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Quotes of the Day:
"They always say that time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself."
– Andy Warhol
"To live a good life: we have the potential for it. If we can learn to be indifferent to what makes no difference."
– Marcus Aurelius
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– Albert Einstein
1. Putin Tells U.S. He’ll Halt War in Exchange for Eastern Ukraine
2. How Trump and Putin Reached a New Make-or-Break Moment on Ukraine
3. Ukrainians Face a Sophie’s Choice
4. Putin Has Already Lost in Ukraine—The Extent of That Loss Depends on What the West Does Next
5. The Case for the Atomic Bomb, 80 Years Later
6. Could the U.S. Have Saved Navalny?
7. Trump Orders Pentagon to Prepare to Target Latin American Drug Cartels
8. Trump Directs Military to Target Foreign Drug Cartels
9. Israel’s Plan to Expand War Raises Fears for Gazans, Hostages
10. Putin Briefs Leaders of China and India on Talks With U.S. on Ukraine
11. India’s Modi Left Soul-Searching After Failed Courtships of Xi and Trump
12. Taiwan Strained by 20% Tariffs, No Trade Deal and Political Uncertainty
13. Japan Says Trump to Correct ‘Extremely Regrettable’ Error in Tariff Order
14. New FM 3-05 Delivers on the Promise to Streamline & Integrate the U.S Army Special Operations Imperatives
15. Why the Far Right Hates Churchill
16. Special ops forces, intel community to team up on operational challenges in ‘data dense environments
17. Emerald Warrior proves AFSOC's agile combat readiness
18. Ukraine, Modern War, and Lessons for the Pacific by Mick Ryan
19. The Anticorruption Angle
20. How to Resist a Dictator – What Belarus’s Democratic Opposition Reveals—and What It Needs to Win
21. Why Wars Don’t End Anymore
1. Putin Tells U.S. He’ll Halt War in Exchange for Eastern Ukraine
I think Ukraine has a vote. It should have THE vote.
Putin Tells U.S. He’ll Halt War in Exchange for Eastern Ukraine
The proposal prompted the Trump administration to begin preparing for a summit with the Russian leader, but European officials expressed skepticism over its viability
https://www.wsj.com/world/putin-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-proposal-0021453b?st=ZYP9wU&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Bojan Pancevski
Follow in Berlin and Alexander Ward
Follow and Robbie Gramer
Follow in Washington
Aug. 8, 2025 4:10 pm ET
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with President Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, in Moscow earlier this week. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/Associated Press
Russian President Vladimir Putin presented the Trump administration this week with a sweeping proposal for a cease-fire in Ukraine, demanding major territorial concessions by Kyiv and a push for global recognition of its claims in exchange for a halt to the fighting, according to European and Ukrainian officials.
European officials expressed serious reservations about the proposal, which would require Ukraine hand over Eastern Ukraine, a region known as the Donbas, without Russia committing to much other than to stop fighting. The offer, which Putin conveyed Wednesday to U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff in Moscow, set off a diplomatic scramble to get further clarity on details of the proposal.
European and Ukrainian officials, who were briefed by President Trump and Witkoff in a series of calls this week, said they worry Putin is simply using the offer as a ploy to avoid punishing new U.S. sanctions and tariffs while continuing the war.
Trump said Wednesday the Russian leader’s offer wasn’t a breakthrough, but was enticing enough to begin organizing a summit meeting as soon as next week. The proposal could signal a shift away from Russia’s previous demands for full Russian control of regions along the entire front line, which extends beyond the Donbas.
Putin told Witkoff he would agree to a complete cease-fire if Ukraine agreed to withdraw forces from all of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, according to officials briefed on the call. Russia would then control Donetsk, Luhansk, as well as the Crimea peninsula, which it seized in 2014 and wants recognized as sovereign Russian territory.
Russia now occupies most of Donetsk and Luhansk, but Ukrainian forces still control sizable chunks of territory, including key cities that are now strongholds of its defense.
In a series of calls this week, Europeans sought to get clarity on a key aspect of the proposal—what would happen in the southern regions of Zaporizhia and Kherson, where Russian troops also control some territory. Officials who were briefed by the Trump administration on calls Wednesday and Thursday came away with conflicting impressions about whether Putin intended to freeze the current front lines or eventually pull out of those regions entirely.
Key regions on the Ukrainian front line
Russian forces in Ukraine
Belarus
Russia
Poland
Kyiv
Luhansk
Ukraine
Donetsk
Zaporizhzhia
Mol.
Kherson
Romania
Crimea
100 miles
100 km
Note: As of Aug. 7
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project
Andrew Barnett/WSJ
Trump himself participated in the first call, along with Witkoff, Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The same officials, without the president, took part in the second call on Thursday, joined by Trump’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg.
In a third call on Friday, Witkoff told European officials that the Russian proposal included two phases, according to two European officials. In the first phase, Ukraine would withdraw from Donetsk and the battle lines would be frozen. That would be followed by a second phase, in which Putin and Trump would agree on a final peace plan that would later be negotiated with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the officials said.
A Ukrainian official who participated in the call with Trump on Wednesday said that Kyiv wasn’t opposed to any proposals in principle, but that a cease-fire would be a prerequisite for any further steps.
White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Trump and his national security team are discussing “potential paths to peace” with their Ukrainian and European counterparts after the Putin-Witkoff meeting. “Out of respect for our sensitive diplomatic discussions with Russia, Ukraine, and our European allies, the White House won’t comment on alleged details in the news media.”
The Kremlin didn’t respond to repeated requests for comment.
Ukrainian and European officials have long rejected officially recognizing Russian control over seized territory. Ukraine’s constitution also prohibits Zelensky from unilaterally authorizing territorial changes. One potential way to get around that issue would be for Zelensky to agree to a de facto partition without legally recognizing any loss of territory, two European officials said.
Zelensky has previously said he would only discuss territorial issues after Russia agreed to a full and unconditional cease-fire, a point Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized.
The proposal didn’t directly address Ukraine’s quest for security guarantees, including near-term membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As part of the proposal, Putin said his government would pass legislation pledging not to attack Ukraine or Europe, a claim European officials have received with deep skepticism.
Putin’s gambit appeared to be designed in part to ratchet up domestic pressure on Zelensky, as many Ukrainians want the war to end but are also opposed to surrendering big chunks of territory. The proposal could now shift pressure onto Kyiv to negotiate a deal and help Moscow sidestep new U.S. sanctions.
Trump’s deadline for Russia to agree to a cease-fire expired Friday. While he imposed 50% tariffs on India, a major importer of Russian oil, he may hold off on other punishments as negotiations proceed.
“We’re going to see what he has to say,” Trump said of Putin when asked whether the deadline was firm. “It’s going to be up to him.”
Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukraine in recent weeks, including against civilian infrastructure in Kyiv. Russia has more than doubled the number of missiles and drones it has fired monthly into Ukraine since January when Trump took office.
Early Friday, the Russian military bombed Bucha—the site of a massacre of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians by Russian forces in 2022 as they withdrew from the region.
Witkoff told European allies on multiple phone calls this week that the offer demonstrated genuine movement by Putin toward peace, even if a final deal could look different from the proposal outlined by the Russian leader.
Some European leaders have expressed cautious optimism that Trump’s diplomatic efforts could yield results. “Perhaps a freezing of the conflict—I don’t want to say the end of the war, but a freezing of the conflict—could happen sooner rather than later,” Polish President Donald Tusk said on Friday. “There is hope for this.”
The Russian government said Friday that Putin had discussed his Witkoff meeting with the leaders of India, China, Belarus, South Africa and other nations, while Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to his counterpart in Turkey, a NATO member.
Write to Bojan Pancevski at bojan.pancevski@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Robbie Gramer at robbie.gramer@wsj.com
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2. How Trump and Putin Reached a New Make-or-Break Moment on Ukraine
Excerpts:
To sway Putin, Trump has embarked on a more confrontational course, threatening sanctions on countries that purchase Russian energy. He targeted India, a major buyer of Russian oil, with 50% tariffs on its goods shipped to the U.S. Other nations that import Russian oil and gas, including China, could see their duties raised by Trump’s Friday deadline for an agreement.
But even Trump seemed less than optimistic Thursday following talks earlier in the week between his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and Putin in Moscow.
“We’re going to see what he has to say,” Trump told reporters of Putin. “That’s going to be up to him.”
How Trump and Putin Reached a New Make-or-Break Moment on Ukraine
The threat of more U.S. sanctions jump-started stalled peace talks but might not produce a deal to halt the fighting
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/trump-putin-russia-ukraine-how-meeting-f9e4ac1e
By Alexander Ward
Follow, Alex Leary
Follow and Matthew Luxmoore
Follow
Aug. 7, 2025 7:00 pm ET
President Trump has intensified economic pressure on Moscow by targeting customers of Russian energy with higher tariffs. Photo: Bonnie Cash/Press Pool
Key Points
What's This?
- President Trump seeks a Ukraine cease-fire deal with Russia’s Putin, a diplomatic achievement he has long desired.
- Trump has shifted tactics, now threatening sanctions on nations buying Russian energy to pressure Putin into a peace agreement.
- Despite the administration’s efforts, Trump is expressing uncertainty, and a potential meeting with Putin faces challenges due to conflicting aims.
WASHINGTON—President Trump has long believed the crux of foreign policy is two leaders in a room making historic deals. Pulling off a cease-fire in Ukraine with Russian President Vladimir Putin would be the kind of diplomatic coup he has long craved.
It remains a long shot.
The leaders could meet as soon as next week to pursue a peace agreement following months of maneuvering. But their approaches remain at odds. Trump has urged Putin to stop the war but has shown little interest in the specifics of a deal. The Kremlin boss has rebuffed all appeals to halt the fighting, except on his terms.
After months of failed efforts to forge a deal, first by coercing Kyiv and later by wooing Putin, Trump has come around to the belief that heightened economic pressure on Moscow might be the only way to get an agreement.
To sway Putin, Trump has embarked on a more confrontational course, threatening sanctions on countries that purchase Russian energy. He targeted India, a major buyer of Russian oil, with 50% tariffs on its goods shipped to the U.S. Other nations that import Russian oil and gas, including China, could see their duties raised by Trump’s Friday deadline for an agreement.
But even Trump seemed less than optimistic Thursday following talks earlier in the week between his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and Putin in Moscow.
“We’re going to see what he has to say,” Trump told reporters of Putin. “That’s going to be up to him.”
Trump: ‘Good Chance’ of Meeting With Putin to Discuss Ending War
Play video: Trump: ‘Good Chance’ of Meeting With Putin to Discuss Ending War
President Trump’s comments came after special envoy Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Photo: Ken Cedeno/Reuters and Mikhail Metzel/Zuma Press
The White House is working on arranging a meeting with Putin but would like a three-way meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt. “President Trump would like to meet with both President Putin and President Zelensky because he wants this brutal war to end,” she said.
The Russian leader said he is only open “in principle” to talks with Zelensky. “We are still far from creating such conditions,” said Putin, who has frequently called into question Zelensky’s legitimacy.
Putin wouldn’t have to agree to meet Zelensky for Trump to see him, the White House said.
If the Trump-Putin summit happens, it could prove the biggest test of Trump’s dealmaking skills this term.
Trump returned to the White House vowing he could stop the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, later claiming he was merely joking. Privately, Trump is fuming at his failure to halt the war 200 days into his second presidency, according to aides.
He has slowly come to recognize that a settlement must take account of Zelensky’s bottom line and that of key European governments, who insist they won’t recognize Russian control over any conquered territory—a key Kremlin demand—as part of an agreement.
There is the added concern that Putin may not be serious about reaching a deal. “Putin has made it clear that the Ukraine war is more important to him than the relationship with the U.S.,” said Alina Polyakova, president and CEO of the Washington-based Center for European Policy Analysis.
Another challenge for Trump will be navigating talks with a Russian leader who has a quarter-century of experience dealing with various U.S. presidents and has proved himself skilled in influencing them.
If Trump meets with Putin and emerges empty-handed, he will have to decide whether to increase pressure on Russia, despite his skepticism that economic or military moves would alter the Kremlin’s calculus, or follow through on a threat he had made repeatedly to abandon the peace process.
Either way, Polyakova said, “the war keeps dragging on.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s envoy, in Moscow this week. Photo: Gavriil Grigorov/Kremlin
Trump entered his second term confident his rapport with Putin would overcome the complexities of the war Russia launched in February 2022. The president’s supporters say he has been wrongly caricatured as too cozy and deferential to the Russian leader.
“People have misunderstood Trump’s approach,” said Fred Fleitz, who was a senior National Security Council official during the first term. “It isn’t that Trump likes dictators. He believes America has to coexist with Russia. Since we’re not going to war, how do we deal with them?”
Trump and Putin have held multiple calls and passed numerous messages through intermediaries, U.S. officials and other people familiar with their communications said.
Their conversations, according to a senior administration official, have been typically friendly. Trump often discusses his aim of a revived U.S.-Russian relationship propelled by growing economic cooperation. Putin lists his grievances and core desires, mainly international recognition of Russia’s control over Crimea and the Donbas region, much of which it has seized from Ukraine.
Their calls extend for hours sometimes due to lengthy Putin monologues and the need for translations, current and former U.S. officials said. Trump, usually impatient and anxious to chime in, listens attentively, aides said.
“Putin does this very methodically,” John Bolton, Trump’s third national security adviser during the first term, said of the former KGB officer. “He’s very knowledgeable, he knows what he’s talking about. When he wants to try and influence somebody, he just talks and talks and talks.”
Putin has carefully studied the new Trump administration and understands where Russia’s leverage with the president lies, said Fiona Hill, who was a top Russia aide in the White House during Trump’s first term. “Putin’s done his homework. He’s had years of figuring out who Trump is,” she said.
Part of that homework was determining how to prosecute his war while sending signals of openness to diplomacy.
Russia still attacks Ukrainian cities and infrastructure with long-range missiles and drones, killing civilians with regularity. The conflict along the roughly 750-mile front line remains a grinding war of attrition, with Russia’s summer offensive clawing gradual gains against a staunch and stretched Ukrainian defense. Moscow’s lead in air power and troop numbers have given it the upper hand in the fight, U.S. and European officials quietly admit, though Russia’s glaring weakness remains its heavily sanctioned economy.
Toys and flowers mark the site of a Russian missile strike last week on a residential building in Kyiv that killed civilians, including children. Photo: Efrem Lukatsky/AP
Trump’s frustrations with Putin started to seep into the open at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in June, when he called his Russian counterpart’s refusal to end the war “misguided.”
“I’m very surprised. Actually, I thought we would have had that settled easy,” Trump told reporters.
A July 3 phone call lasted barely an hour—far shorter than their previous chats. The call lacked the warmth with which they normally spoke to each other, the senior administration official said. There wasn’t a flashpoint, but Trump ended it feeling perplexed, adding to his gnawing sense of being dragged along.
Trump later acknowledged that Putin would say one thing in their conversations about his interest in halting the war and yet do another thing. “I go home, I tell the first lady, ‘And I spoke with Vladimir today. We had a wonderful conversation.’ She said, ‘Oh, really? Another city was just hit.’”
A frustrated Trump announced last month that he would give Putin 50 days to complete a cease-fire with Ukraine, later shortening the deadline to Friday. Failure to do so would lead the U.S. to sanction some of Russia’s top energy customers, a strategy aimed at choking off Moscow’s major remaining sources of revenue for its war effort.
Administration officials and close presidential confidants said Trump and Putin didn’t have a single, major blowup this year. Instead it was a “series of moments,” in the words of Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.), that ultimately convinced Trump that “Putin was trying to play him.”
“You see now a turning of the page, and Putin has nobody to blame but himself,” Graham said.
But there are concerns in the U.S. and Europe that Putin floated the idea of a meeting to continue stringing Trump along, not to settle for peace.
Putin might propose that Russia officially control some of the Ukrainian territory it occupies in exchange for a withdrawal of his forces from other parts of Ukraine, said a senior European diplomat and a Ukrainian official. Trump, eager for a deal, might urge Ukraine and allies to accept the offer.
Kyiv and other European governments would likely reject the plan, the official said, playing into Putin’s hands because Trump, rarely concerned with the details of a peace settlement, might then blame Ukraine for continuing to fight.
Trump could cut off intelligence and military support for Ukraine, as he did earlier this year, setting back Zelensky’s efforts to align himself more closely with Trump following a combative Oval Office meeting in February. The U.S. could also remove itself from the diplomatic process entirely, leaving Moscow and Kyiv to continue what Trump has long labeled “Biden’s war.”
But those who know Trump suspect he will keep pursuing the most prized deal of his early presidency, where success or failure could define his legacy. “He wants to be the guy who gets deals,” said Marc Short, a first-term senior White House aide. “That is his brand.”
Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com, Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com and Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com
3. Ukrainians Face a Sophie’s Choice
Excerpts:
In “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1951), Hannah Arendt described the methods the Nazi and Soviet states used to shatter individual will and render masses ready for subjugation. One step is “the murder of the moral person of the man.” The state accomplishes this by “making the decisions of conscience absolutely questionable and equivocal,” by creating a situation in which “the alternative is no longer between good and evil, but between murder and murder.” The quintessential “moral dilemma” is that of a mother “allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her three children should be killed.” William Styron fictionalized this dilemma in his 1979 novel, “Sophie’s Choice.”
That’s the temptation Ukraine faces as it considers sacrificing some territories ostensibly to save others. Many Ukrainians have loved ones in occupied regions, notes Yulia Marushevska, a Defense Ministry official: “Giving it up is not giving it up to keep it quiet there. It’s giving them up for destruction. It’s giving up your friend or brother.”
Choose one child to survive, and you become complicit in the killing of the other. Sophie chooses, but that choice destroys her. Many Ukrainians believe that consenting to such a compromise is immoral. Such a concession would open up “an endless chain of Sophie’s choices, with the ultimate goal of total absorption and destruction,” one Ukrainian official says.
Ukrainians reject Russia’s offer of a choice between wrong and wrong. “When you see what Russia brings—the mass graves, the forced deportations, the torture of civilians—you stop romanticizing compromise,” Ms. Honcharuk, the combat medic, texts me, en route to the front. “This isn’t about politics. It’s about dignity. About never having to look a child in the eyes and explain that you gave up their future just to stay alive a little longer.”
Ukrainians Face a Sophie’s Choice
Ceding land is one thing, but a peace agreement would also mean sacrificing family and friends.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/ukrainians-face-a-sophies-choice-peace-process-genocide-8feab81e
By Jillian Kay Melchior
Follow
Aug. 7, 2025 1:09 pm ET
Viktoriia Honcharuk, 25, returned home to Ukraine from New York City to volunteer as a combat medic. Photo: Courtesy of Viktoriia Honcharuk
Kyiv, Ukraine
Viktoriia Honcharuk had it all: a bright future at Morgan Stanley and a salary sufficient to enjoy the delights of Manhattan. “And then Russia invaded my country, and I re-evaluated my life,” she says. She returned home to Ukraine to volunteer as a combat medic. I ask her bluntly: Do you expect to grow old?
“For me, it’s not a question of growing old,” Ms. Honcharuk, 25, answers after a long pause. “I accept that every single time I go for evacuations, I might be killed—but that’s OK with me.” She perseveres because “I hope, essentially, that Ukraine will survive” and because “we are contributing to fighting the greatest evil on this earth.”
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The West contemplates a path to peace mainly in political and pragmatic terms. Ukrainians see the war in moral and existential terms. That’s how they can maintain their will even as they look ahead to what is likely to be the bleakest winter of the war so far.
Negotiations have yielded little except the exchange of prisoners of war. Ukrainian soldiers often return from captivity skeletal, with tales of beatings and torture—their fingernails torn out, electric shocks administered to their genitals. Russia bombards Ukrainian cities far behind the front, killing civilians who fail to flee their beds quickly enough. Last month the governor of the southern region of Kherson accused the Russians of “ruthlessly and deliberately” killing a 14-month-old boy with a drone. Ukrainians call such acts evil. Is there another word for them?
This framing also helps explain Ukrainians’ insistence against territorial concessions. A poll published this summer by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that only 38% of Ukrainians would accept some losses for peace, with 52% “firmly against” territorial concessions—although the latter number has declined somewhat since 2022. Sixty-eight percent oppose official recognition of Russian control of occupied territories, and 78% reject the surrender of regions not currently under Russian control, as Vladimir Putin has proposed. How about “de facto recognition of Russian control without de jure recognition”? While that’s more palatable to Ukrainians, more still oppose it than support it.
Retired Lt. Col. Bohdan Krotevych says Ukraine could sacrifice territory if it were uninhabited—“but there are people.” He is a native of Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014, and he fought in Mariupol, which Russia destroyed in 2022.
“Russian occupation is not just changing one state flag to another,” says Oleksandra Matviichuk, head of the Center for Civil Liberties, a Ukrainian nongovernmental organization that shared the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize. The group documents war crimes, and Ms. Matviichuk says she fears “we will reach the moment when even the severe skeptics will have no doubt that this is a genocide. But it will be too late for us.”
Genocide can entail mass slaughter, but the legal definition is broader under the United Nations’ 1948 Genocide Convention. It entails both intent to destroy, in whole or part, an entire people, and at least one of several constituent acts. The U.S. considers China’s forced Sinicization of the Uyghurs a genocide. Similarly, Mr. Putin is working to “eliminate Ukraine as a language and ethnicity, as an identity and culture, and as an independent state,” says Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. This, he says, is “explicitly a genocidal intent.”
Viktoriia Honcharuk worked as an investment banking analyst at Morgan Stanley in New York City before the war. Photo: Courtesy of Viktoriia Honcharuk
“I have stated on numerous occasions that, in my view, the Russian and Ukrainian peoples are essentially one people,” Mr. Putin said in June. “In that sense, we see Ukraine as ours.” Kremlin officials and state-run media routinely make similar statements. “There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine,” proclaimed a recent op-ed in the state-run publication RIA Novosti.
Constituent acts of genocide include “killing” or “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.” In 2022 in the Kyiv suburbs of Bucha and Irpin, retreating Russians left behind mass graves and civilian bodies bearing signs of torture, sexual violence and summary executions. Witnesses described how those trying to flee “were regularly shot at and killed for no apparent reason,” a United Nations report recounted. Similar depredations have been discovered in other liberated cities and reported from occupied territory. “That sort of thing is very intentional and very distinct from incidents like the bombing of Dresden,” says Karolina Hird of the Institute for the Study of War. “There’s no military benefit.”
The forcible transfer of children from one group to another is another constituent act, and Ukrainian authorities say they have information about nearly 20,000 cases in which Ukrainian children have been kidnapped to Russia. The real number is likely much higher, says Dariia Zarivna, executive director of Bring Kids Back UA, an initiative of President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Ukrainians are horrified by what Ms. Zarivna describes as “a large-scale state policy of militarizing Ukrainian children.” Forcibly transferred children are the most vulnerable, but youths in occupied territories are also pushed into military training, including the operation of drones and tactical medical instruction. Russia is preparing them to fight against Ukraine as soon as they turn 18.
Many Ukrainians therefore feel that they are fighting for the moral future of their children. “That is the foundation,” says Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Mr. Zelensky. “Russia is built on the principle of the suppression of an individual by the state. . . . We are different. We are not Russians.”
In “The Origins of Totalitarianism” (1951), Hannah Arendt described the methods the Nazi and Soviet states used to shatter individual will and render masses ready for subjugation. One step is “the murder of the moral person of the man.” The state accomplishes this by “making the decisions of conscience absolutely questionable and equivocal,” by creating a situation in which “the alternative is no longer between good and evil, but between murder and murder.” The quintessential “moral dilemma” is that of a mother “allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her three children should be killed.” William Styron fictionalized this dilemma in his 1979 novel, “Sophie’s Choice.”
That’s the temptation Ukraine faces as it considers sacrificing some territories ostensibly to save others. Many Ukrainians have loved ones in occupied regions, notes Yulia Marushevska, a Defense Ministry official: “Giving it up is not giving it up to keep it quiet there. It’s giving them up for destruction. It’s giving up your friend or brother.”
Choose one child to survive, and you become complicit in the killing of the other. Sophie chooses, but that choice destroys her. Many Ukrainians believe that consenting to such a compromise is immoral. Such a concession would open up “an endless chain of Sophie’s choices, with the ultimate goal of total absorption and destruction,” one Ukrainian official says.
Ukrainians reject Russia’s offer of a choice between wrong and wrong. “When you see what Russia brings—the mass graves, the forced deportations, the torture of civilians—you stop romanticizing compromise,” Ms. Honcharuk, the combat medic, texts me, en route to the front. “This isn’t about politics. It’s about dignity. About never having to look a child in the eyes and explain that you gave up their future just to stay alive a little longer.”
Ms. Melchior is a member of the Journal’s editorial board.
WSJ Opinion: Inside Look at Russia-Ukraine War
Play video: WSJ Opinion: Inside Look at Russia-Ukraine War
Journal Editorial Report: Jillian Melchior details her latest trip to Kyiv as the war intensifies.
Appeared in the August 8, 2025, print edition as 'Ukrainians Face a Sophie’s Choice'.
4. Putin Has Already Lost in Ukraine—The Extent of That Loss Depends on What the West Does Next
Excertps:
One million battle casualties, an estimated 250,000 dead, a collapsing economy, and international pariah status is what Putin has achieved in his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has needed Iranian drones, North Korean soldiers, Indian labor, and Chinese technology to keep his stagnated war machine afloat. Russian birthrates are so dismal he has had to enact a policy of incentivizing Russian women to have more children. Many of Russia’s best minds have fled the country to avoid conscription. Whatever the eventual outcome of this war brings, Putin has already lost the war in Ukraine.
However, Ukraine is also running out of time. War fatigue, decreased US support for the weapons needed for battlefield advantage, and the decreasing supply of capable men and women for the frontlines have prevented Ukrainian forces from being capable of launching offensive operations to drive the Russians from Ukrainian territory. If President Trump wants an end to this war as quickly as possible as he has stated, a full-court press on Russia’s war machine is needed. Coordination with NATO as well as global allies and partners is key.
Diplomatically, the U.S. and NATO must make clear to the primary enablers of Russia’s war machine, China, North Korea, Iran, and North Korea, that the cost of doing business with Putin will not be worth it. Economically, biting sanctions not only on Russia’s economy but also those buying Russian oil must be followed through by Trump. Militarily, the U.S. and NATO must provide Ukraine with everything on its wish list as quickly as possible. Kyiv’s military must be able to go on the offensive, and full Western support is a must. If Trump wishes to focus on China and deter its more aggressive international moves, he must help Putin lose as much as possible in Ukraine.
Putin Has Already Lost in Ukraine—The Extent of That Loss Depends on What the West Does Next
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/08/trump-ukraine-war-strategy/
by Ryan Maness
|
08.08.2025 at 06:00am
Trump to the Rescue?
On July 15, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would be sending more weapons to Ukraine, primarily the air defense Patriot missile systems, via purchases from NATO allies. He then gave Moscow 50 days to agree to a peace deal to end its invasion of Ukraine, or else face 100 percent secondary tariffs on countries that buy Russian products, primarily its oil. This could slow the funding of Putin’s war machine for a time, but would it be enough to get the Kremlin to seriously negotiate a long-term ceasefire that would end years of carnage?
Putin has already lost the war in Ukraine. Even as his depleted military slowly inches westward in its unimpressive summer offensive, the casualty rate of Russian troops has reached the staggering one million mark in just over three years. It is estimated that one-fourth of these casualties are battle deaths. In June, his air power was seriously depleted, losing over 40 high value planes, by a surprise and ingenious drone attack by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), dubbed Operation Spider’s Web. Much of his Black Sea Fleet has had to depart Crimea due to the ability of Ukraine’s special operations forces (SSO) to strike his naval vessels with surface or underwater drones. The list goes on, but the once feared Russian military machine has proven to be overhyped and overrated. Failed reform attempts, corruption, and the nature of Putin’s authoritarian state have returned limited gains compared to massive losses and a stalemated war with a much smaller and less powerful neighbor.
Putin’s use of realpolitik-style power politics over the past two decades have not worked. His long-term strategic goals are further from his grasp than ever before. Most importantly, he has galvanized Ukrainian nationhood, and a once divided nation stands as one against his naked aggression. His dreams of a restored Russian empire where Ukraine and other former Soviet states are permanently brought back into Moscow’s orbit have vanished due to his 2022 miscalculations. He has lost his cash cow: natural gas and oil revenue from the lucrative European market, perhaps permanently. His actions in Ukraine have led to NATO expansion, not contraction, and Russia’s border with the alliance has doubled with Finland’s entry. Putin has exposed Russia as a paper tiger, a hollowed out former superpower being embarrassed on the battlefield by a smaller but smarter Ukrainian fighting force.
Putin Cannot Win
In our forthcoming book, Modern Hybrid Warfare: Russia versus the West, we utilize data analyses and in-depth qualitative methods to show Putin’s failures in Ukraine by dissecting the different facets of the hybrid operations in the full-scale war in Ukraine (2022- present). Our primary argument is that emerging technology does not change the nature of warfare; in fact, it can make it bloodier. With the help of allies and its own homegrown ingenuity, Ukraine has reached technological parity with its larger opponent, and this has led to a stalemate in the trenches of Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where every inch gained is paid for with gallons of blood.
The use of cheap and stealthy drones, for air, sea, and underwater, have allowed the Ukrainians to fight smarter. First-person view (FPV) drones have been essential for intelligence collection and influence operations. Unmanned surface and underwater vehicles (USV, UUV) have allowed a navy-less Ukraine to drive the Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea. Western electronic warfare (EW) equipment and Ukrainian ingenuity has balanced this capability against the Russians who had a clear advantage before the war. The use of private sector space technology has also given the Ukrainians parity with a country with numerous assets in orbit.
Cyber operations have also been relegated to secondary status as a result of Ukrainian preparedness and ingenuity, and well as support from Western military cyber commands and the private sector. A good defense has been able to counter an offensive-minded Russian cyber power, and we have observed a relative balance between the two sides in the digital space.
Artificial intelligence, specifically LLMs, has enhanced the scope and scale of influence operations for both Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine has been successful with creating narratives that evoke anger or humor, and are visual, attributes that social psychology has proven to be the most successful in terms of memory retention. Memetic warfare is real and a very important part of Ukraine’s continued support from its public as well as its international partners. Russia’s influence operations, although successful with its domestic audience, have fallen flat with most international audiences. The overuse of the Nazi trope where Russia accuses Ukraine’s government of being run by the far-right, the continued bombastic nuclear saber-rattling, and framing the West as the aggressor in this conflict have fallen flat for the most part, and support for Ukraine remains high.
Both Russia and Ukraine’s militaries have evolved from their Soviet legacies. These legacies include rampant corruption, poorly trained and equipped soldiers, a focus on mass tactics with a glut in officer corps, and inferior military equipment when compared with Western counterparts. After the suboptimal performance of the Russian military operation in Georgia in 2008, Putin directed that the military be reformed. However, the continuing legacy of corruption, poor leadership and training, and low morale among the enlisted continued, and the result has been a disaster for Putin’s Ukraine blunder.
Ukraine, on the other hand, after the 2014 illegal Crimean annexation and conflict in the Donbas, realized that it must modernize its military to prepare for a Russian invasion, and fast. Over the next eight years, Ukraine reformed its military to reflect those of the West, as U.S. and NATO allies helped train, equip, and reorganize a military in tatters. The results of these reforms have been seen on the battlefield: non-commissioned officers making autonomous battlefield decisions, better training and morale among troops, and superior equipment and tactical groups have kept Ukraine in the fight against its much larger invader.
Increased Western Support Can End the War, On Ukraine’s Terms
Although Trump’s U-turn on arming Ukraine is of great relief to Kyiv, the U.S. and its NATO allies must do more to put Putin in such a corner that he must sue for peace on Kyiv’s terms or else see his regime collapse. As Putin has shown little concern for the human and economic toll of the war on Russia, his acknowledgment of his military’s culmination, its inability to continue effective operations, will require the West to bolster Ukraine’s military so that it can break the stalemate and be capable of a counteroffensive.
One million battle casualties, an estimated 250,000 dead, a collapsing economy, and international pariah status is what Putin has achieved in his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has needed Iranian drones, North Korean soldiers, Indian labor, and Chinese technology to keep his stagnated war machine afloat. Russian birthrates are so dismal he has had to enact a policy of incentivizing Russian women to have more children. Many of Russia’s best minds have fled the country to avoid conscription. Whatever the eventual outcome of this war brings, Putin has already lost the war in Ukraine.
However, Ukraine is also running out of time. War fatigue, decreased US support for the weapons needed for battlefield advantage, and the decreasing supply of capable men and women for the frontlines have prevented Ukrainian forces from being capable of launching offensive operations to drive the Russians from Ukrainian territory. If President Trump wants an end to this war as quickly as possible as he has stated, a full-court press on Russia’s war machine is needed. Coordination with NATO as well as global allies and partners is key.
Diplomatically, the U.S. and NATO must make clear to the primary enablers of Russia’s war machine, China, North Korea, Iran, and North Korea, that the cost of doing business with Putin will not be worth it. Economically, biting sanctions not only on Russia’s economy but also those buying Russian oil must be followed through by Trump. Militarily, the U.S. and NATO must provide Ukraine with everything on its wish list as quickly as possible. Kyiv’s military must be able to go on the offensive, and full Western support is a must. If Trump wishes to focus on China and deter its more aggressive international moves, he must help Putin lose as much as possible in Ukraine.
Tags: emerging technology, Russia-Ukraine War, Trump Administration, US Foreign Policy, Vladimir Putin, Volodymyr Zelensky
About The Author
- Ryan Maness
-
Ryan C. Maness is an Associate Professor in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). He researches cyber and information strategy, U.S. national security, Russian foreign and military policy, political warfare, and hybrid strategies. He is the co-author of Cyber Strategy and the forthcoming book, Modern Hybrid Warfare, Russia versus the West. He teaches Cyber and Information Strategy, Network Warfare, and Irregular Warfare in Europe and the Post-Soviet Space in the Defense Analysis Department at NPS. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
5. The Case for the Atomic Bomb, 80 Years Later
Excerpts:
Some critics have argued that the U.S. should have demonstrated the awesome power of the weapons in some uninhabited region of the world. Yet the Allies only had two bombs, with several months before the next ones came into production. No number of scientists and other observers would have persuaded the hard men of the Japanese general staff, either. It took both devastated cities to convince the politicians and emperor.
Since Japan also had plans to kill Allied prisoners of war as the fighting approached the camps where they were being held, its swift surrender saved tens of thousands of American and British lives, military and civilian. Crucially, the bombs also saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives, because even more Japanese had died in the bombing of Tokyo than in the blast at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The Allied navies would have continued their blockade too, leading to mass starvation.
It took a brave former president of the Japanese Medical Association to state that “when one considers the possibility that the Japanese military would have sacrificed the entire nation if it were not for the atomic bomb attack, then this bomb might be described as having saved Japan.”
The Case for the Atomic Bomb, 80 Years Later
Revisiting the math and morality of the Allied forces’ decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.
By Andrew Roberts
Aug. 7, 2025 5:21 pm ET
Harry Truman and Winston Churchill in the White House, Jan. 7, 1952. Photo: ASSOCIATED PRESS
“Might not a bomb no bigger than an orange be found to possess a secret power to destroy a whole block of buildings—nay, to concentrate the force of a thousand tons of cordite and blast a township at a stroke?” So asked Winston Churchill in September 1924. Twenty-one years later he got something of an answer, as the U.S. bombed Japan, instantly killing as many as 70,000 people in Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945, and 40,000 in Nagasaki three days later.
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In the 80 years since, the world has debated whether President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Churchill were morally right to use the weapons against civilians, even if the direct result was to end the most terrible war in human history. The two men are regularly accused of being war criminals.
They certainly had no qualms. As Churchill recalled in the sixth volume of his World War II memoirs, “Triumph and Tragedy” (1953), the decision “was never even an issue.” “There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise.”
It is remarkable, moreover, how little Christian morality and the concept of a just war were invoked on either side of the debate. Such issues seem not to have entered the conscious thinking of the major Allied participants. The reason, it’s easy to assume, is that they were so thoroughly Christianized that they hardly needed to invoke Augustine and Aquinas in their deliberations. A similar grouping in a pagan society wouldn’t have bothered asking about civilian casualties at all—as for example Iran’s leaders, intent on destroying Israel, don’t bother to do today.
In the postwar world, however, some have argued that Japan was about to surrender and that it was therefore morally wrong to deploy this most destructive of weapons.
Yet Japan was preparing for a fanatical defense of its home islands once its empire was conquered. In his own memoirs, “Year of Decisions,” Truman wrote that he believed an invasion of Japan would have cost half a million American lives. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of State James Byrnes judged that to be conservative, with both estimating the total casualties at one million. Such figures are supported by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose August 1944 study reported that it would “cost half a million American lives and many more that number in wounded.” Even as late as July 1945, the Allies were suffering 7,000 casualties a week fighting the Japanese.
In addition to kamikaze pilots, the Japanese were planning to use flying bombs, suicide attack boats, midget suicide submarines and navy swimmers trained to be human mines, all of which had been used in battle at Okinawa and the Philippines. The U.S. 10th Army had taken nearly three months to capture Okinawa, and it cost the American ground forces 7,343 lives. Another 31,807 had been wounded and 239 were missing. Further, 36 ships were sunk and 368 were damaged, 763 aircraft were lost, 4,907 seamen were killed and another 4,824 were wounded. The Japanese meanwhile lost some 110,000.
With U.S. attrition rates that high for an outlying island, it is safe to assume that the invasion of the sacred Japanese mainland would have been far heavier. The assault on Iwo Jima in the Bonin Islands had killed nearly 7,000 U.S. Marines and wounded 20,000. On June 8, 1945, the Japanese government had pledged to Emperor Hirohito that “the nation would fight to the bitter end,” and Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki supported the army’s plan to carry this out, calling it “the way of the warrior and the path of the patriot.”
Even after several square miles of central Nagasaki were destroyed by the second bomb, army chief Yoshijiro Umezu concluded that Japan still had the “ability to deal a smashing blow to the enemy” and that “it would be inexcusable to surrender unconditionally.” The chief of the naval staff wrote: “We do not believe it possible that we will be defeated.” It took the emperor to state, in his Imperial Rescript on Aug. 14, that “the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.”
Some critics have argued that the U.S. should have demonstrated the awesome power of the weapons in some uninhabited region of the world. Yet the Allies only had two bombs, with several months before the next ones came into production. No number of scientists and other observers would have persuaded the hard men of the Japanese general staff, either. It took both devastated cities to convince the politicians and emperor.
Since Japan also had plans to kill Allied prisoners of war as the fighting approached the camps where they were being held, its swift surrender saved tens of thousands of American and British lives, military and civilian. Crucially, the bombs also saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives, because even more Japanese had died in the bombing of Tokyo than in the blast at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The Allied navies would have continued their blockade too, leading to mass starvation.
It took a brave former president of the Japanese Medical Association to state that “when one considers the possibility that the Japanese military would have sacrificed the entire nation if it were not for the atomic bomb attack, then this bomb might be described as having saved Japan.”
Mr. Roberts, a member of the House of Lords, is author of “Churchill: Walking With Destiny.”
Appeared in the August 8, 2025, print edition as 'The Case for the Atom Bomb, 80 Years Later'.
6. Could the U.S. Have Saved Navalny?
This should be an interesting book. I want to read the "rest of the story" that ends with this conclusion below.
I wonder if the new hostage negotiator has the connections and moxy that our SF brother Roger has? Since President Trump first appointed him as the hostage negotiator in his first term he would have done well to keep him in the job.
Excerpts:
Roger D. Carstens, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs during the Biden presidency and first Trump administration.
The dilemma weighed on Sullivan, who had taken flak from Murdoch-controlled Fox News for swapping an arms dealer for the WNBA’s Griner. The administration needed to explore alternative trades that wouldn’t include the murderer or other ways to pressure the Kremlin. Sullivan had considered punishing Putin by expelling Russian hockey players in America, including Alexander Ovechkin, the NHL star chasing Wayne Gretzky’s all-time scoring record. He decided against it.
Sullivan lamented to Latour that he didn’t yet see “a pathway.” “I do not want to give false hope,” he added. “All I can do is tell you that we have a clear commitment.” Latour left the White House meeting confused. Germany wouldn’t be ready until the U.S. sent a formal request. And Sullivan was reluctant to send one until Germany was ready. The two most powerful governments in the NATO alliance were circling each other like two teenagers at a school dance, each waiting for the other to make a move.
Latour sent a meeting summary to Carstens. Time was wasting, the special envoy felt, his concern boiling into frustration. The pathway was obvious, he believed, yet the White House had discouraged him from even visiting Germany, where he could advance talks. His emails to White House staff were going unanswered.
Rae proposed a workaround: Petlinsky could fly to New York and meet Carstens there. But when the day finally came, in November, the Russian texted to say he had been mysteriously blocked from boarding his plane in Dubai. Carstens was suddenly needed in Israel. Talks were stuck.
But as fate had it, another “back-channel wizard,” happened to be in Tel Aviv—a Russian billionaire Carstens knew could slip a message to Putin. And this time, the White House wouldn’t have time to stop him.
Could the U.S. Have Saved Navalny?
As the Biden administration deliberated, friends of the famous Russian opposition leader rallied behind an audacious plan to spring him from Putin’s gulag.
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/navalny-secret-plan-death-da19e811?st=nyqqYJ&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Drew Hinshaw
Follow and Joe Parkinson
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Aug. 7, 2025 9:00 pm ET
The summer sun was reflecting off the Mediterranean, warming the leather seats of a white Rolls-Royce convertible as the shadowy Russian behind the wheel cruised the cliff-top roads overlooking the Côte d’Azur.
In the passenger seat rode Odessa Rae, a flame-haired Canadian actress and Oscar-winning filmmaker. She had flown to Monaco to meet Stanislav Petlinsky, a self-described “security consultant” with a background in military intelligence who once worked in Vladimir Putin’s office and still boasted access to the president. The night before, he had treated her to a €190 tasting menu of seaweed-garnished langoustine tartare and braised sea bass. But Rae wasn’t sure how Petlinsky would react when she revealed the reason for this trip in July 2023, and her friends in New York worried he might abduct her.
As the wind tousled her hair, she floated an audacious question: What would it take to get Putin to release his archnemesis from prison?
Rae had grown up in Asia, spoke Japanese in a 1990s Levi’s commercial with Brad Pitt, helped bring the rom-com “Crazy Rich Asians” to theaters and once played a wild, underworld spirit in the Superman series “Smallville.” Now, she was playing a central role in “Secret Project Silver Lake,” a discreet effort to free a real-life hero: the subject of her Academy Award-winning documentary, “Navalny.”
Odessa Rae attends a Tribeca CHANEL Women’s Filmmaker Program luncheon in June. Photo: Jamie McCarthy/WireImage
Her film had helped make Alexei Navalny, a charismatic Russian opposition leader, the world’s most famous dissident, chronicling his almost unbelievable endurance run of arrests, assaults and a near-fatal poisoning with the nerve agent Novichok. He had vowed from a German hospital bed to return to Russia and defy Putin, who loathed him so much he refused to utter Navalny’s name. Arrested on arrival in Moscow, Navalny was in solitary confinement at the IK-6 penal colony east of the capital.
Rae had a trump card of sorts. She knew Putin wanted to spring one of his own cronies from prison in Germany—an FSB hit man, Vadim Krasikov, serving life for murdering a Kremlin opponent in a Berlin park.
Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny heads to a meeting in Moscow on Dec. 25, 2017. Photo: Evgeny Feldman/Associated Press
A trade sounded like a fascinating idea, Petlinsky said. He promised to take it to Putin, and Rae returned to Manhattan, hopeful that she and her cohorts were furthering their unlikely bid to free the closest figure Russia ever had to a Nelson Mandela.
Thousands of miles away, the White House was largely unaware of this Monaco back channel. The Biden administration was trying to tightly control negotiations with Moscow over one of its gnarliest foreign policy problems, the rising number of Americans wrongly imprisoned—effectively taken hostage—in Russia. They included a former Marine, Paul Whelan, and our Wall Street Journal colleague, Evan Gershkovich, both jailed as political pawns on espionage charges the U.S. government rejected as bogus.
The FSB, successor to the KGB, had offered the CIA a trade for the Americans, but only for an unconscionable price—America must convince Germany to free Krasikov. The Biden administration was reluctant to force such a nauseating compromise onto a valued ally—and worried that even entertaining the idea would encourage Putin to ensnare more Americans. Months earlier, they had released arms dealer Viktor Bout for WNBA player Brittney Griner, and before her first game back, the FSB had snatched Gershkovich. America needed to look less eager, the White House felt.
Seven months would pass before Washington and Berlin were ready to move on a deal modeled on that first proposal by Rae, but just as soon as they were, it was too late. On Feb. 16, 2024, Russian state media announced that Navalny had died at the notorious “Polar Wolf” prison at the age of 47. Authorities at the gates told his mother the cause was “sudden death syndrome.”
To this day, a debate continues over whether the U.S. missed a chance to save Navalny, or whether back-channel efforts to free him inadvertently precipitated his demise. One camp believes he could have been exchanged if the Biden administration had moved faster, before he was sent to the harsh arctic prison in Dec. 2023. They place particular blame on Jake Sullivan, Joe Biden’s national security adviser, who was simultaneously assembling a complex, multinational agreement to save Navalny and jailed Americans and juggling an unmanageable set of geopolitical threats, including wars in Ukraine and Gaza.
The ‘Polar Wolf’ prison camp where Alexei Navalny died. Photo: Reuters
The aging president, working limited hours and occasionally struggling to remember where negotiations stood, wasn’t pressing enough for a deal, these people contend.
On the other side is an alternative thesis, shared by some top U.S. officials: Russia’s paranoid president was never going to release his most popular opponent. Some involved in the negotiations wonder if the efforts to free Navalny pushed Putin, or his security chiefs, to finally reach a fatal decision on what to do with the meddlesome activist who routinely exposed the corruption of their regime.
Vadim Krasikov, a Russian hit man who was serving a life sentence for gunning down a Putin opponent in a Berlin park. PHOTO: BERLIN STATE POLICE
The truth, wrapped inside Kremlin secrecy and the psychology of Russia’s longtime autocrat, may never be known. The CIA later concluded that Putin might not have meant for Navalny to die when he did, though some European officials doubt such unintended harm could befall the most important dissident in a country as tightly controlled as Russia.
What is clear, as new reporting on the negotiations show, is that efforts to save Navalny and American prisoners in Russia proceeded at a pace the White House was never going to be able to control. Tech billionaires, celebrity journalists, spies and even Hillary Clinton stepped in to advance Secret Project Silver Lake. Gershkovich’s arrest brought the collective power of Rupert Murdoch and his media conglomerate into the fray, as his family and executives called on world leaders from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman to help sway Putin.
Was Navalny’s death inevitable? Or did the U.S. miss its chance to save him and the prospect of a different Russian future? It certainly seemed possible to rescue him in the summer of 2023, when Rae returned to Manhattan and met up with her partner in “Silver Lake,” one of the world’s most famous spy-hunters: a Bulgarian investigative journalist-in-exile who was nervous about texting Petlinsky. After all, a Russian spy ring had tried to abduct him.
The Bulgarian journalist
Christo Grozev was living in one of the few places he hoped Russia wouldn’t dare touch him, Manhattan, an ocean away from his Bulgarian homeland or his family in Vienna, whom he would visit accompanied by armed bodyguards. A lanky, funny and restless ball of nerdy energy, he made his name scouring flight records, satellite imagery, social-media posts and other digital breadcrumbs to reveal the identities of Russia’s most dangerous undercover agents, including Krasikov. He befriended Navalny and helped him identify, and even prank call, the FSB team that poisoned him, a scene captured in “Navalny,” Rae’s documentary.
It was Grozev who identified Petlinsky as a possible line to Putin. Rae had found him amenable and rather charming in Monaco, and on her return to New York, she huddled with Grozev and the head of investigations at Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, Maria Pevchikh, who first hatched this plan to free him 18 months earlier. Over Signal, the encrypted messaging app, the three began texting Petlinsky to outline an exchange calibrated to satisfy each side. He replied with messages, suggestions and prisoners’ names.
Bulgarian investigative journalist Christo Grozev. Photo: julien de rosa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
In effect a trio of friends, more experienced in Hollywood and investigative journalism than prisoner diplomacy, was outpacing the White House, concocting a creative solution to retrieve Russia’s most celebrated dissident. By August, they had assembled a draft of roughly 20 names, a trade larger and more complicated than any in U.S.-Russian history. Petlinsky, circulating their idea in Moscow, received encouraging feedback. But to propel it, he needed proof the U.S. government backed it. He wanted Sullivan to broach the offer.
Sullivan, Rae complained to the Russian, was too cautious. Instead, Navalny’s friends turned to a former Green Beret who had helped free Americans held in Venezuela, Iran and Afghanistan. Roger Carstens, appointed during Trump’s first administration as the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, then retained by Biden, was fascinated with Grozev. Carstens, who still wore combat boots with his suit, called Grozev one of the world’s “back-channel wizards,” the kind of street-smart fixer who could open doors the Ivy League law-school alumni in the Biden White House didn’t even know existed.
This was an extraordinary opportunity for three friends and a mysterious, bon vivant Russian operator to align two of the most powerful, and hostile, governments on earth. And yet Petlinsky was worried about a variable they couldn’t control—media coverage—particularly from the newspaper most invested in the story.
“No press,” he texted.
‘Now Is the Time to Act’
Wall Street Journal Publisher Almar Latour entered the White House carrying a note in his pocket, handwritten with his message for Sullivan: “Now is the time to act.”
The Journal’s front page lay on the national security adviser’s desk, bearing a giant portrait of Gershkovich and a two-word headline, a prison-time count: “100 Days.”
Almar Latour, publisher of The Wall Street Journal, attends the 2024 PEN America Spring Literary Gala. Photo: Jamie McCarthy/Getty Images
“He has committed no crime, only journalism,” the text read.
Fox News and MSNBC were broadcasting images that morning of the prisoner, standing tall in a Russian courtroom’s glass cage. The Journal’s advocacy campaign was firing on all cylinders, and Gershkovich’s face looked out from a digital billboard on Times Square and from banners at Citi Field in Queens and Arsenal’s stadium in London.
Editor in chief Emma Tucker was only eight weeks into her new job, sleeping on a mattress on her unfurnished Manhattan apartment’s floor, when Gershkovich was jailed. But she had swiftly mobilized the newsroom’s staff to “scream from the rooftops” about the injustice. Murdoch had confidentially allowed executives to allocate a “limitless” budget to free the reporter and, along with his family and executives, had been dialing world leaders—the prime minister of Qatar and crown prince of Saudi Arabia. Senators from both parties had demanded Gershkovich’s release.
The Journal’s reporters had obtained an important insight: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz would consider releasing Krasikov, especially if it meant Navalny and Gershkovich could go free in the bargain. To proceed, Germany wanted the White House to make the request, essential political cover.
Quiet diplomacy fell to Latour, who worried that if the White House didn’t act quickly, Gershkovich might get snagged in a yearlong trial.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, left, and national security adviser Jake Sullivan, shown in the Oval Office during the Biden presidency. Photo: brendan smialowski/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Yet as Latour sat down in the West Wing office, he could see Sullivan, the youngest national security adviser since John F. Kennedy’s Camelot cabinet, was on another page. Scholz’s government wasn’t psychologically ready to release Krasikov, Sullivan argued. Freeing a murderer was an unprecedented ask of America’s most important NATO ally. Germany’s coalition government was fragile and divided, and its foreign minister was aghast at the prospect of crossing this moral threshold.
The dilemma weighed on Sullivan, who had taken flak from Murdoch-controlled Fox News for swapping an arms dealer for the WNBA’s Griner. The administration needed to explore alternative trades that wouldn’t include the murderer or other ways to pressure the Kremlin. Sullivan had considered punishing Putin by expelling Russian hockey players in America, including Alexander Ovechkin, the NHL star chasing Wayne Gretzky’s all-time scoring record. He decided against it.
Sullivan lamented to Latour that he didn’t yet see “a pathway.” “I do not want to give false hope,” he added. “All I can do is tell you that we have a clear commitment.” Latour left the White House meeting confused. Germany wouldn’t be ready until the U.S. sent a formal request. And Sullivan was reluctant to send one until Germany was ready. The two most powerful governments in the NATO alliance were circling each other like two teenagers at a school dance, each waiting for the other to make a move.
Roger D. Carstens, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs during the Biden presidency and first Trump administration. Photo: Kent Nishimura for WSJ
Latour sent a meeting summary to Carstens. Time was wasting, the special envoy felt, his concern boiling into frustration. The pathway was obvious, he believed, yet the White House had discouraged him from even visiting Germany, where he could advance talks. His emails to White House staff were going unanswered.
Rae proposed a workaround: Petlinsky could fly to New York and meet Carstens there. But when the day finally came, in November, the Russian texted to say he had been mysteriously blocked from boarding his plane in Dubai. Carstens was suddenly needed in Israel. Talks were stuck.
But as fate had it, another “back-channel wizard,” happened to be in Tel Aviv—a Russian billionaire Carstens knew could slip a message to Putin. And this time, the White House wouldn’t have time to stop him.
Drew Hinshaw and Joe Parkinson are leaders on The Wall Street Journal’s World Enterprise Team. This piece is adapted from their new book, “SWAP: A Secret History of the New Cold War,” which will be published on Aug. 19 by HarperCollins (which, like the Journal, is owned by News Corp).
Write to Joe Parkinson at joe.parkinson@wsj.com and Drew Hinshaw at drew.hinshaw@wsj.com
7. Trump Orders Pentagon to Prepare to Target Latin American Drug Cartels
Will this turn into a real drug war and not just the old cliche, "war on drugs?"
Ambassador Ron Johnson (former Green Beret and CIA officer, as well as former Ambassador to El Salvador) has his work cut out for him.
Excerpts:
“President Trump’s top priority is protecting the homeland, which is why he took the bold step to designate several cartels and gangs as foreign terrorist organizations,” White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said.
The New York Times earlier reported on Trump’s directive.
The options under discussion are focused on special forces operations, intelligence support and precision targeting, the senior official said. Any military action would be coordinated with Mexico and other foreign partners.
In a phone call in April, Trump pressured Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum to allow the U.S. military to become more involved in the fight against the country’s drug cartels, according to people familiar with the discussions. Trump also has previously threatened to take unilateral military action against the cartels if Mexico doesn’t take more drastic action to dismantle them.
Sheinbaum has resisted Trump on this point, emphasizing the implied threat to Mexican sovereignty. She said Friday that Mexico had been informed about Trump’s directive to the Pentagon and that it solely concerned activity in the U.S.
“It has to do with his country, it does not have anything to do with our territory,” she said. “The U.S. is not coming to Mexico with its military.”
Trump Orders Pentagon to Prepare to Target Latin American Drug Cartels
Options under discussion focus on special forces operations, intelligence support and precision targeting
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-orders-pentagon-to-prepare-to-target-drug-cartels-in-latin-america-d47150c2
By Lara Seligman
Follow, Vera Bergengruen
Follow and Brett Forrest
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Updated Aug. 8, 2025 12:13 pm ET
A U.S. Army vehicle in Texas at the border with Mexico recently. Photo: jose luis gonzalez/Reuters
Key Points
What's This?
- President Trump has directed the Pentagon to prepare options for military force against Latin American drug cartels.
- The options under discussion are focused on special forces, intelligence support and precision targeting.
- The U.S. is formulating an approach similar to its effort against Colombian cartels decades ago.
WASHINGTON—President Trump has directed the Pentagon to prepare options to use military force against Latin American drug cartels, according to a senior U.S. official.
Since returning to office this year, Trump has made a priority of dismantling cartels and stopping illicit drugs including fentanyl from entering the U.S. The White House earlier this year designated certain Latin American-based criminal organizations as foreign terrorist organizations.
“President Trump’s top priority is protecting the homeland, which is why he took the bold step to designate several cartels and gangs as foreign terrorist organizations,” White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said.
The New York Times earlier reported on Trump’s directive.
The options under discussion are focused on special forces operations, intelligence support and precision targeting, the senior official said. Any military action would be coordinated with Mexico and other foreign partners.
In a phone call in April, Trump pressured Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum to allow the U.S. military to become more involved in the fight against the country’s drug cartels, according to people familiar with the discussions. Trump also has previously threatened to take unilateral military action against the cartels if Mexico doesn’t take more drastic action to dismantle them.
Sheinbaum has resisted Trump on this point, emphasizing the implied threat to Mexican sovereignty. She said Friday that Mexico had been informed about Trump’s directive to the Pentagon and that it solely concerned activity in the U.S.
“It has to do with his country, it does not have anything to do with our territory,” she said. “The U.S. is not coming to Mexico with its military.”
U.S. and Mexican officials are drafting an agreement that would include intelligence sharing and enforcement coordination in acting against cartels. Sheinbaum, who has said she expects it to be signed soon, has emphasized that “respecting our territory” is essential to the deal.
The head of U.S. Northern Command also asked Congress in February for expanded capabilities that would allow U.S. Special Forces to work more closely with Mexican troops conducting operations against cartels.
“We are fighting an insurgency,” said Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R., Texas), who sits on the House Intelligence Committee and heads a legislative initiative to target cartels. “We need to treat it as such.”
At Sheinbaum’s urging earlier this year, a Mexican Senate commission unanimously approved the entry into Mexico of Green Berets to train marine infantry at a naval base on the Yucatán Peninsula, placing armed, uniformed American special forces operators inside the country for training purposes only.
Any military undertaking would work in concert with longstanding U.S. intelligence efforts against the Mexican cartels.
The Central Intelligence Agency has quietly worked for years with Mexican authorities, providing funding and intelligence about the country’s drug cartels and the groups’ leadership, according to people familiar with the matter.
The Trump administration has been laying the groundwork for a more targeted campaign.
In an annual report released in March, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence identified the drug flow through the southern border as the most important national-security challenge the U.S. faces, ahead of those posed by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.
The CIA has increased the frequency of surveillance and reconnaissance drone flights over Mexico to intensify its air-based intelligence collection on the cartels.
The U.S. is formulating an approach similar to its effort against Colombian cartels decades ago, which could include the use of covert action led by intelligence officers and special military operators working with Mexican agents, according to current and former officials.
The increased focus on countering cartels is “the biggest shift in collection priorities” since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard said in May.
“We cannot continue to just treat these guys as local street gangs,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Catholic outlet EWTN on Thursday, arguing that cartels have the same weapons and tactics as terrorists and militaries.
The Trump administration is expanding legal authorities to target cartels more forcefully.
“It’s no longer a law-enforcement issue,” Rubio said. “It becomes a national-security issue.”
Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com, Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com and Brett Forrest at brett.forrest@wsj.com
8. Trump Directs Military to Target Foreign Drug Cartels
Here is the NY Times article that the WSJ referenced.
Trump Directs Military to Target Foreign Drug Cartels
The president has ordered the Pentagon to use the armed forces to carry out what in the past was considered law enforcement.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/us/trump-military-drug-cartels.html
By Helene CooperMaggie HabermanCharlie Savage and Eric Schmitt
Reporting from Washington
- Aug. 8, 2025Updated 10:35 a.m. ET
Leer en español
President Trump has secretly signed a directive to the Pentagon to begin using military force against certain Latin American drug cartels that his administration has deemed terrorist organizations, according to people familiar with the matter.
The decision to bring the American military into the fight is the most aggressive step so far in the administration’s escalating campaign against the cartels. It signals Mr. Trump’s continued willingness to use military forces to carry out what has primarily been considered a law enforcement responsibility to curb the flow of fentanyl and other illegal drugs.
The order provides an official basis for the possibility of direct military operations at sea and on foreign soil against cartels.
U.S. military officials have started drawing up options for how the military could go after the groups, the people familiar with the conversations said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive internal deliberations.
But directing the military to crack down on the illicit trade also raises legal issues, including whether it would count as “murder” if U.S. forces acting outside of a congressionally authorized armed conflict were to kill civilians — even criminal suspects — who pose no imminent threat.
It is unclear what White House, Pentagon and State Department lawyers have said about the new directive or whether the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has produced an authoritative opinion assessing the legal issues.
Already this year Mr. Trump has deployed National Guard and active duty troops to the southwest border to choke off the flow of drugs as well as immigrants, and has increased surveillance and drug interdiction efforts.
When he returned to office in January, Mr. Trump signed an order directing the State Department to start labeling drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations.
In February, the State Department designated Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha (known as MS-13) and several other groups as foreign terrorist organizations, saying that they constituted “a national-security threat beyond that posed by traditional organized crime.”
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Two weeks ago, the Trump administration added the Venezuelan Cartel de los Soles, or Cartel of the Suns, to a list of specially designated global terrorist groups, asserting that it is headed by President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and other high-ranking officials in his administration.
On Thursday, the Justice and State Departments announced that the United States government is doubling a reward — to $50 million — for information leading to the arrest of Mr. Maduro, who has been indicted on drug trafficking charges. The administration again described him as a cartel head, and Attorney General Pam Bondi said he “will not escape justice and he will be held accountable for his despicable crimes.”
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Asked about Mr. Trump’s authorization for military force against the cartels, Anna Kelly, a White House spokeswoman, said in an email that “President Trump’s top priority is protecting the homeland, which is why he took the bold step to designate several cartels and gangs as foreign terrorist organizations.”
The Defense Department declined to comment on the new directive.
Unilateral military assaults on cartels would be a marked escalation in the long drive to curb drug trafficking, putting U.S. forces in a lead role on the front lines against often well-armed and well-financed organizations. A sustained campaign would also likely raise further issues related to Mr. Trump’s push to use the military more aggressively to back a variety of his policies, often in the face of legal and constitutional constraints.
Past U.S. military involvement in countering drug operations in Latin America have sometimes pushed at legal limits. But those operations were framed as providing support for law enforcement authorities.
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush sent more than 20,000 troops into Panama to arrest its strongman leader, Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted in the United States on charges of drug trafficking.
Ahead of the operation, William P. Barr, who then led the Office of Legal Counsel and was the attorney general in Mr. Trump’s first term, wrote a disputed memo saying it was within Mr. Bush’s authority to direct law-enforcement arrests of fugitives overseas without the consent of foreign states. The United Nations General Assembly condemned the Panama action as a “flagrant violation of international law.”
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President George H.W. Bush sent more than 20,000 into Panama in 1989 in an action condemned by the United Nations.Credit...Manoocher Deghati/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
In the 1990s, the U.S. military assisted Colombian and Peruvian antidrug law enforcement activities by sharing information about civilian flights suspected of carrying drugs — like radar data and communications intercepts. But after those governments started shooting down such planes, the Clinton administration in 1994 halted the assistance for months.
The Office of Legal Counsel produced an opinion saying that military officers who provided such information while knowing it would be used to summarily shoot down those aircraft could be putting themselves at risk of later prosecution. Congress eventually modified U.S. law to permit such assistance.
And the Navy has long participated in intercepting vessels in international waters that are suspected of smuggling drugs toward the United States. But naval ships typically do so as a law enforcement operation, working under the command of a U.S. Coast Guard officer. Under an 1878 law called the Posse Comitatus Act, it is generally illegal to use the military to perform law enforcement functions.
The U.S. military has also conducted joint antidrug training exercises with other countries, including with Colombian and Mexican troops. The military also provided equipment and aircraft to former Drug Enforcement Administration squads that mentored and deployed with — and sometimes got into firefights alongside — local antidrug officers in countries like Honduras. The program ended in 2017.
Updated Aug. 8, 2025, 2:55 p.m. ET1 hour ago
But Mr. Trump’s new directive appears to envision a different approach, focused on U.S. forces directly capturing or killing people involved in the drug trade.
Labeling the cartels as terrorist groups allows the United States “to use other elements of American power, intelligence agencies, the Department of Defense, whatever, to target these groups if we have an opportunity to do it,” Marco Rubio, the secretary of state and national security adviser, said on Thursday in an interview with the Catholic news outlet EWTN. “We have to start treating them as armed terrorist organizations, not simply drug dealing organizations.”
Legal specialists said that under U.S. law, imposing sanctions against a group by declaring it a “terrorist” entity can block its assets and make it harder for its members to do business or travel, but does not provide legal authority for wartime-style operations targeting it with armed force.
In his first term, Mr. Trump became captivated by the idea of bombing drug labs in Mexico, an idea his defense secretary at the time, Mark T. Esper, later portrayed as ludicrous in his memoir, and which provoked outrage from Mexican officials.
The idea of using military force, however, took root among Republicans and became a talking point in the 2024 election cycle. Mr. Trump vowed on the campaign trail to deploy Special Operations troops and naval forces to, as he put it, declare war on the cartels.
The retired Rear Adm. James E. McPherson, who served as the top uniformed lawyer for the navy in the early 2000s, said it would be “a major breach of international law” to use military force in another country’s territory and without its government’s consent unless certain exceptions were met, but that such limits do not apply to unflagged vessels in international waters.
There are also domestic legal constraints. Congress legally authorized the use of military force against Al Qaeda after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but that authorization does not extend to any and all groups the executive branch calls terrorists.
That means military action against cartels would apparently have to rely on a claim about Mr. Trump’s constitutional authority to act in national self-defense, perhaps against fentanyl overdoses. Admiral McPherson noted that the administration has pushed aggressively broad understandings of Mr. Trump’s unilateral power.
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U.S. Coast Guard crew members offloading cargo that was part of a cocaine and marijuana seizure in the Atlantic Ocean in Florida.Credit...Joe Raedle/Getty Images
It is not clear what rules of engagement would govern military action against cartels. But any operation that set out to kill people based on their suspected status as members of a sanctioned cartel, and outside the context of an armed conflict, would raise legal issues involving laws against murder and a longstanding executive order banning assassinations, said Brian Finucane, a former State Department lawyer who is a specialist in the laws of war.
“Under traditional executive branch lawyering, it would be hard to see some random drug trafficker meeting the threshold for the self-defense exception to the assassination ban,” he said.
Alternatively, the military could carry out capture operations, reserving lethal force for self-defense if troops met resistance.
But captures could raise other tricky legal issues, Mr. Finucane added, including about the scope of the military’s ability to hold prisoners as wartime-style detainees without congressional authorization. Or the military could instead transfer any prisoners to the Justice Department for prosecution in civilian court.
In February, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired the top lawyers for the military services, or judge advocates general. The three-star uniformed lawyers are supposed to give independent and nonpolitical advice about international laws of war and domestic legal constraints on the armed forces.
The administration has also largely sidelined the Office of Legal Counsel, the Justice Department arm that traditionally serves as a powerful gatekeeper in American government, including by deciding whether proposed policies are legally permissible.
Late last month, the Senate confirmed Earl Matthews to be Pentagon general counsel, and T. Elliot Gaiser to lead the Office of Legal Counsel. Interpreting what would be legally permissible in terms of using military force against cartels may be an early test for both of the new appointees.
The push to label cartels as terrorist organizations has extended to several that are based in Mexico, as well as a coalition of Haitian gangs that have helped plunge their country into chaos.
In April, Mr. Trump proposed to President Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico that she allow the U.S. military to fight drug cartels on her nation’s soil, but she rejected the idea.
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The U.S. government has asserted that President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela essentially runs the Cartel de los Soles.Credit...Juan Barreto/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
In announcing two weeks ago that it was imposing sanctions on the Venezuelan group Cartel de los Soles, the Treasury Department accused the cartel of providing material support to Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, which it said in turn were “threatening the peace and security of the United States.”
Two days later, Mr. Rubio issued a statement accusing Mr. Maduro of stealing elections and saying he was not the president of Venezuela and that his “regime is not the legitimate government.”
“Maduro is the leader of the designated narco-terrorist organization Cartel de los Soles, and he is responsible for trafficking drugs into the United States and Europe,” Mr. Rubio said. “Maduro, currently indicted by our nation, has corrupted Venezuela’s institutions to assist the cartel’s criminal narco-trafficking scheme into the United States.”
The question of how to combat cartels trafficking drugs, people and other illicit goods has animated much of Mr. Trump’s domestic and foreign policy in his second term.
Early on, the United States stepped up secret drone flights over Mexico to hunt for fentanyl labs, according to U.S. officials.
The covert program began under the Biden administration but intensified under Mr. Trump as he and his C.I.A. director, John Ratcliffe, vowed more aggressive action against Mexican cartels.
The C.I.A. has not been authorized to use the drones to take lethal action, and officials do not envision employing that option. For now, C.I.A. officers in Mexico pass information collected by the drones to Mexican officials.
In addition to the C.I.A.’s efforts, the U.S. military’s Northern Command has also expanded its surveillance of the border. But the U.S. military, unlike the spy agency, is not entering Mexican airspace. The Northern Command has conducted about 330 surveillance flights over the U.S. border with Mexico using a variety of surveillance aircraft including U-2s, RC-135 Rivet Joints, P-8s and drones, according to military officials.
Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent for The Times. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent.
Maggie Haberman is a White House correspondent for The Times, reporting on President Trump.
Charlie Savage writes about national security and legal policy for The Times.
Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times. He has reported on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism for more than three decades.
9. Israel’s Plan to Expand War Raises Fears for Gazans, Hostages
Israel’s Plan to Expand War Raises Fears for Gazans, Hostages
Germany moves to suspend arms sales as Israel’s decision risks deepening international isolation
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-plan-to-expand-war-raises-fears-for-gazans-hostages-9ab9a150
By Summer Said
Follow and Anat Peled
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Updated Aug. 8, 2025 9:44 am ET
Demonstrators and relatives of Israeli hostages protested in Tel Aviv on Thursday. Photo: Ammar Awad/Reuters
Key Points
What's This?
- Israel will expand the war in Gaza to take over Gaza City, where hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are sheltering.
- Arab governments are seeking U.S. help to stop the offensive, while Germany will suspend arms sales to Israel.
- Polling in Israel has shown for months that a large majority of the population, including on the right, supports ending the war.
Israel’s decision to expand the war in Gaza drew expressions of concern from allies and hostage families, amid fears it will endanger those still held in the enclave and deepen a humanitarian crisis there that has already left many Palestinians near starvation.
The move risks deepening Israel’s international isolation over the toll of the war. Germany, a close Israel ally, will formally suspend sales of arms that Israel could use in the Gaza Strip until further notice, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Friday. The planned expansion of the fighting is unlikely to be effective and risks worsening the suffering of Gaza’s civilians, he said.
U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Israel’s decision to expand the war was wrong and pressed it to reconsider in light of the humanitarian crisis and condition of the hostages.
A message of protest against the war was left in the sand near the U.S. consulate in Tel Aviv on Friday. Photo: aviv atlas/Reuters
The U.K. and France have vowed to recognize a Palestinian state in September, and last month 28 countries including the U.K., France, Italy, Canada, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, Japan, Greece and Belgium called for an immediate end to the war.
Instead, under the plan approved by Israel’s security cabinet overnight, Israel’s military will begin preparations to take over Gaza City, where hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are believed to be sheltering and where some Israeli hostages are thought to be held.
Security analysts familiar with the outlines of the plan said Israel hopes the expanded force will pressure Hamas to capitulate in cease-fire talks. The Gaza City operation could take many weeks and be paused at any time, they said.
Arab governments brokering those talks are scrambling to line up U.S. help to stop the offensive from moving forward and to get the parties back to the negotiating table, people familiar with the efforts said. President Trump has expressed concern about starvation in Gaza but recently told reporters that a decision to take over all of Gaza is up to Israel.
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Israel’s security cabinet approved a plan for the military to take control of Gaza City after PM Benjamin Netanyahu pledged to take over the entire enclave. Photo: Salah Malkawi/Getty Images/Ronen Zvulun/Press Pool
The Gaza Strip is experiencing famine conditions, according to an interim report by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, an initiative tasked with assessing the risk of famine around the world and supported by the United Nations and major relief agencies.
It was the most dire assessment of the enclave’s deepening hunger crisis since the war began. The IPC found that food consumption reached its lowest level since the start of the war in July, with 86% of households in Gaza reporting regularly not having food to eat of any kind and almost everyone reporting that they sometimes go to bed hungry. The IPC said at least 16 children under five have died of hunger-related causes since mid-July, compared with seven children the U.N. says died of hunger during the entire first half of the year.
Israel has said there is no policy of starvation in Gaza and that food shortages are overstated.
Inside Israel, the plan to expand the war is heightening concerns about the fate of the hostages still held in Gaza as well as strains on the Israeli military’s forces after nearly two years of fighting on multiple fronts.
Hamas-led forces seized around 250 hostages during the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel that also left around 1,200 people dead. Around 20 of those hostages are believed to be alive in the enclave along with the bodies of around 30 others.
Palestinians grieve for victims of Israeli attacks in Gaza. Photo: Mahmoud Zaki/ZUMA Press
A Palestinian child receives medical treatment in Khan Younis, in the Gaza Strip, this week. Photo: AFP/Getty Images
Polling in Israel has shown for months that a large majority of the population, including on the right, supports ending the war in exchange for a deal to free the hostages. Thousands of Israelis, led by hostage families, took to the streets Thursday to protest the plan to invade areas where Israel believes hostages may be held. Hostage families and many Israeli security officials say that military pressure puts the hostages in danger.
Israel’s military chief, Eyal Zamir, has opposed the idea of a full takeover of Gaza, warning of the need to give exhausted troops a rest. Military commanders say it is becoming increasingly difficult to convince reservists to show up for new rounds of fighting in the enclave.
Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, a senior member of Netanyahu’s Likud party, warned against occupying Gaza before being removed from his position last year by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Anat Peled at anat.peled@wsj.com
10. Putin Briefs Leaders of China and India on Talks With U.S. on Ukraine
A changing world order? Is India the usual "swing state?"
Putin Briefs Leaders of China and India on Talks With U.S. on Ukraine
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia may be seeking to build support among countries that have backed Moscow or remained neutral in the conflict.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/world/asia/putin-trump-ukraine-china-india.html
President Vladimir Putin of Russia meeting with Ajit Doval, India’s national security adviser, in Moscow on Friday, in a photo released by Russian state media.Credit...Pool photo by Kristina Kormilitsyna
By Anatoly Kurmanaev
Reporting form Berlin
Aug. 8, 2025
Updated 12:44 p.m. ET
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Friday briefed the leaders of China and India on his negotiations with the United States over Ukraine peace talks, according to the Kremlin. It is the latest example of the Kremlin’s overtures to major developing nations amid President Trump’s escalating global trade war.
Mr. Putin has stepped up the pace of his public diplomacy since meeting Mr. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff in Moscow on Wednesday. That meeting led the White House and the Kremlin to announce separately that Mr. Trump and Mr. Putin could meet to discuss ending the war in Ukraine as soon as next week.
Ahead of the expected meeting, Mr. Putin appears to be shoring up support for his war strategy among global or regional powers that have either sided with Russia or remained neutral in the conflict. Mr. Putin spoke by telephone on Friday with President Xi Jinping of China and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, but neither Moscow nor Beijing disclosed the substance of their talks beyond offering vague promises to deepen cooperation.
On Thursday, Mr. Putin met an Indian national security official in Moscow and spoke by telephone with President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa. In that period, Mr. Putin also spoke by telephone or in person with the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.
China, India, Russia and South Africa, as well as Brazil, are the major members of the BRICS, a group of 10 developing nations. Those countries, apart from Russia, which already faces comprehensive American sanctions over the war in Ukraine, have seen their trade conditions with the United States worsen significantly since Mr. Trump returned to office in January.
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In most cases, Mr. Trump has framed higher tariffs on these nations as punishments for domestic policies, real or imagined, that he did not like. He has criticized South Africa as mistreating its white minority; called on Brazil to stop prosecuting former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is accused of planning to overthrow the government; and threatened to double tariffs on India for buying Russian oil.
And The Trump administration has criticized China as flooding the United States with synthetic opioids and for buying Russian and Iranian oil, and accused it of exploiting the global trade system.
The governments of Brazil, China, India and South Africa have bristled at Mr. Trump’s accusations, which they called attacks on their sovereignty.
“The targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable,” the country’s foreign ministry said in a statement this week after Mr. Trump threatened an additional 25 percent tariff on its goods if it did not stop buying Russian crude oil. “Like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security,” the statement said.
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Indian officials said this week that they intend to continue buying Russian oil, in effect defying Mr. Trump.
There are tentative signs that Mr. Trump’s economic attacks are drawing the BRICS nations closer, at least in the diplomatic arena. Russia would be the most obvious beneficiary of closer cooperation among the major developing economies, because its own economy is largely frozen out of Western markets.
Later in August, Mr. Xi will host Mr. Modi and Mr. Putin in China for a regional forum, in what will be a rare meeting of the leaders of competing Asian powers. Indian officials announced in Moscow this week that Mr. Putin plans to visit the country by the end of the year. And President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil visited Moscow for a military parade in May, his first trip to Russia in 15 years.
Anatoly Kurmanaev covers Russia and its transformation following the invasion of Ukraine.
11. India’s Modi Left Soul-Searching After Failed Courtships of Xi and Trump
What will Modi do next? What can he do? Is Putin the best he can do?
India’s Modi Left Soul-Searching After Failed Courtships of Xi and Trump
The collapse of the prime minister’s high-stakes efforts to transform ties with the world’s two superpowers has exposed the limits of India’s leverage.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/world/asia/modi-india-trump-china-tariffs.html
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is seeing relations with President Trump break down over issues including trade with Russia.Credit...Adnan Abidi/Reuters
By Mujib Mashal and Hari Kumar
Reporting from New Delhi
Aug. 8, 2025
Updated 3:01 p.m. ET
Narendra Modi first rolled out the red carpet for Xi Jinping.
He shared a riverfront swing in his home state with the leader of China, the giant neighbor that he hoped his own large nation could emulate in economic prosperity. But as they chatted, Chinese troops got involved in a standoff with Indian troops along their shared border. The flare-up in 2014 was the first of several acts of aggression that would ultimately leave Mr. Modi embarrassed, his economy squeezed by the need to keep tens of thousands of Indian troops on a war footing high in the Himalayas for several years.
Years later, India’s strongman warmed up to the United States, putting even more of his political credit on the line to rapidly transform a relationship that had been only slowly shedding its Cold War-era frost. Mr. Modi developed such a bonhomie with President Trump in his first term that he broke with protocol to campaign for a second term for him at a stadium-packed event in Houston. Mr. Modi’s confidence in India’s increasing alignment with the United States grew after the Biden administration looked past that partisan play to continue expanding relations with India, a bulwark against China.
“A.I.” stands for “America and India,” Mr. Modi, who has a penchant for playing with acronyms, told a joint session of Congress last year.
Then came the very public humiliation of Mr. Modi by Mr. Trump, now in his second term. The president singled India out for a whopping 50 percent tariff, citing its purchases of Russian oil, and called India’s economy “dead.” And the president stirred rancor among Indians by giving the leadership of Pakistan — India’s smaller archrival, which Mr. Trump himself had previously called a state sponsor of terrorism — equal footing as he tried to settle a conflict between the Asian neighbors earlier this year.
All that has plunged India into a moment of soul-searching, exposing limitations to its power on the world stage despite its gargantuan size and growing economy. Mr. Modi acknowledged this week that he might pay a personal political price for the trade dispute.
There is increased activity toward warming ties with Beijing again, with Mr. Modi scheduled to visit at the end of the month for the first time in seven years. But relations remain strained by the border skirmish, as well as China’s support recently of Pakistan in its military escalation with India. China, for its part, has been wary of New Delhi’s efforts to create a manufacturing alternative to China.
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Disputes over the border between India and China erupted into conflict a few years ago, straining ties between the country’s two leaders.Credit...Money Sharma/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Mr. Modi has also been working the phone. He spoke with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, which is stuck in its own messy showdown with Mr. Trump. He spoke with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and said that both sides vowed to deepen “the India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.”
Russia’s steadfastness as a partner is being talked up by officials in India. Mr. Modi’s national security adviser was in Moscow this week to finalize details of a trip by Mr. Putin to New Delhi.
“I look forward to hosting President Putin in India later this year,” Mr. Modi said on X after their call.
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But beyond the scramble and defiance, India’s ambition to consolidate its rise as an economic and diplomatic force appears deflated by the sudden uncertainty.
Stuck between two superpowers that have shown no hesitation to put India down in moments of friction, there is a growing sense among Indian officials and experts that the country will have to firmly return to its long-tested doctrine of “strategic autonomy.” In plain speak, that means India is on its own and should make do with a patchwork of contradictory and piecemeal ties, and avoid overcommitting to alliances.
Nirupama Rao, a former Indian ambassador to Beijing and Washington, said Mr. Trump’s punishing moves had upended “the strategic logic of a very consequential partnership” that had been carefully nurtured over more than two decades. There will be “very pragmatic strategic recalibrations” by New Delhi to protect its interests, she said.
Updated Aug. 8, 2025, 2:55 p.m. ET1 hour ago
India’s growing economy allows its leaders breathing room, but it is still a moment of “deep introspection” for the country.
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“We have to draw our lessons from that and really focus on the national priorities and what we need to do to become strong and more influential,” Ms. Rao said.
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Mr. Modi with Mr. Trump in the White House in February. This month, Mr. Trump singled India out for a 50 percent tariff rate.Credit...Eric Lee/The New York Times
There is no indication that official talks between New Delhi and Washington have entirely broken down.
Mr. Trump’s announcement that the additional 25 percent tariff, imposed as a penalty for India’s trade ties to Russia, will go into effect later in the month suggested it could be a crude bargaining tactic to get a more favorable trade deal, and also to pressure Russia to reach a settlement in Ukraine.
Before Mr. Trump put the purchase of Russian oil at the center, Indian officials said progress was being made over his broader concern that trade was out of balance. India had showed willingness to expand its purchases of American energy and defense items.
After multiple rounds of talks, the technical teams from India and the United States appeared to be close to finalizing a first phase of bilateral agreement over the summer. India was even willing to open up, to an extent, its long-protected agriculture market as well, officials have said, something that had been a sticking point in the negotiations.
Amitabh Kant, until recently Mr. Modi’s envoy for dealing with the Group of 20 economies, said that Mr. Trump had used strong-arm tactics against other traditional U.S. allies as well, and that India could still arrive at a mutually beneficial trade deal.
“But even if the trade issues are sorted out, the trust would have been lost forever,” he said.
If Mr. Modi’s response to the Chinese aggression is any indication, analysts say, he will try to resolve the breakdown with the United States quietly and without public escalation.
In the wake of the deadly Chinese encroachment at the border, Mr. Modi’s response was measured. Even as he leveraged the shared threat from Beijing to expand defense and technology and maritime ties with the United States, his officials were at pains to avoid being used by the United States as a pawn against Beijing. That avoidance of public escalation has made it possible to work toward patching up the relationship since last October, when officials of the two sides started engaging in earnest.
The chest-thumping against Mr. Trump from Mr. Modi’s shocked support base has been limited, and Mr. Modi has cloaked his defiance as defending his people’s livelihoods.
“India will never compromise on the interests of its farmers, fishermen and dairy farmers,” Mr. Modi told a gathering this week, after Mr. Trump’s announcement of the high tariffs. “I know I will have to pay a heavy price personally, and I am ready for it.”
The relationship, in fact, had began souring months before Mr. Trump’s focus on Russian oil, leading some officials and analysts to suggest the breakdown in ties has to do with a more personal slight that Mr. Trump has felt.
After tensions between India and Pakistan escalated this spring into days of cross-border clashes between the nuclear-armed neighbors, Mr. Trump announced that he had pressured both sides to agree to a cease-fire.
While Pakistani officials welcomed it — and even later said they had put Mr. Trump’s name up for a Nobel Peace Prize — Indian officials contradicted the American president. They pushed hard against Mr. Trump’s assertion, which he has repeated dozens of times since, and aimed to project Mr. Modi’s image as a strong leader who had forced Pakistan through military might to plea for a cease-fire.
“What we now have is a U.S. president who is a very egotistical person with the highly personalized style of leadership and an Indian prime minister who is also an egotistical person with a highly personalized style of leadership,” said Sanjaya Baru, an author and former adviser to Mr. Modi’s predecessor. “When you have two leaders who have converted what is essentially a relationship between nations into a relationship between individual leaders, I think this is the price that we probably are paying.”
A correction was made on Aug. 8, 2025: An earlier version of this article misspelled the name of the former Indian ambassador who said President Trump’s tariffs had upended an important relationship. She is Nirupama Rao, not Nriupama Rao.
When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more
Mujib Mashal is the South Asia bureau chief for The Times, helping to lead coverage of India and the diverse region around it, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan.
Hari Kumar covers India, based out of New Delhi. He has been a journalist for more than two decades.
12. Taiwan Strained by 20% Tariffs, No Trade Deal and Political Uncertainty
Taiwan Strained by 20% Tariffs, No Trade Deal and Political Uncertainty
Taiwan’s export manufacturers are facing steeper U.S. tariffs than their neighbors got and getting squeezed by an appreciating currency.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/business/taiwan-tariffs-chips-trump.html
In March, TSMC said it would invest $100 billion to expand its operation in Arizona.Credit...Cassidy Araiza for The New York Times
By Meaghan TobinAmy Chang Chien and Xinyun Wu
Reporting from Taipei, Taiwan
Aug. 8, 2025
Updated 2:13 p.m. ET
When President Trump announced his first round of tariffs across most of the world in April, Taiwan looked like it was in a good bargaining position.
The company at the heart of Taiwan’s economy, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which makes the world’s most advanced computer chips for companies like Nvidia and Apple, had only weeks earlier said it would spend $100 billion to expand its operations in Arizona. As Mr. Trump ran down the list of new tariff rates, he singled out Taiwan to praise TSMC for the investment.
“One of the great companies of the world actually, they’re coming in from Taiwan and they’re going to build one of the biggest plants in the world, maybe the biggest, for that,” Mr. Trump said.
This week it emerged that TSMC’s investment may earn the company an exemption from 100 percent tariffs on semiconductors. But it has not been enough to help Taiwan’s leaders clinch a trade deal with Washington and shield their economy from Mr. Trump’s other punishing tariffs.
The 20 percent tariffs on Taiwan, which took effect on Thursday, add to the mounting political and economic pressure facing Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, who was elected in January 2024. He is facing an intensifying confrontation with opposition lawmakers able to effectively stymie his policies. And Taiwan’s currency has appreciated sharply this year against the U.S. dollar — a hindrance for an economy so heavily dependent on exports.
Taiwan’s lead trade negotiators, Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun and the chief trade representative, Yang Jen-ni, have gone to Washington four times since April. They have yet to reach a deal while neighboring Japan and South Korea have negotiated lower tariff rates than Taiwan, further weakening the competitiveness of the island’s exports.
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Some Taiwanese business owners and observers think the Trump administration is looking for Taiwanese companies to commit to more investment in the United States, along the lines of the $550 billion pledged by Japan and the $350 billion from South Korea.
“Both Japan and Korea showed up in Washington with key industries alongside as their wingmen,” said Jason Hsu, a former Taiwanese lawmaker and technology investor who is now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
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Image
Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, called off plans to stop in New York and Dallas during a trip to Latin America this month at the urging of the Trump administration.Credit...Ann Wang/Reuters
There has long been an impression in Taiwan that the government will “always give” when it comes to trade with the United States, said John Deng, a former minister of economic affairs and Taiwan’s chief trade representative during Mr. Trump’s first term in office.
“The thinking has been that the U.S. is our largest market, our most important market,” Mr. Deng said.
Mr. Lai has described the tariffs as temporary and said the two sides had not yet wrapped up talks.
“The United States is crucial to Taiwan’s economic and trade development, and that’s why Taiwan is actively negotiating with the United States, hoping to balance the trade deficit and create mutually beneficial and complementary outcomes,” Mr. Lai said at a news briefing on Aug. 1.
Taiwan’s economy is driven by exports, and the United States is its biggest buyer. As a key node in the global semiconductor supply chain, Taiwan offers computer chips and electronic components that contain them as its main exports. But the island is also a major exporter of metal tools and stainless steel panels, and the world’s third-largest source of metal fasteners like screws and bolts. Most of them go to the United States.
These manufacturers are the businesses bearing the brunt of the 20 percent tariffs on Taiwan. For months, many of them have also been contending with another series of Trump tariffs of 50 percent on steel and aluminum.
“The biggest loser is the traditional manufacturing industry,” said CY Huang, president of FCC Partners, a Taiwanese investment bank.
Image
The United States is the largest buyer of Taiwan’s metal fastener exports like screws and bolts.Credit...Ann Wang/Reuters
The Taiwanese dollar’s appreciation this year has put an additional squeeze on these factory owners. Taiwanese officials have said they will continue to monitor the exchange rate.
The uncertainty has left some companies wondering how they will survive the next few months.
One manager at a screw manufacturing company that has been in business for four decades said that over the past few months, most of his clients had either stopped orders or requested to delay them.
This week, when Taiwan’s international trade agency hosted a session for business owners to ask questions of a lawyer from Washington about the tariffs, more than 3,000 people registered. Many questions were from exporters concerned that they had not filled out their paperwork correctly.
“Adjusting to this situation is challenging,” the Taiwan Association of Machinery Industry, an industry group, said in a statement this month. “We hope to return the exchange rate to the level of early April to give businesses time to adjust and breathe.”
“We urge the government to continue communicating and negotiating with the United States, hoping to lower Taiwan’s tariffs,” the statement said.
Tracking Trump’s New Tariffs on Every Country
Meaghan Tobin covers business and tech stories in Asia with a focus on China and is based in Taipei.
Amy Chang Chien is a reporter and researcher for The Times in Taipei, covering Taiwan and China.
Xinyun Wu is a reporter and researcher for The Times in Taipei, covering technology, Taiwan and China.
13. Japan Says Trump to Correct ‘Extremely Regrettable’ Error in Tariff Order
The devil is always in the details. We seem to be making agreements without them.
Japan Says Trump to Correct ‘Extremely Regrettable’ Error in Tariff Order
Tensions have been mounting between the United States and Japan as both sides appear to have starkly different interpretations of a trade deal finalized last month.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/business/japan-tariffs-us-trade-deal.html
New vehicles at Daikoku Pier in Yokohama, Japan.Credit...Philip Fong/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
By River Akira Davis
Reporting from Tokyo
Aug. 8, 2025
Updated 2:08 p.m. ET
Leer en español
The Trump administration has agreed to correct an “extremely regrettable” blunder in the execution of its trade agreement with Japan, the country’s top trade negotiator said in Washington on Thursday.
In negotiations last month, Japanese officials believed they had secured a deal that, in return for pledges to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in the United States and open their market to more American goods, would set a standard tariff rate of 15 percent for all of Japan’s products shipped to the United States.
In a July 31 executive order, the Trump administration outlined a similar scheme for the European Union. But Japan, along with other trade partners, was issued a new tariff rate that would be “stacked” on top of existing ones. In Japan’s case, that raised tariffs on items such as its beef exports to the United States to 41.4 percent from 26.4 percent.
Now, after Japan’s chief trade negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, went to Washington this week for his ninth round of trade talks, Mr. Akazawa said he had secured a promise from the Trump administration to fix the error. Local media had earlier reported that the United States was not planning to revise the presidential order, citing unidentified White House officials.
This latest development is another example of how a deal with no publicly disclosed written joint agreement — assembled quickly just days before higher threatened tariffs were set to take effect — is causing confusion and growing tension between the United States and one of its top allies and trading partners.
Image
Japan’s chief trade negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, was in Washington this week for his ninth round of trade talks.Credit...Issei Kato/Reuters
In the weeks since the U.S.-Japanese trade agreement was concluded last month, some Japanese officials have bristled at implications from the Trump administration that it would control Japan’s $550 billion investment pledge and that 90 percent of the profit from it would go to the United States.
Shigeru Ishiba, Japan’s prime minister, has also been under fire for not securing a clear date for reduced auto tariffs, now set at 25 percent, to take effect. Those tariffs were one of the key concessions Tokyo gained in its talks with the Trump administration. They apply to Japan’s biggest export to the North American market and have been pummeling the profits of its auto industry.
“Washington is just randomly shooting, and they are shooting some like-minded countries from behind,” Taro Kono, a member of Japan’s House of Representatives, said in a news briefing in Tokyo on Wednesday.
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Mr. Kono, a former minister for foreign affairs during the first Trump administration, suggested that Japan and other countries might have to consider forming an international convention to deal with U.S. tariffs. A spokesman for the White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Mr. Akazawa said on Thursday that he had requested a reduction in automobile tariffs during his meetings in Washington with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. In response, he said, the U.S. side indicated that President Trump would sign an executive order directing automobile tariffs to be reduced and rectifying Japan’s stacked-tariff situation.
Mr. Akazawa said that nothing had been decided on when the corrections would be made but that the United States would act in a “timely” manner.
River Akira Davis covers Japan for The Times, including its economy and businesses, and is based in Tokyo.
14. New FM 3-05 Delivers on the Promise to Streamline & Integrate the U.S Army Special Operations Imperatives
"Original" Imperatives in 2022? The original imperatives were created by then-LTC Glenn Harned and published in the 1990 version of FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations.(Access HERE). I have pasted the original 1990 SO Imperatives below the article.
As I recall the story, (And I am sure COL(RET) Harned will correct me) General Barratto wanted the SF equivalent of the Principles of War but of course said the only principles of war are the Army's principles of war. So COL(RET) Harned interviewed the SF collective brain trust and developed the Special Operations imperatives. I think these have stood the test of time and I worry that "streamlining" them will mean they are watered down and will lose some of the intellectual rigor behind them. SOF operators and planners should not need anything dumbed down.
That said, I like a lot of what the authors have done with FM 3-05 and it will be a valuable contribution if military personnel other than SOF read this doctrine. It seems that the author believes the target audience for FM 3-05 should include non-SOF personnel - I do hope non-SOF personnel read it and internalize it, i.e., special operations (afterall it is one of the five Army core competencies and therefore all Army personnel should be well versed in this core competency. I just hope our SOF personnel can develop greater intellectual rigor by recalling, internalizing the original SO imperatives. Perhaps all SF operators should be required to read and study the original FM 31-20 from 1990. It remains as relevant today as it was in 1990.
Lastly I would argue that the SO imperatives but the intellectually rigorous version and the new streamlined version are applicable for military (and political military operations) beyond SOF. Like so much of special operations equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures, they can be adopted by regular forces and applied in a wide range of situations and conditions. That alone should be the reason why non-SOF personnel should read FM 3-05.
The Five Army core competencies:
1. Prompt and sustained land combat
2. Combined arms operations, which include:
• Combined arms maneuver and wide-area security
• Armored and mechanized operations
• Airborne and air assault operations
3. Special operations
4. Set and sustain the theater for the joint force
4. Integrate national, multinational, and joint power on land
New FM 3-05 Delivers on the Promise to Streamline & Integrate the U.S Army Special Operations Imperatives
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/08/08/new-fm-3-05-delivers/
by Daniel Ross
|
08.08.2025 at 06:00am
An aerial view of the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., May 15, 2023. (DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. John Wright)
The Special Operations (SO) Imperatives just received a much-needed overhaul. These important U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) cultural artifacts changed relatively little over the past 35 years, but change has now arrived. The United States (U.S.) Army recently published the latest version of Field Manual (FM) 3-05, Army Special Operations. This long-awaited update to FM 3-05 (dated 26 June 2025) supersedes the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era iteration published on 09 January 2014. The following article briefly explores the new age of the SO Imperatives and revisits aspects of the recent conversation within ARSOF organizational culture that led to a more streamlined, integrated, and user-friendly list.
The legacy (pre-2025) SO Imperatives fell into obscurity throughout the GWOT years. A central problem was that the unwieldy list of 12 imperatives remained ambiguous or unapplicable to many end-users at the ground level. Additionally, the GWOT ending and shifting contemporary strategic environments forced organizational change across the U.S. Army. Some final precipitating factors for reforming the SO Imperatives occurred when FM 3-0, Operations, introduced U.S. Army-centric tenets and imperatives in 2022. Meanwhile, the pervasive influence of multidomain operations (MDO), large-scale combat operations (LSCO), and irregular warfare (IW) further contributed to the push for change. Uncharacteristically rapid updates to FM 3-0 in March 2025 by the U.S. Army provided the final guidance necessary for doctrine developers to complete and publish FM 3-05.
Figure 1. Original U.S. Army Imperatives (2022) compared to Legacy Special Operations Imperatives
The revised doctrine continues to highlight principles, tactics, and procedures employed by U.S. Army leaders and planners executing special operations and related activities. Even more importantly, (in accordance with Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-01), FM 3-05 reiterates that special operations continue to exist as one of the five core U.S. Army competencies. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 defines special operations as “activities or actions requiring distinct modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training, often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically or diplomatically sensitive environments.” As with all warfare, the principles, tactics, procedures, tenets, and imperatives of special operations require constant review and adaptation.
Figure 2. U.S. Army Core Competencies
FM 3-05 arrives at a pivotal junction and provides important updates to maintain consistency with U.S. Army and Joint Force (JF) doctrine as ARSOF evolves to operate across the modern competition continuum. Phenomenological research from 2022 to 2023 on the leadership and management strategies that U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) senior noncommissioned officers used to be successful during the GWOT instigated an interesting dialogue concerning the SO Imperatives. The research and dialogue produced enlightening ARSOF perspectives on the SO Imperatives and their relevant application in future conduct of IW and LSCO. This prompted a revisiting of SO Imperatives’ importance to ARSOF doctrine and the implications of the U.S. Army’s 2022 introduction of overarching imperatives in FM 3-0, Operations. Creating these explicit U.S. Army imperatives, with notable similarity to the traditional SO Imperatives, produced an inflection point for ARSOF.
The May 2024 article in Special Warfare, “Revisiting the Special Operations Imperatives for Future Irregular Warfare Conflicts,” explored that inflection point and helped find ways to effectively streamline and integrate the SO Imperatives with the U.S. Army tenets and imperatives introduced in the 2022 FM 3-0. The article indicated that the SO Imperatives require constant, careful analysis and would benefit from closer examination to reveal imperatives crucial, memorable, and distinct to the conduct of special operations. The article also highlighted specific feedback from ARSOF senior leaders about which imperatives might be well-suited for integration with the overall U.S. Army imperatives. The new list of SO Imperatives in FM 3-05 appears to reflect many of the suggestions that stemmed from the outside research, professional ARSOF dialogue, and careful analysis by the Joint Army doctrine developers.
The current SO Imperatives have been pared down from 12 to five more concise and less redundant guiding directives.
Figure 3. Revised List of SO Imperatives in FM 3-05 (2025)
They have now been referred to as ‘additive’ imperatives to the U.S. Army’s list. Some might argue that this erases an important piece of ARSOF organizational culture and subordinates special operations to a more nebulous and overarching set of U.S. Army imperatives. Realistically, the SO Imperatives needed an update for quite some time. FM 3-0 revisions, in 2022 and then 2025, merely provided the final impetus to remove redundancy and irrelevance from the list.
Figure 4. Revised List of U.S. Army-centric Imperatives in FM 3-0, Operations (2025)
Many ARSOF leaders had already identified that some of the SO Imperatives were ambiguous or had become redundant, self-explanatory, and unnecessary. Others discussed how most soldiers in ARSOF only remembered the first SO Imperative (Understand the operational environment), and that the list would be more powerful if limited to five points, like the SOF Truths. This constructive criticism highlighted the potential to streamline, combine, or carefully revise FM 3-05 to be more in line with U.S. Army MDO (FM 3-0). In this regard, the new ARSOF capstone doctrine has accomplished its mission to better integrate with the U.S. Army’s current operational framework.
Specifically, FM 3-05 (2025) succeeds in streamlining and integrating the SO imperatives into the overarching U.S. Army’s tenets and imperatives. Simultaneously, the new list notably preserves the original intent of the SO Imperatives. The current FM indicates how the U.S. Army imperatives “are actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at acceptable cost.” Meanwhile, the SO Imperatives remain the basis for “planning, preparing, executing, and assessing [special operations] missions.” Importantly, alongside thoughtful improvements and changes, the revised SO Imperatives did not abandon the central focus on how ARSOF should think about its tasks and missions. Considering ARSOF’s role in the overall U.S. Army and the JF, the revision helps solidify special operations as one of the U.S. Army’s core competencies.
The new SO Imperatives illustrate an aspect of ARSOF’s capacity to rapidly learn and adapt to the complexities of the modern conflict landscape. Challenging entrenched institutional practices or culture is never an easy task. Nevertheless, the revised FM 3-05 has presented a concise and less redundant list of imperatives for ARSOF to carry forward into the IW and LSCO realm. Always recognize political implications, engage the threat discriminately, anticipate information’s psychological effect or impact, operate with and through others, and ensure long-term engagement (the hallmark of ARSOF). Nested within the overarching U.S. Army imperatives, this new language helps highlight ARSOF’s value proposition across multiple operating environments and phases of conflict. After all, the intent was to help ARSOF find balance with the U.S. Army’s newly chartered course and describe how ARSOF contributes to MDO. The recent revision of the SO imperatives represents an integral and successful part of that effort.
(The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official U.S. government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.)
Tags: Army Doctrine, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), Global War on Terror, irregular warfare
About The Author
- Daniel Ross
- Dr. Daniel W. Ross earned a Master of Science in 2015 and his Doctorate degree in 2023, both in Management and Homeland Security. During his career, Dr. Ross has served at various levels with the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and deployed to conflict zones in Africa, Ukraine, and Afghanistan. He also teaches graduate-level university courses related to homeland security, homeland defense, national security, terrorism studies, counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction, emergency and disaster management, and intelligence analysis. Dr. Ross has been published in ProQuest, Special Warfare, and the NCO Journal.
-
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SO Imperatives
While the principles of war characterize successful SO, the SO imperatives discussed below prescribe key operational requirements. SOF commanders must incorporate these imperatives into their mission planning and execution if they are to use their forces effectively (Figure 1-6).
Understand the Operational Environment
SOF commanders cannot dominate their environ- ment. They must assess and understand all aspects of the environment-political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, and military-before act- ing to influence it. The conditions of conflict can change based on military successor defeat, a change in hostile strategy or tactics, or fluctuating levels of US support. They must know who the friendly and hostile decision makers are, what their objectives and strategies are, and how they interact. They must influence friendly decision makers to ensure they understand the implications of SO mission re- quirements and the consequences of not adequately supporting them. SOF commanders must remain flexible and adapt their operations to changing realities. They must anticipate these changes in their environment to exploit fleeting opportunities. They must also assist their supported indigenous military
forces to adjust their strategy and tactics.
Recognize Political Implications
SOF commanders must not anticipate a conventional battlefield environment where military concerns dominate. The role of SOF infrequently a supporting one that creates the conditions for decisive non- military activities to occur. Whether conducting SO independently or in coordination with conventional military operations, SOF commanders must consider the political effects of their military activities.
Facilitate Interagency Activities
When participating in an interagency and often combined effort such as SO, commanders must strive for unity of effort (synchronization), but recognize the difficulty of achieving it. They must anticipate ambiguous missions conflicting interests and objec- tives, compartmentation of activity, and disunity of command. Lacking unity of command, SOF com- manders must facilitate unity of effort by—
- Requesting clear mission statements and the decision makers’ intent.
- Actively and continuously coordinating their activities with all relevant parties (US and non- US, military and nonmilitary).
Engage the Threat Discriminately
SOF commanders have limited resources they cannot easily replace. Their missions often have sensitive political implications. Therefore, SOF commanders must carefully select when, where, and how to employ SOF (Figure 1-7).
Consider Long-Term Effects
SOF commanders must place each discrete problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context. They must then develop a long-term approach to solving the problem. They must accept legal and political constraints (such as less than optimal rules of engagement [ROE]) to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOF commanders must not jeopardize the success of national and theater long-term objectives by their desire for immediate or short-term effects. SO policies, plans, and operations must be consistent with the national and theater priorities and objectives they support. Inconsistency can lead to a loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national level.
Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of SO
There are significant legal and policy considerations to many SO, particularly in conflict situations short of war. In modem conflict, legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. Without this support the United States cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power. The concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict legal definition contained in inter- national law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. Its legitimacy is determined by the people of the nation and by the international community based on their collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, SO will not receive the support of foreign indigenous elements, the US population, or the international community. SOF commanders must ensure their legal advisors review all sensitive aspects of SO mission planning and execution.
Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects
All SO have significant psychological effects. Some may be conducted specifically to produce a desired psychological effect. SOF commanders must inte- grate PSYOP into all their activities to control these effects.
Apply Capabilities Indirectly
Whenever participating in combined operations, the primary role of SOF is to advise, train, and assist indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-US forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of US national security objectives with minimum US visibility, risk, and cost. SOF commanders must avoid taking charge when supporting a foreign government or group. ‘he foreign government or group must assume primary authority and responsibility for the success or failure of the combined effort. All US efforts must reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the supported foreign government or group.
Develop Multiple Options
SOF commanders must maintain their operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and contingency plans. They must be able to shift from one option to another before and during mission execution.
Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
SOF are currently engaged in protracted conflict around the world. They must prepare to continue this effort for the foreseeable future. The US response to conflict varies from case to case. Resourcing of any particular US support effort may also vary. SOF commanders must recognize the need for persis- tence, patience, and continuity of effort. They should not begin programs that are beyond the economic or technological capacity of the host nation (HN) to maintain without US assistance. US funded programs can be counterproductive if the population becomes dependent on them and funding is lost. SO policy, strategy, and programs must therefore be durable,
consistent, and sustainable.
Provide Sufficient Intelligence
SOF normally cannot infiltrate denied territory and develop an ambiguous situation. They do not have the combat power or the reinforcement and support capabilities of conventional forces to deal with unanticipated hostile reactions. The success of SO missions often depends on the executors receiving detailed, near-real-time, all-source intelligence products. This need for national and theater intelligence at the tactical level is unique to SOF. SOF intelligence requirements (IR) impose great demands on supporting intelligence capabilities. SOF commanders must identify their IR in priority. They must note which are mission essential and which are just nice to have. Without realistic priorities to guide it, the intelligence community can quickly become overcommitted attempting to satisfy SOF IR.
Balance Security and Synchronization
Security concerns often dominate SO, but compart- mentation can exclude key personnel from the planning cycle. SOF commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will almost always cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination.
15. Why the Far Right Hates Churchill
Wow. I have no words. I cannot imagine knowing anyone who does NOT think it was right for the US and the UK to fight and destroy the Third Reich. This is just amazing to me.
Why the Far Right Hates Churchill
The accepted historical narrative of the past 80 years—that it was morally right for the U.S. and the U.K. to fight and destroy the Third Reich—is now under assault.
https://www.wsj.com/politics/why-the-far-right-hates-churchill-20fdc710?st=2dJo86&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
By Andrew Roberts
Aug. 8, 2025 10:08 am ET
Long demonized by the left, Churchill has become a villain of the right. Photo: ASSOCIATED PRESS
In November 1940, Winston Churchill delivered a eulogy in Westminster Abbey at the funeral of Neville Chamberlain, his predecessor as prime minister. He spoke poetically about how historical judgments are reached. “History,” he said, “with its flickering lamp, stumbles along the trails of the past, trying to reconstruct its themes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days.”
Sixty years after his death, Churchill’s own reputation is now at the forefront of the culture wars, something that he himself would have relished, having put himself on the front line of five real wars on four continents before the age of 42.
Churchill has long been hated by the left, blamed for opposing socialism and communism, breaking Britain’s general strike of 1926, supporting the British Empire and so on. Yet lately a new and particularly virulent strain of Churchill-hatred has broken out on the ultraright on both sides of the Atlantic, where he is blamed for a quite different set of supposed crimes.
Tucker Carlson has praised Darryl Cooper, a historian who blames Churchill for escalating World War II. Photo: Dave Decker/Zuma Press
The American podcaster Darryl Cooper—who has never written a history book, let alone one about World War II, but whom Tucker Carlson calls “America’s most honest historian”—has claimed that it was Churchill’s fault that the war escalated from the limited one that Adolf Hitler apparently wanted when he invaded Poland in September 1939. According to Cooper, Churchill was the “chief villain” of World War II, rather than any of the more obvious suspects.
There are a number of problems with this theory, not least chronological. Churchill did not even enter the British government until two days after the Nazis’ invasion of Poland. Even then he was not in control of British decision-making, as he did not become prime minister until after Hitler had unleashed his blitzkrieg on Western Europe in May 1940.
Nonetheless, tens of millions of people have downloaded Cooper’s ahistoric tripe, and the British neo-Nazi historian David Irving tweeted, “Glad we are in the mainstream narrative, but would be nice to get a credit,” which got over a quarter of a million views and over five thousand “likes.”
Joe Rogan, the world’s most popular podcaster, has similarly opened the door to extreme revisionism, saying that “Darryl [Cooper] has some of the most nuanced, balanced and charitable views on all the figures in history,” which is true only if he means the Nazis.
Darryl Cooper speaks to Tucker Carlson during an interview recorded in 2024. Photo: Tucker Carlson Show
Cooper’s remarks on the Tucker Carlson show led the Holocaust-denying podcaster Jake Shields to conduct a poll on X asking “who was the biggest villain of WW2.” Among his almost 136,000 respondents, 40.3% gave that distinction to Churchill, with Stalin at 25.9% narrowly beating Hitler at 25.3%.
Shield’s post was viewed by some 855,000 people. It led to a spate of online Churchill-hatred, with comments such as “The good guys lost WW2,” “Churchill wanted a war,” “Churchill was pure evil” and so on endlessly.
Meanwhile in Britain, many representatives of the right-wing populist Reform Party have similarly demonized Churchill. Ian Gribbin, a general election candidate, posted on the Unherd website that “Britain would be in a far better state today had we taken Hitler up on his offer of neutrality…but oh no, Britain’s warped mindset values weird notions of international morality rather than looking after its own people.” He later wrote, “In Britain specifically we need to exorcise the cult of Churchill and recognize that in both policy and military strategy, he was abysmal.”
Reform’s official spokesman then doubled down on these comments when speaking to—ironically enough—the Jewish Chronicle, saying that they were “written with an eye to inconvenient perspectives and truths.”
So why is the ultraright targeting Churchill?
In the simplest terms, it is because his practical aims and principles as a leader of the West were directly opposed to the new strain of isolationism in America and Britain. Today’s revisionists project their views about Iraq, Afghanistan and now Iran backward through history and denounce the leading global interventionists of yesteryear. They blame Churchill (along with Franklin Roosevelt) for “escalating” the conflict with Hitler and thus associate him with any effort to confront today’s aggressive tyrants.
Joe Rogan, the world’s most popular podcaster, has backed a historian who questions Churchill’s role in WWII. Photo: Gregory Payan/Associated Press
It is a sign of the lost trust in established institutions on both sides of the Atlantic that the accepted historical narrative of the past 80 years—that it was morally right for the U.S. and the U.K. to fight and destroy the Third Reich—is now under assault. This new revisionism is possible only because the Greatest Generation is dying out, and their sacrifice is becoming a debatable part of history rather than a lived reality.
It is an unfortunate necessity to engage with these benighted and often hateful revisionists. As their failure to win the endorsement of any of the hundreds of serious historians of World War II suggests, their arguments, such as they are, cannot survive contact with the reality of the historical record.
It is perfectly true that Churchill was instrumental in persuading the British war cabinet not to make peace with Hitler. The decision was taken after no fewer than nine discussions over four days between May 25 and May 28, 1940. As they deliberated, a small armada of boats made their way to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force from the beaches of Dunkirk back to Britain.
“The reason I resent Churchill so much for it,” Cooper told Carlson, “is that he kept this war going when he had no way [of winning]. He had no way to go back and fight this war. All he had was bombers…just rank terrorism.” More than that, once Hitler ripped up yet another treaty and invaded Russia in June of 1941, Churchill immediately made common cause with Stalin against Nazi Germany.
It is worth considering what might have happened had Churchill not urged these fateful choices. If Britain had remained neutral in the West and refrained from bombing Germany, Hitler would have been able to concentrate his entire Luftwaffe against Russia. Instead he had to hold back 30% of it to guard against Churchill’s bombers.
Churchill stands to receive an ovation from British Army troops in Tripoli, Libya, during the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1944. Photo: British Army Office/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Neutrality in the face of Hitler would have meant that the 5,000 aircraft and 7,000 tanks and 51 million pairs of boots and the rest of the aid that Britain and America sent the U.S.S.R. would not have materialized. Nor would the invasion of Normandy have taken place while the Russians and Germans were fighting in Belarus.
Which leads to the obvious: With either Hitler or Stalin controlling all of Europe between Paris and Minsk, the world—including America—would have been in a vastly worse place than the one that Churchill and Roosevelt helped to fashion in 1945.
In his peroration in the Westminster Abbey speech, Churchill said, “The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the fates may play, we always march in the ranks of honor.”
Despite the best efforts of his revisionist detractors, Churchill marches there still. He stands watching over a world order that is now challenged by, among other things, a populist far right whose influence is spreading dangerously.
Andrew Roberts is the author of “Churchill: Walking with Destiny.” He is a member of the House of Lords.
16. Special ops forces, intel community to team up on operational challenges in ‘data dense environments
He who controls the data....
SOF and the IC are coordinating like there is an invisible connection to the OSS that is overseeing both communities.
Special ops forces, intel community to team up on operational challenges in ‘data dense environments'
The Innovation Foundry event, slated for Oct. 28-30 in Chantilly, Virginia, will be hosted by SOFWERX and ICWERX.
By
Jon Harper
defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · August 5, 2025
Special operations forces and members of the intelligence community are preparing to meet with industry and other technology experts to brainstorm ways to help commandos and IC personnel succeed on the frontlines in “data dense environments.”
The gathering, slated for Oct. 28-30 in Chantilly, Virginia, is being organized by SOFWERX and ICWERX — hubs that connect U.S. Special Operations Command and intel agencies with innovators to help solve some of their most difficult challenges — in partnership with SOCOM’s Science and Technology Directorate and the IC.
The meeting will be the 17th Innovation Foundry event hosted by SOFWERX. Previous iterations have focused on contested logistics, “smart cities” and omnipresent sensor networks, among other challenges.
The organization has also assisted SOCOM with other high-tech initiatives such as “Drone in a Box.”
“Field-forward operations refer to the real-time or near real-time collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information in the field or at the source to support mission planning and tactical decision making. These activities rely on advanced technologies, including diverse sensors, smart systems, distributed networks, communication platforms, and AI-driven analytical suites. While these technologies offer significant advantages by providing actionable insights in real-time, they also introduce vulnerabilities (e.g., data reliability and accuracy, cybersecurity, processing speed, energy efficiency). Addressing these vulnerabilities is crucial for maximizing the potential of these technologies while minimizing risks, thereby enabling mission success,” officials wrote in a special notice posted Monday about the upcoming Innovation Foundry event.
Personnel from the SOF and IC communities, industry, academia and national labs are expected to discuss the main tech challenges that forward-deployed operators and analysts will face in the future, brainstorm how to apply capabilities to address those issues, and identify near-term investments that SOCOM and intel agencies need to make to foster new tools for tackling those problems.
The event organizers are interested in bringing together experts in special ops and intelligence missions; AI and machine learning; automation systems; communications technology; cybersecurity; data science; edge computing; information ops; internet of things; IT; high-performance computing; and wearable tech, among other capability areas.
Subject matter experts interested in participating must submit a CV by Aug. 25.
The IF17 event is expected to be followed by a rapid capability assessment “to further develop the preliminary capability concepts,” as well as a series of “integrated technology sprints” to demonstrate proofs of concept, according to the special notice.
Officials may negotiate other transaction agreements for research or prototype projects, procurement for experimentation, cooperative research and development agreements, Federal Acquisition Regulation-based contracts, or other arrangements with innovators, per the notice.
Written by Jon Harper
Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X (the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) @Jon_Harper_
defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · August 5, 2025
17. Emerald Warrior proves AFSOC's agile combat readiness
Emerald Warrior proves AFSOC's agile combat readiness
dvidshub.net
Photo By Airman 1st Class Luke Hirsch | A U.S. Air Force Air Commando assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command...... read more
Photo By Airman 1st Class Luke Hirsch | A U.S. Air Force Air Commando assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command conducts engine startup checks on a U.S. Air Force MC-130J Commando II aircraft after conducting an airfield assessment during Emerald Warrior 25.2, Arizona, July 24, 2025. Part of the Department of the Air Force’s Department-Level Exercise series, Emerald Warrior enhances the combat readiness of Air Commandos forces by training to match the speed and scale of complex operations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Luke Hirsch) | View Image Page
HURLBURT FIELD, FLORIDA, UNITED STATES
08.04.2025
HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. -- The Air Commandos of Air Force Special Operations Command are preparing to operate in contested environments during Emerald Warrior 25.2, held in multiple locations across Arizona and California, July 21 – Aug. 11, 2025.
This iteration of Emerald Warrior, part of the Department of the Air Force’s Department-Level Exercise series, challenged Air Commandos to deliver synchronized military operations at a large scale and expedited pace to the Indo-Pacific region.
A key part of training so far focused on AFSOC’s execution of agile combat employment or ACE, which preserves the force’s ability to conduct effective operations in dispersed locations across the globe.
“ACE has become an operational requirement to be a mission-ready force,” said Col. Mark Hamilton, 1st Special Operations Wing deputy commander of operations. “As we meet the Department of Air Force’s demand to reoptimize for global competition, our Air Commandos must be not only technically proficient but also tactically adaptable. Emerald Warrior provides a challenging and realistic environment to stress-test our ACE capabilities.”
ACE training tests the generation of airpower in unfamiliar environments, validating how AFSOC establishes forward operating bases and sustains operations while deployed with limited support to enable the Air Force and United States Special Operations Command.
Honing these practices and integrating with partner forces gives AFSOC Airmen the experience needed to match the speed and scale of real-world missions.
“Today’s strategic landscape requires our people and assets to maintain a rapid and global reach,” said Hamilton. “Advancing how we exercise ensures we can project forces into dynamic, contested battlespaces at a moment’s notice.”
For EW 25.2, AFSOC mobilized a fleet of several MC-130J Commando II aircraft, to provide critical infiltration and resupply capabilities; C-146A Wolfhound aircraft, for flexible transport options; and U-28A Draco aircraft, to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. These aircraft and crews are operating from multiple locations to fulfill the unique capabilities they bring to the fight.
EW 25.2 pushes Airmen to their limits in realistic scenarios, ensuring they gain the skills and knowledge needed to successfully execute critical missions. As the command’s premier annual training exercise, Emerald Warrior certifies AFSOC’s ability to provide the Joint Force flexible, agile, and responsive specialized airpower. Additionally, this iteration of Emerald Warrior is part of the first-in-a-generation Department Level Exercise series, a new way of conducting operations in a contested, dynamic environment to build capabilities making a stronger, more lethal deterrent force. The DLE series encompasses all branches of the Department of Defense, along with Allies and partners, employing more than 400 Joint and coalition aircraft and more than 12,000 members at more than 50 locations across 3,000 miles.
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18. Ukraine, Modern War, and Lessons for the Pacific by Mick Ryan
Excerpts:
For this reason, I will soon be publishing a significant report that examines how we might better contextualize the insights from Ukraine so they are applicable for military operations, and strategic affairs, in the Pacific theatre.
To be published by the Australian Army Research Centre in August, the report will provide a detailed look at the issue of how relevant lessons from Ukraine are for the Pacific theatre and the nations that are currently conducting military operations there.
This new report, which I preview below, will explore key trends in the Ukraine conflict, highlighting the unprecedented visibility provided by open-source sensors, social media platforms, think tank assessments and media access to battlefield operations. There is a caveat to his however. While this visibility has contributed to a broader understanding of the conflict’s trajectory and the employment of innovative technologies, the inherent "fog of war" continues to obscure numerous aspects. It is anticipated that certain elements of this conflict may remain unknown or shrouded in ambiguity for years to come.
...
Ten Big Lessons from the Ukraine War
While there are sure to be many other insights that can be gleaned from the war, the ten lessons listed below, and which are explored in detail in my forthcoming report, are the most important for governments and military organisations to respond to now.
1. Mass and national mobilization.
2. Cognitive warfare and inter-societal conflict.
3. People.
4. Meshed commercial-military sensor networks.
5. Ubiquitous uncrewed systems.
6. Cheaper, accessible precision deep strike.
7. The importance of alliances.
8. Rapidly expanding adaptation war.
9. Surprise.
10.Leadership.
Ukraine, Modern War, and Lessons for the Pacific
An investigation into how the key insights and lessons from Ukraine in the past four years might be ‘filtered’ to ensure their applicability for military operations in the Pacific Theatre.
https://mickryan.substack.com/p/ukraine-modern-war-and-lessons-for?r=7i07&utm
Mick Ryan
Aug 08, 2025
∙ Paid
Image: Australian Department of Defence
While much attention is focused at present on Trump and Putin dancing around the potential for peace in Ukraine (only one of them appears to be even remotely serious about this), the war in Ukraine and Russia continues. On the ground, Russia is making some headway in its constant attacks in eastern Ukraine, although it continues to take enormous numbers (though replaceable) of casualties. The Ukrainian armed forces have evolved their defensive strategy to incorporate even more significant defensive fortifications, coupled with the implementation of the drone wall.
In the air, both Ukraine and Russia are executing and implementing their long-range strike campaigns. Russia, which is attacking military and civilian targets, is slowly but surely expanding the size and scope of its strikes with its increasing production of Shahed and Geran drones. Ukraine, while constantly adapting its air and missile defences against these Russian attacks, is also focusing its offensive air campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, air defence units as well as military and transportation targets.
One of the biggest growth industries in national security affairs in the past few years has been the study of lessons from the war in Ukraine since February 2022. These vary in quality from the very excellent and well-evidenced studies from European, Ukrainian and American sources, through to the lesser quality material that often washes through social media.
Despite this work, lessons or observations from military conflicts do not always provide a direct template for other nations to follow in other parts of the world. This is for reasons of geography, political factors, infrastructure, culture and the strategic circumstances of each conflict. But it is possible to translate the insights from the war in Ukraine if one can define the key specific characteristics in different theatres through which lessons from Ukraine might be filtered.
For this reason, I will soon be publishing a significant report that examines how we might better contextualize the insights from Ukraine so they are applicable for military operations, and strategic affairs, in the Pacific theatre.
To be published by the Australian Army Research Centre in August, the report will provide a detailed look at the issue of how relevant lessons from Ukraine are for the Pacific theatre and the nations that are currently conducting military operations there.
This new report, which I preview below, will explore key trends in the Ukraine conflict, highlighting the unprecedented visibility provided by open-source sensors, social media platforms, think tank assessments and media access to battlefield operations. There is a caveat to his however. While this visibility has contributed to a broader understanding of the conflict’s trajectory and the employment of innovative technologies, the inherent "fog of war" continues to obscure numerous aspects. It is anticipated that certain elements of this conflict may remain unknown or shrouded in ambiguity for years to come.
In addition to examining the lessons from the war in Ukraine, my new report will also provide a list of factors that differentiate the Pacific theatre from the eastern European frontline situation. It then uses these factors – or translation filters – to ascertain how (and if) lessons from Ukraine might apply to military operations in the Pacific theatre.
Finally, given the insights from Ukraine, and the translation of those lessons for the distinct political, technological, and geographic environment of the Pacific, the paper provides recommendations that might help focus the absorption of lessons from Ukraine into the military institutions who will operate in the Pacific.
Ten Big Lessons from the Ukraine War
As the war in Ukraine has continued, the understanding of trends from the war in Western military and academic institutions has evolved. The world and the international security environment is evolving quickly. Military institutions cannot afford to wait for the end of the war in Ukraine to achieve greater certainty about what lessons should be incorporated into western force design, strategy, and training. Consequently, the assessment of key trends is an ongoing project. Military institutions must learn and adapt with the best knowledge available to them now.
While there are sure to be many other insights that can be gleaned from the war, the ten lessons listed below, and which are explored in detail in my forthcoming report, are the most important for governments and military organisations to respond to now.
- Mass and national mobilization.
- Cognitive warfare and inter-societal conflict.
- People.
- Meshed commercial-military sensor networks.
- Ubiquitous uncrewed systems.
- Cheaper, accessible precision deep strike.
- The importance of alliances.
- Rapidly expanding adaptation war.
- Surprise.
- Leadership.
Translating Ukraine Lessons for the Pacific Theatre
Insights from over three years of war in Ukraine provide defence planners with a myriad of opportunities and challenges in considering the evolution of the force structure, preparedness, training and leadership. Nevertheless, the differences between the European and Pacific theatres must be considered when translating the lessons of modern war from Ukraine into useable insights for Pacific military forces.
Given the differences in culture, geography, politics, infrastructure and weather between Eastern Europe and the western Pacific, a method for translating these lessons is needed to ensure that the observations gathered from the war in Ukraine are optimised for application elsewhere.
Before proceeding, the Pacific Theatre should be defined. For the purposes of this paper, the Pacific theatre is defined by the areas that were encompassed by Pacific Ocean Areas, North Pacific Area, Southwest Pacific and South Pacific Areas during the Second World War. This is also the location of the world’s most dynamic economies, its largest military forces and the military competitions (US-China and the Republic of Korea-North Korea) most likely to result in conflict.
The Pacific is also a unique geographic region which can be used as a test case to develop filters for Ukraine lessons for application to other regions in the world.
Source: U.S. Army Center for Military History, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943
Pacific Filters for Ukraine Lessons
There are multiple ways that one might view the lessons from the war in Ukraine for other regions of the world. Ultimately, the key differences between eastern Europe, and other parts of the world boil down to several broad areas: political and cultural differences, geographic and environmental differences, and differences in the capabilities of the likely military forces involved. Thus, my report proposes that there are four ‘Pacific filters’ that can be applied in to translate Ukraine lessons for use in the region. These are:
- Geography and distance.
- Terrain, vegetation, and weather.
- Political environment.
- Capability of potential adversaries.
The lessons of the Ukraine War proposed in the first part of my new report are measured against the filters above to assess the relevance or otherwise of insights from Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, there are many useful insights which emerge for military and national security planners in the Pacific. Many of these insights highlight the differences between Ukraine and the Pacific, but some lessons have very similar applications in both regions. While the insights from my forthcoming report apply to the Pacific theatre, it would also be possible to develop similar products for individual countries in the Pacific theatre as well.
A quick exploration of each filter is conducted below.
Pacific Filter 1: Geography and distance
When one thinks of the Pacific, an initial consideration is the vast distances between places such as Hawaii and Guam or Australia and Japan. The distance from Hawaii to Guam is approximately 6,400 kilometres. The distance from the west coast of the United States (Los Angeles) to Japan is almost 9,000 kilometres, and to Australia is 12,000 kilometres. Much of the area one transits between these points is open ocean with only a few islands along the routes. Vast distances are a characteristic of the Pacific. Overcoming the many impacts of this distance dominates planning and execution of military operations in the region.
But there are many parts of the region where the distances over which military campaigns might be conducted are much shorter: the Korean peninsula, China-Taiwan and on some of the large islands such as Java, New Guinea or in the Philippines. Both strategic distances, and the shorter regional distances, need to be considered in the translation of Ukraine lessons for the Pacific.
The impact of distance and the island nature of many Pacific nations means that, in some regions, more dispersed civil infrastructure network, particularly ports, airfields, logistics nodes and telecommunications / data transmission than in eastern Europe. The south and southwest Pacific regions are examples of dispersed civil infrastructure. In other parts of the Pacific, such as western Taiwan, China and southern Japan, civil infrastructure is dense and very capable of supporting military operations.
While the Pacific contains many islands, and island nations, it also contains continents. The Eurasian landmass, Australia as well as North and South America frame the Pacific theatre (with Antarctica to the south). While the likelihood of large-scale combat on these continents might be remote, they nonetheless provide the strategic foundations – political, industrial, and military – for nations that engage in strategic competition, confrontation and combat in the Pacific theatre. These considerations matter for military activities and need to be considered when translating Ukraine lessons for application in the Pacific.
Image: Australian Department of Defence
Pacific Filter 2: Terrain, vegetation, and weather
The terrain, vegetation and climatic conditions in the Pacific are quite different from those in Ukraine.
Terrain is a major difference between Ukraine and the Pacific. While Ukraine has cities rural populations, mountains and plains, beaches and river lines, the Pacific not only has more of each, but it is not dominated by the land domain like Ukraine is. Open ocean and littorals feature heavily in the Pacific region and are essential to the conduct of military operations in a way that they are not in Ukraine. Additionally, there mountainous areas in the Pacific, such as in eastern Taiwan and in Papua New Guinea, which are potential locations for military operations. This has not generally been the case in Ukraine.
Vegetation is also very different. For example, the vegetation cover in many parts of the Pacific can be up to 90% while in Ukraine it is much less at nearly 17%. For example, Taiwan has a vegetation coverage of forests on 60% of its land, the Philippines had a 63% coverage of forests, the Solomon Islands has a 85% forest coverage, Papua New Guinea (PNG) has 88% of its land area covered by natural forest with 92% overall tree cover, and Manus Island (a likely allied base in Pacific operations and part of PNG) has 88% vegetation coverage.
Many parts of the Pacific region receive significantly more precipitation on an annual basis and have far higher humidity and temperatures. These conditions will have an impact on many elements of military campaigns including communications, fires, medical support and the use of autonomous weapons - especially aerial and ground systems.
Finally, while Ukraine’s winter and mud season have an impact on operations, for around a month each spring and autumn, the annual cyclone and typhoon seasons across the western Pacific potentially constitute an even greater impact on military operations. The typhoon season in Japan extends from May to October, in Taiwan from May to November, and in the Philippines from June to November. The cyclone season in PNG and Solomon Islands extends from November through to April.
These highly destructive tropical storms not only destroy civil infrastructure, but they can also have a major impact on military operations. During the Second World War, for example, Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet endured two typhoons during operations in the western Pacific (‘Cobra in December 1944, and ‘Viper’ in June 1945) which sank ships, caused the damage to dozens of ships and impacted flying operations.
Weather also adversely affected military operations in the Vietnam War. As Mangesh Sawant describes in the 2023 article, Weather: The Only Constant in Warfare:
The weather of Vietnam lengthened the Vietnam War and contributed to the protracted strategy of the Viet Cong. Weather profoundly impeded U.S. Air Force operations and air strikes on critical targets in Vietnam, so much so that the issue reached the highest levels of the U.S. government, to include President Lyndon B. Johnson. In addition, weather often interfered with reconnaissance activities and the monitoring of surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The U.S. Army typically replaced equipment every eight years. During the Vietnam War, this was cut to two years.
Finally, the different weather, vegetation and terrain also has an impact on casualties due to tropical diseases. While the lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine on casualty care will inform medical evacuation and treatment regimes in the Pacific, one important distinction must be drawn. Based on historical experience, the rates of disease in the Pacific due to a range of environmental factors (including terrain, vegetation, and weather) are higher than in the European theatre.
The best source of data on this is the U.S. Army, which is one of the few military organisations that sustained large concentrations of troops in both theatres between 1941 and 1945 and kept accurate records. (See U.S. Army, Medical Statistics in World War II, (Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1975).
According to the U.S. Army medical statistics for World War Two, troops in the Southwest Pacific had double the death rate from disease than those in the European theatre. The Southwest Pacific had the highest rates of diseases including malaria, infectious hepatitis, and had diagnoses for dysentery and diarrhoeal disease that was nearly 400% of those in Europe.
Pacific Filter 3: Political and Cultural Environment
The western Pacific region is very different to that which exists in Europe. There is no European Union (EU) and there is no Asian version of NATO (nor is there likely to be). Chinese Communist Party strategy includes efforts to corrode any regional multilateral arrangements and alliances which it sees as adversely impacting its interests.
The military, cultural and economic relationships between different Asian nations, and countries outside the region, are quite different from those that exist in Europe. This is an important consideration when seeking to translate strategic lessons from Ukraine because different alliance constructs will influence different methods of deterrence, and different ways of fighting, and supporting fighting, in the Pacific region.
Pacific Filter 4: Capability of potential adversaries
While Russia poses an existential threat to Ukraine and a severe threat to the rest of Europe, its military capacity and size is smaller than China’s in nearly every aspect other than the size of the respective nuclear arsenals. China has the largest navy in the world and has significant capabilities across all domains. In the western Pacific, it will be fighting a home campaign.
North Korea (which is a co-belligerent in the Ukraine War) is a western Pacific nation and highly antagonistic towards its southern neighbour and other nations in the Pacific. Russia also has a significant presence in the Pacific, particularly its navy. Russia and China have conducted multiple joint strategic bomber patrols in the Pacific and have also been undertaking joint naval exercises in the Pacific in 2024 and in 2025. Strategic partnership agreements are in place between Russia and North Korea, as well as between China and Russia.
This is a more complex, dangerous, and complicated arrangement of adversaries than is faced by nations in Europe.
Image: Australian Department of Defence
Learning the Right Lessons from Ukraine
While the focus of my report is on translating lessons for the Pacific theatre, it will also show that various analytical ‘filters’ might be applied to ensure the right lessons are learned from Ukraine by countries and military institutions in different regions of the world. The level of filtering in subsequent analytical products could be more specific than that undertaken here. For example, this might include translating Ukraine lessons to ensure their applicability for specific services in individual countries.
The growing dialog and collaboration between China, Russia, North Korea and Iran provides a significant challenge for nations in the Pacific, and for implementation of relevant lessons from the war in Ukraine. The new adversary learning and adaptation bloc is likely to intensify its military, information, economic and diplomatic collaboration in the coming years. This will complicate the learning and adaptation of nations in the Pacific in security, diplomatic, informational, and economic affairs. A new adaptation war, which extends from the battlefields of Ukraine through to the global security environment, will be a critical element of defence, economic and security affairs in the Pacific for some time to come.
Every nation that is part of this theatre or expects to operate within it must review Ukraine lessons through their own ‘translation filters’, which might include military and national culture, geography and resources available. Ultimately however, the rapid absorption of Ukraine lessons that are relevant to the Pacific will demand good leadership to succeed. Leaders at all levels must be open to new insights, nurture creative solutions and build cultures that encourage learning and rapid adaptation. This will be essential to ensure the learning opportunities from over three years of war in Ukraine are not squandered by political and military leaders across the Pacific.
The full report on how to translate the lessons fr
19. The Anticorruption Angle
Has the global anti-corruption ship already sailed?
Excerpts:
At the same time as it puts its own house in order, the United States should be vigorously engaging with like-minded partners to forge a united front against corruption. As the regulator of the dollar-based financial system, the United States is uniquely positioned to shape the global financial infrastructure within which corruption thrives. In partnership with its European allies, Washington can establish new rules of the game for cross-border financial activity and impose order and transparency on ungoverned financial spaces, including by coordinating sanctions and other coercive measures against governments that abet money laundering, pursuing coordinated sanctions against corrupt officials and their enablers using authorities such as the Global Magnitsky Act, and conditioning access to U.S. markets and other leading financial systems on stringent anti-money-laundering standards that go beyond current international requirements. To enhance these efforts, officials should also step up intelligence collection relating to overseas corruption and provide greater resources for anti-money-laundering entities such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, known as FinCEN.
Alongside these regulatory and law enforcement measures, Washington should recommit to foreign assistance and diplomacy focused on strengthening the rule of law and fighting kleptocracy and state capture. The Biden administration’s most successful initiatives in leveraging American soft power to fight kleptocracy overseas—including defending Guatemala’s electoral integrity against entrenched oligarchy and helping governments in eastern Europe and the Pacific Islands identify and prevent Russian and Chinese attempts to use corrupt networks to tilt elections and shift policy—provide constructive examples to draw on. This effort should be paired with a concerted effort to increase the number of overseas personnel with experience and training in combating corruption, beginning with ambassadors, who are often the tip of the spear of anticorruption efforts in fragile democracies.
American tough talk on corruption has not always translated into action when it has conflicted with other strategic interests. The Biden administration’s reluctance to sanction Indian and Israeli officials dogged by well-documented and credible corruption allegations, as well as its partnerships with deeply corrupt governments in places such as Egypt, Honduras, and Afghanistan, compromised its ability to call out corruption elsewhere in the world and provided ammunition to claims of U.S. hypocrisy and double standards. This will require the next presidential administration to make a public commitment to anticorruption as a priority and a congressional cohort ready and willing to use its oversight authority to monitor progress and hold the administration to those commitments. A good place to start would be passing a law that would prohibit security cooperation with military forces credibly implicated in corrupt acts or linked to regimes that support transnational corruption—akin to the way the so-called Leahy law prohibits security cooperation with forces that commit human rights violations.
At some point, perhaps as soon as 2029, a U.S. administration will once again find itself confronted with the difficult task of persuading its erstwhile partners and allies that it stands for something greater than its own power. But unlike previous reboots, the United States should not expect to sit at the head of the table after spending four years trying to overturn it. Instead, it will need to demonstrate that it is as good as its word on values. A full-throated campaign to restore transparency, accountability, and integrity to its own institutions as well as those of fellow democracies is the place to start.
The Anticorruption Angle
Foreign Affairs · by More by Casey Michel · August 8, 2025
Democrats Should Build a Foreign Policy Around Fighting Graft
August 8, 2025
The U.S. Capitol building viewed through barricades in Washington, D.C., April 2025 Leah Millis / Reuters
CASEY MICHEL is the author of Foreign Agents: How American Lobbyists and Lawmakers Threaten Democracy Around the World.
TREVOR SUTTON is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy.
MATTHEW DUSS is Executive Vice-President of the Center for International Policy. From 2017 to 2022, he served as the chief foreign policy adviser to Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont.
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In the half century after the Watergate scandal exposed the degree to which graft and bribery had tainted Washington and warped U.S. foreign policy, preventing corruption at home and combatting it overseas became a signal mission for federal law enforcement and American diplomacy. Over the decades, commitment to those goals waxed and waned, and numerous scandals demonstrated that the U.S. political system and important American institutions and corporations remained vulnerable to and complicit in corruption. But thanks to a set of powerful laws and regulations and generations of professionals dedicated to supporting transparency and a level playing field, the United States made tremendous strides in fighting corruption.
In the past six months, that progress has been almost completely undone. Since returning to office, President Donald Trump has blunted Washington’s most effective anticorruption tool, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which he described as a “horror show for America”; dissolved task forces to combat kleptocracy; and declared that his administration would not enforce laws designed to prevent wealthy people and companies from hiding their assets in offshore accounts. In one particularly shocking act, as part of a clear quid pro quo, the mayor of New York City, Eric Adams, promised to cooperate with Trump’s crackdown on immigrants; in exchange, Trump’s Department of Justice moved to dismiss federal charges against Adams, who had allegedly turned to foreign sources to illegally fund his reelection campaign. This open embrace of corruption has not stopped at the water’s edge: the Trump administration recently condemned the bribery conviction of a former Colombian president, Álvaro Uribe, calling it the work of “radical judges.”
And then there’s the orgy of self-dealing through which Trump has transformed the White House into a profit platform for himself and his family. Since Trump was inaugurated in January, the company run by his son Eric, the Trump Organization, has struck many new deals with kleptocratic regimes abroad, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, opening a direct line between these regimes and the American president’s wallet. Meanwhile, Trump has become deeply involved in the shady world of crypto, with foreign funders directly bankrolling Trump’s “meme coin” for the chance to gain access to the president. As Richard Briffault, an expert on government ethics, told The Guardian, “People are paying to meet Trump and he’s the regulator in chief. It’s doubly corrupt. This is unprecedented. I don’t think there’s been anything like this in American history.” And of course there is the $400 million jet that government of Qatar “gifted” to Trump to use as a new Air Force One—and perhaps to take with him when he leaves office.
The damage Trump has already done is staggering, and he has more than three years to go even further. But his tolerance for and embrace of the crudest kinds of corruption also create an opportunity for his opponents. The United States may have given up its leading role in the fight against corruption, but Americans still care about it. An October 2022 New York Times/Siena poll of registered voters found that “When respondents were asked to volunteer one or two words to summarize the current threat to democracy, government corruption was brought up most often.” As the Pew researchers who conducted polling on the subject found in 2023, “the belief that there is too much money in politics is widespread. References to the influence of money and concerns about corruption are some of the most frequently cited critiques of the political system, and many Americans see monetary gain as a reason why most elected officials seek office to begin with.”
Few candidates for high-level offices have seized on anticorruption as a campaign platform. (An ironic exception is Trump himself, who managed, in three successive campaigns, to cynically persuade many Americans that he is not an avatar of corruption but a crusader against it.) But earlier this year, the leading mayoral candidate in New York City, Zohran Mamdani, won an upset victory in the Democratic primary in part by criticizing both Adams another candidate, Andrew Cuomo, for representing “the same donors, the same corruption, the same small vision funded by big money.” And anticorruption messages have proved effective in a number of recent issue-based political campaigns around the country. In 2022, a ballot initiative successfully took on the role of “dark money” in elections in Oakland by lowering donation limits and increasing donor transparency rules. Campaigns to establish ranked-choice voting in Evanston, Illinois, Fort Collins, Colorado, and other cities have relied on anticorruption messages in taking on entrenched interests who benefit from traditional balloting.
In seizing on corruption, Democrats and progressives can’t limit themselves to criticizing Trump’s personal venality. Rather, they should connect it to the broader global phenomenon of corruption and argue that Trump is subverting American interests by working in parallel with oligarchs, kleptocrats, and criminals who are eroding democracy all over the world and making the United States less safe and prosperous. Anticorruption efforts should become the main pillar of progressive and Democratic politics not only at home but also in foreign policy.
The idea of values-based U.S. foreign policy may strike some as an anachronism. After all, the Biden administration cast itself as a defender of democratic values that would “lead not merely by the example of our power but by the power of our example,” as President Joe Biden put it in his inaugural address. In practice, however, such lofty rhetoric was married to a nostalgic attachment to American primacy that led to a foreign policy plagued by hypocrisy and incoherence.
Biden’s failure to match rhetoric with action does not mean that future U.S. officials should stop trying to align foreign policy with the broader project of restoring faith in democratic governance and confronting the increasingly oligarchic character of U.S. politics and society. Sticking the landing on the next iteration of a foreign policy that honors both interests and values will hinge on a pragmatic and clear-eyed assessment of what matters to American voters and what the United States can plausibly hope to achieve in its global engagement. In this respect, there is one issue that uniquely bridges the domestic and foreign policy realms and offers a clear path to rebuilding goodwill with Washington’s foreign partners: the fight against corruption.
WHAT WATERGATE WROUGHT
To understand why anticorruption is the future of U.S. foreign policy, it’s helpful to look to the past. For much of American history, corruption was not seen as a major foreign policy issue. That changed after the Watergate scandal. In addition to unearthing wrongdoing on the part of the president, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, the congressional investigations that took place after Watergate also revealed just how deeply entwined American corporations were with corrupt foreign networks abroad. As investigators discovered, many of the most U.S. prominent companies were routinely engaging in high-level bribery around the world, entrenching kleptocratic regimes in the process. The sheer scale of the revelations went far beyond anything American officials ever imagined; as one investigator put it, “None of us dreamed that there were the millions, the tens of millions, the hundreds of millions [in bribes], that we found.”
The fallout was swift. Anti-American protests erupted around the world, centered on how Washington had propped up corrupt regimes and officials. In Honduras, the country’s pro-American autocracy quickly disintegrated when it became clear that the head of the United Fruit Company had bribed the Honduran president to make it easier for the firm to ship bananas. The revelations cemented a generation of anti-American animus in the country. In Italy, companies such as Lockheed had bribed multiple officials in exchange for favorable terms in military aircraft sales. When the details spilled out, the clearest beneficiaries were Italy’s communists, who could point to their capitalist opponents as little more than bought-off American puppets. As Frank Church, the Democratic senator from Idaho who presided over the congressional hearings, put it: “This country and its major allies are going to wake up one morning and find that the basis of stable democratic government has been eaten away.”
Remarkably, the fact that American corporations had spent hundreds of millions of dollars bribing foreign officials was somehow not illegal. The solution, then, was simple: criminalize the activity, and prevent these private American entities from single-handedly detonating American foreign policy. In 1977 legislators did just that, passing the FCPA, which finally made this kind of bribery illegal.
For much of American history, corruption was not seen as a major foreign policy issue.
It was, in many ways, a watershed; not only was this the first legislation of its kind in American history but it was also the first of its kind in global history. Never had any country ever criminalized bribery that took place in other countries or so explicitly linked anticorruption efforts to its foreign policy. It set a bar for other democratic countries and created a bedrock for Washington to flesh out its anticorruption and counter-kleptocracy policy in the decades to come.
Although it took some time, by the early twenty-first century American legislators and White House officials were launching salvo after salvo against transnational corruption, implementing new policies and issuing new appointments that gradually drew anticorruption efforts closer and closer to the center of American foreign policy. In the first decade of this century, the United States made it harder for American banks to launder the wealth of foreign officials, a practice that corroded international stability and corrupted the American financial system in the process. In the 2010s, the creation of the Magnitsky Sanctions—named for the Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, an anticorruption crusader who died in jail in 2009 after being denied medical care—targeted not just human rights abusers but also some of the most corrupt figures around the world, including former Gambian despot Yahya Jammeh, Israeli mining magnate Dan Gertler, and Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of Uzbekistan’s former dictator, among many others.
Momentum stalled during Trump’s first term, though it did not halt entirely. Although Trump issued rhetorical broadsides against many of these policies, he didn’t dismantle any of them, instead allowing them to continue and even expand in certain aspects. After Trump’s defeat in 2020, the momentum returned—and accelerated. The Biden administration and allies in Congress launched multiple efforts to expand Washington’s anticorruption regime. The White House launched initiatives such as the KleptoCapture task force, specifically targeting wealth stashed abroad by corrupt oligarchs. Congress passed the country’s first-ever shell company registry, the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), which promised to end the United States’ role as one of the major centers of the global offshore economy. The administration announced new counter-kleptocracy rules for sectors such as real estate and private investment industries, created a new positions at the State Department and the National Security Council focused exclusively on corruption, and even issued the first-ever U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption, which argued that by “preventing and countering corruption and demonstrating the advantages of transparent and accountable governance, we can secure a critical advantage for the United States and other democracies.”
FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTER
The first six months of Trump’s new administration have been a blur of efforts to dismantle all of that progress, going back decades. Thankfully, because Trump has opted for legislative shortcuts, many of the most powerful tools, such as the FCPA, technically remain on the books, and can be picked up again by a future administration. But future officials can’t simply pick up where Biden left off. Democrats need a much broader, much more salient anticorruption plan moving forward—one that is at the center of their platform rather than at the periphery.
This project is unlikely to succeed if it confines itself to domestic reforms. The old-fashioned notion of corruption as a local problem made sense in an era in which capital mostly stayed within national borders. But in a modern digitized economy when shell companies can be generated in minutes and funds can cross jurisdictions in milliseconds, corruption—especially grand corruption involving elected officials and national leaders—is of an increasingly transnational character.
Consider the recent charges against U.S. Representative Henry Cuellar (D-Tex.), which allege that the legislator accepted bribes from an Azerbaijani oil company and a Mexican bank through a series of sham contracts involving offshore shell companies, or the criminal conviction of former U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) for accepting illicit payments through individuals and front companies linked to the governments of Egypt and Qatar. If the United States does not confront and disrupt the kleptocratic networks, offshore havens, and money-laundering professionals that enable global illicit finance, it is leaving its own institutions exposed to this kind of malign foreign influence.
The United States’ ability to advance its interests at home and abroad depends on the vitality, efficacy, and legitimacy of its own democratic institutions and those of its partners. Corruption is a driver of democratic retrenchment, political instability, civil strife, transnational crime, and human rights abuses. It undermines security partnerships and jeopardizes U.S. military and civilian assistance, as Washington learned the hard way in Afghanistan. It frustrates U.S. efforts to build resilient and reliable supply chains for critical goods by driving up the cost of capital and deterring investment in jurisdictions perceived to have weak rule of law. Finally, corruption provides autocratic governments with a “gray zone” strategic weapon to influence the workings of democratic systems in furtherance of their geopolitical ambitions.
Opposition to corruption is as universal a belief as exists in the world today.
If a future administration wants to reorient U.S. foreign policy toward a genuinely cooperative, post-primacy approach that emphasizes the common good in an increasingly multipolar world, it must do so in tandem with a robust anticorruption program. A world in which corruption runs rampant is one in which states will struggle to cooperate effectively to fight climate change, prepare for and respond to pandemics, promote sustainable development, and ensure equitable and broad distribution of renewable energy technologies, health infrastructure, and other global goods. By the same token, corruption and the offshore jurisdictions and kleptocratic networks that sustain it are obstacles to international coordination on labor exploitation, corporate impunity, and environmental crimes. Put simply, the United States will never succeed in building a more democratic, equal, and peaceful world if it fails to control endemic graft.
Anticorruption also offers the most plausible pathway to repairing Washington’s badly damaged credibility on values. Even before Trump’s second term, the United States’ double standard on Israel’s horrific treatment of Gaza’s civilian population bred mistrust and cynicism in much of the world. That legacy, in conjunction with four more years of “America first” posturing, makes it very unlikely that the next administration will be able to draw on the reserve of global goodwill that Biden enjoyed when he assumed office. Going forward, the United States will face a far heavier burden of proof in establishing its bona fides as a positive force in global affairs.
Anticorruption is a logical point of departure in seeking to establish a new, more benign role for the United States in global affairs. Opposition to corruption is about as universal a belief as exists in the world today, one that even blatantly kleptocratic regimes such as Russia claim to deplore. And notwithstanding the Trump administration’s assault on U.S. anticorruption capabilities, the United States has a strong record of shaping and defending anticorruption and transparency norms. Indeed, prior to the current administration, Washington was in a class of its own in its prosecution and sanctioning of corrupt acts outside its own borders, driving international cooperation around money laundering and illicit finance, and supporting local anticorruption efforts in fragile democracies in the Americas and the Indo-Pacific. These accomplishments offer a foundation from which the United States can resume values-based cooperation with its international partners.
CLEANUP TIME
A future administration that is serious about fighting corruption must first reverse the Trump policies that undercut U.S. anticorruption capabilities. At a minimum, this will mean reinstating the enforcement of key anticorruption and anti-money-laundering laws such as the FCPA and the CTA, restoring initiatives such as the DOJ’s anti-kleptocracy task force and the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator on Global Anti-Corruption, and rejoining international efforts to strengthen transparency in the global economy, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the Open Government Partnership.
The next administration should take aggressive early steps to protect U.S. institutions from the outsize influence of both foreign and domestic special interests that enjoy privileged links to public officials. To mark a clear break from the Trump era for both domestic and foreign audiences, the White House must curb the misuse of public office for private gain wherever it occurs. If the world’s foremost democracy cannot get its own house in order, it will struggle to catalyze reforms elsewhere in the world.
A first step would be to reform the federal bribery statute and federal gifts statute to criminalize a broader range of abuses of public office, such as the payment of “gratuities” to an official as a token of appreciation for an act that he or she had performed in office. (Astonishingly, in 2023, the Supreme Court held that such intuitively corrupt behavior was not bribery under federal law.) The United States should also reform federal lobbying regulations to limit influence peddling by former officials, expanding the definition of lobbying to include any professional who is paid to influence lawmakers, and establishing a lifetime ban on lobbying for former senior officials and a cooling-off period for all others. New laws should bar executives from firms that have been subject to repeated criminal sanctions from serving as senior government officials and prohibit members of Congress from trading stocks or serving on corporate boards. And Congress should ban the grotesque practice of giving top diplomatic posts to major donors.
Perhaps the most important step will be to drastically reform the campaign finance system. The United States is an outlier among developed democracies in that its system of campaign finance is basically a form of legalized bribery. In recent years, more and more foreign actors have begun bankrolling American legislators, taking advantage of massive loopholes in campaign finance laws and the Federal Election Commission’s lack of enforcement. At a minimum, Congress must move to legislate a reversal of the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision, which effectively greenlit bottomless campaign funding from American corporations. It must also reform the FEC, providing the body with much-needed resources to investigate campaign finance crimes and restoring the practice of allowing congressional appointments to the commission, which has become little more than an appendage of the executive branch.
American tough talk on corruption has not always translated into action.
At the same time as it puts its own house in order, the United States should be vigorously engaging with like-minded partners to forge a united front against corruption. As the regulator of the dollar-based financial system, the United States is uniquely positioned to shape the global financial infrastructure within which corruption thrives. In partnership with its European allies, Washington can establish new rules of the game for cross-border financial activity and impose order and transparency on ungoverned financial spaces, including by coordinating sanctions and other coercive measures against governments that abet money laundering, pursuing coordinated sanctions against corrupt officials and their enablers using authorities such as the Global Magnitsky Act, and conditioning access to U.S. markets and other leading financial systems on stringent anti-money-laundering standards that go beyond current international requirements. To enhance these efforts, officials should also step up intelligence collection relating to overseas corruption and provide greater resources for anti-money-laundering entities such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, known as FinCEN.
Alongside these regulatory and law enforcement measures, Washington should recommit to foreign assistance and diplomacy focused on strengthening the rule of law and fighting kleptocracy and state capture. The Biden administration’s most successful initiatives in leveraging American soft power to fight kleptocracy overseas—including defending Guatemala’s electoral integrity against entrenched oligarchy and helping governments in eastern Europe and the Pacific Islands identify and prevent Russian and Chinese attempts to use corrupt networks to tilt elections and shift policy—provide constructive examples to draw on. This effort should be paired with a concerted effort to increase the number of overseas personnel with experience and training in combating corruption, beginning with ambassadors, who are often the tip of the spear of anticorruption efforts in fragile democracies.
American tough talk on corruption has not always translated into action when it has conflicted with other strategic interests. The Biden administration’s reluctance to sanction Indian and Israeli officials dogged by well-documented and credible corruption allegations, as well as its partnerships with deeply corrupt governments in places such as Egypt, Honduras, and Afghanistan, compromised its ability to call out corruption elsewhere in the world and provided ammunition to claims of U.S. hypocrisy and double standards. This will require the next presidential administration to make a public commitment to anticorruption as a priority and a congressional cohort ready and willing to use its oversight authority to monitor progress and hold the administration to those commitments. A good place to start would be passing a law that would prohibit security cooperation with military forces credibly implicated in corrupt acts or linked to regimes that support transnational corruption—akin to the way the so-called Leahy law prohibits security cooperation with forces that commit human rights violations.
At some point, perhaps as soon as 2029, a U.S. administration will once again find itself confronted with the difficult task of persuading its erstwhile partners and allies that it stands for something greater than its own power. But unlike previous reboots, the United States should not expect to sit at the head of the table after spending four years trying to overturn it. Instead, it will need to demonstrate that it is as good as its word on values. A full-throated campaign to restore transparency, accountability, and integrity to its own institutions as well as those of fellow democracies is the place to start.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Casey Michel · August 8, 2025
20. How to Resist a Dictator – What Belarus’s Democratic Opposition Reveals—and What It Needs to Win
A voice from Belarus.
Excerpts:
STOP AT NOTHING
I often say the fight for freedom is not a sprint—but a marathon. Yet it still requires being ready at a moment’s notice. Even the most entrenched dictatorships can suddenly fall.
Fortunately, Belarusians are ready. They are peaceful, patient, and resilient. We are fighting for their dignity, for justice, and for their right to live at home, in peace. They want what every American and European already enjoys: the right to speak freely, to worship without fear, to choose our representatives, to shape our own future, and to live with dignity. They are the values that bind us to our neighbors to the west.
They are also the values that inspire me to keep fighting, as are the thousands of families who are still waiting for their loved ones and the hundreds of thousands of Belarusians who remain in exile. The regime may have believed that releasing my husband would silence me. But it has only reignited my resolve. With Siarhei beside me, and with the strength of our people, I will continue this struggle with double the energy.
Some may say Belarus is too small to matter. But we are part of Europe’s story, and we have paid a high price to advance the continent’s overall freedom. We will not give up. The question is not whether change will come to Belarus. The question is who will be ready when it does.
How to Resist a Dictator
Foreign Affairs · by More by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya · August 8, 2025
What Belarus’s Democratic Opposition Reveals—and What It Needs to Win
August 8, 2025
Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya protesting the 2020 Belarusian presidential election results in Berlin, October 2020 Hannibal Hanschke / Reuters
SVIATLANA TSIKHANOUSKAYA is the leader of the Belarusian opposition and head of the United Transitional Cabinet.
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Belarus—nestled between the European Union, Ukraine, and Russia—has long been overlooked and underestimated by outsiders, who often see it as little more than an extension of Russia. This perception stems largely from the grip of the country’s dictator, Alexander Lukashenko. Since 1994, he has transformed Belarus into a repressive state marked by fraudulent elections, systemic violence, and a deepening reliance on Moscow and Beijing.
But five years ago, Belarusians made it clear that they do not want to live in a belligerent autocracy, isolated from the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. In 2020, I entered Belarus’s presidential election to stop Lukashenko from claiming a sixth term. I didn’t expect to win; Lukashenko had rigged every previous contest. But my message—free the country’s political prisoners, end repression, hold real elections, and restore the rule of law—struck a nerve. According to independent observers, Belarusians overwhelmingly voted for me. When Lukashenko declared himself the winner anyway, the country exploded in the largest peaceful uprising in its modern history. Up to 1.5 million people flooded the streets of Belarusian cities demanding change.
I did not intend to enter politics. I was an English teacher and then a full-time mother focused on helping my hearing-impaired son. My husband, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, was the political one—an entrepreneur whose blog exposed the daily humiliations of life under dictatorship. His words inspired thousands. When he announced his candidacy in May 2020, the regime arrested him days later. I decided to run in his place—not out of ambition, but out of love.
The response to the protests was brutal. To clear the streets, the regime carried out waves of mass arrests, engaged in widespread torture, and generally terrorized the populace. It detained tens of thousands of people, and it beat hundreds more. I was forced into exile, along with many others. But still, the uprising shook the regime to its core. The demonstrations might have succeeded, if not for Russian President Vladimir Putin. To prepare for his February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Putin needed Belarus as a launching pad. He thus propped up Lukashenko by sending in security advisers and other kinds of operatives, providing financial assistance, and signaling a readiness to intervene more intensely—saving Lukashenko’s rule in return for obedience and Belarus’s subjugation. Today, my country remains under de facto Russian occupation. Nine million people are being held hostage by a regime that answers not to them, but to the Kremlin.
Although Lukashenko was able to stop the protests, Belarusians still yearn for freedom. Operating outside the country, my colleagues and I are working to liberate our homeland. We have established a government in exile, staffed with Belarusian activists and defectors from the regime, prepared to take charge of rebuilding the country. We have formalized ties with American and European officials. Many countries now see me as Belarus’s legitimate leader. We have even made inroads with regime insiders who are ready for change.
The spirit of resistance, in other words, endures. And with it, so does the possibility of Belarusian democracy.
AT THE READY
Belarus is a European nation. It has its own language, history, and identity. It has a long tradition of democratic aspirations and of support for its western neighbors. Despite censorship and repression, polls consistently show that Belarusians oppose Russia’s war on Ukraine, reject tyranny, and support democracy. Only four percent favor unification with Russia. Over 60 percent oppose Putin’s deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil.
These numbers are not anomalies. They are evidence of a deep, pro-independence and pro-European orientation that the regime cannot extinguish. They have made it tricky for Putin to do as he wishes in Belarus, despite his and Lukashenko’s tyranny. Putin failed, for example, to drag the Belarusian army into his war. In fact, Belarusian railway workers have sabotaged Russian military logistics, starting in the early weeks of the invasion. Many Belarusians have even joined Ukraine’s defense, forming the Kalinouski Regiment: the largest foreign volunteer unit in Ukraine’s army.
Because of repression, resistance to Lukashenko has shifted underground and out of the country. But even in exile, the Belarusian opposition has built a rare thing: a unified, credible, and ready alternative to dictatorship. We have formed the United Transitional Cabinet and Coordination Council, in which representatives are elected using digital tools. These bodies represent the democratic will of the Belarusian people and provide practical support to those still inside Belarus and to over half a million Belarusians now in exile. They serve as a viable structure of governance—a government in waiting.
History shows that dictatorships often collapse unexpectedly.
In addition to this cabinet and council, our movement includes a network of civil society organizations, diaspora groups, independent media, education and legal services, and humanitarian aid providers that help the repressed and their families. We work with religious groups, small businesses, and labor unions to sustain social solidarity, defend workers’ rights, and preserve Belarusian identity and civic life, despite the dictatorship. Our media platforms continue to reach millions inside Belarus, despite press restrictions.
Our movement is delivering on its pledges. Inspired by a step taken by the Estonian government in exile that formed in the 1940s to oppose Soviet occupation, we have introduced a new Belarusian passport for exiles and drafted a new constitution. We formalized cooperation with the European Union and the Council of Europe. And we are carrying out a strategic dialogue with the U.S. State Department to increase pressure on the regime, to support our movement for freedom, and to ensure that Belarus remains on the international agenda and that it features in conversations about Europe’s security architecture. These steps will help ensure that whenever Belarus has its next political opening, we can swiftly take action and turn the country toward democracy.
Right now, such an opening may seem unlikely. But history shows that dictatorships often collapse unexpectedly—triggered by internal or external shocks. Lukashenko, for example, is aging, and discussions about an inevitable transition of power have already begun within the regime’s highest circles. Unfortunately for them, the system he built is entirely centered on himself and lacks any legitimate or stable mechanism for succession. Unlike some autocrats, Lukashenko also has no viable heir. That makes his system brittle. We are working to ensure that when a power vacuum emerges, Belarus is handed over to us, not to Putin.
We are defending what is left of Belarus’s independence.
To do so, we are already sending a clear message to the regime’s elites: there is a chance for a negotiated, peaceful transition. We are proposing a roundtable dialogue between representatives of the democratic forces and those in the regime who are ready to talk about change. The goal of such a roundtable is to achieve national reconciliation and end the political crisis through a peaceful, negotiated transition. This model is inspired by the Polish round table of 1989 between Solidarity, the country’s opposition movement at the time, and the authorities, who were enfeebled by a weakened Moscow and by U.S. and European sanctions. It ended with Solidarity taking charge.
The Belarusian regime, like the Polish one then, is far less monolithic than it appears. Inside ministries, security services, and even state-run media, there are officials who are disillusioned. Some of them are already leaking valuable information to us, including on how Minsk evades sanctions. These insiders could prove crucial when the window for change opens. That is why we keep quiet but active lines of communication with them. They know that change is inevitable—and that their own future depends on being part of it. In fact, our task is to expand these contacts while maintaining the support of Belarusians and preserving pro-European sentiment. We are working to prevent Russian propaganda from poisoning Belarusian society.
We are also defending what is left of Belarus’s independence. For decades, Lukashenko tried to play Europe and Russia off each other, but today, he is entirely dependent on the latter. As long as he remains in power, Minsk will only more closely align itself with Moscow, to the point where Belarus could become little more than a Russian military outpost.
THE POWER OF PRESSURE
Given the regime’s heavy reliance on the Kremlin, a democratic Belarus is not only in the best interest of Belarusians. It is in the best interest of the United States and the European Union. If Belarus is free, Russia will no longer have the same military balcony in Europe, and that will reduce pressure on NATO’s eastern flank and lower the bloc’s defense costs. In fact, a free Belarus could become a source of regional stability and a true security partner for Ukraine. A democratic Belarus would contribute to digital innovation (the country has a top-notch IT sector), support energy diversification, and facilitate trade. Unlike Lukashenko, it would contribute to border security rather than weaponizing migration to provoke instability in Europe.
To be clear, we are not asking outsiders to change our country for us. That is our job, our mission, and our responsibility. But we do ask for help in making this transformation achievable.
The United States and the European Union have already taken many essential, useful steps. After the Belarusian election was stolen in 2020, they developed a three-pronged approach to support the Belarusian people: weakening Lukashenko’s regime, supporting pro-freedom and pro-European aspirations, and assisting in an eventual transition. To that end, both imposed sanctions on the regime. Lithuania and Poland gave refuge to hundreds of thousands of Belarusians, and Washington and the EU provided support to independent Belarusian media, activists, and projects aimed at preserving national identity. The EU has even pledged over $3 billion to support Belarus through its democratic transition once it begins—a powerful signal that Belarus belongs in Europe. They have continued to draw a line between the Belarusian people and the regime, even after the latter helped Moscow drive toward Kyiv. That distinction is one of the key achievements of our movement.
Emptying a ballot box to count votes during the Belarusian presidential election, Minsk, Belarus, January 2025 Evgenia Novozhenina / Reuters
This approach must continue. At times, I hear analysts call for a return to working with Lukashenko as a means of isolating the Kremlin, as if the two can be separated. Instead, the United States and Europe must double down on their support of Belarus’s people through technical assistance for Belarusian civil society, independent media, human rights activists, cultural organizations, digital security tools, and diaspora networks. They are the oxygen of resistance. That support must be extended to exiles and our institutions. Russia is pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into propping up Lukashenko’s regime. The United States and Europe must make sure we can keep building a strong, resilient alternative.
Some U.S. and EU analysts may wonder whether regime change is feasible when Russia is so committed to keeping Lukashenko around. Morally, the future of Belarus is not for Moscow to decide, but in reality, much will depend on Russia’s strength during any moment of crisis and on the outcome of its war against Ukraine. If Russia is weak and contained, then Belarus has a chance. For this reason, American and European officials cannot ignore Belarus as they begin to discuss cease-fires, Ukraine, and lasting peace in the region. Other states must ensure that Moscow won’t interfere when change in Belarus begins—and that Belarus does not become a consolation prize for a defeated Putin.
In the meantime, Washington and the EU can increase their punitive actions toward Minsk. They could, for instance, apply more secondary sanctions and restrict the cargo trade through the EU-Belarus border, one major source of income for the regime. Even the threat of such actions could make a difference for Belarus’s cash-strapped government. We must raise the cost for Minsk of every act of repression and every crime it commits. That is why we are also calling on other countries to support Lithuania’s initiative at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice to hold the regime accountable for its crimes. We understand that ending Lukashenko’s regime may require some kind of settlement: if Lukashenko were to step down voluntarily and agree to free and fair elections under international supervision, for example, other states could consider giving him and his family personal security guarantees. In fact, we proposed doing this in 2020. But in general, to end the regime’s impunity, its perpetrators must be brought to justice.
THE ART OF THE DEAL
Unfortunately, over the past five years, I’ve often felt that international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have struggled to respond meaningfully to crises like the one in Belarus. Too often, their actions stop at words of condemnation. They lack the tools or the political will, or they are paralyzed by rules demanding consensus and by the obstruction of authoritarian members.
Individual world leaders, however, are a different story. As I have met presidents and prime ministers—at the G-7, the UN General Assembly, and other global platforms—I have realized how crucial personal initiative truly is. I have witnessed bold leadership on Belarus from leaders such as President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, Vice President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.
Perhaps most important, I have witnessed such leadership from U.S. President Donald Trump. It was during his first administration that the United States took decisive action against Lukashenko—action that largely shaped the transatlantic approach to Belarus. Washington was among the first governments to react to his brutal 2020 crackdown, imposing sanctions on his regime. Trump appointed Julie Fisher as ambassador to Belarus. She was denied entry by the regime, but she later brilliantly served as the U.S. special envoy for Belarus until 2022 and now works as the American chargé d’affaires in Kyiv.
Belarus is part of Europe’s story.
Trump has continued this strong track record during his second term in office. Retired general Keith Kellogg—the president’s Ukraine envoy—secured the release of several Belarusian political prisoners, including U.S. citizens and my husband, Siarhei, who had spent five years in solitary confinement. I will be forever grateful to Trump and his team for this breakthrough. It was not only a humanitarian mission but also a clear demonstration of American leverage. Lukashenko fears Trump’s unpredictability, and so he chose to release Siarhei rather than risk stronger sanctions or some other escalation that could endanger his hold on power. He got nothing from Washington in return. Today, we urge Trump to go even further and use that same leverage to push for the release of the remaining 1,150 political prisoners. Doing so could mark the beginning of de-escalation between the Belarusian regime and democratic forces. If his efforts succeed, Trump could score the greatest humanitarian victory for Belarus in modern history.
Trump need not fear the consequences of deeper involvement. Unlike many global crises, Belarus is not mired in civil war, ethnic conflict, or ideological divisions. It is in a decades-long standoff, rooted in one man’s relentless grip on power. For Trump, this is a low-cost, high-impact opportunity. Belarus could become his foreign policy success story—one that sends a message to other entrenched authoritarian regimes, including in Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela, that they are not secure.
To strengthen and coordinate these efforts, it is time to again appoint a U.S. special envoy for Belarus, just as Kellogg was appointed for Ukraine. This envoy can work closely with Washington’s EU partners and our movement on releasing political prisoners, synchronizing sanctions policy, and ensuring that Belarus moves along the path of reform.
I am confident that the U.S. Congress will support this approach. Belarus remains one of the few foreign policy issues that unites lawmakers across party lines. Democrats and Republicans alike, in both the House and the Senate, believe in the steps I have laid out. An updated version of the bipartisan Belarus Democracy Act—which has historically authorized support for Belarusian civil society, independent media, and political prisoners, while mandating sanctions against regime officials—is already being drafted, with both Democratic and Republican sponsors. It can serve as a blueprint for action.
STOP AT NOTHING
I often say the fight for freedom is not a sprint—but a marathon. Yet it still requires being ready at a moment’s notice. Even the most entrenched dictatorships can suddenly fall.
Fortunately, Belarusians are ready. They are peaceful, patient, and resilient. We are fighting for their dignity, for justice, and for their right to live at home, in peace. They want what every American and European already enjoys: the right to speak freely, to worship without fear, to choose our representatives, to shape our own future, and to live with dignity. They are the values that bind us to our neighbors to the west.
They are also the values that inspire me to keep fighting, as are the thousands of families who are still waiting for their loved ones and the hundreds of thousands of Belarusians who remain in exile. The regime may have believed that releasing my husband would silence me. But it has only reignited my resolve. With Siarhei beside me, and with the strength of our people, I will continue this struggle with double the energy.
Some may say Belarus is too small to matter. But we are part of Europe’s story, and we have paid a high price to advance the continent’s overall freedom. We will not give up. The question is not whether change will come to Belarus. The question is who will be ready when it does.
Foreign Affairs · by More by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya · August 8, 2025
21. Why Wars Don’t End Anymore
I think Clausewitz would tell us wars end when the political object is achieved. What is the acceptable, durable, political arrangement that will end hostilities? (until the next conflict caused by politics?)
Why Wars Don’t End Anymore
In a pessimistic era, a temporary pause to fighting has become the most anyone is trying to achieve.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/08/magazine/ceasefires-peace-gaza-ukraine-thailand.html?unlocked_article_code=1.ck8.vobo.ODUezB7zOEuk&smid=url-share
By Linda Kinstler
- Aug. 8, 2025Updated 12:56 p.m. ET
It is hardly the bloodiest conflict going on in the world right now, but the story of its recent “cease-fire” is a depressingly familiar one.
On July 28, the prime ministers of Thailand and Cambodia agreed to a pause in hostilities in the border conflict that has stretched on for decades and, this summer alone, left at least 43 dead. The agreement was brokered by China and the United States, which are uncommonly aligned in a shared desire for peace in the economically important region. Only hours later, the first reports of violations surfaced. Thailand accused Cambodia of firing into its territory and deploying troops toward the border; Cambodia then accused Thailand of putting up barbed wire and detaining a group of its soldiers. Only after military leaders met the next day did fighting actually halt. A tenuous cease-fire remains in place — for now.
This is both a textbook case of what passes these days for peacemaking and a demonstration of the outsize role that cease-fires have come to play in contemporary politics.
Ever since Israel began its retaliatory invasion of Gaza in October 2023, the call for a “cease-fire now” has animated protesters and politicians around the world. Over the past several months, as Israel’s bombardment and blockade of the territory have created a humanitarian crisis and, especially, widespread starvation, demands for a cease-fire have only grown. Last month, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain announced that his country would recognize Palestinian statehood if Israel continues to rebuff plans for a cease-fire and block the delivery of aid. Other world leaders are making the same demand.
Calls for cease-fires can be found elsewhere, too: In Ukraine, they have set the rhythm of a war that has gone on for more than a decade. President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russia of violating over 25 agreements since the start of hostilities. In Sudan, repeated calls for a cease-fire have fallen on deaf ears.
A cease-fire, though, is not the same thing as peace. Cease-fires are often deployed as preconditions for political negotiations, or as mechanisms of last resort in situations in which no other solutions are forthcoming. Wherever they are declared, a specific kind of silence descends. The quiet they bring can be a prelude to peace, or a warning of battles still to come.
“People tend to reach for cease-fires when they do not know what else to do,” said Valerie Sticher, a senior researcher at ETH Zurich. Intended to work as tools of conflict resolution, they often end up operating as mechanisms of conflict management instead. They proliferate in historical moments, like our own, when political settlements of intractable wars are difficult to reach and when few states seem to have the will to even attempt them.
“Violence happens because of political grievances,” said Govinda Clayton, mediation support manager at the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, who has spent over a decade researching cease-fires and supporting conflict parties in negotiations. “And if you do not link the cease-fire to a broader process to address those grievances, it’s basically just a stopgap.” With multiple large-scale conflicts raging around the world, cease-fires have become at once more necessary, more popular and more fragile than ever.
The Ceasefire Project, a research initiative that tracked outcomes of 2,202 cease-fires from 1989 to 2020, found that 68 percent of those were never formally written down. Its data showed that failed cease-fires typically last from 65 to 193 days and that humanitarian cease-fires have historically been “the most likely to be followed quickly by renewed violence.” Most peace processes require at least three cease-fires along the way.
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The transition from war to peace was once thought to proceed according to a series of predictable steps: After one side triumphed over the other — or when both sides were too exhausted to keep fighting — soldiers laid down their arms, diplomats negotiated peace treaties and heads of state proclaimed the end of conflict. In his 1758 work “The Law of Nations,” the philosopher Emmer de Vattel argued that “the effect of the treaty of peace is to put an end to the war, and to abolish the subject of it.” After a treaty was signed, he wrote, its adherents could not “lawfully take up arms again for the same subject.” Any future hostilities could be initiated only over a new and different cause.
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Today, however, peace processes rarely make it past the first stage, leaving the political disputes that ignited war in the first place largely unresolved. When a cease-fire is broken, another soon follows, until that one is violated in turn.
In November, Hezbollah and Israel agreed to a cease-fire that would require each side to withdraw fighters from Israel’s border with Lebanon. The agreement, based in part on a 2006 cease-fire, has been repeatedly violated by each party. Months after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, each side agreed to a cease-fire as part of the Minsk accords. The agreement soon collapsed, and the next year it was followed by another round of negotiations and another cease-fire, which was also immediately violated.
The rise of cease-fires as the world’s default response to war raises the question of whether or not we have abandoned the pursuit of peace itself as a political goal. By relying on them to function as temporary solutions to intractable problems, have world leaders avoided difficult conversations about the origins of wars and the possibility of justice, and left the entire world less stable?
A ‘Golden Age’ of Peace?
For some 50 years, the world was divided between two great powers, and the United Nations Security Council was deadlocked. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a brief efflorescence of peacekeeping efforts and the beginning of a short-lived era of “liberal peace,” when practitioners and politicians believed that conflicts could be resolved through the establishment of democracy, free markets and the rule of law.
“It looked as if the Golden Age had arrived,” the political theorist Stanley Hoffmann wrote in 1995, “and a ‘new world order’ based on the principles of liberal internationalism was going to emerge from the sound and fury of the Cold War.” But unlike at the turn of the 20th century, when a global peace movement led to the construction of the Peace Palace in The Hague and the establishment of international law as a vehicle for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the peace of the 1990s was predicated on a muscular American leadership.
The United States Institute of Peace opened its doors in 1984, chartered by Congress to “leash international violence and manage international conflict.” In 1992, the U.N. created a Department of Peace Operations and deployed its officials to conflict zones around the world. The U.N. secretary general at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, published a report that year called “An Agenda for Peace,” arguing that the goal of his institution should be “to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.” In 1998, the International Criminal Court was created to prosecute grave crimes that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.”
The end of the Cold War meant that the U.S. doctrine of liberal internationalism swiftly became synonymous with peace. The decline of great power politics presented the opportunity for a number of long-simmering conflicts to finally be resolved. Thirty-four comprehensive peace agreements were signed from 1989 to 2012. “There was a consensus in the international community that we should strive for political settlements,” Sticher said. In 1993, the Oslo accords restarted peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians; that year also saw peace negotiations over conflicts in Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti and elsewhere.
When the Clinton administration summed up its achievements in 2001, it celebrated eight years of “peace, progress and prosperity” and highlighted the U.S. role in creating the Dayton peace accords that ended the Bosnian war, the Oslo accords and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland.
Cease-fires played an important, if sometimes counterproductive, role in the conflicts of the ’90s, though they were framed as a prelude to a political settlement. Historically, some cease-fires have proved counterproductive, inflaming violence and degrading trust on both sides of a conflict. During the Bosnian war, more than 70 cease-fires were declared over three years, none of which held for long. The most durable, the four-month “Carter cease-fire” in the winter of 1994-95, was followed by a marked escalation of fighting that led to the genocide at Srebrenica. The combatants used the time off to prepare to return to battle; neither side had any interest, then, in concluding hostilities.
Only after NATO conducted airstrikes against the Bosnian Serb army in 1995 did the parties seriously engage in the political negotiations that led to the eventual Dayton peace agreement and the cease-fire that officially concluded the war — though its provisions for arms control, democratic elections and demilitarization were only partly implemented in the following years.
But by then the project of liberal peace had begun to collapse in on itself. “Communism is dead,” Hoffmann wrote, “but is the other great postwar ideology, liberal internationalism, also dying?”
As the decade progressed, academics and peacekeepers confronted the limitations of their narrow blueprint for pacification. Measures designed to ease ethnic tensions and economic hardship, and to rebuild war-torn nations to resemble their Western supporters, appeared to have had the opposite effect. In Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, and elsewhere, peace-building efforts seemed to have worsened political instability and financial precarity. In Rwanda and Bosnia, U.N. missions failed to prevent genocide, and Western-supported efforts to hold elections appeared to have exacerbated societal divisions.
“At best, the liberal internationalist approach to peace-building has generated unforeseen problems,” the scholar Roland Paris wrote in 1997. “At worst, peace-building missions have had the ‘perverse effect’ of undermining the very peace they were meant to buttress.” The waning of the “golden age” of peace, coupled with the effects of American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, was accompanied by declining interest in interventionism and in pursuing peace processes around the globe. By 2020, several of the cease-fires and peace deals of the ’90s had collapsed.
“Broadly speaking, we are in a historical, global pushback against the liberal peace that prevailed for 10 to 15 years,” said Laurie Nathan, who has been a U.N. mediation adviser and is professor at Notre Dame. One effect of that pushback has been that calls for cease-fires have replaced calls for peace both in public discourse and in politics, as conflict management has taken precedence over more ambitious goals of conflict resolution and reconciliation. “The peacemaking industry is being stripped and downsized at the moment,” Clayton said.
Our Pessimistic World
Cease-fires work only when the parties involved have the incentive and the will to stop fighting — when there is little left to gain on the battlefield. “Both sides have to think they can’t win, and they have to trust each other sufficiently to go to the table,” Nathan said. “They have to make the painful decision to accept painful compromises.”
He learned this lesson firsthand as an anti-Apartheid activist in South Africa. There, he said, “both sides came to the realization that they could fight for another hundred years and no one was going to win.” When the time came for political negotiation, Nathan and others in the African National Congress privately complained that they were compromising too much on matters of transitional justice and on the transfer of lands and properties. He remembers how the party’s leadership, including Nelson Mandela, responded: “Wake up, comrades. We never won.”
Agreements are much more likely in cases like the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, where the international community is united in pressing for a resolution. During the Syrian civil war, the opposing aims of the United States and Russia undercut hopes for a cease-fire. Russian forces intervened at the request of the Bashar al-Assad regime, while the United States supported opposition groups.
“We never found a sustainable cease-fire agreement where there was neither alignment among global powers or disinterest in the conflict,” Clayton said. Wherever world powers are at odds — or are actively fueling the battle — there is little hope of a negotiated peace. “With this move away from a unipolar world, there is no willingness to uphold settlements in the long-term,” Sticher said.
Yet even in the case of Thailand and Cambodia, the cease-fire agreement may end up offering little more than a temporary respite from conflict. “It was a step in the right direction of diminishing tensions,” said Paul Chambers, a visiting fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. “But even with China and the U.S. right there, it was more of a public relations ploy. Who is losing in all of this? The Thai people who were killed, the Cambodians who have been killed. The average person is suffering.” More than 300,000 people remain displaced because of the fighting.
In the best-case scenario, the cease-fire would be a steppingstone toward a resolution to the border dispute, but at the moment, neither side has the incentive to push for a lasting resolution. Every cease-fire must be tailor-made to suit the region it seeks to calm, but none is capacious enough to resolve the historical grievances that made it necessary in the first place. Nowhere is this more evident than in the war between Israel and Hamas, where cease-fire negotiations have repeatedly collapsed, and where each side is committed to declaring victory.
Under such conditions, the best we might hope for is what the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung called “negative peace,” in which there is no large-scale physical violence yet also no resolution to the world’s cascading conflicts. This is the kind of peace that cease-fires and truces can produce — a peace “without justice,” as Nathan put it.
For the political theorist Murad Idris, this condition can also be a “more honest peace” because it does not aspire to deliver anything more than a stop to killing, does not promise anything more than a brief reprieve. Fragile and fleeting by design, these measures reject what he describes as “the pretense of permanence and certainty.” They do not pretend to offer a durable solution or a perpetual peace, do not hold out hope for legal reckonings that may never come. They acknowledge, by their very grammar, what peacekeepers all over the world have long known: Often, the absence of violence is the best you can hope for.
The proliferation of cease-fires in the place of lasting settlements is a symptom of the pessimistic politics of our time. We have become so acclimatized to the age of forever wars that we seem to have forgotten to hope for true peace — that is, a positive peace, a peace with justice.
It is perhaps no surprise that Donald Trump, a countercultural politician, has sought to brand himself as the “president of peace.” And yet in Ukraine, his repeated calls for a cease-fire have been answered by the buzz of armored Russian drones; in Gaza, he has allowed Israel to continue its war in the face of a mounting humanitarian crisis. If and when cease-fires are finally negotiated in these conflicts, they will prove to be permanent only if they are accompanied by real political compromises from both sides.
Otherwise, the brief reprieve they deliver may turn out to be hardly a reprieve at all.
A correction was made on Aug. 8, 2025: An earlier version of this article misstated the name of Govinda Clayton’s employer. It is the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, not the Center for Human Dialogue.
When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more
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De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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