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Quotes of the Day:
“In a war of ideas it is people who get killed.”
– Stanisław Jerzy Lec
"The revolution of the United States was the result of a mature and reflecting preference of freedom, and not of a vague or ill-defined craving for independence. It contracted no alliance with the turbulent passions of anarchy; but its course was marked, on the contrary, by a love of order and law."
– Alexis de Tocqueville
“NATO's vision of being free and allied contrasts with the Eurasian version of President Vladimir Putin's Russia or the Sinocentric vision of President Xi Jinping’s China. Essentially, NATO was and remains a test bed for the geopolitical relevance of western values. What happens next to NATO is of concern to everyone.”
– Stan Rynning, NATO: From Cold War to Ukraine, a History of the WOrld’s Most Powerful Alliance
1. The North Korea Hypersonic Missile Threat Is Real
2. Deterring an Emerging Nuclear Axis in Northeast Asia
3. Joint Press Statement for the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue
4. Stinging Election Loss Leaves South Korean Leader at a Crossroads
5. Pyongyang, Beijing vow strong friendly ties: KCNA
6. China's top legislator Zhao meets key N. Korean official over ways to bolster bilateral ties
7. U.S. envoy to stress 'ironclad' security commitment, openness to N.K. dialogue during DMZ visit: official
8. U.S. has not given up on renewing mandate of U.N. panel monitoring N.K. sanctions: official
9. U.S.-Japan-Philippines announce mutual defense treaty in South China Sea
10. The IPEF, targeting a 14-nation crisis, starts on Wednesday
11. Yoon expected to announce the directions for government reform
12. South Korea, US plan exercises against North Korea nuclear use scenario
13. [From Pyongyang to Manhattan] ① Siblings who defected from North Korea as Ivy League graduate students
14. How a North Korean missile researcher became a South Korean MP
15. HGV Unproven at IRBM Ranges: Analysis of the April 2 Hwasong-16Na Hypersonic Missile Test
16. After Russia’s Veto: The Future of the Sanctions Regime Against North Korea
1. The North Korea Hypersonic Missile Threat Is Real
Excerpts:
Another very important question is where North Korea got this capability. It is my assessment that there can be little doubt about this. North Korea has been proliferating military systems, ammunition, and even ballistic missiles to the Russians as Moscow prosecutes its war against Ukraine. Most analysts (including myself) assess that the payment for these systems and ammunition has come largely in the form of foodstuffs and oil. But most analysts also assess – as do I – that the Russians have agreed to provide technical military assistance to North Korea. Help with developing more advanced ballistic missiles would be a key part of that.
As the war in Ukraine grinds on, we can expect Russia to continue this kind of support. Advances toward a North Korean solid-fuel hypersonic missile can thus be expected to be rapid.
The North Korea Hypersonic Missile Threat Is Real
In April, North Korea successfully tested its second solid-fuel, hypersonic, intermediate-range ballistic missile, indicating significant advancements in its military capabilities. This follows an earlier test of a liquid-fuel hypersonic missile in 2021.
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · April 12, 2024
Summary: In April, North Korea successfully tested its second solid-fuel, hypersonic, intermediate-range ballistic missile, indicating significant advancements in its military capabilities. This follows an earlier test of a liquid-fuel hypersonic missile in 2021. The new missile features enhanced maneuverability and speed, characteristics that challenge traditional ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Northeast Asia. Analysts suggest that this development could lead to a shift in North Korea's missile strategy from liquid-fuel to solid-fuel systems, though the complete phase-out of liquid-fuel missiles is unlikely soon. The test raises concerns about regional security and the need for the U.S. and its allies to bolster BMD efforts. Speculation about North Korea's sudden progress points to potential technical assistance from Russia, linked to Pyongyang's support to Moscow with military systems amid the Ukraine conflict.
North Korea's New Hypersonic Missile Test: A Game Changer for Regional Defense Strategies
U.S. and South Korean military officials confirmed in April that North Korea had conducted its second test of a solid-fuel, hypersonic, intermediate-range ballistic missile. The test appears to have been successful.
The North Koreans already tested a liquid-fuel hypersonic missile in 2021. This is rather advanced technology, but the Russians and Chinese have already used it.
The tests raise several questions. What are the capabilities and differences between this missile and the liquid fuel hypersonic missile the North Koreans tested previously? How will these tests change the way the U.S. and its allies conduct ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Northeast Asia? Perhaps most important, how did the North Koreans suddenly attain this capability?
Growing Hypersonic Capabilities
An examination of the missile tested in April reveals several fascinating elements. The missile is launched from a 14-wheel transporter-erector-launcher. There is what some analysts call a “clamshell” portion near the top of the missile. This device hides and some would say protects the boost-glide vehicle before the missile is launched.
Based on what analysts saw when the test was conducted, it appears this is a legitimate hypersonic missile – or at least a missile with that developing capability. According to The War Zone, “After release, the boost-glide vehicle travels along a relatively shallow atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, generally defined as anything above Mach 5, to its target. The vehicles are also designed to have a significant degree of maneuverability, allowing them to erratically change course and climb and descend along the way.”
If continued testing proves this missile’s capabilities and the North Koreans permanently add it to their inventory, Pyongyang would then wield a liquid-fuel and solid-fuel version of hypersonic missiles. Maneuverability is the key measurement here – the maneuverability of hypersonic missiles is a big part of what makes them a greater threat than typical ballistic platforms.
The advantage of solid-fuel missiles is that they are easier to store and to transport safely. Some analysts expect North Korea will now begin to phase out its liquid-fuel ballistic missiles in favor of using only solid-fuel missiles. That is unlikely, at least for now. North Korea has a very large arsenal of liquid-fuel missiles and will continue to use them.
Threats to Missile Defense in Northeast Asia
A big question for policymakers and military planners is how North Korea’s progress toward solid fuel hypersonic missiles will change ballistic missile defense in Northeast Asia. While the April test was at least partially successful, it also showed that the North Koreans are a ways away from actually being able to produce a highly maneuverable hypersonic missile. Nevertheless, the fact that Pyongyang is now testing both liquid-fuel and solid-fuel hypersonic missiles should shake up BMD efforts in Northeast Asia.
The missile’s range at least in theory allows it to target Japan, all of South Korea, and even Guam. Thus, developing advanced BMD capabilities on the ground and on the seas should now be a high priority for U.S. and allied forces in the region. Increasing focus on shared BMD capabilities should also become a high priority for Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. Failure to do so could be disastrous if war arrives.
Another very important question is where North Korea got this capability. It is my assessment that there can be little doubt about this. North Korea has been proliferating military systems, ammunition, and even ballistic missiles to the Russians as Moscow prosecutes its war against Ukraine. Most analysts (including myself) assess that the payment for these systems and ammunition has come largely in the form of foodstuffs and oil. But most analysts also assess – as do I – that the Russians have agreed to provide technical military assistance to North Korea. Help with developing more advanced ballistic missiles would be a key part of that.
As the war in Ukraine grinds on, we can expect Russia to continue this kind of support. Advances toward a North Korean solid-fuel hypersonic missile can thus be expected to be rapid.
About the Author
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is entitled North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa.
Image Credit: KCNA Screengrab.
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · April 12, 2024
2. Deterring an Emerging Nuclear Axis in Northeast Asia
Excerpts:
In order not to cede strategic ground in the face of a shifting balance of power, the US should continue to actively evolve and enhance existing security frameworks while realistically anticipating and effectively adjusting to the rapidly changing geopolitical conditions.
First, in practical terms, gone are the days of North Korea being willing to sign onto “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear program. When Pyongyang was in the building stage of its nuclear program, talks with the US were useful since Pyongyang could use parts of its nuclear weapons program as collateral for concessions. But, North Korea has already transitioned from the research and development phase of its WMD development to fielding and deployment. Moreover, without cooperation on sanctions implementation from Russia and China, Pyongyang can get more of what it wants without the time-consuming efforts of “engaging the enemy” to get sanctions lifted. Instead, that diplomatic energy will, in the near term, be focused on enhancing and balancing relations with Beijing and Moscow, where tangible benefits can be negotiated with little risk and quick results.
Second, Washington should continue to study and understand the potential South Korean pursuit of nuclear parity did not simply die with the signing of the Washington Declaration. This is not an endorsement of South Korean development of indigenous nuclear weapons, as there are obvious downsides—namely, igniting an arms race involving Japan, further eroding the rules-based order through the delegitimization of liberal mechanisms and institutions like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The point is, polls show that the majority of South Koreans, regardless of political affiliation, are currently in favor of having their own nuclear weapons. While South Korea has, for now, reiterated its commitment to uphold its NPT obligations, this domestic consideration could still evolve into an unavoidable demand for all electable South Korean political leaders to deal with in the next ROK election.
In the meantime, to balance against a strengthening China-Russia-North Korea axis without escalating tensions, further institutionalization and operationalization of both the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and the US-ROK-Japan trilateral framework will be required. Much progress has been made with both lines of effort, as evidenced by the two NCG meetings held in 2023, which helped deepen deterrence cooperation and by the establishment of a multi-year trilateral exercise plan. More work will be required to consolidate and lock in the gains made and ensure continued momentum with these efforts, particularly for ensuring trilateral framework momentum that can withstand potential future political transitions in any of the three capitals. To safeguard against the ebb and flow of regional political currents, burgeoning processes for DPRK missile warning data sharing, multi-domain exercise planning, integrated missile defense, and other forms of information sharing should be honed and institutionalized down to the deepest actionable levels within the trilateral framework.
As the activities of the Panel of Experts draw to a close in late April, the implications of the strategic alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea will become even more pronounced. The emerging China-Russia-DPRK axis is not merely a transient gesture of defiance or disruption; it is indicative of a profound strategic shift in the geopolitical context of Northeast Asia. With this shift, North Korea has seized the chance to overhaul its strategic calculations, re-channeling its focus and resources. Such developments pose a colossal challenge to the US and the US-ROK alliance’s strategic position. To maintain a successful deterrent posture, the US should not only sustain progress with existing security mechanisms like the NCG and trilateral framework, but also stay ahead of the curve by pragmatically adjusting to rapidly changing geopolitical conditions.
Deterring an Emerging Nuclear Axis in Northeast Asia
https://www.38north.org/2024/04/deterring-an-emerging-nuclear-axis-in-northeast-asia/
Amid an increasingly unstable international order, Moscow wielded its veto on March 28, blocking the annual renewal of the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s 1718 Committee Panel of Experts. Russia’s act overturned 15 years of continuity by the Panel to monitor and ensure implementation of UN Security Council sanctions in response to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or North Korea) nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Equally unsettling was China’s first-ever abstention from the annual vote to extend the work of the panel. Prior to this diplomatic blockade, the Panel had enjoyed unanimous support for 14 years since its establishment in 2009 under UN Security Council Resolution 1874. The contrarian move by Russia and China undermines international efforts to restrain North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal while accelerating prospects for regional instability.
The shutdown of the Panel, whose work will be sunset in late April, is a disturbing manifestation of the effects China, Russia and North Korea can produce working in tandem toward a strategic goal. To be clear, the coordinated move by the three countries should not be construed as an ephemeral act of protest or obstruction; rather, it signifies what has become a hard strategic reset in Northeast Asia that has been gaining rapid momentum since 2022. This rebooted configuration has cascaded an opportunity for North Korea, the junior partner in the arrangement, to reevaluate its risk assessment matrix, resulting in Pyongyang’s decision to also reset its attention and resources. The result, in the broader geopolitical context, presents the US, and by extension, the US-Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) alliance, with a gargantuan strategic predicament. To maintain effective deterrence capabilities amid the regional realignment, the US should actively evolve and bolster existing security frameworks while anticipating and adjusting to changing geopolitical conditions.
Hard Reset
The latest episode of strategic solidarity on display at the UN Security Council is further evidence of the calculated alignment that has been building in strength among North Korea, China, and Russia since 2022. Beijing and Moscow officially embarked on a revisionist path regarding North Korea in May that year, when the two countries vetoed a proposed US-led resolution to impose additional UN Security Council sanctions on Pyongyang following missile launches. This was the first veto by either country since the punitive sanctions against North Korea began in 2006. China and Russia continued this trend, opposing UN Security Council collective measures to condemn North Korea’s attempts to launch a spy satellite in May and August 2023.
North Korea has basked in Chinese and Russian support, launching an unprecedented 69 ballistic missiles in 2022, the year marking Beijing and Moscow’s split from the international sanctions regime. Pyongyang has reciprocated by positioning the DPRK as an arms supplier to Russia’s war with Ukraine. The US State Department estimates North Korea has delivered over 10,000 containers filled with munitions and related supplies to Russia since September 2023. Among the weapons deliveries, Russia has received North Korean-provided ballistic missiles, the use of which stands to give Pyongyang invaluable technical data and insights through direct battlefield testing.
Pyongyang’s New Emboldened Approach
The increased support from China and Russia has emboldened North Korea, leading Pyongyang to reassess its strategic approach and realign its foreign policy priorities and resources. There are two demonstrable pieces of evidence for this. In September 2022, after China and Russia vetoed US-led attempts to add sanctions against North Korea for its missile launches, Pyongyang adopted a law enshrining new, offensively oriented nuclear doctrine. The new doctrine superseded a previous law enacted in 2013 centered on the defensive use of nuclear weapons. The doctrine updated in September 2022 insinuates preemptive employment of nuclear weapons using tactical warheads to advance battlefield objectives.
In addition to upgrading its nuclear doctrine to an offensive posture, North Korea has decisively abandoned bilateral talks with the US and inter-Korean diplomacy. The shift began in 2020 when Pyongyang announced that Washington had deceived North Korea and wasted 18 months of its time negotiating with the Donald Trump administration. In June of that year, North Korea announced the severing of all contacts with the South, whom it would subsequently regard as the “enemy.” North Korea continued to rebuff early attempts by the Biden administration to engage, maintaining its stance of rejecting US offers of dialogue. In January 2024, Kim Jong Un announced a formal policy shift, directing a revision to the DPRK’s constitution to remove references to “peaceful reunification” and define the South as the “principal enemy.” The order included codifying a commitment to subjugate and annex the ROK in the event of a new outbreak of war.
Nuclear Asymmetry
By itself, North Korea now has the theoretical capacity to attempt to simultaneously deter the US with ICBMs—a capability Pyongyang continues to refine through continued missile and satellite launches—while compelling South Korea with shorter-range ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons. All that is missing is a transformative change in the international order capable of creating a disruption to the US-ROK alliance—a strategic inflection point that would alter the status quo of international relations. This is where China and Russia come in. Together, the three nuclear-armed countries produce an asymmetric nuclear capability—strategic depth creating a potentially dominant position in a tit-for-tat escalation spiral—that could stretch US hub and spoke extended deterrence commitments with the ROK and Japan.
The three countries not only share common borders, but they also share the same objective of reshaping the international system, which they bitterly complain is dominated by Western rules and values and rigged in favor of the US and its allies. The current China-Russia-DPRK trajectory, particularly as evidenced by Russia’s Panel of Experts veto at the UN Security Council and the Chinese abstention, indicates that coordinated operations to undermine the status quo in Northeast Asia are already well underway. If precedence is a gauge of future actions, then the patterns of Pyongyang’s past are likely to be replicated in the decisions to come. Thus, one can logically expect North Korea to assiduously work to undermine the Armistice Agreement and the US-ROK alliance as well.
Dynamic and Pragmatic Deterrence
In order not to cede strategic ground in the face of a shifting balance of power, the US should continue to actively evolve and enhance existing security frameworks while realistically anticipating and effectively adjusting to the rapidly changing geopolitical conditions.
First, in practical terms, gone are the days of North Korea being willing to sign onto “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear program. When Pyongyang was in the building stage of its nuclear program, talks with the US were useful since Pyongyang could use parts of its nuclear weapons program as collateral for concessions. But, North Korea has already transitioned from the research and development phase of its WMD development to fielding and deployment. Moreover, without cooperation on sanctions implementation from Russia and China, Pyongyang can get more of what it wants without the time-consuming efforts of “engaging the enemy” to get sanctions lifted. Instead, that diplomatic energy will, in the near term, be focused on enhancing and balancing relations with Beijing and Moscow, where tangible benefits can be negotiated with little risk and quick results.
Second, Washington should continue to study and understand the potential South Korean pursuit of nuclear parity did not simply die with the signing of the Washington Declaration. This is not an endorsement of South Korean development of indigenous nuclear weapons, as there are obvious downsides—namely, igniting an arms race involving Japan, further eroding the rules-based order through the delegitimization of liberal mechanisms and institutions like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The point is, polls show that the majority of South Koreans, regardless of political affiliation, are currently in favor of having their own nuclear weapons. While South Korea has, for now, reiterated its commitment to uphold its NPT obligations, this domestic consideration could still evolve into an unavoidable demand for all electable South Korean political leaders to deal with in the next ROK election.
In the meantime, to balance against a strengthening China-Russia-North Korea axis without escalating tensions, further institutionalization and operationalization of both the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and the US-ROK-Japan trilateral framework will be required. Much progress has been made with both lines of effort, as evidenced by the two NCG meetings held in 2023, which helped deepen deterrence cooperation and by the establishment of a multi-year trilateral exercise plan. More work will be required to consolidate and lock in the gains made and ensure continued momentum with these efforts, particularly for ensuring trilateral framework momentum that can withstand potential future political transitions in any of the three capitals. To safeguard against the ebb and flow of regional political currents, burgeoning processes for DPRK missile warning data sharing, multi-domain exercise planning, integrated missile defense, and other forms of information sharing should be honed and institutionalized down to the deepest actionable levels within the trilateral framework.
As the activities of the Panel of Experts draw to a close in late April, the implications of the strategic alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea will become even more pronounced. The emerging China-Russia-DPRK axis is not merely a transient gesture of defiance or disruption; it is indicative of a profound strategic shift in the geopolitical context of Northeast Asia. With this shift, North Korea has seized the chance to overhaul its strategic calculations, re-channeling its focus and resources. Such developments pose a colossal challenge to the US and the US-ROK alliance’s strategic position. To maintain a successful deterrent posture, the US should not only sustain progress with existing security mechanisms like the NCG and trilateral framework, but also stay ahead of the curve by pragmatically adjusting to rapidly changing geopolitical conditions.
3. Joint Press Statement for the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue
This is a good summary of most all the military actions that are taking place within the alliance.
The US can walk and chew gum at the same time. While the Japanese and Philippine Summits were taking place to include a 3+3 meeting with the Philippines, the Pentagon still conducted this routine but substantive dialogue.
Excerpt:
In a plenary session, both sides had an in-depth discussion focusing on the three key pillars of the 'Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance' agreed to by the ROK and the United States at the 55th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM): enhancing extended deterrence efforts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities by evolving into a science and technology alliance, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. Both sides agreed the KIDD was the primary forum to review and report on implementation of specific tasks in accordance with the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance to the SCM. They committed to continue assessing ways to synchronize and align U.S.-ROK bilateral defense mechanisms and engagements to effectively and efficiently support discussions on strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the combined defense posture.
Joint Press Statement for the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue
defense.gov
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense (MND) held the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) on April 11, 2024 in Washington.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Dr. Ely Ratner, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Mr. Andrew Winternitz, led the U.S. delegation. Deputy Minister (DEPMIN) for National Defense Policy, Mr. Cho Chang-rae, led the ROK delegation. Key senior U.S. and ROK defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue.
In a plenary session, both sides had an in-depth discussion focusing on the three key pillars of the 'Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance' agreed to by the ROK and the United States at the 55th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM): enhancing extended deterrence efforts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities by evolving into a science and technology alliance, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. Both sides agreed the KIDD was the primary forum to review and report on implementation of specific tasks in accordance with the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance to the SCM. They committed to continue assessing ways to synchronize and align U.S.-ROK bilateral defense mechanisms and engagements to effectively and efficiently support discussions on strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the combined defense posture.
First of all, the two sides expressed concerns that the DPRK's continued provocations and advancing nuclear and missile capabilities are destabilizing the Korean Peninsula and the region, and shared their assessments of the security environment. Both sides committed to demonstrating the strength of the Alliance through close and coordinated bilateral responses to DPRK provocations, threats, and activities that undermine regional peace and stability.
In that vein, the U.S. side affirmed its ironclad commitment to extended deterrence through regularly visible U.S. strategic asset deployments, and to support the establishment of the ROK Strategic Command to enhance deterrence against the DPRK nuclear and missile threats.
In addition, the U.S. side reaffirmed its enduring and ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK, leveraging the full range of U.S. military capabilities — including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities — and reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime.
The two delegations discussed the DPRK's expanding military cooperation with Russia, which violates United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Both agreed that expanded DPRK-Russian military cooperation, particularly the transfer of weapons and high-technology, undermined peace and stability in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region including the Korean Peninsula and pledged to respond in a close coordination with the international community. The two sides also acknowledged the importance of full implementation of UNSCRs by the entire international community, including Russia and other members of the Security Council, and reaffirmed that these efforts supported the denuclearization of the DPRK.
Both sides assessed that the recent FREEDOM SHIELD exercise 24 (FS 24), which applied a new concept of operations, enhanced the Alliance's crisis management, and strengthened deterrence and defense against advancing DPRK threats. In addition, the two sides affirmed the plan to execute a TTX reflecting a DPRK nuclear use scenario, consistent with the Washington Declaration and as agreed by the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and pledged that U.S.-ROK combined exercises would stay responsive to the rapidly changing security environment on the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed that it was imperative for the Alliance to conduct practical combined exercises and trainings, and acknowledged the need to improve realistic training conditions for U.S. and South Korean troops, including through the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for mutually-agreed training.
The two sides agreed to further modernize Alliance capabilities by leveraging their science and technology to bring cutting-edge technologies to the warfighter, in accordance with the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. They commended the accomplishments of the Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG) including the U.S.-ROK Cyber Alliance exercise in January 2024. In addition, both sides noted that the ROK's recently launched military reconnaissance satellite is an important asset and contribution to extending the U.S.-ROK combined capabilities for surveillance and reconnaissance. The two sides pledged to continue cooperation through the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to strengthen the Alliance's space capabilities. In addition, both sides urged the working groups to focus on initiatives to enhance mission assurance and resilience against evolving threats. The leaders agreed that science and technology (S&T) cooperation needs to be strengthened in areas such as artificial intelligence, autonomous technology and next-generation communications, and that fields of S&T cooperation should contribute to Alliance policy established by the SCM. In that vein, the two sides discussed the way forward to establish a ROK-U.S. senior-level committee to enable science and technology cooperation and reviewed a ROK proposal to organize a U.S.-ROK joint defense science and technology conference.
The two sides agreed that cooperation to develop advanced technologies also supports shared efforts to enhance the defense industrial base of both the United States and ROK, respectively. The two delegations had an in-depth discussion on the Defense Department's progress to develop a Regional Sustainment Framework to facilitate logistics in a contested environment as well as cooperation to distribute Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. side noted the ROK's efforts to collaborate on MRO initiatives, and affirmed that such cooperation is in accordance with the direction of enhancing the Alliance's posture and capabilities. The two leaders also agreed to enhance progress on development of a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement to provide reciprocal market access, which will enhance supply chain resiliency and strengthen defense cooperation between the United States and the ROK.
The two sides reaffirmed the long-standing contribution made by the United Nations Command (UNC) to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and committed to strengthening UNC. Both sides appreciated that the results of the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Seoul in November 2023 demonstrated the commitment and resolve of UNC Member States to implement, manage, and enforce the observation of the Armistice Agreement and to be united upon any renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. side expressed its appreciation for ROK's efforts to continue strengthening cooperation between the ROK, UNC, and UNC Member States by regularizing meetings, and both sides agreed to work closely together.
The KIDD delegations applauded the efforts of the Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Working Group, noting progress towards the transition of wartime OPCON to the Future Combined Forces Command. In particular, the two sides reviewed the progress on this year's bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems, and exchanged views on OPCON issues including the transition of Combined Component Commands to standing component commands. In addition, the two leaders reaffirmed their shared commitment to meeting the three conditions under the bilaterally approved Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) in a systematic and stable manner to strengthen the Alliance combined defense capabilities.
During an Executive Session, ASD Ratner and DEPMIN Cho emphasized the important contribution of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy to deter and respond to advancing DPRK nuclear and missile threats, and welcomed the ongoing efforts of the NCG that contribute to this effect. DEPMIN Cho stressed the importance of ROK-U.S. integrated extended deterrence to the combined posture. The two leaders agreed that the consultation process enabled by the SCM provides the necessary oversight and guidance for combined plans and operations executed in defense of the Alliance.
The two leaders also stressed the importance of trilateral cooperation with Japan, and reviewed the unprecedented progress achieved since the historic Camp David Summit. The U.S. and ROK leaders shared the view that trilateral cooperation with Japan is critical to achieve shared security goals on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. Both sides welcomed the successful activation of a three-way data sharing mechanism for early missile warning information against DPRK threats, as well as the regularization of trilateral exercises. The two sides pledged to work through the Defense Trilateral Talks to deepen cooperation in response to the regional security environment, with a focus on operations in various domains.
The U.S. and ROK sides also reviewed the development of the Alliance into a globally comprehensive strategic relationship grounded in shared values and interests. Both sides concurred that it is important to make joint efforts to promote defense and security cooperation in the region. In that vein, reviewing progress from the Regional Cooperation Working Group, the two sides agreed to continue pursuit of security cooperation initiatives that promote regional peace and stability. In addition, both sides concurred on the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as reflected in the April 2023 “Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.”
ASD Ratner and DEPMIN Cho agreed that the 24th KIDD provided guidance to continue deep and transformative Alliance cooperation in support of our shared values and interests. In particular, both sides assessed that the KIDD laid a foundation for a practical implementation of the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and emphasized the Alliance's decisive and overwhelming combined defense posture. The two leaders commended the U.S. and ROK military and civilian personnel that worked to strengthen the bond of the Alliance, and expressed appreciation for their shared commitment and sacrifice.
defense.gov
4. Stinging Election Loss Leaves South Korean Leader at a Crossroads
Excerpts:
The outcome — and the increasingly polarized South Korean political climate that Mr. Yoon helped intensify — heralded deepening deadlock in a country that is crucial to U.S. efforts to counter China and North Korea. It reduces the odds of Mr. Yoon achieving anything that requires bipartisan support. And it raises the prospect of him leaving office in 2027 with little to show other than redirecting his country’s foreign policy toward expanding military ties with Washington and Tokyo.
...
And while foreign policy largely rests in the hand of the president, Mr. Yoon’s weakened domestic stature could hamper his diplomatic initiatives, some of which have been highly controversial at home.
Lee Jae-myung, whose progressive Democratic Party carried the election, has vehemently criticized Mr. Yoon for expanding military cooperation with Japan, a former colonial master of Korea, and for alienating China, South Korea’s biggest trading partner, on Washington’s behalf. Mr. Lee also prefers dialogue with North Korea, unlike the approach by Mr. Yoon and by Washington of prioritizing sanctions and military deterrence.
When Mr. Yoon won the presidency in 2022, he inherited the Assembly elected two years earlier. He often blamed the opposition-controlled Parliament for blocking or watering down his domestic agenda, such as labor and health care policies. But for this week’s election debacle and his party’s continued lack of parliamentary majority for the rest of his term, Mr. Yoon had few to blame, except for himself.
Still, the election result could have been even worse for him.
The opposition Democratic Party and its coalition partners won nearly 190 seats, falling short of a supermajority of 200 seats, which would have allowed lawmakers to override a presidential veto or pursue an impeachment of the president. Mr. Yoon’s People Power Party and its affiliates won 108 seats, down from the 114 they control in the outgoing Parliament.
Stinging Election Loss Leaves South Korean Leader at a Crossroads
President Yoon Suk Yeol, a key U.S. ally, faces the prospect of becoming a lame duck unless he starts negotiating with the opposition.
President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea casting his early vote for the parliamentary election, in Busan, this month. Voters delivered a decisive defeat for his party. Credit...Yonhap News Agency, via Reuters
By Choe Sang-Hun
Reporting from Seoul
April 11, 2024
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In political banners, campaign slogans and everyday conversations, South Koreans used two words to convey the high stakes of this week’s parliamentary election: “Judgment Day.” It was an opportunity to issue a verdict on the first two years of President Yoon Suk Yeol, a leader who has made strides on the global stage but is deeply unpopular and divisive at home.
The results, released on Thursday, were disastrous for Mr. Yoon.
Voters pushed him to the verge of being a lame duck, giving the opposition one of the biggest parliamentary majorities in recent decades. He becomes the first South Korean president in decades to contend with an opposition-controlled Parliament for his entire time in office.
The outcome — and the increasingly polarized South Korean political climate that Mr. Yoon helped intensify — heralded deepening deadlock in a country that is crucial to U.S. efforts to counter China and North Korea. It reduces the odds of Mr. Yoon achieving anything that requires bipartisan support. And it raises the prospect of him leaving office in 2027 with little to show other than redirecting his country’s foreign policy toward expanding military ties with Washington and Tokyo.
Image
Mr. Yoon alongside President Biden and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan in Thurmont, Md., in August. Mr. Yoon has expanded military ties with Washington and Tokyo.Credit...Samuel Corum for The New York Times
Mr. Yoon has been proud of his conservative foreign policy. But to many voters, this election was about domestic woes, such as inflation and signs of democratic backsliding. The opposition successfully framed the vote as a referendum on him.
For months, political analysts, local media and even critics within his own party had been warning Mr. Yoon about his “disconnect” from everyday people and his “hubris” in dealing with the opposition, a national disaster, a prolonged strike by doctors and allegations of corruption involving his wife, Kim Keon Hee.
More on South Korea
“His leadership has been a runaway train,” said Ahn Byong-jin, a political scientist at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, referring to Mr. Yoon’s obstinacy in pushing unpopular decisions.
During his two years in office, Mr. Yoon’s business-friendly domestic agenda has remained paralyzed by his toxic relationship with the opposition-controlled National Assembly, South Korea’s unicameral legislature. He was more successful overseas, basking in the spotlight in Washington and European capitals for his foreign policy and his country’s growing importance in the war in Ukraine.
For the United States, South Korea under Mr. Yoon is a key and willing partner in building a coalition against China — an effort highlighted by President Biden’s meetings this week with the leaders of Japan and the Philippines.
And while foreign policy largely rests in the hand of the president, Mr. Yoon’s weakened domestic stature could hamper his diplomatic initiatives, some of which have been highly controversial at home.
Lee Jae-myung, whose progressive Democratic Party carried the election, has vehemently criticized Mr. Yoon for expanding military cooperation with Japan, a former colonial master of Korea, and for alienating China, South Korea’s biggest trading partner, on Washington’s behalf. Mr. Lee also prefers dialogue with North Korea, unlike the approach by Mr. Yoon and by Washington of prioritizing sanctions and military deterrence.
When Mr. Yoon won the presidency in 2022, he inherited the Assembly elected two years earlier. He often blamed the opposition-controlled Parliament for blocking or watering down his domestic agenda, such as labor and health care policies. But for this week’s election debacle and his party’s continued lack of parliamentary majority for the rest of his term, Mr. Yoon had few to blame, except for himself.
Still, the election result could have been even worse for him.
The opposition Democratic Party and its coalition partners won nearly 190 seats, falling short of a supermajority of 200 seats, which would have allowed lawmakers to override a presidential veto or pursue an impeachment of the president. Mr. Yoon’s People Power Party and its affiliates won 108 seats, down from the 114 they control in the outgoing Parliament.
Image
The opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung, center of front row, viewing exit poll results in Seoul, on Wednesday. Mr. Lee hopes to run for president again.Credit...Pool photo by Chung Sung-Jun
“This wise decision from the people left President Yoon and the opposition with no option but to start dialogue,” said Sung Deuk Hahm, a political scientist at Kyonggi University. “If they don’t wake up, things can get really ugly.”
Mr. Yoon needs help from the opposition in addressing runaway housing prices, a rapidly aging population and a long-delayed overhaul of the national pension system. Mr. Lee, who was defeated by Mr. Yoon two years ago and hopes to run for president again, also needs to build his leadership credentials.
Stunned by the election result, Mr. Yoon showed signs of doing something observers had once said he would never do: admitting that he was at fault.
Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and many of Mr. Yoon’s top aides tendered their resignations on Thursday to open the way for the president to reorganize his government. The expected shake-up did not include foreign policy aides, a sign that Mr. Yoon intended to maintain his diplomatic initiatives.
Presidential aides also told reporters that Mr. Yoon would try to build a cooperative relationship with members of the opposition, whom his party had called “criminals” during the campaign. Mr. Yoon did not speak publicly, but his chief of staff, Lee Kwan-sup, relayed a message from the president.
“I will humbly accept the will of the people as reflected in the election result and will overhaul the way the government is run and do my best to stabilize the economy and the people’s livelihood,” Mr. Yoon was quoted as saying.
Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun
A version of this article appears in print on April 12, 2024, Section A, Page 11 of the New York edition with the headline: Stinging Defeat Leaves South Korean Leader at a Crossroads. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
5. Pyongyang, Beijing vow strong friendly ties: KCNA
Still closer than lips and teeth?
Pyongyang, Beijing vow strong friendly ties: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · April 13, 2024
SEOUL, April 13 (Yonhap) -- High-ranking officials from North Korea and China attended the opening ceremony of the "year of DPRK-China friendship" in Pyongyang to bolster their ongoing relations, Pyongyang's state media said Saturday.
Choe Ryong-hae, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, and Zhao Leji, chairman of the National People's Congress of China, attended the ceremony at the East Pyongyang Grand Theatre on Friday to mark the 75th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported.
In a speech, Choe reaffirmed the "unshakable will to further develop the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with socialism as the core," the KCNA said.
Choe stressed that the bilateral relations are valuable and precious not only because the two countries are geographically close but also because they have been forged in the struggle for the common cause.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 12, 2024, shows China's top legislator, Zhao Leji (L), meeting with Choe Ryong-hae (R), chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
Zhao was quoted as saying "the traditional China-DPRK friendship ... has taken deeper root and become more durable and precious no matter the ever-changing international situation."
He also stressed it is "the consistent strategic policy of the Chinese party and government to successfully defend, consolidate and develop the traditional China-DPRK friendly relations," according to the KCNA.
The two officials enjoyed celebratory performances and later joined the artists on stage to greet them and take photos together, the report said.
Zhao, who arrived in Pyongyang on Thursday for a three-day visit, is the first high-ranking Chinese official to visit North Korea since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.
North Korea began resuming exchanges with China, its longtime ally and largest economic benefactor, in a limited manner after partially opening its border in August last year following its tight COVID-19 border shutdown.
During his visit, Zhao is expected to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
jaeyeon.woo@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · April 13, 2024
6. China's top legislator Zhao meets key N. Korean official over ways to bolster bilateral ties
China's top legislator Zhao meets key N. Korean official over ways to bolster bilateral ties | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 12, 2024
SEOUL, April 12 (Yonhap) -- China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, has met with Choe Ryong-hae, a senior North Korean official, to discuss ways to further develop bilateral ties, Pyongyang's state media said Friday.
The trip by the No. 3 official in the Chinese Communist Party came as the two countries mark the 75th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations.
The two "discussed the issues of positively promoting exchange and cooperation in all fields, including politics, economy and culture ... and thus further developing the traditional" bilateral relations, the KCNA said, a day after Zhao arrived in Pyongyang for his three-day trip in a bid to attend the opening ceremony of the "North Korea-China Friendly Year."
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 12, 2024, shows China's top legislator, Zhao Leji (L), meeting with Choe Ryong-hae (R), chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
They also exchanged views about bilateral cooperation, as well as regional and international issues of mutual concern, the KCNA said, without elaborating.
Zhao, chairman of the National People's Congress of China, said Beijing hopes to strengthen high-level exchanges and deepen reciprocal cooperation with North Korea on the occasion of the friendship year, according to China's foreign ministry.
They also signed documents of cooperation in such fields as mutual waivers of diplomatic visas, customs clearances and quarantine measures.
Zhao is the first high-ranking Chinese official to visit North Korea since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.
North Korea appears to be ramping up high-level exchanges with Beijing, as much as it has been expanding its relationship with Russia, including military cooperation.
Seoul's unification ministry said Thursday that Zhao's trip to Pyongyang may lead to a full-fledged recovery in bilateral relations between the two nations. Observers see the possibility of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visiting China later this year for a possible summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
North Korea began resuming exchanges with China, its longtime ally and largest economic benefactor, in a limited manner after partially opening its border in August last year following its tight COVID-19 border shutdown.
This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 12, 2024, shows Zhao Leji (5th from L), China's top legislator, and Choe Ryong-hae (5th from R), chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, holding talks in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · April 12, 2024
7. U.S. envoy to stress 'ironclad' security commitment, openness to N.K. dialogue during DMZ visit: official
While i have noticed leaders using the usual "cornerstone" for the Japan-US alliance, I have not heard the usual "linchpin" to describe the ROK/US alliance.
U.S. envoy to stress 'ironclad' security commitment, openness to N.K. dialogue during DMZ visit: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 13, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 12 (Yonhap) -- The top U.S. envoy to the U.N. will reaffirm America's "ironclad" security partnership with South Korea and its openness to "unconditional" dialogue with North Korea during her visit to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas next week, a senior U.S. official said Friday.
On Tuesday, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield plans to pay a visit to the DMZ, after which she will have a roundtable with North Korean escapees. She is set to arrive in Korea on Sunday as part of her East Asia swing that will also take her to Japan.
"The message that Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield will send by visiting the DMZ is that the security partnership with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan is ironclad. She wants to obviously go to the DMZ to get a firsthand look at the situation there," the official said in an online press briefing. ROK is the abbreviation for South Korea's official name.
"I think the message that she will repeat is that the U.S. is open to unconditional dialogue with the DPRK. We have offered this dialogue, we've opened it with an open hand, and what we've received back from the DPRK is a clenched fist," he added.
This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield addressing a meeting of the United Nations Security Council at U.N. headquarters in New York on March 18, 2024. (Yonhap)
The official underscored that Washington hopes that "at some point," Pyongyang will reciprocate its overtures.
"But as of now, our offers to meet have been rejected," he said.
Asked if there has been any request for a summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, the official said that the North has been rejecting "any kind of outreach or dialogue with the U.S. frankly at any level."
"That's unfortunate, but that's where we are. I have not heard of any suggestions about President Biden reaching out to or having any engagement with his counterpart," he said.
"There is a lot that would have to happen for that, and we are nowhere in that vicinity ... That's just not on the table at this moment in terms of the president's involvement."
In Korea, Thomas-Greenfield plans to meet senior Seoul officials and speak with students at Ewha Womans University, according to her office. In Japan, she will meet senior Tokyo officials, local students and family members of Japanese citizens abducted by Pyongyang decades ago, according to the office.
In both countries, the ambassador plans to discuss the next steps to ensure the "continuation of independent and accurate reporting" of the North's weapons proliferation and sanctions evasion activities following Russia's veto of a U.N. resolution on the annual renewal of an expert panel monitoring sanctions enforcement.
Absent the resolution's passage, the panel's mandate is set to expire April 30, a termination that observers say could chip away at international efforts to curb evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 13, 2024
8. U.S. has not given up on renewing mandate of U.N. panel monitoring N.K. sanctions: official
And we should not.
Excerpts:
Commenting on Russia's draft resolution, the official pointed out that Moscow's objective is to put a sunset clause in it and end the panel's independent reporting.
"One of the reasons why they are unhappy is because previous reporting has spoken to Russia's support for sanctions evasion on the part of DPRK," he said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"This is all happening because of Russia's desire to ensure that in no way the international community can probe into what it has been doing with regard to facilitating sanctions evasion by the DPRK," he added.
U.S. has not given up on renewing mandate of U.N. panel monitoring N.K. sanctions: official | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 13, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 12 (Yonhap) -- The United States has not given up on extending the mandate of a U.N. expert panel monitoring the enforcement of anti-North Korea sanctions, a senior U.S. official said Friday, voicing hope for a "change of attitude" by Russia that recently vetoed its renewal.
In an online press briefing, the official also pointed out that irrespective of whether the mandate will be renewed, Washington will be looking for alternative ways to "fill the void."
Last month, Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution for what had been a routine annual roll-over of the panel's mandate in a vote where China abstained. Absent the resolution, the panel will cease to exist on April 30.
"No, we have not given up on extending the mandate of the panel of experts. We want to extend that mandate of the panel," the official told reporters.
"The (panel's) work is critical, but it's Russia -- being helped by China -- does not want to see this work continue," he added.
Russia's veto followed weekslong negotiations, during which Moscow demanded a "sunset clause" for the entire North Korean sanctions regime -- a demand unacceptable to South Korea, the U.S. and other UNSC members particularly at a time of North Korea's growing nuclear and missile threats.
A sunset clause would have left anti-Pyongyang sanctions in effect only for a certain period of time unless there was a UNSC agreement to keep them in place for another agreed-upon period.
The U.S. official touched on what he called "intensive" negotiations in weeks leading to Moscow's veto.
"Russia clearly, in essence, adopted the position that is sort of our way or the highway, and they were really not interested in any kind of compromise," he said. "We hope that they will have a change of attitude. But I am not counting on that."
He went on to say, "Regardless of whether we are able to -- at some point -- renew the mandate, we are going to continue to look for ways to provide the committee with the necessary objective information it needs to do its work."
Launched in 2009, the expert panel has aided the UNSC sanctions committee on North Korea. It published two reports each year -- an interim report and a final report -- on instances of sanctions violations based on information from U.N. member states and other open-source materials.
At a U.N. General Assembly meeting on Thursday, Russian Ambassador to the U.N. Vasily Nebenzya said his country plans to submit a draft resolution in the "very near future" on a one-year extension of the panel's mandate as he reiterated the demand for "updating the perimeters" of the North Korean sanctions regime.
Commenting on Russia's draft resolution, the official pointed out that Moscow's objective is to put a sunset clause in it and end the panel's independent reporting.
"One of the reasons why they are unhappy is because previous reporting has spoken to Russia's support for sanctions evasion on the part of DPRK," he said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
"This is all happening because of Russia's desire to ensure that in no way the international community can probe into what it has been doing with regard to facilitating sanctions evasion by the DPRK," he added.
Since its inception, the panel has laid bare a series of sanctions violations, including those about the North's nuclear and missile programs and other prohibited activities, such as the import of luxury goods and ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned items.
This undated file photo, released by AFP, shows a U.N. Security Council session underway at U.N. headquarters in New York. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 13, 2024
9. U.S.-Japan-Philippines announce mutual defense treaty in South China Sea
I do not think the headline is accurate. I doubt we could get any kind of defense treaty through the US senate these days.
I think a security arrangement regarding the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea should include the ROK as these sea lines of communication are vital for the ROK economy.
And a "web" is stronger than a "lattice," And I think it better describes our evaluation in security arrangements from the old hub and spoke.
Excerpt:
With the inauguration of the Trilateral Summit, the U.S. has fortified an Asia-Pacific security framework that presents a more cohesive barrier against China. This complements existing structures like the Quad, involving the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, alongside the U.S., U.K., and Australia alliance AUKUS, and the trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S., and Japan. Together, these initiatives establish a multilateral cooperation network spanning the Pacific, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia regions. Moreover, the three nations have taken steps to counterbalance China's economic influence by launching the Global Partnership for Infrastructure (GPI) Luzon Corridor, which aims to stimulate investment in Philippine infrastructure.
U.S.-Japan-Philippines announce mutual defense treaty in South China Sea
donga.com
Posted April. 13, 2024 07:42,
Updated April. 13, 2024 07:42
U.S.-Japan-Philippines announce mutual defense treaty in South China Sea. April. 13, 2024 07:42. by 워싱턴=문병기 기자 weappon@donga.com.
In the first trilateral summit held at the White House on Thursday (local time), the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines issued a robust cautionary message directed at China amidst ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The U.S. is evaluated for establishing a 'lattice-like' security system against China by creating a trilateral security cooperation mechanism along with the Quad and AUKUS.
In the joint vision statement issued following the summit, President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. announced, “We are also concerned by the militarization of reclaimed features and unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea. We resolve to advance trilateral defense cooperation, including through combined naval training and exercises.” As a step, they agreed to initiate trilateral maritime consultations, inclusive of maritime exercises, commencing in the upcoming year.
With the inauguration of the Trilateral Summit, the U.S. has fortified an Asia-Pacific security framework that presents a more cohesive barrier against China. This complements existing structures like the Quad, involving the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, alongside the U.S., U.K., and Australia alliance AUKUS, and the trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S., and Japan. Together, these initiatives establish a multilateral cooperation network spanning the Pacific, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia regions. Moreover, the three nations have taken steps to counterbalance China's economic influence by launching the Global Partnership for Infrastructure (GPI) Luzon Corridor, which aims to stimulate investment in Philippine infrastructure.
Prime Minister Kishida underscored in his joint address to the U.S. Congress on that day, "China's current external stance and military actions present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge, not only to the peace and security of Japan but to the peace and stability of the international community at large." Additionally, he condemned North Korea, stating, "There exists an imminent danger of nuclear weapons proliferation in East Asia. North Korea's provocations have an impact beyond the region. It has also exported its ballistic missiles to support Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.”
한국어
donga.com
10. The IPEF, targeting a 14-nation crisis, starts on Wednesday
Unfortunately IPEF cannot replace the TPP. I submit that one of the greatest strategic mistakes by the US was the withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership.
Excerpt:
Initiated in May 2022 under the guidance of President Joe Biden's administration, the IPEF represents the inaugural multilateral international pact concerning supply chains. In the subsequent year, May, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia, and 14 other member states, segmented into four divisions—trade, supply chain, clean economy, and fair economy—undertook negotiations, culminating in the formation of an agreement. The combined GDP of the IPEF member nations constituted 40.9% of the global GDP in 2020.
The IPEF, targeting a 14-nation crisis, starts on Wednesday
donga.com
Posted April. 13, 2024 07:42,
Updated April. 13, 2024 07:42
The IPEF, targeting a 14-nation crisis, starts on Wednesday. April. 13, 2024 07:42. by Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com.
Scheduled to take effect on Wednesday within the country, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) supply chain agreement, spearheaded by the United States, aims to tackle the supply chain crisis triggered by China. As a result, in scenarios similar to the 'urea water crisis' of 2021, stemming from supply chain complications with China, South Korea is poised to gain instant support from resource-abundant nations like the United States and Australia, alongside other countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
"On March 18, the ratification of the IPEF supply chain agreement was submitted, and as per the stipulations of the agreement's activation, it will come into force within the country 30 days later," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental entities declared on Friday. Prior to this, the government reviewed and approved the ratification of the IPEF in a Cabinet meeting held on March 6, followed by President Yoon Suk Yeol's endorsement and submission of the ratification to the IPEF. Earlier this year, in February, the IPEF agreement was initially activated in the United States, Japan, Singapore, Fiji, and India. South Korea marks the sixth nation to endorse the agreement.
Initiated in May 2022 under the guidance of President Joe Biden's administration, the IPEF represents the inaugural multilateral international pact concerning supply chains. In the subsequent year, May, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia, and 14 other member states, segmented into four divisions—trade, supply chain, clean economy, and fair economy—undertook negotiations, culminating in the formation of an agreement. The combined GDP of the IPEF member nations constituted 40.9% of the global GDP in 2020.
A Crisis Response Network (CRN) will be instituted per the agreement, enabling the 14 countries to collectively and promptly address supply chain crises. Should a nation enduring a supply chain dilemma seek aid, an urgent meeting will be convened within 15 days via the CRN to explore remedies, including aligning demand and supply companies and identifying alternate transport routes. During normal periods, efforts will be channeled towards amplifying supply chain resilience via increased investment, logistical enhancements, and collaborative R&D. The IPEF member countries have also consented to avoid actions that could detrimentally impact the supply chain.
With South Korea's heightened vulnerability to China's export constraints and similar actions, due to its substantial reliance on Chinese minerals and energy resources, the government anticipates that the activation of the IPEF agreement will considerably fortify its capacity to navigate supply chain crises. By 2022, South Korea had over 4,000 items with an import dependence exceeding 50% on specific countries, with the reliance on certain nations for essential minerals like lithium, cobalt, and graphite surpassing 80% the preceding year.
한국어
donga.com
11. Yoon expected to announce the directions for government reform
Too little too late?
Yoon expected to announce the directions for government reform
donga.com
Posted April. 13, 2024 07:42,
Updated April. 13, 2024 07:42
Yoon expected to announce the directions for government reform. April. 13, 2024 07:42. by 이상헌 기자, 김지현 기자 dapaper@donga.com.
As South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol expressed strong determination for government reform after the ruling party’s crushing defeats in the April 10 general elections and the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, Lee Jae-myung, revealed a positive stance toward a meeting with the president, the biggest talking point in the South Korean politics at the moment is whether a summit between the president and the opposition party leader will take place for the first time since the current administration was launched. As some of the ruling party members are arguing that the president should accept a meeting with Lee and the understanding of the major opposition party will be necessary to take care of various issues, such as the approval of the next prime minister, the successful accomplishment of the summit will serve as a test for change in the state of the nation.
“Of course, I will meet him, and of course, I will talk to him,” Lee told reporters about the possibility of meeting with President Yoon after he paid respects at the Hyeonchunggwan Hall of the Seoul National Cemetery on Friday morning. “It’s a shame that we haven’t been able to accomplish that,” he added. “If his goal is to beat the opposition party, there is no need to engage in conversation or pay respect. However, the opposition party is one of the pillars managing the state affairs,” Lee said. “Given that the separation of legal, administrative, and judicial powers is the basic principle of South Korea’s constitutional order, it is necessary to respect each other, have conversations, and make compromises for diverging issues.”
While the presidential office explained that President Yoon is willing to cooperate since the disastrous defeat in the general elections, it remained cautious by saying that there is no plan to hold a summit with the opposition party leader, with a senior member of the office saying there is no specific plan for the summit. President Yoon has been negative toward such a summit. However, the public sentiment, which was proven to be cold toward the ruling party based on the results of the general elections, and even some of the ruling party members are putting more and more pressure on President Yoon to accept the summit. In addition, the president needs to ask for cooperation from the opposition party leader, given the situation of the minor ruling party and the major opposition party as the appointment of the next prime minister needs to be approved by the National Assembly.
President Yoon is expected to announce his opinions on the general election results and the directions for the government reform early next week. This announcement can either take the form of a spoken statement to the public or a message delivered at a State of Council meeting. Given the criticism about his one-way communication, an option to hold a press conference is also considered.
한국어
donga.com
12. South Korea, US plan exercises against North Korea nuclear use scenario
South Korea, US plan exercises against North Korea nuclear use scenario
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · April 12, 2024
Trilateral naval exercises focus on countering North Korea’s underwater threats
By Kim Arin
Published : April 12, 2024 - 15:52
Cho Chang-rae, South Korea’s deputy minister of national defense, and Ely Ratner, the US assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, pose for a photograph at the 24th Korea-US Integrated Defense Consultative Group meeting in Washington on Thursday. (Yonhap)
South Korea and the US have agreed to hold tabletop exercises that simulate North Korea’s nuclear weapons use to strengthen a joint response.
According to the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul on Friday, the two countries confirmed the plans at the 24th Korea-US Integrated Defense Consultative Group held in Washington on Thursday.
The meeting in Washington was attended by a South Korean delegation led by Cho Chang-rae, the deputy minister of national defense. The US delegation was led by Ely Ratner, assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs; and Andrew Winternitz, acting deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia.
The TTX, which reflects a scenario of North Korea using nuclear weapons, was agreed upon at the last meeting of the bilateral Nuclear Consultative Group.
“South Korea and the US are committed to demonstrating the strength of our Alliance and the combined defense posture through a close and coordinated joint response to provocations, threats and activities by North Korea that undermine peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula,” the defense ministry said in a statement.
The ministry said the US “reaffirmed its commitment to defend the Republic of Korea with the full range of US military capabilities -- including nuclear, conventional, missile defense and advanced non-nuclear capabilities -- and to deploy strategic assets in a regular and visible manner.”
The US also “reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its allies is unacceptable and will lead to the end of the Kim Jong-un regime” the ministry said.
The ministry said the two sides agreed to improve training conditions, including by sharing facilities and airspace in South Korea, and to modernize alliance capabilities by leveraging the science and technologies of both countries.
Both sides noted that the second military spy satellite launched by South Korea is an important asset for joint reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, and agreed to continue cooperation through the Space Cooperation Working Group.
They also pledged to strengthen the United Nations Command in Korea, recognizing its “longstanding contribution to peace and stability here,” according to the ministry.
The ministry said South Korea and the US share the belief that North Korea-Russia military cooperation "undermines peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula,” and that “a trilateral cooperation with Japan was critical to achieving security goals.”
South Korea, the US and Japan conducted naval exercises Thursday and Friday at the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa with six warships from the three countries, including the Aegis destroyer Seoae Ryu Sung-ryong.
The two-day exercises were part of the trilateral plan established under the Camp David agreement reached by the leaders of the three countries.
The exercises focused on enhancing the joint response capabilities of South Korea, the US and Japan in the face of increasing nuclear and missile threats, including North Korea’s recent ballistic missile launches.
Anti-submarine drills aimed at improving the ability to counter North Korea’s underwater threats, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles, were held over the two days.
Maritime interdiction drills to prevent North Korea’s illegal transportation of weapons of mass destruction and search and rescue drills in the event of a ship in duress were also conducted.
koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · April 12, 2024
13. [From Pyongyang to Manhattan] ① Siblings who defected from North Korea as Ivy League graduate students
A long but good weekend read.
Here is a special series from Radio Free Asia about my good friend and colleague Hyun Seung Lee (we work together at GPF on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea) and his sister Seohyun Lee who are both graduate students at Columbia University. They come from a very strong family (their father Ri Jong Ho and I coauthroed this article in February: The Real Reason North Korea is Threatening War). I have learned so much from them.
One of the very important projects that Hyun Seung is leading is the North Korean Young Leaders Assembly. He has established a group of young leaders from north Kora in South Korea and the US (and it will expand to other countries as well). As noted in the article he boright 10 young escapees to Washington (and Philadelphia) and New York. This summer he will bring back the original 10 core members and bring another 10 to expose them to US government, diplomatic, and military personnel, academics, civil society groups and the UN. These escapees will be critical in helping establish a free and unified Korea, A United Republic of Korea.
These four articles are google translations.
[From Pyongyang to Manhattan] ① Siblings who defected from North Korea as Ivy League graduate students
https://www.rfa.org/korean/special-programs/frompyongyangtomanhattan-04092024163549.html
New York-Jamin Anderson, Jaewoo Park andersonj@rfa.org
2024.04.09
Hyunseung Lee lives in a dormitory near Columbia University. I am scheduled to graduate this coming May.
/RFA photo
North Korean people listening to a lecture on North Korean studies
At the end of last March , Columbia University located in Manhattan, New York, USA .
Discussions about North Korea are in full swing in Room 415 of the Law School Building .
[ Student ] I believe that in order to have dialogue with North Korea for denuclearization, a basic relationship must first be established between North Korea and the international community.
Professor Noh Jeong-ho, who is sitting across from the students, asks a question to the male student sitting next to him.
[ Professor ] I have a question for Hyunseung. What was the North Korean regime’s hostile anti-American policy like as experienced by Hyunseung ? Do ordinary people also feel similar fear or hostility toward the United States ?
About twenty graduate students taking the class ‘Geopolitics of Korean Peninsula Law and Conflict’ listen intently to his story.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] North Korean people are taught that the U.S. military committed many human rights violations during the Korean War . What I learned from the North Korean regime's many educational propaganda materials was that 'the United States is North Korea's biggest enemy . ' The North Korean regime teaches that there is no negotiation and that unconditional victory is the only option North Korea has in its relationship with the United States .
Hyunseung is attending Columbia Law School Professor Noh Jeong-ho’s class titled ‘Korean Peninsula Law and Geopolitics of Conflict.’ /RFA Photo
The person who shared his experience in North Korea is Hyunseung Lee, who defected from North Korea in 2014 .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] This is the entrance to the main campus. There are entrances on both sides , so you can enter from both Amsterdam Boulevard and Broadway Boulevard . The school building is located around here .
Columbia University main campus. It is located on the main road that runs north to south, so outsiders can come and go freely .
As you enter the campus, you can see a dome building in the ancient Greek architectural style in a wide view.
The Row Library building was previously a library, but is now used as the president's office and academic affairs office.
On a sunny spring day, students are sitting in groups and chatting on the steps in front of the library and on the outdoor bench .
It is full of students who spend leisurely time lying down on the lawn, taking a nap or drinking coffee .
[ Hyunseung Lee ] You can think of this as where Columbia students mainly live . Can you see it ? There are many students who come out to enjoy the sunshine .
Hyunseung also sits down on the steps in front of the library and turns on his laptop.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] I'll send you an email. There are times when I receive 100 emails a day . You have to reply at that time . In the case of school group projects, a lot of communication is done via email .
Mr. Hyunseung entered Columbia University's School of International and Public Policy (SIPA) in September last year .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] There is something that makes me anxious. When I open and watch the acceptance announcement online , a congratulatory star appears . If it doesn't pop up, it's gone . But I felt good when the stars rose . Ah, that's a relief .
Hyunseung’s personality is recognized by his friends. Thanks to Hyunseung's positive and outgoing personality, he said they quickly became friends. /RFA Photo
For Hyunseung, who is taking a one- year master's course, this semester is already the last semester.
It seems like he has adapted well to school life. I ran into a friend who was studying nearby and we talked for a while .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] How is your exam preparation going ? It's an open book , right ?
[ Friend ] Are you talking about the test tomorrow? huh .
Hyunseung is also anxious because of the exam that will be held the next day.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] ( Sighing ) There is so much material to read , and I'm trying to study, but it's not easy because there's so much . Among the books you must read, there is one that has been translated into Korean . If there is something like that, you should watch it first . If not, you should watch it in English . Because reading English takes too much time .
Hyunseung studies without having time to play. I'm also curious about his grades , and Hyunseung readily displays last semester's report card on his laptop .
Last semester's report card suddenly revealed by Hyunseung. /RFA Photo
[ Reporter ] How are your grades ?
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] My grades are okay .
Last semester I received A and B+ in all 7 subjects .
[ Reporter ] You're doing well. There is no A+ ?
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] Teachers don’t often give A + . I already finished one class this semester and got an A.
Hyunseung, who was heading to the next class, hurries up his steps, saying he might stop by for a moment.
He runs down the stairs and waits for someone at the entrance to the underground library.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] I would like to receive a snack. I'm hungry now because I didn't eat much before class started .
After a while, a female student appears and is handed two chocolate cookies. Could she be her girlfriend ?
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] I got it from my younger brother . I don't have anything for you two , I'm sorry .
The female student who immediately disappeared into the library saying she had to study for an exam is Hyunseung's younger sister, Seohyun Lee.
“If you succeed in New York, you can succeed anywhere.”
Seohyun is a senior who entered Columbia Graduate School of International and Public Policy a year before her older brother, Hyunseung.
Two North Korean defectors, brother and sister, are attending the same school at the same time.
Hyunseung and Seohyun escaped North Korea 10 years ago with their father, a former high-ranking official in Office 39 of the North Korean Workers' Party.
In 2016 , the Washington Post, an American daily newspaper, introduced them as 'North Korea's top 1% elite class' and described the world they live in as 'Pyeonghattan ' , saying that they enjoyed a standard of living similar to that of Manhattan, New York while living in Pyongyang. .
Seohyun always drinks coffee first thing in the morning when she has a lot of homework to do. He picked it up at Joe Coffee, a cafe on campus. /RFA Photo
The busy streets of New York, where trains frequently pass by on elevated tracks and horns honking are constantly heard.
Seohyun, dressed in a thick coat on a cloudy day that looks like it's about to rain, is hurriedly heading somewhere, holding a cup of coffee in one hand.
[ Lee Seo-hyun ] I'm going to business school right now to meet my friends . One is a friend who studied with me at SIPA and graduated last year , and the other is a friend who is studying at a business school . But it's been a long time since I've seen you . Because everyone was so busy , we only communicated through text messages .
Although she is now a ‘New Yorker’ who is used to living here , Seohyun did not know about the city of New York until she was 20 years old .
[ Lee Seohyun ] I don't think I had any idea . I don't think he'd ever heard of it . When I'm in North Korea, I learn all about the country and its capital . So I knew about Washington D.C., but I didn't really know about New York . When I first came here , I couldn't go out in the evening for about 2 to 3 months because I was scared . But I guess humans are animals of adaptation . I adapted right away and am doing well now .
Before defecting from North Korea, Seohyun attended the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature at Kim Il-sung University, North Korea's most prestigious university, for two years. She then went to China to study and enrolled at Northeastern University of Finance and Economics, where her older brother, Hyunseung, was attending .
[ Seohyun Lee ] To be honest, I think it was equally good. That university ( Kim Il-sung University ) was the best university from my perspective at the time . Now, if I had been told that I had received an admission permit to Kim Il-sung University, I would have just thrown it in the trash can .
Seohyun is taking six classes this semester .
[ Lee Seohyun ] I'm going to class right now. It's a class on North Korean studies , but I'm not late . There are 2 minutes left . Because I have a schedule .
We arrived at the classroom in the nick of time. This is the ‘North Korea : State , Society , Diplomacy’ class at the Graduate School of International Public Policy .
Although she was born and raised in North Korea, Seohyun is also taking classes about North Korea, like her older brother, Hyunseung .
[ Lee Seo-hyun ] What I learned in North Korea focused on content that was refined to fit the North Korean regime, but I think I can learn about North Korean history from a more objective perspective . I also chose this class because the comments and questions left by friends from various backgrounds while taking the class together gave me great inspiration .
Seohyun and her friends (Andrew and Michelle) gathered in the school cafeteria to work on a project. /RFA Photo
In a small class of about fifteen people, Seohyun gave a presentation on the topic of ‘Denuclearization and Diplomacy . ’
Seohyun's role is special to both the professor in charge of the class and the friends taking the same class .
[ Professor Jonathan Corrado ] For every topic I cover in class, Seohyun shares her personal experiences in North Korea. Mr. Seohyun adds his valuable perspective to help his students better understand North Korea from a human perspective, beyond textbooks or lectures .
[ Andrew Lim ] When I first heard that there was a student from North Korea in this class, it felt really unreal. I had some thoughts about North Korea as a closed society through the media , but listening to Seohyun's experience made me understand that the North Korean people we read and studied in books actually exist .
The world's most closed country, North Korea . And the people who lived there .
Seohyun, a North Korean person whom I had only seen in books, and Andrew, a Korean American, met in a North Korean studies class and became close friends.
Why did a brother and sister who grew up in Pyongyang and studied abroad in China choose a school in the middle of New York?
[ Seohyun Lee ] When I said I wanted to study more about international relations, there were several schools that were recommended to me. Among them, I chose Columbia because, as you know, it is a good university , but also because the city itself seems like a place for learning . There is a saying like that . ‘If you succeed in New York, you can succeed anywhere in the world . ’
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] Other people said, ‘Experience New York once, only then can you say you have experienced America, ’ so I came here and realized that the city of New York has many advantages . In particular, since it is the center of the international diplomatic arena and finance, you can obtain relevant information and meet people .
Two siblings who take good care of each other. /RFA Photo
The two siblings, who have always attended the same school since kindergarten, are now attending the same school in the United States, going through Pyongyang's Goldstar Academy and Foreign Language Institute to Northeastern University of Finance and Economics in China .
From exchanging advice on classes and school life, to talking on the phone several times a day, preparing each other's meals, and even doing grocery shopping for each other, I was able to see the affectionate appearance of siblings .
Siblings 6 years apart . We asked each other what kind of older brother and younger brother we were .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] He's kind and listens well , and his younger brother was the head of North Korea's division in elementary school , so he was the class representative . By doing those things, I had leadership skills .
[ Lee Seohyun ] I’m proud of you. Since we were all taking the same course , my brother did very well in school and got good evaluations, so his expectations of me were high , and I think there was implicit pressure on me . Since everyone already knows that I am my brother, I also have to study well to some extent .
Compliments are poured out to each other.
However, when asked, ‘Do you often hear people say you look alike?’ their responses were different.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] Some people say they are twins . Because Americans don't know the difference .
[ Lee Seohyun ] Uh, I… I don't feel very good, though . But my brother was more handsome when he was younger . He used to be a handsome guy , but he got older .
Two people looking at each other and smiling. They look no different from any other siblings .
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Team Lee Kyeong-ha
[From Pyongyang to Manhattan] ② “Yesterday we were enemies, but today we are friends.”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/special-programs/frompyongyangtomanhattan-04102024135701.html
Washington - Jaewoo Park, Jamin Anderson parkja@rfa.org
2024.04.10
Hyeonseung Lee, a North Korean defector attending Columbia University, and August Gold, a former US military student taking the same class, are talking and shaking hands.
/RFA Photo
00:00 / 11:49
Comrade American imperialist invader
An evening at the end of last March . A beer bar in front of Columbia University in New York, USA is crowded with students who have finished their classes .
Hyunseung Lee, a North Korean defector graduate student, is also talking with his classmates.
James Brown, a U.S. Marine Corps officer who studied in the same department as Hyunseung, served in Pohang, Korea and Okinawa, Japan.
[ James Brown ] I spent a lot of time as a U.S. soldier worrying about the threat from North Korea, so when I first met Hyunseung, I was shocked and intrigued at the same time .
To Mr. Hyun Seung, who served in the North Korean People's Army, Mr. Brown was an 'American imperialist aggressor.'
However, on this day, the two people were clinking glasses, toasting, and drinking beer, showing no hostility at all.
[ James Brown ] At one time, I was south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Hyunseung was north of the DMZ . We also trained against each other during the same period . But now Hyunseung is my best friend .
Mr. Hyunseung graduated from Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute, a North Korean-style special high school , and was exempt from military service. However, he volunteered to enlist and served in the People's Army for 3 years and 3 months ( 2002-2005 ) .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] When I was 17 , I served in the North Korean People's Army for 3 years and 4 months . He first started in the 4th Corps , and then was discharged from the 15th Martial Arts Research Institute of the Operations Bureau directly under the General Staff of the People's Army . They are referred to as the best special forces in North Korea . Its mission was to teach and research shooting, including the Juche shooting method and Juche striking method of the Korean People's Army .
At a beer restaurant in front of Columbia University, Hyunseung and his department friends are sitting at a table chatting. /RFA Photo
The reason behind my decision to serve in the military was ‘loyalty’ to the North Korean authorities.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] Even in North Korea, there is a common social belief that ‘men must have military experience.’ And now, I actually wanted to experience the military . I don't think I thought about it that much . Anyway, you continue to learn that serving in the military is serving the country and people .
The next morning, Hyunseung, wearing a dark blue hoodie with Columbia University's slogan on it, is having a discussion in fluent English with August Gold, a friend who served in the U.S. military.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] In North Korea, we were taught a lot of anti-American propaganda, such as that US soldiers committed crimes against humanity during the Korean War . I wonder if there was such training in the US military as well .
[ August Gold ] As far as I remember, there was no hostile education against North Korea . All I heard was that the North Korean government was controlling everything and that they were using old equipment .
Even after breaking up with his friend, Hyunseung speaks passionately about having experienced strong anti-American propaganda in North Korea.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] ( In North Korea ) It is called our Joseon War . US soldiers committed crimes during the Korean War . That's how you learn . But now in the United States, especially in American society, there is no ideological education about North Korea at all . North Korea lives in its own world . What is the United States trying to do to us ( North Korea ) ? So in a way, I feel truly pitiful .
I think it was quite unfair back then when I called my classmates who were taking classes with me ‘American imperialist invaders.’
Hyunseung shopped at H Mart, a Korean supermarket. The cart contains ramen and various vegetables. /RFA Photo
The survival story of the children of elite officers in the People's Army
This evening, Hyunseung heads to 'H - mart' , a Korean supermarket located near Columbia University, saying he will invite reporters to his dormitory and treat them to a meal .
Hyunseung's dormitory located near the campus. I share the kitchen and living room with two graduate students, one from France and the other from America .
Although it is old and old, the building looks old-fashioned and European-style . The elevator also has wooden sliding doors .
Once inside the dormitory, I put down the groceries and take out the kitchen utensils . You can see Hyunseung chopping vegetables .
The unit where Hyunseung worked did not have a designated cook, so the soldiers took turns cooking . When I'm on duty, I usually cook for 30 people , but I've cooked for as many as 70 to 80 people, so I seem to be confident in this level of cooking .
[ Reporter ] What kind of menu did you mainly cook ?
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] Since there were usually no ingredients , the fixed menu was stir -fried radish , stir-fried cabbage , mixed with soybean paste , salted , pickled radish, soup , and rice .
Hyunseung picking up vegetables at H Mart. /RFA Photo
Hyunseung's hands are skillful as he picks up ingredients such as pork, tofu , and cilantro .
The sound of bubbling stew and grilling meat can be heard beyond the kitchen.
After about 40 minutes, the fragrant smell of oil and spicy stew filled the dormitory .
The food he served was North Korean-style tofu kimchi stew and Korean-style pork ribs.
After finishing cooking and eating, I looked more relaxed and talked to the reporters.
Hyunseung , who grew up without difficulties as the eldest son of an official in Room 39 of the Workers' Party, the highest-ranking North Korean official , admits that he was unable to easily adapt to the harsh military life he was experiencing for the first time in his life .
In the dormitory kitchen, Hyunseung Lee cooked food for the reporters. /RFA Photo
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] It was my first time in the military, and I wanted to eat meat because there was no more meat, so I talked to the commander one time and was allowed to go out for half a day. There was someone who knew where I was . A person who is under your father’s control . So I went there to get some meat . We have just obtained approval for 3kg of pork . It was the first time I ate meat like that in half a year . Otherwise, it would be almost unthinkable to eat meat in the military in North Korea .
However, it is said that while serving in the military, he learned more deeply about the real lives of North Korean people.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] I was currently serving in the 4th Corps, so electricity was very scarce at that time . Sometimes we don't have electricity even once a day for even an hour .
Hyunseung Lee looking at the Statue of Liberty from the deck of a cruise ship. /RFA Photo
Until the day the United States presents the ‘Statue of Liberty’ to North Korea
One day, Hyunseung brought reporters to Battery Park dock in the south of Manhattan, offering to show them around New York.
Here, you can take a cruise to see the Statue of Liberty, a gift from France to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the American Revolutionary War victory in 1886 .
When you go up to the deck , you can see the Brooklyn Bridge, the Statue of Liberty, and downtown Manhattan, New York .
Hyunseung is pressing the camera shutter, feeling the refreshing breeze from the river.
Until the early 19th century, the Statue of Liberty was located in a passenger port . It is said that immigrants who left their hometowns embraced the 'American Dream' after seeing the Statue of Liberty .
Hyunseung, who is about to graduate from graduate school, is lost in thought. Did he ever expect that he, who was born and raised in North Korea, would settle down in the United States, a country he had been taught to be his greatest enemy ?
[ Reporter ] Did you think you could come to America?
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] I never even dreamed of it . He wanted to go to America, but he was at a loss because he didn't know how to get there .
Hyunseung Lee talking on the phone in the cruise ship waiting room before boarding the cruise ship. /RFA Photo
For Hyunseung, who left North Korea for freedom, the meaning of the Statue of Liberty is bound to be different.
[ Reporter ] What do you like about coming to the United States?
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] It seems like the United States is no longer thinking about having to worry or be careful . In North Korea, you always have to be careful no matter what you say . Even if you act out, you think you shouldn't get caught by the National Security Agency or something like that . It's very comfortable, especially when watching movies . Because there's so little control, it's almost like I don't see it . I miss you so much because there is control in North Korea . It's a small thing, but I think there's a lot of difference between having freedom and not having it .
In North Korea, people are sentenced to correctional labor just for watching South Korean dramas. However, this kind of control makes them yearn for freedom, and there are quite a few people who have even defected from North Korea because of this .
A former People's Army soldier who was forced to follow communist ideology, he has now become an activist calling for North Korea's freedom in the United States.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] When I didn't know about freedom in North Korea, I never thought about it being precious . Now that I have it, I think it is indispensable . I don't think I can give up . I hope other North Korean residents also find freedom .
Hyunseung dreams that the United States will gift the Statue of Liberty to North Korea one day when freedom comes to North Korea, just as France gifted the Statue of Liberty to the United States.
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Team Lee Kyeong-ha
[From Pyongyang to Manhattan] ③ Seohyun’s family’s ‘Beyond Utopia’
https://www.rfa.org/korean/special-programs/frompyongyangtomanhattan-04112024144209.html
Washington - Jaewoo Park, Jamin Anderson parkja@rfa.org
2024.04.11
A family photo taken by Seohyun's family when they visited Rockefeller Center Plaza in New York last winter. A large crowd gathered to watch the Christmas tree lighting.
/ Provided by Hyunseung Lee
00:00/12:09
“It’s not a student’s duty, but… . ”
It was late one afternoon at the end of March , in the building of the Graduate School of International and Public Policy at Columbia University in New York .
A female student and her friends are carrying and moving boxes.
[ Lee Seohyun ] Oh, wait a minute . oh my . I threw it away .
It looks quite burdensome. The female student who eventually put it down and held up the booklet in the box was Seohyun Lee, a graduate student at Columbia University and a North Korean defector .
[ Seohyun Lee ] With the support of the Korean Permanent Mission to the United Nations, we are planning to hold an event to give ( this booklet ) to those who asked questions and those who won . I understand that this is a brief explanation of the human rights situation in North Korea .
Seohyun was moving a booklet of information on North Korean human rights to be distributed at the school screening of the movie 'Beyond Utopia' to be held the next day.
'Beyond Utopia' is an American documentary ( documentary film ) released last year that depicts the journey of a family of North Korean defectors to escape from North Korea . It won various film awards .
'Korea Focus', a Korean student council to which Seohyun belongs, has been planning this preview since last year to inform Columbia University students about the human rights situation in North Korea and the difficulties of the North Korean defection process.
Seohyun Lee, a North Korean defector graduate student, is moving luggage with her friends from Korea Focus, a Korean-American club at Columbia University, and explaining it to reporters. /RFA Photo
After class the next afternoon, Seohyun frantically runs somewhere again. When he meets reporters, he always answers out of breath .
[ Reporter ] Where are you going?
[ Lee Seo-hyun ] I 'm going to the event hall on the 15th floor .
When I arrived at the preview venue on the 15th floor and put down my bag, a large auditorium came into view .
In one corner of the back of the auditorium , there are gimbap, snacks, and drinks prepared by Korea Focus for the students watching . Now, kimbap is not an unfamiliar food in America .
Beyond Korean popular culture, K- pop and K- drama, the craze for Korean food, K- food, is also strong . Last year, frozen kimbap was launched at a famous grocery store, and it was sold out not long after its launch .
American students also seem to find it unfamiliar, picking up kimbap and sitting in the audience.
The screening has started, but Seohyun is unable to concentrate on the movie and sits by the window outside the auditorium.
Seohyun concentrating on completing her exam during the school screening of the movie Beyond Utopia. /RFA Photo
[ Reporter ] What are you doing?
[ Lee Seohyun ] There were more questions than I expected, so I couldn't finish the test . I have to finish it before the deadline for submission, so I'm trying to finish it before the Q&A time . I want to go in ( at the screening ) , but when I look at it, it's hard to concentrate, so I'm out .
I'm curious as to why you held this event despite your busy schedule.
[ Seohyun Lee ] Although this activity is not mandatory as a student, I believe it is my duty as a student who escaped from North Korea to spread the word.
I wanted to inform many Columbia University students about the reality of North Korea before graduation.
After the movie starts, a familiar face appears at the screening venue. This is Seohyun's older brother, Hyunseung .
Her older brother, Hyunseung, said that he couldn't stop crying when he first saw ' Beyond Utopia ' .
Maybe it's because I had a similar experience as a North Korean defector? Every time Hyunseung hears a story of failed defection from North Korea, his heart sinks .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] The people who are here now ( in the movie ) are people who have traditionally gone through that difficult process . There are many people who have been caught . I also have experience rescuing 2-3 people over the past 2 years , and I have caught people trying to escape from Africa and China . I was also repatriated to North Korea . ( Compared to that ) I, my family, made a decision and acted quickly... .
Seohyun visited the United Nations Headquarters in Manhattan, New York with her brother Hyunseung. The appearance of two siblings looking at the general meeting hall. /RFA Photo
Seohyun’s family’s ‘Beyond Utopia’
[ Seohyun Lee ] Even the pigeons here seem free.
This place, where even pigeons seem free and peaceful, is the United Nations Headquarters located next to the East River in New York.
Seohyun and her older brother, Hyunseung, came here to coordinate an event for North Korean defectors with staff from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
This place has special meaning to the two siblings. It is a stage for activities that can publicize the reality of human rights in North Korea , and it is also one of the few places where the international community can hear the North Korean government's official position .
Last year, Seohyun gave a speech at an informal meeting on North Korean human rights held by the UN Security Council, and Hyunseung organized a 'Young North Korean Defector Leaders' Conference' and arranged a meeting with the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas - Greenfield .
As they entered the United Nations, the two siblings noticed the flags of member countries being displayed.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] There are all the national flags here . If you look here, you will see the North Korean flag . There is also a Korean flag . The North Korean flag looks like this to me . As expected, I found it in one go .
When I discovered the familiar North Korean national flag, I had mixed emotions.
Hyunseung finds the North Korean flag among the flags at the UN headquarters and points to it. /RFA Photo
The family of four, father Ri Jeong-ho, mother Kim Boo-kyung , and children Lee Hyun-seung and Lee Seo-hyeon , defected from China in October 2014 .
Although I didn't cross borders and go through difficult terrain like the cast of the movie 'Beyond Utopia', I felt the same dizzying emotions .
[ Seohyun Lee ] I was so distracted during the process of escaping from North Korea that it felt like I was walking in a dream. At that time, I was very nervous just looking at the North Korean defection process . It was a situation where we didn't know who would appear at any moment and attack us , and it was a situation that no one could predict . It seemed like the anxiety and fear I got from such things overlapped . Then, we just got on the plane. At that time, I felt safe that we were safe, but I also thought, ' Now we have crossed a river that really cannot be crossed . '
At the time, Kim Jong-un, the general secretary of North Korea's Workers' Party, executed his uncle Jang Song-taek, and others around him were also executed, and Seohyun's family witnessed people around them who were in China being taken away .
In particular, Seohyun had to watch as her North Korean friend, with whom she shared a dormitory for four years in China, was taken away by National Security Agency agents right before her eyes one morning . It is said that this friend, who was a subordinate of Jang Song-taek, whose father was executed, was subsequently sent to a political prison camp .
As people around them are purged, Seohyun's family, thinking that they could be next at any time, meets secretly in a park in China.
To avoid eavesdropping and wiretapping, we left cell phones and other electronic devices in the car and discussed 'defector'.
Seohyun and Hyunseung's father, Ri Jeong-ho, and her mother, Kim Bu-kyung, whom reporters met separately in Virginia./RFA Photo
According to his father, Lee Jeong-ho, who our reporters later met separately, the family had made up their mind to defect from North Korea at the time, but they only felt sorry for the family they left behind.
[ Father Lee Jeong-ho ] A family is a community with a destiny, so in that system, if one person goes wrong, everyone goes wrong due to the guilt-by-association system, so we were able to make that decision because we got together and discussed . Nevertheless, there are also brothers left behind in North Korea . People like this are getting noticed now... .
After arriving in Korea, I lived a quiet life, but I did not enjoy complete freedom. This is because the North Korean authorities have been continuously tracking them .
In 2016 , two years after Ri Jeong-ho's family defected from North Korea, North Korea's propaganda media , Uriminjokkiri TV, featured Lee's mother and brothers and urged them to re-enter North Korea . In fact, it was a threatening message from the North Korean authorities toward Ri Jeong-ho's family .
In addition, as he suffered from wiretapping and hacking attacks believed to be from North Korea, he ultimately decided to seek asylum in the United States in March 2016 .
Seohyun's family agreed that although life in the United States was not easy, they were able to survive because they were with their family.
[ Lee Seohyun ] In really difficult situations, I think the only thing you have is your family . I think that my family gives me absolute support and support more than anyone else . I always talk to my brother if I have any difficulties , and I listen to advice and my thoughts change a lot, and I think that's how I've grown .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] Actually, I think it's difficult to settle down after defecting from North Korea and leaving a hometown where I've already lived for over 30 or 20 years . The reason we were able to endure it to some extent was because our family was so close together that we helped each other well .
Parents feel the same way. Although I lived in North Korea all my life and am unfamiliar with the language and culture, I feel reassured by my children .
[ Father Lee Jeong-ho ] But when I was in North Korea at that time, there was no time. If I left in the morning, I would come back at night . But now, since we have a lot of time here, we can talk... . Because we came with a common purpose . Now we discuss ( discuss ) what we should do to change the North Korean system .
[ Mother Kim Boo-kyung ] I always worry, but we are family . The family gains strength and the family sticks together to get through it .
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Team Lee Kyeong-ha
[From Pyongyang to Manhattan] ④ A North Korean defector brother and sister’s real-life capitalist survival story
https://www.rfa.org/korean/special-programs/frompyongyangtomanhattan-04122024143523.html
Washington - Jaewoo Park, Jamin Anderson parkja@rfa.org
2024.04.12
Lee Hyun-seung and Lee Seo-hyeon, North Korean defector siblings, visited Times Square. I am being interviewed while holding an umbrella.
/RFA Photo
00:00/10:57
“Don’t worry we will earn it”
A cafe in Virginia, USA, early this month when the spring cold arrived.
I met Lee Jeong-ho and his wife, Kim Bu-gyeong, former senior officials of North Korea's Workers' Party Office 39, who rarely give media interviews .
When I was told that I would be covering siblings Hyunseung and Seohyun, whose children are attending an Ivy League university in the United States, I readily agreed to the interview .
As parents, sacrifice for our children seems to be universal.
When the family decided to defect from North Korea, Kim Boo-kyung was worried about whether she would adapt well to capitalist society.
This is because they have enjoyed a trouble-free life as the family of a top-ranking executive.
At that time, it was the two siblings who reassured their mother, Kim Bu-kyung.
Seohyun and Hyunseung's father, Ri Jeong-ho, and her mother, Kim Bu-kyung, whom reporters met separately in Virginia./RFA Photo
[ Mother Kim Boo-kyung ] I was wondering if I could live , really, and I was wondering if I really had to do that, but Seohyun and my son said, 'Don't worry, mom'... .
[ Father Lee Jeong-ho ] My wife said , ‘ If we live in a capitalist society, we won’t have money , how will we survive? ’ But now Hyunseung and Seohyun will go and earn money, so don’t worry about that… .
The reporter witnessed a traffic jam while traveling in New York's 'Yellow Cab' with two siblings during the 4 nights and 5 days of reporting.
New York City is said to be discussing a plan to impose a congestion fee on entering passenger vehicles.
Unlike the quiet downtown Pyongyang, where there are no cars, the two siblings are always surprised by the complexity of New York.
Because of the traffic, I spent more time in the taxi and was able to hear more honest stories.
How did the two people learn about capitalism? My first impression of the capitalist city of New York from North Korea was not good .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] In propaganda videos, there are works that only show New York's homeless people or the uncleaned city of New York . Now they only show us that it is ‘rotten and sick capitalism’ . When we can see New York, we can now see what an American city is like through American movies and other works that were smuggled in illegally .
Inside Pyongyang’s Kim Jong-suk Silk Mill. Slogans urging the victory of socialism can be seen. /AP
The North Korean upper class's adaptation to capitalism... Experiences of ‘racism’
The siblings' first experience with capitalism was when they came from North Korea to study in China.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] I went to China ( for the first time ) by train . First of all, I take lessons when I go abroad . When you go out, you must not be influenced by capitalist ideas . You receive cramming training . As soon as you come out, everything seems hostile . Even a good thing is ‘rotten and sick capitalism’ . The good thing was that there was electricity . I felt like this society was moving .
Capitalism in Korea and the United States could not be compared to the experience in 'China'. This is because the financial support and various benefits from his father, who was a high-ranking executive, were gone.
To help her adapt to living in Korea, Seohyun worked part-time ( temporarily ) at a famous bakery and also worked as a Chinese instructor at a language school .
[ Lee Seohyun ] ( Language academy instructor ) I haven’t been doing it for a long time . Would you like to give it a try ? I did it anyway . When I thought about it, I realized that teaching also requires experience, know-how, and preparation , and I thought , ' Who can I teach ?' I thought so . Knowing and communicating are two different things . It was an experience .
In 2016 , the Washington Post interviewed them and introduced them as ‘North Korea’s top 1% elite class . ’ They once lived as part of the 1% upper class in Pyongyang , but after defecting from North Korea, they had to start from scratch again .
Hyunseung, who came to the United States, earned minimum wage by working as a food delivery person for a delivery company, a restaurant employee , and a parking attendant .
In the process, I was even subjected to ‘racial discrimination’.
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] I made a mistake when I was working part-time in parking . So, should you get angry at me and call me racist ? Some Chinese Guy said that . But I didn't know it was racism at the time . But the other kids are now trying to stop him . It's called racism... . In doing so, I also learned about American society .
Lee Hyun-seung and Lee Seo-hyun talking to reporters in a taxi./RFA Photo
The center of ‘rotten and diseased capitalism’
Additionally, Manhattan, New York is the most expensive place to live in the United States.
As of last year , the average monthly rent for an apartment in Manhattan was $ 5,500 , and the median was $ 4,400 . It goes without saying that prices are high .
The two people also checked prices and purchased items carefully while accompanying reporters.
I had the opportunity to tour Columbia University's 'Book Store' with them. The Book Store is a place where you can purchase textbooks , various school supplies, and even souvenirs .
As you go down the escalator, you will find various items such as cups, T-shirts , and ballpoint pens with the sky blue Columbia University symbol on them .
It only has the Columbia University brand on it, but it looks two or three times more expensive than products from other stores .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] There are various things you can see at each school. I think parents also buy one when they come .
[ Reporter ] Do you want to buy it when your parents come?
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] He's coming when he graduates . If he comes, I'll come buy it with him .
The Columbia University Book Store sells items with various shapes of university symbols on them. /RFA Photo
School supplies and textbooks alone are not easy , but I'm curious about the tuition for these two people .
Graduate school tuition at Columbia University, a private school, is said to cost approximately $76,000 per year , or approximately $ 110,000 including living expenses . It is too much of an amount for two siblings to bear .
However, I could not stop my passion for education. After hearing that a North Korean defector brother and sister were struggling in the United States, scholarships were offered from various places in Korea and the United States .
[ Lee Hyun-seung ] There are still people who helped us and we received many scholarships . So, my younger brother and I received the Otto Warmbier scholarship . I also received it from an organization called LINK , the Bush Foundation , the Future Korea Foundation , and the One Korea Foundation .
Seohyun and Hyunseung were selected as recipients of a scholarship provided by the Warmbier Foundation, which honors Otto Warmbier, an American college student who was detained in North Korea and died shortly after being released in a coma.
However, this is not enough, so I am also working on a side job, such as giving lectures to inform people about the situation in North Korea. We also recently received student loans from a bank .
Panoramic view of Times Square in Manhattan, New York. /RFA Photo
A rainy day in March . The two siblings head to ‘Time Square’ with umbrellas .
Although it is evening, this place is as bright as day with sparkling outdoor advertisements. You will realize why it is called ‘Night Night Street’ .
Here, you may be mesmerized by the colorful outdoor advertisements, but you may also end up emptying your pockets . This is because people dressed as Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse cartoon characters approach you, ask you to take a picture, and then demand money .
Compared to the clean Pyongyang subway, the New York subway is dirty and sometimes full of homeless people and rats, so you can see 'rotten capitalism', but for these people, 'capitalism' in which they are rewarded for their work is better than North Korean-style 'socialism' .
[ Seohyun Lee ] I think that capitalism is the optimal system that allows individuals to demonstrate their dreams and abilities as long as they have the ability. In fact, I think the most heartbreaking thing is that there are many really talented friends in North Korea, but they are living like slaves without even a chance to realize their talents .
These siblings are walking the 'path of learning', spending a lot of time and money, and they say it was not a waste of time . Therefore, I recommended other North Korean defectors to pursue academic careers if they have the opportunity .
[ Seohyun Lee ] During my college life, I had many opportunities to learn not only from books but also through my friends and school, so I actually think there is no better place for learning than school . Through various activities with friends and professors . I hope ( other North Korean defectors ) will also take the opportunity to learn .
Editor Park Jeong-woo, Web Team Lee Kyeong-ha
14. How a North Korean missile researcher became a South Korean MP
Now there is only one escape from north Korea in the General Assembly. Both Thae Yong Ho and Ji Song Ho were treated badly by the PPP. They would not allow Ji to run again and they forced THae to run in a DP dominated district.
How a North Korean missile researcher became a South Korean MP
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c51n8w77z9wo
18 hours ago
Frances Mao,
Sangmi Han
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PPP
Park Choong-kwon, 37, defected to South Korea in 2009 after graduating from university where he worked on building the North's nuclear missiles
As a young man, Park Choong-Kwon helped build the nuclear missiles that his homeland, North Korea, blasted off from time to time to threaten the West.
Now he sits in its democratic neighbour’s legislature – a member of South Korea’s parliament elected just this week.
When people migrate from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies, they dream of a better life, of opportunities. A refugee becoming a lawmaker, or even one day president? It’s possible.
But for a North Korean, it’s extraordinary. Park, at age 37, is just the fourth escapee ever to become a parliamentarian in the South.
“I came to South Korea with nothing,” he told the BBC earlier this week, “and now I’ve entered the political arena.
“I see all of this as the power of our liberal democracy and I think it’s all possible because our citizens made it happen. It is a miracle and a blessing.”
For North Korean watchers, it's also a sign of progress.
"There are tens of thousands of North Koreans who voted with their feet, voted against the oppression of that regime with their lives - some lost - but others didn't, and the world is benefiting from them," says Sandra Fahy, an associate professor at Carleton University in Ottawa who's researched life in North Korea.
"Who better to understand the importance of democratic representation and political engagement than those who have lived in a world where it was forbidden?"
Park escaped the clutches of the North Korean state a decade and a half ago when he was 23, having breathed not a word of his plans to his parents and other family members. It was too risky, and if they had known, that could have put them in peril, he says.
He had spent his last three years embedded in the National Defense University – one of the elite students seen as the next generation entrusted with developing the North’s nuclear weapons technology.
While relatively sheltered in the capital, he had grown up in the North in the 1990s, the period of massive famine in the country where millions died and desperate citizens turned to black market goods.
But he was exposed to life outside – through South Korean TV shows smuggled in and study abroad in China, where his fixation on new ideas drew scrutiny from his minders.
By the time he graduated university, he told Korean media, he had realised “how completely wrong and corrupt the North Korean regime was”.
So he hatched his plan and waited.
The release came one day in April 2009. North Korea that day had just managed to successfully launch its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – the very same weapon he had toiled away for years on building. The whole country was “in a celebratory mood”; he saw the opportunity and slipped away the next morning under the cover of the jubilant noise.
Getting out was an ordeal of course - he chose the faster but vastly more expensive route to China, which cost nearly 10 million won (£5,800 pounds; $7,300). Despite the cost, the fake passport provided by the broker was a shoddy certificate.
But in a interview with NK News last year, he recalled the moment he realised he was potentially free. Clambering onto the Chinese-side banks of the Tumen River, there was a mingled sense of freedom and loss - leaving him feeling like an "international orphan".
Another life-changing moment came some time later when he received his South Korean passport - one of the happiest moments of his life, he says.
Compared to many other defectors from the North, about 35,000 of whom have settled in the South since the 1990s, Park adapted quickly to his new life, a challenge smoothed out by his elite background and education.
He was accepted into the country’s most prestigious university – Seoul National University – where he earned a PhD in materials science and engineering, and then landed a highly coveted job at Hyundai Steel, one of the South’s powerhouse conglomerates.
And then the president’s party came knocking.
Park told the BBC he hadn’t ever considered entering politics, but when the People Power Party reached out, he felt he wanted to give back through public service.
As the number two delegate on the ruling party’s list for proportional voting seats, he was essentially guaranteed a spot in Wednesday’s elections – no matter how unfavourable the turnout. The results in the end were terrible for the deeply unpopular President Yoon Suk-yeol and his ruling PPP.
But Park is forward-facing and has big plans now as an elected lawmaker.
In the South’s previous parliament, there had already been two sitting North Korean members – both with significant profiles. Thae Yong-ho, who represents the luxury district of Gangnam, was formerly a North Korean ambassador to the UK who famously defected in 2016 during his London stint.
The other is rights activist Ji Seong-ho, who lost his left arm and leg as a young teenager in 1996 when he and his starving family were stealing coal from a train. He fainted from hunger and fell through a gap between the train cars; the wheels ran over him. He later managed an escape from North Korea on crutches.
Those representatives have long sought to improve the situation for their fellow defectors.
Many say while they may have a new lease on life since arriving in the South, it’s tinged with a feeling of being treated like second-class citizens.
That pushed Ji into running for office in 2020, campaigning on the rights of North Koreans, after a case where defectors accused of smuggling were forcibly returned by South Korean officials.
A year earlier, an impoverished North Korean mother and daughter were found dead in their apartment in Seoul, having reportedly starved to death.
Park says one of his first aims is improving the support given to North Koreans when they arrive in the South – and he’s pushing for lifelong packages. He says since the flow of new arrivals slowed to a trickle due to pandemic border closures, the budget should be re-allocated.
He also wants to leave his mark on inter-Korean relations.
And in that vein, he’s heartily endorsed his president’s current hawkish attitude towards dealing with the North and Kim Jong-un’s increased missile provocations.
While some say the North has reacted because it was spooked by Yoon pursuing closer relationships with the US and Japan, Park dismisses that theory.
“Some people think that since the Yoon government came in, the threat of war has increased. But it’s not true – the provocations were stronger under the previous administration,” he told the BBC.
He points out the North’s missile launches and weapons development increased during President Moon Jae-in's administration – which sought a more conciliatory approach to engaging with North Korea.
But appeasement must not be the approach taken, he argues: “Blocking North Korea’s provocations is the most important priority, and that will lead to reducing the threat of war.”
He believes in eventual reunification between the two halves of the peninsula. This is despite Kim Jong-un this year taking concerted steps to stamp out that prospect: branding the South as the enemy state and reportedly blowing up a massive arch symbolising the two Koreas coming together in the future.
But Park is undeterred. He’s determined to “play a role as a bridge” in the South Korean government.
“I want to help South Koreans view North Korea’s regime and its people separately, fostering a mindset conducive to unification.”
15. HGV Unproven at IRBM Ranges: Analysis of the April 2 Hwasong-16Na Hypersonic Missile Test
Photos and a table at the link.
HGV Unproven at IRBM Ranges: Analysis of the April 2 Hwasong-16Na Hypersonic Missile Test
https://www.38north.org/2024/04/hgv-unproven-at-irbm-ranges-analysis-of-the-april-2-hwasong-16na-hypersonic-missile-test/
On April 2, 2024, North Korea flight tested the Hwasong-16Na (referred to in English as the Hwasong-16B), a two-stage solid-propellant booster armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), marking the second flight test of the wedge-shaped HGV developed by North Korea.
Since September 2021, North Korea has flight tested two types of HGVs, namely a conical shaped one and a wedge-shaped one.[1] In the April 2, 2024 test, the wedge-shaped HGV (atop the Hwasong-16Na) did not demonstrate any clear advantage over the conical-shaped one. In comparison, the conical-shaped HGV appears to have been tested under harsher conditions. Thus, the Hwasong-16Na system as a whole is likely still in an early phase of development.
With tests thus far at limited speed and range, it is hard to validate both HGVs at intermediate-range ballistic missile-class (IRBM) ranges. However, the HGVs have shown their potential to strike Japan if they are to be used at medium ranges. This is especially true for the conical-shaped HGV, which has been tested one more time than the HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na and has likely demonstrated a higher speed. Full-range tests are likely needed to verify the performance of both types of HGVs at true IRBM ranges. However, such tests may pose some challenges for North Korea to implement.
Overview of Pyongyang’s Hypersonic Missile Tests
From September 2021 to early April 2024, North Korea has conducted five tests of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) (Figure 1). The wedge-shaped HGV was first tested in September 2021. It was tested again atop the Hwasong-16Na on April 2, 2024. The conical-shaped HGV has been tested three times from January 2022 to January 2024. Deviating from the use of liquid-propellant boosters, the HGVs tested in 2024 were positioned atop a two-stage solid-propellant booster. Detailed information regarding these tests is compiled in the table in the Annex.
Figure 1. Hypersonic glide vehicles tested by North Korea. (Source: North Korean state media)
As can be seen from the table, North Korean state media and the Japanese and South Korean governments have given different ranges for some of these tests. The discrepancy could be caused by: 1) exaggerated claims by North Korean state media; 2) different tactics on releasing information; and/or 3) the inability of ground-based radars in Japan and South Korea to effectively track the HGVs when the latter descended below the radars’ line of sight.[2]
Comparing the Tests
North Korean state media has published relatively rich information regarding the flight of the conical-shaped HGV tested on January 11, 2022, and the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na tested on April 2, 2024. This information, combined with data released by Japan and South Korea, offered a basis to compare the demonstrated performance of the two types of HGVs. According to North Korean announcements, the two types of HGVs have all reached a range of 1000 km during their tests.[3] However, the following two observations suggest that the conical-shaped HGV was likely tested under harsher conditions:
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North Korea reported that during the April 2, 2024 flight, the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na reached an apogee of around 100 km during its first phase glide, and a second apogee of over 70 km during its second phase glide. In comparison, ROK reports claimed the conical-shaped HGV only reached 60 km at its highest point during its flight on January 11, 2022 (Figure 2). Gliding in the denser atmosphere at lower altitudes means that the conical-shaped HGV needed higher burnout velocity (velocity when the rocket booster burns out) to overcome the greater aerodynamic drag at such altitudes.
Figure 2. The conical-shaped HGV tested on 11 January 2022 (left) reportedly flew a more depressed path than the wedge-shaped HGV tested on 2 April 2024 (right). The red lines show the reported flight path. (Source: Korean Central News Agency)
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Both HGVs reportedly performed a “cross-range,” or turning, maneuver after their first phase glide. However, according to the flight paths North Korean media depicted as being displayed to Kim Jong Un, the turning maneuver conducted by the conical-shaped HGV appeared to be considerably steeper than the one conducted by the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na (Figure 3). This steeper turn results in the loss of more energy than the shallower turn. Thus, to reach the same intended range, higher burnout velocity was needed for the conical-shaped HGV.
Figure 3. Flight paths depicted by North Korea for the January 11, 2022 test (left) and the April 2, 2024 test (right). The red straight lines represent the approximate 1,000 km distance from launch position to impact point. The curved lines below the red straight lines represent the projection of the actual flight path on Earth. The curved lines above represent the flight sequence of the hypersonic missiles. (Source: Korean Central News Agency)
These two observations suggest that the conical-shaped HGV has flown at higher velocity and withstood higher structural and temperature pressures. In addition, the steeper turn also demonstrated a higher degree of agility than the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na. In other words, despite its complex aerodynamic layout (Figure 4), the wedge-shaped HGV has not yet demonstrated in testing clear advantages over the conical shaped one. Thus, in comparison, the Hwasong-16Na system as a whole is likely still in an early phase of development.
Figure 4. The conical shaped HGV (left) has a much simpler aerodynamic layout than the wedge-shaped HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na. (Source: Korean Central News Agency)
Not Ready for IRBM Ranges Yet
Both types of HGVs have demonstrated sufficient range in flight-testing to strike targets in Japan with a highly depressed flight trajectory. As the actual distance reportedly flown by the HGVs was achieved with loss in speed and altitude caused by a turning maneuver, their maximum flight range without the turning maneuver could possibly surpass 1,000 km, putting them on par with the Hwasong-7 (Nodong) mid-range ballistic missile that mainly targets Japan. This is especially true for the conical-shaped HGV, which has been tested one more time than the HGV atop the Hwasong-16Na and has likely demonstrated a higher speed.
North Korea claimed that it had limited the speed of the Hwasong-16Na “by means of delaying the start-up of the second-stage engine and rapidly changing the flight orbit in the active region.”[4] It has also claimed both missiles tested on January 14, 2024 and on April 2, 2024 are of intermediate-range. While the two-stage solid-propellant booster used in both those 2024 tests is most likely of IRBM-class (commonly defined as 3,000 to 5,500 km range), it remains to be seen if the HGV payload could function under realistic conditions at IRBM range. For North Korea, IRBM-class missiles would need at least a 3,300 km range to reach US military bases in Guam.
North Korea’s testing standards do not necessarily follow what other states would require to certify strategic missiles as operational. However, tests without limitations on speed would offer a higher degree of confidence in the actual gliding performance, which is vital to the HGVs. Such tests may involve a mid-course flight beyond the atmosphere (during which maneuvers through reaction control mechanisms, such as via small thrusters, are possible) and, upon reentry, a long phase of glide under active control. Such a test would be more challenging to North Korea than full-range Hwasong-12 IRBM tests conducted before with traditional reentry vehicles, the terminal phase of which is brief and without active control. Without forward deployment of vessels in the Pacific, it remains unclear how North Korea would receive telemetry data from the HGVs in a full-range IRBM test, especially during the glide phase. However, novel technology solutions, such as using space-based receivers, may facilitate such tests.
Annex
- [1]
-
The conical-shaped reentry vehicle is often referred to as a maneuverable reentry vehicle instead of an HGV. It is also apparent that the wedge-shaped HGV may have better gliding characteristics than the conical-shaped reentry vehicle thanks to the former’s more advanced aerodynamic layouts. However, this article refers to both as HGVs because the conical-shaped reentry vehicle, according to announcements released by Japan, North Korea, and South Korea, has 1) reached hypersonic speed; 2) demonstrated a low altitude flight profile; and 3) conducted maneuvers during its glide phase (See Annex). These three criteria, used by aerospace company Stratolaunch, are adopted by the author as definitions for HGVs.
- [2]
- The Japanese authority used the expression “if the missile follows a ballistic arc” as the precondition for some of the range estimates, which supports the assumption that some ground radars based in Japan could not keep track of the entire flight of the HGVs. See: Annex.
- [3]
- According to South Korea, the conical-shaped HGV reached a 1000 km range too during the 14 January 2024 test. The January 2024 test is excluded in the comparison as North Korean media did not reveal substantial information on this test. See: Annex.
- [4]
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A turning maneuver performed by the second stage could be observed in the KCNA video. But contrary to the KCNA claim, the second stage motor seemed to have ignited right away after first stage separation.
16. After Russia’s Veto: The Future of the Sanctions Regime Against North Korea
Conclusion:
There is no doubt that the dissolution of the PoE is regrettable, and that it will further the dysfunctionality of the UNSC sanctions regime against North Korea. It is now mainly upon the states of the emerging “coalition of the willing” to enhance coordination and cooperation outside the UNSC. In this regard, it seems most plausible that the task of monitoring, designing and enforcing sanctions against North Korea will increasingly gravitate to the like-minded nations of the G7. Although G7 decisions certainly do not have the same authority and reach as UNSCRs, Victor Cha and Ellen Kim rightly noted that proactive coordination of policies among an expanded G7 membership that could include like-minded countries such as South Korea, Australia or Spain, among others, may be an imperfect but still effective substitute. While US leadership will be crucial, states such as South Korea can play a much more significant role regarding the future of the international sanctions regime on North Korea.
After Russia’s Veto: The Future of the Sanctions Regime Against North Korea
https://www.38north.org/2024/04/after-russias-veto-the-future-of-the-sanctions-regime-against-north-korea/
On March 28, 2024 and due to a veto cast by Russia, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) failed to adopt a resolution to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE), which was established pursuant to UNSC resolution (UNSCR) 1718 (2006) to monitor (UN member states’ compliance with and enforcement of) the UN sanctions regime on North Korea. Among the five permanent and 10 non-permanent members of the UNSC, Russia was the only country that rejected the annual renewal of the multinational PoE, as China abstained. Russia’s veto will effectively end the mandate for the PoE, which will expire at the end of April 2024.
However, this is merely the latest development in the successive weakening of the UN sanctions regime against North Korea. Moscow (and at least in part Beijing) have already stopped complying with many of the sanctions provisions mandated by the UNSCRs and have actively blocked new UNSCRs in response to repeated North Korean ballistic missile tests since 2022. By ending the mandate of the PoE as well as calling for a sunset clause for the existing resolutions, Russia now appears to be taking concrete actions to permanently dismantle the UN sanctions regime.
This decision marks a significant blow to international efforts monitoring and addressing North Korea’s nuclear and military ambitions, and highlights the need for a new approach that involves key member states and like-minded partners coordinating their efforts outside the UNSC.
The Continuous Weakening of the UN Sanctions Regime Since 2018
Ever since North Korea’s first nuclear weapon test in 2006, sanctions have been one of, if not the central mechanism that the international community has used in its efforts to deal with the country’s nuclear and military ambitions. While numerous countries imposed their own unilateral sanctions on North Korea, the main theatre for the imposition of sanctions since 2006 has been the UNSC, which unanimously adopted ten UNSCRs between 2006 and 2017. Despite disagreements between UNSC members (e.g., regarding the underlying logic of sanctions and their respective reach and clout), until 2017, the UNSC, including Russia and China, demonstrated overall support for the imposition of increasingly tough sanctions on North Korea.
Since December 2017, however, no new sanctions have been adopted through the UNSC. There are two main reasons for this. At first, it was to provide space for diplomacy in 2018 and 2019. However, by the time the diplomacy phase ended in 2019, far-reaching geopolitical shifts were already underway, fueled first by the deepening strategic rivalry between the US and China and then exacerbated by Russia’s war against Ukraine. As these developments had a direct impact on Beijing’s and Moscow’s strategic considerations and priorities in terms of aligning more closely with North Korea, the geopolitical shifts exacerbated the discord among UNSC members on the North Korea issue. In May 2022, Russia and China for the first time vetoed a US-drafted UNSC resolution to strengthen sanctions on North Korea following its repeated ballistic missile tests in violation of previous UN resolutions, thus effectively paralyzing the Council well before the recent Russian veto.
Notable Shifts Away From the UNSC
Russia’s March 2024 veto was a tangible step toward fully undermining the UN sanctions regime against North Korea and has far-reaching consequences. Most obviously, it brings an end to a crucial institution tasked with supporting the 1718 Sanctions Committee, whose mandate has continuously expanded over the years, in monitoring compliance with and identifying loopholes in one of the most complex sanctions regimes currently in place.[1] According to Aaron Arnold, Russia’s veto not only means that “countries [will] lose access to authoritative sources of information, but it is likely that the sanctions against North Korea will now persist in a zombie-like state—neither updated nor monitored.” However, while the PoE’s dissolution naturally hampers the Sanctions Committee’s task, the 1718 Committee itself remains in place and its mandate remains intact, as was stressed by its current Chair, Switzerland’s U.N. Ambassador Pascale Baeriswyl. To bridge the loss of the PoE in the short term, he appealed to countries individually or collectively to now support the Committee with information “to the best of their abilities.”
Ultimately, the weakening of the UNSC’s sanctions regime against North Korea, which has begun well before Russia’s recent veto, means that it will now fall even more on key member states like the US, Japan, and South Korea, as well as other like-minded partners such as the EU and the G7, to better coordinate intelligence, counter-proliferation efforts, and relevant legislation to enforce and monitor restrictive measures. Certainly, without Russian or Chinese support and compliance, this is a major challenge. However, the central theater of sanctions has already begun to shift outside the UNSC.
After Russia and China blocked a US-sponsored UNSCR in 2022 in response to repeated North Korean ballistic missile tests, individual states and the EU not only resumed the imposition of (unilateral) sanctions against North Korea, but a group of like-minded countries increasingly coordinated their respective activities. As a result, a “new” actor constellation emerged that is taking the lead in imposing new sanctions on North Korea. This actor constellation includes individual states such as the US, Japan, South Korea and Australia as well as groups of states such as the EU and the G7.
Numerous sanctions adopted against the DPRK since 2022 were imposed in unison among the like-minded countries. For instance, after Pyongyang launched a reconnaissance satellite in November 2023, the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia collectively and consecutively imposed unilateral sanctions on North Korea. Although coordinated, unilateral sanctions impositions by South Korea, the US, and Japan already occurred before, e.g., in December 2022 and September 2023, the inclusion of Australia marks the first occurrence of this extended collaboration. While the EU, through two additional sanctions decisions in April and December 2022, respectively, already added 16 individuals and eight entities to its sanctions list, in February 2024, Brussels blacklisted North Korea’s defense chief over arms transfers to Russia while the European Council also designated the DPRK missile bureau, among others. Overall, a range of technically unilateral, yet increasingly coordinated sanctions have been imposed since 2022, many specifically addressing North Korea’s cyber activities as one of its crucial sanctions evasion mechanisms together with illegal ship-to-ship transfers.[2]
Within the new actor constellation, the G7 has already emerged as a crucial player, repeatedly voicing its frustration with the UNSC’s inaction by attesting a “stark contrast between the frequency of North Korea’s repeated blatant violations of UNSC [Resolutions] and the UN Security Council’s corresponding inaction because of some members’ obstruction.” Sanctions, according to the 2023 G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Communiqué, must be “fully and scrupulously implemented by all states and remain in place for as long as North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile programs exist.” The group specifically called for greater international coordination to counter North Korea’s malicious cyber activities, which have become a main target of the latest sanctions adopted by numerous states. Given the prospect of a dismembered UN sanctions regime, the task of monitoring, designing and enforcing future sanctions against North Korea will most likely gravitate toward the like-minded nations of the G7, although these decisions certainly will not have the same authority and reach as the UNSCRs.
Improved Coordination and Practical Cooperation Are Required
Given the UNSC’s paralysis and the realistic prospect of a collapsing UNSC sanctions regime, like-minded countries must accelerate their activities to improve coordination and practical cooperation on their respective sanctions activities on North Korea. While recent actions illustrate that information sharing among like-minded partners has improved considerably, much more needs to be done to ensure comprehensive coordination in the designing, enforcement and monitoring of new sanctions, as well as closing existing gaps in coordinating responses to emerging security threats from North Korea.
The US-ROK Working Group on the DPRK’s Cyber Threat, established in 2022, South Korea’s admission to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2022, and the recently launched US-ROK task force aimed at preventing North Korea from procuring illicit oil and imposing coordinated sanctions by the US and the ROK on individuals and entities based in Russia, China and the UAE accused of channeling funds to Pyongyang’s weapons programs are crucial endeavors in this regard.
There is also a need to move cooperation on such matters as North Korea’s cyber threats from dialogue to practical cooperation among like-minded countries. Aside from improved intelligence-sharing, this could include joint tabletop exercises involving government officials, experts and representatives from various industries, mimicking real cybersecurity incidents to improve resilience against North Korea’s cyber activities. In addition to improving government-to-government collaboration, bringing academics and industry experts into a wider coordination process will be important. North Korea’s cyber-espionage operations specifically targeting international experts highlight the central role non-governmental actors play in both implementing national cyber resilience and evaluating national cybersecurity and geopolitical strategies.
In the case of the EU, internal administrative hurdles need to be removed, which can impede efficient and effective cooperation with like-minded countries seeking to coordinate their sanctions activities vis-à-vis North Korea, and prevent rapid responses to evolving security threats. In the current system, in addition to structural provisions (such as appeal deadlines), unilateral sanctions must be introduced by one or more EU member states before they can then be discussed and ultimately implemented in Brussels. Greater efforts need to be made to simplify and streamline these processes.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the dissolution of the PoE is regrettable, and that it will further the dysfunctionality of the UNSC sanctions regime against North Korea. It is now mainly upon the states of the emerging “coalition of the willing” to enhance coordination and cooperation outside the UNSC. In this regard, it seems most plausible that the task of monitoring, designing and enforcing sanctions against North Korea will increasingly gravitate to the like-minded nations of the G7. Although G7 decisions certainly do not have the same authority and reach as UNSCRs, Victor Cha and Ellen Kim rightly noted that proactive coordination of policies among an expanded G7 membership that could include like-minded countries such as South Korea, Australia or Spain, among others, may be an imperfect but still effective substitute. While US leadership will be crucial, states such as South Korea can play a much more significant role regarding the future of the international sanctions regime on North Korea.
- [1]
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In specific, the PoE is mandated with providing crucial assistance to the 1718 Sanctions Committee as well as UN member states by conducting investigations particularly on incidents of non-compliance, gather information and provide guidance on the implementation of sanctions and prepare reports and recommendations.
- [2]
- It has to be noted that all the sanctions adopted since 2022 have been additional designations, and as such no new structural sanctions have been imposed on North Korea since 2017. While this seems rather lackluster, given the DPRK’s dramatic military build-up, the PoE has repeatedly called for such additional, targeted designations.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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