Quotes of the Day:
“World War III is a guerrilla information war with no division between military and civilian participation.”
- Marshall McLuhan, “Culture Is Our Business”, 1970, p. 66
"All political revolutions, not affected by foreign conquest, originate in moral revolutions. The subversion of established institutions is merely one consequence of the previous subversion of established opinions."
- John Stuart Mill
"Of our political revolution of '76, we all are justly proud. It has given us a degree of political freedom, far exceeding that of any other nation of the earth. In it the world has found a solution of the long mooted problem, as to the capability of man to govern himself. In it was the germ which has vegetated, and still is to grow and expand into the universal liberty of mankind."
- Abraham Lincoln
1. Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS
2. Gen Keane on Milley's phone calls with China: The media is taking this 'out of context'
3. Milley’s China Calls During Trump Defeat Were ‘Lawful,’ Conveyed Reassurance, Pentagon Says
4. Australia Will Get Nuclear-Powered Subs In New Partnership With US, UK
5. Out of Africa: The Strategic Mistake of US Disengagement from Somalia
6. How to Deter China From Invading Taiwan
7. The future of special operations may look a lot different than the GWOT aesthetic we’ve come to know
8. US needs to revamp its defence co-operation with Taiwan
9. Analysis | Murphy’s misfired claim that 8 out of 10 U.S. drones miss their target
10. Why China Loves America's Defense Budget Inaction
11. Taliban lionizes Haqqani commander who celebrated ties to Al Qaeda, held American hostage
12. ‘Extremely serious’: Japan says flotilla of gun-equipped Chinese ships appeared near Senkakus
13. Party Capital: A Blueprint for National Security Due Diligence on China — C4ADS
14. General promises US ‘surge’ against foreign cyberattacks
15. Working with the Devil? The Potential for U.S.-Taliban Cooperation Against the Islamic State in Afghanistan
16. How China Exports Authoritarianism
17. Why Australia's new defence pact with the US and Britain is so significant
1. Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS
Will the pronunciation of "awk- us" become commonly used? Was this acronym vetted with the "acronym control officer" and his staff of young military personnel who know how to take an acronym and make it satirical?
Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS
SEPTEMBER 15, 2021
•
As leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, guided by our enduring ideals and shared commitment to the international rules-based order, we resolve to deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including by working with partners, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. As part of this effort, we are announcing the creation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership called “AUKUS” — Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Through AUKUS, our governments will strengthen the ability of each to support our security and defense interests, building on our longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties. We will promote deeper information and technology sharing. We will foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains. And in particular, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.
As the first initiative under AUKUS, recognizing our common tradition as maritime democracies, we commit to a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. Today, we embark on a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability. We will leverage expertise from the United States and the United Kingdom, building on the two countries’ submarine programs to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date.
The development of Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines would be a joint endeavor between the three nations, with a focus on interoperability, commonality, and mutual benefit. Australia is committed to adhering to the highest standards for safeguards, transparency, verification, and accountancy measures to ensure the non-proliferation, safety, and security of nuclear material and technology. Australia remains committed to fulfilling all of its obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state, including with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Our three nations are deeply committed to upholding our leadership on global non-proliferation.
Recognizing our deep defense ties, built over decades, today we also embark on further trilateral collaboration under AUKUS to enhance our joint capabilities and interoperability. These initial efforts will focus on cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities.
The endeavor we launch today will help sustain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. For more than 70 years, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have worked together, along with other important allies and partners, to protect our shared values and promote security and prosperity. Today, with the formation of AUKUS, we recommit ourselves to this vision.
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2. Gen Keane on Milley's phone calls with China: The media is taking this 'out of context'
Gen Keane on Milley's phone calls with China: The media is taking this 'out of context'
The retired four star general says he doesn't "see anything that is undermining the civilian control of the military"
foxnews.com · by Fox News Staff , Fox News Staff | Fox News
Fox News senior strategic analyst discusses Gen. Mark Milley’s reported calls to China on ‘The Story’
Ret. Gen. Jack Keane joined "The Story" to share his thoughts on the latest story about Gen. Mark Milley's reported calls to China and argued that that the media has "sensationalized" the story.
General Jack Keane: I think these are responsible actions that are being taken, not the contrary. Based on what the Pentagon is reporting and the feedback we’re getting from Jennifer Griffin and I trust her and her sources, by the way, they have been impeccable in the past and I take them at face value here, I don’t see anything that is undermining the civilian control of the military. If you took the facts that are being reported and I think being sensationalized in the media. But that is not what the Pentagon is reporting. Seems to be pretty much in sync with what we’re used to seeing. The other thing is, I mean, I don’t know how many times we have to learn this lesson. It would be far better if people are serving in the government not to be talking to the media about things that are going on in the government, particularly such sensitive things as we’re dealing with here. Because they have a tendency to get completely out of context as we’re seeing here. The other thing is, I’m assuming that General Milley isn’t coming forward himself because he’s going to deal with this issue on September 28 with the senators. He probably doesn’t want to upsurp their authority. They’ll have a lot questions on this and what took place in Afghanistan. So I think we’re going to get all the facts on this. I’d be surprised if it’s anything more than what we’re seeing right now.
WATCH THE FULL INTERVIEW HERE:
This article was written by Fox News staff.
foxnews.com · by Fox News Staff , Fox News Staff | Fox News
3. Milley’s China Calls During Trump Defeat Were ‘Lawful,’ Conveyed Reassurance, Pentagon Says
Milley’s China Calls During Trump Defeat Were ‘Lawful,’ Conveyed Reassurance, Pentagon Says
Some Republicans are seeking his ouster, but the Joint Chiefs chairman is the first to serve a guaranteed four years.
Gen. Mark Milley did not go outside the chain of command when the Joint Chiefs chairman reached out to Chinese leaders to reassure them the U.S. would not attack China in the unsteady weeks before and after the 2020 election, his office said Wednesday.
Milley, who is guaranteed another two years in his job, has faced pressure from Congressional Republicans to resign following revelations in Bob Woodward’s upcoming book Peril that the chairman took unusual steps to prevent war. Those steps included reminding flag officers of their specific roles and responsibilities if a nuclear launch were ordered during former President Donald Trump’s erratic final days in office.
Milley’s calls with the Chinese “were in keeping with these duties and responsibilities conveying reassurance in order to maintain strategic stability,” his spokesman Col. Dave Butler said in a statement. “The meeting regarding nuclear weapons protocols was to remind uniformed leaders in the Pentagon of the long-established and robust procedures in light of media reporting on the subject.”
Sworn in as the 20th Joint Chiefs chairman in September 2019, Milley is the first to serve a guaranteed four-year term. Past chairmen served two-year terms, renewable once by the White House. But under legislation that went into effect two years ago, the Army general could serve a second four-year term, and even beyond that “in time of war.”
On Tuesday, Donald Trump responded to the allegations in Woodward’s book by saying that he had never considered launching an attack on China.
“I’ve had so many calls today saying, ‘That’s treason’,” Trump said on Newsmax. “For him to say that I would even think about attacking China, I think he’s trying to just get out of his incompetent withdrawal from Afghanistan.”
Some Republicans have called for Milley to be removed from his post. Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., sent a letter to President Joe Biden on Tuesday demanding that he fire Milley for “working to actively undermine” the president.
Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., said Milley subverted the president’s authority as commander in chief.
“He needs to resign, and if he won’t resign, he needs to be fired,” Hawley said Wednesday on Fox News. “He has broken the trust of the American people.”
Other lawmakers have said they are still seeking more information. Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., who has been a vocal critic of the Biden administration, said the allegations raised by the book seemed “far-fetched” and said he would ask Milley for more information when he testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee later this month.
“We don’t want to jump to conclusions yet, but we’ll certainly vet them and see exactly what happened,” he told “Fox & Friends.”
White House press secretary Jen Psaki said Wednesday that Biden has full confidence in Milley and believes that his commitment to the Constitution is “unquestionable.”
“It’s also important to understand the context,” Psaki said. “The former president was fomenting an insurrection and there was broad concern from a range of members of his national security team about his behavior and his fitness for office.”
4. Australia Will Get Nuclear-Powered Subs In New Partnership With US, UK
A number of second and third order effects of this. One is France is not happy.
Excerpt:
Australia, which is planning to refurbish its six conventionally powered Collins-class guided-missile submarines, had also intended to buy another 12 conventional subs designed by French shipbuilder Naval Group. The first ship in the $90 billion program was expected to be delivered in the early 2030s. That program will reportedly be canceled so that Australia can pursue acquisition of nuclear subs instead.
Australia Will Get Nuclear-Powered Subs In New Partnership With US, UK
Dubbed AUKUS, the new security partnership will increase focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Australia will get its first nuclear-powered submarines under a new trilateral relationship with the United States and United Kingdom intended to improve security in the Pacific, senior administration officials said Wednesday.
The move will put nuclear-powered submarines, which have longer range than Australia’s current conventional subs and can stay underwater for months, in China’s backyard as the administration seeks to pivot its foreign policy to the Indo-Pacific region.
“We undertake this effort as part of a larger constellation of steps including stronger bilateral partnerships with our traditional security partners in Asia...and also stronger engagement with new partners like India, Vietnam, and new formations like the Quad,” a senior administration official said.
President Joe Biden is expected to announce the new partnership, which will be known by the acronym AUKUS, on Wednesday alongside leaders from the United Kingdom and Australia.
More broadly, the new trilateral partnership will include increased cooperation on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, as well as more integration of industrial bases and supply chains, the senior administration official said.
But the group’s first priority will be sharing technology with Australia to help it develop and field nuclear-powered submarines, the senior official said. This is only the second time the United States has shared this type of sensitive technology with an ally. The first was with the United Kingdom in 1958.
“This is a fundamental decision that binds decisively Australia to the United States and Great Britain for generations,” the official said.
The partnership will include only nuclear propulsion, and Australia has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, the official said.
Some nuclear experts raised concerns about any proliferation of nuclear technology. James Acton, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program, called it a “mistake” and worried that the partnership would establish a dangerous precedent that could make nuclear material more widespread around the globe.
“If the US and UK help Australia acquire nuclear submarines, will they say no to, for example, South Korea, whose nonproliferation credentials are less than perfect (sorry) and which has stronger potential incentives to proliferate?” Acton wrote on Twitter.
Others disagree, saying that Australia is not a proliferation risk. Vipin Narang, a professor of nuclear security and political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argued that, because Australia is so far south with so much ocean to patrol, the benefits of the increased range offered by a nuclear-powered submarine outweigh the potential risks,
“If there’s any country I trust, it’s really Australia,” Narang said. “I know there are proliferation risks, but to me they’re offset by the warm fuzzy feeling I get from Australia having SSNs to help us out.”
The senior administration official pushed back on the idea that this could spark nuclear proliferation.
“This technology is extremely sensitive. This is frankly an exception to our policy in many respects,” the official said. “We view this as a one-off.”
One open question is whether the Australian subs will be powered by highly enriched uranium, a weapons-grade power source that fuels both American and British submarines, or low enriched uranium, which powers the French nuclear navy and can not be used directly for bombs, said Kingston Reif, the director of disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. Using low-enriched uranium could help calm fears about nuclear proliferation, Reif said.
The United States is also expected to run out of the highly enriched uranium that powers its subs and aircraft carriers by 2060, and it’s unclear how giving fuel to Australia might affect that supply, Reif said.
Chinese officials have yet to respond to the news. The increased presence of more capable submarines in the Pacific could be viewed by Beijing as a threat, but Narang pointed out that there are already American nuclear submarines patrolling in the Pacific and the South China Sea, which could soften China’s reaction. It will also likely take years before the submarines are actually in the water with trained crews onboard, which gives China a long time to respond and prepare if needed.
China has a fleet of 60 submarines, including six nuclear-powered attack subs, according to a Nuclear Threat Initiative report from February.
Asked if this is a military move aimed at China, the senior administration official stressed that “this partnership is not aimed [at] or about any one country. It’s about advancing our strategic interests, upholding the international rules based order and promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.”
Australia, which is planning to refurbish its six conventionally powered Collins-class guided-missile submarines, had also intended to buy another 12 conventional subs designed by French shipbuilder Naval Group. The first ship in the $90 billion program was expected to be delivered in the early 2030s. That program will reportedly be canceled so that Australia can pursue acquisition of nuclear subs instead.
5. Out of Africa: The Strategic Mistake of US Disengagement from Somalia
Irregular warfare takes presence, patience, and persistence.
The three P’s: Presence, Patience, Persistence. You have to be present to make a difference. You have to be patient because it takes a long time to influence indigenous forces and develop indigenous capabilities. You must have cultural respect without going native and you must have an aptitude and desire for living and working in a foreign culture. It takes persistence because mistakes will be made, every operation will include discovery learning and we will have to learn and adapt.
Out of Africa: The Strategic Mistake of US Disengagement from Somalia - Modern War Institute
In December 1992, as an infantry platoon commander, I was among the first Marines to land in Mogadishu at the onset of Operation Restore Hope. It was a mission that made sense to me and my fellow Marines at the time: to keep the warring factions in check and enable the delivery of relief supplies to the long-suffering population. Ten months later, after the death of nineteen US servicemen and hundreds of Somalis in the Battle of Mogadishu, that mission seemed much less clear. It dissolved altogether with the withdrawal of US forces in March 1994 and the subsequent collapse of the UN mission less than a year later. Somalia, as prevailing wisdom had it, was an irredeemable disaster, a place destined to wallow in its own misery, where the benefits of intervention were unlikely to be worth the price.
In 2019 and 2020, I returned to Mogadishu, this time as a civilian helping to train officers of the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade. It was clear to me then why General Stephen Townsend, the commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), was able to cite Somalia as a place where the command was seeing real progress. But last December, despite this progress, US troops were withdrawn.
In June of this year, I visited Mogadishu again. Conditions were worse in every respect and the war against al-Shabaab was not going well. Two of the seventeen Somali army officers I had helped train the previous year were dead, and several others seriously wounded. Mogadishu had the feeling of a city under siege.
There are compelling reasons for the United States to reengage in Somalia—an important front in the fight against global extremist networks. Learning from recent mistakes, the United States now has the opportunity to implement a coherent policy to counter this threat and protect its limited but real interests in the region.
Why Somalia?
For the last few months Afghanistan has dominated the headlines, but in East Africa another threat gathers momentum. Since the withdrawal of US forces in December, the al-Qaeda–affiliated organization al-Shabaab has resurged to a position of dominance in Somalia—recapturing lost territory and launching repeated attacks in the capital, Mogadishu. The organization is regarded by AFRICOM as being the most imminent threat to US interests in the region and has recently evinced intent to strike at the homeland. This threat is unlikely to have diminished with the Taliban’s recent victory.
President Joe Biden should reverse his predecessor’s decision to withdraw troops from Somalia, or face increasing regional instability and the not unlikely prospect of al-Shabaab conducting a transnational mass-casualty attack from its Somali sanctuary. Although Biden, like President Donald Trump before him, has pledged to end the “forever wars,” the hesitancy to reengage in Somalia reflects a misunderstanding of the very real threat posed by Salafi-jihadist groups, such as al-Shabaab, once they consolidate their positions locally. It represents a misplaced conviction that what happens on the other side of the world cannot harm US interests, a belief that sadly has been disproven time and again. And it conveys the false perception that the only alternative to getting involved in “forever wars” is a policy of isolationism—rather than a mature strategy of engagement with clear objectives.
In February, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced a global posture review, but the outcome of this review has not been announced, and the president has yet to come to a decision on his plans for the region. One hopes that the review will result in a strategy for Somalia that combines security, political, economic, and diplomatic efforts in a campaign supported by the same light military footprint that was previously having some success. Such an approach offers infinitely better prospects in terms of cost and risk than abrupt disengagement.
What Success Looks Like: A Niche Capability
Until last December, the fight against al-Shabaab was showing progress. A US special operations task force (SOTF), numbering some seven hundred personnel, was achieving results out of proportion to its size. Partnering with a specialized Somali force—the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade—the SOTF’s mission was to advise its counterparts in operations against al-Shabaab. Although barely the size of a US battalion, the Danab is by far the most capable element of the Somali National Army (SNA), and the only unit involved in offensive operations. It was a partnership that exemplified one of the US military’s “niche capabilities”—a term used by Gen. Townsend in his posture statement to Congress.
The plan was to win back key terrain outside Mogadishu by focusing on the road networks connecting the capital to provincial cities. It was a version of the inkblot strategy, made famous by the French in Vietnam, and widely adopted—at least in theory—by other Western nations since. In this case, the inkblots were the various towns along each route, won back and strong-pointed by the SNA with some support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), whose troops man a handful of bases in the lower Shabelle valley. Lacking heavy weapons, medics, and organic fire support, the Danab soldiers were largely dependent on their US counterparts. The most substantial support came from a fleet of US Special Operations Command U-28 aircraft, which launched from local airfields to deliver devastatingly accurate fires in support of the Danab. And little by little, despite circumstances that weighed on the side of al-Shabaab, it was happening.
It was an example of how partnering should work: a relationship based on trust, forged by shared goals against an imminent threat. And, for US policymakers, a demonstration of how small units, comprising the right people with responsive air support, can have strategic effect at little cost.
A Policy of Withdrawal leads to Greater Risk
The US SOTF faced obstacles aplenty, perhaps the most stringent of which were self-imposed. Restricted by increasingly limited permissions to accompany their partners, a policy intended to reduce risk, SOTF personnel were, by mid-2019, largely confined to their forward operating bases. Ironically, it may have been this policy that emboldened al-Shabaab into direct attacks. The principle here is a fundamental rule of counterinsurgency—indeed of basic infantry tactics—which is that static units, sitting behind the wire without pushing out into the surrounding area, cede ground and initiative to an aggressive opponent. On the other hand, it could simply be coincidence that, as US forces hunkered down, AFRICOM’s director of intelligence reported “a definitive shift” in al-Shabaab’s plans to attack US interests in the region.
In a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee shortly after the Manda Bay attack, Gen. Townsend described al-Shabaab as “the largest and most kinetically active al-Qa’ida network in the world,” and “the most dangerous to U.S. interests today.” A few months later, President Trump made the decision to withdraw US troops—apparently ignoring AFRICOM’s warning and the hard-learned lessons of the previous year. The move was also a rebuttal to Townsend’s advice to Congress, that “a secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.”
The withdrawal, completed by mid-January 2021, couldn’t have happened at a worse time. Al-Shabaab retook much of the country, recapturing the road networks that are the country’s lifelines, and launching frequent attacks against the capital.
Remote Counterterrorism Doesn’t Work
In late July, the United States resumed drone strikes against al-Shabaab after a seven-month hiatus—but these “decapitation” strikes differ in terms of purpose and effect from the use of close air support for a partner-nation force. In any case, the recent flurry of strikes is not likely to be repeated anytime soon due to policy concerns about using deadly force for collective self-defense.
“We’ve developed counterterrorism over-the-horizon capability that will allow us to . . . act quickly and decisively if needed,” President Biden said this month. If only this were true. The idea of being able to destroy our enemies and restore stability from a distance, without risk, is naturally an appealing prospect for any administration, but remains, in reality, a tantalizing chimera. Remote terrorism does not work without an effective force on the ground, especially against insurgent groups with popular support. Somalia fails this test on both counts.
A strategy based on drone strikes reflects a misunderstanding about the nature of the threat. Al-Shabaab is a product of civil war in Somalia—which in turn is caused by a range of social and environmental issues that, until resolved, will be a continual source of instability in the region. In rural areas, young Somalis flock to join al-Shabaab, induced by the remorseless effects of climate change, extreme poverty, and a perception that the Islamists offered terms under a social contract that were more reliable than those of the government. No counterterrorism strategy, however lethal, that fails to address these issues will affect al-Shabaab’s ability to draw on popular support.
The United States Doesn’t Need to Go It Alone
The international coalition whose mission it is to stabilize Somalia includes an African Union force, a United Nations mission, and training missions from the European Union, the UK, and Turkey. One of the ramifications of the US troop withdrawal and subsequent lack of policy direction has been to sap the effectiveness of these potential partners. Concerned about security, UN personnel are confined to their lodgings at Mogadishu’s airport. And though some AMISOM units had previously been willing to venture out on operations with the Danab and their US advisors, they now seldom do so. For our partners, even a light US footprint confers a heavy moral weight.
The British have plans to reinforce their small commitment in Somalia by deploying their newly formed Ranger Regiment. In a recent visit to Fort Bragg, UK Minister of Defense Ben Wallace seemed to be under the impression that in doing so, the British Rangers would be serving alongside US Special Forces. If this turns out not to be the case, it’s unclear how this will affect the decision to deploy the unit to Somalia.
All of this highlights two important points. First, whether the United States wants to acknowledge its position as a global leader, other countries still have that expectation. And second, Washington has the opportunity to reengage in Somalia as part of a coalition effort.
Accordingly, the United States should take the lead in overall coordination—failure to do so would likely result in the same disjointed patchwork of national efforts that caused such confusion in Afghanistan. But each sub-effort—economic assistance, governmental support, development, security, and building partner capacity—should be assigned to a framework, or lead nation.
A Coherent Strategy
Success in Somalia doesn’t mean winning on the battlefield. It means undermining the causes that have led to civil war in the country for the last three decades. It means leading with a coherent strategy that combines political, economic, diplomatic, and security efforts with a light military footprint. It means driving toward a negotiated solution between the government and the federal states and the most powerful clans whose frequent clashes are in themselves a significant source of instability. And it means inducing the Somali government to negotiate with al-Shabaab—providing a political offramp from conflict.
Like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Houthis in Yemen, al-Shabaab is embedded into the social and political fabric in Somalia, intertwined with the mosaic of clans that form the backbone of Somali society, and at least some of its leaders have shown themselves willing to be part of the political process. And however much effort the United States puts into defeating al-Shabaab militarily, it is unlikely to happen—the group has proven to be remarkably resilient. US airstrikes, which rose significantly under the Trump administration, had little to no effect on al-Shabaab’s ability to conduct offensive operations.
Al-Shabaab has no reason to negotiate unless reduced to a position of disadvantage. Organizations like al-Shabaab—or the Taliban for that matter—derive their popular support not from ideology but from their ability to close the gap between local needs and the local government’s ability or willingness to meet those needs, and herein lies an opportunity to undermine that support.
It may be that the EU or a nation with experience in conducting overseas relief operations, might be induced to lead this effort in Somalia. With Washington contributing financially, and the US and UK militaries advising SNA units in the field, someone else could lead the drive to enable local and federal administrations to provide basic services and—with the support of NGOs—focus on mitigating the conditions that provide support for al-Shabaab.
A coalition—led by the United States in this regard—will need to tie economic support to political incentives for the federal government to do the right things. Failure to do so was one of the US government’s fundamental mistakes in Afghanistan.
AFRICOM has already demonstrated that it is possible to provide effective US military assistance with a light footprint. To sustain the long-term relationships essential for this mission, advisors should deploy in rotation from the same pool of specialized units. They will require responsive air support from the type of low-cost, expeditionary platform that US Special Operations Command plans to field. And the mission must entail advising, but not leading our partners. This is an all-important distinction: the former method, under the right conditions, tends to work; the latter is more likely to fail.
While a small US special operations task force supports our partners in the fight, the coalition military mission will focus on capacity building. Here the UK, with its newly formed Ranger Regiment and experience of leading a similar project in Sierra Leone, would be a good candidate to take the lead. There is an opportunity here to avoid the mistakes of the past, by targeting corruption among senior SNA officers and using biometrics and other assessment methods to verify and track recruitment and training. The same lead-nation approach should be taken with the various nations involved in developing Somalia’s police and law enforcement services.
The Missing Piece
For Washington to implement such a plan abroad requires a functioning foreign policy establishment at home, with unity of effort among all departments and agencies. The outcome of Secretary Austin’s global policy review will be flawed unless it reflects input from stakeholders across government, and a proposal to establish a policy process that relies on close collaboration—from genesis to implementation. This was a fundamental flaw with US policy in Afghanistan: an absence of clear objectives, and a readiness to rely instead on a behemoth but futile military effort.
The precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan should remind us that Washington needs to take stock before labeling every foreign policy commitment as a “forever war” or “nation building,” thus implying intolerable cost. The United States lost fewer than one hundred soldiers over the last five years in Afghanistan—roughly the same number of Americans who die from COVID every two hours. A better approach would be to regard these types of commitment as an insurance policy. If the premiums are affordable and seem like a fair trade when balanced against the worst-case scenarios of not being covered, then the policy makes sense. Afghanistan, arguably, was just such a case, and Somalia undoubtedly so. Perhaps the most consequential deficit in US foreign policy is strategic patience.
As US involvement in Afghanistan ends in tragedy and a welter of recrimination, now is the time to avoid making the same mistakes in the Horn of Africa. We have learned that the deceptive panaceas of troop surges and counterinsurgency by saturation do not work, but neither does remote counterterrorism or influence from a distance. The plan to reengage in the Horn of Africa doesn’t have to be an all-or-nothing decision unless the United States chooses to make it one.
This administration should instead implement a cross-government and multinational plan, supported by a light military footprint. This plan should define objectives, cost, and acceptable levels of risk. Far better to do so upfront, than experience again the irreversible damage that our nation has sustained this past month.
Andrew Milburn retired from the Marine Corps as a colonel in 2019 after a thirty-one-year career. His final position in uniform was deputy commander of Special Operations Command Central, and prior to that commanding officer of the Marine Raider Regiment and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Iraq. Since retiring, he has written a critically acclaimed memoir, When the Tempest Gathers. He is a cohost of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Irregular Warfare Podcast. He tweets at @andymilburn8.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
6. How to Deter China From Invading Taiwan
Excerpts:
Washington and Taipei have a relatively brief interval to change Beijing’s calculus. As the narrative of American decline becomes increasingly popular and politically expedient, it becomes more likely that China could use force to change the status quo in Taiwan. There is bipartisan support in Congress for strengthening Taiwan’s defenses. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has recently shown real openness to creative thinking on the subject, whether acquiring advanced unmanned aerial vehicles or investing in Abrams Main Battle Tanks.
By acting swiftly, the U.S. and Taiwan can dissuade Mr. Xi from making what could be the most disastrous geopolitical calculation since 1939.
How to Deter China From Invading Taiwan
To change Beijing’s calculus, arm Taipei with missiles and turn the island into a ‘porcupine.’
WSJ · by Robert C. O’Brien and Alexander B. Gray
While images from Kabul have damaged U.S. global standing in the short term, Washington can still ensure that its interests are protected over the long term. China’s desire for a coerced unification with Taiwan is no secret. Beijing has increased military, economic and political pressure on Taipei over the past year and shows no sign of easing up. Post-Afghanistan, deterring China from a catastrophic invasion of Taiwan must be the Biden administration’s principal national security objective.
Washington and Taipei can take immediate steps to deter Chinese President Xi Jinping from invading the island democracy. A Taiwan that is what retired Admiral James Stavridis has labeled a “porcupine” would require China to mount a difficult amphibious landing and sustain a prolonged counterinsurgency—both of which could produce significant casualties for China.
First, the U.S. and its European allies should provide Taipei with significant quantities of the Naval Strike Missile, an anti-ship weapon set to deploy on U.S. Navy littoral combat ships. These missiles can launch from sea or land and have a range of about 100 nautical miles. A substantial number of them would seriously threaten any Chinese amphibious force. Packaged with the fast and mobile Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, these missiles could move quickly across the island both before and after landfall to harass the first wave and interrupt reinforcements.
Second, Taiwan should acquire Quickstrike air-dropped sea mines or other advanced sea mine technology from the U.S. The understanding that Taipei is capable, with U.S. assistance, of creating a denied-access zone in the Taiwan Strait would hamstring any Chinese amphibious force, especially one relying heavily on converted ferries and commercial ships. The mass mining of the Strait would undermine global trade by closing the waterway for a long time. But it’s important that Taiwan is able to preserve its freedom.
A third priority should be delivering shoulder-fired Stinger missiles to strategic locations, such as Taiwan’s more than 2,000 police stations. China has dramatically expanded its helicopter fleet in recent years. China might use airborne operations to strike key military and civilian targets ahead of an amphibious invasion. Taiwanese Stingers would blunt Beijing’s helicopter fleet advantage and complicate air operations in the island’s inland territory.
Finally, Taiwan must improve its trained military reserve. Taipei should encourage the formation of shooting clubs, similar to those popular in Central and Eastern Europe. While Taiwanese political culture has an ambivalent relationship with gun ownership, an organized, trained and equipped civilian corps willing to take up arms in the event of Chinese aggression is essential to the island’s defense. A well-armed civilian population could turn any invasion of Taiwan into a lengthy and costly affair.
Such a circumstance would, in turn, create serious domestic political repercussions for President Xi and the Chinese Communist Party, particularly as Chinese casualties mounted. China’s international standing would plummet if it conducted counter insurgency operations against the people of Taiwan in urban centers and rural villages. Beijing would quickly forfeit any pretense of being a “responsible stakeholder” by attempting to pacify democratic Taiwan in a prolonged and bloody guerrilla struggle.
Washington and Taipei have a relatively brief interval to change Beijing’s calculus. As the narrative of American decline becomes increasingly popular and politically expedient, it becomes more likely that China could use force to change the status quo in Taiwan. There is bipartisan support in Congress for strengthening Taiwan’s defenses. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has recently shown real openness to creative thinking on the subject, whether acquiring advanced unmanned aerial vehicles or investing in Abrams Main Battle Tanks.
By acting swiftly, the U.S. and Taiwan can dissuade Mr. Xi from making what could be the most disastrous geopolitical calculation since 1939.
Mr. O’Brien served as national security adviser and Mr. Gray as chief of staff of the White House National Security Council from 2019 to 2021.
WSJ · by Robert C. O’Brien and Alexander B. Gray
7. The future of special operations may look a lot different than the GWOT aesthetic we’ve come to know
The future of special operations may look a lot different than the GWOT aesthetic we’ve come to know
That look may have helped recruit a certain type of service member, Army Lt. Col. Katie Crombe said during the New America Future Security Forum, but it’s only a piece of the puzzle.
“...I kind of went back to what we feel about the posters and the stamps, or the branding, of special operations ― you know, the night vision goggles and the operator with all of the gear going into a building,” she said. “And I thought, you know, that’s that’s not what we need to be advertising fully right now, for us.”
While there is a place for the door-kicker aesthetic, she added, “the people, and the mindset, and the creativity that we’re trying to recruit right now is much different than that.”
Part of that might look like more of a focus on the civil affairs and psychological operations parts of SOCOM, the organizations that do more of the “hearts and minds” work before a conflict gets to the point where operators are going after high-value targets in the middle of the night.
The other part could reflect SOCOM’s recent commitment to diversity and inclusion, which most notably, aims to recruit more women and minorities into SOF organizations.
“... but I think it is difficult for them to promote and bring on talent that looks different than them,” Crombe said of existing leadership, who came up not only in the time of the burly, bearded operator, but in a time where combat deployments meant more than any other measure of skill or leadership.
When someone has taken time out of the deployment churn to further their education or take a position outside the prescribed pipeline, “it just, it doesn’t compute somehow in these [selection and promotion] boards,” she said.
Crombe offered her fellow panel participants as an example. The discussion was moderated by Joint Special Operations University president retired Col. Isaiah Wilson III, who is Black, and included Indian-American Marine Maj. Akhil Iyer and Army Capt. Shaye Haver, one of the first women to graduate Ranger school.
“We are definitely not the recruiting poster for special operations, but I would say that we are at the forefront of a lot of thought within the community,” Crombe said.
The issue will be not only perpetuating that kind of diversity, she said, but keeping it within the organization, so that they are promoted to the highest ranks and they leave a lasting mark.
To do that, SOCOM will have to put people it wouldn’t normally select into leadership positions, but also learn to be okay with the results if it doesn’t all go smoothly.
“And I think that that’s probably the biggest diverse takeaway,” Haver said. “It’s going to look different than probably a lot of people are comfortable with, and we’re going to have to be uncomfortable moving forward. The goodness and that is that it’s a team effort.”
And to continue to feed that diversity, the way SOCOM recruits will have to look different. That should include writing, reading, speaking, problem-solving skills, Crombe said, as well as the grueling physical requirements.
“You know, I think that it’s always an afterthought and it probably needs to be on the same playing field,” she said. " ... And I think that when it comes to the challenges that we’re facing right now, with strategic competition, it’s the problem-solving and creative solutions that paralyze senior leaders ... and so those are the things that I think we really need to be testing in the future to make sure we’re recruiting.”
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. Follow on Twitter @Meghann_MT
8.US needs to revamp its defence co-operation with Taiwan
Excerpts:
“Any American president would find it very difficult to stand aside in the face of a Chinese armed attack on Taiwan,” Bernard Cole, a professor emeritus at the National War College in Washington, wrote in a commentary last week. “However, a decision to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf would almost certainly occur only in light of Taipei’s making maximum preparations to defend its own territory — and this currently is not apparent.”
Summing up more than a decade of analysis from US government officials and think-tankers, Cole observes that Taiwan is failing to reorient its military towards an asymmetric strategy, meaning an approach that seeks to exploit the enemy’s disadvantages instead of trying to match its strengths.
US needs to revamp its defence co-operation with Taiwan
One of the highlights of Han Kuang, the annual military exercises Taiwan is conducting this week, is the take-off and landing of fighter jets on a highway. The performance is meant to demonstrate the air force’s ability to continue operating in the event of a Chinese attack even if air bases are destroyed by missiles.
For most military experts in the US — the sole, if unofficial, guarantor of Taiwan’s security — the show is an indication that Taipei is not doing enough and not the right things to strengthen its defences against an ever mightier adversary.
“Any American president would find it very difficult to stand aside in the face of a Chinese armed attack on Taiwan,” Bernard Cole, a professor emeritus at the National War College in Washington, wrote in a commentary last week. “However, a decision to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf would almost certainly occur only in light of Taipei’s making maximum preparations to defend its own territory — and this currently is not apparent.”
Summing up more than a decade of analysis from US government officials and think-tankers, Cole observes that Taiwan is failing to reorient its military towards an asymmetric strategy, meaning an approach that seeks to exploit the enemy’s disadvantages instead of trying to match its strengths.
In 2008, William Murray, a professor at the US Naval War College, first prescribed a “porcupine” strategy for Taiwan, under which it should enable itself to survive the initial phases of an attack from the People’s Liberation Army until the US could join the fight.
Since then, Washington has implored Taipei countless times to heed that advice: acquire large numbers of mobile and relatively cheap weapons such as portable surface-to-air missiles, harden its critical infrastructure and stockpile resources, and train a territorial defence force that could wage guerrilla warfare against an occupying PLA. The last thing Taipei should be focusing on, according to those suggestions, is its air force, because Beijing would destroy it at the start of a conflict before its fighters could even get off the ground.
As Beijing has stepped up its military threats, US defence experts are growing exasperated over the Taiwan military’s reluctance to decisively act on their instructions. A new defence concept adopted in 2018 that stressed a shift towards asymmetry fell victim to factional struggles and disagreements within the military after its author, former chief of the general staff Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, retired in 2019. And while Taipei has started acquiring some weapons that fit an asymmetric strategy, it is spending vastly larger amounts of money on buying new F-16 fighters from the US and building an indigenous submarine.
But some insiders argue the disconnect between Washington’s prescriptions and Taipei’s actions cannot all be blamed on Taiwanese complacency.
“We have had the same tired conversation for more than a decade, and it is beside the point,” said Eric Chan, a strategist for the US Air Force. He argued that an exclusive focus on preparing for survival under a potential future Chinese invasion would rob Taiwan of the ability to withstand the encroachments from Beijing that are happening right now.
“The most immediate challenge we face is Chinese grey-zone tactics including information warfare aimed at shattering the public’s morale and frequent air incursions seeking to undermine our control over our own airspace,” said a person close to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. “If we only train how to flee and hide, that will shake morale. If we give up on developing our air force, the PLA will win before the war has even started.”
Moreover, Taipei has doubts about the US idea that making the conquest of Taiwan more difficult for the PLA can deter Beijing. “Holding objects on the mainland at risk has a stronger deterrent effect than building a shield that can last a little longer,” said the person close to the defence ministry.
To truly address the shortcomings in Taiwan’s defences, analysts argue Washington and Taipei need to update their security exchanges.
“The main difficulty is that we are still using a co-operation model designed in the 1990s,” said Chan. “We only have a few set venues, and there is a big hole in between. In the past, discussions have been mostly focused on what Taiwan should procure, but many other things like training were on nobody’s radar.” The time to change that is now, he said.
9. Analysis | Murphy’s misfired claim that 8 out of 10 U.S. drones miss their target
Statements like this from Senator Murphy is what makes congressional oversight hard.
Analysis | Murphy’s misfired claim that 8 out of 10 U.S. drones miss their target
The Washington Post · by Glenn KesslerThe Fact Checker Today at 3:00 a.m. EDT · September 16, 2021
“Studies of our drone strikes have suggested that maybe eight out of 10 times we are hitting the wrong target, we have killed thousands of civilians.”
— Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), in an interview on CNN’s “The Lead with Jake Tapper,” Sept. 14
Murphy appeared on CNN to discuss an Aug. 29 drone strike in Afghanistan in the waning days of the U.S. presence there. The U.S. military initially claimed that the drone targeted an Islamic State vehicle preparing for a car-bomb attack.
But now it appears that the vehicle was driven by an aid worker who had loaded his car with water canisters, not explosives. Investigations by The Washington Post and the New York Times raised doubts about the military’s claim that the weapon used, a Hellfire missile, triggered a “secondary explosion” indicative of a car loaded with explosives.
As many as 10 people may have been killed, including the aid worker and seven children ranging in age from 3 to 16.
As part of his appearance on “The Lead with Jake Tapper,” Murphy made a claim that jumped out at us — that studies have shown that “maybe eight out of 10 times we are hitting the wrong target.”
That would be an astonishing record of failure. Is he right?
The Facts
The short answer is no.
Peter Bergen, vice president for global studies at the New America Foundation, heads a project that has documented in great detail the drone war in Pakistan, air and ground operations in Yemen and Somalia, as well as the internationalized air war in Libya. He was puzzled by Murphy’s statement.
“Eight out of 10 is not a stat I have ever heard of,” Bergen said. “As I document in my new book, ‘The Rise and Fall of Osama bin Laden,’ based on the documents that came out bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound, he was very worried about the precision of CIA drone strikes, which were killing a large number of al-Qaeda’s leaders.”
In Pakistan, for instance, the New America data shows there have been a total of 414 strikes, resulting in 2,366 to 3,702 deaths, most of them militants (estimated at 1,910 to 3,071). The civilian death toll was calculated as between 245 and 303. In Yemen, there have been 374 strikes, resulting in 1,387 to 1,776 total deaths, including 124 to 150 civilians, New America says.
In the four countries in New America’s data set, nearly 1,500 civilians are recorded as being killed in drone strikes.
Until the Trump administration ended the practice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released data on drone strikes in “areas of active hostilities” such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Between Jan. 20, 2009, and Dec. 31, 2015, the data showed 473 strikes resulted in 2,372 to 2,581 combatant deaths and 64 to 116 civilian deaths. In 2016, there were 53 strikes, resulting in 431 to 441 combatant deaths and one civilian death, the DNI said.
One can be reasonably suspicious about the civilian death toll in official government releases, given how news accounts place the numbers much higher. The human rights group Reprieve says that a 2010 drone strike killed a deputy commander of the Pakistani Taliban, but at a high cost — claiming 128 more people, 13 of them children.
Bergen noted that the civilian casualty rate from drone strikes “was high initially but became smaller and smaller over time for all sorts of reasons; longer flight times, smaller payloads, better intel, more congressional security, more media scrutiny, clearer rules of engagement.”
Indeed, when we contacted Murphy’s staff for an explanation, we were told he was referring to a statistic in a 2015 article in the Intercept about a 2012-2013 operation. The article was based on internal government documents.
“Documents detailing a special operations campaign in northeastern Afghanistan, Operation Haymaker, show that between January 2012 and February 2013, U.S. special operations airstrikes killed more than 200 people,” the article said. “Of those, only 35 were the intended targets. During one five-month period of the operation, according to the documents, nearly 90 percent of the people killed in airstrikes were not the intended targets.”
The documents obtained by the Intercept described the other people killed as EKIA — “enemy killed in action.” It’s unclear how many might actually be civilians. Some obviously might be militants. One cannot easily leap to the conclusion that everyone else killed in the drone attack did not have links to terrorism.
Murphy argues that the Intercept articles, dubbed the Drone Papers, are the only reliable glimpse of internal government records. His staff dismissed Bergen’s work as relying on news reports.
“What I said was true,” Murphy said in a statement to The Fact Checker. “The data we have does suggest over 80 percent of strikes hit the wrong target. Since the government classifies data on the efficacy of drone strikes, the only full public data set is from a leak of the Haymaker drone campaign in Afghanistan. And a study of that data by The Intercept showed that 90 percent of drones killed the wrong target. At the time of this disclosure, the military did not offer any exculpatory evidence to rebut this claim, and so without any other data and no contradictory information from the military it’s completely reasonable to infer a broader trend from the limited data available. The bottom line is that the data released by the Intercept provides ample evidence that our drone program is wildly ineffective and badly in need of reform.”
The Pinocchio Test
The recent drone attack in Afghanistan has highlighted the sometimes-terrible collateral damage in this form of aerial warfare. Increasingly it appears the drone hit an innocent target, not a terrorism suspect as the military claimed.
Numbers are hard to come by, but it’s certainly possible that “thousands” of civilians have been killed by drone strikes. There is certainly evidence that the impact of civilian deaths from drone strikes has undercut the U.S. image in the region.
But we deal in reliable statistics. Murphy is wrong to claim that “studies” show that 8 out of 10 times U.S. drones have hit the wrong target. He’s talking only about the supposed track record during a five-month period in a region of Afghanistan nearly a decade ago. Moreover, these documents do not indicate whether the other people killed were associated with the target of the attack or innocent civilians. So he cannot take this particular example and apply it to the entire drone program.
Notwithstanding the most recent example, the track record is said to have improved since 2013 — and many militants have been killed.
Murphy earns Three Pinocchios.
Three Pinocchios
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The Washington Post · by Glenn KesslerThe Fact Checker Today at 3:00 a.m. EDT · September 16, 2021
10. Why China Loves America's Defense Budget Inaction
Slow is bad? "Slow is smooth and smooth is fast.." perhaps in CQB but not in budgeting.
Excerpts:
Beyond equipment, the force is facing unrelenting strain today. The National Commission on Aviation Safety said, “current operations tempo is leading to unsafe practices and driving experienced aviators and maintainers out of the force.” Equipment retirements and insufficient replacement rates—particularly for aircraft—coupled with an intense number of operations and degraded readiness creates negatively reinforcing feedback loops.
If China is “on the march,” in the words of Adm. Studeman, then America is still barely crawling when it comes to competition. Enacting defense bills on time (or by the end of the year), and at a higher topline, are small first steps toward setting a better pace to compete with China. Nevertheless, on-time legislation is the bare minimum needed. If Congress cannot do its basic job, then the Pentagon can go ahead and stop pretending that America is even going to try to keep up.
Why China Loves America's Defense Budget Inaction
If slow is bad, late is worse when it comes to competing with China. But it seems Congress is poised to enact yet another spending freeze to start the fiscal year. This expectation is already baked into the cake for federal employees, contracting officials, and defense industry workers.
What few are anticipating, however, is the possibility this could last well into next spring or summer. But a long continuing resolution is very conceivable, and the Pentagon must start preparing now.
One reason for the potentially extreme delay in enacted appropriations is the fact that there are more votes in Congress to increase the Biden defense budget request than to cut it. Yet there are no serious talks underway about how to get defense spending and policy bills passed and parsed out to the frontlines. This is due to defense not being a priority for the administration with reconciliation, infrastructure, and voting rights bills on the docket.
Fiscal framework discussions are also not taking place because it would require a bipartisan deal on overall discretionary spending levels, including for non-defense agencies. Translation: a reduction in growth for non-defense spending and an increase for defense.
As the House prepares to debate the defense authorization bill next week, members will focus on matters big and small. But those debates will stall out until a wider spending agreement is reached.
Meanwhile, the bad news keeps coming.
In an example of how America’s defense bureaucracy moves “way too slow” in the face of urgent threats, Hyten cited the nuclear triad. Specifically, he called out how it is going to take the U.S. “10 to 15 years to modernize 400 [intercontinental ballistic missile] silos that already exist.” China is “basically building almost that many overnight.”
This summer, Admiral Mike Studeman, the top U.S. military intelligence officer for the U.S. IndoPacific Command summed up America’s position vis-à-vis China “in two words used by Gen. Douglas McArthur in discussing the failure to head off World War II: Too late.”
The United States is “too late” in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.”
While Congress has been trying to advance military modernization through more funds, task forces, commissions, and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to name a few, it is still not enough.
As the defense bills for fiscal year 2022 move through Congress with a topline higher than the White House has proposed, the reaction from Pentagon leaders gives the appearance of this necessary relief as being a nuisance or headache. Or worse, unwelcome.
The House Armed Services Committee adopted the amendment posed by ranking member Mike Rogers (R-AL) to increase the topline by $23.9 billion in a bipartisan vote of 42-17. Along with lining the bill up more closely with the Senate’s version, the topline increase contained an additional $9.8 billion in additional weapons procurement spending, drawing heavily from the services’ annual unfunded priorities lists.
This is important for three reasons. First, it begins to align modernization more with historical ratios than the Biden administration’s over-emphasis on research and development (R&D) spending. Getting concepts out of development and into the hands of fighting forces is key to ensuring they are ready, trained, and equipped in the near to mid-term.
Second, both chambers of Congress have now gone on record saying the Biden administration’s defense budget request is insufficient. The Hill is indicating the minimum needed is to raise the topline three percent above inflation. As the Biden team puts together its budget for next year, they will need to defend any continued disconnect with the legislative branch regarding the nature of the threats facing the nation and the resources required to meet them.
Beyond equipment, the force is facing unrelenting strain today. The National Commission on Aviation Safety said, “current operations tempo is leading to unsafe practices and driving experienced aviators and maintainers out of the force.” Equipment retirements and insufficient replacement rates—particularly for aircraft—coupled with an intense number of operations and degraded readiness creates negatively reinforcing feedback loops.
If China is “on the march,” in the words of Adm. Studeman, then America is still barely crawling when it comes to competition. Enacting defense bills on time (or by the end of the year), and at a higher topline, are small first steps toward setting a better pace to compete with China. Nevertheless, on-time legislation is the bare minimum needed. If Congress cannot do its basic job, then the Pentagon can go ahead and stop pretending that America is even going to try to keep up.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Mackenzie Eaglen is a resident fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. You can follow her on Twitter: @MEaglen.
11. Taliban lionizes Haqqani commander who celebrated ties to Al Qaeda, held American hostage
Excerpts:
State’s designation of Sangeen also noted he was “believed to have orchestrated the kidnappings of Afghans and foreign nationals in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.” His most high-profile kidnapping was of Bergdahl, the American soldier who left his unit in Paktika province and was subsequently captured by the Taliban.
Bergdahl was held for nearly five years before being exchanged for the top five Taliban commanders being held at Guantanamo Bay. Sangeen was holding Bergdahl in his custody up until the moment he was killed. Four of the five Taliban leaders who were exchanged for Bergdahl have been given ministerial posts in the Taliban’s new cabinet. The fifth was Mohammad Nabi Omari, a Haqqani Network leader who has been named the Taliban’s governor of Khost province, where the billboard celebrating Sangeen’s service to the Taliban stands.
Taliban lionizes Haqqani commander who celebrated ties to Al Qaeda, held American hostage | FDD's Long War Journal
A Taliban billboard with an image of U.S. hostage Bowe Bergdahl and Haqqani Network leader Mullah Sangeen Zadran.
The Taliban feted one of its famed commanders, Mullah Sangeen Zadran, on a new billboard that also showed Bowe Bergdahl, an American soldier who was held hostage by Sangeen and the Taliban for nearly five years. Sangeen, who was killed in a drone strike in 2013, admitted the ties between the Taliban and Al Qaeda were unbreakable.
The billboard of Sangeen and Bergdahl was raised in Khost province, a stronghold of the Haqqani Network, a powerful Taliban subgroup. Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of the Taliban’s two deputy emirs, is the group’s interim Minister of Interior, arguably one of the most influential postings as he controls the group’s internal security forces. Several other Haqqani leaders hold high-profile posts in the new Taliban government.
Sangeen served as the Taliban’s military commander and then shadow governor of Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan, as well as a senior aid to Sirajuddin before he was killed in a U.S. drone strike in the Ghulam Khan area of Pakistan’s Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan on Sept. 5, 2013.
Four years before his death, Sangeen openly admitted that the bond between the “brothers” of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were unbreakable. In an interview released in Sept. 2009 by As Sahab, Al Qaeda’s official media outlet, Sangeen said: “We do not see any difference between Taliban and Al Qaeda,” and the two groups “are all one and are united by Islam.” Sangeen also noted that Osama bin Laden “has pledged allegiance” to Taliban emir Mullah Muhammad Omar “and has reassured his leadership again and again.” The full quote is reproduced below.
As-Sahab: How is your relation with your brothers in Al-Qaeda and what is the level of cooperation between you?
Mawlawi Sangeen: All praise is for Allah, Al-Qaeda and Taliban all are Muslims and we are united by the brotherhood of Islam. We do not see any difference between Taliban and Al- Qaeda, for we all belong to the religion of Islam. Sheikh Usama has pledged allegiance to Amir Al-Mumineen (Mulla Muhammad Umar) and has reassured his leadership again and again. There is no difference between us, for we are united by Islam and the Sharia governs us. Just as the infidels are one people, so are the Muslims, and they will never succeed in disuniting the Mujahideen, saying that there is Al- Qaeda and Taliban, and that Al-Qaeda are terrorists and extremists. They use many such words, but by the Grace of Allah, it will not affect our brotherly relationship. Now they are also trying to disunite the Taliban, saying that there are two wings, one extremist and another moderate. However, the truth is that we are all one and are united by Islam.
Mullah Sangeen Zadran, in an interview with As Sahab, Al Qaeda’s official media outlet.
Two years before Sangeen was killed, the U.S. State Department added him to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists for supporting Al Qaeda. According to State, Sangeen helped “lead fighters in attacks across Southeastern Afghanistan, and is believed to have planned and coordinated the movement of hundreds of foreign fighters into Afghanistan.” At the time, FDD’s Long War Journal asked State if the term “foreign fighters” mentioned in the designation included members of Al Qaeda, and the response was “Yes. Absolutely.”
The year before he was killed, Sangeen released two videos that encouraged foreign fighters, including Turks and Kurds, to wage jihad in Afghanistan. In the second video, Sangeen promoted clips that showed fighting in Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Iraq and Somalia, and suggested that the jihad spread to the countries of China, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines and Yemen.
Sangeen’s support for Al Qaeda was on display at the moment of his death. Also killed alongside Sangeen on Sept. 5, 2013 was an Al Qaeda explosives expert from Egypt who was known as Zubir al Muzi. At the time of the strike, U.S. intelligence officials told FDD’s Long War Journal that Muzi was also a mid-level commander in al Qaeda’s Lashkar al Zil, or Shadow Army, the paramilitary force that fields small conventional units in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and embeds military trainers within Taliban units. Before he was killed, Sangeeen was considered to be one of the most dangerous operational commanders in eastern Afghanistan, and had organized multiple assaults on U.S. and Afghan combat outposts in the region.
State’s designation of Sangeen also noted he was “believed to have orchestrated the kidnappings of Afghans and foreign nationals in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.” His most high-profile kidnapping was of Bergdahl, the American soldier who left his unit in Paktika province and was subsequently captured by the Taliban.
Bergdahl was held for nearly five years before being exchanged for the top five Taliban commanders being held at Guantanamo Bay. Sangeen was holding Bergdahl in his custody up until the moment he was killed. Four of the five Taliban leaders who were exchanged for Bergdahl have been given ministerial posts in the Taliban’s new cabinet. The fifth was Mohammad Nabi Omari, a Haqqani Network leader who has been named the Taliban’s governor of Khost province, where the billboard celebrating Sangeen’s service to the Taliban stands.
Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.
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12. ‘Extremely serious’: Japan says flotilla of gun-equipped Chinese ships appeared near Senkakus
Excerpt:
China maintains an almost daily presence in the waters off the islands, according to the Japan Coast Guard website. In 2020, Chinese-flagged vessels were spotted in the area a record 333 times, besting the previous year’s record of 282.
‘Extremely serious’: Japan says flotilla of gun-equipped Chinese ships appeared near Senkakus
The Japan Coast Guard approaches a Chinese coast guard ship in Japanese territorial waters in this undated photo. (Japan Coast Guard)
The Japanese government filed a protest with Beijing after seven Chinese coast guard ships — four outfitted with “cannons” — appeared together last month in waters around disputed southern islets in the East China Sea.
The flotilla was spotted near the Senkaku Islands on Aug. 30, a Japan Coast Guard spokesman told Stars and Stripes by phone on Thursday. It was nearly double the usual contingent of Chinese ships patrolling the area and the largest since 2016.
“We consider this incident extremely serious,” the Japan Coast Guard spokesman said. The “Japanese coast guard is always prepared with force that exceeds them.”
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs filed a protest over the incident with its Chinese counterpart, the spokesman said. The spokesman did not know when the protest was made or at what level.
Kyodo News first reported the protest on Wednesday. A ministry spokesman was unavailable to comment this week, the office told Stars and Stripes on Thursday.
The Senkakus are five uninhabited islets 280 miles west of Okinawa. They are controlled by Japan but claimed by both Taiwan and China, which refers to them as Diaoyu Dao.
China maintains an almost daily presence in the waters off the islands, according to the Japan Coast Guard website. In 2020, Chinese-flagged vessels were spotted in the area a record 333 times, besting the previous year’s record of 282.
On Aug. 30, two Chinese vessels were patrolling in Japan’s contiguous zone around the islands when five more arrived at approximately 1 a.m., the coast guard spokesman said. Four of the vessels were equipped with the deck “cannons.” The contiguous zone is a 24-mile-wide band beyond the 12-mile territorial limit. Nations may exercise limited control in their contiguous zones, according to the United Nations.
Four of the ships, including one with a deck gun, then entered Japan’s territorial waters at 2:42 a.m., the spokesman said. They departed 23 minutes later after being warned off by the Japan Coast Guard.
Some of the Chinese ships attempted to approach five Japanese fishing vessels operating in the area but were prevented from reaching them by the coast guard, the spokesman said. The Chinese Coast Guard vessels often engage and harass Japanese fishermen in the area, he said.
The Chinese vessels remained in the contiguous zone until 5:30 p.m. when three departed, the spokesman said. They decreased their number further three days later.
The Aug. 30 incursion remains the most serious incident involving Chinese ships in the area since 2016 when they sent 15 ships, the Japan Coast Guard spokesman said. From Aug. 7-9, three to six ships entered Japan’s territorial waters several times.
It’s customary in Japan for some government officials to speak to the media on condition of anonymity.
Matthew M. Burke
13. Party Capital: A Blueprint for National Security Due Diligence on China — C4ADS
The 54 page report can be downloaded HERE (I have not read it yet but it looks to be useful to China watchers, businesses, and policy makers.).
Excerpt:
Based on these findings, we recommend that the U.S. government and its allies invest more significantly in developing a national security due diligence capability on China that leverages publicly available information, which can facilitate effective multilateral policy responses with timeliness and precision.
Party Capital: A Blueprint for National Security Due Diligence on China — C4ADS
Party Capital
A Blueprint for National Security Due Diligence on China
Author: Jason arterburn
Executive Summary
China’s commercial system exposes the United States to systemic national security risks that require new approaches for threat identification and response. In the absence of formal market protections, Chinese commercial actors operate with the threat of “exposure, incrimination[,] and, by extension, the coercive power of the party-state.” When Chinese companies pursue globalization, they expose the international community to “national security externalities” of the party-state’s involvement in China’s domestic economy, which lacks the neutrality, due process, and clear legal delineation of state-business relations in market-oriented liberal democracies.
Policymakers internationally have achieved broad consensus about the urgency of mitigating the national security risks of exposure to China’s commercial system, and observers have paid significant attention to changes in China’s political economy under General Secretary Xi Jinping. However, comparatively less work has connected the most recent scholarship on Chinese state-business relations to those national security policy concerns. Additionally, while groups like the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have highlighted the need for nontraditional intelligence consumers like state governments and university administrators to gain access to information about threats from China, there remains relatively limited discussion about how to achieve broader stakeholder engagement.
This report presents a systematic analysis of Chinese state-business relations to develop a novel, operational framework for national security due diligence in China’s commercial sector. To do so, we draw not only on the most recent scholarship in international political economy but also on original analysis of high-scale, low-cost data from publicly available sources.
Key findings are as follows:
The Chinese party-state engages with commercial actors through networks that are exceedingly complex, diversified, and politicized. We analyze public disclosures from 70,000+ Chinese companies, universities, and civil society organizations to demonstrate that the party-state engages with commercial actors through commercial, financial, academic, social, and political mechanisms that are both similar to and distinct from state-business relations in market-oriented liberal democracies.
Party-state interactions with the commercial sector leave an extensive data footprint in publicly available sources. We develop a novel framework for assessing national security risks related to Chinese commercial actors that considers party-state equity or financing, political exposure, industry sensitivity, market structure, and goal compatibility between the commercial actor and the party-state.
High-scale data integration produces actionable information on national security risks related to technology competition, corruption, threat finance, and political interference. We operationalize our risk framework to identify high-risk networks in China’s military-industrial complex and financial institutions with case studies in quantum technology, organized crime, and political lobbying in the United States.
Based on these findings, we recommend that the U.S. government and its allies invest more significantly in developing a national security due diligence capability on China that leverages publicly available information, which can facilitate effective multilateral policy responses with timeliness and precision.
14. General promises US ‘surge’ against foreign cyberattacks
General promises US ‘surge’ against foreign cyberattacks | Federal News Network
WASHINGTON (AP) — The general who leads U.S. efforts to thwart foreign-based cyberattacks, and punish those responsible, says he’s mounting a “surge” to fight incursions that have debilitated government agencies and companies responsible for critical infrastructure.
In an interview Tuesday with The Associated Press, Gen. Paul Nakasone broadly described “an intense focus” by government specialists to better find and share information about cyberattacks and “impose costs when necessary.” Those costs include publicly linking adversarial countries to high-profile attacks and exposing the means by which those attacks were carried out, he said.
“Even six months ago, we probably would have said, ‘Ransomware, that’s criminal activity,’” Nakasone said. “But if it has an impact on a nation, like we’ve seen, then it becomes a national security issue. If it’s a national security issue, then certainly we’re going to surge toward it.”
A devastating wave of cyberattacks has compromised sensitive government records and at times led to the shutdown of the operations of energy companies, hospitals and schools. The SolarWinds espionage campaign exposed the emails of 80% of the email accounts used by the U.S. attorneys’ offices in New York and several other departments. A separate hack of Microsoft email server software affected potentially tens of thousands.
Nakasone jointly leads the National Security Agency, the chief intelligence agency tracking foreign communications, and U.S. Cyber Command, the Pentagon’s force for offensive attacks. While the two organizations work mostly in secret, they have been part of a Biden administration effort to publicly identify the people and countries behind attacks. The White House has linked the SolarWinds breach to Russian intelligence and the Microsoft hack to China.
President Joe Biden directly pressed Russian President Vladimir Putin in July to take action against cyber attackers, telling reporters, “We expect them to act if we give them enough information to act on who that is.”
FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate said “there is no indication” yet that Russia had acted to crack down on ransomware. Abbate, Nakasone and other U.S. government officials spoke Tuesday at the Intelligence & National Security Summit.
Nakasone also oversees efforts to track and stop foreign efforts to influence U.S. elections. He disclosed earlier this year that U.S. Cyber Command conducted more than two dozen operations intended to thwart interference in last year’s presidential election.
Biden said in July that Russia had already begun efforts to spread misinformation regarding the 2022 midterm elections, calling them a “pure violation of our sovereignty.” Nakasone declined to detail allegations against Russia, saying intelligence agencies were “generating insights which will move to sharing information in the not too distant future.”
U.S. agencies are not aware of any specific threats related to the California gubernatorial recall election that concludes Tuesday, Nakasone said.
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15. Working with the Devil? The Potential for U.S.-Taliban Cooperation Against the Islamic State in Afghanistan
I am afraid it will be the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy.
Excerpts:
Given several decades of past animosity toward each other, the United States and the Taliban are unlikely to become friends, despite their common enemy. Yet, their recent history of coordination and cooperation might serve as a foundation for a limited, mutually beneficial partnership against the Islamic State in Afghanistan going forward. While coordination until now has mostly entailed communication through military channels, future efforts could be handled via other means. This might even be preferable if such actions were taken covertly. It is possible the Biden administration is already thinking along these lines, as suggested by the recent visit of CIA Director William Burns to Kabul.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned on Sept. 1 against making “any leaps of logic” to predict future collaboration with the Taliban just because of past cooperation with them. Immediately after, Milley emphasized that the Taliban are a “ruthless group,” but as he also acknowledged, “In war, you do what you must in order to reduce risk to mission and force, not necessarily what you want to do.” While the U.S. war against the Taliban is over, its conflict against the Islamic State continues. In that effort, the United States may not want to work with the devil — as many Americans consider the Taliban to be — but it may yet find it beneficial to do so.
Working with the Devil? The Potential for U.S.-Taliban Cooperation Against the Islamic State in Afghanistan - War on the Rocks
During World War II, when defending collaboration with reprehensible regimes, President Franklin Roosevelt liked to quote an old proverb: “My children, it is permitted you in time of grave danger to walk with the devil until you have crossed the bridge.” In 2015, the year after the Islamic State declared the creation of a “caliphate” in parts of Syria and Iraq, Patrick Porter pointedly used the proverb in War on the Rocks to encourage reflection about how to respond to this group: Did policymakers deem the Islamic State sufficiently dangerous and evil to justify working with unsavory partners to combat it?
Today, the U.S. government confronts a different version of the same dilemma: Should the United States cooperate with the Taliban in order to counter the Islamic State in Afghanistan? When asked about prospects for that during a Sept. 1 press conference, Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded, “It’s possible.” Given the 20-year U.S. war against the Taliban, Milley’s remarks made news and came as a shock to some observers.
In fact, the United States has already worked with the Taliban on several occasions in pursuit of common interests, and Milley’s comment makes clear U.S. officials are seriously thinking through the possibility of doing so again. A review of the pros and cons of future U.S.-Taliban cooperation against the Islamic State in Afghanistan shows that while there may be operational advantages for both sides, those benefits could come at significant political costs.
Previous Efforts Against A Common Enemy
The Islamic State in Afghanistan is a declared enemy of both the United States and the Taliban. In 2016, the U.S. government designated the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Earlier this year, American intelligence estimates suggested the group maintained the desire to attack the United States and could develop the capability to do so within 18 to 36 months after a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
As scholars Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines described, the Islamic State in Afghanistan, which was founded in 2015, “sees the Afghan Taliban as its strategic rival.” Among the points of contention, the Islamic State in Afghanistan is highly critical of the Taliban’s limited focus on that country, which “contradicts the Islamic State movement’s goal of establishing a global caliphate.” This rivalry has played out in both a war of words and through significant fighting between the two groups.
The Taliban and the United States thus share an interest in eradicating the Islamic State from Afghanistan, and each has conducted sustained operations focused on degrading the group’s capabilities in recent years. While its military was still deployed in Afghanistan, the United States conducted unilateral and partnered counter-terrorism operations with Afghanistan’s special security forces under the auspices of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. The Taliban have also conducted unilateral operations against the Islamic State, such as when they eliminated the group’s position in Jawzjan province in 2018.
Additionally, U.S. and Taliban forces have acted in mutually beneficial ways in support of their shared interest. In March 2020, the commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Frank McKenzie, acknowledged that the United States had provided “very limited” support to Taliban efforts against the Islamic State in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province.
The extent of this support is not entirely clear, but available reports indicate it took at least two forms. First, U.S. forces exercised strategic restraint whereby they refrained from attacking certain Taliban units who were preparing to launch operations against the Islamic State. Second, the U.S. military conducted airstrikes against Islamic State forces who were directly battling Taliban units. According to U.S. officials, there was no direct communication between U.S. and Taliban forces during these operations. Nonetheless, both sides clearly recognized that tacit cooperation was occurring — the Taliban knew that the U.S. military was listening to their communications and American personnel overseeing the airstrikes went so far as to jokingly call themselves the “Taliban Air Force.”
A more recent example of the United States and the Taliban working together occurred during the evacuation of U.S. personnel and eligible Afghans from Kabul. To create as secure an environment as possible under chaotic conditions, the United States first agreed to an arrangement under which the Taliban took control of the city of Kabul, while the militaries of the United States and its international partners secured the inner perimeter of the Hamid Karzai International Airport. The Taliban further promised not to interfere with the U.S.-led evacuation. To try to facilitate the safe passage of individuals from behind Taliban lines into the airport, the two sides established direct channels of communication and de-confliction mechanisms. Controversially, these included the U.S. government giving the Taliban the names of people who were to be allowed through the latter’s checkpoints. For its part, the Taliban escorted Americans directly to the gates of the airport several times per day.
In the wake of the Islamic State in Afghanistan’s suicide attack at the airport that resulted in the deaths of 13 U.S. servicemembers and hundreds of Afghans, McKenzie revealed that the United States had been sharing sanitized intelligence on Islamic State threats with the Taliban for nearly two weeks. He stated that the communication channels and information sharing had resulted in the Taliban preventing several additional Islamic State attacks against the airport, including when the Taliban cleared a bus that was reportedly rigged with explosives and may have carried two suicide bombers. According to McKenzie, the Taliban were “very pragmatic and very business-like” during the final days of the withdrawal, and they were “very helpful and useful to us as we closed down operations.” The last U.S. servicemember to leave Afghanistan — Maj. Gen. Chris Donahue — talked to the local Taliban commander, with whom he had been coordinating, shortly before boarding the final C-17 out of Kabul.
Even more recently, after the Taliban allowed a chartered Qatar Airways flight to depart Kabul full of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, the White House issued a statement saying that the group was “cooperative” and “professional.” The White House also indicated that the results of this effort were a “positive first step” for relations between the United States and the interim Taliban government.
Given the history of both tacit and direct coordination and cooperation between the U.S. military and the Taliban, as well as previous U.S.-Taliban diplomacy, it is not altogether surprising that Milley left open the door to an interest-based security relationship.
The Pros and Cons of Cooperation Between the United States and the Taliban
With the Taliban’s recent gains against the National Resistance Front, the Islamic State in Afghanistan represents the last major challenge to the Taliban’s consolidation of control in the country. The Taliban are, therefore, eager to destroy the group and, based on previous encounters, should be able to accomplish this. Nevertheless, with the addition of thousands of escaped prisoners to its ranks, the Islamic State in Afghanistan may prove to be a more formidable foe than it has been during the past few years. Thus, the Taliban might benefit from U.S. cooperation against the group — perhaps in the form of sanitized intelligence or even drone strikes — so long as any American support was provided discreetly.
For its part, the United States would benefit from the destruction of the most significant terrorist threat it faces in South Asia, without having to put any of its military forces in harm’s way. Relying on the Taliban to do the bulk of the fighting against the Islamic State in Afghanistan would be a far less costly approach than some of the “over the horizon” options reportedly under consideration. By offering contributions to the Taliban’s goal of defeating the Islamic State, the United States might also incentivize positive actions by Afghanistan’s new regime on other American priorities, such as allowing remaining U.S. citizens and Special Immigrant Visa applicants to depart the country.
As for potential drawbacks, the Biden administration is already paying political costs for the manner in which it exited Afghanistan. President Joe Biden’s approval ratings dropped sharply in August and, in a recent poll by the Economist, just 33 percent of Americans expressed support for his handling of the withdrawal and evacuation from Afghanistan. Overt cooperation with the Taliban regime — even if focused on a recognizable enemy such as the Islamic State — may not resonate with the American public or across the political aisle, especially if the Taliban engage in widespread oppressive actions toward women and minorities, of which there are already some indications. Additionally, even if the administration could secure the Taliban’s cooperation against the Islamic State in Afghanistan, it is highly unlikely that the Taliban would take further action against al-Qaeda, a group with which the Taliban maintain strong ties.
For the Taliban, overt cooperation with the United States could also bring political risks. For years, the Taliban have been concerned about — and heavily focused on — maintaining the internal cohesion of their militant coalition. The Taliban’s interim government, while mostly excluding minorities and entirely excluding women, is generally inclusive of the group’s internal factions and appears to have been designed with that as a central consideration. Some of these factions — most notably, the Haqqanis — might balk at cooperation with the United States. Or, as a member of the group’s cultural commission recently stated, they may just think that the Taliban don’t need any help from the United States to secure the country.
Working with the Enemy of My Enemy?
Given several decades of past animosity toward each other, the United States and the Taliban are unlikely to become friends, despite their common enemy. Yet, their recent history of coordination and cooperation might serve as a foundation for a limited, mutually beneficial partnership against the Islamic State in Afghanistan going forward. While coordination until now has mostly entailed communication through military channels, future efforts could be handled via other means. This might even be preferable if such actions were taken covertly. It is possible the Biden administration is already thinking along these lines, as suggested by the recent visit of CIA Director William Burns to Kabul.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warned on Sept. 1 against making “any leaps of logic” to predict future collaboration with the Taliban just because of past cooperation with them. Immediately after, Milley emphasized that the Taliban are a “ruthless group,” but as he also acknowledged, “In war, you do what you must in order to reduce risk to mission and force, not necessarily what you want to do.” While the U.S. war against the Taliban is over, its conflict against the Islamic State continues. In that effort, the United States may not want to work with the devil — as many Americans consider the Taliban to be — but it may yet find it beneficial to do so.
Jonathan Schroden, Ph.D., directs the Countering Threats and Challenges Program at CNA, a non-profit, non-partisan research and analysis organization based in Arlington, Virginia. His work at CNA has focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency activities across much of the Middle East and South Asia, including numerous deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is also an adjunct scholar at the U.S. Military Academy’s Modern War Institute. You can find him on Twitter: @jjschroden.
Alexander Powell is a research analyst in the Countering Threats and Challenges Program at CNA. He has worked extensively on security issues in Afghanistan, traveling there frequently to conduct assessments of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. He holds an M.A. in security studies from Georgetown University, where his thesis focused on foreign armed interventions in Afghanistan since the Anglo-Afghan wars.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of CNA, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.
16. How China Exports Authoritarianism
As I have written this is my thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.
Excerpts:
There is a legitimate debate to be had about whether China is acting offensively to forge a more illiberal world or defensively to make the world safe for China’s brand of autocracy. That distinction, however, may prove irrelevant if Beijing feels driven to reach into democratic societies, undercut their institutions, suppress and censor speech it deems offensive, and erode the foundations of liberal society the world over.
At a time when governments are searching for quick solutions to massive pandemic-related challenges, China’s provision of illiberal answers and the means to achieve them without relinquishing power is fueling authoritarianism’s global resurgence. China is not fanning the flames of violent revolution or even advocating for one-party rule. But that is not the right metric by which to judge its actions. A better measurement is to look at the totality of the ways Beijing is corrupting democratic governments, societies, and individuals.
The United States and its allies must shore up their defenses and push back against China by cultivating democracy at home as well as abroad. Failure to do so could imperil the current international order—and make the future unsafe for democracy.
How China Exports Authoritarianism
Foreign Affairs · by The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order · September 16, 2021
In a speech to senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials in July, Chinese leader Xi Jinping declared that China must do more to share the “story” of the party’s success with the rest of the world. In order to enhance the international influence of both the country and the party, Xi effectively asserted, Chinese officials should extol the virtues of China’s model of authoritarian governance abroad.
Although some analysts continue to argue that China does not pose an ideological threat to prevailing democratic norms and that the CCP does not export its ideology, it is clear that the CCP has embarked on a drive to promote its style of authoritarianism to illiberal actors around the world. Its goal is not to spread Marxism or to undermine individual democracies but rather to achieve political and economic preeminence, and its efforts to that effect—spreading propaganda, expanding information operations, consolidating economic influence, and meddling in foreign political systems—are hollowing out democratic institutions and norms within and between countries.
To respond to Beijing’s ideological challenge, advocates of democracy must have a better understanding of what China aims to achieve by exporting its political model and how its actions are weakening democracy globally. Only then can they effectively design policies that will reinvigorate democracy at home and abroad while selectively seeking to counter Beijing’s promotion of authoritarian governance.
RIGHT TO BE RULED
Beijing seeks less to impose a Marxist-Leninist ideology on foreign societies than to legitimate and promote its own authoritarian system. The CCP does not seek ideological conformity but rather power, security, and global influence for China and for itself. To this end, the party has issued stark declarations of confidence in its own ideology and in the country’s antidemocratic political path. Xi has made clear that he regards China’s illiberal model of governance as superior to so-called Western political systems and that he seeks to popularize this “Chinese wisdom” throughout the world as a “contribution to mankind.”
Xi and other Chinese leaders frequently portray China’s economic success as proof that the road to prosperity no longer runs through liberal democracy. As Xi put it at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, China’s model offers “a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence”—while ignoring external pressure to democratize. This message is highly attractive to leaders who hope to achieve economic success without answering to the demands of their people. Chinese officials now commonly speak of the “right” of nations to choose their political systems, be they democratic or authoritarian—and the arrogance of countries such as the United States that assume that democracy is the preferable option.
Advocating the right of countries to be ruled by nondemocratic regimes is clearly different from forcibly installing autocratic leaders around the world, as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. But the CCP’s increasingly full-throated promotion of authoritarianism as a superior governance model presents no less of a challenge to democracy than did Soviet interference, particularly when paired with China’s economic and political measures that bolster authoritarian regimes and weaken democratic ones around the world.
TOOLS OF THE TRADE
China’s international efforts to subvert democracy fall into three broad categories. The first includes its attempts to shape the narrative about China in developed countries. In nations ranging from Canada and Germany to Australia and Japan, Beijing aims to silence critics of China and amplify the voices of individuals and institutions that promote closer ties with Beijing or a more positive portrayal of China. Beijing wields both threats and inducements to this end, rewarding positive portrayals and punishing criticism. As the Chinese ambassador to Sweden admitted in 2019, “We treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we have shotguns.”
China offers preferential market access to friendly governments, academic institutions, and businesses but retaliates financially against those it sees as hostile to China’s interests. It also threatens Chinese dissidents and their families, monitors Chinese students abroad, attempts to silence academic discourse deemed offensive to Beijing, and seeks to control how foreigners are educated about China. Beijing has also sought to expand its foreign media footprint, control Chinese-language media abroad, and turn Chinese diaspora citizens against parties or candidates it deems threatening to its interests. Taken together, these actions form a comprehensive strategy to inform, shape, and ultimately control perceptions of China throughout the world.
The second category of antidemocratic actions are those that take place in developing countries. Unlike in the developed world, where China’s political and economic coercion and “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy have engendered a growing backlash, Beijing has received a warmer welcome in many developing countries, where elites hope to learn from a political system that has enabled China’s transformation into the world’s second-largest economy. In a growing number of fragile democracies, Beijing has captured small coteries of corrupt elites and helped them centralize power by insulating them from the demands of civil society and deploying Chinese technology to repress their citizens and help them maintain power indefinitely. This is how the CCP is exporting authoritarianism around the globe: not through seminars on Marxist ideology, as some analysts have claimed, but through a broad range of antidemocratic activities.
The CCP does not seek ideological conformity but rather power, security, and global influence.
China does so less out of a desire to spread its ideology than to expand its influence and economic advantage. Its favored partners are not fervent adherents of Marxism-Leninism but rather officials, business leaders, media tycoons, and others who view the adoption of a nondemocratic governance model that concentrates power in the hands of the few—and shuts out the many—as a route to long-term influence. This preference for antidemocratic collaborators, coupled with China’s opaque and corrupt investment practices, further corrodes democratic institutions, as murky deals struck by Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises encourage a more corrupt and unaccountable class of political elites all too eager to undermine their country’s long-term prosperity in return for personal gain.
China offers more than simple inspiration for a nondemocratic governance model: it provides the tools, training, and resources that permit leaders to ignore democratic countries’ demands for good governance and respect for individual rights as a condition of aid and investment. The CCP regularly conducts large-scale training programs for foreign officials on how to guide public opinion, control civil society, and implement Chinese-style cybersecurity policies in their home countries. A growing number of countries have drawn inspiration from China to pursue laws controlling social media or to build Internet firewalls modeled on China’s own “Great Firewall.” China also provides increasingly sophisticated surveillance technology and internal security training to established authoritarian and fragile democratic governments, enabling them to better suppress dissent and control their own citizens. In countries such as Uganda and Zambia, CCP-linked organizations have shared technology and training with autocratic and autocratic-leaning governments, allowing them to monitor their citizens, muzzle media and civil society, and impose repressive Internet rules.
The CCP has also engaged in more explicit political intervention by interfering directly in the political processes of other sovereign countries to support China-friendly politicians and policies and by co-opting local civic groups and journalists to stymie negative portrayals of China’s international engagement and to protect its ties to corrupt local elites. These efforts are not intended to overthrow democracies or other ideologically dissimilar regimes but to help ensure that China-friendly policies and investment climates will prevail regardless of who is in power. Nevertheless, such efforts erode the accountability of leaders to their citizens, weaken the independence of the media and civil society, and ultimately tilt the playing field to favor illiberal leaders looking to import elements of China’s model of governance into their countries’ political systems. This kind of political encroachment maintains the form of a democratic system while hollowing out the actual substance of a functioning democracy from the inside, making the slide toward authoritarianism harder to detect.
In a growing number of fragile democracies, Beijing has captured small coteries of corrupt elites.
It should come as no surprise that the CCP’s vision of successful governance has no room for independent checks on state power, such as a substantive civil society or healthy opposition. In the model that Beijing is selling and that more and more countries are buying, dissent is not a legitimate expression of individual interests but an attempt to sabotage collective nation-building efforts. Opposition, in other words, is not political participation but state subversion. The popularization of these ideas in a growing number of developing countries is helping the CCP realize its vision for a revised global order in which a plurality of governance models—democratic and authoritarian alike—can exist as equally legitimate political choices.
The last category of international antidemocratic actions involves those aimed at weakening international institutions that instill democratic norms and creating new ones that do not, thereby neutering the liberal presumptions that prevail in the current global order. China uses the clout it has gained by consolidating influence in UN agencies to ensure institutional alignment with Chinese priorities: it has wielded its authority in the International Telecommunications Union, for instance, to promote policies that facilitate the authoritarian use of technology to repress citizens. Beijing’s efforts to topple the current liberal order—which China views as an obstacle to its emergence as a great power—are unprecedented. China is enshrining its own ideological concepts and foreign policy strategies into international statements of consensus, substituting Chinese concepts, such as the “right to development” and “Internet sovereignty,” for more widely held values. It is also promoting its own view of human rights, in which governments can cite supposedly unique local conditions to justify disregard for individual or minority rights and in which civil or political rights are secondary to so-called economic and social rights.
Taken together, Beijing’s illiberal efforts undercut democracy in the developed world, the developing world, and in international institutions amount to an assault on the norms, rules, and ethics by which the world is governed. They threaten to usher in an increasingly undemocratic world populated by regimes that are beholden to Beijing and unsympathetic to the interests of the United States and its allies. Such regimes would be less accountable to their populations, less committed to individual rights, less responsible to international institutions that uphold democratic norms and universal values, and more dedicated to controlling and suppressing information. In short, if Beijing isn’t trying to remake the world in its image, it is trying to make the world friendlier to its interests—and more welcoming to the rise of authoritarianism in general.
STEPPING UP
The CCP’s challenge to democracy requires a concerted and well-resourced effort to shore up democratic institutions in vulnerable countries around the world. This effort should prioritize support for independent media and civil society, aggressive anticorruption and anti–money laundering measures, and investments in technologies that can penetrate closed digital spaces and lend transparency to political processes. The United States and its allies should also work to offer democratic alternatives to the autocratic technologies and conditional lines of credit China is selling. The Biden administration’s Build Back Better World initiative, a G-7 project aimed at providing infrastructure development in low- and middle-income countries that will help counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is an important step in the right direction. But democratic nations can—and must—do more to collectively strengthen vulnerable democracies around the world.
China's actions threaten to usher in a world of undemocratic regimes that are beholden to Beijing.
Such efforts can work only if developed democracies rededicate themselves to making sure that their own political systems deliver: to retain its global appeal, citizen-centered governance that welcomes civil society must be seen as functional. Developed democracies must also shore up their own political defenses and proactively identify and expose CCP efforts to undermine the principles of free speech, interfere in political processes, and co-opt political and business elites. They can do this by working together to tighten foreign influence and investment laws and to encourage elites to prioritize the independence of their own democracies over their personal economic interests in China.
The United States and its allies must also maintain leadership and leverage in the international institutions that will shape the world’s economic and technological future. Ceding U.S. leadership in these institutions provides Beijing with easy wins. China is wielding its position as the host of the World Internet Conference, for instance, to legitimize its (very restricted) definition of Internet freedom. The United States and its allies need to do more than simply show up. They must undertake an aggressive and united effort to secure leadership in these critical organizations across the board.
NO QUICK FIX
Today’s China is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. But Beijing is nonetheless working to amplify authoritarianism around the world. It is hollowing out democratic institutions and enhancing the tools of repression in developing countries. And Chinese leaders are working to dilute the liberal norms and erode human rights protections that are enshrined within many international institutions to make themselves—and like-minded autocrats the world over—more powerful and less accountable.
There is a legitimate debate to be had about whether China is acting offensively to forge a more illiberal world or defensively to make the world safe for China’s brand of autocracy. That distinction, however, may prove irrelevant if Beijing feels driven to reach into democratic societies, undercut their institutions, suppress and censor speech it deems offensive, and erode the foundations of liberal society the world over.
At a time when governments are searching for quick solutions to massive pandemic-related challenges, China’s provision of illiberal answers and the means to achieve them without relinquishing power is fueling authoritarianism’s global resurgence. China is not fanning the flames of violent revolution or even advocating for one-party rule. But that is not the right metric by which to judge its actions. A better measurement is to look at the totality of the ways Beijing is corrupting democratic governments, societies, and individuals.
The United States and its allies must shore up their defenses and push back against China by cultivating democracy at home as well as abroad. Failure to do so could imperil the current international order—and make the future unsafe for democracy.
Foreign Affairs · by The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order · September 16, 2021
17. Why Australia's new defence pact with the US and Britain is so significant
Why Australia's new defence pact with the US and Britain is so significant
The cost of the pivot is unclear.
At a minimum, it's understood to be $2.4 billion in taxpayer funds paid so far, but the compensation to the French has not been made public and may not be fully known yet.
That in itself is a massive story, but the real underlying consequence belongs to Australia’s already highly conflicted relationship with China.
References to “stability” in the Indo-Pacific and changing “threat” environment are all pointers to China’s growing military strength and concerns about the ramifications.
And the reach of this deal under the new partnership between the three nations – to be known as AUKUS – will go much deeper into joint defence and security ties, also stretching into cybersecurity and space.
Joe Biden delivers in the White House, joined virtually by Scott Morrison. Source: ABACA
The Morrison government is at pains to make clear investing in nuclear-powered submarines is not a pivot towards any watering down of the commitment to Australia’s international nuclear non-proliferation agreements.
But the loss of the lucrative submarine contract will upset the French.
It will also raise the hackles of those who’ve been so focused on ensuring Australia doesn’t have any nuclear grey areas.
Now will be the task of explaining this announcement to the Australian people and to the regional neighbourhood, New Zealand and Indonesia in particular.
It will also inflame the tensions with China.
Scott Morrison maintains the phone line to President Xi Jinping in Beijing remains open. But whether this will in any way lead to the Chinese leader dialling Mr Morrison’s number remains an open question.
Trade between the two nations, so important to Australia’s economic bottom line, is now even more sensitive.
The tariffs and pauses on the traffic of Australian meat, barley and wine among other commodities have already bitten hard in some industries.
The Prime Minister is also banking on this pivot to defence, including an increase in the spending on defence capability, playing well with a domestic audience.
It will likely trigger months of announcements, more details and more information about the uncertain environment in the Pacific.
And while the decision throws hundreds of jobs into question, promises will be made about new jobs being created and the “portability” of skills.
Australians now head towards an election with a clear message that the nation's defence forces needed to be turbocharged and there are risks on the horizon.
Voters will be mulling these political pronouncements when they return to the ballot box sometime between now and May next year.
Anna Henderson is SBS News's chief political correspondent.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
