Quotes of the Day:

"They always say that time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself." 

– Andy Warhol

"To live a good life: we have the potential for it. If we can learn to be indifferent to what makes no difference."

– Marcus Aurelius

"I am enough of the artist to draw freely upon my imagination. Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world."

– Albert Einstein

1. South Korea, US militaries will stage large-scale drills this month to address North Korean threats

2. The Variables of OPCON: The ‘Control Rod’ Logic in Today’s ROK-US Alliance

3. Not the Time to Transfer Wartime Control of Forces to South Korea

4. DPRK expanded loudspeaker network weeks before ROK dismantles its own

5. The Second North Korean Wave in Ukraine: What Next as Pyongyang’s Troops Arrive on Russia’s Front Lines?

6. Trump’s transactional diplomacy hangs heavy over upcoming South Korea summit

7. A New CRINK Axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea?

8. North Korea clamps down as Chinese visitors misuse business visas: Sources

9. Ask A North Korean: What is the function of the state run daily Rodong Sinmun?

10. South Korea set to decide whether to let Google Maps finally work properly

11. North Korea’s guide to going nuclear – How Kim Jong Un fortified his impoverished state.

12. Alliance modernization seeks to ensure credible deterrence on, 'beyond' Korean Peninsula: Pentagon

13. Gov't discussing joint Seoul-Washington measures to build peace with N. Korea

14. S. Korea again postpones decision on Google's map data transfer request amid U.S. pressure

15. South Korea must do much more to support the U.S. and defend itself

16. N. Korea’s silence is actually louder psychological warfare

1. South Korea, US militaries will stage large-scale drills this month to address North Korean threats

South Korea, US militaries will stage large-scale drills this month to address North Korean threats

By KIM TONG-HYUNG

Updated 1:58 PM GMT+9, August 7, 2025

Share

AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · August 7, 2025

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea and the United States will launch their annual large-scale military exercise this month to bolster readiness against North Korean threats, the allies said Thursday, in a move likely to irritate Pyongyang amid a prolonged stalemate in diplomacy.

The exercise also comes against the backdrop of concerns in Seoul that the Trump administration could shake up the decades-old alliance by demanding higher payments for the U.S. troop presence in South Korea and possibly move to reduce it as Washington puts more focus on China.

Ulchi Freedom Shield, the second of two large-scale exercises held annually in South Korea, following another set of drills in March, typically involves thousands of troops in computer-simulated command post training and combined field exercises.

The Aug. 18-28 exercise may trigger an angry reaction from North Korea, which calls the joint drills invasion rehearsals and often uses them as a pretext to dial up military demonstrations and weapons tests aimed at advancing its nuclear program.

Doubling down on its nuclear ambitions, North Korea has repeatedly rejected Washington and Seoul’s calls to resume diplomacy aimed at winding down its weapons program, which derailed in 2019. The North has now made Russia the priority of its foreign policy, sending thousands of troops and large amounts of military equipment to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine.

About 18,000 South Korean troops will take part in this year’s Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesperson, Col. Lee Sung Joon, said during a joint briefing with U.S. Forces Korea, which did not disclose the number of participating U.S. troops.

◆ Stay up to date with similar stories by signing up to our WhatsApp channel.

Both Lee and U.S. Forces Korea public affairs director Col. Ryan Donald downplayed speculation that South Korea’s new liberal government, led by President Lee Jae Myung, sought to downsize the exercise to create momentum for dialogue with Pyongyang, saying its scale is similar to previous years. However, Col. Lee said about half of the exercise’s originally planned 40 field training programs were postponed to September due to heat concerns.

The threat from North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile programs will be a key focus of the exercise, which will include training to deter North Korean nuclear use and respond to its missile attacks, Lee said.

The exercise will also incorporate lessons from recent conflicts, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and the clash between Israel and Iran, and address threats from drones, GPS jamming and cyberattacks, Lee and Donald said.

“We look across the globe at the challenges we may face on the battlefield and incorporate that so we can challenge the participants in the exercise,” Donald said. “We are focused on ensuring the alliance is sustainable and credibly deters aggression from the DPRK and addresses the broader regional security challenges,” he said, using the initials of North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The announcement of the exercise came a week after the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un rebuffed overtures by Lee Jae Myung’s government, saying that Seoul’s “blind trust” in its alliance with Washington and hostility toward Pyongyang make it no different from its hard-line conservative predecessor.

Kim Yo Jong later issued a separate statement dismissing the Trump administration’s intent to resume diplomacy on North Korea’s denuclearization, suggesting that Pyongyang — now focused on expanding ties with Russia — sees little urgency in resuming talks with Seoul or Washington.

On the other side of Seoul’s security concerns is whether its alliance with Washington will see dramatic shifts during the second term of President Donald Trump, who has rattled allies and partners with tariff hikes and demands that they reduce their reliance on the U.S. and spend more for their own defense.

Dating back to his first term, Trump has regularly called for South Korea to pay more for the 28,500 American troops stationed on its soil. Recent comments by key Trump administration officials, including Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, have also suggested a desire to restructure the alliance, which some experts say could potentially affect the size and roles of U.S. forces in South Korea.

Under this approach, South Korea would take a greater role in countering North Korean threats while U.S. forces focus more on China, possibly leaving Seoul to face reduced benefits but increased costs and risks, experts say. During Thursday’s news conference, Donald did not provide a specific answer when asked whether U.S. and South Korean troops during their combined exercise will train for any possible realignment of U.S. troops to face broader regional threats.

The future of the alliance will possibly be a topic in a summit between Trump and South Korean President Lee, which is expected this month. In a recent interview with the Washington Post, Lee’s foreign minister, Cho Hyun, downplayed the possibility of significant changes to the U.S. military presence in South Korea.

“We are talking with the United States, but there is no concern about the U.S. forces in Korea. We believe that they will remain as such and their role will remain as of today,” he said.

2. The Variables of OPCON: The ‘Control Rod’ Logic in Today’s ROK-US Alliance

Of all the Korean scholars/researchers I know, there is no one who has more knowledge about OPCON transition than Clint Work.

Read part one of his series at this link: https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/the-variables-of-opcon-the-history-of-the-control-rod-logic/

I look forward to the rest of the series on this.

These insights are important:

The problem with the longstanding control rod logic is that it reflects dichotomous narratives, one of complete U.S. control and another of complete South Korean autonomy and subsequent U.S. security abandonment. Yet the U.S. has never had complete control, and wartime OPCON transition is not or should not be premised upon alliance abrogation or total ROK autonomy. With wartime OPCON transition, Seoul would undoubtedly have to reconceptualize its understanding of and practical approach to deterrence in uncomfortable and uncertain ways, but that would not be done without a U.S. presence. Moving forward, South Korean and U.S. policymakers could reinforce that message. 

To be sure, when it comes to wartime OPCON transition, there are a host of other issues aside from the control rod logic that will have to be openly addressed to competently and stably move forward. These include contested and distortive narratives about South Korean sovereignty, the pros and cons of different command structures and concepts, reviewing and potentially revising the bilaterally agreed upon conditions for OPCON transition, determining how OPCON transition relates to the shifting regional role of U.S, forces and the alliance itself, and determining the role of the UNC in a post-OPCON environment (all of which will be examined in this series). Still, the control rod logic must be acknowledged and tempered if that alliance is to complete OPCON transition in a mutually beneficial manner. 

The Variables of OPCON: The ‘Control Rod’ Logic in Today’s ROK-US Alliance

As it has for decades, the South Korea-U.S. alliance must grapple with the inherently contradictory distortions of the control rod logic.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/the-variables-of-opcon-the-control-rod-logic-in-todays-rok-us-alliance/

By Clint Work

August 08, 2025

United Nations Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and Combined Forces Command commander Gen. Xavier T. Brunson (2nd from left) talks to a Korean War veteran at a ceremony in South Korea to commemorate the 72nd anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement, Jul. 27, 2025.

Credit: Lt. Cmdr. Brendan Trembath, United Nations Command

The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea, or ROK) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate in Washington and Seoul. Although OPCON transition, in one form or another, has been an official alliance policy for two decades if not longer, its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and South Korean administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables. 

Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and South Korean officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy. 

This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. The first two articles in the series will explore one of the more consequential if difficult to measure variables, namely the “control rod” logic (if you missed it, you can read part one of the series here). Subsequent articles will explore the South Korean “sovereignty narrative,” variations in alliance command concepts and structures, the conditions of the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP), how wartime OPCON transition relates to the regional role of U.S. forces and the alliance, and the role on the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) in a post-OPCON transition environment. 

The Control Rod Logic in the 2010s

When South Korean President Park Geun-hye entered office, she requested wartime OPCON transition be further delayed, much like her conservative predecessor. The Obama administration agreed. At the 2014 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), the allies announced the adoption of a “ROK-proposed conditions-based approach” to OPCON transition from the U.S. forces-led Combined Forces Command (CFC) to a new ROK forces-led combined defense command. They reaffirmed their commitment to “a stable OPCON transition at an appropriate date,” while noting “that the conditions-based approach ensures that the ROK will assume wartime OPCON when critical ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable OPCON transition.” 

The critical military capabilities cited in the 2014 statement included, among others, South Korea’s development of its Kill Chain preemptive strike system and Korea Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD), which South Korean defense officials said should be completed by 2023. Yet the latter condition about the security environment, broadly interpretive and political by design, provided a handy backstop in case either or both sides viewed the environment unfavorably.

In 2015, U.S. and South Korean authorities endorsed and signed the “Condition-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan” (COTP). In the fall of 2016 they pledged to continue implementing the plan to ensure a stable transition. It was apparent, however, neither side was rushing to complete the process. For her part, Park was outright opposed to the transition. However, she was soon engulfed in political scandal, impeached, and removed from office. Meanwhile, the Obama administration was reorienting U.S. foreign policy toward competition with China, while facing steadily increasing North Korean nuclear and missile tests. The imperative was to maintain, indeed reassert, U.S. leadership across the Asia-Pacific region, including in Northeast Asia. 

Nevertheless, as has often occurred in the OPCON transition process, political leadership and policy soon shifted. After a decade of conservative rule, President Moon Jae-in entered office in 2017 with the intent to reestablish a progressive agenda, including promoting wartime OPCON transition based on the same sovereignty-based rationale President Roh Moo-hyun used in the 2000s, including withering criticism of South Korea’s military leaders for failing to advance the process. 

From Progress to Roadblocks

Initially, Moon found in U.S. President Donald Trump – himself outspoken about the need for greater allied burden sharing – a seemingly willing partner. Trump and Moon’s first summit meeting and joint statement in June 2017 contained South Korean progressives’ favored language on continuing to work to “expeditiously” enable the conditions-based transfer of wartime OPCON. Both sides reaffirmed such language in successive SCMs.  

In 2018, they signed the Alliance Guidance Principles, which aimed for a strong combined defense posture following OPCON transition, including by maintaining the CFC structure and reaffirming “the mutual commitment that the future CFC is to have an ROK four-star general as the Commander and a U.S. four-star general as Deputy Commander.” Both sides also established concrete steps by which to assess and certify South Korean and alliance capabilities and move forward with the transition process. 

The sudden shift toward engagement with North Korea in early 2018 began to create an environment – or at least the perception of one – conducive to stable OPCON transition. If North Korea-U.S. and Inter-Korean relations evolved under some form of denuclearization, tension-reduction and trust-building measures, and, ultimately, political normalization, transforming the alliance’s longstanding security architecture seemed both realistic and necessary. 

Yet the engagement itself – followed by the disruption of COVID-19 – again waylaid the wartime OPCON transition effort. 

Following his historic Singapore Summit with Kim Jong Un in June 2018, Trump unilaterally cancelled South Korea-U.S. military exercises to help foster further engagement. However, exercises were the main mechanism by which to assess and certify that South Korean forces, alliance structures, and military interoperability were successfully progressing toward OPCON transition. Although the allies made some progress toward this certification under scaled-down exercises during  2019, the onset of COVID-19 further curtailed exercises. At the same time, the stalemate in both U.S. and South Korean engagement with Pyongyang and North Korea’s resumption of short-range missile tests resulted in discord between U.S. and South Korean officials. 

Officials in Seoul continued pushing for expeditious assessment and certification of capabilities required for formal wartime OPCON transition. But U.S. officials resisted a perceived South Korean willingness to skirt agreed-upon certification standards, which, if not properly met, would undermine the alliance’s ability to deter and defend against future North Korean aggression. Also, U.S. defense officials questioned whether and to what degree South Korean capability acquisitions were properly calibrated to meet conditions. 

During congressional hearings, U.S. lawmakers, too, raised skeptical questions about the pace of the wartime OPCON transition process as well as its outcome. As Representative Austin Scott put it, in the event of another war on the Korean Peninsula: “I expect that…the U.S. would in the end be the lead. We’re the ones that have the airpower. We’re the ones that have the command and control aspect of things. We’re the ones that have the weapons systems that it takes to win in that scenario. And to give operational control of that to another country’s commanders is… that timeline is very concerning.” 

Again, if the U.S. were to maintain a forward presence in and treaty commitment to South Korea, U.S. policymakers, lawmakers, and officers were unwilling to accept subpar certification of a South Korean ally they viewed to be unprepared for leadership of U.S. forces and assets under wartime conditions. The control rod logic remained extant. 

Moon administration officials, in turn, argued that the United States was using the certification debate to delay the process, and progressive voices began to push for a time-based approach. Trump officials did not budge. 

Arriving in 2021, the Biden administration quickly tamped down any expectations the alliance would move forward with OPCON transition before the end of Moon’s term. Instead, the Biden team emphasized shoring up the alliance, by quickly inking a new cost-sharing deal with Seoul based on the latter’s own proposal (thus ending a dispute that had lingered for the last 18 months of Trump’s first term). The Biden administration also terminated all remaining range and payload restrictions on South Korean missiles under the alliance’s bilateral missile guidelines. 

On OPCON, defense officials reaffirmed that bilaterally approved conditions must be met and committed to comprehensive joint study on capabilities and various rewrites to key COTP documents. In other words, OPCON transition was still official alliance policy but under a range of new reassessments and revisions, which would take time and require detailed deliberations and agreements. Simply put, wartime OPCON transition was kicked down the road again. 

Bolstering Extended Deterrence, De-emphasizing OPCON Transition

Like past South Korean conservative presidents, while President Yoon Suk-yeol officially embraced OPCON transition when entering office in May 2022, he also had reservations. A security adviser to Yoon warned that “if a perfunctory transfer of wartime OPCON weakens or erodes the combined defense posture, the safety of the people will be threatened.” OPCON transition was de-emphasized in favor of a marked shift in Seoul’s policy toward North Korea and the alliance. 

North Korea had undertaken a historical missile testing campaign and more bellicose rhetoric. Driven by a fundamentally different perspective on inter-Korean relations that stressed deterrence – if not confrontation – above all else, the Yoon administration prioritized expanding the scale and scope of alliance exercises, restarting existing and creating new alliance consultative mechanisms surrounding the U.S. extended deterrence commitment, and building out Seoul’s 3K Defense Systems under South Korea’s soon-to-be established strategic command (ROK STRATCOM). All the while, Yoon publicly played footsie with the possibility of Seoul’s own nuclear armament to garner an increased U.S. extended deterrence commitment.

Under the 2023 Washington Declaration and establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), the Biden administration ultimately embraced the creation of what Yoon and his administration’s officials called a “nuclear-based” alliance. When it came to the peninsula, the Biden administration’s priorities centered on enhancing deterrence while shoring up nonproliferation imperatives (at least as it pertained to half of the peninsula). 

The Biden administration’s Korean Peninsula policy was nested within a broader, more important effort, namely, to strengthen the United States’ network of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific in competition with the “pacing challenge” in China. The Biden team jettisoned Trump’s outspoken critique of allied free-riding and large cost-sharing demands yet retained his administration’s great power competition framework vis-à-vis China. Tightening or establishing upgraded alliance frameworks, like the NCG with South Korea, was considered a means to gaining greater allied fidelity to U.S. strategic imperatives in the Indo-Pacific and under such conditions, OPCON transition was not a priority. 

That said, the 2022, 2023, and 2024 annual SCM Joint Communiques during the Biden administration began to offer more details about the status of the wartime OPCON transition process. These indicated progress was being made, yet also stressed more assessments and certifications were required. Notwithstanding the importance of the detailed certification process, one cannot discount the persistent role of the control rod logic. 

After all, before ROK STRATCOM was even established, U.S. officials secured Yoon’s affirmation in the Washington Declaration that South Korea would work “in lockstep with the United States to closely connect the capabilities and planning activities of the new ROK Strategic Command and the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command.” There were then and remain today real questions and concerns about how and to what extent ROK STRATCOM – and its considerable offensive and defensive capabilities – fits with the existing CFC structure, even more so given Yoon and his administration officials’ heated rhetoric about adopting a disproportionate retaliatory posture against North Korea, within a broader preemptive deterrence framework. 

If those concerns exist under the current U.S.-led CFC, might they become more prevalent under a South Korean-led CFC or, indeed, under a parallel arrangement wherein the U.S. may have even relatively less insight on and influence over South Korea’s actions? And how do reports that Yoon ordered drone operations in North Korea to spark North Korean aggression to justify imposing martial law influence U.S. concerns about precipitous or escalatory South Korean actions? While Yoon is disgraced and his actions have been widely condemned, there is no guarantee South Korea will not elect a future conservative president similarly inclined toward North Korea.

Moving Forward From the Present Moment

Presently, the administration of Lee Jae-myung, in office since June 4, embodies the opposite inclination. It aims to tamp down tensions and find a way back toward engagement with Pyongyang, as difficult as that will be. 

Moreover, while neither the Trump administration as a whole nor the Pentagon specifically has adopted an official position to accelerate wartime OPCON transition, it has emphasized recalibration of the U.S. force posture and regional alliances to prioritize deterring China as the pacing threat and to deny Beijing’s seizure of Taiwan by force as its major planning scenario. In early 2025, the second Trump administration appears less inclined toward the control rod logic within the alliance command structure and more interested in greater regional and strategic flexibility. The second Trump administration appears to prefer Seoul pay more for its own defense and take a more robust role in safeguarding itself.

Yet, as history shows, the control rod logic has a way of resurfacing in both subtle and overt ways. As demonstrated over more than 80 years, the U.S. simply may find it unacceptable to subordinate – or appear to subordinate itself – to another country’s military leadership. Even if the current conditions-based wartime OPCON transition plan results in what is in effect the same combined structure – yet with a South Korean commander and U.S. deputy commander – the optics might not work for a global great power in general or under the framework of an “America First” foreign policy as that evolves in the new Trump administration. Alternatively, the implications of adopting a parallel wartime OPCON structure – akin to what was envisioned under the earlier Strategic Transition Plan – raises other issues, to be explored in a later article in this series.

Congress has already weighed in on the issue in the Senate’s version of the 2026 Fiscal Year National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which “prohibits a reduction in U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula or a change in wartime operational control over the Combined Forces Command until the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that such action is in the national interest.” Further, it “directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Commanders of Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea to conduct an independent risk assessment of any such changes.” Various constituencies may yet again find reason to inject caution into the process.

As it has for decades, the South Korea-U.S. alliance must grapple with the inherently contradictory distortions of the control rod logic. Premised on maintaining a degree of U.S. control or significant influence over the security environment on the Korean peninsula, the control rod logic can result in U.S. efforts to slow the OPCON transition process as well as reinforce Seoul’s sense of security dependence. Indeed, some within the South Korean security establishment fear OPCON transition, because it would result in a command arrangement over which the U.S. has less control and thus could precipitate a complete U.S. military withdrawal. 

This could potentially catalyze antithetical South Korean trajectories, ranging from an open and eager pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent to accommodation with China and disavowal of the U.S. alliance system. The wide possibilities of such discordant trajectories indicate the cacophony of psychologies burbling just under the surface. This, consequently, has shaped Seoul’s efforts to delay or downgrade the OPCON transition effort, which then amplifies U.S. frustrations about South Korean free-riding or lack of burden sharing while at the same time rendering U.S. officials unaware of the role that hierarchical American security tendencies play in fostering obstructionist South Korean behavior. 

The control rod logic and U.S.-led command architecture preferences continue to play a role in an array of perverse incentives, including a South Korean preference for deterrence of North Korea by punishment or preemption rather than denial. Especially under conservative leadership, control rod logic may amplify Seoul’s strategic preferences to threaten severe retaliation, while being secure in its knowledge that the United Stares is there to support it and likely restrain any escalatory cycle. Posturing for disproportionate retaliation, while simultaneously bemoaning U.S.-imposed restraints, lets South Korean administrations look tough yet avoid confronting the high costs likely in the event of a spiraling armed conflict. 

North Korea, shrewd as it is, surely understands this dynamic and perceives a degree of permissive space within which it can aggress without facing overly punitive retaliatory measures from South Korea or the UNC alliance. Pyongyang gets the added benefit of calling Seoul a U.S. lackey. While some argue wartime OPCON transition will result in greater North Korean adventurousness, might it have the opposite effect? Might it simultaneously inject a considerable confounding variable in North Korea’s calculus as well as force Seoul to grapple more immediately with what it means to deter and lead a war? 

Moving forward in earnest with wartime OPCON transition ultimately requires moving past these seemingly endless debates about all-or-nothing military control. South Korea’s advancing military capabilities and the Lee administration’s more tempered approach toward North Korea and desire to take a more robust role in paying for South Korean security provides an opportunity. 

The problem with the longstanding control rod logic is that it reflects dichotomous narratives, one of complete U.S. control and another of complete South Korean autonomy and subsequent U.S. security abandonment. Yet the U.S. has never had complete control, and wartime OPCON transition is not or should not be premised upon alliance abrogation or total ROK autonomy. With wartime OPCON transition, Seoul would undoubtedly have to reconceptualize its understanding of and practical approach to deterrence in uncomfortable and uncertain ways, but that would not be done without a U.S. presence. Moving forward, South Korean and U.S. policymakers could reinforce that message. 

To be sure, when it comes to wartime OPCON transition, there are a host of other issues aside from the control rod logic that will have to be openly addressed to competently and stably move forward. These include contested and distortive narratives about South Korean sovereignty, the pros and cons of different command structures and concepts, reviewing and potentially revising the bilaterally agreed upon conditions for OPCON transition, determining how OPCON transition relates to the shifting regional role of U.S, forces and the alliance itself, and determining the role of the UNC in a post-OPCON environment (all of which will be examined in this series). Still, the control rod logic must be acknowledged and tempered if that alliance is to complete OPCON transition in a mutually beneficial manner. 

Authors

Contributing Author

Clint Work

Dr. Clint Work is a fellow for Northeast Asia at the Center for Strategy and Military Power (CSMP), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU). The views expressed are the author’s alone.

3. Not the Time to Transfer Wartime Control of Forces to South Korea

​Conclusion:

OPCON transfer remains a worthy long-term goal—but in an era of dual contingencies, pragmatism must prevail. Until the Indo-Pacific stabilizes or new crisis-tested command solutions emerge, alliance cohesion and operational clarity must take priority over symbolic milestones. For now, the existing command structure remains the stronger shield against the region’s worst-case scenarios.

Not the Time to Transfer Wartime Control of Forces to South Korea - Defense Opinion

defenseopinion.com · by Ju Hyung Kim · August 7, 2025

South Korea has long viewed the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. as a marker of its military sovereignty. But in a dual contingency involving simultaneous wars in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula, such a shift might prove less a symbol of independence than a structural vulnerability. Timing, in this case, could outweigh symbolism.

China’s growing military assertiveness under Xi Jinping has made a Taiwan conflict seem less remote. Meanwhile, North Korea’s evolving arsenal of missiles, drones, and tactical nuclear weapons—sharpened by lessons from the Ukraine war—could tempt Pyongyang to strike when Washington’s attention is divided.

In this environment, the question of who commands the fight becomes more than a legal or political matter.

Currently, the Republic of Korea (ROK) military and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) operate under the Combined Forces Command (CFC), led by a U.S. general with a South Korean deputy. This structure ensures seamless access to U.S. intelligence, joint planning and rapid force integration.

If the U.S. transferred OPCON, an ROK general would assume command of the future Combined Forces Command, with a U.S. general serving as deputy—while U.S. forces would continue to operate under U.S. national command authority.

While this arrangement works on paper during peacetime, it could slow decision-making and complicate alliance coordination during the unprecedented chaos of a dual contingency.

Potential advantages and drawbacks

Proponents of OPCON transfer argue that it would empower South Korea to exercise greater strategic autonomy. A ROK four-star general commanding the future Combined Forces Command could tailor warfighting responses to the peninsula’s terrain and threat environment, expedite decision-making during national emergencies and assert sovereign control over indigenous assets such as the Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) doctrines.

While Kill Chain is a preemptive measure intended to strike North Korean nuclear launch platforms before they are used, KMPR is a retaliatory measure designed to destroy North Korea’s command structure and leadership after it carries out attacks against South Korea.

This model would also reflect the maturity of a U.S. ally that now fields one of the world’s most technologically advanced militaries.

Yet under a Taiwan–Korea dual contingency, the drawbacks could prove acute. If the transfer were to occur in 2026, U.S. troops stationed in Korea—including key air assets at Osan and Kunsan or naval elements at Busan—would operate under a Korean-led structure, while remaining under U.S. national command authority.

This arrangement could complicate joint decision-making in a dual contingency. In such a scenario, it would raise key questions.

Would Seoul authorize the temporary deployment of U.S. fighter squadrons or missile defense units to reinforce a Taiwan Strait operation, knowing that North Korea might exploit the gap?

Conversely, would U.S. policymakers trust that their forces under a foreign-led operational framework could be rapidly retasked across domains or theaters without political hesitation?

These questions underscore the very real risk of command friction. China and North Korea are closely watching for alliance disunity. Kim Jong Un may interpret command asymmetries or delays in deployment as signs of U.S. disengagement. Xi Jinping, too, could exploit any ambiguity in allied responses—especially in the opening hours of a two-theater conflict, when deterrence relies on unity, not bureaucracy.

A safer path forward

OPCON transfer is not inherently detrimental. Over the long term, it could strengthen South Korea’s defense independence, enable faster national mobilization and symbolize the alliance’s evolution from hierarchy to partnership.

But timing is critical.

The hypothetical of a dual contingency—where both the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula erupt within days of one another—should force defense planners to reassess whether command restructuring enhances or hinders deterrence.

In a 2023 simulation by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The First Battle of the Next War, even modest delays in allied coordination led to significant battlefield setbacks. Without a synchronized, interoperable command system stretching across both theaters, symbolic handovers risk becoming strategic liabilities.

Delaying OPCON transfer until after a joint trilateral crisis command mechanism is operational—one involving the U.S., Japan, and South Korea—may offer a safer path. Such a framework could allow multi-theater coordination without sacrificing sovereignty. Until then, preserving the current U.S.-led CFC ensures predictability in force posture, decision authority, and escalation control.

South Korea’s sovereignty is not diminished by maintaining the current CFC framework. On the contrary, retaining the existing structure in the face of dual threats ensures fast, unified responses and credible deterrence.

OPCON transfer remains a worthy long-term goal—but in an era of dual contingencies, pragmatism must prevail. Until the Indo-Pacific stabilizes or new crisis-tested command solutions emerge, alliance cohesion and operational clarity must take priority over symbolic milestones. For now, the existing command structure remains the stronger shield against the region’s worst-case scenarios.

Ju Hyung Kim

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim is president of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank in Seoul affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly. He is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a forthcoming book.

defenseopinion.com · by Ju Hyung Kim · August 7, 2025

4. DPRK expanded loudspeaker network weeks before ROK dismantles its own

​Because the regime will eventually employ them when it believes they will be useful to support KJU's political warfare strategy.

DPRK expanded loudspeaker network weeks before ROK dismantles its own

JCS says North added more speakers, reportedly in May and June, but has not resumed anti-ROK broadcasts along the border

https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korea-expanded-loudspeaker-system-as-south-finishes-dismantling-its-own/

Jooheon Kim August 8, 2025

A North Korean soldier in front of border loudspeakers, and South Korean soldiers removing loudspeakers near the inter-Korean border. | Images: NK News, ROK defense ministry

North Korea has recently increased its loudspeaker setup along the inter-Korean border, although no propaganda broadcasts have been aired, South Korea’s defense ministry confirmed to NK News, in contrast to Seoul’s efforts to reduce tensions by halting broadcasts and removing its own systems. 

In response to a media report claiming the North had increased its loudspeakers following Seoul’s halt to its own broadcasts, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) official stated on Friday that “each unit consists of several small speakers, and some have been added.”

However, the official added that “Since North Korea is not conducting any (noise) propaganda transmissions toward the South, there are no actual broadcasts at the moment.” 

“It appears to be part of an ongoing effort to enhance output that had been in preparation prior to (our) dismantlement of loudspeakers toward the North.”

The expansion reportedly took place in May and June, even after the South Korean military halted its own loudspeaker broadcasts on June 11. 

Earlier this week, South Korea began dismantling the loudspeakers used for decades to broadcast messages across the demilitarized zone, signaling a push to lower tensions with North Korea while maintaining military readiness. 

“This is a practical measure aimed at easing tensions between South and North Korea, without compromising our military readiness,” the Ministry of National Defense told NK News at the time, adding that the work is expected to be completed within a few days.

South Korea had completed the dismantling of all fixed loudspeakers directed at North Korea by Tuesday, according to the defense ministry.

President Lee Jae-myung has repeatedly criticized the propaganda broadcasts reinstated under his predecessor, calling them provocations that risk escalating tensions with Pyongyang, as well as leaflet campaigns by South Korean civic groups.

Meanwhile, North Korea reportedly contacted the United Nations Command (UNC) last month with a request that South Korea reduce its use of warning broadcasts along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). These broadcasts appear to be activated when North Korean troops approach or cross the MDL, warning them not to enter southern territory.

While the ROK defense ministry told NK News that North Korea notified the UNC of construction work near the MDL on July 18, it did not clarify whether the North also asked for a reduction in warning broadcasts.

Choi Gi-il, a military studies professor at Sangji University and a former ROK Army lieutenant colonel, noted that Pyongyang’s request may have been driven by increased frontline construction activity, especially during the rainy season. 

He also told NK News the North may be showing signs of “wanting dialogue or easing military tensions, but it’s hard to draw conclusions from a single incident.” 

According to Choi, President Lee’s administration aims to promote peace through dialogue and cooperation, which may be “an approach that seems aligned with North Korea’s own interests.”

The expert added that the broadcasts can be disruptive and unwelcome during such operations. 

Edited by Alannah Hill

5. The Second North Korean Wave in Ukraine: What Next as Pyongyang’s Troops Arrive on Russia’s Front Lines?

​Kim's money making machine.

Excerpts:

The totality of current circumstances—Putin’s unwillingness to agree to a ceasefire unless it comes with what amounts to a Ukrainian surrender, the largest drone and ballistic missile attack on Kyiv, and now a shipment of thirty thousand North Korean troops—all point to the likelihood that Russia aims to chip away, continuing the war of attrition while also seeking a larger breakthrough than has otherwise been possible, until it wins. Given Kim Jong-un is also likely being rewarded with Russian technology that North Korea could not have built on its own, the door is not closed to further manpower additions. In 2023, North Korea’s army was believed to number around 1,280,000 active personnel, with an additional three million in reserve. With those figures, and a similar—even stronger—view of troops being expendable, further waves of reinforcements in the tens of thousands are not unlikely. Could Ukrainians reclaim and defend their territories before additional Russian offensives in the spring of 2026?

By conventional wisdom, defending territory is less manpower-intensive than launching an offensive campaign, and Ukrainian forces enjoy a commitment imbalance vis-à-vis their Russian opponents by virtue of the imperative of defending their homeland. Viewed through that lens, the introduction of a large new cohort of North Korean troops is likely an effort to simply shift the battlefield calculus. Russia has lost nearly one million people, either killed or injured, while Ukraine has only lost approximately four hundred thousand. According to an Institute for the Study of War report, as of February Russia occupied only 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. The report estimated that it would take Russian forces over eighty-three years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukrainian territory at the current rate of advance, and with Russian soldiers being killed or wounded at nearly a 2.5x rate than that of Ukrainian fighters. This is clearly an unacceptable status quo for Putin, one that the Kremlin hopes to change.

Russia’s deepening reliance on a foreign military manpower from North Korea signals its intent to chip away at Ukraine through attrition until it secures victory on its terms. With Putin unwilling to agree to a ceasefire absent Ukrainian surrender, and Kim Jung-un rewarded with advanced Russian technology, the alliance is transactional, brutal, and ultimately very repeatable. Trading future Russian for North Korean casualties will play well domestically. With North Korea absorbing the brunt of the fighting, Moscow can prolong its war effort at a fraction of the political cost. The heavily state-controlled Russian media can boast a sharp decline in domestic casualties even as the summer offensive intensifies, framing the war effort as both successful and sustainable. As the Trump administration continues to seek an end to the war—and despite the hopeful possibility that US pressure could yet bear fruit—both sides continue to prepare for a protracted conflict, especially as kinetic operations primarily come to a pause during the winter. Putin isn’t turning to Kim Jong-un out of desperation, but to apply cheap, sustained pressure on the Ukrainian trenches and to shift the psychological balance. Whether an end to the fighting, or even a pause in it, comes before the arrival of North Korean troops on the front lines remains to be seen. If not, the war could be set for wave after wave of new troops as Russia looks to chip away before winter.

The Second North Korean Wave in Ukraine: What Next as Pyongyang’s Troops Arrive on Russia’s Front Lines? - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jared Martin · August 8, 2025

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

Last month, news headlines were dominated by reports that North Korea would supply Russia with thirty thousand troops, ostensibly for an offensive in the fourth summer of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence now reports signs of those troops in Russia. In addition to the manpower, the North Koreans arrived with twelve million 152-millimeter artillery rounds for Russia’s arsenal. With these reinforcements’ battlefield appearance reportedly nearing, the question of where and when they will arrive at the front line remains. Will Russian President Vladimir Putin return the troops to the Sumy region, where the initial wave of Pyongyang’s soldiers were decimated by the Ukrainian defensive line? Or does Putin have a more calculated plan in place?

In the fall of 2024, Russia recruited assistance from Pyongyang for its struggling invasion of Ukraine. Frustrated by the lack of permanent progress in the war, Russia turned to an increasingly close ally for over ten thousand troops to assist in the fight. These reinforcements applied added pressure to Ukrainian defenses as they struggled to hold strategic lines against advancing Russian ground forces.

Fast forward to July 6, 2025, when Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un again in Wonsan during a three-day visit. While in North Korea, Lavrov also met with his North Korean counterpart, Choe Son-hui. According to the Russian News Agency, TASS, Lavrov was quoted as saying, “Our Korean friends confirmed their firm support for all the objectives of the special military operation, as well as for the actions of the Russian leadership and armed forces. In turn, we once again expressed our sincere gratitude for the contribution of Korean People’s Army servicemen to the successful liberation of the Kursk Region from Ukrainian Nazis and foreign mercenaries.”

Just a few days before Lavrov’s visit, North Korea pledged to triple its military contribution, sending an additional twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand troops to the front lines in Ukraine. These reinforcements are expected to arrive in the coming months. Approximately four thousand of the original ten thousand troops Pyongyang sent have been killed or injured. Ukrainian defense intelligence has reported seeing signs that Russian military aircraft are being refitted to carry personnel, possibly for the task of carrying tens of thousands of foreign troops to the front lines. Moscow is likely paying the impoverished North Koreans a minimum per head for their troops as well as providing North Korea with technology that Pyongyang cannot produce itself.

This drastic escalation of North Koreans’ contribution to the Russian war effort comes at a strategic time. In the past month, Russia launched an unprecedented 728 drones and thirteen ballistic missiles against Kyiv. The attack and Putin’s continued aggressive moves have drawn significant frustration from President Donald Trump, as Russia continues to be uncooperative with the US leader’s insistence on a ceasefire. Moreover, Western leaders likely worry Russia will provide North Korea with sensitive technologies that would enhance North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs in exchange for troops and munitions.

Observers, of course, are looking to identify what North Korea’s troop commitment to Russia’s war comes will mean for the Russian-Ukrainian war.

In June, approximately 640,000 Russian soldiers were actively fighting in Ukraine, an increase of forty thousand over a November 2024 Ukrainian Intelligence estimate. In this ruthless war of drones and attrition, Russia still has an advantage in numbers despite suffering approximately 970,000 troops either killed, captured, wounded, or missing in action since the initial invasion in 2022. An additional thirty thousand North Koreans to the front lines provides Putin with an expendable workforce advantage, timed to exploit the summer’s operational window before winter slows the war again.

Last fall, roughly two of every five North Korean troops were killed or injured under Russian command. With an additional two or three divisions of reinforcements making their way to the front, a massing of troops and major effort by Russia to disrupt the largely static pattern the war has taken on and undertake an advance is anticipated. Likely viewed as expendable, the North Koreans would lead the charge, and the offensive would likely be among the most aggressive yet, preceded by massive missile strikes unseen at this point in the war.

The totality of current circumstances—Putin’s unwillingness to agree to a ceasefire unless it comes with what amounts to a Ukrainian surrender, the largest drone and ballistic missile attack on Kyiv, and now a shipment of thirty thousand North Korean troops—all point to the likelihood that Russia aims to chip away, continuing the war of attrition while also seeking a larger breakthrough than has otherwise been possible, until it wins. Given Kim Jong-un is also likely being rewarded with Russian technology that North Korea could not have built on its own, the door is not closed to further manpower additions. In 2023, North Korea’s army was believed to number around 1,280,000 active personnel, with an additional three million in reserve. With those figures, and a similar—even stronger—view of troops being expendable, further waves of reinforcements in the tens of thousands are not unlikely. Could Ukrainians reclaim and defend their territories before additional Russian offensives in the spring of 2026?

By conventional wisdom, defending territory is less manpower-intensive than launching an offensive campaign, and Ukrainian forces enjoy a commitment imbalance vis-à-vis their Russian opponents by virtue of the imperative of defending their homeland. Viewed through that lens, the introduction of a large new cohort of North Korean troops is likely an effort to simply shift the battlefield calculus. Russia has lost nearly one million people, either killed or injured, while Ukraine has only lost approximately four hundred thousand. According to an Institute for the Study of War report, as of February Russia occupied only 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. The report estimated that it would take Russian forces over eighty-three years to capture the remaining 80 percent of Ukrainian territory at the current rate of advance, and with Russian soldiers being killed or wounded at nearly a 2.5x rate than that of Ukrainian fighters. This is clearly an unacceptable status quo for Putin, one that the Kremlin hopes to change.

Russia’s deepening reliance on a foreign military manpower from North Korea signals its intent to chip away at Ukraine through attrition until it secures victory on its terms. With Putin unwilling to agree to a ceasefire absent Ukrainian surrender, and Kim Jung-un rewarded with advanced Russian technology, the alliance is transactional, brutal, and ultimately very repeatable. Trading future Russian for North Korean casualties will play well domestically. With North Korea absorbing the brunt of the fighting, Moscow can prolong its war effort at a fraction of the political cost. The heavily state-controlled Russian media can boast a sharp decline in domestic casualties even as the summer offensive intensifies, framing the war effort as both successful and sustainable. As the Trump administration continues to seek an end to the war—and despite the hopeful possibility that US pressure could yet bear fruit—both sides continue to prepare for a protracted conflict, especially as kinetic operations primarily come to a pause during the winter. Putin isn’t turning to Kim Jong-un out of desperation, but to apply cheap, sustained pressure on the Ukrainian trenches and to shift the psychological balance. Whether an end to the fighting, or even a pause in it, comes before the arrival of North Korean troops on the front lines remains to be seen. If not, the war could be set for wave after wave of new troops as Russia looks to chip away before winter.

Jared Martin is a US Army veteran and intelligence analyst, supervising a counterintelligence team with the U.S. Department of State. He is pursuing a master of international policy and practice at the George Washington University. His work focuses on geopolitical risk, emerging threats, and modern military strategy, and he was recently featured on BBC News Arabic and writes the American Political Substack.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jared Martin · August 8, 2025

6. Trump’s transactional diplomacy hangs heavy over upcoming South Korea summit

​Here is how I would like to see the summit go:

Trump-Lee summit 2025: modernizing the South Korea-U.S. alliance

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/04/perspective-trump-kim-summit/4171754314991/

Trump’s transactional diplomacy hangs heavy over upcoming South Korea summit

washingtontimes.com · by Vaughn Cockayne

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, August 6, 2025

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

As Washington and Seoul prepare for a meeting between their leaders, diplomatic experts debate the impact that President Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy will have on the Indo-Pacific region.

In the latest edition of The Washington Brief, a monthly forum hosted by The Washington Times Foundation, John Delury, an East Asian Affairs expert and modern China history professor, joined Robert G. Joseph, a National Institute of Public Policy scholar and former adviser to George W. Bush, for a conversation on the future of U.S.-Korea relations.

According to Mr. Delury, Mr. Trump has upended how the U.S. has dealt with allies. Since the end of World War II, Mr. Delury explained, Washington has viewed alliances as special relationships with like-minded nations that are built on a shared understanding of the world. Mr. Trump, however, has introduced a transactional strain into U.S. diplomacy.

“Viewing alliances not as these privileged relationships built on trust, which has been the traditional American view, but rather as exploitative relationships built on power,” Mr. Delury said. “In his view, these alliances are to America’s detriment, and they’re ultimately ripping off the United States.”

Stressing his point, he pointed to Mr. Trump’s comments about countries typically seen as U.S. allies. Since taking office this year, Mr. Trump has suggested that Canada could become the 51st state, that U.S. forces could take over Greenland and that the U.S. should take control of the Panama Canal to counter Chinese influence.

According to Mr. Delury, the strong language that Mr. Trump has used in the past with regard to U.S. allies could be disastrous for U.S.-Korean relations. The historian said South Koreans’ experience with Japanese imperialism is never far from their minds.

“There’s a sort of retro imperialism type of language going back to the 19th century about taking Greenland, Panama Canal, Canada, buying the Gaza Strip,” Mr. Delury said. “That really can be like playing with fire in certain parts of the world, including South Korea.”

Mr. Joseph pushed back on categorizing Mr. Trump’s diplomatic strategy as imperialist, insisting the president is conducting a purely transactional foreign policy. Still, the strategy has generated some uncertainty for the upcoming summit between Mr. Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung.

Advertisement

At the summit, for which there is no official date, the two leaders are expected to discuss the U.S.-South Korea trade deal further. Mr. Trump announced last week that the U.S. would levy 15% tariffs on the Southeast Asian country as part of the deal, which includes a $350 billion investment in the U.S. by South Korea.

According to South Korea, at least $150 billion of the investment would go toward shipbuilding in the U.S., with the rest dedicated to battery and chip development. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has said the U.S. would keep 90% of the profits from the investment, which South Korean presidential adviser Kim Yong-beom has denied.

Upcoming talks in Washington between Mr. Trump and Mr. Lee could result in concessions on defense costs for the U.S., an issue left out of last week’s trade deal. Mr. Trump has complained that South Korea should pay more to maintain the 28,500 U.S. troops in the country.

The North Korean question

Questions are swirling about what the U.S.-South Korea summit could mean for negotiations with North Korea. During his first term, Mr. Trump made history by crossing over into the so-called hermit kingdom and conducting diplomatic talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Advertisement

Specifically, experts suggest that Mr. Trump’s transactional foreign policy could make negotiations more fluid for Washington and Pyongyang, and alarming for leaders in Seoul.

“Imagine a North Korea with over 200 nuclear weapons. We can have an American perspective on that. But I would think that the South Korean perspective would be different,” Mr. Joseph said. “We can sit back and say we will deter it. But for South Korea, that’s a different equation.”

Additionally, the White House’s position on denuclearization could be in question. While the State Department has emphasized its position that no nuclear weapons be present on the Korean peninsula, Mr. Delury maintains that the U.S. should have more flexibility if it hopes to reach a deal with the North Koreans.

“I saw [Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s] statement, of ‘no, we’re a hundred percent on complete denuclearization.’ I mean fine. That’s what the State Department’s gonna say,” he said. “But if Donald Trump and Lee Jae-myung do want to resume a dialogue and negotiation process, they’re gonna have to show flexibility in their in their language.”

Advertisement

The U.S. exited high-profile nuclear discussions with Iran before reaching a deal last month. In that case, the U.S. maintained that the Islamic republic could not be allowed to keep its uranium enrichment program if it wanted sanctions removed. Iran has long asserted that its nuclear program is for civilian use only and is key to its national sovereignty.

The talks ultimately broke down in mid-June following Israel’s preemptive strike on Iran’s enrichment facilities. The U.S. joined Israel’s effort, launching a series of coordinated strikes on the sites.

But importantly, Iran does not have nuclear weapons, and North Korea does. According to Mr. Joseph, there is a chance that the U.S. could cede its position on denuclearization on the Korean peninsula in exchange for a deal.

“I think there is a likelihood I don’t know how small it is, but a likelihood that the United States will cave,” he said. “That we will say we can live with a nuclear-armed North Korea, even if they have 200, even if they have 400. We’ve got 10 times that much.”

Advertisement

• Vaughn Cockayne can be reached at vcockayne@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · by Vaughn Cockayne

7. A New CRINK Axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea?

​A new project and resource from CSIS. Access at the link below.

A New CRINK Axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea?

Using original data scraping analysis, infographics, and satellite imagery, CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department experts assess the degree and substantive nature of changing alignment patterns among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK), and the challenges they pose to global governance.

https://www.csis.org/special-initiatives/CRINK-Axis

8. North Korea clamps down as Chinese visitors misuse business visas: Sources

North Korea clamps down as Chinese visitors misuse business visas: Sources

Chinese nationals allegedly misrepresenting travel purpose to bypass DPRK’s ban on most foreign visitors

https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korea-clamps-down-as-chinese-visitors-misuse-business-visas-sources/

Dave Yin August 6, 2025

A North Korean boy on a bus in Pyongyang | Image: NK News (Sept. 2018)

Chinese nationals are sidestepping North Korea’s ban on most foreign tourism by applying for business delegation visas under false pretenses, informed sources told NK News, leading Pyongyang to tighten screening and slow approvals for legitimate visitors. 

Amid North Korea’s ongoing ban on non-Russian tourists, Chinese nationals are resorting to misrepresenting their intentions in order to gain entry to the country, the sources said, although the scale at which this is happening remains unclear.

According to one source with knowledge of the matter, the practice of using a business delegation visa to sightsee has led to longer processing times and potential rejections of applications as North Korean officials attempt to crack down on the issue, making the document harder to obtain for those legitimately trying to conduct business in the country. 

“At the moment, North Korea isn’t happy to hear that there are loopholes for getting into [the country],” the person said, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue. 

Nevertheless, the individual characterized the number of people attempting to misuse the visa as “very limited.” 

However, others painted a different picture. 

Paul Tjia, director of GPI Consultancy, which specializes in outsourcing services in countries including the DPRK, told NK News that, in addition to lying about the purpose of their trips at times, Chinese citizens also sometimes apply for the visa in order to tag along with legitimate commercial visits. 

“It … happened with my business missions, that non-business people tried to join,” he said, adding that he objected to these practices. He explained that even if applicants are successful in deceiving North Korean authorities, a work trip would not offer the same destinations or experiences as a vacation — leaving both the DPRK hosts and the Chinese visitors disappointed.

Chinese social media users have also remarked on the issue in recent weeks, noting that it has become harder to obtain a DPRK business delegation visa this year compared to previous years. Some commenters even described securing one as an impressive feat.

“It is speculated that some people took advantage of the [business visa] and secretly conducted tourism under the guise of commerce, so it has been delayed until now and border controls have tightened more and more,” one commenter wrote.

Beyond individual delegations, questions also remain over whether North Korea will welcome large groups of foreign businesspeople to its international trade fair in the fall. 

The 17th Pyongyang Autumn International Trade Fair (PITF), organized by the Korea External Economic Exchange Association, is expected to feature some 450 domestic and foreign exhibitors spanning fields including machinery, information technology, energy, pharmaceuticals and consumer goods, according to a press release from (Young Pioneer Tours) YPT.

But questions remain about whether the autumn PITF will actually go ahead as scheduled, from Oct. 27 to 31, as Pyongyang canceled all visas for the most recent spring trade fair’s foreign participants just a week before the event.

At the time, the organizers indicated to YPT that the decision to revoke all visas — including those of Russian and Chinese businesspersons — came down to internal logistical uncertainties about managing such a large event after years of canceled and scaled-down exhibitions due to pandemic-related border closures.

Tjia said that his European clients have been waiting for their business visas to be issued since the spring, while noting that visitors from Russia appear to be North Korea’s current priority. 

Russian tourists have so far been the only foreign group allowed to visit North Korea’s new Wonsan Kalma mega resort, which first opened in late June.

Prior to the pandemic, hundreds of thousands of Chinese tourists are estimated to have visited the DPRK, but North Korea has only allowed Chinese diplomats, students and select other groups in recent years.

Despite the apparent difficulties in people-to-people exchanges, China continues to account for nearly all of North Korea’s trade — an estimated 98% in 2024 — with Chinese customs data showing strong double-digit growth in recent months. 

Edited by Alannah Hill

9. Ask A North Korean: What is the function of the state run daily Rodong Sinmun?

​For all those who are concerned with information and influence activities this provides some useful insights.

Maybe the Korean people in the north would like an alternate "social media." Could an underground social media network be created? (understanding the risks from the security services who are trying to prevent such capabilities).

Excerpt:

So, I see the Rodong Sinmun as nothing more than a medium that plays the role of North Korea’s version of social media, expressing Kim Jong Un’s mood and sometimes criticizing and lambasting countries hostile to North Korea.

Ask A North Korean: What is the function of the state run daily Rodong Sinmun?

A defector describes what he learned from reading the newspaper every day and how it differs from South Korean dailies

https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/ask-a-north-korean-what-is-the-function-of-the-state-run-daily-rodong-sinmun/

Seonghyeon August 6, 2025

North Korean women reading a newspaper | Image: NK News (Sept. 2018)

“Ask a North Korean” is an NK News series featuring interviews with and columns by North Korean defectors, most of whom left the DPRK within the last few years.

Readers may submit their questions for defectors by emailing ask@nknews.org and including their first name and city of residence.

Today’s question asks about North Korea’s state-run daily newspaper, Rodong Sinmun.

Seonghyeon — who was born and raised in North Korea and lived there until he defected in 2019 — writes about the reporting in the Rodong Sinmun, the purpose it serves and his first encounters with South Korean journalism.

Got a question for Seonghyeon? Email it to ask@nknews.org with your name and city. We’ll be publishing the best ones.

When I was in school in North Korea, one of our teachers gave us a riddle:

“What kind of door can the whole world see?”

Anyone who’s been through the North Korean education system would know the answer instantly: Rodong Sinmun (door in Korean is “mun” (문)).

In the DPRK, the Rodong Sinmun is a daily newspaper read across all sectors and serves as a key tool for communicating the policies of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). It’s not just a newspaper — it’s the Party’s voice and a daily source of ideological instruction.

But a riddle like that only works in North Korea, where the boundaries of knowledge, language and media are shaped by the state.

North Koreans reading a newspaper in a subway station | Image: NK News (Sept. 2018)

A USEFUL LENS

As an aside, the Rodong Sinmun turned out to be a surprisingly useful lens for understanding North Korea’s social issues. In a world saturated with misinformation, the paper might even offer an unexpected kind of relief.

Because so much of its content is obviously exaggerated or false, you learn to read it with a built-in filter — and that clarity can be oddly reassuring. Unlike more subtle forms of disinformation, propaganda this overt is easier to recognize and mentally discard.

Nevertheless, international news, which was only a few lines long and strongly stimulated my curiosity, was placed in a corner section of the newspaper (on the very last page) and would cover topics such as natural disasters or shootings, unemployment problems and socio-political issues occurring in capitalist countries.

For example, I remember reading about South Korean President Park Geun-hye being impeached and going to prison, which was very shocking and incomprehensible to me.

I desperately wanted to know who could send the president — someone who occupies the highest position — to prison and how, and about this Republic of Korea that sends its presidents to prison.

These reasons allowed me to somewhat realize North Korea’s problems and find today’s freedom.

A North Korean man reading on a bench | Image: NK News (Oct. 2016)

SHOCKING CONTENT

There are many newspaper companies in South Korea, and everyone reads different newspapers. Several years have passed since I started a new life in South Korea, but I still don’t know exactly how many newspaper companies there are.

This reflects the diversity of a democratic society, where multiple news outlets report on a wide range of social issues.

The newspapers I encountered in South Korea were a series of somewhat shocking content. Commercial and public service advertisements occupied more than half of the newspaper’s pages, and the rest of the newspaper was filled with reporting on fierce political struggles between parties, as if directly reflecting the multifaceted nature of a multi-party system.

In addition to this, they delivered stories on incidents happening all around the globe without any censorship.

When I first encountered these newspapers, South Korea seemed like a society rampant with corruption, but as time passed and I understood this society, I learned that newspapers were starkly informing the public about social issues.

North Koreans reading a newspaper in a subway station | Image: NK News (Oct. 2016)

DAILY PROPAGANDA

There are several reasons why North Korean media avoids dark or negative news and focuses solely on hopeful narratives.

North Korean newspapers have very different characteristics from newspapers in countries with functional democratic systems and market economies.

In essence, the Rodong Sinmun is the organ of the WPK. It is not merely a party newspaper; it is distributed to government offices across the country — which makes me wonder if it is even fair to view the Rodong Sinmun as a newspaper. 

It might be more appropriate to see it as WPK’s daily propaganda outlet.

It publishes absolutely no commentary or articles criticizing the DPRK, only featuring articles that review the glorious path the WPK has walked and convincing readers how all the policies promoted by the party are urgent and justified.

In North Korea, besides the Rodong Sinmun, there is the Minju Joson, Korean People’s Army Daily, Pyongyang Sinmun, Chongnyon Jonwi — in addition to newspapers from each region.

But even though there are several daily newspaper companies, their content and editorial standards are not much different from the Rodong Sinmun.

Also, the way newspapers are consumed in North Korea is completely different than anywhere else. Newspaper companies cannot seek a profit, nor are they supposed to.

As explained earlier, since the Rodong Sinmun is the organ of WPK, it gets mass-distributed to all subunits of the party, as well as to the smallest administrative units such as workplaces and subteams of farms. These newspapers are also posted in public places so everyone can see them.

Also, anyone who participates in organizational life in North Korea inevitably encounters newspapers whether they intend to or not. At all workplaces, during the first hour of the morning or during break times, there’s a set time when an agitator reads the newspaper out loud to everyone.

Since Rodong Sinmun aims to promote the superiority of the North Korean system and educate or enlighten the masses, it is systematized to efficiently deliver its content to everyone, highlighting its ultimate function as a tool to deliver propaganda rather than a means to convey information.

North Korean men reading a newspaper in a subway station | Image: NK News (Sept. 2015)

SOCIALLY ISOLATED

In the past, before smartphones were distributed in North Korea, it was very rare for specific individuals to subscribe to newspapers. But with the distribution of smartphones, there is now an environment where anyone can read newspapers if they want.

At the start of each new year, the WPK’s Central Committee holds an annual event where, following the tradition of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un presents the country’s policy agenda for the year ahead.

He presents goals in all fields such as agriculture, industry, military industry and fisheries, and encourages thorough implementation. This is called a joint editorial or New Year’s address and everyone must know and memorize it. They even hold New Year’s address memorization contests.

I vividly remember memorizing and reciting the New Year’s address all night long. While they don’t punish you for not reading the Rodong Sinmun, reading it is a useful way to avoid being socially isolated in North Korean society.

A very large portion of each issue of the Rodong Sinmun serves to disseminate the leader’s greatness and his dedication to the people. 

For example, whenever Kim Jong Un visits anywhere, the paper will dedicate the entire front and second pages to cover it. 

Party cadres then have to convey the contents and policies, as well as the events that Kim Jong Un presides over to units at all levels of society and educate the masses.

So, I see the Rodong Sinmun as nothing more than a medium that plays the role of North Korea’s version of social media, expressing Kim Jong Un’s mood and sometimes criticizing and lambasting countries hostile to North Korea.

Edited by Alannah Hill

10. South Korea set to decide whether to let Google Maps finally work properly

Actually we have found that WAZE seems to work in Korea.

South Korea set to decide whether to let Google Maps finally work properly

The Guardian · by Raphael Rashid · August 7, 2025

For tourists visiting South Korea, one of the world’s most technologically advanced nations, navigating the country’s urban heartlands can prove surprisingly frustrating for one simple reason: Google Maps just doesn’t work effectively.

But on 11 August that could change, as South Korean authorities are set to decide whether to finally grant Google’s request to export the country’s detailed mapping data to overseas servers. Such a move would open up functionality that allows the app to give detailed directions and show users the best routes to travel.

It is a debate spanning nearly two decades which has evolved into a broader test of how democracies balance digital sovereignty with economic openness. Local industry groups are warning of market domination from foreign companies, while those who back Google’s request argue restrictions harm tourism and innovation.

Integration classes and complaints offices: South Korea charts a path to a cohesive multicultural future

Read more

South Korea is one of only a handful of countries – alongside China and North Korea – in which Google Maps fails to function properly.

While Google dominates online services in most of the world, South Korea’s digital landscape is instead controlled by local “portal” companies Naver and Kakao.

These platforms provide comprehensive services including search engines, email, news, messaging, music and maps, creating a formidable ecosystem that has long resisted foreign tech dominance. The firms provide precise public mapping data but store it on domestic servers as required by law.

Google already licenses the same data from a domestic provider but can use it only to display information like landmarks and local businesses – and, crucially, cannot provide directions for users.

Security concerns and local opposition

Google says it needs to distribute and process the data through its global server network to provide real-time navigation for billions of users worldwide, including those researching Korean destinations from abroad.

The government has consistently refused, citing national security risks.

However, Google argues that the mapping data it seeks has already undergone security review and had sensitive locations removed – and the same data is used by domestic competitors. Google has said it will blur satellite imagery of any sensitive facilities if required by authorities.

Critics say approving Google’s request could set a precedent for other foreign companies. Photograph: Andrew Merry/Getty Images

Opposition to Google’s request is fierce. The Korean Association of Spatial Information, Surveying and Mapping (Kasm), which represents 2,600 local companies, reports 90% opposition from 239 member companies surveyed, fearing market domination by the US tech company.

“The government must listen to industry concerns,” says Kim Seok-jong, chair of Kasm, warning of potential “industry devastation”.

Critics also warn that approving the request could set a precedent for other foreign companies, particularly from China. Apple has also applied for similar permissions, according to local media reports.

The government has offered an alternative, saying Google could access the detailed mapping data if it built local datacentres, as domestic competitors do, although this would still not resolve the issue of processing data on Google servers around the world.

In 2022, the vulnerability of such an approach came to light when one of Kakao’s datacentres caught fire, leaving millions without access to the company’s messaging, mapping and ride-hailing services.

Tourism impact

Korea Tourism Organisation data shows complaints increased 71% last year, with Google Maps accounting for 30% of all app-related grievances, primarily due to the non-functioning directions functionality.

Francesco from Italy told the Guardian he was “surprised” to find that Google Maps didn’t work well when he arrived in Seoul for a 1-week trip.

“It’s just so annoying. I search for a reviewed restaurant on Google, then I have to switch to Naver Maps (a local app) just for the walking directions,” he said.

“I heard it’s a security issue,” said Loic, a tourist from France, “but I feel it’s more about protecting local businesses.”

The restrictions have also drawn criticism from tourism startups and tech advocates, who argue that without access to internationally standard mapping tools, they will struggle to build globally competitive services, stifling growth.

Previous government reviews in 2007 and 2016 both resulted in rejection.

This time, an inter-agency committee including defence and intelligence representatives has already extended its original May deadline, citing the need for deeper consultation with security agencies and industry stakeholders.

The issue has featured in broader US-Korea trade tensions, with Washington’s trade office listing South Korea’s mapping restrictions as a “non-tariff trade barrier”.

South Korea recently concluded trade negotiations that secured 15% tariffs rather than the initially threatened 25%, with President Lee Jae Myung scheduled to meet President Donald Trump at the White House in the coming days or weeks.

South Korea’s transport ministry was unavailable for comment ahead of the decision.

Google says its Maps software helps people “navigate and explore with confidence using fresh information about places, roads and traffic” and that it works closely with “local governments to make Maps helpful for locals and visitors”.

The Guardian · by Raphael Rashid · August 7, 2025

11. North Korea’s guide to going nuclear – How Kim Jong Un fortified his impoverished state.

​Some excellent background and current history.

But we all want to know is what is KJU's decision making criteria for employing nuclear weapons?

Excerpts:

Presumably to underline his new friendship with Moscow, Kim was filmed meeting Russia’s ambassador to North Korea at his new tourist resort in June, shaking hands by the water slide. Two weeks later, he hosted Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, onboard his yacht in Wonsan, where he reiterated his unconditional support for Putin’s war on Ukraine. Lavrov said Russia understood North Korea’s need for its nuclear programme, effectively recognising its status as a nuclear power.

The US strikes on Iran will only intensify the Kim regime’s determination to expand and advance its nuclear arsenal. Informed by hindsight, Sydney Seiler told me of his long personal history of observing North Korea’s diplomatic negotiations: “I can say with a high degree of confidence that none of those were real, authentic pursuits of diplomacy.”

Rather, he observed a “pattern of behaviour, with each major period of engagement coming to an end after about a year, or 18 months, and returning to the status quo ante with the weapons programme ending up being stronger at the end than it was going into it”.

With Trump back in power, Kim may be preparing to embark on a new cycle of diplomacy, perhaps to see what he can extract from a president who has gushed over the “beautiful letters” the two men exchanged in 2018 and how they “fell in love”. A few days after I spoke to Seiler, Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong announced that further talks might indeed be possible, but only if the US accepted North Korea as a “nuclear weapons state”. Having finally secured its “magical weapons”, Pyongyang has no intention of giving them up.

North Korea’s guide to going nuclear

How Kim Jong Un fortified his impoverished state.

By Katie Stallard

NewStatesman · by Katie Stallard · August 6, 2025

Photo by AFP via Getty Images

On the bright, sunny afternoon of 24 June, Kim Jong Un’s gleaming mega-yacht docked in Wonsan on North Korea’s east coast. The portly young dictator strolled down the gangway in a sharply tailored dark suit and sped off in a convoy of black armoured limousines. His destination was the Wonsan Kalma coastal resort, a sprawling new development featuring high-rise hotels, pristine sandy beaches and an enormous water park, whose construction he was said to have personally overseen, directing workers to create “a tourist attraction without equal in the world”.

The North Korean leader spent much of his early childhood on the Kalma Peninsula, secluded from the struggles of the rest of his impoverished country behind the high walls of the sumptuous villas reserved for the ruling family. After ascending to power in 2012 around the age of 27 (his precise birth date is unknown), following the death of his father, Kim Jong Il, Kim frequently returned to the area, building a palatial summer residence and hosting visitors on a personal yacht that the former Chicago Bulls basketball star Dennis Rodman described as a “cross between a ferry and a Disney boat”. It was also a favoured location to flaunt his growing power. In 2014, he ordered the commanding officers of his navy to swim ten kilometres around the bay to prove their fitness, while he supervised from beneath a white parasol. During the years since, he has presided over numerous missile tests and live-fire military drills along the same stretch of coast.

As Kim arrived at the opening ceremony of his new tourist resort, “cheers of ‘Hurrah!’ resounded far and wide”, according to the official media reports. The assembled crowd jumped up and down and fireworks exploded along the bay as Kim cut the ribbon and held his scissors triumphantly aloft. He toured the new facilities, marvelling at the entirely unremarkable furnishings of the hotel rooms and admiring the sun loungers on the beach. The first lady, Ri Sol Ju, valiantly struggled to remain upright alongside him as her high heels sank into the sand. Finally, he took a seat at the base of an alarmingly steep yellow water slide alongside his wife and daughter, a crystal ash tray and a packet of cigarettes placed discreetly on a small folding table to his side. He pointed and smiled, apparently delighted, as a few intrepid patrons tried out the new ride, coming perilously close to splashing the supreme leader and his family.

Even a few years ago, this was the sort of scene that would have elicited widespread ridicule, the latest addition to a series of online memes depicting “Kim Jong Un Looking at Things”, in which the running joke was the North Korean ruler – seemingly the living embodiment of the Team America: World Police caricature – pointing excitedly at mundane objects. But those jokes don’t seem quite so funny any more. During his first decade in power, Kim has transformed his small, isolated nation into a de-facto nuclear power, at a terrible cost to his own citizens. He has an arsenal of missiles he claims can reach the US, and a new security alliance with Russia. As an American intelligence assessment concluded earlier this year, “North Korea is in its strongest strategic position in decades.”

Forty-eight hours before his visit to Kalma, on 21 June, the US bombed Iran. A group of B-2 stealth bombers – the same aircraft that had once flown to the Korean Peninsula to demonstrate their ability to reach Pyongyang – dropped 14 massive ordnance penetrators on Iran’s main nuclear facilities. The contrast was stark. In North Korea, which had nuclear weapons, Kim was sauntering around his new water park, seemingly safe from the prospect of any imminent US military action. In Iran, which did not, the regime was left to survey the smouldering rubble of its once-prized underground enrichment sites. But the reality was more complicated.

“The easy conclusion is to say that Kim Jong Un is once again vindicated in his pursuit of nuclear weapons because if Iran had nuclear weapons, like he did, they would not have gotten bombed,” said Sydney Seiler, who led negotiations with North Korea as a US special envoy during the Obama administration, and has served in senior roles in the US intelligence community and National Security Council over the past four decades. “But this has got to send a shock to Kim, because all of a sudden this US president, who everybody said was an isolationist and focused on ‘America First’, has demonstrated that he is willing to take action overseas.” While the US strikes on Iran undoubtedly cemented the Kim regime’s rationale for developing its own nuclear arsenal, Seiler told me, they would also prompt Pyongyang to reassess its prior convictions about Donald Trump’s propensity to use force. “In that sense, Kim might well be a bit back-footed and concerned that he hasn’t cleared the safe zone yet.”

A mural of Kim Jong Un’s glorious predecessors and, respectively, his grandfather and father: Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Photo by Eric Lafforgue/Art In All Of Us/Corbis via Getty Images

North Korea’s nuclear programme can be traced back to Kim’s grandfather, Kim Il Sung, and the early years of the Cold War. In 1956, eight years after the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the country is officially known, Pyongyang signed an agreement on joint nuclear research with the Soviet Union, which had conducted its first nuclear test in 1949, ending the US monopoly on the bomb. The Soviet leadership had concerns about emboldening Kim, who invaded South Korea at the start of the Korean War in 1950, with Stalin’s blessing. Yet they did not want the North to fall behind the South, which was also pursuing nuclear research and allied to the Soviets’ Cold War enemy, the United States.

With Soviet help, North Korea began building its first research reactor around 1962-63, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kim’s determination to achieve his own nuclear capability was affirmed by the international response to neighbouring China’s first nuclear test in 1964. “Kim Il Sung watched Mao Zedong’s transformation after that test,” said Seiler. “He concluded that if one wanted to be recognised and respected globally, you had to pursue this capability.”

Beyond prestige, there was also the matter of survival. The US had dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, and openly weighed the possibility of using nuclear weapons against North Korea during the Korean War five years later, and again during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis against China. That same year the US deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea in an attempt to counter the North’s conventional capabilities, where they remained until the US withdrew almost all of its overseas-based nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War. “Unhappily, we had sold to the rest of the world two ideas,” acknowledged the former US secretary of state Dean Acheson in 1963. “One was that nuclear weapons were a status symbol. The great powers had them; if you didn’t have them, you were a second-rate power. Secondly, if you had them, you could do anything. These were magical weapons.”

The allure of these magical weapons strengthened even further for Pyongyang following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which took with it the Kim regime’s main benefactor and source of foreign aid.

North Korea had signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 under Soviet pressure and after Moscow had agreed to help build its own nuclear power plant, which the regime insisted was for peaceful, civilian purposes. Yet the Kims never abandoned their nuclear ambitions. They had witnessed first hand how quickly long-standing autocratic regimes could collapse as a wave of popular uprisings swept across eastern Europe in 1989. These culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolution that ousted Nicolae Ceaușescu, the dictatorial communist ruler of Romania, who was overthrown and summarily shot, alongside his wife. “Every Kim’s fear since then has been the Ceaușescu scenario,” said Seiler, “where the forces of change overthrow the autocratic system from within.”

When Kim Jong Il took over after the death of his father in 1994, his early years in power were characterised by a devastating famine that was made worse by the regime’s determination to retain control by limiting access to foreign aid organisations. The second Kim doubled down on his father’s Songun, or “military-first” policy. He authorised a covert uranium enrichment programme, which relied on supplies from the Abdul Qadeer Khan network in Pakistan, and experimented with processing spent plutonium fuel rods at the Yongbyon nuclear research facility, which was estimated to have produced enough fissile material for one or two nuclear bombs. The regime also sought to develop its ballistic missile capabilities in cooperation with Iran.

North Korea formally withdrew from the NPT in 2003, citing the “hostile policy” of the US after the then president, George W Bush, grouped the country with Iraq and Iran in his notorious “axis of evil” speech. Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, which resulted in a pitifully low yield, but it turned out to be just a starting point.

Over the next two decades, North Korea pressed ahead with its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the missiles needed to deliver them. Far from the unpredictable “rogue state” that is often portrayed, argues Edward Howell, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and author of North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order: When Bad Behaviour Pays, Pyongyang has in fact pursued a coherent strategy, alternating between periods of crisis and compliance as it tests the patience of the international community, and its long-time ally China.

“North Korea has learned from the outcomes of behaving badly as to how and when it should behave in the future,” Howell told me from Seoul. “This means testing how far it can break international norms pertaining to non-proliferation and non-aggression – the norms that basically guide every sovereign state in international relations – with the aim of reaping benefits and pursuing its ultimate goal of being recognised as a nuclear-armed state.” He calls Pyongyang’s approach: “strategic delinquency”.

In 2009, a new song began playing in regular rotation on North Korean radio. The lyrics were printed in soldiers’ notebooks, but they were not difficult to remember. “Tramp, tramp, tramp, the footsteps of our General Kim…/Bringing us closer to a brilliant future/Tramp, tramp, tramp, ah footsteps.” The “General Kim” in question was soon revealed to be Kim Jong Un, the youngest son of the dynasty’s second leader, Kim Jong Il; the elder Kim had suffered a serious stroke in 2008 and was said to be “gravely ill”.

“Kim Il Sung spent 25 years laying the groundwork for his son to take over as leader,” said Anna Fifield, author of The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un. “Kim Jong Il was steadily promoted up the ranks and the propaganda machine created a narrative around why he was the right person to succeed his father.”

But when it came to his own successor, he had no such time. Instead, he began hurriedly promoting his youngest son as his own health deteriorated. “It was a very hard sell,” Fifield said, “trying to convince a very hierarchical system that a man in his twenties with no political or military experience, whose only qualification was his surname, should take control of a nuclear-armed totalitarian state.”

Still, the regime’s propagandists embarked on a concerted campaign to promote the new “General Kim”, claiming that he could fire a gun by the age of three and ride wild horses by six. He was also given a physical makeover. “Kim Jong Un started wearing suits and glasses that were very reminiscent of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, and cut his hair into that weird style,” Fifield told me. “He even developed a gravelly voice – all traits of his grandfather, whose portrait is ubiquitous in North Korea.”

The third Kim was widely viewed as young and inexperienced when he came to power in 2012. There were serious doubts among international observers as to whether he would be able to command the respect of the regime elite, and cautious optimism in some quarters that he might follow the Chinese model of reform and opening. He had been educated at a private school in Switzerland and he was known to be a fan of videogames and the Chicago Bulls.

The then British foreign secretary, William Hague, ventured that Kim Jong Un’s ascension could mark a “turning point for North Korea” and a new opportunity to return to talks on denuclearisation. But those hopes were swiftly dashed.

Kim ruthlessly consolidated power, in 2013 ordering the execution of his uncle and mentor, Jang Song Thaek, who was previously considered the country’s second most powerful official. He later boasted to Trump that he had arranged for his uncle’s head to be chopped off and displayed on top of his corpse as a warning to others about the consequences of betraying him, although it is unclear if this actually happened. He then had his half-brother Kim Jong Nam assassinated using VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur Airport in 2017.

Kim also stepped up the pace of nuclear and missile tests, declaring a new policy of Byungjin, or “parallel advance”, which called for simultaneously strengthening the economy and the country’s nuclear programme, ignoring that the latter brought international sanctions that stifled the former. According to the regime’s narrative, there was no contradiction between the two – North Korea’s future and the prospects for economic development could only be secured by the “treasured sword” of its nuclear arsenal.

On a reporting trip to Pyongyang in May 2016 that coincided with Kim’s first Workers’ Party congress, and took place between the country’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests, I was taken to see model factory after model factory. There, model workers assured me, under the supervision of my omnipresent minders, that North Korea merely sought the means to defend itself and the peaceful lives of its citizens against the predations of its hostile foreign enemies. As the younger of the two minders put it, invoking the country’s past suffering under Japanese colonial rule and during the Korean War, which North Koreans are told the US and South Korea started: “We have learned the price of being weak.”

The following year, as North Korea tested its first intercontinental ballistic missiles and carried out its sixth nuclear test – while Trump threatened Kim with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” unless he changed course – I interviewed Pyongyang’s ambassador to the UK, Choe Il. I asked whether his country would ever consider giving up its nuclear programme. Choe rattled off a list of countries without nuclear weapons that had been the subject of US military campaigns in recent years, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, to which he could since have added Syria and Iran. “The only way to protect our country is that we strengthen our power enough to suppress any enemy countries,” he insisted. “This is a lesson we feel in our bones.”

There is a lie at the heart of Pyongyang’s rationale for its nuclear weapons as it claims to be defending the country against its foreign enemies. In truth, as the ruling elite knows, there is no imminent threat to North Korea’s security. There is no imperialist army massing at the gates. The Kim regime’s main priority is, as it always has been, the survival of the Kim regime, not the lives of its citizens. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal gives the ruling dynasty power, prestige and a powerful deterrent against any external efforts to provoke regime change. So, despite his brief foray into diplomacy with Trump in 2018 and 2019, it seems unlikely Kim was ever seriously contemplating an end to his nuclear programme. When those negotiations petered out, with Trump cutting short their summit in Hanoi, Kim retreated into his previous isolation, sealing the country’s borders completely at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 as he embarked on a renewed crackdown on potential threats to the regime’s domestic control.

“I don’t think people understand how massively the Covid pandemic changed the situation,” Fyodor Tertitskiy, a Seoul-based scholar of North Korea and author of Accidental Tyrant: The Life of Kim Il Sung, told me. “I think we entered a new age in 2020.” The government introduced a new law against “reactionary thought and culture”, which included punishments for citizens caught using South Korean slang terms.

There were reports of people being executed for watching and sharing South Korean movies and pop music. Kim then led his generals on horseback to the snow-capped summit of Mount Paektu, where he invoked his grandfather’s “indefatigable revolutionary spirit” and vowed to defeat the “unprecedented blockade and pressure imposed by the imperialists”. For good measure, he severed all contact with Seoul and had the inter-Korean liaison office near the border with South Korea blown up.

Then Kim was handed an unexpected breakthrough: Russia invaded Ukraine. The few resources he had to offer were suddenly in demand. North Korea shipped millions of artillery rounds to Russia, along with short-range missiles and an estimated 10,000-12,000 troops. In return, the regime received a badly needed influx of hard cash, and perhaps also technical assistance with its long-range missile and nuclear programmes. After hosting Kim at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in the Russian far east in September 2023, Vladimir Putin was asked whether Russia would now help North Korea to build its own satellites. He replied: “That’s why we came here.” Two months later, after two previous failures, North Korea successfully launched its first reconnaissance satellite.

The following June, Kim welcomed Putin to Pyongyang, where they took turns driving each other around, at speed, in the new Russian limousine the Russian leader had just presented to him. Then they signed a mutual defence pact that resurrected the earlier Cold War treaty between North Korea and the Soviet Union, cementing their new alliance and reducing Pyongyang’s dependence on Beijing. “Kim’s dream would be to be able to play off Russia and China against each other, recreating the model from the late Cold War and enabling North Korea to milk both cows,” Tertitskiy explained. “That was the golden age for the regime, and the darkest era for its people.”

Presumably to underline his new friendship with Moscow, Kim was filmed meeting Russia’s ambassador to North Korea at his new tourist resort in June, shaking hands by the water slide. Two weeks later, he hosted Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, onboard his yacht in Wonsan, where he reiterated his unconditional support for Putin’s war on Ukraine. Lavrov said Russia understood North Korea’s need for its nuclear programme, effectively recognising its status as a nuclear power.

The US strikes on Iran will only intensify the Kim regime’s determination to expand and advance its nuclear arsenal. Informed by hindsight, Sydney Seiler told me of his long personal history of observing North Korea’s diplomatic negotiations: “I can say with a high degree of confidence that none of those were real, authentic pursuits of diplomacy.”

Rather, he observed a “pattern of behaviour, with each major period of engagement coming to an end after about a year, or 18 months, and returning to the status quo ante with the weapons programme ending up being stronger at the end than it was going into it”.

With Trump back in power, Kim may be preparing to embark on a new cycle of diplomacy, perhaps to see what he can extract from a president who has gushed over the “beautiful letters” the two men exchanged in 2018 and how they “fell in love”. A few days after I spoke to Seiler, Kim Jong Un’s sister Kim Yo Jong announced that further talks might indeed be possible, but only if the US accepted North Korea as a “nuclear weapons state”. Having finally secured its “magical weapons”, Pyongyang has no intention of giving them up.

[See also: Disdain and apathy in Washington DC]

Topics in this article : Kim Jong Un , Magazine , North Korea , Nuclear weapons

This article appears in the 07 Aug 2025 issue of the New Statesman, Summer Special 2025

NewStatesman · by Katie Stallard · August 6, 2025

12. Alliance modernization seeks to ensure credible deterrence on, 'beyond' Korean Peninsula: Pentagon

Here are recommendations in eight articles for alliance modernization:

Trump-Lee summit 2025: modernizing the South Korea-U.S. alliance

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/04/perspective-trump-kim-summit/4171754314991/

America First, Allies Always: securing the Asia-Indo-Pacific together

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/07/15/korea-perspective-david-maxwell-speech/8541752588776/

A free and unified Korea: advancing U.S. national security interests

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/05/02/korea-us-national-interests/1231746198198/

America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/

Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/

Why America and South Korea Need a Combined Multi-Domain Task Force

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/why-america-and-south-korea-need-a-combined-multi-domain-task-force

‘Back to the Line’: Why American Soldiers Should Be on the Korean DMZ

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/back-to-the-line-why-american-soldiers-should-be-on-the-korean-dmz/

Why the U.S. must sustain forward stationed forces in Korea

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/01/analysis-korea-us-alliance/7281754067187/

(2nd LD) Alliance modernization seeks to ensure credible deterrence on, 'beyond' Korean Peninsula: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 8, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; RECONSTRUCTS)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 (Yonhap) -- A Pentagon press secretary said Friday that efforts by South Korea and the United States to "modernize" their alliance include expanding cooperation to ensure credible deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and "beyond," while underlining its "primary" focus on deterring North Korean threats.

Press secretary Kingsley Wilson made the remarks in response to Yonhap News Agency's question over the U.S.' push for the alliance modernization at a time when President Donald Trump's administration prioritizes deterring an assertive China and seeks allies' greater "burden-sharing."

"Alliance modernization includes adapting our combined posture, deepening interoperability and expanding cooperation across domains to ensure credible deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and beyond," Wilson said in a statement.

"While the primary focus remains on deterring North Korean aggression, we continue to work closely with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to align our shared defense priorities in response to the broader regional security environment," she added, referring to South Korea by its official name.

In addition, she underscored that the Pentagon remains committed to a "modern, strategically sustainable" South Korea-U.S. alliance that "can address today's and tomorrow's security challenges."

As senior U.S. officials recently talked of the endeavors to modernize the alliance, questions have arisen over what the expression "modernization" signifies, particularly in light of an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry.

Some analysts said the Trump administration might seek to rework the alliance, including the role of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea, to ensure that the alliance's purpose, operational scope and posture are well aligned with the U.S.' geostrategic priority to counter the "pacing" threat from China.

Responding to the modernization question, the State Department stressed the need for the alliance to "adapt to a changing regional security environment."

"The two sides decided to initiate consultations based on a shared understanding of the future direction of the alliance, including strengthening its capabilities and posture amid an evolving regional security environment," a State Department spokesperson told Yonhap News Agency via email.

"Through these consultations, both sides are acknowledging this reality, as well as the need to maintain extended deterrence and increase ROK defense burden-sharing, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between U.S. and Korean forces on the peninsula," the official added.

The talk of modernization comes as U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has tasked Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to develop a new National Defense Strategy to prioritize increasing burden-sharing with allies and deterring Chinese threats. Its first draft is set to be presented to Hegseth no later than Aug. 31.

This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaking during a meeting with the defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on July 25, 2025. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · August 8, 2025

13. Gov't discussing joint Seoul-Washington measures to build peace with N. Korea

​My recommendations are outlined below this article in my "two plus three strategy."

My strategy can be summed up in 12 words:

"Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights."

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program, military threats, and the crimes against humanity is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, free market principles, and human rights as determined by the Korean people: A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). Again, Kim can change or be changed.

Gov't discussing joint Seoul-Washington measures to build peace with N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 8, 2025

SEOUL, Aug. 8 (Yonhap) -- The unification ministry said Friday it is discussing joint cooperation measures between Seoul and Washington aimed at ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula, which will be presented during a scheduled summit between the South Korean and the U.S. presidents.

"In preparation for the South Korea-U.S. summit, the ministry is closely consulting with relevant bodies (on bilateral cooperation) for peace on the Korean Peninsula and the resumption of inter-Korean ties," Chang Yoon-jeong, deputy spokesperson at the ministry, said during a regular press briefing.

Her remarks came shortly after Unification Minister Chung Dong-young told a media outlet that his ministry will draft a proposal on North Korea to be presented during a summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump, scheduled for later this month.

Chung did not elaborate further but compared the envisioned proposal to "MASGA," or "Make America Shipbuilding Great Again," a phrase used by the South Korean negotiating team during a recent tariff reduction deal with Washington to underscore its commitment to supporting the revival of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. MASGA was reported to have played a pivotal role in clinching the deal by appealing to Trump's special interests.

Chang also reaffirmed that Seoul remains open to dialogue with North Korea aimed at peacefully resolving North Korean nuclear issues and that it supports the resumption of talks between Washington and Pyongyang.

"Both South Korea and the U.S. share the position that they are open to dialogue with North Korea to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula and peacefully resolve North Korean nuclear issues," she noted.

"The government has repeatedly said that it proactively supports the resumption of North Korea-U.S. talks," she added, in response to remarks by U.S. State Department acting deputy assistant secretary Seth Bailey, who said Washington takes "with interest" a recent statement by Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North Korean leader.

In her statement last week, Kim suggested North Korea is open to diplomacy with the U.S., as long as it is not aimed at the country's "complete denuclearization."

Chang Yoon-jeong, deputy spokesperson at the unification ministry, speaks during a regular press briefing, in this June 27, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · August 8, 2025

Unification First Then Denuclearization

David Maxwell

President Trump did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and the support for the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea. There are few pundits who see the opportunities that both South Korea with its 8.15 Unification Doctrine and Kim Jong Un with his new hostile policy toward the South are providing to the U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance. It is time to recognize that the only path to denuclearization is through unification. Most importantly, the prevention of war and nuclear use, and the long term outcome on the Korean peninsula are important to the national security and national prosperity of the U.S.

Kim can change. Or Kim can be changed by the Korean people in the north.

The Korean people must solve the “Korea question” (which is the unnatural division of the peninsula described in paragraph 60 of the1953 Armistice).

Key Points:

––Key strategic assumption is that Kim will never negotiate away his nuclear weapons.

––The United States has failed to achieve denuclearization in North Korea for four decades, and a new approach is needed that includes a new focus on human rights and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

–– South Korea unveiled the 8.15 Unification Doctrine in August 2024, emphasizing freedom, peace, and prosperity as core values for unification.

––Kim Jong Un's recent policy changes, including declaring South Korea as the "main enemy" and abandoning peaceful unification, present an opportunity for a new strategy.

––A human rights up front approach focusing on educating Koreans in the north about their universal human rights will empower them to create change.

––The right of self-determination for the Korean people is a fundamental justification for pursuing a free and unified Korea that requires transformation of the regime.

––Four paths to unification are: war, regime collapse, peaceful unification, and regime transformation. The U.S. (along with South Korea) should support regime transformation by the Korea people in the north as the optimal path to peaceful unification.

–– The long term “Two Plus Three strategy” of the U.S. must rest on these two traditional efforts:

(1) the foundation of military deterrence To Prevent War as the vital US national interest and;

(2) “strategic strangulation” – the well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities to support the regime.  

––The radical new strategy must consist of three pillars to support the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change inside north Korea:

(1) a human rights upfront approach (emphasizing the fundamental human right of self-determination of government per the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights);

(2) an information and influence campaign to inform and educate the Korean people in the north about their human rights and provide them practical knowledge for how to take collective action and create the conditions for change;

3) support to the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they seek to solve the Korean question and establish a free and unified Korea, a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (ROK).

––There is a through line from the 1776 Declaration to Independence to a Free and Unified Korea. The American Declaration influenced the 1919 Korean Declaration of Independence. Both influenced Mahatma Ghandi as he pursued Indian Independence and he in turn influenced Dr. Martin Luther King’s strategies. The virtuous circle will be complete when all the Korean people have the right to self-determination of government and achieve a free and unified Korea.

–– The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program, military threats, and the crimes against humanity is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, free market principles, and human rights as determined by the Korean people: A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). Again, Kim can change or be changed.

14. S. Korea again postpones decision on Google's map data transfer request amid U.S. pressure

S. Korea again postpones decision on Google's map data transfer request amid U.S. pressure | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 8, 2025

SEOUL, Aug. 8 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government on Friday delayed its decision on Google's request to export high-precision map data overseas, the transport ministry said, amid pressure from Washington to resolve the issue, calling it a non-tariff barrier.

In February, the U.S. tech giant submitted an application to the state-run National Geographic Information Institute under the ministry, seeking approval for the transfer of 1:5,000-scale high-precision map data to its data centers abroad.

The review panel extended the deadline for the decision by 60 days during its May meeting, citing the need for further discussions on national security and the potential impact on domestic industries, and was supposed to reach a decision by Monday.

But it decided to extend the deadline by another 60 days, according to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.

The review panel is composed of officials from major ministries, including the defense, foreign affairs, industry and science ministries, as well as the National Intelligence Service.

A senior Google official speaks during the "Google for Korea" event in Seoul, in this July 2, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)

Officials said the latest decision was made upon Google's request, as the company sought more time to review ways to address national security concerns related to the data exports.

But the Seoul government seems to be cautious on the matter, as reaching a conclusion ahead of possible discussions on the matter at a future South Korea–U.S. summit could be sensitive and influence other agenda items to be discussed during the summit.

Consultations are under way between Seoul and Washington to set a date for a summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump. Some reports have said that the summit will likely take place around Aug. 25.

Currently, Google provides South Korean maps using publicly available lower-resolution 1:25,000-scale map data combined with aerial and satellite imagery.

The United States has cited the issue as a key non-tariff barrier, though it was excluded from the recent tariff agreement between the two nations under which the U.S. imposes a 15 percent tariff on South Korean imports in exchange for South Korea's pledge to invest US$350 billion in the U.S.

It was not known if the data transfer issue will be on the table at the upcoming summit.

Google previously made similar requests for the transfer of high-precision map data overseas in 2007 and 2016, but Seoul rejected them due to national security concerns, citing the potential exposure of military bases and other sensitive facilities.

graceoh@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · August 8, 2025

15. South Korea must do much more to support the U.S. and defend itself

South Korea must do much more to support the U.S. and defend itself - The Korea Times

koreatimes.co.kr

South Korea must do much more to support the U.S. and defend itself - The Korea Times The Korea Timesmy timesopen notice

koreatimes.co.kr

By Chun In-bum

Published Aug 8, 2025 11:07 am KST

Updated Aug 8, 2025 11:15 am KST

Chun In-bum

Chun In-bum

The recent tariff agreement between South Korea and the United States was reached with much fanfare. For many Koreans, it brought relief — but also confusion. How could the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, once hailed as a symbol of enduring bilateral cooperation, be set aside so easily? That question reflects a deeper reality: Alliances, no matter how long-lived, are never immune to political winds or shifting national interests.

We must take this reality with maturity. The Korea-U.S. alliance, built on shared values and bloodshed during the Korean War, has endured for over seven decades. Yet today, the United States is a country under immense internal pressure. The American people — whom we admire and owe a deep debt of gratitude — are increasingly burdened by global responsibilities that many now believe are unfairly distributed. Exploited by adversaries and taken for granted by allies, Americans have had enough.

Social discontent is rising. Economic disparities are growing. Political polarization has paralyzed governance. Amid these challenges, Americans are questioning why they must continue to shoulder the lion’s share of global security burdens. Their frustration is valid. The United States has provided South Korea with decades of defense support, technological transfer and market access. All of this has enabled Korea to grow from a war-torn nation into a thriving democracy and global economic power.

Yet while South Korea has grown stronger, we have also become more dependent — especially in matters of national defense. It is no wonder that some in the United States have begun referring to us as a "free rider." Although I reject that term, we must be honest: South Korea has not done enough. We can — and must — do much more.

First, we must recognize that the era of unilateral American guarantees is coming to an end. The United States has made clear, time after time, that it expects its allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security. This is not a threat — it is a fact. The sooner we understand and internalize this message, the better prepared we will be for the future.

Second, we must act on this understanding by dramatically increasing our self-defense capabilities. This includes expanding conventional forces, hardening critical infrastructure, investing in cybersecurity and modernizing command and control systems. But above all, we must have an honest conversation about strategic deterrence.

South Korea needs a nuclear deterrent. This is not a call for provocation, but a recognition of reality. The North Korean regime has nuclear weapons and is continuously improving its delivery systems. China and Russia are expanding their own arsenals and growing increasingly assertive. The American nuclear umbrella — while still credible — faces political and logistical limitations in a rapidly changing world.

An indigenous South Korean nuclear capability, developed in close consultation with the United States, would not undermine our alliance. On the contrary, it would strengthen it. By taking more responsibility for regional deterrence, Korea would be helping relieve the disproportionate burden currently placed on American forces. We would be transforming from a dependent ally into a contributing partner.

Such a program must be pursued with transparency, responsibility and adherence to the highest safety and operational standards. The United States should assist us — not just in technology, but in combined planning, shaping doctrine and crisis management. Japan should also be a participant in this conversation, not only to foster regional transparency but also to explore solutions to our shared challenges, such as nuclear waste storage and regional security coordination.

This is not about nationalism. It is about alliance modernization. It is about deterrence. It is about survival.

South Korea must do much more to defend its homeland — not just in words.

Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.

16. N. Korea’s silence is actually louder psychological warfare

​We must execute a superior political warfare strategy. We cannot cede the information battlespace to Kim Jong Un.

N. Korea’s silence is actually louder psychological warfare

"It's a clever strategy to prepare for stronger confrontation while getting the other side to take a break," a source told Daily NK

By Lee Sang-yong - August 7, 2025

dailynk.com · August 6, 2025

On June 9, 2024, South Korea decided during an emergency National Security Council meeting on June 9 to install loudspeakers along the inter-Korean border and restart broadcasts to North Korea. The photo shows soldiers dismantling a loudspeaker in the central part of the inter-Korean border in June 2004. (Yonhap)

North Korea’s decision to stop broadcasting propaganda toward the South isn’t a step back—it’s part of a new, more sophisticated strategy.

The country is preparing more precise and effective psychological warfare operations after reframing inter-Korean relations as “two hostile nations in a state of combat,” according to a Daily NK source in North Korea recently.

The decision to suspend broadcasts came directly from Kim Jong Un himself, with coordination between the ruling party’s politburo and the State Affairs Commission’s strategic policy bureau. This wasn’t a working-level decision but an order from the supreme leader.

In late December 2023, Kim called for a fundamental change in the party’s approach toward the South. “Relations between North and South Korea are no longer those of the same peoples but have become those of two hostile countries or countries in a state of combat,” he said, according to the Korean Central News Agency.

Since North Korea now views relations as “state-to-state”—specifically between hostile states—rather than ties between the same people working toward reconciliation and reunification, its leaders have decided their psychological warfare methods must change accordingly.

“Psychological operations are undergoing a full-scale transition into a ‘means of war,’ given that the leader has stopped even mentioning how we’re the same people,” the source explained. “There’s a strong trend toward scrapping old methods and using new tactics and strategies to unnerve the other side.”

“Because loudspeaker broadcasts are expensive to maintain and have limited effectiveness, the authorities are preparing to restart psychological operations in new ways by redirecting those resources,” the source said. “Other departments, like the Reconnaissance General Bureau, are now being tasked with psychological operations.”

A complete shift in approach

This trend was clear in a recent statement by Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s powerful sister and deputy department director.

In a July 28th statement published by KCNA, Kim Yo Jong said, “No matter how desperately the Lee Jae Myung government may try to imitate fellow countrymen and pretend they do righteous things to attract our attention and receive international attention, there can be no change in our state’s understanding of the enemy.”

Even regarding South Korea’s suspension of broadcasts toward the North, Kim called it “nothing but a reversible turning back of what they should not have done in the first place” and “not work worthy of appreciation.”

These statements show that North Korea has completely shifted to viewing relations with the South as “hostile.”

“This isn’t just rhetorical change. Inside North Korea, there are many calls to reorganize psychological operations against South Korea as against a ‘particular foreign nation,'” the source said. “The broadcast methods, content, and even the department in charge will all change.”

Some analysts suggest the very suspension of psychological warfare broadcasts is itself advanced psychological warfare. The strategy aims to make South Korea believe tensions have lessened, lowering Seoul’s guard and encouraging conciliatory responses—North Korea may have predicted the South Korean government would suspend its own broadcasts.

“It’s a clever strategy to prepare for stronger confrontation while getting the other side to take a break,” the source said. “However, inside North Korea, they maintain a confrontational framework and have already begun testing and developing more precise and comprehensive psychological warfare methods.”

North Korea has started reorganizing its psychological warfare formations before the Ninth Party Congress. Internal policy calls for preparing new forms of offensive action against the South by strategically redeploying funds and personnel and strengthening information warfare.

The country has also internally crafted scenarios to immediately restart psychological warfare if South Korea strengthens its combined military exercises with the United States.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · August 6, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com