Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Be wary of the man who urges an action in which he himself incurs no risk."

– Seneca

"I must not fear. Fear is the mindkiller. Fear is the little-death that brings total obliteration. I will face my fear. I will permit it to pass over me and through me. And when it has gone past I will turn the inner eye to see its path. Where the fear has gone there will be nothing. Only I will remain."

– Frank Herbert

"Peace is the only battle worth waging."

– Albert Camus

1. N. Korea begins dismantling border loudspeakers after S. Korea's move

2. When Evil is Winning (Pyongyang)

3. Trump administration urges South Korea to raise defense spending to 3.8% of GDP

4. Korea-US summit expected to take place Aug. 25

5. Lee’s politics undermines his diplomacy

6. Unification minister vows efforts to address issue of abductees held in N. Korea

7. S. Korea, Japan coordinating Lee-Ishiba summit late August: report

8. How North Korea Promotes Kim’s ‘Dear Daughter’ as a Worthy Heir

9. Washington watches North Korea’s diplomatic signal

10. [Wang Son-taek] Key points for a successful S. Korea-US summit

11. North Korea’s Hwasong-18 ICBM Should Terrify the United States

12. Seoul’s Strategic Dilemma: Navigating a High-Stakes Summit With Trump

13. Chilling simulation shows exactly what would happen if North Korea launched a nuclear bomb towards the White House

14. Leak Reveals the Workaday Lives of North Korean IT Scammers

1. N. Korea begins dismantling border loudspeakers after S. Korea's move

Do not be duped by the regime's political warfare. In this north-South "exchange" the time got something for nothing. The South gave up effective psychological warfare while the north only gave up harassment that had no appreciable effect on the population (though it does contribute to division in Sotu Korean society between the engagegers and the hardliners). But the desired effect was achieved and by dismantling their loudspeakers the "engagers" believe that the regime is showing reciprocity so they will be willing to appease the regime further.

(LEAD) N. Korea begins dismantling border loudspeakers after S. Korea's move | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 9, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; ADDS details, byline, photo)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Aug. 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Saturday began dismantling some loudspeakers installed along the border for noise campaigns against South Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said, just days after the South completed removing border loudspeakers to reduce inter-Korean tension.

On Tuesday, South Korea completed dismantling its anti-Pyongyang loudspeakers along the heavily fortified border, after suspending propaganda broadcasts critical of the North on June 11 in line with President Lee Jae Myung's efforts to mend strained ties with the North.

"Activities by the North Korean military removing loudspeakers against South Korea have been detected in parts of the front-line area since Saturday morning," the JCS said in a notice to reporters.

The military said further verification is needed as to whether it will take place in all border areas, vowing to continue to monitor relevant movements by the North Korean military.

A loudspeaker facility installed by North Korea along the border is seen from the border town of Paju, in this photo taken Aug. 5, 2025. (Yonhap)

North Korea has long bristled against the military's loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets sent by activists over fears of outside information that could pose a threat to its ruling regime.

But under the former conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration, South Korea turned on the loudspeaker campaign for the first time in six years in June last year as Pyongyang launched thousands of trash-carrying balloons across the border. Seoul had previously conducted the campaign on an on-and-off basis following North Korea's fourth nuclear test in 2016.

Since taking office in June, Lee has taken measures to revive inter-Korean ties that remain severed since the North declared in late 2023 that the two Koreas are two separate "hostile" countries and moved to dismantle symbols of inter-Korean relations and unification.

In addition to halting the military's loudspeaker broadcasts, Lee has called on civic groups to suspend their distribution of anti-Pyongyang leaflets, expressing hope that the reconciliatory gestures could pave the way for engagement with the North.

Most recently, Seoul pushed back around half of some 40 field training exercises planned as part of the annual South Korea-U.S. combined Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise set to take place later this month to September, citing "multiple factors."

The decision came after North Korea denounced joint drills between the allies and accused the South of "blindly adhering" to its alliance with Washington. In response, Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, South Korea's top point man on North Korea, said he will propose adjusting the combined military exercise to Lee.

Soldiers dismantle a fixed loudspeaker facility at an unspecified location, which had been used for propaganda broadcasts against North Korea on Aug. 4, 2025, in this photo provided by South Korea's defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · August 9, 2025

2. When Evil is Winning (Pyongyang)

"Sham diplomacy."

Important insights in this short essay.

When Evil is Winning

Why Pyongyang’s decades of sham diplomacy keep its arsenal growing, and why truth is the free world’s most powerful weapon.

https://williamykkim.substack.com/p/when-evil-is-winning?r=5zbwuw&triedRedirect=true

William YK Kim

Aug 08, 2025

For more than 30 years, Pyongyang has perfected a cycle: enter talks, buy time, and emerge with a stronger nuclear arsenal than before.

Insightful North Korean defectors have long warned that Pyongyang uses diplomacy as a strategic tool to buy time, all the while strengthening its nuclear and missile programs. They have repeatedly said there has never been any real diplomacy in the genuine sense. Yet in both the left and right circles of South Korea, these warnings were often dismissed with the refrain: “Defectors are always negative because they fled the North.” Washington was little different.

It is true that many defectors speak in blunt and unpolished terms, which can at times cause discomfort. But if one has the patience to piece their words together, it becomes clear that even without being inside Pyongyang’s inner circle, one can discern the regime’s true intentions. North Korea, in many ways, resembles a cult that distorts Christian doctrine to deify a human leader and enslave its followers. No matter how polished the outward appearance, its spiritual nature and purpose are laid bare to those who see beyond the façade.

World-renowned psychiatrist, bestselling author, and leading thinker on the psychology of evil, Scott Peck, in his book People of the Lie, defines evil as rooted in lies. He points to two keys to overcoming it: first, the insight to see evil for what it is; second, the perseverance and love to care for those who have been deceived by it.

Applied to North Korea, the answer is straightforward: expose the regime’s true nature and deliver that truth to the North Korean people, while extending compassion and consistent care to those living as slaves under the regime’s deception.

The reason diplomacy with North Korea has repeatedly failed is because the world has treated this regime as a normal state, rather than as the cult-like system it truly is. For Kim Jong Un, nuclear weapons may be his “magic weapon.” For the free world, the “magic weapon” should be the flow of truthful outside information into the North.

Tragically, both Washington and Seoul have been moving to discard or drastically cut back that weapon. Spiritually speaking, this is a moment when “evil is winning.” And for me, that is the most painful reality of all.

(Note: As I often note, I fully support dialogue and negotiation. But as Dan Heath writes in Upstream, real progress comes from addressing root causes, which is why I also value Dr. Philip Zelikow’s view that multiple approaches should move forward together.)

#NorthKorea

#HumanRights

#NuclearWeapons

#Diplomacy

#CultRegime

#TruthToPower

#SpiritualInsight

#Evil

#Compassion

#Freedom

Subscribe to William’s Substack

By William YK Kim · Launched 25 days ago

My personal Substack

3. Trump administration urges South Korea to raise defense spending to 3.8% of GDP

It is pretty close to that if you factor in things like support to US forces, support to other nations as a member of the arsenal of democracies, and the construction of Camp Humphreys (the largest US base OCONUS). Revise how you calculate defense spending (which is what I understand NATO nations are doing) and South Korea will be close to this target.

So I asked my "research assistant" (AI) to assess South Korean defense spending. Here is her response.

South Korea's official defense spending as a percentage of GDP typically does not include its contributions to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) through the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) or large-scale infrastructure projects like Camp Humphreys. These are generally treated as separate from the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) core defense budget.

Here’s how it breaks down:

1. Core Defense Budget (counted in GDP %):

This includes:

Personnel costs
Procurement of weapons and equipment
Operations and maintenance
R&D and force modernization

This is what’s included in the official "defense spending as a % of GDP" figure (e.g., ~2.7–2.8% in recent years).

2. Special Measures Agreement (SMA) Contributions (not usually included):

The SMA is a bilateral cost-sharing agreement under which South Korea pays part of the cost for the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea, including:
Labor costs for Korean personnel supporting USFK
Base operations
Construction projects
These payments are off-budget in most reported defense GDP % figures because they are categorized as alliance support or "foreign assistance" rather than direct defense spending.

For 2024, South Korea agreed to contribute over 1.5 trillion KRW (approx. $1.1 billion) under the SMA.

3. Major Infrastructure Projects (e.g., Camp Humphreys relocation):

The Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP) involved over $10 billion in investment, with South Korea paying around 90% of the cost.
These were funded through multi-year special appropriations, not included in the regular defense budget figures reported for GDP ratio calculations.

These are treated more like one-time capital projects or inter-governmental agreements, not routine defense expenditures.

Summary Table:

Trump administration urges South Korea to raise defense spending to 3.8% of GDP

U.S. government documents suggest significant defense funding increase requests from Korea during trade talks.

https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-international/2025/08/10/2UWHAURV2VG4VA6K4OCHVKGOPQ/

Park ji-youn

Published 2025.08.10. 01:33

It has been revealed that the Donald Trump administration in the United States attempted to demand an increase in defense expenditure from Korea to 3.8% of its gross domestic product (GDP) during the Korea-U.S. trade negotiations finalized at the end of last month.

On July 18th, President Donald Trump is signing the stablecoin bill. /Courtesy of Reuters=Yonhap News

The Washington Post (WP) reported on the 9th (local time) citing documents obtained internally from the U.S. government that the Trump administration aimed to use tariffs to gain concessions related to diplomacy, security, and politics.

According to the 'initial draft of the Korea-U.S. agreement' reported by WP, the United States wanted Korea to expand its defense expenditure, which was 2.6% of GDP last year, to 3.8% and to increase the burden-sharing costs for U.S. military stationed in Korea.

It was also included as one of the demands to require Korea to issue a political statement supporting the flexibility of U.S. military posture in Korea (known as strategic flexibility) while continuing to deter North Korea and better deter China.

However, it has not been confirmed whether the U.S. side made such demands during the actual Korea-U.S. tariff negotiations. Last month’s announcements regarding the trade agreement did not include such security issues. The Korean government stated that defense expenditure matters were not addressed during the negotiations for reaching the Korea-U.S. trade agreement.

If the contents of this report are true, it means that regardless of whether the demands have already been conveyed to Korea, the Trump administration's stance has been somewhat revealed.

It can be inferred that the U.S. government's position is that it wants Korea to increase its defense expenditure by nearly 50% and publicly agree to the 'strategic flexibility' of U.S. forces in Korea.

There are also suggestions that the U.S. demands for an increase in Korea's defense expenditure and support for strategic flexibility could be specified in the Korea-U.S. summit that will be held in Washington, D.C. as early as this month.

※ This article has been translated by AI. Share your feedback here.

4. Korea-US summit expected to take place Aug. 25

But there is still no confirmed date that I can find.

Again, here is my vision for the summit:

Trump-Lee summit 2025: modernizing the South Korea-U.S. alliance

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/08/04/perspective-trump-kim-summit/4171754314991/

Korea-US summit expected to take place Aug. 25 - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

President Lee Jae Myung speaks on the phone with U.S. President Donald Trump at his official residence in Seoul, June 6. Korea Times photo by Wang Tae-seok

By Anna J. Park

Published Aug 7, 2025 5:23 pm KST
Updated Aug 7, 2025 5:38 pm KST

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

By Anna J. Park

Published Aug 7, 2025 5:23 pm KST

Updated Aug 7, 2025 5:38 pm KST

First summit meeting anticipated to discuss trade, tariff and alliance

The first summit between Korean President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to take place on Aug. 25 in Washington, D.C.

According to multiple local media reports and government sources, Lee is likely to arrive in the United States on Aug. 24, with the summit scheduled for the following day at the White House.

While final arrangements for the summit schedule are reportedly underway with U.S. officials, the possibility of changes to the date during final negotiations cannot be ruled out.

The presidential office has remained tight-lipped about the summit schedule, underscoring the importance of diplomatic protocols and joint coordination between the two countries.

“The summit date will be determined through diplomatic coordination between the two countries, and due to diplomatic practices, we cannot provide advance details at this time,” presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung told reporters during a press briefing at the presidential office Thursday.

“Once the date is finalized and mutual agreement is reached, we will of course inform the media first.”

U.S. President Donald Trump announces an additional $100 billion Apple investment in the U.S. in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., Wednesday (local time). UPI-Yonhap

If the summit takes place as expected on Aug. 25, Lee will meet his U.S. counterpart 82 days after taking office.

The upcoming summit between Seoul and Washington is anticipated to cover a wide range of issues concerning the South Korea-U.S. alliance, including follow-up negotiations on tariffs and trade matters.

In addition to trade, the talks are also likely to address the so-called “modernization” of the alliance, which may include increased South Korean defense spending, adjustments to the role and deployment of U.S. Forces Korea and closer alignment with U.S. efforts to counter China.

Lee had initially planned to hold his first bilateral meeting with Trump in mid-June during the G7 summit in Canada. However, the meeting was canceled after Trump abruptly returned to the U.S. due to developments related to an Israeli airstrike on Iran.

5. Lee’s politics undermines his diplomacy

Conclusion:

Korea’s diplomacy stands at a crossroads. The decisions made now will shape the structure of its alliances and security for years to come. If approached with instinct over insight and improvisation over vision, these negotiations will not be remembered as a display of alliance strength but as a sign that Korea’s foreign policy has begun to drift. The judgment Lee must now make is not merely about political survival. It is about the strategic survival of the nation he leads.

Lee’s politics undermines his diplomacy - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

By Park Jung-won

Published Aug 7, 2025 4:00 pm KST

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

By Park Jung-won

Published Aug 7, 2025 4:00 pm KST

Park Jung-won

The recent breakthrough in South Korea-U.S. tariff negotiations was quickly presented by the Korean government as a “hard-earned success.” However, a closer look at the process and outcome raises critical questions about whether this was truly a diplomatic win for President Lee Jae Myung’s administration. The official interpretations by Washington and Seoul diverge in important ways, and many observers argue that the deal amounted to tariff reductions in exchange for massive South Korean investment and job commitments in the United States. Labeling such compromises as a strategic success seems more like political messaging. And that messaging may soon be tested by even tougher diplomatic trials ahead.

More importantly, this agreement is only the beginning of a new phase in bilateral relations. It signals that the ROK-U.S. alliance is entering a period of structural realignment, one that will test the Lee administration’s ability to navigate increasingly complex diplomatic terrain. Looming on the horizon are a series of high-stakes issues: burden-sharing for U.S. forces in Korea, a potential redefinition of the U.S. military’s role on the peninsula, the transfer of wartime operational control, evolving policy toward North Korea and the question of Korea’s stance in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis. These are not challenges that can be addressed with reactive messaging or one-off tactics.

South Korea, for its part, appeared to approach the tariff negotiations from a largely defensive posture. This deal goes beyond mere tariff cuts, raising questions not just about economic diplomacy but about Korea’s capacity to shape its own strategic environment.

This defensive posture was not only reflected in the outcome, but was unmistakable during the process itself. For weeks, Korean officials struggled to secure meaningful contact with their American counterparts. Even after Lee’s election, it took considerable time to secure even a brief phone conversation with President Donald Trump. High-level communication has remained sparse, and Korean diplomats have frequently found themselves sidelined. This is not simply a matter of inadequate diplomatic skill — it suggests a deeper problem: a lack of strategic credibility in the eyes of Washington.

Part of the explanation lies in Lee Jae Myung’s political DNA. He rose to power by surviving a series of legal and political challenges, and his governing style is marked by tactical flexibility and short-term maneuvering rather than long-term strategic planning. As a political figure, Lee has often leaned into anti-American rhetoric and pro-China sentiments, positioning himself firmly within a specific ideological camp. While this may have paid dividends in domestic politics, it is a liability on the international stage. In diplomacy, consistency, past statements and accumulated trust matter. To Trump, Lee’s “consistent inconsistency” and tendency to shift positions based on political expediency rather than principle, makes him a predictable and manageable counterpart in deal-making.

Trump’s approach is built on identifying and exploiting the weaknesses of the other party. From his perspective, South Korea is a valuable partner in terms of manufacturing and security, but one that can be pressured into further concessions — especially if it lacks a coherent strategy. If the Lee administration mistakes this pressure for relationship-building, the result could be rising costs for the Korean economy and increased security burdens.

What makes this situation even more serious is the difficulty and sensitivity of what lies ahead. Trump’s past calls for U.S. troop withdrawals from South Korea are resurfacing, and these may be used as leverage to demand a dramatic increase in Seoul’s financial contributions. The role of U.S. forces may shift from a purely defensive posture to one focused on regional stability — a change that could directly affect Korea’s strategic autonomy. Perhaps most concerning, the U.S. is reportedly seeking advance commitments from Seoul on how it would respond in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This is not merely about money — it’s about entanglement in high-risk geopolitical flashpoints.

Against this backdrop, it is imperative that Lee and his core political allies abandon their reliance on domestic ideological frameworks when addressing foreign policy. While in the opposition, Lee found political capital in anti-American slogans and gestures of alignment with China. But these positions now constitute a diplomatic vulnerability — one that Trump, with characteristic aggressiveness, is likely to weaponize. What once fueled partisan gains at home is now being turned against Seoul at the negotiating table.

Partisan battles at home undermine predictability and trust abroad. In diplomacy, those qualities are essential. National security and foreign policy cannot be governed by opinion polls or appeals to a political base. What’s needed now is a bipartisan, long-term vision grounded in a sober understanding of Korea’s position in a shifting geopolitical order. Superficial shows of alignment with Washington are not enough; trust must be earned through consistent, credible actions. Lee must come to terms with the fact that his inconsistent record and lack of strategic direction have already cost Korea valuable leverage.

Lee is no longer an opposition leader. He cannot retreat into the political instincts that once served him. He is now the president of the Republic of Korea. If he fails in foreign policy, it is not only his administration that will suffer — the consequences will fall on the entire nation. As head of state, he must leave behind reactive, survival-driven politics and embrace a more deliberate, forward-looking leadership based on Korea’s enduring national interest. This is not a moment for tactical improvisation, but for strategic clarity.

Korea’s diplomacy stands at a crossroads. The decisions made now will shape the structure of its alliances and security for years to come. If approached with instinct over insight and improvisation over vision, these negotiations will not be remembered as a display of alliance strength but as a sign that Korea’s foreign policy has begun to drift. The judgment Lee must now make is not merely about political survival. It is about the strategic survival of the nation he leads.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.

6. Unification minister vows efforts to address issue of abductees held in N. Korea

Remember that some 78,000 South Korean POWs were never allowed to return to their homes in the ROK and their descendents in the north are still held hostage as slave laborers in the mines. Of course these are not considered in the abductee category but we should never forget this crime against humanity that is being perpetrated every day since the Armistice was signed in 1953.

Unification minister vows efforts to address issue of abductees held in N. Korea - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

This photo shows Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, center, holding a meeting with families of abductees held in North Korea, at his office in Seoul, Friday. Yonhap

By Yonhap

Published Aug 8, 2025 4:52 pm KST

The Korea Times · by ListenListenText SizePrint

By Yonhap

Published Aug 8, 2025 4:52 pm KST

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young met with families of abductees held in North Korea and pledged to make progress on the issue, including efforts to resume dialogue with Pyongyang.

The meeting with members of a group representing families of those abducted by North Korea came after the group agreed in June to halt its leaflet campaigns toward North Korea, following an appeal by the Lee Jae Myung government aimed at reducing tensions and improving inter-Korean relations.

Choi Seong-ryong, the group's leader, reaffirmed his promise to "never do anything to provoke North Korea," while urging the minister to resolve the issue of the abductees instead.

Chung expressed gratitude for the group's cooperation with the Lee government, pledging that the government "will do its utmost to open dialogue with North Korea and make progress on the issues of abductees and prisoners of war."

Kim Tae-joo, the wife of the chief fisherman on a South Korean fishing boat abducted by North Korea in 1987, broke into tears during the meeting with the minister. She dropped to her knees and pleaded for the minister's help in finding out whether her husband is still alive in North Korea, sobbing, "It's been forty years since all contact with my husband was cut off."

Chung noted, "There is no country in the world suffering pain like this," emphasizing that dialogue with North Korea must resume to address the grievances of the families.

7. S. Korea, Japan coordinating Lee-Ishiba summit late August: report

A positive step forward.

(LEAD) S. Korea, Japan coordinating Lee-Ishiba summit late August: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 9, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS presidential spokesperson's remarks in paras 3, 7)

SEOUL, Aug. 9 (Yonhap) -- The offices of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba have been coordinating to hold a summit in Tokyo later this month, a Japanese report said Saturday.

The meeting is most likely to take place around Aug. 23, Japan's Asahi Shimbun reported, citing multiple government sources.

When asked about the report, presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said the two sides have been coordinating the summit, but the schedule has not yet been confirmed.

If realized, it would be Lee's first visit to Japan since taking office in early June and would signal the resumption of "shuttle diplomacy" between the two nations' leaders.

Lee and Ishiba last met in person on June 17 on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Canada, during which they discussed ways to advance bilateral ties and bolster trilateral cooperation with the United States.

Lee is also widely expected to visit Washington for his first summit with U.S. President Donald Trump later this month, though the presidential office has yet to announce the schedule.

"The schedules for a S. Korea-Japan summit and S. Korea-U.S. summit are still being arranged, and have not been confirmed. We will announce them once they are confirmed," Kang told reporters.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (R) and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba pose for a photo ahead of their talks at the Group of Seven summit venue in Kananaskis, Canada, on June 17, 2025. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · August 9, 2025

8. How North Korea Promotes Kim’s ‘Dear Daughter’ as a Worthy Heir

Please go to this link to view the article and photos in the proper format.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/08/09/world/asia/kim-jong-un-daughter-kim-ju-ae-north-korea.html?unlocked_article_code=1.c08.xy7Y.R32-E4DzINp8&smid=url-share

I am skeptical about these "preparations for succession." I always wonder if he is just giving something for Korean watchers to focus and comment on to distract from other issues.

How North Korea Promotes Kim’s ‘Dear Daughter’ as a Worthy Heir

By Pablo Robles and Choe Sang-Hun Aug. 8, 2025

Kim Jong-un introduced his daughter to the world in November 2022 with a show of affection and menace, holding her hand in front of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Since then, state media has shown Kim Ju-ae more and more prominently next to her father, the leader of North Korea.

9. Washington watches North Korea’s diplomatic signal

As we watch these "signals" please assess them through a deep understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.

Washington watches North Korea’s diplomatic signal

Posted August. 09, 2025 07:20,

Updated August. 09, 2025 07:20

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20250809/5775559/1

A senior U.S. State Department official said on Aug. 7 that Washington "notes with interest" a recent statement by Kim Yo Jong, deputy director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, suggesting the North may be open to talks if its status as a nuclear-armed state is acknowledged. The official also called South Korea’s recent conciliatory steps—including the postponement of joint military drills and the dismantling of border loudspeakers—“meaningful.” With the Korea-U.S. summit approaching, some analysts believe Washington, while pushing for Seoul to take the lead in defense efforts, may not rule out engaging with Pyongyang on nuclear disarmament.

Seth Bailey, acting deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and special representative for North Korea, addressed the issue at an annual briefing hosted by the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. "We have seen high-level remarks from the North Korean leadership, including the recent statement by Kim Yo Jong," Bailey said. "We are taking note of her comments with interest." On July 29, Kim said the personal relationship between “our head of state (Kim Jong Un) and the current U.S. president (Donald Trump)” remains intact but added that aligning such personal ties with denuclearization goals “would be an insult to the other party.”

Bailey also referenced the 2018 Singapore joint statement, emphasizing that “since beginning his second term, President Trump has made it clear he is willing to engage with North Korea to advance the policy goals outlined in that agreement.” His remarks highlighted the administration’s readiness to resume dialogue aimed at improving bilateral relations. The Singapore agreement included commitments to normalize diplomatic ties, pursue complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, establish a lasting peace regime, and recover the remains of prisoners of war and those missing in action.

Oh-Hyuk Kwon hyuk@donga.com

10. [Wang Son-taek] Key points for a successful S. Korea-US summit

Will it be on August 25th?

Wise words here from Professor Wang.

Conclusion:

In summary, direct confrontation must be avoided, while strategic praise should be deployed. President Lee must project charisma, not submission. Mutually beneficial programs should be framed as Trump’s victories. Expectations for the summit should be lowered. Trump’s diplomacy is erratic, but not inscrutable. With careful preparation and psychological foresight, the summit can avoid disaster — and perhaps even yield progress. In this high-stakes encounter, restraint, strategy and narrative control will be more valuable than policy details.

[Wang Son-taek] Key points for a successful S. Korea-US summit

koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · August 7, 2025

The upcoming South Korea-US summit scheduled for this month is poised to become a landmark diplomatic event in the history of the alliance — regardless of its outcome. Under President Donald Trump’s renewed leadership, the United States is aggressively redrawing the international order. The administration’s approach has discarded traditional norms of multilateral cooperation in favor of a transactional, unilateral model. At the heart of this shift is an escalating tariff war.

South Korea has also felt the impact. In late July, Seoul and Washington reached a surprising and lopsided agreement: despite the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, which originally guaranteed tariff-free trade, Korea will now face a 15 percent tariff on exports to the US. This concession was made to reduce Trump’s initial demand of a 25 percent tariff. In exchange, Korea agreed to invest $350 billion in the United States and to import $100 billion worth of US energy products. These numbers are staggering.

Unsurprisingly, this has shaken confidence in the alliance. Within South Korea, growing embarrassment and frustration have raised questions over whether the alliance is still grounded in mutual respect — or if it has devolved into an asymmetric arrangement driven solely by US pressure. In this context, the upcoming summit between President Lee Jae Myung and President Trump carries immense importance. Ideally, the two leaders would agree on ways to enhance the alliance and reduce uncertainty. But optimism must be tempered. Trump is a notoriously unpredictable figure. Since beginning his second term in January, he has grown even more inflexible in his positions.

For many global leaders, meeting with Trump has become a nerve-wracking ordeal. In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy experienced a disastrous summit in Washington. During a 40-minute meeting, Trump, and Vice President JD Vance openly cornered Zelenskyy, accusing him of recklessness and dismissing his diplomatic appeals. In May, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa was subjected to a bizarre ambush at the White House. Trump unexpectedly raised unfounded claims about “white genocide” in South Africa and used misleading footage to pressure Ramaphosa in front of the press.

Diplomacy is built on mutual respect and reliable communications. Yet Trump’s actions suggest a deliberate strategy of shaming foreign leaders to achieve domestic political gains. While history offers many examples of powerful states bullying weaker ones, Trump’s overt and often theatrical humiliations of heads of state are without modern precedent.

There is no guarantee that President Lee Jae Myung will be treated differently. Hoping for a summit that yields a comprehensive agreement may be overly ambitious. A successful summit may simply mean that the alliance remains intact and that relations between the two leaders do not fray. To achieve even this limited success, the South Korean government must be thoroughly prepared. First, anticipate Trump’s theatricality. Trump has shown a pattern of using summits for spectacle. Some incidents, like the Ramaphosa ambush, were clearly premeditated. To avoid confrontation, South Korea should convey to the White House that there is no reason for hostility between the two sides.

Second, while Trump has frequently harassed foreign leaders perceived as weak, he tends to respect strong leaders. He has openly expressed admiration for authoritarian figures like Putin, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un. This is not because of ideology, but because he associates strength with authority. President Lee should project confidence and national support — not arrogance, but firm resolve. Any perception that President Lee is weak could prompt Trump to treat him as prey, rather than a peer.

Third, remember that Trump is not persuaded by logic — he is influenced by emotion. Many European leaders have learned that flattery often works where facts do not. While sycophancy is distasteful, directly contradicting Trump in public or humiliating him at the negotiating table is unwise. Managing his ego is not appeasement — it is strategic calibration. If a deal is reached, framing it as a product of Trump’s leadership will likely help sustain momentum. In fact, this approach should apply in all diplomacy, not just with Trump. But in Trump’s case, it is essential.

Fourth, Trump thrives in highly orchestrated events where he is center stage and commands international attention. The 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong Un is instructive: when Trump perceived the summit as favorable, he was willing to engage and compromise. Similarly, Trump’s attitude toward former President Moon Jae-in evolved. While initially skeptical during their first meeting in June 2017, Trump was noticeably more cooperative during the Seoul summit in November that year. In Seoul, Trump reportedly took a strong interest in visiting the Demilitarized Zone and warmed to President Moon. He showed that his attitude can shift when he feels respected or engaged in a dramatic setting.

Fifth, Trump is eccentric, but still shrewd. His apparent rudeness is often a simple tactic to bolster his domestic image. His core concern is winning — especially on issues that matter to his base. If South Korea can identify areas of cooperation that align with Trump’s domestic political agenda, those can be repackaged as victories for him while also serving Korean interests. One area of interest is shipbuilding. Trump has repeatedly emphasized revitalizing US manufacturing, particularly in industries like naval shipbuilding. South Korea could offer more specific ideas in this field. Moreover, emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors and green technology present opportunities for joint initiatives. The key is to shape these proposals so they appear as Trump’s ideas or triumphs.

In summary, direct confrontation must be avoided, while strategic praise should be deployed. President Lee must project charisma, not submission. Mutually beneficial programs should be framed as Trump’s victories. Expectations for the summit should be lowered. Trump’s diplomacy is erratic, but not inscrutable. With careful preparation and psychological foresight, the summit can avoid disaster — and perhaps even yield progress. In this high-stakes encounter, restraint, strategy and narrative control will be more valuable than policy details.

Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.

khnews@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · August 7, 2025

11. North Korea’s Hwasong-18 ICBM Should Terrify the United States

KJU wants us to be afraid, be very afraid. This gives his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies leverage (if we are afraid).

North Korea’s Hwasong-18 ICBM Should Terrify the United States

The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · August 6, 2025

Topic: Air Warfare

Blog Brand: The Buzz

Region: Asia

August 6, 2025

The Hwasong-18 fundamentally upends the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula in North Korea’s favor.

There’s talk that President Donald Trump is prepared to resume the historic diplomacy with North Korea’s ruler, Kim Jong-un, that he had initiated during his first term.

The only problem facing Trump is that the geopolitical situation is much different than it was in his first term, with North Korea now the logistical hub of Russia’s war against Ukraine (and as a primary partner for China in the region). Meanwhile, with the rise of the left-wing government of Lee Jae-myung in South Korea—who seeks stability with Pyongyang and distance from Washington—North Korea has lost a major thorn in its side.

As for North Korea itself, its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities are lightyears beyond what they were in Trump’s first term. In other words, there is little incentive for Pyongyang to negotiate.

How Did North Korea Build a Top-Tier ICBM?

When one talks about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and its threat to its neighbors—and increasingly to the United States—it is hard to imagine why Pyongyang would seek negotiations with America in the first place.

North Korea’s development of the Hwasong–18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) represents a pivotal advancement in its military arsenal, underscoring the regime’s relentless pursuit of nuclear capabilities. First tested in April 2023, this solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM has been launched successfully multiple times, including in July and December 2023.

Unlike its liquid-fueled predecessors, the Hwasong-18’s design enhances survivability and launch readiness, posing a heightened threat to global security. Boasting formidable technical specifications that elevate North Korea’s strike potential, this three-stage missile launched from a transporter-erector launcher (TEL) vehicle, has an estimated range of around 15,000 kilometers (or 9,321 miles). When fired on a standard trajectory, this allows the Hwasong-18 to reliably reach any point in the continental United States from North Korean territory.

In lofted tests, the Hwasong-18 has achieved altitudes exceeding 6,000 kilometers (3,728 miles) with a flight time of more than an hour, demonstrating reliability and payload capacity. The solid-fuel propulsion is a critical upgrade: pre-loaded propellants eliminate the need for lengthy fueling processes, reducing launch preparation from hours to minutes and making preemptive strikes against it far more challenging.

It can potentially carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and decoys (because by at least 2013, we know that North Korea achieved vaunted miniaturization of their nuclear weapons capacity), complicating missile defenses by overwhelming interceptors.

While clearly inspired by Russian designs such as the Topol-M missile, evidence suggests that the Hwasong-18 was largely developed indigenously rather than copied from abroad. The missile’s features position it as North Korea’s most advanced ICBM to date, surpassing its liquid-fueled systems like the Hwasong-17.

Why the Hwasong-18 Missile Is So Dangerous

The missile constitutes a profound threat to the United States and its allies, primarily due to its ability to deliver nuclear warheads across vast distances with minimal warning. For the United States, it directly endangers the mainland, enabling Pyongyang to hold American cities hostage in a crisis and potentially deterring US intervention in regional conflicts. The solid-fuel advantage heightens vulnerability, as mobile launchers are harder to track via satellite, reducing the window for countermeasures.

Allies like South Korea and Japan face amplified risks, too. Shorter-range variants of the missile, or even tactical adaptations, could target bases in Seoul or Tokyo, where US forces are stationed. The threat extends beyond kinetic warfare: it fosters psychological deterrence, forces US allies to second-guess escalatory responses, and could potentially fracture alliances if US extended deterrence appears unreliable.

North Korea’s nuclear warfare doctrine, formalized in a 2022 law on nuclear forces policy, emphasizes preemptive and offensive use to safeguard the regime. While pledging not to transfer nuclear technology, it authorizes nuclear strikes if the leadership, command structure, or state sovereignty is perceived as threatened—even by non-nuclear means. This aggressive stance flatly rejects no-first-use commitments, allowing for early escalation from conventional to nuclear warfare to neutralize superior allied forces.

The Hwasong-18 Is Vital to North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy

Under Kim Jong-un, the doctrine has shifted toward assured retaliation and preemption, leveraging weapons like the Hwasong-18 for credible second-strike capabilities. It aims to deter invasion by imposing unacceptable costs, while constitutional amendments in 2023 enshrined nuclear development as a core state policy.

The Hwasong-18 fundamentally upends the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula in North Korea’s favor. Historically, South Korea and US forces held conventional superiority, but this ICBM provides Pyongyang with a survivable nuclear deterrent that inhibits preemptive allied actions. The Hwasong-18’s mobility and quick-launch features erode the allies’ intelligence advantages, complicating decapitation strategies and shifting the strategic calculus toward mutual vulnerability.

Because of this weapon, the last several years of smart geopolitical moves by North Korea since the end of Trump’s first term, and the recent political upheaval in South Korea, the strategic balance has shifted decisively in North Korea’s favor on the peninsula. The Hwasong-18 plays a key role in that shift.

About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock / mwreck.

The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · August 6, 2025

12. Seoul’s Strategic Dilemma: Navigating a High-Stakes Summit With Trump

Conclusion:

Success, therefore, will not be defined by a grand bargain or a transformative joint vision. Rather, it will be measured by the skillful management of risk and the preservation of core interests. A successful outcome for Lee would be returning to Seoul having secured a manageable, multiyear SMA deal, a joint statement that reaffirms the alliance’s strength without explicitly committing USFK to an anti-China mission, and a strong public reaffirmation from Trump on extended deterrence and troop levels. The primary criterion is to leave Washington with the South Korea-U.S. alliance intact, but without having started a new crisis with either Washington or Beijing. In the turbulent world of transactional diplomacy, a calm news cycle following the summit would be the clearest sign of victory.

Seoul’s Strategic Dilemma: Navigating a High-Stakes Summit With Trump

thediplomat.com

When Donald Trump and Lee Jae-myung meet, the very definition of the 70-year-old South Korea-U.S. alliance will be on the table.

By Seong-Hyon Lee

August 07, 2025

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“Fasten your seat belt. We are going through turbulence.” This was the stark metaphor South Korea’s new foreign minister, Cho Hyun, offered in a recent interview to describe the global security environment. His words aptly capture the challenge facing Seoul as President Lee Jae-myung prepares for his first summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, expected later this month.

Cho’s diplomatic debut in Washington – marked by a crucial meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio – has set the stage for a high-stakes encounter. With a contentious trade deal now settled, the focus has pivoted entirely to the more perilous terrain of defense and security, where the very definition of the 70-year-old South Korea-U.S. alliance is on the table.

The summit’s agenda will be driven by Trump’s transactional worldview, forcing the new progressive administration in Seoul to navigate a set of formidable U.S. demands. The central thesis of the summit is clear: the South Korea-U.S. alliance must now prove its “return on investment” to a skeptical Washington. This will test Lee’s statesmanship as he attempts to secure ironclad U.S. security guarantees against North Korea while parrying a relentless U.S. push for Seoul to “pay up and pivot” toward confronting China – a dilemma starkly reflected in his foreign minister’s recent tightrope diplomacy and Beijing’s wary response.

Washington’s New Calculus: The Price of a “Modernized” Alliance

Trump’s primary demands are expected to be as direct as they are challenging, coalescing around two core pillars: a radical increase in financial contributions and a strategic pivot toward countering China, all packaged under the diplomatic framework of “alliance modernization.” The “pay up” component is familiar ground. Drawing from the playbook of his first term, Trump is widely expected to open negotiations over the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) with an astronomical figure to anchor the conversation.

More strategically significant, however, is the “pivot.” This push is being championed by key administration figures like Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, a principal architect of the “America First” security strategy. In a recent post on X (formerly Twitter), Colby praised South Korea as a “role model” for its defense spending and willingness to take the lead against North Korean threats, yet simultaneously emphasized that the two allies are “closely aligned on the need to modernize the alliance.” For Colby and this school of strategists, “modernization” means rectifying what they see as a strategic misallocation of resources. As one senior South Korean official recently acknowledged, this means there “may be changes to the role and character of USFK.”

This “modernization” is not about minor adjustments. It is a fundamental effort to repurpose U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), moving beyond its traditional mission of deterring North Korea to endow it with the “strategic flexibility” for regional contingencies aimed at China. This could be achieved not by altering the 28,500 statutory troop cap, but by changing the mission sets of those forces or withholding rotational deployments, a move potentially justified under broad interpretations of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty.

The official readout from the Cho-Rubio meeting confirmed this is not mere speculation. It explicitly noted that both sides “emphasized that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait was an indispensable element” of international security and discussed the importance of advancing “U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation.”

Seoul’s High-Wire Act: Defending Sovereignty and Security

Faced with this immense pressure, the Lee administration must perform a delicate balancing act. Cho’s Washington Post interview provided a masterclass in this high-wire diplomacy. He acknowledged China as a “challenge” and “competitor” but immediately stressed the “need for engaging China, because simply trying to block China will not be as effective as we want.”

This careful phrasing, however, was interpreted in Beijing as “ambivalence,” with Chinese state-affiliated media warning Seoul not to be used as leverage by a “third party.” This exchange vividly illustrates the bind Seoul is in: every statement intended to reassure Washington is scrutinized in Beijing, and vice-versa.

This strategic divergence exposes underlying fault lines in the alliance. As noted by analysts in Seoul, the official U.S. call for the “complete denuclearization of the DPRK” or North Korea – a phrase included in the State Department readout – differs subtly but significantly from the traditional preference of South Korean progressive governments for “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” a broader formulation designed to create space for dialogue with Pyongyang.

To counter Washington’s pressure, Lee will arrive with his own non-negotiable demands. The top priority will be securing an ironclad, unambiguous reaffirmation of U.S. extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella. With North Korea’s deepening military cooperation with Russia, any ambiguity in the U.S. commitment is an existential threat. Alongside this, South Korea’s president will push for progress on the transfer of wartime military operational control (OPCON). This long-standing goal, domestically framed as a matter of military sovereignty, inherently resonates with the U.S. administration’s burden-sharing narrative by demonstrating Seoul’s commitment to greater self-reliance.

Redefining Success in a Transactional World

Ultimately, the stakes of this summit are monumental, both for Lee’s government and for the future of Northeast Asian security. His credibility as a statesman is on the line as he navigates between Trump’s demands, China’s red lines, and a deeply polarized domestic public still emerging from a major political crisis.

Success, therefore, will not be defined by a grand bargain or a transformative joint vision. Rather, it will be measured by the skillful management of risk and the preservation of core interests. A successful outcome for Lee would be returning to Seoul having secured a manageable, multiyear SMA deal, a joint statement that reaffirms the alliance’s strength without explicitly committing USFK to an anti-China mission, and a strong public reaffirmation from Trump on extended deterrence and troop levels. The primary criterion is to leave Washington with the South Korea-U.S. alliance intact, but without having started a new crisis with either Washington or Beijing. In the turbulent world of transactional diplomacy, a calm news cycle following the summit would be the clearest sign of victory.

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Washington’s New Calculus: The Price of a “Modernized” Alliance

Seoul’s High-Wire Act: Defending Sovereignty and Security

Redefining Success in a Transactional World

Authors

Guest Author

Seong-Hyon Lee

Seong-Hyon Lee, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations and an associate-in-research at the Harvard University Asia Center. He resides in Boston.

thediplomat.com

13. Chilling simulation shows exactly what would happen if North Korea launched a nuclear bomb towards the White House

Yes, Kim wants us to be afraid.

Chilling simulation shows exactly what would happen if North Korea launched a nuclear bomb towards the White House

Published 10:53 8 Aug 2025 GMT+1

Chilling simulation shows exactly what would happen if North Korea launched a nuclear bomb towards the White House

If a nuclear weapon was launched, the president would only have minutes to evacuate

Emily Brown

A detailed simulation has laid out what might happen if North Korea were to launch a nuclear ballistic missile towards the United States.

unilad.com

A detailed simulation has laid out what might happen if North Korea were to launch a nuclear ballistic missile towards the United States.

The threat of nuclear war is one that continues to hover amid political tensions, with nine countries currently known to possess nuclear weapons.

Those countries include the US, the UK, France, Israel, Pakistan, India and China, as well as Russia and North Korea.

In 2022, The Infographics Show put together a video explaining what might happen if North Korea were to utilize a weapon known as Hwasong-15; a two-stage missile with a wide nose cone that could carry a heavy nuclear warhead on its tip.

The simulation details how North Korea could revert to a 'primitive telephone technology' to ensure their conversation about a launch isn't being spied on, and speculates how the country's leader could give the go-ahead for launch on the missile.

North Korea is one of nine countries with nuclear weapons (Getty Stock Photo)

While the initial plans may come as a surprise, defensive measures in place by the US could detect the thermal plume of the missile, issuing an emergency alert and prompting authorities on the ground in the US to verify the threat.

Advert

Once verified, an alert would go to the White House where the president would head to the situation room to analyze real-time tracking data, while the Secret Service begins preparations to move the POTUS to a secure and 'highly classified' location.

"If the missile is aimed at the White House, the president has less than 40 minutes to vacate," the video explains.

US warships are equipped with missiles which could be used for short-range intercepts just outside the Earth's atmosphere, but they would require the target to be in its descent stage in order to adequately target it.

On dry land, the US Northern Command would begin to activate the US' homeland defences, including the ground-based mid-course defence system which has a collection of intercepters with a far greater range, designed to intercept the missile mid-course.

The video notes that while North Korea does have missiles capable of reaching America's east coast, attacks would be less precise than they would be on the west coast.

Advert

US army ships would move into position in an attempt to protect the major population centers, while so-called 'doomsday' airplanes would take off and fly high enough to avoid any destruction on the ground, with the president likely on board Air Force One.

The president would likely board Air Force One in the event of a nuclear attack (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

Nuclear-capable aircraft would undergo preparations for a possible nuclear mission, while the American nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet would make its own preparations to attack on command.

Once American supercomputers are able to calculate the trajectory, altitude, and speed of the North Korean missile, they would come up with a firing solution for the interceptors and, ideally, successfully destroy the missile.

Advert

Meanwhile, the president could ask the United States Congress for a formal declaration of war with North Korea, meaning the attack is only the beginning.

unilad.com

14. Leak Reveals the Workaday Lives of North Korean IT Scammers

Leak Reveals the Workaday Lives of North Korean IT Scammers

Spreadsheets, Slack messages, and files linked to an alleged group of North Korean IT workers expose their meticulous job-planning and targeting—and the constant surveillance they're under.

Wired · by Matt Burgess · August 7, 2025

Job hunting is a fresh kind of hell. Hours are wasted sifting through open roles, tweaking cover letters, dealing with obtuse recruiters—and that’s all before you get started with potential interviews. Arguably, some of the world’s most prolific job applicants—or at least most persistent—are those of North Korea’s sprawling IT worker schemes. For years, Kim Jong Un’s repressive regime has successfully sent skilled coders abroad where they’re tasked with finding remote work and sending money back to the heavily sanctioned and isolated nation. Each year, thousands of IT workers bring in somewhere between $250 million and $600 million, according to United Nations estimates.

Now an apparent huge new trove of data, obtained by a cybersecurity researcher, sheds new light on how one group of alleged North Korean IT workers has been running its operations and the meticulous planning involved in the money-making schemes. Money made by scam IT workers contributes to North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction development efforts and ballistic missile programs, the US government has said. Emails, spreadsheets, documents, and chat messages from Google, Github, and Slack accounts allegedly linked to the alleged North Korean scammers show how they track potential jobs, log their ongoing applications, and record earnings with a painstaking attention to detail.

The cache of data, which represents a glimpse into the workaday life of some of North Korea’s IT workers, also purportedly includes fake IDs that may be used for job applications, as well as example cover letters, details of laptop farms, and manuals used to create online accounts. It reinforces how reliant upon US-based tech services, such as Google, Slack, and GitHub, the DPRK workers are.

“I think this is the first time to see their internal [operations], how they are working,” says the security researcher, who uses the handle SttyK and asked not to be named due to privacy and security concerns. SttyK, who is presenting their findings at the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas today, says an unnamed confidential source provided them with the data from the online accounts. “There are several dozen gigabytes worth of data. There are thousands of emails,” says SttyK, who showed WIRED their presentation ahead of the conference.

North Korea’s IT workers have, in recent years, infiltrated huge Fortune 500 companies, a host of tech and crypto firms, and countless small businesses. While not all IT worker teams use the same approaches, they often use fake or stolen identities to get work and also use facilitators who help cover their digital tracks. The IT workers are often based in Russia or China and are given more freedom and liberties—they’ve been seen enjoying pool parties and dining out on expensive steak dinners—than millions of North Koreans who are not afforded basic human rights. One North Korean defector who operated as an IT worker recently told the BBC that 85 percent of their ill-gained earnings were sent to North Korea. “It’s still much better than when we were in North Korea,” they said.

Multiple screenshots of spreadsheets in the data obtained by SttyK show a cluster of IT workers that appear to be split into 12 groups—each with around a dozen members—and an overall “master boss.” The spreadsheets are methodologically put together to track jobs and budgets: They have summary and analysis tabs that drill down into the data for each group. Rows and columns are neatly filled out; they appear to be updated and maintained regularly.

The tables show the potential target jobs for IT workers. One sheet, which seemingly includes daily updates, lists job descriptions (“need a new react and web3 developer”), the companies advertising them, and their locations. It also links to the vacancies on freelance websites or contact details for those conducting the hiring. One “status” column says whether they are “waiting” or if there has been “contact.”

Screenshots of one spreadsheet seen by WIRED appears to list the potential real-world names of the IT workers themselves. Alongside each name is a register of the make and model of computer they allegedly have, as well as monitors, hard drives, and serial numbers for each device. The “master boss,” who does not have a name listed, is apparently using a 34-inch monitor and two 500GB hard drives.

One “analysis” page in the data seen by SttyK, the security researcher, shows a list of types of work the group of fraudsters are involved in: AI, blockchain, web scraping, bot development, mobile app and web development, trading, CMS development, desktop app development, and “others.” Each category has a potential budget listed and a “total paid” field. A dozen graphs in one spreadsheet claim to track how much they have been paid, the most lucrative regions to make money from, and whether getting paid weekly, monthly, or as a fixed sum is the most successful.

“It’s professionally run,” says Michael “Barni” Barnhart, a leading North Korean hacking and threat researcher who works for insider threat security firm DTEX. “Everyone has to make their quotas. Everything needs to be jotted down. Everything needs to be noted,” he says. The researcher adds that he has seen similar levels of record keeping with North Korea’s sophisticated hacking groups, which have stolen billions in cryptocurrency in recent years, and are largely separate to IT worker schemes. Barnhart has viewed the data obtained by SttyK and says it overlaps with what he and other researchers were tracking.

“I do think this data is very real,” says Evan Gordenker, a consulting senior manager at the Unit 42 threat intelligence team of cybersecurity company Palo Alto Networks, who has also seen the data SttyK obtained. Gordenker says the firm had been tracking multiple accounts in the data and that one of the prominent GitHub accounts was previously exposing the IT workers’ files publicly. None of the DPRK-linked email addresses responded to WIRED’s requests for comment.

GitHub removed three developer accounts after WIRED got in touch, with Raj Laud, the company’s head of cybersecurity and online safety, saying they have been suspended in line with its “spam and inauthentic activity” rules. “The prevalence of such nation-state threat activity is an industry-wide challenge and a complex issue that we take seriously,” Laud says.

Google declined to comment on specific accounts WIRED provided, citing policies around account privacy and security. “We have processes and policies in place to detect these operations and report them to law enforcement,” says Mike Sinno, director of detection and response at Google. “These processes include taking action against fraudulent activity, proactively notifying targeted organizations, and working with public and private partnerships to share threat intelligence that strengthens defenses against these campaigns.”

“We have strict policies in place that prohibit the use of Slack by sanctioned individuals or entities, and we take swift action when we identify activity that violates these rules,” says Allen Tsai, senior director of corporate communications at Slack’s parent company Salesforce. “We cooperate with law enforcement and relevant authorities as required by law and do not comment on specific accounts or ongoing investigations.”

Another spreadsheet also lists members as being part of a “unit” called “KUT,” a potential abbreviation of North Korea’s Kim Chaek University of Technology, which has been cited in US government warnings about DPRK-linked IT workers. One column in the spreadsheet also lists “ownership” as “Ryonbong,” likely referring to defense company Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, which has been sanctioned by the US since 2005 and UN since 2009. “The vast majority of them [IT workers] are subordinate to and working on behalf of entities directly involved in the DPRK’s UN-prohibited WMD and ballistic missile programs, as well as its advanced conventional weapons development and trade sectors,” the US Treasury Department said in a May 2022 report.

Across the myriad of IT worker-linked GitHub and LinkedIn accounts, CVs, and portfolio websites that researchers have identified in recent years, there are often distinct patterns. Email addresses and accounts use the same names; CVs can look identical. “Reusing resume content is also something that we’ve seen frequently across their profiles,” says Benjamin Racenberg, a senior researcher who has tracked North Korean IT worker personas at cybersecurity firm Nisos. Racenberg says the scammers are increasingly adopting AI for image manipulation, video calls, and as part of scripts they use. “For portfolio websites, we’ve seen them use templates and use the same template over and over again,” Racenberg says.

That all points to some day-to-day drudgery for the IT workers tasked with running the criminal schemes for the Kim regime. “It’s a lot of copy and paste,” Unit 42’s Gordenker says. One suspected IT worker Gordenker has tracked was spotted using 119 identities. “He Googles Japanese name generators—spelled wrong of course—and then over the course of about four hours, just fills out spreadsheets just full of names and potential places [to target].”

The detailed documentation also serves another purpose, though: tracking the IT workers and their actions. “There’s a lot of moving parts once the money gets into the actual hands of leadership, so they're going to need accurate numbers,” DTEX’s Barnhart says. Employee monitoring software has been seen on the scammers’ machines in some instances and researchers claim North Koreans in job interviews won’t answer questions about Kim.

SttyK says they saw dozens of screen recordings in Slack channels showing the workers daily activity. In screenshots of a Slack instance, the “Boss” account sends a message: “@channel: Everyone should try to work more than at least 14 hrs a day.” The next message they sent says: “This time track includes idling time, as you know.”

“Interestingly, their communication has been all English, not Korean,” SttyK says. The researcher, along with others, speculates this may be for a couple of reasons: first, to blend into legitimate activity; and secondly, to help improve their English skills for applications and interviews. Google account data, SttyK says, shows they were frequently using online translation to process messages.

Beyond a glimpse at the ways in which the IT workers track their performance, the data SttyK obtained gives some limited clues about the day-to-day lives of the individual scammers themselves. One spreadsheet lists a volleyball tournament the IT workers apparently had planned; in Slack channels, they celebrated birthdays and shared inspirational memes from a popular Instagram account. In some screen recordings, SttyK says, they can be seen playing Counter-Strike. “I felt there was a strong unity among the members,” SttyK says.

Wired · by Matt Burgess · August 7, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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