Quotes of the day:

"It is usually futile to try to talk facts and analysis to people who are enjoying a sense of moral su[eriorty in their ignorance."

– Thomas Sowell

"Politics: A strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles. The conduct of public affairs for private advantage."

– Ambrose Bierce

"How can great minds be produced in a country where the test of a great mind is agreeing in the opinions of small minds?"

– John Stuart Mill

1. Korean unification dream forsaken, new goal is managing division

2. What’s Going on at Kim Jong-un’s Secret Missile Base?

3. Trump offered to let S. Korean detainees stay, train U.S. workers, Seoul says

4. America's defense begins in the Western Pacific, not in San Diego

5. Exclusive: Hyundai should have called me for visas, Lutnick says

6. Hyundai Raid Will Delay Georgia Battery Plant Construction by Months

7. The Importance of the Battle of the Yalu

8. New deputy takes charge of 600,000-strong US, South Korean combined command

9. US to evaluate troops in Korea based on capabilities, not numbers: JCS nominee

10. Korean workers rejoice as they return home after detention in U.S. immigration raid

11. U.S. detention of Koreans hits trust in alliance, underscores long-festering visa issue 

12. Seoul to seek enhanced visa system for Korean workers in talks with U.S.: security adviser

13. North Korean army blamed Russia for early casualties in Kursk, state TV reveals

14. Korea-US-Japan cooperation is no longer an option as a new axis is taking shape

15. Detained U.S. permanent resident challenges ICE detention

1. Korean unification dream forsaken, new goal is managing division

It pains me very much to read this. There is so much to unpack here.

But let's be frank. There has never been a serious pursuit for unification by either the north or the South. All the talk about peaceful unification in the past has been merely rhetoric and lip service. The first real serious unification planning by the South finally took place in 2024 with the 8.15 Unification doctrine. And the north has never planned for peaceful unification unless you consider subversion of the South to cause its weakening and eventual collapse a plan for peaceful unification. But the fact is that while South Korea's constitution calls for peaceful unification, the north's calls for completing the revolution to rid the peninsula of foreign influence and ultimately to dominate the peninsula under its rule (what I like to call the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulug State).

While I agree that we must reject outdated assumptions, the assumptions that the current South Korean administration clings to is that engagement with the north can lead to coexistence. Unfortunately a quest for coexistence is a path of danger for the ROK,  

Excerpt:

Instead of clinging to outdated assumptions, policymakers must adapt to this new paradigm, focusing on stability, deterrence, and pragmatic engagement to protect peace and human security in a fundamentally altered strategic environment.

The new paradigm should be a realistic plan for change in the north and unification and is embodied in these fourteen words.

"Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.

Unification is more important than ever.

Korean unification dream forsaken, new goal is managing division - Asia Times

North’s 2024 erasure of kinship narrative dovetails with South’s growing sense that imminent unification is unlikely and undesirable

asiatimes.com · Christopher Green · September 11, 2025

North Korea’s explicit abandonment of peaceful unification, formalized by Kim Jong Un’s public announcement in 2024, appears to mark a decisive rupture in inter-Korean relations. Yet, South Korean politics and public sentiment have long been shifting away from unification, and as such Kim’s actions also reflect a broader societal and generational divergence.

As the unification paradigm erodes on both sides, policymakers in South Korea and its partners must embrace managing a divided Korean Peninsula while preserving stability and human security.

For decades, peaceful unification has shaped inter-Korean policy frameworks in both Seoul and Pyongyang, rooted in constitutional mandates and nationalist ideals. This framework is now collapsing. North Korea’s shift began in 2019 following the breakdown of US-North Korea talks and the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.

This shift crystalized in 2024 when Kim Jong Un declared South Korea to be a “primary foe,” effectively erasing kinship narratives from domestic propaganda and dismantling institutions dedicated to inter-Korean dialogue.

In South Korea, the policy platform of newly elected President Lee Jae Myung reflects an acceptance of a reality in which unification is neither imminent nor necessarily desirable. No longer kin, North Korea has become a foreign polity where cultural divergence and concerns about the economic costs of unification erode support for reintegration efforts.

These developments are not merely tactical but conceptual, signaling a transition toward the institutionalization of division on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea’s policy pivot is being operationalized across military, diplomatic and informational domains. North Korea has intensified weapons development while embedding its new doctrine in state media and border military posture, dismantling inter-Korean communication channels and rebranding South Korea as a hostile foreign entity.

Simultaneously, North Korea’s alignment with Russia and continued reliance on China provide diplomatic and economic support for its confrontational stance.

In South Korea, the Lee Jae Myung administration is attempting to balance deterrence with a conditional engagement strategy, but the space for meaningful dialogue has narrowed considerably.

The erosion of the unification narrative challenges South Korean policymakers to reconcile constitutional commitments with emerging realities and to prepare for managing division while reducing the risk of miscalculation or escalation along the Demilitarized Zone.

International actors, who have long viewed unification as the preferred end state, must also adjust their frameworks to prioritize stability, reduce nuclear risks and promote human rights rather than relying on outdated assumptions of reunification.

Policy recommendations

• To manage this new reality, South Korean policymakers should recalibrate strategic communication and education to reflect the practical reality of the two Koreas while maintaining constitutional commitments in principle. They should also retain conditional, transactional engagement windows with North Korea where tangible restraint is demonstrated.
• The US and South Korean militaries should maintain deterrence while restoring communication channels to manage escalation risks effectively.
• The international community should support engagement efforts that refocus on stability, reduce nuclear risks and promote human rights rather than pursuing unification as the assumed end goal. In addition, like-minded partners should closely monitor the roles of China and Russia in enabling North Korea’s hostile posture while coordinating with regional countries to avoid escalation.

The Korean Peninsula is entering a new phase defined by the institutionalization of division. North Korea’s abandonment of unification, South Korea’s shifting public sentiment, and the broader geopolitical context all point toward a long-term reality of two Koreas.

Instead of clinging to outdated assumptions, policymakers must adapt to this new paradigm, focusing on stability, deterrence, and pragmatic engagement to protect peace and human security in a fundamentally altered strategic environment.

Christopher Green is an assistant professor at Leiden University and senior consultant with International Crisis Group.

This policy brief was originally published as part of a limited series from the Korea Economic Institute of America inspired by the latest edition of its publication Korea Policy, Volume 3 Issue 1. It is republished with permission. You can read the author’s full paper by clicking here.

asiatimes.com · Christopher Green · September 11, 2025

2. What’s Going on at Kim Jong-un’s Secret Missile Base?

I fully agree with Dr. Eastwood that we must proceed with policies and a strategy that rests on the strategic assumption that KJU will never negotiate in good faith to denuclearize.

What’s Going on at Kim Jong-un’s Secret Missile Base?

The National Interest · Brent M. Eastwood · September 11, 2025

Topic: Nuclear Proliferation

Blog Brand: Korea Watch

Region: Asia

September 11, 2025

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A newly discovered missile installation indicates that North Korea has no intention of entering into good-faith arms control negotiations.

It shouldn’t surprise us that North Korea has pulled something sneaky again. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been caught with a secret nuclear missile base near China. This installation was previously undiscovered and disclosed in a recent report written by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a DC-based think tank.

The Sinpung-dong Missile Operating Base contains six to nine nuclear-capable ICBMs, and their launchers are located about 17 miles from the Chinese border, according to CNN. CSIS analyzed satellite imagery, documents, and discussions with North Korean witnesses who have left the DPRK as refugees.

This once-secret base could be part of a dispersed group of 15 to 20 ballistic missile facilities. “These missiles pose a potential nuclear threat to East Asia and the continental United States,” the report said.

What Is China’s Role?

Their discovery has many repercussions for international security. First, the proximity to China is a potential problem for Beijing. It is difficult to determine if Chinese president Xi Jinping was consulted prior to the base’s construction. This could be frustrating for Xi as a nuclear exchange this close to the border with North Korea could endanger Chinese citizens.

Xi invited North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to a Chinese military parade during the first week of September that celebrated China’s World War II victory against Japan. Russia’s Vladimir Putin also attended. Xi and Kim likely discussed the presence of the missile base that is so close to China. There is a chance that China’s own overhead satellites caught the DPRK building the installation, and that Xi gave Kim his blessing to construct it. This would also be troubling since it would mean Xi is giving Kim political cover for more nuclear weapons to be built and deployed.

Washington Has Taken Its Eyes Off the Ball in Northeast Asia

It is unclear whether the United States had prior early warning about the ICBM base. The Americans are likely exasperated with all the North’s subterfuges. The DPRK is not known for being transparent about its nuclear infrastructure, and the decentralized nature of the bases is a military advantage for the North. Having numerous different missile bases around the country would create difficulty for the United States to destroy targets in a potential military “bloody nose” attack aimed at securing Kim’s acquiescence to denuclearization.

South Korea Is Foiled Again

South Korea is most alarmed by the flouting of the United Nations efforts to remove nuclear weapons from the peninsula. A network of secret bases means that the North is not concerned in the slightest about any type of diplomatic rapprochement or arms control agreements with Seoul.

Every day, Kim gets more confident about his country’s nuclear power status. He wants complete control of his warheads and the ability to deliver them to the United States at will. There seems to be no inclination to bargain away nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief or other concessions.

The Donald Trump administration seems to have no definite plans for this issue. To be fair, there are pressing needs in the Middle East and Ukraine. However, Trump did say recently he would be open to meeting with Kim this year. Trump believes he has a good relationship with Kim, but has yet to make concrete efforts to engage the North Korean dictator. Moreover, South Korea cannot make any inroads either.

Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, has said South Korea will never be a diplomatic partner with the North. She has a steady influence on her brother, and the pair makes for a difficult one-two punch to US and South Korean statecraft.

North Korean Nuclear Acceptance?

My own strategy of dealing with North Korea has taken a pummeling. In my latest book, I called for the cancellation of combined US-South Korean military exercises in exchange for allowing American inspections of the DPRK’s nuclear infrastructure. If this works, the United States could send home some of its rear echelon support soldiers in South Korea to show that the Trump administration is willing to make a comprehensive deal with North Korea following proper inspections.

But if North Korea has numerous secret nuclear bases around the country, giving up concessions like these to Kim is a fool’s errand.

No good options remain now. North Korea is becoming more powerful, and the United States and South Korea can only look on with dismay. China and Russia are probably smiling as Kim creates another way to aggravate the Americans and the West, who have tried and failed in every possible way to achieve denuclearization.

Indeed, we are past the point of convincing Kim to give up nuclear weapons. The international community will just have to accept the North as a nuclear power, and that is just what Kim Jong-un has worked toward his entire career.

About the Author: Dr. Brent Eastwood

Brent M Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: A Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare, plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for US Senator Tim Scott (R-SC) and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former US Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.

Image: Alexander Khitrov / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · Brent M. Eastwood · September 11, 2025

3. Trump offered to let S. Korean detainees stay, train U.S. workers, Seoul says

This is an indication that the ICE raid was a mistake and acknowledgment that we need these Korean professionals to continue to keep South Korea as the largest foreign direct investor in the US and to construct the factories that will create jobs for Americans.

Trump offered to let S. Korean detainees stay, train U.S. workers, Seoul says

The 316 South Koreans arrested at the Hyundai-LG plant in Georgia are expected to return home Friday. The raid may chill investment in the U.S., South Korea’s president said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/09/11/trump-south-korea-hyundai-raid-visas/?utm

September 11, 2025 at 3:44 a.m. EDTToday at 3:44 a.m. EDT

Detainees are made to stand against a bus before being handcuffed during a raid by federal agents in which over 300 South Koreans were among 475 people arrested at a Hyundai-LG plant in Ellabell, Georgia this month. (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Reuters)

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

SEOUL — President Donald Trump temporarily delayed the repatriation of more than 300 South Korean workers to South Korea after the Hyundai-LG raid in Georgia to explore whether they could stay in the United States to educate and train American workers, South Korean officials said Thursday.

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The 316 South Koreans were released from their detention facility Thursday and are scheduled to arrive home Friday afternoon. They were initially set to leave on a chartered Korean Air flight Wednesday, the day that South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington and requested their “swift release.”

South Korean officials had attributed the delay to an issue on the American side, without elaborating.

Cho learned from Rubio that Trump had halted the release to “understand Seoul’s position on whether they should stay to educate and train U.S. workers or return home, given that the detained South Korean nationals are all skilled workers,” a South Korean Foreign Ministry official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to describe diplomatic discussions.

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Cho told Rubio that Seoul wanted to bring the South Korean nationals home and they could return at a later date, according to the Foreign Ministry. Washington agreed to that, the ministry said.

The U.S. Embassy in Seoul had nothing additional to add, a spokesperson said, referring inquiries to the South Korean Foreign Ministry. The White House did not immediately respond to an emailed request for comment.

Trump’s apparent intervention underscores the contradictions that South Koreans have pointed out in the week since the raid: His administration wants advanced companies from countries like South Korea to invest in the United States but hasn’t provided the visa framework to enable them to set up their high-tech factories.

A Korean Air charter plane at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta on Wednesday. (Mike Stewart/AP)

The arrest of 475 workers last week at the plant in Ellabell, Georgia, was the largest worksite enforcement operation to take place so far in Trump’s second term. In addition to the 316 South Koreans, one requested to stay in the United States with their family.

The incident revealed questionable visa practices by South Korean companies and their subcontractors, who are building factories in the United States at the encouragement of multiple U.S. administrations to help revitalize American manufacturing and compete with China.

Industry officials say South Korean companies had sent workers under temporary visa waivers or on short-term business visas to help build and establish their high-tech factories because those highly skilled jobs are hard to find in the U.S. and long-term work visas are elusive.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said Thursday that the incident could have a chilling effect and make South Korean companies “very hesitant” about expanding their operations in the United States, especially without changes to the visa system.

“I think this will have a significant impact on direct investments in the United States moving forward,” Lee said in a news conference.

“Our companies that have expanded overseas are probably very confused,” he said. “We are not there for long-term research or employment. You need a facility manager to install the machinery and equipment when you establish a factory, right?”

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung at a news conference in Seoul on Thursday. (Kim Hong-Ji/Reuters/Pool/EPA/Shutterstock)

Lee said the two nations are negotiating ways to resolve the visa issue. In the meantime, he said, the U.S. government offered the choice to the Georgia plant detainees — “those who don’t want to go don’t have to.”

The South Korean nationals in Georgia were there to build the electrical vehicle battery plant, jointly operated by Hyundai Motors and LG Energy Solution, South Korean officials say. Hyundai has said that once the factory is fully operational, it will hire more than 8,000 employees and that 99 percent would be American jobs.

The raid sent shock waves through South Korea, where officials say they had repeatedly asked congressional leaders to resolve the visa issue for South Korean companies. The images of workers shackled and handcuffed during the raid have fueled outrage and confusion, especially given the Trump administration’s embrace of South Korean business investments.

The visa statuses of the South Koreans are not clear. Homeland Security officials said some of the workers arrested in the raid had entered the country illegally, some were working in violation of their visas and some had overstayed their visas.

What readers are saying

The comments express strong criticism of President Trump's decision to temporarily suspend the repatriation of South Korean workers, highlighting the chaotic and inconsistent nature of his administration's immigration policies. Many commenters argue that the treatment of these... Show more

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Comments 1,359

By Michelle Ye Hee Lee

Michelle Ye Hee Lee is The Washington Post's Tokyo bureau chief, covering Japan and the Korean peninsula. follow on X@myhlee

4. America's defense begins in the Western Pacific, not in San Diego

I absolutely agree that we must defend the homeland from forward positions. To do anything less puts America at risk.

However, I  am sorry but I have to disagree with my friend Grant Newsham regarding Korea. His criticism is off base. I fear that he has no experience with actual combined operation nor an understanding of how the ROK/US alliance developed over the past seven decades. I fear this is because he is of late part of the faction as "China only" in terms of defense (war) strategy. 

First and foremost it has been the US interest to prevent war in Northeast Asia. That is true and necessary more so now than before.

From 1953 through the beginning of the OPCON transition process the alliance evolved under the strategic assumption that the alliance together would defend the ROK against attack from the north. There was no plan for the ROK to defend itself on its own. This has long guided war planning, doctrinal development, and weapons development and procurement. Both the ROK and US developed doctrine and military capabilities to conduct combined operations not unilateral operations on the Korean peninsula.  For a short time during the OPCON transition process there were discussions and planning for separate warfighting commands and for a short time and the only time in seven decades the process for developing independent warfighting capabilities took place.. This was abandoned by 2012 when the decision was made to retain the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. 

So the bottom line is that the ROK has not developed independent war fighting because the strategic assumption has long been that we will fight as an alliance. We have long optimized the combined capabilities of both militaries. It has never been the intent for the ROK "to go into the deep end of the pool" by itself. That said, the ROK has developed numerous advanced warfighting capabilities as well as a defense industrial base that is now a major contributing partner in the arsenal of democracies. 

Excerpts:

If earlier War Department statements are to be believed, China will get its due in the final defense strategy. And it is prudent both to defend the US homeland (which has in fact been under attack for decades) and to stop taking Western Hemisphere security for granted and pay some real attention.

But here’s the problem:

Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will continue to be recognized as a major threat, and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific as a major task, the final NDS – as a sort of tough love – will also stress that regional nations need to pull their weight, allowing the US to focus on hemispheric and homeland defense.

This resembles what the Trump Administration is doing in Europe – demanding that US allies do more to handle the Ukraine problem and Russian threats.

In theory it makes sense. The US is stretched and has plenty of problems domestically and globally. Nobody should expect regional nations that are closer to the threats to free-ride on the United States, which has carried too much of the security load for too long.

But the problem is that none of our allies or partners in the Indo-Pacific is ready to go into the deep end of the pool by itself. Not even Japan, South Korea or Australia.

And that’s in large part America’s fault. The US never did what was necessary to ensure they could. Yes, there was plenty of feel-good “engagement,” there were scripted exercises – but not the thorough nuts-and-bolts development of real military capabilities to fight a war by themselves (or even alongside the US) against an actual enemy.

There is now no individual Indo-Pacific nation or collective grouping that can take on China.

America's defense begins in the Western Pacific, not in San Diego - Asia Times

Those who ultimately implement the National Defense Strategy need to understand that a policy of tough love for allies has its limits

asiatimes.com · Grant Newsham · September 11, 2025

A recent article in Politico claims that the new US National Defense Strategy (NDS) currently being drafted at the War Department will downplay China as a major threat and place primary focus on homeland defense and hemispheric defense – think, Western hemisphere.

A truism, “Things are never as good as they seem, and never as bad as they seem,” is worth keeping in mind.

If earlier War Department statements are to be believed, China will get its due in the final defense strategy. And it is prudent both to defend the US homeland (which has in fact been under attack for decades) and to stop taking Western Hemisphere security for granted and pay some real attention.

But here’s the problem:

Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will continue to be recognized as a major threat, and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific as a major task, the final NDS – as a sort of tough love – will also stress that regional nations need to pull their weight, allowing the US to focus on hemispheric and homeland defense.

This resembles what the Trump Administration is doing in Europe – demanding that US allies do more to handle the Ukraine problem and Russian threats.

In theory it makes sense. The US is stretched and has plenty of problems domestically and globally. Nobody should expect regional nations that are closer to the threats to free-ride on the United States, which has carried too much of the security load for too long.

But the problem is that none of our allies or partners in the Indo-Pacific is ready to go into the deep end of the pool by itself. Not even Japan, South Korea or Australia.

And that’s in large part America’s fault. The US never did what was necessary to ensure they could. Yes, there was plenty of feel-good “engagement,” there were scripted exercises – but not the thorough nuts-and-bolts development of real military capabilities to fight a war by themselves (or even alongside the US) against an actual enemy.

There is now no individual Indo-Pacific nation or collective grouping that can take on China.

One on one, China will eat them.

There’s also a delicate psychological aspect to US commitments – an aspect that our friends and enemies carefully watch. The prospect of US backing is the glue that lets most nations in the Indo-Pacific at least think they don’t have to roll over for the PRC.

Any sign of lagging commitment – even if Washington protests otherwise, claiming “rock solid” and “iron-clad” alliances, and has the physical capacity to step in – has a corrosive effect, demoralizing friends and encouraging enemies to make a move.

The tough-love approach requires solid, long-term commitment that is also believable and able to survive domestic political expediency and short-attention spans in Washington.

The track record is poor.

Recall the Nixon Doctrine, introduced in 1969, that “the United States would assist in the defense and developments of allies and friends” but would not “undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.” This aimed to replace on-the-ground US military activities with self-defense by capable allies backed up by US support.

By 1975, however, US support for South Vietnam had wavered owing to Congressional interference. The South Vietnamese military and government collapsed and North Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon.

And more recently, there was Afghanistan in 2021. So much for US promises of commitment and tough love of our friends.

The NDS will probably look good on paper – and can be interpreted to suit the reader’s preferences.

But other rumors are floating around of US force withdrawals from Asia, and people of influence in the War Department’s policy world favor pulling back to what they consider more defensible positions closer to, or on, the US mainland.

The US military in the Indo-Pacific is already bare bones when weighed against the powerful and growing Chinese threat.

Just remove a few destroyers and a couple of fighter squadrons from Japan and see what happens. Before long, the NDS will indeed be “as bad as it seemed.”

America’s defense starts in the Western Pacific – not in San Diego. Let’s hope that the people who ultimately implement the NDS understand that.

Colonel Grant Newsham (US Marines – Ret.) is the author of When China Attacks: A Warning to America.

asiatimes.com · Grant Newsham · September 11, 2025

5. Exclusive: Hyundai should have called me for visas, Lutnick says

Or an indication that the right hand of government does not talk to the other right hand of government.

Exclusive: Hyundai should have called me for visas, Lutnick says

Axios · Ben Berkowitz · September 11, 2025

The workers at a Hyundai-linked plant in Georgia raided by ICE last week had the wrong visas — and the company should have asked for help getting the right ones, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick tells Mike Allen in the premiere episode of "The Axios Show."

Why it matters: The images of hundreds of South Korean workers being shackled and hauled off like criminals shocked a close U.S. ally, and raised the question of whether the Trump administration's economic and immigration policies are at odds with each other.

• The administration wants foreign companies to build in the U.S. and hire American workers, but it's just as keen to crack down on foreign labor and make a show of its enforcement priorities.

is our new series featuring our top reporters and experts interviewing newsmakers shaping politics, media, business, tech and culture.

Catch up quick: Authorities raided the under-construction plant Sept. 4, rounding up hundreds of people and hauling them off in chains, including approximately 300 South Koreans.

• The images provoked outrage in Seoul, where the government quickly arranged a flight to bring all the workers home voluntarily.
• The workers were released a week later, with South Korea's President Lee Jae Myung warning that the raid could chill investment in the U.S.
• Hyundai Motor's CEO told Axios Thursday that the impact of the raid would delay plant construction at least two to three months, given it required expertise that only the Korean workers have.

What he's saying: Lutnick said in the debut episode that fault for the raid lay entirely with Hyundai, which he alleged brought the workers in on tourist visas.

• "I called up the Koreans, I said, oh, give me a break. Get the right visa and if you're having problems getting the right visa, call me. I'll call Kristi Noem," he said, referring to the Homeland Security secretary. "We'll help you get the right visa, but don't do it the wrong way,"
• "You can't do things the old way. Donald Trump requires you to do it correctly. You want to immigrate, you want to bring workers here, go through the right process. You can't skirt the rules anymore. That is over."

Reality check: The right visa, as Lutnick puts it, is hard to come by.

• The H-1B visa for specialized foreign workers, for example, has hundreds of thousands more applicants than available slots, meaning demand far outstrips supply.
• It's also not entirely clear how a company could call up the Commerce secretary and get the right visas in sufficient quantities without the rules being bent somehow.

For the record: Hyundai and the joint venture behind the battery plant, HL-GA Battery Company, both issued statements last week saying they were cooperating with law enforcement.

• The carmaker later said it has "zero tolerance" for those who don't follow the law and said it would launch its own investigation to ensure all suppliers and subcontractors comply with immigration requirements.
• Hyundai declined to respond to Lutnick's comments, pointing to its Sept. 5 statement instead.

What we're watching: Whether this kicks off the chilling effect South Korean leadership warned about.

• Lutnick expressed confidence that the raid wouldn't keep other foreign companies from expanding in the U.S.
• "ICE has got to do its job. And if there are all these people who are in this country on the wrong visa, change it," he said.

Axios · Ben Berkowitz · September 11, 2025

6. Hyundai Raid Will Delay Georgia Battery Plant Construction by Months

What will be the long term damage to foreign direct investment and th e ROK/US alliance?

Hyundai Raid Will Delay Georgia Battery Plant Construction by Months

South Korean auto giant still makes most of its money from gas-powered vehicles, not EVs

https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/why-hyundai-raid-wont-crush-the-korean-carmaker-0a4a0e4a

By Christopher Otts

Follow, Timothy W. Martin

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Updated Sept. 11, 2025 1:35 pm ET

Robotic arms welded roofs onto automobile frames at Hyundai’s Metaplant in Georgia earlier this year. Photo: Elijah Nouvelage/Bloomberg News

Quick Summary

• An immigration raid at Hyundai’s Georgia battery plant will delay construction by months, says CEO José Muñoz.View more

DETROIT—The U.S. government’s immigration raid on Hyundai Motor’s 005380 0.22%increase; green up pointing triangle Georgia battery plant site will set back construction by two or three months, according to Chief Executive José Muñoz.

“All these people want to get back” home, Muñoz said Thursday on the sidelines of an automotive conference in Detroit. More than 300 Koreans were released early Thursday and departed midday from Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson Airport.

But the expertise those employees and contract workers had can’t be easily replaced, Muñoz said. “You need to see how can you fill those positions? And then, for the most part, those people are not in the U.S.”

Until Hyundai finds the labor and engineering know-how it needs, it will have to buy electric-vehicle batteries from other suppliers, Muñoz said, adding that the automaker remains committed to investing in the country. 

“The strategic importance of the U.S. market for the company, that doesn’t change,” he said.

The detained workers largely held temporary visas and U.S. authorities alleged they had violated the terms of those. Hyundai’s Executive Chairman, Euisun Chung, said Thursday that he hoped the U.S. and South Korea could work on immigration reforms.

“Visa regulations are very complicated,” he said. “I hope we can make, together, a better system for them.”

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WSJ’s Tim Martin breaks down the U.S. immigration raids at Hyundai’s Georgia plant, why Korean workers were detained, and what happens next. Photo: EPA/Shutterstock

Hyundai sold a record number of vehicles in the U.S. in the first half of 2025. The South Korean auto company’s new, ultramodern assembly plant in Georgia is a wonder in automated manufacturing—a point of pride for the company and for the state. And the vast majority of Hyundai’s sales are for gas-powered vehicles, not EVs.

President Trump has called Hyundai a great company and held it up as proof his tariff strategy is working. Chung traveled to the White House last month for his second face-to-face encounter with Trump this year, where the president said the two countries “need each other” for trade.

After that meeting, Hyundai pledged to invest $5 billion in America during Trump’s term—adding to $21 billion already promised in the spring.

The search warrant for last week’s raid was granted just a few days after that Aug. 25 meeting. A total of 475 workers were rounded up by immigration officials and detained in a federal raid that overshadows Hyundai’s winning streak.

The company now finds itself scrutinized by a U.S. government it has worked so hard to appease. Construction at the battery plant, a joint venture with LG Energy Solution near Savannah, Ga., has been halted.

Hyundai had been on a roll. Combined with sibling automaker Kia, the Hyundai Motor Group ranks as the world’s No. 3 automaker by vehicles sold. In recent years, the South Korean brands have racked up industry awards for design, technology and quality.

“A lot of folks used to discount the Koreans, but they don’t anymore,” said Adam Bernard, a former executive in competitor intelligence at General Motors.

Hyundai and Kia have made “big leaps forward in design” while garnering high rankings in quality, Bernard said.

For the first six months of 2025, Hyundai and Kia’s combined operating profit surpassed Germany’s Volkswagen Group for the first time—outperforming every automaker except Japan’s Toyota Motor, the world’s largest automaker.

Hyundai Motor Executive Chairman Euisun Chung was at the White House in March when the automaker said it would invest $21 billion in U.S. manufacturing. Photo: Win McNamee/Getty Images

Pivoting Hyundai for a high-tech future has been Chung’s priority since he took the reins as executive chair about five years ago at the conglomerate that has been led by his family for generations. Chung, who earned his M.B.A. in San Francisco during the 1990s dot-com boom, expanded Hyundai into robotics and flying cars—while continuing an aggressive push into the U.S.

Hyundai and Kia’s rise in the U.S. has also been dramatic. In addition to the large Georgia facility, Hyundai operates an auto assembly plant in Alabama; Kia has a large production site about an hour outside Atlanta. Eventually, they want most of the cars sold in the U.S. to be made locally rather than at South Korean factories.

Hyundai brand’s U.S. sales have roared to record highs in six of this year’s eight months. Across all vehicle types, Hyundai and Kia control about 10% of the U.S. market, doubling over the past two decades, and now ranking as the No. 4 player after GM, Ford and Toyota, according to Wards Intelligence, which tracks auto sales.

But that American dream has come with some pain.

Hyundai hasn’t raised prices for its cars, wanting to avoid being the first automaker to do so. That means it has absorbed the cost of higher tariffs. The company’s second-quarter net profit fell to $2.4 billion, a 22% decline from a year earlier. The firm warned the economic hit from Trump’s tariffs would worsen in the coming months.

Nowhere can Hyundai’s roller-coaster relationship with the U.S. be seen more clearly than at the $7.6 billion Metaplant facility, which Georgia officials tout as the state’s largest-ever manufacturing project.

Announced three years ago, the combined Hyundai-Kia-Genesis production site—the first such facility in the U.S.—was a big bet on the Biden administration’s multipronged attempt to transition American drivers to electric vehicles, though Hyundai executives say the decision was made internally during the first Trump term. Crucial consumer subsidies of up to $7,500 end this month in accordance with the Trump budget that was pushed through the Republican-controlled Congress.

Alongside the carmaking plants—stamping, welding, paint and final assembly—Hyundai sought to build an EV battery facility with Korean partner LG Energy Solution. This would have been crucial under the Biden administration rules, which favored EVs with domestically sourced batteries.

Hyundai says it remains important to localize production to minimize shipping costs, not to mention tariff risk. It now plans to make gas-electric hybrids at the complex.

Write to Christopher Otts at christopher.otts@wsj.com, Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com and Ryan Felton at ryan.felton@wsj.com

7. The Importance of the Battle of the Yalu

Of course the Yalu River is known in Korea as the Amnokgang (Amnok RIver). I mention that because this excellent article or "battle study" illustrates both the geographic and political importance of the Korean peninsula both in the 19th Century and still today. It was connected to so much then as it is today. What happened on the Korean peninsula had regional effects in the 19th century and I like to say today that what happens on the Korean peninsula (and in the region) will have global effects. Yes I am showing my bias.

And of course history matters and it is surely rhyming today.

The Importance of the Battle of the Yalu

Tommy Jamison

September 12, 2025

warontherocks.com · September 12, 2025

Editor’s Note: This is part of a new series of essays entitled “Battle Studies,” which seeks, through the study of military history, to demonstrate how past lessons about strategy, operations, and tactics apply to current defense challenges.

The Battle of the Yalu on September 17, 1894, set the conditions for Japanese victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The region — if not the world — has been dealing with the ramifications ever since. Strategically, Japanese success guaranteed sea control for an expeditionary assault on Korea and China. Geopolitically, the battle upset assumptions about hierarchies of prestige in East Asia and, more tangibly, led to the Japanese annexation of Taiwan. Technologically speaking, the battle offered a real-world test for novel and largely untried weapons: armored battleships, protected cruisers, and “quick-firing guns.” A globally contested war of words followed, as officials across Europe and the United States attempted to derive useful “lessons” from this natural experiment in modern war.

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Strategic Context: One Mountain, Two Tigers

While ostensibly sparked by a rebellion in Korea, the First Sino-Japanese War ultimately grew out of friction between the Meiji Japanese and Qing Chinese empires dating back a generation — if not centuries. In 1874, a Japanese naval expedition to Taiwan shocked Chinese officials and catalyzed a bilateral arms race between China and Japan, one every bit as dynamic as the 19th-century Anglo-French race, albeit on a smaller scale. “Self-strengthening” movements in both empires relied on the acquisition of foreign technology and expertise to build up national power. What the Qing called “strong ships and powerful cannons” were key components of that larger effort. After years of buying ships and organizing armies, both Japan and China seemed well-prepared for war in the 1890s. When a political crisis in Korea triggered Japanese and Chinese intervention on the peninsula, long-running tensions bubbled over into overt hostilities.

The core challenge for the Imperial Japanese Navy was to land forces on mainland Asia. Doing so required control of the sea, and control of the sea necessitated the defeat of the Qing Empire’s North Sea Fleet. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Influence on Sea Power upon History was not translated into Japanese until 1896, but the principles of concentrated fleet engagement and decisive action to achieve sea control already resonated with officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy. In the late summer of 1894, the belligerents deployed their navies to the Yellow Sea. After months of shadowboxing (mostly owing to political restrictions on how far east Chinese ships could steam), the two fleets joined off the Korean coast near the mouth of the Yalu River. As they closed to engage, regional preponderance in Northeast Asia was on the line. The Chinese expression “one mountain cannot hold two tigers” sums up the general situation well.

Most international observers agreed that the Chinese appeared, superficially at least, to be the dominant force. As late as 1891, the Chinese North Sea Fleet had “awed” the Japanese on a port visit to Nagasaki. But appearances — or simple comparisons of orders of battle — can be deceiving. Since the late 1880s, Qing officials had siphoned off naval funds for pet projects. Contemporaneously, and by sharp contrast, the Japanese parliament authorized a disciplined naval build-up, seizing rapid technological changes to catch up with China’s order of battle. The naval race created a security dilemma that, like many naval races, soon contributed to the outbreak of war.

The Battle: Testing Two Modernizations

Contemporary sources disagree on the exact composition of the belligerent fleets, but in effect, a dozen Chinese and Japanese warships met during the engagement. The Chinese counted on an older (built primarily in 1882–1887) and heterogeneous fleet, organized around two ironclad battleships. These ships, the Dingyuan and Zhenyuan, were larger and better armed than anything in the Japanese arsenal. The Japanese fleet was composed of armored or protected cruisers, but most had a more recent vintage (post-1890) and were equipped with “quick-firing guns” capable of shooting five projectiles per minute under combat conditions. How the two fleets — one old and armed with battleships, the other new and composed of quick-firing cruisers — would perform defied prediction. Battle was the only real way to find out who had won a generation-long naval race.

The Chinese commander Ding Ruchang, onboard the battleship Dingyuan, organized his forces into a line abreast with the two ironclads at the center flanked by weaker cruisers and gunboats. In response, the Japanese squadron under Vice Admiral Itō Sukeyuki formed a column, driving toward the Chinese as though crossing a “T.” As he neared Ding’s forces, Itō split his force in two. The faster “flying squadron” veered off at an angle to attack the weaker ships on the exposed right wing of Ding’s line. Itō’s main force then circled the Chinese fleet, attacking the left end of the Chinese formation. From their position at the center of the Chinese line, Ding and his battleships struggled to engage the more mobile Japanese. A breakdown in Chinese command and control exacerbated Ding’s predicament. The Japanese destroyed four Chinese ships and riddled the rest with shell fire. Two smaller Chinese vessels simply fled. As night fell, Itō broke contact, allowing what remained of the North Sea Fleet to escape. The big ironclads Dingyuan and Zhenyuan limped back to the shelter of Chinese port defenses but were badly damaged by artillery and fire.

Chinese officials feebly called this a “victory,” but at best, the Chinese North Sea Fleet survived (barely) as a “fleet in being” bottled up in the Bohai Sea. For several weeks, this rump force nursed its wounds at the northern Chinese port of Weihaiwei. In February 1895, Japanese torpedo boats and amphibious assaults against Weihaiwei finished the job, capturing or destroying the North Sea Fleet in its entirety. Ding committed suicide. When combined with the collapse of Chinese armies at Pyongyang on September 15, 1894, the Japanese victory at the Yalu was decisive — operationally and eventually strategically.

Sketch Map of the Battle of the Yalu River, Century Illustrated (1895)

Turning Point of the War

Over the next months, Japanese forces pressed their advantages home. Like a reverse Trafalgar (1805), the Japanese victory enabled a maritime state to attack a continental power. Amphibious armies carried out operations against Qing continental forces, which performed only marginally better than the Imperial Chinese Navy. Japanese troops crossed the Yalu in October 1894, bringing the war to mainland China. Facing collapse, the Chinese dispatched negotiators to Shimonoseki, Japan to handle the peacemaking. Li Hongzhang, the head of this delegation, had spent the previous decades building the North Sea Fleet as a tool to resist foreign aggression and recover Chinese sovereignty. In the wake of its defeat, he made his way to Japan to oversee yet another humiliation in a century full of setbacks.

The resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) ended the war and came at a steep cost to the Chinese — and Li Hongzhang personally. After arriving with the unenviable task of negotiating a settlement, a Japanese radical shot him in the face. He survived (refusing surgery in order to get on with the deliberations), but centuries of Chinese hegemony in Eastern Eurasia did not. To get peace, Li signed away a massive indemnity, recognized Korean independence from any tributary relationship with China, and ceded Taiwan to Japanese colonization, though insurgency and disease meant Japan’s occupation of the island would cost many lives. He would have given up more had France, Germany, and Russia not intervened — no doubt fearing Japan’s rise as a regional power — to compel Meiji negotiators to give up maximalist claims.

Even when moderated, Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan and the Penghu islands alongside its growing influence in Korea represented a major acceleration in a program of imperial aggrandizement. The annexation of Okinawa (1879) brought Meiji imperialism to the doorstep of continental Asia. In 1895, the Japanese “joined the imperialist club” by taking Taiwan at the expense of the wobbling Qing Empire. Japanese success in the Russo-Japanese War a decade later (1904-1905) followed much the same playbook: victory at sea (the Battle of Tsushima) followed by an expeditionary campaign against another continental power. On a slightly longer timeline, the annexation of Korea in 1910 and the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 trace their roots to the armies Japan dispatched to Northeast Asia after victory at the Yalu in 1894.

Most broadly, the Chinese defeat at the Yalu was a challenge to the legitimacy of the Qing Dynasty. The Battle of the Yalu was a test of self-strengthening or the Foreign Affairs Movement: an effort to build military and economic power to recover lost sovereignty. In an age that so commonly reified navies into markers of civilizational standing, the failure of the North Sea Fleet not only discredited the movement’s leaders, it wrecked Chinese pretensions of regional hegemony and cultural superiority. In the months and years that followed, many ordinary Chinese and some future revolutionaries looked at the Qing defeat and wondered aloud, “What have you done for me lately?” The Xinhai Revolution that brought down the Qing in 1911 is impossible to disentangle from this moment of disillusionment.

Culture Eats Order of Battle for Breakfast

News of the battle came as an ironic shock that journalists, military officers, and pundits struggled to explain. Yes, Meiji Japan was widely admired as a dynamo of industrial progress, but its advances seemed unlikely to overcome Chinese demographic and geographic advantages. Somehow, contrary to expectation, plucky Japan had defeated the massive Qing Empire. How had it happened? In the end, most attributed Chinese defeat not simply to contingency or tactics, but to an underlying weakness in Chinese culture that manifested in the North Sea Fleet as institutional corruption and favoritism.

Institutionally, the North Sea Fleet struggled with what today might be called “talent management.” Corruption and favoritism limited the efficacy of material acquisitions. What good were ships without the skill to maintain and employ them? Western mercenaries commonly complained about the pathologies of late-Qing bureaucracy: favoritism, careerism, or simply “mandarinism.” The Chinese had bought ships, but a decade of underfunding left the North Sea Fleet in need of maintenance and low on supplies. In the months before the war, officials in China requested to upgrade batteries with quick-firing guns, but to no avail. In battle, foreign experts onboard the big ironclads reported artillery shells filled with sand, which, in fairness, looked a lot like gunpowder and was much cheaper. The inability or unwillingness of other regional fleets to cooperate with the North Sea Fleet further diminished China’s numerical advantage over the Japanese. Itō’s fleet attacked as a unified national force while regional officials in Qing China refused to coordinate. For Chinese historians in the Mao era, all this was evidence of the superiority of “people’s war” over investments in a technologically sophisticated military.

Beyond institutional limitations, 19th-century observers (some of them Chinese) were quick to assign a still deeper level of culpability: civilizational culture. The contrast between Japanese progress and Chinese backwardness seemed to lie at the root of victory and defeat. Reciprocally, defeat was “refracted” by foreign observers into a belief in the incompatibility of Chinese culture with modern science and technology. In 1896, the naval historian Herbert Wilson left no doubt about his feeling, writing that the war proved China “is perhaps the most effete and barbarous state in the world.” This cultural thesis fell in line with many of the popular assumptions of late-19th-century Social Darwinism. Strong Japan succeeded, weak China lost.

It is easy to overextend this argument. By any measure, the very making of the North Sea Fleet was a tangible achievement worth celebrating. Yet, that same fleet’s disastrous performance at the Battle of the Yalu, with the right caveats, was (and is) a warning about culture and material power more generally. The Chinese had the stuff — and some proficiency with it at the tactical level. But without a culture of technocracy and meritocracy, the Qing North Sea Fleet became an unusable liability. Culture — be it institutional or national — had a differential effect, and many believed a decisive one at that.

Tellingly, the cultural explanation of defeat was adopted by many Chinese observers themselves. Defeat was an indictment against the status quo leadership in China. Since the Opium War, Chinese reformers held fast to a conviction that Western study was useful for “application,” but Chinese knowledge should be conserved as the “root” of any modernization. After the Yalu, one skeptic of that approach, Yan Fu, went from instructing North Sea Fleet officers at the Tianjin Naval Academy to translating texts on liberalism and Darwinism in an effort to “awaken” the Chinese nation in a cultural or even spiritual sense. In other words, Yan spent his early life supporting “strong ships and powerful cannons” only to conclude after 1894 that such weapons were baubles. What China really needed was a deeper change; for better or worse, it got it in the revolutions of the 20th century.

Learning (or Not) from Other People’s Wars

The Battle of the Yalu generated a modest library of newspaper stories, journal articles, and intelligence reports. It is easy to understand the excitement. Here was a natural experiment in the efficacy of modern weapons. Professional intelligence agencies were still works in progress (the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence dated only to 1882), but intelligence officers and attachés did their best to understand the war from a tactical and technical perspective. After all, even “scanty indications,” from such real-world engagements, as Alfred Thayer Mahan contended in 1896, were “worth much more than the most carefully arranged programme,” at war colleges and academies in the North Atlantic.

Foreign observers came as journalists, intelligence officers, and mercenaries. William Sims was one of many rushing to the theater to gather information. As the intelligence officer onboard the USS Charleston, he was detailed to shore to explore fortifications and captured warships. His reports provided a granular assessment of the combat power of offensive and defensive weapons. He wrote so many reports that he injured his wrist and had to be medically relieved. When the mercenary Philo T. McGiffin, who served onboard the Zhenyuan, returned home to the United States in 1895, he was enlisted to lecture at the Naval War College and write in national magazines. Alfred Thayer Mahan used McGiffin’s first-person account as the basis for his 1895 “Lessons from the Yalu Fight.” All the while, journalists lit up the telegraph networks, providing detailed (if dubious) commentaries on the course of the war and the sources of victory and defeat.

But just what, exactly, were the lessons to take from this conflict? Mostly, military observers tended to see in defeat confirmation of their existing preferences toward battleship-dominated fleets. Given that Japanese cruisers won out at the Yalu over Chinese battleships, that “lesson” required some heroic rationalization. It went something like this: Yes, the Chinese fleet had been defeated, but Ding’s battleships survived the Japanese cruisers’ rain of shells. With better tactics and artillerists, the Chinese would likely have succeeded. Alfred Thayer Mahan offered an excellent example of this motivated reasoning in action. Even in defeat, he saw the survival of the Chinese ships Dingyuan and Zhenyuan as proof of the “argument of those who favor the battleship as the chief constituent of naval force.” Mahan noted, moreover, that the battle confirmed his assertion that “concentrating force under one command is more efficient than that disseminated among several.” His preferred theory of naval warfare, originally derived from historical research, now appeared validated by empirical observation of modern war.

But were these the right lessons? The process of collecting information and refining it into intelligence on which to make judgments was imperfect and confusing. People are flawed, so too are the data they collect. Analytical biases further distorted matters. Experts downplayed some developments in the war — like the role of torpedoes, logistics, as well as the links between navies and expeditionary warfare — in favor of a selective emphasis on armor, tonnage, and firepower. Reading ex post facto analyses of the battle today gives the sense of selective validation rather than rigorously controlled, objective “lessons.” In a word: “cherry-picking.” Similar temptations are at work today. The aftermath of the Yalu should come as a cautionary example about learning from “other people’s wars.”

Why it Matters: Political Controversy, Heritage, and Experiments

The gap between what most Americans know about the First Sino-Japanese War and the trouble its legacy may one day land them in is genuinely startling. Beijing’s revisionism aims at a region shaped by the Battle of the Yalu and its consequences. Sino-Japanese tensions in the East China Sea, the challenge of managing the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-South Korean alliances, respectively, and above all, the nebulous status of Taiwan all grew out of Qing defeat in 1894-1895. These dynamics are not so much “past” as they are present politics.

For the People’s Republic of China, the legacy of the Yalu has shaped institutions as well. The defeated North Sea Fleet is at once a rationale for military modernization and a source of heritage. Xi Jinping’s “strong military dream” is justified as a response to defeats in the 19th and 20th centuries, often explicitly to the Battle of the Yalu. “Those who lag behind will be bullied” is a common refrain in propaganda at historical sites. And by implication: Modern Chinese must do better than their late-Qing predecessors. As a vast experiment in industrialization and modernization, the creation of the North Sea Fleet is also a form of heritage for the 21st-century People’s Liberation Army Navy. It offers a kind of origin story in history and popular media for sea power in China.

The Battle of the Yalu also matters globally as a case study in the inherent difficulty of learning from “other people’s wars.” How to account for biases and fragmentary evidence is a major challenge. Notice how observers of the Russo-Japanese War and Spanish Civil War took contradictory insights from the same empirical records of conflict. At present, as intelligence services, industry players, and casual observers debate the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the experience of the Sino-Japanese War begs the questions: Are 21st-century observers smarter than Alfred Thayer Mahan? Can they check biases in ways he could not?

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Tommy Jamison, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of Strategic Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of The Pacific’s New Navies (2025). The views here do not represent those of the Naval Postgraduate School or Department of Defense.

Image: Walters Art Museum via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · September 12, 2025

8. New deputy takes charge of 600,000-strong US, South Korean combined command

I think this is sending a significant message from the South Korean defense establishment. General Kim was the first commander of the ROK Strategic Command which was born out of the Washington Declaration and the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and a focus on combined conventional nuclear integration (CNI). But probably most important from President Lee's perspective is that he was also director of the OPCON transition group at MND. We may finally be on the path to OPCON transition and perhaps General Kim will be doing a right seat ride to eventually replace General Brunson as the ROK/US CFC commander..

New deputy takes charge of 600,000-strong US, South Korean combined command

Stars and Stripes · David Choi and Yoojin Lee · September 12, 2025

U.S. Forces Korea commander Army Gen. Xavier Brunson, left, greets the Combined Forces Command's newest deputy commander, South Korean army Gen. Kim Sung-min, during a ceremony at Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Sept. 11, 2025. (U.S. Forces Korea)

SEOUL, South Korea — A new deputy commander took his post Thursday with the joint U.S. and South Korean command overseeing 600,000 active duty troops tasked with defending Seoul.

Gen. Kim Sung-min, formerly commander of the South Korean army’s 5th Corps, became the latest deputy commander of the Combined Forces Command during a ceremony at Camp Humphreys, according to a U.S. Forces Korea news release Thursday.

Humphreys, the largest U.S. overseas military base, is also the headquarters for USFK, U.N Command, Eighth Army and the 2nd Infantry Division. USFK is the U.S. command overseeing the roughly 28,500 American troops stationed in South Korea.

Kim was appointed deputy commander on Sept. 2 by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, who also replaced the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman and the army, navy and air force service chiefs.

Kim’s predecessor at Combined Forces Command, Gen. Kang Shin Chul, served from Oct. 31, 2023, to Sept. 3.

Kim majored in Chinese at the Korea Military Academy in Seoul, the country’s premier military university. He received his commission in 1992, according to his biography.

He served in a variety of leadership positions in the military, including as chief of the U.S. policy division at the Ministry of National Defense in 2016, and as the director of the wartime operational control transition group for the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2020.

He received a master’s degree in national security studies from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

“As we stand at a critical crossroad, I pledge to fulfill my mission under the [South Korea]-U.S. alliance that’s even stronger,” he said at the installation Thursday, according to the release.

USFK commander Army Gen. Xavier Brunson at the event stressed that the defense of South Korea is a “responsibility we carry together.”

“Gen. Kim joins a command that is disciplined, united and ready,” Brunson said in remarks at the ceremony, according to the release. “Our combined team trains and prepares every day to deter aggression and, if necessary, fight and win.”

The Combined Forces Command was established Nov. 7, 1978, to help coordinate joint military operations between the U.S. and South Korea in the event of war. The command also controls the roughly 3.5 million South Korean military reservists in the country.

An American four-star general has traditionally led the command as its chief, with a four-star South Korean general as his deputy.

David Choi

David Choi

David Choi is based in South Korea and reports on the U.S. military and foreign policy. He served in the U.S. Army and California Army National Guard. He graduated from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Yoojin Lee

Yoojin Lee

Yoojin Lee is a correspondent and translator based at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. She graduated from Korea University, where she majored in Global Sports Studies.

Stars and Stripes · David Choi and Yoojin Lee · September 12, 2025

9. US to evaluate troops in Korea based on capabilities, not numbers: JCS nominee

​The press, the pundits, the policymakers, and the public need to fully understand this. It is about capabilities not numbers. Yes, counting the number of troops is the easy button. Understanding capabilities is hard. Heed the General's words. Change is coming but the change can be for the better. To paraphrase an old boss of mine. - Don't count the troops - make the troops count. And believe me the capabilities of our troops and our combined ROK and US military forces will count.

US to evaluate troops in Korea based on capabilities, not numbers: JCS nominee

Gen. Christopher Mahoney’s statement comes amid fears of US troop withdrawal from ROK amid growing North Korean threats

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/us-to-evaluate-troops-in-korea-based-on-capabilities-not-numbers-jcs-nominee/

Jooheon Kim September 12, 2025

Christopher Mahoney speaks during a confirmation hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington on Sept. 11. | Image: Screenshot from the committee's website

The nominee for vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said American troop levels in South Korea should be evaluated based on capabilities rather than soldier numbers, amid concerns that the Trump administration could scale down the U.S. military presence despite growing North Korean threats.

Christopher Mahoney made the statement in written responses submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington for his confirmation hearing. 

“I don’t want to speculate on hypotheticals, but I will emphasize that we view U.S. posture not by the number of service members on the ground but by the capabilities needed to advance our national security interests,” he stated. 

If confirmed, Mahoney said he would “support the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense” in reviewing U.S. capabilities in South Korea and Japan and making appropriate recommendations. The statement by the four-star Marine Corps general comes as U.S. Forces Korea has increasingly suggested that it could expand its mission to address broader regional threats, particularly in countering China.

Mahoney added that the U.S. continues to urge allies like South Korea to contribute more to defense costs and enhance their own military capabilities, which he described as essential for strengthening combined deterrence against regional threats, including North Korea.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly pressured South Korea to pay more for hosting U.S. troops, while Washington has urged its allies in both Europe and Asia to raise their defense spending as part of a broader “burden-sharing” effort.

Mahoney raised concerns over North Korea’s growing military capabilities, including its nuclear, missile, and cyber programs, which he said pose threats to the U.S. and its allies. He also warned that North Korea’s military power is likely to grow further through its deepening strategic cooperation with Russia.

Regarding the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea, Mahoney said Seoul must meet conditions related to independent operational capabilities, and that a favorable security environment must be in place before the transfer occurs. 

He also highlighted the strategic importance of U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific, noting that the concentration of U.S. troops in Japan and South Korea plays a vital role in supporting America’s national security strategy.

Yang Uk, a military expert at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, told NK News that focusing solely on troop numbers misses the point, as those numbers also represent capabilities. 

“The reality is that the U.S. military just doesn’t have the capability to manage everything at once,” he said. “Even Trump will eventually have to acknowledge that the U.S. can’t cover the entire Indo-Pacific alone.”

He stressed the need for South Korea to move away from the illusion that the U.S. military will always be there to provide security, and instead focus on building up its own defense capabilities.

In this context, Japan has reportedly proposed a “one-theater” Indo-Pacific strategy that frames the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas as a single operational zone focused on countering China. 

However, the proposal has raised concerns in South Korea that it could be sidelined in regional security coordination, and potentially left vulnerable in the event of a North Korean attack.

Edited by Bryan Betts

10. Korean workers rejoice as they return home after detention in U.S. immigration raid

(LEAD) Korean workers rejoice as they return home after detention in U.S. immigration raid | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 12, 2025

(ATTN: RECASTS lead para; ADDS more info in last 2 paras, photo)

By Chae Yun-hwan

YEONGJONGDO/SEOUL, Sept. 12 (Yonhap) -- Most Korean workers rejoiced on Friday as they returned home after days of detention in last week's U.S. immigration raid, with some breaking down in tears during the long-awaited reunions with their families.

"I'm back! Freedom!" one of the workers shouted after arriving at Incheon International Airport.

The worker was among 316 South Koreans and 14 foreigners who arrived at the airport, just west of Seoul, aboard a chartered plane from Georgia following their release from detention the previous day.

Their arrival capped off a weeklong push to bring the workers home after their detention in last Thursday's raid at an electric car battery plant construction site co-run by Hyundai Motor Group and LG Energy Solution in Bryan County.

As the workers entered the arrival hall, the airport erupted in applause and cheers. Once they arrived at a waiting area for family members, a woman who had been waiting shouted "honey!" before embracing her husband.

One of the workers told reporters that it felt good to be home, while there was a nod to questions about their health.

Workers who had been detained in a U.S. immigration raid arrive at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul, on Sept. 12, 2025, a day after their release from detention. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Family members had been anxiously waiting for the workers at the airport.

"It felt like my world was collapsing," the wife of an LG Energy Solution worker recounted. "We worried so much over the past week and I am overwhelmed that he is returning home safely."

Lee said her husband went to the United States for a work trip on a B-1 visa in July and had been originally scheduled to return home Thursday.

"When I first heard of the news, my heart sank," she said. "He went through all sorts of hardship before the situation blew up in the final week ahead of his return home."

Seventy-four-year-old Lee Sang-hee was also waiting for her 44-year-old son, an employee at a subcontractor company.

"I thought that he would only go through simple questioning but when I saw on TV that they went to a detention center and were shackled, I was taken aback."

"I am thankful that my son has returned healthy."

Workers who had been detained in a U.S. immigration raid arrive at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul, on Sept. 12, 2025, a day after their release from detention. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

On one side of the arrival hall, a civic group demanding an apology from the U.S. shouted slogans, holding up a satirical banner that depicted U.S. President Donald Trump as an armed U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer.

Around 100 police officers were deployed at the airport to maintain order, while additional personnel were mobilized along the routes from the terminal to the parking lot to assist the workers.

A protester holds up a banner depicting U.S. President Donald Trump as he condemns the U.S. detainment of hundreds of South Korean workers in a sweeping immigration raid at a plant construction site in Georgia, at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul, on Sept. 12, 2025. The workers arrived at the airport this day. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 12, 2025

11. U.S. detention of Koreans hits trust in alliance, underscores long-festering visa issue 

​How can we repair the damage to the Alliance?  

But to those who think Koreans are simply blaming Americans for this that is not the case. Koreans are blaming Korean diplomats and government officials for not securing enough visas. They are blaming Korean businesses for skirting the visa rules. But what they are most upset about is seeing their fellow Koreans in chains in America. Koreans have a long history of being mistreated by great powers and to be treated the way they were by what they and many believe is still the great power of the world and a blood ally of Korea was a blow to the gut. We should consider that.

(News Focus) U.S. detention of Koreans hits trust in alliance, underscores long-festering visa issue | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · September 12, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 (Yonhap) -- After the release of the South Korean workers detained in a U.S. immigration raid, the bilateral alliance faces a set of tricky undertakings, including shoring up Korea's confidence in America as a reliable partner and tackling a long-festering visa issue for skilled professionals, analysts said Thursday.

The Sept. 4 raid at an electric vehicle battery plant construction site for a joint venture between Hyundai Motor Group and LG Energy Solution in Georgia -- a prime example of Korea's investment efforts -- caused shock and consternation among Koreans at a time of growing doubts about U.S. credibility.

The unsettling scene of the workers being handcuffed and shackled has also brought to the fore the visa issue that has gotten into the way of Korean tech firms' endeavors to set up and run factories in the United States despite Washington's repeated calls for new investments.

A total of 316 Korean nationals were released from a detention center in Folkston, Georgia, early Thursday. The Koreans, along with 14 foreigners, boarded a chartered plane in Atlanta to return home in a coda to a bitter chapter in what both Seoul and Washington have touted as the "ironclad" alliance.

A chartered Korean Air plane is landing at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in Atlanta on Sept. 10, 2025. (Yonhap)

"The raid by ICE in a very public manner to maximize visibility did much to damage U.S. credibility as an honest alliance partner," Andrew Yeo, the SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies, said. ICE is short for Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

"The timing was also unfortunate especially so soon after the Trump-Lee summit and Korean companies pledging to invest billions more in the U.S. economy," he added.

The raid at the Korean plant site came just 10 days after Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Donald Trump sought to build personal rapport and discussed the two countries' trade deal, including Korea's commitment to investing US$350 billion in the U.S., at the White House.

During Lee's trip to the U.S. capital, an association of South Korean business leaders also announced their plan to invest $150 billion in the U.S. to "usher in a new era of the "manufacturing renaissance."

The raid left Korean policymakers and businesspeople scratching their heads to figure out what went wrong as they had no idea that the mass detention would occur at a time when the allies seek to capitalize on the forward momentum for cooperation on security, technology and supply chain resiliency to name a few.

According to a survey by Korean pollster Realmeter this week, nearly 60 percent of the respondents said they were disappointed by the crackdown on the Korean plant site.

"The Korean public's confidence in the alliance and overall partnership continues to wane, fueled this week by the Hyundai/LG raids in Georgia and scenes of hundreds of Korean nationals being perp walked in shackles," Rob Rapson, former acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, said.

A U.S. official shackles a worker with a metal chain during an immigration raid at an electric vehicle battery plant construction site for a joint venture of Hyundai Motor Group and LG Energy Solution in Bryan County near Savannah on Sept. 4, 2025, in this photo captured from video footage posted on the website of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Patrick Cronin, the chair for Asia-Pacific security at the Hudson Institute, pointed out that the fact that a diplomatic solution was negotiated to settle the detention case suggests "the entire issue could have been avoided."

"The administration should have approached the factory owners with news that visa laws would be strictly enforced from here on out," he said. "A longer term fix requires an agreed plan on how to manage the workforce, from training more Americans to allowing more legal workers from Korea."

Tom Ramage, an economic policy analyst at the Korea Economic Institute of America, noted that the raid would have "knock-on" effects on other countries.

"The immigration raid occurring at a work site certainly outlines the U.S. as being impartial in enforcing its immigration policies," he said.

"However, this could ultimately have knock-on effects for how other countries weigh their decision to sign on to investments in the U.S. How will their workers be treated? Will they be unfairly targeted? Will there be shared agreement about the status and role of the workers and visiting specialists?"

The raid was the latest in a series of events that observers said might have chipped away at Korea's confidence in the U.S.

Trump's aggressive tariff policy has left a Korea-U.S. free trade agreement in tatters. His administration's recent announcement on a decision to strip South Korean tech firms Samsung Electronics Co. and SK hynix Inc. of "validated end-user" status heightened uncertainty for their business activities.

His administration's focus on increasing allies' security "burden sharing," bolstering homeland security and deterring China in the midst of an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry has also fueled doubts over America's commitment to deterring North Korea.

The detention saga could have a silver lining, observers noted, as South Korea has proposed instituting a working group with the U.S. to discuss creating a new visa category for Korean workers as part of a joint effort to prevent a repeat of such a detention.

The proposal came after Trump signaled his willingness to explore legal ways to help foreign companies bring their technical staff to help hire and train American workers.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to reporters while signing executive orders at the White House in Washington on Sept. 5, 2025, in this photo released by AFP. (Yonhap)

"Going forward, both sides need to coordinate more closely and develop legal pathways for Korean companies to deploy essential technical staff to the U.S. to expedite and facilitate both the construction and operations of these and other massive Korean investment projects, which ultimately will employ thousands of Americans," Rapson said.

"It's in both sides interests to do so."

Most of the Koreans arrested in the raid were known to have entered the U.S. on an ESTA visa waiver program or a B-1 short-term business visitor visa -- in what has long been a practice for Korean businesses due to difficulty in securing an H-1B visa, a nonimmigrant visa for skilled foreign workers.

Both the ESTA visa waiver program and a B-1 short-term business visitor visa do not allow one to receive a salary from a U.S.-based source, among other restrictions.

Those with an H-1B visa can work in the U.S. on a relatively stable footing, but that program is subject to an annual worldwide cap of 85,000 visas. Koreans in information technology, engineering and other "specialty occupations" usually apply for the program, but it takes much time to get the visa.

The detention of the Korean workers has added to growing calls for South Korea to request the creation of a new E-4 work visa for them.

In July, Rep. Young Kim (R-CA) and Rep. Sydney Kamlager‑Dove (D-CA) re-introduced the bill, titled "Partner with Korea Act," that seeks to create an allotment of 15,000 E-4 visas for Korean nationals with specialized education or expertise.

"Processing H-1B or B-1 visas more quickly and/or providing a guaranteed quota allowing the necessary number of Korean workers to help set-up and manage factories in the U.S. would help," Yeo said.

"The Trump administration should also reinstitute some version of the CHIPS Act to invest in education and workforce training. Conversely, Korean companies can reassure Americans that they will help train American workers and find local talent," he said.

This photo, taken on Sept. 11, 2025, shows Korean workers poised to leave a detention center in Folkston, Georgia. (Yonhap)

Ramage highlighted the need for Washington's help in ensuring that Korean firms can proceed smoothly with their investment commitments.

"For these (Korean) investments to continue, it will be imperative for the Trump administration to give substantial assurances to Korean companies on the continued operability of their investments under U.S. labor laws and to foster mutual understanding on the valid status of the Korean workers and technical specialists helping to bring these investments online," he said.

He also said that given the technical expertise and specialized experience South Korea takes to launch Korean greenfield investment abroad, the pending issue could be the start of a broader conversation about how to potentially expand visa categories for countries that are partnering with the U.S. on investment deals.

"Creating country-specific visa channels or expanding the scope of specialty occupation lists could aid in getting the labor the United States needs to get projects like these up and running where specialized experience is needed," he said.

The visa issue would be just part of the daunting tasks facing the bilateral alliance, Rapson said, noting the "challenging" days and weeks ahead for the Seoul-Washington relationship.

"That in turn is just a subset of the larger trade and investment challenges on the immediate horizon," he said.

"The 15 percent U.S. tariff rate on Korea has yet to be implemented and details for Korea's $350 billion investment pledge have yet to be agreed to. If the recent U.S.-Japan investment memorandum of understanding is any guide (and it probably is), it suggests big problems ahead for Seoul in coming to an accommodation with the Trump administration.

South Korean diplomats stand in front of the Folkston Immigration and Customs Enforcement Processing Center in Folkston, Georgia, on Sept. 8, 2025, following their meetings with Korean workers detained during a recent immigration crackdown. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · September 12, 2025

12. Seoul to seek enhanced visa system for Korean workers in talks with U.S.: security adviser

​Let's use common sense and get this right. As George Hucthinson said, we have the opportunity to make something good out of this event. I hope the bureaucracy can use its head and do what is in our mutual national security and economic interests.

Seoul to seek enhanced visa system for Korean workers in talks with U.S.: security adviser | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · September 12, 2025

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Sept. 12 (Yonhap) -- National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Friday that South Korea will consult with the United States on enhancing the visa system and creating a new visa category for Korean workers to reduce uncertainties facing Korean companies operating in the U.S.

Wi made the remarks after more than 300 South Korean workers returned home following a weeklong detention by U.S. immigration authorities in Georgia -- an incident that fueled public anger and prompted Korean businesses to reassess their investment plans.

Most of the detained workers at an electric vehicle battery factory construction site operated by Hyundai Motor and LG Energy Solution had reportedly entered the U.S. on B1 business visas, issued for purposes such as meetings or contract signings, or under the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).

"The government will work to improve practices under the current U.S. visa system to eliminate uncertainties for our companies," Wi told reporters.

National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac speaks during a meeting with reporters at the presidential office in Seoul on Sept. 12, 2025. (Yonhap)

Wi said the issue requires "urgent" attention and a "phased approach," noting Seoul is considering short-term fixes, such as streamlining visa procedures, and long-term measures, while making diplomatic efforts to create a new visa quota or category for Koreans.

"From a long-term perspective, we will actively pursue discussions on creating a visa quota for Koreans or establishing a new visa category through amendments to U.S. domestic law," he said.

He also said Seoul and Washington agreed to seek clear U.S. guidelines on business visas, B1 visas and ESTA to ensure consistent enforcement by U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Workers who had been detained in a U.S. immigration raid arrive at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul, on Sept. 12, 2025, a day after their release from detention. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

On trade, Wi remained cautious about U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's recent remarks that Seoul must accept Washington's demands or face tariffs, saying official positions exchanged at the negotiating table matter more than public comments.

He noted that Seoul and Washington have reached a broad agreement on security issues, but the two sides are still hammering out details of a trade deal reached in late July, which lowered the planned U.S. 25 percent tariffs to 15 percent in exchange for $350 billion investment package and other commitments.

Wi also cited "meaningful progress" in consultations on revising the bilateral nuclear pact to ease restrictions on Seoul's enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, which are considered key to completing the nuclear fuel cycle.

"We hope South Korea will have greater room and flexibility for nuclear enrichment and reprocessing, in a framework similar to Japan's," he said.

Currently, South Korea is allowed to enrich uranium below 20 percent only with U.S. consent and is prohibited from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. Japan, by contrast, can both reprocess spent fuel and produce low-enriched uranium under 20 percent without U.S. approval.

Seoul has long sought such capabilities, citing energy security, environmental needs and export competitiveness, while Washington has been reluctant due to proliferation concerns, as reprocessing facilities can yield plutonium for nuclear weapons.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · September 12, 2025

13. North Korean army blamed Russia for early casualties in Kursk, state TV reveals

​Hmmm.... will this come back to haunt the Propaganda and Agitation Department?

On a more serious note. Combined operations are hard. That is why the ROK/US forces train hard because hard training is what wins wars.

North Korean army blamed Russia for early casualties in Kursk, state TV reveals

KCTV broadcast documents coordination issues in apparent effort to head off criticism for losses in Ukraine war

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/north-korean-army-blamed-russia-for-early-casualties-in-kursk-state-tv-reveals/

Anton Sokolin September 12, 2025

North Korean soldiers providing medical assistance to a wounded comrade presumably in Russia's Kursk | Image: KCTV (Aug. 30, 2025)

North Korean military commanders blamed Russian forces for stalled operations and mounting casualties during the initial DPRK troop deployment to the Ukraine war, according to state media, airing images of military reports prepared for leader Kim Jong Un.

The admission of heavy casualties aligns with Western and Ukrainian intelligence about the early struggles of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to adapt to the rigors of modern warfare in Russia’s Kursk region.

Showing the documents on Korean Central Television (KCTV) appears to be part of ongoing efforts to deflect criticism of the North Korean leadership for losses in the overseas conflict, following Pyongyang’s belated acknowledgement of the deployment earlier this year.

The military reports also document Kim’s orders to keep secret the deployment and joint operations with Russia in southwestern Kursk, near the Ukrainian border, largely confirming open-source reports about efforts to conceal the DPRK troop presence.

Broadcast on Aug. 30, KCTV combined earlier footage detailing DPRK servicemen’s gear and tactics in Kursk with new shots of North Korean combat operations in the border city of Sudzha, showing soldiers flying drones with propaganda units and even capturing Ukrainian soldiers.

But NK News analysis suggests that the videos were largely reenactments staged after the city had already been cleared of Ukrainian forces, seeking to glorify the role of DPRK forces and downplay Russian contributions.

BLAMING RUSSIA

While only shown briefly, the images of military reports aired during the state TV documentary are large and clear enough to read, detailing early struggles coordinating with Russian forces.

In one document dated Dec. 22, North Korean commanders reported that they had to “adjust missions of some units” after “problems raised over the course of the first operation” between Dec. 14-21.

“During the offensive operation, Russian army units failed to expand the offensive results, and as a result the special operations forces (SOF) units could not secure the flanks,” the situation report states.

The setback led to “serious losses” among SOF operatives, who came under “the enemy’s concentrated offensive actions” and were unable to accelerate their advance, according to the report.

A situation report supposedly submitted by KPA commanders to Kim Jong Un, describing DPRK troops’ activities in Kursk and their heavy losses that resulted from the actions of Russian forces in the area in Dec. 2024 | Image: KCTV (Aug. 30,) edited and translated by NK News

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Commanders also briefed Kim on a combined Russia-DPRK offensive launched on Dec. 14, with North Korea’s 62nd Brigade covering 30 square kilometers by Dec. 18 and the 93rd Brigade advancing 20 square kilometers by Dec. 21.

The document appears to continue on another page, but KCTV cut the segment short, with the report ending mid-sentence after stating that “the Russian brigades attacking on the left and right over eight days” likely failed to secure gains.

The report bears Kim Jong Un’s signature across the top in an indication that he reviewed it.

Joost Oilemans, an expert on the North Korean military, assessed Pyongyang’s accusations to be “fairly accurate” based on reporting about problems early in the deployment, adding that “it was predictable that criticism would make it through.”

“The North Korean military hierarchy is independent from the Russian one,” he told NK News. “Whereas the Russians tend to have incentives to downplay issues especially higher up the chain, the North Koreans had the opposite incentive considering who was running the show.”

Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, said the release of the documents points to an attempt to “lay the blame on the Russian side” and show “some tension between the North Korean and Russian staff.”

“The letters shown on TV may be a sign of acknowledging disagreements within the North Korean leadership toward Russia. Nothing is left to chance in North Korean propaganda.”

NOT SO SECRET OPERATIONS

Other military situation reports aired in the Aug. 30 segment provide additional details on DPRK-Russian operations in Kursk, further corroborating what Ukrainian officials and media outlets previously reported about where North Korean soldiers were deployed and efforts to hide their presence.

The earliest report, dated Oct. 22, features extensive notes in Kim Jong Un’s handwriting, urging commanders to maintain secrecy and take the enemy by “surprise in starting the offensive operation.” He also stressed that the request be conveyed to the Russian side, according to the document. 

Accompanying footage showed Kim shedding a tear during New Year’s celebrations, with the narration attributing his anguish to the burden of secrecy about the Kursk deployment.

Kim Jong Un shedding a tear during a New Year’s concert | Image: KCTV (Aug. 30, 2025)

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KCTV also showed a fake military ID with a Tuvan name. This appears to confirm Ukrainian military claims that the Russian military issued such IDs to North Korean soldiers to conceal them as members of Russian minority groups.

Oliemans suggested that Kim’s demands for secrecy “were moot” from the outset given Russia’s well-known lapses in operational security, with Ukraine reporting the first deaths of DPRK soldiers in early November.

Another report dated Nov. 14 offered details on Russian combat operations in specific areas of the Kursk region, where North Korean soldiers were expected to help repel Ukrainian forces.

The document described how Russia’s 137th Guards Airborne Regiment, a mechanized infantry unit under the Aerospace Forces, along with the 155th and 810th Marine Brigades sought to form an encirclement near Novoivanovka, Malaya Loknya and what appears to be Kireevka between Nov. 10-18.

As of around mid-November, the mechanized infantry unit was engaged in an offensive south of Olgovka near the Olgovskaya and Kremyanovskaya Groves, according to the document, an assessment largely consistent with Russian state media coverage of fighting in late October.

Additional footage of DPRK commanders planning operations from trench dugouts appeared to show a live digital combat map, with Russian positions in red and Ukrainian positions in blue. The map matched reporting by Kyiv’s military, the Institute for the Study of War and the Deep State mapping project in early spring, around the time Moscow claimed a major breakthrough in Kursk.

North Korean officers planning operations in Kursk, the live map displayed on the screen shows the location of Russian (red) and Ukrainian (blue) forces in the region, with their positions roughly coinciding with Deep State’s maps dating to early March 2025 | Images: KCTV (Aug. 30, 2025), Deep State, edited by NK News

LIONIZING THE TROOPS

While KCTV has aired what looks like real combat footage from the Ukraine war, the latest broadcast appeared to focus less on battlefield reality than on portraying DPRK troops as the decisive force in liberating the Russian border city of Sudzha.

Combat scenes showed North Korean forces storming urban positions but no opposing forces. 

One sequence depicted a DPRK soldier launching a drone to spread leaflets likely encouraging enemy troops to surrender, but the broadcast showed pamphlets dropping over a residential area in northern Sudzha that was likely already under DPRK and Russian control.

A North Korean soldier launching a drone with attached leaflets in Kursk, presumably in the vicinity of Sudzha | Image: KCTV (Aug. 30, 2025)

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Other clips showed soldiers changing positions, throwing grenades and storming houses in what appeared to be central Sudzha. 

The expert Oliemans said he “strongly” suspects the footage was staged, highlighting clean camera angles in some of the clips. He explained that filming combat footage in safe conditions is “far from strange” and has been “standard throughout modern history.” 

Unlike earlier broadcasts, KCTV’s Aug. 30 segment focused solely on DPRK troops, showing no Russian servicemen in Sudzha as if North Korean soldiers singlehandedly recaptured the town.

North Korean soldiers in central Sudzha, passing by the Burger House fast food restaurant (Coordinates: 51°11’29″N 35°16’23″E) | Images: KCTV (Aug. 30), Google Earth, edited by NK News

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NK News has identified several Sudzha landmarks where DPRK soldiers appeared, including a burger joint, the courthouse and a prominent church. Drone flyovers showed wider views of the city, presumably filmed near DPRK positions.

The KCTV program also re-aired a segment with a photo that appears to show North Korean servicemen taking Ukrainian soldiers prisoner, another moment of glory. 

The expert Monday said that unlike Russian television, KCTV rarely shows North Koreans cooperating with Russians on the battlefield, suggesting that DPRK “propaganda isn’t ready yet to show North Koreans and foreigners working closely together.”

The only acknowledgement of joint operations came in a shot showing Valery Solodchuk — the Russian lieutenant general in charge of Kursk operations — talking to DPRK commanders in a dugout.

North Korean propaganda around the Ukraine war has focused heavily on soldiers’ sacrifices for the state and loyalty to the leader, while saying little about the reasons for supporting Russia’s war effort at an estimated cost of thousands of lives.

North Korean soldiers supposedly taking Ukrainian prisoners in Kursk | Image: KCTV (Aug. 30, 2025)

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For its part, Moscow has openly celebrated Pyongyang’s military support, hosting an exhibition on its “heroism” and promising to name streets and build memorials to honor DPRK soldiers in Kursk.

“North Korean viewers have little idea why they are fighting at all,” Monday said, while adding that KCTV footage does “strongly suggest that everyday people are deriving economic benefits” stemming from Pyongyang’s military cooperation with Moscow.

At his latest summit with Kim Jong Un, Russian President Vladimir Putin was quick to stress that the deployment came at Pyongyang’s initiative, and more North Korean support appears to be on the way.

The governor of Kursk said last week that DPRK military engineers are already assisting with recovery efforts in the region, while the Russian war blogger Severnyi reported that DPRK soldiers arrived near the village Guyevo to boost border defenses.

A North Korean grouping “roughly the size of a brigade” has reached the state border assuming position north of Ukraine’s Sumy region by the villages of Yelizavetovka, Troitskoye and Gordeyevka, according to the Telegram channel on Wednesday.

Colin Zwirko and Seung-Yeon Chung contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Bryan Betts

14. Korea-US-Japan cooperation is no longer an option as a new axis is taking shape

​Concur. Trilateral cooperation is key to our mutual national security.

As the JSOC guys used to say, it takes a network to beat a network. So to rephrase - it takes a superior alliance to beat an axis.

Korea-US-Japan cooperation is no longer an option as a new axis is taking shape - The Korea Times

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

By Chun In-bum

• Published Sep 12, 2025 10:38 am KST

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

By Chun In-bum

Published Sep 12, 2025 10:38 am KST

Chun In-bum

Chun In-bum

Beijing hosted a grand military parade on Sept. 3 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. Officially framed as a remembrance of victory against fascism, the event was, in reality, a display of China’s strategic ambitions and a pointed message to the world.

But what made this year’s parade particularly troubling was not only the weapons on display, but also the political company present: Senior Russian and North Korean delegations stood alongside Chinese leaders. Their presence underscored the growing alignment of authoritarian powers in direct opposition to the United States and its allies.

For South Korea, Japan and the United States, the implications are grave. The parade was not just a projection of China’s capabilities — it was a rehearsal of solidarity among regimes that seek to challenge the rules-based order.

China’s arsenal spoke volumes. Intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, submarine-launched ballistic missiles hypersonic glide vehicles and the “Guam Killer” DF-26 missile signaled Beijing’s determination to hold U.S. and allied bases at risk across the Pacific. Equally significant was the unveiling of new undersea drones and advanced missile defense systems, signaling a doctrine of denying U.S. access and weakening allied resolve.

But the military hardware was only part of the story. The real symbolism lay in the joint stagecraft: Russian officials, despite their ongoing war in Ukraine, stood shoulder to shoulder with their Chinese hosts. North Korean representatives, isolated internationally yet emboldened by Moscow and Beijing, were also in attendance. This was not coincidence — it was choreography.

Moscow’s presence at the parade was more than ceremonial. Russia, bogged down in Ukraine and under Western sanctions, depends on Chinese diplomatic cover and economic support. By appearing in Beijing, Russian President Vladimir Putin reinforced the narrative of an emerging Eurasian bloc determined to resist Western influence.

For Asia, this matters profoundly. A Russia willing to deepen military-technical cooperation with China in missile technology, energy resources or arms sales complicates the regional balance. It also stretches U.S. and allied resources across two theaters: Europe and Asia. Beijing knows this, and the parade was designed to remind the world that Washington cannot afford to neglect either front.

The presence of North Korea leader Kim Jong-un was perhaps even more disturbing for Seoul. Kim's regime has long relied on Chinese economic lifelines, but its military cooperation with Russia during the Ukraine war has elevated Pyongyang’s profile in the axis. Artillery shells shipped to Russia, missile technology exchanges and growing talk of joint exercises signal a return to Cold War-style bloc politics.

At the Beijing parade, North Korea’s attendance was symbolic confirmation that Pyongyang is no longer an isolated irritant, but part of a coordinated triangle with China and Russia. For South Korea, this means the North’s provocations cannot be seen in isolation — they are increasingly linked to a broader strategic design.

For South Korea, the message is unambiguous: Extended deterrence is under challenge not only from Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, but also from a coalition that includes Beijing and Moscow. For Japan, Chinese and Russian coordination threatens maritime security in the East China Sea and beyond. And for the United States, the parade was a direct reminder that its adversaries are aligning across continents.

The conclusion is clear: No single nation can face this alone. The Korea-Japan-U.S. alliance must deepen, expand and harden against the axis taking shape before our eyes. We must act now.

The first step should be a trilateral missile defense plan. North Korean and Chinese missiles cannot be countered piecemeal. Korea, Japan and the U.S. must create a fully integrated detection and interception network, with shared early warning and joint operational planning.

The next step should be coordinated sanctions enforcement. As North Korea funnels arms to Russia and receives advanced technologies in return, loopholes in sanctions regimes are widening. Only coordinated enforcement by Seoul, Tokyo and Washington can slow this dangerous exchange.

The third part is unified strategic messaging. The Beijing parade was theater designed to project inevitability. The allies must respond with their own coordinated narrative showing that aggression and coercion will be met by unity, not hesitation.

Finally, there must be expanded joint exercises. Russia, China and North Korea are already conducting combined drills and must be answered in kind, with regular trilateral exercises across air, sea, space and cyber domains.

For South Korea, deepening defense ties with Japan is politically contentious, but the alternative of facing China, Russia and North Korea in coordination would be far worse. For Japan, solidarity with Korea is no longer optional but existential. For the United States, sustaining credibility in Asia requires prioritizing resources and attention despite global distractions.

The authoritarian axis demonstrated in Beijing is no passing spectacle. It is a structural challenge to the order that has preserved peace in Asia for eight decades.

China’s parade was more than a show of military might. With Russia and North Korea visibly aligned with Beijing, it was a declaration of a new strategic axis intent on undermining the foundations of the international order.

For Korea, Japan and the United States, the lesson is unmistakable. Divided, they invite coercion. United, they can still deter. The parade was not just a warning — it was a call to action. The allies must answer it together, decisively and without delay.

Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.

​15. Detained U.S. permanent resident challenges ICE detention

Get some.

So at least one Korean was unlawfully arrested. I wonder what the statistics are on the 317? How many were in the correct immigration status? How many were permanent residents a sin this case. How many are dual Korean-American citizens? 

I wonder if there is an agreement between the ROK and US not to release those numbers because it would be embarrassing.

But to ICE these people were just pawns for filling a quota:

Excerpt:

Unverified reports suggest that some of the detained Koreans held valid work visas, and ICE was allegedly aware of this. The Guardian (UK) cited ICE documents obtained on the 10th, revealing that at least one detained Korean worker was lawfully residing and employed in the U.S., a fact acknowledged by authorities.

Detained U.S. permanent resident challenges ICE detention

Only one of 317 Koreans opts to stay and contest legality in court​

https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/09/12/XEV4MPVDYFHZRF5E7DCH6ARQJU/

By Lee Ka-young

Published 2025.09.12. 17:51

Updated 2025.09.12. 18:11

An employee detained during an immigration crackdown at the U.S. Hyundai Motor-LG Energy Solution battery plant construction site embraces family members waiting in the long-term parking lot after returning through Incheon International Airport Terminal 2 on the 12th. /Newsis

One of the Korean workers arrested and detained by U.S. immigration authorities has been identified as a U.S. permanent resident who decided to remain in detention locally. Among the 317 Korean nationals arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on the 4th of last month, 316 chose to voluntarily depart and returned to South Korea on the 12th.

The remaining Korean individual, a male, is reportedly preparing to challenge the detention legally while in custody. Unlike the majority of those arrested, who held Electronic Travel Authorization (ESTA) or short-term business (B-1) visas, this man is a U.S. permanent resident. It is also understood that his family resides in the U.S., making voluntary departure less advantageous.

Notably, the man is expected to contest the legality of the detention in court. Legal analysts suggest that opting against voluntary departure could be strategically favorable if pursuing litigation against the U.S. government. If proven that his activities fell within legally permitted boundaries and the ICE raid was unjust, he could potentially claim damages for unlawful arrest and detention. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated, “We will continue to provide necessary consular assistance.”

Unverified reports suggest that some of the detained Koreans held valid work visas, and ICE was allegedly aware of this. The Guardian (UK) cited ICE documents obtained on the 10th, revealing that at least one detained Korean worker was lawfully residing and employed in the U.S., a fact acknowledged by authorities.

※ This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com