatemala.

Ángeles Mariscal and Steve Fisher contributed to this article.

Write to Michelle Hackman at michelle.hackman@wsj.com and Santiago Pérez at santiago.perez@wsj.com

7. Transforming war: A strategic integration of unmanned aerial systems  by Florent Groberg

A Medal of Honor recipient is not resting on his laurels. He is continuing to contribute in ways most such recipients probably have not throughout history.

I salute him and not because I have to because he is a Medal of Honor recipient but because he deserves to be saluted for his heroism and his continued contributions and service.

Transforming war: A strategic integration of unmanned aerial systems

militarytimes.com · by Florent Groberg · August 5, 2024

As conflicts across the Middle East and in Eastern Europe have demonstrated, unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, are reshaping the dynamics of modern warfare, emerging as a pivotal technology alongside communication in military engagements.

In contemporary military operations, UAS are being tightly integrated into infantry tactics, used in new and creative ways for reconnaissance, leveraged for forward operating base defense, relied on to provide critical intelligence and deployed for data collection. Because UAS can autonomously operate in hazardous environments and undertake high-risk missions, they have revolutionized warfare by significantly enhancing operational safety and expanding tactical options for ground forces.

In response to China’s historical technological dominance in the UAS market and amid the technology’s rapid evolution, Congress has taken steps to foster technology development while addressing new potential dangers. Legislative measures have been introduced to support the development of domestic UAS capabilities.

H.R. 2864, the C-CCP Drone Act, would mandate the inclusion of equipment produced by Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences and Technologies Company Limited (DJI Technologies), the world’s largest drone manufacturer, on the Federal Communications Commission’s list of equipment that poses a risk to U.S. national security.

The threat of Chinese advancements

DJI and Autel, both Chinese companies, control more than 90% of the global drone market. In the mid to late 2000s, subsidized pricing allowed DJI to penetrate global markets rapidly, including within the U.S. and NATO countries, to the detriment of domestic manufacturers.

The ubiquity and cost advantages of Chinese drones have disrupted foreign markets while introducing security vulnerabilities in sensitive areas such as critical infrastructure, military bases and urban surveillance. Reports have surfaced of data from Chinese-made drones being transmitted back to servers in China, raising concerns about espionage and data security. China’s collaboration with Russia to enhance Russian FPV drone production capabilities could also pose a further challenge to the U.S. and NATO.

US countermeasures and investment

In this environment, ensuring the West’s UAS superiority on the battlefield will depend on the success of efforts to bolster domestic capabilities, increase investments in R&D and develop advanced technologies that can compete with and surpass those produced by China.

The Department of Defense has initiated multiple programs to bolster U.S.-based UAS manufacturers and support the development of a secure and reliable supply chain for critical components.

Meanwhile, private companies like Anduril, Shield AI and Edge Autonomy are leading the charge with new UAS solutions tailored for defense applications. These innovators are not only developing cutting-edge technology but also ensuring their products are free from foreign influence and data security dangers by manufacturing critical components such as cameras, gimbals, flight controllers, and radios onshore.

Private equity can further these efforts by strategically investing in innovative companies and technologies, driving the growth of domestic UAS innovation. Moreover, by supporting these companies’ efforts to develop onshore manufacturing processes and establish secure supply chains, private equity investment can help reduce dependence on foreign sources and enhance national security.

It is therefore paramount to invest in developing and deploying critical technologies and cyber tools to the warfighter that will be necessary to accelerate domestic UAS development and deployment.

Doctrine, training and safety standards

While much is happening on the production front, we also need to consider the impact of UAS on military operations, which will require significant adjustments. Military doctrine will need to continue to evolve to include new tactics, techniques and procedures for UAS-supported fire and maneuver. Following special operations’ lead in this domain, new protocols will have to be rapidly transitioned to the conventional forces.

Training programs must also change to focus on the operational skills required to manage UAS fleets, interpret real-time data and integrate UAS intelligence into broader operational contexts. This training should include ethical considerations related to privacy violations and rules of engagement in settings where civilian populations are often at risk.

Outlook

Innovations in artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous operations are certain to further enhance UAS capabilities, making them more efficient and versatile. AI is poised to play a significant role in the future of UAS by enabling drones to perform complex tasks with minimal human intervention and adapt to dynamic combat environments, improving their ability to detect and respond to threats. Autonomous operations will reduce the burden on human operators, allowing for more efficient and effective mission execution.

Soon, we can also expect to see UAS with extended operational ranges, improved stealth features and advanced payload capabilities. Integrating UAS with other emerging technologies such as augmented reality and cyber warfare tools will also create new tactical opportunities and challenges.

The integration of UAS with AI will also give ground troops enhanced situational awareness, as well as better coordination and decision-making in the field. Likewise, cyber warfare tools will enable UAS to disrupt enemy communications and infrastructure, providing a strategic advantage in modern conflicts.

As UAS technology continues to evolve and domestic drone production expands, it is crucial for military and industry leaders to closely monitor threats while fostering an entrepreneurial environment that prioritizes continuous innovation, rigorous training and doctrinal adaptation. Through collaboration, the potential of UAS can be fully realized, ensuring that military operations are as effective and efficient as possible while minimizing risks to combatants and civilians.

Florent Groberg is a vice president at AE Industrial within the firm’s Portfolio Strategy and Optimization Group. Groberg previously held key positions at Microsoft, Boeing and LinkedIn. Prior to that, Groberg was a captain in the U.S. Army, completing both U.S. Army Airborne and U.S. Army Ranger schools. Groberg received the Medal of Honor for his actions in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2012. He currently serves on the American Battle Monuments Commission, an appointment by the president of the United States.

8. Bloomberg News Parts Ways With Reporter Involved in Article About Evan Gershkovich’s Release

Responsible action by a journalism organization? We need a strong and ethical Fourth Estate. Bloomberg is taking action to to help restore trust in journalism,

Excerpts:

Bloomberg News Editor in Chief John Micklethwait wrote in a note to staff on Monday that the article’s publication “could have endangered” the negotiated swap that freed Gershkovich and others. 

“Even if our story mercifully ended up making no difference, it was a clear violation of the editorial standards which have made this newsroom so trusted around the world,” he wrote. 

After an investigation, Micklethwait said Bloomberg has taken “disciplinary action against a number of those involved, and we will be reviewing our processes to ensure that failures like this don’t happen again.”

...

In his note to employees, Micklethwait said he has written personally to each of the prisoners to apologize. He also said he apologized immediately to Wall Street Journal Editor in Chief Emma Tucker on Thursday.

“Given the Wall Street Journal’s tireless efforts on their reporter’s behalf, this was clearly their story to lead the way on,” he wrote.

Bloomberg News Parts Ways With Reporter Involved in Article About Evan Gershkovich’s Release

Move is part of disciplinary action taken against several staffers; news outlet says premature story ‘could have endangered’ prisoner swap

https://www.wsj.com/business/media/bloomberg-news-parts-ways-with-reporter-involved-in-article-about-evan-gershkovichs-release-55218b9f?mod=latest_headlines

By Alexandra Bruell

Follow

Aug. 5, 2024 6:19 pm ET

Evan Gershkovich, far right, in San Antonio on Friday with two others released by Russia: Alsu Kurmasheva, second from left, and Paul Whelan. Photo: Eric Gay/Associated Press

Bloomberg News is parting ways with the lead author of an article that incorrectly said Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich had been released by Russia, among several disciplinary actions the news organization took after a review of the matter.

The Bloomberg article, which came out at 7:41 a.m. ET Thursday, was published while Gershkovich and other prisoners were still in Russian custody—en route to Ankara, the capital of Turkey. It was later corrected to reflect the fact that the prisoners hadn’t been released yet at the time of publication.

Bloomberg News Editor in Chief John Micklethwait wrote in a note to staff on Monday that the article’s publication “could have endangered” the negotiated swap that freed Gershkovich and others. 

“Even if our story mercifully ended up making no difference, it was a clear violation of the editorial standards which have made this newsroom so trusted around the world,” he wrote. 

After an investigation, Micklethwait said Bloomberg has taken “disciplinary action against a number of those involved, and we will be reviewing our processes to ensure that failures like this don’t happen again.”

Bloomberg News Editor in Chief John Micklethwait told staffers on Monday that the article violated the company’s editorial standards. Photo: Lino Mirgeler/Zuma Press

Jennifer Jacobs, a senior White House reporter and the article’s lead author, has been let go, according to a person familiar with the matter. “In reporting the story about Evan’s release, I worked hand in hand with my editors to adhere to editorial standards and guidelines,” Jacobs posted on X on Monday afternoon. She didn’t respond to a request for comment.

“Reporters don’t have the final say over when a story is published or with what headline,” she wrote. “This is why checks and balances exist within the editorial processes.” 

Bloomberg News declined to comment on Jacobs’s post. 

Gershkovich had been in Russian custody for 491 days. He and more than a dozen others jailed by the Kremlin were exchanged on Thursday for Russians held in the U.S. and Europe, including a convicted murderer. It was the largest and most complex East-West prisoner swap since the Cold War.

As the news began to unfold, media organizations rushed to prepare their stories and a briefing by U.S. government authorities early Thursday laid out what was about to happen. News outlets were embargoed, meaning they agreed to hold the news until it was clear the prisoners were out of Russian custody and on their way from Turkey, where the exchange was set to take place. 

Details were difficult to obtain on the ground. A statement from Turkey’s intelligence agency saying Gershkovich was free—before he was actually in U.S. custody—appeared to be a critical ingredient in some reporting.

Bloomberg’s article preceded the U.S. government’s briefing and came hours before other major U.S. news organizations reported on Gershkovich’s release. 

Gershkovich and other Americans left Russian aircraft at an airport in Ankara. They then boarded an aircraft to the U.S., and were welcomed back onto U.S. soil by President Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris late Thursday.

In his note to employees, Micklethwait said he has written personally to each of the prisoners to apologize. He also said he apologized immediately to Wall Street Journal Editor in Chief Emma Tucker on Thursday.

“Given the Wall Street Journal’s tireless efforts on their reporter’s behalf, this was clearly their story to lead the way on,” he wrote.

Write to Alexandra Bruell at alexandra.bruell@wsj.com

Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the August 6, 2024, print edition as 'Bloomberg Lets Go Staffer Involved in Gershkovich Story'.

9. What Russia’s arrest footage of Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan really tells us

Call out Russia for its media manipulation.

Excerpt:

Russia’s pro-Kremlin media know how to create an alternative reality, and last week’s historic prisoner swap was no exception.

​

​Regarding their arrests:

Excerpts:

But take nothing at face value from these heavily edited videos. Yes, we see Gershkovich being roughly detained and pushed to the ground. And we see a handcuffed Paul Whelan on a hotel bed, flanked by Russian security officers.

Yet despite the claims of the Russian-language voice-over, there is little here to support Moscow’s case that the two men were engaged in espionage – an allegation strenuously denied by the US government, the families of Whelan and Gershkovich, and their supporters.

What we see instead are classic examples of the Russian art of “black PR”: weaponizing the media to attack individuals and ruin reputations. The arrest videos are thin on information, but rich with insinuation as Gershkovich and Whelan are shown meeting with people before their arrests – suggesting through the power of B-movie imagery that the two men were engaged in some kind of skullduggery.

What Russia’s arrest footage of Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan really tells us | CNN

CNN · by Nathan Hodge · August 6, 2024

From right: Evan Gershkovich, Paul Whelan and Alsu Kurmasheva, who were released from detention in Russia, look on at Kelly Field in San Antonio, Texas on August 2, 2024.

Kaylee Greenlee Beal/Reuters

CNN —

Russia’s pro-Kremlin media know how to create an alternative reality, and last week’s historic prisoner swap was no exception.

On Monday, Russian state-backed media outlets treated viewers to lurid footage of the arrests of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and former US Marine Paul Whelan.

The locations of the videos are not in doubt: Gershkovich was arrested last year at the Bukowski Grill, a steak restaurant in the city of Yekaterinburg; Whelan was arrested at the Metropol Hotel, just across the road from the Bolshoi Theater in central Moscow.

But take nothing at face value from these heavily edited videos. Yes, we see Gershkovich being roughly detained and pushed to the ground. And we see a handcuffed Paul Whelan on a hotel bed, flanked by Russian security officers.

Yet despite the claims of the Russian-language voice-over, there is little here to support Moscow’s case that the two men were engaged in espionage – an allegation strenuously denied by the US government, the families of Whelan and Gershkovich, and their supporters.

What we see instead are classic examples of the Russian art of “black PR”: weaponizing the media to attack individuals and ruin reputations. The arrest videos are thin on information, but rich with insinuation as Gershkovich and Whelan are shown meeting with people before their arrests – suggesting through the power of B-movie imagery that the two men were engaged in some kind of skullduggery.

Russia has long used black PR and kompromat to make life difficult for foreign diplomats it wants to harass. In 2009, the US State Department kicked up a fuss about what it called a doctored video that surfaced on a Russian website that appeared to show a State Department employee having sex with a prostitute.

Russian state TV also loves to amplify a spy scandal: In January 2006, a state television channel aired footage that featured British spies planting a fake rock to conceal electronic equipment, a report clearly timed to embarrass the British government.

But in the cases of Gershkovich and Whelan, the aim of the Russian state was to build a bank of human collateral to trade for its valued agents held abroad. And for a domestic Russian audience, the now-released footage of their arrests is designed to send a message that Russia is infiltrated with foreign enemies – and that its powerful, all-seeing security state never ceases in its vigilance.

Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva speak with Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Roger Carstens at Kelly Field in San Antonio, Texas, August 2, 2024.

Kaylee Greenlee Beal/Reuters

Related article Freed American says she’s ‘finally being treated as a human being’ after Russian detention

The most chilling feature of the videos is the suggestion of entrapment. In both arrests, the footage suggests that hidden cameras were in place and shooting from multiple angles, and that security forces had set up the situation to some extent.

In a statement, Wall Street Journal Publisher and Dow Jones CEO Almar Latour and Wall Street Journal Editor-in-Chief Emma Tucker condemned the video of Gershkovich as a brazen attempt to frame a journalist who was legitimately doing his job.

“Vladimir Putin and his regime in Russia are waging an all-out assault on the free press,” they said. “This video is only the latest evidence that Russia will stop at nothing in its methodical effort to demolish reliable journalism. Evan was doing his job as a journalist, and any portrayal to the contrary is fiction. Journalism is not a crime.”

Certainly, the implements of spycraft supposedly unearthed at the scene of Gershkovich’s arrest – one of the videos shows his notebooks, pens and smartphone – underscore the manipulative nature of the videos.

But the good news is that Gershkovich is out of Russian custody and can now write the definitive and reliable account of what happened during his arrest.

CNN · by Nathan Hodge · August 6, 2024

10. Analysis: Mass arrests and conflicting narratives following the Haniyeh assassination

Excerpts:

Given that the assassination occurred within an IRGC-controlled compound, the security breach likely originated within the IRGC rather than other intelligence factions. It would also make sense for the IRGC to exclude MOIS from the investigation to protect its reputation.

Amid internal chaos, miscommunication, and a lack of unified messaging, the IRGC has adopted the ‘projectile attack’ narrative. This approach suggests that the strike came from an external source, implying a lesser security failure than an internal breach. The notion that multiple rooms were rigged with remote-controlled explosives is far more humiliating for the IRGC than an external missile hitting what was considered a “safe zone.”

Analysis: Mass arrests and conflicting narratives following the Haniyeh assassination | FDD's Long War Journal

longwarjournal.org · by Janatan Sayeh

The logos of Iran’s Intelligence Ministry (left) and the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (right).

In response to the assassination of former Hamas Political Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, the Islamic Republic has arrested over 20 senior intelligence officers and military officials, as well as staff workers at the military-run guesthouse, The New York Times reported on August 4. A day prior, The Independent Persian claimed that some 40 members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Ansar al-Mahdi Protection Unit were arrested shortly after the assassination.

Some reports even claim that officials as high-ranking as Law Enforcement Special Units Commander Hassan Karami were also arrested in the raids. The regime was quick to address any allegations related to the mass arrests, and the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News promptly rejected some claims, stating that Karami was still the commander of the special units.

The Independent Persian and The Telegraph claim that the IRGC’s specialized intelligence unit for espionage has taken over the investigation into Haniyeh’s assassination, with The Independent Persian reporting that the Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) was not allowed to participate in the ongoing manhunt. If true, this further strengthens existing claims about a rivalry among the regime’s security and intelligence institutions.

The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization and MOIS have a long history of competition to dominate the regime’s security apparatus, whether regarding foreign-sponsored espionage or nationwide protest movements. Iranian civic activists who endured torture at the regime’s secret holding cells have claimed that intelligence officers from IRGC and MOIS competed over which faction would be first to find the “culprit” through violent interrogation that obtained confessions, particularly after incidents associated with the Mossad.

This ongoing rivalry might be the reason behind contradictory reporting on how the assassination unfolded. The New York Times and The Telegraph both cited IRGC officials alleging that a bomb was placed in Haniyeh’s room two to three months in advance and detonated remotely from outside Iran. The Telegraph reporting added that two agents placed explosive devices in three rooms of the IRGC safe house and later snuck out of the country but still had a source in Iran.

The IRGC and Hamas, on the other hand, have publicly stated a different story about how the assassination unfolded. Tasnim News reported on the IRGC’s third official statement on the assassination, where it claimed that Israel, with the help of the US, targeted Haniyeh’s room with a short-range projectile with a 7kg (15lbs) warhead from outside the compound.

Hamas’s representative in Tehran, Khaled Qaddoumi, echoed these remarks and stated that the “damage to the wall and ceiling” made it “evident” that the attack was carried out via a “projectile or missile.” Many other regime-funded outlets covered Qaddoumi’s statement and highlighted that “the purpose behind suggesting that a bomb was placed in the room is to “disclaim Israel’s direct responsibility.”

Israel has not claimed responsibility for the attack. When asked about Haniyeh’s assassination, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the military did not conduct any additional airstrikes overnight between Tuesday and Wednesday, other than the targeted killing of Hezbollah military chief Fuad Shukr in Beirut.

This discrepancy in reporting indicates that various parties, such as IRGC Intelligence, IRGC Ansar Al-Mahdi, MOIS, etc., are intentionally crafting differing narratives to deflect blame and avoid being seen as incompetent.

Given that the assassination occurred within an IRGC-controlled compound, the security breach likely originated within the IRGC rather than other intelligence factions. It would also make sense for the IRGC to exclude MOIS from the investigation to protect its reputation.

Amid internal chaos, miscommunication, and a lack of unified messaging, the IRGC has adopted the ‘projectile attack’ narrative. This approach suggests that the strike came from an external source, implying a lesser security failure than an internal breach. The notion that multiple rooms were rigged with remote-controlled explosives is far more humiliating for the IRGC than an external missile hitting what was considered a “safe zone.”

Janatan Sayeh is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focused on Iranian domestic affairs and the Islamic Republic’s regional malign influence.

Tags: IDF, Iran, IRGC, Israel, Israel Hamas

longwarjournal.org · by Janatan Sayeh

11. How the U.S. military cultivated — and then lost — a key African ally

How the U.S. military cultivated — and then lost — a key African ally

A timeline of key events in the lead-up to the U.S. troop withdrawal on Monday from the West African country of Niger.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/05/niger-agadez-us-military-timeline/?mc_cid=186835870b&mc_eid=70bf478f36

5 min

145

American soldiers in front of military vehicles that they are preparing to board on a cargo plane in Niamey on June 7, 2024, during the ceremony for the first departure of American troops from Niger. (Boureima Hama/AFP/Getty Images)

By Rachel Chason

August 5, 2024 at 1:44 p.m. EDT

The U.S. military on Monday withdrew from its base near Agadez, Niger, marking the end of a security relationship with this West African nation that has lasted more than two decades. At its peak, the mission included 1,100 service members split mostly between bases in Niamey, the capital, and outside Agadez. The withdrawal follows months of fruitless negotiations with Niger’s military government, which seized power in a coup a year ago. It marks a strategic defeat for the United States at a moment when the Islamist extremist threat in the region is growing and Russia’s influence is rising.

Here are some of the key moments in the U.S. involvement in the region:

2002

In the wake of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration launched its “war on terror,” trying to stop terrorism at its roots. The Pan Sahel Initiative, launched in 2002, included training and equipping forces in Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania. The focus in the Sahel region, which stretches across the continent below the Sahara desert, was more related to what the United States identified as potential drivers of extremism — including poor governance, vast spaces and poverty — than existing threats. At the time, tourism was a substantive driver of the region’s economy, with visitors flocking to Timbuktu in Mali and passing through Agadez in Niger on their way to tours of the Sahara.

2011

The United States was part of the NATO-led offensive that killed Libyan dictator Moammar Gaddafi, ultimately contributing to the collapse of the Libyan state and a flood of arms into the region. Experts say the chaos in the wake of Gaddafi’s death helped lay the groundwork for an uprising by Tuareg nationalists, whose rebellions Gaddafi had in the past helped mediate.

2012

Mali, which for the previous two decades had been a model of democracy in the region and a top recipient of Western support, collapsed. Soldiers seized power in a coup in the capital, and Tuareg separatists and a variety of Islamist extremists, including groups linked to al-Qaeda, took control of vast swaths of the country’s north. The seizure of numerous cities — including historic Timbuktu — by militants who enforced an extreme version of Islamic law prompted an international outcry and intervention by the French military.

2013

Then-President Barack Obama sent a letter to Congress announcing that the Pentagon would deploy 40 troops to Niger, bringing the total number of American military personnel in Niger to about 100. Defense officials said the troops were deployed to open a drone base in Niamey that would focus on intelligence gathering, including to help the French forces operating in Mali, where it had decided not to deploy American soldiers.

2017

Four U.S. Special Forces troops, along with five Nigerien soldiers, were killed in an ambush by militants associated with an Islamic State affiliate. The ambush, which became known by the name of the village where it happened — Tongo Tongo — prompted inquiries by Congress and the Defense Department, and it triggered a backlash in Washington, where many lawmakers said they did not have a clear sense of the size or scope of the mission in Niger. It also sparked a political controversy, when the widow of one of the soldiers killed said then-President Donald Trump appeared to forget her husband’s name and said that the soldier knew “what he was signing up for.”

Directives for U.S. troops changed after Tongo Tongo, Alan Van Saun, a company commander in a Special Forces battalion from summer 2017 to February 2018, previously told The Washington Post. U.S. soldiers had been patrolling with Nigerien soldiers on “kill and capture” missions, providing intelligence about armed groups as well as medical and logistical support to Nigerien troops. After the ambush, he said, they were largely constrained to providing support from the bases.

2019

The nine-square-mile Air Base 201, which cost more than $100 million to build, opened just outside Agadez, a city on the southern edge of the Sahara known as a hub for migration. U.S. officials said the base became vital for understanding the movements of extremists in North and Western Africa. Gen. Michael E. Langley, who heads U.S. military operations in Africa, warned in a previous interview that losing the base would be “impactful” for counterterrorism operations. “If we can’t see, we can’t sense,” he said.

In Niger, the military was combating militants associated with Boko Haram and its offshoots around Lake Chad, and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State-Sahel in the region bordering Mali and Burkina Faso.

July 2023

Nigerien military officers seized power in a coup d’état, ousting the democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. Within weeks, they asked the 1,500 or so French troops that had been stationed in the country to leave. The United States paused security assistance, as required by U.S. law after a coup, and officials began negotiating to get Niger back on a democratic path.

March 2024

In a late-night news conference, a spokesman for Niger’s government — the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland — declared the American military presence “illegal.” Nigerien officials said that followed a meeting in which they said a top U.S. official was “condescending” and tried to dictate which countries Niger could partner with. The United States has disputed that characterization and said Niger was offered “a choice, not an ultimatum.”

August 2024

The final 130 service members stationed at Air Base 201 loaded into four C-17s and flew out. American and Nigerien officials signed paperwork turning over the base, marking the official end to the U.S. mission in what had long been its top ally in the region.

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By Rachel Chason

Rachel Chason is The Washington Post's West Africa bureau chief. Before becoming a foreign correspondent in 2022, she was a reporter on the Local desk, focusing on politics and government in Prince George's County, Md.  Twitter

12. An Army officer is one of the stars of the U.S. women's Olympic rugby team

Compare two Army officers. One an Olympic Rugby team member and the other a Pageant winner (Miss USA - in next article)

CPT Sullivan entered the family business.

Excerpt:

Sullivan grew up in a family with deep military roots, beginning with her great-great-grandfather’s service in World War I. Subsequent generations of Sullivans served in World War II and Vietnam. Her father, Col. Michael Sullivan, was a Green Beret during the post-9/11 wars and commanded the 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade. Her twin brother is now an Army infantry officer.

An Army officer is one of the stars of the U.S. women's Olympic rugby team

Capt. Samantha Sullivan was an All American at West Point. Her coach said “everything you see is what you’re going to get."

Patty Nieberg

Posted on Jul 30, 2024 6:29 PM EDT

5 minute read

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

The U.S. women’s rugby team just won its first Olympic medal with the help of an Army captain.

In a stunning win, the U.S. women’s rugby sevens team upset Australia to win the bronze medal Tuesday, 14-12. Team USA scored on the game’s final play to win.

One of the stars of the team’s run was Samantha Sullivan, an active duty Army captain and 2020 West Point graduate, where she was an All American rugby player for head coach Bill LeClerc.

LeClerc told Task & Purpose that Sullivan came to rugby only after she was cut from the school’s soccer team, but became a starter early on.

“What I like to think is that we unearthed something in her that she got really passionate about,” LeClerc said. “She’s really a hard working, passionate person who wants to excel at a lot of things and she put the work in.”

Sullivan started every game for Team USA as a prop/wing in the Olympics and scored tries against Japan and Brazil.

Trained as an Army engineer, Sullivan is part of the Army’s World Class Athlete Program which allows soldiers to train full-time toward international competitions.

At West Point, Sullivan recorded an extensive video interview now on the school’s website in which she said rugby was a perfect match for soldiers.

“Rugby is the best sport to play as officers because it is conducive to combat arms. It’s conducive to high intensity environments having to make quick decisions,” Sullivan said.

Rugby at West Point

Sullivan grew up in a family with deep military roots, beginning with her great-great-grandfather’s service in World War I. Subsequent generations of Sullivans served in World War II and Vietnam. Her father, Col. Michael Sullivan, was a Green Beret during the post-9/11 wars and commanded the 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade. Her twin brother is now an Army infantry officer.

Born in Tacoma, Washington, she spent time in Germany, Kentucky, Hawaii and California, but considers Fayetteville, North Carolina home.

“I’ve always wanted to serve but I thought it would be in an ROTC capacity,” Sullivan said about her decision to go to West Point.

It was there that her rugby career began.

Sullivan had been inspired to go to West Point by a family friend and originally tried out for their soccer team. After being denied a spot on the soccer team, Sullivan tried out for rugby her freshman year where she quickly fell in love with the sport. Sullivan graduated in 2020 as one of only three women in the Computer Science major that year, according to an Army West Point website.

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LeClerc said Sullivan had a natural athletic ability along with a fiery passion and a lot of determination. “She was just good at things you don’t have to coach,” he added.

Sullivan still holds the record for West Point Women’s Rugby all-time try scoring record. During her four years, Sullivan scored 84 tries and 3 conversions to total 426 points.

As her college coach, LeClerc said he was proud to see her in action and play the game alongside teammates that she used to compete against at West Point.

By her third rugby game at West Point, Sullivan was a starter on the team, according to the Army. Sullivan said she started her freshman year because she was fast and could “decently catch a ball.” During her college career, Sullivan became a three-time All-American and won the 2019 Prusmack Award for top female collegiate rugby sevens player.

LeClerc said she was a “good kid” with a big heart who was a “goofball” at times.

He recalled a practice where he told Sullivan that she looked different that day. “I’m wearing makeup today, coach. I just wanted to feel like a girl,” he recalled Sullivan say. “She was just Sammy,” he added.

“Everything you see is what you’re going to get,” he said. “I’m super proud of her.”

Even before her Olympic success, in Sullivan’s eyes, the sport not only defined her time at West Point, but changed who she was.

“Being on the rugby team was, I would say, arguably the thing that shaped me the most here that made me the person I am today,” Sullivan said in her taped interview.

LeClerc echoed the same sentiment, adding that the game gives players a sense of purpose and ultimately affects the way they hold themselves and how others see them.

“It changes everything. It changes your confidence. It changes how people look at you and it changes how you project yourself,” LeClerc said. “The game is the one that sort of did that. I just really introduced her to the game and helped her to understand some of the basics. After that, it was really her taking it as far as she could take it and it was pretty special today to see her.”

During her time at West Point, Sullivan served as the Brigade Trust Captain where was responsible for overseeing the academy’s Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment prevention program.

Last second victory

In Paris, Sullivan was a central member of the American team, though the U.S. was not expected to medal against traditional powers like France, New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and others.

But the team won twice in early games, with Sullivan scoring tries in both, and qualified for the bronze medal game against Australia. The Americans trailed for nearly the whole game and appeared to be pinned on their own side of the field in the final seconds when Team USA’s Alex Sedrick took a loose ball, avoided a tackle and sprinted the length of the field to score as time expired, tying the match at 12.

Sullivan had been subbed out of the game, but as her teammates celebrated, cameras caught Sullivan yelling to “shut up” as the team lined up for a final winning kick. Sedrick’s conversion kick was good and Team USA took home the bronze.

“I’m not gonna lie. It wasn’t really expected,” LeClerc said. “Sports is brutal when you see things like that. I mean just on the knife’s edge like that. I’m sitting there watching it and I was like ‘man they’re not gonna get out of this.’”

The latest on Task & Purpose

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NORAD sent 3 different fighters to intercept Russian and Chinese bombers

Patty Nieberg

Sr. Staff Writer

Patty is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. She has covered the military and national defense for five years, including embedding with the National Guard during Hurricane Florence and covering legal proceedings for a former al Qaeda commander at Guantanamo Bay. Her previous bylines can be found at the Associated Press, Bloomberg Government, Washington Post, The New York Times, and ABC.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

13. Army officer and West Point grad crowned Miss USA

It is too bad that diversity is such a bad word these days. An Olympic Rugby star and a pageant winner certainly illustrates the diversity of capabilities, people, and opportunities that exist within our Army.

Army officer and West Point grad crowned Miss USA

2nd Lt. Alma Cooper was assigned to intelligence after graduating from West Point in 2023. She is pursuing a master’s degree at Stanford.

Jeff Schogol

Updated on Aug 5, 2024 4:13 PM EDT

4 minute read

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

The women who wear the crowns of the two premiere U.S. beauty pageants are now both active-duty service members after Army 2nd Lt. Alma Cooper, a West Point graduate and intelligence officer, was crowned Miss USA on Sunday. Cooper’s title comes eight months into the reign of Air Force 2nd Lt. Madison Marsh as Miss America. Both graduated from their respective service academies in 2023.

“Lt. Cooper’s accomplishments are truly inspiring and a testament to her discipline and work ethic,” said Army Col. Terence M. Kelley, director of communications for the U.S. Military Academy. “Her selection as Miss USA is a great example to young people about the importance of character and the opportunities of military service.”

An honor graduate from West Point, Cooper used her personal statement in the pageant to highlight her journey to the Army.

“As the daughter of a migrant worker, a proud Afro Latina woman and an officer of the United States Army, I am living the American dream,” she told the pageant’s judges on Sunday. “If there’s anything that my life and my mother have taught me, it’s that your circumstances never define your destiny: You can make success accessible through demanding excellence.”

She takes the crown after Miss USA 2023 and Miss Teen USA abruptly resigned earlier this year.

Originally from Okemos, Michigan, Cooper graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, with a bachelor’s degree in mathematical science, and she is currently pursuing a master’s degree in statistics at Stanford University in California, according to her university biography.

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In a Stanford video, Cooper said that her father joined the Army and then completed Officer Candidate School, becoming an armor officer. Her Instagram account includes a picture of her father leading her oath of office at West Point

“His whole world was centered around tanks and leadership and soldiers,” Cooper said.

Cooper recalled how her mother signed her up for a two-week summer camp at West Point as she was preparing to apply for colleges.

“I called my parents, and they were like, ‘What do you think?’” Cooper said in the video. “And I go: I love it. I knew from that moment that I was going to go to West Point.”

Then-cadet Alma Cooper in February, 2023 when she learned she would be assigned to the 101st Airborne Division after graduation. Elizabeth Woodruff/USMA PAO, posted to Cooper’s Instagram account.

As a cadet, Cooper served as the brigade adjutant at West Point, for which she led and implemented accountability systems for 4,400 cadets in emergencies. She also traveled the country with West Point’s Leadership, Ethics, and Diversity in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), during which she led STEM modules and discussions about ethical leadership with middle school and high school students.

Her undergraduate thesis focused on how body mass index – a measurement of body fat based on a person’s height and weight – is connected to the Army’s recent recruiting challenges.

“To be a woman of color in that situation was challenging,” Cooper recalled in the video. “It was incredibly rewarding to find moments to elevate the voices of other minority high-potential cadets.”

Cooper first learned about beauty pageants from her mother, who competed in the Miss America contest. At 14, Cooper competed in the Miss Teen USA pageant. In April, she was named Miss Michigan.

“The greatest things in life lie on the other side of fear,” Cooper said in the Stanford video. “When you demand excellence of yourself: When you look for opportunities to be out front, to learn and grow and to better yourself – even in the face of fear – there are so many beautiful things that lie behind that door.”

UPDATE: 08/05/2024; this story was updated with a statement from Army Col. Terence M. Kelley, director of communications for the U.S. Military Academy.

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• Top U.S. special ops units held a major exercise off Alaska, 45 miles from Russia
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Jeff Schogol

Senior Pentagon Reporter

Jeff Schogol is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. He reports on both the Defense Department as a whole as well as individual services, covering a variety of topics that include personnel, policy, military justice, deployments, and technology. His apartment in Alexandria, Va., has served as the Task & Purpose Pentagon bureau since the pandemic first struck in March 2020. The dwelling is now known as Forward Operating Base Schogol.

​14. The US Strengthens the Second Island Chain

​Maps at the link. https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-us-strengthens-the-second-island-chain/?

Excerpts:

Australia has also advanced its cause through security assistance. Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka expressed his desire to end his country’s security deal with China and has now signed security and policing agreements with both Australia and the U.S. This has undermined China’s influence as the Australian Federal Police are now heavily involved with local training. Papua New Guinea also signed a defense agreement with Australia last year that enables its military officers to serve in leadership positions in the Australian army, and it inked a defense cooperation agreement with the U.S. The Solomon Islands has not forsaken its ties to China, but a recent Australian commitment to help expand and train its police will obstruct Beijing’s ability to coerce its neighbors.

The strategy to strengthen northern Australia isn’t without obstacles. The area is remote even by Australian standards, so it will be difficult to find the personnel to complete the projects. Many companies may rather work for clients that are seen as less risky. And it all depends on the continued reliability of South Korea and Japan to handle the first island chain.

Even so, the U.S. and Australia seem set to try. What was once dismissed as unlikely is now a core feature of the long-term strategy to contain China. For the U.S., part of that strategy entails moving some forces from the first island chain to the second and increasing overall deterrence and security without expending additional manpower. Australia seems wholly committed to the idea. After all, its buy-in will secure its northern border and allow dual use by its AUKUS partners.

The US Strengthens the Second Island Chain

What was once dismissed as unlikely is now a core feature of long-term strategy to contain China.

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-us-strengthens-the-second-island-chain/?

By Ronan Wordsworth -

August 5, 2024

Much has been made of the U.S.’ efforts to contain China. Central to its strategy is the first island chain, a line of islands comprising the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan that naturally obstruct China’s access to the open seas. And now that Washington is increasingly confident in South Korea and Japan’s ability to manage the first chain, it is increasingly eager to focus on a second island chain, one to be managed by Australia. Australia has been a partner of Washington’s for years, and recent events, including the progression of the AUKUS security alignment, show that it will likely become a recipient of massive amounts of U.S. defense spending in the coming years.

Alliance Building

The first island chain acts as the vanguard in the U.S.-led security alliance in the region. As such, it has to be able to withstand and prevent a direct attack from mainland China. This is why Washington has worked extensively over the past two years to strengthen its strategic alliances in the Indo-Pacific region, signing trilateral security agreements with Japan and South Korea and with Japan and the Philippines. (The Philippines was once more open to balancing against China and the U.S., but having bristled under Chinese coercion in the South China Sea, it has shown a greater willingness to work with the U.S.)

The second island chain gives the U.S. strategic depth, focusing on things like long-range surveillance and strike capabilities. In theory, it will reinforce the first island chain in the case of an attack and act as a deterrent. This alliance building follows 2021’s AUKUS agreement with Australia and the U.K., which ensured that defense expenditure and the burden of power projection and deterrence into the Indo-Pacific was shared with the closest of allies and provided Washington with a strategic direction for the next decade of military doctrine.

(click to enlarge)

Northern Australia – from Darwin in the Northern Territory to Far North Queensland – has thus risen in strategic prominence for Australia and the U.S. alike. Conventional wisdom has it that the only significant threats to the Australian mainland will come from the north, which thus requires a disproportionately large military presence there. For Washington, Australian bases in this region have been used to station B-52 bombers and F-35 and F-22 fighters, as well as a host of logistics and refueling aircraft – that is, long-range vehicles.

(click to enlarge)

Defense expenditures from both countries attest to the region’s importance. Canberra allocated nearly $4 billion in 2023 to shore up northern bases, from RAAF Base Learmonth to the Cocos Islands, a remote Australian overseas territory in the Indian Ocean, closer to Sri Lanka than to Perth, that completes the second island chain, as well as air bases in the Northern Territory and northern Queensland. Announced in April this year, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program calls for 14 billion-18 billion Australian dollars ($9 billion-$12 billion) for upgrading northern bases in Townsville, Darwin and the Cocos. This money is being spent on air base remediation across northern Australia, including major maintenance at RAAF Base Darwin and Mount Bundey Airfield, redevelopment of the RAAF Base Townsville and airfield works at RAAF bases Curtin and Learmonth. Capital expenditure projects are meant to upgrade runway capacity, provide additional aviation fuel and ammunition storage, invest in additional central mission command planning facilities, and increase defensive capacity with long-range missile installations. In the Cocos Islands, money has been set aside for runway upgrades to accommodate P-8A Poseidon aircraft undertaking surveillance missions, as well as for long-range surveillance drones.

The U.S. is spending likewise. Washington has reportedly begun to use some of the $300 million set aside in 2024 on construction projects in the north, and there are tenders open worth more than $2 billion for the construction of wharves, runways, fuel storage facilities, and aircraft hangers across North Queensland, the Northern Territory, Cocos Islands, Papua New Guinea and East Timor.

Only taking into account the $300 million already committed, this will make northern Australia the top overseas location for U.S. Air Force and Navy construction spending, and with the additional projects in the pipeline, this looks set to continue until at least 2030.

Shifting Priorities

These joint efforts between the U.S. and Australia reflect a new method of countering China, which has been increasingly assertive in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2022, Beijing unexpectedly signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, potentially putting a Chinese naval base within the immediate vicinity of Australia’s eastern flank. In September 2023, China approached Papua New Guinea with an offer for a security deal to help with internal policing. This is similar to the arrangement China has had in Fiji since 2011.

Though Australia and the U.S. are frequent partners of Papua New Guinea and Fiji, their economic reliance on China means that they have often struggled to balance greater powers. Australia and the U.S. understood prying these countries away from China would require offering them a lot of economic incentives. This is precisely what they did, effectively keeping China out of Australia’s near abroad and further cementing the second island chain.

In its 2024-25 budget, for example, Australia set aside a record $2 billion in Pacific development assistance. Fiji is set to be one of the biggest beneficiaries thanks to port upgrades and a plan to lay undersea cables to enhance its telecommunications. Papua New Guinea will receive $637.4 million, while the Solomon Islands will get $171.2 million.

Australia has also advanced its cause through security assistance. Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka expressed his desire to end his country’s security deal with China and has now signed security and policing agreements with both Australia and the U.S. This has undermined China’s influence as the Australian Federal Police are now heavily involved with local training. Papua New Guinea also signed a defense agreement with Australia last year that enables its military officers to serve in leadership positions in the Australian army, and it inked a defense cooperation agreement with the U.S. The Solomon Islands has not forsaken its ties to China, but a recent Australian commitment to help expand and train its police will obstruct Beijing’s ability to coerce its neighbors.

The strategy to strengthen northern Australia isn’t without obstacles. The area is remote even by Australian standards, so it will be difficult to find the personnel to complete the projects. Many companies may rather work for clients that are seen as less risky. And it all depends on the continued reliability of South Korea and Japan to handle the first island chain.

Even so, the U.S. and Australia seem set to try. What was once dismissed as unlikely is now a core feature of the long-term strategy to contain China. For the U.S., part of that strategy entails moving some forces from the first island chain to the second and increasing overall deterrence and security without expending additional manpower. Australia seems wholly committed to the idea. After all, its buy-in will secure its northern border and allow dual use by its AUKUS partners.

Ronan Wordsworth

Ronan Wordsworth is an analyst for Geopolitical Futures. He completed a Masters in Geopolitical Studies at Charles University in Prague in 2022. He has an ongoing association with the University, including assisting an ongoing project of African University partnerships and is co-host of a Geopolitics Podcast. Prior to undertaking the master’s program, Mr Wordsworth completed a Bachelor of Civil Engineering from the University of Sydney and spent nine years working across Australia, Europe, and Southern Africa working up to the level of Senior Project Manager providing experience in statistical analytics.

15. Strategically important Myanmar military HQ appears to fall to the resistance, in a blow to regime

The war that is out of sight and out of (US) mind(s).

Strategically important Myanmar military HQ appears to fall to the resistance, in a blow to regime

By  DAVID RISING

Updated 12:17 AM EDT, August 6, 2024

AP · August 5, 2024

BANGKOK (AP) — Myanmar’s military regime acknowledged Monday it had lost communications with the commanders of a strategically important army headquarters in the northeast, adding credence to a militia group’s claims it had captured the base.

The fall of the army’s Northeast Command in Lashio city would be the biggest in a series of setbacks for Myanmar’s military government this year, as an offensive by an alliance of powerful militias of ethnic minority groups makes broad gains in the civil war.

“The regime’s loss of the Northeast Command is the most humiliating defeat of the war,” said Morgan Michaels, a Singapore-based analyst with the International Institute of Strategic Studies who runs its Myanmar Conflict Map project. “Without Lashio, it will be extremely difficult for the regime to hold onto its final outposts in the theater.”

Those include the key Muse border crossing with China, as well as the strategic crossroads at Kyaukme, and it opens the way for attacks on Pyin Oo Lwin and Myanmar’s second-largest city, Mandalay, Michaels said.

In a video broadcast Monday night on state television, the head of the ruling military council. Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, gave a vague account of the base’s fall, saying some security forces in northern Shan State left their outposts because keeping people safe was their priority.

In his 25-minute address, he accused the ethnic resistance forces and “traitor maggots” inside and outside Myanmar of working together and circulating propaganda to demoralize people.

He alleged that warlordism is growing among leaders of the insurgent groups, and that people are likely to face illegal and unjust killings and an economy involving drug trafficking and gambling. The army will continue to carry out security measures to restore stability, he said.

The loss of Lashio raises questions about whether Myanmar’s ruling military council could be forced to give up attempts to hold contested territory in order to consolidate a defense of the central heartland.

It could also contribute to growing discontent with Min Aung Hlaing, who seized power after leading the overthrow of the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021.

“It seems increasingly unlikely that the army could survive with Min Aung Hlaing at the helm,” Michaels said.

Lashio, about 110 kilometers (70 miles) south of the Chinese border, has been the target of an offensive by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army since early July.

The MNDAA is a military force of the Kokang minority, who are ethnic Chinese. It is part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which in October launched a surprise offensive that succeeded in seizing large tracts of territory along the northern border with China.

The Chinese Embassy in Myanmar on Tuesday urged its citizens in Lashio and other parts of Shan state to strengthen their security precautions, and stay away from conflict zones or return to China.

Beijing helped broker a cease-fire in January, but that fell apart in June when the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, another member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance made up of Ta’ang ethnic minority members, launched new attacks, followed by the MNDAA.

The alliance’s third member, the Arakan Army, has never stopped fighting in its home Rakhine State in western Myanmar.

The groups in the alliance have been fighting for decades for greater autonomy from Myanmar’s central government. They are loosely allied with People’s Defense Forces, pro-democracy resistance groups that have emerged to fight military rule.

The MNDAA initially claimed the capture of the Northeast Command and Lashio on July 25, but it turned out the announcement was premature as the army continued to fight.

The MNDAA in a statement on Facebook on Saturday said the group had finally completely captured the Northeast Command headquarters and defeated the remaining army units in Lashio.

The claims could not be verified independently, with access to the internet and mobile phone services in the area mostly cut off.

A member of Lashio’s Freedom Youth Volunteers-FYV, reached while outside the city, told The Associated Press on Monday that other members of his aid group had reported army personnel remained in control of some areas of the Northeast Command headquarters, though most had been taken by the MNDAA.

He spoke on the condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisals from both sides.

There were reports of gunfire in the city on Sunday, but images of captured soldiers and equipment were circulating widely on social media, suggesting the MNDAA had taken the base. The MNDAA released a photo of its fighters posing in front of a sign outside the Northeast Command.

“The regime has clearly suffered an enormous loss and no longer has any meaningful control of the city, even if it retains a toehold for now,” Michaels said.

Early Monday, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson of Myanmar’s ruling military council, said in an audio statement on state-run MRTV television that it had lost contact with commanders of the Northeast Command headquarters Saturday night and had unconfirmed reports that some have been arrested by the MNDAA.

He did not address MNDAA’s claim of capturing the base.

AP · August 5, 2024

16. Watch: AC-130J gunship pummels Navy vessel during Rim of the Pacific

What a great weapons system.

Video at the link: https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2024/08/05/watch-ac-130j-gunship-pummels-navy-vessel-during-rim-of-the-pacific/?utm

Watch: AC-130J gunship pummels Navy vessel during Rim of the Pacific

militarytimes.com · by Riley Ceder · August 5, 2024

A U.S. Air Force AC-130J gunship took part in battering and sinking a retired U.S. Navy vessel during this summer’s 2024 Rim of the Pacific exercise, according to explosive footage released by the Air Force.

A New Mexico-based 27th Special Operations Wing crew manning the AC-130J bludgeoned the Austin-class amphibious transport dock Dubuque with cannon fire from the air as part of a live-fire sinking exercise last month.

The former amphibious assault ship Tarawa was also sent to the ocean floor as part of the exercise. Footage of the Tarawa’s final moments above the ocean’s surface has yet to be released.

This year’s Rim of the Pacific Exercise, or RIMPAC, involved 29 nations, 40 surface ships, three submarines, 14 national land forces, more than 150 aircraft and 25,000 personnel. It is the largest international maritime exercise and allows militaries the opportunity to test high-powered weapons in real-world scenarios.

Over the roughly minute-and-a-half video, which was recorded off the coast of the Hawaiian island of Kauai, the AC-130J ambushes the Dubuque with a barrage of cannon fire.

Impacts can be seen across the vessel’s surface, with billows of smoke signaling each heavy strike.

Though not included in the video, Dubuque was also hit by U.S. Army AH-64 Apache helicopters and elements from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.

The Dubuque, which now rests 15,000 feet below the waves, was commissioned in 1967 and went on to serve in Vietnam before being decommissioned in 2011.

Ships sunk during the RIMPAC exercise must be cleaned of any toxic substances, such as mercury or petroleum, in compliance with Environmental Protection Agency regulations. Vessels must also sink at least 6,000 feet underwater and 50 nautical miles from land.

About Riley Ceder

Riley Ceder is an editorial fellow at Military Times, where he covers breaking news, criminal justice and human interest stories. He previously worked as an investigative practicum student at The Washington Post, where he contributed to the ongoing Abused by the Badge investigation.

17. AFSOC Turns Rural Highway into Runway for Historic AC-130J Touchdown

Video and photos at the link: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/afsoc-highway-historic-ac-130j-landing/?utm

AFSOC Turns Rural Highway into Runway for Historic AC-130J Touchdown

airandspaceforces.com · by Unshin Harpley · August 5, 2024

Aug. 5, 2024 | By Unshin Lee Harpley

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The Air Force transformed a public freeway into a runway over the weekend, landing various tanker, cargo, and special operations aircraft on the road, including the service’s first-ever touchdown of an AC-130J Ghostrider on a U.S. roadway.

Air Force Special Operations Command landed and took off with an AC-130J, MC-130J, and C-146A on one of Arkansas’ major north-south freeways, Highway 63, on Aug 4. The Air National Guard then took over at the location for a C-130H Hercules touchdown, a spokesperson for the 1st Special Operations Wing told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“This exercise serves as a significant milestone for AFSOC, demonstrating our ability to operate in diverse and austere environments,” Tech. Sgt. Robert Gallagher of the AFSOC Air Commando Development Center, lead planner for the highway landings, said in a statement.

After the C-146A Wolfhound and MC-130J Commando II from the 492nd Special Operations Wing arrived on the highway, the crew established a setup for rapid refueling and arming with portable tanks, known as a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). This enabled the Ghostrider to land, refuel, rearm, and take off again from the five-lane highway.

A U.S. Air Force MC-130J Commando II, assigned to the 492nd Special Operations Wing, lands on Highway 63 during Emerald Warrior 24 FTX II in Bono, Arkansas, August 4, 2024. The objective of the operation was to train aircrews on runway-agnostic operations to enable Air Commandos to effectively work in contested spaces where traditional airfields may be unavailable or under threat. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ty Pilgrim)

A U.S. Air Force AC-130J Ghostrider Gunship, assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing, prepares to land on Highway 63 during Emerald Warrior 24 FTX II in Bono, Arkansas, August 4, 2024. The objective of the operation was to train aircrews on runway-agnostic operations to enable Air Commandos to effectively work in contested spaces where traditional airfields may be unavailable or under threat. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ty Pilgrim)

A U.S. Air Force C-146A Wolfhound, assigned to the 492d Special Operations Wing, lands on Highway 63 during Emerald Warrior 24 FTX II in Bono, Arkansas, August 4, 2024. The “Wolfhound’s” primary mission is to provide flexible and responsive operational movement of small teams and cargo in support of theater special operations commands. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ty Pilgrim)

A U.S. Air Force Special Tactics team, assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing, get into the back of a C-146A Wolfhound, assigned to the 492nd Special Operations Wing, to prepare to exfil from a highway landing during the Emerald Warrior 24 FTX II in Bono, Arkansas, August 4, 2024. Emerald Warrior is a joint, combined exercise that provides realistic and relevant, high-end training to prepare special operations forces, conventional forces, and international partners in an evolving strategic environment. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ty Pilgrim)

U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing, conduct Forward Arming and Refueling Point operations during Emerald Warrior 24 FTX II highway landing operation in Bono, Arkansas, August 4, 2024. The ability to refuel aircraft in contested spaces is a critical element of Agile Combat Employment. FARPs enable Air Force Special Operations Command aircraft to quickly refuel, rearm, and return to the fight, reducing downtime and increasing operational tempo. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ty Pilgrim)

The AC-130J, AFSOC’s primary close air support and combat mission platform, is a heavily modified C-130J Super Hercules designed for precision fire support. The MC-130J Commando II, another variant of the Super Hercules, is a cargo aircraft equipped with advanced avionics, defensive systems, and air refueling capabilities.

“By landing an AC-130J on a highway and conducting FARP, we’re proving our ability to operate in austere and unique environments,” said Col. Patrick Dierig, 1st Special Operations Wing commander, in the statement. “It shows our commitment to maintaining operational flexibility and readiness, ensuring we can deliver decisive airpower whenever and wherever it’s needed.”

The preparation included securing the landing zone in advance by cooperating with local law enforcement, the spokesperson added.

“The team worked with Craighead County and Bono Sheriff’s Department to put up barriers, as the law enforcement closed off U.S. 63 and a portion of 230,” the spokesperson said. “They also work with the Arkansas Department of Transportation as well.”

Afterwards, the Air National Guard’s 189th Airlift Wing stepped in to execute takeoffs and landings with a C-130H transport aircraft on the site. The training saw eight pilots maneuvering the cargo aircraft on an unconventional runway in preparation for humanitarian and disaster relief missions. Col. Jay Geaney, Arkansas Air National Guard director of staff and a C-130H pilot, said the exercise “validated our proof of concept as a capability,” in an email statement to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

The freeway touchdown for AFSOC is part of the ongoing exercise Emerald Warrior, taking place from July 29 to Aug. 18, across Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Nevada, and Puerto Rico. The training is meant to advance the service’s push for Agile Combat Employment.

“Emerald Warrior FTX II demonstrates to our adversaries that we can meet them anytime, any place, anywhere, without the need for traditional runways to project air power,” added Dierig.

The Air Force conducted similar highway landings in Michigan in 2022 with various aircraft, including the A-10, U-28A, C-145, C-146, and MC-12W. This marked the first integrated combat turn of an A-10 on a U.S. highway, where Airmen swiftly refueled and rearmed the aircraft while the engines were still running, allowing the jet to take off again as quickly as possible.

Air

airandspaceforces.com · by Unshin Harpley · August 5, 2024

18. How To Pose as a Reasonable Critic of Israel (With a Little Help From the Media)

​Reasonable should be in quotes. At least "air quotes."

Excerpts:

Before publishing this piece, I contacted Perlmutter and Sidhwa to give them an opportunity to comment. Sidhwa responded at length. He pointed to an open letter that he and Perlmutter sent to the White House after publishing their essay, in which they condemn "the horrors committed on October 7 by Palestinian armed groups." Sidhwa also firmly defended the assertion that he and Perlmutter have "no political interest" in the outcome of the war. In his view, he is purely a humanitarian worker, and even his contention that Israel is committing genocide amounts to an observation, rather than taking sides in the conflict.

Perlmutter and Sidhwa close their essay by asserting that a cut-off of U.S. military aid will force an end to the war. They place no demands on Hamas or its sponsors in Tehran, not even to release the hostages. While they hope their testimony helps to end the war, they cannot see that silence about the danger posed by Hamas is one of the surest means of perpetuating the conflict.

Perlmutter did not respond to a request for comment. Politico pledged to add an editor's note to the piece after the Washington Free Beacon presented the outlet with Perlmutter and Sidhwa's views on Israel.

How To Pose as a Reasonable Critic of Israel (With a Little Help From the Media)

freebeacon.com · by David Adesnik · August 3, 2024

Mark Perlmutter is an orthopedic surgeon from North Carolina. He is Jewish but believes that Zionism is "sadism" and "the moral equivalent of Nazism."

Feroze Sidhwa is a trauma surgeon from California. He alleges that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.

Yet in an essay for Politico, Perlmutter and Sidhwa present themselves as physicians lacking "any political interest in the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—other than wanting it to end." From this perch of supposed neutrality, they accuse Israel of "murdering children" yet do not have a bad word to say about Hamas, even though their article goes on for nearly 5,000 words.

The essay by Perlmutter and Sidhwa is an illustration of how the media can launder Israel's virulent critics to render their views palatable, or even compelling to a mainstream audience. This phenomenon is hardly new, but with a bit of help from Google and X (formerly Twitter), it has become far easier to expose.

In all fairness, Perlmutter and Sidhwa do have a story worth telling. They traveled to Gaza in late March as part of a humanitarian mission for which they volunteered via the Palestinian American Medical Association. They tell the story of a malnourished nine-year-old girl named Juri who had festering wounds, a split femur, and other grave injuries. The surgical team had to wash clumps of maggots off Juri before they could operate, and they warn that she will suffer from severe and permanent disabilities despite their best efforts.

Juri's story is one that deserves to be told, but by a narrator who is prepared to consider the responsibility Hamas bears for her plight. Perlmutter and Sidhwa oppose the horrors of war but cannot bring themselves to acknowledge that Hamas started it. They make a single oblique reference to the events of October 7 and include neither an explicit condemnation of the attack nor expression of sympathy for its victims. Likewise, they express no concern for the Israeli hostages who remain captive in Gaza.

An editor would not have had to conduct much due diligence to discover the two surgeons' bias. Perlmutter's comments on X read like the signs at a campus protest encampment. He describes the Israeli government as fascist, compares a pro-Israel physician to Josef Mengele, and, lest anyone miss his point, simply says, "Israel's genocidal behavior parallels that of Nazi Germany in the 40s."

The bias of Perlmutter's coauthor is no more difficult to discern. Sidhwa has 20 years of experience as a critic of the Jewish state. He first wrote about the subject as a student, contributing a pair of essays to the Israel-bashing website Electronic Intifada in 2005. In the first essay, he mounted a defense of Columbia University professor Joseph Massad, who is once again a figure of controversy thanks to his praise, the day after the October 7 massacre, for the "astonishing" and "astounding" achievements of an "innovative Palestinian resistance."

Describing the teenagers he saw in Gaza, Sidhwa says that they "look like they came out of Auschwitz." Perhaps he does not know that Israel has cooperated with the United Nations and other providers to facilitate the entry of more than 40,000 truckloads of food and other essential goods into Gaza.

As surgeons, Perlmutter and Sidhwa express profound regret for the battering of Gaza's hospitals during the war, for which they hold only Israel responsible. After demanding an end to U.S. military aid, they write, "We must decide, once and for all: are we for or against murdering children, doctors and emergency medical personnel?" An issue they do not raise, even to dispute, is Hamas's exploitation of hospitals for military purposes, a war crime.

Since the group took control of Gaza in 2007, journalists have documented its use of al-Shifa Hospital, the largest in the coastal strip. During a major clash between Israel and Hamas in 2014, the Washington Post described al-Shifa as the group's "de facto headquarters."

On X, Perlmutter alludes to his knowledge of the problem. Responding to another user who pointed to Hamas's presence at al-Shifa, Perlmutter responded, "If a rat enters an orphanage, do you burn down the whole orphanage and incinerate all of the children just to kill the rat? 'Oh, but you knew the rat was there [with the] children, why didn't you say something?'"

This comparison to a single rat entering an orphanage is misleading. In late March, Israeli forces said they captured hundreds of fighters inside al-Shifa, while killing nearly 200 in the battle to clear the facility. The military also released video footage showing the fighters lying dead inside the hospital, still holding their guns. (The editors blurred out the faces of the dead, but not their guns.) The footage also showed the weapons Israeli troops found in the MRI and maternity wards. Even before the battle, the New York Times reported on how Hamas "maintained a hardened tunnel beneath the complex that was supplied with water, power and air-conditioning."

Before publishing this piece, I contacted Perlmutter and Sidhwa to give them an opportunity to comment. Sidhwa responded at length. He pointed to an open letter that he and Perlmutter sent to the White House after publishing their essay, in which they condemn "the horrors committed on October 7 by Palestinian armed groups." Sidhwa also firmly defended the assertion that he and Perlmutter have "no political interest" in the outcome of the war. In his view, he is purely a humanitarian worker, and even his contention that Israel is committing genocide amounts to an observation, rather than taking sides in the conflict.

Perlmutter and Sidhwa close their essay by asserting that a cut-off of U.S. military aid will force an end to the war. They place no demands on Hamas or its sponsors in Tehran, not even to release the hostages. While they hope their testimony helps to end the war, they cannot see that silence about the danger posed by Hamas is one of the surest means of perpetuating the conflict.

Perlmutter did not respond to a request for comment. Politico pledged to add an editor's note to the piece after the Washington Free Beacon presented the outlet with Perlmutter and Sidhwa's views on Israel.

David Adesnik is a senior fellow and director of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Published under: Anti-Semitism , Gaza , Hamas , Israel , Media Bias , Medical Ethics , Palestinians , Politico , war

freebeacon.com · by David Adesnik · August 3, 2024

19. Taiwan is making a TV show about a Chinese invasion. And it’s hitting close to home

Excellent initiative.

 Regarding "red infiltration" described below: I will never forget attending an asymmetric warfare conference in Taiwan at the ROC Army headquarters. There were about 100 people in the room (about 20 Americans). The Chief of Staff of the ROC Army said to us in this room there are PLA spies reporting back to Beijing. I knew he was not speaking about the Americans.

Excerpts:

In “Zero Day,” Chinese infiltration and cognitive warfare takes on many forms – from the lure of money and power to the threat of violence.

In the trailer, a Taiwanese influencer casually encourages her fans to give up the fight and endorse a “peace agreement” with Beijing while livestreaming herself savoring an ice cream; elsewhere, a group of felons walk free from prison and instigate unrest, attacking those who refuse “unification.”

I hope one of the ten episodes is about the families back on the mainland who are losing their only sons to the black hole of Taiwan that is simply absorbing PLA troops who will never return. I had two discussions with the former Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu and recommended that he find a Taiwanese "Tom Clancy" to write a story about the fictional invasion of Taiwan that shows Taiwan being the "black hole" absorbing PLA troops and then describing the popular unrest against the CCP back on the mainland as families' bloodlines are ending in Taiwan with the death of their only children as members of the PLA (due to the former one child policy). Minister Wu said he would write it after he retires.

Taiwan is making a TV show about a Chinese invasion. And it’s hitting close to home | CNN

CNN · by Nectar Gan, Eric Cheung · August 5, 2024

Director Lo Ging-zim working on a scene in Taiwanese TV series "Zero Day."

Courtesy Howard Yu

Hong Kong/Taipei CNN —

Following a military blockade, panic and chaos rip through a besieged island: residents scramble to withdraw cash, foreign nationals rush to be evacuated, riots break out in prisons and television networks are hacked into broadcasting enemy propaganda.

These fictitious scenes have stirred emotion and imagination in Taiwan over what an imminent Chinese invasion may look like, since their release last month in a trailer for “Zero Day,” a forthcoming Taiwanese television series.

The 10-part show is the first in Taiwan to dramatize a possible invasion by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). That threat has loomed over the self-governing island for decades but is now gaining pace as a more powerful and aggressive China ruled by the Communist Party increasingly flexes its military might, pushing tensions to new heights.

The 17-minute trailer hit close to home in Taiwan, making headlines in local media and garnering more than a million views on YouTube.

“As a 21-year-old, I almost burst into tears when I watched it. Every scene in those 17 minutes felt so close to us. Maybe one day in the future, these scenarios will become the reality around us,” said a top comment with more than a thousand upvotes.

But the show also attracted criticism, including from opposition politicians, who said it created panic and exaggerated the crisis.

The specter of war is nothing new for Taiwan, a progressive democracy living in the shadow of authoritarian China, which views the island as its own territory and has vowed to seize it by force if necessary.

Many of Taiwan’s 23 million people have grown used to Beijing’s military threats, even as they become more regular and prominent under Xi Jinping, China’s strongman leader.

But Hsin-mei Cheng, the showrunner of “Zero Day,” worried that her fellow Taiwan citizens have grown “too numb” to the danger of an impending conflict.

“Frankly, everyone has their own fears and imaginations about the war, but in our daily lives, many avoid it or even pretend it doesn’t exist,” the journalist-turned-screenwriter told CNN.

“But as the crisis looms larger over the past two years, I think it’s about time we take a hard look at it and open this Pandora’s box,” she said.

Hsin-mei Cheng, the showrunner of "Zero Day," says she hopes the show can serve as a wakeup call to the people of Taiwan.

Courtesy Hsin-Mei Cheng

A first in Taiwan

In late 2022, more than half a year into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and months after former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei prompted a massive show of force from Beijing, Cheng decided to turn China’s threats against Taiwan into a TV drama.

It was an unprecedented project in an industry that had traditionally shunned sensitive political topics, Cheng said, but she found no shortage of like-minded partners along the way.

Robert Tsao, a chip tycoon and one of Taiwan’s richest men, became the show’s first major investor. The tech billionaire who founded Taiwan’s first semiconductor company, UMC, has previously warned of China’s threat and donated tens of millions of dollars to help Taiwan bolster its defense.

Cheng also assembled a team of 10 directors, each responsible for an episode in “Zero Day” that tells an independent story. Her main criterion for picking the crew: not afraid of being banned by China.

The vast Chinese market of 1.4 billion people has long been a draw for Taiwan’s actors and directors. But as tension rises across the strait, Taiwanese artists are increasingly faced with a choice between vocally toeing Beijing’s political line or being blocked from its lucrative market.

“The existence of this series shows that there are investors and talents who are willing to resist China’s aggression, and there’s a market for them,” said Lo Ging-zim, who directed the show’s trailer and one of the episodes.

“We are all worried and anxious about Taiwan’s present and future, and we hope to contribute what we can with our own skills.”

The crew films a scene inside Taiwan's Presidential Office Building.

Courtesy Howard Yu

Taiwan’s government and its military were supportive of the series, too.

The Presidential Office allowed the show to film on its premises, including a room where the president delivers addresses. And with the military’s approval, the production crew shot scenes aboard a warship during its routine drills.

Getting the authorities on board wasn’t easy.

“It took a lot of communication and persuasion at first,” Cheng said. But the officials understood the importance of the issue at stake and the power of films and TV shows in shaping public perception, she added. “Eventually, they decided it could be a good thing if someone makes a TV series about it.”

The show also received funding from Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture. But Lo, the director, stressed it was part of a broader program to support the island’s film and TV industries.

Neither the funding nor the access for filming gives the government any right to interfere with the production, Lo said, adding that “not a single word of the script had been modified by the government.”

“This is not a political propaganda video or patriotic film,” he said.

That level of artistic and political freedom would be impossible in mainland China and even in the city of Hong Kong, which once boasted a comparatively free and outspoken film industry that has been tamed in recent years as part of a wider crackdown.

Some Hong Kong artists have since moved to Taiwan, including Chapman To, who is starring in “Zero Day.” A vocal supporter of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, To became a naturalized Taiwanese citizen in 2022.

The shooting of “Zero Day”, which started in March, is expected to be wrapped up by the end of November and the show is planned for broadcast in Taiwan next year.

The production team is also in touch with streaming services including Netflix for a potential international release, though discussions are still in the early stages, Lo said.

"Zero Day" crew shoots a scene abroad a Taiwanese warship.

Courtesy Howard Yu

‘Red infiltration’

Most of the series takes place in the week-long countdown to “Zero Day” – the day of the fictional attack.

It starts with Beijing imposing a naval and aerial blockade on Taiwan, under the pretext of search and rescue for a PLA aircraft that “vanished” near the island. In the final episode, Chinese soldiers make landing in Kinmen, a frontline island controlled by Taiwan.

Cheng noted the show doesn’t feature many bloody scenes of military combat – instead, much of the focus is placed on “red infiltration” by China’s ruling Communist Party.

“For me, the war has already begun in Taiwan. It is not being fought through guns and cannons, but through information and infiltration. It’s permeating our daily lives,” she said.

Taiwan officials have increasingly warned against China’s cognitive warfare operations, including disinformation campaigns to sway public opinion.

In “Zero Day,” Chinese infiltration and cognitive warfare takes on many forms – from the lure of money and power to the threat of violence.

In the trailer, a Taiwanese influencer casually encourages her fans to give up the fight and endorse a “peace agreement” with Beijing while livestreaming herself savoring an ice cream; elsewhere, a group of felons walk free from prison and instigate unrest, attacking those who refuse “unification.”

Neither of these scenarios are unimaginable. Thanks to the island’s free speech protections, which were hard won after decades of martial law rule, it is not unusual to see Taiwanese celebrities and influencers parroting Beijing’s talking points. Meanwhile, Taiwan authorities have long publicly accused certain organized crime groups of spreading pro-Chinese Communist Party influence.

In another chilling scene in the trailer, the president’s emergency address to Taiwan is hacked during a live broadcast, with an AI deepfake declaring war on China. Then, television screens across the island abruptly cut to a newscast on Chinese state TV. With an eerie smile, an anchor in a pink suit announces, “the PLA promises all Taiwanese compatriots will be fully protected” and urges them to report any “pro-independence forces” in hiding.

A scene from the trailer of "Zero Day" shows pro-Beijing supporters hanging up banners calling for unification.

Courtesy Howard Yu

Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research who has served as an adviser to “Zero Day,” said the series would be “an important force in countering China’s ‘gray zone tactics’” – or actions just below what might be considered acts of war.

“In the face of fear, people can build up confidence, and this can indirectly and partially offset China’s influence warfare.” he said. “At the same time, when this film is shown on international streaming platforms, viewers around the world can learn about Taiwan from a new perspective,” he added.

The teaser has drawn praise as well as criticism.

Some blamed the series for creating panic. Lee Yen-hsiu, a member of parliament from the opposition Kuomintang party – which in recent decades has pushed for closer ties with China – accused the show of exaggerating the threat of war and further deterring international tourists from visiting Taiwan.

Others accused the trailer of making the Taiwan government look too feeble in the face of aggression from China – which has a military, population and economy that dwarfs Taiwan’s.

Lo, the director, said the government’s capability and Taiwan’s social cohesion were deliberately weakened in the show to highlight the power of Chinese infiltration – and alert Taiwanese people to be more vigilant in real life.

“We want to explore what part of humanity will show up in such a state – would it be fragility, fear and greed or courage and empathy?” he said.

“I believe every Taiwanese person has their own version of Zero Day attack in their mind. We were just the first to make it into a series.”

Cheng didn’t mind the mixed reaction.

“We all think it’s a good thing. As long as the show generates attention and discussion, it means that it resonates with something in people’s hearts,” she said.

Cheng said she didn’t want the show to cause division in Taiwan. During the production process, the crew tried to search for a common denominator that could represent the aspirations of all Taiwanese people.

They found an answer and placed it in the trailer – in the form of a line in the presidential address – “We will always believe, without choices, there’s no freedom. Without freedom, there’s no Taiwan.”

“I hope the show can serve as a wakeup call to the Taiwanese people: what should we do when we still have the right to choose?” Cheng said.

CNN · by Nectar Gan, Eric Cheung · August 5, 2024

20. Opinion Biden’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy has made America’s future more secure

For debate and discussion. I wonder who will write a rebuttal to this.

I think the administration deserves great credit for strengthening alliances in the region (and around the world). I hope the next administration (whomever may lead it) sustains the work on our alliances.

Opinion  Biden’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy has made America’s future more secure

Enhanced U.S. power in the region is one of the most important legacies of this administration.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/08/05/blinken-austin-sullivan-biden-indo-pacific-military-economic/

5 min

306

President Biden shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in the Oval Office on April 10. (Craig Hudson for The Washington Post)

By Antony Blinken, Lloyd Austin and Jake Sullivan

August 5, 2024 at 6:30 a.m. EDT

Antony Blinken is the U.S. secretary of state, Lloyd Austin is defense secretary and Jake Sullivan is President Biden’s national security adviser.

No place on Earth is more critical to Americans’ livelihoods and futures than the Indo-Pacific.

Sign up for the Prompt 2024 newsletter for opinions on the biggest questions in politics

The region — which stretches from our Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean — generates nearly 60 percent of global gross domestic product. Its commerce supports more than 3 million American jobs. Much of the world’s advanced manufacturing, which helps power the U.S. economy, happens in its factories. And the area’s serious security challenges, including North Korea’s nuclear saber-rattling and China’s dangerous and provocative actions at sea, have effects far beyond the region.

But when President Biden took office, America’s standing in this critical part of the world was at its lowest point in decades. The region was still reeling from the covid-19 pandemic. Our allies and partners feared that the United States had become an unreliable friend. An increasingly aggressive China was taking advantage of America’s turn inward to advance its alternative vision of the world — a vision hostile to U.S. interests.

So, President Biden instructed us to transform our approach to the region.

This transformation — and the tremendous results it has brought about — is one of the most important and least-told stories of the foreign policy strategy advanced by President Biden and Vice President Harris.

First, we upgraded the old “hub and spoke” model of diplomacy with an integrated, interconnected network of partnerships.

The United States had long had one-to-one partnerships and alliances with other Indo-Pacific countries. But much like the hub and the spokes of a wheel, those individual partnerships didn’t overlap. We have worked not just to strengthen our existing one-to-one relationships in Asia but also to bring those partners together in new and innovative ways.

We launched AUKUS, a new security partnership among Australia, Britain and the United States.

President Biden brought together Japan and South Korea — two countries with a difficult history — to join the United States in the Camp David Trilateral Summit, spurring unprecedented defense and economic cooperation among our countries. He hosted the first-ever summit between Japan and the Philippines, forging another three-way partnership with U.S. treaty allies.

We elevated the regional grouping known as the Quad — Australia, India, Japan and the United States — to deliver hundreds of millions of lifesaving coronavirus vaccines, mobilize millions of dollars in digital-infrastructure investments, and advance the global clean energy transition.

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We created the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity with 13 other partners to ensure we are meeting the economic challenges of today and not two decades ago, such as building secure supply chains and protecting our critical technologies.

And we hosted two critical regional institutions – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Pacific Islands Forum — for their first-ever summits at the White House.

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OpinionThe future with Vietnam might depend on the past

Second, we worked closely with our allies and partners to confront shared challenges together.

No country in the world has alliances and partnerships like America’s. They magnify our strength and project our power. And they deliver results. Today, this is strikingly evident in the Indo-Pacific. For example, Japan is making historic investments in defense, which will allow it to contribute far more to our alliance — and to security in the region.

South Korea has adopted a new strategy to surge economic investment in key industries in Southeast Asia, strengthening supply chains the U.S. economy relies on.

Australia has deployed new resources to help Pacific Island nations become more resilient — both to climate change and to economic coercion from China.

The Philippines is modernizing its military capabilities and increasingly integrating them with America’s, making them more capable of standing up to bullying from China in the South China Sea.

India and the United States are investing together across the sectors that will shape the future — from semiconductors, to artificial intelligence, to clean energy.

And just last month, we unveiled plans to modernize the command and control of U.S. forces in Japan — the largest upgrade to U.S.-Japanese military ties in seven decades. The defense ministers of Japan, South Korea and the United States met together in Japan for the first time ever. And we announced a once-in-a-generation investment of $500 million to support modernization of the Philippine military.

President Biden has also built bridges among our allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Japan and other Asian partners have stepped forward with strong support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression. Meanwhile, our European partners are standing together to hold China accountable for supporting Vladimir Putin’s war machine and undermining the international rules-based order.

​ 

All this is producing historic security dividends. We’re locking arms with our allies and partners against North Korea’s destabilizing weapons programs. We’re pushing back together against China’s dangerous brinkmanship in the region’s waterways. Our security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific are more effective and more unified — which makes us and our neighbors safer and stronger.

21. USSOCOM hosts quarterly 1st SOF Truth day on transitioning from the military

USSOCOM hosts quarterly 1st SOF Truth day on transitioning from the military

dvidshub.net

Photo By Michael Bottoms | U.S. Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, front right, commander of U.S. Special Operations...... read more

Photo By Michael Bottoms | U.S. Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, front right, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Army Sgt. Maj. Shane Shorter, front left, command senior enlisted leader for U.S. SOCOM, give opening remarks during “1st SOF Truth” day at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, July 30, 2024. The 1st SOF Truth day is hosted by the command and focuses on its #1 priority – people. This event focused on members transitioning from the military and empowering leaders and people with access to the resources available throughout the process. The seminar hosted representatives with the Department of Defense Human Resources Programs, 14 benevolent organizations, and transitioning program leads from the headquarters and components who shared information from their respective areas. (Photo by Michael Bottoms) | View Image Page

MACDILL AFB, FLORIDA, UNITED STATES

08.05.2024

Story by Michael Bottoms

U.S. Special Operations Command

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. – U.S. Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Army Sgt. Maj. Shane Shorter, command senior enlisted leader for U.S. SOCOM, hosted the sixth 1st Special Operations Forces Truth Day, July 30, a series of virtual forums focused on people.

Every quarter, the command’s leaders focus on resources for U.S. SOCOM personnel and their families. This quarter focused on ways to assist SOF members when they transition out of the military.

To open the discussion, Fenton stressed the forum is for O-6 and above command teams, from across the entire SOF enterprise, to attain the necessary tools to take care of their teams at the lowest levels.

Discussions centered around understanding the transition process, being aware of programs available and knowing how to access transition services. Fenton and Shorter emphasized leadership commitment to the welfare of the force.

“The command teams we have in the SOCOM organization are the most incredible in the entire world,” said Fenton. “So, it’s not just a conversation in the team room, but the resources come directly to them.”

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Policy and Programs Erin Logan also gave opening remarks and emphasized transitioning is another mission and commanders need to give time to their people for that process.

“No one does it alone,” said Logan. “Our concept is ‘you are SOF for life,’ so embrace that. Transition is simply the next mission. Service members need time to train and prepare for that mission.”

The seminar hosted representatives with the Department of Defense Human Resources Programs, 14 benevolent organizations, and transitioning program leads from the headquarters and components who shared information from their respective areas.

“The best recruiter is a successful veteran,” said Walter Herd, director of the Army Transition Division, Human Resources Command Center of Excellence, Fort Knox, Kentucky. “If you help a Soldier transition well, give them the time to transition and become successful, then they will become an excellent recruiter.”

Matt Stevens, chief operating officer with The Honor Foundation, shared how veterans transitioning from SOF can become successful.

“It is important to find identity and purpose as service members transition,” said Stevens. “Be introspective and figure out what you want to do in the next phase of your life.”

The Honor Foundation is a career transition program, specifically for SOF members, that provides a clear process and helps them translate their military service experience to the private sector.

During the seminar, leaders highlighted that the transitioning process doesn’t just affect the service member.

“It is not only important to help the service member transition, but also their spouse,” said Jessica Long, program manager for Hiring Our Heroes, a non-profit organization. “It is important to recognize that the whole family is transitioning.”

The quarterly events are a component of the U.S. SOCOM Preservation of the Force and Family’s Integrated Performance Campaign to develop a mutual understanding across senior leadership and explore a variety of approaches to address ways to help people.

Note: All the presentations given that day are available through U.S. SOCOM’s CAC-enabled internal portal and available for individual or unit training purposes.

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22. China's special forces launch spy drone that flaps wings like a real bird

A photo of some of the "trove" of electronic gadgets is at the link: https://www.the-express.com/news/world-news/145172/china-navy-commando-units-tests-bird-drones-jet-surfboards

Based on the photo of the soldier with the bird-like drone I can tell that the Chinese soldiers will be taking up "Falconing" to train using these drones. (note my attempt at sarcasm and humor)

China's special forces launch spy drone that flaps wings like a real bird

The live-fire exercise was held on the 97th founding anniversary of the People's Liberation Army - the largest standing military in the world.

By Kia Fatahi

16:22 ET, Mon, Aug 5, 2024 | UPDATED: 16:43 ET, Mon, Aug 5, 2024

the-express.com · by Kia Fatahi · August 5, 2024

China's elite navy commando unit tests a bird-like drone in a combat drill broadcast on a TV segment (Image: X)

A newly released video showed Chinese elite special forces deploying a trove of electric gadgets, including jet surfboads and bird-like biomimetic drones, during a a televised combat demonstration.

The live-fire exercise was held at the Nanchang Infantry Academy in Jiangxi and was broadcast live on China Military - a military-affiliated tv segment - on August 1.

August 1 is the date that China commemorates the 97th founding anniversary of the People's Liberation Army, which is currently the largest standing military in the world.

• China issued warning shot as US sinks 820-foot ship with stealth explosives
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Video shows several soldiers from the Jiaolong Commandos, an elite amphibious unit under the People's Liberation Army's Navy, riding jet-powered surfboards in a lake.

The Recon Guy from PLAN MC “Jiaolong Commandos” | “Who’s the Gunner King” Trailer • August 1st Special Present pic.twitter.com/yZcKdGdObS

— David Wang (@Nickatgreat1220) August 1, 2024

The Jiaolong Commando, also known as "Sea Dragon," is considered to have "capabilities in air, on land, at sea and underwater, and it can also launch sea-based anti-terrorism operations, according to a CCP-affiliated news report.

The mysterious unit reportedly participated in the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Yemen during the civil war since 2015, according to Chinese state media.

In the TV segment, one of the commandos was seen throwing a winged drone - designed to resemble a sparrow - from his hand after resurfacing from a lake.

The drone is classified as a biomimetic ornithopter, or an unmanned aerial vehicle that can carry advanced sensors, designed to mimic the wing-flapping action of a real bird.

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Due to its extremely small size and appearance, the drones looks like birds when seen from a distance, making this a potential useful tool for special operations forces to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance of enemy targets.

This is not the first time that Chinese government and military agencies have unveiled bird-like drones for reconaissance.

In 2018, China had reportedly unveiled similar bird-like drones that have flown over the Xinjiang region, according to a 2018 report by the South China Morning Post.

the-express.com · by Kia Fatahi · August 5, 2024

23. Several US personnel injured in rocket attack on Iraq base, official says

Video and map at the link.

Several US personnel injured in rocket attack on Iraq base, official says

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/05/politics/personnel-injured-iraq-al-asad-airbase/index.html

By Haley Britzky, CNN

 3 minute read 

Updated 7:09 AM EDT, Tue August 6, 2024

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Several US personnel were injured in a suspected rocket attack Monday against US and coalition forces at Al-Asad Airbase in Iraq, a US defense official said.

“We can confirm that there was a suspected rocket attack today against US and Coalition forces at Al-Asad Airbase, Iraq,” the official said. “Initial indications are that several US personnel were injured. Base personnel are conducting a post-attack damage assessment.”

The US Defense Department late Monday blamed Iran-aligned militia groups for the attack, calling it a “dangerous escalation.”

A Pentagon readout of a call between US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said the two men “agreed that today’s Iran-aligned militia attack on U.S. forces stationed at Al-Asad Airbase in western Iraq marked a dangerous escalation and demonstrated Iran’s destabilizing role in the region.”

Austin reiterated to Gallant “unwavering U.S. commitment to Israel’s security in the face of threats from Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and other Iran-aligned militia groups,” according to the readout.

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Al-Asad Airbase

A vehicle carrying rockets was intercepted by the Iraqi military Monday after the attack. The Iraqi military said in a statement that two rockets were launched from the vehicle in the Haditha district, with eight more being prepared for launch.

The statement added that the perpetrators of the attack are currently being pursued and that leaders, commanders and officers responsible for the “security breaches in the area” will be held accountable.

The attack comes amid extremely high tensions in the Middle East, as the US has been bracing for Iranian retaliation against Israel over the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran last week. Israel has not commented on the killing of Haniyeh. Hezbollah in Lebanon has also vowed retaliation on Israel after the assassination of one of its top commanders in Beirut less than a day before Haniyeh’s killing.

It also comes just days after Austin ordered additional military assets to the region, sending a carrier strike group, a fighter squadron and additional warships to the Middle East.

US officials have long blamed attacks on troops in Iraq and Syria on Iran-backed militia groups.

Deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh said last month after a drone attack on Al-Asad that it was “most likely” carried out by Iranian-supported groups.

“We know that these are IRGC-backed militias that have launched these attacks on US forces in the past. Most likely than not, it is one of those affiliate groups,” Singh said on July 18.

Between October 17 and January 29, there were more than 150 attacks on US personnel in Iraq and Syria. Those attacks slowed after three American troops were killed in a drone attack on a small US outpost in Jordan, resulting in a significant US response that hit 85 targets at seven different locations.

“The United States does not seek conflict in the Middle East or anywhere else in the world,” President Joe Biden said at the time. “But let all those who might seek to do us harm know this: If you harm an American, we will respond.”

This story has been updated with additional developments.

24. The U.S. Finally Wakes Up on Venezuela

The U.S. Finally Wakes Up on Venezuela

Biden is so far silent on this blatant election theft in the Americas.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-finally-wakes-up-on-venezuela-maduro-americas-election-10a5451d?mod=latest_headlines

By The Editorial Board

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Aug. 5, 2024 5:47 pm ET

President Nicolás Maduro speaks during a march amid the disputed presidential election, Caracas, Venezuela, Aug. 3. Photo: maxwell briceno/Reuters

The Biden Administration finally awakened late last week to the obvious reality that Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro is trying to steal another election. The question is whether the U.S. is willing to do anything other than stomp its feet in protest.

For days the State Department dallied in making a judgment even as Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) had refused to release tallies backing up Mr. Maduro’s claims that he had won. But the opposition had organized thousands of monitors at local polling stations who took photos of the tabulated results, and it has posted them online. They show a dominant opposition victory.

“Given the overwhelming evidence, it is clear to the United States and, most importantly, to the Venezuelan people that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes in Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledged on Thursday evening. The Organization of American States has also issued a statement acknowledging the opposition victory.

But words won’t be enough to counter Mr. Maduro’s crackdown. He has called in the Cuban special forces group known as black wasps to lead a military crackdown. Local opposition poll monitors are being tracked down and threatened. Mr. González Urrutia and the opposition leader María Corina Machado have gone into hiding and could be arrested at any moment.

Ms. Machado, who was blocked by the regime from running against Mr. Maduro, risked arrest Saturday to speak to thousand who took to the streets of Caracas to protest the election theft. But Mr. Maduro says the regime has already arrested 2,000 people and there will be more.

Mr. Maduro is backed by Cuba, Russia and China. Brazil and Colombia, both with leftist governments that claim to support democracy, are calling for the release of CNE results, but they have to know CNE is fully controlled by Mr. Maduro’s minions.

Mr. Maduro craves at least the appearance of democratic legitimacy, which the Biden Administration granted by easing oil sanctions on Venezuela in return for the promise of a fair election. The U.S. wanted Venezuelan oil on the world market to ease global prices. But Mr. Maduro and Cuba made Mr. Blinken and President Biden look naive.

Will the U.S. do more now to rally nations to speak up for Venezuela’s democrats? Will they reinstate oil sanctions and in particular impose sanctions on individuals in the regime who are stealing the election? The Venezuelan people have demonstrated their bravery in risking their lives and livelihoods to challenge a thuggish regime. The least they deserve is for the President of the United States to speak and act on their behalf.

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Appeared in the August 6, 2024, print edition as 'The U.S. Finally Wakes Up on Venezuela'.

25. Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura (graphic novel)

I received this note from AUSA. A fascinating graphic novel series is at the AUSA web site at this link: https://www.ausa.org/medal-honor-graphic-novels

I personally have never had an interest in graphic novels but perhaps some of our young people might be interested.

I had no idea of the story behind Hiroshi Miyamura - classified Medal of Honor.

Mr. Maxwell-

On Tuesday, August 6, the Association of the United States Army is proud to announce its latest entry in the Medal of Honor graphic novel series: Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura.

I invite you to share this complimentary digital graphic novel with your readership. Those interested can view the work or download a free copy at www.ausa.org/miyamura or www.ausa.org/moh.

Hiroshi Miyamura received the only Medal of Honor classified as top secret. While fighting in Korea as a machine-gun squad leader, Miyamura faced wave after wave of Chinese soldiers during a night assault. He ordered his men to fall back while he covered their withdrawal. Miyamura was captured by the enemy and held for over two years, only finding out upon his release that he had been awarded the nation’s highest military honor.

Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura was created by a team of professional comic book veterans:

Script: Chuck Dixon (Batman, The Punisher, The ’Nam) 

Artwork, Cover: Andrew Paquette (Avengers, Daredevil, Hellraiser)

Lettering: Troy Peteri (Spider-Man, Iron Man, X-Men)

***

American soldiers have always displayed heroism on the battlefield. But only a select few are recognized with the nation's highest military decoration: the Medal of Honor.

The Association of the United States Army celebrates their valor with the Medal of Honor graphic novel series. These full-color digital books are created by a talented team of professionals drawn from the comic book industry, and the details are vetted by professional historians. Each eight-page issue profiles a true American hero, bringing to life the daring deeds that distinguished themselves by gallantry in action “above and beyond the call of duty.”

The series started in October 2018 with the release of Medal of Honor: Alvin York to commemorate the centennial of York’s heroic actions in World War I. To date, 23 issues have been published, commemorating such heroes as Audie Murphy, Mary Walker, Roy Benavidez, Ralph Puckett, and Alwyn Cashe.

AUSA is producing four new issues in 2024, along with a paperback collection for the fall:

Medal of Honor: Ruben Rivers – for the African American tank commander who fought with the famed “Black Panthers” in World War II

Medal of Honor: Flo Groberg – to celebrate the first foreign-born Medal of Honor recipient since the Vietnam War

Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura – to recognize the Korean War soldier whose award was classified as top secret

Medal of Honor: Charles Whittlesey – for the commander of the Lost Battalion of World War I

Information and links to all of the graphic novels are available on AUSA’s Medal of Honor series page at www.ausa.org/moh.

To read Medal of Honor: Hiroshi Miyamura online or download a free copy, please visit www.ausa.org/miyamura. 

***

Please feel free to share this material with your readership; I do ask that you let me know about any posts or reviews.

You can contact me with any questions at jcraig@ausa.org.

26. How to Make Military AI Governance More Robust

Excerpts:

As states work to implement the Political Declaration, it is imperative to share best practices for mitigating risks in specific use cases, including through legal reviews, codes of conduct, and policy guidance. NATO, as well as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), would be a natural venue for sharing best practices, given the alignment of strategic interests and established intelligence-sharing mechanisms. But engagement must not stop there; it is essential to develop confidence-building measures with China and the Global South to socialize and institutionalize norms surrounding military AI. This need not start from a values-based approach, but rather from states sharing common interests in ensuring that military AI does not upend global security, stability, and prosperity.

Last but not least, capacity building must be a central focus of the upcoming Responsible AI in the Military Domain summit. States should share not only best practices but technical tools and expertise to ensure that all parties that endorse the Political Declaration are able to fully implement its standards. So far, capacity building has been the missing part of the conversation on how to make military AI safer. Policymakers have the opportunity to change that discourse in the pre-summit meetings that are happening now.

The future of military AI governance hinges on collaborative policy efforts rather than legal regulation. The Political Declaration marks a significant stride toward establishing international norms, but it must go beyond common myths and misconceptions surrounding military AI to be effective. As the next Responsible AI in the Military Domain summit approaches, policymakers should focus on clarifying how the law applies to specific AI applications, identifying policy tools to fill legal gaps in protection, and building capacity to implement governance standards within and outside of traditional alliance structures. In the current geopolitical climate, this is the most viable path for mitigating the risks of military AI, leveraging its opportunities, and upholding global security.

How to Make Military AI Governance More Robust - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Brianna Rosen · August 6, 2024

AI-enabled warfare has reached its “Oppenheimer moment.” From the backroom to the battlefield, AI is now being integrated into the full spectrum of military operations, including in logistics, intelligence collection, wargaming, decision-making, target identification, and weapons systems, with increasing levels of autonomy. The Ukrainian military is flying AI-enabled drones; the Israel Defense Forces are relying on AI to accelerate and expand targeting in Gaza; and the Pentagon is using AI to identify targets for airstrikes. The military AI revolution has arrived, and the debate over how it will be governed is heating up.

To navigate this moment responsibly and at responsible speed, policymakers are racing to develop AI governance frameworks even as AI tools are deployed on the battlefield. In the United States, the Biden administration’s executive order on AI directs the U.S. government to prepare a memorandum on military and intelligence uses of this technology area. It is expected to be finalized soon. The Trump campaign has vowed to rescind that order and is reportedly planning to launch a series of “Manhattan Projects” to roll back “burdensome regulations.” On the international stage, the United States is working with like-minded countries to expand the first-ever international agreement on military use of AI — a non-legally binding declaration — ahead of the second Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain in September.

As AI pervades the battlespace, it is time to implement policies and forge consensus around how it will be governed. And while policy debates finally have moved beyond lethal autonomous weapons systems, governance frameworks still suffer from a narrow focus on military operations and international humanitarian law, leaving critical gaps in protection for civilians. Building on the international agreement, policymakers have a rapidly closing window of opportunity to address these problems and ensure that military AI is truly safe — on and off the battlefield.

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Myths and Misconceptions

Before governance issues can be addressed, several myths and misconceptions about military AI must be dispelled. First, there is a tendency to conceive of military AI as though it were a monolithic category, akin to nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. But AI is a general-purpose technology, encompassing a wide range of use cases and applications. Laws, norms, or policies that are adequate for one application may be inapplicable or inappropriate for another. While the term “military AI” might be a useful shorthand phrase, meaningful discussions on AI governance must consider specific use cases, or at least clusters of use cases that share similar characteristics.

Second, military AI is not limited to military organizations. States rely on military, intelligence, and diplomatic services to shape the battlespace and gain asymmetric advantages. Each of these communities is leveraging different AI applications to carry out their specific missions. Intelligence agencies, in particular, are relying on AI to collect, triage, and analyze vast amounts of data in support of military operations. Any governance regime that focuses exclusively on operational military use, then, will fail to put essential safeguards in place at critical points in the “kill chain” or other decision-making processes.

Finally, the concept of “responsible AI” should not be the only touchstone for governance and regulation. As Commissioner Kenneth Payne argued at a recent Wilton Park dialogue in which I participated, AI will change the strategic balance of power, giving rise to new security dilemmas where the most responsible course of action may be to not regulate beyond what the law already requires. Should policymakers tie their hands to more stringent standards when AI affords adversaries decisive strategic advantages in war? What is the responsible course of action in such a scenario?

More broadly, when it comes to national security, the ambiguity of the “responsible AI” framing leaves a great deal of room for interpretation, undermining efforts to establish global consensus. As we have seen in the cyber domain in recent decades, concepts such as “responsibility,” “security,” and “rights” often do not translate across geopolitical divides.

Responsible AI is not the same as AI governance. And as we race to create shared understandings of what AI governance should look like, it is important to keep in focus that governance is about more than just law.

Governance as International Law

Discussions on military AI governance myopically tend to start at law. For more than a decade, states have debated the merits of concluding a new treaty or instituting a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in international institutions and fora, including the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Yet little progress has been made. States are reluctant to ban AI applications that could have significant strategic utility, and they are unwilling to be transparent about sensitive tools used in military and intelligence operations. Given these realities and rising geopolitical tensions, the prospects for an international treaty or an outright ban appear slim.

Instead, states have seized upon existing law, and international humanitarian law in particular, as the standard for regulating military AI. The Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, which has been endorsed by more than 50 countries, emphasizes that the “use of AI in armed conflict must be in accord with states’ obligations under international humanitarian law, including its fundamental principles.” The United States, United Kingdom, and Russia, among other states, repeatedly have stressed that international humanitarian law is sufficient to regulate lethal autonomous weapons systems.

That view is largely correct. Nothing about AI formally or functionally changes the obligations that states have under domestic or international law. AI, like other technologies that have come before it, is an enabler of war — not a weapon in and of itself. AI is a tool. The effects of that tool, and the laws governing it, depend on how it is used. So long as AI is used in military operations that are compliant with international law, existing law theoretically should provide adequate protection.

It would be a category mistake, however, to turn to international humanitarian law as the only framework to regulate defense-related AI applications. Many AI systems have no direct connection to killing in war, even if they increase its pace, scale, or scope. How should these tools be regulated? For example, states are required under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions to ensure all “weapons, means or methods of warfare” are subject to legal reviews to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. But non-weaponized AI applications such as decision support systems would not necessarily be subject to the same rules. Similarly, international humanitarian law simply is not the appropriate body of law when it comes to the development and deployment of AI applications used in intelligence activities that merely contribute to military operations.

As military AI use becomes more ubiquitous, deployment outside of clearly defined armed conflicts becomes more important to regulate. In these settings, adherence to more protective standards — notably, international human rights law — is required. The U.N. General Assembly in a non-binding resolution in March recognized that states must “refrain from or cease the use of artificial intelligence systems that are impossible to operate in compliance with international human rights law.” But that resolution did not explicitly address military and intelligence applications of AI. When AI is used outside of armed conflict, it is imperative that the more protective legal regime of international human rights law should apply. Otherwise, as I have argued elsewhere, the exceptional rules that are said to apply in war risk becoming the default regime across the spectrum of military AI use cases.

Just as existing law applies to AI, improper use of AI tools may also contribute to serious violations of international law — potentially on a larger scale and at a faster pace than without the use of such tools. This is especially true in dynamic targeting and fast-paced conflict environments, when cognitive overload and automation bias impede careful review of AI outputs. Misuse or unquestioning reliance on AI decision support systems, for example, may cause human operators to misidentify civilians as combatants and target the former, violating the principle of distinction. If misidentification occurs on a sufficiently large scale, human operators may launch strikes that disproportionately kill civilians compared to the concrete, direct military advantage obtained.

Even if the above issues are addressed, the law will still fall short of robust AI governance due to acute verification and enforcement problems. In contrast to drone strikes, it is virtually impossible to verify whether and when AI tools have been used in war because they do not necessarily alter the physical signature of weapons systems, which often switch between AI and non-AI enabled modes. This technical feature implies it may be difficult for external observers to discern whether and when AI, as opposed to the military system without AI as an enabler, has contributed to a breach of international law. It also underscores problems with ensuring that adequate enforcement mechanisms are in place, since the ease of defection is far greater than with conventional arms control regimes.

Ultimately, the most pernicious myth about military AI is that there is clear agreement on how international law regulates its use, and that existing law is sufficient to ensure responsible use across the full spectrum of AI applications. Similar to global debates on international law protections in cyberspace, states must develop clear positions on when and how relevant legal regimes apply in complex cases. Additional policy guidance is urgently needed to ensure that international humanitarian law is correctly interpreted and applied, as well as to strengthen safeguards around AI applications that fall outside of what international humanitarian law governs.

Beyond the Law

As with other emerging technologies, the solution to AI governance problems may lie more at the level of policy than law. Policy guidance, political declarations, rules of engagement, and codes of conduct play a crucial role in areas where the law is difficult to interpret or apply. Non-legally binding policies also help build consensus on international norms surrounding the development and deployment of military AI.

The Political Declaration represents an important step toward achieving that goal. But the principles contained in that agreement must be strengthened to fully realize its potential. As policymakers prepare for the Responsible AI in the Military Domain Summit 2024, concrete steps must be taken to address the myths and misconceptions surrounding military AI that impede effective governance.

As a starting point, states should expand the scope and ambition of the Political Declaration. At present, the principles apply primarily to Western countries and the military organizations within them. Key powers — notably China, Russia, and Israel — have not endorsed it. That is problematic considering that Ukraine and Gaza are testing grounds for military AI right now.

For those countries that have endorsed the Political Declaration, the scope should be expanded to include all defense-related applications of AI, both within and outside of the military chain of command. The declaration currently only requires that states “ensure their military organizations adopt and implement these principles for the responsible development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities.” This implies that intelligence agencies that are not part of military organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency or Mossad, are under no obligation to adhere to the principles contained in the declaration, even if they are using AI to identify targets for military action.

Relatedly, states should take steps to clarify how the law applies across the spectrum of AI use cases. This is crucial for ensuring broader compliance with international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and all other applicable legal regimes.

As states work to implement the Political Declaration, it is imperative to share best practices for mitigating risks in specific use cases, including through legal reviews, codes of conduct, and policy guidance. NATO, as well as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), would be a natural venue for sharing best practices, given the alignment of strategic interests and established intelligence-sharing mechanisms. But engagement must not stop there; it is essential to develop confidence-building measures with China and the Global South to socialize and institutionalize norms surrounding military AI. This need not start from a values-based approach, but rather from states sharing common interests in ensuring that military AI does not upend global security, stability, and prosperity.

Last but not least, capacity building must be a central focus of the upcoming Responsible AI in the Military Domain summit. States should share not only best practices but technical tools and expertise to ensure that all parties that endorse the Political Declaration are able to fully implement its standards. So far, capacity building has been the missing part of the conversation on how to make military AI safer. Policymakers have the opportunity to change that discourse in the pre-summit meetings that are happening now.

The future of military AI governance hinges on collaborative policy efforts rather than legal regulation. The Political Declaration marks a significant stride toward establishing international norms, but it must go beyond common myths and misconceptions surrounding military AI to be effective. As the next Responsible AI in the Military Domain summit approaches, policymakers should focus on clarifying how the law applies to specific AI applications, identifying policy tools to fill legal gaps in protection, and building capacity to implement governance standards within and outside of traditional alliance structures. In the current geopolitical climate, this is the most viable path for mitigating the risks of military AI, leveraging its opportunities, and upholding global security.

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Brianna Rosen (@rosen_br) is a senior fellow at Just Security and a strategy and policy fellow at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government.

Image: EJ Hersom

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Brianna Rosen · August 6, 2024

27. Lessons Never Learned: The US Army Disinterest in the 1912–13 Balkan Wars and Today’s Professional Military Discourse

Conclusion:

Within the US Army, there is an active search for lessons about the modern battlefield from the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. This process is vital and should be continued. But there is a danger that these conflicts will become the template for modern warfare, much as the Gulf War, and particularly the Battle of 73 Easting, did for the 1990s US Army. In the process, the lessons of the numerous conflicts today ranging from ethnic insurgency in Myanmar to gang warlords in Mexico will be as ignored much as pre–World War I officers ignored the Balkan Wars. For both the US Army and its officers to prepare for the future it is essential that lessons be identified from a variety of sources, that they are properly analyzed, and that they are spread across the entire service and used to inform the way the Army prepares for tomorrow’s wars. To do so, the infrastructure must be in place. That should include a broad, generalist publication like the Journal of the Military Service Institution.

Lessons Never Learned: The US Army Disinterest in the 1912–13 Balkan Wars and Today’s Professional Military Discourse - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brian McAllister Linn · August 6, 2024

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The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have generated an extensive commentary seeking both to define the characteristics of modern war and to identify lessons applicable for future conflicts. Reflecting today’s proliferation of information (and opinions), students of modern war can quickly exhaust themselves listening to podcasts and seminars, watching videos, and reading everything from blogs to official documents. Given the vast—and often contradictory—amount of current analysis, a study of how the pre–information age US Army’s professional journals assimilated and disseminated lessons from ongoing conflicts may assist those seeking a path through today’s flood of commentary. It also confirms the Harding Project’s recognition of the importance of both the quality and influence of the service’s professional journals.

Much of the current professional military discussion revolves around the purported lessons from Ukraine and Gaza. But will those lessons be propagated across the Army and inform the way it prepares for tomorrow’s wars? To explore this question, we can turn to the past and examine how Army journals derived lessons from the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). Both conflicts were seen by contemporaries as examples of modern war, involving the rapid mobilization of mass armies, costly infantry assaults, intense artillery barrages, machine guns, trenches, and appalling numbers of casualties. But how the Army leadership and its intellectual community perceived these two conflicts was very different.

When the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out, the US Army sent teams to both armies. Not only were they among the largest observer contingents, these teams included such outstanding officers as Peyton C. March and John J. Pershing. The observers’ reports were printed by the War Department in 1907 and widely disseminated throughout the service’s school system. The Army’s primary intellectual forum, the Journal of the Military Service Institution, published both American and foreign analyses within months of the war’s outbreak. Certain topics quickly sparked intra-Army debate—the risks of infantry assaults, the relative merits of offense and defense, methods of employing artillery, the relevance of cavalry—that generated an informed, multibranch dialogue. Combined with a flood of newspaper accounts and several memoirs and campaign narratives, even at an isolated post an officer could assimilate a large amount of relevant data, draw his own analysis, and submit it for publication. Until the US entry into World War I, the Russo-Japanese War remained a perennial topic in all military journals. Although the lessons of the war were hotly debated, both the dissemination of information and the ensuing debates provided a common foundation for officers to appreciate and adapt to problems they would soon encounter on the battlefields of France.

In contrast, the pre–World War I US Army’s efforts to draw lessons from the Balkan Wars were far less organized and thorough. These conflicts were on a massive scale—perhaps 1,500,000 combatants—and were characterized by both rapid mobile operations and trench warfare. Much of what would soon define the Western Front—artillery used for indirect fire, the slaughter of unprotected infantry assaulting with the bayonet, rapid maneuvers by corps and armies ultimately stopped by trenches, aerial reconnaissance, and much more—were previewed here. The US Army quickly sent Lieutenant Sherman Miles as an observer, and his reports were clear, accurate, and prescient. Among the lessons Miles identified, he noted the appalling cost of infantry attacks against entrenched opponents, the necessity for combined arms operations, and that indirect fire, field fortifications, unit cohesion, and aviation were essential components of modern war.

Despite their relevance for both modern warfare and professional education, the Balkan Wars had far less impact on the US Army than the Russo-Japanese War. The only military publication to cover them in any detail was the Journal of the Military Service Institution. And in comparison to the extensive coverage of the Russo-Japanese War, the journal’s examination of the Balkan Wars was limited to articles by Brigadier General James N. Allison, a commissary officer. Allison, who assumed editorship of the journal in 1914, based his analysis not on US observer reports, but on newspapers and articles in foreign journals. The journal also published a few translations and a five-page study of the postwar borders. But taken together, its coverage of the Balkan Wars barely equaled a series on the customs and traditions of the late-nineteenth-century Army. The branch journals, sponsored by their respective schools, all but ignored the conflicts until they were over. The Field Artillery Journal published a lecture by a junior lieutenant in 1915. That same year the Infantry Journal published an essay on the siege of Adrianople (written by an artillery officer); prior to that, it limited its analysis of the Balkan Wars to a five-page synopsis, an almost equally brief translation of a German article, and a handful of editorials. The Journal of the US Cavalry Association was even more dismissive: its treatment of the war consisted of a few sentences.

Why didn’t the Balkan Wars, such apparent harbingers of future war, create more of an impact? First, and probably foremost, they occurred at the same time the US Army was fully engaged in a border crisis with Mexico. This prompted extensive discussion not only on a possible war with that country but on the militia, mobilization, and force structure. The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 captured the journals’ attention and consigned the Balkan Wars to secondary interest.

Second, the US Army leadership and educational establishment made far less effort to study and disseminate the lessons of the Balkan Wars than it did the Russo-Japanese War. Lessons cannot be learned if a military institution does not inform its members, and in the case of the Balkan Wars, the War Department published neither an official history, a summary of lessons learned, or Miles’s reports. The limited analysis provided to and by American officers was haphazard, episodic, and delayed.

Third, many authors and editors viewed the Balkan Wars as an opportunity to confirm preexisting beliefs rather than to learn new lessons. This perfunctory treatment may reflect widespread intellectual exhaustion brought on by a decade of numerous organizational changes (the Root Reforms) and revisions to both branch-specific and Army-wide doctrine. It is not surprising that the branch schools, which sponsored their respective military journals, believed their primary responsibility was to teach bewildered readers the new methods, and not to expose them to still newer ones. Unfortunately, in their focus on equipment, drill, and inspirational tales of past glories they too often fell victim to the compartmentalization and narrow focus identified by J. P. Clark. Thus, the Infantry Journal, whose editorial board passed up no opportunity to bemoan America’s military unpreparedness, identified as the most important lesson of the Balkan Wars that the Bulgarians had mobilized an entire army and defeated the Turks in a fraction of the time the United States had taken to deploy a skeleton division on its borders. The Cavalry Journal, representing a branch on the defensive against charges of obsolescence and irrelevance, found in the Balkan Wars proof of the cavalry’s importance. This problem of confirmation rather than learning was not unique to the Americans. Miles noted his fellow observers from other countries, drawn from their respective general staffs, were so engrossed in strategy, maps, and the movement of divisions and armies, they remained indifferent to the realities of trench warfare, food, and soldiers’ morale that proved decisive in the war’s outcome.

Finally, there was the question of immediacy. It took barely a year for US Army officers studying the successful Japanese siege of Port Arthur to conclude the US Navy’s proposed base in Subic Bay was indefensible. In contrast, besides Miles the few Army officers who wrote on the Balkan Wars did not identify lessons that required immediate application. With the US Army fully engaged in its traditional mission of border protection and an imminent war with Mexico, a faraway war in a distant land was not high on its list of priorities.

Are there still lessons for today’s military professionals in this treatment of the Balkan Wars by the Army’s pre–information age professional journals? Rather than present a list of lessons—the dangers of confirmation bias, overspecialization, branch parochialism—well known to most military readers, this article will be content with one. The Army should sponsor a publication with a broad, generalist perspective like the Journal of the Military Service Institution.

The proposed new journal would serve as what J. P. Clark terms a “watering hole” where Army readers could find longer articles dealing with topics of broad, collective interest. These articles would be written by authors with sufficient research, analytical, and writing skills to discuss military issues that transcend headlines. This journal’s editors could offer a prize for the best essay on a topic of perennial Army concern such as conceptualizing future warfare, improving morale and leadership, winning the information battle both at home and abroad, recruitment and retention, or comparisons of US, allied, and potentially hostile forces. The winning essay and runners up might be published in a single issue. The journal would encourage contributions by all grades and tolerate both criticism and praise. And, in keeping with the new and welcome emphasis on critical thinking and clear and cogent writing, articles would provide officers (and potential authors) with templates for writing.

Within the US Army, there is an active search for lessons about the modern battlefield from the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. This process is vital and should be continued. But there is a danger that these conflicts will become the template for modern warfare, much as the Gulf War, and particularly the Battle of 73 Easting, did for the 1990s US Army. In the process, the lessons of the numerous conflicts today ranging from ethnic insurgency in Myanmar to gang warlords in Mexico will be as ignored much as pre–World War I officers ignored the Balkan Wars. For both the US Army and its officers to prepare for the future it is essential that lessons be identified from a variety of sources, that they are properly analyzed, and that they are spread across the entire service and used to inform the way the Army prepares for tomorrow’s wars. To do so, the infrastructure must be in place. That should include a broad, generalist publication like the Journal of the Military Service Institution.

Brian McAllister Linn recent retired as a history professor at Texas A&M University. He is the author of six books including Real Soldiering: The US Army in the Aftermath of War, 1815–1980.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Brian McAllister Linn · August 6, 2024

28. China’s Real Economic Crisis

Excerpts:

So far, the Biden administration has taken a compartmentalized approach to China, addressing issues one at a time and focusing negotiations on single topics. In contrast, the Chinese government prefers a different approach in which no issues are off the table and concessions in one area might be traded for gains in another, even if the issues are unrelated. Consequently, although Beijing may seem recalcitrant in isolated talks, it might be receptive to a more comprehensive deal that addresses multiple aspects of U.S.-Chinese relations simultaneously. Washington should remain open to the possibility of such a grand bargain and recognize that if incentives change, China’s leadership might shift tactics abruptly, just as it did when it suddenly ended the zero-COVID policy.

Washington should also consider leveraging multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization to facilitate negotiations with Beijing. For example, China might agree to voluntarily drop its developing country status at the WTO, which gives designated countries preferential treatment in some trade disputes. It may also be persuaded to support a revised WTO framework to determine a country’s nonmarket economy status—a designation used by the United States and the EU to impose higher antidumping tariffs on China—on an industry-by-industry basis rather than for an entire economy. Such steps would acknowledge China’s economic success, even as it held it to the higher trade standards of advanced industrialized countries.

Xi views himself as a transformational leader, inviting comparisons to Chairman Mao. This was evident when he formally hosted former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—among the few widely respected American figures in Xi’s China—in July 2023, just four months before Kissinger’s death. Xi believes that as a great power, his country should not be constrained by negotiations or external pressures, but he might be open to voluntary adjustments on trade issues as part of a broader agreement. Many members of China’s professional and business elite feel despair about the state of relations with the United States. They know that China benefits more by being integrated into the Western-led global system than by being excluded from it. But if Washington sticks to its current path and continues to head toward a trade war, it may inadvertently cause Beijing to double down on the industrial policies that are causing overcapacity in the first place. In the long run, this would be as bad for the West as it would be for China.

China’s Real Economic Crisis

Why Beijing Won’t Give Up on a Failing Model

By Zongyuan Zoe Liu

September/October 2024

Published on August 6, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Its Global Ambitions · August 6, 2024

The Chinese economy is stuck. Following Beijing’s decision, in late 2022, to abruptly end its draconian “zero COVID” policy, many observers assumed that China’s growth engine would rapidly reignite. After years of pandemic lockdowns that brought some economic sectors to a virtual halt, reopening the country was supposed to spark a major comeback. Instead, the recovery has faltered, with sluggish GDP performance, sagging consumer confidence, growing clashes with the West, and a collapse in property prices that has caused some of China’s largest companies to default. In July 2024, Chinese official data revealed that GDP growth was falling behind the government’s target of about five percent. The government has finally let the Chinese people leave their homes, but it cannot command the economy to return to its former strength.

To account for this bleak picture, Western observers have put forward a variety of explanations. Among them are China’s sustained real estate crisis, its rapidly aging population, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s tightening grip on the economy and extreme response to the pandemic. But there is a more enduring driver of the present stasis, one that runs deeper than Xi’s growing authoritarianism or the effects of a crashing property market: a decades-old economic strategy that privileges industrial production over all else, an approach that, over time, has resulted in enormous structural overcapacity. For years, Beijing’s industrial policies have led to overinvestment in production facilities in sectors from raw materials to emerging technologies such as batteries and robots, often saddling Chinese cities and firms with huge debt burdens in the process.

Simply put, in many crucial economic sectors, China is producing far more output than it, or foreign markets, can sustainably absorb. As a result, the Chinese economy runs the risk of getting caught in a doom loop of falling prices, insolvency, factory closures, and, ultimately, job losses. Shrinking profits have forced producers to further increase output and more heavily discount their wares in order to generate cash to service their debts. Moreover, as factories are forced to close and industries consolidate, the firms left standing are not necessarily the most efficient or most profitable. Rather, the survivors tend to be those with the best access to government subsidies and cheap financing.

Since the mid-2010s, the problem has become a destabilizing force in international trade, as well. By creating a glut of supply in the global market for many goods, Chinese firms are pushing prices below the break-even point for producers in other countries. In December 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that excess Chinese production was causing “unsustainable” trade imbalances and accused Beijing of engaging in unfair trade practices by offloading ever-greater quantities of Chinese products onto the European market at cutthroat prices. In April, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned that China’s overinvestment in steel, electric vehicles, and many other goods was threatening to cause “economic dislocation” around the globe. “China is now simply too large for the rest of the world to absorb this enormous capacity,” Yellen said.

Despite vehement denials by Beijing, Chinese industrial policy has for decades led to recurring cycles of overcapacity. At home, factories in government-designated priority sectors of the economy routinely sell products below cost in order to satisfy local and national political goals. And Beijing has regularly raised production targets for many goods, even when current levels already exceed demand. Partly, this stems from a long tradition of economic planning that has given enormous emphasis to industrial production and infrastructure development while virtually ignoring household consumption. This oversight does not stem from ignorance or miscalculation; rather, it reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing economic vision.

As the party sees it, consumption is an individualistic distraction that threatens to divert resources away from China’s core economic strength: its industrial base. According to party orthodoxy, China’s economic advantage derives from its low consumption and high savings rates, which generate capital that the state-controlled banking system can funnel into industrial enterprises. This system also reinforces political stability by embedding the party hierarchy into every economic sector. Because China’s bloated industrial base is dependent on cheap financing to survive—financing that the Chinese leadership can restrict at any time—the business elite is tightly bound, and even subservient, to the interests of the party. In the West, money influences politics, but in China it is the opposite: politics influences money. The Chinese economy clearly needs to strike a new balance between investment and consumption, but Beijing is unlikely to make this shift because it depends on the political control it gets from production-intensive economic policy.

For the West, China’s overcapacity problem presents a long-term challenge that can’t be solved simply by erecting new trade barriers. For one thing, even if the United States and Europe were able to significantly limit the amount of Chinese goods reaching Western markets, it would not unravel the structural inefficiencies that have accumulated in China over decades of privileging industrial investment and production goals. Any course correction could take years of sustained Chinese policy to be successful. For another, Xi’s growing emphasis on making China economically self-sufficient—a strategy that is itself a response to perceived efforts by the West to isolate the country economically—has increased, rather than decreased, the pressures leading to overproduction. Moreover, efforts by Washington to prevent Beijing from flooding the United States with cheap goods in key sectors are only likely to create new inefficiencies within the U.S. economy, even as they shift China’s overproduction problem to other international markets.

To craft a better approach, Western leaders and policymakers would do well to understand the deeper forces driving China’s overcapacity and make sure that their own policies are not making it worse. Rather than seeking to further isolate China, the West should take steps to keep Beijing firmly within the global trading system, using the incentives of the global market to steer China toward more balanced growth and less heavy-handed industrial policies. In the absence of such a strategy, the West could face a China that is increasingly unrestrained by international economic ties and prepared to double down on its state-led production strategy, even at the risk of harming the global economy and stunting its own prosperity.

FACTORY DEFECTS

The structural issues underlying China’s economic stasis are not the result of recent policy choices. They stem directly from the lopsided industrial strategy that took shape in the earliest years of China’s reform era, four decades ago. China’s sixth five-year plan (1981–85) was the first to be instituted after Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opened up the Chinese economy. Although the document ran to more than 100 pages, nearly all of it was devoted to developing China’s industrial sector, expanding international trade, and advancing technology; only a single page was given to the topic of increasing income and consumption. Despite vast technological changes and an almost unrecognizably different global market, the party’s emphasis on China’s industrial base remains remarkably similar today. The 14th five-year plan (2021–25) offers detailed targets for economic growth, R & D investment, patent achievement, and food and energy production—but apart from a few other sparse references, household consumption is relegated to a single paragraph.

In prioritizing industrial output, China’s economic planners assume that Chinese producers will always be able to offload excess supply in the global market and reap cash from foreign sales. In practice, however, they have created vast overinvestment in production across sectors in which the domestic market is already saturated and foreign governments are wary of Chinese supply chain dominance. In the early years of the twenty-first century, it was Chinese steel, with the country’s surplus capacity eventually exceeding the entire steel output of Germany, Japan, and the United States combined. More recently, China has ended up with similar excesses in coal, aluminum, glass, cement, robotic equipment, electric-vehicle batteries, and other materials. Chinese factories are now able to produce every year twice as many solar panels as the world can put to use.

For the global economy, China’s chronic overcapacity has far-reaching impacts. With electric vehicles, for instance, carmakers in Europe are already facing stiff competition from cheap Chinese imports. Factories in this and other emerging technology sectors in the West may close or, worse, never get built. Moreover, high-value manufacturing industries have economic effects that go far beyond their own activities; they generate service-sector employment and are vital to sustaining the kinds of pools of local talent that are needed to spur innovation and technological breakthroughs. In China’s domestic market, overcapacity issues have provoked a brutal price war in some industries that is hampering profits and devouring capital. According to government statistics, 27 percent of Chinese automobile manufacturers were unprofitable in May; at one point last year, the figure reached 32 percent. Overproduction throughout the economy has also depressed prices generally, causing inflation to hover near zero and the debt service ratio for the private nonfinancial sector—the ratio of total debt payments to disposable income—to climb to an all-time high. These trends have eroded consumer confidence, leading to further declines in domestic consumption and increasing the risk of China sliding into a deflationary trap.

When Beijing’s economic planners do talk about consumption, they tend to do so in relation to industrial aims. In its brief discussion of the subject, the current five-year plan states that consumption should be steered specifically toward goods that align with Beijing’s industrial priorities: automobiles, electronics, digital products, and smart appliances. Analogously, although China’s vibrant e-commerce sector might suggest a plethora of consumer choices, in reality, major platforms such as Alibaba, Pinduoduo, and Shein compete fiercely to sell the same commoditized products. In other words, the illusion of consumer choice masks a domestic market that is overwhelmingly shaped by the state’s industrial priorities rather than by individual preferences.

This is also reflected in policy initiatives aimed at boosting consumer spending. Consider the government’s recent effort to promote goods replacement. According to a March 2024 action plan, the Ministry of Commerce, together with other Chinese government agencies, has offered subsidies to consumers who trade in old automobiles, home appliances, and fixtures for new models. On paper, the plan loosely resembles the “cash for clunkers” program that Washington introduced during the 2008 recession to help the U.S. car industry. But the plan lacks specific details and relies on local authorities for implementation, rendering it largely ineffective; it has notably failed to lift the prices of durable goods. Although the government can influence the dynamics of supply and demand in China’s consumer markets, it cannot compel people to spend or punish them if they do not. When income growth slows, people naturally tighten their purses, delay big purchases, and try to make do for longer with older equipment. Paradoxically, the drag that overcapacity has placed on the economy overall means that the government’s efforts to direct consumption are making people even less likely to spend.

DEBT COLLECTORS

At the center of Beijing’s overcapacity problem is the burden placed on local authorities to develop China’s industrial base. Top-down industrial plans are designed to reward the cities and regions that can deliver the most GDP growth, by providing incentives to local officials to allocate capital and subsidies to prioritized sectors. As the scholar Mary Gallagher has observed, Beijing has fanned the flames by using social campaigns such as “common prosperity”—a concept Chinese leader Mao Zedong first proposed in 1953 and that Xi revived at a party meeting in 2021—to spur local industrial development. These planning directives and campaigns put enormous pressure on local party chiefs to achieve rapid results, which they may see as crucial for promotion within the party. Consequently, these officials have strong incentives to make highly leveraged investments in priority sectors, irrespective of whether these moves are likely to be profitable.

This phenomenon has fueled risky financing practices by local governments across China. In order to encourage local initiative, Beijing often does not provide financing: instead, it gives local officials broad discretion to arrange off-balance-sheet investment vehicles with the help of regional banks to fund projects in priority sectors, with the national government limiting itself to specifying which types of local financing options are prohibited. About 30 percent of China’s infrastructure spending comes from these investment vehicles; without them, local officials simply cannot do the projects that will win them praise within the party. Inevitably, this approach has led to not only huge industrial overcapacity but also enormous levels of local government debt. According to an investigation by The Wall Street Journal, in July, the total amount of off-the-book debts held by local governments across China now stands at between $7 trillion and $11 trillion, with as much as $800 billion at risk of default.

Although the scale of debt may be worse now, the problem is not new. Ever since China’s 1994 fiscal reform, which allowed local governments to retain a share of the tax revenue they collected but reduced the fiscal transfers they received from Beijing, local governments have been under chronic financial strain. They have struggled to meet their dual mandate of promoting local GDP growth and providing public services with limited resources. By centralizing financial power at the national level and offloading infrastructure and social service expenditures to regions and municipalities, Beijing’s policies have driven local governments into debt. What’s more, by stressing rapid growth performance, Beijing has pushed local officials to favor quickly executed capital projects in industries of national priority. As a further incentive, Beijing sometimes offers limited fiscal support for projects in priority sectors and helps facilitate approvals for local governments to secure financing. Ultimately, the local government bears the financial risk, and the success or failure of the project rests on the shoulders of the party’s local chief, which leads to distorted results.

A larger problem with China’s reliance on local government to implement industrial policy is that it causes cities and regions across the country to compete in the same sectors rather than complement each other or play to their own strengths. Thus, for more than two decades, Chinese provinces—from Xinjiang in the west to Shanghai in the east, from Heilongjiang in the north to Hainan in the south—have, with very little coordination between them, established factories in the same government-designated priority industries, driven by provincial and local officials’ efforts to outperform their peers. Inevitably, this domestic competition has led to overcapacity and high levels of debt, even in industries in which China has gained global market dominance.

Every year, Chinese factories produce twice as many solar panels as the world can use.

Take solar panels. In 2010, China’s State Council announced that strategic emerging industries, including solar power, should account for 15 percent of national GDP by 2020. Within two years, 31 of China’s 34 provinces had designated the solar-photovoltaic industry as a priority, half of all Chinese cities had made investments in the solar-PV industry, and more than 100 Chinese cities had built solar-PV industrial parks. Almost immediately, China’s PV output outstripped domestic demand, with the excess supply being exported to Europe and other areas of the world where governments were subsidizing solar-panel ownership. By 2013, both the United States and the European Union imposed antidumping tariffs on Chinese PV manufacturers. By 2022, China’s own installed solar-PV capacity was greater than any other country’s, following its aggressive renewable energy build-out. But China’s electric grid cannot support additional solar capacity. With the domestic market completely saturated, solar manufacturers have resumed offloading as much of their wares as possible onto foreign markets. In August 2023, the U.S. Commerce Department found that Chinese PV producers were shipping products to Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam for minor processing procedures to avoid paying U.S. antidumping tariffs. China’s PV-production capacity, already double the global demand, is expected to grow by another 50 percent in 2025. This extreme oversupply caused the utilization rate in China’s finished solar power industry to plummet to just 23 percent in early 2024. Nevertheless, these factories continue operating because they need to raise cash to service their debt and cover fixed costs.

Another example is industrial robotics, which Beijing began prioritizing in 2015 as part of its Made in China 2025 strategy. At the time, there was a clear rationale for building a stronger domestic robotics industry: China had surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest buyer of industrial robots, accounting for about 20 percent of sales worldwide. Moreover, the plan seemed to achieve striking results. By 2017, there were more than 800 robotics companies and 40 robotics-focused industrial parks operating across at least 20 Chinese provinces. Yet this all-in effort did little to advance Chinese robotics technology, even as it created a huge industrial base. In order to meet Beijing’s ambitious production targets, local officials tended to invest in mature technologies that could be scaled quickly. Today, China has a large excess capacity in low-end robotics yet still lacks sufficient capacity in high-end autonomous robotics that require indigenous intellectual property.

Overcapacity in low-end production has plagued other Chinese tech industries, as well. The most recent example is artificial intelligence, which Beijing designated as a priority industry in its last two five-year plans. In August 2019, the government called for the creation of about 20 AI “pilot zones”—research parks that have a mandate to use local-government data for market testing. The aim is to exploit China’s two greatest strengths in the field: the ability to quickly build physical infrastructure, and thereby support the agglomeration of AI companies and talent, and the lack of constraints on how the government collects and shares personal data. Within two years, 17 Chinese cities had created such pilot zones, despite the disruption of the coronavirus pandemic and the government’s large-scale lockdowns. Each of these cities has also adopted action plans to induce further investments and data sharing.

On paper, the program seems impressive. China is now second only to the United States in AI investment. But the quality of actual AI research, especially in the field of generative AI, has been hindered by government censorship and a lack of indigenous intellectual property. In fact, many of the Chinese AI startups that have taken advantage of the strong government support are producing products that still fundamentally rely on models and hardware developed in the West. Similar to its initiatives in other emerging industries, Beijing risks wasting enormous capital on redundant investments that emphasize economies of scale rather than deep-rooted innovation.

RACE OF THE ZOMBIES

Paradoxically, even as Beijing’s industrial policy goals change, many of the features that drive overcapacity persist. Whenever the Chinese government prioritizes a new sector, duplicative investments by local governments inevitably fuel intense domestic competition. Firms and factories race to produce the same products and barely make any profit—a phenomenon known in China as nei juan, or involution. Rather than try to differentiate their products, firms will attempt to simply outproduce their rivals by expanding production as fast as possible and engaging in fierce price wars; there is little incentive to gain a competitive edge by improving corporate management or investing in R & D. At the same time, finite domestic demand forces firms to export excess inventory overseas, where it is subject to geopolitics and the fluctuations of global markets. Economic downturns in export destinations and rising trade tensions can stymie export growth and worsen overcapacity at home.

These dynamics all contribute to a vicious cycle: firms backed by bank loans and local government support must produce nonstop to maintain their cash flow. A production halt means no cash flow, prompting creditors to demand their money back. But as firms produce more, excess inventory grows and consumer prices drop further, causing firms to lose more money and require even more financial support from local governments and banks. And as companies go more deeply into debt, it becomes harder for them to pay it off, compounding the chance that they become “zombie companies,” essentially insolvent but able to generate just enough cash flow to meet their credit obligations. As China’s economy has stalled, the government has reduced the taxes and fees levied on firms as a way to spur growth—but that has reduced local government revenue, even as social-services expenditures and debt payments rise. In other words, the close financial relationship between local governments and the firms they support has created a wave of debt-fueled local GDP growth and left the economy in a hard-to-reverse overcapacity trap.

A production line for electric vehicle batteries in Hefei, China, March 2021

Aly Song / Reuters

Yet even now, China shows few signs of reducing its reliance on debt. Xi has doubled down on his campaign for China to achieve technological self-sufficiency, amid intense geopolitical competition with the United States. As Beijing sees it, only by investing even more in strategic sectors can it protect itself from isolation or potential economic sanctions by the West. Thus, the government is concentrating on funding advanced manufacturing and strategic technologies and discouraging investments that it sees as distracting, such as in the property sector. In order to promote more indigenous high-end technology, Chinese policymakers have in recent years mobilized the entire banking system and set up dedicated loan programs to support research and innovation in prioritized sectors. The result has been a tendency to deepen, rather than correct, the structural problems leading to excess investment and production.

For example, in 2021, the China Development Bank created a special loan program for scientific and technological innovation and basic research. By May 2024, the bank had distributed more than $38 billion worth of loans to support critical, cutting-edge sectors, such as semiconductors, clean energy technology, biotech, and pharmaceuticals. In April, the People’s Bank of China, along with several government ministries, launched a $69 billion refinancing fund—to fuel a massive new round of lending by Chinese banks for projects aimed at scientific and technological innovation. Barely two months after the program’s launch, some 421 industrial facilities across the country were designated as “smart manufacturing” demonstration factories—a vague label given to factories that plan to integrate AI into their manufacturing processes. The program also announced investments in more than 10,000 provincial-level digital workshops and more than 4,500 AI-focused companies.

Beyond hitting top-line investment numbers, however, this campaign has few criteria for measuring actual success. Ironically, this new program’s stated goal of filling a financing gap for small and medium-sized enterprises that are working on innovations points to a larger shortcoming in Beijing’s economic management. For years, China’s industrial policy has tended to funnel resources to already mature companies; by contrast, with its massive effort to develop AI and other advanced technologies, the government has committed the financial resources to match the venture capital approach of the United States. Yet even here, China’s economic planners have failed to recognize that the real driving force of innovation is disruption. To truly foster this kind of creativity, entrepreneurs would need unfettered access to domestic capital markets and private capital, a situation that would undermine Beijing’s control of China’s business elites. Without the possibility of market disruption, these enormous investments merely exacerbate China’s overcapacity problem. Money is funneled into those products that can be scaled most rapidly, forcing manufacturers to overproduce and then survive on the slim margins that can be reaped from dumping onto the international market.

THE AGONY OF EXCESS

In industry after industry, China’s chronic overcapacity is creating a complicated dilemma for the United States and the West. In recent months, Western officials have stepped up their criticisms of Beijing’s economic policies. In a speech in May, Lael Brainard, the director of the Biden administration’s Council of Economic Advisers, warned that China’s “policy-driven industrial overcapacity”—a euphemism for antimarket practices—was hurting the global economy. By enforcing policies that “unfairly depress capital, labor, and energy costs” and allow Chinese firms to sell “at or below cost,” she said, China now accounts for a huge percentage of global capacity in electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, and other sectors. As a consequence, Beijing is hampering innovation and competition in the global marketplace, threatening jobs in the United States and elsewhere, and limiting the ability of the United States and other Western countries to build supply chain resilience.

At their meeting in Capri, Italy, in April, members of the G-7 warned, in a joint statement, that “China’s non-market policies and practices” have led to “harmful overcapacity. ”The massive inflow of cheap Chinese-manufactured products has already raised trade tensions. Since 2023, several governments, including those of Vietnam and Brazil, have launched antidumping or antisubsidy investigations against China, and Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union have imposed tariffs on various imports from China, including but not limited to electric vehicles.

Beijing’s industrial policies have driven cities and regions across China into debt.

Faced with mounting international pressure, Xi, leading party journals, and Chinese state media have consistently denied that China has an overcapacity problem. They maintain that the criticisms are driven by an unfounded U.S. “anxiety” and that China’s cost advantage is not the product of subsidies but of the “efforts of enterprises” that “are shaped by full market competition.” Indeed, Chinese diplomats have maintained that in many emerging technology industries, the global economy suffers from significant capacity shortages rather than excess supply. In May, the People’s Daily, the official party newspaper, accused the United States of using exaggerated claims about overcapacity as a pretext for introducing harmful trade barriers meant to contain China and suppress the development of China’s strategic industries.

Nonetheless, Chinese policymakers and economic analysts have long acknowledged the problem. As early as December 2005, Ma Kai, then the director of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, warned that seven industrial sectors, including steel and automobiles, faced severe overcapacity. He attributed the problem to “blind investment and low-level expansion.” Over the nearly two decades since, Beijing has issued more than a dozen administrative guidelines to tackle the problem in various sectors, but with limited success. In March 2024, an analysis by Lu Feng, of Peking University, identified overcapacity problems in new-energy vehicles, electric-vehicle batteries, and legacy microchips. BloombergNEF has estimated that China’s battery production in 2023 alone was equal to total global demand. With the West adding production capacity and Chinese battery makers continuing to expand investment and production, the global problem of excess supply will likely worsen in the years to come.

Lu warned that China’s overdevelopment of these industries will pressure Chinese firms to dump products on international markets and exacerbate China’s already fraught trade relations with the West. To address the problem, he proposed a combination of measures that the Chinese government has already attempted—such as stimulating domestic spending (investment and household consumption)—and those that many economists have long argued for but which Beijing has not done, including separating government from business and reforming redistribution mechanisms to benefit households. Yet these proposed solutions fall short of addressing the fundamental coordination problem plaguing the Chinese economy: the duplication of local government investments in state-designated priority sectors.

LOWER FENCE, TIGHTER LEASH

Thus far, the United States has responded to China’s overcapacity challenge by imposing steep tariffs on Chinese clean energy products, such as solar panels, electric vehicles, and batteries. At the same time, with the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, the Biden administration has poured billions of dollars into building U.S. domestic capacity for many of the same sectors. But the United States should be wary of trying to isolate China simply by building trade barriers and beefing up its own industrial base.

By offering large incentives to companies that invest in critical sectors in the United States, Washington could replicate some of the same problems that are plaguing China’s economy: a reliance on debt-fueled investment, unproductive resource allocation, and, potentially, a speculative bubble in tech-company stocks that could destabilize the market if it suddenly burst. If the goal is to outcompete Beijing, Washington should concentrate on what the American system is already better at: innovation, market disruption, and the intensive use of private capital, with investors choosing the most promising areas to support and taking the risks along with the rewards. By fixating on strategies to limit China’s economic advantages, the United States risks neglecting its own strengths.

A ship transporting Chinese electric vehicles on the Bosphorus, near Istanbul, April 2023

Yoruk Isik / Reuters

U.S. policymakers also need to recognize that China’s overcapacity problem is exacerbated by Beijing’s pursuit of self-sufficiency. This effort, which has been given major emphasis in recent years, reflects Xi’s insecurity and his desire to reduce China’s strategic vulnerabilities amid growing economic and geopolitical tensions with the United States and the West. In fact, Xi’s attempts to mobilize his country’s people and resources to build a technological and financial wall around China carry significant consequences of their own. A China that is increasingly cut off from Western markets will have less to lose in a potential confrontation with the West—and, therefore, less motivation to de-escalate. As long as China is tightly bound to the United States and Europe through the trade of high-value goods that are not easily substitutable, the West will be far more effective in deterring the country from taking destabilizing actions. China and the United States are strategic competitors, not enemies; nonetheless, when it comes to U.S.-Chinese trade relations, there is wisdom in the old saying “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.”

The U.S. government should discourage Beijing from building a wall that can sanction-proof the Chinese economy. To this end, the next administration should foster alliances, restore damaged multilateral institutions, and create new structures of interdependence that make isolation and self-sufficiency not only unattractive to China but also unattainable. A good place to start is by crafting more policies at the negotiation table, rather than merely imposing tariffs. Waging trade wars amid geopolitical tensions will heighten the confidence deficit in the Chinese economy and lead to the depreciation of the renminbi, which will partly offset the impact of tariffs.

China may also be more flexible in its trade policies than it appears. Since the escalation of the U.S.-Chinese trade war, in 2018, Chinese scholars and officials have explored several policy options, including imposing voluntary export restrictions, revaluing the renminbi, promoting domestic consumption, expanding foreign direct investment, and investing in R & D. Chinese scholars have also examined Japan’s trade relations with the United States in the 1980s, noting how trade tensions forced mature Japanese industries, such as automobile manufacturing, to upgrade and become more competitive with their Western rivals, an approach that could offer lessons for China’s electric-vehicle industry.

Apart from voluntary export restrictions, Beijing has already tried several of these options to some extent. If the government also implemented voluntary export controls, it could kill several birds with one stone: such a move would reduce trade and potentially even political tensions with the United States; it would force mature sectors to consolidate and become more sustainable; and it would help shift manufacturing capacity overseas, to serve target markets directly.

Xi is attempting to build a technological and financial wall around China.

So far, the Biden administration has taken a compartmentalized approach to China, addressing issues one at a time and focusing negotiations on single topics. In contrast, the Chinese government prefers a different approach in which no issues are off the table and concessions in one area might be traded for gains in another, even if the issues are unrelated. Consequently, although Beijing may seem recalcitrant in isolated talks, it might be receptive to a more comprehensive deal that addresses multiple aspects of U.S.-Chinese relations simultaneously. Washington should remain open to the possibility of such a grand bargain and recognize that if incentives change, China’s leadership might shift tactics abruptly, just as it did when it suddenly ended the zero-COVID policy.

Washington should also consider leveraging multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization to facilitate negotiations with Beijing. For example, China might agree to voluntarily drop its developing country status at the WTO, which gives designated countries preferential treatment in some trade disputes. It may also be persuaded to support a revised WTO framework to determine a country’s nonmarket economy status—a designation used by the United States and the EU to impose higher antidumping tariffs on China—on an industry-by-industry basis rather than for an entire economy. Such steps would acknowledge China’s economic success, even as it held it to the higher trade standards of advanced industrialized countries.

Xi views himself as a transformational leader, inviting comparisons to Chairman Mao. This was evident when he formally hosted former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—among the few widely respected American figures in Xi’s China—in July 2023, just four months before Kissinger’s death. Xi believes that as a great power, his country should not be constrained by negotiations or external pressures, but he might be open to voluntary adjustments on trade issues as part of a broader agreement. Many members of China’s professional and business elite feel despair about the state of relations with the United States. They know that China benefits more by being integrated into the Western-led global system than by being excluded from it. But if Washington sticks to its current path and continues to head toward a trade war, it may inadvertently cause Beijing to double down on the industrial policies that are causing overcapacity in the first place. In the long run, this would be as bad for the West as it would be for China.

• ZONGYUAN ZOE LIU is Maurice R. Greenberg Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Its Global Ambitions.

Foreign Affairs · by Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Its Global Ambitions · August 6, 2024

29. 'Land of Bad:' JTAC and Delta Force-centered movie is worth a watch

​Except in reality there were no US unilateral missions in the Philippines. The real work that was done was just not as "sexy" as that in this film.

Trailer at the link: https://www.sandboxx.us/news/land-of-bad-jtac-and-delta-force-centered-movie-is-worth-a-watch/?utm

'Land of Bad:' JTAC and Delta Force-centered movie is worth a watch

sandboxx.us · August 2, 2024

The new 2024 Netflix film Land of Bad kicks off with a scene in which an Air Force Tactical Air Controller, Sergeant JJ Kinney (played by Liam Hemsworth), is trying to decide whether to bring a hotel-sized box of either Fruit Loops or Frosted Flakes on his impending special operations mission with three Delta Force operators in the southern Philippines. It is a fitting scene for the viewer, as picking a military-themed action movie to watch is like picking between two sugary cereals: no matter which you choose, the selection is bound to be loaded with artificial ingredients, the colorful packaging probably masks disappointment, and ultimately, the choice will you leave unsatisfied. Fortunately, Land of Bad is more akin to Raisin Nut Bran than Fruit Loops.

Having thoroughly tortured that metaphor, let’s look at what makes Land of Bad an intelligent and enjoyable military thriller movie. The plot centers around Hemsworth’s TACP airman, who is tagging along as the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) for a small Delta Force unit whose mission is to locate a “CIA asset” that was last scene in the company of a shady arms dealer in the southern Philippines. We’ll ignore the baffling aspect of this “CIA asset” being an apparently American citizen – who is also inexplicably referred to later as a “JSOC asset” – and focus on the rescue force.

The three Delta operators, when we first meet them on a helo en route to executing a HALO jump into the target area, initially seem like they will be the same cookie-cutter, brainless killing machines we are often served up in special operations-themed movies. I was prepared to be derisive and dismissive, but then the writers threw in some smart nuance between the bravado and gung-ho spirit, quickly imbuing the three with actual human qualities within a few lines of dialogue. The result is that the three end up being a healthy mix of ferocity, fearlessness, stoicism, and resignation once we get to know them, and especially once fate befalls some of them later. I won’t give the plot away, but suffice it to say that things come off the rails early on in the mission when a group of Abu Sayyef terrorists shows up at the target compound the men are about to assault, setting up for us the JTAC’s story of survival that encompasses the majority of the movie.

Land of Bad trailer. (R.U. Robot Studios, Highland Film Group, Volition Media Partners)

Hemsworth’s Kinney has the essential task of coordinating air support for the operation, and the writers do a great job of capturing how AFSOC TACPs are often treated by Navy SEALs, Delta Force operators, and Green Berets when out in the field. It is a mix of good-natured ribbing derived from inter-service and inter-SOF rivalry and complete reliance on the JTAC to save their ass if and when things go wrong. The writers clearly know their subject matter in that regard and did a great job portraying it on screen.

Kinney’s link to the available air assets throughout is a terrific Russell Crow, who plays Captain Eddie “Reaper” Grimm, an on-the-spectrum former “regular” pilot with major authority issues. He’s now a 50-something Air Force junior officer who sits in an air-conditioned hut back in the States overwatching the operation and providing air support in the form of bombs and missiles when required (and yes, they will be required). The physically remote yet emotionally critical link between Kinney and Reaper harkens back to films like Behind Enemy Lines and Bat-21. And like those two movies, Land of Bad falls squarely into the tradition of the lone service member surviving until he can be rescued.

Grimm’s partner in the drone hut throughout is Staff Sergeant Nia Branson, who provides the constant eyes for the unit on the ground, played effectively by Chika Ikogwe. The warm relationship between the aging Crowe and the younger Ikogwe is portrayed well with some nice human touches thrown in that manage to elevate the characters to more than just “eyes in the sky” for the operators.

While there are still some of the fantastical elements we find in most war movies – seemingly unlimited ammo at times, death-defying falls and fights, and nick-of-time lifesaving stunts – the flying bullets, radio lingo, tactical movements, and a fair amount of the combat dialogue are all pretty legit. The final result is a satisfying and entertaining war movie that is a pretty damn good selection for a little cinematic diversion.

Read more from Sandboxx News

• The Marines’ drone-killing machine preps for ultimate gear test
• New Cold War heats up: US to deploy missiles and hypersonic weapons to Germany
• Inside the recovery of MIA Americans from a secret jungle base
• F-16s carrying the A-10’s 30mm cannon actually saw combat
• ‘Stop That Tank!’ This is how Disney contributed to World War II

sandboxx.us · August 2, 2024

30. From my veins to the frontlines

Unseen and overlooked aspects of the war.

From my veins to the frontlines

Myroslava joins tens of thousands of Ukrainians to donate desperately needed blood for the frontlines. Unfortunately, there hasn't been a culture of such giving, and there are deep shortages.

https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/from-my-veins-to-the-frontlines?utm

Myroslava Tanska-Vikulova

Aug 06, 2024

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450 milliliters — about two cups of volume — could save your life.

Just an ordinary-sized glass.

Not water, soup, or alcohol, but the all-important red liquid in our bodies: blood.

It may seem like fiction at first, but while a person can live without food for weeks, and without water for no more than 3 days, a person will die in just a few minutes if they don’t have enough blood. 

That is why blood donor centers exist, to save lives.

A member of The Russian Volunteer Corps, the Russian anti-government group that is fighting on Ukraine's side, donates his blood for the Ukrainian army in a mobile blood donation vehicle on June 3, 2023 in downtown Kyiv, Ukraine. (Photo by Roman Pilipey/Getty Images.)

Under normal circumstances, donated blood is needed during surgeries, cancer treatments or in case of injuries, but in the Ukrainian reality of war, blood transfusion takes on a completely different and much deeper meaning. 

Every day dozens if not hundreds of soldiers are wounded at the front, and blood donors can save not only their lives, but also the life of the nation of Ukraine. 

Due to the war, the amount of blood needed has increased significantly, as has the number of donors. 

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, I have donated blood three times - joining the tens of thousands of those registered to help in the war effort. It makes me feel responsible.

***

It's 7 a.m. Despite the early hour, I can easily get out of bed, and that doesn't happen very often. Today I know that I am going on a very important mission. I drink some weak tea and eat some biscuits. 

The 'Blood of Ukraine' artwork by I. V. Basanets, an art student, which creatively interprets the importance of blood donation. Seen in June 2024, in Odesa, Ukraine. (Photo by Viacheslav Onyshchenko/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)

A thought occurs to me: I didn't drink alcohol yesterday, I didn't take any medicine, and I avoided meat and fatty foods. It seems to me that I followed the guidelines perfectly. 

I get dressed and hurry to catch the bus to the hospital. I don't run – I only walk quickly, because exercise is also forbidden before giving blood. 

At the hospital, I am greeted by friendly nurses and, as usual, I fill out information about any illnesses I have, what medications I take, and when I last gave blood. Then they take me to a room where they do a blood test, check my hemoglobin level, and ask me to wait. 

These ten minutes of waiting seem like an eternity. The tests determine if I can be a blood donor after all. 

It's important to me to be accepted, because it's the least I can do to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces and my country during the war. 

"Everything is normal, but next time eat more before the procedure, you are exhausted," the doctor told me. 

Of course, I didn't eat much because I was afraid of spoiling everything. Now they are telling me I ate too little!

They bring me some tea and cookies to refresh my body before the blood donation, which will mean I’m not too drained afterwards.

Finally, I am invited into the room where the blood is taken. 

I sit down on a chair and put my hand on the armrest, and they give me a ball to squeeze – so that my vein starts to pulsate more than usual, and the nurse can easily find the vein. Meanwhile, she puts a small tourniquet on my arm and then carefully sticks a needle into my left arm. 

It doesn't hurt at all, even though I don't like injections. It's not the most pleasant feeling, but the thought of something positive – like my family, my cat or even cooking – takes me away from that reality. The needle is so big that it can definitely cause fear in those who are afraid of injections. 

Me feeling good with a needle in my arm in Kyiv, July 3, 2024.

The blood begins to flow like a flood and fills the tube. First, some of the blood is taken to a separate container to be tested for HIV to ensure that my blood will not harm the recipient. 

And then they begin to take blood for transfusion. 

"We usually take 450 ml of blood. This is a safe dose for the donor and the optimal amount needed for the recipient," the nurse who took care of me told me. 

They take my blood for about 7.5 minutes. The nurse tells me that is quite fast compared to other donors. And in case of an emergency, there are safety measures in place.

Me during the blood draw in Kyiv, July 3, 2024.

During the blood donation, the nurses talk to me, ask me how I am feeling, and make me smile throughout. Afterwards, they give me a bag with juice, a chocolate bar and water. They tell me to eat well at home and not to exercise. (But I still run to the bus to avoid waiting for the next half hour.)

***

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the demand for blood donations has increased by 60 percent, and the need remains high.

"Blood donation centers perform a mobilization task, they collect blood, which is then transported to hospitals and the combat zone, which can then be used by medics in the evacuation phases and at stabilization points," said Liudmyla Linnyk, coordinator of the DonorUA platform.

DonorUA is an automated blood donor recruitment and management system developed to promote the donor movement in Ukraine.

A queue of donors formed outside the Zaporizhzhia Regional Blood Service Center, Zaporizhzhia, southeastern Ukraine, on February 25, 2022. Photo by Dmytro Smoliyenko/Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

The need for blood donors is especially high in the summer, even outside of war time. It is a hot season, a season of vacations, so there are fewer donors around. Many organizations stop working during this time, so blood stocks run low. 

The number of people with the O-negative blood type is the lowest, and donors who are O-negative are in particular demand. But this does not mean that hospitals do not need other groups. Blood is in demand across Ukraine – both frontline and rearline cities have the same need. 

"A blood center in a conventional Zakarpattia, Lutsk, Rivne, or Ivano-Frankivsk [cities in Western Ukraine] can buy blood that is delivered to the front," Lidiya Lynnyk said.

Blood can be stored for 38 to 40 days. This depends on the preservative used. It is stored in refrigerators at a specific temperature. 

 A physician takes packed red blood cells out of the fridge in a laboratory at the Blood Service Center on April 7, 2022 in Kyiv, Ukraine. Photo by Oleksii Samsonov/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images.

If the blood is not used before the expiration date, it is discarded. However, Linnik explains that only a very small amount of blood is discarded, as most is used up quickly. 

"When blood is transported to the front, it is in special vehicles equipped with refrigerators. It is a high-tech and expensive process," Linnik said.

The amount of blood Ukraine needs and has each month is classified, as is the total number of donors in Ukraine. However, Linnik was allowed to tell us the number of donors registered on the Donor UA platform, which is about 180,000 people. It’s still not enough.

"This is a big number, but only at first glance. We need at least one million registered donors to fully meet the blood needs of Ukrainians," the center coordinator said.

Members of Ukrainian military wait to donate their blood for the Ukrainian army in a mobile blood donation vehicle on June 3, 2023 in downtown Kyiv, Ukraine. Photo by Roman Pilipey/Getty Images

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), one in three people on the planet will need a blood transfusion at least once in their lifetime. The WHO calculates that to fully meet the blood needs of one thousand people, the country needs 33 regular donors in the population. Unfortunately, the number of donors has not met the need.

"In Ukraine, the number is not 33, but 9, 11, sometimes 13 donors per thousand people, depending on the region," Linnik said. 

People donate blood for the Ukrainian military at the Soldier's House in Lviv, December 22, 2023. Photo by Pavlo Palamarchuk/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

This is an unfortunate situation because donating blood has not become part of the national culture in Ukraine. 

Most people donate blood only when there is an emergency or a family disaster and they need to save one of their relatives or acquaintances. And a very small percentage of people in Ukraine donate blood systematically and regularly.

Currently, about one -third of patients in Ukraine have to wait for blood. Normally, hospitals have blood on hand for emergencies, when a transfusion is needed immediately and time is of the essence.

However, pre-surgery patients or cancer patients usually receive blood with a delay, waiting for additional blood to become available. 

For me personally, donating blood when my health permits is not a choice, but a duty.

Someone may need blood today, and you may need it tomorrow! 

Want to go above and beyond to support our publication? Hit the tip jar and help us keep driving on in Ukraine!

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NEWS OF THE DAY: 

Good morning to readers, Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.

US BLOCKED UKRAINE FROM HITTING DOZENS OF RUSSIAN PLANES: Ukraine had the opportunity to destroy dozens of Russian planes, but the United States prohibited the use of ATACMS missiles, Forbes reports.

This summer, the 47th Guards Bomber Regiment of the Russian Air Force parked dozens of Su-34s, out of about 100 in service, at the open air base at Voronezh-Malshevo, 100 miles from the Ukrainian border. 

This was a rare opportunity for Ukraine to deal a serious blow to the CAB infrastructure if the U.S. had authorized the use of ATACMS missiles. But the Biden administration, fearing escalation, refused. In the second half of June, amid discussions about Ukraine's use of Western weapons, Russia moved the aircraft. 

RUSSIA COULD HELP IRAN IN WAR WITH ISRAEL: Iran has requested advanced air defense systems from Russia as it prepares for a possible war with Israel, and deliveries are already underway, the New York Times reports.

On August 5 senior Russian security official Sergei Shoigu visited Tehran. This comes as Iran prepares to retaliate against Israel for the assassination of a Hamas political leader on Iranian soil last week.

The publication notes that Russia also has economic and cultural ties with Israel, as a large number of Russian Jews live there. But analysts say that Moscow cannot afford to refuse Tehran's help, as it relies heavily on Iranian drones in Ukraine.

ATTACK ON U.S. BASE IN IRAQ: At least five US soldiers were wounded in an attack on a military base in Iraq, Reuters reports, citing US officials.

Two Katyusha rockets were fired at the Al-Asad air base in western Iraq, two sources in the Iraqi security forces said. The rockets landed on the base. It was unclear whether the attack was related to Iran's threats to retaliate for the assassination of the Hamas leader.

The attack comes amid rising tensions in the Middle East following the assassinations last week of a top Hezbollah commander in Lebanon and a top Hamas political leader in Iran, allegedly as a result of Israeli strikes. Both groups are backed by Iran.

UKRAINE’S OLYMPIC SLEEPING BEAUTY: "Sleeping Beauty", "Sleeping Queen Who Won Gold" - this is how the world's media and social media users are talking about Ukrainian athlete Yaroslava Maguchikh, who won gold in the high jump at the Olympic Games the day before.

Between jumps, the Ukrainian athlete rested, wrapped in a sleeping bag. She seemed to be asleep. Even the noise of the arena and the shouts of competitors jumping nearby did not disturb her. At the same time, a hammer-throwing competition was taking place nearby. 

Yaroslava Maguchikh rested on her mat and sleeping bag.

Yaroslava Maguchikh takes a break before winning gold at the Olympics, August 4, 2024. Photo by The Olympic Games on Twitter

The competition that day was quite dramatic. The Australian Nicola Olislagers was competing with Maguchikh for gold until the very end. But she ultimately lost to the Ukrainian. Both reached the same height, but Maguchikh needed fewer attempts.

Ukraine has won seven medals at the Paris Olympics, including 2 golds. At the moment the country ranks 18th in the medals table. 

Today’s Cat of Conflict is my kitty Sherry, who is not a blood donor, but always helps her human parents to feel better after they donate their blood. 

Stay safe out there.

Best,

Myroslava

31. Opinion | The next president must restore our faith in America by Jamie Dimon ·

Is there such a person running for the office?

Excerpts:

A healthy, unified country is good for everyone. I believe that our nation is at a critical time in its 248-year history. Like many of your families, my grandparents were immigrants who did not finish high school. They were drawn to the promise of this nation, which was then, and still is, the beacon of freedom for the world.

America has all the advantages, and we can win the future with smart policy, courageous leaders and everyone with a seat at the table moving in concert.

We need to elect a president who is dedicated to the ideals that define and unite us, and who is committed to restoring our faith in America and our indispensable role in the world.

Such a person could be one of our greatest presidents — and put us on a path that is worthy of the American people.

Opinion | The next president must restore our faith in America

The Washington Post · by Jamie Dimon · August 2, 2024

Jamie Dimon is chairman and chief executive of JPMorgan Chase.

We live in a perilous time. Deeply divided, our nation now faces both challenging domestic issues and perhaps the most complicated geopolitical situation since World War II. We may be at an inflection point that will determine the fate of the free and democratic world for decades.

We should not sleepwalk into disaster — we will prevail, but we need an active, comprehensive effort. This is precisely the time when strong American leadership is needed to unite us and strengthen the indispensable role our country plays for the safety of the world.

We’ve faced worse: war, economic upheaval, social transformation. In those moments, leaders such as Presidents Lincoln, Truman and Eisenhower guided us forward with common sense and pragmatism. Our best leaders strengthen the bonds that unite us. They address the broader interests of our country and don’t pander to base politics or cater to extremes.

There are lessons learned from these leaders that our current candidates should embrace. Unity is a word, but there are specific actions that can accomplish it — actions I hope our next president will adopt:

First, our problems cannot be fixed without our leaders acknowledging them.

Unite Americans with regular, honest and open communication. We deserve a president who explains our problems, encourages input from all sides, and shares plans and solutions.

Eisenhower made a point to have lunch or dinner with opposition leaders, including those he disagreed with, and listen to their views. The best leaders in politics and business take criticism as an opportunity to ask themselves “Where are they right?” instead of “Why are they wrong?” If we’re going to truly unify our country, we need to begin treating opposing views, complaints and critiques as opportunities to find common ground and make us better.

Second, develop policies that reflect our critical place on the global stage.

These national policies should include facing — and fixing — our failure to create equal opportunity for all, expanding the economy by encouraging investments, sharing the wealth, addressing our national debt, maintaining the world’s strongest military, taking control of our borders, strengthening the social safety nets, and renewing national pride by unabashedly teaching civics and American exceptionalism without papering over our mistakes.

In addition, we need to get back to a pragmatic, smart and no-nonsense foreign policy that also advances our economic strategy and strengthens our relationships with our allies. This would include the more effective use of diplomacy, trade and the active promotion of democratic values. When our allies are fighting wars to defend their sovereignty and democracies, and desperately need secure and reliable energy sources, delaying long-term liquid natural gas projects in Louisiana and Texas is misguided and self-defeating. It is bad for the environment and the economy — and it is bad for our allies.

Third, we need smarter policies that provide protection, progress and prosperity to all.

Sadly, we lack coherent energy, education, infrastructure, housing, tax and immigration policies. While we agree sometimes on the problems and the goals, our prescriptions are too often simplistic and poorly designed.

The American Dream is disappearing for many because opportunity is not shared equally. Many inner-city and rural schools do not teach students the skills they need to get good jobs. Some of these problems aren’t necessarily intractable. For example, we can easily reform our mortgage policies to make homeownership more affordable for lower-income Americans.

Additionally, both parties agree on the benefits of dramatically expanding the earned income tax credit, which would get much-needed income to the individuals and communities most in need of it. The absence of good policy is hurting our country and, unfortunately, hurts those who are already disadvantaged the most.

Next, build the best team: a group of rivals.

The members of a president’s Cabinet and administration should reflect the entire nation. Tribal politics will not deliver the best talent and expertise across the political spectrum. Put country and Constitution first.

The private sector has huge wells of expertise and produces 85 percent of our nation’s jobs. It should have a seat at the table. Yet in recent years, government leaders have often failed to engage those in industry. A president should put the most talented people, including those from business and the opposite party, into their Cabinet.

We have seen the powerful impact of this collaboration in places like Detroit. In that city, we saw a mayor, governor, city council, business leaders and community leaders come together regardless of party affiliation to get their city back on its feet. The city’s bonds are investment-grade today, just 10 years after it declared bankruptcy. Collaboration works.

Finally, work to earn the support of all voters.

Recognize that voters are all different and have good reasons to think differently. Do not insult, stereotype, weaponize, scapegoat or gaslight. And do not attack them. Engage them.

This takes bravery. Some forms of bravery are obvious: fighting for our country and caring for our sick. Other forms are less obvious but just as important: listening openly to conflicting views, changing your mind, lifting people up, choosing country over party.

A healthy, unified country is good for everyone. I believe that our nation is at a critical time in its 248-year history. Like many of your families, my grandparents were immigrants who did not finish high school. They were drawn to the promise of this nation, which was then, and still is, the beacon of freedom for the world.

America has all the advantages, and we can win the future with smart policy, courageous leaders and everyone with a seat at the table moving in concert.

We need to elect a president who is dedicated to the ideals that define and unite us, and who is committed to restoring our faith in America and our indispensable role in the world.

Such a person could be one of our greatest presidents — and put us on a path that is worthy of the American people.

The Washington Post · by Jamie Dimon · August 2, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com