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Quotes of the Day:
"With the benefit of historical hindsight, we can all see things which we would wish had been done differently or not at all."
- Elizabeth II
To live is to suffer, to survive is to find some meaning in the suffering.
- Friedrich Nietzsche
“Don’t bother with churches, government buildings or city squares; if you want to know about a culture, spend a night in its bars.”
- Ernest Hemingway
1. Johns Batchelor Show: 1/2: #ROK: #DPRK: Information campaign to free the North Koreas and unite the peninsula. David Maxwell, FDD
2. N. Korea unresponsive to U.N. query on enforced disappearance cases: report
3. S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases hit 8-week low for Saturday amid Chuseok
4. Highways nationwide clogged both ways on 2nd day of Chuseok holiday
5. [WHY] Korea's first world problem: Is the mart open?
6. It’s time to play the long game (South Korea - between the US and PRC)
7. Tightening the Screws: Kim Jong Un’s Clampdown on “Capitalist Tendencies”
8. Preparing for geopolitical typhoon (ROK)
9. Yoon visits Seoul military unit on Chuseok to encourage soldiers
10. North Korea Says It Will Never Give Up Nuclear Weapons: What 10 Experts Told Us
11. N. Korea’s currency continues to strengthen against the Chinese yuan
12. With New Law on Nuclear Forces Policy, North Korea Says Its Nuclear Status Is ‘Irreversible'13.
1. Johns Batchelor Show: 1/2: #ROK: #DPRK: Information campaign to free the North Koreas and unite the peninsula. David Maxwell, FDD
My 2 part interview with John Batchelor on a human rights upfront approach and information and influence activities to solve the "Korea question" to achieve a free and unified Korea.
1/2: #ROK: #DPRK: Information campaign to free the North Koreas and unite the peninsula. David Maxwell, FDD
https://audioboom.com/posts/8155353-1-2-rok-dprk-information-campaign-to-free-the-north-koreas-and-unite-the-peninsula-david-ma?utm
1/2: #ROK: #DPRK: Information campaign to free the North Koreas and unite the peninsula. David Maxwell, FDD
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/09/a-three-part-plan-to-enhance-president-yoons-north-korea-strategy-toward-a-free-and-unified-korea/
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/09/02/a-three-part-plan-to-enhance-president-yoons-north-korea-strategy-toward-a-free-and-unified-korea/
2/2: #ROK: #DPRK: Information campaign to free the North Koreas and unite the peninsula. David Maxwell, FDD
https://audioboom.com/posts/8155354-2-2-rok-dprk-information-campaign-to-free-the-north-koreas-and-unite-the-peninsula-david-ma?utm
2. N. Korea unresponsive to U.N. query on enforced disappearance cases: report
Just in case anyone needs a reminder about north Korean human rights abuses and crimes against humanity.
We need a human rights upfront approach.
N. Korea unresponsive to U.N. query on enforced disappearance cases: report | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · September 10, 2022
SEOUL, Sept. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea remains unresponsive to requests from a U.N. working group for information on more than 300 enforced disappearance cases involving the reclusive country, a U.N. report showed Saturday.
The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has made the requests related to the 362 cases to the North between 1980 and May this year, but there has been no response from Pyongyang, according to its annual report recently submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Council.
Enforced disappearance refers to a case of a person going missing after having been arrested, detained or abducted by a government or state-run organization.
"The Working Group again reiterates its serious concern regarding the continuing practice of forced returns of nationals of the Democratic Republic of Korea from third countries," the report read, using the North's official name.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · September 10, 2022
3. S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases hit 8-week low for Saturday amid Chuseok
But will there be a surge after Chuseouk?
(LEAD) S. Korea's new COVID-19 cases hit 8-week low for Saturday amid Chuseok | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · September 10, 2022
(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES with details throughout; CORRECTS figure in para 2 following KDCA's correction)
SEOUL, Sept. 10 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's new COVID-19 cases fell to the lowest tally for a Saturday in eight weeks, data showed, due largely to fewer tests carried out over the Chuseok holiday.
The country reported 42,724 new COVID-19 infections, including 237 cases from overseas, bringing the total caseload to 23,976,673, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said.
Saturday's tally is sharply down from 69,410 the previous day. Daily infections have slowed after peaking at around 180,000 in mid-August in the latest virus resurgence.
It also marked the lowest figure for a Saturday since the 41,295 reported July 16.
South Korea added 48 COVID-19 deaths, down 20 from a day earlier, raising the death toll to 27,429. The fatality rate came to 0.11 percent.
The number of critically ill patients stood at 525, up 21 from the previous day.
Of the locally transmitted cases, Seoul accounted for 6,076, and its surrounding Gyeonggi Province added 10,947 cases. Incheon, 27 kilometers west of Seoul, reported 2,223 additional infections.
The government has called for vigilance against the virus amid growing transmission risks, with heavy travel expected during the four-day Chuseok holiday that began Friday.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · September 10, 2022
4. Highways nationwide clogged both ways on 2nd day of Chuseok holiday
As an aside, anyone who is concerned with noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) operations and the use of ground transportation to conduct evacuations should study the traffic patterns of Chuseok (and the Lunar New Year) and then multiply the difficulty and complexity by about 100.
(LEAD) Highways nationwide clogged both ways on 2nd day of Chuseok holiday | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · September 10, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES para 3 with latest estimate)
SEOUL, Sept. 10 (Yonhap) -- Sections of expressways nationwide remained clogged with traffic Saturday as South Koreans traveled across the country on the second day of the four-day Chuseok holiday, officials said.
This year's Chuseok holiday, or the Korean fall harvest celebration, started Friday and will run through Monday. Koreans normally head back to their hometowns to spend time with their families.
As of 1:00 p.m., it took 7 hours and 50 minutes to drive from Seoul to Busan, 325 km southeast of the capital, about four hours longer than normal. From Busan to the capital city, it took 8 hours and 10 minutes.
The Korea Expressway Corp. said expressways nationwide are set to remain congested both ways as some people will start returning home, with others heading to their ancestors' graves to pay their respects.
The congestion on the expressways heading to Seoul is set to peak from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Saturday. For the other direction, it is expected to peak at around 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m., according to the expressway operator.
colin@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 강윤승 · September 10, 2022
5. [WHY] Korea's first world problem: Is the mart open?
Slow news day due to Chuseok in Korea. But think about this versus the suffering in the north. The Korean people in the north would be happy to suffer from these problems in the South.
Saturday
September 10, 2022
dictionary + A - A
[WHY] Korea's first world problem: Is the mart open?
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/09/10/why/Korea-large-marts-marts/20220910070004545.html
A Lotte Mart branch in Seoul displays a sign announcing closing dates for August. [NEWS1]
Anyone who has lived in Korea for some amount of time is probably familiar with — and has likely at least once fallen victim to — the baffling shopping conundrum that is the closing of large marts every other Sunday.
Depending on the region, the stores might instead be closed on designated weekdays, but whatever the day may be: It is mandatory for large marts to have these closing days. It’s written in the law.
Visitors to Korea or new residents may find themselves heading to their nearest Homeplus, Lotte Mart or Emart only to be turned away by a sign on the door: “Closed.”
So why is it mandatory for large marts in Korea to have regular closing dates, and what purpose does this system actually serve?
A constant frustration
One man fell victim to the large marts' closed doors so many times that he took the matter into his own hands.
“It was a culmination of all the frustration at the times I walked to the local Homeplus only to find it closed,” said Jake Kwon, a journalist at CNN and the creator of the website ishomeplusopen.com. This website does one thing and one thing only — it tells you whether Homeplus or other large marts in Korea are open that day. The website is as simple as it sounds, with only “Yes” or “No” — written in English — against a white background on the main page.
Officially launched on Feb. 1, 2016, ishomeplusopen.com has on average over 3,000 visitors each month, according to Kwon, a testament to how many people find the closures for large marts confusing, especially foreigners. There have been a total of 345,000 visitors since the website’s launch.
“I found the closing measure inconvenient and, especially at the time of its institution, unusual,” said Kwon. “I do not remember there being a similar system in Vancouver or New York City where I lived.”
Other websites and even apps are available to people who want to know when large marts are closed. A Korean-language app, the name of which can be translated to “Are Marts Closed,” can be downloaded from Google Play Store and App Store, while Naver Map, Google Map and Kakao Map all offer information on closing dates when users search for marts nearby or search for directions to marts.
A shopper browses the aisles at a large mart in Seoul on August 8. [NEWS1]
How did it start?
Korea’s system of enforcing mandatory closing dates for large marts goes back a full decade.
Back in January 2012, the National Assembly passed an amendment to the Distribution Industry Development Act, with the overarching aim to “ensure efficient promotion and balanced development of the distribution industry,” according to the law’s general provisions.
In other words, the amendment was passed in order to protect smaller local shops and traditional markets, which were being threatened by large marts operated by conglomerates like Lotte and Shinsegae, aggressively expanding their branches since the mid-2000s.
Initially, under the amendment of the Distribution Industry Development Act in 2012, large marts and conglomerate-operated "super supermarkets" (SSMs) had to close one to two days a month, and had to keep their doors barred from midnight until 8 a.m. every day. Beginning in April the next year, the mandatory closing dates were fixed to two days a month, while large marts and SSMs had to keep closed between midnight to 10 a.m.
Conglomerates resisted the changes. Two lawsuits, filed jointly by six companies operating large marts and SSMs, took place in an effort to cancel the amendment, with the Supreme Court ruling in 2015 that the amendment was to hold, and the Constitutional Court ruling in 2018 that the enforcement of mandatory closing dates was constitutional.
The courts stated that it was in the public's best interest to maintain and nurture smaller businesses, and stressed the equally important goal of protecting the rights and health of employees working at large marts.
And so the system began.
A traditional market in Chuncheon, Gangwon in January 2022. [YONHAP]
Have small shops and traditional markets fared better by having large marts close?
In short: no. An assortment of research data and surveys conducted over the years have come to the glaring conclusion that mandatory closing dates for large marts have not in any way saved local shops or traditional markets.
The proportion held by small shops and traditional markets in overall retail sales dropped from 40.7 percent in 2012 to 32.2 percent last year, according to Statistics Korea.
In a January 2021 research report by the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), only 8.3 percent of respondents said that they visited small local shops and traditional markets when large marts such as Homeplus were closed.
In the results of an earlier survey by the Korea Distribution Association in 2020, the number of people who responded that they visited small local shops and traditional markets instead of large marts was even lower, at only 5.8 percent.
“It was almost inevitable that the mandatory closures would have no impact,” said Lee Eun-hee, professor of consumer sciences at Inha University. “Regulating customers’ movements will not force them to go another route. Simply closing a certain type of store will not make people visit another type of store.”
Shopping carts are lined up outside a large mart in Seoul on a closing day. [YONHAP]
Then where do customers go when large marts close?
The answer is online shopping malls.
Sales by online shopping malls doubled in the past decade according to Statistics Korea, with the proportion of sales from online shopping malls in total retail sales jumping from 13.8 percent in 2012 to 28.1 percent last year. The amount of transactions on online shopping malls jumped from 34.1 trillion won ($25.3 billion) in 2012 to 187.1 trillion won last year, an increase of more than 448 percent.
More specifically, sales by online shopping malls peaked with an average of 37 percent growth on days when large marts closed, according to research by Suh Yong-gu, a professor of business administration and marketing at Sookmyung Women’s University.
“Online shopping malls are the easiest way for me to shop for groceries when my local Homeplus is closed,” said Kim Seung-gyu, a newlywed office worker in his 30s who lives in Seoul. “I can’t bother to go anywhere else. Sometimes, smaller shops don’t have what I’m looking for on their shelves, and it’s a hassle to go out to traditional markets.”
“You just get used to online shopping,” said Cho Sang-won, a university student in his 20s who lives alone. “I guess traditional markets could be cheaper, but I haven’t been to one in years.”
Like Kim and Cho, many consumers are defaulting to online shopping malls, with 49.5 percent of people shopping online for groceries when large marts are closed, according to a survey conducted by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) on 1,000 consumers in June this year. Another 33.5 percent responded that they would rather wait a day for large marts to open again than visit a traditional market.
Some respondents in these surveys by professor Suh and the KCCI went so far as to say that large marts and smaller businesses including traditional markets were not to be seen as competitors, with 57.3 percent of respondents in Suh’s research saying that the two types of enterprises are not in competition with each other, and 67.8 percent of respondents in the KCCI survey saying that regulations on large marts should be lifted.
“Large marts and smaller businesses including traditional markets are not in competition with each other, but with online shopping malls,” said Suh. “People used to talk about the Walmart effect, but now all we talk about is the Amazon effect,” he continued, referring to the terms used to describe the economic impact felt by local businesses when a large retailer opens a new location in the area, and the disruption of the retail market caused by increased e-commerce.
“The pie for offline enterprises is shrinking rapidly compared to that of online shopping malls,” added Lee. “This has only been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic.”
Gwangjang Market in Seoul is crowded with shoppers and tourists on September 5, a week from Chuseok. [YONHAP]
Some traditional markets are now famous tourist attractions, what about them?
While many small shops and traditional markets have been neglected, a select few seem to thrive as tourist attractions. Although most traditional markets do not have a systematic way of counting the number of daily visitors to get a solid comparison between markets, tourism websites such as the Korea Tourism Organization, World Travel Guide, Expat Guide Korea and Seoul Space list a handful of the most popular markets, many of which overlap.
“Approximately 10,000 people visit our market every day,” said Kim Jin-chul, president of the Mangwon Market Association, one of the traditional markets listed on tourism websites. “Foreign tourists have increased in the last few years, and although they’ve shrunk with the pandemic, the number has bounced back recently. I’d say about 20 tour guides each leading around 10 foreign tourists visit every day.”
According to the Seoul Tourism Association, certain traditional markets were previously advertised to foreigners as places to visit, but the association does not actively promote them anymore.
“Turning traditional markets into tourist attractions cannot be a real solution,” said Lee. “Only a few locations would be able to survive through that strategy. We need to seek out other options.”
Such options to revitalize traditional markets are mainly digitalization of services and differentiation of concepts, according to experts.
“Traditional markets need to adapt to changing times by speeding up digitalization and offering up-to-date services,” said Lee.
In relation to this, digitalization of traditional markets in cooperation with major e-commerce companies such as Coupang and Naver have recently proven fruitful. According to Coupang, sales of shops who adopted deliveries with the company saw a 77 percent average increase over the last two years. Naver reported similar results, saying that in the past three years, 170 shops in traditional markets that they collaborated with experienced a 74-times jump in the number of orders.
A shop owner at Jwadong Traditional Market holds up his phone to show a delivery service app. [YONHAP]
While such collaborations are encouraging in general, people will need to be careful about letting e-commerce companies step into “help” traditional markets digitalize, according to Lee.
“We need to be careful to not have traditional markets rely on e-commerce companies to turn them digital,” said Lee. “There is also the problem of exactly how much of those increased sales actually goes back to the small business owners.”
These success cases in collaboration with e-commerce companies aside, the overall digitalization of small shops and traditional markets has been slow. According to the most recent report on traditional markets published by the Ministry of SMEs and Startups in 2020, only 7.5 percent of traditional markets countrywide had set up a website, while 0.9 percent of shops and vendors in traditional markets had made use of online shopping malls.
The Korean government is trying to raise these numbers and push for the digitalization of small shops and traditional markets. In a policy announcement to support small businesses that was revealed on Aug. 26, the Yoon Suk-yeol government set forth plans to accelerate the digitalization of small businesses, including building a nationwide big data platform to provide useful management information by 2023, and training 100,000 business owners every year to adapt to e-commerce by 2027.
“Educational programs and governmental support for digitalization are most urgent to revitalize small businesses including traditional markets,” said Park Sang-hee, a spokesperson for the Korea Federation of Micro Enterprise.
A shopper carries groceries through a large mart in Seoul on July 17, 2022. [YONHAP]
Could the mandatory closures for large marts be abolished in the near future?
As of now, doesn't seem very likely.
The Yoon Suk-yeol government had introduced the idea of abolishing the mandatory closing dates for large marts in early August, but quickly scrapped it after facing backlash from small business owners and related associations. Yoon himself instructed officials during a Ministry of Economy and Finance meeting on Aug. 25 to “carefully consider the matter so as not to harm small businesses.”
“The issue will most likely drag on year after year,” said Suh. “It’s become a politicized topic, and is not a matter of which option would yield the most economic gains anymore. If changes are to be made to the current system, consumers need to speak up.”
Large marts and the conglomerates that operate them are naturally expected to want an abolishment of the current mandatory closing dates. According to NH Investment & Securities, Emart could generate additional sales of 960 billion won per year if mandatory closing dates are abolished, while Lotte Mart could gain an additional 384 billion won every year.
Those representing small businesses ask whether it’s fair for large marts to try to “take over” what remaining proportion local shops and traditional markets are struggling to hold on to in the retail industry.
“It seems to us that large marts and SSMs are trying to make up for their own losses from the rise of e-commerce by taking over smaller offline shops and markets,” said Park. “Small businesses recognize the need to change, such as adopting digitalization — perhaps large marts also need to change.”
For some consumers, it’s a non-issue.
“I don’t really care if Homeplus starts opening every day,” said Kim, the office worker in his 30s who said he uses online shopping malls when large marts close. “I think I would still keep using Market Kurly even if that happens. I guess I would also order delivery from traditional markets if they offered it, but the nearest market to my house doesn’t have that option yet.”
When asked if he has heard of ishomeplusopen.com, Kim replied he knows and used to visit the site, but has now memorized when his Homeplus closes.
“It’s every second and fourth Sunday.”
BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
6. It’s time to play the long game (South Korea - between the US and PRC)
Thursday
September 8, 2022
dictionary + A - A
It’s time to play the long game
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/09/08/opinion/columns/US-China-contest/20220908181408537.html
Choi Yong-min
The author is the head of the World Trade Center Seoul and former head of the Institute for International Trade.
Amid the U.S.-China hegemony contest, “U.S. for security, China for economy” is often mentioned as Korea’s foreign policy strategy. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in August 1992, Korea’s exports to China recorded $49.8 billion in 2003, up 47.8 percent from the previous year and surpassing Korea’s export to the U.S. at $42.8 billion that year. The development became the realistic foundation for “U.S. for security, China for economy.” Also, as China’s role as the mediator for the North Korean nuclear issue emerged, the vague tightrope walk between America and China was highlighted as a clever tactic and wise compromise.
But since the Thaad crisis in late 2016, a new trend began to appear. Some Korean companies which thrived after advancing to China since the establishment of relations were persecuted and withdrew, and highly popular Korean dramas and games suddenly disappeared in China. Moreover, as the latest U.S.-China contest expanded to a technology war, a return to the Cold War is in progress. As the U.S. and China are pressuring Korea to show which side it is on, should Korea put an end to the dichotomy of the U.S. for security and China for economy?
Korea may want to stop the dual approach and shout for democracy and a free market. But the reality is not that easy. There is no doubt that China will overtake the U.S. and become the biggest global market around 2030. We should also admit the reality that there is no partner to replace China in building a stable supply chain for future industries.
As imports of lithium hydroxide — a key material for secondary batteries — from China increased by 404 percent in the first half, Korea’s reliance on China is nearly absolute. Some say that Korea can pressure China by using semiconductors as a weapon, but it is a short-sighted opinion that does not take the other side into account. Chipmakers cherish the division of work within the industry. For instance, Korean companies conduct wafer processing in Chinese factories, import them, and do wafer-cutting and packaging in Korea. Therefore, if one side is paralyzed, both countries suffer.
Strictly weighing the balance of economy and security, the mantra of America for security and China for economy can be modified a bit. But we easily reach a conclusion that the dual process is still necessary. A pragmatic alternative is to build skills internally and minimize external words and actions for a while.
We can learn from Japan’s response to China. Japan cut ties with Taiwan in 1972 and normalized diplomatic relations with China. It embraced the One China principle. Over the sharp Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands disputes, Tokyo avoided the issue. Whenever a diplomatic issue arises, Japan dispatches a high-level official to Beijing and approaches China through unofficial exchanges.
Korea must avoid choosing between America and China. Low profile diplomacy with China is not the answer, either. A Korean strategy of hiding talent and improving skills is needed to take substantial gains while avoiding conflict. To properly use the frame of “conceal one’s strengths and bide one’s time,” we should refrain from expressing our intentions while trying to maintain an overwhelming technological gap.
Even if there is friction, high-level contacts should be increased. As retired high-level Chinese officials are known to have a strong influence, informal diplomacy should be utilized.
There is no need to react sensitively to Chinese media. Due to the characteristics of a socialist state, we must keep in mind that Chinese media is intended for domestic use. It is necessary to invest more in reinforcing infrastructure to learn about China. China sends young talents to North Korea to learn the language and has diplomats alternate between China, South Korea and North Korea to create Korean Peninsula experts.
If you don’t like your neighbor, you can move. But a country cannot. China is Korea’s closest neighbor and competitor. To effectively deal with China, Korea desperately needs to bide its time and focus on its actual interests.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
7. Tightening the Screws: Kim Jong Un’s Clampdown on “Capitalist Tendencies”
So much to consider from this. Useful for influence operations. Provides an understanding of the regime's true nature and intent for control of the people. The ideological and values fight between north and South. Development in north Korea now, in the future, and post unification... - And so on.
The referenced 14 page paper can be found here: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/FINAL-NCNK-WWC-Silberstein-Tightening%20the%20Screws.pdf
Tightening the Screws: Kim Jong Un’s Clampdown on “Capitalist Tendencies”
https://www.38north.org/2022/09/tightening-the-screws-kim-jong-uns-clampdown-on-capitalist-tendencies/
Image: NCNK / Wilson Center – Korea Center
Although North Korea is one of the harshest totalitarian states in the world, it is not as static as observers often claim. This report examines the roots of Kim Jong Un’s crackdown on so-called “capitalist tendencies,” a term the regime uses to describe its citizen’s consumption of foreign culture, primarily from South Korea, as well as other tendencies the state perceives as threatening to its authority. Because of his age and stint as a high school student in Switzerland, many hoped that Kim might take North Korean society in a less oppressive direction when he came to power in late 2011.
Instead, Kim seems to have been bent on making state surveillance and censorship stronger and more effective from the very beginning. North Korea’s apparatus for social control and surveillance was badly damaged by the famine of the 1990s as some of its most central functionaries, such as border guards, became susceptible to bribes. This has made smuggling of foreign culture, most popularly South Korean TV dramas, both possible and common. A majority of North Koreans have, according to survey studies, watched foreign media content illegally while in North Korea. But specifically under Kim Jong Un’s tenure, defectors say this has become increasingly difficult and dangerous.
Indeed, Kim has made censorship and social conformism important policy priorities. In 2014, for example, Kim gave a speech at a meeting for “ideology officials,” most likely propaganda cadres, accusing “imperialists” of infiltrating “corrupt reactionary ideology and culture” into the country. This issue has remained center-stage. At the Eighth Party Congress in early 2021, for example, Kim delivered a report underscoring the “need for a firm political climate” and “the struggle for eliminating all kinds of anti-people factors,” and other expressions.
This report traces the historical background of the current state campaign, and discusses some of the implications it may have for North Korean society going forward. While the regime sees foreign information and culture as one of its most pressing social threats, the campaign may either lose institutional steam or face public discontent should it continue and intensify.
The full text of “Tightening the Screws: Kim Jong Un’s Clampdown on ‘Capitalist Tendencies,’” a report by 38 North Nonresident Fellow, Dr. Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein for the “Understanding North Korea roundtable series,” a joint program of the National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) and the Wilson Center’s Hyundai Motor – Korean Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, can be found here. The original report and others in this series can be found here.
8. Preparing for geopolitical typhoon (ROK)
Some Korean history - Japanese invasion 1592 and the Korean War of 1950.
The" Future" - Taiwan and PRC-US "competition?"
This is an all encompassing conclusion:
President Yoon Suk-yeol must shake the political slump to prepare the nation for geopolitical risks. The 10th largest trade power should not neglect diplomacy. The foreign minister should be elevated to the level of deputy prime minister. Experts on U.S. and Chinese affairs must advise the president. All national policies encompassing economy, security, science and technology, and culture should be reoriented to strengthen Korea’s readiness towards geopolitical risks. The disaster and tragedy originating with negligence of political leaders are not confined to the realm of history. The administration must put top priority on devising effective strategies to solve the North Korean nuclear threat and geopolitical risks.
Thursday
September 8, 2022
dictionary + A - A
Preparing for geopolitical typhoon
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/09/08/opinion/columns/Korea-geopolitical-China/20220908181638617.html
Yeom Jae-ho
The author is an emeritus professor and former president of Korea University.
The Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592 was devastating. From the invasion 200 years after the Joseon Dynasty was founded, the population shrank by 30 percent, of which 1 percent, or 100,000 Koreans, were taken to Japan as prisoners to never return home.
The second calamity was the 1950-53 Korean War, in which 700,000 Korean, 40,000 American and 200,000 Chinese servicemen died. Including civilians, over two million died.
The Korean War on the face of it was a war between Korean. But it was actually a global war involving the United Nations allied troops from 16 countries behind South Korea — and China and the Soviet Union behind North Korea. The 1592 Japanese invasion also was a part of an imperialistic ambition to conquer the Ming Dynasty of China after Toyotomi Hideyoshi brought an end to the Sengoku Period, or Warring States Period, and united Japan.
The Korean Peninsula is destined for geopolitical risks involving the global powers of the United States, China, Japan and Russia. The U.S., which had supported China to become the world’s factory to help contain the former Soviet Union, is now warring with China. America’s stance has dramatically changed in the last 20 years when it backed China’s market opening and investment and invited Chinese students and skilled workers to the U.S. The U.S. has formed a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, Australia,and India and seeks the Chip 4 alliance with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to rein in China’s rise on the security and technology fronts.
Since a visit to Taiwan by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, China has been firing missiles towards Taiwan in mass-scale military drills in protest to America and Taiwan. China joined Russia’s Vostok (East) 2022 war games in waters off its Far East coastal regions. A new Cold War with South Korea, the U.S and Japan pitted against North Korea, China, and Russia is developing.
As warned in the book “Destined for War” by Harvard University Prof. Graham Allison, the U.S and China could be headed for a war under the Thucydides Trap where a rising power threatens to displace the ruling power. The battleground would likely be Taiwan, the South China Sea or the Korean Peninsula, not the U.S. or Chinese mainland. Even if a physical war will not take place, the U.S.-China contest over trade and technology will bring about greater pressure on South Korea. When Chinese President Xi Jinping’s third term is confirmed at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) next month and he becomes the strongest and longest-lasting Chinese leader after Mao Zedong, he could pursue more nationalistic and hard-line policy to achieve the so-called Chinese dream. The conflict between the U.S. and China will surely deepen to cause more serious challenges to South Korea stuck in the middle.
In January last year, the Ukraine foreign minister strongly denied the possibility of a Russian invasion. But Ukraine has become devastated from a war since February. The postwar global order has been shaken to be guided by the rule of the muscle. But Korea’s political leaders only have thoughts on the next general and presidential elections. They merely chase populist politics and are uninterested in massive geopolitical challenges. The media reports daily on the never-ending political mud fights. Politicians do not ruminate on why films dealing with Japanese invasions — like the 2014 film “The Admiral: Roaring Currents” and recently-screened “Hansan: Rising Dragon” — became unprecedented box-office hits.
The geopolitical typhoon from a clash between America and China could be more deadly and devastating than the Typhoon Hinnamnor, which wreaked havoc on the southeastern coast this week. Strategist Yoolgok and Admiral Lee Sun-shin could not save the country from Japanese invaders because politicians were immersed in factional battles. The opposite report by two envoys of Joseon, who had visited Japan a year before the Japanese invasion, helped cause the internal division. Even the envoy from a rivaling faction admitted the possibility of Japanese invasion but did not dare to mouth it in fear of weakening the faction’s position in the royal court.
President Yoon Suk-yeol must shake the political slump to prepare the nation for geopolitical risks. The 10th largest trade power should not neglect diplomacy. The foreign minister should be elevated to the level of deputy prime minister. Experts on U.S. and Chinese affairs must advise the president. All national policies encompassing economy, security, science and technology, and culture should be reoriented to strengthen Korea’s readiness towards geopolitical risks. The disaster and tragedy originating with negligence of political leaders are not confined to the realm of history. The administration must put top priority on devising effective strategies to solve the North Korean nuclear threat and geopolitical risks.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
9. Yoon visits Seoul military unit on Chuseok to encourage soldiers
Yoon visits Seoul military unit on Chuseok to encourage soldiers
The Korea Times · September 10, 2022
President Yoon Suk-yeol interacts with soldiers and officers during his visit to the Capital Defense Command in Seoul, Saturday. YonhapPresident Yoon Suk-yeol on Saturday visited an Army unit in Seoul to encourage soldiers working on the Chuseok holiday, his office said.
Yoon met with some 40 enlisted soldiers and officers of an air defense company of the Seoul-based Capital Defense Command over lunch, according to the presidential office.
The president said he was grateful for the soldiers devoting themselves to protect the skies of Seoul while being unable to spend time with family and parents on Chuseok.
Yoon also thanked them for their service, noting he is "able to tend to state affairs with a peaceful mind" thanks to their work.
The president later held impromptu video calls with several parents of the soldiers. In one of the calls, Yoon said the government will "spare no effort" to improve working conditions of soldiers.
All able-bodied Korean men are to serve in the military for around two years in a country that constantly faces North Korea's military threats.
Yoon later held separate video calls with soldiers serving in overseas South Korean military units in South Sudan, Lebanon, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, according to his office.
The president highlighted that South Korea is the sole nation in the world to successfully transform into an international aid provider from an aid receiver and said the country's military personnel across the world are the "driving force" behind such efforts.
Yoon also shared a Facebook post thanking military service people on duty during the holiday. He praised their community support in the country's post-typhoon recovery efforts as having served greatly in returning the lives of people affected by the storm to normalcy. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · September 10, 2022
10. North Korea Says It Will Never Give Up Nuclear Weapons: What 10 Experts Told Us
Many excellent comments from a number of Korea watchers.
However, this one is troubling. This is exactly what Kim wants and such appeasement will prove to Kim that his strategy of political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and development of advanced warfighting capabilities has been successful. Such appeasement will not end well for us Kim will double down. And it will make conflict more likely even if we try hard to avoid it.
Excerpt:
That was always an unrealistic objective, as it ignored patent reality: North Korea has nuclear weapons and isn’t going to give them up. The good news, however, is that our nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to deter North Korea indefinitely and assure our security. The best thing we could do is seek inter-Korean rapprochement, encourage the improvement of North/South interaction, and slowly seek normalized relations – as we have successfully done for decades with China and the USSR/Russia. The worst thing we could ever do would be to try and use force to compel Kim to give up his weapons, which would likely spark the war we’ve always said we wanted to avoid.
North Korea Says It Will Never Give Up Nuclear Weapons: What 10 Experts Told Us
19fortyfive.com · by Harry Kazianis · September 9, 2022
While it might not drive the headlines or click traffic that it used to – without Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un threatening each other with nuclear war, the ‘appeal’ just isn’t there – North Korea is still a threat the United States must take very seriously.
And while the Biden Administration doesn’t seem that interested in dealing with the Kim regime at the moment – considering it has a full national security plate these days – it seems Pyongyang is eager to remind Washington that its nuclear forces will continue to advance in the months and years to come. Indeed, North Korea finally stated out loud what most Kim watchers already knew: Pyongyang declared that it would never give up its nuclear weapons in any sort of negotiation and that it is now a full-fledged nuclear weapons state.
To be fair, Pyongyang had already enshrined in its constitution years back that it was a nuclear power and said consistently for some time that it won’t give up its nukes. Nonetheless, yesterday’s announcement from Kim Jong-un was much more authoritative, as it was part of a new nuclear policy law. North Korea also laid out the conditions in which it might even launch a preemptive nuclear strike, something many experts thought was part of Pyongyang’s overall strategic thinking. And just to spice things up – and try to show it would be a ‘responsible’ nuclear power – it codified that the Kims would never sell their nuclear technology.
So, where does this leave us with North Korea? Is it time to accept the Kim family as nuclear power, or are more sanctions to get them back to the bargaining table in order?
19FortyFive asked some of the top experts to share their thoughts in the below symposium. As more responses come in, we will add them below.
Bruce Bechtol, Professor, Angelo State University: “North Korea remains defiant when it comes to their nuclear weapons.
Past behavior hinting that “eventually” they would dismantle their programs was only meant to gain more concessions from the United States. The North Korean leadership has invested far too much time and money into both Plutonium and HEU weaponization programs to simply walk away.
The only thing that would make that happen is for overarching and unreasonable concessions to occur. Even then, Pyongyang’s lack of transparency likely ensures that some of the nuclear weapons would be likely to remain – though hidden from inspectors. Thus, North Korea’s recent announcement comes as no surprise and is typical of the rhetoric spouted when talks (or lack of talks) are at an impasse.
North Korean Hwasong-16 ICBM. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media.
If new talks occur, North Korea has now assured itself a position that takes all involved parties back to the same place they were several years ago – the beginning (again).”
Bruce Bennett, Rand Corporation: “It is no surprise that Kim Jong-un is refusing to denuclearize. He has said he would not denuclearize many times in the past, but he still tempted the U.S. government with negotiations, seeking concessions from the United States. But since he reportedly did not bring North Korean nuclear experts to those negotiations, he apparently viewed them as a way to gain his desired recognition of North Korea as a “nuclear power,” and had no intent to denuclearize. So much for U.S. hopes and dreams. In one poll, 70 percent of South Koreans did not expect Kim to denuclearize, while in another poll, 90 percent of South Koreans thought North Korean denuclearization is unlikely.
The problem is that North Korea doesn’t just possess nuclear weapons: It threatens to use them.
For example, on Thursday, North Korea’s parliament passed a law that included “a provision requiring North Korea’s military to launch nuclear strikes if the leadership comes under attack.” While this is not a particularly surprising deterrent threat against outside intervention, it is worrisome in large part because of growing instability in the North that could trigger North Korea limited nuclear weapon use either in response to internal threats or as a diversionary measure because of internal threats. And the new law justifies preemptive nuclear weapon use, a threat that destabilizes future regional crises.
These concerns must be coupled with the North’s nuclear weapon production going “full steam ahead,” according to the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Whether North Korea has enough fissile materials for 45 nuclear weapons as one expert posits, or for over 100 per a reported U.S. intelligence estimate, these numbers are well beyond what North Korea needs to deter U.S. and/or South Korea-initiated military action against the North.
On a recent trip to South Korea, I asked various audiences: “How large a nuclear attack would North Korea need to threaten against the South to deter South Korean conventional military attacks on the North?” The most common answer was “0”: My audiences saw little to gain and much to lose with military attacks on the North. And I can see no interest in the United States for risking a nuclear weapon exchange with the North—nothing of worth for the U.S. to gain.
President Donald J. Trump shakes hands with Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un Sunday, June 30, 2019, as the two leaders meet at the Korean Demilitarized Zone. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
We must therefore worry that Kim’s continued nuclear weapon build-up is more for offensive than defensive purposes. While Kim is sufficiently risk averse to avoid offensive nuclear weapon use in normal circumstances, what might he do if facing internal threats, especially from the North Korean military. Ordering his military to invade and attack South Korea could divert them from attacking Pyongyang in such circumstances. Since he almost certainly can’t win such a war using only conventional forces, he may hope that his nuclear weapons would allow him to change the peninsula regional balance, especially if the South Korea/U.S. alliance shows fissures in the future.”
James Jay Carafano, Vice President for the Heritage Foundation: “Never say never again is more than a movie title. It is difficult, if not impossible, to envision a future where North Korea is ever allowed to be treated like a normal nation and enjoy the benefits of global intercourse and retain a nuclear arsenal whose sole purpose is to threaten and blackmail its neighbors. The stability and security of Northeast Asia are too important. An eternal commitment to sustaining a nuclear arsenal is a permeant commitment to isolation, and it is unclear if an isolated North Korean regime can sustain itself in perpetuity. Its a self-imposed death sentence.”
Daniel L. Davis, Senior Fellow, Defense Priotories, Former LT. Colonel, U.S. Army: “This declaration simply puts an official seal on what we’ve known is true for over a decade: North Korea is not going to give up what it considers its sole guarantee for regime survival. America’s policy of ‘maximum pressure,’ employed under one name or another by nearly every president since North Korea passed the nuclear threshold, has been an abysmal failure. Virtually every Administration has set a policy goal to see the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.
That was always an unrealistic objective, as it ignored patent reality: North Korea has nuclear weapons and isn’t going to give them up. The good news, however, is that our nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to deter North Korea indefinitely and assure our security. The best thing we could do is seek inter-Korean rapprochement, encourage the improvement of North/South interaction, and slowly seek normalized relations – as we have successfully done for decades with China and the USSR/Russia. The worst thing we could ever do would be to try and use force to compel Kim to give up his weapons, which would likely spark the war we’ve always said we wanted to avoid.
Image: Creative Commons.
We’ll stay safe as long as we don’t do anything foolish, like initiate a war.”
Fred Fleitz, Vice Chair of the America First Policy Institute’s Center for American Security and former CIA analyst: “There is little doubt that the Biden Administration’s negligent North Korea policy coupled with its foreign policy failures led to a surge in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, including Kim Jong Un’s recent statement that his country would never relinquish its nuclear weapons.
This is a far cry from the Trump years when Kim committed to giving up his nuclear weapons program, ceased nuclear tests, and ended most missile tests, including all tests of long-range missiles.
Biden mocked Trump’s accomplishments on North Korea and refused to build on them. He snubbed Pyongyang by naming a part-time special envoy. Secretary of State Blinken has ignored North Korea.
It, therefore, was not a surprise that belligerent actions by North Korea surged as the perception of Biden as a weak president grew.
The North began to surge missile tests last fall after the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. It tested at least 34 missiles so far in 2022, the most ever in one year. In March, North Korea began excavation to regain access to its Punggye-ri underground nuclear test site. And now, the North has withdrawn its commitment to denuclearize.
President Trump did not solve the nuclear threat from North Korea, but his leadership considerably lowered tensions and created a chance for a diplomatic solution. President Biden’s foreign policy incompetence squandered what Trump accomplished. Let’s hope the Biden Administration responds to North Korea with high-level engagement and strength, and not the appeasement we have seen in its efforts to get a new nuclear deal with Iran.”
Hwasong-12. Image Credit: KCNA/North Korean State Media.
Wallace Gregson, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Obama Administration, Retired LT. General, U.S. Marine Corps: “North Korea recently announced that it would never give up its nuclear weapons. Reports indicate that they passed a new law declaring itself a nuclear weapons state and added that this is “irreversible”.
This should have surprised no one.
Internal power dynamics in North Korea, a need to be able to command global attention, and the profitable business of nuclear and weapons proliferation demand possession of an ever-improving ability to deliver nuclear weapons at a global range. Being useful, of not formally allied with autocrats in China and Russia is also a factor. A case could also be made for deterrence, but we have some experience with the defensive advantages of North Korea’s mountainous terrain. It’s hard to think of a good reason to invade conventionally armed North Korea.
A North Korea without nuclear weapons commands little attention, despite its conventional threat to South Korea. Their army is not what it used to be, thanks to malnutrition and other issues, but they do pose a significant threat to South Korea’s capital. In the past, they executed a submarine attack and sank a South Korean vessel. They also shelled one of the Northwest Islands with additional fatalities.
Simply put, they are a dangerous but manageable conventional threat.
They achieved their nuclear weapons status in large part thanks to Pakistan’s A Q Khan, a proliferation entrepreneur. North Korea learned that art well. Business in this blackest of black markets is very good, and it keeps the North Korean elites in their accustomed luxury.”
Image Credit: KCNA/DPRK State Media.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute: “The Biden administration is reacting to foreign crisis after crisis, really a cascade of crises, and it really is remarkable that North Korea’s resumption of testing long-range missiles early this year after four years of quiet barely made the news.
Nobody should be under the illusion that the Kim regime would give up nuclear weapons without being made to, so there is no surprise here. But that doesn’t mean we just resign ourselves to “accepting” them as a normal nuclear state or believe them when they breathlessly declare how they’ll be a responsible nuclear state. North Korea is a gulag with nukes and an active criminal weapons proliferator. What the United States and the West should face up to is the grim geopolitical picture coming into clearer view, and that’s that there is a China-Russia convergence, and they are explicitly deepening ties with rogue states North Korea and Iran to leverage them against us.
How we approach those rogue states will help or hurt the China-Russia effort to break the US-led order.”
Bruce Klingner, former CIA Deputy Division Chief for Korea, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation: “Kim Jong Un’s statement was an affirmation of existing North Korean nuclear doctrine rather than a change.
The regime had already codified its status as a nuclear state during the 2013 revision of the North Korean constitution. Kim’s declaration also mirrors much of the regime’s 2012 Law on Consolidating the Status of a Self-Defensive Nuclear Weapons State.
While Pyongyang has often emphasized its nuclear weapons were for deterrence, it has also long described its nuclear arsenal had a dual purpose of “trusted shield” and “treasured sword” for deterrence and preemptive attack against the United States and its allies. Since at least 2013, the regime has threatened preemptive attacks with nuclear weapons. Pyongyang announced in 2016 and 2017 that it had conducted missile exercises simulating preemptive nuclear attacks over South Korea and Japan.
Image: North Korean State Media.
Pyongyang has also stated for decades that it would never denuclearize. The failure of eight previous international denuclearization agreements with North Korea and the regime’s ongoing violation of 11 UN resolutions requiring denuclearization do not bode well for either U.S. or South Korean diplomatic attempts.
However, neither Washington nor Seoul should abandon their efforts, in conjunction with maintaining deterrence and sanctions enforcement.”
Anthony Ruggiero, Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and former director for North Korea (2018-2019) on the National Security Council: “The Kim Jong Un regime on Thursday declared itself a “responsible nuclear weapons state” while also threatening the United States, South Korea, and Japan with preemptive nuclear strikes. The new law drops the façade that North Korea pursued a nuclear weapons program to defend itself against nuclear threats from Washington. Pyongyang also said it would not deploy nuclear weapons outside its territory and would not share or transfer relevant technology. The world’s foremost proliferator’s commitment to non-proliferation rings hollow since Pyongyang renewed long-range missile cooperation with Iran and built a clandestine nuclear reactor in Syria that was destroyed by Israel.
Some experts will claim that the new law shows that the U.S. sanctions policy is not working. But sanctions pressure on North Korea has been virtually non-existent since then-President Donald Trump embraced summit-level diplomacy. Biden’s decision to continue his predecessor’s policy was a mistake. While Kim is not interested in denuclearization, a robust sanctions policy is still worth pursuing because it decreases resources and inputs into North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The Biden administration should begin by rebuilding the diplomatic coalition and then target Pyongyang’s overseas representatives and funding streams, including its coal sales and export of workers.”
Roger Zakheim, Washington Director, Ronald Reagan President Foundation: “This is a case where North Korea’s words match their actions. For decades and across US administrations, North Korea has used its nuclear program to entrench its brutal regime and intimidate its neighbors; it is the linchpin to the regime’s staying power. The free world has at times deluded itself into thinking otherwise despite North Korea’s conduct and rhetoric.”
Expert Biography: Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) serves as President and CEO of Rogue States Project, a bipartisan national security think tank. He has held senior positions at the Center for the National Interest, the Heritage Foundation, the Potomac Foundation, and many other think tanks and academic institutions focused on defense issues. His ideas have been published in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, CNN, CNBC, and many other outlets across the political spectrum. He holds a graduate degree focusing on International Relations from Harvard University and is the author of the book The Tao of A2/AD, a study of Chinese military modernization.
19fortyfive.com · by Harry Kazianis · September 9, 2022
11. N. Korea’s currency continues to strengthen against the Chinese yuan
Note the importance of the dollar.
Excerpts:
“Even the Chinese prefer dollars over yuan nowadays,” said a source in North Korea on Tuesday. “They ask for the main payment to be in dollars, with yuan used to cover whatever is left over.”
One North Korean economy expert has posited that the dollar is rapidly growing stronger because North Korea’s dollar shortage is greater than its yuan shortage.
In a telephone conversation with Daily NK, Choi Ji Young, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the North Korean authorities’ policy to absorb the public’s foreign currency holdings over the last couple of years may have soaked up more dollars than yuan.
“If the dollar is in greater shortage in North Korea, it could result in differences in exchange rates between the dollar and yuan,” he said.
N. Korea’s currency continues to strengthen against the Chinese yuan
Chinese traders dealing with North Korean trading institutions often prefer to deal in dollars rather than yuan as of late, a source told Daily NK
By Seulkee Jang - 2022.09.09 3:06pm
dailynk.com
A marker delineating the border between China and North Korea (Wikimedia Commons)
North Korea’s currency continues to strengthen against the yuan. Exchange rates usually climb when trade with China temporarily expands ahead of major state events like the Day of the Foundation of the Republic on Sept 9. Not this year, however.
Daily NK’s regular survey of prices in North Korea determined that the yuan was trading at KPW 840 in Pyongyang as of Tuesday.
Though the yuan was trading at roughly the same level in Sinuiju in North Pyongan Province, Hyesan in Yanggang Province and other regions, the KPW-RMB rate was the lowest in Pyongyang.
Compared to January, when the yuan was trading at KPW 590 prior to the restart of China-North Korea freight train service, the current rate represents a 42% increase. Yet from late July, the KPW-RMB rate has been continuously falling.
Normally, increased trade between China and North Korea directly pushes the exchange rate up as North Korean trading institutions purchase dollars or yuan in preparation for trading.
However, the KPW-RMB exchange rate seems to be falling even after Chinese customs officials published a notice early last month that they planned to inspect transportation vehicles to take part in trade with North Korea, sparking higher expectations regarding the restart of truck and train service between the two countries.
Although signals have emerged from China regarding the restart of freight train service or road traffic with North Korea, North Korean authorities have issued no orders regarding expanded trade.
Meanwhile, the KPW-USD exchange rate continues to hold steady in the KPW 8,000-8,500 range.
The KPW-USD rate in Pyongyang was KPW 8,100 as of Tuesday. This represents a 72% rise from January, when the dollar rate was in the KPW 4,700-4,800 range.
Essentially, the restart of freight train service between China and North Korea earlier this year led to skyrocketing rates for both the dollar and yuan, but while the dollar has continued to rally, relatively speaking, the yuan has been weakening since July.
This seems due to a combination of several factors, including trends in international markets and North Korea’s shortage of dollars.
In fact, with Chinese authorities locking down major cities due to COVID-19, the yuan continues to slide, while the dollar grows stronger and stronger due to tighter US monetary policy, including the Federal Reserve’s rate hike, and Europe’s economic slowdown.
The continued strengthening of the dollar and weakening of the yuan in international currency markets appears to have had some impact on local exchange rates in North Korea, too.
When Daily NK cross-checked with sources in North Korea, it found that with the dollar increasingly likely to face a prolonged rally, even Chinese traders dealing with North Korean trading institutions often prefer to deal in dollars rather than yuan as of late.
“Even the Chinese prefer dollars over yuan nowadays,” said a source in North Korea on Tuesday. “They ask for the main payment to be in dollars, with yuan used to cover whatever is left over.”
One North Korean economy expert has posited that the dollar is rapidly growing stronger because North Korea’s dollar shortage is greater than its yuan shortage.
In a telephone conversation with Daily NK, Choi Ji Young, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the North Korean authorities’ policy to absorb the public’s foreign currency holdings over the last couple of years may have soaked up more dollars than yuan.
“If the dollar is in greater shortage in North Korea, it could result in differences in exchange rates between the dollar and yuan,” he said.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
12. With New Law on Nuclear Forces Policy, North Korea Says Its Nuclear Status Is ‘Irreversible'
Time for a Plan B strategy for north Korea.
Excerpts:
Yoon’s “audacious initiative” is also preconditioned on the North taking substantive steps toward denuclearization. North Korea has already made clear that it would never give up its nuclear weapons or dismantle its nuclear arsenals first. Since the failed Hanoi summit between then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in 2019, the North has demanded that the U.S. and South Korea make concessions to even restart dialogue – much less see real progress on the denuclearization of North Korea. In this context, Pyongyang may think that Yoon’s audacious initiative is just an old-school policy devised by those who worked for previous conservative governments. Kim Yo Jong indicated as much in her comments last month.
Kim Jong Un’s recent tendency to target the U.S. also shows that he has no interest in working with the Yoon administration. More importantly, it indicates that he will take further steps to be a contender against the U.S. in the region.
Kim briefly mentioned his bold five-year military modernization plan, which includes the development of new and advanced nuclear weapons, in his speech on Thursday. Once his military successfully achieves the goals of the plan, Kim would be able to secure more nuclear options that can be considered a direct threat to the security of the United States.
For its part, Washington appears to be interested in maintaining the status quo of the Korean Peninsula. Washington has not been able to engage in talks with Pyongyang since 2019, despite a new president taking office in 2021. Due to current President Joe Biden’s previous role as vice president for President Barack Obama, his policy on North Korea was expected to be an updated version of “the strategic patience” approach that was used under the Obama administration. The White House has said that Biden’s “calibrated and practical” approach to North Korea is a new one devised after a months-long policy review. However, it is hard to find differences between Biden’s and Obama’s approaches, considering the spate of the North’s missile tests this year and stalled nuclear talks.
In the wake of the Ukraine crisis and the power game between the U.S. and China, Pyongyang has strengthened ties with Beijing and Moscow sharply in order to weaken Washington’s leverage in the region. While the two powerful allies focus on their security issues, Kim may want to show off more powerful nuclear weapons so that he can be less dependent on the influences of Beijing and Moscow on Korean Peninsula issues and instead be a direct contender against the U.S. president.
With New Law on Nuclear Forces Policy, North Korea Says Its Nuclear Status Is ‘Irreversible'
A day before the 74th anniversary of the country’s founding, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un vowed to keep strengthening his nuclear power.
thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · September 9, 2022
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A day before the 74th anniversary of the country’s founding, North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un publicly declared that his nuclear weapons are no longer a bargaining chip for talks.
“By promulgating a law on a policy of the nuclear forces, our country’s status as a nuclear-weapons state has become irreversible,” the North’s state-controlled Korea Central New Agency (KCNA) quoted Kim as saying during his speech at the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly on Thursday.
Calling the United States the first country that used nuclear weapons and the most powerful nuclear state, Kim said his country’s nuclear arsenal is “a deterrent and ultimate weapon” that has been developed “to eliminate nuclear war and secure the country’s pride and safety.”
While saying that “removing our nuclear weapons is the purpose of the U.S.,” Kim also stated that the ultimate goal of U.S. attempts to denuclearize his country is “the collapse” of Kim’s regime.
Kim accused the U.S. of fomenting North Korean people’s complaints toward the party by imposing large scale economic sanctions against his country. he confidently stated that it is “misjudgment” and “miscalculation” by the country’s adversaries – which refer to the U.S. and South Korea – stating that the sanctions only strengthened the North Korean government’s commitment to develop nuclear weapons.
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Kim mentioned that his people remember numerous historical incidents with tragic endings, caused by “the U.S. imperialists’ cliched sermon, sophistry, sanctions pressure and military threats.” He did not specify the incidents but he may have been alluding to the last days of Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled Libya as a dictator for more than four decades. Based on Washington’s previous attempts to invoke the “Libya Model” in the denuclearization of North Korea, Kim may think that he could face the same fate as Gaddafi – ouster and a brutal death – if he gives up his nuclear weapons.
Stating that the U.S. would never be able to change his people’s decision to develop nuclear weapons, Kim implied that time is now on his side by saying that his country can keep living under the current conditions through its own ways. With this, Kim also warned that his country’s ultimate power has strengthened as a direct consequence of living under Washington’s “brutal” anti-North Korea policy.
Now, as the North has provided a legal framework to keep developing nuclear weapons, Kim said “the whole world and the political and military climate in the Korean Peninsula should change first” if others want to make him change his nuclear policy.
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Kim said North Korea will keep developing and testing its nuclear and missile programs as long as the U.S. and South Korea stick with their policy of pursuing the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of the Korean Peninsula.
According to KCNA’s report on the promulgation of the new law, North Korea’s nuclear forces are explicitly no longer solely meant for the country’s self-defense.
Defining its nuclear forces as “a main force of the state defense,” the North widened the conditions for using its nuclear weapons. The law lays out five conditions under which North Korea can use nuclear weapons, including one that represents the possibility of Kim ordering his troop to launch his nuclear weapons preemptively: “In other case [sic] an inevitable situation in which it is compelled to correspond with catastrophic crisis to the existence of the state and safety of the people by only nuclear weapons is created.”
Seoul and Washington have consistently sent messages to Pyongyang to renew the deadlocked nuclear and inter-Korean dialogues. However, based on Kim’s remarks on Thursday, it is unlikely Pyongyang will respond to either Seoul or Washington’s gestures.
On Thursday, South Korean Unification Minister Kwon Young-se offered to hold talks with Pyongyang to resolve the issues of separated families divided in the wake of the 1950-53 Korean War. However, Kim did not say a single word about Kwon’s proposal during his speech and the KCNA did not publish any statement from Pyongyang officials in response.
Kim’s solidification of his nuclear force provides more evidence of two likely scenarios that were already shaping up: no inter-Korean dialogue during South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s term and more direct confrontation from North Korea against the U.S.
Days after South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol introduced his “audacious initiative” to induce Pyongyang to take steps for denuclearization last month, Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of Kim Jong Un, harshly belittled his policy while using provocative words directly toward Yoon. In her statement, she said “it is our earnest desire to live without awareness of each other.” She also said that “we don’t like Yoon Suk Yeol himself” and “we make it clear that we will not sit face to face with him.”
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It is not surprising to see Pyongyang aim provocative words toward the South Korean president. However, the timing is notable.
It has only been four months since Yoon took office, but Pyongyang already ruled out the possibility of engagement with Seoul during his five-year term. Yoon has remained open to talks with North Korea, but it seems that Pyongyang concluded that it is pointless to speak with the Yoon administration as his previous remarks – including discussions of a preemptive strike on the North – crossed the redline from its perspective.
Kim Jong Un seems to have decided to skip engaging with Seoul. Yoon’s inexperience in diplomacy and politics, coupled with his low approval ratings, might give the impression that he is not a suitable partner to negotiate with. His inconsistent stance on the North’s nuclear and missile threats might also lead Kim to take a negative view of Yoon.
Yoon’s “audacious initiative” is also preconditioned on the North taking substantive steps toward denuclearization. North Korea has already made clear that it would never give up its nuclear weapons or dismantle its nuclear arsenals first. Since the failed Hanoi summit between then-U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in 2019, the North has demanded that the U.S. and South Korea make concessions to even restart dialogue – much less see real progress on the denuclearization of North Korea. In this context, Pyongyang may think that Yoon’s audacious initiative is just an old-school policy devised by those who worked for previous conservative governments. Kim Yo Jong indicated as much in her comments last month.
Kim Jong Un’s recent tendency to target the U.S. also shows that he has no interest in working with the Yoon administration. More importantly, it indicates that he will take further steps to be a contender against the U.S. in the region.
Kim briefly mentioned his bold five-year military modernization plan, which includes the development of new and advanced nuclear weapons, in his speech on Thursday. Once his military successfully achieves the goals of the plan, Kim would be able to secure more nuclear options that can be considered a direct threat to the security of the United States.
For its part, Washington appears to be interested in maintaining the status quo of the Korean Peninsula. Washington has not been able to engage in talks with Pyongyang since 2019, despite a new president taking office in 2021. Due to current President Joe Biden’s previous role as vice president for President Barack Obama, his policy on North Korea was expected to be an updated version of “the strategic patience” approach that was used under the Obama administration. The White House has said that Biden’s “calibrated and practical” approach to North Korea is a new one devised after a months-long policy review. However, it is hard to find differences between Biden’s and Obama’s approaches, considering the spate of the North’s missile tests this year and stalled nuclear talks.
In the wake of the Ukraine crisis and the power game between the U.S. and China, Pyongyang has strengthened ties with Beijing and Moscow sharply in order to weaken Washington’s leverage in the region. While the two powerful allies focus on their security issues, Kim may want to show off more powerful nuclear weapons so that he can be less dependent on the influences of Beijing and Moscow on Korean Peninsula issues and instead be a direct contender against the U.S. president.
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is Chief Koreas Correspondent for The Diplomat and a non-resident Research Fellow of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm Korea Center.
thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · September 9, 2022
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