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Quotes of the Day:
“When pride arises out of knowledge, that is always a sign that something in one's knowledge is indeed terribly wrong. For when knowledge is truly present, it makes one humble in a completely natural way.”
- Rudolf Steiner
“The oppressor would not be so strong if he did not have accomplices among the oppressed.”
- Simone de Beauvoir
“The existence of the Kim regime is an offense to human dignity.”
- Hon. Damon Wilson, President, National Endowment for Democracy, 15 SEP 22
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 15 (Putin's War)
2, Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (15.09.22) CDS comments on key events
3. General Mark Hertling: Russia's Army Is Terrible. But It's Not Over.
4. White House Appoints 2022-2023 Class of White House Fellows - The White House
5. US Intelligence Predicted Resurgence of Islamic State Group Threat, Declassified Report Shows
6. Fortress China: Xi Jinping’s plan for economic independence
7. Putin’s NATO bungle
8. U.S.-Japan Defense Leaders Look to Strengthen Rules-Based Order
9. The Weaponization of Capital (by China)
10. Who held defense stocks while making national security policy? - Responsible Statecraft
11. Putin’s Next Move in Ukraine
12. "All Invaded People Want to Resist": Steinbeck's The Moon is Down (Dusty Shelves)
13. About the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
14. Israel’s Defense Minister Reveals Syrian Military Sites Used to Produce Advanced Weapons for Iran
15. Serbia’s Move to Cancel EuroPride Shows How Vučić Plays Off West Against Russia and His Base
16. FDD | U.S. Should Deny Visa to Iranian President
17. Ukraine Situation Report: Top U.S. Marine Praises Battlefield Lessons Learned
18. Exclusive-U.S. weighs China sanctions to deter Taiwan action, Taiwan presses EU
19. Russian Invasion of Ukraine Chinese Support for Putin’s War Looks More Shaky After Summit
20. What the U.S. gets wrong about China and Russia
21. Special-ops units from Down Under made their mark with US commandos in Vietnam. They may have to do it again against China.
22. How a Thai Special Forces Soldier Ended Up in the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes
23. Wormuth: Here are the 6 areas the Army must be prepared for in 2030
24. Russia, China and Iran are new Axis of Evil plotting to break up West
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 15 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is responding to the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast by doubling down on crypto-mobilization, rather than setting conditions for general mobilization.
- The Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally at Russian bases in former Soviet states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February, likely weakening Russian influence in those states.
- Russian and Ukrainian sources reported Ukrainian ground attacks northwest of Kharkiv City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.
- Russian-appointed occupation officials and milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a landing at the Kinsburn Spit (a narrow peninsula of the Crimean Peninsula).
- Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults and are reinforcing positions on the Eastern Axis.
- The Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is likely attempting to stop its administrators from fleeing ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, demonstrating the bureaucratic fragility of the DNR.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 15
understandingwar.org
Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 15, 9:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian forces are continuing counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine, increasingly pressuring Russian positions and logistics lines in eastern Kharkiv, northern Luhansk, and eastern Donetsk oblasts. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing ground operations southwest of Izyum, near Lyman, and on the east bank of the Oskil River, reportedly compelling Russian forces to withdraw from some areas in eastern Ukraine and reinforce others.[1] Russian forces in eastern Ukraine will likely struggle to hold their defensive lines if Ukrainian forces continue to push farther east.
The Kremlin is responding to the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast by doubling down on crypto-mobilization rather than setting conditions for general mobilization. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called on all federal subjects to initiate “self-mobilization” and not wait on the Kremlin to declare martial law.[2] Kadyrov claimed that each federal subject must prove its readiness to help Russia by recruiting at least 1,000 servicemen instead of delivering speeches and conducting fruitless public events. Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan echoed the need for Russians to volunteer to join the war effort, and several loyalist Russian governors publicly supported Kadyrov’s speech.[3] The Russian-appointed head of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, announced the formation of two volunteer battalions on the peninsula in support of Kadyrov’s calls.[4]
The defeat around Kharkiv Oblast prompted the Kremlin to announce a Russia-wide recruitment campaign. Kremlin officials and state media had not previously made country-wide recruitment calls but had instead tasked local officials and outlets to generate forces ostensibly on their own initiative. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov vaguely welcomed the creation of the battalions on July 12, while 47 loyalist federal subjects advertised and funded the regional volunteer battalion recruitment campaign.[5] A prominent Russian milblogger and a supporter of general mobilization praised officials such as Kadyrov for taking the recruitment campaign from the ineffective Russian Ministry of Defense; this recruitment revamp is likely to secure more support for the Kremlin among nationalist figures who are increasingly critical of the Russian MoD, even if the drive does not generate large numbers of combat-effective troops.[6]
The Kremlin has likely abandoned its efforts to shield select federal subjects from recruitment drives, which may increase social tensions. ISW has previously reported that the Kremlin attempted to shield Moscow City residents from reports of the formation of the Moscow-based “Sobyaninsky Polk” volunteer regiment.[7] Russian opposition outlet The Insider noted that several groups in the republics of Buryatia, Kalmykia, Tyva, and Yakytia (Republic of Sakha) are publicly opposed to the Kremlin's emphasis on recruitment on an ethnic basis.[8] Simonyan’s statement about “self-mobilization” prompted numerous negative comments among Russians calling on Russian oligarchs to pay for and fight in the war.[9]
The Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally stationed in Russian bases in former Soviet states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February, likely weakening Russian influence in those states. A Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigation reported on September 14 that the Russian military has already deployed approximately 1500 Russian personnel from Russia’s 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion began and plans to deploy 600 more personnel from facilities in Dushanbe and Bokhatar, a southern Tajik city, in the future.[10] RFE/RL additionally reported on September 13 that Russia has likely redeployed approximately 300 Tuvan troops from the Russian Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan to fight in Ukraine at varying points since late 2021.[11]
The withdrawals from the Central Asian states are noteworthy in the context of border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tajik and Kyrgyz border guards exchanged fire in three separate incidents on September 14, killing at least two people.[12] The uptick in violence between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both of which are members of the Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), comes alongside renewed aggression by Azerbaijan against CSTO member state Armenia. Russian forces also withdrew 800 personnel from Armenia early in the war to replenish losses in Ukraine, as ISW has previously reported.[13]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is responding to the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast by doubling down on crypto-mobilization, rather than setting conditions for general mobilization.
- The Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally at Russian bases in former Soviet states since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February, likely weakening Russian influence in those states.
- Russian and Ukrainian sources reported Ukrainian ground attacks northwest of Kharkiv City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.
- Russian-appointed occupation officials and milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a landing at the Kinsburn Spit (a narrow peninsula of the Crimean Peninsula).
- Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults and are reinforcing positions on the Eastern Axis.
- The Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is likely attempting to stop its administrators from fleeing ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, demonstrating the bureaucratic fragility of the DNR.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in eastern Ukraine, setting conditions to drive deeper into the Russian rear in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces expelled Russian forces from Sosnove on the north bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and are fortifying positions at the settlement.[14] The source also reported that Russian forces may have pulled out from Studenok immediately west of Sosnove to avoid encirclement.[15] Official Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces reinforced Russian positions in Lyman.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the heavily reduced remnants of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps 202nd and 204th Motorized Rifle Regiments were disbanded into reserves, possibly meaning that the remnants of these reduced elements reinforced the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) elements fighting in Lyman.[17]
Ukrainian forces are reportedly advancing across the Oskil River in northern Kharkiv Oblast. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are establishing bases and artillery positions throughout Kharkiv Oblast, including emplacing artillery in Hryanykivka on the east bank of the Oskil River near the R79 highway.[18] A confirmed Ukrainian position in Hryanykivka would indicate that the Russian frontline east of the Oskil River is weak and/or that Russian forces’ lines in this area are farther east of the Oskil River than previously assessed. ISW will continue collecting and reconciling data to refine our control of terrain assessment. A Russian source reported that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups occasionally cross the Oskil River in unspecified areas.[19]
Ukrainian forces continued operations to disrupt Russian logistics in eastern Ukraine and pin Russian forces away from the frontlines. Ukrainian forces reportedly struck rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast, including Lysychansk, Svitlodarsk, Perevalsk, and Kadiivka, all situated along major Russian GLOCs.[20] Imagery shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a Russian base in Lysychansk.[21] Russian and Ukrainian sources engaged in artillery duels across the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border.[22]
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Ukrainian military officials are continuing their operational silence regarding the progress of the southern counteroffensive, noting that Ukrainian forces are continuing to improve their tactical positions and are engaged in positional battles.[23] Ukrainian local sources stated that there is no official confirmation that Ukrainian forces have liberated Kyselivka northwest of Kherson City but noted receiving local reports that Russian forces are mining all of the roads in the settlement.[24] Ukrainian officials did not report changes in Russian troop composition, but social media footage showed a Tuva Oblast flag in Beryslav, which likely indicates that Russian forces are continuing to reinforce northern Kherson Oblast with regionally formed volunteer units.[25] Conventional Russian military units typically do not fly republic or federal subject flags.
Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing their interdiction campaign, targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the Inhulets and Dnipro Rivers.[26] Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces are continuing to transfer equipment across the Dnipro River, however.[27] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck areas of Russian manpower and equipment concentrations in the Kherson City suburbs and in Krynychanka (about 21km southeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River).[28] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces damaged Russian ammunition depots in Sadove (about 15km southwest of Snihurivka) and Mykolaiv and Kherson raions, and struck the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control center in Komyshany, northwest of Kherson City.[29] Ukraine’s Department of Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian military base in Nova Kakhovka, and local footage and reports corroborated StratCom’s information.[30] Other social media reports noted Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions in Oleshky, on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[31]
Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated three areas of kinetic activity on September 15: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border west of Vysokopillya. A Russian milblogger claimed that one Ukrainian reconnaissance and sabotage group drove down 25km southeast of the bridgehead to Charivne in a car without encountering any obstacles.[32] The milblogger added that Russian shelling decreased in Sukhyi Stavok (about 12km southeast of the bridgehead) and that Ukrainians are operating helicopters in the area, which may indicate that Russian forces have pulled back further from the bridgehead area. The milblogger noted that Russian forces continue to repel Ukrainian counterattacks on Davydiv Brid on the T2207 highway. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults from Arhanhelske on Ivanivka (west of Vysokopillya), while Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian airborne troops repelled Ukrainian counterattacks on Kostyrka and Novopetrivka.[33] Kherson Oblast Head Yaroslav Yanushevych stated that Ukrainian forces conducted evacuations from Myrolyubivka (southeast of Vysokopillya), which could indicate that Ukrainian forces have advanced to the settlement.[34] Both the Russian Defense Ministry and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched missile strikes at Ukrainian positions on the Kherson Oblast border.[35]
Russian-appointed occupation officials and milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a landing at the Kinsburn Spit (a narrow peninsula of the Crimean Peninsula southwest of Kherson City) on September 14, but offered differing accounts. Several milbloggers amplified the claims of a single source that suggested Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful amphibious landing at the Kinsburn Spit with five boats. The source also claimed that there was an unconfirmed report of a heliborne landing at the Iron Port in Lazurne, about 60km southwest of Kherson City.[36] Deputy Head of the Russian occupation administration in Kherson Oblast Kirill Stremousov claimed that Russian forces repelled the attempted landing and killed over 120 Ukrainian airborne troops at the Kinsburn Spit.[37] Another milblogger criticized Stremousov and pointed out that his sources within Russian units in the area did not witness or repel any Ukrainian landing attempts and that Stremousov did not present any visual evidence supporting his claim.[38]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults across the Eastern Axis and continued routine fire along the line of contact on September 15.[39] Both Ukrainian and Russian official sources confirmed fighting in Spirne (east of Siversk) and Mayorsk (south of Bakhmut).[40] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured Mayorsk, though ISW cannot verify this claim.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults against Mayorsk, southeast of Bakhmut, and southwest of Donetsk City.[42]
Russian forces are reinforcing positions along the Eastern Axis, likely due to extensive combat losses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are moving reserves from 3rd Army Corps volunteer battalions and remnants of units previously operating in Kharkiv Oblast to reinforce the Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast frontlines.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that the Russian 137th Airborne Regiment (subordinate to the 106th Airborne Division) sustained significant combat losses in the Bakhmut area and cannot continue combat operations without additional unspecified measures (likely meaning reconstitution).[44]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued to strike Ukrainian hydraulic structures in Kryvyi Rih and other infrastructure in Ukraine on September 15. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials reported that Russian forces again targeted unspecified hydraulic structures in Kryvyi Rih, and Russian sources published footage of smoke claiming that Russian strikes damaged an unspecified dam on the Inhulets River on September 15.[45] Russian forces are likely continuing to strike Ukrainian dams on the Inhulets River to raise flood levels in an effort to disrupt the Ukrainian bridgehead over the river in northern Kherson Oblast and threaten Ukrainian logistics lines in the same way that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian crossings of the Dnipro River.[46] Russian milbloggers amplified footage of large-scale explosions in the cities of Uman, Zaporizhia, and Vinnytsia, as well as in Odesa Oblast.[47] Russian forces also launched an Onyx cruise missile from a Bastion coastal missile complex and a Kh-59 missile fired from an Su-35 aircraft at an open area in Mykolaiv Oblast.[48] Social media users reported witnessing the activation of Russian air defense systems in Yevpatoria, Crimea.[49]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian military leadership continues to pull newly-mobilized forces from every possible source but is unlikely to be able to meaningfully increase Russian combat power with those forces. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 15 that the Russian government lifted restrictions on conscription for large families, suggesting that multiple sons from the same family could be forced to fight in Ukraine.[50] The Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, reported on September 14 that Russian forces are promoting Russian military service in occupied territories such as Melitopol.[51] Forcibly or even willingly-mobilized Ukrainian civilians without military experience who are ordered to fight their better-trained countrymen are unlikely to significantly enhance Russian combat power in Ukraine.
The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on September 15 that the Russian Military Construction Complex is building a new, modern “military town” in Sernovodskoye in the Chechen Republic.[52] The town will reportedly contain over 50 facilities to accommodate Chechnya-based units.
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
The Russian proxy Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) is likely attempting to stop its administrators from fleeing ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, demonstrating the bureaucratic fragility of the DNR. The DNR’s State Defense Committee extended one-time injury payments of 3 million rubles and one-time death payments of 5 million rubles to the families of officers, civil servants, and employees of the DNR’s Ministry of Emergency Situations killed in the line of work, the first time ISW has observed DNR civil servants being promised payment in the event of their injury or death in the war.[53] The DNR is likely attempting to incentivize its employees to remain in place to prevent a collapse in local governance as Ukrainian forces advance. Russian occupation forces have struggled to staff local administrations in occupied Ukrainian territory since the invasion began due to a lack of willing Ukrainian collaborators and competent bureaucrats.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[3] https://t.me/margaritasimonyan/12050; https://ura dot news/news/1052587297
[4] https://t.me/Aksenov82/1469; https://t.me/kommunist/9459; https://t.me... com/ru/news/2022/09/15/v-krymu-tozhe-nachali-formirovat-dobrovolcheskie-batalony
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://tass dot com/politics/1478839
[8] https://theins dot ru/politika/254329
[9] https://24tv dot ua/ru/simonjan-sdelala-novoe-zajavlenie-zovet-rossijan-sobirat-dengi_n2157987
[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf...; https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/09/12/krasnyy_liman/
[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hCejE9MTF5ywGLZs3Sf.... RUAF attacked the front and rear areas with aviation. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=582024966937795
[37] https://t.me/rian_ru/177844; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/8710; https://ta... ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15755683; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/320
2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (15.09.22) CDS comments on key events
CDS Daily brief (15.09.22) CDS comments on key events
Humanitarian aspect:
In Kryvyi Rih, the local rescuers worked all night to contain the water that spilt after the Russian rocket attack on the Karachun Dam on the evening of September 14. The Russian military fired 8 "Kinzhal" and "Kalibr" missiles on the dam. The head of the city's military administration, Oleksandr Vilkul, said that 112 private houses and yards were flooded. People were evacuated. According to Oleksandr Vilkul, two dams in the Chornohorka area had to be blown up for the water to recede faster. Several water pipes were also damaged due to the rocket attack. Almost 5,000 people were left with no running water.
Another enemy missile strike hit the city's hydraulic facilities in Kryvyi Rih on the evening of September 15. Oleksandr Vilkul said that two missiles were recorded. An industrial enterprise in Kryvyi Rih was hit around 2 p.m., and severe damage was reported.
Around midnight on September 15, a Russian rocker hit a high-rise apartment building in Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast. A man was rescued from a ruined apartment. Search and rescue operation continues as more people could be under the rubble, Donetsk Oblast Military Administration reported. Over the past day, two people were killed and 13 injured in Donetsk Oblast.
As a result of today's shelling of Kharkiv Oblast by the Russian troops, 12 people were injured, including two children. According to the head of the Oblast administration Oleh Synehubov, ten people were injured in the Kupyansk district. Among them are children aged 12 and 13. Also, one woman was wounded in the Izyum district and another one in the Kharkiv district.
Around 5:30 p.m. on September 15, the Russian forces shelled the Novooleksandrivska amalgamated community in the Zaporizhzhya district using cluster-type MLRS munitions, Oleksandr Starukh, head of Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration said. The shells hit a field, striking a fire. No causalities or damage were reported.
On the morning of September 15, Zaporizhzhya was again attacked by a Russian missile, secretary of the Zaporizhzhya City Council, Anatoly Kurtev, said. A hit near one of the city's infrastructure enterprises was recorded. The building windows were blown out, and there was a power outage.
Russian rockets hit the Petrivska community, Kirovohrad Oblast, in the center of Ukraine. "The aggressor is trying to barbarically destroy infrastructure facilities," the head of Kirovohrad Oblast Military Administration, Andriy Raikovych, said. According to his information, one rocket was shot down by air defense.
40% of Ukrainians have lost their jobs due to the war. Currently, only 23% of the country's residents continue to work and receive full wages, and 22.5% of Ukrainians continue to work, receiving reduced wages, the personnel portal grc.ua stated in the press release. Of the
Ukrainians left without a job: 19% lost their jobs due to the termination of the company's activities, another 10.9% of the respondents reported that they were laid off, and 11.3% lost their jobs due to relocation to another region. Ukrinform reported earlier that the number of remote work offers decreased in Ukraine. At the beginning of autumn, only 7% of job offers involved a remote format.
Sixteen local collaborators have been detained after the liberation of the Kharkiv Oblast, the Security Service of Ukraine reports. Additionally, according to the SBU, thirteen have already been charged, and eleven have been arrested. In total, SBU officers conducted an in-depth check of about 7,000 people in the liberated settlements of Kharkiv Oblast.
Occupied territories
Andrii Bilozerov, a teacher at the Bilohirsk Technical School in the occupied Crimea, who played the Ukrainian song "Bayraktar" at the school, was fired. His students reported him. The administration of the Bilohirsk Technical School is under investigation, Krym.Realii reported. Bilozerov was later arrested for 13 days, the press service of the Crimean occupation police department said.
According to the National Resistance Center of the Special Operations forces of Ukraine, in the occupied Kherson Oblast, the Russian occupation authorities opened 91 out of 457 schools on September 1, which is 19.9%. The number is so small because there are no children. Most families have left the region. 15,500 children went to school, 12.3% of the total number. 1,254 children (11.4%) went to the first grade.
Almost no men are left in the occupied Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, due to forced mobilization [by occupation authorities], the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian MOD reports. The conscription offices were tasked to "mobilize" 6,000 local residents. Raids to find men of military age are ongoing in the Central Market, public places, shops, shopping centers, gas stations, etc. The men from Horlivka, who were previously "mobilized" into the 9th Separate Marine Regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the Russian Army, have been out of contact since September 11. They are known to have been in temporarily captured areas of Kherson Oblast, where they refused to participate in hostilities. The last information that came from them was that the Russian commanders threatened to send all "refuseniks" to the front without weapons.
According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian MOD, Russia does not recognize passports issued in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts; their bearers are not allowed to cross the border into the Russian Federation.
According to Petro Andryushchenko, advisor to Mariupol mayor, people in the city protest spontaneously against the absence of water and electricity in their homes. Andryshchenko published a video of the protest. He also reported that the head and chief energy engineer of the seized Mariupol thermal network have resigned. They don't want to be blamed for the inability to start the heating season and face punishment.
Operational situation
It is the 204th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy continues to concentrate its efforts on establishing full control over the territory of Donetsk Oblast, maintaining control over the temporarily captured territories and disrupting the offensive of the Ukrainian troops in certain directions.
The Russian military is shelling the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces along the contact line. The enemy is trying to regroup its troops in separate directions and conducts aerial reconnaissance. The threat of air and missile strikes throughout the territory of Ukraine persists.
The Russian forces continue to attack civilian infrastructure facilities, violating the norms of International Humanitarian Law, laws and customs of war. The infrastructure of more than 30 towns and villages was damaged by air strikes, missile strikes, and the use of MLRS, in particular, Kryvyi Rih, Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Vovchansk, Kostyantynivka, Lozova, Siversk, Bilohorivka, Mykolaivka, Verkhnokamyanske, Soledar, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Vesela Dolyna, Zaitseve, Yuryivka, New York, Pervomaiske, Kamianka, Vremivka, Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Sukhy Stavok, Kostromka, Bila Krynytsia, and Myrne.
Over the past 24 hours, the Russian military has launched 8 missile strikes, 19 air strikes, and fired 86 rocket-propelled grenades at military and civilian targets on the territory of Ukraine.
The enemy keeps five BTGs in the border areas of the Russian Bryansk and Kursk oblasts to demonstrate the forward presence and constrain the Ukrainian Defense Forces (combined BTGs from the 144th motorized rifle division, 3rd motorized rifle division, 15th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 423rd tank regiment of the 4th tank division, 79th motorized rifle regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division, 11th Army Corps).
The Russian military shelled the positions of the Ukrainian troops with mortars and barrel artillery in the areas of Senkivka, Bleshnya and Galaganivka (Chernihiv Oblast) and Stepne, Novovasylivka (Sumy Oblast). They used UAVs with combat load (VOG-17) in the Mkha district (Chernihiv Oblast).
To hold the temporarily captured territories, the Russian military is trying to strengthen the first line of defense in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhya Oblasts. It is moving reserves from the 3rd Army Corps and the remnants of units withdrawn from the Kharkiv direction. At the same time, due to the disruption of their logistical support by the Ukrainian Defense Forces, the units of the Russian Armed Forces performing tasks along the contact line lack certain types of ammunition for MLRS and artillery.
During the past 24 hours, to support the ground groupings, the Ukrainian Air Force carried out 12 strikes on the Russian manpower and equipment concentration areas. As a result, it was confirmed that six areas of Russian manpower concentration, two platoon strongholds and four positions of anti-aircraft fire were destroyed.
Air defense units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed four Russian aircraft in different directions, namely three Su-25 and one Su-24m.
Belarus continues to supply the Russian forces with ammunition. On September 11, 19 wagons with ammunition were sent from the 46th missile and ammunition storage arsenal (Bronna Gora, Brest Oblast, Belarus) to the Bryansk-Lhovsky and Gukovo railway stations (Rostov Oblast, Russia). Since the beginning of the full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, 18 echelons with ammunition (188 wagons with a total weight of more than 7,677 tons) have been sent from the territory of the Republic of Belarus.
The morale of the personnel of the invasion forces remains low. Kharkiv direction
• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the
RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;
• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.
The Russian forces fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas around Baranivka, Hoptivka, Vysoka Yaruga, Neskuchne and Kupyansk.
The enemy 202nd and 204th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 2nd Army Corps suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment and are currently withdrawn to the temporarily occupied territory of Novosvitlivka, Luhansk Oblast.
Kramatorsk direction
● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;
● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.
The Russian forces shelled Tetyanivka, Kryva Luka and Bilohorivka. To identify the position of the Ukrainian troops and adjust artillery fire, the Russian military used UAVs in the areas around Spirne, Shyroke, Vilne Pole, Solodka Balka, and Ocheretuvate.
Donetsk direction
● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet", 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces near Vesele, Yakovlivka, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Vesela Dolyna, Zaitseve, Sukha Balka, Pervomaiske, Vodyane, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka and Novomykhailivka.
Ukrainian Defense forces continue to successfully repulse Russian attacks, in particular, in the areas around Spirne, Soledar, Mayorsk, Zaitseve, Odradivka, Vesela Dolyna, Vodyane, and Novomykhailivka.
The destruction of a significant number of servicemen and military equipment of the 137th parachute airborne regiment of the 106th airborne division of the Russian Armed Forces was confirmed. Significant losses do not allow the aforementioned unit to continue combat operations without additional measures.
The Russian aggressor led offensive operations employing "Wagner" PMC units in the direction of Klynove and Vesela Dolyna, but did not achieve success.
Zaporizhzhya direction
● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines
brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.
The Russian forces shelled the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces near Vilne Pole, Zelene Pole, Novopil, Velyka Novosilka, Pavlivka, Orihiv, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya.
Kherson direction
● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades.
There is no change in the operational situation.
There are two Iranian-made "Mohajer-6" UAVs and a ground control station at Kirovsk Airfield (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea).
The enemy continues attempts to restore transportation links across the Dnipro River at the Kakhovka HPP (in particular, one of the locks is being filled with rubble). The "Tor" system provides air defense to the work area.
Kherson-Berislav bridgehead
● Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –
11.8 km;
● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC.
The Russian forces shelled Bila Krynytsia, Olhyne, Lyubomirivka, Ternovi Pody, Pravdyne, Myrne and Ivanivka. They constantly conduct aerial reconnaissance by UAVs.
Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:
The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the sea and connect unrecognized Transnistria with the Russian Federation by land through the coast of the Black and Azov seas.
Along the southern coast of Crimea, there are four enemy cruise missile carriers. Up to 32 enemy Kalibr missiles are ready for a salvo.
Additionally, 13 other enemy warships and vessels of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla are at sea, providing reconnaissance and blockade of navigation in the Azov-Black Sea waters.
Five large amphibious ships are maneuvering near the southern part of the occupied Crimea, ensuring the combat coordination of the recently created marine infantry grouping based on the 382nd separate battalion of the Russian marines (based in the city of Temryuk, Krasnodar Krai, Russia). The rest of the amphibious ships (8 units) are in the ports of Novorossiysk and Sevastopol for replenishment and scheduled maintenance. There are no signs of preparation for an amphibious assault on the southern coast of Ukraine.
All 4 submarines of project 636.3 are in the port of Novorossiysk.
Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 12 Su-27, Su-30 and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.
On September 15, 11 vessels are scheduled to depart from the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdenny. They have 240,000 tons of agricultural products destined for the countries of Africa, Asia and Europe on board. Since the "grain initiative" started, 3.3 million tons of food have been exported from Ukrainian ports. A total of 145 ships with agricultural products left Ukrainian ports.
Russian officials, however, increasingly make statements that the Russian Federation may not extend the grain agreement, which expires in November 2022 (120 days). In this regard, UN Secretary-General Mr Guterres had a telephone conversation with Russian President Putin on September 14. The UN Secretary-General spoke with Putin, in particular, about the export of Ukrainian grain, expressing hope that the agreement concluded on July 22 by Ukraine, Turkey, and Russia through the mediation of the UN for 120 days will be preserved. At the same time, Guterres also wants it to apply to the export of Russian ammonia. He noted that negotiations are underway on possible ammonia exports from the Russian Federation through the Black Sea since there is a risk of a crisis in the fertilizer market.
Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 15.09
Personnel - almost 53,850 people (+200);
Tanks – 2,193 (+13);
Armored combat vehicles – 4,682 (+17);
Artillery systems – 1,295 (+5);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 311 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 167 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,522 (+21); Aircraft - 250 (+4);
Helicopters – 215 (0);
UAV operational and tactical level - 908 (0); Intercepted cruise missiles - 233 (0);
Boats / ships - 15 (0).
Ukraine, general news
According to a public opinion poll, "Trust in the state: how to preserve national unity for the sake of victory", conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, the following institutions enjoy the most trust among Ukrainians: 91% of respondents trust the Armed Forces, the State Emergency Service - 82%, the National Guard - 81%, volunteer organizations - 77%, the State Border Service - 74%, volunteer military units - 73%, the President of Ukraine - 71%.
And the following institutions enjoy the lowest trust: 55% of respondents do not trust political parties. Also, 46% of respondents do not trust the judicial system, another 46% - officials, 37% - commercial banks and 19% - the Verkhovna Rada.
The export of Ukrainian goods in January-August 2022 decreased by 31% compared to the same period of the last year and amounted to about $29 billion, Ukrinform reports with reference to the State Customs Service of Ukraine. The export of Ukrainian metals and metal products decreased by more than half (-54%) — $4.7 billion against $10.2 billion in 8 months of 2021. The second place in terms of decline (-53%) is mineral products — January-August 2022 exports amounted to $2.8 billion against $5.9 billion in the same period last year. Exports of chemical industry products decreased by 46% — from $2.4 billion to $1.3 billion.
According to a poll conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on September 13-17, no territorial concessions to Russia are acceptable to 87% of Ukrainians (this indicator has grown by 3 percentage points compared to July). Only 8% believe that to achieve peace and preserve independence, it is possible to give up some territories (and the share of such people decreased by 2 percentage points compared to July).
International diplomatic aspect
"We highly appreciate the well-balanced position of our Chinese friends in connection with the Ukrainian crisis," Vladimir Putin told Chinese leader Xi Jinping during their visit to Uzbekistan. In the Chinese readout of the meeting, there wasn't a specific mention of Ukraine, but Xi promised "strong support" to Russia's "core interests."
Meanwhile, while meeting with Russian politicians, Li Zhanshu, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP, blamed the US and their NATO allies for the military build-up
along the Russian border, which poses a severe national security threat and threat to the Russian people. "That's why we fully understand Russia's measures to safeguard its interests and provide our support. On the Ukrainian issue, we see how they [the US and NATO] put Russia in a stalemate, and Russia made an important decision to turn to the decisive rebuff," said one of the top Chinese officials.
The US urged China not to back Moscow in its war against Kyiv. "The whole world should be lined up against what Mr. Putin is doing," stated the White House national security spokesman. John Kirby said it remained to be seen how much China would back Russia's war, however, noting that Beijing had not moved to support Putin or violated sanctions against Moscow materially.
Germany will send to Ukraine two more MARS II rocket launchers, 200 MLRS rockets, and 50 Dingo armored personnel carriers. Meanwhile, Germany's foreign minister is putting pressure on Chancellor Olaf Scholz to make up his mind on advanced tanks' delivery.
General Eberhard Zorn believes that Putin is capable of opening a second front in Kaliningrad, the Baltic Sea, and the Finnish border. The most senior German military commander thinks that "even though 60 percent of the Russian army forces are tied up in Ukraine, they still have uncommitted capacity… If Putin ordered a general mobilization, he would not have personnel problems either".
In his tweet, the former commander of US forces in Europe, Ben Hodges, commented that this claim showed a "stunningly poor analysis of Russian capabilities that unfortunately reflects much of the German 'elite' thinking". "Finland alone would crush Russian forces" while "Lithuania/Poland would smother Kaliningrad in a week," twitted General Ben Hodges. "The Social Democrats don't want to (deliver more weapons), and now they are pulling out every excuse," pointed out Gustav Gressel, a security expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
"Getting a visa to a country is not a subjective right for anyone, but the visa issuer always has discretion," said the President of Finland. Sauli Niinisto wants to complicate issuing visas to Russian nationals, reversing the procedure favoring those who own real estate in the Nordic country.
The US imposed sanctions on more than 40 Russian persons and 30 entities related to the head of the Chechen Republic. As part of a new sanctions package, the United States is introducing a ban on the export, re-export and sale of quantum computing services to Russia from October 15, the US Department of the Treasury informed.
The EU Council has prolonged the restrictive measures targeting those responsible for undermining or threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence for half a year. The measures include travel restrictions for natural persons, the freezing of assets, and a ban on making funds or other economic resources available to 1206 individuals and 108 entities.
The European Investment Bank disbursed the first tranches of the €1.59 billion package of the Ukraine Solidarity Urgent Response, supported by an EU guarantee. The first chunk of €500 million will help the Ukrainian government cover short-term financing needs and ensure urgent repairs of damaged roads, bridges, and railway infrastructure.
Russia, relevant news
The Russian court fined the five members of the municipal council of the "Smolnynskiy" district who had previously called for the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to be charged with treason. They were charged with "discrediting" the Russian army, Meduza reported. The fines amounted to 44,000 - 47,000 rubles (USD 735-785).
Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020 and are involved in security studies, defence policy research and advocacy. Currently all our activity is focused on stopping the ongoing war.
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3. General Mark Hertling: Russia's Army Is Terrible. But It's Not Over.
You can listen to General Hertling's analysis at the link or read the transcript below.
https://morningshots.thebulwark.com/p/general-mark-hertling-russias-army
General Mark Hertling: Russia's Army Is Terrible. But It's Not Over.
Our deep-dive into the War in Ukraine
morningshots.thebulwark.com · by Charlie Sykes
(The Bulwark / Midjourney)
Tempo, Fatigue, and Black Swans
I sat down with Lt. General (ret.) Mark Hertling for an in-depth discussion of the war in Ukraine. Hertling is a former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe and the Seventh Army, so he brings a wealth of insight to his analysis of both the Ukrainian and Russian armies.
What follows is an edited, partial transcript of our conversation:
On Russian army corruption (3:22)
Charlie: So what has happened? When we look at the success of this counter-offensive and the failure of the Russians, is this all about the new Western weapons? Or is it a more complex story? … I'd like to get your take on why you think the Ukrainians were able to be so successful in the short term, and the role of Western weaponry and the strategy that they've employed.
Lt. Gen. Hertling: Well … I kind of bristle every time I see on the internet or on television shows or listening to podcasts, when I hear people say that it's all about the Western technology, and we should give them more. We should give them everything they want.
Because, whereas that's certainly a part of what has made Ukraine successful in defending their motherland, there are so many other complexities involved, as you just said.
The first thing is the Ukraine army has transformed over the last 15 years, and I proudly say I was a small part of that when we were training with the Ukrainian army, when I was commander in U.S. forces in Europe…
So, we started that way back in about 2008, and truthfully, it was for selfish reasons. It was because Ukraine had volunteered to send forces to both Iraq and Afghanistan, which they did until the very end of both of those wars, and we needed them to be competent on the battlefield and fight shoulder to shoulder with us. They were not that kind of an army when we first started working with them.
So, over the last 15 years, they have transformed internally. They have conducted western style training events and exercises, they have built a more professional Leadership Corps, not only at the senior officer level, but at the NCO or the sergeants level, and they have really bought into the Western approach to security. So, that's another factor.
But, one factor that not a whole lot of people are saying much about is, truthfully, the Russian army is bad.
As Ukraine has gone in one direction, in terms of a positive transformation, over the last 15 years, because of kleptocracy, and corruption, and poor training, and poor leadership, and lousy recruiting, and just the way they purchase and acquire equipment and treat their soldiers, the Russian army has deteriorated and gone in the opposite direction.
So, it's a combination of the improved Ukrainian army, the horrible stature of the Russian army, and the incorporation of key technological weapons at critical points during this fight.
Charlie: Well, let's talk about the Russian army for a little bit. As you pointed out, the Russians have been now fighting for more than 200 days in dirt and mud. They haven't been well led. They haven't been resupplied. Some of them haven't been paid. They've been under attack by precision artillery. They're fighting Ukrainians who are defending their motherland. And, their morale is ... in the toilet. So, the question is, what does Russia do now? I mean, Russia is now put back on the defense. But, as you pointed out, I mean, they continue to control vast swathes of Ukraine. They still have quite a few resources, and Vladimir Putin has lots of cards. So what do you see as the status of the Russian army right now?
Lt. Gen. Hertling: Well, you know, I sometimes get pushback when I post things on Twitter, because there are some that will jump on and say, "Hey, you're giving away operational security secrets and the Russians can adapt to that."
My response to that is "No, they can't."
I mean ... if you have a viable military, and you make mistakes on the battlefield, and you have a culture of learning, and growing and changing, and adapting to your mistakes and turning things around, then I'd say, "Yeah, okay. You don't want to give any secrets to the Russians because they want to adapt."
This is the example of Israel in the 1973 war in the Middle East. They adapted when they were initially defeated. So, good armies can do that, but Russia is not a good army.
It is so corrupt, and it is so debased by their political leaders, and their senior leaders, you would literally have to replace everyone, and start a training process for both officers and sergeants, noncommissioned officers, as we call them.
You would have to somehow get new equipment for them that isn't damaged or in very poor condition, which all of their equipment is. You would have to train their soldiers on how to conduct ... combined arms operations, which they have failed to do. And, truthfully, all of that takes time.
I was once asked when I was a trainer at our National Training Center in California, when ... a bunch of congressmen were watching a brigade, commanded by a colonel, conduct operations. One of the congressmen asked me, "What does it take to make that brigade commander so good." And I said, "About 20 years of experience, from being a lieutenant all the way up to being a colonel, and seeing how armies work."
I guess, Charlie, what I'm trying to say is, you just don't fix an army overnight, especially when it has the morale problems that the Russian army has now, when it has the equipment and leadership problems, what they have. And, when there is so much corruption at the ministerial level, the senior general level at the top in Mr. Putin.
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On what happens next (20:26)
Charlie: So, let's talk about what happens next. As you pointed out at the top of the show here, there's lots of fighting remaining. The Russians are in retreat, but they will obviously consolidate their lines of defense. They're likely to defend some of the key logistics hubs in the south. They're, again, likely shoring up their defenses and using artillery to some effect. So, clearly, this offensive is not going to go on at this pace forever. So, let's talk about the three things that you said yesterday on your Twitter thread that concern you: tempo, fatigue, and black swans. So, let's go through each one of them. Talk to me of what you mean about tempo?
Lt. Gen. Hertling: Well, this is something that, as a senior operational level or strategic level commander, you have to concern yourself with. And, I learned this lesson not only from experience, but also being taught by my mentors. You know, tempo is a term that the military uses. It's actually defined in doctrine as the rate of speed and rhythm of military operations with respect to the enemy's activities. Now, that seems like a simple definition, but what it means is, how fast you go, or how slow do you go or how much do you go in the middle, so that everyone can keep up?
You know, it's one thing to have frontline forces blasting through occupied territory by the Russians, which we've seen Ukraine do over the last five days. It's another thing for those frontline forces to turn around and say, "Okay, I've used up all my ammunition, where is it?" Or, "I don't have any more fuel left in my vehicle? Where's the fuel?" Or, "Okay, I've hit these targets, intelligence guys and gals, where are the next targets I need to hit? And where's the enemy going?"
So, I'm saying this simply, so you understand that the frontline fighters will go as far and as fast as they can, but everyone else has to keep up with them. And, this gets back to my other comment before about the training of the Ukrainian force.
Again, I'll probably get heat for this. Ukraine has a good army, right now. They don't have a great army, right now.
They are missing some of the parts and pieces at the operational and strategic level. And, even though they've been very successful, and your listeners will say, "Well, what's he talking about? They just reconquered Kharkiv."
Yeah, okay, but there's a whole lot more to go and there's a whole lot more things to do, and even the American army screws us up quite a bit.
So, what you have to do is keep everyone together, realize that you can't outrun your supporters and your supply and you can't put yourself in a position where the enemy sees opportunities to conduct attacks against you.
When I first saw the initial advance of the Ukrainian army on a map, it kind of looked like the Germans heading toward Bastogne in World War II. It was a very long line of Ukrainian vehicles, over 25 to 50 kilometers long. And, both sides of that line, we're still surrounded, allegedly, by Russian forces.
So, if Russia had been a good army, they could have attacked into those shoulders, as they're called, and collapsed the Ukrainian offense very quickly, the only thing, truthfully, that saved the Ukrainian army and that long line of attack from Kharkiv to Izium, and then on to Kupiansk, was the fact that Russia is so bad at what they do.
They didn't seize the opportunity, and they didn't have the intelligence that showed them how open for attack the Ukrainian army was.
Charlie: The second one of your concerns that you listed was fatigue. And, “fatigue makes cowards of us all.” I don't know if that was Vince Lombardi or William Shakespeare, but obviously, this is something that the most experienced commanders, and I think most of us actually understand. So, what do you mean? What are you concerned about in terms of fatigue? The fatigue of Ukrainian forces that just don't know when to stop?
Lt. Gen. Hertling: Well, that's part of it. It's just the fatigue of combat.
I'm going to give you an example: When I was a young major during Desert Storm, when we crossed the line of departure in Saudi Arabia, and I was in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, as part of first armored division, we literally moved for three days straight, without contact, or scattered contact, with enemy forces.
And, those were the frontline Iraqi forces that were actually pretty bad. So, we were taking a lot of prisoners, much like Ukraine has done with Russia.
But, then we hit the Republican Guard at about the four day mark. And, most of us hadn't slept. I mean, commanders never get enough rest, and leaders never get enough rest.
But, the soldiers, because it was a continuous movement, also did not get enough rest. So, you're talking about four days straight without sleep, grabbing bites of food, always being on the alert, because you never know when you're going to be hit, or when you're going to have to hit other people. So, it's just a physiologically and emotionally fatiguing event to go into combat.
Then when you start combat — when you're actually shooting — the adrenaline push that you get from that is the equivalent of what you sustain when you are really fatigued to try and keep going.
So, you have a double dose… Your hormones, just drive you off the chart. So, after four days, you are just completely exhausted.
Now, there's support: when you have support from your fellow soldiers, when you have the population and the government behind you, that fatigue is mitigated. But it's still there.
So, what I'd suggest, is if those frontline forces don't take a tactical pause, to rest, to recuperate, to resupply, to just get a little bit of sleep, it will drain that force.
And, truthfully, Charlie, that's what's been happening to Russia, they have been under attack, their soldiers have been lying in the dirt, uncared for by their leaders, not knowing really what their mission is, and getting pounded by artillery on a daily basis. So it's a different proposition, but it's the same physiological requirements to keep in the human body and the related equipment going.
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On Black Swans (30:50)
Charlie: So your third concern after tempo and fatigue is Black Swan. The Black Swan event, unpredictable events that can have severe consequences. So what are you thinking of there? What are the black swans that we should be keeping an eye out for?
Lt. Gen. Hertling: Well, Charlie, in combat, one of the things I learned as a senior commander is just when you think things are going great, something comes up to, pardon my expression. bite you in the ass. And it's usually something that could have been unexpected, but usually it's not. It's something that's in the back of your mind, you say, "Oh, that might happen ... but I'll just overlook it for now." But they always come back to bite you.
This happens in business a lot, too. But what I'm suggesting is, from an amateur observer standpoint, I could sit here today and just write down at my desk 100 things that might crop up that are partly unanticipated, and there may be no plans for.
What I listed in that tweet thread that you're talking about are just eight that kind of came to mind. There are many, many more. And there are people in the State Department, in the Pentagon, in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in President Zelenskyy's government that are certainly watching some of these things and looking for them, but it's going to surprise the American people. If something happens to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, that's a scary event, but people are planning for what to do next, and they have talked about these things.
… The Ukrainian army is [also] going to capture a lot of Russian prisoners, probably within the next week, if they haven't already captured them.
There's indicators that there's an element in Kharkiv, of the Russian fourth tank division of the first tank army, they left behind estimates, somewhere between 35 to 45 tanks, and 35 BMPs, which are the Russian equivalents of a personnel carrier. And if they left that many behind, that means there's a whole lot of people out there that are being rounded up.
And I would suggest both in Kharkiv and in Kherson, we're soon going to see a massive number of Russian prisoners of war.
Now, the question is, what is Ukraine Army going to do with them? And how are they going to safeguard those, because, by the way, that's that's a requirement of the Geneva Convention is you safeguard your prisoners of war and you don't treat them harshly. Russia has not done that. They have done just the opposite. They have been criminal in their approach to prisoners of war.
…I keep using the example of the Falaise pocket during World War II, a place in France where Bradley's army captured close to 10,000 German prisoners. Well, when you have that many prisoners of war, what do you do with them? How do you feed them? How do you put them in camps? How do you make sure that they're safeguarded?
And how many Ukrainian soldiers are going to be really pissed if they come upon these groups of people, and they want to take out revenge on them? I think the Ukrainian army is more professional than that. But, you know, people do strange things when...
Charlie: They're human beings.
Lt. Gen. Hertling: Yeah.
You can listen to our whole conversation here.
Thanks for reading Morning Shots! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.
morningshots.thebulwark.com · by Charlie Sykes
4. White House Appoints 2022-2023 Class of White House Fellows - The White House
Congratulations to the many distinguished fellows selected, including a US Navy SEAL officer. But let me highlight this noncommissioned officer:
Joshua Woehr is from Clearwater, Florida, and is placed at the Office of the First Lady Joining Forces Initiative. Josh is a Sergeant Major in the U.S. Army and has served over 20 years in Special Operations as a Green Beret and Ranger, having deployed over 15 times. He recently returned from Iraq, where he led the integration of next-generation technology onto the battlefield. A father of six children, Josh is passionate about serving military families. In 2014, he and his wife founded the Rick Herrema Foundation, establishing “Rick’s Place” at Fort Bragg, NC. Rick’s Place is a 50-acre campus that provides a place of community and activity to thousands of military family members every year. Josh is a first-generation college graduate, holding a B.A. in Arabic Studies from California University of Pennsylvania and an M.A. in Social-Organizational Psychology from Teachers College, Columbia University.
White House Appoints 2022-2023 Class of White House Fellows - The White House
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · September 14, 2022
The President’s Commission on White House Fellows is pleased to announce the appointment of the 2022-2023 class of White House Fellows. Founded in 1964, the White House Fellows program offers exceptional young leaders first-hand experience working at the highest levels of the Federal government. Fellows spend a year working with senior White House Staff, Cabinet Secretaries, and other top-ranking Administration officials, and leave the Administration equipped to serve as better leaders in their communities. Fellowships are awarded on a non-partisan basis.
This year’s Fellows advanced through a highly competitive selection process, and they are a remarkably gifted, passionate, and accomplished group. These Fellows bring experience from across the country and from a broad cross-section of professions, including from the private sector, local government, academia, the non-profit sector, medicine, law, and the armed forces.
Applications for the 2023-2024 Fellowship year will be accepted starting November 1, 2022. The application link and additional information is available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/get-involved/fellows/apply/.
2022-2023 Class of White House Fellows:
Samuel Ayres is from Denver, Colorado, and is placed at the White House Domestic Policy Council. Sam earned a J.D. from Yale Law School, where he published scholarship on environmental law and was a member of the law journal. Prior to law school, Sam served as a noncommissioned officer in the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment. He deployed multiple times to Afghanistan, where he led a fire team and rifle squad of Rangers. Before enlisting in the Army, Sam was a foreign policy researcher and writer. Sam earned a B.A. in English and Political Science from Yale College, where he was a Truman Scholar. Following the Fellowship, he will clerk on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Jacqueline Burgette is from Issaquah, Washington, and is placed at the Office of the National Cyber Director. Jacqueline is a pediatric dentist, educator, and community-engaged researcher working at the forefront of advancing dental health equity for all Americans. Jacqueline earned her DMD from the Harvard School of Dental Medicine as a Presidential Scholar and Ph.D. in Health Policy and Management from the University of North Carolina. She served on the faculty at the University of Pittsburgh where she mentored trainees in research and clinical practice. Jacqueline led multi-site studies that amplified the voices of vulnerable families to improve child dental health in Appalachia. She developed a dental education “video box” for communities with high rates of tooth decay and founded a dental clinic that serves children living with HIV/AIDS in Haiti. Jacqueline spearheaded academic-community partnerships, established novel interprofessional health curricula, and published prominent research in dental public health and health policy.
Makini Chisolm-Straker is from New York City, New York, and is placed at the Social Security Administration. Makini is an emergency medicine physician and a public health expert focused on centering invisible populations and reframing social policies as determinants of wellbeing. She led multiple research teams, including those that produced the first validated, comprehensive trafficking screening tools for undomiciled young adults and emergency department patients; she co-founded the advocacy organization HEAL Trafficking; and she helped expand the anti-trafficking paradigm to one that employs public health principles. She has served in Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and the Middle East in low-resource, disaster, and conflict settings. Makini co-edited two public health textbooks and has written multiple chapters and academic articles on labor and sex trafficking, genderqueer emergency care, and unaccompanied/separated minors. Makini earned an A.B. in Religious Studies and an M.D. from Brown University, and an M.P.H. from Columbia University.
Vanessa Cobarrubias is from Harlingen, Texas, and is placed at theDepartment of Health and Human Services and the Office of the First Lady focusing on the Cancer Moonshot Initiative. After receiving a Bachelor of Communication Arts from St. Mary’s University and prior to transitioning into healthcare, Vanessa was an accomplished educator and speech language pathology assistant. Since obtaining a Master of Physician Assistant Studies at the University of Texas – Rio Grande Valley, she has worked tirelessly to serve the Rio Grande community (an area in which COVID-related deaths were twice that of the rest of the state of Texas) throughout the pandemic. In addition to overseeing antibody infusions for over 10,000 patients, she founded and worked diligently on a door-to-door vaccine awareness program serving the region’s indigent population. A community-recognized “Texas Healthcare Hero,” this daughter of educators and granddaughter of immigrant farmworkers is driven to empower those who cannot speak for themselves.
Kevin Flores is from Springdale, Arkansas, and is placed at the Small Business Administration. Kevin is an attorney and former city councilman. Born in El Salvador, he and his family came to the U.S. upon fleeing the Salvadoran civil war. At seventeen, Kevin enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps, where he deployed to Iraq in 2007 and was then assigned to the State Department as an embassy security guard. Kevin later worked at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., before returning to Arkansas. In 2020, he became the first Hispanic and first immigrant elected to the Springdale City Council. Kevin has served on numerous non-profit boards and is an active Rotarian. He has founded various mentoring programs and bilingual professional programs in Springdale Public Schools, the largest school district in Arkansas. Kevin earned a B.A. in International Political Economics from Fordham University and a J.D. from the University of Arkansas, School of Law.
Maria Gilbert is from New York City, New York, and is placed at the Department of Homeland Security. Maria is a Lieutenant for the New York City Police Department (NYPD). As a Lieutenant, she is responsible for evaluating programs and policies that govern over 50,000 staff members and for all organizational changes. She also volunteers as a peer support member for the NYPD, providing critical mental health resources to employees in need. Outside of the NYPD, Maria is the founder of Beads of Hope Inc., a non-profit organization focused on cancer awareness, prevention, and finding a cure while emphasizing the mental well-being of those affected by cancer. She has a Bachelor of Computer Engineering Degree and a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from the Harvard Kennedy School, and she uses this skillset to merge technology with policy.
Adan Gonzalez, is from Dallas, Texas, and is placed at the Department of Education. As the son of immigrants, Adan values the power of education. He graduated from Georgetown University, majoring in Government with a minor in Education, Inquiry and Justice. He earned a Masters in Education Leadership at Columbia University and a Masters in Education Policy and Management from Harvard University. Adan has engaged with students and parents globally to advocate for the importance of higher education, parental support, and community involvement. He has served his local community as a teacher and Director of School & Family Partnerships. He is the Founder of Puede Network, a family empowerment organization that provides underserved minority students—many from Dallas’ Oak Cliff neighborhood where Adan grew up and continues to live—with transformative programming encompassing; academics, health and nutrition, community stewardship, recreational athletics, and socio-emotional support. Adan enjoys being a youth soccer and boxing coach in his spare time, and he aspires to make his family proud.
Harrison Hines is from Carmel, Indiana, and is placed at the White House Domestic Policy Council. Harrison is a neurologist who leverages his background in theology and policy to address healthcare disparities burdening vulnerable populations. As a legislative aide to California State Assemblymember Shirley Weber, he championed initiatives expanding insurance coverage for developmentally disabled Californians and improving representation for incarcerated individuals. During residency training at University of California, San Francisco, Harrison served on the boards of trustees for local and state medical societies where he advocated for equitable COVID-19 vaccine distribution and fair medical trainee employment practices. Harrison founded a volunteer networking organization, directed community outreach at a free clinic, and participated in international research on faith-based healthcare delivery. He earned his M.D. from Stanford University, Master of Theological Studies from Duke Divinity School as a Theology, Medicine, and Culture Fellow, and B.A. from Duke University as a Robertson Scholar.
William Jones is from Annapolis, Maryland, and is placed at the National Security Council. Will is a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy and has served as a SEAL Officer for 12 years. During his career in Naval Special Warfare, he has deployed multiple times focused on combating terrorism in East and North Africa, and South America. Will’s most recent tour was as the Operations Officer for the Intelligence and Targeting organization within the SEAL Teams, managing the operational and logistic requirements for a 400-person command conducting sensitive operations. Will is a volunteer for the Naval Special Warfare diversity outreach program, focused on expanding diversity within maritime Special Operations through education and engagement across the civilian sector. Will is a graduate of Penn State University, where he received a Bachelor of Science in Institutional Management and was captain of his NCAA Division-1 lacrosse program. He earned his Master of Arts in International Business and Policy from Georgetown University.
Jeffrey Nadel is from Centennial, Colorado, and is placed at the Department of Veterans Affairs. Jeff is a resident neurosurgeon at the University of Utah, committed to ensuring equitable access to surgery for all. In his work combatting health disparities across the globe, Jeff collaborated with the Costa Rican government to build a national literacy program for the elderly. He also worked to cultivate a global surgery research partnership in Uganda. Domestically, he co-directed a free clinic for the homeless and helped lead an effort to fund community health workers in Detroit. Jeff served as a researcher at The Brookings Institution and the National Institutes of Health. He has published more than three dozen peer-reviewed papers, book chapters, and press articles. Jeff earned an M.D. and M.S. (Clinical Research) from the University of Michigan as a Dean’s Scholar, and a B.A. from Colorado College as a Boettcher Scholar.
Elizabeth Ragan is from Beavercreek, Oregon, and is placed at the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Lizzy is a public health professional with expertise in infectious diseases and has managed a range of global and domestic research portfolios. In response to COVID-19, Lizzy worked with Boston Medical Center leadership to launch and sustain a novel biorepository to support critical pandemic response research. She also managed a Massachusetts-wide program addressing inequitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and care. Most recently, Lizzy served in a senior management role in research operations. Lizzy is a disability and DEI advocate, and is a former member of Oregon Health Authority’s Health Equity Committee. Lizzy earned her B.S. from Oregon State University where she graduated summa cum laude and received both the Waldo-Cummings and Kalervo Oberg Outstanding Senior Awards. She earned her M.P.H. in Global Health and Epidemiology from the Boston University School of Public Health.
Graham Van Hook is from Alexandria, Virginia, and is placed at the Office of Cabinet Affairs. Graham is a fourth generation Naval Officer, lately serving as a liaison to the Congressional Appropriations Committees. He has deployed five times around the world, most recently as Commanding Officer of USS Tornado. While in command, his crew seized over 50 million dollars in narcotics, and earned the coveted Battle “E” award as the number one ship in her class. His leadership and policy articles have been featured in several professional publications. He served on the Board of the Surface Navy Association and is a Term Member on the Council on Foreign Relations. Graham dedicates his free time to United Through Reading, Service2School, and the Oyster Recovery Partnership. Graham holds a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy, a M.S. from the University of Arkansas and a M.B.A. from Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management.
Lav Varshney is from Champaign, Illinois, and is placed at the National Security Council, Deputy Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology. He is a professor of engineering, computer science, and neuroscience at the University of Illinois, where he conducts scholarly research, technological innovation, teaching, and broad public engagement. He works with Brookhaven National Laboratory on computing for national security. He has published widely in core areas of information theory and artificial intelligence (AI), as well as applications in climate, sustainability, food, public health, medicine, creativity, telecommunications, semiconductors, and infrastructure. As an entrepreneur, he has been chief scientist of startup companies: one using AI to optimize wastewater treatment, another using AI in social music co-creativity platforms, and a third making food systems more resilient and flavorful. He holds a B.S. degree in electrical and computer engineering from Cornell and a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and computer science from MIT.
Vanessa Velasquez is from Vero Beach, Florida, and is placed at the U.S. Navy. Vanessa has extensive project management experience, most recently at Apple as a Global Supply Manager where she helped manage sourcing components for the iPhone. In this role, she engaged with international suppliers for capital equipment. Previously at Amazon, Vanessa first started in a fulfillment center running operations, eventually working her way up to corporate headquarters where she focused on Amazon’s engagement with Hispanic businesses. In her portfolios, she generated over $20 million in revenue and led projects worth over $100 million. As a proud Latina raised by a single mom, Vanessa dedicates her time in and out of work to underserved communities. She mentors Hispanic Scholarship Fund scholars to cultivate future Hispanic leaders. She previously served as the inaugural Director of Fulfillment Center and Community Engagement at Glamazon (Amazon’s LGBTQ+ ERG). Vanessa earned her B.B.A. and B.A. from Mississippi State University.
Joshua Woehr is from Clearwater, Florida, and is placed at the Office of the First Lady Joining Forces Initiative. Josh is a Sergeant Major in the U.S. Army and has served over 20 years in Special Operations as a Green Beret and Ranger, having deployed over 15 times. He recently returned from Iraq, where he led the integration of next-generation technology onto the battlefield. A father of six children, Josh is passionate about serving military families. In 2014, he and his wife founded the Rick Herrema Foundation, establishing “Rick’s Place” at Fort Bragg, NC. Rick’s Place is a 50-acre campus that provides a place of community and activity to thousands of military family members every year. Josh is a first-generation college graduate, holding a B.A. in Arabic Studies from California University of Pennsylvania and an M.A. in Social-Organizational Psychology from Teachers College, Columbia University.
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whitehouse.gov · by The White House · September 14, 2022
5. US Intelligence Predicted Resurgence of Islamic State Group Threat, Declassified Report Shows
There are no "intelligence failures." Intelligence mostly gets it right and certainly more often than we hear about. But the failures are generally operational and policy- the failure to heed the intelligence, most often by policy makers, especially it does not fit the desired political narrative..
US Intelligence Predicted Resurgence of Islamic State Group Threat, Declassified Report Shows
military.com · by 15 Sep 2022 Associated Press | By Nomaan Merchant · September 15, 2022
WASHINGTON — U.S. intelligence officials predicted two years ago that the Islamic State group would likely regain much of its former strength and global influence, particularly if American and other Western forces reduced their role in countering the extremist movement, according to a newly declassified report.
Analysts said many of the judgments in the 2020 report appear prescient today, particularly as the group is resurgent in Afghanistan following President Joe Biden’s withdrawal of American forces last year.
The Islamic State group is no longer controlling huge swaths of territory or staging attacks in the United States as it did several years ago before a major U.S.-led offensive. But it is now slowly rebuilding some core capabilities in Iraq and Syria and increasingly fighting local governments in places including Afghanistan, where an affiliate of the IS group, also known by the acronym ISIS, is fighting the ruling Taliban following the U.S. withdrawal.
“If the United States and our partners pull back or withdraw further from areas where ISIS is active, the group’s trajectory will increasingly depend on local governments' will and capability to fill the resulting security voids,” says the report, originally published in classified form in May 2020, months after then-President Donald Trump's administration reached an agreement with the Taliban to pull out American troops.
Biden and top national security officials have cited the recent strike killing al-Qaida head Ayman al-Zawahri as evidence that America maintains an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism capacity in Afghanistan after the withdrawal. U.S. special forces also killed the head of the Islamic State group in a February raid in northwest Syria.
“The fact of those operations are, I think, reflective how serious this threat environment remains," said Christy Abizaid, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, on Thursday. But she added that analysts believe the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland is “less acute than we've seen it" at any time since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Analysts have recently seen growth in ISIS group branches around the world, particularly in Africa, said Abizaid, who spoke at the Intelligence and National Security Summit outside Washington.
“Afghanistan is a really interesting story along those lines about where the ISIS affiliate is and how we continue to be concerned about it,” she said.
Some outside analysts say al-Zawahri's apparent presence in downtown Kabul suggests that extremist groups are more comfortable operating in Afghanistan — and that it will be tougher to counter the Islamic State group as it grows across the country.
Bruce Hoffman, senior fellow for counterterrorism at the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations, called the May 2020 report “very clear-eyed and forthright.”
“It’s very different operating against ISIS in the isolated mountain redoubts or deep valleys of Afghanistan,” he said. “The advantages that enabled us to so brilliantly take out al-Zawahri, I would guess, are absent outside of Kabul.”
While the White House last month released declassified points from an intelligence assessment saying al-Qaida had not reconstituted in Afghanistan, the points did not address the Islamic State in Khorasan, the local ISIS group affiliate. IS-K was responsible for killing 13 U.S. troops outside the Kabul airport during the withdrawal and has continued to mount an insurgency against the Taliban now in control of the country.
The National Security Council said in a statement that the U.S. is working to deny “ISIS-K access to financing, disrupt and deter foreign terrorist fighters from reaching Afghanistan and the region, and counter ISIS-K's violent extremism.”
The May 2020 report was declassified this August and published online last week by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The ODNI periodically declassifies and releases older intelligence assessments. A spokesperson for the ODNI's National Counterterrorism Center declined to answer questions about the assessment or address the intelligence community's current view on the Islamic State group.
The report predicts that the Islamic State group's global branches are likely to increase its "capability to conduct attacks in many regions of the world, including the West.” The U.S. would more likely face attacks from people inspired by the group's ideology than plots directed or supported by the group, the report said.
Pressure by local governments where the IS group is active and their international partners “almost certainly will shape the scale of ISIS' resurgence in Iraq and Syria and its expansion worldwide,” the report said.
Experts commonly agree with the report's predictions, said Colin Clarke, an expert on counterterrorism who is director of research for The Soufan Group, an intelligence and security consultancy. But top intelligence analysts would have been involved in drafting and reviewing the assessment, formally known as a national intelligence estimate, he said.
Clarke noted several recent IS-linked attacks in Afghanistan, including an apparent suicide bombing outside the Russian embassy in Kabul that killed two diplomats, as well as ongoing fighting between militants and U.S.-backed forces at a sprawling camp in Syria.
“There are some things that have happened in the last few weeks," he said, “that make you wonder if the situation is not more dire than is being presented.”
military.com · by 15 Sep 2022 Associated Press | By Nomaan Merchant · September 15, 2022
6. Fortress China: Xi Jinping’s plan for economic independence
The "formula" a China hand once provided to us at lecture: energy security = economic growth = domestic political stability = the CCP remaining in power.
Graphics at the link: https://www.ft.com/content/0496b125-7760-41ba-8895-8358a7f24685?63bac0e6-3d28-36b1-7417-423982f60790
Fortress China: Xi Jinping’s plan for economic independence
Beijing wants to become less dependent on the west — and especially on its technology. But how realistic is this self-sufficiency goal in a connected world?
Financial Times · by James Kynge · September 15, 2022
Tianjin Saixiang’s “nanoknife” may be a form of precision surgery, but it is indicative of a broad trend that is reshaping China’s economic relationship with the rest of the world.
Made by a little-known Chinese company, it is designed to target prostate cancer without invasive surgery. Tianjin Saixiang was given the official imprimatur of “little giant” in 2020, meaning it qualifies for preferential treatment in return for helping China to climb the technology ladder.
According to an executive at the company, who declined to be named, this Chinese version of a cutting-edge treatment is part of a drive to reduce the need for imported medical technologies. The government “requires local hospitals to, where possible, replace foreign medical equipment with domestic ones,” says the executive. “That is a boon for us.”
This month, Xi Jinping gave a speech about the urgent need for breakthroughs in domestic technology in order to outcompete the west and bolster national security. The experience of Tianjin Saixiang is one small example of the scale of the Chinese leader’s ambition.
Under Xi — who appears all but certain to secure another term in power next month — China is seeking to become a state-led and self-sufficient techno-superpower that will no longer rely so much on the west.
The underlying objective, say analysts, is to build a “fortress China” — re-engineering the world’s second-largest economy so it can run on internal energies and, if the need arises, withstand a military conflict. While many in the US want to “decouple” their economy from China, Beijing wants to become less dependent on the west — and especially on its technology.
The strategy has several constituent parts and — if successful — will take several years to realise, the analysts say. In technology, the aim is to spur domestic innovation and localise strategic aspects of the supply chain. In energy, the objective is to boost the deployment of renewables and reduce reliance on seaborne oil and gas. In food, the path to greater self-reliance includes revitalising the local seed industry. In finance, the imperative is to counter the potential weaponisation of the US dollar.
Such changes represent a clear challenge for many multinational companies, some of which derive the lion’s share of their global growth from China’s market.
China’s self-sufficiency drive has been building for a number of years but has been accelerated since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent western sanctions on Moscow.
Chen Zhiwu, a professor of finance at the University of Hong Kong, says Chinese leaders understand military conflicts may be “hard to avoid” if Beijing wants to unify Taiwan with the mainland.
“The comprehensive economic sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine have only added urgency to [China] achieving self-sufficiency in technology, finance, food and energy,” Chen adds. “Self-sufficiency as a phrase has regained currency in the party’s publications.”
Steve Tsang, a professor at Soas, University of London, warns the construction of “fortress China” does not mean Beijing is about to seal itself off from the outside world. As the global economy’s top trading power and one of the biggest recipients of foreign direct investment, such a course would amount to economic self-harm.
“Instead, [Xi] is building a series of moving fortresses or forward bases to advance China’s place in the world,” says Tsang. “They are above all about making China an innovative power with technologies that others will look to China for sharing, making them dependent on China.”
Heavy gamble on tech
Many of the changes being signalled as China prepares to host the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist party in mid-October have been foreshadowed or in train for some time. But the party congress appears likely to reaffirm and accelerate the pace of several such developments.
Xi’s remarks as he presided this month over a meeting of the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, one of the party bodies he uses to rule China, set out a clear vision for technology.
The development of “core technologies” was not something that could be left up to the free market but had to be led by China’s government. “It is necessary to strengthen the centralised and unified leadership of the [. . .] Central Committee and establish an authoritative decision-making command system [for technology],” the CCTV broadcast quoted Xi as saying.
In an indication of the importance that Xi attaches to this agenda, he appears set to pack the new Central Committee, which comprises about 200 of the most senior officials in China, with technocrats, rather than career bureaucrats, according to an analysis by Damien Ma, managing director of Macro Polo, a US-based think-tank.
These tech-savvy officials will then be responsible for overseeing what amounts to a huge gamble. China is pouring unprecedented resources into fostering technological self-reliance, especially in strategic industries such as semiconductors, in the hope that such funding will lead to innovation and import substitution.
In total, well over $150bn has been pledged to spur progress in semiconductors. A report last year by Semiconductor Industry Association, a grouping of US chipmakers, found that $39bn has already been invested by China’s National Integrated Circuits Fund largely in new manufacturing projects.
In addition, more than 15 local governments have announced funds worth a total of $25bn dedicated to the support of Chinese semiconductor companies. A further $50bn has been earmarked in the form of “government grants, equity investments and low-interest loans”, the SIA report said.
By comparison, the US plan to dispense $50bn to support its own domestic semiconductor industry looks much more modest.
Semiconductors are generally considered the Achilles heel of China’s industry. In 2020, it imported a whopping $378bn of semiconductors, a supply chain vulnerability perpetuated by the fact that 95 per cent of installed indigenous Chinese capacity is dedicated to making trailing-edge technology, the SIA report said.
Nevertheless, some notable breakthroughs have occurred. It emerged this summer that SMIC, one of China’s leading chipmakers, has successfully made a 7 nanometre chip, putting it just one or two “generations” behind industry leaders such as TSMC in Taiwan and Samsung in South Korea.
Several analysts, however, say that notwithstanding such progress and the huge funds that China has dedicated to the development of its chip industry, goals of full semiconductor self-reliance are delusional. The industry is so complex and interconnected that no country can stand alone.
“Self-sufficiency is a fantasy for any country, even ones as large as the US or China, when it comes to chips,” says Dan Wang, technology analyst for Gavekal Dragonomics based in Shanghai.
A second strand to China’s efforts to attain technology self-sufficiency comes in two interrelated areas — the state’s selection of potential champions such as Tianjin Saixiang and government backing for a strenuous push into venture capital.
China’s president Xi Jinping addresses workers on an oil platform off eastern China, where he said: ‘Our energy rice bowl must be held in our own hands’ © Xie Huanchi/Xinhua/Alamy
At a national meeting held this month in the eastern province of Jiangsu, China named 8,997 enterprises as “little giants”, putting them in line for tax breaks so they can help China compete with the US and other western powers.
Xi, in a letter to the meeting, said he hoped that such enterprises will “play a more important role in stabilising supply chains” — indicating his ambition that the “little giants” will help to indigenise China’s technology industry.
Support for such efforts can be found in Beijing’s assertion of increasing control over the country’s venture capital industry. In the past few years, China has overseen the establishment of more than 1,800 so-called government guidance funds, which have raised more than Rmb6tn ($900bn) to invest largely in tech sectors that Beijing deems “strategic”.
The funds’ salient feature is that they are mostly run by provincial and local governments or by state-owned enterprises. But here too analysts are sceptical over the long-term efficacy of Beijing’s attempts to “pick winners”.
An adviser to China’s government, who declined to be identified, says that several aspects of the “little giants” plan were flawed.
Companies had to be vetted by local governments in the first instance, opening up the potential for favouritism and corruption. At the same time, government officials can be poor assessors of a company’s prospects, especially when it involves technology that is hard to understand.
“The best way to identify . . . champions is to follow the rule of the survival of the fittest,” says the government adviser. “Any high-tech firm that grows big through competition should be viewed as a [candidate ‘little giant’]. It can’t be pre-determined by the government.”
Such concerns do not mean the “little giants” programme will fail in its objectives to foster greater self-reliance, but just that considerable waste and inefficiency may be built into the system.
Focus on renewables
At the intersection of geopolitics and technology lies another big vulnerability for China — the supply of energy. On a visit to an oilfield in northern China late last year, Xi made a clarion call that has echoed through the official media ever since.
“Our energy rice bowl must be held in our own hands,” he said.
With the country’s current energy self-sufficiency rate at about 80 per cent, that leaves some 20 per cent of supply — mostly in the form of imported oil and gas — relatively vulnerable to external shocks. China is particularly concerned about shipping routes through “chokepoints” such as the Strait of Malacca, where US naval power remains supreme.
Michal Meidan, a director at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, says Beijing is adopting an increased focus on renewables such as solar and wind as part of the solution.
“China looks at the global geopolitical situation and assesses the vulnerabilities around supply chains,” says Meidan. “Enhancing and entrenching its dominant position in renewable manufacturing and supply chains as well as its deployment domestically makes a lot of sense.”
This creates a reliable impetus behind renewable future deployment that is already at world-leading levels. Analysts say China is on track to achieve early a national plan to source about 33 per cent of its power from renewables by 2025. But it will be many years before its vulnerabilities over seaborne oil and gas imports are shored up, they added.
Key food battlefront
A more intractable dependency on the outside world comes in agriculture.
China’s food security has plummeted over the past three decades as its population has grown and agricultural land usage has shifted from grains to more lucrative crops. In 2021, only 33 per cent of the country’s total demand for the three main food oils — soyabean oil, peanut oil and rapeseed oil — was satisfied by domestic production, down from more than 100 per cent in the early 1990s.
Although successive Chinese leaders have stressed the vital importance of food security for years, analysts believe the language and tone has hardened under Xi.
That has been especially the case since the trade war rhetoric unleashed by the US under Donald Trump and the 2019 publication of the food security white paper by China’s State Council. Food security and national security have since been clearly conflated by senior leaders and the goal of staple food self-sufficiency increasingly described in similar terms to other “fortress China” ambitions.
Key policies on grain output focus on the need for ever greater yields, as well as greater protection of arable land, more efficient water use and other big water-saving projects. China aims to maintain its self-sufficiency in major grains, which reached over 95 per cent in 2019.
But the most important policy, according to analyst Trina Chen at Goldman Sachs, is the seed industry revitalisation plan, which Xi first promoted in 2021 and which urges greater efforts to achieve self-reliance.
The really key inflection point that will show food production coming under the “fortress China” bracket will be the introduction of the first generation of GM seeds in China — a shift that has been strongly resisted but which analysts now see as inevitable. (China only uses GM cotton at this point.) The attitude has shifted since the Chinese acquisition of Syngenta, the Swiss agritech group whose large business portfolio includes seeds and the development of domestic GM producers.
The dollar as a weapon
“Fortress China” calculations can also be seen in China’s attitude toward the dominance of the dollar. For Beijing, one of the most alarming features of the western sanctions on Russia was the exclusion of some of its financial institutions from Swift, a global messaging system that is central to international settlement.
Chinese officials have long warned of such a scenario. “When Americans . . . frequently use sanctions and over-emphasise the interests of the US while ignoring its international responsibilities, more and more nations hope to reduce their reliance on the dollar,” wrote Zhou Chengjun, director of the People’s Bank of China’s Institute of Finance, in May last year.
Vulnerability to this type of sanction arises because about three-quarters of China’s trade is invoiced in dollars — which means it relies on access to Swift.
Beijing’s solution can only be in the long term. Its efforts to “internationalise” the renminbi, its currency, have met with limited success so far. Similarly, efforts to promote a “digital renminbi” — which dispenses with the need to use platforms such as Swift’s — have been slow.
“Over the short run, Beijing has been at pains not to fall foul of western sanctions imposed on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, but also its focus on decoupling from the dollar has sharpened,” says Diana Choyleva, chief economist at Enodo Economics in London.
Solar panels cover hills in Shanxi province. Analysts say China is on track to achieve early a national plan to source about 33% of its power from renewables by 2025 © Sam McNeil/AP
China’s emphasis on self-reliance has been a long time coming. From about 2015 onwards, Xi’s administration placed increasing emphasis on self-reliance in industrial supply chains. That intensified with last year’s launch of China’s 14th “Five Year Plan” and the introduction of a policy called “dual circulation” — which stressed China’s need to rely on internal dynamism.
Since then, a rising tide of US sanctions on Chinese companies, geopolitical divisions flowing from China’s support for Russia in the war in Ukraine and a surge in tensions over Taiwan have reinforced the trends underpinning “fortress China”.
Such a heavy emphasis on domestic technology poses a significant risk to those multinational companies focused on supplying the Chinese market. According to one senior Asia banker, there is currently a massive disconnect in the boardrooms of western companies between their enthusiasm for the growth potential of their businesses in China and their silence on the geopolitical debate that is shaping the environment they have to operate in.
“A lot of the western companies blame themselves for not speaking up and making it clear what they think the business relationship between China and the west should look like,” says the banker. “But at the same time they feel pretty unable to do anything about that, because with things the way they are, what is the upside of being the company that speaks up?”
However, some analysts believe that for all the political slogans, there are still important limitations on the scope of the “fortress China” plans.
Yu Jie, a senior research fellow at Chatham House, a UK think-tank, argues that China cannot afford to completely isolate itself from the world due to its export-oriented structure. As a result, Beijing is likely to adopt a hybrid approach depending on the industry.
“Sectors with strategic importance and everyday necessities for the population will be treated as matters of national security,” says Yu, “whereas sectors that require foreign capital and manpower will remain open and interconnected to the world.”
Video: China's unseen war for strategic influence
Financial Times · by James Kynge · September 15, 2022
7. Putin’s NATO bungle
Excerpts:
With U.S. support for NATO and European security at a historic high, many might ask how sustainable this support will be over the longer term. Few in NATO have forgotten the histrionics under the previous administration in which former President Donald Trump repeatedly castigated the Alliance, even threatening to withdraw the U.S. from NATO.
Of course, no one knows what might happen in 2024, let alone if Trump were to be reelected. But public opinion tends to be far less fickle than many assume. Indeed, support for NATO among Americans has risen steadily over the past decade — though less so among Republicans. It’s one of the few issues on which large majorities, on both sides of the aisle, can agree — not only now, but also when Trump was in office.
Russia’s actions have only cemented American support for NATO. It has helped strengthen and unify the military alliance itself — hardly the outcome Putin sought.
Putin’s NATO bungle
Politico · by Ivo Daalder · September 16, 2022
From across the Pond
Russia’s actions have unwittingly cemented American support for both Europe and the Alliance, bolstering transatlantic solidarity.
Russia is now the most-sanctioned country in the world | Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images
By
September 16, 2022 4:46 am
Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin had high hopes for the invasion of his western neighbor earlier this year — he was going to bring all of Ukraine back into Russia’s fold; he was going to expand Russia’s influence throughout Eastern and Central Europe; he was going to fracture, if not force, the collapse of NATO.
In short, the Russian president was going to regain everything Russia had lost when the Soviet Union disintegrated, and reverse what he saw as “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.”
But Putin’s hopes have been brutally crushed, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may well turn out to be the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 21st century — at least as far as Russia is concerned.
Far from capturing Ukraine in a matter of weeks, Russia is now clearly on the defensive. Ukraine has recaptured more than 60,000 square kilometers of territory that Russia had occupied in the early weeks of the invasion. Russian soldiers are fleeing, their commanders are disorganized, and the army is now being resupplied from ammunition stocks sold by North Korea.
The larger strategic failure, however, is Russia’s declining influence throughout Europe, and the rebirth of transatlantic solidarity through a strengthened and more unified NATO, which Putin himself has unwittingly fostered.
Far from fracturing, NATO and the West as a whole have responded to the war with remarkable unity of effort. Russia is now the most sanctioned country in the world. And though Moscow may still hope to exploit Europe’s dependence on Russian gas as a weapon to force appeasement, it increasingly looks like alternative sources of supply and conservation measures will get the Continent through all but the harshest of winters.
Meanwhile, attitudes toward Russia have shifted dramatically, undergirding the strong and unified opposition to Moscow and its policies. That change is perhaps most notable in the U.S., where a new survey released by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows strong support for Europe and NATO.
For all the talk in Washington and elsewhere of an American pivot to Asia, Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has led Americans to pivot back to Europe. When asked which region they thought was most important to the future of U.S. military security, 50 percent said Europe — compared to 21 percent for Asia and 19 percent for the Middle East. Just two years ago, a bare 16 percent of Americans saw Europe as most important for U.S. security, compared to 61 percent for the Middle East.
Europe’s importance to Americans is also underscored by their view of NATO. In fact, the American public is now more committed to the Atlantic Alliance than in any time since our polling began nearly 50 years ago. Four in five Americans now want to either maintain (62 percent) or increase (19 percent) U.S. commitment to NATO. And while Democrats are most committed (at 90 percent), so are three-quarters of Republicans and Independents.
Since earlier this year, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has substantially increased commitment to NATO, deploying about 25 percent more troops, aircraft, mechanized vehicles and naval vessels, many far forward in the east.
Americans greatly favor such a long-term presence in Europe, with two out three supporting long-term bases in Germany (68 percent), the Baltic states (65 percent), and Poland (62 percent). In the case of Germany and Poland, those numbers are up by nearly 60 percent when compared to a decade ago.
Just as important is the fact that American support for NATO enlargement is as strong as ever. This, despite — or perhaps even because of — Moscow blaming NATO’s decision to bring Central and Eastern European countries into its fold for instability in Europe, as well as for its invasion of Ukraine.
Moscow’s actions even convinced Finland and Sweden to cast off their century’s old commitments to neutrality and apply to join NATO, with Alliance leaders inviting both countries to join last June, and the U.S. Senate voting 95-1 to approve their accession last month.
Three-quarters of Americans who were polled, favor bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO, thereby committing the U.S. to defend countries that, in the case of Finland, share a 1,400-kilometer land border with Russia. More remarkably, 73 percent of Americans would favor giving Ukraine NATO membership, and a surprising four in 10 favor sending U.S. troops to defend Ukraine today — even though Biden and NATO leaders have specifically ruled that out.
With U.S. support for NATO and European security at a historic high, many might ask how sustainable this support will be over the longer term. Few in NATO have forgotten the histrionics under the previous administration in which former President Donald Trump repeatedly castigated the Alliance, even threatening to withdraw the U.S. from NATO.
Of course, no one knows what might happen in 2024, let alone if Trump were to be reelected. But public opinion tends to be far less fickle than many assume. Indeed, support for NATO among Americans has risen steadily over the past decade — though less so among Republicans. It’s one of the few issues on which large majorities, on both sides of the aisle, can agree — not only now, but also when Trump was in office.
Russia’s actions have only cemented American support for NATO. It has helped strengthen and unify the military alliance itself — hardly the outcome Putin sought.
8. U.S.-Japan Defense Leaders Look to Strengthen Rules-Based Order
U.S.-Japan Defense Leaders Look to Strengthen Rules-Based Order
defense.gov · by JIM GARAMONE
News Sept. 14, 2022 | BY , DOD News
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III told Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of security in the Indo-Pacific and pledged to make the already close alliance even closer.
The two men met and held meetings in the Pentagon today. While the two have spoken before, this is Hamada's first meeting with Austin. Hamada previously served as defense minister in 2008-2009.
Honor Cordon
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III hosts an honor cordon welcoming Japan's Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada to the Pentagon, Sept. 14, 2022.
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Austin said the United States and Japan are bound together by ties of friendship and trust. The two nations also share common interests and a belief in democracy.
"We also share a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and a rules-based international order," the secretary said. "But China's recent aggressive behavior and Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, are serious challenges to that vision."
Austin minced no words in discussing the threats in the globe today. "Let's be clear, China's coercive actions in the Taiwan Strait, and the waters surrounding Japan are provocative, destabilizing and aggressive," he said. "Our response, together with Japan and our other allies and partners, had been responsible, steady and resolute."
Austin emphasized America's commitment to the defense of Japan saying it includes "our commitment to credible and resilient extended deterrence, using the full range of our conventional and nuclear capabilities."
In Formation
A formation of C-130J Super Hercules fly to the Fuji Training Center, Japan, before a taking part in a container delivery system bundle drop, as part of the Airborne 22 exercise earlier this year.
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Japan Ground Self-Defense Force soldiers bound between buildings during a simulated combat assault as part of exercise Iron Fist 2022 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif., Jan. 14, 2022.
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Hamada agreed, saying through a translator that no country has the right to change the rules-based order unilaterally.
Hamada also wants to work closely with the United States to modernize the overall alliance and, specifically, Japanese military capabilities.
Austin said the two leaders would discuss ways to bolster the free and open Indo-Pacific and said the United States would like to deepen cooperation with other like-minded nations, "including building upon recent trilateral engagements with South Korea and Australia."
Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Focus-on-Indo-Pacific/
Defense Secretary Austin Japan China Indo-Pacific
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9. The Weaponization of Capital (by China)
Read the entire memo with graphics here: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/09/15/the-weaponization-of-capital-chinas-private-equity-venture-capital/
September 15, 2022 | Memo
The Weaponization of Capital
Strategic Implications of China’s Private Equity/Venture Capital Playbook
Emily de La Bruyère
Senior Fellow
Nathan Picarsic
Senior Fellow
FDD | The Weaponization of Capital
fdd.org · by Emily de La Bruyère Senior Fellow · September 15, 2022
Executive Summary
Private equity and venture capital — and the capital flows they represent — are relatively new and increasingly important vehicles for accessing innovation, information, and influence. China may be penetrating this realm in nuanced ways that the U.S. security apparatus has yet to fully understand, let alone address.
U.S. policy makers have long recognized the risks of capital flowing into the United States. More recent efforts have also begun to grapple with national security risks related to capital flowing from the United States to China. Regrettably, this recognition and related efforts have had minimal effect. They amount to little more than lip service, particularly when it comes to private market capital flows, which are less regulated than public market capital flows.
The strategic role of private market capital flows is a novel and largely overlooked aspect of geopolitical competition. Private equity and venture capital were not institutionalized asset classes during the Cold War. But Chinese political and economic leaders appear to grasp the importance of these fields and how they could have outsized influence in the current U.S.-China competition. Yet this is a field of widespread opacity, and it is difficult to reach definitive conclusions about exposure to foreign capital in these capital flows without first achieving greater transparency and improving frameworks for studying these risks.
This paper documents trends in Chinese participation in U.S. private market investments — and corresponding risks. Contrary to common assumptions, Chinese inbound investment has not decreased in the wake of heightened U.S.-China geopolitical tension. And regardless of absolute deal flow, the avenues for inbound Chinese capital have expanded: The sub-surface space of limited partnership stakes in U.S.- or third-party-domiciled general partnerships has grown steadily over the past decade. These investments are not subject to review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). As a result, they provide Chinese entities with access to private equity and venture capital funds that back high-growth technology companies. In addition to access to technology and innovation, these investments also offer tremendous influence.
This memo reviews examples of limited partnership stakes in private equity taken by the likes of China’s largest sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation. It also explores allocations of Chinese capital into leading venture capital funds in Silicon Valley. The report further provides clear examples of the access that Beijing’s indirect capital allocations can provide.
China has updated its strategy for allocating capital for returns, technology acquisition, and influence to tap the strategic value of private market pools of capital. U.S. policy has not. This asymmetry raises several challenges that necessitate the following policy recommendations:
- The definition of covered transactions for CFIUS reviews should be amended to include limited partnership stakes that provide indirect access to critical and emerging technologies. Similarly, CFIUS and other regulatory tools for monitoring foreign influence and control should align the standard for “controlling investments” with the reality of today’s critical technology. Informational rights afforded to investors today mean as much as board seats and operational control meant in decades past.
- The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should expand disclosure requirements for private market investment vehicles to require, at a minimum, reporting on investments received from limited partners with ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the Chinese entities that oversee Beijing’s “military-civil fusion” strategy.
- Federal and state-level investment authorities, including but not limited to employee pension funds, should mandate that fund managers conduct due diligence to guarantee that public and public-employee funds are not supporting the CCP’s military modernization, illicit technology acquisition campaign, or programs of surveillance and human rights abuses.
- New modes of public-private partnership should be explored to share information on Chinese investment patterns and objectives. Information sharing among U.S. and allied funds can serve to block inbound capital seeking influential limited partnership stakes. Over time, information sharing should also serve an offensive purpose in aiding both private- and public-sector resource allocators to fill vacuums that may result from the elimination of inbound Chinese capital.
10. Who held defense stocks while making national security policy? - Responsible Statecraft
Who held defense stocks while making national security policy? - Responsible Statecraft
responsiblestatecraft.org · by Nick Cleveland-Stout · September 16, 2022
Conflicts of interest
Who held defense stocks while making national security policy?
Though all of the lawmakers in a recent analysis deny any impropriety, the capacity for competing interests is clear.
September 16, 2022
Written by
Nick Cleveland-Stout
Who held defense stocks while making national security policy?
The New York Times reported this week found that 97 members of Congress “bought or sold stocks, bonds, or other financial assets that intersected with their congressional work or reported similar transactions by their spouse or a dependent child” between 2019 and 2021. With more than 3,700 such trades in those three years alone, the investigation reveals potential conflicts of interest in nearly every area of policymaking.
Defense policy is no different. At least 25 members sat on committees that shape national security policy while simultaneously trading financial assets in companies that could create competing interests with their work, such as defense stock. With a near-even party split, Democrats and Republicans may have found a rare instance of common ground.
The majority of these members sat on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees — the committees responsible for the budget and oversight of the Department of Defense.
The list includes the former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, James Inhofe (R-Okla.), who bought and sold shares of technology companies as they fought over a $10 billion cloud computing contract with the Pentagon, which eventually went to Microsoft. When the Pentagon later decided to cancel the contract, House Armed Services Committee member Rep. Pat Fallon (R-Texas) sold up to $250,000 worth of Microsoft stock two weeks before it was publically announced. Fallon served on the subcommittee which oversaw the deal, though a spokesperson said at the time that he had “absolutely no prior knowledge the Pentagon intended to cancel” the contract.
It also includes Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), who reported more trades than any other member of Congress. Though they were “made by trusts in the name of his wife and young children,” these trades spanned all of the top five weapons contractors — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman — which could conflict with his role as a member of the House Armed Services Committee. Khanna has been an opponent of overspending on the Pentagon, an indication that there is not always a straight line between stock ownership and votes on the budget. But that is decidedly not the case with many other members who cash in on defense stocks while wielding power in favor of bigger defense spending.
Members of the Foreign Affairs, Homeland Security, Intelligence, and Appropriations committees also reported trades that could constitute a conflict of interest.
John Rutherford (R-Fla.), for instance, traded Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, and BAE Systems stock while sitting on the House Appropriations subcommittee responsible for determining the Department of Homeland Security’s funding. All three of those companies have been awarded contracts with the Department of Homeland Security. Rutherford then bought Raytheon stock the day that Russia invaded Ukraine, a company that has also been awarded contracts by the Department of Homeland Security.
The New York Times analysis defines a potential conflict of interest fairly narrowly, only focusing on stock trades in companies relevant to committee assignments. Given the daunting task of assembling such a comprehensive list, it is also limited to that three-year span. As a result, it doesn’t include instances like Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.) picking up Raytheon stock the day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, or Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) buying Lockheed Martin stock the day before. By the Times’ own admission, “the analysis is surely an undercount.”
Though all of these lawmakers deny any impropriety, the capacity for competing interests is clear; Congress continues to approve defense budgets beyond what even the Pentagon even asks for, more than half of which goes to private contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which could in turn privately benefit members of Congress invested in those stocks.
This could create a perverse incentive structure when taking into account that when global tensions rise, defense stocks tend to follow suit. War is often good for defense companies’ bottom line; Jon Schwartz noted in the Intercept last year that “defense stocks outperformed the stock market overall by 58 percent during the Afghanistan War.” Some members of the defense industry even acknowledge this connection, as Raytheon CEO Greg Hayes did during an earnings call earlier this year:
“We are seeing, I would say, opportunities for international sales. We just have to look to last week where we saw the drone attack in the UAE, which have attacked some of their other facilities. And of course, the tensions in Eastern Europe, the tensions in the South China Sea, all of those things are putting pressure on some of the defense spending over there. So I fully expect we’re going to see some benefit from it.”
Pressure is mounting for Congress to seriously consider self-regulation of stock trading. Seventy percent of Americans support banning lawmakers from trading stocks, including a majority of both Democratic and Republican voters. To date, at least six different bills have been proposed to limit the ability of members of Congress to trade stock.
Despite the popularity of these measures, self-regulation is always a tall order. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) went on record saying that limiting lawmakers’ ability to trade stocks would be “ridiculous” and that “it would really cut back on the amount of people that would want to come up here and serve.” Tuberville himself traded stock of major defense contractors such as Honeywell and General Dynamics while sitting on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Confidence in Congress sits in the single digits, as overinvestment in the Pentagon has come at the underinvestment in healthcare, education, and addressing the climate crisis. Even if lawmakers defend their trades as routine, the goal should be to eliminate both the appearance and reality of conflict in setting national security priorities.
11. Putin’s Next Move in Ukraine
Excerpts:
As they wait for Putin’s response to Ukraine’s successes, whatever it will be, the United States and Europe should keep providing Ukraine with the support it needs to stay in the fight and, most of all, to remain on the offensive. At the same time, Germany and France can use telephone diplomacy, despite its awkwardness, to convey to Putin the futility of his war and of his attempts to undermine support for Ukraine by engineering energy crises in Europe and hunger crises globally. In case Putin escalates and resorts to nuclear threats, the West should not be intimidated. It should remind Russia of the invisible rules of the war: that neither side wants to turn this conventional war into a wider NATO-Russian confrontation. A nuclear escalation would violate these rules and could lead to NATO involvement. It would be to everybody’s detriment.
Ukraine’s successes have opened a solid path to constructing a Ukraine too strong for Russia to attack in the future. That is a substantial achievement. The unresolved question is how Putin will attempt to manage Russia’s bleak position, with what military purpose and with what political message. To give up, he would have to reinvent himself politically. To mobilize he would have to reinvent the Russia he has been creating since coming to power in 2000, the Russia saved from the chaos of the 1990s, the Russia that was ushering in a stable, consumption-oriented middle class, the Russia in which a private life (far away from politics) was a pleasant pastime. By invading, Putin thought he would push Zelensky’s Ukraine into the abyss. He may in fact have done this to his own regime.
Putin’s Next Move in Ukraine
Mobilize, Retreat, or Something In-Between?
September 16, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · September 16, 2022
For the first time in the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin must contend with the serious prospect of losing it. Early setbacks around Kyiv and Chernigov had been balanced by Russian gains in the south and the east; they could be justified as tactical retreats and thus as Russian choices, regardless of whether they truly were. By contrast, the near rout of Russian soldiers in the Kharkiv region on September 10—and the rapid reconquest by Ukrainian forces of territory spanning some 2,000 square miles in the east and south—clearly showed that Ukraine was on top and that Russian troops may continue to fall to future such offensives. Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive destroyed the illusion of Russian invincibility. It has also heralded a new stage in the West’s expectations. Suddenly, Western leaders and strategists have been able to contemplate Ukraine gaining the upper hand in this war. This shift in perspective seems certain to unleash a new dynamic of military support for Ukraine. The argument that Ukraine should sue for peace, rather than keep fighting, has been refuted.
But the perspective has changed most dramatically for Russia, and this entails significant new risks for both Ukraine and the West. Since the failure of his lightning strike to take Kyiv in February 2022, Putin has been keeping two balls in the air. One is sustaining the war for the long term with a peacetime Russian army, having surmised that Ukraine’s military is weaker and that a prolonged war favors Russia. The other ball is ensuring that Russian society remains insulated from the war, on the assumption that Putin can maintain high levels of domestic support as long as ordinary Russians are not exposed to the war’s costs. Ukraine’s battlefield successes around Kharkiv, however, have dramatically upset these calculations.
Putin is now confronted with a set of harsh choices. He can keep Russia’s military commitment limited, maintaining current troop levels and continuing to insulate Russian society, or he can order a mass mobilization. Either option poses a serious threat to Putin’s legitimacy. In choosing the former, Putin would give up the prospect of Russian victory and run the risk of outright defeat. Already, the nationalist pro-war forces he has released have become more and more dissatisfied with the conduct of the war. They had been promised land and glory in a rapid campaign. Instead, they have received a staggering death toll for minor territorial advances, which now look increasingly precarious. Continuing the status quo could create dangerous new fissures in Putin’s regime.
Mobilization, on the other hand, would radically upset the Kremlin’s careful management of the war at home. Dramatically increasing Russia’s manpower might seem a logical choice for a country with a population that is three times the size of Ukraine’s, but the war’s popularity has depended on it being far away. Even the Russian terminology for war, the “special military operation,” has been a hedge, an obfuscation. Despite the Kremlin’s rhetoric of “denazification,” for the Russian population the Ukraine war is entirely unlike the direct, existential struggle that Russia endured in World War II. By announcing a mobilization, the Kremlin would risk domestic opposition to a war that most Russians are unprepared to fight.
Of course, Putin may choose neither of these options. He may seek to change the war by finding a middle way between full mobilization and continuing the status quo. Though he is a self-styled man of action, Putin tends to be indecisive when the stakes are high, preferring to step into situations without ever resolving them. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia moved into eastern Ukraine, signed a diplomatic agreement, and then dithered for years, neither advancing nor retreating. In Syria, Russia made its move in 2015, backing up Bashar al-Assad militarily and turning the tide in his favor. But Syria remains up in the air, with a political solution to the war entirely out of sight.
Putin has damaged his regime not just by opening his military to setbacks around Kharkiv but by matching extravagant political aims in Ukraine to meager and inefficiently marshaled means. In Ukraine, any of the options now confronting Putin will have significant consequences. Whatever his next move, Europe and the United States should continue supplying the Ukrainian army with the tools it needs most to stay on the offensive. But they must also consider more far-reaching implications for a regime that might be facing growing pressure at home while it seeks new ways to inflict maximum pain on Ukraine and its allies. For Putin, desperate times will not call for reasoned measures.
An Imperial Call to Battle
A decision by Putin to mobilize the Russian population, to institute a draft and to call hundreds of thousands of new soldiers, would raise stark new challenges for both Russia and the West. Even if only partial, a Kremlin-ordered mobilization would amount to a full recognition that the country is at war. It would also make that war existential for Russia. Until now, the invasion of Ukraine has not even been presented as a war to most of the Russian population. It has been termed a military operation, which has in practice been a war of choice built on delusional overconfidence and false assumptions about Ukraine and about Ukraine’s allies and partners. With mobilization, however, Russia would be publicly investing itself in a major war. Choice would be transformed into necessity and the “special operation” into a war that all Russians would need to fight and win. Such a decision would probably make a defeat unacceptable for the Russian leadership, rendering the prospect of a negotiated outcome even more unlikely.
This course would be risky for Putin. Russia’s military performance to date hardly suggests that throwing more soldiers into the fight would yield better results for Moscow. In addition, training soldiers would take time, and Russia would need to provide a commensurate increase in military equipment. At the same time, by bringing in many Russians who have no interest in fighting, mobilization could exacerbate rather than resolve problems of morale for the Russian army. Above all, whether full or partial, a mobilization does not necessarily mean victory for Russia. Mobilization would need to be tied to achievable strategic ends.
In pursuing mobilization, Putin would have to address these military perils while keeping on board those militarist and nationalist constituencies that have been empowered by the war and that would certainly welcome this move. The military peril is one of timing. In addition to receiving adequate training, new recruits would need to be integrated into fighting units, which would take many months—at a time when Russia’s officer corps is tied up at the front and whose members have already been dying in high numbers. And with each passing month, as a Putin-ordered mobilization gets underway, arms and assistance will be pouring into Ukraine and the Ukrainian military will be consolidating its strength. If Russia tries to wait out the winter and to launch a new offensive in the spring with fresh forces, it would be against a country that is much more prepared and battle hardened than it was in February 2022.
It is better to have a foolish small war than a foolish big war.
For Putin, however, maintaining broad domestic support during mobilization could prove equally difficult. From the Kremlin’s perspective, during the first six months of the war, Putin got his domestic politics right. In the absence of a general mobilization, the Kremlin’s true believers and Russian nationalists could still thrill to a war of conquest, to a settling of scores with the West. As for the many Russians who initially had no animus against Ukraine and were taken aback by the war, many of them, with the Kremlin’s active encouragement, could simply ignore what was happening. For them, it was a special operation that should be left to the specialists. Mobilization, however, would render it impossible to keep the war out of the daily life of urban Russians. Having been schooled in disengagement from politics by the Putin regime, they would now have to be mobilized emotionally. They would have to accept that their fathers, brothers, and sons could die in battle. Demanding such a large-scale shift in attitude from the Russian population could easily backfire for Putin.
Mobilization would not solve the flawed logic of the war. Doubling down on a strategic mistake doubles the mistake. Mobilization as such would do nothing to minimize the essential strategic miscalculation of Putin’s decision to launch the invasion. It would not reverse the many ways in which the war runs counter to Russian economic and security interests. In this regard, the political dilemma Putin faces about mobilization relates directly to the nature of the war. Historically, Russia has proved a formidable adversary when attacked by outside forces: both Napoleon and Hitler underestimated the depth and resolve of Russian forces when they chose to invade Russia. But like the United States and many other countries, Russia has struggled with wars of choice. The Russo-Japanese war of 1905—which began when diplomacy over Korea broke down and which Tsar Nicholas II prolonged for the sake of Russian honor—ended badly for Moscow. So did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. (And in both cases, the wars unfolded without the added pressures of mass mobilization.) In contrast to rallying the public for a war of national defense, mobilization in the name of an ill-conceived imperial project is a recipe for domestic political unrest. It is better to have a foolish small war than a foolish big war.
For Ukraine and the West, a Russian mobilization would be a psychological shock at first. The weaknesses of the Russian army will continue to benefit Ukraine, but a mobilization would signal a renewed resolve by the Russian leadership to stave off defeat at any cost—even the cost of domestic support. If Putin goes all in, the West will have to once again assess his state of mind and the potential for major military escalation.
Pulling Back and Prolonging
Another option available to Putin is some form of retreat. In choosing this path, he would have to give up on the prospect of a genuine victory. He could seek to keep the war going, reducing commitments to the minimum needed to hold the territory already gained in the east and south. He could return to his 2014 approach to eastern Ukraine—keeping occupied territory under Russian control but without advances, thereby destabilizing the entire country—but with a much greater Russian military presence. Giving up on victory, however, would mean halting offensive operations. Putin would never admit that he was giving up. He would suggest that the war will escalate later, that his designs on Ukraine have not changed, that his claim on success will derive from his strategic patience. He would have to rely on Russians’ desire to go about their lives unperturbed by a continual state of war. For this, Russia would need to maintain enough of a stalemate in eastern Ukraine for Russians to go on ignoring the war. That may or may not be achievable given Ukraine’s recent gains. Going forward, Kyiv will do everything it can not to furnish Russia with a politically convenient stalemate.
For Putin, faced with dramatic Russian military setbacks, it would be no easy task to sell military inaction to the Russian public. Until now, the Kremlin has relied on the myth of his army’s invincibility and the narrative of a defensive war to fuel support for the “special operation.” Over time, however, a stalled venture, much reduced in ambition, might expose the futility of a war that has already resulted in an estimated 70,000 to 80,000 Russian dead and wounded. Even if the current figure is not widely known in Russia, more and more families will be affected by the war. Such a venture would also leave Russia’s military and security apparatus increasingly under attack for their failure to deliver the promised victory. Some of their members would be thirsting for another chance—perhaps with another leader.
At the same time, in seeking to maintain a stalemate, Putin will have to reckon with Ukrainian forces that are not standing still. Ukraine’s prowess will continue to grow with more and better weapon deliveries. Under Zelensky’s leadership, Ukrainians want to win this war. Any serious miscalculation by Russia could lead to another devastating defeat, which might be definitive. Ukraine has every incentive not to allow Russia to dig in, though the slow progress of Ukraine’s counteroffensive around Kherson shows that not every offensive move of Ukraine’s will necessarily be as successful as the recent one around Kharkiv.
Dirtier and More Dangerous
Given the domestic risks associated with both mobilization and retreat, Putin may well try to find a middle way. For Ukraine and the West, this option would be less dangerous than a full mobilization but still a serious challenge in the next months and years. Searching for new ways to prosecute the war without the risks of mobilization, Putin could have several courses of action. He might try to muddle through with covert mobilization—forcibly recruiting volunteers, conscripts, and Wagner mercenaries, such as prisoners from Russian penal colonies. He might unleash new acts of terror against the Ukrainian population, for example by hitting critical infrastructure, such as energy and water supplies, to break the will of the population as winter approaches. He might also increase attacks on essential civilian targets, such as hospitals and schools, and resort to uglier attacks, such as thermobaric weapons, which have a devastating effect on their surroundings. In short, he can try to repeat the extreme tactics that he used in Syria. At the same time, to shore up his support, Putin might find new ways to repress dissent and prosecute “traitors” at home.
Choosing this middle way would be typical of Putin’s indecisiveness in tense situations. Instead of an announced mobilization, he can use modest new resources to achieve small successes against Ukraine in areas where Russia’s position is strongest. He can also wreak havoc in parts of Ukraine that are not directly exposed to fighting, by attacking critical infrastructure, disrupting any sense of normality across Ukraine, and doing what he can to block U.S. and European efforts to assist in reconstruction. In doing so, Putin would attempt to preserve the atmosphere of danger that has haunted Ukraine since February 2022. If he has trouble controlling the narrative at home, since this was once a war that Russia was supposed to win easily, he can use force to crush dissent. For this, his government is well equipped.
This middle way will require resolve and patience from the West. Putin will bet on dwindling support for Ukraine from Europe and the West as they struggle with an energy crisis throughout at least the coming winter. An increasingly brutal war in Ukraine could lead to more calls to end hostilities regardless of the conditions imposed on Ukraine. Even if European countries do not pressure Kyiv explicitly, they might limit the military support with the argument that their own stocks and economic capabilities are overstretched. Ukraine’s successes in the Kharkiv region will postpone this kind of war fatigue for a while. But it is unclear whether Ukraine can repeat its success and the morale boost that it gave to its own population and Western audiences.
Western Patience, a Russian Precipice
For both Ukraine and its Western allies, it would be preferable for Russia not to mobilize. A better outcome is for Putin to give up on the prospect of victory. But the means for influencing Putin’s choices are limited. One is to maintain the status quo, in which the provision of weapons and intelligence have helped the Ukrainian military prosper. Ukrainians have already proved that their political system is durable enough to sustain the war effort. They have already proved that they have excellent fighting ability and capable military leadership. The coupling of these internal strengths with the sophisticated weaponry the West is increasingly prepared to supply intimidated Russian soldiers around Kharkiv. Whether it has also intimidated the Kremlin is anyone’s guess, but the Kremlin can only ignore Ukraine’s growing military strength for so long. The greater this strength, the less Russia can accomplish in Ukraine. Day by day, Ukraine is acquiring deterrent power.
Given this emerging reality, the West can hope that Putin might internalize the logic of Russia’s limits and of Ukraine’s capacities. In the best case, Putin would accept the tactical and strategic setbacks that began in early September not in apocalyptic terms but as the outcome of military choices that will define the scope and aims of eventual negotiations. Ukraine has significantly improved its negotiation position in recent days and weeks. Russia has not yet acknowledged the changed balance of power and has not yet toned down its demands, but it might benefit from doing so in the future, when confronted with the war’s rapidly diminishing returns. Were Putin to give up on victory by giving up on offensive operations, even if—as is likely—he refuses to negotiate, it would be a partial victory for Ukraine and a partial victory for the West. As such it might seem unsatisfying. Relative to where Ukraine was on February 24, 2022, however, it would be a superb outcome.
If Russia does mobilize, Ukraine and the West must stay calm and build on the successes of the past seven months. Putin’s Russia has been unable to develop a clear concept for its war, unable to learn from its mistakes, and unable to execute many of the functions of a world-class military. Mobilization per se would change none of this. The greatest dangers of mobilization might well relate to Russia more than to Ukraine. Russians might resist mobilization, in which case the regime would start to crumble, as the tsarist government did in 1917. Or Russia might well be defeated after a full mobilization, a debacle Putin would not survive. Beyond the Kremlin walls, this might sound like a happy ending, but a collapsed Russia would also upend the international system as we know it and lead to instability well beyond its borders. Nobody can predict what kind of regime might follow the collapse of a Putinist state in Russia.
Day by day, Ukraine is acquiring deterrent power.
As they wait for Putin’s response to Ukraine’s successes, whatever it will be, the United States and Europe should keep providing Ukraine with the support it needs to stay in the fight and, most of all, to remain on the offensive. At the same time, Germany and France can use telephone diplomacy, despite its awkwardness, to convey to Putin the futility of his war and of his attempts to undermine support for Ukraine by engineering energy crises in Europe and hunger crises globally. In case Putin escalates and resorts to nuclear threats, the West should not be intimidated. It should remind Russia of the invisible rules of the war: that neither side wants to turn this conventional war into a wider NATO-Russian confrontation. A nuclear escalation would violate these rules and could lead to NATO involvement. It would be to everybody’s detriment.
Ukraine’s successes have opened a solid path to constructing a Ukraine too strong for Russia to attack in the future. That is a substantial achievement. The unresolved question is how Putin will attempt to manage Russia’s bleak position, with what military purpose and with what political message. To give up, he would have to reinvent himself politically. To mobilize he would have to reinvent the Russia he has been creating since coming to power in 2000, the Russia saved from the chaos of the 1990s, the Russia that was ushering in a stable, consumption-oriented middle class, the Russia in which a private life (far away from politics) was a pleasant pastime. By invading, Putin thought he would push Zelensky’s Ukraine into the abyss. He may in fact have done this to his own regime.
- LIANA FIX is Program Director in the International Affairs Department of the Körber Foundation and was previously a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
- MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2014 to 2016, he served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio.
Foreign Affairs · by Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage · September 16, 2022
12. "All Invaded People Want to Resist": Steinbeck's The Moon is Down (Dusty Shelves)
I just reread this book over the summer, (I have a copy on my iPad) I would love to find someone from north Korea to write a novel of resistance in north Korea along the lines of Steinbeck's book. We need to find authors who are willing to follow in Steinbeck's footsteps.
Note that Steinbeck wrote this book with General Donovan's encouragement. This is an excerpt from a blog - The Moon is Down – Precision Propaganda Prose at this link: https://chronicchronicler.wordpress.com/2014/05/07/the-moon-is-down-precision-propaganda-prose/
So let’s get into some history then some overview so you can get the gist of what was going on and what the story is about. So according to Donald V. Coers (the gentleman who wrote the introduction to my copy of The Moon is Down), Steinbeck served voluntarily in several US government intelligence agencies between 1940 and 1942 out of concern of the Nazis. It was during this time that he met Colonel William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan, who was head of the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and the Office for Strategic Services (OSS), both of which would merge to become the CIA.
It was while Steinbeck was working at the COI that Donovan and Steinbeck began discussions on using his literary talents to make a propaganda piece. From these talks, and gathering information on refugees from Norway, Denmark, France, Belgium and the Netherlands about underground activities against the Nazi invaders. It was this that inspired him to write his book and, after several drafts, The Moon is Down was published in 1942.
It can be accessed and read online for free at this link: https://www.onlinereadfreebooks.com/en/The-Moon-Is-Down-990474/1
“ALL INVADED PEOPLE WANT TO RESIST”: STEINBECK’S THE MOON IS DOWN (DUSTY SHELVES)
warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Rick Chersicla · September 16, 2022
The nearly uncontested conquest of the town at the center of the novella is thanks in part to a collaborator in their midst, a prominent townsperson who had set the conditions that ensured a smooth entry for the invading force.
Most readers likely associate John Steinbeck with mandatory High School assignments—The Grapes of Wrath, or perhaps Of Mice and Men—and are not aware of his work during the Second World War. Steinbeck served as a war correspondent in England and in Italy, and much of his wartime writing (both fiction and nonfiction) was borne out of his own experiences and observations. One of his lesser known works is his short classic of resilience and civil resistance, The Moon is Down.
Published in 1942, The Moon is Down is set in an unnamed Northern European country, where an invader (with some very thinly veiled similarities to Nazi Germany) rapidly overcomes the people of a mining town and their miniscule local militia. The nearly uncontested conquest of the town at the center of the novella is thanks in part to a collaborator in their midst, a prominent townsperson who had set the conditions that ensured a smooth entry for the invading force. The book does not focus on the invasion however, and contains no battle scenes, but centers rather on how people cope with occupation, and the social dynamics at play within resistance movements.
Shaken by their rapid capitulation and immediate occupation, the townspeople do not know precisely how to interact with their initially benevolent invaders, and are vexed as to how to feel about the new status quo. The town is isolated from the rest of the country, and the local leaders grapple with what the appropriate behavior is for an occupied people. The commanding officer of the invading force, a Colonel Lanser, is obligated by his orders to administer the town through collaborating local authorities. As a result, the mayor is not removed, but remains the face of the local government as Colonel Lanser and his staff attempt to keep the town peaceful and the townspeople docile by governing through familiar leaders. The invaders need the town for its natural resources—particularly coal, and to get it the townspeople must be cooperative with the occupying force.
Colonel Lanser initially has an ironically cordial relationship with the Mayor given the circumstances, until the Mayor finds his courage and begins to assert himself. The emboldened local leader tries to warn the Colonel that the townspeople may not accept their current condition as a lasting one, and reminds Lanser that “the one impossible job is to break a man’s spirit permanently.” Colonel Lanser himself is a semi-tragic figure, torn between his lessons of the last war, and his orders—leading the occupation only grudgingly. He counsels caution to the younger officers, and is a pragmatic if not somewhat melancholy figure. The experienced Colonel expects resentment (“there are no peaceful people” he remembers), and understands that a strong response to resistance or acts of sabotage will only begin a cycle of reprisals and resistance. When one of his officers is killed after trying to force a townsperson to work, the Colonel sees the “spark that can burst into flame” ignite an earnest resistance—“so it begins!” he proclaims.
The dichotomy between the older generation who has seen the human cost of war, and the younger ones, full of faith in their system and their cause, is the most interesting theme of the book.
Slowly, both overt and deniable acts of sabotage slow down progress for the occupiers. The local miners “make mistakes” and machinery breaks, and eventually outside sponsors send dynamite in by parachute to cut the railroad. The occupiers’ reactions to mounting resistance are split between the experienced Colonel, and the naïve younger members of his staff. The dichotomy between the older generation who has seen the human cost of war, and the younger ones, full of faith in their system and their cause, is the most interesting theme of the book. Tensions build as Lanser and his staff lurch into to a familiar historical pattern: the seemingly inevitable cycle of occupation, resistance, and violence.
Steinbeck tells the story of the psychological changes within the town as resistance mounts, as the originally confident conquerors begin to fear the townspeople. Some of Colonel Lanser’s staff begin to lose faith—first in their mission, but then also in their domestic leadership. “Is this place conquered?” asks one of the younger officers of his Captain. When his Captain replies with “Of course,” the doubting Lieutenant begins to unravel: “Conquered and we’re afraid, conquered and we’re surrounded.” His once-total faith shaken, the previously confident Lieutenant observes that they’ve moved “conquest after conquest, deeper and deeper into molasses.” Hysterical, the Lieutenant has a new perspective on the war, and can see new headlines: “Flies conquer the flypaper. Flies capture two hundred miles of new flypaper!”
The Moon is Down is a quick, worthwhile, and timely read. It is not one of dramatic battle scenes, but rather an examination of how the Mayor and the townspeople grapple with what it means to be free, and their obligations as free people and citizens. Criticized as propaganda by some, it is worth noting that the novella was clandestinely printed in or smuggled into multiple occupied countries by 1944, inspiring the will to resist across Europe. After World War II, Steinbeck was even recognized by the Norwegian King due to the perceived impact of The Moon is Down in Norway. It is difficult to read this classic work in 2022, however, and think of Norway, or World War II, but rather of Ukraine. Are there Russian soldiers wondering now if “the flies have captured the flypaper”? Time will tell.
Rick Chersicla is an Army Strategist currently serving in a joint headquarters in Europe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Troops of the Wehrmacht, the military forces of Nazi Germany, in Oslo, Norway on April 9, 1940, the first day of the German invasion and occupation of Norway in World War II. The soldiers are equipped with greatcoats, steel helmets, studded jack boots, Karabiner 98k rifles and field gear. They are marching down the Karl Johans gate Street while civilians have gathered on the pavements as spectactors of the show. Unarmed Norwegian police in dark overcoats and British brodie helmets help maintain law and order. In the background are the Royal palace, the buildings of University of Oslo, etc.
Photo Credit: Henriksen & Steen (Photographers in Oslo, Norway) / National Library of Norway
warroom.armywarcollege.edu · by Rick Chersicla · September 16, 2022
13. About the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
More excellent insights from Matt Armstrong. No one knows this history better than Matt. This includes many great quotes (which I will "borrow" and use.. I also include a very good list of research topics for students and practitioners.
About the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
mountainrunner.substack.com · by Matt Armstrong
The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy was established in 1948 through the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. I posted this forgotten fact on the commission’s website back in 2011 when I served as the commission’s executive director, and, fortunately, it remains there. The reason was two-fold. First, to show the maligned Smith-Mundt Act wasn’t the “anti-US propganda” law it had come to be known as through pervasive disinformation, misinformation, and, I’d argue having done the research, academic malpractice. The second reason was to show the commission had a long and once important role. The updating of why the commission existed was partly to reframe the commission from being merely a baton wielded at the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, as was the view by some at the time, but an entity dual-hatted to provide advocacy and oversight over a broader portfolio and, equally important, to recall that the “clients” of the commission were Congress, the Secretary of State, and the President, and not the public diplomacy under secretary or even academia.
As part of that effort, I had my staff find and upload to the commission’s website every report by the commission. Here is the current website, and here is an earlier archived version (which the former ultimately points to) created during my tenure. (A note: I had my staff scan and upload my copy of the 1945 MacMahon report, “Memorandum on the Postwar International Information Program of the United States,” the Dec 1945 edition, not the July 1945 edition, but someone subsequently removed that from the website. Good luck finding a copy of this report, which is highly relevant to public diplomacy then and today.) When a past report was only available in hard copy, they scanned and OCR’d the report to make a searchable PDF, which was then uploaded to the site. Around 1974 and 1984, the reports could only be found on microfilm or -fiche, but with no workable readers at the archives, there is a corresponding gap in the report list at the website.
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I should pause here and comment on the staffing situation at the commission. I was authorized a single admin person, who I inherited (and whose position description dated from, I kid you not, 1999), and an FSO assigned to the commission on a Y Tour. The same legislation that shuttered USIA also put a statutory limit on the commission’s staff. I tried to get a retiring FSO – Elizabeth “Liz” Colton – on board via a Y Tour, but the bureaucracy objected and delayed until the window to detail her to the commission closed. I did manage to get two interns, the terrific Irina Karmanova and Brittaney Miller. I also managed to get a USMC Lt.Col. detailed to the commission from the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, specifically from the office of the retiring Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Cliff Gilmore. The under secretary’s office initially objected to this, despite the written support of the Vice Chairman and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Doug Wilson (formerly of USIA and a friend), on the grounds the under secretary’s office had recently removed a DOD liaison. I clarified that Cliff would not be a mere liaison but would do actual work. He came on, and I had a full office with squeezed-in desks in a small suite over at the then-SA-44 (301 4th St SW) in the former USIA offices, a location I was able to move us to and greatly preferred over the previous co-location with public diplomacy folks at the Main State complex (specifically within SA-5 and among the then IIP bureau) due to our work.
However, I did not merely have staff capture the documents but summarize them, list the commissioners, and provide key statements found in the report. I felt this was critically important to the public diplomacy community by bringing them some life by drawing attention to them with even just a brief overview. Originally, and through 1977 when they were merged under the present name, there were two commissions. The one we focused on was the Advisory Commission on Information. The second was the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange. An example of the summary was the following for the first report of the information commission, published in March 1949, about 13 months after the commission was established with Truman’s signature on the Smith-Mundt Act on January 27, 1948:
Commission Members
Erwin D. Canham, acting chair
Philip D. Reed
Justin Miller
Mark May
Summary
This report outlined existing worldwide programming and made recommendations to the Secretary of State and Congress. The Commission observed that the implementation of Public Law 402 is off to a good start. So far, excellent contacts have been established—although disseminating information to a larger audience requires a larger US Government operating budget and staff. The report praised American libraries abroad as well as the activities of VOA and encouraged an expansion of these programs. The report also emphasized that the ultimate purpose of international information efforts is to create public opinion based on accurate information.
Quotations
"The audience reached here are available. The Voice is heard. And it is effective. It is effective partly because it tells the people the truth about what is going on in the world outside: and in their own countries."
"Our broadcasts are reaching the masses of those peoples and are keeping them informed of the truth and of the American position."
"Our aim should not be to sell ourselves particularly but to prevent the Soviets from selling us short by default on our part."
"In every instance the press, radio, library, and film work should be expanded beyond present narrow limitations."
It should be noted that for the first several years, the commission was obligated to produce two reports a year, and it did so without computers, email, Zoom, etc. Further, the commissioners were no slouches. Above, Erwin Canham, serving as acting chair, was a distinguished reporter and chief editor of the Christian Science Monitor; Philip Reed was the president and CEO of General Electric; Justin Miller had been an Associate Justice on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and was then presently the president of the National Association of Broadcasters; and Mark A. May was a noted psychologist, director of Yale’s Institute of Human Relations, and had advised the War Department during the war on matters related to psychological warfare. Later that year, before the publication of the commission’s second report in September, Mark Ethridge came on a chairman. Ethridge was a journalist, serving as editor and publisher of the Louisville, Kentucky, Courier-Journal and Times, previously the president of the National Association of Broadcasters, and had been studying the postwar situation in the Balkans for the State Department, served as a US delegate to a UN commission investigating Greek border and again for the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine in 1949.
One of my go-to discussion events on the subject of public diplomacy’s trajectory is a lively debate during a Senate hearing between Senator Fulbright in 1967 with the chairman of the Advisory Commission on Information. The conversation was noteworthy because it signaled Fulbright’s later amending of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1972 as part of his broader effort to shut down USIA, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty. For the purpose of this note, however, the hearing is relevant to point out the perceived (and actual) importance of the commission. The commission chairman at the time was Frank Stanton, then the head of CBS formerly, until the week before the hearing, the head of RAND Corporation.
This walk through history, both personal and institutional, is intended to show the commission can provide real and substantial advice and be strictly a convener of conversations by others. In looking back at my files for the commission, I thought it might be interesting to share some thoughts and suggestions from that time.
From the start of my tenure, I wanted to know what the relevant communities thought were the priorities lacking attention and insights around the broad tent of “public diplomacy” issues. I had meetings with senior leaders around the State Department, including with more than one under secretary, many assistant secretaries and many others, including career public diplomacy officers. I met with every Member or their staff that had expressed an interest in some public diplomacy program or an issue (or geography) related to public diplomacy but wasn’t overtly “public diplomacy,” I met with Defense Department folks, and I met with others outside of government. My basic question was: what are the top 3 issues related to this broad concept of “public diplomacy” that you want more information on? I wanted to know what their issues were rather than impose my ideas and to provide a list of ranked and relevant topics to the commissioners for their decision on how to proceed, after all, I was just staff.
In June 2011, below was the preliminary list we were working off to create the agenda for inquiries, possibly reports, and also be a useful source of information for stakeholders across the government (or at least be a kind of central operator to connect those needing information to those with the information).
Issue: what is the impact of uncertain budgets on public diplomacy
How does uncertainty and anticipated shutdowns effect planning and execution of public diplomacy?
What is the impact on America’s image?
Issue: thinking about Public Diplomacy in broad terms
Is PD a luxury or a core component of FP?
Are sufficient resources available?
Should it do / include CVE [countering violent extremism]?
Is it more or less necessary in a world of falling boundaries of geography, language, and technology that permit and create not only information flows but also allow for new diasporas and tribes?
Issue: the Smith-Mundt Act
Does the prohibition on domestic access hinder PD in today’s global human and information environment?
Would removing the ‘firewall’ result in a shift in priorities at State for domestic engagement over engagement abroad?
Would the removal increase accountability and transparency of US public diplomacy? Would it also foster a constituency?
What is ‘propagandizing U.S. citizens’ and how does it relate here?
Issue: Training the Public Diplomacy FSO
Do public diplomats get enough training?
When they get training, how does it compare to military information training, such as NDU, DINFOS, etc.?
Compare with the training – initial and continuing – of MIST/MISO/IO.
Does the level of training or perceived level of training and capabilities influence the choice of team in the field (i.e. selecting MIST over PD)?
How to educate, equip, encourage and empower the 21st Century foreign service officer?
Issue: Engaging Audiences
Balancing between online & offline, elites v youth v everybody, mass v key audiences
Social Media: too much reliance? Is social media the answer to everything but the answer to nothing?
Issue: ECA programs
Are there too many ‘boutique’ or niche programs? Too much engagement of ‘youth’? What is youth? (How would US react to French programs in US?)
Issue: Religion and Minority Engagement
What constraints is US PD under when engaging on the basis of religion or minority status?
Issue: Center for Strategic Counterterrorsm Communication
Is it a smart idea? Is it solving an otherwise solvable probem?
Does it have the resources and authorities it requires?
Is it too focused on CVE?
Issue: Citizen Diplomacy (& Corporate Social Responsibility)
What advantages & pitfalls should be considered? What about the Logan Act?
Issue: @America
What works, what doesn’t, and, if it should be done again, how should it look or operate?
Issue: Relationship of State to the BBG?
How do the global priorities of State / WH and BBG sync? How does BBG (including surrogates) synchronize with FP requirements?
Issue: Is Research properly resourced?
Examine in-house & outsourced research. Look at INR, IIP, BBG, OSC, etc options
Issue: Public Diplomacy in Post-Quake Japan
Are there lessons in DOD PD by USN in Japan?
Issue: Congressional Silos
How to better inform and empower Congress to make smart decisions to support smart power?
Blended requirements require blended authorities and appropriations
Issue: Revisit the HR report (“No one in PD does PD”)
Where are we now? Revisit the concerns and recommendations in the report. Revise or reemphasize them.
Issue: Review US Government social media policies
Virtually all virtual engagement is public diplomacy…
Issue: Foreign Aid, Humanitarian Relief and Disaster Recovery
Are they properly conceived as public diplomacy?
Are they properly supported to effectively conduct public diplomacy?
Are they effectively integrated into larger public diplomacy efforts?
Issue: Review capabilities, capacities and requirements for US libraries and resource centers
Requirement in HR 2410; follow up on Lugar report on Libraries
Issue: Review and compare public diplomacy programs of other countries and significant non-state actors
In November 2011, proposals for the commission’s 2012 agenda had been refined to include the following:
TOPICS FOR INQUIRY / LINES OF EFFORT IN 2012:
• [Impact of] Increasing deployment of MIST to support Embassy / USG engagement
• Impact of uncertain budgets on public diplomacy
• Role of public diplomacy in foreign policy / what is ‘public diplomacy’
• Branding USA and USG programs
• Hiring and supporting PD professionals / Revisit the Commission’s HR report, role of AFSA in supporting or hindering PD, U/S as champion of PD cone
• Internet Freedom and Information Freedom
• Engaging religion-based groups and minorities
• Review and compare the public diplomacy of other countries and relevant non-state actors
• Compare training of State and Defense information officers, including schoolhouse options, and career benefits or penalties
• Build and maintain a list of candidate public diplomacy / strategic communication thought leaders, both inside and outside the government
• USAID and influencing foreign publics / public diplomacy of foreign aid, humanitarian relief and disaster recovery
• Rise of new identities, challenges to nationalism, borderless “tribes” to public diplomacy
• Inventory Public Diplomacy efforts
SUGGESTED PAGES FOR THE WEBSITE:
1. What is public diplomacy, strategic communication
2. Why do we need PD/SC now?
3. What are the origins of the terms PD / SC?
4. Is PD / SC something just the US does?
5. Is PD / SC just something governments do?
6. Why don’t more people know about PD / SC?
At over a decade old, the above lists seem evergreen while also suggesting missed opportunities for the commission. I wonder how the above would change if the legislative and executive communities were asked for their top 3 priorities today?
Returning to my quest to get a public diplomacy FSO onto the commission, in my July 2011 plea to the Director General of the Foreign Service to place Liz Colton with the commission on a Y Tour, I listed the following areas where she would provide specific and valuable expertise:
• Examine the impact and value of the “consultative staffing” process implemented at the request of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs;
• Revisit the findings, recommendations, and other items related to the Commission’s 2008 report entitled “Getting the People Part Right”;
•Examine and compare how State and Defense information officers are trained and supported; and,
•Examine how the Department prepared for and/or responded to specific events, such as “Arab Spring” and the death of Osama bin Laden, and identify any lessons learned or changes that should be considered to make the Department more effective and efficient in the future.
More broadly, the Officer will provide subject matter expertise in the areas of staffing, training, and execution of public diplomacy activities by the Department on the ground. The Officer will lead inquiries and investigations, advise the Commission, and author reports in the areas described above, as well as provide input and advice into other relevant topic areas of the Commission.
This commission was and is potentially of great value partly because it is not subject to restraints by legislative affairs or interagency rivalries. It can provide unvarnished views of the problems while advocating advancement. It can be, should be, and was supposed to be a neutral party provided both necessary, professional, informed, expert, and timely oversight and advocacy, both of which combine to become necessary advice. This advice is sorely needed by Members and staff in Congress, senior leadership at the State Department, the National Security Council, and the White House, as well as others across the executive branch.
Today, the commission’s “inventory” project appears to consume it. Though it may provide some use, it is not clear to me that it is an appropriate use of the commission, its limited resources, its special access, or its special mandate. (I helped write and advised on the text that created this requirement, so I have a sense of the original intent, which does not match the outcome.) In looking through my files to write this note, I came across this comment by John Brown, one of public diplomacy’s valued voices from the past, from June 2011 about the topic of an inventory for public diplomacy programs from an inquiry by Senate staffer Paul Foldi:
Thanks so much for getting back on this [compiling a inventory of State Department Public Diplomacy Programs], about which I feel rather strongly [see below]. Why not hire, at minimal cost to the USG, say five grad students from "Public Diplomacy" programs -- USC, Syracuse, Tufts, NYU -- to work on such a project. It would cost little to the taxpayer and be most instructive to lawmakers and the American public.
John’s idea was good. My use of interns at the time suggested a viable path. Today, however, the inventory consumes the commission, apparently leaving it no real ability to do anything else other than convening conversations between others, meetings which its own commissioners and staff appear to add nothing to based on the transcripts.
Looking at the conversation thread that included John’s comment was this interesting statement by public diplomacy alumni and still essential hub of information Len Baldyga:
There once was the old statistic that 33% of the exchanges were carried out by USAID and only 13% by USIA/State Dept.
After years of the commission producing an annual inventory, is the need for executive and legislative for actionable, timely, relevant, and digestible oversight and advice being satisifed? I recently had a conversation with a senior public diplomacy Foreign Service Officer who relayed a problem they encountered. I suggested the issue was directly up the commission’s lane if it operated as it should. This FSO had never heard of the commission, let alone considered it a resource.
When was the last time, do you suppose, that a commissioner was asked to provide informed and expert advice to Congress or the executive branch on the subject of public diplomacy, its organization, support for, integration with foreign policy, staffing, leadership, or its relevance to US national security? In my testimony before a House subcommittee in July, I told the committee, though absent, should be a resource for them to ask and answer serious questions, like whether the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is still needed.
There appears to be no interest or appetite in the commission presently or the White House to want, support, or enable the creativity and desire to produce necessary, professional, informed, expert, and timely oversight and advocacy in the interest of US national security. We are a long way from fully accepting the recommendations of the MacMahon report mentioned above, as completed in July 1945:
The adequacy with which the United States as a society is portrayed to the other peoples of the world is a matter of concern to the American people and their government. Specifically, it concerns the Department of State. Modern international relations lie between peoples, not merely governments. Statements on foreign policy are intelligible abroad in the spirit in which they are intended only when other peoples understand their context of national tradition and character which is essential to the meaning of any statement… International information activities are integral to the conduct of foreign policy. The object of such activities is, first, to see that the context of knowledge among other peoples about the United States is full and fair, not meager and distorted and, second, to see that the policies which directly affect other peoples are presented abroad with enough detail as well as background to make them understandable.
Arguably, the above sentiment (from the opening of a 241-page report completed in six months) is more true today, and yet operationally and conceptually, we are farther removed from this truth than then. The commission, despite its mandate, is no where in sight to help.
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mountainrunner.substack.com · by Matt Armstrong
14. Israel’s Defense Minister Reveals Syrian Military Sites Used to Produce Advanced Weapons for Iran
Israel’s Defense Minister Reveals Syrian Military Sites Used to Produce Advanced Weapons for Iran | FDD's Long War Journal
longwarjournal.org · by Joe Truzman · September 16, 2022
GOTHAM HALL, NEW YORK, UNITED STATES – 2022/09/12: Israeli Minister of Defense, Benjamin “Benny” Gantz, speaks during annual Jerusalem Post conference at Gotham Hall. (Photo by Lev Radin/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images)
At a Jerusalem Post conference in New York on Monday, Israel’s Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, revealed a map displaying Syrian arms manufacturing facilities used to produce advanced weapons for Tehran and its proxies in the region.
Gantz attributed the development of the precision guided munitions (PGM) sites to former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qassem Soleimani and said the facilities were being used to distribute advanced arms to Lebanese Hezbollah including other militant organizations backed by Tehran.
“Under the vision of Qassem Soleimani, Iran transformed CERS (Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center) into production facilities for mid and long-range, precise missiles and weapons, provided to Hezbollah and Iranian proxies. In other words, it became yet another Iranian front – a factory for advanced, strategic weapons,” Gantz stated.
Furthermore, Gantz called attention to the “underground” CERS site in Masyaf, saying it was being used to “produce advanced missiles.”
By specifically mentioning the arms manufacturing facility in Masyaf, Gantz may have been hinting that Israel was behind the Aug. 25 attack on the site.
While Israel did not officially admit responsibility for the strikes, Reuters, citing Russian news agencies, reported Israel was behind the assault saying “four Israeli jets had launched a total of four cruise missiles and 16 guided aerial bombs” at the CERS site in Masyaf.
Gantz also warned similar arms manufacturing facilities were being constructed in Lebanon and Yemen.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have long warned about the production of PGMs in Lebanon. On Sept. 29 2021, the IDF published a detailed report revealing three “underground” PGM sites located in Beirut. The report claimed Hezbollah was manufacturing PGMs at the locations in order to “directly target Israeli civilians, towns and cities.”
On Aug. 18, IDF military chief Aviv Kohavi stated ten days earlier a “third country” had been attacked during the Gaza conflict. While Kohavi did not name the third country, evidence suggests the IDF carried out a military operation in Yemen.
On Aug. 8, reports claimed a blast had occurred at a “military camp” near the capital of Sanaa, Yemen. The cause of the blast was blamed on a “malfunction” during the transfer of ballistic missiles.
Several weeks later, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree tweeted a message warning Israel against “committing any foolishness, because doing so will not be met with silence but with an appropriate response.”
While the Houthi’s regularly condemn Israel, Saree’s message appeared to directly address the possibility that Israel carried out the offensive. In addition to the tweet, an editorial published by the Houthis denied the attack took place. Although, given Israel’s history of carrying out military operations abroad against Iranian weapons sites, it is plausible that the IDF was behind the blast near Sanaa on Aug. 8.
Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
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Tags: Gaza, hezbollah, Iran, Israel, lebanon, PGM, Syria, Yemen
longwarjournal.org · by Joe Truzman · September 16, 2022
15. Serbia’s Move to Cancel EuroPride Shows How Vučić Plays Off West Against Russia and His Base
Conclusion:
It’s clear the decisions by Vučić’s government against EuroPride mark just the latest iteration of his manipulative balancing act between the West and more moderate forces in Serbia on the one hand and Russia and his far-right base on the other. The West must ensure that his strategy of playing these sides off against each other, to the detriment of the EU values that Serbia must embrace to gain membership, backfires, and understand the complex games Vučić is playing. Make no mistake: Unrestrained, Vučić’s anti-Western and anti-human rights decisions will only become more extreme.
Serbia’s Move to Cancel EuroPride Shows How Vučić Plays Off West Against Russia and His Base
by Tanya Domi and Ivana Stradner
September 15, 2022
justsecurity.org · by Tanya Domi · September 15, 2022
September 15, 2022
The Serbian government is moving to cancel a long-planned parade in Belgrade this Saturday as part of the annual pan-European EuroPride celebration, hosted in a different European city each year, after thousands of religious conservatives marched on Sept. 11 to, as they put it, protect Serbian “traditional values.” President Alexander Vučić’s decision last month to cancel the weeklong celebration and the Serbian police announcement on Sept. 13 that it was banning Saturday’s parade may be part of his strategy of constantly playing the West and Serbian moderates off against Moscow and his domestic right-wing base. The EuroPride decisions and events, for example, should be seen within the context of Vučić’s decisions around the same time to accede to an agreement brokered by the European Union and the United States over border ID disputes with Kosovo.
Vučić’s decision to cancel EuroPride stands in contrast to Serbia’s historic role as one of the most pro-LGBTQ countries in the Balkans. Serbian activists have been organizing marches since 2001, and in 2014, Vučić took steps to back these activists by authorizing and mobilizing police to protect marchers from the threat of violent right-wing protestors. This official backing lent the marches an air of legitimacy, and Pride events in Serbia have since drawn activists from all over the region, including members of the European Union Parliament and the Western diplomatic corps. Pride marches have been violence-free since 2014 and became normalized.
That yielded Belgrade Pride sufficient political backing by European LGBTQ groups and the Serbian government in support of Belgrade Pride’s bid to host European Pride (EuroPride) in 2022. It marks the first time a Slavic country has hosted European Pride and a major step forward by Serbia in support of European LGBTQ human rights.
Why then take this step to cancel EuroPride, one that is sure to upset the leadership of many Western governments and human rights organizations, even as Vučić continues to give at least lip service to the country’s aspirations for EU membership? The move illustrates how Vučić’s power rests largely on his ability to balance the West and Russia, in turn mollifying and extracting concessions and promises from each as they fear that Serbia will fall under the other side’s influence.
This constant game is evident in everything Vučić does. He refused to join EU sanctions against Russia in the spring, but in June declared — as he frequently does — that joining the EU is in Serbia’s best interest. On the same day he announced the cancelation of the EuroPride event, Aug. 27, he also said he would propose that openly lesbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić be re-elected by Serbia’s National Assembly to an unprecedented third term heading his Cabinet. She has since been re-elected. This balancing act has allowed Vučić to negotiate, among other things, favorable arms deals with Moscow, while bringing in significant economic aid from the EU.
As a young member of Serbia’s Parliament in 1995, Vučić in a now-infamous speech during the war in neighboring Bosnia, vowed to Serbia’s parliament that “For every Serb killed, we will kill 100 Muslims.” Within a few years, he joined Slobodan Milošević’s government, serving as minister of information during the 1998-1999 war in Kosovo.
Today’s older Vučić is more pragmatic, a man who demonstrates allegiance to Moscow but understands well that he needs the West for Serbia’s — and his own — financial survival, via EU accession and the generous economic support that comes with it. Over the duration of his leadership, Vučić has toned down his rhetoric to a certain extent and pledged to bring Serbia closer to the EU, but still regularly takes steps that seem more aligned with the Kremlin than with Brussels.
The intersection of the EuroPride events with the Serbia-Kosovo border dispute was typical. On Aug. 27, the same day Vučić sought to cancel EuroPride, he not only endorsed Brnabić as prime minister again but also reached an EU and U.S.-brokered agreement with Kosovo to resolve their dispute over identification for border crossings. The accord would undoubtedly have angered the Kremlin, which has been among the outliers globally in rejecting recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty since it declared independence from Serbia in 2008. The day before Vučić’s accord with Kosovo, on Aug. 26, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Gabriel Escobar had declared that it was time to forget the narrative that “Kosovo is Serbia” and start saying that “Kosovo and Serbia are actually Europe.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova quickly responded, “Never.”
Moscow, of course, also has long made its own phobias clear on issues related to LGBTQ rights. In 2013, for instance, Putin’s regime escalated its campaign against LGBTQ Russians with ”gay propaganda” laws that prohibited information for minors on LGBTQ issues, essentially a dog whistle against gays and lesbians and homosexuality. Such onerous laws are bolstered by the Russian government’s close relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church, which the Kremlin has long wielded as an instrument of foreign meddling and sowing of chaos, including in the Balkans.
The Russian Orthodox Church maintains close relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which organized last weekend’s right-wing protest in Belgrade, according to the Associated Press, and both churches are known to maintain close ties with their respective governments. Both churches seek to safeguard what they perceive as the “traditional values” of their respective societies, so it was no surprise when Serbian Patriarch Porfirije supported the Serbian government’s decision to cancel EuroPride, which he said was not in accordance with traditional Serbian values – “the pillars on which our identity has been built for centuries.” Porfirije’s stance mirrors that of the Russian Orthodox Church, which for years has been a vocal opponent of holding public Pride events in Russia. In fact, last weekend’s right-wing Belgrade protest even featured Russian flags and portraits of Putin, the AP reported.
It’s clear the decisions by Vučić’s government against EuroPride mark just the latest iteration of his manipulative balancing act between the West and more moderate forces in Serbia on the one hand and Russia and his far-right base on the other. The West must ensure that his strategy of playing these sides off against each other, to the detriment of the EU values that Serbia must embrace to gain membership, backfires, and understand the complex games Vučić is playing. Make no mistake: Unrestrained, Vučić’s anti-Western and anti-human rights decisions will only become more extreme.
IMAGE: Orthodox Christian believers hold icons as part of a joint “prayer for salvation of Serbia” on September, 11, 2022, during a rally “for marriage and family” in Belgrade called by the Serbian Orthodox Church against an upcoming EuroPride event. Thousands of demonstrators protested against the upcoming pan-European EuroPride celebration in the Serbian capital Belgrade on September 11, 2022, days before the gathering of the LGBTQ community was set to be held. Tensions have been simmering in the capital with pride organisers vowing to carry on with the gathering scheduled for September 17, 2022, after the Serbian government pulled its support for the event. (Photo by OLIVER BUNIC/AFP via Getty Images)
justsecurity.org · by Tanya Domi · September 15, 2022
16. FDD | U.S. Should Deny Visa to Iranian President
FDD | U.S. Should Deny Visa to Iranian President
Saeed Ghasseminejad
Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor
David Adesnik
Senior Fellow and Director of Research
fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · September 15, 2022
A bipartisan group of 52 U.S. lawmakers asked President Joe Biden on Monday to deny Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi permission to visit New York for the UN General Assembly later this month. This would be an extraordinary measure, yet Raisi was personally responsible for the summary execution of thousands of political prisoners, and his government has attempted to kidnap and kill U.S. citizens on American soil this year.
Seven Republican senators made a similar request in August for Biden to deny Raisi a visa. They wrote, “In 1988, while deputy prosecutor of Tehran, Raisi served on a Death Commission which sentenced approximately 5,000 prisoners to death … without the right to appeal or a fair trial.”
Raisi continued to commit abuses as he rose through the ranks of the Iranian judiciary, becoming its chief in 2019. That same year, the Trump administration imposed human rights sanctions on Raisi and other senior Iranian officials. The designation makes Raisi subject to U.S. secondary sanctions and bans any dealing with him by U.S. persons. The designation also means that people who engage in certain transactions with Raisi can be the target of further designation. Additionally, the sanctions prohibit financial institutions from facilitating transactions “for or on behalf of the persons” designated by the Treasury Department, such as Raisi.
Both congressional appeals to Biden cited the Justice Department’s revelation in August that it had arrested and charged a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for attempting to arrange the assassination of former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, likely near his current office in Washington, DC. Last year, the Justice Department exposed Tehran’s effort to kidnap Iranian-American journalist Masih Alinejad and transport her to the Middle East.
Five hundred Iranian-American professionals also sent an open letter to Biden calling on him to block Raisi’s visit. They said, “Raisi should stand trial before international tribunals for crimes against humanity and genocide.”
As the host country for UN headquarters, the United States has a general obligation to grant visas to those conducting UN business. However, as lawmakers noted in their letters to Biden, U.S. law authorizes a denial of visas to individuals responsible for torture and extrajudicial killings.
In 1987, the U.S. government declared Austrian President Kurt Waldheim ineligible for a visa because of his responsibility for the persecution of Jews and other civilians during World War II. Washington also refused to let Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat visit in 1988 because of his responsibility for acts of terrorism.
Even by the standards of the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran, Raisi is not a run-of-the-mill politician. He has been a driving force behind the state’s pervasive abuse of its citizens over the past four decades. Allowing Raisi to visit the United States while the regime he represents is plotting to kill Americans is a mistake.
Biden should heed the advice of lawmakers and deny Raisi a visa.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior Iran and financial economics advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (@FDD), where David Adesnik is director of research. Follow them on Twitter @SGhasseminejad and @adesnik. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Saeed Ghasseminejad Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor · September 15, 2022
17. Ukraine Situation Report: Top U.S. Marine Praises Battlefield Lessons Learned
The words of the propagandist here sound like the start of a world war.
Excerpts:
With Russia losing so much ground and Ukraine continuing to be the beneficiary of global support, Russians may seek alternative means of prosecuting the all-out war they launched on Feb. 24. One propagandist went as far as to suggest an international coalition, wherein Russia would partner with Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, North Korea and some African states to fight against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, damage control is being done in the so-called separatist 'Luhansk People's Republic' after Ukraine's stunningly successful offensive. Nerves are clearly rattled that Ukrainian forces
Ukraine Situation Report: Top U.S. Marine Praises Battlefield Lessons Learned
Ukraine’s military successes bode well for Commandant David Berger’s new vision for the U.S. Marine Corps.
BY
HOWARD ALTMAN
SEP 15, 2022 8:48 PM
thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · September 15, 2022
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The Marine Corps's top officer says there are many lessons and affirmations to be learned from how Ukrainian troops are fighting Russians.
Especially in Ukraine's empowerment of small unit leaders and its use of surveillance and countersurveillance to target artillery fires. These are two elements that are a big part of Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 concept to remake the Corps into a forward-deployed, distributed force under the guns of a peer adversary like China.
Ukraine’s success on the battlefield “does reaffirm the fact that small unit leaders who are well-trained, who have the experience and maturity to make decisions and are empowered to make decisions in lieu of detailed guidance is powerful,” said Berger, speaking at the Defense One’s State of Defense virtual conference Thursday.
“Even when outnumbered, even when up against formations that are two, three, four times as big, if they are mobile, if they're distributed, if they're well-trained and well-led, they can actually achieve…a tactical advantage over a much larger organization even if it has some systems that the smaller units do not have.”
One of Ukraine’s great advantages over Russia is that its small units can operate with a degree of independence, reacting to battlefield conditions, while Russian units, under a highly rigid command hierarchy, have to wait for instructions from higher headquarters, leaving them unable to respond quickly to the dynamics of combat.
Ukrainian troops enjoy the advantage of being able to operate with a degree of independence at the small unit level. (Photo by Serhii Mykhalchuk/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)
“So what did we learn? Partly that it reaffirms entrust, empower junior leaders. Stop micromanaging. Frankly, allow them to make decisions in lieu of detailed guidance, and then don't jump down their throat if it's done a little bit differently than you had in mind. Actually, reward ‘em for taking initiative. Don't wait. Lean into it. Understand and accept risk.”
The ferocity displayed by Ukrainian troops “reaffirms the physical aspect of combat as well,” said Berger. “These aren’t machines versus machines. There's a human toll. There's an endurance factor. All of the physical toughness part that is the heart and soul of the Marine Corps [is] all playing out in Ukraine as well. And I don't think it's a big surprise to those of us who know that many of the Ukrainian tactical leaders trained in the U.S. at our schools alongside us.”
Ukrainian soldiers sit atop a tank in Izyum, Kharkiv Region, eastern Ukraine on Sept. 14, 2022. (Photo by JUAN BARRETO/AFP via Getty Images)
A big part of Force Design 2030 is the ability of Marines to operate in far-flung places, with few resources and limited ability to resupply in a contested area.
Ukraine has displayed great logistics prowess and adaptability, which the Marines would have to rely on to make Force Design 2030 work.
“The side that can adapt to the fight they have, not the one that they planned, not the one that's in the school book, not the one that's in the doctrinal manual, but the one they have in front of them - the one who can adapt faster has a huge advantage. That's that agility of the mind which we press into Marine leaders all the time.”
As far as new lessons, Berger said “lethality in terms of artillery versus artillery. Some might say, ‘wow, this is just going to be a slugfest,’ but we're actually learning that there's a huge value to reconnaissance [and] counter reconnaissance. In other words, the side that can see more and prevent the adversary from seeing them actually adds to it. It's not just back off and slug it out. Ukrainian forces are doing a fantastic job in terms of small tactical unit reconnaissance and actually counter reconnaissance. This is a great learning point for the Marine Corps.”
Before we get to the latest, get caught up on The War Zone’s previous rolling coverage of the war in Ukraine by clicking here.
The Latest
As Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate their gains, more and more evidence is emerging of the brutality of Russian troops.
"A mass burial of people was found in Izyum, Kharkiv Region," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Thursday on his Telegram channel. "The necessary procedural actions have already begun there. More information - clear, verified - should be available tomorrow."
"Tomorrow there will be Ukrainian and international journalists in Izyum," Zelensky said. "We want the world to know what is really happening and what the Russian occupation has led to. Bucha, Mariupol, now, unfortunately, Raisin… Russia leaves death everywhere. And must be responsible for it. The world must hold Russia to real responsibility for this war. We will do everything for this."
Meanwhile, Ukraine's swift and successful counteroffensive in the Kharkiv Oblast has finally forced Russia to admit what the rest of the world has seen. That its once-vaunted army is being routed by the nation it sought to conquer.
Instead of fabricating fantastic claims of victory, Kremlin leaders and their media mouthpieces are now turning on themselves, seeking scapegoats for battlefield failures.
Russia's increasing military woes are apparently not helping Vladimir Putin in his bid to seek aid from Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
"Beijing is perturbed by the impact on the global economy and has been careful not to give material support to Russia that could trigger Western sanctions on China's own economy," Reuters reported Thursday after the two leaders met in Uzbekistan.
China, apparently, isn't the only nation worried about escalating tensions.
CNN reported that the Biden administration once again signaled on Thursday that it likely won't provide Ukraine with Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles.
The ATACMS, which can be fired by the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System provided to Ukraine, has a range of up to about 185 miles. That's far further than the 43-mile range of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) the U.S. has also provided. It also hits with a much bigger punch.
The Russians on Thursday threatened "to react" to the provision of such long-range munitions, which would make the U.S. "a party to the conflict."
Drones, which have been used effectively by both Russia and Ukraine, apparently don't raise as many concerns as ATACMS. Now more evidence is emerging of Iranian-made drones being used by the Russians.
While Russia has received some help from Iran, Ukraine continues to be the beneficiary of foreign military largesse.
Germany has agreed to send Ukraine another tranche of weapons; two more MARS II MLRS systems - a country-specific derivative of the M270 - and 50 Dingo All Protection Transport vehicles.
Germany is also involved in another arrangement to supply Ukraine. Greece has agreed to send Ukraine 40 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). In exchange, Greece will get 40 German Marder IFVs.
In addition to those promised vehicles, weapons watchers have spotted Finnish-supplied Sisu XA-180/185 amphibious armored personnel carriers, which no doubt are coming in handy.
With Russia losing so much ground and Ukraine continuing to be the beneficiary of global support, Russians may seek alternative means of prosecuting the all-out war they launched on Feb. 24. One propagandist went as far as to suggest an international coalition, wherein Russia would partner with Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, North Korea and some African states to fight against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, damage control is being done in the so-called separatist 'Luhansk People's Republic' after Ukraine's stunningly successful offensive. Nerves are clearly rattled that Ukrainian forces will push south next, as it has stated it would do, at least at some point.
thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · September 15, 2022
18. Exclusive-U.S. weighs China sanctions to deter Taiwan action, Taiwan presses EU
Exclusive-U.S. weighs China sanctions to deter Taiwan action, Taiwan presses EU
Reuters · by Ben Blanchard, Yimou Lee, John O’Donnell, Alexandra Alper, Trevor Hunnicutt · September 14, 2022
By Ben Blanchard, Yimou Lee, John O’Donnell, Alexandra Alper, Trevor Hunnicutt
6 Min Read
TAIPEI/FRANKFURT/WASHINGTON (Reuters) -The United States is considering options for a sanctions package against China to deter it from invading Taiwan, with the European Union coming under diplomatic pressure from Taipei to do the same, according to sources familiar with the discussions.
A globe is seen in front of Chinese and Taiwanese flags in this illustration, August 6, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration
The sources said the deliberations in Washington and Taipei’s separate lobbying of EU envoys were both at an early stage - a response to fears of a Chinese invasion that have grown as military tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait.
In both cases, the idea is to take sanctions beyond measures already taken in the West to restrict some trade and investment with China in sensitive technologies like computer chips and telecoms equipment.
The sources did not provide any details of what is being considered but the notion of sanctions on the world’s second-largest economy and one of the global supply chain’s biggest links raises questions of feasibility.
“The potential imposition of sanctions on China is a far more complex exercise than sanctions on Russia, given U.S. and allies’ extensive entanglement with the Chinese economy,” said Nazak Nikakhtar, a former senior U.S. Commerce Department official.
China claims Taiwan as its own territory and last month fired missiles over the island and sailed warships across their unofficial sea frontier after U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in what Beijing saw as a provocation.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has vowed to bring democratically-governed Taiwan under Beijing’s control and has not ruled out the use of force. He is set to secure a third, five-year leadership term at a Communist Party congress next month. Taiwan’s government strongly rejects China’s sovereignty claims.
Responding to the news on the sanctions package, a foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing warned against underestimating China.
“I want to emphasize that any country or person should not underestimate the strong determination and firm will of the Chinese government and people in defending national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and realising the reunification of the motherland,” the spokesperson, Mao Ning, said on Wednesday.
Officials in Washington are considering options for a possible package of sanctions against China to deter Xi from attempting to invade Taiwan, said a U.S. official and an official from a country in close coordination with Washington.
U.S. talks over sanctions began after Russia invaded Ukraine in February, but took on fresh urgency after the Chinese reaction to Pelosi’s visit, the two sources said.
The United States, backed by NATO allies, took a similar approach to Russia in January with a threat of unspecified sanctions but this failed to dissuade Russian President Vladimir Putin from launching his invasion of Ukraine.
The White House is focused on getting countries on the same page, including coordinating between Europe and Asia, and avoiding provoking Beijing, the non-U.S. official said.
Reuters was unable to learn details on what specific sanctions were under consideration, but some analysts suggested China’s military could be the focus.
“Big picture, initial sanctions conversations will likely revolve around curtailing China’s access to certain technologies required to sustain a military operation against Taiwan,” said Craig Singleton at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
The White House declined to comment.
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry said it had discussed China’s recent war games and the “great challenges” China poses to Taiwan and the region with the United States, Europe and other like-minded partners, but could not disclose details.
TAIWAN’S PITCH TO EUROPE
Taiwan had already broached sanctions with European officials after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but China’s recent military exercises have seen Taiwan’s position harden, six sources briefed on the Taiwan-Europe discussions told Reuters.
Top Taiwanese officials’ calls for sanctions preparations have intensified in recent weeks. A recent Chinese white paper, which withdrew a promise not to send troops or administrators to Taiwan if Beijing takes control of the island, has prompted a redoubling of their efforts with Europe.
Taiwan has not asked for anything specific, only for Europe to plan what actions it may take if China attacked, one source briefed on discussions said, and has asked Europe to warn China privately that it would face consequences.
EU officials have so far shied away from imposing tough sanctions on China over human rights issues, as the country plays a far bigger role for the bloc’s economy than Russia, said another person familiar with the matter.
European sanctions would require all 27 member countries to agree, which is often elusive; consensus was tough even in isolating Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, in part because its gas was critical for Germany.
All of Europe, excluding the Vatican, has formal diplomatic relations with Beijing but not Taipei, though Taiwanese and European officials have had extensive, private contacts since China’s military exercises began, the sources say.
Germany, the bloc’s economic engine, is “wary,” according to another official familiar with the discussion. “I don’t think the Russia-Ukraine has fundamentally changed the way they view their relationship with China.”
But there is growing concern in the German government over its economic dependence on China, with the economy minister pledging a new trade policy and “no more naivety” on Tuesday.
A spokesperson for German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declined to comment.
Reporting by Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee in Taipei, John O’Donnell in Frankfurt, and Alexandra Alper and Trevor Hunnicutt in Washington; Additional reporting by Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom in Washington; Editing by Rosalba O’Brien and Clarence Fernandez
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Ben Blanchard, Yimou Lee, John O’Donnell, Alexandra Alper, Trevor Hunnicutt · September 14, 2022
Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Chinese Support for Putin’s War Looks More Shaky After Summit
Published Sept. 15, 2022
Updated Sept. 16, 2022, 7:50 a.m. ET
- Balakliya
- Nicole Tung for The New York Times
- Balakliya
- Nicole Tung for The New York Times
- Cherkask’kyi Byshkyn
- Nicole Tung for The New York Times
- Izium
- Evgeniy Maloletka/Associated Press
- Nova Husarivka
- Nicole Tung for The New York Times
- Izium
- Nicole Tung for The New York Times
- Kherson region
- Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
- Kryvyi Rih
- Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Follow live news updates on the Russia-Ukraine war.
Here’s what we know:
The Russian president met with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, at a time of increasing animosity with the West. President Biden will meet on Friday with the families of Brittney Griner and another American imprisoned in Russia.
Putin acknowledges China may have ‘questions and concerns’ about the war.
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Putin Admits China May Have ‘Concerns’ About Ukraine Invasion
Footage from Russian state media shows President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia meeting with Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, in Uzbekistan at a summit meant to show the strength of the relationship between the two authoritarian leaders.CreditCredit...Pool photo by Alexandr Demyanchuk/Sputnik
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said on Thursday that Moscow understood that China had “questions and concerns” about the war in Ukraine — a notable, if cryptic, admission from Mr. Putin that Beijing may not fully approve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
And his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping — in his first face-to-face meeting with Mr. Putin since the invasion began — struck a far more subdued tone than the Russian president, and steered clear in his public comments of any mention of Ukraine at all.
Taken together, the remarks were a stark sign that Russia lacks the full backing of its most powerful international partner as it tries to recover from a humiliating rout in northeastern Ukraine last week.
The two authoritarian leaders met during a summit in Uzbekistan that was meant to signal the strength of the relationship between the countries at a time of increasing animosity with the West and challenges to their agendas. The meeting was particularly important to Mr. Putin, who has become more isolated by the United States and its allies over his invasion of Ukraine.
“We highly appreciate the balanced position of our Chinese friends in connection with the Ukrainian crisis,” Mr. Putin said in televised remarks at the start of the meeting. “We understand your questions and concerns in this regard. During today’s meeting, of course, we will explain in detail our position on this issue, although we have spoken about this before.”
While Chinese officials have offered some lip service in recent months to Russia’s message that the war in Ukraine was the West’s fault, Mr. Xi did not repeat any of those lines in his televised comments. He carefully avoided offering any endorsement of specific Russian policies, instead offering generalities about China’s and Russia’s view of the world.
After the meeting, China released a statement saying that it was “ready to work with Russia in extending strong support to each other on issues concerning their respective core interests.”
It was a strikingly different tone from Mr. Xi than in early February, before the invasion. The two countries issued a joint statement before the start of the Winter Olympics in Beijing describing their partnership as having “no limits.”
The lukewarm Chinese support leaves Mr. Putin in an increasingly difficult spot as the invasion approaches the seven-month mark and he faces increasing criticism inside Russia about how he is conducting the war.
Sergey Radchenko, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said Mr. Putin “has severely undercut his leverage with China” by cutting himself off from the West.
“He has nowhere else to turn but to China,” Mr. Radchenko said. “And the Chinese are best at looking after their own interests.”
In contrast with Mr. Xi’s circumspect remarks, Mr. Putin railed against the “unipolar,” American-led world order that he sees Beijing and Moscow aligned against.
“We jointly stand for the formation of a just, democratic and multipolar world order based on international law and the central role of the U.N., and not on some rules that someone has come up with and is trying to impose on others, without even explaining what it’s about,” Mr. Putin told Mr. Xi.
Asked about the summit meeting at a news conference on Thursday, a State Department spokesman, Ned Price, said it was “not surprising” that China had concerns about the war.
“It is somewhat curious,” Mr. Price added, “that President Putin would be the one to admit it.”
China has been a crucial trade partner for Russia in the months since the invasion began and Western nations turned their backs. China has increased its exports of some goods to Russia, and it bought record levels of Russian oil in May, June and July.
But China has done little to help circumvent Western sanctions that prevent Russia from importing advanced Western technology. It also appears to have refrained so far this year from shipping weapons to Russia, forcing Moscow to ask Iran and North Korea for military equipment.
Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi met on the sidelines of a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a multilateral, security-focused organization that includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan and four Central Asian nations. For Mr. Xi, the gathering was a chance to resume his role as a global statesman. It was his first trip abroad since he went to Myanmar in January 2020.
Edward Wong contributed reporting.
— Anton Troianovski, Keith Bradsher and Austin Ramzy
PUTIN-XI SUMMITRead more about why the meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir V. Putin suggested that Moscow does not have an unconditional ally in Beijing.
The U.S. will send $600 million in additional military supplies to Ukraine.
Image
A multiple rocket-launching vehicle being transported by a Ukrainian military vehicle in June.Credit...Finbarr O’Reilly for The New York Times
WASHINGTON — Days after Russia’s humiliating rout in northeastern Ukraine, the Biden administration said on Thursday that it would send an additional $600 million in military supplies to Ukraine, including more artillery ammunition.
The new shipment — which will also include counterartillery radar, counterdrone systems and mine-clearing equipment — continues the Pentagon’s recent trend of sending large amounts of ammunition that Ukraine needs to carry out heavy fighting in the country’s south, east and northeast.
The latest drawdown of military goods from Pentagon stockpiles — the 21st since the invasion began in February — was announced just hours after President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, held their first face-to-face meeting since the war began, amid signs that Moscow lacked the full support of its most powerful international ally following Ukraine’s stunning comeback in the country’s northeast.
“We are delivering the arms and equipment that Ukraine’s forces are utilizing so effectively as they continue their successful counteroffensive against Russia’s invasion,” Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said in a statement. “President Biden has been clear we will support the people of Ukraine for as long as it takes.”
Notably, this shipment did not include the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, long-range guided missiles that can strike targets up to 190 miles away.
Since Ukraine’s successful offensive, President Volodymyr Zelensky has renewed his request for ATACMS from President Biden, but so far has been rebuffed. The Pentagon has instead provided thousands of satellite-guided rockets and 16 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers, or HIMARS, to fire them. Those rockets have struck more than 400 Russian ammunition depots, command posts and radars.
The HIMARS can carry six guided rockets at a time, each of which can strike targets nearly 50 miles away — a range that Pentagon officials say covers the vast majority of Ukraine’s intended targets. By comparison, a HIMARS launcher can carry only one of the larger ATACMS missiles at a time before needing to reload.
The new shipment also includes additional guided rockets for the HIMARS, as well as 36,000 rounds for 105-millimeter howitzers, and 1,000 precision-guided 155-millimeter shells, according to a Pentagon statement. Both weapons systems have become staples in Ukraine’s Western-supplied arsenal against Russia.
The United States has now committed $15.1 billion in military aid to Ukraine since the invasion — more than 40 percent of which has come in the past six weeks.
Ukrainian and American officials said the now weekly or biweekly Pentagon announcements of new shipments of weapons and munitions from American inventories have given Kyiv’s senior commanders the confidence to plan complex simultaneous offensives, like those in Kherson in the south and near Kharkiv in the northeast.
Those operations were discussed in a phone call Thursday between Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their Ukrainian counterparts, according to a statement from General Milley’s office that provided no other details.
— Eric Schmitt
20. What the U.S. gets wrong about China and Russia
Excerpt:
G: What are the costs for the U.S. to have that Russia-China partnership continue and perhaps be strengthened?
YS: Well, I think to begin with anything that we want to do at the U.N., especially the U.N. Security Council, is not going to happen. The Chinese have the veto, the Russians have the veto, they can have a double veto. So that’s going to significantly sabotage our ability to promote our agenda at multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. Then China and Russia are working together within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the heartland of Eurasia. China and Russia are building their alignment and building their close circle of friends. If this is not the emergence or the rise of a bipolar world, I don’t know what is.
What the U.S. gets wrong about China and Russia
The two leaders made a fresh show of their friendship at a regional summit — but as a leading scholar tells Grid, that doesn’t mean China supports Putin’s war.
Lili Pike
China Reporter
September 15, 2022
grid.news · by Lili Pike
On Thursday, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, a clear sign that their ties remain strong despite the seismic shifts since their last meeting seven months ago. At that February summit, on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics, the two leaders said their countries enjoyed a “no limits” friendship, built upon a mutual resentment of Western nations. They issued a long joint statement that was a not-so-veiled attack on the U.S.-led global order, and — in language that was likely music to Putin’s ears — a full-throated defense of Russia’s hard-line stand against NATO.
Less than three weeks later, Russia invaded Ukraine.
At Thursday’s meeting, held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, the tone was slightly different — no doubt a consequence of how much has changed since February. Putin said, “We highly value the balanced position of our Chinese friends when it comes to the Ukraine crisis” — a note of thanks to China for standing with Russia in terms of financial support, U.N. votes, and continued condemnation of the U.S. and NATO. But Putin also acknowledged that China may not be as fully supportive of Russia now as it was before the tanks rolled in. “We understand your questions and concerns about this,” Putin said of the war in Ukraine.
“Questions and concerns” may mean many things; it has never been clear what exactly Putin told Xi in February about his planned invasion, but many have surmised that China would not have supported the widespread, full-on assault that followed. Thursday’s meeting also took place in the wake of a major Russian setback in the war, as Ukrainian forces launched a surprise counteroffensive and recaptured a large swath of territory in the Kharkiv region. Putin’s mention of these concerns is noteworthy, first, because Chinese leaders have made no public statements about such concerns; and second, because the Russian leader so rarely speaks of the war with anything less than full-throated bluster.
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For his part, Xi said nothing in his public remarks about the war in Ukraine, and while under-the-surface frictions may exist, the meeting underlined that the relationship itself remains valuable to China. “China is ready to work with Russia in extending strong support to each other on issues concerning their respective core interests,” Xi said during the meeting, according to a Chinese government statement.
The trip — Xi’s first outside China since the beginning of the pandemic — wasn’t just about Russia; the Chinese leader visited Kazakhstan before arriving in Uzbekistan for a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral organization that includes Russia, India, Pakistan and four Central Asian countries. It was on the sidelines of that meeting that he met with Putin.
Among other things, Xi’s decision to attend the summit and meet with Putin, despite China’s ongoing strict covid policy, showed his commitment to building strong relationships outside the Western sphere of influence, at a time of increasingly strained relations with the United States. China is “keen to cement exclusive blocs of countries that will support it — or at least not support the United States,” Bonny Lin and Jude Blanchette, China experts at Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote in an August article in Foreign Affairs.
Grid spoke with Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, about the significance of the Putin-Xi meeting, the evolution of the China-Russia relationship since the war and how that relationship fits into China’s broader foreign policy aim of building alliances against the West.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
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Grid: Why do you think that Xi has chosen to travel for this meeting — in particular after staying in China for so many months?
Yun Sun: I think a couple of factors. From a domestic politics point of view, Xi’s visit, actually one month before the 20th Party Congress [a key political meeting where Xi is expected to gain a third term], is certainly a demonstration of confidence that he has domestic politics under control and he has the results of the Party Congress under control.
Then in terms of Central Asia, of course, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is now seen as China’s foreign policy base — the strongest support that China can count on in global affairs, and that happened in the context of the deterioration of relations with the United States. As long as there’s no improvement in sight with Washington, China will continue to feel the urge to at least align its position with Russia.
Then coming to covid, we all know that China is still observing the zero-covid policy domestically, and to a large extent, it is because of the need for social stability in China before the Party Congress. So people expect broadly that by the time the Party Congress is over, China will gradually loosen its restrictions on travel and also loosen its [covid] restrictions, but you have to start somewhere. So for Xi Jinping to take the trip now is paving the ground for China to gradually abandon the zero-covid policy after the Party Congress. The message is: The top leader is already traveling overseas, so it must be pretty safe to do so.
G: What is the significance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for China and its vision of the world? Is this a group of countries that China can really count on?
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YS: Well, at a minimum, you could say it is a counter to the West. It is China’s answer to the Western definition that China is isolated and China is generally unappreciated by the world, and the SCO is China’s answer: that we have partners, we have solidarity among countries in the region, and we have alternative visions for international order, and also for our domestic political model, and it is as legitimate as the Western model. So that’s why I say the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is almost emerging as China’s face for its foreign strategy and its foreign policy.
G: About the meeting with Putin in particular, what do you think Xi wanted to get out of it? And what Putin might have wanted?
YS: I think for Xi, we already saw that the other Chinese leader, Li Zhanshu [the third most powerful leader in China], just visited Russia last week. We already saw some of those concrete commitments from China: economic cooperation with Russia, energy, infrastructure, education, healthcare, science and technology. I would not be surprised if we see a more concrete commitment on economic cooperation coming out of the summit.
But I don’t think that Xi Jinping or China will commit specifically to concrete military support or military aid to Russia, directly related to the war in Ukraine, because that is not a war that China supports. China may not oppose it. But it doesn’t mean that China supports it. So I think most of the things we will see coming out of China and Russia are going to be in the economic realm. Because so far in the past several months, the Chinese say, “Well, we have largely observed the U.S. sanctions on Russia. But moving forward, this is not sustainable. What is the legality of the U.S. sanctions, unilateral sanctions that do not have U.N. authorization?”
G: On that front, you’d see China increasingly push back against those sanctions and not necessarily abide by them?
YS: Well, these are unilateral sanctions, right? For China, unilateral sanctions without U.N. authorization are illegal to begin with.
G: But China has been basically conforming with them so far.
YS: Well, so far the U.S. does not have secondary sanctions on high-tech exports to Russia either. The Chinese have been concerned about the implications of U.S.-China decoupling, because they certainly do not want to see further decoupling between the Chinese economy and the American economy. But it looks like decoupling is happening anyway. And as long as there’s no sign of improvement of relations between China and the United States, the Chinese will have very little incentive to drop Russia or no incentive to drop Russia.
G: What does China get out of its relationship with Russia now?
YS: Strategic alignment, supporters of China’s agenda — or at least the supporters of China’s position, even without specific technical support to China’s activities.
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G: Would you say on the balance, though, that right now Russia is more dependent on China than China is dependent on Russia?
YS: Well, currently, if you look at the trading data, Russia has gained much more revenue from their energy commodities since the beginning of the war. So I guess the question is, what is Russia depending on China for? Does Russia need money? Russia probably has created more revenue for itself than anyone would have imagined when the war first broke out. So the West generally predicted that Russia’s economy is going to be destroyed. But in reality, the Russian economy has received this large infusion of cash because of the energy price hike. So I would say that Russia is not in a desperate position, that it has to depend on China for anything.
G: For now, at least.
YS: For now, at least, and we’ll see how the war evolves and how, for example, the energy crisis also evolves. Winter is coming. We know that Europe will need Russian energy resources.
G: Is there anything else that Russia may be looking to gain from China that it hasn’t received so far? That might be feasible for China to give?
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YS: What is Russia gaining? Well, we in the United States see China as a problem and see Russia as a problem, and we also do not want them to work together and align with each other. Well, that’s very difficult because they have a natural incentive to work together. So for us to say what is Russia really trying to gain, I would say the most important thing is that China and Russia are standing together, they may not support each other on everything that the other side is engaged in, like China does not really support the Russian war in Ukraine, but they’re not going to oppose each other either. And that is significant. That’s two votes on the U.N. Security Council. That means that any U.N. Security Council resolution would not be passed, that solidarity between two authoritarian regimes.
And these two authoritarian regimes also happen to be nuclear powers, Russia has the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, and that by itself carries tremendous political significance.
So instead of the technical support that Russia is trying, or not trying to gain from China, I think we should focus on the strategic landscape — that our policy is pushing China and Russia together. And maybe they don’t have an alliance, but the alignment that they have already formed is becoming increasingly like an alliance, and we claim that we don’t want them to work with each other. Unfortunately, that’s where our policies are pushing toward.
G: If you were advising U.S. policymakers, would you suggest a change in policy? How would you advise policymakers such that that convergence between Russia and China wasn’t as much in China’s interest?
YS: I would say that there needs to be a trade-off. Our logic seems to be we can walk and chew gum at the same time, so we can compete with China and confront Russia at the same time. But we also do not want China and Russia to work together. Well, guess what, they will work together and their cooperation has become increasingly close. So we need to prioritize. Which one do we identify as a bigger problem? Is it Russia? Or is it China? Well, we could say, it’s both. But the reality is that then both of them will work with each other and make it increasingly difficult or impossible for us to achieve our policy goals. So I would say that we have to define very clearly what our priority is.
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G: Going back to the status of the war, given the recent change of events and the success Ukraine has seen on the battlefield, how do you think that impacts how China is seeing the war, how it sees Russia and Putin’s future?
YS: I think that is another misunderstanding in the West — that somehow China’s policy toward Russia is dependent on the war or was a result of the war. Well, it really is not. China’s policy on Russia is dependent on U.S.-China relations. As long as there’s no sign of improvement of relations with Washington, China will side with Russia, regardless of whether Russia wins or loses in Ukraine. So to say that Russia is losing, therefore China may not support Russia or China may support Russia more, I think that is not how the Chinese would perceive or approach the issue. For China, if Russia wins, that’s great because China gains a stronger ally. If Russia loses, that is also great because China gains a vassal state, which is the second-largest nuclear power in the world. So I think people in the West, in Washington especially, want to see how China is going to lose in this. But in the Chinese framing, it’s about how China is winning in this.
Given the current state of U.S.-China relations, the Chinese are not going to have any choice but to seek a closer alignment with Russia. Because for them, things are only going to be worse, they will be deprived of another partner, and given China’s relationship with the United States, they don’t have a lot of partners that they can call close partners these days. So for the Chinese, they probably see no choice but to move forward with closer alignment with Russia. And if we think that can be reversed and stopped without somehow moderating or adapting our policy on China, we are really living in Wonderland.
G: What are the costs for the U.S. to have that Russia-China partnership continue and perhaps be strengthened?
YS: Well, I think to begin with anything that we want to do at the U.N., especially the U.N. Security Council, is not going to happen. The Chinese have the veto, the Russians have the veto, they can have a double veto. So that’s going to significantly sabotage our ability to promote our agenda at multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. Then China and Russia are working together within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the heartland of Eurasia. China and Russia are building their alignment and building their close circle of friends. If this is not the emergence or the rise of a bipolar world, I don’t know what is.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
grid.news · by Lili Pike
21. Special-ops units from Down Under made their mark with US commandos in Vietnam. They may have to do it again against China.
I will soon have a paper published here (https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/essays/) that will address AUKUS SOF in support of a free and open INDOPACIFIC.
Special-ops units from Down Under made their mark with US commandos in Vietnam. They may have to do it again against China.
Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou
Australian troops return to Bien Hoa Airbase north of Saigon after search and destroy operation with US and Vietnamese troops in 1965.
Fairfax Media via Getty Images/Fairfax Media via Getty Images via Getty Images
- During the Vietnam War, US troops were supported by forces from several allied countries.
- Australia and New Zealand sent special-operations troops to fight alongside US commandos.
- The Australian and Kiwi operators quickly earned a reputation for their professionalism and skills.
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Although the Vietnam War is remembered as a US war, US allies, including Australia and New Zealand, sent troops to fight there as well.
The role of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) and the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) was especially notable. From 1966 to 1971, these two special-operations units deployed a small number of commandos to support conventional forces in Vietnam.
At first, the two units gathered intelligence for the conventional forces through long-range reconnaissance patrols. Gradually, however, they shifted to a more aggressive stance and started going after high-value North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targets in ambushes and direct-action operations.
Australian and Kiwi special operators quickly earned a fearsome reputation. They conducted about 1,400 operations and accounted for more than 500 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong killed or captured, while losing only two men.
Their professionalism and unmatched bushcraft led the North Vietnamese to nickname them "Ma Rung," or "phantoms of the jungle."
To this day, the Australian and Kiwi commandos' patrolling and tracking skills are highly regarded, and they could again be quite effective in a conflict with China.
Hunting in the jungle
Members of the ANZAC Battalion, which comprised soldiers from Australia and New Zealand, cross a paddy field near Nui Dat, South Vietnam.
Bryan Campbell/Australian War Memorial
The jungle was a familiar hunting ground for the Australian and New Zealand commandos.
Special operators from the two countries had fought with the British against Communist insurgents in Malaya and Borneo. They gained institutional knowledge of patrolling and bushcraft during these conflicts, which enabled their devastating success in Vietnam.
In Vietnam, SASR and NZSAS patrols, composed of four to six commandos, carried a lot more firepower than was the norm in order to appear to be a larger force if they bumped into the North Vietnamese. Rifles, grenades and grenade launchers, machine guns, anti-personnel mines, and other explosives were their staples.
But wielding firepower is a common skill, and it was bushcraft skills that ensured the survival of SASR and NZSAS commandos in Vietnam. Few troops can take the physical and mental beating required in intelligence-gathering operations in dense jungle and surrounded by thousands of enemies.
"The hardest aspect for me was trying to be constantly vigilant as, believe it or not, the enemy, either NVA or Viet Cong, seemed to be everywhere!" Sam McDonald, a former SASR operator who served in Vietnam, told Insider.
US Army helicopters land near members of The Royal Australian Regiment north of the village of Phuoc Hai in South Vietnam on August 26, 1967.
Michael Coleridge/Australian War Memorial
Jungle operations were physically demanding. Often, the operators would need the better part of a day just to cover 100 to 200 meters.
Their snail-like pace was necessary to remain undetected. Snapping dead tree branches, splashing puddles of water, rustling blades of grass, and disturbing soil were all things that could give away their position to a highly skilled tracker.
The North Vietnamese used special tactics, including dogs, and their fearsome "sappers" — a special-operations unit developed to counter US, Australian, and New Zealand special operators — to search for patrols operating behind their lines.
The mental toll was even heavier. Once on the ground, teams had to operate in silence.
"Imagine four or five people sitting there for up to five days, not moving, not being able to cook or heat water for a drink or cook their food, eating cold food, and having enemy activity as close as 10 feet away from you. There's a lot of cold sweats, there's a lot of hot sweats," a former NZSAS operator said in a 2007 documentary about the unit.
A New Zealand soldier in South Vietnam in April 1968.
Richard William Crothers/Australian War Memorial
While they were on patrol, the operators would use hand signals to communicate. If they had to check in with an airborne forward observer, they would just click the radio handset to pass a message. Under such conditions, they got to know each other better than their own siblings and could often anticipate the move of another patrol member just by looking at them.
Every part of their missions were fraught with danger, even on the way out.
In one instance, exhausted NZSAS commandos were patrolling back to their base after an eight-day jungle reconnaissance mission when they stumbled upon the enemy. "We heard these Vietnamese voices yapping. I said, 'Jesus what's that?' A guy said 'Charlie,'" a former NZSAS trooper said.
The Kiwi commandos stayed low, hoping that the enemy would pass without noticing them. But a couple of North Vietnamese sensed something and left the trail to investigate. The NZSAS patrol mowed them down.
Old lessons for a future war
A US Army soldier takes part in the Australian army's Junior Leader Jungle Training Course in August 2012.
US Army/Capt. Stephen A. Austria
Both units held onto the knowledge they picked up in Vietnam. "Upon my return to Perth, I was put on the staff of the SAS selection course to pass on knowledge of Vietnam," McDonald said.
To this day, NSZAS veterans of Vietnam will test and provide feedback to new troopers who are going through the patrolling phase of the NZSAS selection.
If current tensions with China in the Indo-Pacific region escalate into a full-blown war, special-operations troops from the US and allied militaries could find themselves busy conducting reconnaissance of military installations, such as airbases and missiles sites, in the region — and potentially in mainland China — to gather intelligence and targeting data for precision strikes.
While technological advances have transformed the battlefield, in the unique and unforgiving jungle environment many "analog" practices are still valuable. Re-embracing the bushcraft developed in the jungles of Vietnam could prove critical for such operations, especially after 20 years fighting in open desert terrain against lightly armed opponents.
"The jungle is a very unforgiving environment," a US Air Force special operator said during jungle-warfare training in Hawaii this spring. "Everything is so different, so we need to get used to that kind of environment to be effective."
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is currently working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou
22. How a Thai Special Forces Soldier Ended Up in the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes
An amazing human being.
How a Thai Special Forces Soldier Ended Up in the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes
military.com · by Blake Stilwell · September 15, 2022
Inside the Pentagon is a special room dedicated to preserving the memories and actions of America's bravest troops. The Hall of Heroes is dedicated to the more than 3,400 U.S. troops who have received the Medal of Honor, and features all of their names.
The room, dedicated in 1968, also has a few special features, including one photo of a foreign national, Chaicharn Harnavee. A world away, Chaicharn was locked in North Vietnam's infamous "Hanoi Hilton” prison that year. He wasn't the first resident, but he would be the last. Along the way, he would save the lives of countless American prisoners there. That's how his photo ended up in the Hall of Heroes.
In May 1965, then-Sgt. Chaicharn Harnavee accompanied an American civilian pilot on a resupply mission to help construct a hospital in Laos. Chaicharn was a member of the Thai Special Forces in Laos, and it was his day off, but Ernest Brace needed a spotter and the construction crew needed supplies.
Along for the ride were a Laotian Special Forces soldier, a Lao woman and her baby. They arrived at the airfield in Sayaboury Province, Laos, and offloaded their cargo. As they prepared to return home, they started taking heavy small arms fire. When the shots killed their human passengers, Brace and Chaicharn darted for the treeline, but found themselves face to face with 300 communist soldiers.
The two were taken prisoner and forced to march for about two weeks toward Dien Bien Phu, with little food and no medical treatment. They spent three years at the camp in North Vietnam in ankle stocks, hands bound and unable to communicate with each other. They also underwent routine beatings.
In 1968, they were moved to Hua Lo Prison in Hanoi, known to the Americans as the Hanoi Hilton. There were already American prisoners of war incarcerated there, but Chaicharn didn't know that right away. He was immediately placed in solitary confinement, where he spent two years.
When he was released from solitary, he would be allowed out of his cell for two hours a day to clean in the water purification plant. After a year of cleaning the plant, he would make contact with another prisoner, his first in nearly six years. A South Vietnamese Air Force pilot he knew as "Maz" taught him the prisoners' "tap code" so he could communicate with others.
Through the tap code and a series of hand signals he picked up from Maz, Chaicharn began to learn English and could better communicate with other prisoners. Eventually, Chaicharn used the access he had to the facility during his cleaning; he began to steal for himself and the other prisoners.
Small items like pencils and paper were used to help prisoners signal to one another. As his English improved, he got prisoners items they needed. He even smuggled his own food to the Americans who were slowly starving to death. Chaicharn is the reason many of the downed U.S. pilots who were repatriated after the Vietnam War made it home at all.
Sgt. Chaicharn Harnavee was not released in 1973 with the Americans, however. After one month of being alone in the prison, Chaicharn was taken to a prison camp along North Vietnam's border with China, where he was placed in charge of 216 other Thai POWs. This camp was different from Hua Lo; it was a "re-education" camp.
The North Vietnamese instructed Chaicharn to ensure the Thai prisoners completed their re-education work and became loyal communists. He refused and was placed in a three-foot-by-six-foot box, with just one hole in the top, for six months. At the end of the punishment, he was asked whether he would help re-educate the prisoners; he again refused.
Chaicharn had no idea that the freed Americans had begun to ask questions about him and were pressuring the U.S. to find out. He was finally released on Sept. 29, 1974, after nine years, four months and eight days held captive. After he returned to Thailand, King Bhumibol promoted Chaicharn to captain.
Capt. Chaicharn was soon invited to the U.S. by the former POWs he helped during their captivity. He visited the Pentagon, where he was presented with the Silver Star and the Legion of Merit.
Today, a photo of Chaicharn Harnavee hangs in the Hall of Heroes because of his service to those prisoners at Hua Lo. He retired from the Thai armed forces as a colonel in 1992 and continued serving as a public official until his death in 2018.
-- Blake Stilwell can be reached at blake.stilwell@military.com. He can also be found on Twitter @blakestilwell or on Facebook.
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military.com · by Blake Stilwell · September 15, 2022
23. Wormuth: Here are the 6 areas the Army must be prepared for in 2030
Excerpts:
So, what’s on the list?
The ability to “see” the battlefield at all times.
Coordination at greater speed.
“Win the fires fight.”
Hiding on the battlefield.
Wormuth’s fifth point was that the Army of the future has to be able to “communicate and share data rapidly,” not only among soldiers, but also among the joint force and coalition partners.
Talk often and quickly.
Wormuth: Here are the 6 areas the Army must be prepared for in 2030 - Breaking Defense
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · September 15, 2022
U.S. Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth (Staff Sgt. Nicholas J. De La Pena/US Army).
WASHINGTON — As the US Army prepares to fight on the battlefield of 2030, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth is making public six key areas the Army must be prepared for as it anticipates “transparent” battlefield, where “Army forces are going to be under constant observation, and what can be seen can be targeted.”
Speaking at the Maneuver Warfighter Conference at Fort Benning, Ga. on Tuesday, Wormuth described a fighting force that must be more lethal, mobile, and protected in order to successfully fight against near-peer threats like China or Russia, as the service moves forward with its modernization strategy.
“The advent of longer range fires, cyberattacks and …proliferation of UAS on the battlefield means that anyone can come under attack whether you’re on the edge of the battlefield, whether you’re in the rear areas, or even if you’re in the homeland,” Wormuth said.
The Army is currently spending billions of dollars on a collection of 35 “signature” future weapons system, like longer range artillery, as well as about 100 other projects, such as high-altitude ISR platforms, that it believes will give soldiers an advantage on the battlefield of 2030 and beyond. The modernization programs focus on enabling Multi-Domain Operations, the Army’s future warfighting doctrine, which is supposed to come out in October, Wormuth said in her comments today.
So, what’s on the list?
The ability to “see” the battlefield at all times. Increasing situational awareness on the battlefield for both commanders and soldiers will be vital, Wormuth said. The Army plans to do that through a series of ISR platforms, including the Multi-Domain Sensing System, High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System, Terrestrial Layer System-Brigade Combat Team and TLS-Echelon Above Brigade — all ISR sensors that will share battlefield info with troops across different formations.
“Army forces have got to be able to see farther, see more and more persistently than our enemies,” Wormuth said.
Coordination at greater speed. The second critical area for the Army of 2030, the secretary said, is the service’s ability to coordinate dispersed forces to strike enemy targets at quick speed. To do so, she noted the service’s continued investment in faster ground vehicles, including upgraded tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, which is the Bradley’s replacement. She also highlighted the Army’s recent award for its new light tank, the Mobile Protected Firepower, as well as plans for robotic vehicles to carry heavy loads or providing fires.
“These new vehicles are going to enable the fire supporters, engineers, medics, command post and logistics trains to keep up with the combat elements,” Wormuth said.
“Win the fires fight.” The Army must be able to quickly hit an adversary with quick, high-speed artillery, Wormuth said. The Army’s top modernization priority is long-range precision fires, several parts of which are scheduled to be in some stage of prototyping by fiscal 2023, including the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, Precision Strike Missile and ship-killing Mid-Range Capability. Range wise, the service is looking at everything from 40 miles with the Extended Range Artillery Cannon to 1,700 miles with the LRHW.
“Recognizing that China and Russia have fire capabilities that significantly range us in some cases and outnumber us, we’re in the process of growing our artillery formations and improving their range, their rate of fire, their lethality and mobility,” Wormuth said.
Hiding on the battlefield. Those first three areas, Wormuth said, are irrelevant if the Army can’t adequately hide itself. She said the 2030 force will need be highly mobile to avoid being targeted, meaning soldiers will need to rely on basic capabilities like camouflage while also developing more advanced electronic warfare capabilities that mask electromagnetic signature to counter-drone options.
“Army formations are going to require improved mobility, and the use of camouflage, decoys and hide sites to reduce visual and electromagnetic signatures,” she said.
Soaking after Wormuth, Gen. James McConville, chief of staff of the Army, agreed, highlighting the Army’s changing nature of its command post. The Army wants to move away from the easily spotted command post tents towards a command post that’s dispersed across mobile vehicles that are interconnected through the network. That type of work is underway at Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications-Tactical at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
“We’re going to have to change the way we think about mission command and command posts because the battlefield is so lethal,” McConville said at the same conference. “For those that haven’t been to the training centers, we’re going to make you move all the time.”
Wormuth’s fifth point was that the Army of the future has to be able to “communicate and share data rapidly,” not only among soldiers, but also among the joint force and coalition partners. The Army is seeking to connect its assets together as part of its Multi-Domain Operations doctrine, which feeds into Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the Pentagon’s future warfighting construct.
The Army is working on networking together its weapon systems, in addition to those of joint and coalition partners, through its annual Project Convergence exercise. So far, the Army has successfully passed targeting data from an F-35 joint strike fighter and a Marine radar to an Army fires unit, Wormuth said.
Professionals talk logistics. Last on Wormuth’s list was the ability of the Army to sustain the fight of 2030, an area “where we have the most work yet to do as a service,” she said. As the Defense Department looks to pivot to the Indo-Pacific, Wormuth has stated that she sees one of the Army’s primary roles in the Pacific being the logistics service for the joint force.
“We have to not only be able to sustain ourselves during the fight, but we’ve got to be able to get to the fight and that’s going to be much harder in a more contested environment,” she said.
breakingdefense.com · by Andrew Eversden · September 15, 2022
24. Russia, China and Iran are new Axis of Evil plotting to break up West
Why do they not recognize north Korea as part of these "conspiracies?" Don't they know north Korea's relations with these three evil nations? Yes they mention that north Korea as a plank holder in the original axis of evil. But why don't they recognize what north Korea is doing today?
Russia, China and Iran are new Axis of Evil plotting to break up West
The REAL Axis of Evil: How nuclear-armed Russia, China and Iran are plotting to break up the West with a new world order
- Russia's invasion of Ukraine has helped forge closer ties with anti-West nations Iran and China
- The trio are united by their desire to thwart the West and have spoken of their desire to form new alliances
- They regularly engage in nuclear sabre-rattling and want to upset democracy with their authoritarian regimes
By JACK NEWMAN FOR MAILONLINE
PUBLISHED: 12:28 EDT, 15 September 2022 | UPDATED: 12:28 EDT, 15 September 2022
Daily Mail · by Jack Newman For Mailonline · September 15, 2022
At the dawn of the millennium, the West was facing a new threat far removed from the previous century's enemies of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.
Rather than grand territorial ambitions, these new dangers came from hostile countries wanting only to wreak havoc and instil fear in the US and Europe, through terrorism and nuclear sabre-rattling.
A hangover from imperialism and Soviet allegiances, the countries were said to be united by a hatred of the West and being seemingly hellbent on destruction.
In 2002, George W. Bush described the trio of North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an 'axis of evil' in a bid to shore up support for his War on Terror and pinpoint a common enemy.
But what actually united the countries beyond their common anti-West ideology was in fact their limited scope and their over-inflated capabilities.
Iraq, as was later discovered, did not possess any weapons of mass destruction, North Korea's nuclear programme was in its infancy, and Iran would go on to sign the nuclear deal to lift sanctions imposed on the country.
But now, a new Axis of Evil is forming which presents a much more terrifying threat to Western security and democracy, and its leaders are meeting today.
Xi Jinping, right, Vladimir Putin, centre, and Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh attend today's talks in Uzbekistan
Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation today
Putin shakes hands with Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi as he looks to forge a new world order with anti-Western leaders
Russia, China and Iran are threatening a new 'world order', breaking up the West through cyber attacks, election interference, territorial landgrabs, bare-faced aggression, propaganda and nuclear stockpiling.
Unlike the threats two decades on, the current axis is led by a genuine superpower in China, with Russia also capable of unleashing chaos on a global scale, and its leader having shown himself to be a war-mongering despot does little to allay the fears.
Iran remains a junior partner, but flanked by the two allies, it presents a triptych of terror that looks to reshape the world as we know it.
When Putin travelled to Iran in the summer, Kremlin loyalist Yevgeny Popov said they were forming a new 'Axis of Good' which raised eyebrows in the West.
The countries' three respective presidents, Putin, Xi Jinping and Ebrahim Raisi also met in Uzbekistan today for talks aimed at boosting ties between their countries.
While they were flanked by other nations at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the West knows that it is the triumvirate represents the real danger.
A Russian missile strike destroys a flat in Bakhmut, Donetsk today, as it continues its savage war in Ukraine
Bodies of civilians in plastic bags lay in a mass grave in Bucha discovered by Ukrainians in April
While they were flanked by other nations at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the West knows that it is the triumvirate represents the real danger
Iran is not a full member, but moved a step closer today by signing a memorandum of obligations to join the Asian security pact.
In a very thinly-veiled hint of his plans, Putin today blasted what he described as an 'ugly' effort by the US and its allies to maintain their perceived global domination.
'Attempts to create a unipolar world have recently taken an absolutely ugly shape. They are absolutely unacceptable for the vast majority of countries on the globe,' the Russian president said in opening remarks ahead of his meeting with Xi.
Xi added that China, together with Russia, will 'set an example of a responsible world power and to play a leading role to take the rapidly changing world on a track of sustainable and positive development.'
Raisi said during his meeting with Putin today: 'Iran is determined to boost its ties with Russia, from economic to aerospace and political fields.
'The cooperation between Tehran and Moscow can significantly neutralise the limitations imposed on our countries by the U.S. sanctions,' he said.
Earlier this week, a Chinese diplomat said Beijing is willing to shape the international order together with Russia in a 'more just and rational direction', further signalling their intent to form an 'entente terrible'.
While the countries had been forging relationships for some years, the fulcrum in global geopolitics came on February 24 when Putin ordered his inhumane invasion which used the West and NATO's expansion eastwards as a pretext.
When Putin travelled to Iran in the summer, Kremlin loyalist Yevgeny Popov said they were forming a new 'Axis of Good' which raised eyebrows in the West (pictured today)
Iran unveiled the Khaibar-buster missile earlier this year and boasted of how it could reach Israel and US bases in the Middle East
The Iranian Army launches a drone carrying a missile during military drills, with Russia expected to receive a shipment
For years, Russia was seen as a more benign and outward looking country compared to its totalitarianism of much of the 20th century.
Moscow opened its arms to the West and its riches and the West received them in kind, turning much of London into a playground for oligarchs and their billions.
But that all changed when troops stepped across the Ukrainian border, bringing the sceptre of World War III closer than it had been in decades.
War crimes committed by Putin's forces have seen residential buildings targeted, civilians tortured and raped, children separated from their families and sent to Russia, summary executions and use of banned weapons, it has been claimed.
His savagery has united most of the world in a coalition of collective condemnation, as Ukraine flags fly over much of the West.
But elsewhere, countries have remained remarkably tight-lipped about the blatant violence, hoping it could secure them a seat at Putin's table and keep relations strong.
Putin's aggression not only revealed his desire to restore Russia to the 'glories' of the expansive Soviet Union, but also acted as a signal to the West and its protocols.
It showed his intent to act completely in his own interest without regard for how much it would disrupt the global food chain, economy, energy and refugee situations.
Russia test launched the Sarmat ICBM in April and has issued constant nuclear threats towards the West
His constant threats towards NATO powers and his nuclear sabre-rattling only adds to the potential outbreak of full-scale global conflict.
The war has already redrawn the map, with Baltic countries lining up to join NATO, re-erecting the Iron Curtain that was long thought to be torn down for good.
On top of his bellicose actions on the ground, Putin is also engaged in a war of information, espionage and politics.
Persistent cyber attacks and election interference are deliberately intended to upset democratic norms in the West.
It was claimed only this week that Russia has spent £250million since 2014 trying to influence foreign elections in more than two dozen countries.
Unlike declared efforts by foreign governments to lobby for preferred initiatives, Russia's covert influence involved using front organisations to funnel money to preferred causes or politicians, the US intelligence cable alleges.
Putin was spending huge sums 'in an attempt to manipulate democracies from the inside,' the US official said.
Ukrainian soldiers sit atop a tank in Izyum, Kharkiv Region, eastern Ukraine, today
State Department spokesman Ned Price called Russia's covert funding an 'assault on sovereignty.'
'It is an effort to chip away at the ability of people around the world to choose the governments that they see best fit to represent them, to represent their interests, and to represent their values,' he said.
The coordinated attack on institutions is all part of Putin's plan to undermine the West and shore up his authorities regime, sowing seeds of discord abroad while strengthening his own position at home.
Russia's alliance with China has been brought into sharp focus by the war.
Once bitter Cold War enemies, Beijing and Moscow have stepped up cooperation in recent years as a counterbalance to what they see as US global dominance.
When Putin and Xi met at the Winter Olympics before the invasion, the countries stressed their friendship 'has no limits'.
It was reported in March that senior Chinese officials asked Putin to hold off on invading Ukraine until after the 2022 Winter Olympics.
But China does still have something to lose from their alliance, with trade with Europe and the United States a major driver of China's economic growth, even as its estrangement with the US and its appetite for energy have led it to deepen ties with Moscow.
When Putin and Xi met at the Winter Olympics before the invasion, the countries stressed their friendship 'has no limits' (pictured today)
Military vehicles carrying DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles travel past Tiananmen Square during a Chinese military parade
Beijing has not condemned Moscow's invasion, and provided diplomatic cover by blasting Western sanctions and arms sales to Kyiv.
Moscow is also looking for new markets and suppliers to replace the major foreign firms that left Russia following the invasion.
Beijing is Moscow's largest trading partner, with trade volumes last year hitting $147 billion, according to Chinese customs data.
The Russian military also announced sweeping military drills in the country's east that will involve forces from China last week, another show of increasingly close ties.
This summer, they unveiled the first road bridge linking the two countries, connecting the far eastern Russian city of Blagoveshchensk with the northern Chinese city of Heihe.
Last week, Beijing's top legislator Li Zhanshu became the highest-ranking Communist Party politician to travel to Russia since the Ukraine invasion.
Li on his visit hailed an 'unprecedented level' of trust and cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) vehicles carry out drills off the coast of Zhangzhou, the mainland's closest city to Taiwan
It was also feared that Russia's moves in Ukraine would trigger similar action from China in Taiwan.
Beijing claims the disputed island as its own territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary.
China says it plans to annex Taiwan under the 'one country, two systems' format applied in Hong Kong, which critics say has been undermined by a sweeping national security law that asserts Beijing's control over speech and political participation.
The concept has been thoroughly rejected in Taiwanese public opinion polls in which respondents have overwhelmingly favoured the status-quo of de-facto independence.
Tensions rose last month when a visit by US Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan triggered the biggest military activity ever seen around the island in a show of Chinese might.
Any provocation from China would likely see US involvement, another very real threat to global order from the superpower.
A Chinese armoured rocket launcher pictured practicing live-fire drills near Taiwan last month
Jinping's heavy investment in Africa with his Belt and Road Initiative also shows his desire to usurp Western hegemony.
The pursuit of a 'new Silk Road' trade route between Asia and Europe is the flagship of President Xi Jinping's plans for Chinese expansion.
It is made up of a 'belt' of six overland corridors that direct trade to and from China and a maritime 'road' of shipping routes and seaports from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.
Pillars of the BRI already built include freight rail links from Wuhan to Lyon and Chengdu to Prague.
Author Johnathan E. Hillman, an adviser to the US State Department, wrote: 'By limiting outside scrutiny, the initiative's lack of transparency gives Chinese companies an edge in risky markets, and it allows Beijing to use large projects to exercise political influence.'
The multitrillion-dollar initiative involves hundreds of projects, most of them built by Chinese contractors and financed by loans from Chinese state-owned banks, across an arc of 65 countries from the South Pacific through Asia to Africa, Europe and the Middle East.
The Chinese government calls the initiative 'a bid to enhance regional connectivity and embrace a brighter future'.
Other observes and critics, however, see it as a push for the country's position as a global economic power with a China-centred trading network while burying some countries under massive debt.
Meanwhile, Iran's importance to the 'new world order' was underlined by Putin's decision to embark on his first trip beyond the borders of the old Soviet Union since the Ukraine war.
Without sanctions relief in sight, Iran's tactical partnership with Russia has become one of survival.
Iran has rapidly advanced its nuclear program since former President Donald Trump abandoned the atomic accord and reimposed crushing sanctions.
Putin arrived in Iran in June to forge a fearsome new alliance, with both sanction-hit countries united by their hatred for the West
Iran has unveiled a new missile that is capable of hitting nearby US bases and targets within its arch-enemy Israel
Backed into a corner by the West and its regional rivals, Iran is ramping up uranium enrichment, cracking down on dissent and grabbing headlines with optimistic, hard-line stances intended to keep the Iranian currency from crashing.
Fadahossein Maleki, a member of the Iranian parliament's influential committee on national security and foreign policy, described Russia as Iran's 'most strategic partner'.
His comments belied decades of animosity stemming from Russia's occupation of Iran during World War II - and its refusal to leave afterward.
Putin's foreign affairs adviser Yuri Ushakov called Iran 'an important partner for Russia', saying the countries shared 'a desire to take their relations to a new level of strategic partnership.'
During June's meeting, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said of the Ukraine invasion: 'War is a violent and difficult issue, and the Islamic Republic is in no way happy that civilians get caught up in it, but concerning Ukraine, had you not taken the initiative, the other side [NATO] would have taken the initiative and caused the war.'
Russia has also obtained hundreds of Iranian drones capable of being used in its war against Ukraine despite US warnings to Tehran not to ship them, according to Western intelligence officials.
Facing economic sanctions and limits to its supply chain due to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has increasingly turned to Iran as a key partner and supplier of weapons.
Iran's foreign minister, Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, said Tehran had 'various types of collaboration with Russia, including in the defence sector.'
Earlier this year, Raisi also expressed his desire for closer cooperation with China.
Raisi told China's Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe that Tehran sees its ties with Beijing as strategic.
Closer cooperation would serve to confront what the Iranian president described as US unilateralism as talks to revive Tehran's nuclear deal with world powers have stalled.
'Confronting unilateralism and creating stability and order is possible through cooperation of independent and like-minded powers,' Raisi was quoted as saying.
Wei in turn said improving ties between Iran and China would provide security, 'particularly in the current critical and tense situation.'
A Russian delegation visited an Iranian airfield on June 8 and July 5 to inspect the drones which could be used to direct artillery fire and destroy Ukrainian military hardware
Iran and China have increased their military ties in recent years, with their navies visiting each other's ports and holding joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean.
In 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement that covered a variety of economic activities from oil and mining to promoting industrial activity in Iran, as well as transportation and agricultural collaborations.
Iran is not only relying on Chinese and Russian influence, but is also building its own arsenal of weaponry designed to terrorise the West.
Unveiled early this year, the Khaibar-buster, a reference to a Jewish castle overrun by Muslim warriors led by Prophet Mohammed in the early days of Islam, has a range of 900 miles and runs on solid fuel, state media reported.
The missile has high accuracy, is manufactured completely domestically, and can defeat missile shield systems, the report said, although this information has not been independently verified.
Armed forces chief of staff Mohammad Bagheri described it as a strategic, 'long-range' missile.
He said during the unveiling: 'The enemies of the Revolution and the Islamic Republic do not understand anything but the language of power and force'.
Iran has the largest arsenal of missiles in the Middle East.
While we are in an age of information and cyber warfare, the threat of a nuclear apocalypse may seem slim despite the constant warnings.
But the combined powers of Russia, China and Iran now possess the capabilities to completely disrupt the West, as we have already seen in the past two years.
Covid, whose true origins remain unknown but emerged from China, proved how easy it is to turn the world upside down which enemies of the West will have noted.
The unholy trinity are already colluding to reset the world in their favour and the West should not take this for granted as it faces being broken up and overtaken with a new authoritarian order that endangers the values we hold so dearly.
Daily Mail · by Jack Newman For Mailonline · September 15, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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