Quotes of the Day:

"If a man neglects education, he walks lame to the end of his lime."

- Plato

“A man is like a fraction, whose numerator is what he is, and whose denominator is what he thinks of himself. The larger the denominator, the smaller the fraction.” 

-Leo Tolstoy.

"Now I see the secret of the making of the best persons. It is to grow in the open air and to eat and sleep with the earth."

 - Walt Whitman

1. Strengthening the Profession: A Call to All Army Leaders to Revitalize Our Professional Discourse

2. Politicization and Pop Culture: How Public Perception of Special Operations Units Intersects with Civil-Military Relations

3. China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques

4. Beware the False Prophets of War

5. A Facebook Post on Coach Deion Sanders and Character and Leadership

6. Lithium deposit found in US may be among world’s largest, study finds

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2023

8. Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

9. It's Google versus the US in the biggest antitrust trial in decades

10. Death penalty upheld for soldier who killed 13 in base shooting

11. How the ‘nuclear football’ remains a potent symbol of the unthinkable

12. Republican Bill with Massive Boost to Junior Enlisted Pay Sparks Veto Threat from Biden

13. The Power of Solid Alliances for Good

14. Biden inches toward decision on long-range missiles as Ukraine ups pressure

15. Replicator: How America Plans to Take on the China Military Challenge

16. DOJ to ‘Surge’ Resources at Corporate Crimes With National Security Implications

17. 9/11 at 22: From 'We Will Never Forget' to 'We’ll Never Learn'

18. Elon Musk's refusal to have Starlink support Ukraine attack in Crimea raises questions for Pentagon

19. Morocco’s reluctance to accept quake aid baffles foreign governments

20.  Putin Calls Trump Charges Political ‘Persecution’

21. DoD Enters Agreement to Expand Domestic Lithium Mining for U.S. Battery Supply Chains

22. Ukraine's Fight on the Front Lines of the Information Environment

1. Strengthening the Profession: A Call to All Army Leaders to Revitalize Our Professional Discourse

The CSA has provided his guidance. We must write.

As many know I'm a great fan of quotes

Who dares, wins (SAS motto)

Who thinks, wins (late General Wayne A. Downing)

Who writes, leads (unknown)

I think we should adopt the third we - writers can and should lead.

Obviously I agree with the CSA and fully support this effort to revitalize the professional discourse. In 2011 I wrote this article A Recommendation for Quiet Professionals, to urge SOF to write for publication.  https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-recommendation-for-quiet-professionals

Excerpts from the article below:

This is a critical and challenging time to be a soldier of all ranks. The strategic environment virtually ensures there will be plenty of work for the Army in the years ahead, even if we cannot know exactly when, where, or how threats will manifest. Making matters more challenging, the pace of change, technological but also social and cultural, is so great that the character of war is changing faster than ever—faster even than a century ago, when Patton was predicting the impact of technologies like the tank. The country and future soldiers depend on us to devote as much effort to preparing intellectually as we do physically.

We cannot remain static, so we ask this of you: Write for your branch magazines and professional bulletins. Look for opportunities to volunteer as an editor. Spread the word. And join us as we commit to renewing one of our Army’s greatest assets, our culture of professional military writing.

Strengthening the Profession: A Call to All Army Leaders to Revitalize Our Professional Discourse - Modern War Institute

General Randy George, General Gary Brito and Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Weimer | 09.11.23

mwi.westpoint.edu · September 11, 2023

Today our Army finds itself in an interwar period. We do not know when it will end, and so the work we must do is urgent work. We must modernize our equipment and doctrine, we must train hard, and we must reinvest in our profession. To do this work well, we cannot solely depend on the thoughts and voices of senior leaders in high command, as we can assure you: we do not have all the answers. Instead, we must strengthen our profession from top to bottom by building expertise through written discourse. We must also train hard on mission essential tasks and individual warfighting skills. This will ensure that when called, our Army is ready.

Our Army must reinvest in venues that produce vital professional discourse to improve our professional expertise. When we were leading companies, Infantry, Armor, and other branch magazines allowed us to learn from our peers, plan the best possible training, and see new ways of operating. But today, the Army’s professional publications need our help. They publish fewer pages and less often. Their authorship is not as diverse as our Army. And their means of circulation have not kept pace with this smartphone era. This is despite the hard work of dedicated editorial staff through a period of great transition.

The US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will lead this effort to reinvest in the professional dialogue needed for this interwar period as an integral part of a larger plan to strengthen our profession. Created to change the Army and celebrating its fiftieth anniversary this year, TRADOC will strengthen the profession by attending to its institutions, experiences, and culture. These renewed professional publications will give every one of the Army’s soldiers, NCOs, officers, and civilian professionals the opportunity to partake in a conversation as wide, diverse, and thoughtful as the Army itself.

To succeed in renewing the Army’s publications, however, top-down reinvestment alone will not do. We need the help of every leader in the Army.

The Path Forward

As one way of strengthening the Army’s professional institutions, experiences, and culture, we acknowledge the work of the Harding Project. Started by an Army major and captain, the Harding Project is an effort to renew professional military publications. Their detailed analysis and careful prescriptions convinced us to think harder about the role of our publications in the Army profession.

Professional writing is important. In a hierarchical organization like the Army, professional writing allows leaders to inform the force of changes, while others share lessons laterally. As these lessons accumulate, professional writing connects communities of interest around shared problems and then informs doctrinal development. Writing can also create an outlet for issues that may not find a hearing in other forums. And finally, writing well builds talented communicators—a critical component of modern military leadership.

While today’s media environment is crowded, there is a critical place for a vibrant set of Army publications for several reasons. First, only our publications are backed by the full faith and credit of the Army, and while non-Army outlets have provided valuable space for the discussion of issues vital to our service, we can’t count on them to stick around. Second, even while Army outlets like MWI have demonstrated that there is an appetite for articles and other media that advance our understanding of our profession and the challenges ahead, they rightly do not focus on niche branch issues. That responsibility rests with our professional bulletins: Infantry, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, and twelve others. These publications have been impactful throughout their history—Military Review helped drive development of AirLand Battle in the 1970s, for example, as Armor (then Cavalry Journal) drove discourse around the tank in the run-up to World War II—and we need them to remain impactful today. The challenges (and opportunities) of the years ahead are no less formidable than those earlier moments; we need a robust, bottom-up professional discussion to help drive us forward.

Given the importance of the Army’s professional journals, we must focus on renewing the institutions that support professional writing. The first step is modernizing to web-first, mobile-friendly outlets supported by social media. Soldiers encounter content on social media or through recommendations from their friends. After encountering an article on social media, links direct them to that article on the web. Unfortunately, our professional publications, with the exception of Army University Press, have largely missed this transition. This may be partly due to declines in resources; regardless, it’s time to get started.

After modernizing, the Army will better connect our outlets by experimenting with volunteer editors. When the Infantry Journal renewed in the 1930s, active duty soldiers rotated through editorial positions to keep publications fresh. For a variety of reasons, the Army no longer staffs journals with uniformed personnel. As a result, many officers and soldiers feel little connection to their publications. We’re going to fix that.

Finally, we will fix our archives. If you’ve ever tried to search for historic Infantry articles, you might have noticed that you can’t. That’s because our archives are in massive PDF files. Put another way, we’ve locked ourselves out of thousands of lessons our predecessors learned. We are going to fix that too. Our Army Center of Military History and its reach to over twenty Army museums are but a few resources that can assist in this area.

We have evidence this approach will work. Six months ago, the Army University Press and Military Review adopted a modern, web-first platform supported by social media. Since then, their weekly visitors are up by 60.1 percent while their subscribers have increased by 54 percent. Army University Press also just added branch magazines to its landing page as a first effort to raise the profile of all of our Army’s professional publications.

As members of the profession of arms, we ask for your support over the next few months. As a modest gesture to recognize our talented writers, we will recognize three impactful articles each month with a pen, coin, and personal note of congratulations. We’ve sent our first ones to First Lieutenant Mara Tazartus for her article on engagement area development in Armor and Sergeant First Class Leyton Summerlin for his article on standards in Infantry. Now we are scouring the internet for September’s authors. During the Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting in October, we will feature the professional writing renewal during the forum on professionalism. If you are there, look for the Army University Press’s kiosk at the Army exhibit and give them your feedback on our outlets.

A Call to Action

In the interwar period before World War II, our greatest generals and warfighters contributed their thoughts to branch publications. In the Infantry Journal, then Major George C. Marshall wrote about “Profiting by War Experiences,” while then Major George S. Patton, Jr. contributed his thoughts on “Success in War.” Likewise, noncommissioned officers like Sergeant Terry Bull contributed articles on “Battle Practice” while Staff Sergeant Robert W. Gordon both wrote for and edited the journal. Their contributions demonstrated the strength of the profession by helping solve the real problems of the day.

To strengthen the profession today, our role as senior leaders is to ensure the institution provides relevant, quality places for the force to develop and refine our martial knowledge—ideas about leadership, training, and warfighting. We know those ideas are out there. We see them every time we talk with soldiers, whether at home station, at the combat training centers, or on deployment. This is also evident in the contributions of those who are currently writing in the online forums mentioned above and in Military Review.

Yet our professions currently misses out on those ideas. Many of the great ideas we hear are too specific, too technical for general-purpose publications. Yet the nature of our profession is that the details are just as important—probably even more important—than the big ideas. Branch journals are the place to share new ideas, ask questions, and identify challenges and solutions.

What sort of ideas, questions, and solutions are we looking for? Professions are defined by a combination of formal institutional inputs like doctrine, experiences in training and deployment, and an understanding of the world as a whole. Branch journals are a place to bring all these influences together.

As Marshall and Patton did before, we need those leaders operating where it matters to offer their ideas about where our doctrine and school curricula get it right, need improvement, or are missing something. The profession also requires sharing innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures more widely than just within your unit or group of colleagues. The Army devotes enormous resources to realistic, demanding training. Share what you learn!

Finally, one of the hallmarks of our age is that so much happening in the civilian world can—and must—be incorporated into our operations for the Army to succeed. What ideas, techniques, and technologies can we incorporate into how we operate? As we watch the war in Ukraine, there are numerous, clear signs that successful armies are learning organizations that quickly apply imaginative solutions.

As you contribute to our revitalized professional journals, you will be solving problems and you will also be strengthening the profession. For individuals, writing a well-argued article with supporting evidence hones the ability to think critically and communicate. These are essential leader traits. It also requires some courage to put your ideas out there, and both individuals and the institution will take some licks in the process. But this is exactly the type of courage we need right now. It is no different than any other form of training. Well-meaning leaders may be wary of “rocking the boat,” but the Army needs the absolute best ideas at echelon. You have our commitment that we will be open to the best ideas, even if they challenge the sacred cows of the Army’s conventional wisdom. Encourage writing in your formations so that our Army remains the greatest ground force in the world—strong, professional, and ready to defend its fellow citizens.

This is a critical and challenging time to be a soldier of all ranks. The strategic environment virtually ensures there will be plenty of work for the Army in the years ahead, even if we cannot know exactly when, where, or how threats will manifest. Making matters more challenging, the pace of change, technological but also social and cultural, is so great that the character of war is changing faster than ever—faster even than a century ago, when Patton was predicting the impact of technologies like the tank. The country and future soldiers depend on us to devote as much effort to preparing intellectually as we do physically.

We cannot remain static, so we ask this of you: Write for your branch magazines and professional bulletins. Look for opportunities to volunteer as an editor. Spread the word. And join us as we commit to renewing one of our Army’s greatest assets, our culture of professional military writing.

General Randy George is the acting chief of staff of the US Army and the 38th vice chief of staff of the US Army.

General Gary Brito is the 18th commanding general of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia.

Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Weimer is the 17th sergeant major of the Army.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Chin-U Pak, 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined Division

mwi.westpoint.edu · September 11, 2023

2. Politicization and Pop Culture: How Public Perception of Special Operations Units Intersects with Civil-Military Relations

A powerful critique. Some may disagree but I think we should all take a good look in the mirror and reflect one this.

Politicization and Pop Culture: How Public Perception of Special Operations Units Intersects with Civil-Military Relations - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Edward Salo · September 11, 2023

Editor’s note: This is the latest article in “Rethinking Civ-Mil,” a series that endeavors to present expert commentary on diverse issues surrounding civil-military relations in the United States. Read all articles in the series here.

Special thanks to MWI’s research director, Dr. Max Margulies, and MWI research fellow Dr. Carrie A. Lee for their work as series editors.

In May 2017, a US Army and Marine veteran posted on social media:

SEAL = SEAL

SEAL ≠ policy expert

SEAL = Creative non-fiction writer

SEAL ≠ ethical

SEAL ≠ Business expert

SEAL = CrossFit instructor

SEAL ≠ good governance

SEALs are good at being SEALs.

While the post was in jest, it illustrates the degree to which former special operations forces (SOF) personnel, despite their small numbers, are held in such high esteem even in areas only tenuously connected to their military service. Furthermore, the post’s explicit references to policy expertise and good governance are indicative of how certain portions of the electorate value the former SOF members’ opinions as a litmus test of American policy. Flipping through the news channels reveals a number of former SOF personnel discussing not only military topics but also social and cultural issues that have little connection to national security issues.

This oversaturation of SOF in the media raises questions about the state of civil-military relations. Why, for example, does having been a Navy SEAL have any bearing on being qualified for political office or leadership? What does Special Forces experience have to do with social and cultural expertise? This seeming prerequisite is problematic for political and cultural discourse, specifically when it comes to when and where military service is applicable or relevant.

SOF in American Popular Culture and Politics

Since 9/11, the SOF community has increasingly deviated from its historical reputation as “quiet professionals.” This change is due in large part to politicians and others using the image of these special operations units to present their political agendas, but equally it is a function of a media and entertainment industry that increasingly makes SOF the subject of TV shows and movies. Rather than being quiet professionals whose exploits are not the focus of the nightly news, special operations units are now at the forefront of popular culture’s portrayal of the US military, and the image of the US military is now disproportionately influenced by SOF. Between 2012 and 2017 the movies Zero Dark Thirty, Act of Valor, American Sniper, and Lone Survivor were box office hits. TV shows like SEAL Team brought the SOF emphasis to the small screen. Even the reboots of Hawaii Five-O and Magnum, P.I. gave their leads ex-SEAL backgrounds. Another TV show, The Unit, was based on the US Army’s Delta Force and included a former Delta Force operator as a creator. Furthermore, in a recent reboot of Superman, Clark Kent decides to become a Navy SEAL, rather than a reporter, before he becomes a superhero.

In addition to the movies and shows, the public has been saturated with books, podcasts, and other items that promote a special operations lifestyle and experience. While some former SOF personnel write books directly related to their expertise, namely about survival, physical fitness, and combat, others have strayed further afield to write novels or nonfiction books about everything from self-help to child-rearing. Moreover, many former members have also used their experience in special operations to move into a career in new media with podcasts or YouTube channels. In addition, anyone can purchase clothing, equipment, or coffee from companies owned by SOF veterans.

One of the critics of the self-promotion cycle is Navy SEAL Forrest S. Crowell, who wrote his thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School on the problems of self-promotion in the SEAL community. He commented that “the cultivation of celebrity status has incentivized narcissistic and profit-focused behavior within the SEAL community, which in turn has eroded organizational effectiveness, damaged national security, and undermined healthy civil-military relations.” There are individuals like Crowell who are worried about the impact of cultural and image changes. However, it is worth considering whether the opinions expressed in academic theses, novels, TV shows, movies, and podcasts by SEALs are being given the attention they deserve.

The intersection of former SOF personnel and politics is problematic in regard to civil-military relations. One political action group, Special Operations for America, explicitly ties combat experience with knowing “how to best keep Americans safe and preserve our way of life.” The implication is that veterans, specifically SOF veterans, are inherently qualified to govern the nation. Additionally, a few former SOF personnel have jumped into politics themselves, winning various offices by using their SOF careers as a major part of their platforms. For example, in 2022, nine former members of the US Army’s Special Forces and six former Navy SEALs ran for congressional seats to fill what one laudatory observer described as “a void in leadership at the National level.” Having veterans serving in elected offices certainly has benefits for the nation, but relying on SOF experience as a litmus test of the ability to legislate and govern is problematic. Unfortunately, this only becomes undeniably clear when the assumption that SOF experience uniquely equips these elite operators to govern is undermined publicly and in spectacular fashion.

Of course, the public attention paid to US SOF can have positive effects. It can inspire young Americans to serve in the military, as occurred in the recruiting boom in the 1980s after the release of Top Gun. And the books former SOF personnel are writing about their experiences give nonmilitary readers at least some exposure to the military. Still, it risks fostering a culture of militarism in American politics that is in tension with the model of civil-military relations established in the US Constitution and promoted since the early days of America’s founding by President George Washington and others. The German historian Alfred Vagts, in A History of Militarism, defined militarism the “domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals and scales of value, in the life of states.” According to Vagts, militarism is not just about having actual authority but also involves a focus on military spirit, ideals, and values. Some former SOF personnel have taken on the role of the protectors of the nation. It is important to acknowledge that these individuals are not representative of the entire SOF community and may be a small minority. But even while such a minority’s intentions may be patriotic and genuine, their actions could harm the relationship between the military and civil society.

A Phenomenon Decades in the Making

While SOF members have long been described as quiet professionals, they have been the subject of heroic portrayals in popular culture since the 1960s, including, for example, Robin Moore’s 1965 account of the Green Berets in Vietnam and the movie based on the book. After the end of the Vietnam War, the portrayals of SOF in popular media continued to depict them fighting terrorists, communist guerrillas, or even Soviet intelligence forces—from the novels of Tom Clancy to movies like Navy SEALs.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the enemies in some popular portrayals of SOF, especially novels, changed from external to internal threats. And with that change, there emerged a depiction of these elite forces as the saviors of the nation from both. One of the major authors that illustrated this shift was a former commander of SEAL Team Six, Richard Marcinko, who cowrote a series of sixteen adventure novels that starred a fictionalized version of himself and some of his friends. While his band of warriors fought outside threats like Islamist terrorists, North Koreans, and the IRA, there was usually a subplot in which Marcinko had to battle cowardly or treasonous US officials (many thinly veiled copies of actual officials). Marcinko’s works promoted a narrative where violence was the only way to protect America, and it was the diplomats and the politicians that were willing to sell away the nation.

After 9/11, this literary motif continued. For example, in All Lines Black, one of a series of novels by Dalton Fury (the pen name of a former Delta Force commander), protagonist Kolt Raynor is sold out to a terrorist group by the secretary of state as part of a larger deal. Again, the SOF soldier works to keep the nation safe while the corrupt politician is concerned only with personal ambition. More recently, in ex-SEAL Jack Carr’s novel The Terminal List, his protagonist learns that elements of the American government were behind the ambush that killed his team, and later killed his family. And it is not only books by former SOF members that reflect these themes. Novelist Brad Thor’s series also features an ex-SOF hero, who similarly has to battle both internal and external threats. Conspiracy theories have even emerged that mirror the plots of these fictional novels. Even if these novels are not causal of any specific problem in civil-military relations, I would contend that they are representative of a loss of faith in civilian leadership.

This genre often portrays the government as an adversary of both citizens and the military. These storylines—featuring SOF members as the only ones capable of combating external and internal threats and contrasting their courage and selfless service with the corruption of government officials—are reminiscent of the stabbed-in-the-back myth popular among some German citizens in the wake of their nation’s military defeat in World War I. After the war, that narrative weakened the public’s opinion of German elected officials in the decade leading up to the ascendancy of a regime that would adopt an especially militaristic approach to the nation’s political and social problems.

How Can We Fix the Problem?

Naturally, we cannot prevent individuals from writing novels or memoirs or creating podcasts about their experiences, and it would be unwise to try. However, we can utilize the image of the SOF to support positive civil-military relations within our nation.

In order to reestablish the culture of quiet professionalism within the SOF community, it is important to take a collaborative approach from both the top down and the bottom up. This can involve working with current writers, novelists, and podcasters to shift the focus of stories and revive the culture. Additionally, conducting academic studies on the portrayal of SOF in popular culture and its impact on how Americans perceive SOF through institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School or Joint Special Operations University can further this goal. It also is crucial to separate the SOF community from direct partisan politics, just as it is for the military as a whole, to ensure that the level of trust between the nation and its military, which has its roots in the founding documents, is maintained.

It is important to accurately represent the diversity within the SOF community in all US DoD publications. This will show that the SOF community is made up of individuals with different backgrounds, much like the United States as a whole. It would also be helpful to encourage more publications that highlight the history of SOF members fighting external threats, particularly during the Cold War. This will help demonstrate their role in protecting the nation in times characterized by peer threats.

During the Global War on Terrorism, US SOF played a crucial role in safeguarding the nation. These units, many of which had previously operated with little public attention, became more visible, and the public’s perception of the military became disproportionately influenced by SOF imagery. Politicians and others utilized the image of these elite units to promote political agendas, while they have simultaneously been featured increasingly as the subjects of TV shows, movies, and other media. Collectively, this had an adverse impact on civil-military relations. As Crowell argued, former SOF personnel are “the core of what is becoming a special interest pressure group that uses the credibility of special operations to push partisan politics.” It is imperative to ensure that the image of the US military in popular culture is nonpartisan, democratic, and a symbol of unity for the nation.

Edward Salo, PhD is an associate professor of history at Arkansas State University. Before coming to A-State in 2014, he spent fourteen years as a consulting historian for various firms across the nation. His work has been published by War on the Rocks, The National Interest, 1945, InkStick, and by the Modern War Institute. He is also a research fellow for the Modern War Institute, host of the Sea Control podcast, and a member of the New America Nuclear Futures Working Group.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization the author is affiliated with, including Arkansas State University.

Image credit: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Anthony W. Walker, US Navy

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Edward Salo · September 11, 2023

3. China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques

How is the GEC at State handling this? Are the PSYOP professionals at Fort Liberty studying this?

China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques

By David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers

David E. Sanger reported from Washington, and Steven Lee Myers from San Francisco.

Sept. 11, 2023

Updated 4:16 p.m. ET

The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · September 11, 2023

Beijing’s influence campaign using artificial intelligence is a rapid change in tactics, researchers from Microsoft and other organizations say.

China’s most recent influence campaign suggests that it is making more direct attempts to sow discord in the United States.Credit...Pool photo by Andy Wong

Sept. 11, 2023Updated 4:16 p.m. ET

When wildfires swept across Maui last month with destructive fury, China’s increasingly resourceful information warriors pounced.

The disaster was not natural, they said in a flurry of false posts that spread across the internet, but was the result of a secret “weather weapon” being tested by the United States. To bolster the plausibility, the posts carried photographs that appeared to have been generated by artificial intelligence programs, making them among the first to use these new tools to bolster the aura of authenticity of a disinformation campaign.

For China — which largely stood on the sidelines of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections while Russia ran hacking operations and disinformation campaigns — the effort to cast the wildfires as a deliberate act by American intelligence agencies and the military was a rapid change of tactics.

Until now, China’s influence campaigns have been focused on amplifying propaganda defending its policies on Taiwan and other subjects. The most recent effort, revealed by researchers from Microsoft and a range of other organizations, suggests that Beijing is making more direct attempts to sow discord in the United States.

The move also comes as the Biden administration and Congress are grappling with how to push back on China without tipping the two countries into open conflict, and with how to reduce the risk that A.I. is used to magnify disinformation.

The impact of the Chinese campaign — identified by researchers from Microsoft, Recorded Future, the RAND Corporation, NewsGuard and the University of Maryland — is difficult to measure, though early indications suggest that few social media users engaged with the most outlandish of the conspiracy theories.

Brad Smith, the vice chairman and president of Microsoft, whose researchers analyzed the covert campaign, sharply criticized China for exploiting a natural disaster for political gain.

“I just don’t think that’s worthy of any country, much less any country that aspires to be a great country,” Mr. Smith said in an interview on Monday.

China was not the only country to make political use of the Maui fires. Russia did as well, spreading posts that emphasized how much money the United States was spending on the war in Ukraine and that suggested the cash would be better spent at home for disaster relief.

The researchers suggested that China was building a network of accounts that could be put to use in future information operations, including the next U.S. presidential election. That is the pattern that Russia set in the year or so leading up to the 2016 election.

“This is going into a new direction, which is sort of amplifying conspiracy theories that are not directly related to some of their interests, like Taiwan,” said Brian Liston, a researcher at Recorded Future, a cybersecurity company based in Massachusetts.

A destroyed neighborhood in Lahaina, Hawaii, last month. China has made the wildfires a target of disinformation.Credit...Go Nakamura for The New York Times

If China does engage in influence operations for the election next year, U.S. intelligence officials have assessed in recent months, it is likely to try to diminish President Biden and raise the profile of former President Donald J. Trump. While that may seem counterintuitive to Americans who remember Mr. Trump’s effort to blame Beijing for what he called the “China virus,” the intelligence officials have concluded that Chinese leaders prefer Mr. Trump. He has called for pulling Americans out of Japan, South Korea and other parts of Asia, while Mr. Biden has cut off China’s access to the most advanced chips and the equipment made to produce them.

China’s promotion of a conspiracy theory about the fires comes after Mr. Biden vented in Bali last fall to Xi Jinping, China’s president, about Beijing’s role in the spread of such disinformation. According to administration officials, Mr. Biden angrily criticized Mr. Xi for the spread of false accusations that the United States operated biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine.

There is no indication that Russia and China are working together on information operations, according to the researchers and administration officials, but they often echo each other’s messages, particularly when it comes to criticizing U.S. policies. Their combined efforts suggest a new phase of the disinformation wars is about to begin, one bolstered by the use of A.I. tools.

“We don’t have direct evidence of coordination between China and Russia in these campaigns, but we’re certainly finding alignment and a sort of synchronization,” said William Marcellino, a researcher at RAND and an author of a new report warning that artificial intelligence will enable a “critical jump forward” in global influence operations.

The wildfires in Hawaii — like many natural disasters these days — spawned numerous rumors, false reports and conspiracy theories almost from the start.

Caroline Amy Orr Bueno, a researcher at the University of Maryland’s Applied Research Lab for Intelligence and Security, reported that a coordinated Russian campaign began on Twitter, the social media platform now known as X, on Aug. 9, a day after the fires started.

It spread the phrase, “Hawaii, not Ukraine,” from one obscure account with few followers through a series of conservative or right-wing accounts like Breitbart and ultimately Russian state media, reaching thousands of users with a message intended to undercut U.S. military assistance to Ukraine.

President Biden has criticized President Xi Jinping of China for the spread of false accusations about the United States and Ukraine.Credit...Florence Lo/Reuters

China’s state media apparatus often echoes Russian themes, especially animosity toward the United States. But in this case, it also pursued a distinct disinformation campaign.

Recorded Future first reported that the Chinese government mounted a covert campaign to blame a “weather weapon” for the fires, identifying numerous posts in mid-August falsely claiming that MI6, the British foreign intelligence service, had revealed “the amazing truth behind the wildfire.” Posts with the exact language appeared on social media sites across the internet, including Pinterest, Tumblr, Medium and Pixiv, a Japanese site used by artists.

Other inauthentic accounts spread similar content, often accompanied with mislabeled videos, including one from a popular TikTok account, The Paranormal Chic, that showed a transformer explosion in Chile. According to Recorded Future, the Chinese content often echoed — and amplified — posts by conspiracy theorists and extremists in the United States, including white supremacists.

The Chinese campaign operated across many of the major social media platforms — and in many languages, suggesting it was aimed at reaching a global audience. Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center identified inauthentic posts in 31 languages, including French, German and Italian, but also in less prominent ones like Igbo, Odia and Guarani.

The artificially generated images of the Hawaii wildfires identified by Microsoft’s researchers appeared on multiple platforms, including a Reddit post in Dutch. “These specific A.I.-generated images appear to be exclusively used” by Chinese accounts used in this campaign, Microsoft said in a report. “They do not appear to be present elsewhere online.”

Clint Watts, the general manager of Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center, said that China appeared to have adopted Russia’s playbook for influence operations, laying the groundwork to influence politics in the United States and other countries.

“This would be Russia in 2015,” he said, referring to the bots and inauthentic accounts Russia created before its extensive online influence operation during the 2016 election. “If we look at how other actors have done this, they are building capacity. Now they’re building accounts that are covert.”

Natural disasters have often been the focus of disinformation campaigns, allowing bad actors to exploit emotions to accuse governments of shortcomings, either in preparation or in response. The goal can be to undermine trust in specific policies, like U.S. support for Ukraine, or more generally to sow internal discord. By suggesting the United States was testing or using secret weapons against its own citizens, China’s effort also seemed intended to depict the country as a reckless, militaristic power.

“We’ve always been able to come together in the wake of humanitarian disasters and provide relief in the wake of earthquakes or hurricanes or fires,” said Mr. Smith, who is presenting some of Microsoft’s findings to Congress on Tuesday. “And to see this kind of pursuit instead is both, I think deeply disturbing and something that the global community should draw a red line around and put off-limits.”

David E. Sanger is a White House and national security correspondent. In a 38-year reporting career for The Times, he has been on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting. His newest book is “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age.” More about David E. Sanger

Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is also the author of “The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin.” More about Steven Lee Myers

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The New York Times · by Steven Lee Myers · September 11, 2023

4. Beware the False Prophets of War

Another important critique.

In 2012 I offered my views on PME but I think they could apply to Security Studies and be somewhat in line with Dr. Cohen's antidotes. I argued that all PME should have five core subjects: history, theory, geography, operational art, and strategy. "Thoughts on Professional Military Education: After 9-11, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the Era of Fiscal Austerity | Small Wars Journal"  https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-professional-military-education-after-9-11-iraq-and-afghanistan-era-fiscal

Excerpts:

How and why has this happened? Failing to project the actual course of a war is, after all, a phenomenon on both the right and the left of the political spectrum, and quite as common among serving officers and intelligence officials as among journalists and commentators.

To some extent, the explanations vary with the cases. The Iraq and Afghanistan misjudgments reflected in part the difficulty of overcoming the military’s self-imposed amnesia about counterinsurgency after Vietnam. The “We will never do that again” sentiment led the U.S. Army in particular to stop thinking about counterinsurgency. When I led a study for the Defense Policy Board on the subject in 2004, I discovered that the counterinsurgency manuals still on hand were of Vietnam vintage, presuming an opposing army of Communist-indoctrinated peasants in straw hats and black pajamas.

...

Very few people study war. In the past three or four decades, universities have been filled with courses on “security studies,” which means, in practice, things such as arms control, deterrence theory, and bargaining under threat. That is where today’s journalists, scholars, and officials were educated. Universities that once had eminent military historians—a Mac Coffman at the University of Wisconsin, a Gunther Rothenberg at Purdue, a Gordon Craig at Stanford, a Theodore Ropp at Duke—saw them replaced by respectable scholars who were less directly concerned (or not engaged at all) with what happens when nations summon up armies, fleets, and air armadas to make the final argument of kings.

...

Two antidotes come to mind. The first is a lot more military history all around—old-fashioned guns-and-trumpets stuff, as antiquated and embarrassing as that is to the contemporary academic mind. One should read military history in width and depth, the 20th century’s greatest English-speaking military historian, Michael Howard, once said. One should know something about a lot of wars and a great deal about a few, to develop an instinct about what things in war will go well and which poorly, what one can anticipate and what one cannot.

And we should keep an honest accounting. Errors—even big errors—of military judgment are inevitable. But when misjudgments occur, those who make them should ask themselves some painful and searching questions. (I wrote the second chapter of The Big Stick to reckon with my own misjudgments about Iraq.) And when such miscalls are truly egregious, persistent, and, what is much worse, unacknowledged and unexamined, journalists, pundits, and officials should consider whether that well-known name should still be on speed dial, as is the case with the Ukraine war today. Otherwise, the most recent set of errors will most definitely not be the last, or even the worst.

Beware the False Prophets of War

Why have the experts been so persistently wrong?

By Eliot A. Cohen

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · September 11, 2023

Prognosticating about war is always a chancy business. Even the most arrogant pundit or politician soon learns to slip a qualifying “You never can tell” into their predictions. But making all allowance for that, it is striking just how bad Western governments, commentators, and leaders have been over the past few decades at gauging not only what course wars might take but how they have gone as they have unfolded.

In 1990, many respectable analysts and journalists predicted a bloodbath followed by a quagmire in the Kuwaiti and Iraqi deserts as battle-hardened Iraqi troops faced their outnumbered and supposedly softer American counterparts. The Gulf War, however, ended up being a swift conflict in which friendly fire and accidents did as much damage to the U.S. Army as hostile fire. The Iraqis were outgunned, outmaneuvered, out-led, and—as we later learned—actually outnumbered by the forces ranged against them.

Garrett M. Graff: After 9/11, the U.S. got almost everything wrong

American and European planners similarly overestimated their opponents in the Balkans in the 1990s. Historically misinformed references to the numbers of German divisions pinned down by Tito’s partisans during World War II had defense planners and commentators convinced that although the U.S. had won a smashing victory with ease against Iraq, intervening in Bosnia would be a much tougher fight. It wasn’t.

Misestimates in both directions have continued ever since. For four years after the start of the Iraq War in 2003, the U.S. flailed about, convincing itself that it was merely fighting a declining number of “former regime elements” and “bitter-enders” waging irregular warfare, who could be disposed of by the shaky new Iraqi army. It took a more realistic view—and the war’s best commander, General David Petraeus—to turn around both assessment and strategy.

If overoptimism had bedeviled the U.S. government in Iraq before 2007, and in Afghanistan as well, persistent and equally ungrounded pessimism about the possibilities of reversing the situation pervaded Congress. In fact, a freshman senator from Illinois and a senior senator from Delaware, both of whom would become president, were convinced that the Iraq War was hopeless just as Petraeus and his five new brigades turned it around. Back to overoptimism again: American administrations misjudged the pace and extent of the Taliban’s war against our Afghan allies in the early 2000s; in 2021, they were stunned by the collapse of the Afghan regime once we had announced our final withdrawal. They had been equally surprised by the re-eruption of the Islamic State after a similar, if lesser, withdrawal from Iraq a decade earlier.

Prominent analysts of the Russian military confidently projected a Russian blitzkrieg against Ukraine in February 2022. Yet well before the full weight of Western aid could be felt in Ukraine, the invader was shown to be far less competent, and the defenders far more effective, than anyone had anticipated. A similar pattern is occurring now, as anonymous military leakers and supposed experts say that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a failure because fighters are not maneuvering in the manner of George S. Patton and the Third Army in the breakout from the Normandy beachheads in 1944.

How and why has this happened? Failing to project the actual course of a war is, after all, a phenomenon on both the right and the left of the political spectrum, and quite as common among serving officers and intelligence officials as among journalists and commentators.

To some extent, the explanations vary with the cases. The Iraq and Afghanistan misjudgments reflected in part the difficulty of overcoming the military’s self-imposed amnesia about counterinsurgency after Vietnam. The “We will never do that again” sentiment led the U.S. Army in particular to stop thinking about counterinsurgency. When I led a study for the Defense Policy Board on the subject in 2004, I discovered that the counterinsurgency manuals still on hand were of Vietnam vintage, presuming an opposing army of Communist-indoctrinated peasants in straw hats and black pajamas.

The Ukraine misjudgments came from different sources: narrow focus on numbers of weapons and pieces of kit, confusion of military doctrine with actual ability to execute it, and the enduring American suspicion that if you are allied with the United States, you are probably corrupt, incompetent, and cowardly. That was unfair with regard to the Vietnamese, Afghans, and Iraqis, who were in some measure each set up to fail, but it was grossly wrong with regard to Ukraine. And with an analytic subculture built around a certain reverence for the Russian bear, some had difficulty accepting that the bruin was rheumatic, myopic, mangy, and had mangled claws.

Very few people study war. In the past three or four decades, universities have been filled with courses on “security studies,” which means, in practice, things such as arms control, deterrence theory, and bargaining under threat. That is where today’s journalists, scholars, and officials were educated. Universities that once had eminent military historians—a Mac Coffman at the University of Wisconsin, a Gunther Rothenberg at Purdue, a Gordon Craig at Stanford, a Theodore Ropp at Duke—saw them replaced by respectable scholars who were less directly concerned (or not engaged at all) with what happens when nations summon up armies, fleets, and air armadas to make the final argument of kings.

For civilians, the end of the draft meant the vanishing of a gritty familiarity with what makes militaries work, and, just as important, with their numerous stupidities and inefficiencies. As military experience dried up in the political, scholarly, and journalistic worlds, professional officers operated exclusively in an environment in which, however, grueling and lethal the forever wars might seem, the United States always had overwhelming advantages, including supremacy in the air and in space, and secure logistical bases and lines of communication. These conflicts were hard and often bitter experiences, but they were not wars of the kind that kill hundreds or even thousands in a day, and they were not wars against countries that could contest our dominance in the air or at sea. That has not happened since 1945.

Our systems of higher military education only partly compensate for this lack of direct experience. When he was secretary of defense, James Mattis called for “putting the war back in war college.” But the war colleges, with important and respectable exceptions in terms of faculty and courses, are primarily designed to bring mid-career officers into the political-military world of international politics and foreign policy, of defense decision making and analysis. These are not the hatcheries of the elite war planners and scholars of war that we need.

The conviction remains in many quarters that somehow, real war will not again come to us. That is why even though military leaders know that ammunition stocks are way too low, they do not pound their civilian superiors’ desks pleading to build them up. It is why political leaders, in turn, fail to level with the American people that we need to spend more—a lot more—on defense, if we hope to prevent in other parts of the world the horrors that have befallen Ukraine. It is why humanitarian restrictions on some valuable weapons—mines and cluster munitions in particular—can make their way into law or policy, because we somehow think that these horrors will never become necessities.

David Frum: The Iraq War reconsidered

Two antidotes come to mind. The first is a lot more military history all around—old-fashioned guns-and-trumpets stuff, as antiquated and embarrassing as that is to the contemporary academic mind. One should read military history in width and depth, the 20th century’s greatest English-speaking military historian, Michael Howard, once said. One should know something about a lot of wars and a great deal about a few, to develop an instinct about what things in war will go well and which poorly, what one can anticipate and what one cannot.

And we should keep an honest accounting. Errors—even big errors—of military judgment are inevitable. But when misjudgments occur, those who make them should ask themselves some painful and searching questions. (I wrote the second chapter of The Big Stick to reckon with my own misjudgments about Iraq.) And when such miscalls are truly egregious, persistent, and, what is much worse, unacknowledged and unexamined, journalists, pundits, and officials should consider whether that well-known name should still be on speed dial, as is the case with the Ukraine war today. Otherwise, the most recent set of errors will most definitely not be the last, or even the worst.

The Atlantic · by Eliot A. Cohen · September 11, 2023

5. A Facebook Post on Cach Deion Sanders and Character and Leadership

Some interesting food for thought. I can only assume this is true. But based on what I recall from the media narrative I would not have guessed this about his leadership. And if it is not true then I certainly wish it was so that it could perhaps inspire people and drive important discussions.

My high school football experience was life changing for me as I was (like my fellow players) inspired by the leadership of my football coach, Larry Ciotti. I carry his lessons to this day.

https://www.facebook.com/david.maxwell161/posts/pfbid0PEZ4HP9CZSVgqPMuk1aLXiqMXcigojSgx9mf3zakVpfyFZxPuFg5b6ZucZL1PwNEl?notif_id=1694361255218765&notif_t=feedback_reaction_generic&ref=notif

Thomas Krannawitter

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If you want to understand the growing division in America, there’s a fascinating case study unfolding right now at Colorado’s largest public university.

The University of Colorado hired a high-profile, high-salaried, football coach, Deion Sanders.

By all measures, including today’s blowout victory over Nebraska, Coach Sanders has already remade, strengthened, and greatly improved what was merely a year ago one of the worst college football programs, ever.

Sanders is a football coach, yes. A big part of his time and energy is focused on, well, football. But football, by his own account, is not his main priority.

His main focus is the moral character of his players. He’s very open about this. He wants to influence and inspire young men to become good men—good sons, future good fathers, good citizens. He wants them to be personally responsible, carry themselves well, be respectful to others, and expect nothing they haven’t worked for and earned. He thinks winning football games will be among many good results.

The thematic motto for Sanders is simple: "Smart. Tough. Fast. Disciplined. Great character." That's what he tells his players every day.

Coach Prime’s strategy is an old strategy. It’s ancient. It is, I might argue, Aristotelian. His strategy can be distilled down to this slice of classical wisdom: Before you can be happy, you must first practice being good. Be a good person—exercise all the virtues, strive for excellence in everything, make good choices—and good things are more likely to happen, including winning rather than losing football games.

None of this is to suggest that Deion Sanders is or needs to be a perfect human being. He’s not. He is simply and rightly challenging students who play football at CU to be better, more moral, more excellent human beings. In doing so, he cannot help but challenge himself to be better, too.

To all the cynics who pounce on the hypocrisy of anyone who extolls virtue but fails to be perfectly virtuous himself: One need not be perfect in order to strive for self-improvement while encouraging others to improve themselves and aim for something higher.

The premise of everything Coach Sanders is doing is that there IS a good—a fundamental, objective, transcendental good—by which human beings, human actions, and human choices can be judged.

Here’s the fascinating case study: The greatest opposition to what Coach Sanders is trying to teach and instill in young football players comes from within the very university that hired him, and the many other universities like it.

CU football players don’t need to go far to have the lessons of Sanders mocked, ridiculed, and dismissed. They need only walk into any of the social sciences or humanities in the academic buildings surrounding the athletics department. There they will hear erudite academic sophisticates, many with PhDs, promoting philosophical nihilism and moral relativism, usually with a chuckle: “Who is to say what is right or wrong?” they ask with contempt for anyone who dares to answer. “Who is to say what good character is?”

There’s the case study. There’s the division in our modern world: One party says, “Be good, work, and appreciate the good things that result from having good character.” The other party rolls their eyes and laughs at the mere suggestion there is a good that can be discovered and known by the human mind.

The division of our modern world is the difference between the moral-character-building and personal responsibility Coach Sanders is promoting versus the nihilism peddled by academics who don’t much care about the human suffering caused by the ideas, policies, programs, and ways of life they promote.

It's neither incorrect nor uncharitable to assess this conflict by the different results they produce. It appears Coach Sanders is well on his way to forming an excellent football team composed of young men learning what excellence is, many of whom will likely go on to do many wonderful things after they graduate, whether related to football or not.

It should surprise no one if the experience of playing CU football for Coach Sanders turns out to be a pivotal, life-changing experience for many of these young men.

Meanwhile, university social sciences and humanities will continue to infect young minds with toxic philosophic doctrines and woke slogans that fuel all kinds of social pathologies, including more young university students than ever dependent on prescription (and non-prescription) drugs because they are deeply morally confused (they quite literally do not know what a man or a woman is), depressed, and suicidal. These are the same students who lack any sense of purpose or meaning, flocking in record numbers to see therapists, psychologists, and counselors.

6. Lithium deposit found in US may be among world’s largest, study finds

AUTO Published September 10, 2023 5:44pm EDT

Lithium deposit found in US may be among world’s largest, study finds

Automakers, threatened by possible shortages of lithium for EV batteries, are racing to lock in supplies

foxbusiness.com · by Bradford Betz

video

Why are electric vehicles so expensive?

U.S. Oil and Gas Association president Tim Stewart breaks down the Biden admin's energy policies on 'The Bottom Line.'

A deposit of lithium recently discovered along the Nevada-Oregon border may be among the world’s largest, having potentially huge implications for the transition to electric vehicles.

Volcanologists and geologists from Lithium Americas Corporation, GNS Science, and Oregon State University reported their findings in a paper for Science Advances, published August 31.

A truck drives past brine evaporation ponds at Albemarle Corp.'s Silver Peak lithium facility, on Oct. 6, 2022, in Silver Peak, Nev. (AP Newsroom)

The deposit exists in the McDermitt Caldera, a caldera approximately 28 miles long and 22 miles wide. It is believed that the caldera contains around 20 to 40 million metric tons of lithium – a figure that would dwarf deposits in Chile and Australia.

MAN FORCED TO DITCH FORD TV TRUCK DURING FAMILY ROAD TRIP TO CHICAGO: ‘BIGGEST SCAM OF MODERN TIMES’

Belgian geologist Anouk Borst told Chemistry World that the findings "could change the dynamics of lithium globally, in terms of price, security of supply and geopolitics."

Geopolitical strategist Peter Zeihan told FOX Business that the geology "appears promising" but cautioned that there hasn't "been significant prospecting in the area."

"Obviously worthy of exploration. Definitely not worth changing anyone's mid-term plans. Yet," Zeihan said, arguing that building up processing infrastructure should be first priority.

"Regardless of where we get ore from, we know we're going to have to be able to process lithium ore into concentrate to make lithium metal and batteries and such."

The researchers’ paper comes as automakers, threatened by possible shortages of lithium for EV batteries, are racing to lock in supplies.

Any shortfall in lithium would disrupt plans to ramp up sales to tens of millions of EV’s a year. The race for lithium has also fueled political conflict – particularly with China – and complaints about the environmental cost of extracting them.

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX BUSINESS APP

Globally, lithium output is on track to triple over the next decade, but demand for electric SUVs, sports cars, and sedans threatens to exceed supply. Each battery requires about 17 pounds of lithium, plus cobalt, nickel and other metals.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

foxbusiness.com · by Bradford Betz

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 11 and have reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Rosgvardia may be recruiting previously imprisoned former Wagner Group fighters, likely to further subsume Wagner remnants while bolstering Russia’s domestic security apparatus.
• Russian border guards expressed similar grievances about limited capabilities and equipment to those voiced by Russian troops serving in Ukraine and continued to express concern over potential Ukrainian raids into Russia.
• The Kremlin’s ruling United Russia party unsurprisingly achieved most of its desired results in highly fraudulent local elections in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Vladivostok in the coming days, likely to discuss bilateral relations and North Korea’s supplies of artillery munitions to Russia.
• US and Armenian forces began joint military exercises in Armenia on September 11.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 11.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least one sector of the front on September 11 and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian Central Election Committee Head Alexander Sidyakin unsurprisingly claimed that United Russia received the majority of votes in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
• Ukrainian and United Kingdom military officials reported on September 11 that the Russian military intends to mobilize over 400,000 personnel by the end of 2023.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 11, 2023

Sep 11, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2023

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

September 11, 2023, 4:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 11 and have reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian military officials announced on September 11 that Ukrainian forces have liberated 2 square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction over the past week and have made gains near Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriiivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut).[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces have gained a total of 4.8 square kilometers in the Tavriisk (Zaporizhia) operational direction over the past week, particularly south of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and west of Verbove (20km southeast of Orikhiv).[2]

The Rosgvardia may be recruiting previously imprisoned former Wagner Group fighters, likely to further subsume Wagner remnants while bolstering Russia’s domestic security apparatus. Russian opposition outlet iStories reported on September 11 that relatives of previously imprisoned former Wagner fighters revealed that some of their relatives received invitations to serve in the Rosgvardia following a series of tests and certifications.[3] iStories noted that the Rosgvardia is asking former Wagner fighters to pass a security check and provide documentation of official pardons of their prison sentences, as well as documentation of the conclusion of their contracts with Wagner. iStories also amplified the claims of a Rosgvardia servicemember from the 2nd Battalion of an unidentified Moscow-based Rosgvardia unit that ex-Wagner fighters are serving in his unit, including those without any conventional military experience. Another Rosgvardia servicemember from Rostov-on-Don alleged that his unit has sent ex-Wagner fighters to guard “strategic objects” in occupied Ukraine. The Rosgvardia’s possible active recruitment of former Wagner fighters is noteworthy in the wake of recent efforts by the Russian leadership to strengthen the Rosgvardia’s role as a domestic security organ following Wagner’s June 24 armed rebellion.[4] ISW has previously reported on the transfer of “Grom” units (elite anti-drug special units of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs) and heavy weaponry to the Rosgvardia following the rebellion.[5] The Rosgvardia may be recruiting former Wagner fighters to maximize its force generation pool, or potentially to exert more direct control over former Wagner elements in the hopes of consolidating domestic security following the rebellion.

Russian border guards expressed similar grievances about limited capabilities and equipment to those voiced by Russian troops serving in Ukraine and continued to express concern over potential Ukrainian raids into Russia. A Russian milblogger who serves on the Kremlin’s human rights council amplified complaints that the Russian had authorities poorly equip border guard units and failed to supply them with sufficient digital communications systems, reconnaissance and strike drones, mobile transport, and medical supplies.[6] The milblogger noted that these grievances come from almost all border service departments within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).[7] The milblogger noted that border service units formed task forces to participate in the Soviet war in Afghanistan and were equipped with artillery, aviation, and armored vehicles, implying modern FSB border guard units need similar capabilities.[8] The milblogger claimed that border guard units only receive anti-tank missiles and mortars from personal connections with Russian military units, and advocated for Russian authorities to provide better equipment — including self-propelled artillery systems and electronic warfare systems — to current border guards, especially those in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts, which border Ukraine.[9] The milblogger’s reference to the Soviet border guards’ participation in the war in Afghanistan and call for the provision of more complex systems suggest that Russian border guards continue to be concerned about the threat of possible Ukrainian cross-border raids into Russia and Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian territory.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting southern Ukraine on the night of September 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 12 Shaheds over Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts and another unspecified drone.[10] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 11 that Russian forces are changing tactics and using drones “en masse.”[11] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched 10 missiles, including Kh-31P anti-radar missiles and Ka-59 guided cruise missiles, at Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[12]

The Kremlin’s ruling United Russia party unsurprisingly achieved most of its desired results in highly fraudulent local elections in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) claimed that United Russia won gubernatorial elections in 13 regions and is leading in six regions where votes are still being counted.[13] United Russia gubernatorial candidates won over 72 percent of the vote in 13 out of 20 regions in Central Russia, the Russian Far East, and Siberia.[14] All three of the candidates that Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly endorsed — Nizhny Novgorod Governor Gleb Nitkin, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, and Smolensk Governor Vasily Anokhin — won or are leading by major margins.[15] United Russia reportedly received 83 percent of the vote in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in Ukraine, 78 percent in Donetsk Oblast, 74 percent in Luhansk Oblast, and 74.8 percent in Kherson Oblast.[16] Non-United Russia gubernatorial candidates won in only two regions, Khakassia and Oryol oblasts, where Communist Party incumbents were re-elected.[17] ISW has previously reported on the Kremlin’s extensive preparations to intimidate voters and directly falsify results to ensure a United Russia victory throughout Russia and in highly fraudulent “elections” in occupied Ukraine.[18]

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Vladivostok in the coming days, likely to discuss bilateral relations and North Korea’s supplies of artillery munitions to Russia.[19] The Kremlin announced on September 11 that Kim will meet with Putin in the coming days, and Kim has reportedly left Pyongyang and is traveling to Russia.[20] ISW will continue to follow developments in the lead-up to the meeting.

US and Armenian forces began joint military exercises in Armenia on September 11. The Armenian Ministry of Defense stated that the joint US-Armenian “Eagle Partner 2023” exercises will prepare Armenian forces to take part in international peacekeeping missions and will last until September 20.[21] 85 US personnel and 175 Armenian personnel are participating in exercises at the Zar and Armavir training grounds near Yerevan.[22] “Eagle Partner 2023” will occur against the backdrop of increasingly tense relations between Moscow and Yerevan, as well as heightened tensions between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 11 and have reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Rosgvardia may be recruiting previously imprisoned former Wagner Group fighters, likely to further subsume Wagner remnants while bolstering Russia’s domestic security apparatus.
• Russian border guards expressed similar grievances about limited capabilities and equipment to those voiced by Russian troops serving in Ukraine and continued to express concern over potential Ukrainian raids into Russia.
• The Kremlin’s ruling United Russia party unsurprisingly achieved most of its desired results in highly fraudulent local elections in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Vladivostok in the coming days, likely to discuss bilateral relations and North Korea’s supplies of artillery munitions to Russia.
• US and Armenian forces began joint military exercises in Armenia on September 11.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 11.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least one sector of the front on September 11 and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian Central Election Committee Head Alexander Sidyakin unsurprisingly claimed that United Russia received the majority of votes in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
• Ukrainian and United Kingdom military officials reported on September 11 that the Russian military intends to mobilize over 400,000 personnel by the end of 2023.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 11 and advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage posted on September 11 shows that Russian forces have made gains near the forest belt northeast of Synkivka (10km northeast of Kupyansk).[24] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported ongoing heavy fighting in the Kupyansk direction and that Ukrainian forces are repelling Russian attacks near Synkivka.[25] Malyar also stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line near Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove).[26] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have advanced up to half a kilometer near Novoyehorivka.[27] A Russian milblogger posted combat footage of the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) fighting near Kreminna.[28] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash noted that Russian forces are conducting intense artillery fire along this line.[29]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Kreminna on September 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian assault groups west of Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[30] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are focusing on attacks in the Serebryanske forest area near Torske (15km west of Kreminna).[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced on September 11. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut).[32] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into Andriivka.[33] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces are achieving unspecified success near Klishchiivka, Predtechyne (16km southwest of Bakhmut), Andriivka, Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut), and Dachne (19km southwest of Bakhmut).[34] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Kurdyumivka.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in the Klishchiivka-Andrivka-Kurdyumivka area but have not advanced in this area.[36] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces still control Andriivka and Kurdyumivka.[37] Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated two square kilometers in the Bakhmut direction over the past week.[38]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut but did not make any confirmed advances on September 11. The Ukrainian General Staff and Malyar reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Kurdyumivka.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut), and Klishchiivka but did not specify an outcome.[40] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 10 that Russian forces conducted assaults near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka.[41] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 11 that Russian forces rotated units of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Assault Brigade on Bakhmut’s northern flank, likely referring to a tactical rotation-in-place by elements of the 106th Brigade, as Russian forces have done in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[42] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz forces alongside the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps and Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are operating on the western outskirts of Klishchiivka.[43] A Russian milblogger also amplified footage claiming to show elements of the “Yenisei” detachment of the “Sibir” Cossack Brigade of the Volunteer Assault Corps operating near Bakhmut.[44]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced on September 11. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces control part of Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) but noted that the situation is fluid and fighting continues.[45] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Opytne and in the direction of Spartak (4km south of Avdiivka).[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces lack manpower, competent commanders, quality assault tactics, and counterbattery capabilities in this area of the front.[47] Other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced to the outskirts of Opytne but Russian forces immediately pushed them back and retained full control of the settlement, however.[48] The Russian MoD claimed on September 11 that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Avdiivka and Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City).[49]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 11 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff and Malyar reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Keramik (14km northwest of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in Marinka.[51] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 10 that Russian forces attacked the southern outskirts of Avdiivka, near Krasnohorivka, and on the western outskirts of Marinka.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly advanced on September 11. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have achieved unspecified successes near Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[53] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on September 10 and 11 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked northwest of Novomayorske, near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and north of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 11 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 10 that Russian forces recaptured lost positions north of Pryyutne near the Hrusheva Gully.[55] A Russian media aggregator claimed on September 10 that Russian forces counterattacked near Novomayorske.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are operating near Novomayorske.[57]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 11 and reportedly advanced. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces have advanced 4.8 square kilometers in the past week in the Tavriisk (Zaporizhia) direction and that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes south of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[58] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and in the forested area east of the settlement.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Robotyne-Verbove line.[60] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 10 that Ukrainian forces attempted to advance towards Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[61]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novodanylivka (6km south of Orikhiv) and Robotyne.[62] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked near Novofedorivka (21km southeast of Orikhiv).[63] Russian sources also claimed on September 10 and 11 that Russian forces regained lost positions east of Robotyne and near Verbove.[64]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on September 11 that GUR units restored Ukrainian control over the Boyko Towers gas production drilling platforms off the coast of Crimea in the Black Sea on an unspecified date.[65] Russian forces controlled the drilling platforms since 2015.[66]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian and United Kingdom military officials reported on September 11 that the Russian military intends to mobilize over 400,000 personnel by the end of 2023. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that the Russian military intends to recruit 420,000 contract personnel by the end of 2023.[67] ISW has previously assessed that this number likely includes many volunteers who are already fighting in Ukraine, and who were forced to sign contracts with the Russian MoD by July 1, 2023.[68] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian military will conduct mass forced mobilization of about 400,000 to 700,000 people in Russia and occupied Ukraine in the “near future.”[69] It is unclear if these figures include personnel already serving in volunteer and irregular formations in Ukraine, and it is unlikely that these numbers refer to total combat power. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian authorities plan to call up about 40,000 Chechen residents to serve in “blocking units,” likely referencing Chechen units that served as “barrier forces” policing Russian military deserters in occupied Kherson Oblast.[70]

Israeli National Intelligence Agency (Mossad) Director David Barnea stated on September 10 that Iran previously intended to provide Russia with short- and long-range missiles, but that unspecified actors “foiled these plans.”[71]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian Central Election Committee (CEC) Head Alexander Sidyakin unsurprisingly claimed that United Russia received the majority of votes in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[72] Sidyakin also claimed that voter turnout ranged from 74.4 percent to over 80 percent in these occupied areas. ISW has previously reported that Russian occupation authorities likely attempted to inflate voter turnout numbers prior to the election through coercive measures and conducting door-to-door voting.[73] The supposedly high rate of voter turnout in occupied Ukraine is also likely a reflection of recent massive demographic changes as a result of Russia’s occupation of Ukraine. Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain) reported that occupied almost 10 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast’s adult population left during Russia’s occupation.[74] This figure likely comprises both segments of the population that were able to leave freely and those that Russian authorities have forcibly removed to other occupied areas of Ukraine or deported to the Russian Federation.

UN Special Rapporteur Alice Jill Edwards reported that Russian authorities likely torture Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) as part of a “state policy.”[75] Edwards reported on September 10 that Russian authorities likely continue to torture Ukrainian civilians and POWs and that acts of torture seem “orchestrated as part of a State policy to intimidate, instill fear, punish, or extract information and confessions.”[76] Edwards also stated that these acts of torture and violent punishment would violate international human rights and humanitarian law.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on September 11 that Belarus plans to create its own private military company (PMC) out of Wagner Group fighters who remained in Belarus.[78] The Resistance Center stated that Wagner fighters in Belarus who chose not to sign contracts with the Russian MoD have the option to join Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s “HardService” PMC, which has existed since 2019. The Resistance Center noted that “HardService” will train in Minsk Oblast and that Lukashenko hopes to use them in protest suppression.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

8. Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

Download the 240 page report at this link: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2500/RRA2555-1/RAND_RRA2555-1.pdf

As an aside (per my professional bias) there is no discussion of SOF in INDOPACOM. SOF (and SF) is tangentially mentioned in the context of the NATO SOF HQ, the Baltics, UK, Romania, Ukraine. This is no significant discussion of US SOF.

There is no discussion of irregular warfare and political warfare is mentioned in a footnote concerning CCP activities. There is no mention of the gray/grey zone.

The quasi reference to unconventional warfare ("unconventional defense plans") is in this excerpt:

The United States, other allies, and NATO

commands have provided significant training and/or security assistance to

all three Baltic governments, and this support should be continued. This

approach—leveraging unconventional defense plans and capabilities while

incorporating comprehensive defense, societal resilience, and resistance

strategies—might also serve as a best practice for other allies

There is no mention of the Joint Concept for Competing which would seem germaine if they are discussing the concept of influence since influence is key to competition (but the report does not discuss strategic competition).

The key findings are a brual critique of the US military.:

• The nature of warfare has evolved since the Cold War, and it has become increasingly clear that the U.S. defense strategy and posture are insolvent.
• The U.S. defense strategy has been predicated on U.S. military forces that were superior in all domains to those of any adversary. This superiority is gone. The United States and its allies no longer have a virtual monopoly on the technologies and capabilities that made them so dominant against adversarial forces.
• U.S. and allied forces do not require superiority to defeat aggression by even their most powerful foes. The United States, acting in concert with key allies and partners, can restore credible postures of deterrence against major aggression without having to regain overmatch in any operational domain against China or Russia.
• Russia's brutal and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine has awakened North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the risk of a wider war in the Euro-Atlantic area. This realization has motivated allies to make significant increases in defense spending and preparedness, but much more must be done over the next few years to deter and defend the region against further aggression by Russia's reconstituted military forces.
• Taiwan has embraced the rhetoric of asymmetric warfare, but its budget reflects a preference for legacy systems. As a result, there is a gap between the United States' and Taiwan's goals for the direction of Taiwan's defense program.

Inflection Point

How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

by David A. Ochmanek, Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, Michael J. Mazarr

rand.org · by David A. Ochmanek

The U.S. defense strategy and posture have become insolvent. Sustained, coordinated efforts by the United States, its allies, and its key partners are necessary to deter and defeat modern threats, including Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and reconstituted forces and China's economic takeoff and concomitant military modernization. This report offers ideas on how to address shortcomings in defense preparations.

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Inflection Point

How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence

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Research Questions

1. What are the principal demands for which U.S. and allied military forces should prepare?
2. If those forces are deemed inadequate, what gaps exist in the capabilities, posture, and operational concepts of those forces?
3. What options exist to fill those gaps, and what steps should policymakers consider in reformulating plans for future forces?

The U.S. defense strategy and posture have become insolvent. The tasks that the nation expects its military forces and other elements of national power to do internationally exceed the means that are available to accomplish those tasks. Sustained, coordinated efforts by the United States and its allies are necessary to deter and defeat modern threats, including Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and reconstituted forces and China's economic takeoff and concomitant military modernization. This report offers ideas on how to address shortcomings in defense preparations.

Key Findings

• The nature of warfare has evolved since the Cold War, and it has become increasingly clear that the U.S. defense strategy and posture are insolvent.
• The U.S. defense strategy has been predicated on U.S. military forces that were superior in all domains to those of any adversary. This superiority is gone. The United States and its allies no longer have a virtual monopoly on the technologies and capabilities that made them so dominant against adversarial forces.
• U.S. and allied forces do not require superiority to defeat aggression by even their most powerful foes. The United States, acting in concert with key allies and partners, can restore credible postures of deterrence against major aggression without having to regain overmatch in any operational domain against China or Russia.
• Russia's brutal and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine has awakened North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to the risk of a wider war in the Euro-Atlantic area. This realization has motivated allies to make significant increases in defense spending and preparedness, but much more must be done over the next few years to deter and defend the region against further aggression by Russia's reconstituted military forces.
• Taiwan has embraced the rhetoric of asymmetric warfare, but its budget reflects a preference for legacy systems. As a result, there is a gap between the United States' and Taiwan's goals for the direction of Taiwan's defense program.

Recommendations

• Equip and posture forces and support assets for rapid and robust response.
• Field the basic elements of a multidomain sensing and targeting grid.
• Field weapons and platforms capable of delivering sufficient levels of lethality into contested battlespaces to impose severe attrition on the enemy's invasion force in the opening days of a conflict.
• Ensure that inventories of preferred munitions and other consumables are sufficient to carry out continued strikes against enemy forces.
• Articulate a short list of priority operational challenges for defeating aggression in highly contested environments.
• Incentivize innovation.
• Make Congress a partner.
• Define the future operational concept; efforts will be immeasurably enhanced if all stakeholders have a shared understanding of how joint and combined forces are intended to fight in the future.
• Accelerate force adaptation.
• Taiwan should assess both its existing force and all future investments to determine the ability of these investments to survive and operate effectively against full-scale attack on Taiwan.
• Encourage NATO allies to meet agreed-on defense investment goals and force posture requirements and to devote more resources to military capabilities for sustained, high-end conventional operations, including five-year plans to enlarge munitions inventories.
• Create a more resilient forward posture for collective defense on NATO's eastern flank. Work with allies to bring all eight battle groups on NATO's eastern flank to brigade strength and enhance readiness and exercises to realize the force generation goals of the allied Force Model.
• Provide Ukraine with assurances of long-term Western security assistance and training and a clear path to NATO membership.

Table of Contents

• Chapter One
• Converging Crises and the Imperative for Change
• Chapter Two
• Defense Without Dominance: Restoring Balances in Conventional Military Power
• Chapter Three
• Fighting Together: The Evolving Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Partners
• Chapter Four
• Restoring Solvency

Research conducted by

• RAND National Security Research Division

This research was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Document Details

• Copyright: RAND Corporation
• Availability: Available
• Print Format: Paperback
• Paperback Pages: 240
• List Price: $41.00
• Paperback Price: $32.80
• Paperback ISBN/EAN: 1-9774-1159-2
• Document Number: RR-A2555-1
• Year: 2023
• Series: Research Reports

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Citation

Format:

• Chicago Manual of Style
• RAND Corporation Style Manual

Ochmanek, David A., Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Michael J. Mazarr, Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html. Also available in print form.

Ochmanek, David A., Anna Dowd, Stephen J. Flanagan, Andrew R. Hoehn, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Michael J. Mazarr, Inflection Point: How to Reverse the Erosion of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence, RAND Corporation, RR-A2555-1, 2023. As of August 30, 2023: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html

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rand.org · by David A. Ochmanek

9. It's Google versus the US in the biggest antitrust trial in decades

Excerpts:

The Justice Department’s antitrust case echoes the one it filed against Microsoft in 1998. Regulators then accused Microsoft of forcing computer makers that relied on its dominant Windows operating system to also feature Microsoft’s Internet Explorer — just as the internet was starting to go mainstream. That bundling practice crushed competition from the once-popular browser Netscape.

Several members of the Justice Department’s team in the Google case — including lead Justice Department litigator Kenneth Dintzer — also worked on the Microsoft investigation.

Google could be hobbled if the trial ends in concessions that undercut its power. One possibility is that the company could be forced to stop paying Apple and other companies to make Google the default search engine on smartphones and computers.

Or the legal battle could cause Google to lose focus. That’s what happened to Microsoft after its antitrust showdown with the Justice Department. Distracted, the software giant struggled to adapt to the impact of internet search and smartphones. Google capitalized on that distraction to leap from its startup roots into an imposing powerhouse.

It's Google versus the US in the biggest antitrust trial in decades

AP · September 12, 2023

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WASHINGTON (AP) — Google will confront a threat to its dominant search engine beginning Tuesday when federal regulators launch an attempt to dismantle its internet empire in the biggest U.S. antitrust trial in a quarter century.

Over the next 10 weeks, federal lawyers and state attorneys general will try to prove Google rigged the market in its favor by locking its search engine in as the default choice in a plethora of places and devices. U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta likely won’t issue a ruling until early next year. If he decides Google broke the law, another trial will decide what steps should be taken to rein in the Mountain View, California-based company.

Top executives at Google and its corporate parent Alphabet Inc., as well as those from other powerful technology companies are expected to testify. Among them is likely to be Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai, who succeeded Google co-founder Larry Page four years ago. Court documents also suggest that Eddy Cue, a high ranking Apple executive, might be called to the stand.

The Justice Department filed its antitrust lawsuit against Google nearly three years ago during the Trump administration, charging that the company has used its internet search dominance to gain an unfair advantage against competitors. Government lawyers allege that Google protects its franchise through a form of payola, shelling out billions of dollars annually to be the default search engine on the iPhone and on web browsers such as Apple’s Safari and Mozilla’s Firefox.

Regulators also charge that Google has illegally rigged the market in its favor by requiring its search engine to be bundled with its Android software for smartphones if the device manufacturers want full access to the Android app store.

Google counters that it faces a wide range of competition despite commanding about 90% of the internet search market. Its rivals, Google argues, range from search engines such as Microsoft’s Bing to websites like Amazon and Yelp, where consumers can post questions about what to buy or where to go.

From Google’s perspective, perpetual improvements to its search engine explain why people almost reflexively keep coming back to it, a habit that long ago made “Googling” synonymous with looking things up on the internet.

The trial begins just a couple weeks after the 25th anniversary of the first investment in the company — a $100,000 check written by Sun Microsystems co-founder Andy Bechtolsheim that enabled Page and Sergey Brin to set up shop in a Silicon Valley garage.

Today, Google’s corporate parent, Alphabet, is worth $1.7 trillion and employs 182,000 people, with most of the money coming from $224 billion in annual ad sales flowing through a network of digital services anchored by a search engine that fields billions of queries a day.

The Justice Department’s antitrust case echoes the one it filed against Microsoft in 1998. Regulators then accused Microsoft of forcing computer makers that relied on its dominant Windows operating system to also feature Microsoft’s Internet Explorer — just as the internet was starting to go mainstream. That bundling practice crushed competition from the once-popular browser Netscape.

Several members of the Justice Department’s team in the Google case — including lead Justice Department litigator Kenneth Dintzer — also worked on the Microsoft investigation.

Google could be hobbled if the trial ends in concessions that undercut its power. One possibility is that the company could be forced to stop paying Apple and other companies to make Google the default search engine on smartphones and computers.

Or the legal battle could cause Google to lose focus. That’s what happened to Microsoft after its antitrust showdown with the Justice Department. Distracted, the software giant struggled to adapt to the impact of internet search and smartphones. Google capitalized on that distraction to leap from its startup roots into an imposing powerhouse.

AP · September 12, 2023

10. Death penalty upheld for soldier who killed 13 in base shooting

Excerpts:

Hasan is one of four former service members on military death row at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. President George W. Bush signed off on the execution of ex-soldier Ronald Gray, but an execution of the serial rapist and murderer is unlikely in the near future due to the case becoming a legal roller coaster. Others who previously sat on military death row had their death sentences reduced by President Barack Obama during his final days in office.

The U.S. government has not executed a member of the armed forces since 1961, when Army Pvt. John Bennett was executed for rape and murder, according to the Death Penalty Information Center. In 1983, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ruled in U.S. v Matthews that military death penalty sentences were unconstitutional. Then-President Ronald Reagan reinstated the practice after outlining detailed standards for military death penalty sentences.

Death penalty upheld for soldier who killed 13 in base shooting

armytimes.com · by Zamone Perez · September 11, 2023

A top military court delivered a unanimous decision to uphold the death penalty conviction of ex-Army Maj. Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 people and wounded dozens of others at then-Fort Hood, Texas.

On Nov. 5, 2009, Hasan walked into a readiness processing center and opened fire with a semi-automatic handgun. Thirteen people, including a pregnant soldier, died in the barrage. At his court-martial, Hasan admitted to the shooting, and he was sentenced to death. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces rejected Hasan’s motion to reverse his death sentence after not finding enough merits to his arguments to grant his motion.

“After carefully considering his raised issues and the record, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to any relief. We therefore affirm the judgment of the lower court,” the court’s opinion read. The court then went on to reject each of his arguments.

Attorneys for Hasan could not be reached for comment.

But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces’ decision does not finalize a pending execution, and Hasan’s case is far from over. Ten years have passed since Hasan pleaded guilty at his court martial in 2013 to the killings. But Eugene Fidell, a visiting lecturer at Yale Law School, said it takes time for a capital case to make its way through the courts due to the “meticulous” nature of the U.S. legal system, even the military justice system.

“In a capital case, you leave no stone unturned,” he said. “I think it’s hard because this was an unanimous decision, so you don’t have the benefit of a dissenting opinion, which would obviously be helpful. It’s the kind of thing you hope for if you have a serious case.”

Fidell said Hasan still has a number of legal options to get his death penalty conviction overturned. If Hasan believes the judges made a mistake or overlooked an issue, he can ask for a reconsideration. Those, he said, are rarely granted. Hasan could then appeal to the Supreme Court if that is rejected.

The case also presents an issue for President Joe Biden, who campaigned as an anti-death penalty candidate. Unlike a civilian court’s ruling, the president must “personally, affirmatively” sign off on a military execution.

Hasan is one of four former service members on military death row at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. President George W. Bush signed off on the execution of ex-soldier Ronald Gray, but an execution of the serial rapist and murderer is unlikely in the near future due to the case becoming a legal roller coaster. Others who previously sat on military death row had their death sentences reduced by President Barack Obama during his final days in office.

The U.S. government has not executed a member of the armed forces since 1961, when Army Pvt. John Bennett was executed for rape and murder, according to the Death Penalty Information Center. In 1983, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ruled in U.S. v Matthews that military death penalty sentences were unconstitutional. Then-President Ronald Reagan reinstated the practice after outlining detailed standards for military death penalty sentences.

Jonathan Lehrfeld contributed reporting to this article.

11. How the ‘nuclear football’ remains a potent symbol of the unthinkable

Although I have known a few officers who have carried the football I actually do not know much about the work they do or the processes surrounding it. It remains a mystery (as it should).

There is an interesting discussion of the Vice Presidents that I was unaware of.

Excerpts:

Despite the contents of the nuclear football remaining somewhat of a mystery for national security concerns, the device itself still conveys a striking message to the U.S. adversaries, reminding them of the massive defense capabilities it can activate amidst heightened nuclear tensions, said Christopher Karns, former 341st Mission Support Group commander.

How the ‘nuclear football’ remains a potent symbol of the unthinkable

militarytimes.com · by Georgina DiNardo · September 11, 2023

The nuclear threat has been dormant in the public’s mind since the end the Cold War. But renewed attention due to the wild success of the film “Oppenheimer’' and rising tensions with Russia and China has brought the so-called nuclear football, the activation device for the U.S. arsenal, back into view.

The sighting of a military aide handling the football, closely following President Joe Biden as he exited a meeting with the United Kingdom’s prime minister on July 10, the day before the NATO summit during which the war in Ukraine was discussed, heightened already building tensions between NATO members and Russia.

Russia and the United States respectively lead the nuclear weapons race, both far ahead of the seven other countries that also have nuclear weapons, according to data obtained from the World Population Review.

Out of the nine countries that have nuclear weapons, the U.S., Russia and Pakistan are the only three that have aides following their political leaders with nuclear briefcases. The information that person carries, along with launch codes the president carries, allows the world’s most powerful political leader to launch Armageddon if needed at any moment.

Despite the contents of the nuclear football remaining somewhat of a mystery for national security concerns, the device itself still conveys a striking message to the U.S. adversaries, reminding them of the massive defense capabilities it can activate amidst heightened nuclear tensions, said Christopher Karns, former 341st Mission Support Group commander.

An image from YouTube shows a mushroom cloud from a U.S. above-ground nuclear test. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California released the first set of restored films of nuclear tests conducted by the U.S. government from the 1940s to the early 1960s on YouTube on March 15, 2017. (Kyodo)

The nuclear football was not always what is today. Over time, the briefcase has had drastic changes to its contents, causing speculation to arise over its morality.

A history of the nuclear football

Following the creation and use of the atomic bomb in the 1940s, a story that “Oppenheimer” deeply explored, then President Dwight D. Eisenhower feared the U.S. would be helpless against a nuclear assault. In the late 1950s, he directed a military aide to carry a bag containing documents that would allow the president to communicate an action plan with military headquarters across the country whenever he left Washington.

Eisenhower’s initial satchel included emergency action documents which would help the president regain control of United States actions if a nuclear attack was launched by another country.

“In the event of a nuclear attack, the president could basically seize control of the government and suspend habeas corpus and do all sorts of other things that he wouldn’t be allowed to do in peacetime and wouldn’t be constitutional, but would nevertheless, let him run the government on an emergency basis,” Stephen Schwartz, a nonresident senior fellow at the Bulletin for Atomic Scientists, an organization that aims to inform the public about man-made threats to humanity, told Military Times.

Eisenhower transferred the satchel to his successor, President John F. Kennedy, who changed it over time, as he wanted blueprints for an alternative solution to the all-or-nothing nuclear war strategy of the time. Kennedy also coined the nickname “the nuclear football” after an early nuclear war plan called “Dropkick,” which used mosquitos to test insect warfare concepts.

President Bill Clinton presenting one of his military aide’s, Buzz Patterson, who handled the nuclear football with a symbolic football for his service. (Contributed)

Former President Jimmy Carter trimmed down the football’s contents, knowing that if the situation arose in which he would have to use the football, he’s have just minutes to act.

Legal concerns about the documents within the football drove revisions during the Carter and Reagan Administrations. By the late 1980s, the documents inside the nuclear football had been completely updated for the first time since Kennedy, said former military aide Buzz Patterson, who handled the football during the Clinton Administration.

“It was pretty much the same football when Carter assumed office that JFK had had and it was outdated,” Patterson said in an interview with Military Times. “They did a couple of modernizations. They went back and looked at the war plans [and] the president’s emergency documents and they realized that some of the stuff is pretty old.”

Despite changes and modernizations throughout history, Karns believes the football is still a strong symbolic message to foes of the United States.

“The availability of this capability serves as a valuable deterrent to those considering harm to the United States,” Karns, who led the 341st Mission Support Group in their mission to prepare expeditionary combat support forces to operations around the world, wrote in a text response to Military Times.

Common misconceptions

Russia and Pakistan both have similar nuclear briefcases. Unlike the U.S., which clouds the nuclear football with mystery, Russia unveiled the contents of that country’s nuclear briefcase on television in 2019 .

As Russian television showed in 2019, the briefcase held actual buttons to launch a nuclear attack, a flash card with codes on it and a keypad of sorts to enter numerical instructions. The contents have not been shown since, however, an aide still follows Putin around will it regularly.

Press spotted an aide carrying Putin’s nuclear briefcase, called the “Cheget,” when he arrived at the Red Square Victory Parade in May. Putin then gave a speech, blaming Ukraine for the war and citing Russian casualties, further increasing tensions among nations.

The U.S. actually has two footballs — one for the president and one for the vice president.

The vice president is offered a personal squad of military aides to carry a backup football, but can refuse the satchel, as then Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson did. Most vice presidents do not reject the football, Schwartz said, as it’s crucial for national security in cases of presidential death or impeachment.

Patterson said that when Clinton severely injured his knee, there were discussions over whether they needed to make Gore’s backup satchel the main one.

“There was a conversation between myself and one of the VP’s military aides, and my concern was if we put Clinton under [anesthesia], then Gore has to have [control of] the football for however long it takes, but we never ended up having to do that,” Patterson said.

Former Vice President Mike Pence was seen at the January 6 insurrection being followed by a military aide holding the satchel.

The satchel is not all that is required to trigger nuclear weapons in times of crisis. A card with authentication codes, dubbed the “biscuit” which doesn’t have real launch codes but can verify the president’s identity, is supposed to be always carried by the president. Military Times could not confirm the origin of the term.

“The president does not have the launch codes,” Schwartz said. “No president has had launch codes. So, the president can’t physically turn keys or push buttons to do anything, he’s relying on a whole chain of people, hundreds of people down the chain of command to transmit the orders and do all of that.”

The National Security Agency generates identification codes for the president to use to authenticate their identity with the National Military Command Center if they want to activate a nuclear defense, Schwartz said.

The activation process begins with an alphanumeric challenge response code from a National Military Command Center officer to the president. The president would then read their identification code, stored on the biscuit, through a secure communication device in the football. If correct, the president chooses an action plan and attack orders are relayed to all involved in the chosen nuclear defense strategy, including intercontinental ballistic missile operators, submarines and bombers, Schwartz said.

Lost biscuit never found

There have been circumstances throughout history when the president was separated from the biscuit, such as when then President Reagan was shot in 1981 and hospital workers stripped him down to save his life, tossing the biscuit into a hospital bag amid the pandemonium.

“[Clinton] lost them forever,” Patterson said. “We never did find them. I was the guy that was with him when he confessed that he had lost them. When I pressed him on it, and I said ‘Okay, sir, how long’s it been since you’ve seen them? Where’s the last place you saw them?’ Typical stuff you ask when somebody’s lost something. And, he said he couldn’t recall. And at one point, he said it could have been up to three or four months [since he’d seen them].”

Patterson claims that Clinton confessed he lost the codes the same morning the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal hit the press.

“The thing about the military aides is we are right around the president, but we’re not always with the president in terms of being in the same room,” Patterson said.

Ethical ramifications

The job of carrying the nuclear football can be burdensome, and not only because it weighs about 45 pounds. Patterson says that the psychological impact of holding such monumental power influences the handler.

“It’s not an easy job,” Patterson said. “It can result in tremendous casualties and the loss of life, livelihoods, cities, homes and all that kind of stuff. I think we all just knew that we were there to be a tool that [could be used], but we didn’t necessarily have to.”

The White House and Department of Defense collaborate to select nuclear football handler candidates. Patterson said that he was one of six Air Force members flown out to Washington for background checks and interviews. Once selected, Patterson immediately flew back to Northern California, sold his home and moved into the White House.

Patterson served for the usual two years, representing the Air Force’s nuclear football handler, alongside a team of military aide’s from other branches.

No specific mental health test was necessary for the role, Patterson said, instead candidates were appointed to the position after passing a security clearance. Schwartz said everyone who works with nuclear weapons must pass a screening called Yankee, including the military aide handling the football.

“They’re subjected to the personnel reliability program, just like everybody else who works with or around nuclear weapons,” Schwartz said. “Except, of course, for the president, who isn’t subject to anything.”

Schwartz said that most presidents avoid acknowledging the football due to unease.

“[Their inauguration briefing is] the first and last time most presidents think about this,” Schwartz said. “Most of them find it off putting [and] disturbing, you know, to be reminded that they have this power. So they just generally do not think about it.”

While the president has the power to activate it, the military aide is tasked with ensuring that the president is of sound mind before they were to activate the nuclear football.

Patterson recalled grappling over how he would refuse the president’s command to launch nuclear weapons if he believed they were not of sound mind and body.

“And I told myself internally many times ‘If I think he’s coming across as nuts, I don’t think I can participate in this,’” Patterson said. “And so that’s how I rationalized it to myself, and I think a lot of the other aides thought the same kind of thing.”

When then President Trump was in office, some media outlets questioned his sanity, Schwartz said.

“So even if the president went completely bonkers and wanted to launch a nuclear attack, he can’t physically do anything,” Schwartz said. “If he was mentally deranged, people would have a responsibility not to follow those orders, although legally they’re supposed to. So, there’s this kind of gray area there about what you would do, which was tested during the Trump Administration.”

Federal prosecutors lodged an indictment against Trump, alleging he took boxes of classified documents with him as he was leaving office, including documents with information about nuclear programs, defense and weapons.

President Biden’s mental fitness has been debated, 43% of Americans said they believe Biden and Trump are both too old to be president again, a Washington Post-ABC News poll found.

This leaves the military aides tasked with handling the football in charge of what Karn’s believes is the final defense and symbol to prevent a nuclear attack.

“The nuclear enterprise is the ultimate insurance policy for the nation,” Karns said. “If a situation or scenario ever developed where nuclear capabilities were considered, it would impact all of DoD and [the] whole of government in some capacity.”

C4ISRNET Senior Reporter Colin Demarest contributed to this article.

About Georgina DiNardo

Georgina DiNardo is an editorial fellow for Military Times and Defense News and a recent graduate of American University, specializing in journalism, psychology, and photography in Washington, D.C.

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militarytimes.com · by Georgina DiNardo · September 11, 2023

12. Republican Bill with Massive Boost to Junior Enlisted Pay Sparks Veto Threat from Biden

30% for E-6s and below. Wow. That is probably the only way to ensure we do not have our junior enlisted on government assistance to feed their families. They certainly do deserve much greater compensation than they currently receive.

But is the 30% increase really the main or sole reason for the veto threat as one might infer from the headline - it is not according to the article. It is included in the list of reasons in the "broader statement" but apparently the headline editor seemed to want to send a message about the administration as if it does not care about junior enlisted.

Republican Bill with Massive Boost to Junior Enlisted Pay Sparks Veto Threat from Biden

military.com · by Rebecca Kheel · September 11, 2023

The White House is taking issue with a House Republican proposal to give junior enlisted troops a more than 30% pay bump next year.

The opposition to rewriting the pay scale for E-6s and below was included in a broader statement the White House issued Monday afternoon threatening to veto the House's proposed fiscal 2024 Pentagon spending bill, largely over the administration's objection to "divisive policy provisions" that target abortion rights and LGBTQ+ service members.

"If the president were presented with [the bill], he would veto it," the statement said.

Under the spending bill advanced by the House Appropriations Committee earlier this year and scheduled to be voted on by the full House later this week, no service member would make less than the equivalent of $15 per hour for a 40-hour workweek.

For example, the bill would set the monthly base pay for an E-1 with at least four months of service at $2,600.60, compared to the rate now of $1,917.63 per month. An E-6 with less than two years of service could make $3,210 per month under the bill, compared to $2,980.47 per month now.

While the White House said it appreciates lawmakers' "concern for the needs of the nation's most junior enlisted members' compensation," it added that it "strongly opposes" the bill's significant change to the pay scale while the administration is in the midst of its own comprehensive review of military pay.

The 14th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation was launched at the beginning of this year and is expected to wrap by January 2025.

Lawmakers in both parties in recent years have raised concerns that junior enlisted members are struggling to afford basic necessities such as food and housing. At hearings, when lawmakers have asked Pentagon officials about proposals to increase pay for junior enlisted troops, officials have deferred to the quadrennial review.

In addition to pointing to the administration's ongoing review, the White House argued the changes to the pay scale are not fully paid for in the bill. The bill would provide $800 million to cover increased salaries, but the White House said it would cost $4.4 billion in fiscal 2024 and $23.4 billion over five years.

The White House also argued the changes would create "pay compression" in some areas.

"This would remove an important incentive for enlisted members to seek increased responsibilities and earn promotions at the grade of E-6 and higher, harming military readiness," the statement said.

The House's defense spending bill was already unlikely to become law as-is after Republicans included a slew of partisan riders aimed at Pentagon policies that conservatives consider "woke."

The funding bill would, among other provisions, prohibit surgery or hormone therapy for transgender troops and ban funding from being used to pay for travel and leave for service members seeking abortions.

"The administration opposes those provisions that limit access to non-covered reproductive healthcare by servicemembers and their families, impede the ability of all servicemembers to serve to their fullest capacity, and undermine the United States' ability to fight foreign adversary disinformation," the White House statement Monday said. "Including divisive policy provisions within an appropriations bill also dramatically increases the threat of a continuing resolution, which would further damage America's national security."

The jockeying over the bill comes as Congress has just three weeks to reach an agreement to fund the government past this fiscal year, which ends Sept. 30.

If lawmakers cannot at least agree on a stopgap spending measure known as a continuing resolution, then the government would shut down and service members would face having to work without pay until it reopens.

-- Rebecca Kheel can be reached at rebecca.kheel@military.com. Follow her on X @reporterkheel.

military.com · by Rebecca Kheel · September 11, 2023

13. The Power of Solid Alliances for Good

Excerpts:

Most importantly for the U.S., there is a need for continued U.S. global leadership. A pressing need to better disseminate information about our values – life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in a liberal democracy tethered to the rule of law. We should reconstitute the U.S. Information Service, abolished in 1999, with offices and dedicated personnel in all our embassies, focused on this important mission.

If left to the people, autocracies will be replaced by democracies dedicated to the rule of law. Our job should be to communicate with the people.

The Power of Solid Alliances for Good

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/opinion/the-power-of-solid-alliances-for-good?mc_cid=b8984c5f51

SEPTEMBER 11TH, 2023 BY JOSEPH DETRANI | 0 COMMENTS

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories. The views expressed represent those of the author.

View all articles by Joseph DeTrani

OPINION — The Camp David Summit of the U.S., South Korea and Japan was emblematic of an alliance that, despite historical issues, showed that democracies with the rule of law, responsive to the people, can and will unite to deter and if necessary, defeat a threatening adversary.

Much has been said about the alliance of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea and their effort to appeal to the Global South and others, espousing a line that these autocracies represent a form of governance that others should emulate. It’s hard to understand why any of these countries, based on their behavior, would be a model for others to emulate.

Russia discarded the security assurances they provided to Ukraine in 1994 with the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, pledging to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders or to use or threaten the use of force. Russia blatantly violated these security assurances in 2014 with its invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Russia then doubled down with its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with the ongoing carnage in this unprovoked war. Is this the model for others to emulate?

North Korea, unable to feed its own people, with a record of extreme human rights abuses, has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in its nuclear and missile programs, determined to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state. A desperate and isolated Vladimir Putin has reportedly reached out to Kim Jung Un for military assistance: artillery shells, rockets, and other weaponry, in exchange for food and energy assistance and possibly assistance with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs – all in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Recent media reporting of a planned visit of Kim Jung Un to Russia to meet with Putin, most likely in Vladivostok, appears to be imminent. The former Soviet Union had provided North Korea with a research reactor in 1963 and in 1985 got North Korea to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) – that North Korea quit in January 2003 – while also helping with North Korea’s ballistic missile programs. This ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, when North Korea then looked to China for greater economic assistance and geopolitical support. Russia was an active member of the Six-Party Talks, hosted by China, from 2003-2009, committed to securing the complete and verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons facilities.

Cipher Brief Subscriber+Members enjoy unlimited access to Cipher Brief content, including analysis with experts, private virtual briefings with experts, the M-F Open Source Report and the weekly Dead Drop – an insider look at the latest gossip in the national security space. It pays to be a Subscriber+Member. Upgrade your access today.

The irony is that Russia now needs North Korea’s military support to persist with their invasion of Ukraine. And North Korea, desperate for attention and economic and military assistance, not only openly supports Russia’s invasion of a sovereign nation but is willing to provide military support to Russia.

Are these the countries others want to emulate?

Six months after the death of Mahsa Amini, protests in Iran continue. The demonstrations are indicative of the resentment the people have toward the ruling theocracy, an elite group apparently oblivious to severe economic conditions affecting the people, with high inflation and unemployment, living under an oppressive regime. A regime that supports proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Qods Force providing weapons, training and financial support to militias and political organizations in these – and other – countries, challenging legitimate governments.

Is this the country others want to emulate?

Since the normalization of relations with China in January 1979, the U.S. has been China’s major trading partner, with over $600 billion annually in trade, and significant U.S. foreign direct investment throughout China, with over 300,000 Chinese students annually attending our universities and colleges. Indeed, this was Deng Xiaoping’s strategy when he took over in 1978: Ensuring a close economic and strategic relationship with the U.S. 

Since Xi Jinping took over in 2013, there has been considerable tension in relations with the U.S. and others, to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region and Taiwan Strait, with concern about the treatment of the Uighurs in Xinjiang Province and the 2020 National Security Law for Hong Kong that nullified the Basic Law that allowed for fifty years of a “one country two systems” form of governance for Hong Kong, established in July 1997 when Hong Kong reverted back to China after 150 years of British Rule.

There is an opportunity for China to cooperate with the U.S. on a multitude of issues for the common good, like North Korea, climate change, pandemics, counter-narcotics and counter-international organized crime and other issues.

Most importantly for the U.S., there is a need for continued U.S. global leadership. A pressing need to better disseminate information about our values – life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in a liberal democracy tethered to the rule of law. We should reconstitute the U.S. Information Service, abolished in 1999, with offices and dedicated personnel in all our embassies, focused on this important mission.

If left to the people, autocracies will be replaced by democracies dedicated to the rule of law. Our job should be to communicate with the people.

This piece by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joe Detrani was first published in The Washington Times

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. 

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief   

14. Biden inches toward decision on long-range missiles as Ukraine ups pressure

Biden inches toward decision on long-range missiles as Ukraine ups pressure

By ALEXANDER WARD, PAUL MCLEARY and LARA SELIGMAN

09/11/2023 04:28 PM EDT

Politico

Kyiv wants an official announcement by next week’s UN General Assembly, but U.S. officials say that’s unlikely.

A decision by President Joe Biden on sending ATACMS for Ukraine’s use against Russian forces would almost certainly come after the annual Turtle Bay confab. | Pool Photo by Luong Thai Linh

09/11/2023 04:28 PM EDT

The Biden administration is in active conversations about whether to send long-range missiles to Ukraine amid an intense campaign for the U.S. to transfer the weapon, according to two U.S. officials and a person close to the Ukrainian government.

It’s unclear if a decision memo has reached President Joe Biden’s desk. The officials said a final call would be made with Ukraine’s input, but Washington and Kyiv aren’t engaged in discussions about an announcement or a rollout of Army Tactical Missile Systems.

Ukraine is pushing the U.S. to greenlight the delivery of ATACMS by next week’s U.N. General Assembly attended by Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Officials in Kyiv said they’re expecting some good news on that front after the Ukrainian leader touches down in New York City.

But U.S. officials say that timeline is too tight. A decision by Biden on sending ATACMS for Ukraine’s use against Russian forces would almost certainly come after the annual Turtle Bay confab.

Asked about the prospect of delivering ATACMS, deputy national security adviser Jon Finer said the White House hasn’t taken anything off the table. “Our position all along has been we will get Ukraine the capabilities that will enable it to succeed on the battlefield,” he told reporters on the sidelines of the G20 summit in India. “We will continue to assess the situation on the ground and make decisions based on that.”

If Biden signs off on the transfer, he will provide a weapon for which Ukraine has clamored since the earliest days of the 18-month war. ATACMS, which can travel up to 190 miles, would give Ukraine’s forces the ability to strike far beyond Russia’s defensive positions inside Ukraine and, possibly, deep into Russian sovereign territory.

Ukraine already has received some long-range missiles, such as the U.K.-donated Storm Shadow that can travel over 150 miles. The Storm Shadow is launched from Ukrainian Soviet-era jets, while the ATACMS can be fired from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System already in Ukraine, which would allow the Ukrainians much more flexibility in where and how they launch the missile.

Those launchers normally fire rockets that travel about 50 miles, though the U.S. has also promised to send the ground-launched small diameter bomb by the end of the year, which can hit targets over 90 miles away.

As its ground forces launch attacks against well-defended Russian trench lines and heavily fortified positions, Ukraine has prioritized hitting Russian logistics nodes and transportation hubs well behind the front lines. The Storm Shadow missiles have also targeted ammunition dumps in Crimea.

ABC News first reported that the U.S. was nearing a decision on sending ATACMS. Pentagon spokesperson Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder said Monday he had nothing to announce on ATACMS and declined to discuss U.S. inventory levels.

Zelenskyy told CNN on Sunday that he is planning to speak with Biden about the issue, and “I think he can change this page and this war. Once he did it with the HIMARS — it was very important, these HIMARS.”

On talks to get ATACMS into Ukrainian hands, “we are moving. I hope we’ll get it in autumn,” Zelenskyy said. “For us, it’s very important not to do the pause in this counteroffensive and I need it very much.”

The administration has long been skeptical of providing ATACMS to Ukraine. Last year, national security adviser Jake Sullivan told an Aspen Security Forum audience that Biden wanted “to ensure that we don’t get into a situation in which we are approaching the Third World War.” Sending missiles that Ukraine could launch into Russia would increase that risk, he said.

But in July, Sullivan told the same conference that the administration was “prepared to take risks, and we will continue to be prepared to take risks to provide support to Ukraine.” The strong statement came after the United Kingdom and France both sent long-range weapons of their own to Ukraine, leading to criticism of the U.S. for not following suit.

The Pentagon, meanwhile, has been hesitant to send ATACMS because of concerns over how many missiles the U.S. has in its inventory. DOD officials previously told their Ukrainian counterparts that the U.S. didn’t have any ATACMS in its stockpile to spare. The weapons’ manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, currently makes about 500 ATACMS a year, though they’re all slated for sale to Poland, Finland, Romania, the UAE and Taiwan, which have ordered the missile system in recent years.

The Army hasn’t purchased new ATACMS in several years, though it has upgraded them with better guidance systems. The service is also preparing to move past the ATACMS, and beginning this year will start the transition to the new Precision Strike Missile, which can travel at least 310 miles, vastly outranging the ATACMS’ 190 miles.

The Army will start receiving deliveries of the new missile this year, which could make more ATACMS available to transfer to other countries.

POLITICO

Politico

15. Replicator: How America Plans to Take on the China Military Challenge

Conclusion:

So there’s a diplomatic component to Replicator to go along with strategy, operations, and force design. Best to approach the allies now.

Replicator: How America Plans to Take on the China Military Challenge

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · September 11, 2023

Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks set defense commentators aflutter last month when she announced “Replicator,” an initiative meant to field “small, smart, cheap” uncrewed, autonomous aerial, surface, and subsurface vehicles by the thousand within the next two years—all without asking Congress for additional taxpayer dollars.

The goal: to offset China’s advantages in numbers on the cheap and in a hurry. I applaud the theory. It’s distributed warfare carried to the nth degree.

Now show me.

Why Replicator Is Important

It’s doubtful the initiative’s overseers named the initiative for this reason, but calling it Replicator should constantly rebuke them not to short-circuit the scientific method in their haste to start stamping out drones. Replication is the soul of the scientific method. Philosopher of science Karl Popper attested to the importance of repetition. Repeating an experiment and garnering the same results each time cannot elevate a hypothesis to a universal law, observes Popper—there is no such thing as settled science—but it’s about as close as we can come in this fallen world.

Because it’s impossible to prove a hypothesis for all time, Popper insists that experimenters make their best effort to “falsify,” or disprove it. If they do their utmost yet repeatedly fail to falsify a proposition, then the proposition stands—provisionally—unless and until disproof does come along. Then they amend it until it defies falsification, or they discard it. Fortunately, fielding uncrewed aircraft and ships and getting them to work together for operational and tactical effect is an engineering problem. If you can reduce a hypothesis to engineering, build a prototype, and test it in the field, and if it works as predicted over and over again, it has withstood falsification.

Rigor is at a premium during testing.

Weapon systems are hypotheses. That being the case, scientific-technical personnel should make sincere, determined efforts to falsify the concepts underlying Replicator, not to mention the hardware’s real-world performance. Maybe the family of drones will function as designed, maybe it will need revising, or maybe the initiative will be a bust. Best to find out now. That’s why Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer, the “father of Aegis,” made build a little, test a little, learn a lot his credo. Meyer lived the scientific method. The Aegis combat system remains the gold standard of naval warfare forty years hence, affirming his wisdom.

The scientific ethos—the skeptical mindset—propounded by Meyer and Popper must permeate all phases of weapons development, manufacturing, and operations. If realistic field trials have already vindicated the craft envisioned by Replicator—and it’s hard to tell from outside the classified realm—then by all means start mass-producing them. If not, it would be foolhardy to rush untried systems into production.

It may sound like I’m harping a lot about a little, but the past two decades are littered with instances when someone conceived a brilliant idea, transformed the idea into gadgetry, and ordered the gadget into serial production without adequate vetting. The littoral combat ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, Ford-class aircraft carrier, and F-35 joint strike fighter testify to the perils of undue haste in scientific-technical pursuits.

Let’s not repeat the folly of past R&D endeavors such as these. There are no shortcuts.

But suppose things turn out well and Replicator works as advertised. Will swarms of unmanned planes, ships, and subs exert decisive impact on Pacific battlegrounds of the future? Here again, skepticism represents the proper attitude. Tactics, operational concepts, and war plans are hypotheses as surely as the implements used to execute them. They are theories positing cause and effect: if I do X, Y, and Z, my actions will yield tactical, operational, or strategic effects A, B, and C that advance my warfighting cause.

Admiral J. C. Wylie would look askance at claims that Replicator is a war-winner. Wylie pays tribute to “cumulative” operations, meaning masses of tactical actions unrelated to one another in time or space. They happen all over the map and are unchoreographed with one another.

Undersea warfare is a classic genre of cumulative operations. During World War II the U.S. Pacific Fleet submarine force fanned out across the Western Pacific to raid Japanese shipping, mercantile shipping in particular. One attack on Japanese ships bore no relation to another transpiring elsewhere on the nautical chart. By its nature no individual action could bring about decisive effects. Sinking a single freighter or oiler makes little difference to a foe’s overall war effort. Add up the results of a bunch of small-scale encounters, though, and the cumulative effects can debilitate an enemy over time—contributing to final victory. Pacific submarines sank over 1,100 Japanese vessels of all types during World War II. They dealt a slow-motion but devastating blow against a maritime empire reliant on shipping to connect dispersed islands and continental territories.

Hence the label cumulative. The aggregate damage wrought by scattershot attacks can help grind down an antagonist over time. For Wylie cumulative operations amount to a difference-maker in a closely matched struggle, improving prospects for the war effort’s “sequential” component. They are indecisive in themselves. Sequential operations do lead from one tactical action to the next. Heavy forces pound away at the opponent repeatedly and in sequence until a triumph is in hand. It’s easier to overcome a foe wearied by cumulative operations.

Drone warfare looks strikingly cumulative in character. It’s an adjunct to main battle forces prosecuting sequential operations, not a war-winning capability in its own right. This is not a knock against Replicator, just a caution against hype. U.S. and allied forces will need time in a Pacific war. A short war portends a Chinese victory. Cumulative uncrewed operations could help balk People’s Liberation Army operations for a time, taking aim at amphibious shipping and the warplanes and warships that guard it. Delay would grant heavy forces—carrier and amphibious task forces, surface action groups, and the like, along with their U.S. Air Force comrades—time to gather in the region, amass combat power at the scene of action, and flip the script on China.

Judging from his writings, Wylie would pronounce the cumulative effort invaluable but indecisive. And to her credit, Kathleen Hicks went out of her way not to oversell Replicator: “America still benefits from platforms that are large, exquisite, expensive, and few.” Indeed. Much as during World War II, cumulative operations will postpone defeat while the exquisite arm of the joint force girds for a sequential counteroffensive.

If Replicator lives up to its billing.

It’s worth pointing out that Pentagon chieftains, though not in so many words, are shaping a strategy vis-à-vis China that hews to the classic pattern for active defense. They have tacitly—and correctly—admitted that the U.S. joint force and its regional partners will be weaker than China’s military on day one of a conflict. The combatant that’s weaker at the outset of war tends to deploy cumulative measures because that’s what it can do while working up for a sequential campaign that delivers victory.

Start cumulative, go sequential.

And lastly, Replicator refocuses attention, if any reminder is needed, on the all-important alliance dimension of Pacific deterrence and warfare. Operating from Guam or other bases on American soil, U.S. forces could never stage superior military might at likely scenes of action in the South China Sea, East China Sea, or Taiwan Strait, making themselves the stronger pugilist in battle. They’re too far away. There is no drone exemption to the tyranny of distance. To get within drone range of these battlegrounds, U.S. forces must either secure access to bases near them, chiefly along the first island chain, or they must risk precious crewed assets to transport drones close to their hunting grounds, which could defeat the purpose of Replicator. That host governments would grant access, however, is not a foregone conclusion.

So there’s a diplomatic component to Replicator to go along with strategy, operations, and force design. Best to approach the allies now.

Corn, popped.

About the Author and Their Expertise

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone. Holmes is also on staff as a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · September 11, 2023

16. DOJ to ‘Surge’ Resources at Corporate Crimes With National Security Implications

DOJ to ‘Surge’ Resources at Corporate Crimes With National Security Implications

Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General Marshall Miller cited the appointment of the National Security Division’s first chief counsel for corporate enforcement and its ongoing hiring of 25 prosecutors

https://www.wsj.com/articles/doj-to-surge-resources-at-corporate-crimes-with-national-security-implications-317eca16?page=1

By David Smagalla

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Sept. 11, 2023 6:32 pm ET

The seal of the U.S. Justice Department. PHOTO: KEVIN LAMARQUE/REUTERS

U.S. prosecutors are increasingly focusing their attention on investigating corporate crimes that have national security implications, a top Justice Department official said Monday.

“We’ve determined that it’s necessary for the department to infuse significant amounts of resources into national security, corporate investigations and prosecutions,” said Marshall Miller, principal associate deputy attorney general at the Justice Department, during a panel at the Practising Law Institute’s conference on white-collar crime in New York.

Marshall Miller is principal associate deputy attorney general at the Justice Department. PHOTO: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Miller cited the appointment, announced Monday, of the National Security Division’s first chief counsel for corporate enforcement. Ian Richardson, a former federal prosecutor in the Eastern District of New York, will coordinate and oversee the prosecution of corporate crime relating to U.S. national security. 

The Justice Department’s national security division is in the process of hiring 25 new prosecutors who will be tasked with tackling sanctions evasion and export control violations, with additional resources being added to the money-laundering-and-asset-recovery section’s bank integrity unit. The hires were announced in March.

“It’s a big issue for the department,” said Miller. “We’re surging resources at it. As a result, I think you’re going to see more and more of those cases going forward in a partnership between the national security division, the criminal division and our great U.S. attorney community.”

Prosecutors in recent years have seen more national security investigations uncovering corporate misconduct and more corporate investigations revealing potential national security violations, including violations of sanctions, export controls and material support for terrorism.

In 2022, French cement firm Lafarge pleaded guilty to paying Islamic State and an al Qaeda affiliate to protect its Syrian cement plant, and earlier this year, 

British American Tobacco agreed to pay more than $635 million to resolve charges that the U.K. tobacco company conspired to violate U.S. sanctions by selling cigarettes to North Korea.“Agriculture and concrete are not areas like financial services or defense industries where you expect to see national security corporate cases,” Miller said. “But we’re seeing them more and more.”

Miller said the U.S. could increase its emphasis on trade secret issues involving China, citing the formation of the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, a partnership between the Justice Department and Commerce Department that focuses on areas where technology is being illegally obtained by foreign adversaries. 

“We’re looking at all kinds of different ways that that’s happening, from cybercrime, to export control violations to intellectual property crime,” Miller said. 

Write to David Smagalla at David.smagalla@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Marshall Miller serves as principal associate deputy attorney general at the Justice Department. A subheading in an earlier version of this article incorrectly said he was the deputy attorney general. (Corrected on Sept. 11)

17. 9/11 at 22: From 'We Will Never Forget' to 'We’ll Never Learn'

9/11 at 22: From 'We Will Never Forget' to 'We’ll Never Learn'

Ignorance and arrogance on the part of U.S. leaders congealed in the years leading to 9/11 into a dangerously false sense of national security. 

19fortyfive.com · by Brandon Weichert · September 11, 2023

Today marks the 22nd anniversary of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. On that day, nearly 3,000 people were murdered by the vicious actions of a handful of Islamist terrorists working for al Qaeda.

Shortly thereafter, the United States would enter the poorly named Global War on Terrorism. It would invade Afghanistan, chase down Islamists throughout the Horn of Africa and in South Asia, and eventually invade Iraq.

All because of a few hours on one beautiful, September day.

What we know now from years of investigations is that there is, of course, more to the story behind 9/11.

For example, a group of mostly well-educated, upper-middle-class Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians, and other Arabs who embraced a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an did not just wake up and decide to come to the United States and convert a handful of passenger airliners into cruise missiles.

Bin Laden’s Grand Strategy

There was a larger strategy at work. Specifically, the strategy of Osama Bin Laden. Despite all the money and resources in the world, the massive American intelligence and defense apparatuses missed that strategy — even after Bin Laden had made clear his intentions.

Shortly after aiding in the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Saudi-born Bin Laden, heir to a very wealthy family in Saudi Arabia, took much of his wealth and continued funding his jihadist movement, which became known as al Qaeda, or “The Base”.

While toiling in the foothills of Afghanistan, Bin Laden conspired to turn his ire against the sole remaining superpower, the United States.

Americans, meanwhile, were living through the “End of History”. The Soviets were vanquished, the Berlin Wall had come down, and the Cold War was over. There were no real threats to America’s expansion of global capitalism and its full-spectrum military dominance.

Bin Laden had other plans. He began attacking American assets and allies abroad, even managing to hit the World Trade Center in 1993. Still, the Americans never took al Qaeda or Bin Laden seriously. (At the CIA, Bin Laden was erroneously referred to as simply “the Financier”).

Bin Laden persisted.

By 1996, he told ABC News his plans of waging war upon the unsuspecting, arrogant Americans, and he explained why.

Contrary to what then-President George W. Bush and his fellow neoconservatives argued in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden did not attack America because he hated the country’s freedom. No, al Qaeda hit the United States because of real strategic ambitions on their part and anger toward U.S. foreign policy in the Greater Middle East.

Indicators & Warnings Ignored

In the decade preceding 9/11, there were multiple indicators and warnings from al Qaeda (normally in the form of brutal terrorist attacks) highlighting the threat. Yet, the elephantine national security bureaucracy never acted as decisively as it could have or should have.

Sure, the CIA was monitoring al Qaeda globally.

In fact, the storied clandestine intelligence service may have had greater understanding of al Qaeda’s ultimate plot against the United States than they have admitted in public. Certainly, the FBI was tracking al Qaeda far more than was originally understood.

The Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, the military’s equivalent to the CIA, through its ABLE-Danger outfit, was closely monitoring the al Qaeda threat.

Richard Clarke, who had served as the White House counterterrorism czar in the Clinton Administration and was carried over to the Bush Administration, was one of the highest-ranking U.S. government officials who was both aware of and trying to warn any policymaker who would listen about the threat.

His efforts were ignored and even impugned in the run-up to the September 11 attacks.

In August 2001, CIA analysts were so attenuated to the Bin Laden threat that they sent President Bush an infamous memo entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike Us.”

That memo was ignored.

The old excuses that the intelligence was inconclusive just don’t hold up under scrutiny. A memo like that should have at least compelled the Bush administration to take some defensive measures at American airports and other potential soft targets, both abroad as well as at home. But virtually no major action was taken by the Bush administration to even slightly address the concerns in the memo, which was sent to the White House just a few weeks before the attacks.

On the day of the attacks, then-CIA Director George Tenet was eating breakfast with some colleagues at a Georgetown café. Once the news broke, he immediately told his dining partners that it was al Qaeda who attacked.

How could so many people in the intelligence community be aware and yet be so indecisive? How could two presidents, from two different political parties, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have gotten America’s counterterrorism strategy before 9/11 so wrong — especially when there were no other significant threats at the time?

Whatever conspiracy theories exist on the internet, the fact remains that the U.S. national security apparatus was at least partly aware of al Qaeda’s threat, as were a variety of elected officials over the course of a decade.

Yet none took the kind of action required to address the threat before it could strike the American homeland.

Politics and bureaucratic inertia certainly played a role in this.

A Refusal to Listen

More than that, though, an unwillingness to believe Bin Laden’s threats — as well as the arrogant assertion that al Qaeda was the equivalent of the Ku Klux Klan of the Middle East and, therefore, could never pose a real threat to the all-powerful United States — led to 9/11.

Because of an inability to adequately understand and respond to Bin Laden’s threat before he could strike, the U.S. was sent down a path of war that, through its own response, caused the very kind of strategic loss in the region that Bin Laden had desired.

Without 9/11, America would never have destabilized the region, as it did with the Iraq War of 2003. America then undermined its own interests by supporting Islamist rebels in places like Syria and Libya.

Over the course of the GWOT, Washington’s policymakers attempted to overthrow pro-American dictatorships in key Muslim nations, like Egypt, in favor of the very Islamist groups that America was at war with in Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington then tried to empower the wildly Islamist regime of Iran, which only further undermined America’s once-dominant position in the Greater Middle East.

Of course, things totally collapsed for the United States when it completely abandoned Afghanistan — leaving it in the hands of the very forces it had initially gone to war against in 2001, the Taliban and by extension, their al Qaeda allies.

An Unwillingness to Respond

Essentially, Bin Laden went to war with the United States because he believed the Americans were what he referred to as the “weaker horse” in the region. By showing the region’s population that America could be made to bleed, Bin Laden hoped to trigger a wider regional revolution. Hence his reason for choosing the Leninist title for his organization, “The Base”, which behaved much like Lenin’s vanguard ideological front, the Bolsheviks.

In the course of making America bleed, as Bin Laden believed he alone did to the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the jihadist anticipated that the Americans would inevitably be pushed out of the region.

While it may have taken longer than Bin Laden expected, and al Qaeda is no longer the premier Islamist terrorist organization in the region — and Bin Laden himself is dead — his dream of a pan-Islamic revival coupled with the diminishment of America’s role in the region is coming to fruition.

The ideology, irrespective of whatever technological deficiencies al Qaeda possessed, proved far more damaging to the Americans than what most U.S. leaders believed was possible.

Ignorance is the Punishment

Ignorance and arrogance on the part of U.S. leaders congealed in the years leading to 9/11 into a dangerously false sense of national security.

That, and our refusal to understand the threats gathering just over the horizon, led to the horrific 9/11 attacks and two decades of war of the Greater Middle East. The GWOT has become a strategic defeat of the United States in that geopolitically vital region.

The very same ignorance and arrogance that created the false sense of security in America in the 1990s and early 2000s as it related to al Qaeda’s threat pervades America’s national security establishment today, only now about the People’s Republic of China.

More dangerously, many of the same individuals — or their allies — who ignored the indicators and warnings of 9/11 are in charge of America’s security today.

After 9/11, we said that “We would never forget.”

Unfortunately, we’re proving that we’ll never learn.

A 19FortyFive Senior Editor, Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life (Encounter Books), and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy (July 23). Weichert occasionally serves as a Subject Matter Expert for various organizations, including the Department of Defense. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

19fortyfive.com · by Brandon Weichert · September 11, 2023

18. Elon Musk's refusal to have Starlink support Ukraine attack in Crimea raises questions for Pentagon

Do we have to rely on people like Elon Musk? How can we prevent someone like Elon Musk from acting contrary to US interests?

Elon Musk's refusal to have Starlink support Ukraine attack in Crimea raises questions for Pentagon

AP · September 11, 2023

FILE - Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk speaks at the SATELLITE Conference and Exhibition, March 9, 2020, in Washington. Musk’s refusal to allow Ukraine to use Starlink internet services to launch a surprise attack on Russian forces in Crimea last September has raised questions for the Pentagon. The Air Force’s top civilian leader, Frank Kendall, says the military may need to be more explicit in future defense contracts that services or products it purchases could be used in war. (AP Photo/Susan Walsh, File)

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NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. (AP) — SpaceX founder Elon Musk’s refusal to allow Ukraine to use Starlink internet services to launch a surprise attack on Russian forces in Crimea last September has raised questions as to whether the U.S. military needs to be more explicit in future contracts that services or products it purchases could be used in war, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said Monday.

Excerpts of a new biography of Musk published by The Washington Post last week revealed that the Ukrainians in September 2022 had asked for the Starlink support to attack Russian naval vessels based at the Crimean port of Sevastopol. Musk had refused due to concerns that Russia would launch a nuclear attack in response. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and claims it as its territory.

Musk was not on a military contract when he refused the Crimea request; he’d been providing terminals to Ukraine for free in response to Russia’s February 2022 invasion. However, in the months since, the U.S. military has funded and officially contracted with Starlink for continued support. The Pentagon has not disclosed the terms or cost of that contract, citing operational security.

But the Pentagon is reliant on SpaceX for far more than the Ukraine response, and the uncertainty that Musk or any other commercial vendor could refuse to provide services in a future conflict has led space systems military planners to reconsider what needs to be explicitly laid out in future agreements, Kendall said during a roundtable with reporters at the Air Force Association convention at National Harbor, Maryland, on Monday.

“If we’re going to rely upon commercial architectures or commercial systems for operational use, then we have to have some assurances that they’re going to be available,” Kendall said. “We have to have that. Otherwise they are a convenience and maybe an economy in peacetime, but they’re not something we can rely upon in wartime.”

SpaceX also has the contract to help the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command develop a rocket ship that would quickly move military cargo into a conflict zone or disaster zone, which could alleviate the military’s reliance on slower aircraft or ships. While not specifying SpaceX, Gen. Mike Minihan, head of Air Mobility Command, said, “American industry has to be clear-eyed on the full spectrum of what it could be used for.”

As U.S. military investment in space has increased in recent years, concerns have revolved around how to indemnify commercial vendors from liability in case something goes wrong in a launch and whether the U.S. military has an obligation to defend those firms’ assets, such as their satellites or ground stations, if they are providing military support in a conflict.

Until Musk’s refusal in Ukraine, there had not been a focus on whether there needed to be language saying a firm providing military support in war had to agree that that support could be used in combat.

“We acquire technology, we acquire services, required platforms to serve the Air Force mission, or in this case, the Department of the Air Force,” said Andrew Hunter, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, technology and logistics. “So that is an expectation, that it is going to be used for Air Force purposes, which will include, when necessary, to be used to support combat operations.”

AP · September 11, 2023

19. Morocco’s reluctance to accept quake aid baffles foreign governments

Excerpts:

But others expressed surprise that assistance was being turned down.

“It is incomprehensible why this help is not requested,” tweeted Carl-Julius Cronenberg, a member of parliament for Germany’s Free Democrats. “It shouldn’t be about misunderstood national pride, but only about the fastest and best possible help!”

Morocco’s reluctance to accept quake aid baffles foreign governments

By Loveday Morris and Annabelle Timsit

Updated September 11, 2023 at 8:04 p.m. EDT|Published September 11, 2023 at 5:37 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Loveday Morris · September 11, 2023

Governments far and wide have offered aid to Morocco following a 6.8-magnitude earthquake that has left more than 2,500 people dead and thousands injured and displaced.

But to the bafflement of officials abroad and critics at home, Morocco has been slow to accept support.

Countries including France, Germany, Italy and the United States, along with the United Nations, said they were waiting to provide any help they could after Friday’s devastating earthquake in the High Atlas Mountains.

The Moroccan Interior Ministry said in a statement Sunday that it would initially accept search-and-rescue teams only from Britain, Qatar, Spain and the United Arab Emirates — which it called “friendly countries” — after taking into account the “needs of the field”

But Morocco also appeared slow to take up offers of broader humanitarian and technical assistance. Washington “reached out immediately to the Moroccan government to offer any assistance that we can provide,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday on CNN. “We await word from the Moroccan government to find out how we can help, where we can help,” Blinken said.

The U.S. Agency for International Development did not immediately respond to a request on Monday on whether it had yet mobilized any teams or assistance.

The United Nations has brought in experts to Morocco but is “on standby waiting for a request for assistance,” said Farhan Haq, deputy spokesperson for the U.N. secretary general. Whereas the U.N. has coordinated efforts on the ground in past disasters, the Moroccan government is “trying itself to mobilize aid,” he told CNN on Monday. He said he expected more bilateral agreements in the coming days.

In France, which ruled over Morocco as a colonial power from 1912 to 1956, the lack of uptake of support was greeted with surprise and sparked speculation that a cooling in relations between Paris and Rabat over immigration and other issues had played a role.

French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna said that some 60 other countries, including France, had offered assistance, but stressed that she believed controversy was being overblown.

Morocco had not “refused” France’s help, she told French channel BFM TV. France will give $5.4 million to French and international nonprofits working on the ground in Morocco and stands ready to support Morocco further, she said.

Catherine Colonna (@MinColonna): "Le Maroc décide souverainement" sur l'aide apportée pic.twitter.com/0Vi6tLFhu1

— BFMTV (@BFMTV) September 11, 2023

Simon Martin, the British ambassador to Morocco, said 60 U.K. search-and-rescue experts and four search dogs had arrived in the country to support Moroccan-led operations. The Spanish urban search-and-rescue team said it was receiving and coordinating international teams.

Countries including Tunisia and Saudi Arabia have said they are sending aid, though it is not clear if any has been dispatched. Other nongovernmental organizations said they had already mobilized.

Meanwhile, a 50-person team from Germany’s Technical Relief Agency assembled at Cologne Bonn Airport over the weekend was sent home from the airport on Sunday after their offer for help was not taken up.

The rapid deployment unit was “ready within a short time to use their technical expertise to provide humanitarian aid in Morocco,” the agency’s president, Sabine Lackner, said in a news release. The agency deployed a 50-person team to Turkey and Syria for four months after the devastating quake there at the beginning of this year. It is now “checking whether and how the country can be helped with the delivery of relief supplies.”

Addressing journalists on Monday, German Foreign Ministry spokesman Sebastian Fischer said there was no indication that the decision on aid by Morocco was “political.”

“The Moroccan side thanked us for the offer of help,” he said, adding that in emergencies, “you also have to ensure coordination.”

But others expressed surprise that assistance was being turned down.

“It is incomprehensible why this help is not requested,” tweeted Carl-Julius Cronenberg, a member of parliament for Germany’s Free Democrats. “It shouldn’t be about misunderstood national pride, but only about the fastest and best possible help!”

Miriam Berger, Sarah Dadouch and Missy Ryan in Washington, and Kate Brady in Berlin contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Loveday Morris · September 11, 2023

20. Putin Calls Trump Charges Political ‘Persecution’

In normal times Putin's statements would be denounced by all political parties and it might even drive a united response to those who would attack our democracy. What effect will Putin have today?

We should be looking at this as an opportunity to support an information campaign against Russia and the axis of authoritarians.

Putin Calls Trump Charges Political ‘Persecution’

Russian president says cases against Republican nominee expose U.S. weakness

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putin-calls-trump-charges-political-persecution-1736c591?page=1

By Matthew Luxmoore

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Updated Sept. 12, 2023 7:19 am ET

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Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the indictments against Donald Trump amount to political “persecution,” echoing the former president’s repeated statements. Photo: Pavel Bednyakov/Pool Sputnik Kremlin/Associated Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday waded into the debate over the criminal charges faced by Republican election candidate Donald Trump, saying the cases against the former U.S. president amount to political “persecution” and expose U.S. weakness.

“This shows the whole rottenness of the American political system, which cannot claim to teach others about democracy,” Putin said in an appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, an annual event aimed at showcasing the Russian government’s development plans. “What’s happening with Trump is a persecution of a political rival for political motives.”

Putin’s comments echo repeated statements made by Trump, who faces a total of 91 charges at the federal and state levels over conspiring to undo the 2020 election results as well as the improper storage of classified documents at his Florida estate and hush-money payments to a porn star.

Trump, who is a front-runner for the Republican nomination despite facing the prospect of conviction before the election next November, has publicly criticized U.S. spending on Ukraine and military aid to the war-torn country as it continues a major counteroffensive aimed at ousting Russian forces from the vast swath of Ukrainian land they occupy.

On the day Russia launched its war on Ukraine in February of last year, the former U.S. president called Putin “pretty smart” and criticized the U.S. response to Russia’s invasion. Speaking at a Republican presidential town hall hosted by CNN in May, he said that as president he would be able to resolve the Ukraine war in one day by striking a deal with both sides.

Referring to those comments on Tuesday, Putin said that he welcomed any such initiative. But he said that he didn’t expect any changes in relations between Russia and the U.S., regardless of who is president after November 2024.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said the charges show ’the whole rottenness of the American political system.’ PHOTO: VLADIMIR SMIRNOV/ZUMA PRESS

Putin has long portrayed the war in Ukraine, which has cost tens of thousands of Russian lives and prompted Western sanctions that have hobbled Russia’s economy, as a broader fight against the U.S.-led Western alliance. In his comments on Tuesday, he said the cases against Trump throw light on domestic tensions in the U.S. that make the country weaker in its standoff with Russia. “They simply exposed their domestic problems,” he said. “And in that sense, if they’re trying to compete with us on something, then it shows who we’re competing with.”

Ukraine has achieved limited gains against deeply fortified Russian positions since launching in June its counteroffensive using Western weapons and many troops trained in the West. In recent weeks it has broken through the first line of Russian defenses in the south, but it still has a long way to go before seizing strategically significant towns.

Putin on Tuesday said that Ukraine’s counteroffensive had failed. He said the provision of further Western weapons, such as F-16 jet fighters pledged by several Western countries, won’t lead to results for Kyiv’s forces. “It will simply extend the conflict,” he said.

Russia has in recent months sought to target manpower shortages through recruitment campaigns playing out across the country. Addressing speculation that he might announce another countrywide mobilization for the war, Putin suggested there was no need to do so.

He said that in the past six to seven months, 270,000 people in Russia had signed contracts for voluntary service in the armed forces. The figure is on top of the 300,000 drafted into the military as part of the partial mobilization announced in September of last year, Putin said.

“People are willingly opting for military service in today’s realities,” he said. “Understanding what awaits them, that they can give their lives for the motherland or receive serious injuries.”

With the war now in its 19th month, Moscow has been deepening its ties with non-Western countries, especially China. Russia’s economy has become more dependent on China, with trade between the two nations helping to finance Moscow’s war effort.

On Tuesday, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Russia for talks with Putin that U.S. officials said could advance ammunition sales aimed at replenishing Russia’s stockpile for the Ukraine war.

Putin defended Russia’s moves to forge alliances.

“We don’t create military alliances, and we don’t make alliances against others,” he said. “We make alliances in the interests of our nations. And that’s how we’ll continue.”

Asked about Moscow’s invasions of Hungary in 1956 and the Czech Republic in 1968 to suppress an anti-Soviet uprising and attempted liberal reforms, Putin said the decision to send tanks into those countries was a mistake.

However, he has stood firm in the face of criticism about his decision to invade Ukraine with tanks, troops and war planes last year, and has repeatedly said everything is going to plan despite the colossal losses Russia has suffered.

Putin said that Russia, which expanded its land mass over centuries through military conquest and now occupies almost 20 percent of Ukraine, has never been a colonizing power.

Write to Matthew Luxmoore at matthew.luxmoore@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Donald Trump faces a total of 91 charges at the federal and state levels. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said he faces 13 charges. (Corrected on Sept. 12)

21. DoD Enters Agreement to Expand Domestic Lithium Mining for U.S. Battery Supply Chains

DoD Enters Agreement to Expand Domestic Lithium Mining for U.S. Battery Supply Chains

defense.gov

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The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Industrial Base Policy, through its Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization (MCEIP) office, entered an agreement with Albemarle Corporation to support the expansion of domestic mining and production of lithium.

The $90 million agreement, entered into under Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities and utilizing funds appropriated by the Inflation Reduction Act, will help support Albemarle's planned re-opening of their Kings Mountain, N.C. lithium mine to increase domestic production of lithium for the nation's battery supply chain. Albemarle estimates that Kings Mountain will be operational between 2025 and 2030.

"The agreement with Albemarle demonstrates the DoD's ongoing commitment to meeting the needs of our warfighter, today and in the future," said Mr. Anthony Di Stasio, MCEIP Director. "This investment directly supports President Biden's April 2022 Presidential Determination for Critical Materials in Large-Capacity Batteries."

This agreement represents the continuation of the MCEIP five-year investment plan to secure supply chains for minerals and materials critical to the DoD and the commercial sector. The DoD is committed to continuing to work with industry to ensure the continued availability of these essential resources.

About the Department of Defense's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) for developing Department of Defense policies for the maintenance of the United States defense industrial base (DIB), executing small business programs and policy, and conduction geo-economic analysis and assessments. The office also provides the USD(A&S) with recommendations on budget matters related to the DIB, anticipates and closes gaps in manufacturing capabilities for defense systems, and assesses impacts related to mergers, acquisition, and divestitures. IBP monitors and assesses the impact of foreign investments in the United States and executes authorities under sections 2501 and 2505 U.S.C. Title 10.

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22. Ukraine's Fight on the Front Lines of the Information Environment

I hope we are learning lessons from Ukraine.

​Excerpts:

Activities in the information environment, often facilitated by cyberspace, bring together previously separate activities such as mass communication and intelligence. In Ukraine, this has resulted in impactful outcomes—the observations of which should not be disregarded by anyone searching for lessons. Ukraine has grasped the importance of collaboration among government ministries, military actors, and civil society.

But this effort has developed entirely organically. External influences have played a role in shaping Ukraine’s strategies for operating in the information environment. Influences from the former Soviet Union and Russia have had a lasting impact. Clear parallels can also be drawn between Ukraine and Israel, wherein initial failures in the information environment led to enhanced interagency cooperation and the involvement of tech-savvy personnel who understand the dynamics of the online world. And notably, Ukraine has also eagerly embraced the strategic communications concept of NATO, albeit with a Ukrainian touch that emphasizes networking over rigid doctrine.

It would be wise to take note of Ukraine’s approach in the ongoing conflict with Russia. Despite being outmatched by Russia in 2014, Ukraine has transformed into a nation that steadfastly defends itself against the Russian onslaught, rallying Western and other allies for support and setting a strong model for a government’s use of the information environment in times of conflict.

Ukraine's Fight on the Front Lines of the Information Environment - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Peter Schrijver · September 12, 2023

In early August 2023, residents of Russian-annexed Crimea received phone calls containing a recorded message urging them to avoid military infrastructure, naval bases, and assembly areas for military equipment in Crimea. The unidentified speaker warned of missile strikes and ongoing drone attacks against Russian forces. It was yet another example since Russia’s invasion last year of the innovative strategies in the information environment for which Ukraine has earned praise. Specifically, Ukraine has gained admiration for its effective communication of messages to both domestic and international audiences, as well as for its robust cybersecurity measures, which have enabled the prevention of and response to cyberattacks on its networks and systems.

Of course, success in war is often a function not only of innovation, but also of a willingness to borrow tactics, techniques, and procedures that have worked well elsewhere, in other conflicts. Indeed, the phone calls in Crimea bear a resemblance to similar warning calls and text messages received by Israeli citizens and Gaza residents over the past fifteen years during periods of tension between Israel and the de facto rulers of Gaza, Hamas. But this is not the only example that appears to have influenced the development of Ukrainian operations in the information environment. Unsurprisingly, these operations have also borrowed from Soviet and Russian concepts of information warfare. They have also incorporated Western ideas about strategic communications. In some instances, the learning pathways are clear and evident, while in others they are less so. But regardless of how deliberately Ukraine has emulated others’ successful approaches, it is clear that effective practices migrate across both time and geography. Tracing that migration not only enables observers to better understand Ukraine’s operations in the information environment, but also equips them to leverage such migration in future conflicts. For NATO countries, that likely means learning from Ukraine in the same way it has learned from others.

Soviet and Russian Influences

The legacy of Soviet and Russian ideas about information warfare is natural, and Russia, as the dominant state in the Soviet Union, has had a profound and deep influence on Ukraine.

An example can be found in the activities of the Ukrainian military intelligence service, HUR (Holovne Upravlinnja Rozvidky). This service uses intercepted phone calls of Russian soldiers to family members and regularly releases excerpts of these calls on social media. In particular, fragments are used in which Russian soldiers express discontent, disappointment with their leadership, or confessions of (war) crimes. This highlights the twenty-first-century possibilities of technology. However, it is not a new idea to use the personal communication of opponents for influence operations. During the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army’s Political Directorate, responsible for all political propaganda by the military, targeted German army members with specific messaging. After the Battle for Moscow, in December 1941, the directorate started an operation analyzing captured letters from German soldiers to their families. These letters, in which German soldiers expressed dissatisfaction about their circumstances in winter, provided insight into the morale and psychological stamina of the enemy. This information was used to specifically tailor messaging to German forces via a wide array of delivery methods. The themes—You are lost, forgotten, and doomed in an endless Russian winter; The dead are calling to the ones still alive; The ones who surrendered do not suffer anymore—are reminiscent of today’s HUR operations on social media.

Another example is the extensive use of personal celebrity to enhance individual messages. For the Soviet Union, this took the form of employing well-known authors and poets as war correspondents. These prominent writers—like Ilya Ehrenburg, Konstantin Simonov, and Vasilii Grossman, who all wrote for the military newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda—followed Red Army units in their battles against Nazi Germany. Ehrenburg was one of the leading anti-German publicists and became legendary, the single most read journalist of the war, adored by the population. Ukraine has adopted a different approach, but one that still leverages celebrity. Instead of relying on prominent authors with a large, preexisting following, it grants ordinary Ukrainian soldiers the ability to send out a continuous stream of messages on social media about their daily activities on the frontline, giving their audiences an up-close view of the military’s experience. This has made some of them celebrities on TikTok and YouTube, with several—like Lieutenant Olga Bigar (callsign “Witch”) of the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces and Operator Starsky—attracting large numbers of followers, just as Ehrenburg did eight decades ago.

It is noteworthy that social media publication policies are guided from Kyiv, ensuring that messages revolve around key themes—bravery, resilience, and defiance—and are consistent and aligned with overarching goals. Other than that, Ukrainian content creators hardly face any restrictions, unlike their Soviet predecessors, who operated under harsh guidelines from Moscow. Humorous content and interaction with animals, particularly cats and dogs, are recurring themes in videos of Ukrainian military personnel on social media. Additionally, blatant failures and alleged crimes of Russian armed forces are frequently emphasized.

Ukraine has also adopted—and adapted—more modern Russian ideas, like the concept of information confrontation. Russian military thinking separates this concept into two main categories: informational-psychological confrontation and informational-technical confrontation. The former consists of efforts to influence the enemy’s population and military forces, while the latter involves the physical manipulation or destruction of information networks. According to Russian military doctrine, state actors handle implementing this concept, but nonstate actors also play a key role.

Ukraine has in recent years felt the effects of Russian information confrontation firsthand. Russia ratcheted up a multifaceted campaign of information warfare in 2014 with the intention of undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. This included a range of strategies, including physical acts, online attacks, and efforts to sow disunity in Ukrainian society. Russia specifically attacked the physical and digital information infrastructure of Ukraine. The goal was to weaken Ukraine’s defenses by stimulating reactions like confusion, disorganization, and a sense of helplessness.

Inadvertently, civil society in Ukraine during the years 2014 and 2015 aligned with Russia’s paradigm of information confrontation, which accentuates the involvement of nonstate entities. Nongovernmental organizations and initiatives such as Information Resistance, StopFake.org, Ukraine Today, and the Ukraine Crisis Media Center assumed a critical function in counteracting propaganda and extending media-bolstering efforts. This involved the provision of services conventionally attributed to governmental authorities. Presently, these Ukrainian nongovernmental organizations persist in their consequential roles, wherein they—along with fundraising collectives—continue to have substantial influence on the communication landscape of wartime Ukraine.

After the events of 2014 and 2015 Ukrainian researcher Mikolay Turanskiy described the consequences of Russia’s operations and the necessity to improve his country’s approach. “The establishment of an independent Ukraine has been associated with persistent psychological and informational pressure,” he wrote. “To mitigate the effects of such pressure, Ukrainian scientists, and experts in the field of information and psychological warfare must make concerted efforts to expose manipulative and propagandistic actions and prevent hostile information and psychological campaigns from being conducted on Ukrainian soil.” Concurrent with Turanskiy’s recommendation, Ukraine’s military-scientific establishment studied the Russian approach and developed strategies to counter it. This has led to a series of measures to improve the resilience of Ukraine in the information environment.

Learning from the Israeli Experience?

Despite the combined government and civil society efforts to thwart Russian influence, Ukraine faced a bleak situation after the dust somewhat settled with the Minsk agreements in 2015. Russia had annexed Crimea and an uneasy ceasefire in the east of Ukraine was established. The National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv concluded in a postmortem report that Ukraine had lost the battle in the information environment.

In this respect, Ukraine faced similar challenges as Israel had in the past. This is exemplified by an archetypical event during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. During that war, Hezbollah fired an Iranian-supplied Noor antiship cruise missile at the Israeli corvette INS Hanit. The attack killed four crew members and caused considerable damage to the ship. Although the strike had a minimal impact on Israel’s naval operations, it had a profound psychological effect. Hezbollah used its media platform, al-Manar, to broadcast a video that claimed to show the attack, accompanied by a triumphant speech by Hezbollah’s leader, Saeed Hassan Nasrallah. The video was intended to create a powerful impression on both domestic and international audiences and to achieve several objectives: demonstrate Hezbollah’s capability, emphasize the group’s resolve, and boost its image and legitimacy It was an event that showed Hezbollah’s skillful use of information warfare as a strategic tool and how nonstate actors can challenge state actors in asymmetric conflicts by exploiting their weaknesses. Considering instances like this, analysts credited Hezbollah with a decisive victory in the information environment, which Israel failed to achieve at that time.

However, six years later, in 2012, during Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza, Israel showcased that it had learned to use the information environment to its own advantage, specifically social media. A central focus of Israel’s social media campaign was the portrayal of the precision and potency of its weaponry, alongside shedding light on the difficulties endured by Israeli citizens in the face of Hamas rocket barrages. A distinct hallmark of Israel’s digital engagement during the operation was its mobilization of domestic and international supporters via platforms such as YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. By disseminating messages and testimonials across online platforms, Israel succeeded in fostering a sense of unity, solidarity, and patriotism among its backers. A distinctive facet of Israel’s social media approach was its decentralized and bottom-up orientation, which included giving young, media-savvy officers of the Israel Defense Forces the lead in the social media campaign.

Both Israel and Ukraine have launched dedicated online ventures tailored to supply their respective supporter bases with resources for information dissemination and advocacy. An example of this transpired in the initiation of the Israel Under Fire project on social media in 2012. This citizen initiative, reinforced by government endorsement, provided live updates and information about attacks on Israel. The campaign aimed to raise awareness and support for Israel’s right to defend itself. Ukraine has embraced comparable tactics, shaping platforms and campaigns to not only diffuse accurate information but also to rectify any misinformation, while concurrently fostering international awareness of the circumstances faced by Ukraine, its military, and its people. An example is #SnakeIslandStrong, a campaign designed to spotlight the valor and tenacity exhibited by Ukrainian soldiers during their defense of Snake Island against a Russian attack in 2022. Additionally, Ukraine’s adept use of social media to express gratitude toward international partners for their (military) aid packages further illustrates its strategic approach to fostering support and solidarity.

Two examples showing the similarities between visual overviews of successful air defense operations shared on social media by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (left) and the Israel Defence Forces (right).

Although there is no record of official contact between Ukraine and Israel regarding an exchange of knowledge on operations in the information environment, there are more than just superficial similarities between the approaches of the two countries. Both nations have rallied domestic and international support by capitalizing on the reach of social media. Furthermore, Ukraine has extended beyond this trajectory by incorporating initiatives for crowdfunding goods for the army and the needs of citizens who are not able to help themselves, thereby broadening the scope of engagement. A notable case in point is the recent crowdfunding effort undertaken by several Ukrainian entities—the government program United24, nongovernmental organization Come Back Alive, and private company Monobank. This cooperative initiative, aimed at procuring ten thousand first-person-view drones and ammunition for Ukrainian forces, emerged as an illustrative instance of mobilizing financial support from the public. Within a span of five days in August 2023 the crowdfunding organization collected 235 million Ukrainian hryvnia, equivalent to 6.3 million US dollars, through contributions from over three hundred thousand individuals and companies from Ukraine and abroad.

The Israel Defense Forces, and Israel’s broader experience more than ten years ago, demonstrated that combat operations, coordinated with activities in the information environment, can have significant impacts. Like Ukraine in 2014, Israel had learned from a previous situation (the Second Lebanon War in 2006) that a compelling narrative is required, one that explains why its forces were on the battlefield and solidifies support from its own population and foreign sympathizers. After the experiences of 2014 and 2015, the Ukrainians seem to have taken these lessons to heart and are applying it in their ongoing operations.

Strategic Communications as an Integrator—Facilitated by Ukrainian Networks

A third apparent external influence on the Ukrainian approach to operations in the information environment is the NATO strategic communications concept. In 2014, a report from the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv recognized the active role of civil society in countering Russian influence, while at the same time noting that this positive development was set against the backdrop of the government’s tame media response toward the Russian campaign. The institute’s experts attributed this to the absence of a solid national strategy for sharing information with both local and international audiences. There was also a shortage of resources and skilled personnel in this area.

Given these challenges, the report’s authors advised that it was necessary to “implement and institutionalize the practice of the strategic communications”. This idea gained more traction as time went on. Ukrainian scholars Tetiana Popova and Volodymyr Lipkan outlined the core features of this concept as a coordinated effort involving both state and nonstate actors to manage information, including by using various methods to shape public opinion, safeguard information sovereignty, and advance national identity and interests.

In 2015 Ukraine teamed up with NATO. This collaboration resulted in the NATO-Ukraine Strategic Communications Partnership Roadmap. The roadmap, signed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Turchynov, aimed to boost Ukraine’s strategic communications abilities. It also sought to cultivate a culture of strategic communications in Ukraine and maintain standards of accuracy and ethics to ensure the credibility of government communication.

An important aspect of Ukraine’s strategic communications culture is the strong ties among specialists from various departments in charge of information-related tasks in Ukraine’s ministries and civil society representatives. These horizontal personal connections were forged in the years before the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion, fostered by instructive training sessions and seminars on strategic communications. Consecutive Ukrainian deputy ministers of defense have been leading figures in these recurring events, which covered diverse topics, exposing participants to collaborative work under pressure, networking, and joint problem-solving. This collaborative atmosphere involved a range of actors, such as military and intelligence personnel, civil servants, academics, journalists, and public figures. Consequently, a culture of continuous networking and informal communication flourished.

In essence, Ukraine’s investments in strategic communications reflect a concept based on international alignment with NATO mixed with strong internal Ukrainian networks that developed in the years leading up to the invasion. This approach has leveraged networking as a method for success.

Activities in the information environment, often facilitated by cyberspace, bring together previously separate activities such as mass communication and intelligence. In Ukraine, this has resulted in impactful outcomes—the observations of which should not be disregarded by anyone searching for lessons. Ukraine has grasped the importance of collaboration among government ministries, military actors, and civil society.

But this effort has developed entirely organically. External influences have played a role in shaping Ukraine’s strategies for operating in the information environment. Influences from the former Soviet Union and Russia have had a lasting impact. Clear parallels can also be drawn between Ukraine and Israel, wherein initial failures in the information environment led to enhanced interagency cooperation and the involvement of tech-savvy personnel who understand the dynamics of the online world. And notably, Ukraine has also eagerly embraced the strategic communications concept of NATO, albeit with a Ukrainian touch that emphasizes networking over rigid doctrine.

It would be wise to take note of Ukraine’s approach in the ongoing conflict with Russia. Despite being outmatched by Russia in 2014, Ukraine has transformed into a nation that steadfastly defends itself against the Russian onslaught, rallying Western and other allies for support and setting a strong model for a government’s use of the information environment in times of conflict.

Major Peter Schrijver is a PhD researcher affiliated with the Netherlands Defence Academy. His academic interests focus on Ukraine’s operations in the information environment.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: President of Ukraine

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Peter Schrijver · September 12, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

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