Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The individual has always fought not to be absorbed by the tribe. If you try you will often be alone and sometimes afraid. But no price is too high for the privilege of being yourself.”

– Friedrich Nietzsche

“Racism is the lowest, most crudely primitive form of collectivism. It is the notion of ascribing moral, social, or political significance to a man’s genetic lineage—the notion that a man’s intellectual and characterological traits are produced and transmitted by his internal body chemistry. Which means, in practice, that a man is to be judged, not by his own character and actions, but by the characters and actions of a collective of ancestors.”

– Ayn Rand

“It is also in the interests of the tyrant to make his subjects poor… the people are so occupied with their daily tasks that they have no time for playing.”

– Aristotle

1. Strategic Forecast: Russia Collapse Risk

2. Ukraine’s Most Lethal Soldiers – Inside the Deadly Game of Drone Warfare

3. Drone Update – September 16, 2025

4. Israel Launches New Ground Offensive Seeking to Force End to Gaza War

5. Residents of Eastern Poland Fear Russia’s War in Ukraine Is Coming to Them

6. U.S. Reaches Outline of TikTok Deal With China

7. The Mobile Command Post: Allowing the Commander to Command

8. From words to actions: An exploration and critical review of the concept of ‘stochastic terrorism’

9. US military again targeted a boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela, Trump says

10. Is the U.S. at War With Venezuela? Latest Strike Raises Legal Concerns

11. A Week That Shook the Old Order

12. US drone dilemma: Why the most advanced military in the world is playing catchup on the modern battlefield

13. The Coming Tripolar World Order

14. In reversal, Pentagon keeps women’s advisory group, adds four more

15. Combat Craft Medium to Gain New, Improved Sibling

16. Last Special Operations MC-12W Surveillance Planes Retired

17. Philippines Rejects Chinese Scarborough Shoal Nature Reserve Claim

18. US Army reveals Typhon missile system in Japan

19. Army adopts venture capital model to speed tech to soldiers

20. How to Take Command of the “Commander’s Intelligence Program”

21. Fort Bragg horrors expose dark underbelly of post-9/11 warfare

22. The Lies America Tells Itself About the Middle East

23. US Military Officers Visit Belarus for Russian War Games

1. Strategic Forecast: Russia Collapse Risk

Excerpts:

Upshot: Global Risk

Absent global aid and pressure to oust Putin’s forces from Ukraine, the odds that Putin will drive Russia to collapse and failed state status will rise. China, India, the U.S., and the E.U. have vital interests in preventing a collapse and helping ensure that Russia’s weapons and instruments of power are secured against proliferation.

Recommended Collective Action: Prevent Russia’s Collapse

Absent a fair, just, and enforceable treaty ending the war with deterrent security and arms guarantees, an expedited international push to help Ukraine liberate itself from Russian troops by Fall 2026 has the best chance of saving Russia from its leadership-driven collapse. The international goal should be to support Ukraine consistently in its task of rendering the Russian military unable to continue in Ukraine, thereby shortening the war.

Those with leadership potential in Russia who are familiar with President Putin’s profligacy with Russian and Ukrainian lives, assets, and opportunity costs need a catalyst to oust Putin’s regime. An accelerated liberation of Ukraine could do it.

Strategic Forecast: Russia Collapse Risk

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/16/strategic-forecast-russia-collapse-risk/

by Michael Woodson

09.16.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract:

This forecast estimates percentage odds for a collapse or partial collapse of the Russian state and economy if Russia’s war on Ukraine continues. It covers vital global interests in context, effects of diplomacy, factors causing collapse, demographic weaknesses, seized asset use, and the unlikelihood that Russia’s feared bombardment tactics will lead to Russian conquest in Ukraine. The thesis here is that Ukrainian liberation and sovereignty will sooner prevent Russia’s collapse by prompting an efficient, internal transition of power in Moscow that conserves resources. An ongoing Russian war for conquest in Ukraine will cause a lack of human capacity to sustain the great power state and economy Russians have come to expect.

Forecast

This forecast assumes consistent European political, military, and economic aid to Ukraine. It rests on the U.S. honoring its pledge to sell European powers the arms needed to replace those they send to Ukraine. It also depends on Ukrainian forces’ ongoing, adaptive military automation and Ukrainian expats returning at a reasonable rate to bolster Ukraine’s defense and morale. Finally, this forecast depends on many promised results-oriented U.S.-led sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and strategic actions to suppress Russia’s war-making capability if Mr. Putin refuses good faith peace and multilateral security guarantees for Ukraine.

The power vacuum after a Russian collapse will degrade Russia’s capacity to defend, secure, and control its weapons, valuable resources, and energy assets. Risk of catastrophic weapons proliferation to terrorists, use of black market weapons in warfare, and related accidents would rise, threatening all nations.

Vital Interests in Ukraine’s Liberation and Leadership

Preventing Russia’s collapse requires Ukraine’s liberation from Russian forces by Fall 2026. This will be of vital strategic interest to the world, including Russia. For the United States, Xi Jinping’s forewarning of an assault on Taiwan in 2027 incentivizes a Ukrainian liberation by Fall 2026 or sooner, as the U.S. deterrent to China increases with only one great power challenge to focus on.

Putin’s Stopgap Gambit Likely Futile

Mr. Putin likely believes in a ‘Trump card” advantage in his war on Ukraine, possibly secured via his special relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump in the Alaska talks of August 15, 2025. In anticipation of owning Mr. Trump, President Putin had ordered breakthrough operations to obtain more ground as negotiations go on. And Mr. Trump has done what Mr. Putin wanted and advocated for a final peace deal requiring more negotiation time without a ceasefire, pressuring Mr. Zelensky with Ukraine under attack during negotiations.

After the Alaska meeting, however, Mr. Trump led an optimistic meeting with Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy and European leaders in which he pledged U.S. involvement in security guarantees to Ukraine in any peace deal with Russia. Still, Mr. Trump has said the trilateral meeting with Mr. Putin, Mr. Zelenskyy, and himself would be the most important one, and if ‘past is prologue,’ it could swing Mr. Putin’s way.

Yet, even if a Machiavellian peace treaty occurs as many observers expect, neither Trump nor Putin can fix Russia’s crippling, cascading human capacity problem. As Putin is unlikely to give up Ukraine or allow foreign powers to help run Russia while his forces take and try to hold Ukraine, Russia’s human capacity problem makes Putin’s target fixation on Ukraine an exercise in national self-implosion.

Factors Portending Russia’s Collapse if War on Ukraine Continues

Risk of Russia’s collapse increases each hour that Putin’s war on Ukraine hollows out Russia’s military-aged population, domestic work forces, and Russia’s grasp on its instruments of power. Brain and body drain from the war, reluctant migrant laborers, and an aging workforce are breaking down Russia’s human capacity to run itself, even if other resources remain. Early signs of breakdown include Russia’s reliance on North Korean troops, foreign mercenaries, oil for Chinese manufacturing, and non-traditional foreign labor. Also, Russia’s military and defense complex has been poaching civilian workers for war jobs.

Also, Putin’s goal of conquering Ukraine is profligate if Ukraine cannot be held. A month into Putin’s aggression, a March 2022 analysis by Seth G. Jones with the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) found that even if Russia conquered Ukraine, it could not garrison more than four soldiers per 1,000 Ukrainians to hold it. This fell well short of the historic force ratios in successfully held post-conquest territories, Dr. Jones studied that averaged 13 occupying soldiers per 1,000 residents, with 20 per 1,000 at higher ranges.

That analysis was three years ago, before Russia’s stunning losses in Ukraine mounted. A June 2025 CSIS update found that Russia’s three-year progress against Ukraine has been slower than many historic, pitched-front wars, with steep losses of troops, tanks, combat vehicles, weapons, and naval and air assets.

CSIS also noted signs of Russia’s economic erosion as labor, capital, and other resources are diverted to the war after years of sanctions and nearly 300 billion USD in frozen assets abroad.

The Institute for the Study of War’s (ISW) July 2025 assessment reinforced CSIS’s findings of outsized Russian losses, citing a recent Economist estimate that Russia’s casualties in its Ukraine war ranged between 900,000 and 1.3 million, with troop deaths between 190,000 and 350,000.

For such heavy losses, Russia had advanced very slowly and lost ground until about 6 months ago when Russian forces reportedly pushed gains to an average of 14-15 square kilometers per day for the first half of 2025, according to ISW.

Russia’s battlefield gains have come since the Trump Administration reportedly suspended military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine in early March 2025, after an apparent televised clash with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. Yet, President Trump had recently changed course again, claiming to have lost patience with Putin’s bad-faith peace negotiations and voicing a commitment to sell U.S. weapons to the European Union NATO members to replace those they send to Ukraine.

Against Russia’s ability to sustain its gains, ISW’s July report noted that Russia’s cycle of combat loss had been compounding against itself in forced reliance on under-trained, inexperienced soldiers replacing casualties at the front.

Naval Post-Graduate School Associate Professor Ryan Maness had this prognosis for the plagued Russian invasion and occupation in his August 8, 2025, article at Small Wars Journal:

Putin has already lost the war in Ukraine. Even as his depleted military slowly inches westward in its unimpressive summer offensive, the casualty rate of Russian troops has reached the staggering one million mark in just over three years.

At Geopolitical Futures (GPF), a Russian personnel vulnerability index report covering 2020-2024 spanning civilian sectors in passenger transport, motor vehicle transportation, services, trade, construction, electric power, and manufacturing showed low, low neutral, to high neutral personnel vulnerability scores until roughly mid-2021, when vulnerability in all sectors surged.

By mid-2023, all sectors had high or critical-level personnel vulnerability scores. This trend coincided with Russia’s telegraphed lightning exercises around March 2021, war-avoidant emigration, and the military buildup on the Ukrainian border leading up to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. See the infographic below:

Let’s extrapolate. Russia has occupied roughly 20% of Ukraine in three years and six months of conventional combat. Being conservative with approximate midpoints in ISW and Economist casualty figures above, Russia suffered roughly one million casualties with 250,000 dead in three years of war in Ukraine. To achieve President Putin’s imperial ambitions Russia would have to conquer the other 80% of Ukraine.

At the rate of conquest to date, Russia would need twelve more years to take the remaining 80% of Ukraine with intervening culminations of Russian troop formations likely slowing progress while being required to hold occupied areas lest an insurgency

retake them. If it took three years for Russia to amass 1,000,000 casualties and 250,000 killed, the same loss rate over 12 more years suggests Russian casualties could swell to 5 million with 1,000,000 killed. Russia’s human capacity issues are already critical and moving toward a disaster scenario. Even if we cut the extrapolated losses by half, the Russian state and economy cannot afford 2.5 million more casualties with 500,000 more killed.

Hypothetically, even if Russia managed to conquer Ukraine, it would likely need to leave a garrison of between 13-20 Russian troops per 1,000 Ukrainians to hold Ukraine while incurring guerrilla warfare casualties and losses expected from a long Ukrainian insurgency. Ukrainians have been returning to Ukraine since 2023, with an estimated population of 39,134,615 as of this writing. 39,134,615 / 1000 = 39,134.615.

39,000 x 13 = 507,000 total Russian troops garrisoned to cover 13 troops per 1,000 Ukrainians at the low range, and 39,000 x 20 = 780,000 troops total Russian troops per 1,000 Ukrainians at the highest range, using Seth G. Jones CSIS estimates for successful occupation.

When, under these circumstances, would the GPF personnel vulnerability index score now showing critical risk to Russia’s human capacity to run the industrial and tax base go off the charts to reach breakdown-level?

Our estimate that Putin must be defeated in Ukraine by the Fall of 2026 to avert Russia’s collapse implies that if Putin’s war enters its fifth year in 2027, the personnel vulnerability scores in Russia will go from critical to breakdown. This, as two more years of warfare in Ukraine could mean 2/3 of roughly 1,000,000 more casualties, and 2/3 of some 250,000 more deaths at about 660,000 casualties and 166,666 deaths.

None of this includes morbidity and mortality from COVID-19’s ongoing effects, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and the morbidity, mortality, and mental health issues confronting survivors of war. Nor does it speak to the loss of younger generations who would have helped take care of their elders, creating new social spending issues for the government. Nor is there an appreciation for how the tax base will shrink when it is most needed to grow to cover the Russians’ post-war and aging population’s costs.

The likelihood of Russian emigres returning to be conscripted into the Russian military or punished for emigrating is low. And male war deaths mean the single mother population will also increase in Russia as in Stalin’s time, driving more families into poverty that may require state aid. Russian women will then carry a burden to care for the young and old, taking a toll on the people who tend to keep the Russian social fabric together.

With such degrading forces at work inside Russia, we arrived at the 70% risk of political-economic collapse by 2029 if Russia continues the war on Ukraine into 2027.

Moreover, as Russia weakens, per long accepted military doctrine, strategic vulnerabilities attract enemies and opportunists who will rise on a flagging power’s flanks and challenge them when they are weakest. There are a number of areas on Russia’s southern borders in which that could come to pass.

Underlying Historic Population Weakness

Accentuating the risk of Russia’s war-driven depopulation and labor shortages across all sectors of the Russian economy is the birth rate decline in Russia’s ruling Slavic demographic. Government population policies are reportedly not working.

As Russia’s adult population ages, dies, is disabled at war, retires, emigrates, and/or suffers health challenges, the birth rate does not grow or sustain the population. This is another reason that land taken in Ukraine very likely cannot be held mid- to long-term.

Russia’s birth rate has dropped precipitously, according to Russia’s statistical agency Rosstat. According to a Moscow Times report citing demographer Alexei Raksha, “..the first quarter of 2025 likely saw the lowest number of births since the early 1800s, with February marking the lowest monthly figure in over 200 years.”

The numbers look so bad that Rosstat reportedly stopped publishing its monthly birth, death, and population figures earlier this year, according to Moscow Times. The same report noted a drop in male life expectancy “from 66 years in 2024 to 61 in mid-2025.” Such a drop suggests sharp acceleration in population loss.

Russia has also done damage to immigration rates that once filled labor needs due to immigration and conscription policies that shrink immigration numbers.

Bombardment Hopes Misplaced

Strapped for personnel to win his war, some fear that a desperate Putin could bombard Ukraine into the stone age then occupy the rubble, pursuing a different democide approach than Stalin’s, yet mass murder nonetheless. However, this puts Moscow on the hook to rebuild Ukraine to avoid having a failed state on its border while investing heavily to suppress a likely insurgency among the ruins. As occupier, Russia will also be charged with providing services to Ukrainians, committing manpower for both missions as Russia’s home defense and independence weaken.

Russia had once used mass bombardment to flatten Syrian infrastructure and scatter Syria’s Sunni majority that had resisted Putin’s vassal, Bashar al-Assad. Yet after Russia’s bombardment, not only did Syria’s reconstruction not happen, but the Assad regime collapsed in 2024 as the Syrian Sunni majority regrouped its forces and took Damascus. Russia was powerless to stop the reversal as Putin had already sunk Russian military and mercenary forces into Ukraine and Africa.

Frozen Russian Assets

If Putin does not withdraw from Ukraine or bombards Ukraine as he did Syria, the European Union and others will likely not release Russia’s nearly $300 billion in frozen assets, but instead spend it on Ukraine’s defense.

Those holding Russia’s frozen assets should not ration them until Russia collapses and Ukraine is weak, nor hold them as an appeasing incentive for Putin to enter into an unreliable peace agreement with Ukraine. Moscow under Putin would sooner see the money as an incentive to a peace agreement to recover the assets, reconstitute his forces, and renew his war effort.

The frozen Russian assets are better spent on boosting Ukrainian force capability to cut off Russian ammunition sources and supply lines through the winter of 2026, leveraging Russian military culmination and investing in a long-term deterrent against future invasions.

Upshot: Global Risk

Absent global aid and pressure to oust Putin’s forces from Ukraine, the odds that Putin will drive Russia to collapse and failed state status will rise. China, India, the U.S., and the E.U. have vital interests in preventing a collapse and helping ensure that Russia’s weapons and instruments of power are secured against proliferation.

Recommended Collective Action: Prevent Russia’s Collapse

Absent a fair, just, and enforceable treaty ending the war with deterrent security and arms guarantees, an expedited international push to help Ukraine liberate itself from Russian troops by Fall 2026 has the best chance of saving Russia from its leadership-driven collapse. The international goal should be to support Ukraine consistently in its task of rendering the Russian military unable to continue in Ukraine, thereby shortening the war.

Those with leadership potential in Russia who are familiar with President Putin’s profligacy with Russian and Ukrainian lives, assets, and opportunity costs need a catalyst to oust Putin’s regime. An accelerated liberation of Ukraine could do it.

Tags: Demographics, global security, NATO, Putin's War, Russia, Ukraine

About The Author

Michael Woodson
Michael Woodson is Chief Executive at Stratpass Corp. publishing on U.S. and allied security, freedom, and defense. Company publications include the blog StrategyShelf.com, and brief books on Amazon, “Adaptive Thinking in Gray War,” and “Above Kim’s Head: A Working Deterrence Policy for North Korea.”

2. Ukraine’s Most Lethal Soldiers – Inside the Deadly Game of Drone Warfare

A story.

Ukraine’s Most Lethal Soldiers

From the front lines in Kherson, with a unit that kills Russians for points

By Ken Harbaugh

Inside the Deadly Game of Drone Warfare

The Atlantic · Ken Harbaugh · September 15, 2025

On Ukraine’s front lines, combat patches are currency. Soldiers trade their insignia for those of other units, mostly, but sometimes for alcohol and cigarettes. When I visited earlier this summer, I brought a stack of U.S. Navy patches from my time as an aviator, along with a rucksack that has featured a steady rotation of insignia from soldiers I’ve met in war zones around the world.

The latest addition is a camouflaged crab, the emblem of Ukraine’s 34th Coastal Defense Brigade. Even though the group was established less than a year ago, its drone operators may already rank among the deadliest fighters in the history of war. I joined three of them on June 1, one of the most intense days of Russia’s invasion, to see firsthand how they are remaking drone warfare.

Earlier that day, Ukrainian intelligence services had launched an attack deep inside Russia, targeting the bombers and surveillance aircraft that Russian President Vladimir Putin uses to terrorize Ukrainian cities. The operation destroyed up to a third of Russia’s strategic air fleet.

That night, after the attack had ended, I rendezvoused with a drone unit from the 34th Brigade in Kherson, in southern Ukraine. We met at a bombed-out gas station a few miles from the Zero Line, the edge of no-man’s-land. We were well within range of Russian artillery, but the bigger threat was the first-person-view (FPV) drones roaming the area, which allow a pilot to stalk their targets using a live video feed.

Read: Ukraine’s new way of war

Under the cover of a bullet-riddled awning, the unit commander briefed us, using only a red penlight for illumination. He introduced himself and the rest of the group—“Team A”—in a mix of Ukrainian and English: “We don’t use our real names, but my call sign is Adama. I fly the suicide drones. ‘Ghost’ will launch the reconnaissance drones, called Mavics, and recover them so they can be reused. ‘Triple-A’ will operate the Mavics once Ghost gets them in the air.” (I have changed their call signs to protect their identities.)

The suicide drones Adama referred to are Ukraine’s answer to Russia’s FPVs, and they are key to Ukraine’s defensive strategy. Ukrainians manufacture them, for only a few hundred bucks each, in warehouses and home garages throughout the country. Conservative estimates suggest that Ukraine will produce more than 4 million this year. They will be equipped with FPV cameras and warheads, to be flown over no-man’s-land into Russian-occupied territory.

As we strapped on helmets and body armor, Adama laid out the mission. We’d be traveling to a bunker near another unit, Team B, which would assemble suicide drones and arm them with explosives. “Once fuses are set, I will take control from our position and pilot the drone,” Adama said. “Triple-A will trail my killer drones with his Mavic. He’ll verify targets, ID new ones, and record kills.”

He smiled, then added, “Happy hunting.”

Adama turned to me with one final instruction: “When we get to the bunker, go in. Don’t grab your gear. Don’t try to help. Just get inside. We will take care of everything else.” The few seconds it would take to sprint from our vehicle would be extremely dangerous, he said. If a Russian drone tracked us to that spot, we’d be an easy target.

The route to the bunker was short, just a couple of miles. Every yard brought us deeper into the range of the Russian FPVs. We drove fast through Kherson, with no lights. The buildings bore bullet holes and burn marks from artillery blasts. Roads were cratered, and overgrowth claimed parking lots and playgrounds. The Russians had held the city for nine months, until November 2022. Then a Ukrainian counterattack forced them back across the Dnieper River. Some months later, the Russians blew up the dam, leaving this part of the city underwater for weeks.

Several minutes into the trip, we heard the whine of Russian Shahed drones descending toward targets in the inhabited city center behind us. Adama ordered our driver to find cover, and we stopped under a dense canopy of trees. Gun crews around the city opened fire. Their tracer arcs converged on the approaching drones.

Once the wave passed, we proceeded to the bunker. Our truck skidded to a stop outside a 14-story building pockmarked with shell holes. Every window was blown out, and rubble littered the ground. I sprinted inside to a small room on the first floor as the team unloaded gear in near-total darkness. The whole transfer took less than 15 seconds. Adama, Triple-A, and Ghost settled into their stations, plugged laptops into antennas, and unpacked the Mavics.

Within minutes, Adama received an audio message. The encryption filter made the excited shouting sound metallic. “Scooter, scooter, scooter!” a voice yelled. Adama enlarged the infrared feed from an overhead surveillance drone, revealing a pair of Jet Skis racing across the Dnieper from the Russian side. They pulled up to the bank, dropped two soldiers near our position, and sped off.

This is a favorite tactic of Russian special forces looking to attack drone crews, because it allows them to sneak behind the front lines, past the Ukrainian infantry defending the riverbanks. “Probably Wagner,” Adama said, referring to the mercenary group that produces many of Russia’s most brutal fighters. “They do some crazy shit.”

Across the street, Team B prepped a drone for launch. Ghost set up his Mavic, and within seconds both the suicide and recon drones were in the air, speeding toward the last known location of the two Russian soldiers. Other teams in the area launched more drones, competing for the kill. “They’ll be dead soon,” Adama said of the Russians.

Ukraine’s drone units, like Adama’s, have pioneered one of the most consequential innovations in modern warfare. It has nothing to do with materials science or weapons design. Rather, it is a new approach to killing: Ukraine has gamified war, awarding points to pilots who eliminate certain targets. An online portal updates the point values for killing infantry, destroying artillery, or neutralizing any manner of battlefield asset. On any given day, military intelligence might determine that rocket launchers pose a special threat, in which case they could be worth the most points. Today, the value of a special-forces soldier, such as the ones speeding toward us, is especially high.

Read: Russia is losing the war—just not to Ukraine

Points mainly confer bragging rights, but pilots can also exchange them for items that make life at the front more bearable. The system reminded me of my time in the Boy Scouts, when I sold light bulbs and candy to rack up points, which—at the end of one glorious summer—I exchanged for a Lego fighter jet. Instead of toys, drone pilots can win perks such as new combat boots, electric kettles, or upgraded night-vision goggles.

The two Russian special-forces operators deposited on Ukraine’s side of the Dnieper had no idea how little their lives were worth. Later that day, their deaths would be delivered by a cheap drone, composed of printed parts, assembled a few hours earlier, and equipped with a one-kilogram explosive charge surrounded by bits of scrap metal. On a shelf next to me, between the smoke grenades and coffee creamer, sat a 20-pound bag of rusty bolts waiting to be packed around the next day’s warheads.

For every drone sent downrange by the 34th, the enemy sent two back. My original plan had been to follow Adama’s team for three hours, then withdraw and get to safety before sunrise. But at dusk on our second night, the Russians still had us pinned down. I learned later that this was one of the largest drone assaults of the war so far. Putin apparently wanted revenge for the bombers he had lost the day before.

I gave up counting after the eighth strike near our position. After another 10 or so, my reflexive flinching stopped. I still felt each blast wave in my chest, and I still closed my eyes as dust rained down from the ceiling. But I learned to shrug off the Russian misses.

Nothing that moves survives long in the wasteland between the Russian and Ukrainian lines. Sometimes, even things that don’t move get destroyed. We saw a Russian flag atop a building, a transparent attempt to provoke Ukrainian drone pilots. It worked. Adama judged the flag to be worth the price of a suicide drone and lined up his shot. I didn’t understand the power of a single kilogram of explosives until I saw the flag vaporized.

One hour passed. We monitored drone feeds and listened to other units engaging until the drone circling our area spotted what appeared to be sandbags in the window of a bombed-out home. On closer inspection, the camera revealed antidrone netting, an indicator that the building might be occupied. Adama ordered Team B to prepare a killer drone, and within minutes he was piloting it toward the new target. He flew into the window, hoping to flush out anyone inside. The drone snagged on the netting, then detonated. The entire structure shook. Triple-A was watching from his Mavic and shouted in Ukrainian. I looked over his shoulder at the screen and saw a Russian soldier sprinting out the back of the building.

Over the next four hours, the team tracked the soldier as he moved between piles of rubble looking for cover. “Why don’t you just launch another drone and take him out?” I asked. “I want to see where he takes us,” Adama responded. Eventually, the soldier entered a building. Sandbags and plywood protected the windows, but the materials were recessed to be less noticeable, and fresh vehicle tracks marked the ground nearby. “There’s more in there,” Adama said.

Over the encrypted chat, he laid out an attack plan involving a drone unit in a neighboring sector. The mission unfolded just as Adama directed: Mavics observed and recorded as a pair of killer drones got into position. The first slammed into the building, blasting a hole in a wall of sandbags that had been piled behind one of the windows. Adama piloted the second drone; he waited a few seconds for the dust to clear, then lost patience and declared, “Fuck it, I’m going in.” Moments after his drone entered the building, the whole structure seemed to expand, and debris and dust shot out of every window. The roof lifted several feet in the air.

Raj Shah and Christopher Kirchhoff: In Ukraine, we saw a glimpse of the future of war

Adama kept his gaze on the screen while Triple-A high-fived him. “That’s a secondary explosion,” he said—other munitions had probably detonated inside, given the size of the blast. “Let’s count it: one confirmed kill, probably more.”

“How can you be sure?” I asked.

“Because we blew the fucking roof off,” Adama replied. He smiled again. “Sometimes,” he added, looking up from his screen, “we’ll see them crawl out before they die.”

Adama turned back to his screen. “And sometimes,” he said, “when we take back a cleared area, we get to see what we’ve done.” He lit a cigarette, and entered the kill into a spreadsheet on his laptop.

Two hours later, a nearby Ukrainian signals-intelligence team hacked into the Russians’ drone feed and shared it with Adama. “This is what the Russian drone pilots are seeing,” he explained.

“Right now?” I asked. “Isn’t that our position?”

Adama answered, “Yes, and yes.”

Every time the Russian-drone camera panned across our building, searching for signs of life, Adama, Triple-A, and Ghost waved at the monitor, pointing toward the building across the street. “Not here!” they yelled, laughing. “Hit Team B! They’re assholes!”

Late into the night, the attacks subsided. Adama surmised that the Russians were low on drones and attempting to resupply. We took advantage of the lull and called in a truck to pick us up and take us to safety.

In the 20 hours I spent with Adama’s team, it launched 12 suicide drones and killed at least one Russian—likely more. One kill a day might seem insignificant. But that rate, repeated over and over by drone units across the front, has transformed the war. The best teams, like Adama’s, might take out several hundred Russian soldiers in a year. In previous conflicts, a kill count that large from a unit this small would have been extraordinary; for drone warfare, it’s merely good. Ukraine’s drone teams comprise about 2 percent of its total armed forces, yet they account for a large majority of Russia’s casualties.

The truck radioed to us that it was one minute away, and all joking stopped. Although the attacks had waned, we knew that the Russians had likely spent the past 20 hours homing in on our location. Adama repeated his earlier instruction to me: “When the truck pulls up, move fast. We’ll get your bag and everything else.”

The pickup came to a halt outside our bunker. Within seconds, we were loaded up and speeding away. Our driver took curves on two wheels, with no headlights to illuminate the road ahead. We approached a bridge, the main bottleneck for vehicles entering and exiting the combat area. Adama’s drone detector screamed a warning, picking up the electronic signature of an approaching Russian craft.

We raced across the bridge and saw the wreckage of another vehicle smoldering by the side of the road. “From a few hours ago,” Adama said. Past the bridge, the screech of the detector faded, and we eased up. Ten minutes later, we parked in front of a bombed-out, seemingly abandoned building.

Adama unfastened a padlock and loosened the chain securing the doors. When he swung them open, I saw half a dozen 3-D printers on workbenches, whirring as they deposited new drone parts onto holding trays. Every wall was stacked to the ceiling with thousands of suicide drones, ready for assembly and waiting for the appropriate warhead, to be determined by whatever the next day’s priority targets would be.

The team dropped its gear, and we gathered outside to say goodbye. Adama ripped his unit patch, the camo crab, off his shoulder and handed it to me. “Crabs adapt,” he said. “They can operate anywhere.” I did my best to return the gesture, handing out my last two Navy patches. But they felt insufficient somehow, so I unpinned a set of gold aviator wings that I’d received when I graduated flight school; they had been fixed to my backpack for more than a decade. Adama nodded in a wordless acknowledgment of the wings’ significance. He reached into his bag and pulled out a small black patch.

In Russian, it read “PMC Wagner Group.” I felt a streak of hard crust on one side of the patch where it had been partially melted. Adama said, “He was on fire when he died.”

I will never display that patch. I keep it in a drawer but pull it out sometimes and wonder about the life its owner led before Adama took it. I think, too, of the man I saw being hunted across the wasteland of Kherson. I picture him consumed by fire, and imagine the uncounted soldiers who died alongside him.

More than any other patch I have collected, this half-burnt one comes closest to telling the truth about modern war, and the brutal game it has become. Dead men’s patches are traded like tokens. Soldiers’ lives are reduced to points. That makes drone warfare seem abstract and impersonal, but the opposite is true. Unlike artillerymen, drone pilots single out individuals, sometimes seeing the panic on their faces before striking. Killing this way is as intimate as it is efficient. It is a game we may never stop playing.

The Atlantic · Ken Harbaugh · September 15, 2025

3. Drone Update – September 16, 2025

Drone Update – September 16, 2025

https://sof.news/drones/20250916/

September 16, 2025 SOF News Drones 0

Recent news about unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are used in conflicts, training, new developments, and drone technology. Topics are listed below:

UAS and Launched Effects Summit
Countering the Swarm
‘Top Drone’ School
Drones in Saber Junction 25
Marines Test Drones
Cheap Drones and U.S. Bomber Fleet
Let the Squad Fail – Drones to Lowest Level
U.S. Playing Catchup
Russian Jet Powered Drones
All About Russian Attack Drones
Ukraine’s Drone Wall
How Drones Changed Tanks
19 Russian Drones Over Poland
Drones, Insurgents, Cartels – Latin America
Germany and Heron Drones
UK to Produce Drones for Ukraine
German Skyranger System for Ukraine

U.A. Army UAS and Launched Effects Summit

This article’s featured topic is about a recent one-week event held at Fort Rucker, Alabama August 11-18, 2025. The event was focused on the rapid increase in unmanned systems in the U.S. Army and how training, maintenance, and fielding will take place in the future. This event in Alabama was one of many ‘Launched Effects’ events to take place in the future. Some announcements were made to include:

Lifting of restrictions on UAS acquisition and fielding
Deployment of smaller systems at lower levels within the Army
Merging the UAS operator and maintainer career fields – now 15X
Adopting a “train the trainers” plan for UAS
Expansion of commercial drones for Army use from 11 to 30
3D printing and additive manufacturing systems

Read more in “Army UAS and Launched Effects Summit Begins at Fort Rucker”, by John Hamilton, U.S. Army, August 12, 2025. See also “US Army soldiers kick the tires on a new class of multipurpose drones”, by Courtney Albon, Defense News, September 8, 2025.

Top Image: Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, commanding general of the Army Aviation Center of Excellence and Fort Rucker, gives the opening remarks at the Army’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Launched Effects Summit. (John Hamilton)

U.S. and Drones

Defeating Swarm Drones. With the proliferation of cheap, mass produced drones the U.S. is now facing “democratized” mass precision fires. The decades of air dominance and a near monopoly on precision strike by the U.S. is now gone. While the DOD has invested in expensive legacy systems as well as emerging counter drone capabilities, these efforts have been hindered by insufficient scale and urgency. China is rapidly developing its drone capability as well as setting up numerous factories to mass produce its drone force. The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has published (Sep 2025) a report on topic.

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/report-us-counter-drone-defenses-insufficient-as-china-scales-up-unmanned-capabilities/

‘Top Drone’ School. DOD plans to host at least two Top Drone schools each year. The event will provide a chance for service members, industry, and academia to prove out tactics, operational procedures, and drone capabilities. The first event was recently held – four days long at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The drones were a mix of first person view systems and fiber-optic connected drones. “Pentagon stages first ‘Top Drone’ school for operators to hone skills”, Military Times, September 11, 2025.

Drones in Saber Junction 25. The U.S. Army took drone warfare to the next level this week with the 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s (2CR) multinational exercise Saber Junction 25 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). Soldiers from within the formation flew hundreds of reconnaissance and attack drones to fight the opposition forces (OPFOR) and used these new systems to enhance their warfighting capabilities. This ranged from security reconnaissance missions to targeted strikes against enemy armored vehicles. “Revolutionizing Warfare: 2CR Drones at Saber Junction 25”, DVIDS, September 10, 2025.

Marines Test Drones. 1st Marine Division drone operators spent 12 days testing vendor-loaned drone systems on multiple ranges at Camp Pendleton, California. Following the tests the Marines conducted detailed briefs that will guide procurement and influence future small UAS capability development across the Department of Defense. “Marines Test Drone Systems During Defense Innovation Unit Challenge”, U.S. Department of War, September 10, 2025.

Cheap Drones and U.S. Bomber Fleet. Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web in June of 2025 was a wake up call for the United States strategic bomber fleet. The Ukrainian operation took out a third of Russia’s bomber fleet overnight with 117 drones. The U.S. needs to develop and implement increased resiliency to protect its strategic assets in the 21st century. “Cheap Drones, Priceless Targets: Fortifying America’s Bomber Fleet”, Small Wars Journal, September 9, 2025.

Let the Squad Fail – Put Drones to Lowest Level. The best way to get drones working in enough numbers on the frontlines is to give out to the infantry squads. The young soldiers will figure it out quickly enough. The more they fail the quicker they learn. “Want Drone Dominance? Let the Squad Fail”, by Charlie Phelps, Modern War Institute, September 15, 2025.

U.S. Playing Catchup. The U.S. is excellent in building large, expensive weapons systems; but in many ways it is not so adept in quickly producing large quantities of small, cheap systems – like drones. “US drone dilemma: Why the most advanced military in the world is playing catchup on the modern battlefield”, CNN Politics, September 15, 2025.

Drones and the Ukraine – Russia Conflict

Russian Jet Powered Drones. Just a few months back defense analysts following the conflict in Ukraine were predicting that Russia’s slow-moving drones would eventually be replaced with faster jet-powered drones. These faster drones will be harder to detect and to shoot down. This past week on Wednesday – Thursday (27-28 August) Ukraine was hit by a massive drone and missile attack (598 drones, Twitter, @RALee85, Aug 28, 2025) causing a number of deaths. Some of the drones were powered by Czech PBS TJ40-G2 engines by PBS Velka Bites using a German Bosch pump. (source: Twitter, @wartranslated, Aug 28, 2025)

All About Russian Attack Drones. Most peoples conception of drones used in warfare, except folks in Ukraine of course, is of small quadcopters used by hobbyists a few years back. Thousands of these small drones are used every day by both sides of the Ukraine – Russia conflict. The majority of people outside of Ukraine are less familiar with the Russian long-range attack drones that are launched every night against Ukrainian cities. When compared to the small quadcopter drones, these larger ones appear quite massive. Read more on this topic in “Everything you need to know about Russia attack drones in 2 charts”, Kyiv Independent, September 14, 2025.

AI Drone Software. A program that runs on a regular laptop is now helping drone operators hit targets utilizing artificial intelligence. “Meet Clarity: Ukrainian AI to Hunt Russian Forces in Seconds, Not Hours”, United24 Media, September 9, 2025.

Ukraine’s Drone Wall. A layered defense composed of unmanned systems picks off Russians who, astride motorcycles, cross into no-man’s land in suicidal wave attacks. “Inside Ukraine’s drone wall holding off Russia’s meatgrinder assaults”, Asia Times, September 12, 2025.

How Drones Changed Tanks. When the Russians invaded Ukraine in 2022, the employment of tanks resembled the tank warfare of World War II. The introduction of drones dropping munitions and later of first person view – one way drones have change armor tactics and tank appearance. “Tanks Were Just Tanks, Until Drones Made Them Change”, The New York Times, September 8, 2025. (subscription)

AI-Driven Drones. Ukraine’s defense industry is shifting rapidly to fielding drones operated by artificial intelligence for terminal guidance. Many of its drones will come standard with a terminal guidance module that allows the drone to operate even under heavy jamming and electronic warfare. While the cost increases by only 10%, the effectiveness of the drones are increased by 2-4 times. Many of these first person view drones cost less than $500. “Ukraine Just Put AI Into Its FPV Drones – and They’re Already Winning”, United24 Media, September 15, 2025.

Russian Drones Over Poland. On a night this past week over 450 drones and 30 missiles attacked military and civilian targets in Ukraine. Nineteen drones flew into Poland – four were shot down and others simply crashed. Read more in “Could a ‘drone wall’ have protected Poland’s airspace?”, Defense News, September 11, 2025.

There are probably some explanations for the incursion:

It was drone operator error
The AI system malfunctioned
Defensive jamming systems caused the incursion
Russia is testing Poland’s air defense system
Russia is testing NATO’s resolve

Drones Around the World

UK to Produce Drones for Ukraine. Thousands of interceptor drones will be built and delivered to Ukraine every month. ‘Project Octopus’ is a program where Ukraine will share intellectual property that is highly effective against the Russian’s Shahed one-way attack drones. The interceptor drones will cost 10% of the Russian systems they destroy. It is estimated that a Shahed costs about $35,000. “UK to produce Ukraine-designed interceptor drones, supply thousands”, Defense News, September 11, 2025.

Drones in Latin America. Criminal organizations in Mexico, Colombia, and other countries are getting smarter on the use of drones to conduct their nefarious activities. Insurgent groups are also beginning to use drones. Currently, first person view (FPV) drones are being used; but it won’t be long before fiber-optic cable directed drones enter the scene. “The Future of Criminal Drone Use in Latin America”, War on the Rocks, September 9, 2025.

Heron Drones. Germany is buying three Heron drones from Israel for 1 billion Euros. There are several variety of Heron drones produced by the Israel Aerospace Industries. Bloomberg, 5 Sep 2025.

German Skyranger System for Ukraine. A Germany arms manufacturer is set to deliver a short-range air defense system to Ukraine by the end of the year. The deal is worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The systems 35-mm cannon can cover six square miles and is useful in intercepting low-flying objects such as drones. “Ukraine slated to get Skyranger drone-defense cannons by year’s end”, Defense News, September 11, 2025.

**********

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4. Israel Launches New Ground Offensive Seeking to Force End to Gaza War

The beginning, the end or will a long war continue in other forms?

Israel Launches New Ground Offensive Seeking to Force End to Gaza War

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described Gaza City as Hamas’s ‘last important stronghold’

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-launches-new-ground-offensive-in-bid-to-end-gaza-war-73ae2089

By Dov Lieber

Follow, Alexander Ward

Follow and Abeer Ayyoub

Updated Sept. 16, 2025 5:45 am ET

Palestinians survey the damage after an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City on Tuesday. Photo: ebrahim hajjaj/Reuters

Quick Summary

Israel launched a ground offensive into Gaza City, following heavy bombardment, seeking to end the war against Hamas with military force.View more

Israel launched a long-anticipated ground offensive into Gaza City early Tuesday morning, Israel’s military said, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seeks to end the war against Hamas with military force instead of diplomacy.

The assault kicked off with a heavy bombardment of the Gaza Strip’s most populous area, where hundreds of thousands are believed to still be sheltering following almost two years of war that has flattened much of the rest of the seaside enclave. Netanyahu has called the city “the last important stronghold” of Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, and he has argued that conquering it would deal a decisive blow.

Israel’s military last week ordered Palestinians to evacuate Gaza City amid a bombing campaign that focused on high-rise buildings ahead of its ground operation. The military declined to comment on the size of the troop deployment but said it included ground forces advancing gradually toward the center of Gaza City, which is densely populated and where Israel has refrained from intensive operations on the ground since the start of the war.

“It’s just the first step,” said Yaron Buskila, a lieutenant colonel in Israel’s military reserves and chief executive of Israel Defense and Security Forum, a security-oriented think tank. “It’s airstrikes and artillery and some ground forces but we will see more in the next days getting in.”

Gaza City residents reported a frightening barrage of military force overnight, with explosions, gunfire and helicopters raining down around them. The wail of ambulances pierced the silences between bombs.

“I wish I could leave,” said Manar Ashi, a 30-year-old mother of three, in the Rimal district of Gaza City.

The Israeli military said the deployment included ground forces advancing gradually toward the center of Gaza City. Photo: amir cohen/Reuters

Analysts said the action on Tuesday was only the initial phase of the ground operation. Photo: Leo Correa/Associated Press

Israel has mobilized tens of thousands of reservists in anticipation of the ground offensive, which aims to defeat Hamas once and for all after its Oct. 7, 2023, attacks killed 1,200 Israelis and resulted in some 250 hostages being taken into Gaza.

The Gaza City ground operation began shortly after Netanyahu met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is pushing for a cease-fire desired by President Trump that would end the war and release the remaining hostages. Rubio left Israel with a pessimistic view of a peace deal’s chances.

“Ultimately, we would all prefer to see a negotiated end that leads to all the hostages being released, that leads to Hamas being disarmed and eliminated as a threat,” he told reporters early Tuesday.

“The Israelis have begun to take operations there,” Rubio said of the Gaza City offensive. “So we think we have a very short window of time in which a deal can happen. We don’t have months anymore, and we probably have days and maybe a few weeks.”

Israel is expanding the war at a time when Gaza is largely subdued. Israel says it holds 75% of the strip. Two million Gazans are crammed into Gaza City, an evacuation zone called al-Mawasi and other camps.

The Israeli military has been trying to push the estimated one million Palestinians in the strip’s north, where Gaza City is located, to flee south ahead of an offensive. The United Nations has estimated only around 200,000 have heeded the call. An Israeli military official said that number is closer to 350,000.

Mourners at a funeral in Gaza City. Photo: Omar Ashtawy/ZUMA Press

Two years of war has flattened much of Gaza. Photo: Leo Correa/AP

While its troops already control 40% of Gaza City, largely along its outskirts, the Israeli military has been playing a game of whack-a-mole elsewhere, defeating Hamas in one neighborhood, only to see fighters pop back up and establish themselves elsewhere. Ending that cycle is one of the offensive’s objectives.

The Israeli military official said they expect to fight between 2,000 to 3,000 militants inside Gaza City. Israeli and Arab officials estimate Hamas has tens of thousands of fighters within its ranks, though many are fresh recruits with little training.

The operation has been widely criticized in European capitals and among aid groups for expanding the conflict amid dire humanitarian conditions in the enclave.

Israel’s security establishment has also pushed back against the plan in favor of pursuing a limited deal to release more of the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza. Officials fear hostages could be killed in the fighting and are concerned that troops are exhausted after nearly two years of war.

Polls in Israel have shown for months that a large majority of the population, including right-wingers, support ending the Gaza war in exchange for freedom for the remaining hostages held by Hamas.

Tens of thousands of Israelis took to the streets of Israel on Saturday to protest Netanyahu’s expansion of the war, in one of the largest antiwar demonstrations in recent months.

As the bombardment of Gaza City intensified Monday night, families of hostages set up a tent encampment outside Netanyahu’s Jerusalem residence, where they spent the night and called on Israelis to join them.

“Our loved ones who are in Gaza are being bombarded by the Israeli military at the order of the Prime Minister,” said Anat Angrest, the mother of hostage Matan Angrest, who Israel believes is alive. “We are terrified it will be their last night and that the living hostages will pay with their lives.”

The campaign comes days after Israel struck Hamas political representatives in Qatar, part of an expanding pressure campaign against the group.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and laid out U.S. objectives to end the war in Gaza. Photo: Nathan Howard/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

5. Residents of Eastern Poland Fear Russia’s War in Ukraine Is Coming to Them

Does Russia not fear becoming over extended or does it believe NATO will not respond? If it does not fear a NATO response, how do we change Putin's assessment?

Residents of Eastern Poland Fear Russia’s War in Ukraine Is Coming to Them

Days after drones reached deep inside Polish territory, locals worry Russia’s hybrid campaign could turn into a military confrontation

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/poland-reactions-russia-ukraine-war-cf53ca4c

Ala Wesolowska’s house was damaged after NATO-member warplanes shot down several Russian drones over Poland.

By Karolina Jeznach | Photography by Maciek Nabrdalik for WSJ

Sept. 15, 2025 10:00 pm ET

Quick Summary

A Russian drone incursion into Poland has left residents near the Ukrainian border fearful of escalating conflict.View more

WYRYKI, Poland—Moments before the top of her house was ripped off early Wednesday morning, Ala Wesolowska had gone downstairs to make breakfast.

Hearing the crash above her, she raced outside to see a warplane roaring across the dawn sky.

“Right above my head, flying so low, it was so loud,” Wesolowska said as she picked through the carcass of her home this weekend.

She and her family, who live less than 20 miles from the Ukrainian border, had found themselves caught in the crossfire of an unprecedented encounter between Russian drones and NATO jet fighters—the latest escalation in the confrontation between Moscow and the West.

There were no injuries from the all-night incursion, but days afterward, residents in Poland’s eastern edges are fearful for their future.

Many worry that the events of last week were just a prelude and that the violence that has raged for more than three years in neighboring Ukraine might more powerfully burst over the border.

Katarzyna Dzwigala lives in Wyhalew, a village about a 40-minute drive from Poland's border with Ukraine.

On her soy and corn farm in eastern Poland, Katarzyna Dzwigala said she heard a thud as she was getting her children ready for school early Wednesday. When teachers canceled school that day, she found out the noise had been caused by a drone. NATO shot at least three of 19 drones out of the sky on Wednesday morning, targeting the ones that posed a direct threat, according to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who told lawmakers that last week’s incident brought the country closer to conflict than at any time since World War II.

“My son asked me yesterday if the war was coming,” said Dzwigala, 38 years old. She tried to reassure him, but acknowledges having had similar thoughts. The family lives in Wyhalew, a village about a 40-minute drive from the border with Ukraine.

The incursion has opened a new chapter in Poland’s experience of the war in Ukraine. The country has already been the target of Russian sabotage operations, meant to undermine Warsaw’s support for Kyiv. Moscow has carried out a campaign of hybrid warfare in which it is suspected of having set fires at factories, shopping centers and warehouses. The drone incursion, however, pushes its operations closer to a military confrontation.

“The kids are really scared,” said Dzwigala.

Residents of Wyryki shared a photo of part of an AIM-120c missile that was found in a field. Houses in the village were destroyed following the incident in Polish airspace.

The government has pledged to enhance security together with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, who have donated helicopters and jet fighters to strengthen the alliance’s eastern border. On Saturday, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski was in Kyiv discussing Ukraine’s antidrone protocols—procedures Poland would implement if the threat persists.

“Together we can face this danger,” he said in a video on X.

There hasn’t been a formal assessment of whether the incursion of Gerbera drones—a smaller variant of the Shahed often made of plywood and styrofoam—and decoys was deliberate, but the intelligence services of NATO countries conferred on Wednesday evening to discuss their findings related to the incident, and concluded that it was most likely a deliberate attack, according to people familiar with the discussions.

Russia has sought to deflect blame, saying its drones didn’t have the capability to travel as far as the border into Poland, let alone deep into the country. Some military analysts, however, suggest the unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, were modified for longer flights.

Drone parts found

Cruise missile parts found

Baltic Sea

Lithuania

Detail

Rus.

Russia

Pol.

Ukr.

Poland

Germany

Belarus

Warsaw

Lodz

Lublin

Kyiv

Krakow

Ukraine

Czech Rep.

Slovakia

Austria

100 miles

100 km

Note: Locations are not exhaustive

Source: staff reports

Daniel Kiss/WSJ

This weekend saw a fresh wave of warnings in Poland when more Russian drone strikes in neighboring Ukraine forced Warsaw once again rush to send jets and close its Lublin airport on Poland’s eastern flank. This time, no drones crossed the border, but the alerts rattled already fragile nerves.

On Saturday afternoon, Edyta and Tomasz Wieczorek, a middle-aged couple in Krzywowierzba, eastern Poland, were having coffee when their phones lighted up with a new government emergency-service alert. Fearing another round of violence, they were also exasperated by the government’s failure to tell them how to respond. Just then, reports that a drone had violated Romania’s airspace came through on their phone screens. NATO jet fighters tracked the drone but didn’t shoot it down, according to Romania’s defense minister, who said the UAV was a Shahed used by Russia in its attacks on Ukraine.

Edyta Wieczorek, 43, said she wanted the government to start organizing drone drills for residents. Her 12-year-old daughter has refused to sleep in her second-floor bedroom, she said, after the drone smashed through the Wesolowski’s home, which is in the neighboring village, part of a close-knit community where most people are acquainted.

“None of us knows what to do in case of a mass drone attack, more importantly, we do not have any shelters around here,” she said. “We are most at risk.”

Edyta Wieczorek said there wasn't a clear procedure for how to respond to the Polish government's emergency-service alerts on her phone.

The Wesolowski family rushed to pack up their belongings on Saturday, fearing the walls might crumble and take down what remains of their house. They will stay in an apartment at the village library, where the local government has arranged temporary accommodation for them.

Many residents nearby are awaiting word from the state about what happened above their houses last week and what they can expect in the future. In the absence of explanations, the villagers are assembling their own timeline of events to try to piece together what happened and asking whether NATO’s response might have caused more damage than it prevented.

The cost of the response is also under scrutiny. Krystian Ziec, one of the creators of the system for integrating F-16 jet fighters within the Polish Armed Forces, estimated that the operation to take down the cheap Russian drones would have cost around $8 million.

In a country that welcomed millions of Ukrainians fleeing in the first years of the war, the incident has divided communities who debate the role Ukraine might have played in the incursion. For some, it has brought out an even greater sense of solidarity with their war-torn neighbor. Others feel Kyiv is trying to drag Poland into the fight.

A destroyed house in Wyryki.

Some have even repeated Russia’s narrative that the drones were sent up or off course by Ukraine to inflame the conflict.

Yuri Ihnat, a spokesman for Ukraine’s air force, said electronic-warfare jamming equipment was turned on that night, like every night of an attack, but that the modification of the drones to allow them to fly further, their location and the course they took far into Poland indicate that the incursion wasn’t caused by the jamming.

Poland’s Sikorski has also addressed the allegations, saying that the Russian incursion was not by mistake.

“Disinformation is just as real of a problem,” said Bernard Blaszczuk, mayor of Wyryki county, adding that more defense assets would help calm nerves in the region.

“I would like to see some NATO troops around here,” he said. “We are 8 miles away from the border with Ukraine, so all of this should be expected.”

Days after the incursions, Polish President Karol Nawrocki approved the deployment of NATO forces on Polish territory, but it is still unclear how and when that would happen.

Appeared in the September 16, 2025, print edition as 'Poles Fear War Closing In After Russian Drone Attack'.

6. U.S. Reaches Outline of TikTok Deal With China

How have all these frameworks and "outlines of a deal" worked out in the past few months?

Are we closing the barn door after the horses have escaped? Hasn't China already "hoovered up" a gazillion bytes of data on Americans?

And what is the half life of these social media fads? Will TikTok lose its luster in the coming months or years? Are we anticipating what comes after TikTok?

U.S. Reaches Outline of TikTok Deal With China

Beijing likely agreed to framework to keep alive China’s desire for a Trump visit

https://www.wsj.com/business/tiktok-deal-us-china-framework-5f406292

By Rebecca Feng

Follow, Lingling Wei

Follow and Amrith Ramkumar

Updated Sept. 15, 2025 1:50 pm ET

President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping will speak Friday to complete the TikTok deal amid high tensions over trade, tariffs and chips. Photo: Thomas Coex/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

MADRID—U.S. and Chinese negotiators reached a framework deal on TikTok after two days of trade talks here, a crucial step toward ending the yearslong saga over whether the video-sharing app can operate in America just days before it was set to be banned.

Beijing had previously shown little appetite for a deal on the popular app, but likely conceded to an agreement to keep alive its ambition for President Trump to visit China.

The deal will be confirmed by Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping after a call on Friday, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

The outline of an agreement came together as China escalated its regulatory campaign against U.S. chip juggernaut Nvidia during the negotiations.

The Chinese regulator’s action, according to people familiar with the matter, was taken to provide Xi with political cover for the TikTok deal so he wouldn’t appear weak to his domestic audience.

Until the Madrid meetings, Chinese authorities had resisted U.S. demands that TikTok’s Chinese parent company, ByteDance, sell its controlling stake to U.S. investors. The newfound flexibility is linked to Beijing’s intensifying efforts to secure a state visit from Trump.

WSJ Reporter Explains Where a U.S.-China TikTok Deal Stands

The Mobile Command Post: Allowing the Commander to Command

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/15/the-mobile-command-post-allowing-the-commander-to-command/

by Scott Henderson

09.15.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract:

Military Command, Control, and Communications systems have become increasingly complex as the military has scaled its intent for increasing joint operations. While these systems have been designed with good intent, evidence has shown that too much technology and information is both difficult to adopt at scale and can slow down operational tempo when it doesn’t work properly – which is likely in conflict. To solve this, this article has defined the principles of a modular (based on mission set), light, and sustainable Mobile Command Post that leverages currently-approved communication devices and vehicles to create an edge-based tactical command node. The intent is purely to unburden the unit commander from technology complexity and put that burden on the technology itself by using AI/autonomy-infused radios, sensors, and systems in one light command vehicle. This generates speed of decision-making and operations unseen in warfare.

The Wakeup Call Was 22 Years Ago:

In March 2003, a young, inexperienced US Army company commander unknowingly veered off course. The commander’s unit was supporting the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s push toward Nasiriyah. But a wrong turn off Highway 8 placed them directly on Highway 7—into the heart of the city and into the jaws of a waiting Iraqi Army ambush.

The young officer realized the mistake only after passing the Al-Quds News Headquarters, a landmark not listed in his planning materials. Minutes later, the convoy was engulfed in small arms, rockets, mortar, and tank fire. Eleven American soldiers were killed. Six were captured. The firefight lasted 30 minutes before Alpha Company of the 2nd MEB, led by USMC Major Bill Peoples, arrived to rescue the survivors.

This wasn’t just a tragic navigation error. It was a failure of command-and-control systems—a breakdown in connectivity, interoperability, and technological readiness. The Army company was the last in a 600-vehicle convoy. Mechanical issues had slowed them down, separating them from the main force and cutting them off from higher headquarters. The Marines they were supporting operated on a different frequency and network. The officer’s only tools were a CD-ROM mission plan, a SINCGARS radio that lost power, and a handheld Garmin GPS—which was jammed as soon as contact was made.

The company was alone. In enemy territory. Under fire. And their command-and-control technology had failed them.

The systems the company commander relied on were not interoperable. They were not sustainable. And they were not intuitive enough to support him in the chaos of combat. The GPS became a glorified compass, and the CD-ROM was useless once they were lost. The fog of war descended—and the very tools meant to guide the unit became obstacles. This is not just a story from the past; it is a warning for the future.

Today’s company commander faces an even more daunting technological landscape. Instead of a handful of systems, he must manage dozens—multiple radios, mesh networks, SATCOM, GPS, CPUs running joint planning software, mobile power systems, and more. All of it must function in contested environments, under constant surveillance, and often while under fire. When it doesn’t, he’s left troubleshooting a digital maze while trying to lead troops in combat.

It takes six months—or more—for organizations to adapt to new technologies. How can we expect our commanders to remain competent in an environment that changes by the week? We must ask ourselves: Are we equipping our tactical leaders to win, or are we burying them in complexity?

This article offers two solutions, not sweeping reforms, but practical corrections:

Operational: A restructured Tactical Command Post (TAC) model that reduces footprint, increases mobility, and empowers commanders to lead without being tethered to fragile systems.
Technological: A Mobile Command Post (MCP) that is fast, modular, and software-defined—built for maneuver, survivability, simplicity, and (eventually), autonomy.

The story of the Nasiriyah ambush is not just history; it’s a mirror. And if we don’t act, it may become prophecy.

These are not radical ideas. They are necessary corrections to a system that has drifted too far from the realities of modern warfare. If we want our commanders to win, we must give them tools that work with them, not against them. We must ensure they can lead when the network fails, when the systems crash, and when the enemy is watching.

This is a wake-up call. Not just for the Army, but for every stakeholder in national defense. The tactical edge is where wars are won—and right now, it’s overloaded, overexposed, and under-supported.

The Problem – Technology Saturation and Tactical Overload in Joint Force Operations:

As mentioned, research has shown that organizations require a minimum of six months to effectively adopt new technologies—often longer when the systems are complex or the operational environment is dynamic. In today’s era of exponential technological advancement, that lag in adoption is no longer just inefficient—it’s potentially catastrophic. For the U.S. Army, particularly in the context of joint force entry operations, this delay could have existential consequences.

This raises a critical question: Are our doctrinal strategies, especially those centered on joint maneuver and force projection—becoming impractical due to the pace of technological change?

Doctrine, tactics, training, and field manuals are intended to be the strategic guideposts for commanders at every echelon. But joint operations demand joint interoperability, and in practice, this means a reliance on a vast and ever-evolving connectivity framework. The Army’s Integrated Tactical Network (ITN), Unified Network Plan, and other programs are designed to enable this—but they also introduce complexity that can overwhelm the tactical edge.

Consider the contrast: CPT King once operated with a SINCGARS radio, a GPS, a CD-ROM, and a map. Today’s company-level commander, operating from a Tactical Command Post (TAC), must manage:

Four or more communications systems
Multiple software applications for planning, C2, and situational awareness
GPS and geospatial tools
Multiple sensors, UAS, and CUAS elements
Mobile power systems
All while navigating contested spectrum environments and constant surveillance
When that commander PCSs, and the new one comes in, everyone must re-learn new systems, as the Army employs numerous models, brands, and C2 frameworks

When the unit comes under fire and systems begin to fail—jammed, degraded, or simply too complex to troubleshoot in real time—the commander is left managing 15+ systems, each with its own update cycle, interface, and failure point. This is not just a technical challenge; it’s a tactical liability. Not only are direct operations in combat a problem, but the Army is saturated with far more radios, computers, software models/brands, sensors, and competing companies – when a commander moves on to another, they need to be re-trained on all new systems (plus the new updates).

And yet, innovation is inevitable. Warfare will continue to evolve, and the need to maintain technological superiority will remain. But current conflicts and training environments have revealed a troubling trend: the battlefield is becoming oversaturated with technology, especially for light infantry and maneuver forces. The very systems designed to create a decision advantage are instead creating a quagmire of complexity.

Operational Solution – Tactical MCP Restructuring:

Recommended are two “fixes” that can be implemented in congruence. One is operational: the modern TAC must shrink to the size of a single light tactical vehicle and primarily act as a lightly manned (squad to platoon-sized), mobile information node within an established lodgment, or constantly on-the-move. Call it a “Mobile Command Post” (MCP). These “command nodes” should also increase in quantity within brigade combat teams (BCTs) – preferably one per company. This structure ensures that MCP signatures remain light, while nodes can extend throughout/beyond a Forward Line of Troops (FLOT), while simultaneously sending communications and information to the higher-level echelon in the rear – all while managing the battle. Operational tempo is the key here; the MCP technology works, while the unit commander decides. The system should not be an impedance.

To maintain operational tempo and survivability, the TAC must evolve into mobile, distributed command nodes—MCPs—that act as autonomous C2 platforms.

Tactical Command Post Restructure

Size and Structure

Vehicle-mounted, squad- to platoon-sized
One per company in BCTs
Enables distributed C2 and redundancy

Role and Employment

Mobile information nodes – eventually unmanned or autonomous
Relay data, support ISR, coordinate fires
Rapid displacement capability

Survivability and Signature Management

Software-defined radios and sensors
Spectrum agility and terrain masking
Remote operation to reduce personnel exposure

Trainability and Continuity

MCP kits must be standardized and modular, allowing commanders and staff to train on a common set of tools
Personnel rotating between units should encounter familiar systems, reducing downtime and increasing operational effectiveness
This approach ensures that commanders can lead with confidence, regardless of where they are assigned

Technological Solution – A Light, Sustainable, Mobile Command Post (MCP) Concept:

Coinciding with these operational principles, the MCP’s technology must evolve with the modern understanding of joint force entry. Tempo is arguably the most important trait of maneuver operations. Decision-making at speed, even on the move, is necessary in today’s climate. To maintain overmatch in multi-domain operations (MDO), motorized infantry battalions must possess a mobile command post (MCP) capability that supports rapid decision-making, mobility, and survivability. The MCP must enable commanders to operate at the speed of relevance, particularly in contested environments saturated with unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and long-range fires.

MCP Capability Requirements

Mobility and Platform Integration

Mounted on high-mobility, low-signature platforms (General Motors ISV variants)
Modular for C5ISR integration
Low cost and logistical footprint
Mobile comms architecture with Hoverfly VHAs, and SATCOM
Dismountable mesh radio systems

Power Autonomy

Onboard or portable power kits
Silent watch and hybrid configurations (GM ISV and Utility Vehicle with upgraded power configuration)

Modular, Trainable C5ISR Architecture

MCPs must use pre-approved, Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)-compliant commercial technologies that are modular by mission set and standardized across the force
All C2 systems must be software-defined, enabling AI/ML integration and automated resilience features
Kits must be trainable and sustainable, allowing personnel to operate familiar systems even when reassigned to new units
Modular kits reduce training time, increase interoperability, and ensure continuity of operations across the Army

Integration of Anduril’s Lattice AI/ML Platform

All hardware should be capable of incorporating the Lattice AI and OS backbone
As part of the Army’s award to Anduril Industries under the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) initiative, the Lattice C2 platform is already being integrated into compute nodes
Lattice provides a modular, open-architecture software backbone that fuses sensor data and automates decision support

Interoperability and Sustainability

Certified by PEO-C3T for ITN and COE
Plug-and-play with joint networks
Scalable, sustainable, and remotely updatable
3 – 4 standardized “kits” that include commercial radios, compute, software, and sensors (infused with Lattice) that commanders can train on and be accustomed to. They also allow for modularity across mission sets.
All “kits” are comprised of available COTS systems that meet the above criteria – this keeps costs and logistics trains at a minimum

In Summary

The introduction of mission-specific, standardized “kits” significantly enhances the concept by addressing several key challenges:

It ensures interoperability across units.
It reduces the training burden and improves operational continuity.
It simplifies logistics and cost management by relying on widely available COTS components.
It allows the system to remain adaptable, reducing complexity and increasing operational effectiveness.

By tailoring technology to mission needs while maintaining a standardized base of equipment and software, the MCP concept becomes far more practical and scalable. This should indeed fix a major part of the problem of technological overload, making the systems more practical for frontline commanders.

Conclusion – Empowering Commanders at the Tactical Edge:

American doctrine encourages decentralized decision-making, but today’s commanders are being buried under complexity. We must give them tools that move with them, adapt to terrain, and amplify their ability to lead under fire.

MCPs must be mobile, modular, and interoperable, capable of pushing and pulling information across the battlefield, coordinating fires, and enabling decisions at speed. They must be fast, affordable, and scalable. One day, they may even operate unmanned, autonomously relaying data while commanders focus on maneuver, not maintenance.

If we simplify command technology, we conduct modern platforms, software-defined systems, and streamlined techniques—empowering commanders to lead decisively. We reduce cognitive overload, increase survivability, and restore the tempo that wins battles.

Twenty years ago, in Nasiriyah, our Army unit commander would have welcomed today’s technology. But we must ensure it creates space for the next young officer to operate freely—not trap him in a web of systems that slow his unit and confuse the mission.

The future of maneuver warfare is not about more technology—it’s about better technology, used smarter and built to serve the commander. The solutions are here. The need is urgent. The time to act is now.

Tags: command, command post, Joint Operations, military technology, Operational Technology, Technology

About The Author

Scott Henderson
Scott Henderson is a Military Strategy and Systems Analyst with experience in technology integration, operational analysis, and civil-military relations research. He has an Army background and enjoys research on theory and the creative application of concepts.

8. From words to actions: An exploration and critical review of the concept of ‘stochastic terrorism’

We should recognize and understand "stochastic terrorism"

From words

to actions

An exploration and critical

review of the concept of

‘stochastic terrorism’

Fook Nederveen, Emma Zürcher, Rick Slootweg,

Felicitas Hochstrasser, Stijn Hoorens

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3200/RRA3232-1/RAND_RRA3232-1.summary-English.pdf

Summary The role of the media in radicalisation and terrorism has been a topic of discussion in recent years. Citizens are increasingly at risk to be exposed to extremist ideas through social media and communication apps, which can lead to a normalisation of hatred towards certain individuals, groups or institutions and an increased acceptance of violence. A term that is gaining popularity in the media and popular scientific literature in the context of recent incidents of extremist violence in which the media may have played a role is 'stochastic terrorism'.

This term refers to hostile, derogatory and/or dehumanising language by influential individuals towards a political, social, ethnic or religious group or individual. Through interaction on social media and traditional media, this language may lead to a climate of fear, which in turn increases the likelihood of someone turning to violence, even if the initial message does not explicitly call for it. Due to the implicit nature of these expressions, individuals responsible for (reinforcing) inflammatory discourse cannot straightforwardly be prosecuted, if at all. However, there is currently no legal definition or even a unified understanding of this somewhat elusive concept. This study aims to review the concept of stochastic terrorism critically and contribute to its further understanding.

9. US military again targeted a boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela, Trump says

US military again targeted a boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela, Trump says

By AAMER MADHANI and REGINA GARCIA CANO

Updated 3:37 AM EDT, September 16, 2025

AP · AAMER MADHANI · September 15, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump said the U.S. military on Monday again targeted a boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela, killing three aboard the vessel, and hinted that the military targeting of cartels could be further expanded.

“The Strike occurred while these confirmed narcoterrorists from Venezuela were in International Waters transporting illegal narcotics (A DEADLY WEAPON POISONING AMERICANS!) headed to the U.S.,” Trump said in a Truth Social post announcing the strike. “These extremely violent drug trafficking cartels POSE A THREAT to U.S. National Security, Foreign Policy, and vital U.S. Interests.”

The strike was carried out nearly two weeks after another military strike on what the Trump administration said was a drug-carrying speedboat from Venezuela that killed 11.

Speaking to reporters in the Oval Office later on Monday, Trump said he had been shown footage of the latest strike by Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Asked what proof the U.S. has that the vessel was carrying drugs, Trump replied, “We have proof. All you have to do is look at the cargo that was spattered all over the ocean — big bags of cocaine and and fentanyl all over the place.”

Trump also suggested that U.S. military strikes targeting alleged drug smugglers at sea could be expanded to land.

He said the U.S. military is seeing fewer vessels in the Caribbean since carrying out the first strike early this month. But he said the cartels are still smuggling drugs by land.

“We’re telling the cartels right now we’re going to be stopping them, too,” Trump said. “When they come by land we’re going to be stopping them the same way we stopped the boats. ... But maybe by talking about it a little bit, it won’t happen. If it doesn’t happen that’s good.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth later took to X to warn cartels the U.S. would “track them, kill them, and dismantle their networks throughout our hemisphere — at the times and places of our choosing,” echoing muscular language used by past administrations during the Global War on Terror. The White House also posted a short unclassified video clip on social media of the strike.

Questions about legality

The Trump administration has justified the military action as a necessary escalation to stem the flow of drugs into the United States.

But several senators, Democrats and some Republicans, have questioned the legality of Trump’s action. They view it as a potential overreach of executive authority in part because the military was used for law enforcement purposes.

Democratic Sen. Adam Schiff of California said he’s drafting a war powers resolution aimed at preventing U.S. troops from engaging in further strikes until formally authorized by Congress.

Schiff said he was concerned “these lawless killings are just putting us at risk” and could prompt another country to target U.S. forces without proper justification.

“I don’t want to see us get into some war with Venezuela because the president is just blowing ships willy-nilly out of the water,” Schiff said.

Human rights groups have also raised concerns that the strikes flout international law. The White House has offered scant information about how the operations came together or the legal authorities under which they were carried out.

“Let us be clear — this may be an extrajudicial execution, which is murder,” said Daphne Eviatar, who directs Amnesty International USA’s Security with Human Rights Program. “There is absolutely no legal justification for this military strike.”

The Trump administration has claimed self-defense as a legal justification for the first strike, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio arguing the drug cartels “pose an immediate threat” to the nation.

U.S. officials said the strike early this month targeted Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan gang designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization. And they indicated more military strikes on drug targets would be coming as the U.S. looks to “wage war” on cartels.

Trump did not specify whether Tren de Aragua was also the target of Monday’s strike.

The Venezuelan government did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the reported strike.

The Trump administration has railed specifically against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro for the scourge of illegal drugs in U.S. communities.

Venezuela’s president lashes out

Maduro during a press conference earlier on Monday lashed out at the U.S. government, accusing the Trump administration of using drug trafficking accusations as an excuse for a military operation whose intentions are “to intimidate and seek regime change” in the South American country.

Maduro also repudiated what he described as a weekend operation in which 18 Marines raided a Venezuelan fishing boat in the Caribbean.

“What were they looking for? Tuna? What were they looking for? A kilo of snapper? Who gave the order in Washington for a missile destroyer to send 18 armed Marines to raid a tuna fishing vessel?” he said. “They were looking for a military incident. If the tuna fishing boys had any kind of weapons and used weapons while in Venezuelan jurisdiction, it would have been the military incident that the warmongers, extremists who want a war in the Caribbean, are seeking.”

Speaking to Fox News earlier Monday, Rubio reiterated that the U.S. doesn’t see Maduro as the rightful leader of Venezuela but as head of a drug cartel. Rubio has consistently depicted Venezuela as a vestige of communist ideology in the Western Hemisphere.

“We’re not going to have a cartel, operating or masquerading as a government, operating in our own hemisphere,” Rubio said.

Following the first military strike on a boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela, America’s chief diplomat said Trump was “going to use the U.S. military and all the elements of American power to target cartels who are targeting America.”

The AP and others have reported that the boat had turned around and was heading back to shore when it was struck. But Rubio on Monday said he didn’t know if that’s accurate.

“What needs to start happening is some of these boats need to get blown up,” Rubio said. “We can’t live in a world where all of a sudden they do a U-turn and so we can’t touch them anymore.”

—

AP writers Matthew Lee in Jerusalem and Mary Clare Jalonick in Washington contributed reporting.

AP · AAMER MADHANI · September 15, 2025

10. Is the U.S. at War With Venezuela? Latest Strike Raises Legal Concerns

Congress certainly has not declared war.

Is the U.S. at War With Venezuela? Latest Strike Raises Legal Concerns

Miranda Jeyaretnam

Reporter

TIME · Miranda Jeyaretnam

President Donald Trump ordered a strike on a second Venezuelan vessel in international waters, alleging that it carried drugs, shortly after Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro said the U.S. was trying to provoke a “major war.”

The strike, conducted on Monday morning, killed three people off the coast of Venezuela. Trump claimed that the vessel was transporting drugs headed for the U.S. The strike comes less than a month after the U.S. mobilized military assets and personnel near the South American country and conducted a similar strike on another Venezuelan vessel, which killed 11 people.

“This morning, on my Orders, U.S. Military Forces conducted a SECOND Kinetic Strike against positively identified, extraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels and narcoterrorists,” Trump posted on Truth Social. “These extremely violent drug trafficking cartels POSE A THREAT to U.S. National Security, Foreign Policy, and vital U.S. Interests.”

He added: “BE WARNED — IF YOU ARE TRANSPORTING DRUGS THAT CAN KILL AMERICANS, WE ARE HUNTING YOU!”

Trump included a 27-second video in the post that showed a vessel exploding and bursting into flames, which he said was proof that the boat carried drugs. It’s not clear from the video what was on the vessel.

“All you have to do is look at the cargo that was spattered all over the ocean—big bags of cocaine and fentanyl all over the place,” Trump told reporters at the Oval Office. “We recorded them. It was very careful, because we know you people would be after us. We’re very careful.”

Still, Trump’s assurances, however, have done little to assuage concerns from some that the U.S. is headed toward—or already engaging in—an unauthorized war with Venezuela. Here’s what to know.

How Trump has targeted Venezuela in drug crackdown

The Trump Administration has said that its attacks on Venezuela are part of its wider crackdown on drug trafficking into the U.S. On the first day of his second term in office, Trump declared a national emergency over illegal immigration and drug trafficking across the U.S.-Mexico border. He has since imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico, accusing the countries of not sufficiently clamping down on cross-border fentanyl smuggling, and on China over its alleged manufacturing of fentanyl. He also designated drug cartels, including Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, as foreign terrorist groups and labeled them a national security threat. Last month, he signed a secret directive to the Pentagon authorizing the use of military force against these cartels, according to the New York Times.

The Administration has ratcheted up its offensive on Venezuela specifically. It has accused Maduro of being “one of the world’s largest drug traffickers” and leader of the so-called Cartel of the Suns, which the Venezuelan government has refuted. Last month, the Administration doubled the reward to $50 million for information leading to the arrest of Maduro, whom Trump has called a dictator. The U.S. government does not recognize Maduro’s last two electoral victories.

Meanwhile, Attorney General Pam Bondi said last month that the U.S. government had seized up to $700 million of assets allegedly linked to Maduro. Trump also issued penalty tariffs on countries that purchase oil from Venezuela in March.

The Trump Administration has also cracked down on Venezuelan immigration into the U.S., including revoking the protected status of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans and deporting 238 Venezuelans in March to an El Salvadoran prison, several of whom U.S. courts have said were wrongfully deported.

On Sept. 2, Trump ordered a military strike on a Venezuelan vessel, killing 11 people whom the Trump Administration claimed were members of Tren de Aragua and transporting illegal narcotics. The Times, however, reported that the boat had turned around after noticing a military aircraft following it. The strike came after Trump had directed U.S. navy ships to the edge of Venezuelan waters, prompting the Venezuelan government to mobilize militia troops and bringing the two countries to a precarious standoff.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Monday said that the U.S. government had “100% fidelity and certainty” that the boat in the first strike was involved in trafficking drugs to the U.S.

“What needs to start happening is some of these boats need to get blown up,” Rubio said in an interview with Fox News. He added that since the strike, the “number of boats heading towards the United States suddenly dropped dramatically.”

When asked on Sunday if the U.S. would “start doing strikes on mainland Venezuela,” Trump said, “We’ll see what happens.”

Venezuela says relations with U.S. ‘destroyed’

Shortly before Monday’s strike, Maduro said at a press conference in Caracas that what “battered relations” existed between the U.S. and Venezuela had “been destroyed by their bomb threats” and were now “completely broken.”

He characterized U.S. actions as “aggression all down the line, it’s a police aggression … a political aggression, a diplomatic aggression, and an ongoing aggression of military character.”

“The communications with the government of the U.S. are thrown away. They are thrown away by them with their threats of bombs, death and blackmail,” Maduro said.

Venezuela had responded to the Sept. 2 strike by flying two F-16 fighter jets over a U.S. Navy destroyer on Sept. 4.—to which Trump warned that the U.S. would shoot down Venezuelan jets that “put us in a dangerous situation.” Maduro claimed after the Sept. 2 strike that eight U.S. warships with 1,200 missiles were targeting Venezuela, adding that his country was in “maximum readiness to defend” itself.

On Saturday, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil accused the U.S. military of boarding a Venezuelan vessel, which he said was a “small, harmless” fishing boat. U.S. forces seized the vessel, Gil said, and “illegally and hostilely” detained those onboard for eight hours.

The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry said whoever ordered the action was “looking for an incident to justify escalating war in the Caribbean, with the aim of regime change.”

The Trump Administration earlier this month denied seeking regime change, arguing that its military build-up is intended to stop drug-smuggling by cartels.

Most cocaine in Latin America is produced in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia—not Venezuela. In 2019, 74% of cocaine shipments to the U.S. came through the Pacific, which Venezuela does not border, while 24% came through the Caribbean, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro points at a map of the Americas during a press conference in Caracas on Sept. 15, 2025. Jesus Vargas—AP

‘Blowing ships willy-nilly’ raises legal concerns

Some observers have raised concerns around the legality of the U.S. military strike in international waters.

Countries are prohibited from using force unless under attack per the United Nations charter. After designating Tren de Aragua as a terrorist organization, Trump accused the cartel of “perpetrating, attempting, and threatening an invasion of predatory incursion against the territory of the United States,” invoking the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, and said the gang was conducting “irregular warfare against the U.S.” at the direction of Maduro.

But after the first strike, Michael Becker, an assistant professor of international human rights law at Trinity College Dublin told the BBC that “the fact that U.S. officials describe the individuals killed by the U.S. strike as narco-terrorists does not transform them into lawful military targets.”

Becker said the strike likely violated the U.N.’s bar on the use of force as well as protections of the right to life under international human rights law. He added in a post on X on Monday: “It doesn’t matter if the victims are criminals. These are murders.”

Other legal experts also weighed in to the BBC. “Intentional killing outside armed conflict hostilities is unlawful unless it is to save a life immediately,” said Mary Ellen O’Connell, a professor at the Notre Dame Law School.

It’s not just international law in question. In the U.S., the President is required to have Congressional approval in deciding whether the U.S. should go to war, though the President has the authority to use force in limited circumstances under the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations of Use of Military Force (AUMF), which have come under bipartisan criticism for effectively giving Presidents a “blank check” to order military actions without Congressional approval.

A source familiar with Pentagon thinking told CNN, “If there was a boat full of al Qaeda fighters smuggling explosives towards the U.S., would anyone even ask this question?” Congress did officially authorize U.S. use of force against al Qaeda under the 2001 AUMF after the Sept. 11 attacks, which it has not done against Tren de Aragua.

“The fact that Congress has just been completely left out [of] the loop suggests the Trump Administration doesn’t feel that it has to follow the ordinary rules of the game,” Oona Hathaway, a professor of international law at Yale Law School, told NPR.

Rumen Cholakov, a visiting lecturer of U.S. constitutional law at King’s College London, told the BBC, “It is not immediately obvious that drug cartels such as Tren de Aragua would be within the President’s AUMF powers, but that might be what ‘narco-terrorists’ is hinting at.”

White House spokesperson Anna Kelly told the Times that Trump’s order for the first strike “acted in line with the laws of armed conflict to protect our country from those trying to bring poison to our shores.”

Kentucky Sen. Rand Paul, a Republican, expressed concern about the extrajudicious nature of the strikes. “Did he ever read To Kill a Mockingbird? Did he ever wonder what might happen if the accused were immediately executed without trial or representation??” Paul posted on X on Sept. 6, in reply to a post from Vice President J.D. Vance arguing that “Killing cartel members who poison our fellow citizens is the highest and best use of our military.”

California Sen. Adam Schiff, a Democrat, said on Monday that he will introduce a war powers resolution to “reclaim Congress’s power to declare war.” (Earlier this year, lawmakers similarly sought to rein in Trump’s military involvement in the war between Israel and Iran, which ended after the U.S. bombed three Iranian nuclear facilities.)

“Donald Trump just blew up another boat in the middle of the ocean with no legal justification,” Schiff posted on X.

In a video accompanying the post, Schiff called the two strikes “extra-judicial killings” that put “us at risk,” noting that the strikes may set a precedent for other countries to similarly attack U.S. vessels on the basis of alleged drug trafficking.

“You probably saw that the President has blown another ship out of the water, again claiming that these were narco-terrorists and somehow that he has the authority to do this. He does not,” Schiff said. “I don’t want to see us get into some war with Venezuela, because the President is just blowing ships willy-nilly out of the water.”

TIME · Miranda Jeyaretnam

11. A Week That Shook the Old Order

A Week That Shook the Old Order

Most Western leaders are flailing while foreign foes capitalize on their opportunity.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/a-week-that-shook-the-old-order-0bc8fab4

By Walter Russell Mead

Sept. 15, 2025 4:49 pm ET

Demonstrators gather in London, Sept. 13. Photo: Lab Ky Mo/Zuma Press

A line widely but wrongly attributed to Lenin states that there are decades when nothing happens and weeks when decades happen. Last week was one of those weeks.

Israel struck Hamas negotiators in Qatar and, despite an intensifying global outcry, moved toward a full-scale invasion and occupation of Gaza City. Amid a wave of cyberattacks and sabotage against European countries, a large group of Russian drones invaded the airspace of Poland, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member. President Trump demanded that NATO allies slap massive secondary sanctions on India and China as the first step in a renewed campaign to force Russia to end its attack on Ukraine.

The French government fell after losing a confidence vote in the National Assembly, and the prime minister of Japan announced he was stepping down after a disastrous tenure during which the long-governing Liberal Democratic Party of Japan lost its majorities in both houses of Parliament.

“Far right” parties continued their advances across Europe. Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (formerly the National Front) and Alice Weidel’s Alternative for Germany, known as AfD, all lead national polls. The AfD tripled its vote in the prosperous former West German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, while the streets of London filled with antiestablishment and pro-Trump demonstrators.

Only the intervention of South Korea’s foreign minister prevented some 316 Hyundai workers from being handcuffed on the long deportation flight from Atlanta to Seoul. Brazil’s former president was sentenced to 27 years in prison after being convicted of plotting a coup. Britain’s ambassador to the U.S. was dismissed after the publication of embarrassing emails he sent to his former friend Jeffrey Epstein.

And the assassination of Charlie Kirk sharpened questions at home and abroad about the social and political stability of the U.S., the country on which what remains of world order depends more than ever.

Any one of these events would dominate a week’s news in calmer times. What we are seeing today is the accelerating dissolution of the post-1945 world order. It isn’t merely that the old order’s foreign opponents have combined more effectively to disrupt it. The order’s defenders are flailing.

There are many reasons for the West’s poor performance. The current tranche of leaders for the most part can neither defend their countries from foreign foes nor defend the political status quo from populists at home. The muddled thinking of a generation of policy elites, who foolishly supposed that geopolitical conflict had ended forever, left the West radically unprepared for resurgent opponents. Voters everywhere remain unwilling to support vigorous defense and foreign policies that offer hope of reversing the global drift toward great-power conflict. Universities no longer provide the grounding in intellectual, cultural, diplomatic and military history that enables leaders to plan wisely and inspires them to lead well.

As the old order fades, its boundaries become fuzzy, and its foes respect them less. That is happening in Europe, where Russia daily tests its belief that the trans-Atlantic alliance is more of a bluff than a real and living force. It is what is happening in the western Pacific, where China probes the defenses of its maritime neighbors with increasing confidence and aggression.

In this context, if the Kirk assassination exacerbates American polarization, the consequences will be global. America’s brutal political competition heightens the chance that the promises of one president will be repudiated by his successor. It also increases the likelihood that an America consumed by internal divisions will have fewer resources and less energy to devote to foreign policy—no matter who is president.

The news isn’t all bad. While controversial in many quarters, Kirk’s example of patriotism, religious faith and commitment to open dialogue inspired young people all over the country. America’s capacity for economic and technological innovation is, if anything, renewing itself. The absurdities and excesses of identity politics have led to such intellectual follies, antisemitism and other forms of hate that even many strongly liberal intellectuals are reconsidering some long-held assumptions. And rising foreign threats are slowly but surely concentrating minds on the need to shore up our defenses.

Time will tell whether the green shoots of revival can renew the West and whether newly empowered populists will grow into their new responsibilities quickly enough to avoid disaster. For now, the upholders of the existing world order lack the conviction and clarity of vision required to defend it. Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and even the shell-shocked mullahs of Iran will inevitably seek to capitalize on their historic opportunity. There is no reason to suppose that these powers will lose interest in probing the West for weaknesses anytime soon.

Paul Gigot interviews longtime Wall Street Journal Columnist Dan Henninger

Appeared in the September 16, 2025, print edition as 'A Week That Shook the Old Order'.

12. US drone dilemma: Why the most advanced military in the world is playing catchup on the modern battlefield

US drone dilemma: Why the most advanced military in the world is playing catchup on the modern battlefield | CNN Politics

CNN · Haley Britzky, Isabelle Khurshudyan · September 15, 2025

See all topics

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The future of warfare felt a lot like playing a video game. Soldiers fastened on virtual-reality glasses and then moved their fingers across the joystick in their palms. A small drone buzzed and lifted in response.

At a military base in Texas last month, American soldiers trained on how to operate small quadcopters, the kind that now dominate the battlefield in Ukraine and are increasingly the weapon of choice for combatants around the world.

With an explosive attached, a drone costing less than $1,000 can destroy a tank worth millions.

For troops at Fort Bliss in El Paso — members of the Multi-functional Reconnaissance Company, 6-1 Cavalry Regiment — the technology and tactics were still new. And for the US military, that’s a problem.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has spurred a flurry of evolution in drone warfare — so much so that the US, with one of the most advanced militaries and defense industrial complexes in the world, found itself behind. Most American soldiers lack the know-how for fighting with unmanned systems, and while the US has excelled at building large, expensive weaponry — fighter jets, tanks, precision-guided missiles — it is in many ways unprepared to quickly produce large quantities of small, cheap systems, like drones.

Defense officials are now rushing to catch up.

In July, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth circulated a memo to senior leaders aimed at accelerating the US military’s adoption of drones. In recent months, US troops began building and 3-D printing drones and training on simulators reminiscent of video games to learn how to guide small systems through windows, around corners or into an enemy tank’s hatch.

“This is not tomorrow’s problem. This is today’s problem,” Maj. Gen. Curt Taylor, commander of the US Army’s 1st Armored Division, told CNN at an Army conference in Germany in July. “And the first fight of the next war is going to involve more drones than any of us have ever seen.”

Inside the US military’s push for small, cheap drones that have transformed the battlefield

2:20 - Source: CNN

Inside the US military’s push for small, cheap drones that have transformed the battlefield

2:20

Learning from Ukraine

While military units are working to get up to speed, the US still faces manufacturing hurdles to match the capabilities and production of countries like China, analysts and industry leaders said. A key challenge is that US weapons can’t contain Chinese parts for security reasons, but domestic alternatives are significantly more expensive.

Ukraine has offered to help on drone production, as officials in Kyiv have sought to cement deeper ties with Washington to ensure Ukraine’s future security. Though Washington has sent billions in weapons to Ukraine, Kyiv now sees its opportunity to send something back to the US.

During a visit to the White House last month, Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky pitched President Donald Trump on a $50 billion deal to supply and co-produce drones with the US. Zelensky told journalists that the program, which hasn’t been finalized, would deliver 10 million unmanned systems annually over five years.

“In the past six months especially, there’s been some kind of radical change in the perception of how drones work and the development of the industry,” Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister who led the country’s wartime effort to buy and mass produce drones, told CNN.

Fedorov said he’s noticed a spike in demand for Ukraine’s drone data — tens of thousands of drone-camera videos depicting successful strikes on equipment, personnel and buildings that countries and defense companies could use to train artificial intelligence systems.

Fiberoptic FPV drones are handed over by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha to the 21st Mechanized Brigade in Kyiv on September 10.

Andrew Kravchenko/Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images

Fedorov said Kyiv could potentially leverage its drone innovation in exchange for more financial or materiel support in the future.

“This a geopolitical card that our president will consider how to use,” Fedorov said. “It would be a big help to our allies, and this is exactly the right relationship to have with them. We provide high-quality drones, high-quality data and our expertise, and then we get back more security assistance.”

A drone for every soldier

At a conference center in Wiesbaden, Germany, in July, Ukrainian military leaders presented a blunt assessment of NATO’s need to invest in drones to a packed room of NATO military officials and defense industry wonks.

Maj. Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine, waged a bet that there is not “a single tank of the road” that could survive first-person view drones, known as FPV drones.

“You should also understand that our experience is super valuable for all of you here, as none of the countries have this kind of experience nowadays,” Brovdi said through his translator.

Maj. Gen. Volodymyr Horbatiuk, deputy chief of Ukraine’s General Staff, told the crowd that while artillery and anti-tank missiles are vital, roughly 80% of Kyiv’s success in hitting targets come from drones.

“It is not the future, it is the routine reality of how we wage our war,” Horbatiuk later added.

A Ukrainian serviceman controls a FPV drone during a training flight in an undisclosed location in eastern Ukraine on August 16.

Genya Savilov/AFP/Getty Images

The repair center for a drone division training near Kramatorsk, Ukraine, on October 24, 2024.

Andre Luis Alves/Anadolu/Getty Images

Patches of units operating ground drones are displayed at a classified location in Ukraine on August 8

Pierre Crom/Getty Images

American officials have reached the same conclusion. Hegseth’s July memo was repeatedly pointed to by military leaders who spoke to CNN as significant for getting drones into troops’ hands faster. The memo emphasizes that commanders should embrace risk, not shy away from it — an approach that is, ironically, nearly antithetical to how the military does business.

“Lethality will not be hindered by self-imposed restrictions, especially when it comes to harnessing technologies we invented but were slow to pursue,” Hegseth wrote. “Drone technology is advancing so rapidly, our major risk is risk-avoidance.”

“Next year I expect to see this capability integrated into all relevant combat training, including force-on-force drone wars,” he added.

That memo alone gave many commanders the top-cover they felt they needed to move faster. But the Army had already been moving in that direction as part of a broader modernization initiative bringing in new weapons and technologies. The multi-functional reconnaissance company at Fort Bliss was a product of that effort launched last year.

Col. Nick Ryan, whose office oversees the integration of unmanned aircraft into the Army, told CNN there are “already has plans in place” to ensure every unit in the Army “receives unmanned aircraft systems” in fiscal year 2026.

The ultimate goal is for soldiers to treat drones “as if it was their personal weapon, their radio, their night-vision goggles or a grenade,” Ryan said. “That it’s just something they’re so used to and so familiar with, that it’s just part of their standard kit that they take with them everywhere they go.”

Welcome to Drones 101

The initial two-week training at Bliss starts in a classroom, where soldiers learn how to build their own drones, crucial for the knowledge of how to fix something in the field if something goes wrong. Then, they start practicing how to fly with a computer simulator that gets them used to what is essentially a video game controller.

When that’s mastered, soldiers take their drones to an “FPV gym” of sorts, where they can practice flying through hanging tires or doorways and even into a cardboard replica — with exact measurements, found online — of an adversary’s armored vehicle.

A drone is flown through the “FPV gym” at Fort Bliss in El Paso.

CNN

A solider practices with a first-person view drone at Fort Bliss.

CNN

The training isn’t just happening in Texas. In Europe, every US Army unit rotating through the region will leave “with company-level training” on drones, including using them to drop live munitions, Brig. Gen. Terry Tillis, commander of the 7th Army Training Command in Germany, told reporters in Wiesbaden in July.

A new course at Fort Benning, Georgia, expected to start in October will provide “foundational training” for all new soldiers going through One Station Unit Training — which combines soldiers’ basic training and advanced training for their specific jobs — to ensure they’re familiar with drones, according to the Army.

And at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, home to the Army’s storied 82nd Airborne Division, a new company stood up in 2023 is spearheading innovation for a multitude of efforts, including drones. That company — Gainey Company — also works to train others in the division on drones, company commander Capt. CJ Drew told CNN. Those training courses are constantly adjusted using feedback from other US soldiers, as well as what the military is observing in Ukraine with drone warfare.

The 82nd Airborne’s unique mission as the nation’s crisis response force — a brigade of soldiers prepared to deploy around the globe with just hours’ notice — signals that drone innovation and new technology provides a critical edge to soldiers in harm’s way.

A small drone could “take the place of a forward observer” — a soldier who identifies targets for artillery fire or air support — Brig. Gen. Andy Kiser, deputy commanding general of operations for the 82nd Airborne, told CNN. They can also “enhance” the work of cavalry scouts, who are largely responsible for reconnaissance and other missions to gather information about enemy forces.

The training at Fort Bliss begins with soldiers learning how to build their own drones.

CNN

“What that helps is we can identify IEDs ahead of time,” Kiser said. “We can identify potentially any armor ambushes, small ambushes. We can ensure we’ve got actual enemy threats in buildings before we strike because we can get in there and look at windows and see what’s postured to attack us moving forward.”

Emil Michael, a former Uber executive who now runs the Pentagon’s research and engineering office, told CNN the urgent efforts are about more than using drones in actual combat, but also the support roles they’ll fill, such as delivering critical supplies and medical assistance. Michael’s office oversees the Pentagon’s work on technology innovation and advises the defense secretary on manufacturing, engineering and research.

“You could do a lot of things where there was otherwise risk to humans, and do it now with machines,” Michael said. “And that’s pretty exciting in that you could really have your troops as well protected as they’ve ever been before.”

Cracking into the Ukrainian market

The overwhelming majority of the drones Ukrainian soldiers use on the front lines today are made in Ukraine. However, in the early months of the war, US-made attack drones — 100 Switchblade loitering munitions — were included in American weapons assistance packages.

The lightweight, fixed-wing drones were reserved for Ukraine’s top special forces units — a sign of how Kyiv prized the technology as one of the first modern weapons it received from allies. But the US eventually stopped providing Switchblade drones to Ukraine, in part because of feedback from Ukrainian soldiers that they weren’t as effective as alternatives against Russian electronic warfare.

Within the war, there is a technological arms race between Ukraine and Russia, each trying to improve on the other’s latest innovation. That’s given companies in Ukraine an edge over foreign competitors, which lacked the direct contact with soldiers in the field.

A Ukrainian serviceman from an anti-drone unit watches the sky after firing a machine gun at a Russian Shahed UAV in Ukraine's Donetsk region on August 10.

Pierre Crom/Getty Images

A Russian Shahed UAV crashes into an agricultural field on August 10 after being down by a Ukrainian anti-drone unit.

Pierre Crom/Getty Images

A residential building damaged during a Russian air strike in Kyiv on June 6, as Russia carried out a barrage of overnight drone strikes across Ukraine.

Roman Pilipey/AFP/Getty Images

“The winner is who can update their technology the fastest,” said Fedorov, the Ukrainian minister. “Ukrainian companies were here on the ground and getting feedback, so they were able to overtake other types of drones that didn’t really work.”

That’s led some leading US drone producers, such as Neros and Anduril, to send teams to Kyiv and cut deals with the Ukrainian government to get their drones on the front lines.

“We didn’t see a point in building an FPV drone and not bringing it to Ukraine,” said Soren Monroe-Anderson, CEO and co-founder of Neros.

Neros earlier this year won a contract to deliver 6,000 FPV attack drones to Ukraine over six months. The company is just two years old and part of a new guard of US firms in the defense industry sphere, traditionally ruled by giants such as Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Neros is a tech startup, which got early venture capital funding from billionaire Peter Thiel.

“Frankly, when we started the company, the DoD was not very interested in what we were doing,” Monroe-Anderson told CNN. “It was just a lot of buzzwords about a critical mass and building cheap drones, but no one knew what an FPV drone was and no one cared about small quadcopters.”

Monroe-Anderson said he took 30 FPV drone prototypes on his first trip to Ukraine. Neros went through “so many” iterations of its drone over successive trips to Ukraine.

“We just kept on the path of developing stuff based on the feedback we got from Ukraine and continuously testing it there and going over to Ukraine,” he said. “And then eventually that became extremely valuable in the eyes of the DoD.”

‘Literally 100 times more expensive’

The push for smaller, cheaper systems is an overhaul in the traditional way of thinking for the defense industry. Companies can no longer afford to take years to develop or update something that could already be outdated by the time it’s put into the hands of a soldier on the front lines.

Chris Bose, president of Anduril Industries, says the problem is that the Pentagon historically has treated drones the same way it treats the acquisition of any kind of large defense item. “And you basically have to model the acquisition of these kind of lower-cost, autonomous, uncrewed systems as basically the inverse of our traditional military capabilities,” Bose said in an interview with CNN.

While Ukrainian companies typically use cheap Chinese parts and chips in their drones, those components are prohibited in US weapons. Monroe-Anderson said Neros quickly realized making those parts in America was in some cases “literally 100 times more expensive.” Producing high volumes would bring the cost down, but there isn’t enough demand.

And since Chinese companies like DJI already rule the consumer drone space, American FPV drone manufacturers are dependent on Pentagon contracts, which haven’t been for large volumes yet. The Pentagon’s Replicator initiative — announced in 2023 as a program intended to drive large-scale production of cheap systems for the US military — set out to build just 3,000 drones in two years.

“The state of the industry is pretty abysmal,” Monroe-Anderson said. “Neros produces 2,000 drones per month, and we have the highest-rate drone manufacturing line in America, which to me is crazy because that is not that big of a number.”

Ukrainian companies have increased their production capacity to produce 4 million drones this year, the country’s defense minister said in June. That includes Ukraine’s impressive arsenal of long-range attack drones, some of which are capable of striking targets more than 1,000 miles away. Ukraine has also developed a line of naval drones that have successfully combatted Russia’s larger fleet in the Black Sea.

A soldier of the 23rd Mechanized Brigade operates an FPV drone in Ukraine on June 2.

Oxana Chorna/Global Images Ukraine/Getty Images

To incentivize Ukrainian troops and drone units, Kyiv created a points system that rewards each successful strike recorded by video. The more points a battalion or company score, the more drones they receive to continue hitting targets. Those videos, Fedorov said, now comprise the drone data set other countries want for training artificial intelligence models.

But Ukraine remains open to foreign drone manufacturers, and Fedorov said the country has pitched itself as a testing ground for defense companies wanting to see how their product performs in real war conditions. Brave1, a defense technology incubator affiliated with the Ukrainian government, recently launched a “Test in Ukraine” initiative for defense companies to apply for their weapons to be used on the front line.

As the drone proliferation on both sides increased, the battlefield crawled to a freeze. Anywhere within 15 miles of the front line is now considered a no-go zone because that’s where most drones can reach, and some will target even small groups of infantry spotted walking. Vehicular movement in that area is especially dangerous, limiting the armies’ options to resupply or rotate forces.

Analysts and officials said drone warfare would likely look different in a conflict in the sprawling Indo-Pacific than it does on the often-static front lines of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. But the same technology will likely be used, and China already produces tens of millions of small drones every year, a concern to the US.

“We have to be ready for that,” said Samuel Bendett, a military analyst and adviser with the Center for Naval Analyses. “We have to understand what it’s like. This is a technological change that is irreversible at this point.”

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CNN · Haley Britzky, Isabelle Khurshudyan · September 15, 2025

13. The Coming Tripolar World Order

Excerpts:

The reported language of the National Defense Strategy reflects a much more restrictive version of American power or influence than even what the president and those close to him had indicated during the initial months of his second term. Pentagon restrainers had previously outlined a move away from America’s traditional defensive presence in Europe and the Middle East, nominally to preserve combat power for a potential conflict with China. But signaling that we might even de-emphasize preparations to defend Taiwan in order to prioritize a war on drug-smuggling banana boats is tipping the needle toward more de-facto isolationism.

This path, if continued, leads toward a global order rife with uncertainty and danger—for the United States in particular and for the world as a whole. Rather than a system in which international norms are observed, backed by the might and influence of the world’s strongest military and largest economy, the receding U.S. influence creates a void to be filled by Russia in Europe and Central Asia, by China in the Pacific and Africa, and to a lesser but concerning extent, by Iran in the Middle East. Countries will find themselves in one of three spheres, dominated by powers acting on craven self-interest, in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

We will woefully miss the day when the U.S., through maintenance and vigilance, enjoyed an order that upheld free trade and fostered the continued expansion of human liberty. If we wish to remain a superpower, we should choose to act like one.

The Coming Tripolar World Order

thedispatch.com · Mike Nelson · September 15, 2025

In words and actions, key foreign policy decision-makers within the Trump administration seem to be signaling a shift away from the United States’ global leadership role. If borne out, these changes are likely to usher in a new tripolar international system in which the United States, Communist China, and revanchist Russia divvy up spheres of influence. The result? A more dangerous world for Americans everywhere.

This month, Politico reported that the draft version of the coming National Defense Strategy places securing the Western Hemisphere above countering threats posed by China, Russia, Iran, and other global adversaries. Defense strategies, by definition, set priorities for the Pentagon as it determines how to allocate limited military assets. While previous blueprints—including one published by the first Trump administration in 2018— have focused on countering China, the latest one reverses the emphasis on America’s foremost geopolitical adversary.

If enacted, the defense plan would codify the Trump administration’s shift away from a U.S.-led world order. From withholding military aid to Ukraine to signaling an end to security assistance programs for NATO allies preparing to defend against Russian aggression, Donald Trump’s Department of Defense seems to be making it clear: The days of America playing a forward defense and acting as the guarantor of the liberal world order are waning. Instead, the administration has signaled plans to focus on a goal-line defense in our own neighborhood.

In an interview last week with his former Fox & Friends Weekend co-host, Rachel Campos-Duffy, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth articulated the rationale behind the Pentagon’s new approach. “We’re going to put America first. In this case, the Americas first—our hemisphere,” he said. “We’ve projected power for a long time in far-flung places that had a nebulous connection to our own security in the homeland. We’re securing the homeland.”

The world order this strategy would undermine is one the United States has largely grown accustomed to, and potentially taken for granted. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States invested billions through the Marshall Plan to rebuild, unify, and bolster like-minded democracies in Western Europe to counter oppression and deter aggression from the Soviet Union. During this time, American wealth, prosperity, and power all flourished, leading to the collapse of the USSR after it failed to compete with U.S. cultural and economic dominance. In other words, this sizable investment in Marshall Plan dollars paid off not only by creating a global system that made Americans richer but also by avoiding the cost in blood and treasure of a war with Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the undisputed global power—economically, militarily, diplomatically, and culturally.

This period has also been a time of relative peace for the United States and the world, despite histrionics about “forever wars.” Since the start of the postwar global order, America has suffered roughly a quarter of the deaths in all conflicts that it did during the single war that preceded it. That the conflict in Ukraine marks the first large-scale European war since 1945 is simultaneously a testament to the stability of the U.S.-led order, an indicator of just how heinous Russian actions are, and a somber harbinger of what may come if the existing order is deserted.

Just like nature, global order abhors a vacuum. The spaces left open by receding American influence will be filled, most likely not by like-minded and allied countries, but by competitors seeking to carve out their modern empires. China has been slowly pressing forward in its efforts to exert more power abroad, both close to home in maritime territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, and further afield, with its Belt and Road Initiative and its “string of pearls” strategy.

Russia, under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, seems driven to reverse what he has called the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the last century—the breakup of the Soviet Union—by re-establishing Russian dominance over eastern and central Europe, potentially including countries that joined NATO after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Putin has not been timid about testing the limits and resolve of the alliance and American commitment to it. Just last week, Russia launched a swarm of drones at NATO member Poland.

Allowing these bad actors to carve up their respective spheres of influence may seem like common sense to the isolationists and restrainers at the Pentagon—it is cheaper in the short term to do less than to do more. But it is far easier to pay the cost to maintain what one already has than to attempt to claw it back later or to live in a world beholden to the will of others. China and Russia are currently pushing against the edges of American influence in an attempt to expand their range and power, but we will not end those provocations by letting them get nearer to U.S. soil. Instead of pushing back against Chinese maritime bullying in the Philippines, we may find ourselves doing it off the coast of Hawaii. Instead of helping European allies prevent Russian subterfuge, cyberattacks, and assassinations, we may find ourselves playing whack-a-mole on the periphery of the Western Hemisphere.

This new defense framework also makes conflict more likely rather than less by signaling weakness, or at least disinterest, where the United States had previously demonstrated resolve. The concept of strategic ambiguity—that the United States will not declare in advance what actions we might take in response to aggression against Taiwan, leaving China to weigh a potential overwhelming American response as it determines if the cost of action is worth it—may not officially end, but it will likely become less effective. Instead of believing that America will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, Beijing will likely come to the opposite conclusion, and rightly or wrongly, fail to regard a potential military confrontation with the U.S. as a serious deterrent. Perception shapes reality, and the perception of a weak, feckless, and passive United States will create a reality we do not like. Weakness begets aggression, and tepid resolve welcomes those who would take advantage of the confusion.

The reported language of the National Defense Strategy reflects a much more restrictive version of American power or influence than even what the president and those close to him had indicated during the initial months of his second term. Pentagon restrainers had previously outlined a move away from America’s traditional defensive presence in Europe and the Middle East, nominally to preserve combat power for a potential conflict with China. But signaling that we might even de-emphasize preparations to defend Taiwan in order to prioritize a war on drug-smuggling banana boats is tipping the needle toward more de-facto isolationism.

This path, if continued, leads toward a global order rife with uncertainty and danger—for the United States in particular and for the world as a whole. Rather than a system in which international norms are observed, backed by the might and influence of the world’s strongest military and largest economy, the receding U.S. influence creates a void to be filled by Russia in Europe and Central Asia, by China in the Pacific and Africa, and to a lesser but concerning extent, by Iran in the Middle East. Countries will find themselves in one of three spheres, dominated by powers acting on craven self-interest, in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

We will woefully miss the day when the U.S., through maintenance and vigilance, enjoyed an order that upheld free trade and fostered the continued expansion of human liberty. If we wish to remain a superpower, we should choose to act like one.

thedispatch.com · Mike Nelson · September 15, 2025

14. In reversal, Pentagon keeps women’s advisory group, adds four more

I would just like to know what the competition is like to get assigned to be on the "Managed Aquifer Recharge Working Group." (apologies for using what I am sure is an important working group for an attempt at humor).

On a more serious note are these excerpts:

“As part of the resumption of operations, each DOD sponsor will review the charters of each advisory committee they sponsor to ensure alignment with the President’s priorities and those of the Department,” Hegseth’s memo states.

For some who have worked in and with the advisory committees, the back-and-forth of recent years — beginning with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s "zero-based review" in 2021 that put all the committees on ice and threatened to merge DACOWITS with other boards — has left them feeling protective of fragile progress.

Jessica Ruttenber, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and KC-135 refueling aircraft pilot, saw the Air Force Women’s Initiative Team she’d worked with to improve gear for female pilots shuttered by the Pentagon in January amid efforts to shut down DEI initiatives.

After reports that DACOWITS was next to close, she said she scrambled to make copies of all the studies and documentation DACOWITS has posted on its public site over the years.

“We’re at 16%, 17% women in the DOD on active duty. We’re allowed to be in everything but I don’t think we’re fully integrated into everything,” Ruttenber said.

Nonetheless, she said, women have played a critical role in the historic military recruiting surge that began last fall.

“When you bring the warrior ethos, women are stepping up,” she said. “So, we need committees for women.”

In reversal, Pentagon keeps women’s advisory group, adds four moreBy Hope Hodge Seck

Sep 15, 2025, 02:45 PM

Drill Instructor SSgt. Jennifer Garza disciplines recruits at MCRD Parris Island, South Carolina. (Scott Olson/Getty Images)

A 75-year-old commission advocating for women in the armed services will be revived as part of a phased restoration of 39 Pentagon advisory groups put on pause earlier this year, Military Times has learned.

The move, detailed in an internal memo, follows a May memo that recommended termination for the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, as well as a number of other committees now set to be restored.

The Sept. 8 memo, signed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, also introduces four new advisory committees, including groups focused on artificial intelligence and education.

“To effectively manage DOD resources that support each DOD advisory committee, the Department will use a phased approach … for resuming committee operations and appointment of new advisory committee members,” Hegseth wrote. “Pending the nomination and appointment of new advisory committee members, each DOD Sponsor may authorize the resumption of operational support, to include funding, for each DOD advisory committee they sponsor.”

The new boards, labeled in the memo as “pending establishment,” include:

Advisory Panel on the Requirements Process of the Department of Defense
Board of Advisers for the Office of the Senior Official with Principal Responsibility for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Managed Aquifer Recharge Working Group
School Advisory Committees

The creation of each of these new groups was mandated by recent legislation.

In February, Military Times reported that all existing DOD advisory groups were put on notice and given a week to deliver to the Pentagon’s office of personnel and readiness a report on their mission, members and operating expenses, as well as a one-page summary of how the “advice of the committee benefited the Department, Federal Government, United States, warrior ethos, etc. and how it aligns to the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s objectives.”

The committees were also asked to justify their continued existence. The demand, which preceded a pause in all advisory committee activity, was issued as Hegseth worked to slash 8% from Pentagon operating expenses.

In May, an email sent by Pentagon Deputy Director of Washington Services Bob Salesses and reviewed by Military Times recommended that 14 of the 40-plus existing advisory boards be terminated, including DACOWITS, the Department of Defense Board of Actuaries, and the Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing, among others.

But the new Hegseth memo runs counter to most of these recommendations.

At deadline, Pentagon officials had not responded to a query about the timeline for the phased committee restoration or the reason why numerous boards previously highlighted for elimination had been spared.

A source with knowledge of planning said that the Pentagon was now nearing the end of Phase I in the timeline.

Committees whose activities have already fully or partially resumed, according to the memo, include:

Advisory Board for National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Advisory Board for the National Reconnaissance Office
Board of Visitors for the U.S. Air Force Academy
Corps of Engineers Western Water Cooperation Committee
Gold Star Advisory Council
National Security Emerging Technology Board
National Security Education Board
Strategic Research and Development Program Scientific Advisory Board
U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors
U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors

The NGA and NRO boards, as well as the emerging technology board, had been recommended for termination in Salesses’ letter.

Those recommended for restoration in Phase I of the new plan include (with those previously recommended for termination starred):

Defense Policy Board
Defense Science Board
Department of Defense Board of Actuaries*
Department of Defense Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Board of Actuaries*
Department of Defense Wage Committee
U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group*
Uniform Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel

Boards in Phase II Include:

The Air University Board of Visitors
The Army Education Advisory Committee
The Board of Regents, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University
Board of Visitors, National Defense University
Defense Business Board
Defense Health Board
Defense Innovation Board
Department of the Navy Science and Technology Board
Education for Seapower Advisory Board
Military Justice Review Panel
Reserve Forces Policy Board
Strategic and Critical Minerals Board of Directors
U.S. Army Science Board

Phase III Includes:

Advisory Committee on Arlington National Cemetery
Advisory Panel on Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs
Armed Forces Retirement Home Advisory Council
Defense Advisory Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Misconduct
Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces
Defense Advisory Committee on Military Personnel Testing*
DACOWITS*

The Defense Advisory Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Misconduct and the Defense Advisory Committee on the Investigation Prosecution and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces were recommended for merger in Salesses’ letter; the Hegseth memo retains them and keeps them separate.

The committees in Phase IV, the final phase, include:

Board on Coastal Engineering*
Board of Visitors for the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation*
Department of Defense Military Family Readiness Council
Non-Federal Interest Advisory Committee*
Tribal and Economically Disadvantaged Communities Advisory Committee*

Ultimately, only two of the 14 committees recommended for termination were not retained: The Table Rock Lake Oversight Committee and the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Advisory Board.

The retained groups, meanwhile, may still face change.

“As part of the resumption of operations, each DOD sponsor will review the charters of each advisory committee they sponsor to ensure alignment with the President’s priorities and those of the Department,” Hegseth’s memo states.

For some who have worked in and with the advisory committees, the back-and-forth of recent years — beginning with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s "zero-based review" in 2021 that put all the committees on ice and threatened to merge DACOWITS with other boards — has left them feeling protective of fragile progress.

Jessica Ruttenber, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and KC-135 refueling aircraft pilot, saw the Air Force Women’s Initiative Team she’d worked with to improve gear for female pilots shuttered by the Pentagon in January amid efforts to shut down DEI initiatives.

After reports that DACOWITS was next to close, she said she scrambled to make copies of all the studies and documentation DACOWITS has posted on its public site over the years.

“We’re at 16%, 17% women in the DOD on active duty. We’re allowed to be in everything but I don’t think we’re fully integrated into everything,” Ruttenber said.

Nonetheless, she said, women have played a critical role in the historic military recruiting surge that began last fall.

“When you bring the warrior ethos, women are stepping up,” she said. “So, we need committees for women.”

15. Combat Craft Medium to Gain New, Improved Sibling

Combat Craft Medium to Gain New, Improved Sibling - Seapower

seapowermagazine.org · Peter Ong · September 15, 2025

A Combatant Craft Medium assigned to a West-coast based Naval Special Warfare unit maneuvers in Apra Harbor, Guam, in 2021. Photo credit: U.S. Navy photo by Shaina O’Neal

The United States Special Operations Command’s Combat Craft Medium Mark 1 will get a new and improved next-generation sibling in the future called the Combat Craft Medium Mark 2. Currently, USSOCOM is working with Oregon-based company ReconCraft on the first completely new Naval Special Warfare boat design since 2015.

Built by Vigor Industrial, the CCM Mark 1 is a durable, stealthy, low-observable, armored double-hull aluminum boat used by Naval Special Boat Teams for infiltration and extraction of special operations forces in medium-threat environments. It is 60 feet long with a width (beam) of 13 feet and a draft of 3.3 feet, can travel at over 52 knots and can carry .50 caliber M2 heavy machine guns, Mark 19 automatic grenade launchers and 7.62mm M240G medium machine guns on the aft deck.

It has a crew of four and can carry 19 special operators. Range is 600 nautical miles at 40 knots. Vigor Industrial built 31 CCMs, which are transportable via trucks towing trailers and C-17 military cargo aircraft.

According to SAM.gov, the United States’ official federal contracting website, “The CCM Mk2 will replace the CCM Mk1 with a high-speed, aluminum-hulled craft designed to enhance USSOCOM’s maritime capabilities. It incorporates advanced materials and technologies to support multi-role capabilities for maritime missions. This effort includes the design consulting, prototyping, fabrication and outfitting of a single CCM Mk2 prototype, with the potential for a follow-on production contract or agreement.”

Key Specifications for the CCM Mk2

Hull Material: High-performance aluminum.
Engines: Twin 1,600 hp marine diesels
Propulsors: Marine waterjets
Dimensions:Length 68.6 feet, beam 14.2 feet, draft 3.6 feet.
Fuel:Diesel, with a capacity of approximately 3,200 gallons.
Mobility: Configured for road and military aircraft transport.

Thus, the CCM Mark 2 is slightly longer, wider and deeper than the CCM Mark 1.

“In August 2025, U.S. Special Operations Command awarded an Other Transaction Authority agreement to ReconCraft LLC to produce the Combatant Craft Medium Mark 2 Engineering Development Model,” Lieutenant Commander Kassie Collins of USSOCOM replied in response to a question from Seapower. “CCM Mk2 will replace the CCM Mk1 fleet, providing Naval Special Warfare with an enhanced capability to conduct long-range, multi-mission operations in maritime environments. CCM Mk2 incorporates integrated survivability enhancements to support irregular warfare operations in maritime environments across the globe.”

Seapower asked if the CCM Mark 2 will replace the CCM Mark 1 on a one-for-one basis and if the CCM Mark 1s will be retired.

“The CCM Mk1 fleet continues to support the demand signal around the globe. The CCM Mk2 platform is being built from the ground up to include upgrades that the CCM Mk1 has incorporated throughout its service, while providing more space, power and opportunity to adapt to future payloads or systems. When the production of the CCM Mk2 begins, the CCM Mk1 will continue to support the force and we will evaluate boats on an individual basis to determine an informed service life, balancing commander’s needs and resources,” Collins responded.

ReconCraft declined to comment on the Combat Craft Medium, Mark 2, and USSOCOM and the company have no images or photos to share since the CCM Mark 2 is an entirely new design starting from the proverbial drawing boards. Questions on CCM Mark 2 armament and sensors were not provided at this early stage of the design process.

16. Last Special Operations MC-12W Surveillance Planes Retired

Aircraft: the most expensive platforms/systems in USSOCOM. (not complaining at all as we need the aircraft, just stating a fact).

Last Special Operations MC-12W Surveillance Planes Retired

The MC-12Ws were retired to make way for OA-1K light attack planes, but some worry this risks creating an aerial intelligence-gathering gap.

Joseph Trevithick

Published Sep 15, 2025 2:07 PM EDT

twz.com · Joseph Trevithick

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

The last MC-12W Liberty turboprop surveillance aircraft under U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC) umbrella have been retired. This is part of a plan to free up resources to help with the fielding of the new OA-1K Skyraider II light attack aircraft, which has also been set to involve the retirement of the U-28A Draco, another turboprop surveillance plane. At the same time, AFSOC insists that the OA-1K is not a direct replacement for the MC-12Ws or the U-28As, which has prompted concerns about capability and capacity gaps.

AFSOC confirmed the divestiture of its last MC-12Ws to TWZ last week. The 137th Special Operations Wing, part of the Oklahoma Air National Guard and aligned with AFSOC, conducted a retirement ceremony for the Liberty aircraft last month. The event was held at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base, which is co-located with Will Rogers International Airport in Oklahoma City. The 137th has also been working closely with the active-duty 492nd Special Operations Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona to train the initial cadre of OA-1K pilots.

An MC-12W receives a water salute at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base during the retirement ceremony on August 2, 2025. Air National Guard/Staff Sgt. Caitlin Carnes

“During the time it was assigned to 137th Special Operations Wing, the MC-12W logged 50,725 flying hours and 2,501 combat and combat-support sorties across six locations outside the continental U.S.,” according to a brief press release from the wing on August 3.

A modified Beechcraft King Air 350ER twin-engine turboprop, the MC-12W first entered Air Force service back in 2009. The year before, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had directed the service to acquire the aircraft to help meet the massive surge in demand for aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Liberty name is a reference to the Liberty Ships of World War II fame, and the speed with which those vital logistics vessels were built and put into service. The first of what eventually became a fleet of around 40 Air Force MC-12Ws began flying operational missions eight months after funding for their purchase was approved.

The MC-12W configuration included a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared video cameras and a signals intelligence (SIGINT) suite. Each aircraft also had satellite and other communications capabilities to share video feeds and other data with friendly forces in near-real time.

Amid the scaling back of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early to mid-2010s, regular Air Force units stopped flying the MC-12W. At least a portion of the remaining Liberty aircraft fleet was passed to AFSOC, as well as the U.S. Army. The Oklahoma Air National Guard’s 137th Air Refueling Wing transitioned to the 137th Special Operations Wing in 2015, and subsequently received 13 MC-12Ws.

ISR-configured Beechcraft King Air variants with varying sensor suites and other capabilities have been and continue to be very popular globally, including with the U.S. military and other branches of the U.S. government. Contractor-owned and/or operated examples have often been part of the mix supporting U.S. operations, as well. For decades, dating back to the Cold War, the Army has been a particularly prolific operator of these planes, but the service is now set to stop flying turboprop surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft of any type by the end of this year. The U.S. special operations community has also utilized other variations beyond the MC-12W, and what might happen to those planes as part of the fielding of the OA-1K is not entirely clear.

An MC-12W Liberty, in front, shares the flightline at Will Rogers Air National Guard Base with an AT-802U being used to train future OA-1K pilots, seen behind, in November 2024. Air National Guard/Senior Airman Erika Chapa

The two-seat OA-1K, which U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) declared the winner of its Armed Overwatch competition in 2022, is based on the Air Tractor AT-802 single-engine turboprop crop duster. AFSOC is expecting to eventually receive 75 Skyraider IIs, though there have been questions in recent years about whether that fleet size might shrink.

As designed, the OA-1K can carry up to 6,000 pounds of ordnance and other stores on up to eight underwing pylons, but the aircraft for AFSOC have typically been shown with no more than six fitted. The planes also have a “robust suite of radios and datalinks providing multiple means for line-of-sight (LOS) and beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) communications,” L3Harris, the prime contractor for the conversion work, has said in the past.

The first fully missionized OA-1K, which was delivered to the US Air Force earlier this year. USAF

OA-1Ks can carry camera turrets and other sensors in underwing pods, but these provide limited capability compared to the integrated ISR suite found on the MC-12W. As noted, SOCOM and the Air Force have themselves stressed repeatedly that they do not see the Skyraider II as a direct replacement for the Liberty aircraft or the U-28A, the latter of which also has a mix of electro-optical and infrared video cameras and SIGINT capabilities.

A U-28A Draco. USAF

“The MC-12W Liberty’s real-time intelligence and surveillance capabilities complement the OA-1K Skyraider II’s precision strike support, making their collaboration a powerful asset to Air Force Special Operations Command’s mission,” the caption to a picture released by AFSOC’s 1st Special Operations Wing of the two types flying together back in June reads, somewhat ironically now given the divestiture of the former.

An MC-12W, at left, flies together with an OA-1K, at right, off the coast of Florida in June. USAF

What plans SOCOM and AFSOC might have now for a more direct replacement for the MC-12Ws and U-28As are unclear. A slide on crewed ISR platforms that SOCOM’s Program Executive Officer for Fixed Wing programs (PEO-FW) presented at the annual SOF Week conference in May, seen below, simply says the current “driving operational needs” are “maintaining platform effectiveness throughout anticipated remaining lifecycle of the individual programs,” and provides some general comments on possible upgrades to existing platforms. The slide notably shows the U-28A, as well as an image reflecting SOCOM’s fleet of ISR-configured twin-engine Dash-8 turboprops, but not the MC-12W. The uncertainty has already prompted concerns about potential ISR capability and capacity gaps.

SOCOM

“SOCOM plans to divest two ISR platforms. Subsequently, some personnel and resources from the platforms will be used to support Armed Overwatch,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a Congressional watchdog, wrote in a report on the Armed Overwatch program released in September 2024. “However, GAO found that SOCOM has not taken steps to plan for, or add, critical ISR capabilities provided by soon-to-be divested aircraft. Also, SOCOM has not addressed risks associated with the loss of these capabilities if the new aircraft does not provide them.”

An MC-12W and a U-28A together. Air National Guard Andrew LaMoreaux

Broader questions have been raised about the overall operational utility of the OA-1K given the Pentagon’s current stated focus on preparing for future high-end fights, especially one against China in the Pacific. The stated purpose of the Skyraider II is to provide “a deployable, affordable, and sustainable crewed aircraft systems [sic] capable of executing Close Air Support (CAS), precision strike, and armed reconnaissance requirements in austere and permissive environments for use in Irregular Warfare,” according to the most recent proposed defense budget for the 2026 Fiscal Year.

A key driver behind the Armed Overwatch program in the past was also to help free up tactical combat jets, bombers, and other higher-end aircraft that had been performing CAS and armed reconnaissance in permissive airspace over countries like Afghanistan and Iraq for more demanding and/or higher-priority missions. At the same time, this would reduce wear and tear on those platforms from flying constant and often short-endurance sorties. A light attack aircraft like the OA-1K would have the additional benefit of being able to operate a minimal logistics footprint at far-flung locations closer to actual operating areas. In turn, this would reduce the time it would take them to get on station and increase their ability to loiter in a particular area once they arrived, all without adding to the strain of already heavily in-demand aerial refueling tankers.

Furthermore, the Armed Overwatch program, which formally began in 2020, followed years of abortive light attack aircraft programs and other tangential test and evaluation efforts, all driven heavily by the demands of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era. By the time the OA-1K was picked as the winner of the Armed Overwatch competition in 2022, the U.S. military had withdrawn from Afghanistan. Since the start of President Donald Trump’s second term, his administration has been working to further reduce American commitments in Syria and Iraq, as well as in various parts of Africa.

“The way that the OA-1K will look on day one is not how probably the OA-1K will look on day 1,000,” A high-ranking Air Force official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss planning issues, told TWZ in an interview earlier this year. “As we field it, it will continue to iterate based on the requirements that our supported forces articulate to us. We’re intimately involved with all of those forces, even as we speak, on shaping the initial and then also the growing requirements that I’m sure that we will find for that platform going forward.”

The Skyraider II “was designed to be very flexible. A big element of the platform is, again, this notion of modularity, [and] open systems architecture,” they continued. “What that does for us is, on a given mission, you might put certain types of capabilities [on the aircraft] – those could be ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities, … strike capabilities – you may have more of one than the other, depending on the day or the mission requirement of the supported force. But then the next day, that may change, and you can rapidly swap out what the capabilities are of the platform on a given mission.”

“How could we support them [friendly forces] if it’s in the Pacific or anywhere else? The OA-1K certainly has some roles and missions that can [provide] support there. And then in a large-scale combat operation, we are looking at, in partnership with other components of SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command], what are some of the things that it could do,” they added. “Can it employ air-launched effects, at range, at standoff, in a flexible way that would provide value?”

‘Launched effect’ is a catch-all term that the U.S. military currently uses to refer broadly to uncrewed aerial systems that can be launched from air, ground, and maritime platforms. These systems could be configured as one-way attackers or to perform other non-kinetic missions, including electronic warfare, ISR, and signal relay. AFSOC has also been looking into new standoff capabilities of AC-130J Ghostrider gunships, including the integration of new Black Arrow Small Cruise Missiles (SCM) and existing AGM-48 Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, as a path to ensuring the relevance of those aircraft in future high-end fights.

“From when OA-1K was conceptualized and decided on until now, the world’s changed a little bit,” Lt. Gen. Michael Conley, head of AFSOC, also told TWZ and others at a media roundtable on the sidelines of the Air & Space Forces Association’s main annual conference last year. “But as we move forward, I think there’s opportunity to look at, again, some novel mission sets. …how quick can we get the wings on and off it so we could use it in some sort of crisis response, if we needed to? Where does the role of SIGINT [signals intelligence], or ELINT [electronic intelligence] or… some sort of ISR collect [factor in] there. I think there’s opportunity for that. Again, not anything we’ve committed to yet.”

Air Force and SOCOM officials have also continued to stress that lower-intensity missions, as well as cooperation with allies and partners facing those types of threats, are not going away despite the focus on China in the Pacific region. The possibility of employing OA-1Ks at least in a surveillance role along the southern U.S. border with Mexico has been raised multiple times, as well.

Much about the OA-1K’s future still looks to be settled, but AFSOC has now gotten rid of its MC-12W Liberty aircraft to help make way for the new light attack aircraft.

Howard Altman contributed to this story.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Joseph Trevithick

Deputy Editor

Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.

News & Features

twz.com · Joseph Trevithick

17. Philippines Rejects Chinese Scarborough Shoal Nature Reserve Claim

And rejects Chinese lawfare and refuses to be a victim of China's three warfares and unrestricted warfare.

Philippines Rejects Chinese Scarborough Shoal Nature Reserve Claim - USNI News

news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · September 15, 2025

A People’s Liberation Army fighter over Scarborough Shoal from Dec. 29, 2024, drills. Chinese Ministry of Defense image

Manila pushed back against China’s plans to create a national nature reserve at a disputed South China Sea maritime feature, a move officials say could increase the People’s Liberation Army’s foothold in the area.

China’s State Council plans to create a 3,523 hectare zone dedicated to the conservation of Scarborough Shoal’s coral reef ecosystem, according to an announcement last week. Plans released from the Chinese government encompass the maritime feature’s northern portion, further delineating sections of the disputed shoal into core, experimental and main protection areas.

“The State Council has instructed relevant government departments and local authorities to strictly implement the regulations on nature reserves, as well as provisions related to the development and management of protected areas,” reads an article from Chinese state media outlet Xinhua.

In response, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a diplomatic protest, arguing Scarborough Shoal “is a longstanding and integral part of the Philippines over which it has sovereignty and jurisdiction.”

The development is the latest in the long-running dispute between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal. Known to Manila as Bajo De Masinloc and to Beijing as Huangyan Dao, the shoal has been one of the most hotly contested South China Sea maritime features between Philippine and Chinese forces. While the Philippines views the shoal – located 120 miles from the country’s largest island – under its western exclusive economic zone, China claims the maritime feature as sovereign national territory.

A near-constant People’s Liberation Army Navy, China Coast Guard and Chinese Maritime Militia presence has been maintained within and around the shoal since a standoff between the two countries in 2012.

In designating the shoal a nature reserve, China is likely to ramp up its law enforcement operations in the area and may target Philippine forces. According to the State Council, the new national nature reserve will “strengthen supervision and law enforcement against all types of illegal and irregular activities” within Scarborough Shoal.

“I would say that this is yet another example of the PRC (People’s Republic of China) using ‘lawfare’ as a tool to assert a new status quo in favor of its illegal territorial claims in the region,” Ben Lewis, a co-founder of PLATracker, told USNI News regarding the purpose of the national nature reserve.

Lewis, whose organization is dedicated to monitoring Chinese military activities, highlighted the country’s history of using “arbitrary legality” amid disputes. He said he expects Chinese forces to use the national nature reserve to justify their law enforcement tactics against Philippine vessels.

Chinese forces have frequently denied Philippine government and civilian vessels from operation near or within the shoal using what the China Coast Guard has described as “law enforcement.” Beijing’s cutters have enforced China’s claims through a variety of tactics involving the use of water cannons, lasers, long-range acoustic devices and ramming maneuvers.

Within the last three decades, China expanded its presence in the South China Sea from fishingman shelters to full-fledged military bases via intensive land reclamation efforts and forward-deployed forces.

Efforts to increase China’s foothold in the area could increase under the national nature reserve, according to Collin Koh, a research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies under the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. The declaration means China could construct research facilities, civilian outposts and ocean monitoring stations, Koh told USNI News.

“They would of course also be used as some sort of test balloon to see how far the envelope can be pushed, including the possibility of building a small outpost in the name of guarding the nature reserve, or to ‘facilitate’ tourism and sightseeing activities,” said Koh. “It could even be a scientific research station. All these would mean some form of limited construction activities.”

Koh believes that Manila should continue supporting its civilian fishing efforts near the shoal to disregard the Chinese claims. However, Koh also noted that Philippine government and civilian vessels may face a “more challenging operational environment” as a result of the Chinese assertion.

While Chinese forces have frequently deployed to the shoal, recent maritime and aerial incidents have shown the presence of destroyers, frigates and fighter jets supporting China’s efforts to deny Philippine forces from operating within and near Scarborough Shoal. A collision between a 052D-class guided missile destroyer and a cutter occurred last month during one of these interdiction operations.

“This isn’t environmental protection – it’s environmental lawfare,” Ray Powell, director of the SeaLight Project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, told USNI News.

Powell highlighted China’s disregard for preserving the South China Sea ecosystem, noting that Chinese fishermen exploited Scarborough Shoal for more than a decade through “highly destructive methods.” A 2025 report from the Center of Strategic and International Studies claimed that China has destroyed up to 4,648 acres of reef since 2013.

“Now it seeks to consolidate its sovereignty claim while deflecting attention from the ecological damage it caused,” Powell said. “It’s like an arsonist promoting himself to fire marshal over the ruins of a building he stole and burned”

news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · September 15, 2025

18. US Army reveals Typhon missile system in Japan

We are placing stones on the Go board in the competition with China..

US Army reveals Typhon missile system in JapanBy The Associated Press

Sep 15, 2025, 11:03 AM

A Mid-Range Capability Launcher arrives in Northern Luzon, Philippines, in 2024. (Capt. Ryan DeBooy/U.S. Army)

TOKYO — The U.S. Army revealed Monday its mid-range missile system, Typhon, at one of its bases in Japan for the first time as the two allies stepped up their deterrence against China ‘s growing assertiveness in the region.

Typhon was featured during the annual bilateral exercise Resolute Dragon, which started last week, with more than 19,000 U.S. and Japanese troops participating in the exercise that focuses on maritime defense and littoral protection and held across Japan, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.

The land-based weapon, capable of firing the Standard Missile-6 and the Tomahawk cruise missiles that can hit targets on China’s eastern coasts, was delivered last month to the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Iwakuni, in southwestern Japan. Its exhibition in Japan follows its deployment in the Philippines last year, triggering criticisms from China and Russia.

The U.S. Army is not expected to fire Typhon or other advanced missile systems during the Resolute Dragon exercise, and its deployment in Iwakuni is only for the exercise ending on Sept. 25, Japanese public television NHK reported.

US Army readies second Typhon battery for Pacific deployment

Japan has been rapidly accelerating its military buildup, especially the so-called strike-back capability with mid- to long-range missiles as a counter to missile and nuclear threats from China, as well as North Korea and Russia.

“Employing multiple systems and different types of munitions, it is able to create dilemmas for the enemy,” Col. Wade Germann, commander of the U.S. Army’s 3d Multi-Domain Task Force, said in a televised news conference from Iwakuni.

It also comes days after Japan’s Defense Ministry said it spotted China’s newest aircraft carrier Fujian for the first time in the East China Sea, in waters just north of Japanese-controlled disputed islands Senkaku, which Beijing also claims and calls the Diaoyu.

19. Army adopts venture capital model to speed tech to soldiers

Transforming in contact on multiple levels of the 3D chess board.

Army adopts venture capital model to speed tech to soldiers

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/09/15/army-adopts-venture-capital-model-to-speed-tech-to-soldiers/

By Jen Judson

Sep 15, 2025, 12:37 PM

Staff Sgt. Kristopher Garbea, from the unmanned aerial system platoon, 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, holds a small reconnaissance drone during Saber Junction 25 (SJ25) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany Sept. 9, 2025. (Capt. Shenicquia Fulton/Army)

The U.S. Army is rolling out a new initiative, dubbed Fuze, that leaders say will overhaul how the service invests in technology by borrowing from Silicon Valley’s venture capital playbook.

The service is betting that venture-style risk-taking can shave years off procurement timelines and will determine whether Silicon Valley speed can mesh with Pentagon scale.

“With Fuze, the Army is telling innovators that we’re open for business. Fuze will help us to not only invest but scale promising capabilities — bridging the valley of death,” Army Secretary Dan Driscoll said in a statement to Defense News.

Unlike traditional procurement that starts with an Army-defined problem followed by appointing a company to solve the problem, Fuze flips the approach. The new process allows the service to find technology to bring in “that helps us think about what our problems are differently,” Chris Manning, the Army’s deputy assistant secretary for research and technology, told Defense News in a recent interview.

Venture capitalists make 100 investments and only end up with a few with outsized returns. The Army is accepting that same risk to capture bigger payoffs.

“We’re really taking the approach where we’re going to deliberately make a large number of investments in emerging tech companies,” Matt Willis, the Army’s Fuze program director, said in the interview. “Some tech might not reach the maturity that we want, [but] there’s going to be some companies that are going to have an outsized, revolutionary impact on our soldiers.”

The program aligns four existing fundings streams: XTech prize competitions, small-business funding, tech maturation and manufacturing technology — worth about $750 million in fiscal 2025.

The Army plans to initiate the program by running an XTech Disrupt live pitch competition, in partnership with Y Combinator — a technology startup accelerator and VC firm — at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference next month in Washington.

The competition, according to Willis, will focus on four technology areas important to the Army: electronic warfare, unmanned aircraft systems, counter-UAS and energy resiliency at the edge. The prize pool totals $500,000.

Technologies that win out in the competition will go straight into the hands of soldiers in operational environments for real-world evaluation.

The Army has spent the better part of a decade trying to match its acquisition speed with the rest of the high-tech world, but trying to break down the bureaucracy and change the culture has been a challenging task.

Fuze is central to a broader shift in the Army as it seeks dramatic transformation rapidly.

“Continuous transformation is like our once-in-a-generation change for the Army to get at and prepare for the future battlefield,” Brandon Pugh, the Army’s cyber adviser, told Defense News. “But a key part of that is the acquisition process to really make sure that the warfighter and the soldier on the battlefield has the correct technology they need.”

Speed is central to that transformation. “We’re hoping to have a capability to an acquisition pathway in 10 days, and hopefully within 30 to 45 days, for the first prototype to be with an Army unit,” Pugh said. “That is extraordinary.”

The Army has struggled with the pace of past acquisitions, particularly in fast-evolving fields like electronic warfare. “It’s so quickly evolving, you have to be able to acquire this quickly and iterate quickly, or else you’re instantly behind, even if you do successfully acquire it. I think that’s the risk,” Pugh noted.

Army officials stressed that Fuze is not just a bureaucratic reshuffling. “This isn’t just like a rebranding. We’re coalescing these innovation programs from a strategic, operational and execution standpoint… to help companies move through that pipeline more quickly,” Willis said.

“The end outcome we want is having the best technology here quickly,” Pugh said.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

20. How to Take Command of the “Commander’s Intelligence Program”

It is simple (but even the simplest thing is hard in war). Do not ask your intelligence officer to make predictions. Do not expect perfect information. Demand the best judgement (and imagination too) and estimate of what the enemy is most likely AND what is the enemy's most dangerous course of action. And realize that every action you take will cause the enemy to react and therefore the intelligence assessment must be revised as the original estimate will no longer be valid. Simple to say, hard to do.

But most failures are not intelligence failures - they are operational and planning failures and often failures to heed the intelligence estimate.

Conclusion:

Intelligence is a tough business, and even in the era of big data and artificial intelligence, failures will happen. Among military leaders, the adage that military missions come in two types — operational successes and intelligence failures — is alive and well. The commander is the most important intelligence officer in any organization, and they should own the vision of the enemy and the intelligence requirements. If the intelligence officer is not a comfortable fit in the commander’s inner circle or is not an expert at their trade, perhaps it is time to find a new one. But before firing the J2, the leader should ask themselves: “Am I telling them what I want? Am I a part of the collection team? Am I keeping my door open to the people and my mind open to the indicators?” If senior officers want intelligence to drive operations, they should own it.

How to Take Command of the “Commander’s Intelligence Program”

Robert P. Ashley, Jr. and Thomas W. Spahr

September 16, 2025

warontherocks.com · September 16, 2025

“Why isn’t my J2 giving me the information I need? What do all these intelligence agencies do for me anyway?”

As U.S. military officers progress in rank, their relationship with intelligence evolves. Senior officers interact more with the intelligence community as the military assigns them to service component commands, joint task forces, and combatant commands. Further, technological advances and the increasing availability of data have made intelligence both more capable and complex. The operational-level commander has an intelligence officer — a J2, G2, N2, or A2 (we use J2 in this essay) — to help bridge the gap to the immense intelligence community, while also integrating its reporting with subordinate collectors. But it is inherently a commander’s responsibility to lead the management and integration of intelligence into operations: They should seek understanding, contribute to the collection effort, and tell their intelligence team what they need to succeed.

By doing so, senior military officers executing military campaigns can cultivate and lead a successful intelligence effort within their organizations. The best U.S. operational commanders from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken personal responsibility for their intelligence program: They have “owned” it. We base the observations offered here on interviews with military senior leaders, academic research, and our own lived experiences as intelligence officers.

BECOME A MEMBER

Make It Your Own

The intelligence officer cannot bring the weight of the intelligence community to address the commander’s needs unless the leader shares their priorities and concerns. Gen. Joseph Dunford, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasized that he needed to brief his intelligence team first on his priorities before they briefed him. Clear guidance enables the J2 to focus finite intelligence collection and analytical resources. To build this vital relationship, the J2 should be in the commander’s inner circle, traveling with him or her, attending daily close-out meetings, and striving to understand how the commander thinks. As the U.S. Central Command commander, Gen. Kenneth (Frank) McKenzie had an intelligence briefing every morning, then expected his J2 to give him regular updates throughout the day. While it is the J2’s responsibility to earn a spot in the inner circle, the commander first needs to afford them the opportunity to gain trust.

Senior leaders should also think of themselves as collectors. When a leader visits subordinate or adjacent units or conducts key leader engagements with a partner, they should share their impressions with the J2. An easy way to ensure this is to always bring the J2 — or a member of the intel team — on battlefield circulation, then compare notes immediately to ensure they both heard the same message. If an intelligence professional is not present for the engagement — especially with an allied or partner nation — a debriefing becomes essential. Several senior leaders we served under lamented the inaccuracy of information in national-level intelligence assessments. Gen. David Petraeus, while commanding in Iraq and Afghanistan, regularly challenged intelligence community assessments. When he became the CIA director, he ordered headquarters-based analysts to consult with intelligence specialists in theater to avoid this gap. Part of the challenge was that information from the commanders’ engagements remained in the senior leaders’ heads and never made its way into intelligence reporting. A disciplined strategic debriefing program can capture that information for broader consumption across the intelligence community, but the commander should first acknowledge their role as collectors. Disagreements between analysts will invariably still ensue, but at least they will be looking at the same reporting.

Regular commander-led deep dives with intelligence analysts is another effective technique for a leader to empower their intelligence teams. These direct exchanges build shared understanding and help refine the commanders’ intelligence needs. By removing the filter between the leader, who is interfacing with allies and senior officials, and the analyst, who is immersed in intelligence reporting, both sides will gain clarity. Gen. Scott Miller, when commanding in Afghanistan, regularly stopped by the sensitive comparted information facility late at night to speak directly with analysts — often unannounced. While every J2 would prefer the boss to let them know when they plan to visit, no J2 is going to complain about an engaged commander who values talking with their intelligence team. Simply asking good questions and providing clear guidance to the analyst is a critical step to becoming a good consumer. Refined, relevant, and specific questions will often emerge from these deep dive sessions and enable the J2 to shape collection requirements.

While the J2 will typically draft the priority intelligence requirements (PIR), they ultimately belong to the commander. Dunford told one of us that:

Often what we describe as intelligence “failures” could actually be characterized as leadership failures. Did the commander ask the right questions? Did the commander provide the right priorities for collection and focus? Did the commander properly supervise the prioritization and allocation of what will always be finite intelligence capabilities?

Miller gave guidance to his intel team through daily comments on his read-book, meetings with the J2, and frequent deep dives with analysts, and did not think that the priority intelligence requirements alone could “answer the many intricacies of the Afghan problem.” Miller wrote to one of us, “Writing the PIR was the easy part, but conditioning the force to look outside of the lines for when they felt the need to report was important.” Understanding those nuances only comes through regular interactions between leaders and intelligence professionals.

As leaders engage with their intelligence team, they should question analytical tradecraft and make analysts defend their assessments. Questions like, “Tell me about the sources you have supporting your assessment?”, “What is the quality of that reporting?”, and “Does anyone in the community disagree with you?” encourage analysts to think twice about their sourcing and talk to other intelligence agencies. Further, the commander’s perspective is unique, and they may come to a different, more accurate conclusion. The World War II practitioner and scholar Sherman Kent wrote about the consumer: “His remoteness from the fogging detail and drudgery of the surveillance or research may be the very thing which permits him to arrive at the more accurate synthesis of what the truth is than that afforded the producer.” Whether the leader’s instincts are correct or not, the conversation and accountability he or she demands by questioning the assessment is invaluable. Commanders should understand the assessment before they accept it.

Occasionally, individual raw, unanalyzed reports get widespread attention or are so revealing that it may be appropriate for the J2 to show a leader that report. However, including unanalyzed information in a read-book should be done with caution, as raw reporting — such as a signals intelligence intercept — lacks context and is ultimately just one piece of a larger puzzle. Yet, at times, having the commander review unanalyzed reporting can be useful, and some leaders demand this level of visibility. For example, we have witnessed instances when the CIA was planning to present critical human intelligence to the secretary of defense, and it was important that the subordinate task force J2 show the report to the forward-deployed commander and provide context. Similarly, when we asked Gen. Stanley McChrystal about how he makes his assessment, he revealed:

I found that simply asking a journalist or someone living in an area provided as accurate an overall assessment as all our collection. The secret is not to accept one over the other — it is to integrate them. In a simplistic example, I ask Alexa each morning about the weather — but I don’t decide what to wear until I’ve looked (and typically stepped) outside.

Related to raw reporting is the challenge of finding consensus among intelligence analysts and how to present opposing views. Even when looking at the same evidence, people will often reach different conclusions. The Supreme Court is a good example of this phenomenon. All nine justices are reading the same Constitution and its amendments, yet they rarely vote unanimously. Presidential Daily Briefers are required to inform their principals if there is a significant opposing view, and operational analysts should too — and commanders should ask.

In early 2020, when Lt. Gen. Bob Ashley was director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, there was a fierce debate between intelligence analysts across the “three-letter agencies” inside the Beltway and those in Afghanistan over how quickly the Islamic State in Afghanistan could attack the U.S. homeland after the U.S. military withdrew from the country. The Washington-based analysts believed it would take longer, while those in the country viewed the Islamic State as more capable and estimated the time to be less than half of the view from stateside. This assessment could influence how the United States would draw down its forces and the decision to withdraw at all. To try to find common ground, Ashley convened a classified video teleconference among the senior analysts involved in the debate who each presented their case with evidence. He concluded they were all reading the same reports, just interpreting them differently. The analysts never agreed, and ultimately, he decided on the assessment. Still, when he presented that decision to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ashley included a description of the opposing view along with the dissenting analysts’ justification.

It is the J2’s job to figure out how the commander prefers to receive information, but the best commanders are forthright with their preferences. Maj. Gen. Curtis Taylor, former commander at the National Training Center and 1st Armored Division commander, says analysts should be deep and thorough, but present information clearly and concisely: “Intel analysts often make the mistake of describing how they built a watch, when the boss just needs to know the time.” At the presidential level, George W. Bush preferred reading longer assessments and then engaging in conversation with the analysts. Barack Obama liked shorter summaries on an iPad followed by a briefing with his intelligence advisors. In his first term, Donald Trump favored less frequent sessions linked to relevant changes or major decisions and preferred visual aids (slides, posters, etc.) versus reading. Consumers can help their intelligence officers by sharing their preferences early on.

Finally, when analysts build a daily read-book, the leader owes them feedback. Thin, focused products — not fat, unfocused, and generally unread tomes — make everyone’s life better. Leaders should both ask questions and let analysts know when something piques their interest. In Afghanistan, Miller would type his comments in purple font on the daily update before sending it back to the staff, who would find answers to his questions and incorporate his input into the standing estimate. This guidance was incredibly valuable in focusing intelligence collection and analytical efforts. A word of caution, however: Be careful what you ask for. Asking questions based on curiosity versus relevance could pull finite analytical resources and collection platforms off more important tasks.

Speaking Truth to Power

It is popular to claim that intelligence professionals should “speak truth to power” — expressing honest assessments to those in positions of authority. Yet we struggle with the word “truth” when referring to intelligence, and the scholar Mark Lowenthal calls this sentiment “both wrong and dangerous.” He argues that intelligence is not “truth” due to the complexity of human conflict, characterized by often unreliable sources and an adversary who is intentionally trying to obfuscate information. It is better for the intelligence officer to tell the consumer what they think, why, and to include a level of certainty. Gen. Colin Powell demanded that his analysts “Tell me what you know, then tell me what you don’t know, and only then can you tell me what you think.” The undersecretary of defense for intelligence and the director of national intelligence prescribe the use of certain qualifying words that correspond to percentages of certainty in assessments across the intelligence community. Despite this, commanders may dictate the words they understand best. Further, all the “likelys” and “probablys” bother some leaders, but it is important they know what they mean.

Figure 1: Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytical Standards, Dec 21, 2022

While “truth to power” may be inaccurate, the idea that the intelligence officer should at times disagree with the commander is critical, and while the J2 should be a part of the commander’s inner circle, there is danger in being too close. Groupthink and a desire to please the boss can cloud analytical judgement. In the words of Sherman Kent “If he sees his side the easy winner, the argument runs, he will tend to underrate the enemy; if the loser, to overrate the enemy.” This is particularly acute in a command climate where subordinates are intimidated by the leader. The 2022 Russian intelligence assessment that the Ukrainian military would roll over easily comes to mind: Who in President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle wants to tell him he’s wrong? The solution is to find the middle ground where the intelligence officer has enough information to focus collection and analysis without falling in love with the plan. Former Chairman of the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee Sir Percy Cradock describes the intelligence officer-commander relationship this way: “The best arrangement is intelligence and policy in separate but adjoining rooms, with communicating doors and thin partition walls, as in cheap hotels.”

Of the dangers of being too close or too far, we believe the greater peril is the latter. The intelligence officer must know how their commander thinks but also recognize the risk of bias towards the “home team.” The J2 should step out or remain silent during operational planning, and the commander must respect that and be open to bad news that foils his vision. Our value proposition as intelligence professionals is that we are agnostic to the decision. Nevertheless, intelligence leaders must be prepared when the boss asks, “I got the assessment…what do you think?”

The Commander is the Best Intelligence Officer in the Unit

In 2013, after returning from an eight-month deployment to southern Afghanistan as a Brigade S2, then-Maj. Tom Spahr wrote that “Your commander is the best intel officer in the BCT [Brigade Combat Team]: Learn how he thinks, advise him on capabilities, and let his instincts be your guide. . . then present information to him in a way he understands.” This wasn’t a new idea then, and we still regularly hear senior military intelligence officers refer to the commander as the “best intelligence officer in the unit.” Yet at the operational level of war, we are more comfortable with the assertion “the commander is the most important intelligence officer in the unit.” This is not to degrade the commander’s intuition, but rather to acknowledge the complexity of operational intelligence and remind the J2 of their responsibility to be the expert. While the commander will make the final call on the assessment, as the volume of information grows exponentially, the J2 owes it to the leader to make sense of the torrent of data. Further, the J2 should be the expert on ever-evolving capabilities across the vast intelligence community. Nonetheless, the commander is the most important intelligence officer in any organization, because ultimately the only intelligence that matters is that which resides between the boss’s ears when making a decision.

Conclusion

Intelligence is a tough business, and even in the era of big data and artificial intelligence, failures will happen. Among military leaders, the adage that military missions come in two types — operational successes and intelligence failures — is alive and well. The commander is the most important intelligence officer in any organization, and they should own the vision of the enemy and the intelligence requirements. If the intelligence officer is not a comfortable fit in the commander’s inner circle or is not an expert at their trade, perhaps it is time to find a new one. But before firing the J2, the leader should ask themselves: “Am I telling them what I want? Am I a part of the collection team? Am I keeping my door open to the people and my mind open to the indicators?” If senior officers want intelligence to drive operations, they should own it.

BECOME A MEMBER

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Robert P. Ashley, Jr. retired from the U.S. Army in November 2020 after over 36 years of active duty service as an intelligence officer. He served as the 21st director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (2017-2020); the Army deputy chief of staff, G-2 (Intelligence); the director of intelligence, U.S. Army Joint Special Operations Command; the director of intelligence, U.S. Central Command; the deputy chief of staff, Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force and director of intelligence, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan; and commanding general and commandant, U.S .Army Intelligence Center and School. He currently serves as a commissioner on the Afghanistan War Commission among other senior advisory positions.

Thomas W. Spahr, Ph.D., is the Francis DeSerio Chair of Theater and Strategic Intelligence at the U.S. Army War College. He served as a military intelligence officer for over 27 years before retiring from the Army in October 2024. Dr. Spahr served as the chair of the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, U.S. Army War College (2022-2024); chief of staff for the CJ2 (Intelligence), Operation Resolute Support, Afghanistan (2019-2020); and senior intelligence officer (G2), 4th Infantry Division and Fort Carson (2016-2018). He deployed as an intelligence officer to Afghanistan four times and Colombia twice and has taken part in several multinational training exercises in Eastern Europe. Dr. Spahr holds an M.S. and a Ph.D. in History from The Ohio State University and an M.S.S. from the U.S. Army War College.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Image: U.S. Strategic Command

warontherocks.com · September 16, 2025

21. Fort Bragg horrors expose dark underbelly of post-9/11 warfare

I didn't think I would care for this review too much but there are some important points.

There is more to this book than the initial reporting it reveals. Yes, the focus is on the allegations of drugs and a 'two-tiered justice system." But it delves into other areas (though the author is trying to connect a lot of dots that may or may not be connectable but support a certain agenda).

Excerpts:

But there’s a second, parallel narrative in the book that’s perhaps even more significant. Harp embeds the story of individual soldiers into a larger examination of the history of the global War on Terror (GWOT) that began after 9/11, and the U.S. military adoption of new forms of Special Operations-based warfare during that conflict.

After the most active phase of the 2003 Iraq war ended in roughly 2007-08, the GWOT has in many ways faded from broader public consideration. It has not left the mark on the American consciousness that the Vietnam war or even the “forgotten” Korean war did. But especially as we see tactics, justifications, and rhetoric from the GWOT re-emerging in the Trump Administration’s apparent new war on terrorist-designated drug cartels, this is a mistake.

Harp traces the way in which the military shifted from the mass deployment of large numbers of ordinary infantry forces overseas — which contributed to large-scale public opposition to the Vietnam War and the early Iraq War — to the more intensive use of much smaller numbers of highly trained Special Forces operators. This is a form of warfare less visible to the broader public, but with an even more significant personal impact on the small number of fighters who practice it.

...

Another important aspect of the book is the description of what Harp calls “Iraq War 3” — Operation Inherent Resolve — against ISIS beginning in 2014, which demonstrates the impact of the military’s new way of war. Harp covered this war himself as a journalist, and documents the intensity of U.S. operations. He claims that more troops were deployed in Iraq and Syria for the conflict — over 10,000 — than were ever acknowledged. It’s difficult to believe that a war of this size and intensity could have been fought with so little public attention before the military perfected its new Special Operations intensive method of warfare.

The capacity to fight highly lethal but relatively U.S. personnel-light conflicts using the combination of Special Forces and local proxies opens up new possibilities for the American military — and new challenges for public oversight of its actions. Again, this is especially salient in light of the signals from the Trump Administration that it plans a GWOT-style war against drug cartels directly on American borders.

One could quarrel with many of the specific claims in this book. William Lavigne, perhaps the central character, is only one individual. It’s always possible to misrepresent the full reality of a large community such as Fort Bragg or the Special Forces through the selection of the most extreme examples. There have been many deaths in Fort Bragg but there are also many troops stationed there. The 109 deaths in Fort Bragg in 2020 and 2021 represent 5.4% of all deaths in the active duty U.S. military during those years, but over 3% of all active duty soldiers are stationed there, so the disproportion is not as extreme as one might think.

Fort Bragg horrors expose dark underbelly of post-9/11 warfare

responsiblestatecraft.org · Marcus Stanley · September 16, 2025

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Veteran and journalist Seth Harp's new book is causing a stir as he explores how the war came home, complete with drugs, violence, and criminality.

Sep 16, 2025

In 2020 and 2021, 109 U.S. soldiers died at Fort Bragg, the largest military base in the country and the central location for the key Special Operations Units in the American military.

Only four of them were on overseas deployments. The others died stateside, mostly of drug overdoses, violence, or suicide. The situation has hardly improved. It was recently revealed that another 51 soldiers died at Fort Bragg in 2023. According to U.S. government data, these represent more military fatalities than have occurred at the hands of enemy forces in any year since 2013.

“The Fort Bragg Cartel: Drug Trafficking and Murder in the Special Forces” recently published by Seth Harpis a deep dive into the culture that produced these deaths. The book proceeds on two levels. The first is a closely reported examination of the lives of several Special Operations soldiers caught up in criminal networks — especially William Lavigne, a Delta Force operator who became part of an international drug cartel and was eventually murdered in a still unsolved case. This aspect of the book, which has the feel of an especially compelling true crime thriller, is no doubt what has propelled the book onto bestseller lists and picked up for an HBO miniseries.

But there’s a second, parallel narrative in the book that’s perhaps even more significant. Harp embeds the story of individual soldiers into a larger examination of the history of the global War on Terror (GWOT) that began after 9/11, and the U.S. military adoption of new forms of Special Operations-based warfare during that conflict.

After the most active phase of the 2003 Iraq war ended in roughly 2007-08, the GWOT has in many ways faded from broader public consideration. It has not left the mark on the American consciousness that the Vietnam war or even the “forgotten” Korean war did. But especially as we see tactics, justifications, and rhetoric from the GWOT re-emerging in the Trump Administration’s apparent new war on terrorist-designated drug cartels, this is a mistake.

Harp traces the way in which the military shifted from the mass deployment of large numbers of ordinary infantry forces overseas — which contributed to large-scale public opposition to the Vietnam War and the early Iraq War — to the more intensive use of much smaller numbers of highly trained Special Forces operators. This is a form of warfare less visible to the broader public, but with an even more significant personal impact on the small number of fighters who practice it.

While most will be familiar with the U.S. military use of covert assassination tactics and raids, what feels new here is the extensive documentation of the sheer volume and character of these operations. They feel less like targeted assassinations than an industrialized assembly line of personalized killing.

Harp describes Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) General Stanley McChrystal’s Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) cycle, saying that “despite the ungainly initialism, the F3EAD cycle was not a complicated concept. It typically meant tracking down a target, killing him and every adult man and teenage boy in the vicinity, seizing every piece of paper and electronic device found on their persons, and using these materials to come up with more names to add to the hit list, and then killing them too, sometimes just a few hours later.”

Later in the book, Harp describes the Special Operations mission in the GWOT as “covertly liquidating the male population base of recalcitrant ethnic and tribal groups that resist U.S. military occupation.”

The full power of the book emerges in the way Harp personalizes the cost of these tactics to the men who perform them. There is a physical cost measured in the impact on their bodies and the routine use of performance enhancing drugs to facilitate the high-intensity, nonstop cycle of violent raids on deployments and the intensive training in peacetime.

There is also a psychic and moral cost in the act of killing. This is often illuminated through interviews with women connected to these soldiers. Indeed, women emerge in the book as a kind of horrified chorus of normalcy, as the mothers, sisters, wives, and girlfriends of Special Forces operators testify to the emotional changes that have occurred in their men over the years. Gruesome details are scattered through the book, such as when the sister of one of Lavigne’s friends asks him why his dog has no teeth:

“Lavigne told her that its titanium dentures had been surgically removed upon retirement because the dog had been trained to attack and had grown accustomed to feeding on the flesh of people killed in special operations raids, including being allowed, ‘as a ‘treat',’ to eat human brains.”

The political clout of Special Operations within the military community apparently leads to a two-tier system of justice in the municipalities around Fort Bragg. Lavigne’s murder of his close friend during a drug-fueled dispute is covered up by the police. There also seems to be a culture of impunity for domestic abuse and sexual assault.

Harp argues, convincingly, that the routine use of prescription amphetamines and opioids contributed to an epidemic of substance use among Fort Bragg soldiers. This in turn became a gateway for some to become traffickers in illegal drugs. He also claims, more controversially but with substantial evidence, that GWOT operations in Afghanistan were central to the increase in U.S. opioid use that has occurred over the past several decades. He points out that the Taliban banned opium production in 2000 for religious reasons, that the heroin trade experienced an apparent resurgence of production under the corrupt U.S.-backed Afghan government during the war, and that much of the heroin reaching the U.S. during the period may have been misclassified as coming from Mexico rather than Afghanistan.

Another important aspect of the book is the description of what Harp calls “Iraq War 3” — Operation Inherent Resolve — against ISIS beginning in 2014, which demonstrates the impact of the military’s new way of war. Harp covered this war himself as a journalist, and documents the intensity of U.S. operations. He claims that more troops were deployed in Iraq and Syria for the conflict — over 10,000 — than were ever acknowledged. It’s difficult to believe that a war of this size and intensity could have been fought with so little public attention before the military perfected its new Special Operations intensive method of warfare.

The capacity to fight highly lethal but relatively U.S. personnel-light conflicts using the combination of Special Forces and local proxies opens up new possibilities for the American military — and new challenges for public oversight of its actions. Again, this is especially salient in light of the signals from the Trump Administration that it plans a GWOT-style war against drug cartels directly on American borders.

One could quarrel with many of the specific claims in this book. William Lavigne, perhaps the central character, is only one individual. It’s always possible to misrepresent the full reality of a large community such as Fort Bragg or the Special Forces through the selection of the most extreme examples. There have been many deaths in Fort Bragg but there are also many troops stationed there. The 109 deaths in Fort Bragg in 2020 and 2021 represent 5.4% of all deaths in the active duty U.S. military during those years, but over 3% of all active duty soldiers are stationed there, so the disproportion is not as extreme as one might think.

Harp’s claims about the centrality of Afghan heroin to the U.S. drug trade are likewise controversial, as there is debate about the sources of heroin flowing to the U.S. and the effectiveness of the Taliban in cutting off the heroin trade. They can also be questioned in light of the increasing importance of fentanyl — a synthetic that does not involve Afghan opium — to the drug crisis..

But the book is still path-breaking and compelling in its description of the transformation of the U.S. military during the War on Terror, as well as its deeply reported and resonant description of the personal toll of that transformation on members of one military community and their families.

Marcus Stanley

Marcus Stanley is the Director of Studies at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Prior to joining the Quincy Institute, he spent a decade at Americans for Financial Reform. He has a PhD in public policy from Harvard, with a focus on economics.

Top photo credit: Seth Harp book jacket (Viking press) US special operators/deviant art/creative commons

Top image credit: President Donald Trump meets with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance before a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Monday, August 18, 2025, in the Oval Office. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

22. The Lies America Tells Itself About the Middle East

Excerpts:

How the Arab world initially reacted to Trump’s reelection in 2024 spoke volumes. By almost any standard, Trump should have had everything going against him in this regard. In his first term, he had decisively tilted the field in Israel’s favor, eager to break with convention and jettison peace process truisms he dismissed as fairy tales. During his campaign, he had called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “finish the job” in Gaza; whatever moral indignation Biden officials dared voice at Israel’s conduct of its war there would find no echo among their successors. Yet in the early days, in many corners of the Middle East, relief came more readily than despair at the thought of bidding farewell to Biden’s approach—and, as they saw it, Obama’s, as well.

The familiar explanation that it takes an autocrat to enjoy an autocrat, that in Trump, Arab dictators recognized one of their ilk, goes only so far. Biden, after all, had hardly proved a true crusader on behalf of democracy and human rights. What Arab leaders and a not insignificant portion of their publics resented was Washington’s moral vanity, feckless expressions of empathy, and convictions devoid of courage. What they found hard to stomach were the lies. If you are not going to lift a finger for the Palestinians, have the decency not to pretend to care. At least with Trump, they thought, they knew what they were getting, even if his actions could be unpredictable and mostly not to their liking. They saw in him a leader without moral compass, at ease with the unashamed exercise of power. Unlike his predecessors, Trump did not drone on about an imaginary two-state solution; meant it when he said all options were on the table regarding Iran; and, when he authorized talks with Hamas, dropped the pantomime of refusing to engage with the only Palestinian entity that could decide on matters of war and peace. How much this represents a break with the past remains to be seen. Still, after years of faux outrage and bogus preaching, genuine cynicism was to many a welcome breath of fresh air.

Over decades, the United States had gradually built an alternate universe. A universe in which happy talk comes true and actions produce promised consequences. In which Washington’s mission in Afghanistan gives rise to a modern democracy and U.S.-backed government forces can stand up to the Taliban. In which economic sanctions yield desired political change, domesticate the Houthis, reverse Iran’s nuclear advances. In which the United States is engaged in a decisive struggle of democratic forces against autocratic regimes. A universe in which moderate Palestinians represent their people, will reform the Palestinian Authority and curb its political demands; a reasonable Israeli center will take charge thanks to gentle American prodding, will agree to meaningful territorial withdrawals and to a Palestinian state worthy of the name. A universe in which a cease-fire in Gaza is imminent, international justice is blind, and Washington’s crude double standards do not incessantly defile the international order it purports to defend.

Then there is the actual universe, all flesh and bones and lies.

The Lies America Tells Itself About the Middle East

Foreign Affairs · More by Hussein Agha · September 16, 2025

As Its Influence Faded, Washington Dissembled and Denied Reality

September 16, 2025

At the site of an Israeli strike in Gaza City, September 2025 Dawoud Abu Alkas / Reuters

HUSSEIN AGHA has been involved in Israeli-Palestinian affairs and negotiations for more than half a century. He was a Senior Associate at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford from 1996 to 2023.

ROBERT MALLEY is a Lecturer at Yale University’s Jackson School of Global Affairs. He served in senior Middle East positions in the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations.

This article is adapted from their book Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel-Palestine (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2025).

More by Robert Malley

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On any given day during the long war in Gaza, a Biden administration official could be expected to assert any of the following: a cease-fire was around the corner, the United States was working tirelessly to achieve one, it cared equally about the Israelis and the Palestinians, a historic Saudi-Israeli normalization deal was at hand, and all this was bound up with an irreversible path to Palestinian statehood.

Not one of those pronouncements bore even a loose resemblance to the truth. Talks about a cease-fire dragged on, and when they fitfully bore fruit, the resulting understandings quickly fell apart. The United States refrained from doing the one thing—conditioning or halting the military aid to Israel that kept the fire from ceasing—that might have made it happen. Taking that step was also the one thing that might have demonstrated, beyond platitudes, a U.S. commitment to protecting both Israeli and Palestinian lives. Saudi Arabia kept repeating that normalization with Israel depended on progress toward a Palestinian state, and the Israeli government consistently ruled such progress out. The more time went on, the more U.S. statements were exposed as empty words, met with disbelief or indifference. That did not stop them from being made. Did U.S. policymakers believe what they said? If not, why did they keep saying it? And if they did, how could they ignore so much contrary evidence staring them in the face?

The falsehoods served as cover for a policy that enabled Israel’s ferocious attacks on Gaza and hailed the most modest, fleeting improvement in the situation in the Palestinian enclave as the product of American humanitarianism and resolve. Israel’s brutality worsened under the Trump administration, but those earlier falsehoods had paved the way. They helped normalize Israel’s indiscriminate killings; its targeting of hospitals, schools, and mosques; its use of access to food as a weapon of war; and its continued reliance on American weapons. They laid the ground and there was no turning back.

The deceit was not new. Its roots stretch back well before the war in Gaza and extend well beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It became a habit. For decades, the United States dissembled about its stance toward the conflict, posing as a mediator when it was an outright partisan. It dissembled when it helped put together a “peace process” that did far more to perpetuate and solidify the status quo than to upend it. It dissembled when it portrayed its broader Middle East policy as promoting democracy and human rights. It dissembled when it claimed success even as its efforts yielded serial disaster.

As the falsehoods have become more apparent and harder to ignore, U.S. influence has dwindled. Israelis, Palestinians, and other local actors ignore the charade—leaving behind the bromides about the two-state solution, peace, democracy, and American mediation—and revert to more visceral, unembellished attitudes that sprout from their pasts. As in earlier decades, Palestinians—adrift, leaderless, brimming with anger and thirst for revenge—resort to isolated acts of violence against Israelis, awaiting the day they cohere into more organized form. As before, Israel, unrestrained and unbridled, extends its arm wherever and whenever it sees a Palestinian ripe for killing: in the 1970s in Amman, Beirut, Tunis, Paris, or Rome; nowadays in Doha and Tehran. On both sides, worse is to come. The United States will do little but contemplate the debris.

THE ANATOMY OF FAILURE

The life of a failed U.S. policy in the Middle East proceeds in stages. First comes the wrong-headed approach, misreading of a situation, deliberate or inadvertent mistake, as when U.S. officials assert that the best way to influence Israel is not through pressure but with a warm embrace. When they clumsily meddle in Palestinian politics, seeking to anoint a preferred set of “moderate” leaders, an endorsement that, in the eyes of those leaders’ constituents, has little to distinguish itself from an indictment. When they exclude from peacemaking the forces most able to derail it, those on both sides who, for reasons religious or ideological, share a deep, immutable attachment to all the land between the river and the sea, and who would experience giving up an inch of it as a wrenching ripping apart—Israeli settlers and religious nationalists, Palestinian refugees and Islamists.

The riddle of American policy is that its masters know so much and comprehend so little. Information is not understanding; it can be the opposite. In 2000, senior U.S. intelligence officials, based on what they had seen, heard, and thought they had learned, assured President Bill Clinton that the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat would have no choice but to accept Clinton’s proposals during the summit at Camp David, that he would be crazy not to. Arafat turned them down, celebrated as a hero by his people for doing so. In 2006, the Bush administration missed clear signs that pointed to a Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections for which Washington had clamored and about which Palestinian officials had fretted.

Years later, after the 2011 uprising in Syria broke out, raw intelligence erroneously depicted a battlefield that gave President Bashar al-Assad scant chance of short-term survival, the rebels who sought to oust him a relatively swift path to success. During the Biden administration, U.S. officials relied on intelligence reports to evaluate the thinking of Iranian leaders and their stance on a proposed nuclear deal. Their assessments, as often as not, turned out to be wrong. They were surprised by the Taliban’s lightning victory after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, by Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, by the collapse of Assad’s regime the following year, surprised that they had been surprised.

These shocks were not the result of deliberate distortions in which intelligence is molded to suit official whims—such as when the Central Intelligence Agency in 2003 told President George W. Bush what he wanted to hear: that the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, that the case against him was a “slam dunk.” They were the result of a dynamic that is less deceptive, less purposeful. It is no less treacherous.

Over time, it becomes difficult to tell where self-delusion ends and dissembling begins.

Intelligence data often comes with appropriate warnings. Officials may be reminded that the information they have received was gleaned from a single conversation in one place, at one time, without the benefit of wider analysis, broader context, and knowledge of unspoken assumptions. They can be told that whatever is extracted is not the whole puzzle and that to possess pieces of the puzzle can be more misleading than to have none. Yet the cautions matter little. To those who have never crossed paths with raw intelligence—the intercept of a conversation, the contents of a secret memorandum—the thrill can be hard to describe. You feel as if you were in the protagonists’ room and in their minds, you have an advantage they cannot possess, can only dream of. You know. But you do not. American policymakers read and barely understood, read some more and understood even less.

The enigma in these and other instances is not chiefly that the United States misjudged. To get things wrong, misread foreign dynamics, or misapprehend local actors is not unusual. For most policymakers, it is part of the job. What is uncommon, and harder to explain, is how often these failures have been allowed to happen and recur; how even their proliferation has led to neither personal nor institutional accountability, seldom to a mild reprimand, let alone a genuine rethink; how little the United States appears capable of learning from mistakes. The issue is why the country has proved so resistant to changing its ways. Next in the life of an American failure is its replication.

Even more confounding than the mistakes or their stubborn repetition is U.S. officials’ habit of voicing a falsehood even after they know it to be untrue, even after they know that others know it to be untrue. The final stage of failure is the lie. The lie is born of the failure, and it blooms as the failure recurs. American policymakers do something they think will work, do it again even though it did not work, say it works when everyone knows it does not, promise it will when all have lost patience and faith. Unmoored from reality, the pronouncements veer into happy talk. It is more than mere spin. It suggests a deliberate, almost strategic attitude of boundless cheer contrary to common sense and everyday experience. It is this, the casual way in which the United States regularly proffers optimistic statements that fly in the face of all evidence and stand in sharp contrast to a sorry record, that is most striking and perplexing.

HOW AN ILLUSION BECOMES A LIE

Lies rest at the heart of politics and diplomacy, but there are lies, and there are lies. There is the lie that purports to serve the common good, as when U.S. President John F. Kennedy misled the public about the secret U.S.-Soviet understanding regarding the United States’ removal of missiles from Turkey to end the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. There is the big lie, blatant and oft-repeated, that aims to convert its audience to zombie-like belief. The shrewd lie or lie of the cynic, the sort at which Henry Kissinger excelled and in which the George W. Bush administration indulged ahead of the Iraq invasion. It can justify war or prevent it. It can break a logjam. It can kill. The lie of the hopeless striving to rally hope, of Saddam’s spokesperson during the 2003 Iraq war, extolling triumph amid annihilation. The lie of the underdog, to which Arafat clung like one clings to a buoy for survival. He would tell Egypt that Syria was his foe, tell Syria that it was Egypt, tell Saudi Arabia that it was both. He would forswear knowledge of a fighter he had just ordered into action and claim familiarity with one on whom he had never once set eyes. All would learn to distrust him—the learning came fast. But lies saved him and put his cause on the map.

There are lies that get things done, even if what gets done can be ugly, foul, violent, or worse. They have a purpose, not always or necessarily a higher one. A purpose all the same. But the fabrications that came to pervade and corrode the United States’ Middle East diplomacy are not of this kind. They stand apart because they fool nobody and those who utter them must know that nobody is fooled. They happen when one U.S. administration after another has proclaimed its determination to achieve a two-state solution well after the time such an outcome had become impossible; when the Biden administration asserted it cared equally about Israeli and Palestinian lives; when it proclaimed it was tireless in its pursuit of a cease-fire or that Saudi-Israeli normalization was there for the taking, just within reach.

Are all these lies? The word may seem too strong. Many of the assertions do not start that way. They originate as misapprehension or self-delusion. On the eve of a 2000 summit between Clinton and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Geneva, every member of the U.S. team believed that the Syrian leader would reject the Israeli peace proposal they had been asked to convey. Indeed, they had told the Israeli prime minister as much. Still, they must have convinced themselves there was a chance; why else would they have gone? At Camp David in 2000, U.S. participants likewise persuaded themselves that a deal between Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was at hand when nothing—neither territorial division nor the status of Jerusalem nor the fate of Palestinian refugees—had been agreed. When, during President Barack Obama’s second term, Secretary of State John Kerry, fresh into his Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic foray, said that the parties were closer to a deal than ever before, it is doubtful that he was pretending. Like others before him, he was confident that reaching an agreement was a matter of will and perseverance, both of which he possessed in abundance. When Biden administration officials claimed that Saudi Arabia would be ready for normalization with Israel, they probably meant it; after all, that is what Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had privately conveyed.

Over time, it becomes difficult to tell where self-delusion ends and dissembling begins. Eventually, after the words are repeated often enough, the distinction blurs and matters less, if at all. The two merge. An illusion endlessly repeated despite its demonstrable untruth ceases to be an illusion and becomes a lie; a lie endlessly retold can become second nature, so ingrained and instinctive as to detach from its origins and morph into self-delusion. American officials’ recurrent claims, over many decades, that they are committed to a two-state solution and that another round of U.S.-mediated talks could bring it about were no doubt born of genuine conviction. When, failure after failure, they continue to echo the mantra, it is no longer an illusion and turns into deceit. It is another of those phenomena one needs to experience to appreciate. American officials had faith when they went to Geneva and Camp David and also knew both would be a bust; believed in Kerry’s initiative and knew it was quixotic; trusted that Saudi-Israeli normalization was achievable and were resigned to the fact that, for the time being, it was a pipe dream. They both knew and did not know and were not sure which was which. “The past was erased, the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth,” George Orwell wrote in his dystopian novel, 1984. Proof disproves belief, and still the faith endures.

THE LIMITS OF POWER

There came a time when, in its dealings with the Middle East, the United States began to make a religion out of optimism, embrace an ideology of wishful thinking, routinely speak empty words, and issue claims readily disproved by events. It is hard to identify a precise date, easier to identify a probable cause: the acquired habit cannot be separated from the erosion of U.S. power and influence.

No party can match American military or economic dominance, but an increasing number of partners and enemies in the Middle East learned to disregard it. The United States, with all its might, was regularly rebuffed by Israel, often even by the Palestinians, and did little more than witness its own embarrassment. If power is the ability to stretch one’s capacity beyond its objective measure and direct the behavior of others, this was the reverse. The tragedy of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is not Washington’s fault alone. But it is difficult to imagine a greater chasm between capability and accomplishment. The bully was bullied and did nothing about it.

Elsewhere, in Afghanistan as in Iraq, the United States showed it did not know how to wage a war, much less win one. Thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Afghans and Iraqis lost their lives. The Iraq war ended with an Iranian-backed government and militias in charge, the Afghanistan war with the Taliban back in power in the wake of an ignominious U.S. retreat.

In the Middle East, the United States began to make a religion out of optimism.

The United States showed it could not manage peace, either. Across the region, it embraced autocrats, rebuked them, embraced them once more. It sought to promote a democratic transition in Egypt in 2011, a chapter that closed with the consolidation of a government more repressive than the one its leaders helped overthrow. In Libya in 2011, Obama ordered strikes that helped topple the country’s leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi. The result was civil war, instability, the proliferation of armed militias, as well as the flow of weapons across Africa and of refugees into Europe. The U.S. president hoped the operation would succeed, later described it as a “shit show.” He was right on one of those counts. The Obama administration’s subsequent efforts to oust the Syrian regime through heavy investment in the armed opposition followed a similar pattern: U.S. involvement helped prolong a civil war, further encouraged Iranian and Russian interventions, and failed to bring the rebels to power. Many of the weapons the United States helped ship to Syria landed in the hands of jihadist groups that the United States then scrambled to subdue.

In these and other instances, the Arab uprisings took a dark and ugly path. When they began, Obama famously spoke of the United States backing the winds of change, being on the “right side of history.” History paid no heed. In each case, wishful thinking stumbled on hard facts, and the United States appeared curiously oblivious to the lessons of its own Middle East history—lessons about its overconfidence; the limits of its power; the resilience of established governments; the unreliability of local partners keen for American succor, indifferent to American advice; the blowback that follows propping up armed groups about which Washington knows little and over which it has even less control; its repeated attraction, like moth to flame, to a region it has repeatedly vowed to escape. Lessons, in short, about the marriage of the United States’ irresistible urge to meddle in a region and its unfamiliarity with that region’s ways.

Even when the outcomes for which it had labored came to pass, they did not come at Washington’s behest. Years of U.S. efforts to weaken regional militant movements—Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Palestinian armed groups, the Houthis—did little to erode their influence. The United States had sought to cripple them in different ways, and they suffered from the blows, but they bounced back, thriving on the adversity. The significant strike, the serious one, came at Israel’s hands, when it decapitated Hezbollah and devastated its ranks in September 2024. Shortly before Assad fled Damascus that December and his regime disintegrated, the United States had concluded that both were there to stay and pondered a deal to improve bilateral relations. Stunned, American officials could do little more than watch as a group designated as a terrorist organization by the United States swiftly chased Assad out, completing the task Washington had tried so hard and so unsuccessfully to accomplish, and sit down with someone who, in the quick transition from opposition to power, had transformed in their eyes from jihadist to statesman.

What Washington loses in influence, it makes up in noise.

With each failure came the falsehood that became the marrow of U.S. Middle East diplomacy. In Afghanistan, the United States repeated that success was around the corner and chased its tail until it caught up with defeat. While claiming to be engaged in a fight for democracy and human rights, Washington was flanked by partners—Egypt, Gulf Arab monarchies and sheikhdoms, Israel—that ignored the former and flouted the latter. The United States insisted its pressure could constrain Iran’s nuclear program. When the pressure did not work, more was supposed to do the trick. Yet each new U.S. sanction slapped on in response to every new Iranian act of defiance was proof of its own futility. One cannot seriously argue that pressure will curb Iran’s behavior if more pressure continually yields worse behavior.

At times, strangest of all, there is both pretense and confession of the pretense. When Obama armed Syrian rebels, he publicly asserted, “This dictator will fall.” Later, he acknowledged that the idea of such an opposition succeeding—a ragtag group of “former doctors, farmers, pharmacists” vanquishing an army—was a fantasy. The Biden administration decried President Donald Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal that Obama had negotiated and to reimpose sanctions. In the same breath, it boasted that it had not lifted a single sanction, had added many more, and vowed to increase the pressure it acknowledged had not worked. President Joe Biden, also, when U.S. forces began to go after the Houthis in Yemen in response to their attacks on commercial ships, and U.S. military spokespeople repeatedly claimed success, gave this curious statement about the strikes he had ordered to a reporter: “When you say are they working, are they stopping the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue? Yes.” U.S. presidents were as good as their words, and their words as clear as mush.

The less the United States governs the course of events, the more its officials feel the need to talk about them, which is one way to project a sense of control. What Washington loses in influence, it makes up in noise. It masks impotence with loquaciousness, futility with eloquence. True power is quiet. The disconnect between words and reality is near impossible to comprehend, save perhaps as a hint of the end of an era. It suggests the wistfulness of a once almighty superpower that longs for the days when it could get its way, the weight of an incentive structure that penalizes pessimism for the judgment it passes on American purpose and rewards optimism for the verdict it casts on American prowess, or the hope that compulsive, cheerful repetition will make the deceptions real.

BACK TO REALITY

How the Arab world initially reacted to Trump’s reelection in 2024 spoke volumes. By almost any standard, Trump should have had everything going against him in this regard. In his first term, he had decisively tilted the field in Israel’s favor, eager to break with convention and jettison peace process truisms he dismissed as fairy tales. During his campaign, he had called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “finish the job” in Gaza; whatever moral indignation Biden officials dared voice at Israel’s conduct of its war there would find no echo among their successors. Yet in the early days, in many corners of the Middle East, relief came more readily than despair at the thought of bidding farewell to Biden’s approach—and, as they saw it, Obama’s, as well.

The familiar explanation that it takes an autocrat to enjoy an autocrat, that in Trump, Arab dictators recognized one of their ilk, goes only so far. Biden, after all, had hardly proved a true crusader on behalf of democracy and human rights. What Arab leaders and a not insignificant portion of their publics resented was Washington’s moral vanity, feckless expressions of empathy, and convictions devoid of courage. What they found hard to stomach were the lies. If you are not going to lift a finger for the Palestinians, have the decency not to pretend to care. At least with Trump, they thought, they knew what they were getting, even if his actions could be unpredictable and mostly not to their liking. They saw in him a leader without moral compass, at ease with the unashamed exercise of power. Unlike his predecessors, Trump did not drone on about an imaginary two-state solution; meant it when he said all options were on the table regarding Iran; and, when he authorized talks with Hamas, dropped the pantomime of refusing to engage with the only Palestinian entity that could decide on matters of war and peace. How much this represents a break with the past remains to be seen. Still, after years of faux outrage and bogus preaching, genuine cynicism was to many a welcome breath of fresh air.

Over decades, the United States had gradually built an alternate universe. A universe in which happy talk comes true and actions produce promised consequences. In which Washington’s mission in Afghanistan gives rise to a modern democracy and U.S.-backed government forces can stand up to the Taliban. In which economic sanctions yield desired political change, domesticate the Houthis, reverse Iran’s nuclear advances. In which the United States is engaged in a decisive struggle of democratic forces against autocratic regimes. A universe in which moderate Palestinians represent their people, will reform the Palestinian Authority and curb its political demands; a reasonable Israeli center will take charge thanks to gentle American prodding, will agree to meaningful territorial withdrawals and to a Palestinian state worthy of the name. A universe in which a cease-fire in Gaza is imminent, international justice is blind, and Washington’s crude double standards do not incessantly defile the international order it purports to defend.

Then there is the actual universe, all flesh and bones and lies.

Foreign Affairs · More by Hussein Agha · September 16, 2025

23. US Military Officers Visit Belarus for Russian War Games

Unusual.

US Military Officers Visit Belarus for Russian War Games

kyivpost.com

Belarus Washington Russia

The surprise visit by US officers is seen as the latest sign of warming ties between Washington and Minsk after a series of high-level visits and gestures of goodwill from both sides.

by Antonia Langford | Sept. 15, 2025, 6:51 pm

Military attaches watch the "Zapad-2025" (West-2025) joint Russian-Belarusian military drills at a training ground near the town of Borisov, east of the capital Minsk, on September 15, 2025. (Photo by Olesya KURPYAYEVA / AFP)

Flip

US military officers made a surprise visit to observe joint war games between Russia and Belarus on Monday and were encouraged by Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin to look at “whatever is of interest to you.”

In a video released on Telegram by the Belarusian Defense Ministry, two uniformed US officers thank Khrenin for the invitation in Russian and shake his hand.

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Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.

In the clip Khrenin tells his visitors: “We will show whatever is of interest to you. Whatever you want. You can go there and see, talk to people.”

“Who would have thought how the morning of another day of the Zapad-2025 (West-2025) exercise would begin?” a statement accompanying the video said, adding that “the handshake between Belarus and the US at the military training ground was something worth photographing.”

American servicemen present at the exercises declined to speak to reporters, Reuters reported.

They were joined by military-diplomatic missions from 22 other countries, the Belarusians said, including Azerbaijan, Hungary, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Vietnam.

Zapad-2025, the first such exercise to be held since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, involves simulating attacking with and defending against nuclear weapons.

During the exercise, troops will practice planning nuclear strikes against a potential adversary in order to “maintain the credibility” of Russian and Belarusian nuclear deterrent forces, Khrenin told the state-run Belta news agency.

Digging for Victory – Russia Competes in Hungary’s Grave Digging Competition

Excluded from most international sporting events, Russia was allowed to enter a team in this year’s “world cup of grave-digging” in the southern Hungarian city of Szekszárd.

Minsk has said that around 7,000 Russian and Belarusian soldiers are taking part – a stark decrease from the 200,000 seen at Zapad 2021, that was used a smokescreen to the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – and perhaps a signal of Moscow’s lack of spare manpower.

The exercises take place at a delicate moment as Poland masses troops and Western jets after an incursion of around 19 Russian drones into Polish airspace last week.

In response to the violation, Poland shut a key border crossing with Belarus, freezing a key route for Chinese exports to the European Union reportedly worth almost $30 billion per year and landing a painful economic blow to Minsk.

The presence of US officers at the war games is a sign of warming ties between Washington and Belarus, which have been consolidated by a spate of bilateral talks in recent months.

Last week, Trump special envoy John Coale visited Minsk, securing the release of 52 political prisoners by Belarus including opposition politician Mikalai Statkevich and philosopher Uladzimir Matskevich.

Coale and authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko discussed re-establishing a trade relationship, sanctions relief for Belarus’ national airline Belavia and re-opening the US embassy in Minsk “in the very near future”, according to Reuters.

The embassy had previously been closed in February 2022 after Lukashenko allowed Belarus to be used as a launchpad for deploying thousands of troops into Ukraine.

In June, after a visit to Minsk by high-ranking US official and Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg, 14 political prisoners including opposition leader Siarhei Tsikhanouski, who had been imprisoned for more than five years, were released.

Minsk has been keen to play down the exercises as it allows itself to be courted by the US, describing Zapad-2025 as defensive and limited to its eastern regions, far away from NATO’s borders.

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Antonia Langford

Antonia Langford is a journalist and freelance translator who has written for The Guardian, The Times, The Telegraph, The i, and many more. She has reported from Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Poland and is particularly interested in displacement, environment, language, authoritarianism and human stories.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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