Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Intelligence isn’t about being right. It’s about being able to change your mind when you get better evidence."

– anonymous multi-source internet meme (but still worth reflecting on)

"Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does."

– Jean-Paul Sartre

“Let the welfare of the people be the supreme law.”

– Cicero

1. Memo to Congress: Capabilities matter more than numbers for US forces in Korea

2. South Korea, U.S. to hold combined tabletop military exercise in Pyeongtaek next week

3. Navigating the new normal: Strategic simultaneity, US Forces Korea flexibility, and alliance imperatives

4. Treaty allies are developing fallback options in case the US disengages from the region, an analyst said

5. US Detention of Korean Workers Stiffens Mood in Seoul

6. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief to attend Incheon Landing commemoration

7. FM Cho to visit Beijing for talks with Wang Yi: sources

8. U.S. Deputy State Secretary Landau expresses regrets over detention of S. Koreans

9. U.S., S. Korea stress importance of regional security cooperation in Seoul talks

10. N. Korean women swept up in Chinese investigation of online dissent

11. N. Korea frames China visit as step toward global leadership role

12. The Kim Jong Un era: Why wishful thinking won’t work anymore

13. Kim Jong Un’s triumph: the rise and rise of North Korea’s dictator

1. Memo to Congress: Capabilities matter more than numbers for US forces in Korea

Although people are always more important than hardware, it is the capabilities of the troops in their units (with their hardware) that is more important than the simple number of troops.

We have to be a little more sophisticated among the press, the policymakers, the pundits, and the public and not simply count numbers of troops.

Conclusion:

Compromise language focused on these types of requirements may get a better reception from the Trump administration. It is also likely to fare better in the House of Representatives, whose draft NDAA language currently only includes a nonbinding “Sense of Congress” provision on force reductions on the Korean Peninsula. Such requirement-based amendments to the Senate language can thus simultaneously assure observers of the strength of the US-South Korea alliance while ensuring that the US force posture is lean and reflective of the national interest.

Memo to Congress: Capabilities matter more than numbers for US forces in Korea

atlanticcouncil.org · Andrea Ratiu · September 9, 2025

TO: Senators Roger F. Wicker and Jack Reed, chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee

FROM: Adam Kozloski and Markus Garlauskas

SUBJECT: A rational US force posture in the Republic of Korea

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What do world leaders need to know? Our “Memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: Language in the Senate NDAA prohibiting force posture changes on the Korean Peninsula should be amended: Instead of an archaic number of US service members, Congress should opt for a requirements-based model that allows the United States to tailor the force to the operational and strategic situation of the Korean Peninsula and the broader Indo-Pacific.

During negotiations on the final NDAA text, Congress should instead define what a force in Korea needs to do, considering theater-level nuclear systems, noncombatant evacuation, logistics and medical support, conventional strike and targeting capabilities, integrated air and missile defense, and base protection.

Background: Current force posture language

The future of US force posture on the Korean Peninsula has taken a spotlight role in this year’s negotiations surrounding the must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), legislation shepherded through the Congress by the House and Senate armed services committees. This year, the committees appear to have forgone the formal “conference” process, reverting to negotiating the final NDAA text behind closed doors in an “informal conference.” This process, increasingly common in recent years, provides an outsized influence to the chair and ranking member of the committees in the House and Senate, whose teams manage negotiations. The Senate Armed Services Committee has restored and enhanced language prohibiting the use of funds to reduce the number of US service members serving on active duty in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In fact, this year’s Senate NDAA language far surpasses the scope and requirements of past language. In the John S. McCain FY 2019 NDAA, Section 1264 set the floor at 22,000 active duty personnel. Section 1264 required only simple certifications that a proposed future reduction was in the national security interest of the United States and that the secretary “has appropriately consulted” with allies, including Japan and the Republic of Korea.

In contrast, this year’s Senate NDAA restricts any reduction below 28,500 US military personnel “permanently stationed in or deployed to” South Korea. It further requires not just certifications that a proposed reduction of force is in the national security interest of the United States and that the “appropriate consultations” have occurred but also assessments by the secretary of defense, in consultation with the commander of US Forces Korea (USFK), the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), the secretary of state, and the director of national intelligence. These assessments would include a laundry list of reports on the impact and cost of reducing forces on the defense posture of affected nations and INDOPACOM, plus the ability to execute contingency plans, carry out joint training, and sustain the credibility of US deterrence commitments. The Senate NDAA also requires a detailed description of each consultation with allies instead of the previously required simple certification that consultations have occurred, and a new independent risk assessment by the commanders of USFK, INDOPACOM, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the impact of any proposed reductions. Finally, the Senate version of this prohibition envisions a ninety-day shot clock starting when the certification is transmitted to Congress, which must be unclassified, before the administration could act on either a transfer of command or reduction below 28,500 active-duty personnel. This ensures Congress retains the initiative to introduce further legislation to prevent a reduction.

A remodeled Korean alliance for an age of great power competition

Taken as a whole, the language is a strong signal from the Senate Armed Services Committee that Congress will not accept a smaller US force posture on the peninsula, and institutes severe safeguards to ensure compliance. With discussion of cuts to USFK being raised regularly—a reporter asked about the possibility during the August 25 US-South Korea meeting in the Oval Office—Congress is understandably concerned that a severe reduction in USFK personnel may be in the offing, which could reduce the confidence the United States’ South Korean and other Indo-Pacific allies have in Washington’s commitment to their defense.

However, as one of us pointed out in a recent analysis, the 28,500 troop floor is a “longtime artificial constraint” based on legacy commitments divorced from strategic analysis—the number is just a political signal of commitment to South Korea, not tied to a specific level of military capability. The US military posture in Korea has more strategic and operational relevance than just reassuring South Koreans, and there is a lot more to measuring the capability of that posture than taking a headcount.

Given that the Pentagon in 2022 identified China as the United States’ “pacing challenge,” discussions of cuts to USFK are often tied to a reorientation toward countering China in the Indo-Pacific. The reporter’s question to Trump was characteristic: “Would you consider reducing the number of US forces in South Korea so that the United States can have more flexibility in the region?” Some advocates for major cuts in USFK pointedly portray the current level of US forces in Korea as a liability when it comes to facing China. Two of these advocates noted in a July analysis: “Seoul has not offered the United States unrestricted contingency access to use its bases for operations elsewhere in the theater during a conflict.” This is a strawman argument, as this level of “unrestricted contingency access” is a high bar indeed to expect from another sovereign state. No regional US ally offers the United States such access. Even the Pacific Islands states who have largely ceded their military responsibilities to the United States under their Compacts of Free Association have placed some restrictions on certain types of munitions that the military can host on their territory. Is it realistic to expect that US forces stationed in any sovereign US ally would have a blank check to attack Beijing without prior consultation and thereby drag the ally into a war with China? Other US allies have rightfully pointed out that the choice of entering future hostilities will ultimately be down to the “government of the day.” This lack of clarity creates inherent risk for US planners who are forced to design contingencies with questionable allied involvement and support.

The overall questions about how USFK fit into the larger strategic picture vis a vis China, and the potential constraints on employing USFK in a US-China confrontation are valid ones, however. Seoul is also understandably not eager to antagonize Beijing by providing clarity—particularly not publicly—on how it would see its alliance obligations and an acceptable role for USFK in the event of a hypothetical US-China war. This lack of clarity and Seoul’s unwillingness to offer a blank check for USFK operations against China notwithstanding, Korea is very unlikely to remain neutral in such a conflict or to try to shut down various forms of USFK support to US military operations elsewhere. Given Korea’s strategic location, its well-developed infrastructure, and the network of US and ROK bases and military support functions there, USFK and the ROK could provide valuable aid to US operations and foster dilemmas for Beijing during a hypothetical US-China war—even without engaging in direct combat, as South Korean experts have increasingly noted. Further, there is every reason to expect that if US territory or US bases in Korea are attacked by China in the ensuing conflict, South Korea would fight alongside the United States, bringing additional capability and basing options, while USFK units and bases could be fully unleashed to play key direct combat roles.

To address the US concerns raised by the current state of ambiguity, a simple and general reassurance from Seoul would be a good start, as we have previously argued: “The South Korean president should at least tacitly affirm that Seoul will adhere to the 1953 mutual defense treaty as a two-way treaty, not just a commitment by the United States to defend South Korea against North Korea.” Such a reassurance could help set the stage for a recalibration of US Forces Korea to both meet US obligations under the 1953 mutual defense treaty and to better support broader US defense priorities vis-a-vis China.

A strategically advantageous compromise

Refining a force posture based on operational requirements rather than political symbolism is common sense. Congress should clearly define essential tasks in furtherance of the national interest as the floor for force reduction, instead of an archaic number detached from operational needs. Spelling out specific requirements for the force posture on the Korean Peninsula would not only help dispel misconceptions about the usefulness of such forces but also enable future force posture recalibration to build on a strategically coherent foundation. Congress should consider a floor built around the following key operational and strategic needs and ensure that the commanders of INDOPACOM and USFK can provide independent assessments on the force posture requirements to meet these needs.

Ensuring nuclear deterrence through theater-level nuclear capable systems. F-35A fighters have already been deployed in recent joint exercises. A long-term deployment or permanent stationing of dual-capable F-35As in Korea, able to carry nuclear or nonnuclear weapons and explicitly trained and prepared for nuclear missions, would send a strong message of deterrence. This ultimately could be far more important to reassuring South Koreans of US commitment to extended deterrence than any particular number of US military personnel stationed on the peninsula.
Improving the ability to conduct rapid conventional strikes against targets throughout North Korea and other adversaries within conventional range, such as China.
Supporting an integrated air and missile defense architecture across the Republic of Korea to provide assurance to the Korean people, protect the tens of thousands of American citizens living in Korea, and protect US service members and assets.
Maintaining a network of distributed and hardened bases and facilities to mitigate the risk of saturation attacks on core facilities severely degrading the US capability to respond.
Ensuring the physical safety and protection of US service members, bases, and military assets deployed to the Korean Peninsula.
Preparing noncombatant evacuation operations for Americans in South Korea, and other key allied personnel in the event of war.
Retaining sufficient medical, logistical, and maintenance support in Korea to support deployed forces in a high-intensity conflict environment.
Engaging in intelligence collection, analysis, and targeting against North Korea and other regional adversaries.

Compromise language focused on these types of requirements may get a better reception from the Trump administration. It is also likely to fare better in the House of Representatives, whose draft NDAA language currently only includes a nonbinding “Sense of Congress” provision on force reductions on the Korean Peninsula. Such requirement-based amendments to the Senate language can thus simultaneously assure observers of the strength of the US-South Korea alliance while ensuring that the US force posture is lean and reflective of the national interest.

Markus Garlauskas was the National Intelligence Officer for North Korea on the US National Intelligence Council from July 2014 to June 2020. He served for nearly twelve years overseas at the headquarters of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea in Seoul, including as chief strategist to three successive commanders of US Forces Korea.

Adam Kozloski was an aide and foreign policy adviser to US senators on the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee until 2024.

The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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atlanticcouncil.org · Andrea Ratiu · September 9, 2025

2. South Korea, U.S. to hold combined tabletop military exercise in Pyeongtaek next week

Excellent. This is very important.

September 12, 2025

dictionary + A - A

South Korea, U.S. to hold combined tabletop military exercise in Pyeongtaek next week

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-09-12/national/defense/South-Korea-US-to-hold-combined-tabletop-military-exercise-in-Pyeongtaek-next-week/2397651?detailWord=

Published: 12 Sep. 2025, 13:43

Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined Division take part in a joint urban operations drill in Paju, Gyeonggi, on March 19. [NEWS1]

South Korea and the United States will hold a combined nuclear and conventional integration (CNI) tabletop exercise (TTX) at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, for five days next week, according to military officials Friday.

This will be the first such exercise under the President Lee Jae Myung administration.

CNI refers to the integration of South Korea’s conventional capabilities with the United States’ potential nuclear assets to deter and respond to North Korea’s nuclear threats. A TTX is when two militaries work through hypothetical scenarios rather than conduct field maneuvers.

The drill, called “Iron Mace," is part of the “Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula,” agreed upon by the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) last July.

Soldiers from the Army’s 7th Engineer Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined Division conduct a pontoon bridge crossing drill during the South Korea-U.S. combined arms river crossing xxercise on the Namhan River in Yeoju, Gyeonggi, on Aug. 27. [NEWS1]

During the exercise, to be held next week from Monday through Friday, the allies will discuss operational plans that combine U.S. nuclear forces and South Korean conventional capabilities, including procedures for joint planning when the United States deploys nuclear-capable strategic assets. They will also explore ways to strengthen extended deterrence against North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

South Korean and U.S. officials decided not to disclose the exercise to the public to avoid provoking the North or compromising operational security. Observers say this reflects the Lee administration’s policy focus on easing inter-Korean tensions and restoring trust as part of efforts to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.

BY CHUNG YEONG-GYO [kim.juyeon2@joongang.co.kr]

3. Navigating the new normal: Strategic simultaneity, US Forces Korea flexibility, and alliance imperatives

Smernatics perhaps but we need strategic agility which is more than flexibility in my mind.

Navigating the new normal: Strategic simultaneity, US Forces Korea flexibility, and alliance imperatives

atlanticcouncil.org · syyoo · August 27, 2025

Defense Policy Korea Nuclear Deterrence Security Partnerships United States and Canada

Issue Brief August 27, 2025

Bottom lines up front

Seoul should anticipate a possible transition of US Forces Korea toward fewer ground forces and a more flexible US presence overall.
Mismanaging such a transition risks alliance fatigue, fragmentation, or hollow deterrence.
US demands should not be depicted as unilateral disengagements but as catalysts to deepen conventional-nuclear integration of the alliance, seek new assurances, and refine the division of labor to create a more adaptive and credible alliance.

The recent summit between South Korean President Lee Jae-myung and US President Donald Trump, despite looming anticipation of large-scale changes in the alliance, such as restructuring of US Forces Korea (USFK), ended with Trump touting his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Yet as Trump hinted about seeking “ownership” of military bases, his demands for greater burden-sharing from Seoul remain. This particularly reflects Washington’s apparent shift toward a “China-first” strategy as reportedly outlined in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance. South Korea can expect continued pressure to assume greater regional security responsibilities, with alliance discussions over key issues such as troop reduction, strategic flexibility, and wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer. Echoing the latest call of Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, to upgrade the ROK-US alliance from “ironclad” to “titanium,” I also contend in this paper that the brewing changes in the alliance can provide momentum for a renewal befitting the changing security environment. With specific focus on the possibility of USFK reduction or adjustments, I contend that while strategic simultaneity fragments traditional alliance roles, it also generates new imperatives and opportunities for conventional-nuclear integration and refining the division of labor to create a more adaptive and credible alliance.

Strategic simultaneity and USFK transformation

The concept of strategic simultaneity has posed new questions for alliance structures. Amid rising tensions with both a US nuclear peer and a near peer—the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) also is expanding its nuclear weapons capabilities, assisted by its mutual defense pact with Russia. These factors demand the sustained attention and readiness of US forces in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, the US military has ongoing commitments of support for Ukraine and in the Middle East, leading to a reprioritization of resources.

Faced with such a congested security environment, the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula appears to be at the edge of transformation. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, reported in May that the approximately 4,500 troops of USFK’s Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)—which currently rotates into South Korea every nine months—could be withdrawn for possible redeployment to Guam or even the US southern border for domestic missions. The retirement of twenty-four A-10 aircraft by September 2025 also necessitates reconfiguration of the forces.

In Seoul, these possible USFK adjustments arouse concerns, particularly given the backdrop of Trump’s approach to alliances. The withdrawal of the SBCT, for instance, would leave the Eighth Army—which commands US Army forces in South Korea—without any maneuver elements. Although artillery, Apache helicopters, missile defense units (e.g., Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms are expected to remain, this shift increases the burden on the ROK military to fill operational gaps, especially in early-phase ground operations. The Stryker team, designed for rapid response and equipped with real-time targeting sensors, plays a key role in ground warfare; its absence would degrade US immediate tactical responsiveness in South Korea.

Moreover, there is growing concern in Seoul about US interest in enhancing USFK’s strategic flexibility to address contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula. Although key military leaders including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John D. Caine, the USFK commander, General Xavier T. Brunson, and the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, have publicly underscored the continuing need for the US presence on the Korean Peninsula for credible deterrence against North Korea, the issue of strategic flexibility is reemerging as a critical topic within the alliance.

This is particularly true amid Washington’s prioritization of its military readiness vis-à-vis China. Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, currently leading the drafting of the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, has repeatedly emphasized—prior to entering office—the need to reorient USFK to better address what he regards as the primary threat: China. Robert Peters, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, has also recently urged that “all geographic combatant commands should be directed to plan for a China contingency.” Such calls underscore the United States’ growing strategic rationale behind transforming USFK into a force better aligned with transregional deterrence priorities. The United States has reaffirmed the ROK-US alliance as “ironclad,” as Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, and emphasized the alliance’s capacity to “continue to thrive” under Seoul’s new leadership of President Lee Jae-myung. Yet the US perception of a congested threat environment in the Asia-Pacific region, its priority focus on China, and its vision of a more flexible USFK all point to the potential for alliance fissure.

New mission for alliance: Strategic reconfiguration

In short, Seoul should anticipate a possible transition toward fewer ground forces and a more flexible US presence. Washington’s increasing emphasis on airpower and missile defense over heavy ground units suggests a redefinition of US priorities in the region. The upcoming withdrawal of legacy platforms and restructuring of USFK may reflect this shift. The current administration’s apparent interest in the transfer of wartime operational control will accelerate such a shift.

What’s important for the alliance, however, is to ensure that the transformation constitutes a strategic reconfiguration rather than fragmentation. Both Seoul and Washington’s stakes are too high to diminish deterrence and the extended deterrence values of the alliance. Therefore, even though US military forces are stretched thin in a multi-adversary environment, Seoul does not have the luxury of foregoing the combined deterrence and extended deterrence mechanisms of the ROK-US alliance. The DPRK’s continued nuclear threats, the revived DPRK-Russia mutual defense pact, and China’s increasing encroachment at sea and air have also congested Seoul’s security environment.

To reconfigure the alliance without risking a kind of deterrence vacuum on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul and Washington should pursue new initiatives for conventional-nuclear integration and refined division of labor in the region. To elaborate, since the 2023 Washington Declaration and the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), South Korea and the United States have focused on improving the conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) of their forces, including US nuclear weapons. For South Korea, the motivation behind pursuing CNI has centered on two key objectives. First, CNI enables the ROK to specify and expand its conventional role, by which it can seek to better lock in the US security commitment to provide, per the State Department’s NCG fact sheet, the “full range of US capabilities including nuclear.” Second, by delineating its conventional responsibilities, South Korea can upgrade both its operational and hardware capabilities. Altogether, CNI is an effort to signal the alliance’s credible resolve and capability to deter DPRK.

First and foremost, this CNI context would enable Seoul to ensure that any reduction of USFK troops or withdrawal of US legacy platforms is followed by the United States’ continued provision of extended deterrence and also to push for new US assurance measures. Seoul should seek to reaffirm the declaratory policy that, should North Korea employ nuclear weapons in an attack, the United States will employ “the full range of US capabilities” and bring about “the end of the Kim regime.” Sustaining the operation of key deterrence coordination mechanisms such as the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group and NCG, as well as regular maintenance of combined training and exercises, will be critical.

Second, regarding capability, the legacy platforms can be replaced with new and advanced capabilities. Indeed, with the retirement of the A-10 aircraft, there is proposed permanent deployment of one F-35A squadron at Kunsan Air Base, with rotation of another squadron. The F-35, with its stealth and electronic warfare capabilities, offers better survivability and precision strike options against critical targets than the A-10. Technologically, it surpasses the F-16 in versatility, integrating electronic warfare and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor suites for multi-role missions. More importantly, the anticipated deployment of F-35As may be a window of opportunity for Seoul and Washington to discuss possible utilization of F-35As for dual-capable aircraft (DCA) missions—given their capability of deploying and operating US tactical nuclear weapons. Flexible and temporary deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons, as well as Seoul’s participation in DCA missions, could be the next steps of alliance transformation as well. Moreover, the United States also is prepping for consolidation of sixty-two F-16s into two “super squadrons” at Osan Air Base (one super squadron is already in place). The consolidation of the F-16 fleet into super squadrons reflects a new US approach to maximizing combat readiness by integrating aircraft and personnel for rapid, high-intensity operations. For Seoul, such consolidation at Osan Air Base would shorten response times to North Korean threats by more than 100 kilometers—e.g., Kunsan to Kaesong in 5 minutes 20 seconds at Mach 2, Osan to Kaesong in 2 minutes 30 seconds. Its effect on the adversary is already salient as Rodong Sinmun, the official Party newspaper of North Korea, in May condemned the first super squadron’s establishment as “a dangerous military move aimed at preemptive strikes against our state.” In addition, with Trump’s push for a missile defense system dubbed the Golden Dome—with an earmark of $25 billion in the FY2026 defense budget—Seoul may also seek to reinvigorate missile defense cooperation. As recent Israel-Iran conflict demonstrated, missile defense is not only a central means to enhance deterrence (and extended deterrence) by denial but also to damage limitation and survivability or resilience if deterrence fails.

Third, aside from capabilities, thinking about a larger scope of deterrence beyond the Korean Peninsula may be necessary for Seoul as well. As the US burden to deter multiple, simultaneous threats grows heavier, it serves South Korea’s strategic interest to actively contribute to efforts aimed at reinforcing the credibility and resilience of US regional deterrence, including its nuclear umbrella. While Seoul remains committed to its preference for a Korean Peninsula-centric posture, it must also recognize that reluctance to engage in broader regional deterrence initiatives may weaken US resolve, erode deterrence coherence, and embolden adversaries to exploit perceived gaps, especially under Trump’s approach to alliances.

Last but not least, the transformation of USFK—and the broader evolution of the ROK-US alliance—will serve as a powerful external driver compelling Seoul to undertake a comprehensive overhaul of its national defense posture. As USFK shifts toward a more agile and airpower-oriented configuration, with fewer ground forces, the onus will fall increasingly on South Korea to fill capability gaps across multiple domains. This will likely require a significant increase in defense spending, acceleration of military procurements, and deep structural reforms in force structure, doctrine, and training—particularly in areas such as ISR and missile defense. Close strategic synchronization—as urged by Ham Hyeong-pil, director for the Center for Security Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis—with an evolving US force posture would help secure Washington’s continued political and operational support for Seoul’s force modernization efforts. Above all, strategic synchronization will be critical to ensure that any reduction in the scale or change in role of USFK does not lead to a deterrence vacuum, which could embolden adversaries such as North Korea, China, or even Russia to test the credibility of the alliance.

Conclusion

The second Trump administration’s priorities and the evolving reality of strategic simultaneity—exacerbated by the growing threats from North Korea, China, and a realigned Russia bolstered by North Korean military support—have ushered in an era of transformation for the ROK-US alliance. As Washington reallocates both attention and US military assets toward transregional challenges, Seoul faces mounting pressure to absorb a greater share of operational responsibility, strategically recalibrate its force posture, and align its defense planning with a shifting alliance architecture. If mismanaged, this shift could lead to alliance fragmentation, fatigue, or hollow deterrence. However, as this article contends, if managed carefully and strategically leveraged, the anticipated transformation of USFK presents Seoul with a critical window of opportunity: to deepen the alliance’s CNI, refine the division of labor, and lay the foundation for a more adaptive and strategically credible alliance.

The future of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula—and indeed, the wider Indo-Pacific region—will hinge on Seoul’s ability to reframe US force realignments not as unilateral disengagements but as catalysts for indigenous capability development, coevolution in defense planning, and new forms of assurance through extended deterrence mechanisms.

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Image: US Army photo by Cpl. Philemon Tan

atlanticcouncil.org · syyoo · August 27, 2025

4. Treaty allies are developing fallback options in case the US disengages from the region, an analyst said

Yep.

Home Editorial & Opinion

Sun, Sep 14, 2025 page7

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2025/09/14/2003843750?utm

Treaty allies are developing fallback options in case the US disengages from the region, an analyst said

By Chris Megerian, Didi Tang and Kim Tong-hyung / AP, WASHINGTON
US President Donald Trump’s aggressive trade and immigration policies are undermining relationships that have been cornerstones of US foreign policy to counter China’s growing influence, eroding years of diplomatic investments spanning administrations.
The latest fracture came on Friday, when hundreds of South Korean workers were detained at a Hyundai manufacturing plant in Georgia, a facility that had been a showcase for closer economic ties between the two countries. Some of the workers, who were being investigated for visa issues, were shackled.
Administration officials insist that trade will not be impacted, but foreign-policy analysts have watched deteriorating relationships with alarm. Instead of following the conventional wisdom of building coalitions as a bulwark against China, Trump has reveled in turning the screws on friend and foe alike.
Illustration: Louise Ting
“Treaty allies are developing fallback options if the United States disengages from the region,” said Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US strategy in Asia. “Some partners are hedging by cultivating better relationships with China.”
Ties with India have also cooled despite a previously cordial friendship between Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Trump, a Republican, imposed tariffs on India as punishment for buying Russian oil during the war in Ukraine and he has grown closer with Pakistan, a bordering rival.
Modi was recently photographed with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) during a security summit in Tianjin, China, prompting a social media jab from Trump.
“Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest, China,” he wrote. “May they have a long and prosperous future together!”
It is possible that recent spats could blow over. Trump called Modi “my very good friend” when announcing trade talks between the two countries would continue in a Truth Social post.
“I feel certain that there will be no difficulty in coming to a successful conclusion for both of our Great Countries,” he wrote.
Modi responded by calling the two countries “close friends and natural partners” and said he was “confident that our trade negotiations will pave the way for unlocking the limitless potential of the India-US partnership.”
However, concerns among Asian nations might not be temporary, especially if there is a sense that Trump’s skeptical view of foreign engagement will linger after he is no longer in office.
“Most countries in the region believe that Washington’s protectionist policies, unilateral tendencies and greater skepticism of overseas engagement will outlast the Trump administration,” Cooper said.
In a statement, the Chinese embassy in Washington said that the country never engages “in zero-sum games or geopolitical confrontations where one wins and the other loses,” but “is committed to maintaining world peace, stability and development, sharing development opportunities with countries around the world.”
Trump has occasionally talked tough toward China, and he risked a trade war between the world’s first and second-largest economies by announcing steep tariffs.
However, both sides have stepped back from that confrontation and Trump has been focused on seeking a summit with Xi.
After a meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) over the summer, the US Department of State said that both sides “agreed to explore areas of potential cooperation, while seeking to manage differences.”
The tension between Trump and Modi has been particularly surprising given their closeness during Trump’s first term.
However, Modi has declined to indulge Trump’s attempt to claim credit for brokering a recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, although Pakistan has nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize that he covets.
In addition, India has been caught in the crossfire of Trump’s efforts to resolve the Russian invasion of Ukraine. To put indirect pressure on Moscow, Trump increased tariffs on India for buying Russian oil during the war.
Eric Garcetti, who served as US ambassador to India under former US president Joe Biden, said that years of diplomacy would not be reversed, but said “a lot of damage can be done,” and he warned that it would be a “very lonely world” if India and US are not on the same page.
“This is one of the most critical relationships for our success and for the world,” he said.
Rick Rossow, a senior adviser focused on India and emerging Asia economics at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that the US-India relationship is at “a low point,” but “such moments always feel like they are more significant than they actually are.”
However, tensions could jeopardize a planned visit by Trump to India to attend a summit that would also include leaders from Japan and Australia. The strategic grouping, known as the Quad, is viewed as a mechanism to counter Beijing’s military and political influences in the region.
The raid at the Hyundai facility stands out as a highly public display of the Trump administration’s willingness to enforce its aggressive immigration policy, even if it also comes at an economic cost, sparking anger and a sense of betrayal in South Korea, less than two weeks after a White House meeting between Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung.
“Damage has already been done as anti-American sentiment is clearly on the rise,” said Bong Youngshik, a professor at Seoul’s Yonsei University, citing public shock in South Korea over the detentions and US authorities releasing video showing the workers being chained and taken away.
Trump has pushed Seoul to expand US industrial investments, but without a visa system to support enough skilled workers to establish new manufacturing facilities.
“There’s a growing perception among South Koreans that the United States is engaging in bullying behavior, not only about this case but also with their aggressive push to increase tariffs,” Bong said. “There’s a widespread feeling that it is taking things too far.”
The issue would remain a “ticking time bomb” and “it will become extremely difficult for South Korean companies to send their employees to the United States,” Bong said.

5. US Detention of Korean Workers Stiffens Mood in Seoul

At the risk of sounding like "whataboutism" I think both sides need to examine the underlying problems that exist on both sides, get past the emotionalism of this debacle, and work together to improve the situation from each side.

US Detention of Korean Workers Stiffens Mood in Seoul

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/usa-detention-korean-workers-stiffens-mood-seoul?utm

Debacle for both sides

Sep 14, 2025

By: Shim Jae Hoon

With children screaming and housewives wiping away tears, the arrival lounge at Incheon International Airport on September 12 felt like a dockside crowd welcoming their kin returning home from some foreign war front.

A chartered Korean Air flight was bringing 316 South Korean technicians and engineers released from a week-long detention by US immigration authorities at a new Korean-financed plant at Allabell, Georgia for Hyundai Motors and LG Energy Solutions. On the same flight were 14 others working at the same site from Japan, China, and Indonesia.

The Georgia crackdown occurs in the middle of the maelstrom that is US immigration policy and which leaves neither side looking very good. Washington’s take-no-prisoners immigration situation under US President Donald Trump occurs as the US also seeks foreign direct investment, while South Korea willingly flaunts immigration rules.

The US$4.3 billion joint venture battery facility, among the largest projects in Georgia and expected to create 8,500 jobs, was scheduled for completion later this year to supply battery cells to Hyundai’s nearby EV factory, Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America LLC (HMGMA). It is now endangered.

The scenes of helmeted ICE agents in full battle gear invading the peaceful worksite and rounding up workers at gunpoint, chaining and shackling them – repeatedly shown on Korean TV news – so outraged Korean viewers at home that it triggered waves of outrage and denunciation, calling for a new look at relations with the US, Seoul’s most important ally. It also caused high embarrassment for the new Lee Jae Myung administration, which has been under suspicion of harboring people with anti-American backgrounds.

Apparently sensing the danger to the plant’s future, Christopher Landau, a senior US state department official, on Sunday expressed regret over the recent mass detention and vowed to prevent similar occurrences. Landau visited Seoul for a meeting with South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo to convey his “deep regrets.”

That was cold comfort for the workers, who arrived unshaven and looking dazed, showing lingering shock from the treatment they received, being iron-chained and shackled most of the time.

“We have had to have our meals next to a toilet stool,” said one Korean worker, shaking his head. “We were taken under gunpoint and then chained like big-time criminals,” said another man who refused to give his name.

The hapless returnees were abruptly freed following intense negotiations at the White House with the South Korean foreign minister and a top presidential security adviser from Seoul hurrying to Washington for high-level talks, which apparently saved the Korean workers the fate of being carted off to some unknown distant nation south of the US border.

In the end, it was talks with President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mark Rubio that saved the Korean workers from internment for working without proper visas. With the Trump administration expecting to have large numbers of Korean workers come to build more factories, including shipyards for American warships, it appeared Washington saw no point in convicting all of those detained.

Korean news reports said US President Donald Trump at first thought of forgiving the Georgia workers, but the Koreans were presumably too stunned to stay on.

In the wake of the Georgia debacle, reports in Seoul say the US and South Korea will agree on a new special work visa arrangement to be applied to Koreans coming to the US for work on projects involving Korea’s investment. But in Seoul, questions are being raised about whether such a new system can help heal the impact of the shock.

While the workers have been spared prosecution and lengthy imprisonment, their return and exclusion from criminal charges doesn’t obscure the reputation of Koreans in the United States and elsewhere, breaking visa rules, overstaying or working without proper visa requirements. Many Koreans enter the United States under the so-called ESTA program, an electronic system for travel authorization allowing visitors to the US for simple, non-business trips.

And yet, quite a few Korean companies have broken visa rules by sending home-office people on company projects or sales missions. As in the case of the Georgia plant where engineers and technicians worked at their subsidiary plants or factories for quick project implementation, Koreans have often been accused of being scofflaws.

“It is known we are all guilty of (breaking immigration laws) in the name of quick project implementation,” one retired construction worker told Asia Sentinel, explaining that worksite projects and deadlines have often been used as an excuse for breaking visa rules.

That certainly was the case of the 300-plus technicians illegally working at the Georgia plant. The surprise was why ICE officials had taken so long to secure a court order to invade the plant and stage what appeared to be a combat operation with fully armored vehicles.

Calling the Georgia immigration agency’s action “extremely disconcerting,” President Lee, carefully choosing his words, told a news conference marking his hundred days in office: “it could have a considerable impact on direct investment in the US,” adding “Korean companies are bound to be very hesitant about investing directly.”

Lee has ample reason to be apprehensive. His three-month-old administration is now under relentless pressure from the Trump administration to sign a new trade accord accepting a 15 percent tariff in exchange for a promise of investments totaling US$350 billion. No formal agreement has yet been signed, but in the midst of the Georgia frisson, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has openly called on Seoul to implement the investment accord or face a 25 percent tariff as initially slapped by Trump.

In principle at least, Seoul’s large business community, mainly consisting of family-owned chaebol groups such as Hyundai Motors, Samsung Electronics, and LG Group, are in agreement to increase their investment in the US, which remains their largest export market. Not only in manufactured goods but also in high technology, the two countries are inextricably linked in many ways, so that corporations like Samsung and Hyundai have become household names in the United States.

But there is a significant difference as to how that investment figure should be composed, and how soon these investments would have to be carried out. Reports so far indicate a significant degree of disagreement as to how and when these investments should be carried out.

According to reports in Seoul, Korean corporations hope to raise all or a significant amount of potential investment from the US, while the Trump administration officials have said they prefer Koreans raising investment capital elsewhere. The aggregate US$350 billion reportedly committed by South Korean businesses also appears to be an object of speculation, as the figure simply means adding up various oral statements given by individual business groups.

Whatever is true, the amount appears overly high for South Korea’s economic size. The promised investment figure represents something like 80 percent of foreign exchange holdings (amounting to US$480 billion).

So far, reports indicate that the Trump administration hopes the Korean business community will raise much of these funds outside the US. Although these projects will be carried out in separate stages, informal responses being bantered about in Washington appear hardly encouraging.

“We’re trying to make the US understand how important it is for us to raise $350 billion without sending shocks through our foreign exchange market,” said Kim Yong Beom, as quoted in a recent CNBC report. Kim knows what he is talking about as he is President Lee’s chief of staff for policy. “

Nor is that the only issue complicating potential investment. Washington and Seoul are also at loggerheads as to how profits accruing from potential Korean investments should be shared. Senior US officials have recently been quoted as saying that the US should claim 90 percent of profit from Korea-invested projects as they occur in the United States with US labor content.

Not surprisingly, reaction in Seoul has been muffled but negative. “Why the hell should we accept that kind of a deal?” was a response from one Korean business leader as quoted anonymously in a Seoul newspaper. It looks like the two erstwhile strong security allies are about to enter a long tunnel on business and other issues.

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Independent news and analysis about Asia's politics, economics, culture and more

6. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief to attend Incheon Landing commemoration

I recall advising MacArthur on the landing:

(note attempt at humor)

Photo here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_8xUWJDH_NIBmEfLP9eg8z5WhRRg3iQb/view?usp=sharing

Sunday

September 14, 2025

dictionary + A - A

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief to attend Incheon Landing commemoration

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-09-14/national/defense/US-IndoPacific-Command-chief-to-attend-Incheon-Landing-commemoration/2398557

Published: 14 Sep. 2025, 18:35

Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Paparo delivers his speech during the opening ceremony of the Super Garuda Shield 2025 joint military exercise at the Navy Staff and Command School in Jakarta, Indonesia on Aug. 25. [EPA/YONHAP]

Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, will join a ceremony in Incheon on Sunday to mark the 75th anniversary of the Incheon Landing of the 1950-53 Korean War, the first time Washington’s top regional commander has taken part in the commemoration of the pivotal Korean War operation.

Paparo, 61, plans to join the “Night of Harmony and Peace” (translated) event hosted by Incheon Mayor Yoo Jeong-bok at Harbor Park Hotel at 6 p.m., military officials said.

Incheon marks Korean War landing with call for worldwide peace

South Korea receives remains of four Turkish soldiers killed during Korean War

Korea, U.S. reaffirm cooperation in joint search for Korean War remains

The event serves as a welcoming reception on the eve of the official anniversary ceremony, which the city of Incheon and the Korean Navy will hold at Incheon Inner Harbor on Monday.

Veterans Affairs Minister Kwon Oh-eul, Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and Adm. Kang Dong-gil, Korea’s Navy chief of naval operations, will also attend. Paparo is expected to deliver congratulatory remarks.

Yoo first invited Paparo when they met at the U.S. Forces Korea change-of-command ceremony at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, in December 2024.

Yoo reportedly emphasized in his invitation that “this may be the last chance for many veterans to attend” and asked the commander to join the anniversary. Paparo confirmed his attendance through Incheon city officials in June.

He reportedly noted the symbolic weight of attending, as the first UN commander who led the Incheon Landing, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, once held the same operational authority Paparo now holds as head of Indo-Pacific Command.

Joseph Raines, executive director of the General Douglas MacArthur Memorial Foundation, is also expected to attend. Arthur MacArthur IV, the general’s only son, sent a letter to the organizers ahead of the commemoration.

Paparo, who is currently on a regional tour, had initially planned to attend Monday's main ceremony but revised his schedule to join only the eve’s reception before departing Korea. He arrived in Seoul on Saturday after visiting Tokyo on Sept. 10, where he met Gen. Hiroaki Uchikura, chief of staff of Japan’s Joint Staff.

Paparo took command of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in May after leading the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Indo-Pacific Command is the largest of the Pentagon’s six geographic combatant commands, covering about 52 percent of the Earth’s surface, including U.S. Forces Korea.

BY SHIM SEOK-YONG [paik.jihwan@joongang.co.kr]

7. FM Cho to visit Beijing for talks with Wang Yi: sources

The question is will Xi attend APC in Seoul 30 OCT- 1 NOV and meet with President Trump?

FM Cho to visit Beijing for talks with Wang Yi: sources | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 14, 2025

BEIJING/SEOUL, Sept. 14 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun is expected to visit China this week for talks with his counterpart, Wang Yi, diplomatic sources said Sunday.

Cho is likely to raise Chinese President Xi Jinping's potential visit to South Korea for next month's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Xi is widely expected to attend the summit, though China has yet to confirm his participation.

Cho is also expected to reaffirm South Korea and China's shared goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and ask for China's constructive role amid concerns that Beijing may be softening its stance of nonacceptance of North Korea's nuclear program.

Earlier this month, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held talks with Xi in their first meeting in more than six years. The two leaders made no public mention of denuclearization, in contrast to their four summits in 2018-19.

Kim also joined Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a large military parade in Beijing earlier this month to mark China's victory over Japan in World War II, the first such gathering in 66 years.

Their show of unity raised concerns it could complicate South Korea's efforts to ease inter-Korean tensions while balancing relations with Beijing amid escalating U.S.-China rivalry.

The two sides could also discuss other outstanding bilateral issues, including Chinese steel structures in the overlapping maritime zone in the Yellow Sea.

Cho is expected to depart for Beijing around Sept. 17, in what would be his first visit to China since taking office in July.

This undated compiled photo shows Foreign Minister Cho Hyun (L) and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · September 14, 2025

8. U.S. Deputy State Secretary Landau expresses regrets over detention of S. Koreans

Koreans want to know if the US is accepting responsibility for the debacle?

But the DEPSECSTATE is right with this focus - let's take this as a severe wakeup call and fix the underlying problems.

Excerpts:

Landau also told Park that the two allies should try to use the incident as an opportunity to further strengthen their bilateral ties and improve relevant systems where necessary, according to the ministry.

Landau also said U.S. President Donald Trump has a keen interest in the matter and ensured that those who have returned home will not face any disadvantages when reentering the United States. The state department official said Washington would try to ensure there would be no further incidents of a similar nature in the future.

Landau proposed working-level talks on issuing proper visas for South Korean workers in the U.S., citing a need to provide institutional support for South Korean corporations' investments that contribute to the American economy and manufacturing.

U.S. Deputy State Secretary Landau expresses regrets over detention of S. Koreans | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr

Yoo Jee-ho

Diplomacy 17:42 September 14, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 14 (Yonhap) -- A senior U.S. state department official on Sunday expressed regrets over the recent mass detention of South Korean workers in America and vowed to prevent similar occurrences.

Christopher Landau, deputy secretary of state, visited Seoul for a meeting with South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo.

According to Seoul's foreign ministry, Landau conveyed his deep regrets over the detention of hundreds of South Korean workers in an immigration crackdown earlier this month at an electric vehicle battery plant construction site for a joint venture between Hyundai Motor Group and LG Energy Solution in Bryan County, Georgia. A total of 316 South Korean workers returned home Friday, after being held in a detention center for a week.

U.S. Deputy State Secretary Christopher Landau (L) and South Korean First Vice Minister Park Yoon-joo pose for photos before their talks at the foreign ministry in Seoul on Sept. 14, 2025, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Landau also told Park that the two allies should try to use the incident as an opportunity to further strengthen their bilateral ties and improve relevant systems where necessary, according to the ministry.

Landau also said U.S. President Donald Trump has a keen interest in the matter and ensured that those who have returned home will not face any disadvantages when reentering the United States. The state department official said Washington would try to ensure there would be no further incidents of a similar nature in the future.

Landau proposed working-level talks on issuing proper visas for South Korean workers in the U.S., citing a need to provide institutional support for South Korean corporations' investments that contribute to the American economy and manufacturing.

In response, Park touched upon inconveniences that South Korean workers faced while in detention and said the general public in South Korea, in addition to the workers themselves, felt deeply shocked by the crackdown.

According to the ministry, Park also strongly urged the U.S. to take practical steps and implement systematic improvements to ease South Korean people's concerns.

(END)

Keywords

#U.S. #detention

U.S. Deputy State Secretary Landau expresses regrets over detention of S. Koreans

en.yna.co.kr

9. U.S., S. Korea stress importance of regional security cooperation in Seoul talks

Covering a lot of ground.

Excerpts:

Ahn and Paparo also reaffirmed the importance of trilateral security cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan to protect the peace and security of the region in the face of North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

Earlier in the day, Paparo met with Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and exchanged views on the state of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the regional security situation.

Cho thanked Paparo for his leadership in contributing to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the rest of the region as the Indo-Pacific commander.

Cho also briefed Paparo on the outcome of the South Korea-U.S. summit from August and asked the admiral to make sure his command would play a role in developing the bilateral ties into a future-oriented, comprehensive strategic alliance.

U.S., S. Korea stress importance of regional security cooperation in Seoul talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yoo Jee-ho · September 14, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 14 (Yonhap) -- Adm. Samuel Paparo Jr., commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, stressed the importance of regional security cooperation in his talks with the defense and foreign ministers of South Korea on Sunday.

Paparo met with Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back at the ministry headquarters in Seoul, where they discussed the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and ways to enhance the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

According to the ministry, Ahn recognized the integral role that the Indo-Pacific Command, which commands and controls the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), plays in ensuring peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the entire Indo-Pacific region.

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (L) shakes hands with Adm. Samuel Paparo Jr., commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, before their talks at the ministry headquarters in Seoul on Sept. 14, 2025, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Ahn and Paparo agreed that North Korea's improving nuclear and missile capabilities, along with its military cooperation with Russia, pose a great threat to peace in the Indo-Pacific region. They concluded that maintaining a firm combined readiness posture will be important in deterring and responding to the threat.

Ahn and Paparo also reaffirmed the importance of trilateral security cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan to protect the peace and security of the region in the face of North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

Earlier in the day, Paparo met with Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and exchanged views on the state of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the regional security situation.

Cho thanked Paparo for his leadership in contributing to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the rest of the region as the Indo-Pacific commander.

Cho also briefed Paparo on the outcome of the South Korea-U.S. summit from August and asked the admiral to make sure his command would play a role in developing the bilateral ties into a future-oriented, comprehensive strategic alliance.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun (R) shakes hands with Adm. Samuel Paparo Jr., commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, before their talks at the ministry headquarters in Seoul on Sept. 14, 2025, in this photo provided by the ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

According to the ministry, Paparo responded that he expects to continue to deepen cooperation with South Korea, calling it a key partner and an exemplary ally.

The two sides agreed that South Korea is an ideal partner that could help revive the U.S. manufacturing sector and that they will work together to implement specific measures in bilateral cooperation in shipbuilding.

Cho and Paparo also recognized the USFK's role in ensuring the peace and stability of the region, and said they will try to maintain a firm readiness posture.

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yoo Jee-ho · September 14, 2025

10. N. Korean women swept up in Chinese investigation of online dissent

Excerpts:

Multiple sources in China told Daily NK recently that Chinese police have been cracking down on online criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army and the leaders of Russia and North Korea who attended the military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

“Posts that criticize Chinese President Xi Jinping for standing beside Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at Tiananmen Square—a sacred historical site infused with the spirit of the Cultural Revolution—were spreading on Weibo,” the source said, referring to China’s popular microblogging platform.

“Remarks about Kim Jong Un have led investigators to consider female defectors as being potentially implicated in the posts and to bring them in for questioning,” the source said.

In Hubei and Hunan provinces and the cities of Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin, female defectors have described police confiscating electronic devices during home raids or calling them to stations for questioning. Some women reportedly still cannot retrieve their devices days later.

...

“One female defector in Shanghai was so afraid of being sent back to North Korea that she fled with her Chinese husband to relatives living far away, leaving her children with her mother-in-law. Another female defector in Tianjin became so anxious about receiving a police summons following Kim Jong Un’s visit to China that she had to be hospitalized,” said another source in China.

N. Korean women swept up in Chinese investigation of online dissent

"In Chongqing, one female defector's children have been watching the gate every night to make sure their mother isn't taken away," a source told Daily NK

By Jeong Tae Joo -

September 13, 2025

dailynk.com · September 12, 2025

Chinese police investigating online criticism of a military parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of “Victory Day” are targeting North Korean female defectors—who are illegal aliens in China—confiscating phones and bringing them in for questioning.

Multiple sources in China told Daily NK recently that Chinese police have been cracking down on online criticism of the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army and the leaders of Russia and North Korea who attended the military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

“Posts that criticize Chinese President Xi Jinping for standing beside Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at Tiananmen Square—a sacred historical site infused with the spirit of the Cultural Revolution—were spreading on Weibo,” the source said, referring to China’s popular microblogging platform.

“Remarks about Kim Jong Un have led investigators to consider female defectors as being potentially implicated in the posts and to bring them in for questioning,” the source said.

In Hubei and Hunan provinces and the cities of Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin, female defectors have described police confiscating electronic devices during home raids or calling them to stations for questioning. Some women reportedly still cannot retrieve their devices days later.

Fear spreads through defector communities

“One female defector in Shanghai was so afraid of being sent back to North Korea that she fled with her Chinese husband to relatives living far away, leaving her children with her mother-in-law. Another female defector in Tianjin became so anxious about receiving a police summons following Kim Jong Un’s visit to China that she had to be hospitalized,” said another source in China.

“In Chongqing, one female defector’s children have been watching the gate every night to make sure their mother isn’t taken away. As that story spread through the community, Chinese neighbors said they felt sorry that defectors were being blamed for critical posts written by Chinese citizens. Some locals said they don’t want authorities harassing defectors who have married Chinese citizens and started families,” the source added.

Police in some areas have explained that questioning and device inspections should not be interpreted as part of a repatriation campaign.

“A female defector who has long been the live-in girlfriend of a Chinese man was reassured by police that they were only investigating criticism about the military parade posted by subversive elements, which had nothing to do with sending people back to North Korea,” the source said.

Chinese police included female defectors in their investigation because defectors might be connected with online criticism of Kim Jong Un, and because defectors—lacking valid identification—must use phones registered under other people’s names.

Criticism of the military parade in online communities is being treated as a political issue in China. Italian news agency Agenzia Nova reported Sept. 5 that a man was arrested in Xiangyang, Hubei province, for posting critical comments about the parade. Video news outlet Zhangwen Shixun reported Sept. 6 that a 47-year-old Hubei man was arrested September 3 for expressing “inappropriate opinions” about the “Victory Day” parade.

“On an official level, police are identifying and punishing Chinese who disparaged the military parade. But covertly, they are also inspecting mobile devices of female defectors who are illegal aliens here. The crackdown on criticism of the military parade is once again raising the terrifying specter of repatriation for defectors in China,” the source said.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · September 12, 2025

11. N. Korea frames China visit as step toward global leadership role

One of the many objectives of the Kimfamily reime.

Let's review:

Kim Family Regime Strategy

Vital Interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime
Strategic Aim: Unification (domination) of the Peninsula (to ensure regime survival)

- Subversion, coercion, extortion, use of force

Key Condition: Split the ROK/US Alliance

- US forces off the Peninsula

-“Divide and Conquer” – Divide the Alliance and conquer the ROK

Desire: Recognition as "global"and nuclear power – negotiate SALT/START

- Nuclear weapons key to deterrence – Hwang Jong Yop

- nK believes US will not attack a nation with nuclear weapons

N. Korea frames China visit as step toward global leadership role

Study sessions begin by praising Kim as an "outstanding and sophisticated politician who is leading the world based on independent state power..."

By Jeong Seo-yeong - September 12, 2025

dailynk.com · September 12, 2025

North Korean officials are studying a compilation of leader Kim Jong Un’s remarks to senior party figures before his recent visit to China, with the materials positioning North Korea as a emerging global power.

“Officials’ study groups received a compilation of the Supreme Leader’s talks on the recent international situation, his visit to the People’s Republic of China and relevant foreign and diplomatic policies as an immortal, classic revolutionary work, with officials studying it from Sept. 4,” a Daily NK source in Pyongyang said recently.

According to the source, the study sessions begin by praising Kim as an “outstanding and sophisticated politician who is leading the world based on independent state power and an invincible status amid the suddenly transforming international situation” and as “humanity’s great figure who is relentlessly ensuring the dignity of independent Korea, the people’s peace and our national strength.”

The sessions provide an in-depth examination of Kim’s statements made during talks with leading Central Committee officials before he visited China.

According to the study materials, Kim told Central Committee officials he was “sure that his visit to China would become a historical and deeply significant step showing the world once again that the path we chose, the path our party and people chose, was the perfectly right one.”

He said the visit would “symbolically demonstrate the historic opportunity of the DPRK’s extraordinarily elevated status, while serving as a new, global revolution and heroic effort, with the world returning to a two or three-nation axis of North Korea and China or North Korea, China and Russia.” He characterized the visit as a “historic event that opened a new situation, with North Korea serving as a bold leading nation in the reorganization of the global order.”

Strategic foreign policy framework

The study sessions also assess the international situation and focus on Kim’s foreign policy strategy statements during his Central Committee talks.

Kim said recent pressure through intensified military cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan has heightened the need for tripartite collaboration among North Korea, China and Russia in politics, economics, and military matters.

Kim noted that China “is broadening its base and background for its own strategic support diplomacy despite U.S. containment and pressure, and we must connect this to our national strength and stability.” He said North Korea and China “must strengthen cooperation in each field as our interests coincide under the shared goal of checking U.S. hegemony and easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and, beyond that, the Asia-Pacific region.”

Kim outlined his strategy to pioneer the international stage by bolstering deep, mutual recognition and respect between North Korea and China based on historic bonds and trust, creating a political foundation for China to adopt a neutral or tacitly approving stance during North Korea’s negotiations with the United States over recognition of Pyongyang’s nuclear status.

Kim also discussed economic cooperation with China, saying North Korea must secure food, energy and raw material aid from China and use the assistance to ease economic hardships and stabilize people’s livelihoods.

“The study sessions end with calls to expand political education across the entire society to teach people that our Supreme Leader isn’t an isolated leader but a politician leading the world,” the source said.

dailynk.com · September 12, 2025

12. The Kim Jong Un era: Why wishful thinking won’t work anymore

Bold diplomacy will occur only after the Lee administration decides to pursue a free and unified Korea as the key to Korean security and prosperity.

Conclusion:

Thus, we must take a long breath and secure South Korea’s national security and national interests while simultaneously pushing dialogue with Kim — but not getting hung up on them — and undertaking multilateral activities to approach the North Korean people. When a direct path is blocked, you go around. Now is such a time, with the Kim regime likely to focus for the time being on cutting itself off from South Korea, cooperating with Russia and China, and, when necessary, striking a major deal with the Trump administration. I recall the words of one former diplomat who said, “Please, let’s engage in bold diplomacy, just like Kim Jong Un.”

Three points:

1. The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

2. Kim Gum Hyuk: Change is coming.

3. Fourteen words:"unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights."

The Kim Jong Un era: Why wishful thinking won’t work anymore

Many people say the Kim regime could collapse due to economic difficulties, but structurally speaking, North Korea's traditional leadership system and powerful police state are operating effectively

By Gil-sup Kwak - September 12, 2025

dailynk.com · September 11, 2025

XI Jinping made his first state visit to North Korea from June 20-21, 2019. (Rodong Sinmun)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un went to China to celebrate China’s so-called Victory Day on Sept. 3 and engage in national security diplomacy. For the first time, he stood alongside Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and other world leaders on the high rostrum of Tiananmen Square. The South Korean and international press made a big fuss over the value and significance of the “full shot” of Kim, Xi and Putin standing together. We’re on the threshold of the Kim Jong Un era.

What should we think at this moment? I first think of all the government officials who have long made one-sided arguments. As Kim Jong Un and his sister have said, there’s no need to divide between progressive and conservative. In international relations, and especially inter-Korean relations, anachronistic fixed notions, childish confirmation bias and wishful thinking detached from reality are pitfalls to be avoided. Yet such thinking has dominated Korean society in the past and remains essentially unchanged today.

“Kim Jong Un is in poor health and will soon die.” “The North Korean regime is on its last legs.” “North Korea’s troop deployment to the Russia-Ukraine war will hasten the regime’s end.” “North Korea has neither the will nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons.” “If we treat Kim Jong Un with goodwill and cooperate with him, he’ll abandon his nukes and engage in dialogue and cooperation.” “Kim Jong Un might participate in the APEC summit in Gyeongju.” How many times have we heard these things? Such talk is nothing but shortsightedness and sophistry.

In international relations, including the North Korean nuclear issue, one must view facts as facts and craft precise strategies and tactics, but we often refuse to see things as they are, instead wearing rose-tinted glasses. We can no longer do so. We must now adopt a cool-headed approach.

The judgments and suggestions I’ve made in my five books, including “Analysis of Kim Jong Un,” and columns haven’t been 100% correct. However, they’re clearly starting points from which to engage in broader consideration. Today, I’d like once more to highlight and discuss how we must never underestimate or simply trust Kim Jong Un, how we must more seriously understand the dual nature of the Korea issue (as both a Korean national issue and an international issue), and how we must approach Korean issues from a three-dimensional, realistic and global perspective rather than a one-sided, wishful or nationalistic one.

Six realities we must face

First, Kim Jong Un is an adventurer with complexes and ambition. He suddenly finds himself in his 15th year as the country’s leader. We must not view wholly negatively or lightly his purges and politics of fear, his hell-bent development of nuclear weapons, his strategic response to the COVID-19 pandemic, his deployment of troops to the Russia-Ukraine war, and his multilateral diplomacy debut during China’s Victory Day. Not every leader could do those things. He may have abandoned the concept of cooperative reunification based on united front tactics due to unfavorable circumstances, but he’s strengthening his nuclear weapon-based strategy of “territorial integrity” — in other words, reunifying the country by conquering the South.

Second, the Kim Jong Un regime is unlikely to face sudden changes in the near future. Many people say the Kim regime could collapse due to economic difficulties, but structurally speaking, North Korea’s traditional leadership system and powerful police state are operating effectively. The North Korean people’s familiarity with poverty and North Korea’s slowly recovering economy due to fissures in the international sanctions regime (namely, the intensifying alliance between the North, China and Russia) make this improbable.

Third, North Korea will no longer give up its nuclear weapons voluntarily. The international community is trying hard to ignore the North’s advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities and its enshrinement of its nuclear doctrine in its constitution and legal code. However, as time passes, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities will grow, China and Russia will give the North their tacit consent, and the U.S. Trump administration’s jitters will increase as the midterm elections approach.

Fourth, Kim Jong Un’s “two hostile states” doctrine outwardly appears to reject the ideas of a shared Korean identity and national reunification and favor the North’s status as an independent state, but in fact, it’s a “cultural war” to completely eliminate South Korean pop culture, which has spread throughout North Korean society. Accordingly, North Korea has no reason to restart inter-Korean exchanges that could fundamentally shake the proverbial tower Pyongyang worked so hard to build.

Fifth, the North Korean people are outwardly enduring the government’s crackdowns on South Korean pop culture under the name of the “two hostile states” doctrine, but inwardly, they still thirst for outside knowledge, and if the chance emerges, they’ll endure the risks to consume it.

Sixth, policies based on one particular South Korean political camp’s ideas — whether a progressive government’s policy 2.0 or a conservative government’s policy 2.0 — will no longer work. Only a fusion of progressive and conservative policies will work. Only then will Seoul be able to engage properly with Kim Jong Un or Trump, consolidate national opinion, and draw closer to the North Korean people.

I’m not a working-level official in the Korean government. My advice is based on long experience. I hope today’s talking points help government officials and readers consider Kim Jong Un, North Korea and the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

The path forward

I’ll stress it one more time. North Korea’s “two hostile states” doctrine is a life-or-death gamble that rejects the sacred precepts of Kim’s ancestors — the single Korean nation and national reunification. It’s a form of “Kim Jong Un-style martial law.” When education and crackdowns failed to halt the spread of South Korean pop culture, and even a series of vicious laws carrying extreme punishments proved ineffective, the doctrine was the strongest card Kim could play. Of course, the policy carries several inherent strategic and tactical goals, but the central one is to blind and silence the North Korean people — whose eyes have opened to information from the outside world, the biggest headache for the regime — while securing the Kim family’s perpetual rule through nuclear weapons and the politics of fear.

Moreover, world leaders, such as Trump, continue to court Kim Jong Un. We’re on the verge of the Kim Jong Un era. With things going this way, North Korea has no reason to touch the drug that is South Korea. Therefore, the Lee Jae-myung administration must recognize that when Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s powerful sister, said Seoul’s hopes were nothing more than a “pipe dream,” she wasn’t joking.

Thus, we must take a long breath and secure South Korea’s national security and national interests while simultaneously pushing dialogue with Kim — but not getting hung up on them — and undertaking multilateral activities to approach the North Korean people. When a direct path is blocked, you go around. Now is such a time, with the Kim regime likely to focus for the time being on cutting itself off from South Korea, cooperating with Russia and China, and, when necessary, striking a major deal with the Trump administration. I recall the words of one former diplomat who said, “Please, let’s engage in bold diplomacy, just like Kim Jong Un.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · September 11, 2025

13. Kim Jong Un’s triumph: the rise and rise of North Korea’s dictator

Excerpt:

All in all, the trio that stood on the podium at Tiananmen Square make for a sinister new force in global politics, said Lina Chang in Asia Times (Hong Kong). But I wouldn’t overplay their new relationship too much. Things between North Korea and China in particular blow “hot and cold”. Remember, it wasn’t long ago that Kim described China’s attempt to reform his country’s economy as a “filthy wind of bourgeois liberty”.

Kim Jong Un’s triumph: the rise and rise of North Korea’s dictator

North Korean leader has strengthened ties with Russia and China, and recently revealed his ‘respected child’ to the world

The Week · The Week UK · September 13, 2025

Kim Jong Un met Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping recently in Beijing

(Image credit: Getty Images)

published 13 September 2025

“Whatever you make of his grotesque politics, his execrable human rights record and his lamentable physical condition, Kim Jong Un is one of the most brilliantly successful national leaders in the world,” said Richard Lloyd Parry in The Times. When he succeeded his late father as head of the hermit kingdom in 2011, plenty of people wrote the young leader off as a weak and “callow fattie” who’d be gone within months.

Since then, Kim has purged his potential domestic challengers (including, allegedly, ordering the killing of an elder sibling with a nerve agent); established his own powerful cult of personality in North Korea; and built up a nuclear arsenal that has significantly strengthened his standing on the world stage.

‘Diplomatic victory’

That rise in influence reached its apogee last week, said Katsuji Nakazawa in The Nikkei (Tokyo), when Kim, 41, stood shoulder-to-shoulder with two of Asia’s most powerful leaders, China’s President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin of Russia, at the massive military parade in Beijing. To be given equal billing with Putin was a huge “diplomatic victory”.

Kim had arrived in China in his own unique style, said Tetsuya Fujita in the same paper – travelling the 800-odd miles between Pyongyang and Beijing in an armoured train equipped with a special lavatory “to prevent the leak of any biometric data”. As he moved around the Chinese capital, aides wiped down every surface he’d touched, to stop foreign intelligence agencies from being able to gather any traces of his DNA.

‘Respected child’

The most striking aspect of Kim’s visit, though, said Roland Oliphant in The Daily Telegraph, is that he was accompanied almost everywhere by his 12-year-old daughter. Her name – at least according to ex-basketball player (and unofficial personal envoy to North Korea) Dennis Rodman – is Kim Ju Ae; though the North Korean press only refers to her as “respected child”. She often looks more “Bond villain than pre-teen” (on one previous outing she sported a fur-lined leather trench coat and gloves). But with her near-constant presence at Kim’s side, there is growing evidence she is being groomed to succeed her father as leader of the nuclear-armed nation. She is now potentially “the most powerful – and dangerous – girl in the world”.

Of course, there may be a more cynical reason Kim takes her everywhere, said Julian Ryall in Deutsche Welle (Bonn). The reclusive leader is famously fearful of assassination; “one theory”, says an expert, “is that he keeps his daughter close in the belief that the US would not be willing to kill her as well”.

‘A de facto nuclear power’

Kim’s triumphant tour of China culminated in a one-to-one summit with President Xi, said Choe Sang-Hun in The New York Times. And tellingly, this time Xi made no effort to pressure his neighbour into removing his nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. Kim’s main mission is complete: his rogue nation is now effectively accepted by both China and Russia “as a de facto nuclear power”. His economy is also experiencing a dramatic uplift, said Choo Jae-woo in The Korea Times (Seoul), thanks in large part to the war in Ukraine. Putin and Kim have become “blood allies”, after the latter sent 14,000 North Korean troops to fight alongside Russian soldiers in that conflict. In return, Kremlin gold is flooding into North Korea, to pay for millions of shells. Last week, Russia, China and North Korea also struck a trilateral agreement to make their new alliance more “economically formidable”.

All in all, the trio that stood on the podium at Tiananmen Square make for a sinister new force in global politics, said Lina Chang in Asia Times (Hong Kong). But I wouldn’t overplay their new relationship too much. Things between North Korea and China in particular blow “hot and cold”. Remember, it wasn’t long ago that Kim described China’s attempt to reform his country’s economy as a “filthy wind of bourgeois liberty”.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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