Quotes of the Day:

"I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts." 

- John Locke

"Our lives are frittered away by detail; simplify, simplify." 

- Henry David Thoreau

"Wrong does not cease to be wrong because the majority share in it."

- Leo Tolstoy

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2023

2.  Congress Should Debate Now Whether We Defend Taiwan, Not on the Eve of Invasion By Bing West

3. China-Linked Hackers Breached a Power Grid—Again

4. DOD Releases 2023 Cyber Strategy Summary

5. In a US showdown with China, there are some missions with no special-operations 'easy button'

6. Will the West Abandon Ukraine?

7. Air Force Ranger Assessment Course (RAC) | SOF News

8. Hanoi’s American Hedge

9. The U.S is getting hacked. So the Pentagon is overhauling its approach to cyber.

10. American Universities Shouldn’t Cut All Ties With China

11. Opinion | President Biden should not run again in 2024

12. Pentagon-Funded Study Warns Dementia Among U.S. Officials Poses National Security Threat

13. My Encounters With a Suspected Spy

14. How Elon Musk become a power player in the Ukraine war

15. The Biodefense Posture Review Needs Focus to Succeed

16. If it doesn’t make you more lethal, ditch it, says top Army officer

17. Determining the True Extent of Terrorism’s Existential Threat

18. China, Russia will use cyber to sow chaos if war starts, Pentagon says

19. Who will be the president's top military adviser after Gen. Milley retires?

20. New DOD cyber strategy notes limits of digital deterrence

21. America’s Current Nuclear Arsenal Was Built for a More Benign World

22. After the Attack: A Playbook for Continuity of the Economy Planning and Implementation

23. President Biden’s Military Blockade

24. Chinese Warships Gather in Sign of Major Naval Exercises

25. Are Ukraine’s tactics working?

26. De-dollarization Dreams: Why the US Dollar Won’t Bow Out

27. How China’s Belt and Road Took Over the World

28. China unveils 'blueprint' for Taiwan integration while sending warships around the self-ruled island

29.U.S. military sends cyber team to 'hunt' foes from NATO ally next to Russia

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin’s inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1.
• These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term.
• Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum.
• North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Primorsky Krai on September 12 and will meet with Putin in the coming days, likely to discuss the provision of North Korean artillery munitions to Russia.
• Russian authorities have reportedly adjusted air defense systems around Moscow in light of recent increased drone strikes on the city, likely in part to assuage complaints in the Russian information space about the ineffectiveness of air defenses around the capital.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced in some areas on September 12.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 12 and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian officials introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma that would punish Russian servicemen fighting within volunteer armed formations for losing or deliberately destroying military equipment or supplies.
• Russian occupation officials continue to deport children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of recreational programs.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

Sep 12, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 12, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 12, 2023, 5pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin’s inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1. A Russian Telegram channel with alleged connections to Russian security sources claimed that select Russian officials are “seriously” preparing for a second wave of reserve mobilization and are hoping to conduct another reserve mobilization wave in the fall.[1] It is important to distinguish between Russia’s normal semi-annual conscription callup, a large-scale reserve mobilization like the one that brought more than 300,000 reservists into the Russian armed forces in Fall 2022, crypto-mobilizations that bring reservists into the force at lower numbers over a long period of time, and various efforts to encourage or coerce Russians to sign ostensibly voluntary contracts with the Russian military. The channel claimed that Russian officials want to mobilize between 170,000 to 175,000 reservists and move the fall conscription date from October 1 to November 1 to accommodate a reserve mobilization processes, while simultaneously conducting “contract mobilization” to recruit an additional 130,000 personnel for contract service using coercive measures.[2] The channel claimed that a powerful group of “siloviki hawks” is also proposing stricter reserve mobilization measures such as restricting certain individuals from obtaining mobilization deferrals, which has sparked major disagreements with officials in the Russian Presidential Administration. The channel claimed that the Presidential Administration fears a response to such measures from other Russian officials and broader Russian society.

These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term. ISW previously observed an increase in discussions about reserve mobilization preparations and speculations in the lead-up to the spring conscription cycle earlier in 2023.[3] Select Russian officials have also proposed more dramatic mobilization measures that have not materialized.[4] Putin also emphasized Russian contract service recruitment rates when responding to the question about the potential second reserve mobilization wave at the Eastern Economic Forum on September 12.[5] Putin’s response does not necessarily set information conditions to prepare Russian society for involuntary mobilization and instead may suggest his commitment to ongoing crypto mobilization practices. Any new reserve mobilization wave depends on Putin.[6]

Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed to produce concrete results and presented likely very inflated numbers of claimed Ukrainian personnel and equipment losses.[7] Putin also accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate and claimed that Russia cannot pursue an end to hostilities as long as Ukraine is pursuing a counteroffensive, thereby furthering a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to accuse Ukraine as being the party disinterested in negotiations in order to undermine Ukrainian battlefield successes and reduce international support for Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[8]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 12 and have reportedly advanced south of Bakhmut and Robotyne. Ukrainian military sources stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting active offensive operations near Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[9] The Ukrainian General Staff also stated that Ukrainian forces were additionally successful south and southeast of Robotyne (about 13km south of Orikhiv).[10] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun clarified that Ukrainian forces have advanced between 300-500 meters south and southeast of Robotyne.[11] The Ukrainian Military Media Center noted that Russian forces are increasingly pulling reserves from deep within Russian territory to the frontline in Ukraine out of fear of a Ukrainian breakthrough.[12]

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Primorsky Krai on September 12 and will meet with Putin in the coming days, likely to discuss the provision of North Korean artillery munitions to Russia. Kim met with Russian Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology Alexander Kozlov and Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako upon arriving in Russia.[13] Kim’s trip to Russia is his first known trip outside of North Korea since the COVID-19 pandemic.[14] ISW will continue to follow developments in the lead-up to the meeting and will report on the content of the meeting once it becomes available.

Russian authorities have reportedly adjusted air defense systems around Moscow in light of recent increased drone strikes on the city, likely in part to assuage complaints in the Russian information space about the ineffectiveness of air defenses around the capital. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) stated that Russian authorities have moved short and medium-range air defense systems, including Pantsir-S1 systems, to elevated positions around Moscow City to target drones.[15] The UK MoD noted that these adjustments are also likely meant to visibly demonstrate to the population that Russian authorities are taking steps to combat increasingly frequent drone strikes in the Russian rear, particularly in Moscow Oblast.[16] ISW has previously reported that Russian sources have complained about Moscow air defenses’ inability to stop such drone strikes, with some blaming Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and his administration directly.[17]

A car killed a Russian milblogger in occupied Donetsk City on September 11. Russian milblogger Gennady Dubovoy died after a car struck him as he crossed the road, and some other Russian milbloggers mourned Dubovoy’s death.[18] Dubovoy’s death comes amid an ongoing Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) campaign to censor Russian ultranationalist milbloggers whose narratives and complaints deviate too far from accepted official narratives.[19] Dubovoy has recently levied criticisms against the Russian government for its treatment of Russian combat veterans and former Wagner Group fighters, and recently stated that he took a step back from the ultranationalist information space due to demands to report on the “confirmation of your [referring to Russian officials] delusions.”[20] Dubovoy recently indicated that he is not a supporter of imprisoned ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin, whose supporters have recently been the targets of official and public censorship.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin’s inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1.
• These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term.
• Putin also reamplified several boilerplate information operations falsely framing the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed endeavor and accused Ukraine of being unwilling to negotiate during his address at the Eastern Economic Forum.
• North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Primorsky Krai on September 12 and will meet with Putin in the coming days, likely to discuss the provision of North Korean artillery munitions to Russia.
• Russian authorities have reportedly adjusted air defense systems around Moscow in light of recent increased drone strikes on the city, likely in part to assuage complaints in the Russian information space about the ineffectiveness of air defenses around the capital.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced in some areas on September 12.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 12 and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian officials introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma that would punish Russian servicemen fighting within volunteer armed formations for losing or deliberately destroying military equipment or supplies.
• Russian occupation officials continue to deport children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of recreational programs.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on September 12. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), south of Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna) and reported that fighting is ongoing near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) and in the directions of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces regularly attack in the forest area west of Kreminna.[23]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 12 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove).[24] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 11 that Russian forces also advanced near Synkivka and Petropavlivka.[25] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations east of the Oskil River (west of and parallel to the Svatove-Kreminna line) and advanced slightly in unspecified areas.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 12 that Russian forces continue attempts to break through Ukrainian defenses near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 12 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 11 and 12 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains north of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut) and southwest of Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive operations and advancing south of Bakhmut.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating in the center of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) where unspecified Chechen ”Akhmat” units previously held positions.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Mayorsk and west of Andriivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut).[31] A Russian news aggregator claimed on September 11 that Ukrainian forces entered Andriivka but that Russian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 12 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and Klishchiivka.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Kurdyumivka.[34] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz units are defending near Kurdyumivka and noted that the Russian defense of Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka is necessary in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from capturing Bakhmut.[35] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti claimed in an article published on September 12 that the “St. George” sabotage and reconnaissance volunteer brigade is defending along the Klishchiivka-Kurdyumivka-Andriivka line (7-13km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] Footage shot on September 11 purportedly shows elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment of the 106th VDV Division operating near Rozdolivka (15km northeast of Bakhmut).[37]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 12 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and Spartak and recaptured unspecified positions that Ukrainian forces had captured on September 11.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka).[40] Geolocated footage published on September 12 shows elements of the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Slavic” Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) defending north of Opytne.[41]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 12 and did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar confirmed that Ukrainian forces entered Opytne and that fighting is ongoing in the settlement.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control Opytne and that fighting is ongoing north of the settlement where Ukrainian forces control unspecified positions.[43] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Avdiivka.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not make confirmed advances on September 12. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack on the northwestern outskirts of Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on the morning of September 12.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted unsuccessful attacks on the Urozhaine-Staromayorske line (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekov claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian infantry attack north of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces went on the defensive in the area.[47]

Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on September 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks south of Novodarivka (13km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Staromayorske but did not specify an outcome.[49]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes south and southeast of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[50] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces advanced 300-500 meters south and southeast of Robotyne and near Novodanylivka (4km south of Orikhiv).[51] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne, Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[52] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the number of daily Ukrainian attacks on the Robotyne-Verbove line decreased as of September 11.[53]

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not advance on September 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled multiple Russian attacks near Robotyne.[54]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma that would punish Russian servicemen fighting within volunteer armed formations for losing or deliberately destroying military equipment or supplies.[55] Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Andrei Kartapalov and other deputies submitted the bill, which stipulates that volunteers do not currently bear financial responsibility for the loss or deliberate destruction of military property unlike Russian regular military personnel, despite receiving military equipment from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The bill is likely a part of the ongoing Russian effort to integrate Russian irregular armed formations into the Russian Armed Forces.

A Russian insider source claimed that deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin used to participate in the release of wealthy inmates and crime bosses from prison under the pretext that they would go fight in Ukraine.[56] The source claimed that wealthy and influential prisoners could purchase parole in return for claiming to participate in combat in Ukraine. The sources claimed that the market for parole purchases has seemingly shut down following Prigozhin’s death.

NOTE: Flightradar24 incorrectly reported that a Pouya Air aircraft flew to Russian-occupied Crimea on September 7.[57] This announcement changes ISW’s September 8 assessment that the aircraft was possibly transferring military materials and/or personnel to Russian positions in Crimea. Iran continues to supply Russia with military equipment via other routes, such as the Caspian Sea route, however.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to deport children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of recreational programs. A source affiliated with the Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced on September 12 that 37 children from the Skadovsk Raion of occupied Kherson Oblast went on a 21-day “recreational vacation” to the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic and will receive medical and psychological assistance at the “Rainbow” rehabilitation center.[59] The occupation source posted footage of the children accompanied by an individual in military uniform, suggesting that Russian security forces are overseeing such “trips.” ISW continues to assess that any removals of children from their homeland during the course of military conflicts by the occupying power is inherently coercive, and therefore inherently deportation and a violation of international law.[60]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarus appears to continue efforts to leverage the Wagner Group. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 12 that representatives of the Wagner Group taught tactical medicine classes as part of the ongoing “Voenkor-2023” special tactical exercises.[61] The Ukrainian Resistance Center additionally reported that former Wagner fighters who have recently joined the Belarusian “GardService” private military company (PMC) are signing contracts to deploy to an unspecified central African country to guard facilities and train local soldiers.[62]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Congress Should Debate Now Whether We Defend Taiwan, Not on the Eve of Invasion  By Bing West

Excerpts:

The correct setting for debate is Congress, where the Select Committee on China has capable, bipartisan leadership. The goal would be the passage of a congressional resolution to defend Taiwan. The White House will vigorously disagree. Xi will threaten economic excommunication. Lobbyists for the many corporations entangled with China will withhold campaign contributions. Fearful of losing Chinese students paying full tuition, professors and the intellectual elite will predict apocalypse.

The correct setting for debate is Congress, where the Select Committee on China has capable, bipartisan leadership. The goal would be the passage of a congressional resolution to defend Taiwan. The White House will vigorously disagree. Xi will threaten economic excommunication. Lobbyists for the many corporations entangled with China will withhold campaign contributions. Fearful of losing Chinese students paying full tuition, professors and the intellectual elite will predict apocalypse.Such hyperbole is unwarranted. Our steadfastness in NATO deterred the Soviet Union and led to its collapse. Similarly, if Congress declares the defense of Taiwan to be in our vital interest, Xi will not attack and ruin his country. We can lance this boil before it becomes poisonous. Trusting in the common sense of the American people, Congress should hold an open debate.

Congress Should Debate Now Whether We Defend Taiwan, Not on the Eve of Invasion

military.com · by 12 Sep 2023 Military.com | By Bing West · September 12, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

China is our economic, ideological and military adversary. The military flashpoint between our two countries is Taiwan, which China's Chairman Xi Jinping has sworn to seize.

Our current policy is to refuse to declare whether we will or will not defend Taiwan. In a speech in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson placed South Korea and Taiwan outside America's defensive perimeter. Months later, to protect South Korea, we had to fight a three-year war at a cost of 37,000 American lives. We now risk repeating that mistake by inviting China's miscalculation that we will not defend Taiwan.

In declaring that we will defend Taiwan, our values and our interests align, just as they do in our defense of Europe. For 248 years, American values have emphasized individual rights and freedom. The Taiwanese also identify as living in a democracy, willing to defend against totalitarian China.

As for our self-interest, if Taiwan falls, China will then control the western Pacific, including all seaborne trade with Japan, South Korea and others. No longer the world's dominant superpower, America will fall back to Guam and Hawaii. Losing in Vietnam and Afghanistan was humiliating; shirking in the face of Chinese aggression would be world-altering. It is in our vital interest not to be driven from the Pacific.

Nor can we stand aside and only provide aid, as in the case of Ukraine. If Taiwan is attacked, obviously military aid must be rushed to Taiwan. That would immediately entangle our transport ships and aircraft in the fight.

And what follows, once we are in the middle of the battle? It's impossible to predict how far that war would escalate. Unclassified wargames project at least tens of thousands of casualties on both sides. Assuming Japan joins in the fighting as an ally alongside the U.S., the Chinese assault would likely be defeated. With its ports blockaded by our submarines, China's economy would crumble. In sum, Xi would imperil China's entire future by attacking Taiwan, if America fought back.

Granted, our will as a nation is badly fractured. Dyspepsia defines our intellectual class. Courses on Western civilization have been dropped from our universities. Our history is frequently depicted as one of oppression. Our defense budget is not keeping pace with inflation, and our Navy is shrinking. Military recruiting is down. Faith in our institutions is plummeting. Due to foolish policies and fundamental political divisions, we lost the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Knowing our frailties, Xi will persist in pressuring Taiwan to dissolve from within, while employing military provocations to test America's martial resolve.

Do we have such resolve? Here's the surprising news: Despite our internal discord, three-quarters of Americans view China as our adversary. By 37% to 22%, Americans on a bipartisan basis believe we should militarily protect Taiwan, while the other 41% say they don't know enough to decide. That indecision invites either a miscalculation by Xi plunging us into war or, if we choose to be bystanders, the shameful retreat of America from the Pacific.

In the brief crisis window preceding an invasion, there will not be a reasoned debate whether we should fight. Xi, unleashing a torrent of disinformation, will thunder about nuclear perdition. The very word "nuclear" has prevented President Joe Biden from sending the appropriate military aid to Ukraine.

The time for open debate is now, not later when Xi is about to assault and rattles the sword of Armageddon to scare America into paralysis. Who, then, will inform the 41% of undecided Americans why Taiwan must not be abandoned? Most certainly not the White House. Biden cannot articulate coherent arguments.

"I just want to make sure we have a relationship with China that is on the up and up," he said last week. The phrase "up and up" is attractive but hollow.

Former President Donald Trump claims that promising to defend Taiwan would undercut his negotiating leverage with Xi, whom he admires. To Trump, values appear to be merely transactions -- Taiwan might be traded for lithium batteries. Under either man, the White House offers no bully pulpit for education about the stakes if we refuse to defend that island.

The correct setting for debate is Congress, where the Select Committee on China has capable, bipartisan leadership. The goal would be the passage of a congressional resolution to defend Taiwan. The White House will vigorously disagree. Xi will threaten economic excommunication. Lobbyists for the many corporations entangled with China will withhold campaign contributions. Fearful of losing Chinese students paying full tuition, professors and the intellectual elite will predict apocalypse.

Such hyperbole is unwarranted. Our steadfastness in NATO deterred the Soviet Union and led to its collapse. Similarly, if Congress declares the defense of Taiwan to be in our vital interest, Xi will not attack and ruin his country. We can lance this boil before it becomes poisonous. Trusting in the common sense of the American people, Congress should hold an open debate.

-- Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense for international security, has written a dozen books about America's wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

military.com · by 12 Sep 2023 Military.com | By Bing West · September 12, 2023

3. China-Linked Hackers Breached a Power Grid—Again

A review of Unrestricted Warfare might be warranted.

Excerpts:

Given this most recent Chinese grid breach, Hultquist argues it's now beginning to appear that some Chinese hacker teams may have a similar mission to that Berserk Bear group: to maintain access, plant the malware necessary for sabotage, and wait for the order to deliver the payload of that cyberattack at a strategic moment. And that mission means the hackers Symantec caught inside the unnamed Asian country's grid will almost certainly return, he says.

“They have to maintain access, which means they're probably going to go right back in there. They get caught, they retool, and they show up again,” says Hultquist. “The major factor here is their ability to just stay on target—until it's time to pull the trigger.”

ANDY GREENBERGSECURITYSEP 12, 2023 6:00 AM

China-Linked Hackers Breached a Power Grid—Again

Signs suggest the culprits worked within a notorious Chinese hacker group that may have also hacked Indian electric utilities years earlier.

Wired · by Condé Nast · September 12, 2023

The loose nexus of Chinese-origin cyberspies collectively called APT41 is known for carrying out some of the most brazen hacking schemes linked to China over the past decade. Its methods range from a spree of software supply chain attacks that planted malware in popular applications to a sideline in profit-focused cybercrime that went so far as to steal pandemic relief funds from the US government. Now, an apparent offshoot of the group appears to have turned its focus to another worrying category of target: power grids.

Today, researchers on the Threat Hunter Team at Broadcom-owned security firm Symantec revealed that a Chinese hacker group with connections to APT41, which Symantec is calling RedFly, breached the computer network of a national power grid in an Asian country—though Symantec has declined to name which country was targeted. The breach began in February of this year and persisted for at least six months as the hackers expanded their foothold throughout the IT network of the country's national electric utility, though it's not clear how close the hackers came to gaining the ability to disrupt power generation or transmission.

The unnamed country whose grid was targeted in the breach was one that China would “have an interest in from a strategic perspective,” hints Dick O'Brien, a principal intelligence analyst on Symantec's research team. O'Brien notes that Symantec doesn't have direct evidence that the hackers were focused on sabotaging the country's grid, and says it's possible they were merely carrying out espionage. But other researchers at security firm Mandiant point to clues that these hackers may be the same ones that had been previously discovered targeting electrical utilities in India. And given recent warnings about China's hackers breaching power grid networks in US states and in Guam—and specifically laying the groundwork to cause blackouts there—O'Brien warns there's reason to believe China may be doing the same in this case.

“There are all sorts of reasons for attacking critical national infrastructure targets,” says O'Brien. “But you always have to wonder if one [reason] is to be able to retain a disruptive capability. I'm not saying they would use it. But if there are tensions between the two countries, you can push the button.”

Symantec's discovery comes on the heels of warnings from Microsoft and US agencies including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) that a different Chinese state-sponsored hacking group known as Volt Typhoon had penetrated US electric utilities, including in the US territory of Guam—perhaps laying the groundwork for cyberattacks in the event of a conflict, such as a military confrontation over Taiwan. The New York Times later reported that government officials were particularly concerned that the malware had been placed in those networks to create the ability to cut power to US military bases.

In fact, fears of a renewed Chinese interest in hacking power grids stretch back to two years ago, when cybersecurity firm Recorded Future warned in February 2021 that Chinese state-sponsored hackers had placed malware in power grid networks in neighboring India—as well as railways and seaport networks—in the midst of a border dispute between the two countries. Recorded Future wrote at the time that the breach appeared to be aimed at gaining the ability to cause blackouts in India, though the firm said it wasn't clear whether the tactic was designed to send a message to India or to gain a practical capability in advance of military conflict, or both.

Some evidence suggests the 2021 India-focused hacking campaign and the new power grid breach identified by Symantec were both carried out by the same team of hackers with links to the broad umbrella group of Chinese state-sponsored spies known as APT41, which is sometimes called Wicked Panda or Barium. Symantec notes that the hackers whose grid-hacking intrusion it tracked used a piece of malware known as ShadowPad, which was deployed by an APT41 subgroup in 2017 to infect machines in a supply chain attack that corrupted code distributed by networking software firm NetSarang and in several incidents since then. In 2020, five alleged members of APT41 were indicted and identified as working for a contractor for China's Ministry of State Security known as Chengdu 404. But even just last year, the US Secret Service warned that hackers within APT41 had stolen millions in US Covid-19 relief funds, a rare instance of state-sponsored cybercrime targeting another government.

Although Symantec didn't link the grid-hacking group it's calling RedFly to any specific subgroup of APT41, researchers at cybersecurity firm Mandiant point out that both the RedFly breach and the years-earlier Indian grid-hacking campaign used the same domain as a command-and-control server for their malware: Websencl.com. That suggests the RedFly group may in fact be tied to both cases of grid hacking, says John Hultquist, who leads threat intelligence at Mandiant. (Given that Symantec wouldn't name the Asian country whose grid RedFly targeted, Hultquist adds that it may in fact be India again.)

More broadly, Hultquist sees the RedFly breach as a troubling sign that China is shifting its focus toward more aggressive targeting of critical infrastructure like power grids. For years, China largely focused its state-sponsored hacking on espionage, even as other nations like Russia and Iran have attempted to breach electrical utilities in apparent attempts to plant malware capable of triggering tactical blackouts. The Russian military intelligence group Sandworm, for example, has attempted to cause three blackouts in Ukraine—two of which succeeded. Another Russian group tied to its FSB intelligence agency known as Berserk Bear has repeatedly breached the US power grid to gain a similar capability, but without ever attempting to cause a disruption.

Given this most recent Chinese grid breach, Hultquist argues it's now beginning to appear that some Chinese hacker teams may have a similar mission to that Berserk Bear group: to maintain access, plant the malware necessary for sabotage, and wait for the order to deliver the payload of that cyberattack at a strategic moment. And that mission means the hackers Symantec caught inside the unnamed Asian country's grid will almost certainly return, he says.

“They have to maintain access, which means they're probably going to go right back in there. They get caught, they retool, and they show up again,” says Hultquist. “The major factor here is their ability to just stay on target—until it's time to pull the trigger.”

Wired · by Condé Nast · September 12, 2023

4. DOD Releases 2023 Cyber Strategy Summary

The 24 page Cyber Strategy Summary can be accessed at this link: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/12/2003299076/-1/-1/1/2023_DOD_Cyber_Strategy_Summary.PDF

DOD Releases 2023 Cyber Strategy Summary

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Today, the Department of Defense (DOD) released an unclassified summary of its classified 2023 Cyber Strategy.

The 2023 DOD Cyber Strategy, which DOD transmitted to Congress in May, is the baseline document for how the Department is operationalizing the priorities of the 2022 National Security Strategy, 2022 National Defense Strategy, and the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy. It builds upon the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy and will set a new strategic direction for the Department.

"This strategy draws on lessons learned from years of conducting cyber operations and our close observation of how cyber has been used in the Russia-Ukraine war," Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb said. "It has driven home the need to work closely with our allies, partners, and industry to make sure we have the right cyber capabilities, cyber security, and cyber resilience to help deter conflict, and to fight and win if deterrence fails."

The United States faces diverse, growing threats in cyberspace and the strategy outlines how DOD is maximizing its cyber capabilities in support of integrated deterrence and employing cyberspace operations in concert with other instruments of national power.

The strategy highlights DOD’s actions to invest in and ensure the defense, availability, reliability, and resilience of its cyber networks and infrastructure to support non-DOD agencies in their related roles and to protect the defense industrial base.

"Distinct from previous iterations, the strategy commits to increasing our collective cyber resilience by building the cyber capability of allies and partners." Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cyber Policy Mieke Eoyang said. "It also reflects the department’s approach to defending the homeland through the cyber domain as well as prioritizing the integration of cyber capabilities into our traditional warfighting capabilities."

The strategy is the fourth iteration for the Department, and the first to be informed by years of significant cyberspace operations. You can read the full summary on Defense.gov.

Publication: 2023 DOD Cyber Strategy

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5. In a US showdown with China, there are some missions with no special-operations 'easy button'

Unfortunately Dr. Ucko's article is at this link but behind a paywall: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2023.2219701?journalCode=rusi20

Dr.Ucko is exactly right in that SOF is uniquely suited for activities in the gray zone of strategic competition as well as playing a key supporting role in major combat operations.

I think if you only look at SOF from the perspective of or through the lens of Afghanistan and Iraq you will tend to overlook the true DNA of SOF and in particular Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs. SOF has always been about more than violence and preparation for combat.

As an example the two SOF trinities are (https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/two-special-operations-trinities): 

Number One:

• Irregular warfare
• Unconventional warfare
• Support to political warfare

Number Two:

• Influence
• Governance
• Support to indigenous forces and population

These were practiced by SOF throughout the GWOT and to include in areas outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Four good points here from Professor Ucko. I would offer my Eight Points of Irregular Warfare from 2018 to complement the Professor's here: https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html

Also in regards to the third and fourth points LTG Cleveland and Daniel Egel offer specific recommendations in The American Way of Irregular Warfare: An Analytic Memoir here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA301-1.htmlhttps://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA301-1.html

And in regards to point three and as well Professor Ucko's comments on the importance of political warfare, I also recommend this: An American Way of Political Warfare

A Proposal (by Charles T. Cleveland, Ryan C. Crocker, Daniel Egel, Andrew Liepman, David Maxwell)  https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE304.html

Excerpts:

Ucko writes that strategic competition requires more than violence and preparation for combat — at which commandos excel — and that political warfare is also a key element, making four main arguments about how to get the most out of special-operations forces.

First, the US special-operations community should consolidate its core strengths, particularly irregular warfare, which is "highly relevant" to strategic competition with China.Ucko writes that strategic competition requires more than violence and preparation for combat — at which commandos excel — and that political warfare is also a key element, making four main arguments about how to get the most out of special-operations forces.

First, the US special-operations community should consolidate its core strengths, particularly irregular warfare, which is "highly relevant" to strategic competition with China.

Second, outside of tasks related to irregular warfare, restraint is warranted because of "inevitable limits on SOF's bandwidth, the trade-offs inherent to adding more to an already full plate, and the nature of the competition, which in most respects remains a non-military phenomenon."

Third, other US agencies also need to take a role in irregular warfare, which Ucko says is "fundamentally about legitimacy, politics and blended lines of effort and so cannot be left to what is, after all, a military force – no matter how special."

Finally, US leaders should clarify what the country is competing over and why to avoid what Ucko describes as "opacity" about objectives that can lead to "a lack of focus and prioritisation."Finally, US leaders should clarify what the country is competing over and why to avoid what Ucko describes as "opacity" about objectives that can lead to "a lack of focus and prioritisation."

But I have to call out this error in history. It was the CIA, Special Forces, and US Airpower that led the way in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. Yes Delta and the Rangers participated and did important work but the Taliban were ousted primarily by the Northern Alliance and other indigenous forces advised by the CIA and Special Forces with the support of US airpower. And in terms of Iraq we should specially recognize the 10th Special Forces Group in northern Iraq organizing and advising some 50,000 Kurd/Pershmerga forces that had to take the place of 4th ID who could not get into northern Iraq to the political decision by Turkey to deny use of its territory.

More recently, Delta Force and US Army Rangers led the way into Afghanistan, and Delta Force, US Army Green Berets and Psychological Operations soldiers, and the British Special Boat Service teamed up with Kurdish fighters to tie down several Iraqi divisions and prevent them from responding to the US invasion of southern Iraq in 2003.

HOME  MILITARY & DEFENSE

In a US showdown with China, there are some missions with no special-operations 'easy button'

Stavros Atlamazoglou Sep 11, 2023, 5:37 PM EDT

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

A competitor in the US Army Special Operations Command International Sniper Competition at Fort Bragg in North Carolina in March 2022.US Army/K. Kassens

• Special-operations forces have been a centerpiece of US military operations for two decades.
• As the US focuses on competition with China, those forces will take on a new set of missions.
• US leaders should remember that special operators aren't suited for some tasks, one expert says.

For two decades, US policymakers have relied on special-operations forces to tackle the hardest missions.

And for a good reason: US special-operations units have a history of achieving outcomes on the battlefield out of proportion to their relatively small size and budget.

But in an era of strategic competition with China, there are some missions with no special-ops "easy button," according to David Ucko, a professor and expert on irregular warfare.

The limits of SOF

An Afghan special-forces soldier and a US Special Forces soldier during a firefight with insurgents in Afghanistan's Ghazni province in February 2014.Pfc. David Devich/US Army

In an article in the journal of the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank, Ucko argues that as US special-operations forces shift from two decades of mostly low-intensity fighting against terrorist groups and insurgents, US leaders need to focus on using those forces for missions within their competencies.

Ucko writes that strategic competition requires more than violence and preparation for combat — at which commandos excel — and that political warfare is also a key element, making four main arguments about how to get the most out of special-operations forces.

First, the US special-operations community should consolidate its core strengths, particularly irregular warfare, which is "highly relevant" to strategic competition with China.

Second, outside of tasks related to irregular warfare, restraint is warranted because of "inevitable limits on SOF's bandwidth, the trade-offs inherent to adding more to an already full plate, and the nature of the competition, which in most respects remains a non-military phenomenon."

US Air Force Special Tactics operators tandem hoist into a CV-22B Osprey during an exercise near RAF Mildenhall on April 15, 2021.US Air Force/Tech. Sgt. Westin Warburton

Third, other US agencies also need to take a role in irregular warfare, which Ucko says is "fundamentally about legitimacy, politics and blended lines of effort and so cannot be left to what is, after all, a military force – no matter how special."

Finally, US leaders should clarify what the country is competing over and why to avoid what Ucko describes as "opacity" about objectives that can lead to "a lack of focus and prioritisation."

Irregular warfare is indeed highly relevant to the strategic competition with near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia. It allows the US military to shape the operational environment to its liking before any shots are fired. But irregular warfare includes more than military force and can take a whole-of-nation effort to maximize its effectiveness.

"As SOF establishes its remit in boosting resilience and resistance, it must be careful not to veer into civilian realms where other agencies should lead," Ucko warns.

Soldiers in the Psychological Operations Qualification Course at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in North Carolina in June 2021.US Army/K. Kassens

Indeed, in strategic competition, the departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and intelligence agencies can often be more effective in certain tasks than the military.

Among the tasks that Ucko says have no "SOF easy button" are addressing local corruption that allows Chinese political infiltration, thwarting Russian efforts to undermine elections, or reviewing suspect foreign investments.

In addition, Ucko argues that special operators are a valuable force that can't be saddled with missions just because they can do them. US military special-operations units already struggle to retain personnel, many of whom have been driven away by frequent deployments.

Ucko also highlights the dual nature of a lot of special-operations mission sets, such as foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare.

US Navy SEALs train with Philippine Navy special-operations and Australian army special-operations troops in Palawan in April 2022.US Marine Corps/Sgt. Mario A. Ramirez

While foreign internal defense "traditionally meant aiding a friendly government against an insurgency," US special-operations forces now look at it as a way "to boost a country's 'resilience' against foreign-sponsored proxies, modes of disinformation or political infiltration," Ucko writes.

In unconventional warfare, commandos usually sponsor an insurgency against an "illicit or occupying government," but they can also increase the resistance capabilities of countries under attack or at risk of invasion, like Ukraine or Taiwan.

While those two missions are relevant to competition with Russia and China, they are also demanding and will require US special-operations forces to "rebalance" after 20 years of counterinsurgency and focus on a different set of skills, such as language ability and cultural awareness, which has implications for special-ops recruiting and training, Ucko writes.

Different wars, different missions

A US Army Green Beret with Philippine National Police and Coast Guard special-operations personnel in Palawan in May 2022.US Army/Sgt. 1st Class Jared N. Gehmann

Special operators can be quite effective in large-scale conventional conflicts if they are employed according to their strengths, and they have proven that time and again.

In North Africa in World War II, British SAS and Commonwealth Long Range Desert Group commandos harassed Axis troops, destroying more of their aircraft on the ground in raids than the Allied air forces could shoot down. SAS and LRDG reconnaissance also enabled the Allies' overall victory during that phase of the war.

US Army Delta Force and British SAS troops earned praise for hunting Scud missiles in the desert during the Gulf war, helping prevent Iraq from expanding that conflict.

More recently, Delta Force and US Army Rangers led the way into Afghanistan, and Delta Force, US Army Green Berets and Psychological Operations soldiers, and the British Special Boat Service teamed up with Kurdish fighters to tie down several Iraqi divisions and prevent them from responding to the US invasion of southern Iraq in 2003.

While that history shows that special operators can shape the course of a large-scale conflict, US leaders should remember that there are still limits on what those troops can do in a major war.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

6. Will the West Abandon Ukraine?

Excerpts:

As the conflict lingers, Ukraine will have to adapt its narrative of the war for Western publics. Instead of a quick and decisive victory, as many had hoped for when the summer counteroffensive was first launched, Kyiv will need to explain the endgame of a prolonged war, which remains the survival of Ukraine. Otherwise, a feeling of detachment could take hold, especially if the war shifts increasingly to Russian territory through drone strikes or other kinds of attacks. Even though they may be necessary for Ukrainian self-defense and morale, such attacks could become politically costly if they contribute to “both-sides-ism” in Western debates.

In 2015, after the worst of the fighting in eastern Ukraine ended after a flawed cease-fire deal, the cardinal error of the West was to lose interest. Somehow the crisis was supposed to take care of itself. From this, Putin learned what he took to be an essential truth about the fickleness of Western leaders. Going forward, Europe and the United States must keep demonstrating that Putin drew the wrong conclusion. The containment of Russia and the preservation of Ukrainian sovereignty are first-order Western interests. They should not depend on images of horrific violence, on constant media attention, or on the charisma of any one Ukrainian politician. Western indifference and impatience are Putin’s ultimate weapons in this war. Without them, he faces a strategic dead end.

Will the West Abandon Ukraine?

Kyiv Must Prepare for a Possible Change of Heart in America and Europe

By Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage

September 12, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · September 12, 2023

When Russia annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014, Kyiv had many supporters. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States sought the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty through sanctions on Russia and through diplomacy, but they refused direct military involvement. Only belatedly did they provide lethal military assistance—not until 2019, in Washington’s case.

By late February of 2022, however, as Russia amassed its forces on the Ukrainian border, that reluctance had mostly melted away. The brutal invasion that followed, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s charismatic leadership, generated a first round of Western military and financial aid. Ukraine’s stunning battlefield successes in September and October 2022 opened the door to even more ambitious support.

A coalition of the world’s wealthiest and most technologically advanced countries gives Ukraine a major structural advantage. Russia, by contrast, has only two countries—Iran and North Korea—openly assisting it with its war, although China has been both an important economic backstop to the Kremlin’s war effort and a provider of nonlethal military aid. Yet Western military support comes with its own risks and challenges. One is Ukraine’s extreme dependence on Western military and financial assistance. Ukraine’s army has shifted away from the aging infrastructure and antiquated doctrines that defined it during the post-Soviet era, becoming heavily reliant on Western equipment and strategic planning. Meanwhile, Russia is waging war on Ukraine’s economy, which would struggle to function without international help.

Continued Western commitment to Ukraine cannot be guaranteed. Political constituencies in Europe and the United States are questioning long-term support for Ukraine. So far, such voices remain in the minority, but they are multiplying and becoming louder. The promotion of openly pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian views remains a political rarity. Instead, skepticism tends to emerge from long-running domestic political debates. In the United States, the war in Ukraine has become the latest flash point in the fight over how much Americans should care about (and spend on) supporting overseas partners and allies. In Europe, the COVID-19 pandemic and high inflation in the wake of the war have exerted economic pressure. Optimism about Ukraine’s success has begun to waver, leading to uneasiness about a major, open-ended war on European soil.

Meanwhile, developments on the frontlines—especially the relatively slow pace and modest gains of the counteroffensive Ukraine launched earlier this summer—have emboldened skeptics of Western support for Kyiv. Even if the counteroffensive picks up steam, it will not end the war anytime soon. Ukraine’s advocates do not have a clear, agreed-on theory of victory, which presents a political liability. Outside Ukraine, stories other than the war now dominate the news. The longer the conflict continues, the more the David and Goliath struggle of its early days will fade into the background, fueling a perception of futility and bolstering calls to find at least a cosmetic solution.

The main risk for Ukraine is less an abrupt political shift in the West than the slow unraveling of a carefully woven web of foreign assistance. If a sudden shift does occur, however, it will start in the United States, where the basic direction of U.S. foreign policy will be on the ballot in November 2024. Given the peril even a gradual loss of support would pose, not to mention a sudden break, the Ukrainian government should diversify its outreach across the political spectrum, adapting its appeals for help to the prospect of a drawn-out war. Meanwhile, political leaders in the United States and Europe should do what they can to entrench financial and military assistance to Ukraine in long-term budgetary cycles, making the aid more difficult for future officials to unwind.

FAIR-WEATHER FRIENDS?

In Europe, the United States is a source of anxiety, the possible weak link in the transatlantic chain. Ironically, European countries foster the same anxiety in Washington. Undiminished devotion to Ukraine characterizes the governments of Finland, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Baltic states. Fears that a far-right government would reverse Italy’s course on Ukraine have proved unfounded. Instead, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has reaffirmed the West’s course. Given how unpopular Putin’s war is in France, even the main French opposition figure, the far-right populist Marine Le Pen—who has historically been supportive of Putin and even approved of the annexation of Crimea in 2014—has stuck with her earlier denunciation of the full-scale invasion. She does, however, oppose sanctions and heavy weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Hungary remains an outlier, an EU and NATO member that is clearly unenthusiastic about Ukraine’s cause. In exchange for not breaking a Brussels consensus that favors sanctioning Russia, Hungary has extracted many concessions from the EU. So far, that has been enough to keep Prime Minister Viktor Orban on board.

Staunch European support seems unlikely to buckle soon. According to a June survey by Eurobarometer, 64 percent of EU residents support financing the purchase and supply of military equipment to Ukraine, ranging from 30 percent in Bulgaria to 93 percent in Sweden. No European party that advocates an openly pro-Russian agenda has been able to build a sustainable electoral coalition. Indeed, many European publics have become more supportive of the EU and NATO since the war began.

Nevertheless, a kind of fatigue is taking its toll on Europe. The best example of this can be found in Germany, which has survived an energy bottleneck caused by the war and accepted a million Ukrainian refugees while gradually increasing its assistance to Ukraine. As with the pandemic, it is the long arc of the crisis that engenders frustration: high energy prices, a recession, concerns about deindustrialization and a dysfunctional governing coalition have brought about a malaise, which has benefited the far-right party Alternative for Germany. Polling now places the AfD as Germany’s second-strongest party. It wants to withdraw Germany from NATO and halt support for Ukraine, but the party’s popularity does not stem from its pro-Russian views. The AfD exploits general discontent to make its critique of Germany’s Atlanticist foreign policy seem more mainstream.

To Europeans, the longer the war continues, the more it could seem intractable and costly, more a vehicle for U.S. power than a core European interest. Since support for the war is the status quo position in Europe, entrepreneurial politicians could focus on the home front and blame elites in capital cities and Brussels for caring more about Ukraine than about their own populations. For example, a popular left-wing German member of parliament, Sahra Wagenknecht, recently compared support for Ukraine to a bottomless pit, while the federal budget is being cut in all other areas. Such views could easily become more common in Europe, and their proponents would not need to furnish a viable alternative policy; they need not even speak the truth. It would not take a particularly skilled demagogue to persuade those Europeans enduring economic pressures that an easy end to the war is available and that ending it would deliver them from their woes, such as high inflation.

The main risk for Ukraine is the slow unraveling of a carefully woven web of foreign assistance.

The wildcard in the war is the United States. In recent polls, President Joe Biden is either behind former President Donald Trump or even with him. Trump’s return would likely be a calamity for Ukraine. As president, Trump treated Ukraine as an appendage of his reelection campaign and attempted to strongarm Zelensky into damaging the reputation of Biden, Trump’s main rival at the time. According to The New York Times, several times in 2018 Trump privately proposed withdrawing the United States from NATO in the presence of senior administration officials. He never followed through on the idea. But to judge from his rhetoric on the campaign trail, he seems determined to go even further in breaking with established norms and traditions if he returns to the White House. And in recent months, Trump has suggested that he could end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. Such campaign bluster suggests that Trump would prefer a negotiated settlement to the conflict (most likely on Russian terms) to the steady continuation of aid and assistance to Ukraine.

Trump may not become the Republican nominee. It is striking, however, that among the other candidates, the two with the highest poll numbers, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and the entrepreneur Vivek Ramaswamy, are the most dismissive of Ukraine. The Reaganite wing of the Republican Party—which supports a robust defense of allied democracies and includes figures such as former Vice President Mike Pence and Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky—remains well represented on Capitol Hill and in Washington think tanks. But among the Republican primary electorate, that vision is falling flat. The GOP base sees China as a far greater threat than Russia, and many Republicans see a tradeoff between supporting Ukraine and addressing domestic problems. According to a poll released by Gallup in June, 50 percent of Republicans believe that Washington is overdoing its support for Ukraine, up from 43 percent at the beginning of the war. Forty-nine percent of Republicans prefer to end the conflict quickly, even if doing so would allow Russia to keep captured territory.

“We’re going out of our way to use U.S. military resources to defend an invasion of someone else’s border when we’re doing absolutely nothing to stop the cartel-aided invasion across our own southern border right here at home,” Ramaswamy wrote last month, repeating a refrain that has become commonplace in conservative U.S. media. That argument, which may be facile and xenophobic, has a strong intuitive appeal for many Republicans and conservatives. It likely resonates with many independents and even some Democrats and progressives.

COMMITMENT ISSUES

The curtailment of Western support for Ukraine would not end the war. No Western country is actively fighting in Ukraine, and despite the pivotal role of Western arms and money, it has been Ukraine’s war from the outset. It is Ukrainians who have demonstrated extraordinary valor and made extraordinary sacrifices. With or without Western partnership, Ukraine would face the same predicament: an adversary that does not accept the existence of the Ukrainian nation or the legitimacy of Ukrainian culture or Ukrainian language, and that has given itself license to attack civilians—with horrific consequences. Ukraine must contend with this adversary however it can. Until there are new leaders in the Kremlin, Ukraine has no choice but to resist Russia by force.

Without Western backing, Ukraine would face two dilemmas. One would be the challenge of fighting the war if Western materiel became either more expensive, less forthcoming, or both. Ukrainian soldiers have devoted considerable time to training on Western equipment. Ukrainian strategists have benefited enormously from the targeting help and the intelligence sharing they receive from the United States and from other countries. Internet access on the battlefield often goes through Starlink, through technology that the U.S.-based tech entrepreneur Elon Musk provided free of charge for a while (apparently with restrictions) and that, more recently, the Pentagon has decided to pay for. If Europe or the United States (or both) were to cut off Ukraine, it would amount to an incalculable loss of military prowess.

The other dilemma would extend beyond Ukraine. Western support for Ukraine and Russian self-perception are deeply intertwined. Putin’s invasion was not just a wager that Ukraine would fall and that Russia could then control or partition the country. It was a wager about the West and in particular about the United States—which, months before the invasion, had finally cut its losses in Afghanistan after a long, difficult war. Putin was betting against the strategic acumen and patience of the United States—and that of NATO, by extension. Were the United States and fellow NATO members to lose patience in Ukraine, the Kremlin might well declare the war a strategic triumph even if Russia remained mired in conflict in Ukraine, and it might be seen globally as a triumph for Moscow.

Should support for Ukraine fade in Europe but not in the United States, Russia would pursue a divide-and-conquer approach. It might propose a faux negotiated settlement, a pause in the fighting, or poison-pill diplomacy of the kind that Russia practiced in 2014 and 2015, when it gave the impression of being open to compromise but was in fact seeking to dominate Ukraine. The idea would be to drive a wedge between some European governments and Washington and between western Europe and eastern Europe. A Europe at odds with the United States and a Europe at odds with itself would be an excellent playing field for Russian efforts (through manipulation and espionage) to normalize the absorption of Ukrainian territory into Russia. Should U.S. support and leadership hold, however, Ukraine will have a strong foundation. It would be impossible for western Europe to reach out to Russia or to negotiate an agreement with Russia over Ukraine’s head were the United States to oppose this outcome.

A loss of support from the United States, and not in Europe, would have a more dramatic effect. EU members and institutions have now committed almost double the United States’ total aid for Ukraine (financial, military, and humanitarian), via multiyear packages. But U.S. military commitments match all of the EU’s combined military pledges for Ukraine. Europe cannot substitute for U.S. military assistance on such a large scale, and it would struggle to fill the leadership gap. If the United States tried to force a negotiated settlement on Ukraine, Europeans would have little capacity to resist. A myopic or rushed settlement would imperil Ukraine’s security and the security of Europe alike. In Russia’s eyes, such a settlement might demonstrate a diminishing U.S. commitment to Europe’s security writ large.

PUTIN’S SECRET WEAPON

Ukraine has little leverage over the domestic politics of its wartime partners. Although no one could make a better case for Ukraine than Zelensky has, public opinion and elections in Europe or the United States will follow a logic internal to these countries. The Ukrainian government should cultivate relationships with political figures and parties that are not strongly in Ukraine’s camp, including parties on the far left and the far right, much as the Ukrainian government has developed ties with China during the war, despite China’s proximity to Russia. In this manner, Kyiv can work against the political polarization that risks eroding support for Ukraine.

When Zelensky came to power in 2019, he was almost immediately caught up in political machinations from Washington—but survived to lead his country when it needed him most. He is skilled at not aligning himself too closely with any one political party. To political constituencies not yet convinced about supporting the war, such as left-wing parties in Germany, far-right ones in France, and surging populist parties in countries such as Slovakia, Zelensky should emphasize the enormous military and economic costs a Russian victory in Ukraine would impose on the individual countries of the West, not least from the massive wave of migrants it would produce.

In Washington and in European capitals, support for Ukraine cannot be set in stone. All foreign policy choices should be put to the test of elections, but some priorities can be safeguarded. Financial support and security guarantees for Ukraine can be included in legislation and embedded in far-sighted budgets. In the EU, for example, the European Commission has proposed allocating more than $50 billion to Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, and modernization for 2024–27. Brussels and EU member states should expand these multiyear pledges well into the future.

Ukraine has little leverage over the domestic politics of its wartime partners.

No single election, even the 2024 presidential election in the United States, is a life-or-death referendum on Western policy: Trump campaigned in 2016 on a rapprochement with Russia and ended up sending lethal aid to Ukraine. The separation of powers and the recurrence of elections are themselves democratic protections against worst-case scenarios. Regardless of whether the status quo holds in the West, officials must continually and imaginatively make the case for helping Ukraine.

As the conflict lingers, Ukraine will have to adapt its narrative of the war for Western publics. Instead of a quick and decisive victory, as many had hoped for when the summer counteroffensive was first launched, Kyiv will need to explain the endgame of a prolonged war, which remains the survival of Ukraine. Otherwise, a feeling of detachment could take hold, especially if the war shifts increasingly to Russian territory through drone strikes or other kinds of attacks. Even though they may be necessary for Ukrainian self-defense and morale, such attacks could become politically costly if they contribute to “both-sides-ism” in Western debates.

In 2015, after the worst of the fighting in eastern Ukraine ended after a flawed cease-fire deal, the cardinal error of the West was to lose interest. Somehow the crisis was supposed to take care of itself. From this, Putin learned what he took to be an essential truth about the fickleness of Western leaders. Going forward, Europe and the United States must keep demonstrating that Putin drew the wrong conclusion. The containment of Russia and the preservation of Ukrainian sovereignty are first-order Western interests. They should not depend on images of horrific violence, on constant media attention, or on the charisma of any one Ukrainian politician. Western indifference and impatience are Putin’s ultimate weapons in this war. Without them, he faces a strategic dead end.

• LIANA FIX is a Fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations.
• MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Nonresident Senior Associate in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio.

Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · September 12, 2023

7. Air Force Ranger Assessment Course (RAC) | SOF News

Air Force Ranger Assessment Course (RAC) | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · September 12, 2023

By Hailey Haux.

Better leaders up and down the chain, commissioned and non-commissioned; that’s what the Air and Space Force will get when Airmen and Guardians are sent to the Ranger Assessment Course (RAC).

As a commander and supervisor, wouldn’t you want those kinds of highly motivated, trained and dedicated Airmen on your team? It all begins with supporting them and sending them through the RAC.

Recently, 15 Airmen, 15 Soldiers and one Guardian put that thought to the test during a Ranger Assessment Course, the Air Forces’ version of the Army’s Small Unit Ranger Tactics, or SURT. The Air Force RAC is a 19-day course designed to assess the physical and mental toughness of Airmen and Guardians who are interested in attending Army Ranger School.

“Ranger school is the Department of Defense’s premier combat leadership school, there’s really no better reason to go through a school than that,” said U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Luciano Rosano, RAC Instructor. “Some leaders are born, some leaders are made, some leaders are forged through fire. Whether you graduate or not, everyone comes out of school with a different perspective on life.”

While going through the Ranger Assessment Course, the students learned skills such as battle drills, land navigation, and small unit tactics like ambushes which ultimately led to an understanding of combat leadership, followership, troop leading procedures, communication skills, accountability, performance under stress, intestinal fortitude and much more.

“Integrity first, service before self, excellence in all we do, and character, connection, commitment and courage,” said Gabriel Rodriguez, Readiness Training and Ranger Assessment Course program manager. “These are the Air and Space Force’s core values respectively; the principles that help guide decision making and vector to take a path toward mission accomplishment are the same. No matter what you’re wearing on your uniform, it all ties into being united and growing together as one interconnected force on the same mission in protecting our country.”

The Airmen, Soldiers and Guardian worked together throughout the course, further reinforcing the need to understand what it’s like to operate in a joint environment and in turn how to better support one another once they return to their respective units.

For the Guardian, his every-day job is developing satellite communications tools for warfighters. During this course, he was able to get first-hand exposure to those communications tools and how they work out in the field.

“One of the biggest challenges that I think I’ve faced in my work back home is we design a system that doesn’t meet the intent of the warfighter, and that comes from a lack of communication and a lack of understanding,” said U.S. Space Force Capt. Daniel Reynolds, RAC student coming from the 4th Test and Evaluation Squadron out of Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. “At courses like this we take individuals who are working in space, and we get them together with individuals who are the tip of the spear, executing these missions, engaging the enemy face-to-face. That’s where we learn how to design better systems and capabilities.”

The National Defense Strategy identifies four top-level priorities that the Department of Defense must pursue to strengthen deterrence, and the fourth priority is, “to ensure our future military advantage, we will build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.”

“In the joint environment we all have the same mission, so maintaining the relationships and unit cohesion with all my teammates—Soldiers, Guardians, Airmen, etc.—is crucial so that whenever we work together—now or in the future—it goes smooth,” said U.S. Air Force 1st Lt. John Aldaco, RAC student coming from the 820th Base Defense Group out of Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. “These are all my teammates around me, and they are crucial to success in this course and will be crucial all the way through Ranger School and beyond.”

Truly representing a joint force, there were service members from numerous Air and Space Force Specialty Codes and Army Military Occupational Specialties in the RAC. It ranged from Army infantry to Air Force medics a Space Force developmental engineer, and included career fields like engineer officer, military police, contracting, security forces and others.

“Being here, they are learning how to operate in a joint environment,” said U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Douglas Brock, RAC Instructor “These Airmen—and Guardian—are exposed to working alongside their Army counterparts; learning how to lead service members to fight onto an objective and complete the mission. The benefits of this course, as well as Ranger School, are increased mental and physical toughness, enhanced leadership skills, broader knowledge of military operations and a huge sense of accomplishment.”

While going through the RAC, students not only learned about the technical tactics, but they also conducted physical training and ruck marches to prepare them for the requirements at Ranger School. During the Ranger Assessment Phase week at Ranger School, students are required to complete 49 push-ups, 59 sit-ups, a five-mile run in 40 minutes, and six chin-ups. RAP week is culminated with a 12-mile foot march with each student carrying an average load of 35 pounds. After the RAP, – which lasts four days – generally, only two-thirds of the class will make it to the patrolling phase, or Darby Phase.

“I’ve really enjoyed seeing the hunger in the Airmen and their eagerness to succeed because the Air and Space Forces don’t get very many Ranger School slots every year, so they have to be incredibly competitive and willing to push themselves to get those slots,” said U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Bryan Dabous, Lightning Academy Small Unit Ranger Tactics Instructor. “Ranger School is a leadership school, and it puts people in extremely stressful conditions. They teach them and they evaluate them, then those graduates go out and become leaders. If they are able to operate and lead in the most difficult conditions, they will be able to operate anytime, anywhere—ground, air, space, etc.”

Of the 31 total candidates that started the RAC, 19 completed the course and 15 met all the standards needed for a recommendation to go to Ranger School where their determination and grit will be put to the test and hopefully earn that coveted tab stating that they are Ranger qualified.

For Airmen and Guardians, earning their Ranger tab may be harder to come by, but that shouldn’t stop them—or commanders—from putting their hat in the ring. Since 1955 when the Air Force first began sending Airmen to Ranger School, a little more than 350 Airmen have graduated, and returned to their units with more knowledge and experience in leading. Those 350 Ranger Qualified Airmen were able to teach what they learned to those within their units, making the Air Force even better as a whole.

“Airmen and Guardians while at Ranger School will be exposed to a combat environment facing stressors like sleep and food deprivation, extreme weather conditions, and the stress of succeeding the course,” said U.S. Air Force Capt. Daniel Mack, RAC Instructor. “Anyone can lead in good conditions, but can you lead when you are hungry, tired, and fatigued? Additionally, can you get others to perform when they are in the same conditions? Completing the course or not, Airmen and Guardians go back to the Air and Space Force as a better leader.”

As an Airman or Guardian, if you are thinking that Ranger School is just out of reach, you may just be wrong—you might have what it takes and they only thing to do is give it a try!

One of the many misconceptions of the RAC and Ranger School is that you must be 100% ready before you even attend the Ranger Assessment Course—but that’s where most people are wrong. Yes, you need to prepare for it, but according to U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Keegan Donnelly, RAC instructor, the RAC curriculum has undergone an intense review and rewrite to craft a leadership laboratory. It has been designed in such a way where they teach and coach the students then assess their abilities which has proven to be a more digestible approach for the Airmen and Guardians wishing to attend. Regardless of their recommendation to move onto Ranger or not, they are still returning to their units a better trained and more lethal. adaptable leader in the joint arena.

“The amount of discipline, wide range of experiences and learning how to manage stress and find your best self is really good for anyone who wants to take this on,” said U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Oliver Ancans, RAC student coming from the 354th Contracting Squadron out of Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. “Ranger School is a leadership school so getting the opportunity to go through it, learn and grow from it and then passing down the knowledge and discipline is important.”

Right now, the Air Force is heavily focused on Agile Combat Employment and Multi Capable Airmen. These concepts empower Airmen and Guardians who go through the Ranger Assessment Course, Ranger School, and become Ranger qualified to understand any mission and can assess and execute any task; anytime, anywhere.

“The NDS and the demands of warfare with a peer competitor can pose different challenges which being Ranger qualified makes Airmen or Guardians diverse in the foundational skills that enable them to succeed in a contested, degraded and operationally limited environment with minimal support,” said Rodriguez. “ACE teams consist of multi capable airmen able to provide mission control and base operating support as the mission dictates. By minimizing the footprint of personnel, Ranger qualified Air Force members can increase survivability and complicate adversary targets. Ranger school and RAC already bring all types of AFSCs and U.S. Army MOSs together to accomplish the same mission supporting higher headquarters’ guidance. Each member brings a different specialty, trained to meet the adversary all while trained under arduous conditions similar to those of combat.”

Being Ranger qualified means that those Airmen and Guardians are trained in a wide range of skills indicative to ACE and MCA such as land navigation, small unit tactics, reconnaissance, etc.

“A Ranger qualified individual has a reputation for being highly motivated and highly disciplined,” said Rodriguez. “This makes them well-suited for the demanding tasks that are often associated with MCA and ACE missions. This sense of camaraderie can be invaluable in the high-pressure environment of an MCA or ACE mission. When they work together, they can accomplish anything.”

While navigating their way through the RAC, the Airmen, Guardian, and Soldiers were looked after by a team of joint force medics—further displaying how integrated the Air Force is with its Army counterparts.

“It’s important to share the workload, integrate with our joint service members and share our different experiences,” said U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Aubrey Rowe, 15th Wing Operational Medical Readiness Squadron Independent Duty Medical Technician. “I’ve really enjoyed being part of this joint team and building the trust between us as medics, the instructors, and the students. Over our time here, we’ve been able to learn from each other in order to protect the health and safety of the students.”

One thing commanders can be sure of if they send their Airmen and Guardians to the Ranger Assessment Course is that it’s a valuable tool for identifying and developing future leaders, and it builds unit cohesion by having the diversity of training and talent within their ranks.

“Wearing the Ranger tab, to me, means embodying the idea that you are expected to face adversity, danger, and difficulty for yourself and those that you lead or work alongside. That you have a unique personality trait of choosing to face any challenge head-on and under any unknown terms,” said Rodriguez. “Someone who will do all they can to help others no matter the cost. A team player that leaves no one behind, and shares what they have. They will endure hardship, injury, and danger to accomplish the mission. Someone who doesn’t give up!”

Ranger Creed

Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and high esprit-de-corps of the Rangers.

Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite Soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move further, faster and fight harder than any other Soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong, and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task, whatever it may be, one hundred percent and then some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well-trained Soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, neatness of dress, and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow.

Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor.

Rangers Lead The Way!

**********

This story by Tech. Sgt. Hailey Haux was first published on August 30, 2023, by the Defense Information Visual Distribution Service. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Photo: Ranger Assessment Course students run up the largest hill—known as Big Ivan—May 23, 2023, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. During the course the Airmen, Soldiers and Guardian worked together, further reinforcing the need to understand what it’s like to work in a joint environment and in turn how to better support one another once they return to their respective units. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Hailey Haux)

sof.news · by SOF News · September 12, 2023

8. Hanoi’s American Hedge

Excerpts:

The United States has much to offer Vietnam. By helping build up the country’s industrial know-how and supporting the growth and diversification of its economy, Washington can expand Hanoi’s options for resisting Chinese coercion. Technology transfer and training, including expanding Vietnam’s capacity in maritime surveillance, are of particular interest to Vietnamese officials. Hanoi has ambitious plans to stake out a more important position in global supply chains, especially when it comes to semiconductors, and the United States and its allies can help Vietnam achieve that goal. Indeed, along with the joint U.S.-Vietnamese announcement of the new elevated partnership, the two countries have launched substantive plans for technology investment, education and research, and other initiatives aimed at building Vietnam’s digital labor force. Notably, Biden was accompanied on his visit by the executives of top American chip-making and tech companies, suggesting that these industries will be a significant focus of future bilateral cooperation.

For its part, the United States is interested in Vietnam chiefly in the context of its competition with China, but there could also be important economic advantages. For example, Vietnam’s defense industry is becoming a significant international player, including as a supplier of semiconductors, defense equipment, and training for both sides in the war in Ukraine. This sector is of interest to the United States, as well. Last December, Vietnam organized its first-ever defense exposition, where it signaled a strong desire to expand its range of international suppliers and boost its own indigenous production. U.S. contractors Lockheed Martin and Raytheon had a strong presence at the expo. Given that the U.S. embargo on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam, in place since the Vietnam War, was lifted only in 2016, this development is remarkable.

Is the entente between Washington and Hanoi sustainable? The answer truly depends on how hard China pushes. For now, the Vietnamese leadership is doing its best to make up for its lack of a formal security alliance while taking care to avoid overcommitment. Hanoi is thereby turning the country’s vulnerability into a strength by maintaining relations with both China and the United States and even benefiting from their competition. If that balance continues to hold, Vietnam may become a model for other countries in the region increasingly caught between two powerful rivals.

Hanoi’s American Hedge

Why a New U.S. Partnership Is Unlikely to Change Vietnam’s Multialignment Strategy

By Huong Le Thu

September 12, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Huong Le Thu · September 12, 2023

On September 10, U.S. President Joe Biden traveled to Hanoi to announce a historic agreement with Vietnam’s Communist leader, Nguyen Phu Trong. Despite the relatively recent establishment of ties between the United States and Vietnam, the two countries have jointly agreed to elevate their existing relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” an arrangement that Vietnam reserves for only a handful of close partners.

To many observers, the visit signals the culmination of the Southeast Asian country’s growing strategic alignment with Washington. Marking ten years since the two countries entered a lower level of cooperation (what the Vietnamese refer to as a “comprehensive partnership”), the new arrangement gives the United States a central position in Vietnam’s security policy. The announcement also shows the extent to which China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific has pushed these former foes closer together.

Indeed, U.S.-Vietnamese relations have come a long way since the countries normalized ties in 1995. After fighting one of the bloodiest conflicts since World War II, the two countries have now elevated their relations to the highest level possible, at least according to Vietnam’s hierarchy. And despite being governed by dramatically different political systems—Vietnam is still a one-party, communist state—Washington and Hanoi have also begun to cooperate on a wide range of issues, such as semiconductors, clean energy, and public health. Given China’s growing pressure on Vietnam, including limiting its access to the South China Sea, a growing security alliance with the United States may seem particularly advantageous to the Vietnamese leadership.

Yet it is far too simplistic to assume that Vietnam is choosing to align with the United States. For one thing, although Vietnam reserves its comprehensive strategic partnerships for a select group of countries, that list also includes China, India, Russia, and South Korea. And it maintains other levels of partnerships with many other states. In fact, such complex and multilayered ties—including with countries that are themselves rivals—is characteristic of Vietnam’s approach. The government has long sought to align itself with multiple countries rather than a single power. At the same time, for Vietnam, it is no secret that China is both an obstacle to and an impetus for enhanced security ties with the United States. Getting too close to Washington too soon could be seen as a provocation to Beijing and would likely invite some form of retaliation that Hanoi seeks to avoid.

In this sense, Vietnam’s agreement with the Biden administration should be seen as an important step forward in bilateral ties, bringing enormous benefits to Hanoi. But it is not an arrangement that is likely to change the Vietnamese government’s fundamental orientation. Rather than choosing between the United States and China, Hanoi sees itself as reinforcing its omnidirectional foreign policy in which it strives to keep equidistant from both. Elevating the relationship with the United States is just another part of that master plan.

FOES INTO FRIENDS

That Vietnam and the United States have come this far is a significant achievement. Vietnamese political elites had long resisted such a deal. For a long time, even after the normalization of ties nearly three decades ago, they remained suspicious of Washington and its intentions toward the Vietnamese Communist Party, which has ruled the unified country since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Well into the twenty-first century, Hanoi considered the threat of democratic change, or what in Vietnam is referred to as “peaceful evolution” —potentially instigated with the support of the United States and any remaining sympathizers of the fallen South Vietnamese regime—as one of its top national security threats.

Over the past decade, however, successive U.S. administrations have reassured the Vietnamese that the United States respects Vietnam’s right to self-determination and has no intention of meddling in its internal politics. In 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in an attempt to reach a breakthrough with North Korea, highlighted Vietnam as a model for how to open up and modernize while remaining communist, and in 2019, Hanoi hosted the second summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Although the talks with Pyongyang were short-lived, the spotlight placed on Vietnam reassured the country’s leaders not only that Washington accepted their regime but also that it sufficiently trusted them to serve as honest brokers for these difficult negotiations.

Vietnam is arguably more exposed to China than any other country.

Geopolitical changes in Southeast Asia have also provided an important catalyst. In sharing a land border with China and having a long coastline on the South China Sea, Vietnam is arguably more exposed to Beijing’s growing assertiveness than any other country in the region, especially given that Vietnam has no formal external defense guarantees. China’s flouting of international maritime law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, its refusal to play by the rules, and its penchant for flexing its military muscles have alarmed Hanoi. Along with China’s failure to recognize a 2016 ruling of a UN court of arbitration dismissing the historical basis for Chinese claims in the South China Sea, Beijing has militarized artificial islands in the disputed waters, used maritime militia to menace Vietnamese fishing vessels and Vietnam’s coast guard, and frequently obstructed Vietnam’s ability to exercise economic rights within its Exclusive Economic Zone.

Among China’s most recent provocations was its release in late August of a new “standard map” showing that most of the South China Sea belongs to China, in defiance of the 2016 UN ruling. In early September, in what was seen as a warning from Beijing regarding Biden’s upcoming visit to Vietnam, the Chinese coast guard used water cannons against Vietnamese fishing boats operating in the vicinity of the disputed Paracel Islands, over which China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim sovereignty. China has also used its dams upstream on the Mekong River to significantly restrict Vietnam’s water supply. And Beijing is vastly expanding Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base to create what analysts suggest could be a major overseas installation for the Chinese navy. Assertive moves such as these have rankled Hanoi, making it feel doubly squeezed—on sea and land—by its giant neighbor.

Amid these tensions, both the Trump and Biden administrations set out to enhance relations with Vietnam. In fact, it was in Vietnam, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang in 2017, that Trump for the first time articulated the United States’ “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept, which seeks to formalize the sovereign rights of independent states in the region and limit coercive behavior by Beijing and which became a prelude to the Indo-Pacific strategy, which the Biden Administration has further developed. Trump’s remarks referring to Vietnam’s proud history of independence and sovereignty and to its current struggles with China over maritime claims were received in Hanoi as an unequivocal expression of U.S. support.

SEA CHANGE ON CHINA

A shared perception of the Chinese threat now anchors U.S.-Vietnamese relations. Under Trump, the United States also went through a drastic transformation in its attitude toward China. In the final six months of Trump’s presidency, the State Department departed from its policy of not taking sides in the claimants’ disputes in the South China Sea and issued statements explicitly rejecting China’s claims, condemning its coercive actions toward Vietnam, and affirming Hanoi’s sovereign rights to exploit natural resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone.

Paradoxically, although Trump’s disregard for a more traditional values-based foreign policy may have been detrimental to U.S. relations with democratic allies and partners, it assisted the rapprochement between Washington and Hanoi, making it easier for the two sides to come together despite major differences in their respective norms, values, and political systems. This convergence has evidently deepened under the Biden administration, and a rare bipartisan consensus has emerged regarding China. In July 2021, the Biden administration made its first cabinet-level visit to Southeast Asia when Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin traveled to the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. Two of those countries were natural destinations: the United States has extensive defense commitments with its formal treaty ally, the Philippines, and Singapore has long been its most important security partner in the region. Vietnam, however, stood out, particularly given that Thailand, Washington’s other partner in the region, and Indonesia, the region’s largest player, were not given a similar level of attention.

When Biden skipped the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Jakarta in September and attended only the G-20 in India and then headed to Vietnam for a bilateral visit, it said a great deal about the importance Washington now places on Hanoi. And although other regional capitals may take it as another U.S. snub to ASEAN and its multilateral gatherings, for the Vietnamese, this prioritization is a sign of prestige. In formal speeches, U.S. officials stress that they are not pressuring governments in the region to choose sides. Yet by proactively strengthening bilateral ties with countries such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam while downplaying multilateral gatherings that include China, Washington itself seems to have made a choice: it is working with those that it finds like-minded in regard to strategic competition with Beijing.

Washington and Hanoi have come together despite vast political differences.

In some respects, Washington’s new understanding with Vietnam has extended to other issues. For example, it has helped both countries address the lingering wounds of the Vietnam War. Traditionally, Vietnamese foreign policy elites have been more receptive to engagement with the United States, whereas the country’s defense establishment has been more resistant, given the personal experience of many of its members who fought in the war and for whom the legacy of the war holds greater importance. In the memorandum of understanding signed during Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit in 2021, the United States promised to help search for Vietnamese soldiers listed as missing in action, reciprocating for years of Vietnam’s help in finding lost American soldiers and repatriating their remains since the normalization of ties in 1995. As recently as 2018, and despite strong advocacy from Vietnamese and international humanitarian groups, the United States was reluctant to help clear unexploded ordnance, land mines, and Agent Orange residue in Vietnam that has contaminated the land and devastated peoples’ health. This breakthrough signals that the Biden administration understands the importance these issues have for advancing future security cooperation.

The rapprochement has had other effects, as well. The vaccines that the United States and its partners donated to Vietnam since 2021 were instrumental for the country as it struggled to cope with the outbreak of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus. Washington is building a sprawling new embassy in Hanoi at a cost of $1.2 billion, making it the most expensive U.S. diplomatic complex in the world. The United States has become Vietnam’s top export market (to the point that it has left the United States with an awkward $116 billion trade deficit, as of 2022). And as the U.S.-Chinese trade war has intensified, Vietnam has become a popular destination for multinational corporations seeking to leave China. Notably, a number of large technology companies, including Apple, Dell, Google, Microsoft, and others, have invested in Vietnam in recent years. Conversely, Vietnam’s biggest outbound business investment so far has been in the United States, with VinFast, a Vietnamese electric vehicle maker, announcing in 2022 that it would invest a stunning $6.5 billion in a manufacturing complex in North Carolina.

Nonetheless, China still enjoys respect from Vietnam’s political leaders. In October 2022, despite a general reluctance to travel and lingering health issues, Trong ventured to China to become one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate the Chinese leader Xi Jinping on his third term in office. And as security negotiations with Washington have progressed, Hanoi has been careful to avoid provoking Beijing. In what appears to be an attempt to downplay the significance of the new comprehensive strategic partnership with the United States and double down on its multialignment policy, Vietnam has signaled its intentions to elevate its relations with Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore to the same status in recent weeks.

BALANCING, WITH BENEFITS

Vietnam’s deepening security cooperation with the United States certainly marks an important turning point for both countries and will be especially important in managing its power asymmetry with China. But it does not suggest that Hanoi is abandoning formal opposition to military alliances and to hosting foreign bases—two of the key prohibitions in its Four Nos policy, articulated in its defense white paper in 2019. Hanoi will always seek to make sure that it is not solely dependent on the United States and that Washington is not its only choice. Not only it is seeking to balance between the United States and China; Vietnam also maintains good—and, when it comes to defense contracts, cosy—relations with Russia, even since its illegal invasion of Ukraine. So it would be a mistake to interpret the new U.S. agreement as a prelude to Vietnam joining a Washington-centered block to collectively contain China. Rather than taking sides in the current U.S.-Chinese tensions, Vietnam will always choose Vietnam. Still, Washington can support Vietnam in ways that also serve U.S. interests.

The United States has much to offer Vietnam. By helping build up the country’s industrial know-how and supporting the growth and diversification of its economy, Washington can expand Hanoi’s options for resisting Chinese coercion. Technology transfer and training, including expanding Vietnam’s capacity in maritime surveillance, are of particular interest to Vietnamese officials. Hanoi has ambitious plans to stake out a more important position in global supply chains, especially when it comes to semiconductors, and the United States and its allies can help Vietnam achieve that goal. Indeed, along with the joint U.S.-Vietnamese announcement of the new elevated partnership, the two countries have launched substantive plans for technology investment, education and research, and other initiatives aimed at building Vietnam’s digital labor force. Notably, Biden was accompanied on his visit by the executives of top American chip-making and tech companies, suggesting that these industries will be a significant focus of future bilateral cooperation.

For its part, the United States is interested in Vietnam chiefly in the context of its competition with China, but there could also be important economic advantages. For example, Vietnam’s defense industry is becoming a significant international player, including as a supplier of semiconductors, defense equipment, and training for both sides in the war in Ukraine. This sector is of interest to the United States, as well. Last December, Vietnam organized its first-ever defense exposition, where it signaled a strong desire to expand its range of international suppliers and boost its own indigenous production. U.S. contractors Lockheed Martin and Raytheon had a strong presence at the expo. Given that the U.S. embargo on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam, in place since the Vietnam War, was lifted only in 2016, this development is remarkable.

Is the entente between Washington and Hanoi sustainable? The answer truly depends on how hard China pushes. For now, the Vietnamese leadership is doing its best to make up for its lack of a formal security alliance while taking care to avoid overcommitment. Hanoi is thereby turning the country’s vulnerability into a strength by maintaining relations with both China and the United States and even benefiting from their competition. If that balance continues to hold, Vietnam may become a model for other countries in the region increasingly caught between two powerful rivals.

• HUONG LE THU is a Nonresident Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Foreign Affairs · by Huong Le Thu · September 12, 2023

9. The U.S is getting hacked. So the Pentagon is overhauling its approach to cyber.

Excerpts:

Pentagon officials acknowledge that they’re taking on big tasks despite having limited resources and personnel. DOD has struggled to hire and retain cybersecurity personnel in a highly competitive market.

“How to most effectively use our limited offensive cyber resources continues to be an area that still needs a bit of maturation,” Moore said.

Some argue that the Pentagon should be focusing more on solving that problem, such as pushing for the creation of a Cyber Force — a new branch of the military at the level of the Navy or Space Force — that would be responsible for manning, training and equipping personnel, and would likely involve a major boost to DOD cyber personnel, funding and attention. DOD has studied the idea, and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) proposed language in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act to require a study of whether a Cyber Force is needed at the Pentagon.

“At least they acknowledge they need institutional reforms,” Montgomery said, referring to the changes coming in the new strategy. But, he said, the chance of carrying them out without a fundamental restructuring to include a Cyber Force is unlikely.

“The good news is they are absolutely doing a good job at expanding their definition of who is in the defense industrial base and inside the tent,” Montgomery said.

The U.S is getting hacked. So the Pentagon is overhauling its approach to cyber.

By MAGGIE MILLER and LARA SELIGMAN

09/12/2023 10:32 AM EDT

Politico

The new approach to cybersecurity comes following attacks on critical U.S. companies and federal agencies, and as the Pentagon eyes Chinese hacking efforts with increasing concern.

DOD had always left handling cyberattacks on private entities to law enforcement, said Cyber Command head Gen. Paul Nakasone. Colonial Pipeline got the Pentagon to rethink that. | Jose Luis Magana/AP Photo

09/12/2023 10:32 AM EDT

A series of high-profile cyberattacks from Russia, China and criminal networks in recent years have served as a wake up call to the Defense Department that cyberwarfare has changed.

And that reckoning has forced one of its most secretive branches — U.S. Cyber Command — to come to an unusual conclusion: Going it alone is no longer an option.

Hackers are increasingly infiltrating private companies and government agencies far outside the Pentagon’s usual purview, and the hacks are being perpetrated by cybercriminals who honed their strategies abroad before striking the United States.

So Pentagon leaders have started opening up communications with other federal agencies and the private sector on cyber threats to elections and other critical systems, and increasing assistance to foreign allies. They’ve codified the changes in a new cybersecurity strategy viewed by POLITICO that is set to be released Tuesday.

It’s “a more calibrated thinking about cyber, and realistic thinking about cyber,” said Mieke Eoyang, DOD deputy assistant secretary for cyber policy, in an interview ahead of the strategy rollout.

It’s also a big bet for a Defense Department that already has a shortage of cybersecurity-trained personnel and isn’t used to sharing key intelligence outside agency walls. And if it doesn’t work, the U.S. could find itself spread thin in its efforts to keep up with increasingly sophisticated and savvy digital adversaries.

But those familiar with Pentagon cyber operations say opening up is the only way to keep up.

For decades, the Pentagon focused its Cyber Command defense operations on protecting U.S. military networks from cyberattacks. But that left openings for other infiltrations — those at civilian government agencies and ransomware cyberattacks in which criminals shut down the networks of private businesses essential to the U.S. economy and demand payments to hand back control.

“DOD’s cyber strategy was extremely reactive in nature and led U.S. Cyber Command to really only be prepared to help recover from a cyber event and to develop capabilities that would only be used during war,” said Lt. Gen. Charlie Moore, who served as deputy commander of Cyber Command from 2020 to 2022. “During those days, I would frustratingly refer to Cyber Command as the ‘clean up on Aisle 6’ and ‘break glass in time of war’ command.”

But during Moore’s tenure, the increasing number and variety of cyber strikes garnered wider attention. In December 2020, the U.S. discovered that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the networks of at least a dozen federal agencies in what became known as the SolarWinds hack. In 2021, a ransomware strike on Colonial Pipeline forced the shutdown of the line that provided around half the East Coast’s gas supply.

Ransomware attacks later in the year on meat producer JBS Foods and on IT management group Kaseya, both linked to Russian-based cybercriminal groups, added to the sense throughout the government and the country that the U.S. didn’t have the cyber defenses it needed.

“2021, this is the inflection point for the nation in cyberspace, this is when cybersecurity became national security,” said Gen. Paul Nakasone, head of both the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, in an interview at the NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Md.

The Colonial Pipeline hack showed a particular gap. It was carried out by a cybercriminal group on a private business — a company the federal government did not directly protect — and involved a major disruption to daily life.

DOD had always left such ransomware attacks to law enforcement agencies to handle, Nakasone said. Colonial Pipeline got the Pentagon to rethink that.

“This is for our Department of Defense. This is how we have to defend our nation,” he said.

The Biden administration has since buckled down on working with critical infrastructure owners and operators to enhance security for sectors including water, the electric grid and oil and gas pipelines.

DOD is now aiming to tighten these bonds with the private sector— which controls almost 90 percent of all critical U.S. networks — by providing more resources and intelligence to those companies, according to the strategy.

Rather than merely asking companies to share information about breaches after they’d occurred, DOD started saying to companies: “‘we owe you actionable intelligence, and you will defend the networks yourselves,’” said Eoyang, the deputy assistant secretary.

At the same time, DOD has been slowly increasing its joint cyber operations with allies — a shift for a branch that previously focused its foreign operations on defending its own networks against attackers.

The document highlights DOD’s increased cooperation with partners such as Ukraine and others — and promises more ahead.

Cyber Command first started deploying “hunt forward” teams — which travel to allied nations to check critical networks for vulnerabilities — after revelations of Russian attempts to spread divisive content online ahead of the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. The idea was to look for ways that Russia or other adversaries could interfere in foreign nations, and both assist partners in preventing this and learn lessons to bring home.

At the time, Nakasone “told CyberCom, ‘if you want to know what Russia is doing in cyberspace, go to Ukraine, because that is where they are extremely active,’” Moore said.

Ukraine was one of the first countries to receive such teams, said Moore, adding that the missions were “extremely successful.” The teams brought back information about Moscow’s tactics in cyber warfare, plans for interference in the elections and actual Russian malware.

Since then, Cyber Command has conducted dozens of hunt forward operations around the world, including in Estonia, Lithuania, Albania and Latvia. The teams normally comprise eight to 10 people from the command’s Cyber National Mission Force, now headed up by Maj. Gen. Joe Hartman, and are deployed at the request of the partner nation.

“It provides us insights on what our adversaries are doing so we can secure our own networks,” Nakasone said.

Cyber Command deployed a hunt forward team to Ukraine again in December 2021 — just weeks before Russia began launching cyberattacks on Kyiv’s networks ahead of its full-scale invasion in February. Sitting side-by-side with Ukrainian cyber professionals, the team hunted for malicious activity on Kyiv’s networks until they left in February.

The team has continued to work remotely with the Ukrainian cyber forces from the U.S., said Holly Baroody, executive director of Cyber Command.

“Because we’re developing that relationship, where we have a team on the ground and they’re actually being able to exchange information, what we’ve started to find is that there’s a willingness to share other cyber threat information even beyond the networks that we’re hunting on,” Baroody said.

But putting more resources into hunt forward operations could take away from efforts to “fight and win the nation’s wars,” according to retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, now senior director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’s Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation.

Cyber Command is also taking its fight more into the public sphere, such as through calling out “malicious” cyber activities by China. This pointed language is a marked shift from the last strategy in 2018, which only called out China in regards to hacking operations to steal U.S. intellectual property and its larger “strategic threat.”

It states that in a conflict, the Chinese government “likely intends to launch destructive cyberattacks against the U.S. Homeland,” following similar warnings from other top officials in recent months.

“China represents to us an order of magnitude different challenge than the others,” Eoyang said, noting that China can “limit our operational capability.”

As recently as July, it was revealed that China-linked hackers had breached emails of officials at the State and Commerce departments.

The strategy also highlights the Pentagon’s own offensive cyber activities, a rare acknowledgement that DOD conducts such operations. The strategy states that “our adversaries will be made to doubt the efficacy of their military capabilities as well as the belief that they can conduct unattributed coercive actions against the United States.”

The new strategy will face a major test next year with the U.S. presidential elections. Nakasone said DOD is forming an “election security group” with personnel from the NSA and Cyber Command, and is also working with “foreign partners,” the private sector and academia.

Further work with other federal agencies and private sector groups, such as social media platforms, to protect elections is also in the works, he added.

Pentagon officials acknowledge that they’re taking on big tasks despite having limited resources and personnel. DOD has struggled to hire and retain cybersecurity personnel in a highly competitive market.

“How to most effectively use our limited offensive cyber resources continues to be an area that still needs a bit of maturation,” Moore said.

Some argue that the Pentagon should be focusing more on solving that problem, such as pushing for the creation of a Cyber Force — a new branch of the military at the level of the Navy or Space Force — that would be responsible for manning, training and equipping personnel, and would likely involve a major boost to DOD cyber personnel, funding and attention. DOD has studied the idea, and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) proposed language in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act to require a study of whether a Cyber Force is needed at the Pentagon.

“At least they acknowledge they need institutional reforms,” Montgomery said, referring to the changes coming in the new strategy. But, he said, the chance of carrying them out without a fundamental restructuring to include a Cyber Force is unlikely.

“The good news is they are absolutely doing a good job at expanding their definition of who is in the defense industrial base and inside the tent,” Montgomery said.

POLITICO

Politico

10. American Universities Shouldn’t Cut All Ties With China

Is this conclusion a fact, an assumption, a possibility, or a hope?

Conclusion:

Universities are uniquely able to build bridges through education, research, and joint problem-solving. Because they employ the shared common language of science and scholarship, at moments when dialogue seems to be impossible, they are sometimes the only institutions still able to build those bridges. American universities should accept and embrace the responsibility to build them, despite the political headwinds.

American Universities Shouldn’t Cut All Ties With China

Why Academic Links Are Essential in a Fragmenting World

By L. Rafael Reif

September 13, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by L. Rafael Reif · September 13, 2023

Since the United States and China reopened diplomatic relations in the late 1970s, the leaders of both countries have recognized the value of having their universities work together in research and education, to promote prosperity and friendship. Today, however, U.S. policymakers are so concerned about the potential transfer of advances in science and technology from American university laboratories to China that, step by step, sometimes intentionally, sometimes inadvertently, they are discouraging academic exchanges. Research papers authored jointly by U.S. and Chinese scientists fell in 2021 for the first time in decades, the number of American scientists of Chinese descent leaving the United States for China has ticked upward, and surveys of Chinese students thinking of studying abroad suggest that the United States is becoming a less desirable destination for many of them.

In late August, the U.S. government continued to signal its wariness about academic engagements with China by waiting until the last minute to renew the landmark U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, which dates back to 1979. The agreement commits each country to encouraging contacts between their people and organizations, and paves the way for joint research and the exchange of scientists and students. The Biden administration has extended it for only another six months, and some lawmakers on Capitol Hill would like to see it expire.

Although China clearly pursues its own interests when working alongside the United States in scientific explorations, maintaining connections between the two countries’ scientists may be more important than ever. The Beijing-Washington relationship has deteriorated into something akin to a new Cold War, setting up a dangerous rivalry that could damage both countries, and the world. Universities can contribute to stabilizing this relationship without increasing the United States’ vulnerability to Chinese espionage or other efforts to benefit unduly from U.S. research—as long as they do not underestimate the risks posed by engaging with their counterparts based in a rival nation. But universities—and the U.S. government—should avoid exaggerating the risks, as well.

BRIDGING THE GAP

Universities have often played an important role in lowering international tensions and encouraging mutual understanding. Even during the most fraught periods of the Cold War, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union saw reasons to cooperate in academic science. The Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement of 1958 authorized the exchange of delegations of professors between Columbia University and Moscow University and between Harvard University and Leningrad University. The deal also charged the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences with promoting a broader series of visits. Eighteen years after these exchanges began, a panel led by MIT economist Carl Kaysen found that the academy-sponsored program had been a “striking, even spectacular” success in forging links between the two countries’ scientists, in helping the United States learn about Soviet capabilities in science and technology, and in improving relations between the two superpowers.

Of course, there are important differences between U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War and U.S.-Chinese relations today. The United States was not particularly tied to the Soviet Union economically, but it is to China, which means that economic concerns and national security concerns are far more intertwined than they were during the Cold War. And today, many more technologies are dual use, with both commercial and military applications. This overlap complicates the question of which fields of research are too sensitive to allow for collaboration. Despite these differences, there is still reason to believe that academic exchanges can help people transcend their national narratives and find common ground in the pursuit of scientific truth.

BRAIN GAIN

One of the most important ways that American universities promote mutual understanding between countries—while also advancing U.S. interests—is by educating students from around the world. More international students come to the United States than to any other country, with China and India the top foreign sources of U.S. students. As is often noted, the ability of American universities to attract the world’s best talent is a key to the United States’ success. This also happens to be the form of global engagement where the risks are smallest. Generally, students’ access to information is circumscribed, so they would have limited utility as foreign agents.

Yet, these days, I often hear the question: Why would an American university want to educate the human capital of an unfriendly country? The answer is that, on balance, educating international talent, including that of unfriendly nations, is overwhelmingly beneficial to the United States. Nationwide, in fields as crucial to the economy and national security as engineering, computer science, and mathematics, more than half of American doctorates go to international students. The National Science Foundation’s Survey of Earned Doctorates tells us that the majority of these international doctoral recipients—including nearly three out of four Chinese doctoral recipients—intend to remain in the United States after their studies. And despite the obstacles the U.S. government sets, most of them find a way to stay. In 2017, 90 percent of the STEM students from China who’d earned doctoral degrees in the United States between 2000 and 2015 were still in the United States, helping the country advance. Instead of contributing their considerable talents to their home country, they choose to stay and contribute to the United States. This is a brain gain that the country should be celebrating.

Unfortunately, as a country, the United States has been undermining itself in recent years with policies that discourage brilliant students from attending American schools, beginning in 2017 with the Trump administration’s travel ban targeting Muslim-majority countries. In 2018, the U.S. government shortened student visas for Chinese graduate students studying certain fields from five years to one year. In May 2020, the Trump administration announced its decision to deny visas to Chinese graduate students currently or previously affiliated with institutions that support China’s “military-civil fusion strategy.” The Biden administration has left this policy in place.

This restriction on Chinese graduate students is both broad and opaque, and the criteria for its implementation have never been made clear. As long as it remains in effect, this policy is probably preventing between 3,000 and 5,000 Chinese students from entering U.S. graduate programs every year, according to a 2021 analysis published by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology. Although China has a national security law that compels its citizens to assist in intelligence gathering whenever it is demanded of them, reports of Chinese students engaging in activities that threaten U.S. national or economic security are rare.

Academic exchanges can help people transcend their national narratives.

Once international graduate students are in the United States, it can be difficult for them to remain. After they earn their degrees, most of them will move from one type of temporary status to another, without a clear path to a green card for permanent residency. Because the United States has strict annual quotas by country and by category for green cards, graduate students often have to wait years before gaining the assurance that they and their families won’t be unexpectedly uprooted.

At universities such as MIT, many international graduate students become entrepreneurs, often spinning new companies out of the research they conduct in our laboratories. The United States offers no visa specifically for these young founders, however, and instead requires employer sponsorship. These founders generally have to prove that they are employees of their own startups—and are able to be fired—forcing them to make the difficult choice of potentially losing control of their own inventions or leaving the country.

There is actually a considerable bipartisan consensus in Washington that the government needs to fix this situation and make it as easy as possible for international students who earn advanced degrees in STEM fields to stay, to work, and to launch companies in the United States. There have been a number of proposals over the years to “staple a green card” to the diplomas of international graduate students in STEM fields. Legislation introduced in July by Senators Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) and Mike Rounds (R-S.Dak.) would exempt advanced STEM graduates from green card quotas. But such proposals have been consistently held up in Congress because of the heated disagreement surrounding comprehensive immigration reform.

What if the U.S.-educated students don’t stay, and instead return home to help the United States’ geopolitical rivals build their own capabilities? They return home with the perspectives gained on U.S. campuses, and educated young people are often the only hope for social and political progress in countries that oppress their own people today.

WHEN TO SAY NO

Other kinds of engagements with China, including collaborations in research and institutional partnerships, demand more circumspection from universities. Beijing aspires to rival Washington in economic, diplomatic, and military power and to develop a new world order that promotes different principles from those that underpin the system the United States and its allies built after World War II. Unsurprisingly, Beijing has tried to benefit from technologies invented in the West, and it has sometimes done so through industrial espionage and the theft of intellectual property.

But China is the world’s other great superpower in science and engineering, just behind the United States in its combined public- and private-sector investments in research and development. Because of the quality of the research now being conducted in China, Chinese researchers are the most frequent international co-authors for American researchers in peer-reviewed science and engineering journals. For that reason, putting blanket limitations on collaborating with Chinese peers would mean limiting U.S. progress. Nonetheless, there are growing pressures in both countries to construct higher barriers to research and educational exchanges.

In 2019, MIT tightened its review process for potential international collaborations with China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, as well as projects elsewhere that may carry special risks. Proposals are carefully screened, and a small committee of top administrators reviews the thorniest proposals. By 2021, as tensions grew between the United States and China, it was clear to MIT that it needed to articulate a strategy specifically for China. The university formed a group to study the problem and charged it with finding a balance between gaining the benefits of scientific and educational collaboration and avoiding undermining U.S. national or economic security, or human rights in China. The group’s recommendations, which are now university policy, preclude as potential research partners China’s national defense universities, military research institutes, national defense laboratories at civilian universities, and companies that are Chinese military providers or whose activities contribute to the oppression of Chinese citizens.

Because most engagements with China are initiated by faculty members, the group’s report offered MIT researchers guidance on what activities they can and should undertake and those they should avoid. The university urges researchers to make sure the benefits of any collaboration will be mutual. It also urges them to avoid participation in talent recruitment programs that pay scientists from other nations to conduct research in China or to open laboratories there, and to establish norms within their research group surrounding the sharing of information.

As universities consider the risks involved in any international engagement, they should also consider what they risk by not collaborating with foreign partners. If universities can strike the right balance, they can safeguard open scientific research, open exchange, and the free flow of ideas and people while still recognizing that, when dealing with countries that have authoritarian governments, the goodwill of individual researchers does not guarantee a good result.

WRONGLY ACCUSED

Sometimes, however, when it comes to China, the government from which U.S. academics need protection is their own. In 2018, the U.S. Justice Department launched the China Initiative, to address the theft of sensitive data and technologies by people funded by the Chinese government. Many academic scientists and engineers felt stigmatized by these investigations because they were born in China or were of Chinese descent. Add to this a wave of hate crimes against Asian Americans during the pandemic, and the result was a sense of fear and anxiety among people whose talents the United States has long welcomed.

At MIT, this quickly became personal, as one of our colleagues, Gang Chen, a distinguished professor and an expert in heat transfer and energy conversion, was arrested and charged by federal prosecutors with failing to disclose Chinese affiliations on grant applications. We had faith in him from the beginning, and the Department of Justice ultimately dropped the charges. His story was not unique: a number of such cases against university researchers were dropped or dismissed.

The Department of Justice has since recognized the unfairness of the China Initiative name, which suggested that there was a lower threshold for prosecution for people with Chinese ties or heritage—and retired the program in favor of its broader Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats. But the effects still linger, with researchers such as Chen who were wrongly accused now much more cautious in their work and in their decisions about whether to seek federal funding or which students and collaborators to take on. A recently published survey of Chinese American university scientists sponsored by the Asian American Scholar Forum found that 72 percent do not feel safe as an academic researcher in the United States, 65 percent are worried about collaborations with China, and 86 percent are finding it harder to recruit international students.

Scientific cooperation is an essential form of diplomacy.

In considering security risks, every university should go beyond mere compliance with government rules and put policies in place to help the institution and individual faculty members decide when foreign collaborations are appropriate and when they are not. And, clearly, the United States government must take action against anyone illicitly transferring technologies to other countries. But it is up to both government and university leaders to ensure that legitimate national security concerns do not result in indiscriminate policies that make most academic exchanges impossible. Different kinds of collaborations involve various levels of risk, and they should be assessed accordingly. For example, collaborations where each country’s scientists work in their own laboratories but publish together may raise fewer issues than those in which laboratories are shared.

There are also specific fields—such as climate change, pandemic prevention, cancer treatment, and food safety—where the risks of collaborating are small and the potential benefits to humanity are immense. Even in those areas of science and engineering in which China and the United States are ferociously competitive, it may be possible to join forces on fundamental, pre-competitive research. The scientific advances resulting from such collaborations are openly published, to the benefit of the world—even as the two nations race each other to develop applications based on that science to their own advantage.

GREAT-POWER EDUCATION

If American universities are strongly discouraged from working with China, they will no longer have the ability to accelerate progress on global challenges by sharing ideas and resources with Chinese scientists or to improve themselves through collaboration, competition, and attracting great talent. And, most significant, the United States will understand much less about where China stands—not just in terms of technology development and military modernization but also in terms of its people’s goals and aspirations.

Unfortunately, China now seems less interested in being known. It has cut off foreign access to its most important academic databases, frustrating not just U.S. scientists and engineers but also Americans who study China’s economy, politics, culture, and history and who help the United States comprehend its greatest geopolitical competitor.

Scientific cooperation is an essential form of diplomacy, generating open-mindedness, patience, and fellow feeling. Once they begin working together for a higher cause, faculty and students from countries with long-standing animosities often overcome their cultural biases and learn to respect each other as peers. And connections forged in academic settings can have enormous geopolitical consequences: during the Cold War, the trust that American scientists established with their Soviet colleagues while considering purely scientific issues helped to lead to bilateral agreements on arms control. Although not everyone approves of the Iran nuclear agreement reached in 2015, the fact that an agreement could be achieved at all was surely helped by the MIT connection shared by two of the key people negotiating it: then U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, a longtime MIT faculty member, and Ali Akbar Salehi, then head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and an MIT alumnus. As Moniz has said, although the two men did not know each other at MIT, they had mutual friends and professional contacts thanks to their shared affiliation with the university, which helped them build mutual trust.

The United States needs to develop a fuller understanding of its strategic competitors, both to challenge them and to seek common ground for the sake of peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity in a non-zero-sum world. If the United States and China cease trying to understand each other, the results may be catastrophic.

Universities are uniquely able to build bridges through education, research, and joint problem-solving. Because they employ the shared common language of science and scholarship, at moments when dialogue seems to be impossible, they are sometimes the only institutions still able to build those bridges. American universities should accept and embrace the responsibility to build them, despite the political headwinds.

• L. RAFAEL REIF is President Emeritus and the Ray and Maria Stata Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT.

Foreign Affairs · by L. Rafael Reif · September 13, 2023

11. Opinion | President Biden should not run again in 2024

No partisan intent or judgment intended by sending this. I offer this OpEd from David Ignatius to ask the question: Is this a Cronkite/Johnson moment? If you lose Ignatius do you lose the country?

Opinion | President Biden should not run again in 2024

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · September 12, 2023

Joe Biden launched his candidacy for president in 2019 with the words “we are in the battle for the soul of this nation.” He was right. And though it wasn’t obvious at first to many Democrats, he was the best person to wage that fight. He was a genial but also shrewd campaigner for the restoration of what legislators call “regular order.”

Since then, Biden has had a remarkable string of wins. He defeated President Donald Trump in the 2020 election; he led a Democratic rebuff of Trump’s acolytes in the 2022 midterms; his Justice Department has systematically prosecuted the Jan. 6, 2021, insurrection that Trump championed and, now, through special counsel Jack Smith, the department is bringing Trump himself to justice.

What I admire most about President Biden is that in a polarized nation, he has governed from the center out, as he promised in his victory speech. With an unexpectedly steady hand, he passed some of the most important domestic legislation in recent decades. In foreign policy, he managed the delicate balance of helping Ukraine fight Russia without getting America itself into a war. In sum, he has been a successful and effective president.

But I don’t think Biden and Vice President Harris should run for reelection. It’s painful to say that, given my admiration for much of what they have accomplished. But if he and Harris campaign together in 2024, I think Biden risks undoing his greatest achievement — which was stopping Trump.

Biden wrote his political testament in his inaugural address: “When our days are through, our children and our children’s children will say of us: They gave their best, they did their duty, they healed a broken land.” Mr. President, maybe this is that moment when duty has been served.

Biden would carry two big liabilities into a 2024 campaign. He would be 82 when he began a second term. According to a recent Associated Press-NORC poll, 77 percent of the public, including 69 percent of Democrats, think he’s too old to be effective for four more years. Biden’s age isn’t just a Fox News trope; it’s been the subject of dinner-table conversations across America this summer.

Because of their concerns about Biden’s age, voters would sensibly focus on his presumptive running mate, Harris. She is less popular than Biden, with a 39.5 percent approval rating, according to polling website FiveThirtyEight. Harris has many laudable qualities, but the simple fact is that she has failed to gain traction in the country or even within her own party.

Biden could encourage a more open vice-presidential selection process that could produce a stronger running mate. There are many good alternatives, starting with now-Mayor of Los Angeles Karen Bass, whom I wish Biden had chosen in the first place, or Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo. But breaking up the ticket would be a free-for-all that could alienate Black women, a key constituency. Biden might end up more vulnerable.

Politicians who know Biden well say that if he were convinced that Trump were truly vanquished, he would feel he had accomplished his political mission. He will run again if he believes in his gut that Trump will be the GOP nominee and that he has the best chance to defeat Trump and save the country from the nightmare of a revenge presidency.

Biden has never been good at saying no. He should have resisted the choice of Harris, who was a colleague of his beloved son Beau when they were both state attorneys general. He should have blocked then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, which has done considerable damage to the island’s security. He should have stopped his son Hunter from joining the board of a Ukrainian gas company and representing companies in China — and he certainly should have resisted Hunter’s attempts to impress clients by getting Dad on the phone.

Biden has another chance to say no — to himself, this time — by withdrawing from the 2024 race. It might not be in character for Biden, but it would be a wise choice for the country.

Biden has in many ways remade himself as president. He is no longer the garrulous glad-hander I met when I first covered Congress more than four decades ago. He’s still an old-time pol, to be sure, but he is now more focused and strategic; he executes policies systematically, at home and abroad. As Franklin Foer writes in “The Last Politician,” a new account of Biden’s presidency, “he will be remembered as the old hack who could.”

Time is running out. In a month or so, this decision will be cast in stone. It will be too late for other Democrats, including Harris, to test themselves in primaries and see whether they have the stuff of presidential leadership. Right now, there’s no clear alternative to Biden — no screamingly obvious replacement waiting in the wings. That might be the decider for Biden, that there’s seemingly nobody else. But maybe he will trust in democracy to discover new leadership, “in the arena.”

I hope Biden has this conversation with himself about whether to run, and that he levels with the country about it. It would focus the 2024 campaign. Who is the best person to stop Trump? That was the question when Biden decided to run in 2019, and it’s still the essential test of a Democratic nominee today.

The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · September 12, 2023

12. Pentagon-Funded Study Warns Dementia Among U.S. Officials Poses National Security Threat

Interesting timing for this article given the recent health events and the controversy over the age of the two front running presidential candidates.

Excerpts:

The study, published by the RAND Corporation’s National Security Research Division in April, identifies individuals with both current and former access to classified material who develop dementia as threats to national security, citing the possibility that they may unwittingly disclose government secrets.

“Individuals who hold or held a security clearance and handled classified material could become a security threat if they develop dementia and unwittingly share government secrets,” the study says.

As the study notes, there does not appear to be any other publicly available research into dementia, an umbrella term for the loss of cognitive functioning, despite the fact that Americans are living longer than ever before and that the researchers were able to identify several cases in which senior intelligence officials died of Alzheimer’s disease, a progressive brain disorder and the most common cause of dementia.

Pentagon-Funded Study Warns Dementia Among U.S. Officials Poses National Security Threat

Sens. Mitch McConnell and Dianne Feinstein, who have access to top-secret information, recently had public health episodes.

Ken Klippenstein

September 12 2023, 3:17 p.m.

The Intercept · by Ken Klippenstein · September 12, 2023

As the national security workforce ages, dementia impacting U.S. officials poses a threat to national security, according to a first-of-its-kind study by a Pentagon-funded think tank. The report, released this spring, came as several prominent U.S. officials trusted with some of the nation’s most highly classified intelligence experienced public lapses, stoking calls for resignations and debate about Washington’s aging leadership.

Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., who had a second freezing episode last month, enjoys the most privileged access to classified information of anyone in Congress as a member of the so-called Gang of Eight congressional leadership. Ninety-year-old Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., whose decline has seen her confused about how to vote and experiencing memory lapses — forgetting conversations and not recalling a monthslong absence — was for years a member of the Gang of Eight and remains a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, on which she has served since 2001.

The study, published by the RAND Corporation’s National Security Research Division in April, identifies individuals with both current and former access to classified material who develop dementia as threats to national security, citing the possibility that they may unwittingly disclose government secrets.

“Individuals who hold or held a security clearance and handled classified material could become a security threat if they develop dementia and unwittingly share government secrets,” the study says.

As the study notes, there does not appear to be any other publicly available research into dementia, an umbrella term for the loss of cognitive functioning, despite the fact that Americans are living longer than ever before and that the researchers were able to identify several cases in which senior intelligence officials died of Alzheimer’s disease, a progressive brain disorder and the most common cause of dementia.

“As people live longer and retire later, challenges associated with cognitive impairment in the workplace will need to be addressed,” the report says. “Our limited research suggests this concern is an emerging security blind spot.”

Most holders of security clearances, a ballooning class of officials and other bureaucrats with access to secret government information, are subject to rigorous and invasive vetting procedures. Applying for a clearance can mean hourslong polygraph tests; character interviews with old teachers, friends, and neighbors; and ongoing automated monitoring of their bank accounts and other personal information. As one senior Pentagon official who oversees such a program told me of people who enter the intelligence bureaucracy, “You basically give up your Fourth Amendment rights.”

Yet, as the authors of the RAND report note, there does not appear to be any vetting for age-related cognitive decline. In fact, the director of national intelligence’s directive on continuous evaluation contains no mention of age or cognitive decline.

While the study doesn’t mention any U.S. officials by name, its timing comes amid a simmering debate about gerontocracy: rule by the elderly. Following McConnell’s first freezing episode, in July, Google searches for the term “gerontocracy” spiked.

“The president called to check on me,” McConnell said when asked about the first episode. “I told him I got sandbagged,” he quipped, referring to President Joe Biden’s trip-and-fall incident during a June graduation ceremony at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado, which sparked conservative criticisms about the 80-year-old’s own functioning.

Related

Google Searches for “Gerontocracy” Skyrocket After McConnell Episode

While likely an attempt by McConnell at deflecting from his lapse, Biden’s age has emerged as a clear concern to voters, including Democrats. Sixty-nine percent of Democrats say Biden is “too old to effectively serve” another term, an Associated Press-NORC poll found last month. The findings were echoed by a CNN poll released last week that found that 67 percent of Democrats said the party should nominate someone else, with 49 percent directly mentioning Biden’s age as their biggest concern.

As commander in chief, the president is the nation’s ultimate classification authority, with the extraordinary power to classify and declassify information broadly. No other American has as privileged access to classified information as the president.

The U.S.’s current leadership is not only the oldest in history, but also the number of older people in Congress has grown dramatically in recent years. In 1981, only 4 percent of Congress was over the age of 70. By 2022, that number had spiked to 23 percent.

In 2017, Vox reported that a pharmacist had filled Alzheimer’s prescriptions for multiple members of Congress. With little incentive for an elected official to disclose such an illness, it is difficult to know just how pervasive the problem is. Feinstein’s retinue of staffers have for years sought to conceal her decline, having established a system to prevent her from walking the halls of Congress alone and risk having an unsupervised interaction with a reporter.

Despite the public controversy, there’s little indication that any officials will resign — or choose not to seek reelection.

After years of speculation about her retirement, 83-year-old Speaker Emerita Rep. Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., stunned observers when she announced on Friday that she would run for reelection, seeking her 19th term.

Join The Conversation

The Intercept · by Ken Klippenstein · September 12, 2023

13. My Encounters With a Suspected Spy

Anyone who attends international or national security related conferences (and probably scientific conferences as well - though I have no experience with those) must be wary and vigilant).

My Encounters With a Suspected Spy

He invited me to join a Westminster panel on China. Later we met for coffee. What did he learn?

https://www.wsj.com/articles/my-encounters-with-a-suspected-spy-chris-cash-beijing-ccp-britain-london-china-f99d8c74#cxrecs_s

By Joseph C. Sternberg

Sept. 12, 2023 12:06 pm ET

The Palace of Westminster in London, Sept. 11. PHOTO: TAYFUN SALCI/ZUMA PRESS

London

When the email from the alleged spy for China landed in my inbox, it took me a moment to realize I should pay attention to it.

It was a speaking invitation and arrived on the afternoon of Jan. 2. Would I participate in a panel discussion for a forthcoming book about the contest between democracies and autocracies? Such requests cross my transom from time to time, and I admit I don’t always respond quickly. I almost overlooked this one until a few details caught my eye.

The invitation came on behalf of the China Research Group, a caucus of members of the British Parliament with hawkish views on Beijing. I respect one of the CRG’s founders, Tom Tugendhat, who is now security minister. And I’d met the author of the book a few years before and was happy to help him launch his new work even though I suspected I wouldn’t agree with parts of it. I accepted the invitation.

The one thing that didn’t stand out at all about the email was the name of the CRG staffer who had sent it: Chris Cash. I’d never heard of him. Now everyone has, since the Times of London reported this weekend that he was arrested earlier this year on suspicion of spying for Beijing. A law firm on Monday issued a statement on behalf of the person arrested, without naming Mr. Cash, in which its client said he is “completely innocent” of the allegations.

If the allegations are true, this ranks as one of the most serious espionage incidents in the U.K. since the height of the Cold War. As a parliamentary staffer, Mr. Cash would have had access to nonpublic (although apparently not classified) information. His perch at the CRG offered him insight into the thinking of British lawmakers who are most suspicious of the Chinese Communist Party. And he had a window into the activities of other members of society, such as the human-rights activists who interact with those lawmakers—and of journalists.

The main surprise is that it took so long for allegations of this sort to emerge here. Before this weekend, Britain’s Parliament was one of the few major legislatures in the West not to have become embroiled in a Chinese spying scandal of this magnitude. The U.S. Congress has suffered such cases, as have the Canadian and Australian parliaments.

Beijing’s intentions globally appear to stretch beyond information gathering. Influence also is a goal, as the Chinese allegedly plant individuals who can shape attitudes and policies. It’s hard to believe such an effort would have worked in the U.K. given the stature and experience of CRG members.

No matter. If Chinese espionage has happened here, Beijing can claim a win even now if it has been exposed. The mere suggestion of such influence plants seeds of doubt about the integrity of Western democracy. Certainly this episode threatens to embarrass Mr. Tugendhat, one of Beijing’s most vocal British critics—albeit undeservedly and only by distant association through the CRG, since he appears not to have worked closely with Mr. Cash.

As for my bit part: I participated in the panel discussion on Feb. 7 in a meeting room in Westminster Palace, home to Parliament. The audience appeared to be a mix of parliamentary staffers and activists of various sorts. I assumed at least one attendee would be from the Chinese Embassy, there to monitor the event and perhaps intimidate some of the other audience members merely by his or her presence as is Beijing’s standard practice these days.

At the end of the event, the other panelists, Mr. Cash and I posed for a photograph, which the Times republished this weekend.

Mr. Cash and I subsequently met one-on-one in early March at a coffee shop. I don’t remember who first suggested the idea in person during the panel event, but he reached out first via email to schedule the follow-up. Our chat was intended to be off the record, so I won’t share what he said. But under the circumstances I feel at liberty to tell Journal readers about my half of the conversation:

My aim was to determine whether Mr. Cash might be a helpful source, but I concluded he wouldn’t be. He hadn’t told me anything interesting that I couldn’t have inferred from reading a newspaper. I didn’t bother trying to maintain the connection after that meeting, which is why until the Times published its article this weekend I didn’t realize he had become incommunicado following his reported arrest later in March.

What might Mr. Cash have learned from me? As a matter of course, in such meetings I don’t discuss other sources or my private conversations with colleagues on any topic. As I recall, I asked him mostly about Britain’s economic relationship with China. I also asked if he had any insight into Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s dilatory approach to the case of jailed Hong Kong journalist and British citizen Jimmy Lai. But my interest in these matters is well-known because my colleagues and I have published our views on them. The meeting may have been a dud all around.

***

At that panel discussion, I argued that democracies defeat autocracies by being more like ourselves. That means more transparency, more tolerance for free debate, and also more care by each institution to carry out its role diligently within an open society. The new global wave of Chinese spying is so pernicious because it challenges our ability to do that.

Concerning legislatures, those bodies require trust to function on our behalf. In Britain there are already calls to tighten rules on the issuance of parliamentary passes to staffers. Perhaps there’s room for improvement, but such tweaks aren’t necessarily cost-free. They come at the risk of limiting the ability of lawmakers to draw on the expertise of many talented staffers, and such rules risk embedding a broader climate of distrust.

Meanwhile, should citizens be wary of lobbying lawmakers for fear that sensitive information (personal or commercial) could find its way into the wrong hands? This isn’t a trivial concern for human-rights activists, who play a vital role in our democracies by informing and persuading lawmakers about events in China. They already face substantial risks of harassment from the Chinese agents we too often allow to operate unrestrained on our shores, where they intimidate students on campuses, marchers at protests and more. Not even a congressman’s or member of Parliament’s office can be taken for granted as a safe zone.

Inevitably we’ll find there are no easy ways to protect ourselves. But understand that Beijing’s global espionage operations are about more than intelligence gathering. They are attempts to transform our democratic cultures from within, to make us less like ourselves. That may be the most dangerous threat of all.

Mr. Sternberg, a member of the Journal’s editorial board, writes the Political Economics column.

14. How Elon Musk become a power player in the Ukraine war

We really need to figure this out. Are we going to become dependent on Elon Musk and others like him for certain capabilities? If so, how can we ensure that the capabilities that he or others control cannot be manipulated in ways that are contrary to US interests?

Excerpts:

The Biden administration has remained largely silent on Musk’s controversial role in Ukraine. Secretary of State Antony Blinken declined to comment when asked about Musk turning off Starlink during a CNN interview this week.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall refrained from criticizing Musk, but said the Pentagon should draft contracts that would allow more oversight, the Associated Press reported.

“If we’re going to rely upon commercial architectures or commercial systems for operational use, then we have to have some assurances that they’re going to be available,” Kendall said at a conference in National Harbor, Md., on Monday. “We have to have that. Otherwise, they are a convenience…in peacetime, but they’re not something we can rely upon in wartime.”

The latest concerns follow Musk floating a Russia-friendly peace plan last fall and reports that he spoke directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin before releasing the proposal. 

How Elon Musk become a power player in the Ukraine war

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4200944-how-elon-musk-become-a-power-player-in-the-ukraine-war/

BY BRAD DRESS - 09/13/23 6:00 AM ET

Elon Musk has become a surprising power player in the Ukraine war, overseeing a vast communications network that is crucial to Kyiv’s fight against Russia.

A biography of the billionaire released this week shows the extent of Musk’s power, revealing how he exercised his newfound geopolitical power to single-handedly thwart a major Ukrainian raid last year by refusing to extend Starlink capabilities. There are also other reported instances of Musk reducing Ukraine’s capabilities on the battlefield.

Alp Sevimlisoy, a millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council, said the U.S. “should definitely be looking at developing” its own capabilities to be less reliant on Musk, though he acknowledged Starlink is an “extremely unique” technology that cannot be easily replicated on a fast timetable.

He called for the U.S. to work more closely with Musk in the meantime to prevent future events like the botched raid.

The Biden administration has remained largely silent on Musk’s controversial role in Ukraine. Secretary of State Antony Blinken declined to comment when asked about Musk turning off Starlink during a CNN interview this week.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall refrained from criticizing Musk, but said the Pentagon should draft contracts that would allow more oversight, the Associated Press reported.

“If we’re going to rely upon commercial architectures or commercial systems for operational use, then we have to have some assurances that they’re going to be available,” Kendall said at a conference in National Harbor, Md., on Monday. “We have to have that. Otherwise, they are a convenience…in peacetime, but they’re not something we can rely upon in wartime.”

The latest concerns follow Musk floating a Russia-friendly peace plan last fall and reports that he spoke directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin before releasing the proposal. 

The biography, “Elon Musk,” by famed author Walter Isaacson, details how Musk pulled the plug during a Ukrainian raid last year in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. 

Ukrainians were targeting a fleet of Russian ships in the harbor but were unable to attack because Starlink was not extended to the area, says the book released Tuesday. 

The excerpt of “Elon Musk,” published by CNN and The Washington Post, said Ukraine deployed submarine drones to attack the fleet, but the drones lost connectivity and “washed ashore harmlessly.” The book claimed Musk shut off service over fears of starting a nuclear war.

Isaacson corrected himself on X, the social platform formerly known as Twitter and now owned by Musk, saying the Starlink service was never extended to Crimea. Ukrainians were denied access when they requested it, he said. Musk shared a similar account on X last week.

The Ukrainian raid is not the only instance of Musk intervening in the war. Starlink was unavailable during another unspecified time, in southern Ukraine, forcing Ukrainian soldiers to retreat, according to the New Yorker, which reported that SpaceX deliberately cut off connectivity in certain areas.

SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell said the company has also limited Kyiv’s abilities to connect Starlink with the direct operation of drones, saying at a February conference that Ukraine “leveraged [Starlink] in ways that were unintentional and not part of any agreement.”

Musk’s direct involvement in Crimea operations last year has stirred anger in Kyiv. Top advisors and officials working under Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have publicly slammed Musk over the revelations in Isaacson’s book.

Maksym Skrypchenko, the president of the Transatlantic Dialogue Center, a think tank that advises the Ukrainian government, said Musk handed Russia a “comparative benefit” when shutting off access to Starlink.

“Musk just gave Russians another chance to use the Black Sea fleet to execute more attacks and kill more people,” Skrypchenko said. “The goal was to strike against the fleet, which is the legal military target. Also the narrative about preventing the nuclear war is wrong itself. We have already succeeded in sinking Russian ships.”

Still, he said Starlink “plays a crucial role in today’s Ukraine.” 

“Starting from providing civilians with internet in places where there is no network at all and finishing with giving an ability for our military to communicate with each other in places where ordinary radio talks are either tapped or eavesdropped,” he said in an email. 

The uniqueness and irreplaceability of the technology is putting both Ukraine and the U.S. in a tight spot.

Nathan Marx, a research fellow at the Center for International Policy focusing on technology and U.S. foreign policy, said Starlink provides a “capability that’s really, really hard to replace right now” across public and private sectors.

“There’s not a lot of other companies who have this massive constellation of very relatively low orbit satellites that Starlink does,” he said.

Marx argued that Musk’s power dynamic in Ukraine is a symptom of how much power private companies and defense contractors have over Washington. 

“I wonder how much of this is part of the culture and structure of these companies,” he said. “I do think they have a level of power where they could definitely cause this level of disruption or more.”

Musk began supplying Starlink services to Ukraine in early 2022, shortly after Russia wiped out Ukrainian communications technology before the invasion. Over time, the technology has become the communications backbone for Ukrainian forces, helping them stay connected over radio and access internet services.

Yet Musk has begun to question his role in Ukraine and why his technology was being used for violent means, according to the new book.

“How am I in this war?” he asked, according to the biography.

In the fall of 2022, Musk announced he would not keep funding Starlink services because of the high cost. Though he eventually relented and said he would keep footing the bill, this sent the Pentagon into a panic, sparking several meetings on how to handle the situation, according to the New Yorker.

Colin Kahl, the former under secretary of defense for policy, told the magazine they needed assurances Musk “couldn’t wake up one morning and just decide, like, he didn’t want to do this anymore” and to find a way to “lock in services across Ukraine.”

The Pentagon announced in June that it had agreed to a contract with Musk to fund the Starlink services, though details on the arrangement have been kept under wraps.

In Russia, Musk’s efforts have been well received. Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president and deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, praised Musk as the “last adequate mind in North America.”

Putin himself called Musk an “outstanding person” during remarks on Tuesday.

Russian officials also welcomed Musk’s peace plan shared on X in October, which proposed that Moscow could keep Crimea and elections would decide the future of four Ukrainian regions illegally occupied by Russia. (Musk reportedly spoke with Putin before that peace plan, but the billionaire denies the allegations).

Sevimlisoy, of the Atlantic Council, said Musk is more aligned with some Republicans who want the war to end and are softening on support for Ukraine. He said that Musk wants to be “taken seriously on the geopolitical front” but is likely being kept at arm’s length in Washington.

“There is an institutional desire to keep a distance from Musk in various departments,” Sevimlisoy assessed. “What that does is it pushes him to a perspective of having only his own knowledge to tackle the topics.”

TAGS ALP SEVIMLISOY ELON MUSK FRANK KENDALL RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR STARLINK

15. The Biodefense Posture Review Needs Focus to Succeed

Excerpts:

The COVID-19 pandemic, as bad as it has been for the nation, has had a minimal impact on the armed forces’ day-to-day operational tempo. This is in no small way due to the existing force health protection measures that protect and maintain the fighting force and that, unless countered by congressional interests, work very well. The U.S. military does have a resilient capability to resist the impact of natural disease outbreaks, buttressed by Health and Human Services’ programs. The Department of Defense’s biosurety compliance program continues its good laboratory practices, having gotten through the few challenges of its recent past. What the military has traditionally called “biodefense” remains challenged by technical and budgetary limitations, but it needs to be developed as part of a larger countering weapons of mass destruction strategy, focused on protecting against biological weapons and not diluted with the vast demands of pandemic preparedness. These important functions need to be retained within their existing program elements and not lost under a generic biodefense construct and directed by an acquisition office.

This Biodefense Posture Review fails to advance our understanding of the national security community’s equities in public health issues or improve the department’s force health protection efforts. By imposing an artificial governance body over a significantly large and complex mission-set, the department is taking responsibilities away from the very offices that are working to advance these defense issues. If departmental leadership believes in “whole-of-government” approaches and the importance of not duplicating other government agencies’ capabilities, this Biodefense Posture Review needs to be critically re-assessed and refocused toward the Department of Defense’s core missions of force health protection, global health engagement, and countering weapons of mass destruction.

The Biodefense Posture Review Needs Focus to Succeed - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Al Mauroni · September 13, 2023

More than three years ago, the U.S. government began its tepid response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Without a doubt, there have been missteps and challenges despite the fact that this was not the first time that the U.S. government has had to face a significant pandemic. The U.S. government has maintained a significant national security interest in biological threats since at least late 2001. The Department of Defense in particular has been developing pandemic and infectious disease strategies since at least 2009. Given the perceived stumbles by the Department of Health and Human Services in addressing this recent pandemic, the U.S. military took an unprecedented role in supporting the development and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. Now Department of Defense leaders are suggesting that the department should play a greater role in the nation’s efforts to counter natural disease outbreaks, both domestically and abroad.

On Nov. 1, 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin directed the department to prepare a Biodefense Posture Review that would “assess the biological threat landscape and establish the Department’s approach to biodefense.” Austin identified three main goals for the study — to unify the department’s biological research efforts, to modernize operations to improve readiness, and to synchronize biodefense-related planning with other government agencies to support national biodefense efforts. More than 21 months later, the report has finally been released, but it is simply not on par with the Nuclear Posture Review or Missile Defense Review. It offers no construct for countering adversary threats, has a tenuous connection (at best) to the National Defense Strategy, and gives no plan to modernize specific defense capabilities.

As the first of its kind, the Biodefense Posture Review does not examine military biodefense capabilities and does not illuminate the department’s readiness posture. Instead, it obfuscates the department’s biopreparedness concepts, takes authorities away from military agencies that address biological threats, and calls for duplicating efforts of other government agencies that have significant national biopreparedness roles.

Become a Member

This Biodefense Posture Review calls for a single governance structure, a Biodefense Council, to develop priorities and investment strategies, advise intelligence gathering, redirect budget activities, oversee the services’ exercises and readiness for biological incidents, and engage in industrial base discussions on the nation’s bioeconomy. This action is necessary not because the Department of Defense lacks authorities and defined roles for biodefense functions, but rather that it “could benefit from a more collective and unified approach” and needs to “strengthen integration mechanisms for situational awareness.” To execute this function, the Biodefense Posture Review uses poorly defined terms of reference, misrepresents existing defense concepts relating to biopreparedness, and ignores existing roles and missions of the Military Health System and the services’ acquisition and logistics offices.

Lack of Definitional Clarity

The basis for this review can be found in the Biden administration’s 2021 document American Pandemic Preparedness: Transforming Our Capabilities and the 2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan. Both documents direct U.S. government agencies to develop discrete capabilities to protect against biological incidents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. The focus of national guidance was appropriately on pandemic preparedness, given the nation’s struggle with containing the COVID-19 outbreak. Concerns about deliberate and accidental biological releases exist, but these threats have not resulted in any catastrophic incidents in the nation. Department of Defense leaders are tasked to protect their servicemembers, civilian workers, and military families on its many installations and bases from all three types of biological threats and are in fact performing those missions today. But in reading this review, one might be excused for not understanding that basic point.

The Biden administration’s National Biodefense Strategy identifies the Department of Defense as having lead and support responsibilities for a number of its goals. It is not a surprise, then, that the Biodefense Posture Review uses the same basic definitions as used in the strategy. However, the National Biodefense Strategy is inherently flawed due to its poorly defined terms of reference and lack of context as to how biological threats should be addressed. As defined in the strategy, biodefense includes all actions to counter (prevent), prepare for (protect against), respond to, and recover from bioincidents. These are the same general terms used in Presidential Policy Directive 8 “National Preparedness,” but it is unclear why the term “biopreparedness” was not considered, as it is used extensively in other government documents. It would have been a much more accurate term than biodefense.

The term “defense” has traditionally applied to protection and response against malicious actors, excluding prevention or recovery efforts. Prevention involves actions taken before a crisis while recovery addresses issues after a crisis — defense is what happens between prevention and recovery. There is a difference between how the military supports the federal response to a domestic terrorist incident and how it sustains operations given a biological weapons attack during wartime. The distinction is important if policymakers are to task the right defense agencies to develop discrete and vital biodefense capabilities for specific military scenarios. This clarity is absent in the review.

The review identifies a biothreat as an entity that causes a biohazard that leads to a bioincident. A biohazard is any biological substance that represents an actual or potential danger to people, animals, plants, or the environment. A bioincident is any act in which a biohazard threatens people. This circular logic complicates efforts to define distinct requirements needed to address specific threat sources (Mother Nature, a laboratory worker, an adversarial nation) and to designate which government agencies should receive funds to counter these threats. There are dozens if not hundreds of significant biological threats, and not all biological threats are national security concerns. The use of a generic term such as “biological threats” removes any rationale as to how federal funds should be allocated or how military capabilities should be developed. There is no “one size fits all” approach for protection and response across the spectrum of biological threats.

Clearly, the authors of the Biodefense Posture Review recognize that there are distinctions between naturally occurring biological threats, deliberate biological incidents, and laboratory accidents. It does warn the reader of adversarial nation intentions and the dangers of biotechnology advances that may lead to emerging biological threats, along with a heavy emphasis on the need for pandemic preparedness. And the Department of Defense already pursues these goals as detailed in directives on how force health protection, biological defense, and laboratory biosecurity are to be executed. At the same time, the review insists that there are “gaps, seams, and overlaps” across these areas that require a larger portfolio management effort to ensure that military forces are fully protected from the range of biological threats. However, it does not explain where these gaps, seams, and overlaps are.

There’s a particular emphasis on “emerging threats” and “threat-agnostic” medical countermeasures that the review says are required to ensure that the military can “more effectively and rapidly respond to biothreats.” The review calls for doing away with lists that prioritize biological warfare agents and natural diseases due to the possible emergence of “currently unknown or novel” biological threats. This idea of the destructive application of biotechnology is not new. Certainly the question of the origin of COVID-19, whether it was an emerging disease from natural origins, a bioengineered agent that escaped from a laboratory, or an intended biological weapon, plays into this discussion. This debate misses the important point, that COVID-19’s origin doesn’t matter as much as how the U.S. government improves its preparations for a future pandemic that threatens a civilian populace. This is a very different debate from how the U.S. military should develop biodefense capabilities to protect young, healthy troops during wartime. The challenge isn’t managing emerging threats, it’s determining who should get funds to address them.

Ignoring Strategic Missions and Goals

The review was tasked to “unify efforts” across the department, to “optimize capabilities” and “synchronize biodefense planning.” To many leaders that means tasking defense organizations to address the perceived public health gaps seen after the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The review identifies three organizations — the Defense Health Agency, the Department of Defense Chemical-Biological Defense Program, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency — as key players, but does not review the adequacy of the existing capabilities of the armed services to conduct force health protection, military biodefense, and laboratory biosecurity. The review does not mention the Army, Air Force, and Navy public health agencies, the U.S. Army Medical Institute for Infectious Diseases, nor special programs such as the Department of Defense’s Congressionally-Directed Medical Research Program, a significant biomedical research program for countering diseases. It offers no vision for future capabilities, as the Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review have.

The Biodefense Posture Review suggests that a plethora of agencies and programs, each with its own directives and budgets, is the obstacle to optimizing biodefense capabilities. In fact, each organization has specific authorities and budgets because they create discrete capabilities for force health protection, global health engagement, and countering weapons of mass destruction (see Figure 1). Laboratory biosecurity, military intelligence, and biological research and development are supporting factors for all of these missions. There is a pandemic and infectious disease strategy separate from the countering weapons of mass destruction strategy because of the significant differences in mitigating a global pandemic versus countering an adversary with a biological weapon. The military services have a vested interest in maintaining their full combat potential by keeping people healthy, but that is a larger mission than simply disease prevention. It includes non-war-related accidents, self-inflicted wounds, combat injuries, and non-communicable diseases as well, all of which are part of force health protection. Most importantly, all of the services work together at the Defense Health Headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia. The Defense Health Agency already integrates and executes joint force health protection efforts, which includes disease prevention.

The Department of Defense’s Global Health Engagement effort has a distinct mission in that this area does not address the protection of U.S. forces from biological threats. It supports a broader U.S. government mission (led by Health and Human Services and complemented by the State Department) to help partner nations to build health capacity, combat emerging infectious diseases and antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. The department’s response to the West Africa Ebola crisis in 2014 was one such example of this mission. This effort is managed separately from military force health protection and biodefense so that it complements Health and Human Services’ lead role and does not impinge on the U.S. military’s efforts to protect its personnel from infectious diseases.

The Biodefense Posture Review emphasizes the need to increase biosurveillance capabilities, which is puzzling because (as the review itself notes) such a program already exists. The Defense Health Agency oversees the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Division that provides services to the military services and combatant commands, to include working with other government agencies to provide worldwide disease surveillance. It is tightly linked to disease surveillance programs in Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and other agencies across the globe. The intelligence community recently renamed its National Counterproliferation Center to include biosecurity concerns in light of criticism as to its role in evaluating infectious disease outbreaks.

Military biodefense is a subcomponent of countering weapons of mass destruction and is funded separately from medical infectious disease research and development. There is a very good reason for why this division exists. In 1990, U.S. forces deploying to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm did not have enough anthrax or botulinum toxin vaccines. They also lacked automated detection systems to warn troops of any biological attack. In the 1980s, the Army’s medical agencies had made a conscious decision to move the bulk of their research funds to address natural infectious diseases and not biological warfare agents because the agencies judged natural diseases to be the greater risk to military forces. And if one were to look at the year-to-year impact of both threats, they were right, but this decision resulted in a very significant threat to U.S. forces when they fought an adversary with a biological weapons program. Despite this history and the lack of robust military biodefense capabilities, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense have repeatedly moved defense funds away from chemical-biological defense and to countermeasures for natural disease outbreaks over the past 15 years out of misguided desires to have Department of Defense research contribute to national public health efforts.

The review welcomes collaboration with other government agencies, notably Health and Human Services’ National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, but this is already happening. It fails to note Homeland Security’s National Biosurveillance Integration Center and National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, and State’s Office of International Health and Biodefense. These agencies have put tens of billions of dollars into national biopreparedness objectives, particularly in early detection, global biosurveillance, and medical response activities. Where is the capability gap that the Department of Defense must address around significant national and international biological disease outbreaks, when these other agencies are adequately resourced and agile enough to do their missions?

The Drive for Efficiency

The overwhelming majority of biothreats come from natural disease outbreaks, and since the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs oversees the Defense Health Agency and its $37 billion annual budget, has the lead for Department of Defense’s Global Health Engagement, and is the lead for Department of Defense biosurveillance activities, one might believe that this is the right office to chair a Biodefense Council. In reality, the assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense has been appointed as the Department of Defense executive secretariat for this governance vehicle, an office whose primary responsibility is facilitating the development of military requirements for nuclear weapons, as well as overseeing about a billion dollars in biological defense research and biological threat-reduction efforts. The review specifically targets the Chemical and Biological Defense Program to move its research toward pandemic preparedness, continuing a “spirit of competition” with the Defense Health Program. Given the review’s heavy focus on COVID-19 response, why is an acquisition office leading the review of these disease prevention concerns?

It may be that some officials in the department do not believe that the medical professionals understand defense policy enough to inform its direction, and in part this may be because the medical community does not do enough to engage on its own equities. For example, the Military Health Systems has seen significant challenges when competing against other defense priorities, even given the impact of COVID-19 and stated commitments to protecting the health of servicemembers. There is an inherent struggle between policymakers and scientists in writing, vetting, and implementing public policy measures. Particular to health policy, there is a challenge in executing evidence-based policy in that there can be a gulf between medical practitioners who focus on current best evidence to make recommendations about health care and policymakers who focus on politics and short-term decision-making contrary to science-based evidence. There is a danger of politicizing science if these actors do not agree on leading health topics. To a degree, this also extends to the relationship between the military medical community and defense policymakers.

The review calls for a “DoD-wide effort to develop and exercise scenarios that incorporate biothreats” and to “prioritize plans and training to improve readiness to meet requirements in a biologically challenged environment.” The report does not discuss the role of professional military education, an unfortunate absence. There are two significant challenges that will make this difficult. First, none of the armed services practice or train for engaging biothreats as a singular focus — they practice medical force health protection and chemical-biological defense as adjuncts to combat exercises. It has been traditionally very difficult to simulate an “attack” by biological organisms in any military exercise, which adds to the absence of realistic biodefense training. Second, there are limited funds allocated to training and exercises for the general force, and there are always other priorities that are higher than biodefense (unless the unit is question is a medical unit or an Army biodetection unit). No military unit ever failed a National Training Center deployment because it couldn’t do biodefense. The services are not going to increase training and exercise efforts unless funds are targeted specifically for this purpose, and that seems very unlikely.

The military services should have adequate stocks of critical biodefense supplies, respective to the context. Every servicemember should be prepared to operate in the context of biological threats, whether serving on a U.S. military base during a pandemic, fighting against an adversary that uses biological weapons, or working as a scientist in a government biological research laboratory. But this is a service responsibility to train, organize, and equip forces for future operating environments. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has an oversight role, but lacking any change in funding strategies, the services are going to have this responsibility. There are always questions as to the readiness of U.S. forces to protect themselves from chemical and biological weapons as well as to operate in a radiological-contaminated environment during wartime. These are known issues that the services understand and are responsible to address. There are already appropriate forums for these discussions — in the service headquarters, within the Joint Staff, and at the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Deborah Rosenblum recently described the need for a new governance structure to manage across “silos of centers of excellence” that resist the implementation of necessary investments and reforms short of direction from the deputy secretary of defense. It’s unclear that these silos are in fact the problem and that they require such a draconian solution. The services understand what they need, and they use the existing defense acquisition process to field required capabilities to meet national security objectives. The “silos” exist to ensure that these capabilities are developed in line with how the military organizes, equips, and trains its force. The joint staff surgeon, director operational test and evaluation, and the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation offices assess how well those capabilities are developed. The processes identified in Department of Defense directives and instructions will work, if given the opportunity.

Conclusion

The defense leadership and, in turn, the national leadership should have a strong understanding of the Department of Defense’s capabilities to mitigate pandemic diseases, protect against the adversarial use of biological weapons, and reduce laboratory accidents. However, these three functions have never been managed under a single amorphous “biodefense enterprise.” There is a good reason for this, given that there are different defense programs tasked with countering the sources of these distinct biological threats. For defense policy to be successful, the government should clearly define roles and missions for defense agencies, which can then be translated into plans and budgets that meet specific policy objectives. Over the past 20 years, there have been recommendations to merge the Department of Defense’s medical biological research and development efforts for public health and military biodefense into one organizational structure out of a desire for efficiencies. None of these attempts have succeeded because they ignored how defense requirements and budgets are executed to meet national security objectives.

The national security community does need to prioritize and assess its efforts to develop capabilities against adversaries with biological weapons. The community used to understand this. At the same time, the community’s interest in public health issues has grown significantly. It started after the 2001 Amerithrax incident and has grown in scope with every pandemic that has hit the United States. But it is far from clear that the national security community understands the concept of health security at all. Health security is supposedly an overlap of concerns shared by the national security and public health communities, and yet it has not developed as a jointly understood issue as much as a vague concept of which both communities have been talking past each other. It is a mistake to think that the Department of Defense should do more for pandemic response using the Chemical and Biological Defense Program as a vehicle rather than the Defense Health Agency working with Health and Human Services, given its authorities and resources to address natural disease outbreaks.

The COVID-19 pandemic, as bad as it has been for the nation, has had a minimal impact on the armed forces’ day-to-day operational tempo. This is in no small way due to the existing force health protection measures that protect and maintain the fighting force and that, unless countered by congressional interests, work very well. The U.S. military does have a resilient capability to resist the impact of natural disease outbreaks, buttressed by Health and Human Services’ programs. The Department of Defense’s biosurety compliance program continues its good laboratory practices, having gotten through the few challenges of its recent past. What the military has traditionally called “biodefense” remains challenged by technical and budgetary limitations, but it needs to be developed as part of a larger countering weapons of mass destruction strategy, focused on protecting against biological weapons and not diluted with the vast demands of pandemic preparedness. These important functions need to be retained within their existing program elements and not lost under a generic biodefense construct and directed by an acquisition office.

This Biodefense Posture Review fails to advance our understanding of the national security community’s equities in public health issues or improve the department’s force health protection efforts. By imposing an artificial governance body over a significantly large and complex mission-set, the department is taking responsibilities away from the very offices that are working to advance these defense issues. If departmental leadership believes in “whole-of-government” approaches and the importance of not duplicating other government agencies’ capabilities, this Biodefense Posture Review needs to be critically re-assessed and refocused toward the Department of Defense’s core missions of force health protection, global health engagement, and countering weapons of mass destruction.

Become a Member

Albert J. Mauroni is the director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of the book BIOCRISIS: Defining Biological Threats in U.S. Policy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Al Mauroni · September 13, 2023

16. If it doesn’t make you more lethal, ditch it, says top Army officer

Oh those change of command inventories! Every company commander's (and supply sergeant's) nightmare!

Excerpts:

Beating back criticisms of real-life problems that soldiers face such as managing deployment and training with family time, Weimer clarified how warfighting drives even those very personal factors of Army life.

“Warfighting is the reason we exist,” Weimer said. “But you can’t be a good warfighter if you don’t take care of your family, if you don’t take care of your teammates. You can’t be a good warfighter if you can’t manage your time. The list goes on and on and on. So, they’re not inseparable.”

As part of the warfighting focus, the pair said they want to reduce the non-combat preparation work for even low-level commanders. George noted it shouldn’t take three or more weeks for a company commander to inventory their gear.

But the general isn’t tossing it all on the lower ranks. He pointed to industry and commercial models, noting that a Walmart staff can inventory their entire store overnight. He expects to develop “passive inventory systems” to aid commanders with that task.

If it doesn’t make you more lethal, ditch it, says top Army officer

armytimes.com · by Todd South · September 12, 2023

The acting Army chief of staff and sergeant major shared four focus areas they expect to frame how the service meets a host of challenges during their tenure.

Gen. Randy George, acting chief, and Sergeant Major of the Army Michael Weimer laid out these areas on Tuesday to both an in-person and online audience at the epicenter of Army combat arms, the Maneuver Warfighter Conference at the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Moore, Georgia.

The all-encompassing effort is aimed at a singular focus — warfighting. That will mean tough training but also reducing and even cutting some of the time-consuming, non-warfighting tasks.

“If there are things on your training schedule that are not making you more lethal or more cohesive where you’re taking care of your teammates, then you need to have a discussion about taking that off the schedule and not doing it,” George said.

The four areas cover a wide range but offer specific signals as to how, and where, the new chief plans to lead the Army over the next four years.

Those four areas include warfighting, continuous transformation, strengthening the profession and delivering ready combat formations.

Beating back criticisms of real-life problems that soldiers face such as managing deployment and training with family time, Weimer clarified how warfighting drives even those very personal factors of Army life.

“Warfighting is the reason we exist,” Weimer said. “But you can’t be a good warfighter if you don’t take care of your family, if you don’t take care of your teammates. You can’t be a good warfighter if you can’t manage your time. The list goes on and on and on. So, they’re not inseparable.”

As part of the warfighting focus, the pair said they want to reduce the non-combat preparation work for even low-level commanders. George noted it shouldn’t take three or more weeks for a company commander to inventory their gear.

But the general isn’t tossing it all on the lower ranks. He pointed to industry and commercial models, noting that a Walmart staff can inventory their entire store overnight. He expects to develop “passive inventory systems” to aid commanders with that task.

Warfighting will also mean more tools to do the job of combat more efficiently. George noted a recent visit to 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which was amid training, “in the box” as its known, for Saber Junction, an exercise in U.S. Army Europe and Africa Command.

George said that commanders of the cavalry unit were able to control six Stryker combat vehicles all on tablet computer devices.

In the same remarks, George held up a tablet saying that a unit commander, his or her staff and subordinates should all be able to view the common operating picture on the same device.

He recalled deploying with a command and control cell that carried 19 pelican cases and took nearly 15 vehicles to move around the battlespace.

“We can’t operate like that on the battlefield,” George said.

Part of improving training and buying more time will be on the higher echelon units to take the burden off the lower-level commanders, George said.

One example George provided included the division warfighter exercises. These are complex, multi-echelon unit events. The general sees these types of events as building a collective, virtual or simulated, trainer so the larger units, such as brigades and divisions, can practice their work without having to line up all the subordinate units.

“I think about the video game culture and see no reason why we cannot produce, and we will, a collective trainer so that battalion and higher can acquire reps and sets,” George said.

For the continuous transformation focus, both men signaled a strong commitment to the Holistic Health and Fitness program, and specifically the Army Combat Fitness Test, a topic of debate among soldiers and even members of Congress since its inception in recent years.

“We’re going to continue doing the ACFT,” Weimer said in direct response to an audience question.

He called both the ACFT and H2F critical tools for changing the culture of fitness in the Army.

George added on, saying that the standards for the ACFT will evolve as part of the continuous transformation effort. The acting chief also noted that they would soon announce additional funding to speed up the resourcing of the H2F staff and equipment more quickly to units.

The current timeline calls for the 110 combat arms brigades across the Army to receive the complement of H2F staff and gear by 2030.

For delivering combat-ready formations beyond training, George said that reducing unnecessary demands, such as vehicle maintenance and improving industrial base production would help.

Many of the munitions plants in the United States still rely on decades-old technologies. Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth and the previous Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, talked about this publicly in recent years.

George said he wants to put resources into those plants and to companies that produce crucial parts for Army systems. The general looks to “magazine depth,” meaning how many munitions, personnel and equipment the force has ready to go to war, including parts as well as bullets and artillery shells.

The general has already consulted a group of senior chief warrant officers on vehicle maintenance. He said that a review that would allow for going longer on vehicles specifically before pulling them in for deep maintenance cycles would save “35 man years” of maintenance time for I Corps alone.

George and Weimer’s plan to strengthen the profession focuses mostly on standards and discipline and looks to take in lessons learned, such as those happening now in Ukraine, into unit training and schools so that soldiers and officers have the most relevant, up-to-date combat information and techniques.

A new effort, dubbed, “The Harding Project,” seeks to reinvigorate professional writing and debate. George is calling on the use of publications such as Infantry Magazine, Armor Magazine, Modern War Institute and War on the Rocks.

“That’s what it takes to be a professional at your skill,” Weimer said. “We read, we write, we discuss.”

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

17. Determining the True Extent of Terrorism’s Existential Threat

We must not neglect the continuing terrorist threats. The authors lay out some of the civilization-ending possibilities.

Conclusion:

Several plausible pathways exist for terrorists to destroy human civilization, or at least to exacerbate overall existential risk. While these pathways are admittedly extremely unlikely at present, they may not remain so forever, and the grave consequences if they were to occur justify serious consideration of the threat. If a terrorist causes existential harm, humanity does not have a second chance.

Determining the True Extent of Terrorism’s Existential Threat - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Zak Kallenborn, Gary Ackerman · September 12, 2023

The apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo sought to ignite a cataclysmic war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Asahara Shoko, the cult’s leader, believed Aum would incite the apocalypse, and he would emerge from the wreckage of humanity as a new Jesus Christ. This belief motivated Aum’s pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Although Aum’s ambitions often outstripped their capability, especially when they sought an earthquake-making device on March 20 1995, Aum carried out an attack on the Tokyo subway system using sarin gas, killing thirteen and injuring thousands more.

Unfortunately, Aum Shinrikyo is not the only terrorist group with apocalyptic ambitions.

Terrorists could seek to destroy humanity due to apocalyptic beliefs, environmental fatalism, or a desire to eliminate suffering (negative utilitarianism). The history of human thought provides no shortage of apocalyptic tropes to draw upon, from the revelations of John, through the Ragnarok of the Norse, to the Zoroastrian Frashokereti. Like Aum Shinrikyo, a group with activist millenarian beliefs may turn to terrorism, believing that they will be the ones to incite a global apocalypse and that such catastrophe would be desirable. Alternatively, terrorists might draw upon biocentrist views that humanity is a plague, desiring the destruction of humanity so that the natural world can thrive. For example, the Chicago-based group RISE in the 1970s sought to destroy humanity so that they could repopulate the Earth with a small cadre of environmentally conscious revolutionaries. Or, terrorists may believe that life is nothing more than suffering, adopting an extreme negative utilitarianist view in which human existence is viewed as inevitably horrible, with ending all human life as the only way to reduce that horror.

While by no means common among terrorists, there are those who might develop the motivation to wipe out humankind. The grim reality is that there are three pathways whereby terrorists could, in fact, do so: existential attacks, spoiler attacks, and systemic harm. The silver frame on this dark portrait is that each pathway to existential harm requires the alignment of rare contingencies, whether they be temporal, political, technological, or extreme terrorist capability. Nonetheless, some degree of concern, and certainly global vigilance, is justified.

Pathways to Global Harm

Terrorists can cause existential harm by 1) developing their own “super-weapon;” 2) obstructing risk mitigation measures to allow other existential risks to manifest; or 3) causing sufficiently broad or acute harm that global governments fail to mitigate existential risks. The risk dynamics differ greatly for each pathway. For example, a terrorist group mounting a genetically engineered biological weapons attack of sufficient size to wipe out humanity would likely require significant (and historically unique) levels of technological, organizational, and financial resources. By contrast, a terrorist attack to disrupt a NASA planetary defense mission against an incoming planet-killing asteroid would only require limited capability, but could only generate existential harm in the rare contingency that such an asteroid is both imminently incoming and that delaying a defensive mission is not feasible.

Existential Attack

Life is suffering, and Dr. Louis Therman was ready to end that suffering. He had finally engineered the perfect virus. A highly contagious pathogen that would quickly spread all around the world and do…nothing at all. Well, at least for the first few years. By then the virus will have spread to the remotest parts of the world. It’ll be too late to shut down airports and border crossings, the virus will have already penetrated. Then the genetic killswitch will engage. The virus will become uniformly lethal and humanity’s long-suffering will end.

Existential attacks are basically the plots of movie supervillains. A terrorist somehow creates a genetically engineered biological weapon that spreads through the world, and manages to kill everyone. Or, they manipulate global powers into starting a nuclear war, perhaps tricking early warning systems so an attack appears imminent at a time of high crisis. Or, perhaps, the terrorist creates an artificial super intelligence that is designed to be existentially harmful (something that academics and industry leaders are increasingly warning about occurring accidentally).

Although plausible, an existential attack would require the perpetrators to possess extraordinary amounts of scientific know-how and technical capability, together with all the logistical resources required to pull off such an endeavor. A genetically engineered pathogen appears to be the only known vector by which a terrorist could directly bring about existential harm. Causing that harm would require the terrorists to not only acquire and modify the pathogen (or create it from scratch), but to overcome the inherent tradeoffs between disease virulence and spread. The terrorist would also need to scale up, deliver and modify or design the agent in such a way so that the agent could continue to cause harm following global countermeasures, like quarantines or vaccines, or remain undetected while it spreads until suddenly manifesting lethal qualities. There are of course hypothetical technological developments like artificial super intelligences or nanorobots that might provide an alternative route, but as they are theoretical, their development would necessarily require ground-breaking advancements in science and technology to realize. Perhaps as others create the necessary fundamental breakthroughs and develop all these technologies for benign purposes, the barriers for terrorist use will become surmountable. But the timeline is uncertain and successful acquisition remains speculative.

It’s also possible that a terrorist could indirectly cause existential harm, by, for example, tricking early warning systems into starting nuclear wars. The risk dynamics will be similar to direct existential attacks, as the terrorist would need to have an extremely sophisticated understanding of technical details of early warning systems, and the capability to create plausible simulacrum that would trick those systems.

Existential Spoilers

An asteroid 20km in diameter has been detected heading on a collision course with Earth. Astronomers judge a possible impact to occur within three months. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration prepares to launch a planetary defense mission: a kinetic impactor is set to crash into the asteroid, and reroute it to a safer trajectory. Over the ensuing weeks, news media covers the impending strike nonstop, with partisan commentators pointing fingers at each other for underfunding, and undervaluing scientific research and values. The global cacophony of bickering talking heads leads the leader of a Los Angeles-based spiritual group to conclude that the asteroid was sent by a higher power to lead humanity into its next state of being. He gets to work on a plan.

The day before impact, the group leader rents a truck, his followers fill it with nitrogen fertilizer explosives, and he drives to the launch site in Santa Barbara. The leader barrels through the gate, security guards open fire and even though the leader takes a bullet to the shoulder, he keeps going. The truck makes it to the launch pad where the rocket is being fueled and the leader detonates the explosives. Only about half explode, but that is enough. The damage is not extensive, but it would require at least three weeks to repair or to re-equip another rocket at an alternate location. Three weeks too long.

Existential spoilers are terrorist attacks to disrupt measures aimed at reducing or preventing sources of existential risk. Besides disrupting planetary defenses, a terrorist might spoil peace talks between two warring nuclear powers, disrupt a major geoengineering project meant to solve climate change, or remove safeguards on an artificial super intelligence.

An existential spoiler causing actual existential harm is likely to be highly contingent on temporal, spatial, astronomical, political, and other factors. Disrupting a planetary defense mission only creates existential harm when a planet killer asteroid is inbound and where there is no redundancy in the mitigation measure. A terrorist could plausibly undertake an existential spoiler attack without intending to cause existential harm, as in the hypothetical case of an ethnonationalist group upset over the terms of a prospective peace deal between two warring nuclear powers which disrupts a precarious deal and renews a spiral of nuclear instability. However, certain spoilers will almost certainly require apocalyptic motivations, as most politically inspired violent groups have no interest in having the entire strategic playing field erased by an asteroid. Importantly, at least in theory, an existential spoiler may only require modest capabilities to succeed.

Systemic Harm

When global astronomers sounded the alarm in 2052 that the big one was coming, no one was ready. Only a few years previously, the resurgent Islamic State had managed to detonate a nuclear weapon in New York City. Manhattan was flattened, millions died, global financial markets were in ruins, and the United States was hellbent on vengeance. If a program had nothing to do with rebuilding the country or killing those responsible, funding was slashed to ribbons, if not cut entirely. NASA was a major victim of the budget cuts. Why should Americans look up at the stars when the world around them was crumbling? Any public or political attention to planetary defense had faded decades ago.

Systemic harms are attacks that are not necessarily intended to cause existential harm, but cause enough harm that the international community is unwilling or unable to mitigate existential risks. Here, the harm is generated primarily through the reaction to terrorist attacks. For example, an extreme attack on the United States akin to 9/11 may cause the country to focus entirely on counterterrorism, reducing budgetary and legislative attention to reducing existential risks. Alternatively, cycles of government oppression and terrorist response might destabilize society enough to weaken global cooperation and the capacity to adequately mitigate existential risks. Whether systemic harm translates to actual extinction will be highly contingent, however, because extinction requires an existential risk scenario (e.g. global nuclear war or an incoming asteroid) to manifest while the global community is distracted or weakened. Once the world restabilizes, existential risks could receive their due attention.

What now?

Given that – at least for now – existential terrorism will only manifest in the case of extremely capable terrorists or highly contingent circumstances, the likelihood of terrorists bringing about existential levels of harm is quite low. However, looking at the inordinate consequences represented by the end of humanity, the overall risk cannot be completely ignored. Not to mention that actors, technologies and environments can change, sometimes rapidly. Policymakers should take prudent and practical measures to reduce the threat of existential terrorism.

First, while continuing to devote the bulk of counterterrorism resources to extant extremist threats, intelligence and law enforcement agencies should reserve some capacity to explicitly monitor for signs of an increase in existential threat, whether these be the rise of a group with apocalyptic or negative utilitarian motives, or improvements in technology that would bring existential harm within the competencies of a broader range of actors. Interagency coordination is especially vital when trying to discern what are often likely to be “weak signals.” International information sharing is especially critical, as the threat is necessarily trans-national and global. This could perhaps include new mechanisms for inter-governmental policy coordination and response when potential existential terrorism threats are identified.

Second, both counterterrorism agencies and the broader national security community should plan for spoilers whenever crucial existential risk mitigation measures are planned or undertaken. In many cases this will simply mean recognizing the potential for disruptive terrorist attacks and increasing security measures. States should also consider building redundancy and resilience into existential risk prevention and mitigation measures wherever possible, which has value even beyond existential terrorism. Missing parts, natural hazards, and human error all could spoil existential risk mitigation measures.

Last, since systemic harm is dependent on a type of autoimmune reaction on the part of global society, whatever actions states take to counter (non-existential) terrorism should be both proportional and not blind policymakers to actual existential risks. Simply recognizing the dangers of distraction or overreaction can go a long way towards addressing the possibility of terrorist actions resulting in systemic harm.

Several plausible pathways exist for terrorists to destroy human civilization, or at least to exacerbate overall existential risk. While these pathways are admittedly extremely unlikely at present, they may not remain so forever, and the grave consequences if they were to occur justify serious consideration of the threat. If a terrorist causes existential harm, humanity does not have a second chance.

The following article is derived from “Existential Terrorism: Can Terrorists Destroy Humanity,” recently published in the European Journal of Risk Regulation.

Zachary Kallenborn is an adjunct fellow (Non-resident) with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, Research Affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), an officially proclaimed U.S. Army “Mad Scientist,” and national security consultant.

Gary A. Ackerman is an Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Research in the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity at the University at Albany (SUNY), where his research focuses on assessing emerging threats and understanding how terrorists and other adversaries make tactical, operational, and strategic decisions, particularly regarding innovating in their use of weapons and tactics.

Main image: U.S. Army Reserve Staff Sgt. Eric Huggins with the 468th Engineer Detachment, 368th Engineer Battalion, 302d Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 412th Theater Engineer Command, based in Danvers, Mass., directs his team where to wheel a “victim” after a Vehicle Extrication during the New York City Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Joint Training Exercise in New York City, July 10, 2018. (Clinton Wood/Army)

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irregularwarfare.org · by Zak Kallenborn, Gary Ackerman · September 12, 2023

18. China, Russia will use cyber to sow chaos if war starts, Pentagon says

A BFO (blinding flash of the obvious). But just because it is obvious does not mean we should assume we are prepared for it. We must be ready now, before the first shot is fired or the first electron is transmitted because our adversaries are preparing now.

China, Russia will use cyber to sow chaos if war starts, Pentagon says

c4isrnet.com · by Colin Demarest · September 12, 2023

WASHINGTON — China and Russia are prepared to unleash a flurry of cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure and defense networks should war break out, according to a Pentagon strategy unveiled this week.

Such tactics, meant to sow chaos, divert precious resources and paralyze military mobilization, were observed in Eastern Europe during Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine, a conflict that colors the Pentagon’s new 2023 Cyber Strategy. An unclassified summary of the document was made public Sept. 12.

“The United States is challenged by malicious cyber actors who seek to exploit our technological vulnerabilities and undermine our military’s competitive edge,” its introduction reads. “They target our critical infrastructure and endanger the American people. Defending against and defeating these cyber threats is a Department of Defense imperative.”

Defense officials have long considered China and Russia national security hazards. While China poses the most-serious and long-term threat, they say, Russia presents more-immediate concerns. Both countries wield serious cyber arsenals. An International Institute for Strategic Studies report in 2021 placed China and Russia in tier two of its cyber powerhouse rankings. The U.S. sat in first.

The strategy, which supersedes a 2018 version, describes China as a “broad and pervasive” cyber espionage threat, one capable of absconding with defense trade secrets and monitoring U.S. citizens. It further labels Russia an online manipulator and harasser of critical infrastructure such as pipelines, hospitals and transportation.

RELATED

Pentagon to review zero-trust blueprints across military services

“We’ve got to flip the script here, given what we face here in 2023 and beyond,” Pentagon CIO John Sherman said at a cybersecurity conference.

“Cyber issues everywhere — in critical infrastructure, domestically and abroad — are something that’s front and center on the minds of our key senior leaders,” Gregory Touhill, a retired Air Force brigadier general and former federal chief information security officer, said Sept. 11 at a conference in National Harbor in Maryland. His comments came before the publication of the strategy’s summary.

“We continue to see critical infrastructure as a target for cyber-enabled attacks, including things like denial-of-service, malicious software, ransomware, theft of intellectual property,” he added. “We’re very concerned about that.”

The Pentagon’s strategy cleaves with the White House’s digital defense plans, which were rolled out in March. In them, the Biden administration vowed to employ “all instruments of national power” to disrupt and dismantle malicious cyber actors near and far.

Doing so will require significant collaboration with foreign governments, industry leaders and more.

“The nation’s constellation of diplomatic and defense relationships represents a foundational strategic advantage,” the Pentagon strategy reads. “In cyberspace, the capabilities of allies and partners combine with those of the United States to enable timely information sharing and interoperability as well as contribute to our collective security.”

About Colin Demarest

Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.

19. Who will be the president's top military adviser after Gen. Milley retires?

Excerpts:

If the Senate has not confirmed Milley’s successor by Oct. 1, Navy Adm. Christopher Grady will temporarily serve as both chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Army Col. David Butler, a spokesman for Milley.

Grady has served as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since December 2021. He is also the current holder of the service’s “Old Salt” award, recognizing him as the longest serving surface warfare officer on active duty in the Navy.

Who will be the president's top military adviser after Gen. Milley retires?

Congress provides civilian oversight of the military.

BY JEFF SCHOGOL | PUBLISHED SEP 12, 2023 3:33 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · September 12, 2023

The U.S. military could be without a Senate-confirmed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Army Gen. Mark Milley retires in little more than two weeks.

If the Senate has not confirmed Milley’s successor by Oct. 1, Navy Adm. Christopher Grady will temporarily serve as both chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Army Col. David Butler, a spokesman for Milley.

Grady has served as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since December 2021. He is also the current holder of the service’s “Old Salt” award, recognizing him as the longest serving surface warfare officer on active duty in the Navy.

Since February, Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) has blocked the Senate from using a parliamentary procedure that lawmakers routinely use to approve military promotions en masse rather than hold individual votes on every general and flag officer up for promotion. Voting on each promotion individually could take months, the Associated Press has reported.

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Tuberville’s hold is in protest of a Defense Department policy that covers the travel expenses of troops who need to travel out of care for reproductive care, including abortion.

Tuberville’s hold has prevented the Senate from voting to confirm Air Force Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown Jr. as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Brown is currently serving as the Air Force’s chief of staff.

Air Force Chief of Staff Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. addresses students from Air War College and Air Command and Staff College at Air University. (Trey Ward/U.S. Air Force)

As vice chairman, Grady already has a variety of responsibilities including leading the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, or JROC, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman.

During the Iraq war, the JROC determined how many Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles that each military branch would receive.

“So if you add the duties of the chairman of the joint chiefs, that’s a lot for a person to cover for an extended period of time,” Ryder said at a Pentagon news conference.

Over the summer, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and other defense officials spoke with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, including Sen. Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), as well as Tuberville on the issue of Milley’s departure, Ryder said.

“Secretary Austin continues to lean hard into this and plans to conduct additional calls with senators this week and will continue to speak out and urge Sen. Tuberville to lift his holds that are putting our readiness and our national security at risk,” Ryder said.

Tuberville appeared to be caught off guard on Monday when he learned that Milley could not remain chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff beyond Oct. 1.

In an exchange with CNN producer Morgan Rimmer, Tuberville said: “He has to leave? …We’ll get someone else to do the job.”

Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill on July 20, 2023 in Washington, DC. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Tuberville’s spokesman Steven Stafford told Task & Purpose on Tuesday that the senator is confident in Grady’s abilities to effectively advise Biden on military matters.

Stafford noted that Tuberville made a speech on Monday calling for senators to hold a vote this month on Brown’s promotion.

“Coach is willing to vote on all of the nominees,” Stafford said, referencing Tuberville’s career as a college football coach prior to joining the Senate.

Brown’s nomination to replace Milley is the highest profile of more than 300 nominations Tuberville has blocked so far.

Should the Senate not confirm Brown by Oct. 1, he would remain Air Force chief of staff, an Air Force spokesperson said.

If Brown were to move up the position of Chairman, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin has been nominated to replace Brown as Air Force chief of staff. If the Senate votes to confirm Brown but not the other nominations that Tuberville is blocking, Allvin would serve as the Air Force’s acting chief of staff, the Air Force spokesperson said.

Tuberville’s hold has already prevented Army Gen. Randy George, Marine Gen. Eric Smith, and Navy Adm. Lisa Franchetti from becoming Army chief of staff, Marine Corps commandant, and chief of naval operations respectively. All three are currently dual hatted as acting service chiefs and vice chiefs.

Admiral Lisa Franchetti was nominated July 21, 2023, as Chief of Naval Operations. If Confirmed she would be the first woman to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force wrote a recent commentary in the Washington Post arguing that Tuberville’s hold on promotions is putting U.S. national security at risk.

“The generals and admirals who will be leading our forces a decade from now are colonels and captains today,” the service secretaries wrote. “They are watching this spectacle and might conclude that their service at the highest ranks of our military is no longer valued by members of Congress or, by extension, the American public.”

By holding up the nominations of hundreds of general and flag officers for political reasons, Tuberville is harming civil-military relations, said Risa Brooks, a political science professor at Marquette University in Wisconsin.

Tuberville’s actions are also a distraction from Congress’ responsibility to provide civilian oversight of the U.S. military, Brooks told Task & Purpose.

“If the issue was that those being held up for promotion, there was some indication that they weren’t competent or weren’t worthy of those promotions, that might be one reason to hold them up, and maybe that would be consistent with civilian oversight of the military,” Brooks said. “But holding up the promotions over DoD policies that you don’t like, when those officers are not implicated or involved in making those policies, is really inappropriate and contrary to the civilian oversight role.”

Moreover, Congress has been unable to affirm the suitability of the officers currently leading the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps as a result of Tuberville’s actions, said Kori Schake, head of foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute think tank in Washington, D.C.

As a senator, Tuberville can propose legislation to change the Defense Department policy to which he objects, said Schake, who co-authored a book with retired Marine Gen. James Mattis on the civil-military divide.

“Using the politicization of the military to object to a policy is terrible for the military’s relationship to the political leadership, and it’s terrible for the military’s relationship with the American public,” Schake told Task & Purpose.

Tuberville’s blanket hold on military promotions is unprecedented in its scope and how long it has lasted, said Peter Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University in North Carolina.

“Senate confirmation of senior military officers is an important exercise of civilian oversight of the military, but the system is not designed to function in this way – and hobbling the military and military readiness in this way is not the best way to maintain effective civilian control,” Feaver Task & Purpose.

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• Marine vet charged with false Purple Heart claim, benefits fraud
• Three Navy SEAL commanders face charges in Hell Week death

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · September 12, 2023

20. New DOD cyber strategy notes limits of digital deterrence

​Excerpts:

Additionally, for the first time, the 2023 strategy commits the department to building partner cyber capacity.

“Distinct from previous iterations of the DOD cyber strategy, this strategy commits to building the cyber capability of global allies and partners and to increase our collective resilience against cyberattack,” Eoyang said. “Allies and partners are a strategic advantage that no competitor can match.”

New DOD cyber strategy notes limits of digital deterrence

The 2023 DOD cyber strategy, for the first time, has been informed by real-world operations by both the U.S. and others.

BY

MARK POMERLEAU

SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · September 12, 2023

Cyber effects alone have proved to be ineffective deterrents of malicious activity, according to the Department of Defense’s new cyber strategy.

The Pentagon on Tuesday released an unclassified summary of its 2023 cyber strategy, the first update since 2018. A fact sheet about the document was previously unveiled in May when the blueprint was delivered to Congress.

One of the key developments since the 2018 iteration was rolled out is the observation of real-world military cyber operations, both by the United States — mainly U.S. Cyber Command — and throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The 2018 strategy first articulated the concept of “defend forward,” which involves the Pentagon’s digital warriors operating on networks outside the United States in order to confront threats before they ever reach domestic networks — which Cybercom achieves through persistent engagement, or challenging adversary activities daily and wherever they operate.

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However, prior to 2018, the DOD conducted a surprisingly limited number of actual cyber ops. This was a key driver of the development of the persistent engagement concept, which sources have referred to as a counter remedy to inaction given there was previously too much bias for inaction. Following new authorities from the executive branch and Congress, Cybercom was able to operate more frequently in cyberspace and gain more experience.

“The 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy is grounded in real-world experience. Since 2018, the Department has conducted a significant number of cyberspace operations through its policy of defending forward, actively disrupting malicious cyber activity before it can affect the U.S. Homeland,” the strategy states. “This strategy is further informed by Russia’s 2022 war on Ukraine, which has seen a significant use of cyber capabilities during armed conflict. In this saturated cyber battlefield, military operations conducted by states and non-state proxies have collided with the cyber defense efforts of numerous private sector actors. The conflict has demonstrated the character of war in the cyber domain. Its lessons will shape the maturation of our cyber capabilities.”

The document notes that DOD’s “experiences have shown that cyber capabilities held in reserve or employed in isolation render little deterrent effect on their own. Instead, these military capabilities are most effective when used in concert with other instruments of national power, creating a deterrent greater than the sum of its parts.”

“The strategy draws from our experience conducting offensive and defensive operations. It’s also informed by DOD’s close observation of the Russia-Ukraine war and the integration of cyber into large-scale military operations. Which is to say, this is not an aspirational document, it reflects hard won lessons and truths,” Mieke Eoyang, deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, told reporters Tuesday during a briefing at the Pentagon.

She noted that one the main lessons from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that cyber is not decisive by itself and must be used in concert with other military capabilities.

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“I think prior to this conflict, there was a sense that cyber would have a much more decisive impact in warfare than what we experienced,” she explained. “What this conflict is showing us is the importance of integrated cyber capabilities in and alongside other warfighting capabilities. And that is consistent with the approach in the [National Defense Strategy] on integrated deterrence and is an important lesson for us to think about that cyber is a capability that is best used in concert with those others and may be of limited utility when used all by itself.”

Overall, the new strategy remains largely unchanged from its 2018 predecessor, highlighting many of the same tenants such as take action in cyberspace during day-to-day competition with adversaries; collaborate with interagency, industry and international partners; increase the resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure; and build trusted private sector partnerships, among others.

Major advancements since 2018 includes “hunt-forward” operations. These involve physically sending defensively oriented cyber protection teams from U.S. Cyber Command’s Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) to foreign countries to hunt for threats on their networks at the invitation of host nations.

“Since 2018, the Department has regularly worked with our Allies and partners to help identify vulnerabilities on their government-operated networks. These operations and assessments, conducted by USCYBERCOM, have aided U.S. cybersecurity preparedness, contributed to the warfighting capability of the Joint Force, and established or enhanced strong information-sharing relationships with a number of nations, including Ukraine,” the new strategy states. “They have also bolstered the cyber resilience of Allies and partners by exposing hostile [tactics, techniques and procedures] and malware. We will continue to conduct these operations in the years ahead, illuminating adversary actions in cyberspace and frustrating the designs of malicious cyber actors. Our efforts will bolster collective cybersecurity and improve relationships with Allies and partners.”

Cybercom on Tuesday announced its second hunt-forward operation in Lithuania in so many years.

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Additionally, for the first time, the 2023 strategy commits the department to building partner cyber capacity.

“Distinct from previous iterations of the DOD cyber strategy, this strategy commits to building the cyber capability of global allies and partners and to increase our collective resilience against cyberattack,” Eoyang said. “Allies and partners are a strategic advantage that no competitor can match.”

In This Story

• cyber
• cyber strategy

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · September 12, 2023

21. America’s Current Nuclear Arsenal Was Built for a More Benign World

Excerpts:

The current U.S. nuclear arsenal was designed for a world in which Russia did not have 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, did not invade its neighbors, or threaten NATO states with nuclear strikes. It was also meant for a world in which China would follow American leadership toward nuclear disarmament—not build nuclear weapons to reach parity.

To be blunt, the current U.S. arsenal is insufficient to deter our enemies. China and Russia are on the march, and if America does not build the arsenal needed to ensure peace, it will suffer the consequences.

America’s Current Nuclear Arsenal Was Built for a More Benign World

By Robert Peters

September 13, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/09/13/americas_current_nuclear_arsenal_was_built_for_a_more_benign_world_979195.html?mc_cid=34830e04ba

In April 2010, President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Under that agreement, Russia, and the United States both committed to cut strategic nuclear weapons from 2,200 warheads to 1,550, and both leaders promised to begin work on a follow-on treaty that would cut the arsenals of each country even deeper.

New START was seen as the beginning of a new era of arms control. President Obama remarked, “Going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons.” Some national security professionals even anticipated that future treaties would include China.

Later that year, President Obama struck a deal with then-Senator Jon Kyl to modernize America’s nuclear arsenal, including upgrades to delivery systems, platforms, and warheads, as well as improvements to the infrastructure needed to produce the fissile material that creates a nuclear yield.

The assumption was that, with this modernization program, the nuclear arsenal would remain adequate to deal with a benign security environment. The world, however, turned out differently than expected.

After ratifying New START, the Russians refused to negotiate a follow-on treaty. Consequently, both strategic arsenals remained at New START levels, and both parties were free to expand their non-strategic arsenals. Meanwhile, despite repeated overtures, China remained uninterested in nuclear arms control talks.

In subsequent years, Russia’s invasions of Ukraine presented new security challenges—particularly as Moscow moved nuclear weapons into Belarus and threatened NATO allies with nuclear strikes. China’s threats to neighboring states across the western Pacific were also significant, destabilizing the region and raising concerns about a broader Pacific war.

Russia and China, of course, were expanding their nuclear arsenals and capabilities the whole time. Moscow, for example, has spent the last decade multiplying its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons and is now fielding nuclear-capable theater-range cruise missiles.

So, how are things going for the U.S. nuclear modernization effort?

According to a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the Department of Energy’s ability to produce plutonium pits—the explosive material needed to create nuclear detonations—is four years behind schedule and may cost three times the original estimate.

The Sentinel missile, which is meant to replace the Minuteman III nuclear missile, is also struggling. According to GAO, “Sentinel is behind schedule due to staffing shortfalls, delays with clearance processing, and classified information technology infrastructure challenges.”

Likewise, the Columbia-class missile submarine, which is supposed to replace the Ohio-class submarine, “remains behind on producing design products—in particular, work instructions that detail how to build the submarine.”

While there are some bright spots—for example, the B-21 Raider bomber, intended to replace the B-2 bomber, is on track and Congress wisely chose to insert funding for the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile into the defense budget—the grim reality is that the U.S. modernization effort is lagging.

To deter increasingly aggressive and nuclear-armed China and Russia and to hedge against an uncertain future, the United States needs to build a nuclear arsenal that is larger and more diverse than what was planned on in the wake of the 2010 New START agreement.

More specifically, the United States should:

• Prepare to place more than one warhead on delivery vehicles of the ballistic missile force. The Defense Department should lay the groundwork to upload additional nuclear weapons onto the ICBM force to pre–New START levels.
• Examine the utility of a nuclear anti-ship missile. A long-range anti-ship nuclear capability would give the President more nuclear response options in the face of an adversary using nuclear weapons, thereby better deterring adversary nuclear strikes.
• Examine the feasibility of making the Sentinel ICBM road mobile. Given the expansion of adversary intercontinental nuclear capabilities and that U.S. ballistic missile submarines may no longer be undetectable, an additional second-strike capability in the form of road-mobile ICBMs would go a long way to reduce risk by creating significant targeting challenges for U.S. adversaries.
• Consider fielding road-mobile, theater-range, land-attack nuclear missiles. The ability to strike adversary targets with road-mobile theater-range weapons would help to hold adversary targets at risk, thereby complicating adversary targeting calculus.

The current U.S. nuclear arsenal was designed for a world in which Russia did not have 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, did not invade its neighbors, or threaten NATO states with nuclear strikes. It was also meant for a world in which China would follow American leadership toward nuclear disarmament—not build nuclear weapons to reach parity.

To be blunt, the current U.S. arsenal is insufficient to deter our enemies. China and Russia are on the march, and if America does not build the arsenal needed to ensure peace, it will suffer the consequences.

Robert Peters is Research Fellow for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Center for National Defense at The Heritage Foundation.

22. After the Attack: A Playbook for Continuity of the Economy Planning and Implementation

EXSUM is below.

Download the entire memo here:

https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/fdd-memo-cote.pdf\

September 13, 2023 | Memo

After the Attack

A Playbook for Continuity of the Economy Planning and Implementation

Mark Harvey

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

CCTI Senior Director and Senior Fellow

fdd.org · · September 13, 2023

Note: Memo authors join chairman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY), executive chairman of Southern Company Tom Fanning, and CCTI Chair Dr. Samantha Ravich at an FDD event on September 13, 2023. (Watch here.)

Executive Summary

The strength of a nation’s economy shapes its military power, national security, and international influence. In a conflict, an adversary is likely to attack the U.S. economy in an attempt to undermine America’s ability to mobilize military forces, generate economic power, and exercise other policy options. Recognizing the devastation that cyberattacks and other adversarial action, as well as natural disasters, could have on the U.S. economy and defense industrial base, the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the president to develop a Continuity of the Economy (COTE) plan to “maintain and restore the economy” in the wake of just such an event.

Sen. Angus King (I-ME) and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI), chairmen of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, wrote in their letter accompanying the commission’s groundbreaking March 2020 report that the concept of COTE not only serves as a guide for restoring economic functions, but it is also “a fundamental pillar of deterrence—a way to tell our adversaries that we, as a society, will survive to defeat them with speed and agility if they launch a major cyberattack against us.” Congress adopted the NDAA provision on COTE because of the commission’s clear-eyed warning.

In August 2023, the executive branch belatedly delivered its response to Congress — as a report and not as a plan or even a plan for a plan. The report is an exploration of existing policies and frameworks relevant to COTE, yet it does not determine how these should be updated or improved.

Among the critical shortcomings of the administration’s report is the missed opportunity to engage the private sector more effectively in the COTE process. Sustaining vital economic functions during a crisis requires a collaborative effort with private sector partners who provide nearly all critical economic services. This collaboration is often secondary in other disaster recovery planning efforts but is essential for COTE. The administration’s report fails to acknowledge this, instead concluding that COTE requirements are already addressed in existing plans. Yet elsewhere, the administration’s report notes that these existing plans do not specifically address recovery of the economy or the critical role of the private sector in that endeavor.

The report’s executive summary is even dismissive of Congress’ intent, determining that a COTE plan may be duplicative and could create confusion. While it is true that the federal government has robust emergency planning and response frameworks, those plans are effectively silent on how to restore the economy. A dedicated COTE program would harmonize existing plans, determine how and when to invoke existing authorities, and ensure the public-private collaboration necessary to restore the economy. Just as the nation spends enormous amounts of time and money every year ensuring that the U.S. armed forces can be called upon at any time, the federal government also needs to ensure that it can act swiftly — in partnership with the private sector — in the event of a major economic disruption. Planning for this “on the fly” invites failure.

Furthermore, while this memo agrees with the administration that existing emergency response frameworks should include economic recovery, the administration’s report neither establishes a process nor assigns responsibility to a specific individual or agency to ensure this integration happens. In short, there is no one in charge of ensuring federal agencies update their plans to acknowledge this growing challenge, and many plans are a decade old.

This memo is more forward leaning and presents a playbook to address these gaps, offering recommendations for a robust COTE governance structure. In a crisis, the White House (through the National Security Council) will oversee response and recovery efforts and leverage unique presidential authorities to mobilize the public and private sector resources necessary to enable economic continuity. This memo recommends that the White House homeland security advisor should lead these efforts, serving as national COTE coordinator. The national COTE coordinator will need an industry counterpart — a senior executive from a key critical infrastructure sector able to foster the necessary cross-sector coordination. With private industry holding many of the levers needed to restart the economy, this industry COTE liaison must be seamlessly integrated into decision making.

The national COTE coordinator and industry COTE liaison will need to draw on federal government and private sector actors to perform the day-to-day planning and operational support work. Specifically, this requires a national COTE manager to lead the planning, conduct the exercises, maintain situational awareness, and sustain the necessary relationships between federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators on a routine basis. This person can also hold federal agencies accountable for adding COTE requirements into existing plans and reviewing and updating plans on a regular cycle. The COTE effort will need to leverage the resources and expertise of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) National Risk Management Center as well as the industry-specific expertise of the federal agencies that serve as sector risk management agencies. It will also need to leverage existing, well-functioning mechanisms for public-private collaboration like the industry-led sector coordinating councils and their federal counterparts, the government coordinating councils.

In addition to outlining these roles, this memo’s playbook explains how to set up a COTE program, engage stakeholders, identify critical functions, and conduct exercises to develop and test iterative COTE plans.

Attempted cyberattacks against key pillars of the U.S. economy are already a daily occurrence, and China and Russia are reportedly currently installing malware intended to put critical infrastructures at risk in a contingency. The federal government therefore must plan for the eventuality of a successful, widespread cyber or physical attack on lifeline sectors of the American economy. Improving U.S. national resilience, to include effective COTE preparations and planning, will help ensure the nation can quickly recover and respond to any attack.

23. President Biden’s Military Blockade

​There are two sides fighting the phony culture war because both sides think there are political benefits to doing so

President Biden’s Military Blockade

He threatens to veto a defense bill over culture wars, not real wars.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-biden-defense-bill-veto-house-republicans-military-pentagon-china-3a985ff6

By The Editorial Board

Sept. 12, 2023 6:34 pm ET

The Pentagon in Arlington, Va. PHOTO: DANIEL SLIM/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By now you’ve seen headlines that the House GOP is descending into dysfunction, but a rump of Republicans aren’t the only intransigents in Washington. The White House is firing off veto threats about a GOP military spending bill, which is rich considering how the Biden crowd claims to be focused on deterring China.

The White House on Monday issued a veto threat for the House Republican Pentagon spending bill, which is moving through the lower chamber this week. As part of the debt-ceiling deal, the GOP agreed to cap defense at Mr. Biden’s $886 billion request, even as many Republicans think the military needs more to deal with proliferating world problems.

The Biden Administration now says it “strongly opposes” the GOP bill because Republicans dared to exert Congress’s prerogatives. The bill blocks funding for a Pentagon policy that offers leave and transportation expenses for service members traveling to get an abortion. That unilateral Biden policy is not, as the White House claims, “in full accordance with the law,” and it has served mainly as an accelerant to America’s cultural wars.

The White House also objects to provisions on climate change. But the House is controlled by Republicans, so Mr. Biden will have to deign to negotiate with a co-equal branch.

The House bill isn’t perfect. The White House rightly objects that the bill doesn’t fund bulk buys of the Standard Missile-6 and an air-to-air missile. House appropriators are skeptical that contractors can deliver and think the block buys don’t save enough money.

But deeper stocks of excellent missiles are the best purchases America can make to raise the costs of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Buying parts in bulk now could help the U.S. surge production in a crisis. The Biden Administration could iron out these disagreements in an eventual House-Senate conference without a public veto showdown.

The budget debate in Washington is increasingly detached from world reality. China is amassing “the largest military buildup since World War II,” as the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific command has said. Mr. Biden’s Air Force Secretary said this week that the U.S. “must be ready for a kind of war we have no modern experience with.”

He’s right, and the public needs to hear that message. But Americans won’t believe it if they see the Biden White House subordinating that priority to a fight over elective abortion or other cultural cudgels.

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House Republicans passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on July 14, 2023 after a debate that highlighted military priorities versus cultural issues. Images: Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly

24. Chinese Warships Gather in Sign of Major Naval Exercises

Chinese Warships Gather in Sign of Major Naval Exercises

Shandong aircraft carrier among Chinese vessels spotted sailing toward Pacific Ocean following U.S. drills in the region

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/chinese-warships-gather-in-sign-of-major-naval-exercises-3930ec12

By Alastair Gale

Follow

Updated Sept. 12, 2023 11:00 pm ET

A helicopter took off from a Chinese aircraft carrier in waters off Japan on April 15. PHOTO: DEFENSE MINISTRY OF JAPAN/VIA REUTERS

TOKYO—A Chinese aircraft carrier and around two dozen other Chinese warships were gathering in the western Pacific, according to authorities in Taiwan and Japan, an unusually large group suggesting Beijing may be planning major naval exercises.

The movement follows a flurry of U.S. military activity in the region, and comes as efforts by Washington and Beijing to improve relations appear to have lost momentum.

China has made no announcement about coming naval drills, but it has condemned a transit of the Taiwan Strait by a U.S. destroyer and Canadian frigate on Saturday. The U.S. held other naval exercises near China involving allies such as Japan and the Philippines in recent weeks.

The Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong sailed toward the western Pacific Ocean to the southeast of Taiwan on Monday for training, Taiwan’s military said. It also said it identified 20 Chinese warships around Taiwan, without giving further details.

Japan’s military said six Chinese destroyers and two Chinese frigates were spotted on Monday morning close to Japan and monitored as they sailed southeast between the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako into the Pacific Ocean.

On Wednesday morning, China sent at least 35 warplanes out on sorties near Taiwan, with some joining the Shandong for training exercises, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said.

“The Shandong undoubtedly poses a new threat” to Taiwan, Gen. Huang Wen-chi, the assistant deputy chief of general staff for intelligence for Taiwan’s military, said at a Tuesday news conference in Taipei, noting that the aircraft carrier has been paired with new large destroyers.

On Saturday, the guided-missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson and Royal Canadian Navy frigate HMCS Ottawa sailed through the Taiwan Strait, according to the U.S. military, in a so-called freedom-of-navigation operation.

China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, scrambled air and naval forces to monitor the U.S. and Canadian ships, according to a spokesman for the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command.

Guided-missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson in the Taiwan Strait on Sept. 9. PHOTO: MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST 1ST CLASS JAMAAL LIDDELL/U.S. NAVY/ASSOCIATED PRESS

“Troops in the theater remain on high alert at all times, resolutely safeguarding national sovereignty and security as well as regional peace and stability,” the spokesman said.

China views transits by American and other warships of the Taiwan Strait, a channel about 100 miles wide that separates Taiwan from the Chinese mainland, as particularly provocative. In June, the U.S. accused a Chinese destroyer of sailing dangerously close to a U.S. warship as it traveled through the waterway.

The USS Ralph Johnson also conducted a joint exercise with a Philippine navy ship in the South China Sea last week, according to the U.S. military. In August, the U.S., Japan, Australia and the Philippines held joint naval exercises in the South China Sea, a region that China claims broad ownership of.

Chinese coast guard ships also have sought to block efforts by the Philippines to reach a contested reef in the South China Sea in recent days, further raising tensions in the region.

The Chinese military conducted major naval exercises to the east of Taiwan in April after a visit to the U.S. by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. Those drills also included the Shandong, one of China’s two operational aircraft carriers.

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For decades, Taiwan has looked to its east coast as a safe haven to survive a Chinese invasion until allies, particularly the U.S., can arrive to assist. But PLA activity around the island’s east has thrown that strategy into question. Illustration: Adam Adada

Washington has pushed to improve communication between the U.S. and Chinese militaries as part of an effort to stabilize ties that had been in free fall over issues ranging from technology and espionage to Taiwan, which Beijing claims as a part of China.

Chinese leaders have resisted U.S. overtures on setting up military-to-military crisis hotlines, arguing that agreeing to such channels would encourage more U.S. military activity in areas China considers its domain.

Lately, Beijing has also appeared to cool on Washington’s efforts to improve other areas of the relationship. China has decided not to send its foreign minister to an annual United Nations meeting of government leaders later this month, The Wall Street Journal reported. That could complicate monthslong efforts to arrange a meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and President Biden at a summit of Asian-Pacific leaders in San Francisco in November.

Earlier this month, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security issued an unusual statement on social media hinting that Xi might skip the meeting in San Francisco unless the U.S. shows “sufficient sincerity.”

Joyu Wang contributed to this article.

Write to Alastair Gale at alastair.gale@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the September 13, 2023, print edition as 'Chinese Warships Gather In Pacific'.

25. Are Ukraine’s tactics working?

Excerpts:

In recent weeks Ukraine has made faster progress in the south by piercing the first of Russia’s three defensive lines in Zaporizhia around the village of Robotyne, widening the resulting salient by pressing east to Verbove and then attacking towards the village of Novoprokopivka (see map). Russia has been forced to commit key reserves from its 76th air assault division; but it has been able to commit them because Ukraine threw in its own in August.

It is not clear how much fresh manpower either side has left. Rates of attrition appear to favour Ukraine over Russia, but sources suggest that Russia can probably still scrape together enough reserves to plug holes. “Unless there is a collapse of Russian lines, the battles we have seen for the past three months are the ones we will likely continue to see over the next few months,” concludes Mr Muzyka, who argues that only the deployment of larger formations, beyond Ukraine’s capacity, would speed things up. Dozens of Western officials consulted by The Economist are also sceptical that a major breakthrough will come before winter. “We’ve got to extend our timeline,” says one of them. “This could be a very long struggle.” 

Are Ukraine’s tactics working?

Slow progress on the battlefield prompts quarrels over strategy

Sep 12th 2023 | KYIV AND WASHINGTON, DC

The Economist

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

DMYTRO KULEBA, Ukraine’s foreign minister, is a smooth and affable diplomat, unruffled by the trickiest questions. But on August 31st his patience snapped. “Criticising the slow pace of the counter-offensive equals…spitting into the face of the Ukrainian soldier who sacrifices his life every day,” he told journalists. “I would recommend all critics to shut up, come to Ukraine and try to liberate one square centimetre by themselves.” That outburst was prompted by weeks of stories in the American press, in which anonymous officials took issue with Ukraine’s slow progress on the battlefield and questioned its military tactics. The row is unseemly. But is Ukraine’s approach working?

Allied debates over strategy are hardly unusual. American and British officials worked closely with Ukraine in the months before it launched its counter-offensive in June. They gave intelligence and advice, conducted detailed war gaming to simulate how different attacks might play out and helped design and train the brigades that received the lion’s share of Western equipment. Even so, Ukraine—stung by a big leak of American intelligence documents unearthed in April—kept its own counsel. It delayed the start of the offensive and held plans close to its chest.

One big point of contention was Ukraine’s earlier decision, over the first half of the year, to keep fighting for Bakhmut, a town in the eastern Donbas region that has limited strategic significance but became a potent symbol of resistance. Ukraine’s decision to defend the town at all costs had a “big influence” on the subsequent counter-offensive, argues Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting, a firm that tracks the war. Ukraine burned through its stockpile of shells, a problem mitigated only by South Korea’s decision to supply more via America, while Russia gained time to build up its formidable defences in the south—the so-called Surovikin line, named after a now-fired Russian general.

Quarrels persisted even after the counter-offensive began. American officials had encouraged Ukraine to concentrate its forces on the main axis of attack in the south, towards the Sea of Azov. Instead Ukraine split its forces with the aim of stretching the Russians over a longer front. The most experienced brigades, armed mostly with older gear, were kept in Bakhmut, where they are making modest progress on the town’s flanks. One source says that politics is playing an unhelpful role in military strategy, with well-connected brigades around Bakhmut getting a larger share of scarce ammunition than military considerations alone might warrant.

Meanwhile Ukraine deployed less experienced brigades on the more important southern axis, armed with newer kit. They quickly became bogged down in dense minefields covered by Russian artillery, drones and helicopters. Untested commanders made a series of mistakes, such as running into friendly mines and mistiming attacks. “If more experienced Ukrainian brigades were given the new equipment, they may not have committed many of the errors the new brigades made,” write Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, both experts on Russia’s armed forces, in an essay for War on the Rocks, an online journal.

Some blame for early missteps lies with those who helped plan the counter-offensive. In a recent paper Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a think-tank in London, argue that the assault relied in part on outdated assumptions that did not take into account the threat from new sorts of sensors and drones. They conclude: “Much of the data supporting the tactics that Ukraine’s international partners sought to train Ukrainian forces to adopt was based on operational analysis from the 20th century that did not contend with a range of technologies employed in Ukraine.” Russian fortifications were also far more substantial than Western planners assumed.

Wherever the fault lies, it is clear that something went wrong. “It seems that Kyiv had no contingency plans that could be quickly implemented in case the attack stalled,” notes Mr Muzyka. Eventually Ukrainian commanders decided to hold back their heavy armour and switch to a simpler approach. Groups of sappers, often crawling on their bellies, now clear minefields by hand. Platoons and companies, rather than brigades, fight tree line to tree line, advancing on foot so as to present a smaller target. This has helped limit losses of men and equipment, but allows only 700 to 1,200 metres of progress every five days, notes the RUSI paper, giving Russian troops time to “reset” their defences (the rate may have picked up a little of late).

That leads to two debates. One is whether Ukrainian commanders have been too risk-averse. Some Western officials argue that if Ukraine had stuck with bolder and larger-scale attacks, as planned, they would have taken higher casualties at first but had more luck breaking through Russian lines, shortening the offensive and reducing the overall toll. Ukrainian officials retort that this would only have led to more bloodshed, and that officers could not expect a heavily depleted citizen army to mimic Russian human-wave attacks.

A second debate is whether Ukraine should emulate a Western way of war or carve out its own path. Western armed forces prize the idea of combined-arms manoeuvre, in which armoured forces synchronise their movement with infantry, artillery, air defence and (increasingly) electronic and cyber attacks. The five weeks of pre-offensive training given to Ukrainian troops in Germany was not nearly enough to make them proficient in this sort of warfare.

“The Ukrainians are still tied to Soviet doctrine,” complains an American official. Heavy artillery barrages, in place of more judicious and precise attacks, are one source of tension, not least because America is playing the lead role in sourcing ammunition for Ukrainian guns. “It’s going to take time for their mindset…and tactics to change,” says the official.

In fact the Ukrainian approach is fit for purpose, says B.A. Friedman, a retired artillery officer in the US Marine Corps and author of a book on military tactics. In the spring of 1918, after years of stalemate on the western front of the first world war, the German army realised that large units were too vulnerable to artillery fire. Their solution was smaller, nimbler and well-drilled “storm troopers” who could cross enemy lines and grab territory, with heavier units moving up later. “Since Ukraine doesn’t have the ability to use air power on any kind of relevant scale, it makes total sense to solve the problem the way it was solved before air power matured,” says Mr Friedman. Many European officers acknowledge that their own better trained and equipped armies would struggle to break the Surovikin line.

Fighting about fighting

American officials are not well placed to offer lessons on tactical best practice, says Mr Friedman. The bulk of their recent experience of combat has been in mountainous or desert areas where small units cannot take advantage of cover to advance in this way. The two main training centres for America’s ground forces, the army’s site at Fort Irwin and the marines’ location at Twentynine Palms, are both in Californian desert environments, he points out. “US forces have very little experience facing anything like what Ukraine is facing, whether in combat or in training.”

The problem is: nor does Ukraine. Mr Watling and Mr Reynolds argue that attrition of officers and the dramatic expansion of Ukraine’s army over the past 18 months mean that it lacks sufficient junior leaders with expertise in offensive operations. The result, they say, is that decisions are thrown up to more senior officers, overwhelming brigade headquarters that already have a lot on their plate.

image: The Economist

They give the example of a Ukrainian attack on the village of Rivnopil in Donetsk province earlier in the summer. Attackers are supposed to release smoke to cover their movement and confuse the enemy. But only 3% of Ukraine’s artillery-fire missions involved smoke—in part because senior commanders did not want to obscure their own view of the battle from drones circling overhead. The lesson is that Ukraine needs more junior officers who can be trusted to take the initiative even when their bosses cannot watch from afar.

The quality of training is important, too. Western training facilities are hobbled by a “safety culture in NATO”, argue Mr Watling and Mr Reynolds. Drones are central to Ukraine’s tactics, allowing artillery units to spot targets and infantry to perform reconnaissance. Yet most NATO training areas impose tight restrictions on when and how drones may be flown, for fear they will veer off course. Safety rules also mean that artillery skills are typically taught later in courses. But in Ukraine “troops who are not prepared to deal with artillery are not prepared for the fight,” write the RUSI analysts. Europe’s health and safety rules are not a good fit for a war of national survival.

Most of these issues will not be resolved during the current counter-offensive. Ukraine will eventually need to reintroduce mechanised and armoured forces if it is to exploit any breakthroughs. That could get easier: minefields are less dense beyond the first line of defence. It is thought to have enough ammunition to fight through the autumn. But on September 10th Mark Milley, America’s top general, said that Ukraine probably had 30 to 45 days of combat left before rain and mud would make it too difficult for vehicles to advance.

In recent weeks Ukraine has made faster progress in the south by piercing the first of Russia’s three defensive lines in Zaporizhia around the village of Robotyne, widening the resulting salient by pressing east to Verbove and then attacking towards the village of Novoprokopivka (see map). Russia has been forced to commit key reserves from its 76th air assault division; but it has been able to commit them because Ukraine threw in its own in August.

It is not clear how much fresh manpower either side has left. Rates of attrition appear to favour Ukraine over Russia, but sources suggest that Russia can probably still scrape together enough reserves to plug holes. “Unless there is a collapse of Russian lines, the battles we have seen for the past three months are the ones we will likely continue to see over the next few months,” concludes Mr Muzyka, who argues that only the deployment of larger formations, beyond Ukraine’s capacity, would speed things up. Dozens of Western officials consulted by The Economist are also sceptical that a major breakthrough will come before winter. “We’ve got to extend our timeline,” says one of them. “This could be a very long struggle.” ■

The Economist

26. De-dollarization Dreams: Why the US Dollar Won’t Bow Out

Excerpts:

As highlighted by Russian frustrations over receiving payment in Indian rupees for oil exports, conversion challenges are evident when settling trade in local currencies. China, with its vast economic clout, could step in as the “BRICS paymaster,” but this poses its own set of problems, especially when it comes to liquidity support for countries in distress.

While the discourse around de-dollarization gains momentum, particularly with the strategic expansion of BRICS, the U.S. dollar’s preeminence remains largely unchallenged. Economic realities, intertwined geopolitics, and the sheer inertia of existing financial systems ensure the dollar’s place remains secure, at least for the foreseeable future. The ebb and flow of global currencies will always persist, but pronouncing the decline of the dollar seems premature at best.

De-dollarization Dreams: Why the US Dollar Won’t Bow Out

While the discourse around de-dollarization gains momentum, particularly with the strategic expansion of BRICS, the U.S. dollar’s preeminence remains largely unchallenged.

By Shaoyu Yuan

September 13, 2023

thediplomat.com · by Shaoyu Yuan · September 13, 2023

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The world of international finance has been abuzz with discussions of de-dollarization. Recent events such as the BRICS expansion and increasing narratives hinting at the decline of the U.S. dollar’s dominance in global trade have dominated news headlines.

But if one digs deeper beyond the sensationalism and examines the empirical evidence, the longevity of the U.S. dollar’s dominance becomes apparent. It will continue to play a central role in global finance.

Recent news from the BRICS summit in South Africa has ignited a renewed debate on de-dollarization, especially with Saudi Arabia, a major oil producer, joining the club. The energy dominance of BRICS seems to be on an upward trajectory, with its members accounting for an estimated 42 percent of global crude oil output once the announced new members – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – are incorporated.

The question then emerges: Is the U.S. dollar’s dominance waning?

Let’s dig a little deeper into the dynamics. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is responsible for over 17 percent of global crude oil exports, most of which head toward Asia, particularly BRICS nations China and India. With BRICS pushing for de-dollarization, speculation is rife that Saudi Arabia may switch to non-dollar-denominated currencies for its oil trade, particularly with these two nations.

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However, the Saudi riyal’s peg to the U.S. dollar has been a formidable barrier against such a shift. Moreover, despite the clamor, concrete steps toward such a switch have been sparse.

It’s also crucial to note that energy constitutes merely 15 percent of global trade. Even if Saudi Arabia were to alter its oil export invoicing, it’s unlikely to signal the end of the dollar as the favored international currency. Moreover, the increasing trade interconnectedness between the core and newly invited BRICS nations suggests that economic motivations, rather than just a push for de-dollarization, are at the heart of these alliances.

JPMorgan, one of the most respected names in global finance, has flagged signs of de-dollarization. Yet, its analysts also maintain that the dollar’s hegemony ultimately remains unthreatened in the foreseeable future. To understand this seeming paradox, we need to sift through the nuanced intricacies of their observations.

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While the dollar’s share in foreign exchange trading volumes stands impressively at 88 percent, and its role in trade invoicing remains stable, its portion in central bank reserves worldwide has declined to a record low of 58 percent. However, this is still a lion’s share when compared to other global currencies. Even as the BRICS nations, motivated in part by geopolitical tensions such as the Ukraine conflict, make concerted efforts to bypass the dollar in trade, the dollar’s overarching influence remains largely intact.

There are simply few alternatives to the U.S. dollar. China’s yuan, for example, constitutes a meager 7 percent of foreign exchange trading volume. The drive to internationalize the yuan, a potential successor to the dollar, faces significant barriers like China’s capital controls. Meanwhile, the euro’s share has dwindled, mostly attributed to a decade of ultra-low interest rates.

The recent 14th summit of the BRICS nations cast a revealing light on the challenges facing de-dollarization. Hopes of a common currency, which would have been a bold step toward reducing the dollar’s centrality, seemed to be shelved, at least for the time being. South Africa’s finance minister told reporters that “no one had tabled the issue of a BRICS currency, not even in informal meetings,” as doing so would involve “losing independence on monetary politics.”

Instead, BRICS’ emphasis was placed on bilateral clearing, which is fraught with its own set of challenges. Inherent problems arise with bilateral trade settlements. Imbalances in trade, which are inevitable over time, necessitate conversion into a universally accepted currency – precisely why the U.S. dollar is so widely used to begin with.

As highlighted by Russian frustrations over receiving payment in Indian rupees for oil exports, conversion challenges are evident when settling trade in local currencies. China, with its vast economic clout, could step in as the “BRICS paymaster,” but this poses its own set of problems, especially when it comes to liquidity support for countries in distress.

While the discourse around de-dollarization gains momentum, particularly with the strategic expansion of BRICS, the U.S. dollar’s preeminence remains largely unchallenged. Economic realities, intertwined geopolitics, and the sheer inertia of existing financial systems ensure the dollar’s place remains secure, at least for the foreseeable future. The ebb and flow of global currencies will always persist, but pronouncing the decline of the dollar seems premature at best.

GUEST AUTHOR

Shaoyu Yuan

Shaoyu Yuan is a distinguished researcher and a Ph.D. candidate in Global Affairs at Rutgers University, specializing in international relations dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region.

thediplomat.com · by Shaoyu Yuan · September 13, 2023

27. How China’s Belt and Road Took Over the World

How China’s Belt and Road Took Over the World

Mapping the BRI’s growth over its first 10 years – and its transformation from a Eurasian transit corridor to an initiative with global scope.

By Shannon Tiezzi

September 12, 2023

thediplomat.com · by Shannon Tiezzi · September 12, 2023

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On September 7, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan. Titled “Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt,” the address evoked the history of the ancient Silk Road, which Xi traced back to a Chinese envoy in the 2nd century BC.

The speech, as befitted its setting, was narrowly focused on China and Central Asia, with repeated references to historical ties. Xi’s original proposal was that China and its Eurasian neighbors “jointly build an economic belt along the Silk Road.” The original proposal, besides being geographically restricted, was also relatively narrow in its sectoral scope. Xi mentioned four areas for cooperation under the Silk Road Economic Belt: policy consultation, road connections, trade facilitation, and monetary circulation (trade in local currencies).

One month later, the Silk Road Economic Belt was joined by the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which Xi proposed during a similar speech before the Indonesian legislature. The Maritime Silk Road was also circumscribed in both geographic and thematic scope: Xi’s original pitch was limited to “maritime cooperation” with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Those were the humble roots of what became known jointly as “One Belt, One Road,” later rebranded into the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) in English (in Chinese, the One Belt, One Road / 一带一路 nomenclature stuck). Over time, the BRI grew far beyond the original vision to expand into almost every region of the world. As of the 10th anniversary of Xi’s speech in Kazakhstan, 154 countries had signed official documents on BRI cooperation with China, according to the official “Belt and Road Portal” website run by the Chinese government.

The sectors covered by the BRI had multiplied as well. When Xi described the still-evolving vision at the first Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, he still mentioned the original four pillars of policy connectivity, infrastructure connectivity (now expanded far beyond the original reference to “roads” to include railways, ports, pipelines, and digital infrastructure), trade facilitation, and financial connectivity (now including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, and other lending mechanisms in addition to the use of local currencies). Added to the mix was a new emphasis on “people-to-people connectivity” in the form of cultural and educational exchanges.

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The BRI has spawned even more subsets since then: the Digital Silk Road, the Polar Silk Road, the Health Silk Road, the Space Silk Road, and the Green Silk Road. Far from its targeted origins, today nearly any cooperation project China undertakes in any country around the world could conceivably be categorized as part of the Belt and Road.

Given the initiative’s enormous growth since September 2013, it’s worth looking at how the Belt and Road spread around the world.

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Where the BRI Stands Today

As of September 2023, there are 154 members of the BRI – 80 percent of the United Nations’ 193 member states. At this point, then, it’s easier to discuss who’s not in the BRI.

The holdouts stand out easily in the map above: all of North America, most of Western Europe, and a good part of South America.

Elsewhere in the world, the United States’ fellow Quad members – Australia, Japan, and India – have not joined up; all have their own deep concerns about China’s global ambitions. In the Middle East, close U.S. allies Jordan and Israel are the lone hold-outs. And then there are the 15 countries that don’t have diplomatic ties with China: Taiwan’s 13 remaining diplomatic allies, as well as Bhutan and Kosovo.

Perhaps the most curious omission is North Korea – ostensibly a close Chinese partner that is badly in need of the additional funding that would come from BRI membership. It’s possible that China simply saw extending Pyongyang an invite to join as a bad risk: little to gain and a lot to lose, given North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and heavily sanctioned status. (BRI member Iran is also a nuclear proliferation risk under heavy sanctions, but unlike North Korea it occupies a pivotal geographic location linking Central Asia and the Middle East.)

The regional breakdown shines some light on the regions where the BRI has found the most buy-in. Both Central Asia and Southeast Asia count every regional state as members; North America is the only region of the world where no state has joined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions also stand out, with over 90 percent of regional countries having signed BRI agreements with China.

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Given that so much of the BRI’s image is tied to lucrative infrastructure funding offers for member states, it’s unsurprising that there is a strong correlation between national wealth and BRI membership. High income countries are the least likely to join, with less than half (46 percent) having signed up. Upper middle income countries have a much higher rate of BRI membership, 79 percent. From there, the rate jumps astronomically, with over 90 percent of both lower middle and low income countries having joined.

In fact, there are just five lower middle and low income countries that have not signed up, and the reasons for each are obvious: Bhutan, Eswatini, and Haiti don’t have diplomatic relations with China; India has a deep distrust of Beijing (and resents that the BRI passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir); and North Korea, as discussed above, may be too much of a pariah even for China.

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How the BRI Got to Now

Just as interesting as where the Belt and Road stands after its first decade is the story of how it got there. The map below shows BRI member counts as of December 31 for each calendar year (aside from 2023, where data ends on September 11).

Things started out fairly slowly, with just five countries having signed BRI cooperation documents by the end of 2014. All of them are countries on what we can consider the original concept of the Belt and Road – transit points either by land or by sea linking China to Europe.

Things started to heat up in 2015, with 16 countries joining the Belt and Road. Again, the geographic scope is within the bounds of a China-Europe connection. Interestingly, eight European countries joined this year, most of them ahead of the China-Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) summit that was held in Suzhou in November of that year. This was the heyday of what was then known as the “16+1” format, with various countries in Central and Eastern Europe vying to be China’s “bridge to Europe.”

This also marked a major trend in BRI expansion: Many of these agreements would be signed in the immediate lead-up to a large regional summit. That, in turn, raises questions about just how much individual thought China was putting into each agreement, as opposed to rushing to grab as many signatories as possible to showcase at a major diplomatic event.

Without a big headlining summit, 2016 saw a return to modest expansion, with just five countries signing new agreements. By contrast, 31 countries would join in 2017 – a surge driven largely by the first Belt and Road Forum, held in Beijing that May. By the end of the year, nearly all of Central and Southeast Asia had signed on, with the exceptions of Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Central and Eastern Europe has also become a solid Belt and Road bloc, with more members from that region than from Africa as of the end of 2017.

It’s also important to note that, as of 2017, the BRI still largely followed the basic geographic focus first laid out in Xi’s addresses in Kazakhstan and Indonesia. Of the 58 states that had signed up to the Belt and Road by end of 2017, Panama and New Zealand are the only states not conceivably on a map of overland or maritime transit routes between China and Europe.

2018, however, would the year the BRI truly went global.

A whopping 67 countries signed BRI agreements that year, driven by two major summits: the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing and a summit of Pacific Island leaders on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Papua New Guinea. Those two events alone saw 38 countries join the BRI fold: 31 African states just before or after FOCAC 2018, and seven Pacific Island countries ahead of the summit in Papua New Guinea.

By this point, the BRI had lost all semblance of the original Eurasian connection, instead becoming a catch-all for China’s foreign policy in general. BRI members can be found throughout the Pacific Islands region, Central and South America, and across all of the African continent.

2019 was another good year for growth, thanks to China’s hosting of the second Belt and Road forum in May of that year. Fifteen states joined up, 10 of them in the lead-up to the big event.

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But things came skidding to a halt in 2020, thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, which closed China’s borders for nearly three years. The only addition to the Belt and Road in 2020 was Kiribati, which sneaked in just before the world shut down.

Kiribati’s President Taneti Maamau visited China on January 6, 2020 – the first such visit after Kiribati established ties with China in September 2019. This typifies another pattern of BRI growth: Since its announcement in 2013, countries that have cut ties with Taiwan tend to sign up to the Belt and Road as part of their diplomatic embrace of Beijing. Panama in 2017, the Dominican Republic in 2018, Solomon Islands in 2019, Kiribati in 2020, Nicaragua in 2022, and Honduras in 2023 all followed this trend.

Ahead of the FOCAC summit in 2021, China inked deals with most of the African countries that had been holding out; all seven of the countries to join that year are part of sub-Saharan Africa. Another five countries from around the world joined in 2022, and just one has signed up thus far in 2023.

The slow-down in growth is not surprising, given the simple fact that there are fewer countries that haven’t joined – and they mostly have good reasons for refusing and will be difficult to persuade.

Does the BRI’s Spread Matter?

The trillion dollar question remains: How much does it really matter when a country signs a BRI cooperation document? In one sense, of course it matters – such agreements are a handy barometer of countries that have a positive relationship with Beijing (or, at least, did at one point). In addition to foreign governments hoping for increased investment and trade flows from China, the symbolism of growing the BRI to the maximum extent clearly matters for Beijing. That’s added motivation for the signatories: If Beijing is pushing a partner government to sign on, they are likely to do so absent a pressing national interest pulling in the opposite direction (for example, India’s concerns about the BRI passing through disputed areas).

But BRI agreements are non-binding and of little value if not accompanied by actual project contracts. As discovered by Italy, which is reconsidering its membership in the BRI club, a cooperation document doesn’t always mean much in practice. Similarly, the CEE countries, some of the earliest members of the Belt and Road Initiative, have largely become disillusioned with China in general and the BRI in particular.

Indeed, data from the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT), published by the American Enterprise Institute, shows that the United States, Australia, Brazil, France, and Germany all were among the top investment destinations for China from 2013 to now – despite none having joined the BRI.

This is not to say the BRI is meaningless – far from it. The CGIT also tracked $564 billion in Chinese funding for construction and BRI-related projects from 2013 to 2023. AidData found that China outspends the United States by a 2-to-1 ratio on international development finance – a shift in the balance of global aid that largely occurred following the BRI’s launch in 2013. As Ana Horigoshi of AidData noted in her recent article for The Diplomat Magazine:

In the first five years of the BRI (2013-2017), China bankrolled an average of $83.5 billion a year in overseas development projects, a net increase of $31.3 billion per year on average over the five years prior (2008-2012). The net increase alone is equivalent to the total U.S. average yearly financing in the 2013-2017 period.

But not all BRI member countries are created equal, especially given that much of the raw funding is tied up in “mega projects” worth $500 million or more. AidData further found that “despite larger loans and expanded loan portfolios, BRI has not led to any major changes in the sectoral or geographical composition of China’s overseas development finance program.”

In other words, signing up to the BRI does not guarantee a major influx of Chinese investment or developing finance, nor does sitting outside the Belt and Road preclude benefiting from China’s outward cash flows. Chinese money is largely flowing to the same places and sectors as before the BRI – just in larger quantities.

In that sense, the growth of the BRI is perhaps best understood as symbolic: a picture of countries whose aspirations for their relationships with China outweigh their concerns. With that in mind, the BRI’s reach today is important, if only as a good reminder that the vast majority of the world is not interested in “decoupling” from China.

STAFF AUTHOR

Shannon Tiezzi

Shannon Tiezzi is Editor-in-Chief at The Diplomat.

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thediplomat.com · by Shannon Tiezzi · September 12, 2023

28.China unveils 'blueprint' for Taiwan integration while sending warships around the self-ruled island

China unveils 'blueprint' for Taiwan integration while sending warships around the self-ruled island | CNN

CNN · by Nectar Gan,Eric Cheung · September 13, 2023

Hong Kong CNN —

China on Tuesday unveiled a plan to deepen integration between the coastal province of Fujian and self-governing Taiwan, touting the benefits of closer cross-strait cooperation while sending warships around the island in a show of military might.

The directive, issued jointly by the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council, vows to make Fujian a “demonstration zone” for integrated development with Taiwan, and the “first home” for Taiwanese residents and businesses to settle in China.

The document, hailed as a “blueprint” of Taiwan’s future development by Chinese experts cited in state media, comes at a delicate moment in cross-strait relations as Taiwan gears up for its presidential election in January.

It also comes as China continues to ramp up military pressure on Taiwan, a vibrant democracy of 24 million people that Beijing’s ruling Communist Party claims as its territory — despite never having controlled it.

Ahead of Beijing’s release of its integration plan, a Chinese aircraft carrier and around two dozen Chinese warships were spotted gathering in waters near Taiwan this week, according to Taiwanese authorities.

China has long taken a carrot and stick approach to Taiwan, threatening it with the prospect of military invasion while offering opportunities for business and cultural exchanges to those it believes are more amenable to Beijing’s point of view.

Given the extent to which cross-strait ties have frayed in recent years, it remains unclear how receptive those in Taiwan will be to China’s sweeping proposal.

On Wednesday, Wang Ting-yu, a Taiwanese lawmaker from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, said the integration plan was “ridiculous.”

“China should think about how it can take care of its bad debts, but not how it can conduct united front work against Taiwan,” Wang said in a video message, referring to government-affiliated efforts to advance Beijing’s goals overseas.

The concept of turning Fujian into a zone for integrated development with Taiwan first appeared in China’s official document in 2021, but it did not provide any details at the time.

In June, when a senior Chinese leader raised the integration plan at a forum, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council called the proposal “meaningless” and “futile,” saying it was not in line with Taiwan’s public expectations and “belittles” Taiwan.

CNN has reached out to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council for comment.

In the directive, Beijing vows to improve the environment for Taiwanese firms to do businesses in Fujian, deepen industrial and capital cooperation, and encourage Taiwanese companies to list on Chinese stock exchanges.

In a first, Taiwanese companies will be allowed to invest in and set up radio and television production companies in Fujian in a pilot program.

The directive also seeks to attract Taiwanese workers and families to settle in Fujian. It vows to enhance social welfare programs to make it easier for Taiwanese people to live and work in the province – including buying property, and promises equal treatment for Taiwan’s students to enroll in public schools.

Chinese observers noted “the document is equivalent to outlining the future development blueprint of Taiwan island, which is expected to gain a broader driving force and development prospect by integrating with Fujian,” the state-run Global Times said.

Fujian, a province of 40 million people on the western side of the Taiwan Strait, is the closest to Taiwan both geographically and culturally.

Many Taiwanese are descendants of Fujian immigrants who arrived in waves over the centuries, bringing with them the dialect, customs and religion that formed the backbone of the traditional culture among Taiwan’s majority Han population.

China’s ruling Communist Party has long attempted to use the geographic, historic and cultural proximity between Fujian and Taiwan as an argument for closer economic and social integration – and eventual unification – with the island.

Taiwan's Kinmen islands lie just a few miles from the Chinese port city of Xiamen

John Mees/CNN

A China-Taiwan DMZ? Meet the Kinmen islanders who want a bridge, not a war

A particular focus of Beijing’s integration efforts falls on Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which are located much closer to Fujian than Taiwan and have shared the strongest ties with the mainland historically.

In Tuesday’s directive, Beijing pledges to further speed up integration between the city of Xiamen and Kinmen – which are only a few miles apart.

It vows to explore cooperation on infrastructure projects between the two cities, which will allow electricity and gas to be transported from Xiamen to Kinmen, and to connect the two cities with a bridge. Kinmen residents will also be able to enjoy the same treatment as local residents in Xiamen, according to the plan.

Similar integration measures are also laid out for the city of Fuzhou and Matsu.

To some residents of Kinmen, the plans to promote greater connectivity may be appealing. This year, a cross-party alliance of eight local councilors in Kinmen proposed to build a bridge to Xiamen to boost economic ties, as part of a wider proposal to turn Kinmen into a demilitarized zone, or so-called “peace island.”

Sitting on the front line between Taiwan and China, Kinmen had faced numerous amphibious assaults and shelling by the Chinese military in the years following the Chinese civil war.

The councilors’ proposal envisages removing all of Taiwan’s troops and military installations from the islands and turning Kinmen into a setting for Beijing-Taipei talks aimed at “de-escalating tensions.”

CNN’s Wayne Chang contributed to this story.

CNN · by Nectar Gan,Eric Cheung · September 13, 2023

29. U.S. military sends cyber team to 'hunt' foes from NATO ally next to Russia

U.S. military sends cyber team to 'hunt' foes from NATO ally next to Russia

BY TOM O'CONNOR ON 9/12/23 AT 9:00 AM EDT

Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · September 12, 2023

A U.S. military cyberwarfare team has recently conducted a "defensive hunt operation" in the Baltic NATO state of Lithuania amid heightened tensions surrounding Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has told Newsweek.

In a statement, CYBERCOM said that the second such deployment since May of last year, just months into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, was led by operators attached to the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), alongside counterparts from the Lithuanian Interior Ministry's Information Technology and Communications Department.

Throughout the months-long deployment, "the teams analyzed key networks, identified and prioritized by the partner, for evidence of malicious cyber activity while identifying vulnerabilities," the statement said. Few details of the mission have been made public.

A CNMF spokesperson declined to "get into specifics of our tactics, techniques and procedures," but told Newsweek that the elite cyber force's "core mission is to defend the nation in and through cyberspace, halting, disrupting, and/or increasing the costs on adversaries who are attempting to interfere in our democratic processes, steal our intellectual property, or attack our critical infrastructure."

"Defend Forward Operations are being conducted because adversaries are routinely executing operations against their neighbors," the CNMF spokesperson said. "As long as adversaries target our partners, and if those partners invite us, we're going to go there and hunt."

"We operate together in cyberspace to learn from one another and share information on threats which helps to harden/enhance the security of the networks on which the U.S. and our ally depends," the spokesperson added.

Lithuanian border guard monitors the video feed from cameras along the border to the Russian semi-exclave of Kaliningrad on October 28, 2022 in Vistytis, Lithuania. Vistytis lies in the strategically vital Suwalki Gap, an approximately 43-mile stretch of land along the Lithuanian and Polish border between Kaliningrad and Russia-loyal Belarus. Sean Gallup/Getty Images

Established in 2014, the CNMF constitutes one third of a triad of CYBERCOM forces that also includes the Cyber Combat Mission Force and Cyber Protection Force. According to CYBERCOM's statement, the CNMF "has deployed 50 times and conducted hunt operations on over 75 networks in more than 23 countries."

In addition to Lithuania, nations to which the CNMF has deployed in Eastern Europe include Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Ukraine, which has accused Russia of mounting a cyberwarfare campaign alongside its kinetic attack against the neighboring nation.

While a number of countries, including the United States, have accused Russia of malign activities in the digital realm, anxieties over potential vulnerabilities in this domain have increased considerably since the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted.

"We need to develop competences and be more resilient to cyberattacks," Lithuanian Vice Interior Minister Arnoldas Abramavičius, said in the CYBERCOM statement. "The war in Ukraine has shown that cyberattacks are a powerful tool of modern warfare, so it is extremely important to be prepared and to ensure the security of our networks."

"I believe that the results of this mission will be mutually beneficial and contribute to creating a common area of security and democracy in our region," he added.

Lithuania, a former Soviet republic, borders Russia's heavily militarized Kaliningrad semi-exclave region and has been an ardent support of Ukraine throughout the conflict. Concerns over the Baltic country's security following the first eruption of unrest tied to Russia in Ukraine in 2014 led to the formation of a multinational NATO battlegroup in Lithuania, alongside three others in Estonia, Latvia and Poland.

CNMF commander Army Major General Joe Hartman also weighed in on the conditions surrounding the latest operation, stating that "cyber threats rarely occur in a vacuum."

"Ultimately, what impacts one nation or network can impact us all," Hartman said in the CYBERCOM statement, "and that is why we are fortunate to have opportunities such as these to work side by side with trusted partners in Lithuania."

News of the operation comes just days after Moscow's top cyber diplomat told Newsweek that it was Washington that was behind an escalating trend of attacks in the realm of information and communication technologies (ICTs).

Dismissing "a lack of hard evidence" to back up claims that the Kremlin engaged in such illicit activities, Artur Lyukmanov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's International Information Security Department and special representative to President Vladimir Putin on international cooperation on information security, said "the U.S. builds up offensive ICT-capabilities, conducts 'hunt-forward' operations against Russia" and "employs its clients abroad."

Lyukmanov made specific reference to so-called "cyber laboratories" set up by CYBERCOM across NATO states in Eastern Europe.

"We want to halt further deterioration," Lyukmanov said at the time. "A mistake in the use of ICTs may lead to a direct conflict, an all-out war, especially as that the White House is aware that Russia has all the necessary capabilities to defend itself. A devastative computer attack against our critical information infrastructure will not be left without response."

Newsweek · by Tom O'Connor · September 12, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com