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Quotes of the Day:
"Have more than you show, speak less than you know."
- William Shakespeare
“My experience in traditional firms is that anything new is seen as innovative, and the people assigned to it, like any parent, become irrationally passionate about the project and refuse to acknowledge just how stupid and ugly your little project has become.”
- Scott Galloway, The Four: The Hidden DNA of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google
“The world is full of fools—people who cannot wait to get results, who change with the wind, who can’t see past their noses. You encounter them everywhere: the indecisive boss, the rash colleague, the hysterical subordinate. When working alongside fools, do not fight them. Instead think of them the way you think of children, or pets, not important enough to affect your mental balance. Detach yourself emotionally. And while you’re inwardly laughing at their foolishness, indulge them in one of their more harmless ideas. The ability to stay cheerful in the face of fools is an important skill.”
- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War
This Day in History: September 17
North Korea and South Korea were admitted to the United Nations.
1. N. Korea's Kim leaves Russia on armored train to return home: Russian media
2. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Vladivostok of Russian Federation
3. How China and Russia facilitate North Korea’s human rights abuses
4. Deal or no deal? What we know about the Putin-Kim meeting
5. N. Korea's Kim 'deeply impressed' with Russia's modern aviation technology: KCNA
6. Is Reunification Still Possible? Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo on Korea
7. Yoon says N.K.-Russia military cooperation 'illegal, unjust': interview
8. Russia unlikely to provide high-level arms tech to North Korea
9. The public face of China's military under corruption probe
10. Opinion | The Kim-Putin summit highlights Biden’s failed North Korea policy
11. Kim given gift of drones on Russian trip
12. New chapter in trilateral relationship has begun
13. North Korea’s Lazarus Group Has Stolen $240M in Crypto in Just 104 Days: Elliptic
14. Inside The S. Korean Factory That Could Be Key For Ukraine
15. BTS member Suga to begin military service on Friday
16. President and Mrs. Bush meet with North Korean refugees
17. Alliance of the Weak: Why Russia and North Korea Are Joining Forces
1. N. Korea's Kim leaves Russia on armored train to return home: Russian media
Kim's coming out party has concluded. We should keep in mind that Kim and Putin did not have to have a summit to conclude these deals (if in fact any were concluded). On one level this is likely PR to match the April Biden-Yoon Summit and the August Camp David Summit. This supports a number of themes and messages for the Propaganda and Agitation departments of both countries.
And they want to try to drive up our fear level. We should not take the bait but most of the media and pundits have swallowed it hook, line, and sinker.
We should interpret these 6 days as providing us with strategic clarity as to the absolute hostile intentions of both north Korea and Russia but that they are focused on political warfare and blackmail diplomacy against the US and its alliances even as they pursue advanced weapons (or basic ammunition as in the case of Russia to support Putin's war in Ukraine). Both Russia and north Korea are operating from a position of weakness and these meetings are an indication of the failure of their strategies to date. We need to exploit that.
Excerpts:
Kim pledged to throw his full support behind Putin, saying the Russian army and people will triumph over "evil" forces, in an apparent endorsement of Russia's war in Ukraine.
Putin told a local news channel following the summit talks at the space center in Russia's Amur region that he sees prospects for military and technical cooperation with the North.
He also said Kim showed "great interest" in rocket technology, pledging to help the recalcitrant regime build its own satellite.
North Korea made attempts in May and August to place a military spy satellite into orbit, but they ended in failure. The country has pledged to launch a third spy satellite in October.
Speculation arose that military cooperation would have been discussed, as Russia apparently needs North Korea's supplies of artillery shells and ammunition for its war in Ukraine, while the North wants high-tech weapons technology from Russia.
(2nd LD) N. Korea's Kim leaves Russia on armored train to return home: Russian media | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · September 17, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with background; ADDS photos)
SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un left Russia on his armored train Sunday to return home following a six-day visit to the country, Russian media said.
The train carrying Kim departed the railway station in Russia's Far Eastern city of Artyom as Russian officials saw him off, RIA Novosti news agency said. Kim also waved and gave a salute to the Russian officials.
The North Korean leader visited Russia at the invitation of President Vladimir Putin. On Wednesday, the two held a summit at the Vostochny space center amid growing concern about possible military cooperation between the two countries.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) waves to Russian officials before boarding his armored train at the railway station in Russia's Far Eastern city of Artyom to return home on Sept. 17, 2023, in this photo released by TASS. (Yonhap)
Kim pledged to throw his full support behind Putin, saying the Russian army and people will triumph over "evil" forces, in an apparent endorsement of Russia's war in Ukraine.
Putin told a local news channel following the summit talks at the space center in Russia's Amur region that he sees prospects for military and technical cooperation with the North.
He also said Kim showed "great interest" in rocket technology, pledging to help the recalcitrant regime build its own satellite.
North Korea made attempts in May and August to place a military spy satellite into orbit, but they ended in failure. The country has pledged to launch a third spy satellite in October.
Speculation arose that military cooperation would have been discussed, as Russia apparently needs North Korea's supplies of artillery shells and ammunition for its war in Ukraine, while the North wants high-tech weapons technology from Russia.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) holds talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome space launch center in the Russian Far East on Sept. 13, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
This was the longest overseas trip by Kim since taking power. Including travel time, the North Korean leader spent a total of eight days on his visit to Russia.
After departing from Pyongyang by armored train last Sunday, Kim arrived at the rocket launch facility on Wednesday, traveling more than 1,000 kilometers north of the eastern Russian city of Vladivostok, where the two leaders previously met in 2019.
Photos carried by the North's state media showed that Kim was accompanied by the North's top party and military officials, including military marshals Ri Pyong-chol and Pak Jong-chon, and Pak Thae-song, an official in charge of space technology.
The makeup of his entourage and the selection of Russia's space facility as the venue for talks spawned speculation that North Korea may agree to supply Russia with ammunition and weaponry in exchange for food aid and a transfer of weapons technology from Moscow, such as those involving spy satellites and nuclear-powered submarines.
Following the summit, Kim went on a tour of Russia's Far East and visited key military facilities in the region.
On Friday, he visited a Russian aircraft plant that produces advanced fighter jets, including the Sukhoi Su-35, in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
During his trip to the Yuri Gagarin Aviation Plant, Kim said he was "deeply impressed" with the advanced state of Russian aerospace and aviation technology, according to Pyongyang's state media.
"Saying that he was deeply impressed by the rich independent potential and modernity of the Russian aircraft manufacturing industry and its ceaseless enterprising efforts toward new goals, he sincerely hoped that the plant would make sustained development by achieving higher production growth in the future," the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
The next day, Kim held talks with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in Vladivostok and talked about strengthening bilateral military cooperation and exchanges.
They "exchanged their constructive opinions on the practical issues arising in further strengthening the strategic and tactical coordination, cooperation and mutual exchange between the armed forces of the two countries and in the fields of their national defence and security," the KCNA said.
The same day Kim also visited the Knevichi Airbase, where he inspected strategic bombers, multi-role fighter jets and other warplanes, as well as Russia's Pacific Sea Fleet to board the Marshal Shaposhnikov frigate, it said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) smiles as he visits the Yuri Gagarin Aviation Plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Russia on Sept. 15, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · September 17, 2023
2. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Vladivostok of Russian Federation
Here is the Propaganda and Agitation report on Kim's visit.
Note he went to the ballet to view "Sleeping Beauty."
Excerpts:
He exchanged greetings with Aleksey Krivoruchko, vice minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Yevmenov, commander-in-chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kobylash, commander of the long-range bomber force, and other commanding officers of the Russian armed forces who came to receive him, and observed different types of strategic bombers, multi-role fighter jets, pursuit fighter jets, attack fighter jets and other modern warplanes of the Russian air force.
Sergei Kobylash, commander of the long-range bomber force, warmly welcomed Kim Jong Un visiting the Knevichi Airbase and explained in detail about the military planes on display.
Seeing the military planes on display, Kim Jong Un learned about their combat performance and arms and equipment, being briefed on their tactical and technical specifications. Then he had a talk with commanding officers of the Russian armed forces.
...
Kim Jong Un visited the Pacific Sea Fleet base as the next leg of his tour.
The Pacific Sea Fleet is a powerful naval fortress of the national defences of Russia which reliably defends the territorial waters and national interests of Russia in constant actual war readiness with various kinds of surface ships, different types of submarines including strategic nuclear submarines, air force and other latest strategic weapons and equipment.
...
Kim Jong Un shared views on the regional and international military and political situation with Sergei Shoigu, and exchanged their constructive opinions on the practical issues arising in further strengthening the strategic and tactical coordination, cooperation and mutual exchange between the armed forces of the two countries and in the fields of their national defence and security.
That evening he, together with Vladivostok citizens, enjoyed a ballet "Sleeping Beauty" at the Maritime Territory Branch of the Mariinsky Theatre.
Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Vladivostok of Russian Federation
https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1694901876-567846972/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-visits-vladivostok-of-russian-federation/
Date: 17/09/2023 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source
Pyongyang, September 17 (KCNA) -- Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), visited Vladivostok City of the Russian Federation on September 16.
The city was in a fervent and warm welcoming atmosphere to greet the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un at a time when a fresh heyday of friendship and solidarity and cooperation is being opened up in the history of the development of the relations between the DPRK and Russia.
The private train of Kim Jong Un arrived at the yard of the Artyom-Primorski Station No. 1 at 9:00 local time.
He was greeted by Alexandr Kozlov, minister of Natural Resources and Ecology, Oleg Kozhemyako, governor of the Maritime Territory Administration, Byacheslav Kwon, mayor of Artyom, and other senior officials from the capital and local areas.
He exchanged greetings with the senior officials who came to receive him, and warmly waved back to the lovely Russian children welcoming him with bouquets.
He visited the Knevichi Airbase as the first leg of his tour of Vladivostok.
Accompanying him were Marshals of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Ri Pyong Chol and Pak Jong Chon, Kang Sun Nam, minister of National Defence of the DPRK, General Kim Kwang Hyok, commander of the KPA Air Force, Admiral Kim Myong Sik, commander of the KPA Navy, other leading officials and suite members, and senior officials of the Russian Federation from the capital and local areas.
The guard of honor of the three services of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the military band lined up at the airbase.
Kim Jong Un was warmly greeted by Sergei Shoigu, minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.
He gladly met and exchanged warm greetings with Sergei Shoigu.
He reviewed the guard of honor of the three services of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
He exchanged greetings with Aleksey Krivoruchko, vice minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Nikolai Yevmenov, commander-in-chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kobylash, commander of the long-range bomber force, and other commanding officers of the Russian armed forces who came to receive him, and observed different types of strategic bombers, multi-role fighter jets, pursuit fighter jets, attack fighter jets and other modern warplanes of the Russian air force.
Sergei Kobylash, commander of the long-range bomber force, warmly welcomed Kim Jong Un visiting the Knevichi Airbase and explained in detail about the military planes on display.
Seeing the military planes on display, Kim Jong Un learned about their combat performance and arms and equipment, being briefed on their tactical and technical specifications. Then he had a talk with commanding officers of the Russian armed forces.
Sergei Kobylash presented Kim Jong Un with a gift as a token of deep thanks for his visit to the airbase.
Kim Jong Un visited the Pacific Sea Fleet base as the next leg of his tour.
The Pacific Sea Fleet is a powerful naval fortress of the national defences of Russia which reliably defends the territorial waters and national interests of Russia in constant actual war readiness with various kinds of surface ships, different types of submarines including strategic nuclear submarines, air force and other latest strategic weapons and equipment.
The Pacific Sea Fleet received Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, president of the State Affairs of the DPRK and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, with the deepest sincerity and respect and faith.
Kim Jong Un was greeted by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Nikolai Yevmenov, Commander of the Pacific Sea Fleet Viktor Liina and other commanding officers of the fleet.
He exchanged greetings with the commanding officers of the navy who came to greet him, and boarded Frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov, being saluted by the guard of honor of the three services of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the guard of honor of the Pacific Sea Fleet.
He received a salute from the captain of the frigate.
Being explained in detail by Commander-in-Chief Yevmenov about the naval operation capability, major weapons and equipment and combat performance of the frigate, Kim Jong Un went round its combined control room, wheelhouse, etc.
He highly appreciated the service personnel of the Pacific Sea Fleet for having made a great contribution to peace and security in Northeast Asia and the rest of the world by displaying brave fighting spirit and heroism. And he presented his gift as a token of his visit to the fleet and left his autograph in the visitors' book "The victorious wake for defending justice and peace will last forever. Regard for the Pacific Sea Fleet Kim Jong Un 2023. 9.16".
Sergei Shoigu, minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, hosted a luncheon in welcome of Kim Jong Un 's visit to the fleet.
At the luncheon, he warmly welcomed once again the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un who visited the Russian Federation and the Pacific Sea Fleet, expressing his will to further deepen the friendship and cooperation between the defence ministries of the two countries.
DPRK Defence Minister Kang Sun Nam in his reply speech conveyed the warm militant greetings of the officers and men of the Korean People's Army to all the officers and men of the heroic Pacific Sea Fleet, expressing the willingness to further strengthen the militant unity and cooperation with the Russian army and reliably safeguard the regional and global peace and stability.
The luncheon proceeded in a comradely and friendly atmosphere.
Kim Jong Un was presented with a gift by Sergei Shoigu.
At the end of the luncheon he had a talk with Sergei Shoigu.
Expressing his pleasure of meeting the Russian defence minister again, he spoke highly of the development, modernity and heroism of the Russian armed forces reliably defending the independent right and development interests of the country.
Recalling that he was given special hospitality by Kim Jong Un during his Pyongyang visit made on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War, Defence Minister Shoigu expressed thanks to Kim Jong Un for visiting the Russian Federation to encourage the service personnel and people of Russia who have turned out to realize their cause of justice.
Kim Jong Un shared views on the regional and international military and political situation with Sergei Shoigu, and exchanged their constructive opinions on the practical issues arising in further strengthening the strategic and tactical coordination, cooperation and mutual exchange between the armed forces of the two countries and in the fields of their national defence and security.
That evening he, together with Vladivostok citizens, enjoyed a ballet "Sleeping Beauty" at the Maritime Territory Branch of the Mariinsky Theatre.
Among the audience were DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, O Su Yong and Pak Thae Song, secretaries of the C.C., WPK, and other senior officials and suite members.
Alexandr Kozlov, minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia, Oleg Kozhemyako, governor of the Maritime Territory Administration, and other senior officials from Moscow and local areas of Russia enjoyed the ballet together with them.
Kim Jong Un was warmly greeted by Russian cadres and Sergei Bannikov, manager of the theatre.
He, touring Vladivostok City with friendly feelings toward the Russian people, took the reserved seats of the theatre together with the cadres of the two countries, being given a rousing ovation by citizens of Vladivostok.
He expressed deep thanks to the performers and the theatre for their impressive and elegant ballet of high artistic value. -0-
www.kcna.kp (Juche112.9.17.)
3. How China and Russia facilitate North Korea’s human rights abuses
The 17 page report can be downloaded here: https://gwbushcenter.imgix.net/wp-content/uploads/GWBI_2023_NKChinaRussia_Report.pdf
How China and Russia facilitate North Korea’s human rights abuses | George W. Bush Presidential Center
bushcenter.org · by Learn more about Victor Cha.
Report September 13, 2023
How China and Russia facilitate North Korea’s human rights abuses
By
Victor Cha
Senior Fellow
George W. Bush Institute
Dr. Katrin Fraser Katz
Guest Author
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper was inspired and informed by a panel of government and nongovernment experts convened by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the George W. Bush Institute, and the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea to discuss China and Russia’s role in North Korea’s human rights abuses.
Above all, the North Korean regime focuses its resources on maintaining its own survival. While this is true in some regard for all political regimes, North Korea’s case is exceptional because its strategy for doing so is based on the complete subjugation of its citizens. This results in gross human rights violations being committed against the North Korean people.
The February 2014 U.N. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or COI report, specifically details the DPRK’s violations of the freedoms of thought, expression and religion; discrimination; violations of the freedom of movement and residence; violations of the right to food and related aspects of the right to life; arbitrary detention, torture, executions and prison camps; abductions and enforced disappearances from other countries; and crimes against humanity.
However, the roles played by authoritarian leaders in Beijing and Moscow in facilitating North Korea’s human rights violations are less frequently examined. Examples include helping Pyongyang evade international sanctions in ways that are mutually beneficial, human trafficking and transnational repression, forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees, and even coopting entities within the United Nations to discourage initiatives on advancing North Korean human rights.
China and Russia’s complicity in these abuses stems from a combination of political support for North Korea’s Kim regime; nonenforcement of international human rights obligations and sanctions; economic profit; and general allegiance against the West.
Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have both presented North Korea with new incentives and opportunities to further repress its own people, both within and outside its borders. While there has been some recent movement by the United States and United Nations to advance North Korean human rights, more can be done.
Specifically, Washington should ensure that human rights are integrated into a clear North Korea policy, enforce existing legislation like the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, impose additional sanctions on Chinese and Russian companies complicit in abuses, and recruit the private sector to be vigilant against contracting with entities linked to human rights abuses.
The United States, however, can’t be the sole actor in this effort. International partners should be engaged to reinvigorate the North Korean human rights movement, work with civil society on raising the profile of North Korean labor abuses, and use the 10th anniversary of the COI report to assess areas of progress and vulnerability in advancing North Korean human rights.
Download the Executive Summary (PDF)
Read the full report (PDF)
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bushcenter.org · by Learn more about Victor Cha.
4. Deal or no deal? What we know about the Putin-Kim meeting
Excerpts:
Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko also threw himself into the mix this week, saying there could be a three-way alliance among his country, Russia and North Korea.
Summing up all of the developments, Kennedy, of King’s College London, said for Russia, “there’s a bit of embarrassment here.”
“This is not the great alliance of World War II or anything like that,” he said.
But Kennedy noted that the likely deal means Russia could now fight through the winter while it ramps up production at home.
“Anybody who thinks this was going to be over has been hedging their bets,” he said of the war in Ukraine. “You should probably open your eyes and realize that this is going to be a long term thing.”
Deal or no deal? What we know about the Putin-Kim meeting
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4207072-putin-kim-meeting-what-we-know/
BY BRAD DRESS - 09/15/23 5:15 PM ET
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met during a high-stakes meeting in eastern Russia this week, underscoring deep ties and possibly cementing a military support and technology deal the U.S. warns will prolong the war in Ukraine.
While no official announcement was made, Western analysts still expect that North Korea and Russia reached an agreement in which Pyongyang will provide Moscow with artillery shells in return for food and critical technology to power nuclear missiles and satellites.
Greg Kennedy, the director of economic conflict and competition research group at King’s College London, said the lack of a formally announced deal probably has the intention to keep people “uncertain” on the specifications to avoid international scrutiny, especially because it would violate United Nations security resolutions.
“The uncertainty is something they can work with,” Kennedy said. “Without some kind of narrative or some kind of agreement that’s been verified by Western press, then you’re able to tell whatever narrative or whatever story you want around the world. So in different places, different Russian representatives can say different things.”
Kim traveled to the city of Vladivostok in eastern Russia via armored trained at the beginning of this week, making the trip after Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited North Korea in July.
The two leaders met Wednesday and announced that ties remained strong, according to North Korea’s Foreign Ministry. Kim said he supported the strategic interests of Russia and vowed to strengthen relations even further. He even invited Putin to visit North Korea.
Kim also toured the Vostochny Cosmodrome, a major launch center in Russia, as North Korea has struggled to get satellites up into space. Kim is extending his stay in Russia, expected to tour Russia’s Pacific fleet and other facilities in the coming days. North Korea may also seek help with modernizing its navy and air forces.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on Friday said there was no deal signed on military-technical cooperation.
“No agreements were signed on this issue or on other issues and there were no such plans,” he said, according to Russian state-run media outlet Tass.
Details of any forged deal are likely to be revealed over time by Western intelligence officials who are monitoring the situation closely. Sasha Baker, the U.S. acting undersecretary of defense for policy, said the U.S. will “try to identify and expose and counter Russian attempts to acquire military equipment.”
The implications of any deal are high. North Korea, which is still technically at war with South Korea and has robust artillery production, likely has tens of millions of rounds it could deliver to Russia, which is expending high rates of artillery. Any technology provided to North Korea could lead to an emboldened Pyongyang, which has been ramping up nuclear missile testing as tensions rise with South Korea.
The U.S. has warned that North Korea will “pay a price” if the country supports Russia in the war against Ukraine.
Pentagon deputy press secretary Sabrina Singh said on Thursday they were monitoring the situation and “would expect” a deal was made.
“What we’re seeing right now is Russia in quite a desperate mode and seeking support from North Korea,” she told reporters. “Providing any type of ammunition would further continue the war.”
Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko also threw himself into the mix this week, saying there could be a three-way alliance among his country, Russia and North Korea.
Summing up all of the developments, Kennedy, of King’s College London, said for Russia, “there’s a bit of embarrassment here.”
“This is not the great alliance of World War II or anything like that,” he said.
But Kennedy noted that the likely deal means Russia could now fight through the winter while it ramps up production at home.
“Anybody who thinks this was going to be over has been hedging their bets,” he said of the war in Ukraine. “You should probably open your eyes and realize that this is going to be a long term thing.”
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
5. N. Korea's Kim 'deeply impressed' with Russia's modern aviation technology: KCNA
Excerpts:
"Saying that he was deeply impressed by the rich independent potential and modernity of the Russian aircraft manufacturing industry and its ceaseless enterprising efforts toward new goals, he sincerely hoped that the plant would make sustained development by achieving higher production growth in the future," the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
Kim expressed "sincere regard" for Russia's aviation technology undergoing rapid development and "outpacing the outside potential threats," it added.
He also "highly appreciated the officials, scientists, technicians and workers of the plant for making a great contribution to the development of the country's air industry by achieving excellent successes in production with highly advanced technology and strong mental power."
(LEAD) N. Korea's Kim 'deeply impressed' with Russia's modern aviation technology: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 16, 2023
(ATTN: ADDS photo, more info throughout)
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Sept. 16 (Yonhap) -- North Korea leader Kim Jong-un said he was "deeply impressed" with the advanced state of Russian aerospace and aviation technology as he visited an aircraft plant during his ongoing visit to Russia this week, Pyongyang's state media said Saturday.
Following his summit meeting with President Vladimir Putin, Kim visited the Yuri Gagarin Aviation Plant that produces advanced fighter jets including the Sukhoi Su-35 in the far eastern region of Komsomolsk-on-Amur the previous day.
"Saying that he was deeply impressed by the rich independent potential and modernity of the Russian aircraft manufacturing industry and its ceaseless enterprising efforts toward new goals, he sincerely hoped that the plant would make sustained development by achieving higher production growth in the future," the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
Kim expressed "sincere regard" for Russia's aviation technology undergoing rapid development and "outpacing the outside potential threats," it added.
He also "highly appreciated the officials, scientists, technicians and workers of the plant for making a great contribution to the development of the country's air industry by achieving excellent successes in production with highly advanced technology and strong mental power."
Founded in 1934, the aviation plant made a "great contribution to defeating fascism" during the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War by producing various kinds of aircraft, including long-range bombers. Today is the largest Su-type fighter jet manufacturer in Russia, according to KCNA.
Kim was accompanied by the North's top party and military officials, including Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and top advisor Marshal Ri Pyong-chol. Also included in the group were Pak Jong-chon, a leader in the Workers' Party of Korea and Pak Thae-song, an official in charge of space technology.
KCNA said Kim departed for his next destination Friday afternoon. He is expected to travel to Vladivostok and meet Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and have a tour of the Russian Navy's Pacific fleet.
Kim Jong-un meets Putin
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) visit the Vostochny Cosmodrome space launch center in the Russian Far East on Sept. 13, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 16, 2023
6. Is Reunification Still Possible? Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo on Korea
You can listen to the podcast at this link or read the transcript below. https://democracyparadox.com/2023/09/12/is-reunification-still-possible-victor-cha-and-ramon-pacheco-pardo-on-korea/#more-9437
A very good and useful discussion of Korean history before we get to the title question.
Excerpts:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
I think there is in the sense that it is true that South Koreans, especially younger South Koreans, are becoming more skeptical of outright unification like we saw in Germany for example. But of course, there are ways of trying to reunify the countries and South Koreans still have a model of one country, two systems, with freedom of movement. Some others think gradual rapprochement between the two Koreas until we get to reunification. Of course, if there were to be a collapse of the Kim regime, it would probably lead to the absorption of North Korea by South Korea.
But I think more importantly is that even those Koreans, South Koreans, that may be more skeptical of reunification, when the time comes if the choice is between reunification and continuing where we are with North Korea under the patronage of China… And if the Kim regime collapses, for example, China would send in its troops. It’s a scenario that we have to think of to take control of North Korea. I think clearly South Koreans are going to want reunification. I think this matters because we don’t know what the opinions from North Korea are for sure. Of course, in the book, we talk about a survey that CSIS conducted of some North Koreans and it seems that North Koreans would want reunification. I think most experts would agree with this idea.
So even without knowing for sure, because of the opacity of the regime, we assume that North Koreans would at least be okay with reunification. I think that it would happen. It’s also quite interesting to know that when we look at defectors from North Korea to South Korea, younger defectors, those in their teens, in their twenties, find it easier to adapt to South Korea than older ones that are growing up in a completely different system. This is because many of them grew up in the so called jangmadang, which are the markets that we see spread throughout North Korea going back to the 1990s following the famine that we mentioned. So, this is an incipient market system at the very local level, obviously not at the national level, in North Korea.
But they kind of understand how the market should be working and that it’s not the state providing for you. They don’t expect that from the state. So, there are North Koreans who have grown up in this system who would find it easier to adapt to a reunified Korea, which most certainly would be democratic and capitalist than older North Koreans who grew up in a completely different system who may still feel thankful to the Kim family, the cult of personality that Victor mentioned before. That this is still quite important for older North Koreans, but we’ve seen it’s not necessarily the case for younger North Koreans who know that they don’t live in paradise. So that’s why I’m positive that if the time comes, I think reunification would actually happen.
Victor Cha
I would agree, not in the short term though. I would say that there’s always hope that unification will happen. It doesn’t look like it today, certainly in the short term, because the North Korean regime still seems to be fully in control and it’s not like South Korea is going to go communist anytime soon. But a couple of caveats. The first is North Korea is stable up until the day it’s not. In other words, we always talk about how the regime manages to hold on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union despite the collapse of all these Eastern European countries. So, they seem to have a firm grip on power. You know, the day that it collapses, there’ll be a lot of people out there who will say this was inevitable. The writing’s on the wall. I don’t think we can rule out that fact.
The biggest known unknown when it comes to the future of North Korea is the health of the leader. Kim Jong Un is what, 30, 40 something years old and in very poor health. The entire political system is based on him. If he were to go, there is no successor. I mean, he has a younger sister and then he has some very young kids. We just don’t know. I mean, he could keel over a heart attack tomorrow or a stroke just as his father and his grandfather did. So, we just don’t know. This is the first country that we know of where they’ve had a third-generation transition of leadership within the family in a dictatorship like this. Could they possibly pass on to a fourth generation? Sure. It’s possible if there’s a clearly designated leader in line, but right now there certainly doesn’t look like it.
So, I would say that it’s stable up until it’s not and that the biggest known unknown when it comes to the future of North Korea is the health of the leader and he’s not very healthy. The last thing I will say is that I do think that much as everybody would like to see what’s called a soft landing in Korea, that is a well-integrated, long transition period, moving from two countries and two systems to economic cooperation, eventually one country, two systems, and eventually one country, one system. That sort of planned out transition is what everybody would like to see, but I don’t think that’s what will happen in Korea.
The history of Korea is that it goes from one major shock point to the next, whether it’s occupation by the Japanese, liberation, then war, then democratization, the financial crisis which we didn’t talk about in the late 1990s. It has gone from one crisis to another. That is sort of the history of Korea. So, my own view is I think history doesn’t always repeat itself, but it often rhymes as that famous American writer once said. I think that if it does happen in Korea, it will happen suddenly with the collapse of North Korea.
But as we talk about in the very last line of the book, we believe that as chaotic as that might seem, in the end, Korea will persevere. They will survive. They will not just persevere. They will prosper. Because that has been the history of the Korean people, they have faced one hardship after another, one hopeless situation after another. Through grit and perseverance, they have not only survived, but they have prospered.
Is Reunification Still Possible? Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo on Korea - Democracy Paradox
democracyparadox.com · by democracyparadoxblog · September 12, 2023
Victor Cha is a professor of government at Georgetown University and holds the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is a former director for Asian Affairs at the White House National Security Council. Ramon Pacheco Pardo is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at Free University of Brussels. They are the authors of
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North Korea is stable up until the day it’s not… The day that it collapses, there’ll be a lot of people out there who will say this was inevitable.
Victor Cha
Key Highlights
- Introduction – 0:45
- Korea as a People and a Place – 2:25
- Korean War and its Aftermath – 11:44
- Democracy – 23:23
- Is Reconciliation Possible? – 40:55
Podcast Transcript
Last week Kim Jong-Un met with Vladimir Putin to discuss supplying weapons to Russia for its war in Ukraine. It stands in sharp contrast to South Korea whose own defense industry has resupplied armaments of American allies who have devoted their own supplies to Ukraine. It’s yet another reminder of how the two Koreas continue to pursue divergent paths in their politics, economics, and foreign affairs.
Most of us take for granted the division between the North and the South. It’s difficult to imagine a reconciliation between the two and reunification is almost unfathomable. But both North and South Korea continue to believe reunification is not only possible but inevitable. In order to understand whether this was possible, we need to better understand the history and the culture of Korea.
So, I reached out to Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo. They are the authors of a new book called Korea: A New History of South and North. Ramon is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at Free University of Brussels. Victor is a professor of government at Georgetown University and holds the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is a former director for Asian Affairs at the White House National Security Council.
Our conversation touches on the history and culture of Korea. But the question we continue to return involves whether reunification is still possible. It’s a conversation that touches on ideas about democracy, national identity, and international relations.
If you like this episode, please support the show any way you can. Currently, the show is looking for partners or sponsors. I know a lot of organizations want to start their own podcasts, but most find it is harder than it sounds. Rather than starting your own project from scratch, consider becoming a sponsor or partner of Democracy Paradox. If you’re interested, please email me at jkempf@democracyparadox.com. But for now… This is my conversation with Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo…
jmk
Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo, welcome to the Democracy Paradox.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Thanks for having me.
Victor Cha
Thank you for having me.
jmk
Well, Victor and Ramon, it was a very impressive book. It’s the first book that I can recall reading that was really a history of Korea, especially one that combined both the North and the South together. And something that I didn’t realize until I really read your book was that I don’t think that I’ve really thought of Korea as being unified. My entire lifetime they’ve been separate. They’ve been two distinct countries and your book really kind of still thinks of them… I mean, one of the key themes of the book is that you can’t tell the history of the North or the South without telling the history of both of them. So, where I’d like to kind of begin is to just tackle the elephant in the room. Why is it that we should still think of Korea as a single entity or a single country after 70 years of division at this point?
Victor Cha
So, thanks for the question and thanks for having us on the podcast. The first way I would respond is to say that it’s been 70 years of division, as you say, but it’s 70 years out of thousands of years of Korean civilization. It wasn’t that long ago – we’re still talking about within the 20th century – when Korea was unified. It was occupied by another country, but it was unified at the time.
So, our perspective on it was that this 70 years, although it’s been quite significant for each Korea, both North and South in both good and bad ways, is still an aberrant period in the overall history of the country. We thought it was important to talk about the histories of both of them as one. In particular, Ramon did a great job on the chapters from the 1960s onwards, where he told the stories of the two Koreas in dialogue with each other.
jmk
You described the Korean peninsula in the early chapters particularly as valued strategically, but not intrinsically. I thought that was really important to help us understand how that shaped Korea’s early history. Can you explain what that means and how it really shaped how we think about Korea and how Korea developed?
Victor Cha
When we say Korea was valued strategically, but not intrinsically in the late 19th century in the world of balance of power politics that were taking place in East Asia at the time, what we meant is that you had these countries with ambitions, Japan, Imperial, Japan, Russia, China, that were vying for influence over the Korean peninsula, but in many ways they’re vying for influence, not because they valued anything in particular about Korea, as much as they valued it in the sense that they didn’t want the other competing powers to have it. So, that’s what we mean when we say it was valued strategically, not intrinsically.
Japan valued influence over Korea so that China didn’t have a land bridge or a sort of dagger pointed at the heart of Japan, which was the way they often described the Korean peninsula. China wanted to continue to maintain Korea under its empire to avoid allowing Japan to get a foothold on continental Asia. Russia was interested in Korea for similar sorts of reasons. So, the idea was that they weren’t necessarily valuing Korea as we value Korea today for its pop culture, for its cutting-edge technology, for its defense industrial complex. They were valuing Korea at the time largely to keep it out of other people’s hands.
It was the ultimate pawn in great power politics and I think what we do in the later chapters is show that that’s not the way Korea is today. Korea is a very important country. It’s the 10th largest economy in the world. The sixth strongest military in the world, cutting-edge technology, cutting-edge pop culture, these sorts of things make it something that’s valued in and of itself. In many ways, a leader or a trendsetter in these areas.
jmk
So, Ramon, do you feel that Koreans feel that they’re valued intrinsically now, or that their country is valued intrinsically, or is there a little bit of that legacy that’s left over that they still feel a little bit left out as if they’re still just valued strategically rather than for what the country itself can actually do?
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
I think that’s a great question, because it’s something we discuss with Koreans, especially South Koreans, of course. Today, I think there are still some Koreans who don’t understand how their country is perceived overseas. They still think… There is this famous saying in Korea that they’re a shrimp among whales. Some of them still feel this way. That when you have this competition between the big powers, for example, the US and China, that Korea is not at the same level, but also that it’s not being valued. By any of the two in its own terms. But I think more and more Koreans see it differently. I think more and more Koreans, when you talk to them, do realize, certainly when you talk to business people, foreign policymakers, politicians, that their country has been valued for what it can offer and this goes way beyond pop culture.
jmk
Korea is in an interesting neighborhood. It’s next to China, which is the largest country in the world in terms of population, second largest in the world in terms of its economy. It’s also near Japan, which is the third largest country in the world in terms of its economy. It’s sandwiched between two enormous economies, two enormous populations and even though Korea, South Korea is now the 10th largest economy, like you said, it’s still dwarfed by two of its neighbors economically and definitely dwarfed by population by China. Ramon, is there any sense from people in South Korea that having those two large countries near it makes it feel less important geopolitically or does it make them feel more important geopolitically for where it exists in terms of its neighborhood today?
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
I think that the mindset is changing because as we were conducting research for this book and also when talking to Koreans about how they felt in the 70s and the 80s, many of them believe that they would be sandwiched within a high-tech developed Japan and low-cost China, so their economy wouldn’t be able to survive. All the low-cost production would move to China and all the high-tech products would be made in Japan. But we have seen that this is not the case. We have seen now Korean companies competing at the cutting edge, not only with Japanese firms, but also, of course, with American and European firms depending on the sector – semiconductor, electric batteries, green shipping, for example – centers in which Korea is at the cutting edge.
But the pop culture, I think has helped a lot. Koreans have realized that their pop culture is well known globally. They have realized that they’re able to compete at the global level in certain sectors. But I think the lingering fear that the economic rise of China that continues even though it has slowed down with China moving up, the value of the chain, and Japan, of course, is still technologically very advanced, that this could be detrimental to the Korean economy.
So, I think there’s this change in mindset, as I said, but also the lingering fear that who knows in 10, 20, 30 years’ time – Is Korea still going to be able to survive amidst the economic competition between the big two powers in the region, plus, of course, the US at the global level, not only in the region. So, I don’t think there is a single idea about where Korea is in this competition with the two big powers, but I do think that more and more Koreans think that they are able to compete in many different sectors.
jmk
So, Victor, I want to take us backwards to go back into history once again and I want to revisit that quote where we began: the idea of Korea being valued strategically, but not intrinsically. I think that there’s no better example of Korea being valued strategically than the United States getting involved in the Korean War. The way that you portrayed in the book, the United States didn’t see Korea as important in and of itself. It saw it as just a chess piece in its conflict, its Cold War conflict, with the Soviet Union. Can you help us understand better why Korea was so important for the United States to get involved in or why it thought it was important to get involved in the Korean War in the fifties?
Victor Cha
So, I think for listeners, the best way to understand this is that North Korea invaded South Korea in June of 1950. As of December of 1949, so literally only six months earlier, the United States had made a decision about how it was going to treat Korea, which was essentially to disengage from Korea. The decision was made by George Kennan and others that the US position after World War II in Asia would be focused largely on maritime Asia because they needed to contain Soviet force projection capabilities from the land via sea and via the air. The best way to do that would be with some sort of maritime orientation of allies that included Japan as the centerpiece with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines and possibly Indonesia.
So, for this reason, two particular territories were not included: the Korean Peninsula, South Korea, and Formosa or Taiwan at the time. These were decisions made by Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and others. They were institutionalized in an NSC memo in December of 1949. What’s astounding about the Korean War and the North Korean invasion is within a period of a couple of weeks, the United States basically completely reversed their strategic policy when it came to Asia. They became fully engaged on the Korean peninsula. They devoted massive amounts of resources and troops to fighting a war in Korea even though the main concern was Europe and they were also basically completely changed their relationship with the newly communist China by interposing the seventh fleet in the Taiwan Straits and signing a defense treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of Taiwan.
So, these are major changes in US policy that were driven by a North Korean invasion of South Korea at a time when the United States had said we really see no interest in the Korean Peninsula. Their interest in the Korean Peninsula, again, was largely strategic. It was not intrinsic. They saw this, as Truman said, as the first ripple of communist waves that would eventually show up on US shores. They fully believed at the time in something called the domino theory which was that if you let one of these small countries fall to communism, they will all start to fall one by one.
So, what they saw was first, of course, China going communist in 1949. Then they saw this effort at turning all of Korea communist. All of a sudden, Korea became a very important central piece in the Cold War puzzle in Asia that caused the United States to devote tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars again, largely for the strategic value of Korea, not necessarily the intrinsic value of Korea.
jmk
Looking back on it, do you think that that was the right decision? I mean, at the time it was incredibly controversial and remained controversial for years. Do you think that we made the right decision, especially as we look at how South Korea has developed and really been one of the stars in Asia?
Victor Cha
Oh, yeah, sure. I think so. I mean, if the US had not intervened in June of 1950, all of Korea would be under communist rule right now. There’s no denying that. The South Koreans were underdeveloped, underprepared. The North Koreans had the support of China, Mao, and they also had a lot of support, material support and air support from the Soviet Union. There was no way Korea could have survived on its own. So, we would be talking about a peninsula that would be entirely communist at this point, which would probably have had an effect on the security of the region, including Japan, Taiwan, and others.
That would have been the choice versus having, again, one of the most prosperous democracies, certainly in East Asia, if not the world that is at the leading edge of biotech, artificial intelligence, quantum computing. Things where they are partners now with the United States and Japan, not junior partners, but equal partners, and then of course, in terms of pop culture and music. Korea is a trendsetter now. It was entirely the right choice to make.
For me, I think, and I still teach it this way, South Korea is an example of why the Cold War was fought. It’s often remembered in the United States as a so-called forgotten war, because in the end it was a stalemate. The dividing line between the two Koreas didn’t change. But in the end, the success of South Korea across every spectrum that you can imagine. That’s the living example of why we fought the cold war.
jmk
You mentioned that North Korea had the support of the Russians and had the support of the Chinese, but you also mentioned in the book something that I did not realize, which was North Korea was actually much more industrialized than the South and had a huge economic head start. So, in many ways, North Korea already had just an advantage economically, industrially to be able to attack South Korea. Can you explain a little bit about the economic advantages that the North had over the South?
Victor Cha
I mean, the thing the listeners have to remember is that we’re talking about the period before the Korean war, the period of the war, and the period after the war, when we’re talking about the relative economic development of the two Koreas. In the period before the war, during the Japanese occupation, the Japanese colonizers put all of the industry in the North because that is where all the mineral deposits geographically on the Korean peninsula are located – rich in coal, nickel, iron ore, all sorts of minerals. So, the Japanese built all of that industry in the North and the South was largely the rice basket or bread basket of the country such that after the Japanese left the Korean peninsula the northern portion of the Korean peninsula was very developed in terms of infrastructure, industry, telecommunications, road infrastructure, that put them in a very strong position.
The war came, of course, and that advantage was completely destroyed, because the United States and UN forces basically carpet-bombed North Korea to the point where there was nothing left to bomb. Targeters actually ran out of targets in North Korea because they had basically completely leveled the country. But after the war, both the Chinese and the Soviets put a lot of effort and help into rebuilding North Korea. Again, relatively more than what the United States was doing at the time. The United States was providing some assistance, but certainly not on the level that the North Koreans were receiving from the Chinese and the Soviet Union, which allowed the North Korean economy to develop and be actually, by most metrics, doing better than the South Korean economy up through the 1970s.
But then we see the gap widening as South Korea begins to develop first an import substitution economy, then an export-oriented economy. They start to develop such that by the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the trend lines are very clear where South Korea is now taking off economically and North Korea is starting to stagnate and eventually decline.
jmk
It’s shocking that it’s that late in the history that we’re talking about, the 70s and 80s, before we see this split between the North and the South economically. Ramon, can you talk a little bit more about why the South overtook the North economically? I mean, is it really just as simple as the North was communist and had bad economic policies and the South embraced capitalism? Is it that simple or is there something more to the story?
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
The truth is that simple to an extent. In the sense that by the 1970s, the North Korean economic model was exhausted. Not only the North Korean one, of course, the main patrons were China and the Soviet Union and we saw by the 1980s that the Soviet model was also exhausted. China, of course, looked to grow and started to open up late 1970s. But in the case of South Korea, it did embrace capitalism. Of course, with a degree of state interventionism that continues to this day. It obviously had access to the US Market and US Capital as Victor said, in the 1950s.
Maybe US economic support was not as strong as Soviet support and Chinese support was for North Korea, but later on, more American capital started to come into the country, also Japanese capital after the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan in the 1960s. South Korea started to be able to export to the US market, which was open to certain allies and partners. It was also able to start exporting to Japan and to Western Europe. The use of factories were open in South Korea to firms from these countries. But it has to be said from the beginning, at the same time, South Korean leaders, political leaders, business leaders, were very clear that they had to be able to compete with firms from other countries. It wasn’t enough to be the factory of the Western world, so to speak, and producing cheap goods.
That’s why you saw, as I mentioned before, this state interventionism. This idea that you need to have a long term economic plan that would allow Korean firms to move up the value of the chain, that would be able to move beyond textiles and shoes and later on moving to sectors such as steel, for example, later on moving into what we see today, semiconductors, for example, electronics as well and all these sectors that Korea is well known for today. But it is true that it was a very capitalist model. There was competition. There was protectionism within the country. But the country also opened up to competition from foreign firms in a way that North Korea never did. Also, Korean firms were encouraged to export.
The idea was, okay, if you export to other countries, you will have to compete to an extent that consumers in these countries will want to buy your products not only because they’re cheap, but at some point, because they are good and they can compete with local products. That’s what Korea was able to do. So, going back to your question, you can maybe oversimplify, but say it was a question of capitalism in this case. It was better than communism and it actually worked for South Korea when it came to a competition with North Korea.
jmk
So, along with economic differences between North and South, there are obvious political differences between the two. However, for the first few decades. South Korea was mostly a dictatorship, although there was a false start in terms of democracy within those years, Victor, why did democracy not take root in South Korea in its early years?
Victor Cha
So, technically South Korea in those early years was a constitutional democracy. The constitution itself set out democratic principles. There were elections. But the problem was the practice of democracy was not well practiced. Elections were often corrupt, power grabs, or the desire to continue to stay in power by two of the longest leaders in these early years in South Korea, Syngman Rhee and then Park Chung Hee. The words were about democracy and the documents even talked about democracy, but democracy was not practiced. This was different from North Korea where very clearly they were an autocratic dictatorship from the start. There may have been voting that took place in North Korea and the Supreme People’s Assembly, but everybody knew what the outcome would be.
The political competition that took place in the South under this framework of democracy was also open to a lot of corruption and other sorts of things to try to win that political competition, even cheating to win that political competition. So, in the end, the practice was not democratic, but the institutional framework tried to remain democratic. But also, when we talk about these early years being nondemocratic, we also have to remember the political turmoil that took place in Korea during these early years. It was about the most forthright demonstration of democracy that you can imagine.
The protests by students, by labor leaders, by other social leaders was democracy in practice. People protested what they saw as corrupt election results or corrupt behavior on the part of the government or the corrupt use of development assistance that was being provided by the United States to Korea. The way that political opposition politicians and grassroots protest movements emerged was the epitome of the practice of democracy in Korea. Of course, it led to the political turmoil that was South Korean politics in these early years. But that was democracy in action, if you will.
jmk
China often makes the case that democracy doesn’t work for its country because it has Confucian values. Korea is a country that I would assume would also have Confucian values, but has adopted democracy and has flourished democratically. You’ve just explained that part of the reason why it’s flourished democratically today is because it has a history of adopting democracy culturally, even before it formally democratized later on. Can you explain a little bit about how Korean culture is able to accept and embrace democratic values?
Victor Cha
So yes, there is an argument that’s been out there that some different thought leaders have put forward about how Confucian values and Western democratic norms do not go well together and that the best way that Confucian Asian societies manage the notion of democracy is not through Western liberal democratic principles, but through the notion of good governance where the social goods that are provided to society are provided by the government.
But at the same time, the society is willing to give up some values or a sense of the collective as opposed to the individual. The Korean example shows that we should not simply accept that particular argument about discounting the value or the application of Western liberal democracy to Confucian societies like Korea. First of all, Korea is about the most Confucian society in all of Asia. I think Ramon would agree. There was a time in Korea’s history when they were part of the Chinese tributary system. The saying was that they were more Confucian than Confucius. They were more Confucian than the Chinese in terms of their support and respect for Confucian principles. I think that’s true. If you look at family hierarchy and the ways social mores exist, there’s that element.
But I would say the other thing about Korean culture is that in addition to being Confucian, it is deeply, deeply egalitarian in the sense that no Korean thinks another Korean is better than they are. So, you could be the guy working on the construction site and you could be the conglomerate Chaebol businessman and that construction worker doesn’t think he’s any different from that Chaebol. There’s a deep egalitarian streak, even in Korean Confucian society, that I think helps explain the willingness to stand up and protest, not accepting that they should accept what the political elite or the business elite tell them. There’s a willingness to stand up and stand up for rights.
Again, people describe the 60s and 70s as a period of Korean dictatorship and illiberal politics. But the turmoil that we saw in Korea at this time, to me, again, was a demonstration of democratic principles in practice. I mean, you look at North Korea. There was illiberal politics in North Korea, but you didn’t see any demonstrations. There was nobody out there in the street or opposition politicians out there demonstrating and leading rallies against the government. You didn’t see that in North Korea. So that’s truly illiberal. What we saw in Korea was deep strains of egalitarianism in the context of a Confucian society that was expressed in these democratic principles and this contestation for political power in Korea that was very turbulent in the 60s and 70s.
jmk
So, Ramon, does the South Korean experience then demonstrate that democratic principles are really universal or universal values, if you will?
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
So, yes, I do think that there’s a truth to what you say. That there’s this argument that authoritarian leaders make in different parts of the world that democracy is something from over there, from the West, from the US, Western Europe. Then we have seen how this is not the case. I think it’s quite interesting f you talk to younger South Koreans, what they feel most proud of is not the economic development of the country or the international culture of the country, it is the democratization process that took place within the country, how this has been uprooted, but also how they’re able to make their leaders accountable through demonstrations more often than not. How they’re able to have influence, not only politically, but also with business leaders.
This idea that you are not better than me and if you’re not doing your work properly, we’re going to come out. We’re going to demonstrate. Then we’re going to make our displeasure with your behavior known. Again, this is replicated in other countries. My own home country, Spain, has a strong protest culture as well. It’s the same feeling that if the leader is not doing their job properly, then you’re not going to wait for the next election. You are going to go out to the street and let them know.
jmk
So, Ramon, why don’t we just take a second and give the account of how South Korea became a democracy. Can you give the short version of that story?
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Yes. I’ll shorten it, as you say. In 1979 Park Chung Hee passes away and we see many South Koreans felt that maybe the time for democracy had come. He had helped to propel economic development, but the time for democracy had come. There was talk in Korea with the so called Seoul Spring in parallel with the Prague Spring in the Czech Republic. They said they were going to push for democracy. But then you have Chun Doo-hwan, the leader who replaced Park very quickly. He held a coup and he was able to rule as a dictator. In 1987, he promised that he wouldn’t stand for reelection in 1987. Normally, there had been elections to the National Assembly during this period of time. He had said after 1987, my seven-year rule is over. I’m not going to run for election again.
But then it looked like he was preparing Roh Tae-woo, who was one of his lieutenants, to take over without a direct election. The protests we had seen throughout the 1980s, going all the way back to the moment when Chun Doo-hwan had his coup, by 1987 became a daily, constant occurrence. So, every day the labor movement that Victor mentioned, we also had the student movement, of course, the feminist movement joined in, because by the 1980s you start to the feminist movement in South Korea becoming more politically important. You also see normal white collar workers, who in the past may have been more reluctant to join the protests, who would go to their office and then afterwards they would come out and join the protest as well.
So, it became this movement that essentially became impossible to stop for the regime. A couple of students, one of them was tortured and then killed, another one was shot with a tear gas bomb and he passed away as well. So, this helped even further rally South Koreans to say, ‘Okay, this cannot stand anymore.’ So, basically, the government, through Roh Tae-woo, who gave a famous speech in the summer of 1997, had to admit that democracy was the way to go and there were elections in December 1997.
Very quickly, democracy took hold in South Korea, because in other countries, we know after democracy, there were coup attempts and there were doubts about whether democracy would survive. Of course, in South Korea itself, there were questions about it, but very quickly took hold throughout 1997-98. Then we saw how elections have been taking place ever since and there has been no coup attempt in South Korean history.
jmk
So, Victor, the story that I’m hearing about democratization in South Korea is that the South Korean people played a very important role in making sure that its country followed through and became a democracy. Why is it that the North didn’t have a similar moment? Because I would think that North Koreans come from a similar culture. I mean, again, these are Koreans just on the other side of the border. Why is it that there hasn’t been a moment that they’ve tried to take their country back?
Victor Cha
So I think, as Ramon said, there was a political moment in Korea where the people thought that they wanted democracy. That they did not want any more illiberal political practices. But I think that political moment also coincided with a long-term trend of economic development and growing affluence among the Korean people where the traditional priority of fast-growing economies based on the producer and producer rights at the expense of consumer rights changed where Korea became big enough and became economically developed enough that the focus then became not just what’s good for the companies, but what’s good for the consumer, what’s good for the people.
So, I think it’s a combination of both the political moment as well as the economic development that created a more affluent middle class that thought about rights that they deserved as consumers, both political and economic consumers, and not just what was good for company, the state and big business. Which was what was prioritized in the double-digit economic growth we saw in Korea in the seventies and into the mid-eighties. Why doesn’t that happen in North Korea? Well, for one, there isn’t economic growth in North Korea and if there is economic growth, all the benefits were going to the state. They weren’t going to the people. In addition, North Korea didn’t have a patron ally as the South Koreans did that was quietly very supportive of individual rights, free and fair elections, and the promotion of democracy.
What is so interesting about the story of democracy in South Korea and the transition that took place in 1987 is that the United States was fully supportive of it, but it played a very subtle but significant role in preventing the imposition of martial law by the incumbent government at the time. The incumbent government had to make a choice with all these demonstrations that were raging nationwide. That, as Ramon said, were not simply the traditional radical students and radical labor. These are middle-class white-collar workers, gender rights activists, doctors and nurses, professors that were all out there on the streets protesting. The role that the United States played was quiet, but significant in saying whatever happens in South Korea there should not be any violence, which essentially was not the imposition of martial law.
That, I think, played a very important role in the incumbent government’s decision not to roll tanks through the streets like the Chinese did in Tiananmen Square. North Korea didn’t have any sort of patron ally like that that was supportive of democracy and democratic principles and free and fair elections and things of that nature. On the contrary, its two patrons, the Soviet Union and China, if anything, were patrons that were anathema to those sorts of ideas. So, that’s why I think we see it develop in South Korea, but we don’t see it develop in North Korea. Of course, it has to do with political evolution, but it also has to do with economic development and the role that the patron ally played.
Korea in many ways was one of the key models for this notion of democratic development in the East Asian economies where you see economic growth first that then precedes the demand for political rights by a growing middle class that then leads to democratic transition. As Ramon knows well, there are theories of international relations and democracy that are developed based on what we saw in places like Korea and Taiwan.
jmk
1987 is an interesting year because it’s a couple of years into Mikhail Gorbachev’s term. He came to power in 1985 and he institutes Glasnost and Perestroika. I think technically those came into force after ‘87, or really kind of picked up steam after ‘87. But just four years after South Korea democratizes, the Soviet Union collapses and you have what many people thought was going to be a democratic Russia coming to power. What was really the impact on North Korea? I mean, I don’t get the impression that there were any demands to be able to democratize or really any demands within North Korea to be able to bring an end to the North Korean state. Was there any effort to be able to fight back against the Kim dynasty during that period?
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Not that we know of, actually. So, North Korea is very opaque, as we all know, not only today, but also back then. But from what we know, there was no real movement to try to change the regime, even in the 1990s when we see the death of Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea who North Koreans really supported as their leader, were really thankful to for creating the country and the view of prosperity, especially until the 1970s, early 1980s, at least. Even during that period of time when he’s in the process of being replaced by his son, Kim Jong Il and when North Korea is going through the so called Arduous March or Great Famine when hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of North Koreans perish because of malnourishment, the patron states stopped providing energy, stopped providing food…
We’re talking about the Soviet Union after they disintegrated, China as well. We see this period of real hardship in North Korea, but there are no accounts of a move to get rid of the political, in this case, the Kim family, even during this period of time. So, from what we know in North Korean history, there hasn’t been a mass movement, a citizen movement, trying to push for democracy. There have been back in the 50s and the 60s, attempts within the party to maybe try to remove the Kim family from power – unsuccessful and fairly easily stopped back then by Kim Il Sung. So, there hasn’t been this type of movement and other than the reasons that Victor mentioned, I think the domestic level of repression that you have in North Korea is almost unparalleled in contemporary history or world history.
jmk
So, Victor, just a few years ago, the Trump administration was trying to negotiate with North Korea and we’ve seen multiple administrations try to negotiate with North Korea. Every single one of them has really failed. I think that’s really a big problem when we start thinking about whether there is any opportunity to be able to unify the North and South. The fact is we can’t even negotiate with the North. Do you think that there’s any hope to negotiate with North Korea in the near future?
Victor Cha
There’s always hope, I would say. Of all the possible paths for negotiation with North Korea, the one that is the most often attempted is the notion of trying to set aside some of the security issues and focus on inter-Korean economic cooperation, different ideas and projects to marry up South Korean capital and technology with North Korean cheap and illiterate labor. The idea being that practical economic cooperation is politically neutral. That’s in quotation marks. That trust could then be built through the mutually beneficial economic cooperation that could then potentially lead to other forms of security, tension reduction, political compromise, things of that nature. That is the view that has been put forward by different political groups and others that express inter-Korean rapprochement as the priority for South Korean national security.
But it has not been successful thus far. It doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t keep being tried, but it has not been successful thus far. My own view on this is I don’t think there is really a chance to have any sort of meaningful negotiation with North Korea along those lines until the Kim family regime is no longer in North Korea. That is because the Kim family regime is not just a political dictatorship, it is a cult of personality, a totalitarian system in which the most important thing that matters for the leadership is the political rule of the family. When that’s the case, it makes it very hard for the government of North Korea to make rational economic decisions or rational economic choices.
They make the choices that make the most sense for the family and for the continued leadership of the family and the elite. Not necessarily the decisions that are in the best economic interests of the country. People always ask, ‘Well, if China could economically modernize under Deng Xiaoping, why can’t the North Koreans do the same thing?’ The answer very clearly is that there is no Deng Xiaoping in North Korea and for the Chinese, the choice was between economically modernizing or dying, literally dying as a nation. In North Korea’s case, if they don’t economically modernize, they suffer, but at the same time, they will not die. Because going back to the very beginning of our discussion, there is a country out there that will make sure that it doesn’t die and that is China, because China values North Korea strategically.
They do not want the North Korean buffer between South Korea and the United States and Japan to disappear. If there is unification of the Korean Peninsula, China now has a democracy that is most likely a US military ally directly on its border. For that reason, China will never let North Korea die. North Korea doesn’t face the same choices that Deng Xiaoping faced in the late 1980s. So, to go back to the original point I think this idea of trying to negotiate with North Korea, eventually using the economic lever as the way to get the foot in the door. It’s a viable strategy, but it’s not one that’s going to work with the Kim family still in power.
If this family were eventually to be removed from power and North Korea had its own version of Park Chung Hee, what I mean by that is a military dictator as a leader. Still a dictator, still illiberal in a liberal system, but a military dictator, then I think there’s a better chance of having that sort of conversation than when the family is in power.
Park Chung Hee, the military dictator in the 1970s in South Korea who ruled over some of the most politically repressive years of South Korea’s government, could make rational economic decisions, such as normalizing relations with Japan so that he could get access to heavy industry, chemical industry, low interest loans to build a South Korean economy, ship building, car building, all this sort of stuff that got the Korean economic miracle started. That was a rational economic decision made by a military dictator. That’s what North Korea needs right now and it’s not going to happen with the Kim family in power.
jmk
So, I’d like to be able to bring the conversation back to the original question, which was about unification of North and South Korea. Victor just laid out a number of reasons why it’s not going to happen in the near future. One of them was it cannot happen so long as the Kim family is in power. China is going to fight tooth and nail against reunification between the North and the South and that doesn’t even touch on the fact that there’s an enormous economic divide between these countries and possibly just a cultural divide at this point, political, cultural divide at this point between how they would even relate within a democratic Korea that unified the North and the South. So, I’d like to bring this back to the idea of whether there’s still hope for unification between North and South Korea.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
I think there is in the sense that it is true that South Koreans, especially younger South Koreans, are becoming more skeptical of outright unification like we saw in Germany for example. But of course, there are ways of trying to reunify the countries and South Koreans still have a model of one country, two systems, with freedom of movement. Some others think gradual rapprochement between the two Koreas until we get to reunification. Of course, if there were to be a collapse of the Kim regime, it would probably lead to the absorption of North Korea by South Korea.
But I think more importantly is that even those Koreans, South Koreans, that may be more skeptical of reunification, when the time comes if the choice is between reunification and continuing where we are with North Korea under the patronage of China… And if the Kim regime collapses, for example, China would send in its troops. It’s a scenario that we have to think of to take control of North Korea. I think clearly South Koreans are going to want reunification. I think this matters because we don’t know what the opinions from North Korea are for sure. Of course, in the book, we talk about a survey that CSIS conducted of some North Koreans and it seems that North Koreans would want reunification. I think most experts would agree with this idea.
So even without knowing for sure, because of the opacity of the regime, we assume that North Koreans would at least be okay with reunification. I think that it would happen. It’s also quite interesting to know that when we look at defectors from North Korea to South Korea, younger defectors, those in their teens, in their twenties, find it easier to adapt to South Korea than older ones that are growing up in a completely different system. This is because many of them grew up in the so called jangmadang, which are the markets that we see spread throughout North Korea going back to the 1990s following the famine that we mentioned. So, this is an incipient market system at the very local level, obviously not at the national level, in North Korea.
But they kind of understand how the market should be working and that it’s not the state providing for you. They don’t expect that from the state. So, there are North Koreans who have grown up in this system who would find it easier to adapt to a reunified Korea, which most certainly would be democratic and capitalist than older North Koreans who grew up in a completely different system who may still feel thankful to the Kim family, the cult of personality that Victor mentioned before. That this is still quite important for older North Koreans, but we’ve seen it’s not necessarily the case for younger North Koreans who know that they don’t live in paradise. So that’s why I’m positive that if the time comes, I think reunification would actually happen.
Victor Cha
I would agree, not in the short term though. I would say that there’s always hope that unification will happen. It doesn’t look like it today, certainly in the short term, because the North Korean regime still seems to be fully in control and it’s not like South Korea is going to go communist anytime soon. But a couple of caveats. The first is North Korea is stable up until the day it’s not. In other words, we always talk about how the regime manages to hold on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union despite the collapse of all these Eastern European countries. So, they seem to have a firm grip on power. You know, the day that it collapses, there’ll be a lot of people out there who will say this was inevitable. The writing’s on the wall. I don’t think we can rule out that fact.
The biggest known unknown when it comes to the future of North Korea is the health of the leader. Kim Jong Un is what, 30, 40 something years old and in very poor health. The entire political system is based on him. If he were to go, there is no successor. I mean, he has a younger sister and then he has some very young kids. We just don’t know. I mean, he could keel over a heart attack tomorrow or a stroke just as his father and his grandfather did. So, we just don’t know. This is the first country that we know of where they’ve had a third-generation transition of leadership within the family in a dictatorship like this. Could they possibly pass on to a fourth generation? Sure. It’s possible if there’s a clearly designated leader in line, but right now there certainly doesn’t look like it.
So, I would say that it’s stable up until it’s not and that the biggest known unknown when it comes to the future of North Korea is the health of the leader and he’s not very healthy. The last thing I will say is that I do think that much as everybody would like to see what’s called a soft landing in Korea, that is a well-integrated, long transition period, moving from two countries and two systems to economic cooperation, eventually one country, two systems, and eventually one country, one system. That sort of planned out transition is what everybody would like to see, but I don’t think that’s what will happen in Korea.
The history of Korea is that it goes from one major shock point to the next, whether it’s occupation by the Japanese, liberation, then war, then democratization, the financial crisis which we didn’t talk about in the late 1990s. It has gone from one crisis to another. That is sort of the history of Korea. So, my own view is I think history doesn’t always repeat itself, but it often rhymes as that famous American writer once said. I think that if it does happen in Korea, it will happen suddenly with the collapse of North Korea.
But as we talk about in the very last line of the book, we believe that as chaotic as that might seem, in the end, Korea will persevere. They will survive. They will not just persevere. They will prosper. Because that has been the history of the Korean people, they have faced one hardship after another, one hopeless situation after another. Through grit and perseverance, they have not only survived, but they have prospered.
jmk
Well, Victor and Ramon, thank you so much for joining me today. It’s a great book. In fact, I didn’t realize how much I needed to read a book like this because it really taught me how much more I needed to learn about Korea. So, it’s called Korea: A New History of South and North. Thank you so much for writing it. Thank you so much for joining me today.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Thanks for having us.
Victor Cha
Yeah, thanks so much for having us on the podcast. We really enjoyed it and we’re glad you enjoyed the book and we hope your listeners will read it too.
Key Links
Korea: A New History of South and North by Victor Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Victor Cha at the Center for Strategic & International Studies
Ramon Pacheco Pardo at King’s College London
Democracy Paradox Podcast
Deng Xiaoping is Not Who You Think He is. Joseph Torigian on Leadership Transitions in China and the Soviet Union
Hal Brands Thinks China is a Declining Power… Here’s Why that’s a Problem
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democracyparadox.com · by democracyparadoxblog · September 12, 2023
7. Yoon says N.K.-Russia military cooperation 'illegal, unjust': interview
But not unexpected. The failed leaders need each other.
Yoon says N.K.-Russia military cooperation 'illegal, unjust': interview | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · September 17, 2023
By Kang Jae-eun
SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said in an interview published Sunday that military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is "illegal and unjust" and the international community will unite more tightly against it.
Yoon made the remark in a written interview with the Associated Press, a day before he heads to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly amid concern about deepening military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow after a summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"Military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is illegal and unjust as it contravenes U.N. Security Council resolutions and various other international sanctions," Yoon was quoted as saying. "The international community will unite more tightly in response to such a move."
Yoon also warned that the North will face "the end of the regime" if it attempts to use nuclear weapons.
"Our two countries (South Korea and the United States) reaffirmed that any nuclear attack by North Korea will be met with a swift, overwhelming and decisive response that will bring about the end of the regime," he was quoted as saying.
Yoon said the U.S. "extended deterrence," which calls for using the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, "will develop into a joint system in which both countries discuss, decide and act together."
"We will also enhance the ability to deter and respond to any nuclear or missile threat from North Korea," he said.
Yoon also rejected the notion that South Korea's relations with China could be hurt amid closer security cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo, saying the trilateral cooperation "harbors no intention of marginalizing any particular nation or establishing an exclusive coalition."
"All three countries -- the Republic of Korea, the United States and Japan -- share a common understanding that it is important for China to play a responsible and constructive role not only in resolving pending issues on the Korean Peninsula and in the region but also in addressing global challenges," Yoon said in the interview.
President Yoon Suk Yeol is seen giving an address at the U.N. General Assembly in New York in this file photo taken Sept. 20, 2022, local time. (Yonhap)
fairydust@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kang Jae-eun · September 17, 2023
8. Russia unlikely to provide high-level arms tech to North Korea
Wishful thinking?
Not all press and pundits are fearful.
Excerpts:
"From Russia's perspective, benefits from relations with North Korea are limited to ammunitions and artillery shells for the war in Ukraine," Jeong said, adding that Moscow will continue looking for other routes to receive conventional weapons rather than relying solely on Pyongyang.
South Korea's Ministry of Unification shared a similar analysis.
"The question is, what else can Russia expect from North Korea beyond acquiring artillery shells? In that context, there may be limitations to Russia's support for advanced military technology to North Korea," a senior ministry official told reporters, Thursday.
The official added that Russia would consider its relations with South Korea more important than that with the North in the long term, saying that the South Korean government will continue to monitor the developments in North Korea-Russia ties.
Russia unlikely to provide high-level arms tech to North Korea
The Korea Times · by 2023-09-17 16:53 | North Korea · September 17, 2023
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un waves as he boards his private train bound to Pyongyang from Primorsky-1 railway station in Artyom, 40 kilometers northeast of Vladivostok, Sunday. Tass-Yonhap
Kim Jong-un wraps up six-day trip to Russia
By Lee Hyo-jin
The recent burgeoning military cooperation between North Korea and Russia has sparked concerns about the potential transfer of nuclear weapons technologies from Moscow to Pyongyang, but that is unlikely to happen, according to analysts, Sunday.
Later in the day, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un departed from the Russian Far East city of Artyom, completing his six-day visit to Russia, during which the two nations vowed to bolster partnerships focusing on military cooperation.
A bulletproof train carrying Kim at the Primorsky-1 railway station was seen off by an honor guard of the Eastern Military District and the military band of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, according to Russia's state-run Tass news agency.
Since entering Russia last Tuesday for his first trip abroad in more than four years, Kim had met Russian President Vladimir Putin and visited key military and technology sites.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is given a tour around Russia's strategic bombers and other warplanes by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, second from left, and other Russian officials in Vladivostok, Saturday, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency, Sunday. Yonhap
"I think there may be some cooperation on space programs and lower-level military kinds of exchanges and assistance. I do wonder though, how much sensitive technology Putin is willing to give to North Korea," Terence Roehrig, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, told The Korea Times, Sunday.
Although a much-heralded summit between North Korean leader Kim and Putin was held on Wednesday, North Korea still remains a question mark for Russia, Roehrig said.
"This is a short-term kind of relationship, which may not develop that deep, because what do the North Koreans have to offer the Russians?" he said.
The professor anticipates that some possible technological cooperation could be made concerning the modernization of North Korea's Navy and Air Force to some degree, focusing primarily on improving what North Korea already has.
On Saturday, Kim inspected Russia's key nuclear weapons including nuclear-capable bombers, hypersonic missiles and warships at the Knevichi airfield in Vladivostok, according to Pyongyang's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), as the North Korean leader continued his multi-day visit to the Russian Far East region since arriving there on Tuesday morning last week.
Later in the day, Kim was given a tour around Russia's Pacific Sea Fleet equipped with strategic nuclear submarines guided by Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
These tours around key elements of Russia's nuclear force, however, do not necessarily indicate that Russia will share its nuclear-related technologies with North Korea, said Jeong Jae-won, a professor of Eurasian studies at Kookmin University.
"Such a move would not only be a violation of the international non-proliferation treaty, but it would also spark a backlash from China," he said. "And arming its neighboring country with advanced nuclear weapons isn't something Russia would really want, given that it can be risky for Russia as well in the long term."
Neither Russia nor North Korea have shared details of Wednesday's summit, with no joint statements or agreements issued following the meeting.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attends a show at the dolphinarium of the Primorsky Aquarium on Vladivostok's Russky Island, Sunday. Tass-Yonhap
"Although it is highly rare for the Russian government not to release any official statements following a summit, it wasn't so surprising considering that the summit was focused on weapons trade," Jeong said.
Details on specifically which weapons technologies and information Russia will offer to North Korea may still be in the discussion stage, and will likely be decided in the coming weeks during the Russian foreign minister's envisaged trip to Pyongyang, according to the professor.
"The absence of documents means that arms trade will take place below the surface, but at the same time, it also suggests that Russia may not keep its promise about the transfer of weapons technology," Jeong said.
Jeong also said that Putin did not spare as much of his time as expected for his meeting with Kim than expected, indicating that Russia's relations with North Korea may not be a top priority for the Russian leader. After the summit and dinner, which lasted about four hours on Wednesday, Putin returned to Moscow, while Kim continued his visit in the region.
"From Russia's perspective, benefits from relations with North Korea are limited to ammunitions and artillery shells for the war in Ukraine," Jeong said, adding that Moscow will continue looking for other routes to receive conventional weapons rather than relying solely on Pyongyang.
South Korea's Ministry of Unification shared a similar analysis.
"The question is, what else can Russia expect from North Korea beyond acquiring artillery shells? In that context, there may be limitations to Russia's support for advanced military technology to North Korea," a senior ministry official told reporters, Thursday.
The official added that Russia would consider its relations with South Korea more important than that with the North in the long term, saying that the South Korean government will continue to monitor the developments in North Korea-Russia ties.
The Korea Times · by 2023-09-17 16:53 | North Korea · September 17, 2023
9. The public face of China's military under corruption probe
The public face of China's military under corruption probe
Reuters · by Greg Torode
BEIJING, Sept 16 (Reuters) - General Li Shangfu, a veteran of China's military modernisation drive, rose through the ranks to become defence minister this year. Within six months, he disappeared under the cloud of a corruption probe.
Li grew to prominence under President Xi Jinping's pursuit of military might during his decade in power while China's relations with the United States soured over issues including Taiwan, the democratically governed island that Beijing claims.
But part of Xi's drive to improve his fighting force has been to stamp out corruption that has long plagued China's military and other state institutions.
A leader China's space and cyber warfare development and then head of military procurement, Li, 65, was elevated to defence minister in March.
After he disappeared from public view last month and missed meetings, including with at least once foreign counterpart, Reuters reported on Friday that Li was under investigation in a broad probe over procurement of military equipment.
Reuters could not ascertain what purchases were under scrutiny. China's defence ministry did not respond to a request for comment. The foreign ministry's spokeswoman told reporters on Friday she was not aware of the situation.
While his post as defence minister is viewed as largely diplomatic and ceremonial, Li is one of China's five state councillors, a cabinet position that outranks other ministers.
He also has a more public role than others on the Central Military Commission, China's top defence body, commanded by Xi. His relations with the United States, which sanctioned Li in 2018 for buying weapons from Russia, have defined his spell in the role.
SANCTIONS OR DIALOGUE
Li's tenure began as Washington was pushing to restore military dialogue and communications that Beijing froze in reaction to a visit last year to Taiwan by the then-speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi.
Chinese officials have repeatedly said the U.S. should drop sanctions on Li if it wants to resume high-level military communications - a risky dynamic as Washington and Beijing spar over issues ranging from trade to Taiwan.
Beijing in June declined a U.S. request for a meeting with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at a high-profile annual security forum in Singapore. Their encounter ended with a handshake.
At the forum, Li warned that conflict with the U.S. would be an "unbearable disaster" but that China sought dialogue over confrontation.
In mid-August, he met high-ranking officials in Russia and Belarus, a show of support for countries diplomatically isolated by the West in the wake of Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.
Li was last seen in Beijing on Aug. 29 delivering a keynote address at a security forum with African nations.
TECHNOCRAT ORIGINS
Li's history as a technocrat - he is an aerospace engineer who worked on China's satellite programme - was helpful in trying to meet Xi's goals for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), experts say.
"The operational and technological background of the next Chinese defence minister is especially pertinent given that the PLA aims to become a world-class military by 2049," said James Char, a security scholar at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
In 2016, Li was named deputy commander of the PLA's fledgling Strategic Support Force, an elite group tasked with accelerating the development of China's space and cyber warfare capabilities.
He was then appointed head of the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission. Li was sanctioned over the purchase of 10 Russian Su-35 combat aircraft in 2017 and equipment related to the S-400 surface-to-air missile system.
In July, the department took the highly unusual step of issuing a notice that it was looking to "clean up" its bidding process. It invited the public to report irregularities dating back to October 2017, when Li was at its helm. He ran the unit until October 2022.
Li's term at the Central Military Commission highlighted his ties to Xi, who has strengthened his grip across the military. Some scholars believe Li has close ties to Zhang Youxia, a close military ally of Xi, whom Li replaced as head of the department.
Zhang was promoted to first vice chairman of the military commission during the Communist Party Congress last year, with Li following him onto the commission's seven-person governing group.
Despite the uncertainty of Li's absence, analysts say there is probably no shortage of senior military officials who could step into the figurehead role of defence minister. A bigger question is what priority Beijing will continue to place on China's military diplomacy amid ongoing regional tensions.
Reporting by Laurie Chen in Beijing and Greg Torode in Hong Kong; Editing by John Geddie and William Mallard
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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Laurie Chen
Thomson Reuters
Laurie Chen is a China Correspondent at Reuters' Beijing bureau, covering politics and general news. Before joining Reuters, she reported on China for six years at Agence France-Presse and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. She speaks fluent Mandarin.
Reuters · by Greg Torode
10. Opinion | The Kim-Putin summit highlights Biden’s failed North Korea policy
At least Mr. Rogin blames both Biden and Trump. But why does Kim Jog Un always get a pass? Do these pundits think we should make concessions to a regime that for 7 decades has consistently broken agreements and has long harbored a hostile policy toward the South (and the US). Why can't these pundits begin with an understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime before embarking on the blame the US president(s) argument?
Actually, what the Kim-Putin summit shows is the strategic clarity of Kim Jong'un's strategy.. This is the inflection point. While many pundits call for a "new" strategy of offering concessions in return for Kim restarting negotiations, it is time to implement a new strategy that is based on understanding the nature, objectives, and strategy of the regime. A long term strategy that focused on human rights, information, and the solution to the "Korea question."
Opinion | The Kim-Putin summit highlights Biden’s failed North Korea policy
The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · September 15, 2023
When President Barack Obama welcomed President-elect Donald Trump to the Oval Office in November 2016, he recommended that Trump make the North Korea nuclear threat his top priority. Trump actually took Obama’s advice — but then went on to bungle the diplomacy. President Biden has chosen to ignore Obama’s warning altogether, giving the cold shoulder to North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. So how’s that working out?
The consequences of the Biden administration’s policy of non-engagement with Pyongyang played out this week in Russia’s Far East. Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed Kim with full fanfare; they toured Russian space launch facilities and airplane factories while dining on crab dumplings, sturgeon and beef. Kim pledged to give Russia “full and unconditional support” for its aggressive war in Ukraine. North Korea will likely manufacture and transfer large quantities of munitions that will end up killing Ukrainian civilians.
In return, Kim got something even more important from Putin: He essentially announced the end of the multilateral military technology sanctions regime that Russia had supported (at least rhetorically) for decades. In April, former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev publicly warned the South Korean government that any military support for Ukraine could result in Russia giving North Korea advanced weapons. Now Putin is making good on that threat.
Russia’s transfer of satellite and rocket technology could make the Kim regime’s sizable nuclear arsenal even more dangerous. The U.S. and South Korean governments both promised this week that such actions would result in repercussions. But neither Putin nor Kim seems especially worried.
Jenny Town, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, told me the Biden administration’s lack of any diplomatic initiative toward North Korea has contributed to the current impasse. Over the past two years, Biden officials have repeatedly stated that they are open to negotiations with Pyongyang over its nuclear program with no preconditions. But they must know that’s a nonstarter for Kim.
“It’s been a nonpolicy. Just saying we are open to diplomacy is the most passive way of doing things,” Town said. “There’s an arms race going on in East Asia. Why would the North Koreans talk to us about denuclearization now?”
The Biden team has pursued very active diplomacy with East Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea, aimed at intensifying military cooperation and strengthening deterrence. That’s wise — but not enough on its own. There’s no visible effort to restart talks with Pyongyang. The State Department’s special representative for North Korea, Sung Kim, also has a full-time job as ambassador to Indonesia — which doesn’t exactly signal any serious intent to the North Koreans.
With any further sanctions blocked by Russia and China, the only way to persuade Pyongyang to talk is to put something it wants on the table. This need not be a concession on the military or nuclear front. Kim faces economic troubles, food insecurity and public health needs, all of which the United States could help alleviate.
“We are trying to convince an insecure country that it doesn’t need nuclear weapons by threatening it,” Town said. “We haven’t provided any incentives for North Korea to see us as a viable option.”
Privately, Biden officials often say that there’s no sign the North Koreans are interested in talking to the United States. The long-used communication channel that runs through Pyongyang’s United Nations mission in New York remains in place, but it has gone largely silent. Official statements coming out of North Korea’s propaganda ministry range from the insulting to the absurd.
U.S. officials also note that the South Koreans have little interest in pursuing negotiations with the North, following the failure of the previous administration in Seoul. The administration’s North Korea-watchers also argue that Trump’s erratic and incoherent diplomatic gambit undermined any trust Kim had in the United States.
To be sure, any Biden administration effort to reengage with North Korea would be very difficult; the chance of success would be low. There’s also a high likelihood it would prove a political loser for Biden, especially as he prepares to run for reelection. Engaging with North Korea requires both leadership and political capital.
But it is precisely because Trump’s diplomacy was a such a mess that Biden should try again. Kim could be in power for several decades. Shouldn’t at least one serious attempt to engage him be mounted? What will happen if Trump comes back to office? That could mean four more years of erratic threats and love letters.
Strategic patience is dangerous in 2023 for the same reason it was dangerous when the Obama administration practiced it a decade ago. When there’s no diplomacy, North Korea accelerates its weapons programs and grows closer to U.S. adversaries — and the risk of conflict rises. Engaging the Kim regime is hard. Not engaging it is much worse.
The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · September 15, 2023
11. Kim given gift of drones on Russian trip
And I am sure he cherishes the hat the most. See photo at the link: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/09/103_359387.html
Kim given gift of drones on Russian trip
The Korea Times · by 2023-09-17 16:38 | North Korea · September 17, 2023
A photo released by the official North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, shaking hands with Minister of Defense of Russia Sergei Shoigu during a visit to Vladivostok, Russia, Sept. 16. EPA-Yonhap
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un received five explosive drones, a reconnaissance drone and a bulletproof vest as gifts from a regional governor on his visit to Russia, official TASS news agency said Sunday.
Kim's first official visit abroad since the coronavirus pandemic has fanned Western fears that Moscow and Pyongyang will defy sanctions and strike an arms deal.
On Saturday he met the Russian defence minister in Vladivostok, where he inspected state-of-the-art weapons including a hypersonic missile system.
TASS said the "leader of the DPRK received five kamikaze drones and a 'Geran-25' reconnaissance drone with vertical takeoff," using the official name of North Korea.
TASS said the governor of the Primorye region, which borders China and North Korea, also "offered Kim Jong-un a set of bulletproof protection" and "special clothing not detectable by thermal cameras."
Russia unlikely to provide high-level arms tech to North Korea
Kim's extended tour of Russia's far eastern region, which began on Tuesday, has focused extensively on military matters, as evidenced by his own officer-dominated entourage, a symbolic exchange of rifles with President Vladimir Putin and a tour of a fighter jet factory in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
Moscow is believed to be interested in buying North Korean ammunition to continue fighting in Ukraine, while Pyongyang wants Russia's help to develop its internationally condemned missile programme.
The Kremlin has said no agreement has or will be signed.
Kim also met with North Korean students studying in Vladivostok on Sunday.
North Korean news agency KCNA has described the atmosphere during Kim's visit as "fervent and warm" and said a "new era of friendship, solidarity and cooperation" was opening between North Korea and Russia. (AFP)
The Korea Times · by 2023-09-17 16:38 | North Korea · September 17, 2023
12. New chapter in trilateral relationship has begun
"JAROKUS."
I concur with Ambassador Ahn. This is an inflection point and a key opportunity to solidify relationships to serve mutual security intess for years and decades to come. But we have to work at it.
New chapter in trilateral relationship has begun
The Korea Times · September 17, 2023
By Ahn Ho-young
The leaders of the Republic of Korea, Japan and the United States convened at Camp David on Aug. 18 for a trilateral summit. The three leaders agreed to strengthen their respective economies, support the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and bolster regional and global peace and security.
The three leaders wrapped up their joint statement by declaring that "a new chapter in our trilateral relationship has begun." I wholeheartedly agree with that statement.
It is time for a new chapter in the trilateral relationship. In the past 70 years, the rules-based liberal order offered a stable international basis for industrialization, democratization and national development in various areas for a large number of countries. That order is being seriously challenged around the world. For that reason, today has been defined as a pivotal point in history in the joint statement: "a hinge point of history, when geopolitical competition, the climate crisis, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and nuclear provocations test us."
As the joint statement states, "This is a moment that requires unity and coordinated action from true partners." That in fact is the reason why the U.S. has been promoting mini-lateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, such as Quad and AUKUS (Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.). One region where such regional cooperation is badly needed is Northeast Asia. For that, we had to overcome a long-standing barrier; the bilateral relations between Korea and Japan, fraught with issues of history. President Yoon took important steps in that direction through a series of courageous moves. His moves led to appreciable rapprochement in relations between Korea and Japan, which made it possible to usher in a new chapter in the trilateral relationship.
It's a new chapter in our trilateral relationship, because the three leaders committed themselves to significantly enhancing the trilateral partnership for security.
The three leaders committed themselves to a new mechanism of consultation on security matters: "We announce our governments' commitment to consult with each other in an expeditious manner to coordinate our responses to regional challenges, provocations, and threats that affect our collective interests and security." To ensure effective implementation of the commitment, they agreed to set up a hotline among the three leaders. They also agreed to hold trilateral meetings between the three nations' leaders, foreign ministers, defense ministers and national security advisers at least annually.
In particular, the three leaders agreed to a large number of measures to deal more effectively with the denuclearization of North Korea. They announced the establishment of a new working group to combat North Korea's cyber threats.
They also announced their intention to hold annual, multi-domain trilateral exercises on a regular basis to enhance their coordinated capabilities and cooperation.
The enhanced trilateral partnership for security, along with the U.S.-ROK and the U.S.-Japan alliances and other mini-lateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, such as Quad and AUKUS, will send a strong message and deter actors in the region from any unilateral attempts to use force and change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific.
It's a new chapter in the trilateral relationship because the three leaders agreed to maintain focus on building robust cooperation in the economic security and technology spheres. They took note of ongoing trilateral cooperation in the fields of the economy and technology, particularly on semiconductors and batteries, as well as on technology security and standards, clean energy and energy security, biotechnology, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing and scientific research.
The three leaders took new steps as well. They agreed to launch early warning system pilots to expand information sharing and enhance policy coordination on global supply chains. They also agreed to expand trilateral collaborative research and development, in such sectors as cooperation to open a radio access network (RAN) and space security cooperation.
I have long thought that the Korea-U.S. alliance, which hinges upon the two pillars of security and the economy, must advance to establishing a third pillar in enhanced cooperation in technology. It has strong implications for both Korea's economy and security. The Korean economy cannot continue to grow without making new breakthroughs in technology on top of what it has achieved in semiconductors, batteries and information and communication technologies. New technologies, for example AI, can have a serious impact on the way wars are fought in the future as well. In that sense, it is reassuring that the three leaders agreed on significantly enhancing the trilateral partnership for technology.
For all these reasons, a large number of commentators agree that "a new chapter in our trilateral relationship has begun." At the same time, they add caveats. The implementation of the vast areas of agreements made at Camp David will require heavy resource allocation of time, budgets and personnel in all three countries.
Furthermore, the three countries are all democracies, where leadership changes every several years. For that reason, we cannot overemphasize the importance of letting leaders, opinion-makers and citizens of our countries understand the importance of the trilateral partnership at this hinge point in history.
Ahn Ho-young is chair professor at Kyungnam University. He served as vice foreign minister and Korean ambassador to the United States.
The Korea Times · September 17, 2023
13. North Korea’s Lazarus Group Has Stolen $240M in Crypto in Just 104 Days: Elliptic
The all purpose sword at work.
North Korea’s Lazarus Group Has Stolen $240M in Crypto in Just 104 Days: Elliptic
Adding to the tally is the $54 million hack of crypto exchange CoinEx, which blockchain sleuths at Elliptic now believe Lazarus was likely behind.
https://decrypt.co/197407/north-korea-lazarus-hacks-240m-crypto-just-104-days-elliptic
By Andrew Throuvalas
Sep 15, 2023
3 min read
Blockchain surveillance firm Elliptic published a report Friday detailing the exploits of notorious North Korean hacking group Lazarus, which has been “ramping up” activity in recent months.
The organization has been linked to five major crypto hacks over the past three months. The latest, according to blockchain data, was the global cryptocurrency exchange CoinEx, which was hacked earlier this week for a now estimated $54 million. All in all, Elliptic estimates that North Korea's Lazarus is responsible for the theft of almost $240 million in crypto in just the past 104 days alone.
“Elliptic analysis confirms that some of the funds stolen from CoinEx were sent to an address which was used by the Lazarus group to launder funds stolen from the Drake-backed crypto casio Stake.com, albeit on a different blockchain,” wrote Elliptic. The FBI said last week that Lazarus was responsible for stealing $41 million in cryptocurrency from Stake.
Elliptic's findings today corroborate those of on-chain sleuth ZachXBT, who on Wednesday said on Twitter that the CoinEx hacker had “accidentally connect their address” to the Stake hack.
The hacker then moved stolen funds to Ethereum using a bridge previously used by Lazarus, before transferring them to a wallet address known to be controlled by the hacker. A substantial portion of funds originated from the Tron and Polygon blockchains.
According to Elliptic, Lazarus hackers also mixed funds with addresses that were seen during the Stake hack and used an address that was involved in the $100 million Atomic wallet hack in June.
“In light of this blockchain activity, and in the absence of information suggesting the CoinEx hack was conducted by any other threat group, Elliptic agrees that Lazarus Group should be suspected for the theft of funds from CoinEx,” researchers at the analytic firm said.
Other hacks in which Lazarus has been recently implicated include the crypto payments platform CoinsPaid in late June, and the crypto payment provider Alphapo in July. Elliptic noted that the group appears to be re-targeting centralized platforms as opposed to decentralized ones, possibly due to social engineering attacks being more feasible against such targets.
CoinEx put out an open letter to hackers on Friday requesting that they contact the company either via email or over the blockchain to negotiate a bug bounty and return of funds.
14. Inside The S. Korean Factory That Could Be Key For Ukraine
Inside The S. Korean Factory That Could Be Key For Ukraine
Barron's · by Kang Jin-kyu
September 15, 2023
Longstanding domestic policy bars Seoul from selling weapons into active conflicts, but even so it signed deals worth $17.3 billion last year, including a $12.7 billion agreement with NATO member and key Kyiv ally Poland, for K9 Howitzers, K2 tanks, and more.
And with North Korea's Kim Jong Un in Russia touring space centres and weapons factories, experts say the South may be forced to review its careful balancing act on the Ukraine war -- which Seoul has condemned, even as it resists calls to supply weapons directly to Kyiv.
On the assembly line Friday were rows of Warsaw-bound Howitzers, an artillery weapon a bit like a super-mobile cannon.
South Korea is ramping up arms exports while traditional behemoths struggle with production shortages
Jung Yeon-je
Hanwha Aerospace, South Korea's largest defence contractor, is racing to meet delivery targets for the 14-wheeled, 47-tonne K9 Howitzers, which have a firing a range of 40 kilometres (25 miles) -- much longer than a tank, although the K9 needs to be stationary to shoot.
Poland ordered 212 K9s last year and Seoul has already delivered 48 of them -- a pace "no one else can achieve," Lee Kyoung-hun, Hanwha's production leader told AFP.
"We are capable of delivering products in the shortest time frame possible," said Lee, adding that it took between three and four months to build one Howitzer from scratch.
Seoul has long harboured ambitions to join the ranks of the world's top arms exporters -- aiming to be the fourth largest, behind the US, Russia and France -- something that is now possible, industry research indicates.
Seoul has long harboured ambitions to join the ranks of the world's top arms exporters
Jung Yeon-je
It has already sold artillery shells to Washington -- but with a "final user" agreement in place meaning the United States would be the military that uses the munitions.
Experts have said this allows the United States to then provide their own shells to Kyiv.
South Korea's arms industry has one key advantage over others globally: it's always been "ready for war," said Choi Dong-bin, Hanwha Aerospace's senior vice president.
Hostilities in the 1950 to 1953 Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty, and Seoul remains technically at war with nuclear-armed Pyongyang.
This gives the country an advantage globally in weapons production, Choi said, as Seoul has the capacity to mass-produce quickly and easily whenever it gets an order.
"The fact that we're maintaining production line is another boon. At this moment we're receiving many orders from overseas and we are able to respond quickly to their demands and deliver products in a short period of time," he said.
Seoul's weapons are also well-tested: "These are deployed on the ground," on one of the world's most heavily fortified borders, Choi said.
A weapons deal between North Korea and Russia could change Seoul's stance on its arms exports
Jung Yeon-je
"Because they are deployed (in South Korea), it has the capacity to perform in any part of the world," he added.
Heavily-sanctioned North Korea lacks Seoul's high-tech weaponry -- but it does have stockpiles of outdated Soviet-era munitions.
Kim met Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday, and experts have warned the internationally-isolated pair might have agreed a deal involving Pyongyang supplying artillery shells and anti-tank missiles in exchange for satellite technology from Moscow.
Any such deal could change Seoul's calculations, experts say, as although South Korea has condemned Russia's invasions of Ukraine, it has resisted calls to step up support to Kyiv, in part as it has long called on Moscow to help manage Kim Jong Un.
Experts say exports of South Korean weaponry would be of great value to Kyiv
Jung Yeon-je
But if Moscow starts buying weapons from Pyongyang -- something that would violate rafts of UN sanctions -- it could both change the course of the Ukraine war and force Seoul's hand, said Choi Gi-il, professor of military studies at Sangji University.
"If that were to happen, I think it will be more than 50-50 probability that South Korea-manufactured weapons exported to Poland would be deployed to help Ukraine fend off the Russians," he said.
The export of South Korean weaponry, especially the K9 howitzers, would be "of great value to Kyiv," he said.
"It's always better to have more howitzers in war and both Russia and Ukraine don't have enough of them," he said, adding that Ukraine was mostly using Soviet-era outdated weapons.
"But K9s stand out as among the most recent, overwhelming conventional weapons. It will mean so much for Kiev to have them on the frontlines."
Barron's · by Kang Jin-kyu
15. BTS member Suga to begin military service on Friday
BTS member Suga to begin military service on Friday | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · September 17, 2023
SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- Suga, a member of the K-pop sensation BTS, will begin his mandatory military service this week, his agency announced Sunday.
BigHit Music said Suga, 30, will fulfill his military duty by doing an alternative service beginning Friday.
Suga will be the third member of the group to join the military. Jin enlisted in December 2022, and J-Hope followed suit in April this year.
This Aug. 8, 2023, file photo provided by BigHit Music shows BTS member Suga during a Seoul concert. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
In early August, Suga, rapper and producer for the group, withdrew his request to delay the start of his mandatory service.
Unlike Jin and J-Hope, Suga has been ruled unfit for the regular combat duty. While all able-bodied men must serve in the military, those with health issues may be assigned to alternative services, which include working in an office for a municipal government.
Though reasons for the decision on Suga have not been disclosed, it is believed to be related to a surgery he had to repair a torn labrum in 2020.
Mindful of the public nature of Suga's service, BigHit Music urged the group's fans not to frequent Suga's place of duty.
In May, Suga reached No. 2 on Billboard 200 with his solo debut effort, "D-Day." He performed in 10 cities on a solo world tour, drawing over 300,000 fans.
This June 27, 2023, file photo provided by BigHit Music shows BTS member Suga during a concert. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · September 17, 2023
16. President and Mrs. Bush meet with North Korean refugees
See the photos of my good friends Seo Hyun Lee and Hyun Seing Lee with President and Mrs. Bush here: https://www.flickr.com/photos/georgewbushcenter/albums/72177720311194157/with/53187776188/
it is great to see President Bush take such a strong interest in escapees/refugees from the north.
President and Mrs. Bush meet with North Korean refugees | George W. Bush Presidential Center
bushcenter.org
Press Release
President and Mrs. Bush meet with North Korean refugees
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The Bush Institute releases policy paper on how China and Russia facilitate North Korea’s human rights abuses
Dallas, Texas—Today, President and Mrs. George W. Bush welcomed 14 North Korean refugees to the George W. Bush Presidential Center to learn about their hopes for themselves and their families in the United States and their concerns about the situation in North Korea. The refugees are recipients of the Lindsay Lloyd North Korea Freedom Scholarship and Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) advocacy fellows.
“Escaping speaks of courage, risk, learning to go to the extreme just to survive to get out of a dark, dark society. I believe a lot of Americans, if we can get your stories to them, they would say, ‘This is the kind of person we want in America…’ We’re big believers in immigration, because immigrants bring a new perspective, and they renew our soul,” said President George W. Bush.
Since 2017, $300,000 has been awarded in the form of 75 scholarships for North Koreans to pursue higher education in the United States. The conversation took place at a workshop hosted by the George W. Bush Institute and LiNK where attendees have the opportunity to further develop their leadership and advocacy skills.
“I’ve always been a big advocate for a free North Korea, and one way to help advance the cause is to provide opportunities for people that have sought freedom to get an education. And they then become leaders,” said President Bush.
View photos from the gathering.
Today, the Bush Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies published a policy paper urging the administration, Congress, the international community, and the United Nations to take action to weaken China and Russia’s ability to facilitate North Korea’s human rights abuses.
For more information about the Bush Institute’s work on supporting freedom in North Korea, visit bushcenter.org/northkorea.
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About the George W. Bush Institute
The George W. Bush Institute is a solution-oriented nonpartisan policy organization focused on ensuring opportunity for all, strengthening democracy, and advancing free societies. Housed within the George W. Bush Presidential Center, the Bush Institute is rooted in compassionate conservative values and committed to creating positive, meaningful, and lasting change at home and abroad. We utilize our unique platform and convening power to advance solutions to national and global issues of the day. Learn more at bushcenter.org.
17. Alliance of the Weak: Why Russia and North Korea Are Joining Forces
Thank you Professor Kelly. They are weak and failures. But even when China is engaged in a threesome of convenience their security arrangement will always be transactional and Kim's DNA to play Xi and Putin off against each for his own benefit will result in a dysfunctional relationship in the long term.
Alliance of the Weak: Why Russia and North Korea Are Joining Forces
A vague North Korean-Russia alignment adds a new headache to East Asian security. But without China, it is still underpowered.
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · September 17, 2023
Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean supremo Kim Jong Un met in far eastern Russia this week.
There is a lot of anxiety that the two might form some kind of partnership or even alliance.
They certainly share a lot in common. Both are gangsters running mafia states, where enemies ‘accidentally’ fall out windows and corruption is widespread.
Both loathe American hegemony and are excluded from the world economy by sanctions. As mutual pariahs, an alignment seems natural, and there is probably not much the rest of the world can do about it.
But we need not worry that much. This is a partnership of the weak and the desperate. Neither remotely possesses the ability to undo the vibrant liberal world economy around them which they envy so much. Nor do either have the ability to challenge the global political order except by using nuclear weapons, which has its massive downsides of course.
They can surely cause trouble, but we need not overreact. So long as China – which is vastly more powerful and helps keep these two rogues afloat – keeps its distance, an alignment of Russia and North Korea can only play the spoiler. It cannot radically alter world politics.
Russia and North Korea are Weak, Which is Why They Act so Fearsomely
Our typical impression of Russia and North Korea is of fearsome states who threaten their neighbors with vast, strutting militaries. There is some truth to this. Both countries really want us to see them that way. They conduct large military parades, and both leaders are frequently seen publicly with military officials. Both make frequent threats and invoke their nuclear weapons routinely.
But this is mostly bravado. The core elements of national power are economic capacity and military capability – How big is your economy? And how much, consequently, can you spend on defense? And Russia and North Korea are both very far behind.
Putin himself admitted this in his famous lament that the break-up of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” Without the large economic base of the USSR and its empire, Russia is far weaker. It simply cannot keep up with the productive capability of its rivals. North Korea’s position is even worse, of course. Its economy is less than 5 percent the size of South Korea’s economy.
The result is that neither can afford the military they desperately want. Specifically, neither can afford the military quality they want. Russia’s army is bogged down in what was supposed to be a quick war against a minor power. Instead, Russia’s performance in Ukraine has made it clear that it is no match for NATO. North Korea has been conventionally behind South Korea for decades.
The result is that both talk up their nuclear weapons. They are covering their weakness. But nukes are a poor way to demonstrate power. They are so dangerous and frightening that they are all but unusable in normal diplomacy. Putin and Kim both benefit from regime security – no one will attack them now – but they do not give Russia and North Korea the ability to alter day-to-day politics around them, to catch up to their competitors, to reduce American dominance, and so on.
North Korea Wins from a Trade
We need not overreact to their emergent military trading relationship. It is bad but not catastrophic. North Korean ammunition will buy time for Russia in Ukraine, but it does not resolve Russia’s core problems in that war – massive, technologically superior Western aid to Ukraine; a far greater Ukrainian will to fight; a relentless bleeding of Russian power at the expense of its pretensions to equality with the West and China.
More problematic is a Russian transfer of nuclear submarine technology or missile engine technology to North Korea. North Korea is surprisingly good a repurposing and indigenizing foreign technologies. It will use Russian technology to improve its missile force and its survivability against a U.S.-South Korean airstrike.
But this too alters the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. South Korea is massively conventionally dominant, and any North Korean nuclear use would provoke massive punishment. We have lived with North Korean nuclear weapons for almost twenty years already.
North Korea does win from the trade though. Russia is so desperate for ammunition for its quagmire of a war that it is considering trading away technologies it would normally never give a rogue such as North Korea.
There is No ‘Axis of Authoritarianism’ without China
A vague North Korean-Russia alignment adds a new headache to East Asian security. But without China, it is still underpowered. Russia and North Korea do not have the economic heft to build an axis or counter-order to the democratic capitalist states. And China is deeply economically integrated with those states. Should Beijing break with the world economy to join Russia and North Korea, that would indeed be revolutionary. But this is not forthcoming. Beijing has been very quiet on Putin’s war. Without China, Putin and Kim are just a couple of gangsters.
About the Author
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · September 17, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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