Quotes of the Day:

"Have more than you show, speak less than you know."

- William Shakespeare

“My experience in traditional firms is that anything new is seen as innovative, and the people assigned to it, like any parent, become irrationally passionate about the project and refuse to acknowledge just how stupid and ugly your little project has become.”

- Scott Galloway, The Four: The Hidden DNA of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google

“The world is full of fools—people who cannot wait to get results, who change with the wind, who can’t see past their noses. You encounter them everywhere: the indecisive boss, the rash colleague, the hysterical subordinate. When working alongside fools, do not fight them. Instead think of them the way you think of children, or pets, not important enough to affect your mental balance. Detach yourself emotionally. And while you’re inwardly laughing at their foolishness, indulge them in one of their more harmless ideas. The ability to stay cheerful in the face of fools is an important skill.”

- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War

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1. In Risky Hunt for Secrets, U.S. and China Expand Global Spy Operations

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2023

3. When I met diplomats, who was spying on who?

4. The Endless Frustration of Chinese Diplomacy

5. Ukraine’s Next Battlefield Foe: Bad Weather

6. Upheavals in Xi's world spread concern about China's diplomacy

7. Is China’s Economic Predicament as Bad as Japan’s? It Could Be Worse

8. America’s Warrior Diplomat, Rahm Emanuel, Takes On China’s Xi Personally

9. Philippines defense chief: ‘Covert’ actions of Chinese workers in country a ‘security risk’

10. How ‘war on terror’ was fought and won in Southeast Asia – for now

11. Long Enlistments, Culture Wars, and Disconnect From the Public: Expert Outlines How the US Military's Recruitment Is Falling Short

12. The long arm of Chinese law is getting longer in Southeast Asia

13. Ukrainian soldier says US-made Bradley fighting vehicles are 'priceless' in nighttime assaults, offering visibility better than in daylight

14. ANALYSIS: How ATACMS Will Help Ukraine

15. Ukraine’s best defense is to decolonize the Russian Federation from within

16. 80 Percent of Russians Consider Their Country To Be 'Great' as Putin Begs North Korea for Weapons

17. China Defense Chief Mystery Adds to Leadership Turbulence

18. Why the US Military Values a PhD in Political Science

1. In Risky Hunt for Secrets, U.S. and China Expand Global Spy Operations

A fascinating read that I think does a good job of outlining the challenges and complexities of intelligence operations versus China.

However, this section jumped out at me. I leave it to the intelligence experts and China hands to interpret. It seems to me that the article portrays Xi as tough and in command but then the balloon the description and analysis of the balloon incident seems to be giving Xi a pass or making excuses for him - giving him plausible deniability at least as to foreknowledge of the activity. Was he really upset about the potential impact of the incident on the upcoming Biden visit? Are some analysts or the media painting the picture that Xi really wants talks with the US to a specific policy agenda? And of course the questions is if our spy networks were so dismantled how do we know what's going on inside the highest levels of the CCP?

Excerpts:

American intelligence agencies concluded that the People’s Liberation Army had kept Mr. Xi in the dark until the balloon was over the United States.

American officials would not discuss how spy agencies gleaned this information. But in details reported here for the first time, they discovered that when Mr. Xi learned of the balloon’s trajectory and realized it was derailing planned talks with Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, he berated senior generals for failing to tell him that the balloon had gone astray, according to American officials briefed on the intelligence.

The episode threw a spotlight on the expanding and highly secretive spy-versus-spy contest between the United States and China. The balloon crisis, a small part of a much larger Chinese espionage effort, reflects a brazen new aggressiveness by Beijing in gathering intelligence on the United States as well as Washington’s growing capabilities to collect its own information on China.

Conclusion:

But intelligence collection is not in itself a prelude to war. The espionage struggle actually could be a substitute for armed clashes, as it often was during the Cold War.

U.S. intelligence officials believe that China does not want to go to war now over Taiwan, Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, told Congress in March.

“We assess that Beijing still believes it benefits most,” she said, “by preventing a spiraling of tensions and by preserving stability in its relationship with the United States.”

In Risky Hunt for Secrets, U.S. and China Expand Global Spy Operations

By Julian E. Barnes and Edward Wong

Julian E. Barnes, who covers the U.S. spy agencies, and Edward Wong, a diplomatic correspondent and The Times’s former Beijing bureau chief, have reported together on China intelligence issues for five years.

• Sept. 17, 2023

The New York Times · by Edward Wong · September 17, 2023

The nations are taking bold steps in the espionage shadow war to try to collect intelligence on leadership thinking and military capabilities.

By Julian E. Barnes and

Julian E. Barnes, who covers the U.S. spy agencies, and Edward Wong, a diplomatic correspondent and The Times’s former Beijing bureau chief, have reported together on China intelligence issues for five years.

• Sept. 17, 2023

As China’s spy balloon drifted across the continental United States in February, American intelligence agencies learned that President Xi Jinping of China had become enraged with senior Chinese military generals.

The spy agencies had been trying to understand what Mr. Xi knew and what actions he would take as the balloon, originally aimed at U.S. military bases in Guam and Hawaii, was blown off course.

Mr. Xi was not opposed to risky spying operations against the United States, but American intelligence agencies concluded that the People’s Liberation Army had kept Mr. Xi in the dark until the balloon was over the United States.

American officials would not discuss how spy agencies gleaned this information. But in details reported here for the first time, they discovered that when Mr. Xi learned of the balloon’s trajectory and realized it was derailing planned talks with Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, he berated senior generals for failing to tell him that the balloon had gone astray, according to American officials briefed on the intelligence.

The episode threw a spotlight on the expanding and highly secretive spy-versus-spy contest between the United States and China. The balloon crisis, a small part of a much larger Chinese espionage effort, reflects a brazen new aggressiveness by Beijing in gathering intelligence on the United States as well as Washington’s growing capabilities to collect its own information on China.

For Washington, the espionage efforts are a critical part of President Biden’s strategy to constrain the military and technological rise of China, in line with his thinking that the country poses the greatest long-term challenge to American power.

For Beijing, the new tolerance for bold action among Chinese spy agencies is driven by Mr. Xi, who has led his military to engage in aggressive moves along the nation’s borders and pushed his foreign intelligence agency to become more active in farther-flung locales.

President Xi Jinping of China has led his military to engage in aggressive moves along the nation’s borders and pushed his foreign intelligence agency to become more active in farther-flung locales.

The main efforts on both sides are aimed at answering the two most difficult questions: What are the intentions of leaders in the rival nation, and what military and technological capabilities do they command?

American officials, most of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss espionage, have stressed in interviews throughout the year the magnitude of the challenge. The C.I.A. is focusing on Mr. Xi himself, and in particular his intentions regarding Taiwan. The F.B.I.’s counterintelligence task forces across the nation have intensified their hunt for Chinese efforts to recruit spies inside the United States. U.S. agents have identified a dozen penetrations by Chinese citizens of military bases on American soil in the last 12 months.

Both countries are racing to develop their artificial intelligence technology, which they believe is critical to maintaining a military and economic edge and will give their spy agencies new capabilities.

Taken together, U.S. officials say, China’s efforts reach across every facet of national security, diplomacy and advanced commercial technology in the United States and partner nations.

The C.I.A. and the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency have set up new centers focused on spying on China. U.S. officials have honed their capabilities to intercept electronic communications, including using spy planes off China’s coast.

The spy conflict with China is even more expansive than the one that played out between the Americans and the Soviets during the Cold War, said Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director. China’s large population and economy enable it to build intelligence services that are bigger than those of the United States.

“The fact is that compared to the P.R.C., we’re vastly outnumbered on the ground, but it’s on us to defend the American people here at home,” Mr. Wray said in an interview, using the initials for the People’s Republic of China. “I view this as the challenge of our generation.”

China sees it differently. Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, has said that “it is the U.S. that is the No. 1 surveillance country and has the largest spy network in the world.”

‘Going After Everything’

Espionage can halt a slide into war or smooth the path of delicate negotiations, but it can also speed nations toward armed conflict or cause diplomatic rifts.

In late February, weeks after he canceled an important trip to Beijing over the balloon episode, Mr. Blinken confronted China’s top diplomat with a U.S. intelligence assessment that Beijing was considering giving weapons to Russia. That disclosure raised tensions, but also might be keeping China from sending the arms, U.S. officials say. And when Mr. Blinken finally went to Beijing in June, he raised the issue of Chinese intelligence activities in Cuba.

China’s vastly improved satellite reconnaissance and its cyberintrusions are its most important means of collecting intelligence, U.S. officials say. The fleet of spy balloons, though far less sophisticated, has allowed China to exploit the unregulated zone of “near space.” And the U.S. government is warning allies that China’s electronic surveillance capabilities could expand if the world’s nations use technology from Chinese communications companies.

China has suspended its spy balloon program since one floated off course over the continental United States and was shot down off the coast of South Carolina in February.Credit...Randall Hill/Reuters

Artificial intelligence is another battleground. The U.S. government sees its lead in A.I. as a way to help offset China’s strength in numbers. Chinese officials hope the technology will help them counter American military power, including by pinpointing U.S. submarines and establishing domination of space, U.S. officials say.

American officials are also more concerned than ever at Chinese agencies’ efforts to gather intelligence through personal contacts. They say China’s main intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security, aims to place agents or recruit assets across the U.S. government, as well as in technology companies and the defense industry.

Chinese agents use social media sites — LinkedIn in particular — to lure potential recruits. Any time an American takes a publicly disclosed intelligence job, they can expect a barrage of outreach from Chinese citizens on social media, according to current and former officials.

Responding to that threat, federal agencies have quietly opened or expanded their in-house spy catching operations. And Mr. Wray said the F.B.I. has thousands of open Chinese intelligence investigations, and every one of its 56 field offices has active cases. All of those field offices now have counterintelligence and cyber task forces largely focused on the threat from Chinese intelligence.

Those investigations involve attempts by Chinese spies to recruit informants, steal information, hack into systems and monitor and harass Chinese dissidents in the United States, including using so-called police outposts.

“They’re going after everything,” Mr. Wray said. “What makes the P.R.C. intelligence apparatus so pernicious is the way it uses every means at its disposal against us all at once, blending cyber, human intelligence, corporate transactions and investments to achieve its strategic goals.”

But critics say some of the U.S. government’s counterintelligence efforts are racially biased and paranoid, amounting to a new Red Scare — a charge at least partly supported by the cases the Justice Department has had to drop and by its shutdown of the Trump-era China Initiative program.

China has undertaken its own expansive counterintelligence crusade, one that echoes Mao-era political campaigns. On July 1, China enacted a sweeping expansion of a counterespionage law. And in August, the Ministry of State Security announced that “all members of society” should help fight foreign spying, and offered rewards for anyone providing information.

The rival governments have also established new listening posts and secret intelligence-sharing agreements with other governments. American and Chinese agents have intensified their operations against each other in pivotal cities, from Brussels to Abu Dhabi to Singapore, with each side looking to influence foreign officials and recruit well-placed assets.

The Art of Mind-Reading

Some U.S. officials think Mr. Xi’s authoritarian governance style gives intelligence agencies an opening to recruit disaffected Chinese citizens.Credit...Florence Lo/Reuters

For American spy agencies, Mr. Xi’s decisions and intentions are arguably the most valuable intelligence they seek, but he is also the most elusive of targets.

U.S. agencies are now probing exactly why China’s defense minister, Gen. Li Shangfu, appears to have been placed under investigation for corruption, and why Mr. Xi ousted Qin Gang, his foreign minister. American diplomacy and policy depend on knowing the motivations behind these moves.

A decade ago, the United States’ network of informants in China was eliminated by Chinese counterintelligence officials after the informants’ identities were uncovered. Since then, the C.I.A. has faced a major challenge to rebuild its network. That is partly because China’s expanding webs of electronic surveillance have made it difficult for American case officers to move freely in China to meet contacts.

China even has artificial intelligence software that can recognize faces and detect the gait of an American spy, meaning traditional disguises are not enough to avoid detection, according to a former intelligence official. American operatives now must spend days rather than hours taking routes to spot any tailing Chinese agents before meeting a source or exchanging messages, former intelligence officials say.

And Mr. Xi, like other authoritarian leaders, limits his use of phones or electronic communications, for the very purpose of making it difficult for foreign intelligence agencies to intercept his orders.

But officials in the vast bureaucracy under Mr. Xi do use electronic devices, giving U.S. agencies a chance to intercept information — what spies call signals intelligence — to give them some insight into the internal discussions of their Chinese counterparts.

In the balloon incident, the C.I.A. began tracking the balloon in mid-January, when the Chinese army launched it from Hainan Island, officials said.

U.S. officials also determined that commanders on the Central Military Commission that Mr. Xi chairs were unaware of this particular flight until it was tipping into crisis, and they vented their frustration at the generals overseeing the surveillance program.

Since that crisis, China has paused the operations of its fleet of balloons, but American officials said they believe Beijing will likely restart the program later.

William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director, has ordered an expansion of intelligence collection and analysis of China.

Under William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director since 2021, the agency has hired more China experts, increased spending on China-related efforts and created a new mission center on China. And while American officials refuse to discuss details of the agency’s network of informants, Mr. Burns said publicly in July that it had made progress on rebuilding a “strong human intelligence capability.”

While it is unclear how robust the new network is, some U.S. officials think Mr. Xi’s extremely authoritarian governance style gives intelligence agencies an opening to recruit disaffected Chinese citizens, including from among the political and business elite who had benefited in previous decades from less party control and a less ideological leadership.

Some prominent Chinese figures, including “princelings” of Communist Party elite families, say in private conversations that they disagree with the turn China has taken.

China has also poured resources into determining the thinking of top American officials. A Justice Department indictment unsealed in July suggests Chinese businesspeople tied to the government were trying to recruit James Woolsey, a former C.I.A. director who was in the running to be a Trump administration national security cabinet official right after the 2016 election.

The Chinese government operates a vast network of cameras that use facial recognition software, making it difficult for American intelligence officers to move freely in China to meet contacts.Credit...Aly Song/Reuters

More recently, a sophisticated, highly targeted penetration of Microsoft’s cloud computing platform gave China access to the emails of senior State Department diplomats, including the American ambassador in Beijing and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo.

American officials traveling to China take elaborate countermeasures to avoid having government secrets pilfered. They are issued burner cellphones and laptops and told to leave their regular devices at home.

Dennis Wilder, a former U.S. intelligence analyst on China and a senior fellow at Georgetown University, said that discerning the intentions of American leaders is one of the very top priorities for Chinese intelligence agencies.

“They look for senior planning and intentions,” he said. “What is the secretary of state really thinking? What is he really doing? What are the operations the C.I.A. is really running against you?”

Measuring Military Muscle

U.S. Navy fighter jets on an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea in 2019. President Biden has declared that the U.S. military will defend Taiwan should China try to seize the island.

No issue in U.S.-China relations has loomed larger than Taiwan. It is the flashpoint likeliest to lead to war, analysts say. Mr. Xi has said China must take control of Taiwan, a de facto independent island, and has ordered his military to be capable of doing so by 2027. But so far, the United States and its allies do not appear to have concrete intelligence on whether Mr. Xi would be willing to order an invasion.

And China obsesses over the flip side of the question. Mr. Biden has declared four times that the U.S. military will defend Taiwan should China try to seize the island. But whether Mr. Biden really means that — and whether American leaders plan to permanently keep Taiwan out of China’s reach — are believed to be focal points of some of China’s intelligence efforts.

In the absence of real intelligence on intentions, American and Chinese officials are focused on gathering information on each other’s military capabilities. The United States, for instance, has stepped up its aerial surveillance of Chinese military bases.

Meanwhile, Chinese intelligence agents have penetrated many parts of the Taiwanese government over the decades, former U.S. intelligence officials say. Chinese agents are now trying to learn more about the Biden administration’s efforts to outfit Taiwan with certain weapons systems and provide secret training for Taiwanese troops. Chinese agents also seek more details on the growing military cooperation between the United States and Asian allies.

Taiwanese military boats patrolling the Matsu Islands, just in front of China’s Fujian province.

“What is it all for?” asked Representative Mike Gallagher, Republican of Wisconsin and chairman of the House’s new China committee, referring to Beijing’s espionage efforts. “My speculation, based on what we see around our military bases, based on their cyberhacks, is that it is all geared toward Taiwan.”

Other U.S. officials also say China’s desire to learn more about American armed readiness explains its attempts to surveil military bases around the United States. In the last 12 months, according to U.S. officials, they have tracked about a dozen attempts by Chinese citizens to sneak on to military bases to take photos or measure electromagnetic activity. Some of the recent efforts appear focused on bases that would play an important role in a Taiwan conflict, they say.

In August, the Justice Department charged two American sailors with providing military secrets to Chinese intelligence agents. The sailors pleaded not guilty.

But intelligence collection is not in itself a prelude to war. The espionage struggle actually could be a substitute for armed clashes, as it often was during the Cold War.

U.S. intelligence officials believe that China does not want to go to war now over Taiwan, Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, told Congress in March.

“We assess that Beijing still believes it benefits most,” she said, “by preventing a spiraling of tensions and by preserving stability in its relationship with the United States.”

Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal. More about Julian E. Barnes

Edward Wong is a diplomatic correspondent who has reported for The Times for more than 24 years from New York, Baghdad, Beijing and Washington. He was on a team of Pulitzer Prize finalists for Iraq War coverage. More about Edward Wong

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Global Espionage Grows Between U.S. and China

12

The New York Times · by Edward Wong · September 17, 2023

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-sept-16-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on September 16 and continued to make gains in the area.
• Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast have likely forced the Russian command to prioritize the Russian defense there and laterally redeploy elements of a relatively elite formation away from the Russian defense south of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces also advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 16 and continued to penetrate the Russian defensive layer that lies ahead of the current extent of Ukrainian advances.
• Ukrainian forces have likely made a significant tactical breach along a section of the current Russian defense layer in the Robotyne area over the past several weeks that they continue to widen.
• Russian ultranationalists continued to complain about endemic lying within the Russian military after Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev voiced similar complaints on September 15.
• A Ukrainian naval drone strike likely damaged a Russian ship in the Black Sea on September 14.
• A Ukrainian official confirmed on September 16 that a civilian vessel used the Ukrainian corridor in the Black Sea to reach a Ukrainian port for the first time.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Vladivostok, where Kim viewed pieces of Russian weapons technology on September 16.
• The Russian military leadership may be removing ineffective air defense officials on the pretext of corruption charges to avoid admitting the failures of Russian air defenses against increasing drone strikes on Russian cities including Moscow.
• Russian military officials continue efforts to solidify Russia’s relationship with African states amidst changing dynamics on the continent resulting from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to subsume the Wagner Group.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia on September 16 and advanced in some areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 16 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers continue complaining about the role of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in perpetuating issues affecting Russian military personnel.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to resettle residential areas of occupied Ukraine with Russians.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPT. 16, 2023

Sep 16, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2023

Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 16, 2023, 6:25pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on September 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on September 16 and continued to make gains in the area. Geolocated footage posted on September 15 confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Rozdolivka (about 13km northeast of Bakhmut) and in northern Klishchiivka (about 6km southwest of Bakhmut).[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar noted that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and stated that Ukrainian forces continue to be successful in the Klishchiivka area.[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrsky posted footage of Ukrainian personnel in Andriivka (8km southwest of Bakhmut) following the Ukrainian liberation of the settlement on September 14.[3]

Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast have likely forced the Russian command to prioritize the Russian defense there and laterally redeploy elements of a relatively elite formation away from the Russian defense south of Bakhmut. North Ossetian volunteer battalions “Storm Ossetia” and “Alania,” which are operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, posted an image on September 16 purporting to show a small detachment of the Russian 83rd Separate Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade in Nesteryanka (on the western shoulder of the current Ukrainian breach in western Zaporizhia Oblast).[4] Elements of the 83rd Brigade deployed to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations around Klishchiivka in late June and were observed in combat in the area in late August.[5] Elements of the 83rd Brigade were reportedly still operating in the Bakhmut area as of September 11, although elements of the brigade may have been split across two different sectors of the front.[6] Klishchiivka has been a focal point of fighting in the Bakhmut area in recent weeks, and the redeployment of any elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade amid Ukrainian advances near Klishchiivka suggests a deep concern about Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Russian prioritization of the defense there.

ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along several lines of effort would force the Russian command to prioritize certain sectors of the front and conduct lateral redeployments that offer Ukraine opportunities for exploitation.[7] Ukrainian counteroffensive operations have fixed relatively elite units and formations to the area, including elements of the 98th VDV Division, the 83rd VDV Brigade, the 11th VDV Brigade, the 31st VDV Brigade, the 106th VDV Division, and the 364th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate).[8] Russian forces have thus far been unwilling to send these relatively elite formations to aid in the critical defensive effort in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut appear to continue preventing the Russian command from doing so at scale. ISW will publish a review of the strategic significance of how Ukrainian operations have fixed Russian forces to the Bakhmut area in an upcoming special edition.

Ukrainian forces also advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 16 and continued to penetrate the Russian defensive layer that lies ahead of the current extent of Ukrainian advances. Geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced along Russian defensive positions to the west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[9] Additional geolocated footage published on September 15 indicates that Ukrainian infantry advanced further along a series of Russian defensive positions immediately west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) but likely did not maintain control of these positions.[10] The Ukrainian presence at these Russian defensive positions indicates that Russian forces do not control these positions either and that Ukrainian forces are continuing to operate past the Russian defensive layer that that runs northwest of Verbove to north of Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv).

Ukrainian forces have likely made a significant tactical breach along a section of the current Russian defense layer in the Robotyne area over the past several weeks that they continue to widen. Ukrainian forces have continued offensive operations past a section of the Russian defensive layer west of Verbove since penetrating it on September 4 and have widened their breach along a 2.6km section of those Russian defensive positions.[11] The continued absence of observed Ukrainian heavy equipment and vehicles past this defensive layer continues to indicate that Ukrainian forces have yet to complete a breakthrough of this defensive layer, however.[12] Ukrainian officials have indicated that the series of Russian defensive positions currently ahead of the Ukrainian advance may be less challenging than the initial Russian defensive layer that Ukrainian forces broke through to the north.[13] Russian forces had concentrated the majority of their combat power at those forward-most Russian defensive positions to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and these Russian forces have likely suffered heavy losses and conducted fighting withdrawals to prepared positions behind the current defensive layer.[14] ISW has long assessed that Russian forces lack the manpower to man the entire multi-echeloned Russian defensive fortification systems in southern Ukraine, and the Russian forces defending the current layer of defense are likely elements of formations that have been fighting in the area without operational-level unit rotation since the start of the counteroffensive or elements of formations that laterally transferred from elsewhere along the front.[15]

Russian ultranationalists continued to complain about endemic lying within the Russian military after Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev voiced similar complaints on September 15. A Russian milblogger posted a statement reportedly from a subscriber on September 16 that concurred with Gurulev’s assertion that the culture of lying in the Russian military is the main issue preventing a Russian victory in Ukraine.[16] Another Russian milblogger stated that the issue is a “disaster” and that lies occur at all levels of the Russian military as subordinate commanders are afraid to report the truth about the condition and needs of units and formations.[17] The milblogger stated the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian President Vladimir Putin are likely receiving false reports. The milblogger added that tyranny (bad command culture), fraud, and a lack of military resourcefulness are some of the issues affecting the Russian military in Ukraine and that the main goal of the Russian military should be to minimize personnel losses. A Russian insider source compared Gurulev to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in his role as the “front line truth teller.”[18]

A Ukrainian naval drone strike likely damaged a Russian ship in the Black Sea on September 14. Ukrainian newspaper Ukrainska Pravda published a photo reportedly from a source within the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) that indicates that Ukrainian naval drones struck and damaged a Russian Bora-class corvette near the entrance to Sevastopol Bay in occupied Crimea on September 14.[19] Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on September 16 that Ukraine will conduct more drone attacks on Russian ships in the future.[20] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian ships do not stay at their bases but are constantly moving between naval bases in Russia and occupied Crimea to avoid strikes against them.[21] Russian forces have previously used large ships in the Black Sea to mitigate the damage that Ukrainian strikes have inflicted on other Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in southern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces are likely targeting Russian ships in the Black Sea to further damage Russia’s ability to mitigate ongoing logistics complications among other things.[22]

A Ukrainian official confirmed on September 16 that a civilian vessel used the Ukrainian corridor in the Black Sea to reach a Ukrainian port for the first time. Ukrainian Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov announced that civilian bulk carriers flying the Palau flag used the existing Ukrainian corridor to sail towards Chornomorsk, where the vessels will load over 20,000 tons of grain for export to countries in Africa and Asia.[23] The Kremlin previously escalated its posturing in the Black Sea to curtail maritime traffic to Ukraine and increase its leverage to extract maximalist concessions to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative.[24] United Kingdom military aircraft are reportedly conducting patrols over the Black Sea to deter Russian forces from acting aggressively towards civilian vessels.[25] Kubrakov stated that five civilian vessels have traveled from Ukraine along the Ukrainian Black Sea corridor since August 15: Joseph Schulte, Primus, Anna-Theresa, Ocean Courtesy, and Puma.[26]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Vladivostok, where Kim viewed pieces of Russian weapons technology on September 16. Kim viewed Tu-22MS, Tu-95MS, and Tu-160 strategic bombers; Su25SM3, Su-30SM, and Su-34 fighter-bombers; a MiG-31I missile carrier with Kinzhal missiles; the frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov; a Uranus anti-ship missile system; and Kalibr cruise missiles.[27] Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash told Kim that the Tu-160 strategic bombers received new Kh-BD cruise missiles with a claimed range of over 6,500 kilometers and can carry 12 such missiles.[28] Russia is highly unlikely to provide physical systems or weapons to North Korea due to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s likely concern that this provision may trigger secondary sanctions against Russia, but Putin may be open to other forms of technological and defensive cooperation with North Korea in return for North Korean artillery ammunition.[29]

The Russian military leadership may be removing ineffective air defense officials on the pretext of corruption charges to avoid admitting the failures of Russian air defenses against increasing drone strikes on Russian cities including Moscow. Russian outlet Kommersant reported on September 16 that the Tula Oblast Venesky District Court sentenced Vladislav Gukov, former head of the MoD Department of State Defense Procurement, to a nine-year prison term for corruption.[30] Kommersant noted that the investigation found that Gukov accepted over 15 million rubles ($154,950) in bribes from various enterprises that were meant to supply the MoD with “urgently needed” X-ray diagnostic systems for KamAZ vehicles.[31] A Russian insider source alleged that Gukov was a close personal friend of Major General Vyacheslav Lobuzko, former commander of a division of the 3rd Separate Air Defense Army and one of the designers of the “Voronezh” cruise and ballistic missile detection system, whom Russian authorities also imprisoned for corruption in May.[32] The insider source additionally claimed that Gukov was personally responsible for signing off on the procurement of air defense systems and complexes.[33]

Gukov’s corruption charge and his role as a prominent Russian air defense official closely mirror the case of the commander of the Moscow-based 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense, Army Major General Konstantin Ogienko, whom Moscow Oblast authorities arrested on similar corruption and bribery charges relating to giving state defense property to an unnamed civilian organization.[34] ISW has no reason to doubt that these air defense officials are complicit in corruption and bribery schemes, but the recent trend of arrests of prominent air defense officials on corruption charges may suggest that higher echelons of the Russian military wish to remove these air defense officials from their positions without having to admit that the Russian domestic air defense system is failing.[35]

Russian military officials continue efforts to solidify Russia’s relationship with African states amidst changing dynamics on the continent resulting from the Russian MoD’s efforts to subsume the Wagner Group. Russian milbloggers and Malian national broadcaster ORTM reported that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov arrived in Bamako, Mali on September 16 and met with the Malian and Nigerien defense ministers and Malian junta head Assimi Goita.[36] Russian milbloggers speculated that Yevkurov and the Malian and Nigerien ministers discussed military-technical cooperation, the implications of the coup in Niger, and increased the Russian MoD's support for the Malian junta against Tuareg rebels in northern Mali.[37] One Russian source suggested that the MoD seeks to take over Wagner Group remnants in northern Mali, which is consistent with ISW’s previous observation that the Russian MoD has recently made efforts to assume control of Wagner’s operations on the African continent.[38] Yevkurov notably visited multiple African countries including Burkina Faso, Libya, and Syria in early September to replace “private military companies” with MoD elements.[39] The Ukrainian Resistance Center relatedly reported on September 16 that the Russian MoD is increasingly sending representatives to Algeria, Mali, and Sudan to convince remaining Wagner fighters to sign contracts with a structure affiliated with and supervised by the MoD.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on September 16 and continued to make gains in the area.
• Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast have likely forced the Russian command to prioritize the Russian defense there and laterally redeploy elements of a relatively elite formation away from the Russian defense south of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces also advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 16 and continued to penetrate the Russian defensive layer that lies ahead of the current extent of Ukrainian advances.
• Ukrainian forces have likely made a significant tactical breach along a section of the current Russian defense layer in the Robotyne area over the past several weeks that they continue to widen.
• Russian ultranationalists continued to complain about endemic lying within the Russian military after Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev voiced similar complaints on September 15.
• A Ukrainian naval drone strike likely damaged a Russian ship in the Black Sea on September 14.
• A Ukrainian official confirmed on September 16 that a civilian vessel used the Ukrainian corridor in the Black Sea to reach a Ukrainian port for the first time.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Vladivostok, where Kim viewed pieces of Russian weapons technology on September 16.
• The Russian military leadership may be removing ineffective air defense officials on the pretext of corruption charges to avoid admitting the failures of Russian air defenses against increasing drone strikes on Russian cities including Moscow.
• Russian military officials continue efforts to solidify Russia’s relationship with African states amidst changing dynamics on the continent resulting from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to subsume the Wagner Group.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia on September 16 and advanced in some areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 16 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian milbloggers continue complaining about the role of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in perpetuating issues affecting Russian military personnel.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to resettle residential areas of occupied Ukraine with Russians.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 16 and reportedly made marginal advances. A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka and Berestove (32km south of Kreminna) on September 16.[41] The Russian MoD claimed on September 16 that Russian forces improved their tactical positions in the Kupyansk direction in the past week.[42]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and did not advance on September 16. Russian military officials claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian attacks in the directions of Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk) and Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) and five Ukrainian attacks near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 16 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced southeast of Rozdolivka (17km northeast of Bakhmut) and in northern Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on September 16 that Ukrainian forces conducted successful assault operations near Klishchiivka and that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[45] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reported that Ukrainian forces are gradually pushing Russian forces out of their positions and forcing them to retreat in the Bakhmut direction, and Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Bakhmut direction.[46] A Russian milblogger acknowledged Ukrainian control over Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) but another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control only part of Andriivka and that most of the settlement is a contested ”gray zone.”[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces control southern and central Klishchiivka but a Russian news aggregator claimed on September 15 that the settlement is a contested ”gray zone” and Ukrainian forces have not gained a foothold in the settlement.[48] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked on the Klishchiivka-Kurdyumivka line north of Bakhmut and that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[49]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced on September 16. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked in northeastern Klishchiivka and near Andriivka.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control the railway immediately east of Andriivka, northeastern Klishchiivka, and Kurdyumivka.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff and Malyar reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut) and Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] The Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade published footage and reported that Russian artillery fired on Russian soldiers, likely of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps), surrendering to Ukrainian forces in Andriivka.[53]

Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line are holding their positions in the Avdiivka and Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) directions.[54]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on September 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Marinka.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked from the direction of Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka but did not specify an outcome.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued assaults along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 16 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting assaults in the Shakhtarske direction in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[57] The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which operates in the area, claimed that the tempo of Ukrainian operations has declined over the past three days.[58] A Russian news aggregator claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) repelled a Ukrainian attack near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) on September 15.[59] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled eight Ukrainian assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Donetsk Oblast during the previous week.[60]

Russian forces counterattacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 16 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Urozhaine and suffered significant manpower and equipment losses.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) pushed Ukrainian forces out of positions north of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and occupied an unspecified stronghold.[62]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced on September 16. Geolocated footage published on September 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced along Russian defensive positions to the west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[63] Additional geolocated footage published on September 15 indicates that Ukrainian infantry advanced further along a series of Russian defensive positions immediately west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) but likely do not maintain control of these positions.[64] The Ukrainian presence at these defensive positions suggests that Russian forces do not control these positions either. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified partial success near Verbove and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations towards Novoprokopivka from the northwest, suggesting an expanded Ukrainian presence west or southwest of Robotyne.[66] Other Russian sources claimed that small Ukrainian groups conducted unsuccessful assaults without heavy equipment near Robotyne and Verbove.[67] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled 18 Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Verbove in the previous week.[68]

Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed gains on September 16. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked from Kopani (12km southwest of Orikhiv) and Novprokopivka but did not specify an outcome.[69]

Russian sources continue to report Ukrainian activity in the Dnipro River delta. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 16 that fighting is ongoing on and near islands in the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[70] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces in the Kherson direction focused on preventing Ukrainian forces from landing on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as well as islands in the Dnipro River during the past week.[71]

Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported that Russian forces in occupied Crimea are reconfiguring their air defense umbrella. Humenyuk stated on September 15 that the Ukrainian strike on a Russian S-400 “Triumf” system near Yevpatoria, Crimea on September 14 is forcing Russian forces to rearrange the locations of their air defense systems and that Russian forces have found significant gaps in air defense coverage in Crimea.[72]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian milbloggers continue complaining about the role of the Russian MoD in perpetuating issues affecting Russian military personnel. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that the Russian MoD’s June 2023 initiative to provide legal combat veteran status to Russian personnel operating in the Russian border areas and occupied Crimea has fallen short and failed to improve the situation for the military personnel.[73] The milblogger complained that these rear area personnel receive less pay and that the personnel in Crimea receive no housing allowances despite frequent Ukrainian shelling of Russian border areas and strikes against occupied Crimea. Another prominent milblogger complained on September 16 that Russian military inspectors have been detaining Russian military personnel operating on the Robotyne-Verbove line in western Zaporizhia Oblast for operating military vehicles without license plates or documents.[74] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces lost the documents for some vehicles while fighting on the front line and that these detentions prevented frontline personnel from transferring from the frontline to rear areas after completing combat missions.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to resettle residential areas of occupied Ukraine with Russians. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 16 that Russian soldiers and occupation officials in occupied Kherson Oblast were taking private houses from local residents and settling in these homes, while forcibly resettling the Ukrainian residents and conducting filtration measures against them.[75] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko similarly noted that Russian occupation officials are forcibly evicting Mariupol residents from apartment buildings and relocating Russians into those homes.[76] The Fourth Geneva Convention holds that it is unlawful for an occupying power to transfer its own population to a territory that it occupies, and ISW continues to assess that Russia is undertaking a campaign of forcibly de-populating areas of Ukraine and resettling these spaces with Russian citizens.[77]

The Crimea-based Atesh partisan group stated that one of its agents destroyed two Russian trucks with an improvised explosive device (IED) in occupied Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, on September 15.[78]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

3. When I met diplomats, who was spying on who?

Conclusion:

To my mind a spy is someone who knowingly assists a foreign power, knowingly to the disadvantage of his own country, by providing information either for material reward, or under threat of blackmail, or out of disillusion with his own country or admiration for the foreign power. That’s a high bar; but it’s time we sharpened up our definition before the word loses all meaning.

When I met diplomats, who was spying on who?

We are obsessed with the glamour and intrigue of espionage but the reality is shades of grey and moments of uncertaintyMatthew Parris

The Times · by Matthew Parris · September 17, 2023

We humans are obsessed with espionage: always have been, always will be. Never forget this when approaching any spy-related story. The tale may turn out to be important and disturbing; but remember that even if it were not it would still have its audience on the edge of our seats. We are captivated by the world of spooks, and this can lend them the ear of politicians and the media, and the mystique that comes with knowing more than we can ask them to say.

Why such awe? The answer lies as much in human psychology as in the historical record. Treachery fascinates us. For good Darwinian reasons, something within all of us keeps a wary eye out for false friends, for concealed danger, for persons unknown who are trying to compromise us, poison us, steal our secrets or undermine our security. Hence the enduring appeal of spy novels, spy documentaries and spy movies. A splinter of incipient paranoia pierces us all.

Certainly there have been episodes, though usually in war or counterterrorism, when the course of history has been changed by espionage, and these remain rightly vivid in our imagination. I most emphatically do not belong to the “it’s all rubbish” view of spying. We tend to forget, however, the wealth of energetic but unproductive effort to harvest information from which little useful was ever gained. Scandals leap into our thoughts: Profumo, Keeler and Captain Ivanov, Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt: some just dupes, others traitors. Philby betrayed British agents just as Soviets who we “turned” doubtless betrayed Soviet agents, but did you ever learn and, if you did, do you now remember what it was the Soviet Union actually gained from many of these that proved of critical importance? Our enemies and our competitors are often quite stupid.

Which brings me to China. Investigations being current, it’s best to say nothing about Chris Cash: the parliamentary aide and Chinese “spy suspect” who is (as it happens) a friend of friends, though I’ve never spoken to him. I know it’s routine in such cases to say “we must suspend judgment” while nursing suspicion, but this is a case where I really do suspend judgment. MPs have been (correctly) prefacing their remarks about Cash with the word “alleged”, then proceeding directly to expressions of indignation about Chinese interference. The two should not be linked, and it’s unjust to Cash to imply otherwise while we do not yet know the truth of this. We should also keep in mind that there’s another (unnamed) person under investigation who has rather dropped out of the media story.

What does “spying” really mean, and who is, and who is not, a “spy”? I ask, very aware of how in my own life I’ve often hovered around the edge of this world. It started after university with an invitation to join MI6: declined because, being gay, this didn’t feel like a good idea; though I did join the Foreign & Commonwealth Office where homosexuality, if found out, would in those days equally have ended a career.

The next year came a curious incident. At a party in north London given by a fellow-FCO recruit, I met a young and stunningly handsome Bulgarian diplomat. He asked for a lift back into town. As we drove he started leaning ever closer to me. But he had terrible breath. Otherwise the temptation might have been irresistible. And maybe he was just secretly gay too — who knows? — but after dropping him off on the Cromwell Road I later got a postcard from him in Bulgaria. This I handed to the FCO’s security people who told me not to reply. Absent the halitosis and how differently my life could have gone, though I’d never have yielded to blackmail. Was he trying to be a spy, and if I’d slept with him would I have been a spy? I certainly knew nothing that would have been useful to Sofia.

Then I left the FCO and joined the Conservative Research Department, writing a booklet on the communist threat. A lunch invitation from a mid-ranking diplomat in the East German embassy turned into further lunches so I told M16 (I’d become an MP by then) who asked me to continue them and offered to pay for them (I refused). They doubtless wanted to know whether this chap could be “turned”. Having got to know him I advised this was unlikely. Memory fades as to what he asked me about over lunches; and anyway it doesn’t matter because I knew nothing. Was I “spying”? Was he?

At a conference of anti-Soviet communists and socialists in Rome (they paid my expenses), I spoke; and met an adorable young West German called Edgar, from some kind of fringe Marxist grouping. Nothing happened, but after I’d become an MP he too wrote to me, to renew our acquaintance — and I thought the letter best binned. An active friendship might have been professionally useful to either or both of us. “Spying”?

The closer you get both to the word and the idea, the cloudier it seems. I can write about these things now without attracting suspicion because I did always let our own intelligence service know what was happening. Being in the FCO gave me a keener understanding of the possible consequences of networking with the enemy. A more incautious person might have freelanced a bit out of curiosity, sociability or vanity, and in ignorance of what was really going on.

The beginning of wisdom here is to see that there are many greys between black and white; to understand that countries, foe or friend, will always seek advantage by trying to gain access to information not in the public domain; that we do need to be on our guard; but that spying is not an occupation much inhabited by either glamour or infamy, heroes or villains, and neither threatens nor promises as much as we may excitedly suppose. China is certainly dangerous, but there’s no point in shouting at it, and the Chinese Communist Party are self-defeating in their unfocused information-gathering and influencer-seeking. Seldom can a great power have engendered so much international hostility and distrust in so short a time. There are many fools in Beijing, so let’s stay watchful but let’s not big these people up, nor glamorise their unfiltered hoovering up of information. They’d certainly be wasting their time at Westminster, where nobody knows anything.

To my mind a spy is someone who knowingly assists a foreign power, knowingly to the disadvantage of his own country, by providing information either for material reward, or under threat of blackmail, or out of disillusion with his own country or admiration for the foreign power. That’s a high bar; but it’s time we sharpened up our definition before the word loses all meaning.

The Times · by Matthew Parris · September 17, 2023

4. The Endless Frustration of Chinese Diplomacy

Excerpts:

Diplomats were on the front line of the CCP’s global campaign yet also the most prone to outside influence. Even today, they hold foreign counterparts at arm’s length, never engaging socially, and continue to travel in pairs so that each may watch the other. All of this makes personal rapport impossible to build. In his 2008 memoir, Ji Chaozhu, a former diplomat and translator for Mao Zedong, called this professional persona “controlled openness.”

The European diplomat told me how social media made Chinese diplomats easily accessible, at least in theory. They would share their WeChat handles upon first meeting and be reachable via the platform even outside of work hours. Yet any attempt to make the relationship more personal inevitably hit a stone wall. “I never knew where they lived or anything about their personal lives,” the diplomat said. Guajardo had a similar experience, once inviting an assistant minister at the foreign ministry to the Beijing Jockey Club, hoping for a more sociable chat. The minister turned up with two note-taking aides.

The exception to this is high-level negotiations, where the Chinese leadership has more power to act on their own initiative and a proven ability to turn on the charm. In the 1980s, Richard Solomon of the Rand Corp., who had worked on China at the U.S. National Security Council, wrote a report for U.S. intelligence agencies on why Chinese negotiations of the preceding years had been so successful for Beijing. He found that China had a well-established playbook, the most “distinctive characteristic” of which was the cultivation of personal relationships.

Beijing would establish a relationship with a “friendly” official in the U.S. administration, charming them through banquets and flattery. It would call them an “old friend” of China but use that label as a method of emotional blackmail when needed. “They manipulate feelings of goodwill, obligation, guilt or dependence to achieve their negotiating objectives,” Solomon wrote in the report, which was marked as “Secret” at the time. He identified Henry Kissinger as one of China’s targets, quoting him as saying “after a dinner of Peking duck, I’ll sign anything.”

James Mann, who fought to have the report declassified in the ’90s when he was a Los Angeles Times reporter, said he sees much of the same patterns in today’s negotiations. “A senior American official will be told he or she is, if not a ‘friend of China,’ then at least someone who really ‘understands China,’ as other Americans supposedly do not. China can then send messages through that official, expecting the official to relay them in Washington to try to resolve bureaucratic disputes. My own guess right now is that China is seeking to cultivate Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo as its key interlocutor.”

The Endless Frustration of Chinese Diplomacy​

Beijing’s representatives are always scared they could be the next to vanish.

By Cindy Yu, an assistant editor of The Spectator and presenter of the Chinese Whispers podcast.

Foreign Policy · by Cindy Yu · September 17, 2023

Jorge Guajardo’s first mission as Mexico’s new ambassador to Beijing was dealing with the fentanyl crisis. It was 2007, and the United States’ growing fentanyl addiction was already fueling Mexico’s organized crime, with groups using precursor chemicals smuggled from China. “We never got any traction with that,” Guajardo said. “[Chinese officials] didn’t understand, or they pretended not to understand.”

It wasn’t until Mexico hosted the G-20 in 2012, when then-Mexican President Felipe Calderón raised the issue directly with his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, that the country’s concerns were finally heard. After the summit, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached out to Guajardo’s team to ask for meetings on the issue—five years after his first efforts.

For Guajardo, now in the private sector, the episode was a typical example of how Chinese diplomats worked. “It’s a one-way channel. [Chinese diplomats] come to you with messages they want to relate to you, but anything you want to relate to them, they just either ignore or don’t know what to do with that information. So it becomes unimportant to them.” He believes that Hu had never been informed about the issue earlier, and only when Calderón was able to directly reach him did the order to do something come down from the top.

It’s an all-too-typical experience for outsiders trying to deal with China’s bureaucratic, opaque, and oftentimes defensive diplomats.

Traditionally, diplomats are supposed to represent their nation—but also to build bridges between countries, especially over difficult issues. They maintain communication channels and find fudges to resolve seemingly intractable differences of position. This doesn’t seem to be the case for Chinese diplomats, whose role is more to “keep foreigners away from Chinese policymakers,” said John Gerson, a former advisor to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on China. “It’s a moat.” Their role is to protect and bolster an authoritarian regime keen for the world’s approval but unable to take any approbation.

In many ways, the patterns of Chinese diplomacy have changed remarkably little since the decades it was run out of Yanan, the mountain headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It has the same military discipline, fierce loyalty, and underlying defensiveness. As journalist Peter Martin writes in China’s Civilian Army, the Chinese diplomatic service had been “set up to help a closed and paranoid political system cope with a more open outside world.”

That results in diplomats who are valued for their message discipline, their loyalty (to the party), and their diligence. But they are also molded into bureaucrats who have little flexibility or ability to act on their own initiative. International diplomats often complain that it’s difficult, if not impossible, to find any personal rapport with individual Chinese diplomats, especially at the lower levels. “China wants to have two ambassadors. They want to have a Chinese ambassador in Mexico telling Mexicans what China is thinking. And they want a Mexican ambassador in China telling Mexicans what China is thinking,” Guajardo said, quite seriously.

Pavel Slunkin, a former Belarusian diplomat, was on the receiving end of Chinese diplomatic bureaucracy when he worked on President Xi Jinping’s visit to Minsk in 2015. He was used to state visits taking two weeks to arrange—Xi’s took two months of meeting after meeting. The peak of the box-ticking exercise came when the new director of protocol at the foreign ministry demanded, at 2 a.m., a final check of the Great Patriotic War Museum before Xi was due to visit the next day.

For Slunkin, this was a revealing instance of fearful diplomats who needed to please their bosses. It is “the tradition of dictatorships, when they want to make bosses happy and everyone has their own boss. … And they are competing to show how good and efficient they are on every single level. And that’s why sometimes stupid ideas appear, sometimes absolutely unusual things appear. It doesn’t mean that Xi Jinping wants them to do that,” he said.

The director of protocol with whom Slunkin dealt was a rising star named Qin Gang, who later rose to become foreign minister for just seven months before mysteriously disappearing, and being removed from office, this year. The same just happened to China’s defense minister, Li Shangfu, now missing for several weeks and reportedly removed from office. For Chinese diplomats, it’s not just good office politics to impress your seniors. The foreign ministry has been subjected to periodic political campaigns and tests of loyalty from its earliest days. Diplomats learn that their domestic audience is more important than any international one. “Whenever there is a more nationalist, orthodox administration … the foreign ministry is the first suspected agency. That’s where people go to root out traitors,” former U.S. diplomat Susan Thornton told Martin in China’s Civilian Army.

Under Xi, diplomats who are more stridently nationalistic have been rewarded, such as Zhao Lijian, a midranking diplomat posted to Pakistan who became a foreign ministry spokesperson on the back of his fiery tweets defending China. It was soon dubbed “wolf warrior” diplomacy, after a series of Rambo-esque nationalistic movies.

One senior European diplomat who asked for anonymity and who was posted to Beijing in 2017 said Chinese counterparts were quick to retort with counter-accusations if his side ever raised concerns about human rights abuses in China, probably with one eye on their own careers. The example was set from the top: In 2016, Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused a Canadian journalist of “arrogance and prejudice against China” for daring to ask about a Canadian citizen detained in China under allegations of espionage. The exchange went viral in China and was celebrated by nationalists.

The same history prevents ambitious diplomats from getting too close to foreigners, as that proximity could be seen as disloyalty or ideological corruption—especially in periods when China is paranoid about foreign spies. After all, the foreign ministry was created as a new Communist government tried to establish its control over the country and its legitimacy in a largely hostile world. Then-Premier Zhou Enlai spoke about it as being the “People’s Liberation Army in civilian clothing.”

Diplomats were on the front line of the CCP’s global campaign yet also the most prone to outside influence. Even today, they hold foreign counterparts at arm’s length, never engaging socially, and continue to travel in pairs so that each may watch the other. All of this makes personal rapport impossible to build. In his 2008 memoir, Ji Chaozhu, a former diplomat and translator for Mao Zedong, called this professional persona “controlled openness.”

The European diplomat told me how social media made Chinese diplomats easily accessible, at least in theory. They would share their WeChat handles upon first meeting and be reachable via the platform even outside of work hours. Yet any attempt to make the relationship more personal inevitably hit a stone wall. “I never knew where they lived or anything about their personal lives,” the diplomat said. Guajardo had a similar experience, once inviting an assistant minister at the foreign ministry to the Beijing Jockey Club, hoping for a more sociable chat. The minister turned up with two note-taking aides.

The exception to this is high-level negotiations, where the Chinese leadership has more power to act on their own initiative and a proven ability to turn on the charm. In the 1980s, Richard Solomon of the Rand Corp., who had worked on China at the U.S. National Security Council, wrote a report for U.S. intelligence agencies on why Chinese negotiations of the preceding years had been so successful for Beijing. He found that China had a well-established playbook, the most “distinctive characteristic” of which was the cultivation of personal relationships.

Beijing would establish a relationship with a “friendly” official in the U.S. administration, charming them through banquets and flattery. It would call them an “old friend” of China but use that label as a method of emotional blackmail when needed. “They manipulate feelings of goodwill, obligation, guilt or dependence to achieve their negotiating objectives,” Solomon wrote in the report, which was marked as “Secret” at the time. He identified Henry Kissinger as one of China’s targets, quoting him as saying “after a dinner of Peking duck, I’ll sign anything.”

James Mann, who fought to have the report declassified in the ’90s when he was a Los Angeles Times reporter, said he sees much of the same patterns in today’s negotiations. “A senior American official will be told he or she is, if not a ‘friend of China,’ then at least someone who really ‘understands China,’ as other Americans supposedly do not. China can then send messages through that official, expecting the official to relay them in Washington to try to resolve bureaucratic disputes. My own guess right now is that China is seeking to cultivate Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo as its key interlocutor.”

Measuring the success of diplomacy is tough, especially for the mundane conversations that happen between governments every day. While the Chinese method is often infuriating for foreign diplomats, and there is a real risk that Communist leaders are too shielded from outside information, limiting their ability to make perfect decisions, it is not easy to write it off as ineffective. The senior European diplomat said the Chinese adherence to protocol set helpful boundaries—for example, ahead of a leader-to-leader phone call, the Chinese always tested the line three times (24 hours before the call, one hour before, and 15 minutes before).

Using WeChat also meant that diplomats were always available. Finally, Chinese diplomats always stay on message, sometimes obstinately, whether it’s in drafting communiques or negotiating new agreements. That can pay off. After all, it was China’s perceived success in negotiation that necessitated the Rand report.

It seems that when Beijing knows what it wants, it can also be flexible enough to let foreigners in. Deborah Seligsohn, a former U.S. foreign service officer who worked in Beijing on and off for 18 years, said she had no problem meeting with Chinese departments outside of the foreign ministry on issues such as new health and science agreements. “The U.S. CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] was instrumental in helping the Chinese CDC come into being,” she said. “I do think the Chinese government was treating different countries differently depending on what they could get out of it.”

This contrasts with other diplomats’ experiences of being stonewalled by the foreign ministry when trying to meet other Chinese government departments. At one point, Seligsohn recounted, nobody (on the Chinese side) even told the foreign ministry about a new American scientist being posted to Beijing as part of an agency-to-agency agreement between the United States and China. His visa was eventually granted after four months.

More potentially damaging is Chinese diplomacy’s aggressive tilt under Xi. As China’s foreign policy became more assertive and the world reeled from a pandemic worsened by China’s slow initial response, belligerent diplomats didn’t endear Beijing to anyone. A Pew Research Center poll published in July found that a median of 76 percent of adults surveyed across 24 countries did not think China takes the interests of other countries into account in its own foreign policy; Pew also found that China’s popularity in a number of advanced economies had fallen precipitously under Xi.

Wolf warrior diplomacy also represented a departure from former leader Deng Xiaoping’s tao guang yang hui approach. Roughly translated as “hide your ability and bide your time,” it was a philosophy that served the CCP well in the years after the Tiananmen Square protests. Gerson thinks the switch was a miscalculation: Just as Beijing had been quietly gaining on the U.S. lead, it started boldly advertising its own progress. “So what did President [Donald] Trump do? He pushed China back down.”

But Xi seems deeply committed to this approach and is unlikely to ditch it. As long as the brittle mood continues in Beijing, with officials, including Qin, purged on a regular basis, diplomats are likely to take the safest option: pandering to nationalism and avoiding contact with foreigners. It’s a structure where discipline is valued more than personal charm, where the goal is to defend the CCP through steadfast message discipline rather than winning hearts and minds—however many diplomatic counterparts you drive crazy on the way.​

Foreign Policy · by Cindy Yu · September 17, 2023

5. Ukraine’s Next Battlefield Foe: Bad Weather

Every army wants someone like Patton's Chaplain at the Battle of the Bulge to offer weather prayers.

Ukraine’s Next Battlefield Foe: Bad Weather

Drenching rain and icy cold could impede Ukraine’s chance of exploiting an eventual breakthrough

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraines-next-battlefield-foe-bad-weather-212a5f94

By Isabel ColesFollow

 and Daniel MichaelsFollow

Updated Sept. 17, 2023 12:01 am ET

ZAPORIZHZHIA, Ukraine—For Ukrainian soldiers struggling to make headway against entrenched Russian troops, the counteroffensive is taking on a new urgency as summer gives way to shorter days, drenching rain and then snow.

Both Ukrainians and Russians are accustomed to biting cold, and the war has churned on during two winters, so ground troops won’t abandon the battlefield anytime soon. But relentless downpours can dissolve roads, and icy weather complicates basic operations from loading artillery shells to pulling a trigger.

One worry is that Ukraine’s grueling assault on Russian defenses could eventually achieve a breach that its heavy armored equipment can’t quickly exploit because terrain is too muddy or snowy.

For now, fighting is a brutal infantry slog over small distances, with both sides’ movements limited by constant aerial surveillance and attacks. Kyiv’s forces are battering away at heavily defended Russian lines, seeking to create fissures that they can widen and push tanks and other armored equipment through. 

Ukraine’s push southward

Russian-controlled area

Russian fortifications

UKRAINE

Area of detail

Zaporizhzhia

Orikhiv

Robotyne

Verbove

Tokmak

Melitopol

20 miles

Sea of Azov

20 km

Note: Russian-controlled area as of Sept. 13

Sources: Brady Africk, American Enterprise Institute (Russian fortifications); Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project (Russian-controlled area)

Andrew Barnett/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

“The fighting will continue one way or another,” said Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s HUR military intelligence service, last weekend. 

“It is harder to fight in the cold, in the wet, in the mud,” he acknowledged. Still, he added: “The offensive operation will continue on all fronts.”

U.S. Army Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was more cautious about Ukraine’s ability to advance this year. Its forces have “probably about 30 to 45 days’ worth of fighting weather left” this year before conditions turn against them, he told the BBC last weekend.

Another Western defense official said that around the end of October, Ukraine will need to transition from attacking to holding ground, and more to protecting civilian infrastructure from Russian drones and missiles during winter.

While the weather remains hot and largely dry, Kyiv’s forces are trying to advance. They last month seized the village of Robotyne and expanded a salient around it, piercing Russia’s main defensive line and raising hopes of a breakthrough after months of painful gains measured in meters a day. 

A Ukrainian sniper takes part in a reconnaissance mission near Bakhmut. PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

A Ukrainian serviceman prepares an infantry-fighting vehicle for combat in the southeastern region of Zaporizhzhia. PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

Even if Ukrainian forces can’t punch through to the Azov Sea, roughly 55 miles south of their current front, advancing just five or 10 miles could put Russia’s vital supply lines within range of Ukrainian artillery.

In recent days, the Ukrainians have expanded the bulge further, appearing to target a gap consisting of farm fields between two villages southeast of Robotyne.

The path forward remains fraught with danger, though. Russian war planes and drones drop bombs and locate Ukrainian troops for artillery attacks. Moscow’s soldiers hide behind tree lines and blind bends in zigzagging trenches.   

“They are fighting very hard,” said a drone operator in a Ukrainian air-reconnaissance unit operating near the Verbove front, who uses the call sign Syviy. “Every house, every trench is a full-scale fight with lots of casualties on both sides.”

The drone unit to which Syviy belongs works with assault troops, helping them spot dangers ahead. Their uncrewed aircraft seek out Russian troop movements, supply convoys and stationary targets, ranging from armed bunkers to food trucks.

Ukraine’s drone operators have been providing crucial air reconnaissance for advancing troops. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Ukraine’s forces, such as those fighting in the Donetsk region, are among the first to integrate drones directly into their front-line operations. PHOTO: LIBKOS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Any pause in Ukraine’s assault could let Russia entrench itself more deeply in occupied territory, complicating future Ukrainian attempts to retake control. Satellite images show that Russia is already reinforcing previously constructed defenses behind the front line, according to Brady Africk at the American Enterprise Institute, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. 

“If you need to fight, you fight, and if you’re still on your front foot, you go, if you think it’s advantageous,” said a senior official at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Dismounted forces can walk in the snow,” said the official, adding the proviso that “you still have to move your gear and you still have to move to exploit a breach” in enemy lines, if one is achievable.

Fear of cracking open Russian lines but being unable to flood a gap due to ground conditions is one factor egging on Ukrainian troops. They want to advance before bomb-scarred fields turn to mud or snowfields. 

“Rain will make work very difficult. Mud will limit maneuverability,” said Oleksandr Solonko, another member of the drone unit. “Logistic routes are already limited, and then there will be even fewer options. Opportunities for armored vehicles will be narrowed.” 

Oleksandr Solonko says Ukrainian drone units like his have to contend with Russian electronic warfare. PHOTO: JOSEPH SYWENKYJ FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

The most treacherous conditions will come in November and early December—part of a period Russians call rasputitsa, the time when the roads dissolve. After that, mud will harden and movement will become easier. Frozen ground favors heavy weaponry but snow can impede both movement and evasion because soldiers and equipment are easier to spot visually or due to heat signatures.

These days, drones are helping Ukrainian ground forces pick their way forward and, by spotting Russian artillery, helping to chip away at its ability to hit Kyiv’s advancing soldiers.

Ukrainian troops are among the first to integrate drones directly into their front-line operations, providing real-time intelligence about the immediate surroundings.

“In Ukraine, we see that drones have made it possible to have constant reconnaissance and surveillance in the air,” Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “That’s not just for high-level officers, but even low-level soldiers who 20 years ago wouldn’t have known what’s going on near them, but now can link into a drone feed.”

To Ukrainian troops’ dismay, Russian troops have also learned quickly how to integrate drones into battlefield operations. That shift is one reason Kyiv’s counteroffensive this summer has advanced so slowly, officials say.

The extent and complexity of Russia’s fortifications in spring dashed hopes of quick success like summer last year, when Ukrainian forces within days recaptured a swath of territory in the northeast. After Russia lost most of the Kharkiv region and was forced to retreat from the southern city of Kherson, its troops began preparing to defend the rest of the territory it occupied against future Ukrainian attacks.

Ukrainian tank crews are approaching another period of difficult conditions including mud and snow. PHOTO: GLEB GARANICH/REUTERS

East of Robotyne, Ukrainian forces encountered a warren of trenches Russia had dug on elevated ground—one of the most advantageous positions for miles around. Two to three meters deep, the trenches follow a jagged zigzag course. 

“Behind every corner is a soldier firing at you,” said Syviy. “Sometimes it’s so narrow that you can get stuck there with armor.” 

Ukrainian troops took the trench after capturing Robotyne last month. 

The territory Ukraine has been reclaiming is so heavily mined that troops must send engineers out on foot to check ground ahead, impeding planning beyond the next defenses they face, said the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank, in a recent report. Russians monitor the few routes through minefields.

The senior NATO official said Russia is launching land mines behind advancing Ukrainian troops, turning even captured territory into deadly terrain.

Soldiers can’t even venture out of trenches to relieve themselves, Syviy said. “They see you every time you come in or go out.”

Most movement takes place under cover of darkness when it is harder for drones to see. During the day, drone reconnaissance missions are often cut short by Russian electronic warfare systems, Solonko said. With the front line constantly shifting, drones are occasionally brought down by Ukraine’s own electronic warfare systems.

“We don’t have a bright Hollywood-like picture when we send up a drone,” said Solonko.

The effects of heavy fall rain and winter snow on new drone routines remain an open question. Both sides are familiar with less-sophisticated fighting.

“Perhaps the emphasis will shift and some tactics will change,” but fighting will continue, said Solonko. “After all, both we and the occupiers have experience of fighting in such conditions.”

Ievgeniia Sivorka contributed to this article.

Ukrainian soldiers reinforce a trench at the front line near Bakhmut. PHOTO: LIBKOS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Write to Isabel Coles at isabel.coles@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

6. Upheavals in Xi's world spread concern about China's diplomacy

Spread the word. Xi is having a hard time. The media seems to be on message.

Upheavals in Xi's world spread concern about China's diplomacy

Reuters · by Greg Torode

BEIJING, Sept 17 (Reuters) - The disappearance of China's defence minister, the latest in a string of upheavals in the country's top ranks, is stoking uncertainty about President Xi Jinping's rule as an internal security clampdown trumps international engagement.

The growing unpredictability could affect the confidence other countries place in the leadership of the world's second-biggest economy, diplomats and analysts say.

Defence Minister Li Shangfu, who has missed meetings including with at least one foreign counterpart since he was last seen in late August, is under investigation in a corruption probe into military procurement, Reuters reported on Friday.

Newly installed Foreign Minister Qin Gang vanished with scant explanation in July, the same month as an abrupt shake-up of the military's elite Rocket Force, which oversees China's nuclear arsenal.

As Xi, China's commander-in-chief has focussed inward, he caused concern among foreign diplomats this month by missing a Group of 20 summit in India, the first time he has skipped the global leaders' gathering in his decade in power.

Faced with the growing uncertainties, some diplomats and analysts are calling for a hard look at the true nature of Xi's regime.

"Clear-eyed assessments are needed - this isn't just a question of whether China is a partner or a competitor, it is a source of economic, political and military risk," said Drew Thompson, a former Pentagon official who is now a scholar at the National University of Singapore.

Due to a lack of transparency surrounding the changes, various explanations were plausible "and this feeds the crisis of confidence that is brewing around China," Thompson said.

China's Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Saturday.

PROXIMITY ISN'T PATRONAGE

Regarding Defence Minister Li's disappearance and investigation, a ministry spokeswoman told reporters on Friday she was not aware of the situation. The State Council and Defence Ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

Since his appointment in March, Li has been the public face of China’s expanding military diplomacy, expressing concern over U.S. military operations during a high-profile security conference in June and visiting Russia and Belarus in August.

He had been expected to host an international security meeting in Beijing in October and represent the People's Liberation Army (PLA) at a meeting in November of regional defence chiefs in Jakarta.

With corruption long permeating China's military and state institutions, some analysts and diplomats believe Xi's anti-graft crackdowns mark political purges across the Communist Party.

"Regardless of the reason... the sense that this could keep happening could have an impact on foreign actors' confidence in engaging with their Chinese counterparts," said Helena Legarda, lead analyst with the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin.

The Li upheaval is unusual for its speed and its reach into Xi's hand-picked elites.

"This is all so sudden and opaque. One thing we can now see is that proximity does not equate to patronage in Xi's world," said Singapore-based security analyst Alexander Neill, an adjunct fellow with Hawaii's Pacific Forum think-tank.

CONTINUITY RISK

Although not in a direct command position, Li serves on Xi's seven-person Central Military Commission and is one of China's five state councillors, a cabinet position that outranks regular ministers. Some scholars believe he is close to General Zhang Youxia, who sits above him on the commission and is Xi's closest ally in the PLA.

Li, sanctioned by Washington in 2018 for an arms deal with Russia, shunned a meeting with U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin at Singapore's Shangri-la Dialogue security conference in June, where a handshake marked their closest interaction.

Austin and other U.S. officials are keen to resume high-level talks between the two militaries regional tensions roil. But Beijing counters that it wants Washington to be less assertive in the Asia-Pacific.

Regional envoys say deeper Chinese military diplomacy is vital, particularly with the U.S. but also with other powers, as China increasingly deploys forces around Taiwan - the democratically governed island it claims - and across disputed parts of the East and South China Seas.

If Li's fate "reflects Xi's increasingly inward focus, it is not good for those of us who want greater openness and lines of communications with China's military," said one Asian diplomat.

As the PLA has an unprecedented level of military engagements with Southeast Asian forces this year, the recent swift changes back in Beijing "spur speculation and some concern about the continuity of policy", said political scientist Ja Ian Chong at the National University of Singapore.

"A shake-up of the military at this time is likely to draw attention, given the heightened activity of the PLA near Taiwan and the East China Sea, as well as stepped-up paramilitary activity in the South China Sea, since such actions create potential risk of accidents, escalation and crises," Chong said.

Reporting By Greg Torode in Hong Kong and Martin Quin Pollard in Beijing; Editing by William Mallard

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Martin Quin Pollard

Thomson Reuters

Martin is a (China) political and general news correspondent based in Beijing. He has previously worked as a TV reporter and video journalist and is fluent in Mandarin and French.

Reuters · by Greg Torode

7. Is China’s Economic Predicament as Bad as Japan’s? It Could Be Worse

Excerpts:

Also in China’s favor, its urbanization rate is lower, standing at 65% in 2022, versus Japan’s, which was at 77% in 1988. That could give China more potential to raise productivity and growth as people move to cities and take on nonagricultural jobs.

China’s tighter control over its capital markets means the risk of a sharp appreciation of its currency, which would harm exports, is low. Japan had to deal with a sharp increase in its currency several times in recent decades, which at times added to its economic struggles.

“We believe worries on China being trapped in a balance sheet recession are overdone,” economists from 

Bank of America recently wrote.

 Yet in other ways, China’s problems will be harder to tackle than Japan’s.  

Its population is aging faster; it began to decline in 2022. In Japan, that didn’t happen until 2008, nearly two decades after its bubble burst. 

Worse, China appears to be entering a period of weaker long-term growth rates before reaching rich-world status, i.e. it is getting old before it gets rich: China’s per capita income was $12,850 in 2022, much lower than Japan in 1991 at $29,080, World Bank data shows.

Is China’s Economic Predicament as Bad as Japan’s? It Could Be Worse

From demographics to decoupling, China faces challenges Japan didn’t after its 1980s bubble

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/is-chinas-economic-predicament-as-bad-as-japans-it-could-be-worse-aa962d0d

By Stella Yifan Xie

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Updated Sept. 17, 2023 12:02 am ET

China appears to be entering a period of weaker long-term growth rates before reaching rich-world status. PHOTO: TINGSHU WANG/REUTERS

HONG KONG—Starting in the 1990s Japan became synonymous with economic stagnation, as a boom gave way to lethargic growth, declining population and deflation.  

Many economists say China today looks similar. The reality: In many ways its problems are more intractable than Japan’s. China’s public debt levels are higher by some measures than Japan’s were and its demographics are worse. The geopolitical tensions that China is dealing with go beyond the trade frictions Japan once faced with the U.S. 

Another headwind: China’s government, which has been cracking down on the private sector in recent years, seems ideologically less inclined than Tokyo was then to support growth.

None of this means China is sure to repeat the years of economic stagnation that Japan is only now showing signs of exiting. It has some advantages that Japan didn’t. Its economic growth in coming years is likely to be well above Japan’s in the 1990s. 

Even so, economists say the parallels are a warning for Communist Party leaders in Beijing: If they don’t act more forcefully, the country could get stuck in a protracted period of economic sluggishness similar to Japan’s. Despite piecemeal steps in recent weeks, including modest interest-rate cuts, Beijing has held back on major stimulus to revive growth. 

 “China’s policy responses so far could put it on track for ‘Japanification,’” said Johanna Chua, chief Asia economist at Citigroup. She believes China’s overall growth prospects could be slowing more sharply than Japan’s.

China today and Japan 30 years ago share many similarities, including high debt levels, an aging population and signs of deflation. 

During a long postwar economic expansion, Japan became an export powerhouse that American politicians and corporate executives worried would be unstoppable. Then in the early 1990s, real estate and stock market bubbles burst and the economy hit the skids. 

Policy makers cut interest rates to virtually zero, but growth failed to rebound as consumers and companies focused on repaying debt to repair their balance sheets instead of borrowing to finance new spending and investment.

Richard Koo, an economist at the research arm of Japanese investment bank Nomura Securities, famously coined the term “balance sheet recession” to describe the phenomenon.

China, too, has seen a property bubble pop after years of extraordinary economic growth. Chinese consumers are now paying off mortgages early, despite government efforts to get them to borrow and spend more.

 Private firms are also reluctant to invest despite lower interest rates, stirring anxiety among economists that monetary easing might be losing its potency in China. 

By some measures, China’s asset bubbles aren’t as big. 

Morgan Stanley estimates that China’s ratio of property value to gross domestic product peaked at 260% in 2020, up from 170% of GDP in 2014; home prices have only fallen slightly since the peak, according to official data. China’s equity markets hit a recent peak of 80% of GDP in 2021 and now sit at 67% of GDP. YOU MAY ALSO LIKE

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A record number of Chinese college students graduated this summer, but landing their dream job may be a long shot. WSJ takes a look at why China’s youth unemployment is at record highs. Photo illustration: Adam Adada

In Japan, land values as a percentage of GDP reached 560% of GDP in 1990 before falling back to 394% by 1994, Morgan Stanley estimates. The Tokyo Stock Exchange’s market capitalization rose to 142% of GDP in 1989 from 34% in 1982.

Also in China’s favor, its urbanization rate is lower, standing at 65% in 2022, versus Japan’s, which was at 77% in 1988. That could give China more potential to raise productivity and growth as people move to cities and take on nonagricultural jobs.

China’s tighter control over its capital markets means the risk of a sharp appreciation of its currency, which would harm exports, is low. Japan had to deal with a sharp increase in its currency several times in recent decades, which at times added to its economic struggles.

“We believe worries on China being trapped in a balance sheet recession are overdone,” economists from 

Bank of America recently wrote. Yet in other ways, China’s problems will be harder to tackle than Japan’s.  

Its population is aging faster; it began to decline in 2022. In Japan, that didn’t happen until 2008, nearly two decades after its bubble burst. 

Worse, China appears to be entering a period of weaker long-term growth rates before reaching rich-world status, i.e. it is getting old before it gets rich: China’s per capita income was $12,850 in 2022, much lower than Japan in 1991 at $29,080, World Bank data shows.

A residential project in Beijing earlier this year. PHOTO: BLOOMBERG NEWS

Then there is the problem of debt. Once off-balance-sheet borrowing by local governments is factored in, total public debt in China reached 95% of GDP in 2022, compared with 62% of GDP in Japan in 1991, according to J.P. Morgan. That limits authorities’ ability to pursue fiscal stimulus.  

External pressures also appear to be tougher for China. Japan faced a lot of heat from its trading partners, but as a military ally of the U.S., it never risked a “new Cold War”—as some analysts now describe the U.S.-China relationship. Efforts by the U.S. and its allies to block China’s access to advanced technologies and reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains have sparked a plunge in foreign direct investment into China this year, which could significantly slow growth in the long run. 

Many analysts worry Beijing is underestimating the risk of long-term stagnation—and doing too little to avoid it. Moderate cuts to key interest rates, lowering down payment ratios for apartments and recent vocal support for the private sector have done little to revive sentiment so far. Economists including Xiaoqin Pi from Bank of America argue that more coordinated easing in fiscal, monetary and property policies will be needed to put China’s growth back on track.

But President Xi Jinping is ideologically opposed to increasing government support for households and consumers, which he derides as “welfarism.”

Write to Stella Yifan Xie at stella.xie@wsj.com

8. America’s Warrior Diplomat, Rahm Emanuel, Takes On China’s Xi Personally

Excerpts:

China and Japan, Emanuel’s host country, have been feuding recently over Tokyo’s discharge of slightly radioactive water from the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear-power plant. Beijing, in wolf-warrior fashion, said Japan was treating the Pacific Ocean as its own private sewer. Japanese leaders said China was ignoring science, but Emanuel was even sharper in his criticism of what he described as Beijing’s underhanded motives. 

At a joint press event earlier this month with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.)—just before their lunch featuring Fukushima vegetables—he followed McCarthy’s blast at Beijing by declaring Xi had turned his back on the world and was paying the price.

“If you want to have 30% unemployment among your youth, that’s President Xi’s greatest economic accomplishment and it wouldn’t exactly be what I would put on my résumé,” Emanuel said, likely exaggerating the actual jobless rate.

“But that’s what he has done, turning his back,” Emanuel said. “All the consequences have now come to bear, with massive unemployment and economic contraction among the private sector in China.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Sept. 12 that “China’s economy will remain a major engine for the global economy.” She said Beijing is committed to win-win cooperation with other countries.

America’s Warrior Diplomat, Rahm Emanuel, Takes On China’s Xi Personally

U.S. ambassador in Tokyo jabs at Beijing leader over economic woes and disappearance of top officials

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/americas-warrior-diplomat-rahm-emanuel-takes-on-chinas-xi-personally-19edc16e

By Peter Landers

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Sept. 16, 2023 11:00 am ET

U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel has spent most of his career in the rough-and-tumble of politics, and it shows. PHOTO: POOL/REUTERS

China’s Communist Party chief Xi Jinping doesn’t have to worry about opposition leaders at home criticizing his record. But not far away, a U.S. diplomat has seized that role for himself with barbed and sometimes sarcastic criticism.

Rahm Emanuel, Washington’s ambassador in Tokyo, is stepping up personal attacks on Xi, depicting the Chinese leader as an incompetent steward of the economy, a foreign-policy failure and a bumbling would-be Machiavellian whose government is a mess.

The latest jab on X, formerly Twitter, came Friday when Emanuel speculated with three question marks that Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu, who hasn’t been seen in public since Aug. 29, was missing meetings “because he was placed on house arrest???” Alluding to other top officials who have recently lost their jobs under mysterious circumstances, he added, “Might be getting crowded in there.”

U.S. officials said Li was being removed from his post. 

A week earlier, Emanuel had been among the first outside China to publicly note Li’s disappearance. He said that Xi’s cabinet “is now resembling Agatha Christie’s novel ‘And Then There Were None’” and suggested that the unemployment rate of ministers might exceed that of China’s young people, which stood at 21% this summer before Beijing stopped disclosing the data.

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Li Shangfu hasn’t made a public appearance since late August and U.S. officials say the Chinese Defense Minister is being ousted from his post. Li is the latest of several senior Chinese officials to disappear without explanation. Photo: How Hwee Young/Shutterstock

A State Department spokesman declined to comment on Emanuel’s initial tweet beyond calling it colorful, and other U.S. diplomats haven’t echoed his language. Members of President Biden’s cabinet have gone in the opposite direction, seeking in recent visits to Beijing to relax U.S.-China tensions. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said last month in Beijing, “We believe a strong Chinese economy is a good thing” and “I see a wealth of opportunity for our two countries to work together to address our mutual interests.”

A former Democratic congressman, chief of staff to President Barack Obama and mayor of Chicago, the 63-year-old Emanuel has spent most of his career in the rough-and-tumble of politics, where attacking adversaries is part of the job. Many of his remarks would be natural in the context of a U.S. election, perhaps against a longtime incumbent with a mixed record.

But in diplomacy it is unusual to directly take on by name foreign leaders, even of adversarial countries, or use sarcasm and mockery to highlight another country’s domestic problems.

Some recent Emanuel jabs at Xi Jinping, standing, have centered on the sudden absence of Defense Minister Li Shangfu, here applauding Xi in April, who U.S. officials said was being removed from his post. PHOTO: ANDY WONG/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Lully Miura, a Tokyo political analyst who is also a frequent commenter on X, said she fears Emanuel is playing into Chinese hands by being drawn into a mudslinging match started by China’s own “wolf warrior” diplomats. “You have to be aware of the risks that you might resemble the enemy,” Miura said. “They are waiting for us to pick a fight that they chose.”

The wolf-warrior style, named after a nationalistic Chinese film franchise about an action hero who battles American-led mercenary groups, took hold during the Trump administration as Beijing’s diplomats fired off barbs, threats and conspiracy theories in speeches and Twitter posts.

In an interview Friday, Emanuel said, “Criticizing me is actually a deflection from the real problem,” which he said is Beijing’s silence over subjects such as the disappearance of top officials and the origins of Covid-19.

“Why isn’t China transparent with anyone?” Emanuel said. He added, “Deceit and deception are traits that run through everything China does. That’s unacceptable for a world leader.”

Other Biden administration officials, such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken, are trying a different approach to Xi. PHOTO: LEAH MILLIS/REUTERS

China and Japan, Emanuel’s host country, have been feuding recently over Tokyo’s discharge of slightly radioactive water from the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear-power plant. Beijing, in wolf-warrior fashion, said Japan was treating the Pacific Ocean as its own private sewer. Japanese leaders said China was ignoring science, but Emanuel was even sharper in his criticism of what he described as Beijing’s underhanded motives. 

At a joint press event earlier this month with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R., Calif.)—just before their lunch featuring Fukushima vegetables—he followed McCarthy’s blast at Beijing by declaring Xi had turned his back on the world and was paying the price.

“If you want to have 30% unemployment among your youth, that’s President Xi’s greatest economic accomplishment and it wouldn’t exactly be what I would put on my résumé,” Emanuel said, likely exaggerating the actual jobless rate.

“But that’s what he has done, turning his back,” Emanuel said. “All the consequences have now come to bear, with massive unemployment and economic contraction among the private sector in China.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Sept. 12 that “China’s economy will remain a major engine for the global economy.” She said Beijing is committed to win-win cooperation with other countries.

Write to Peter Landers at Peter.Landers@wsj.com

9. Philippines defense chief: ‘Covert’ actions of Chinese workers in country a ‘security risk’

Spies, spies everywhere. A thousand grains of sand?

Philippines defense chief: ‘Covert’ actions of Chinese workers in country a ‘security risk’

benarnews.org

The Philippine defense chief has said that possible “covert” activities by Chinese workers in the country are a “security risk” and the defense department’s current focus was on such actions.

Workers from China who are in and out of the Philippines on a regular basis are difficult to keep track of, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. told lawmakers during his confirmation hearing on Wednesday.

Opposition Senator Risa Hontiveros had asked Teodoro about the national security implications of Chinese state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) operations in critical public services, including energy and telecommunications.

“The SOEs and infrastructures, that’s not so much a problem because we can monitor it and we have default control over it. It’s the activities that we cannot see that’s worrisome,” Teodoro said in reply.

“So what I want to know and what we are currently focusing on are the covert economic activities and information activities that are not openly happening.”

Chinese workers, especially those that frequently come and go, are a “security risk” because the government cannot monitor them, Teodoro added.

The State Grid Corporation of China owns 40% of the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, while state-owned China Telecom partly owns one of the archipelago’s telecommunications providers, DITO Telecom.

During the administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte, there was an influx of Chinese workers in the country, particularly in the Philippine offshore gaming operations, or POGOs.

These operations cater mainly to customers in mainland China, where gambling is banned. At their peak, POGOs hired more than 300,000 Chinese workers, according to officials

Earlier this week, the Philippine Coast Guard spokesman had alleged without offering proof that China was running a disinformation campaign supported by ‘state actors” on Manila’s dispute with Beijing on the West Philippine Sea, which is the part of the South China Sea within Manila’s exclusive economic zone.

The Philippines in 2016 won a landmark ruling in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which threw out China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. Beijing, however, has ignored the ruling and carried on with its military expansionism in the strategic waterway, including building artificial islands.

“I hope we are keeping tabs on those hostile state actors and doing what we can to minimize their ability to influence public opinion in the Philippines,” Sen. Hontiveros said.

Teodoro said the defense department and the Philippine military knew about the “fusion of external threats through internal activities” but they were still verifying reports.

“The best way … to weaken a country, rather than an overt war-like disruption of your facilities, is really to take control of [the] internal economy, internal processes and the like,” Teodoro said.

He added that there was a need for intelligence and confidential funds allotment for different agencies “to prevent” such eventualities.

Meanwhile, China has increased its presence in the South China Sea. Beijing has consistently deployed its China Coast Guard ships and maritime militia vessels to harass Philippine ships, Filipino officials said.

Philippine ally the United States is seeking access to more bases in the Philippines on top of nine sites already included under an expanded pact amid heightened regional tensions with China, Philippine military chief Romeo Brawner Jr. and Adm. John C. Aquilino, head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said this week.

Froilan Gallardo and Richel V. Umel in Cagayan de Oro city, southern Philippines, contributed to this report.

benarnews.org

10. How ‘war on terror’ was fought and won in Southeast Asia – for now

For now. This is managing the terrorist problem. Unfortunately terrorism can never be eradicated. We will find a cure for all cancers before terrorism can be eliminated.

Excerpts:

Open-source data collection shows that between 2021 and 2023, more JI members were arrested than members of other groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an ISIL-affiliated group responsible for recent attacks in Indonesia and the wider region.

Some of the more recent incidents include the 2018 Surabaya bombings in which three Christian churches were attacked in the city of Surabaya by a husband and wife and their four children, one of whom was just nine years old. Fifteen people were killed.

The same group was also behind the Jolo Cathedral bombings in Sulu in the Philippines in 2019 that killed 20 people.

“Between 2021 and 2023, there were some 610 people arrested, 42 percent of whom were JI and 39 percent JAD and other pro-Islamic State groups,” Satria said.

“For me, that goes to show that, despite not conducting attacks, JI is very much still active, be it in conducting recruitment, fundraising or preparing for its regeneration,” he said.

Abuza agreed with that cautious tone, saying the lack of clear leadership on a global scale for hardline groups had also contributed to a general sense of quintessence.

But that could quickly change.

“These organisations are living organisations and respond to the external environment,” Abuza said.

“Everyone is waiting to see what happens in the Middle East and who emerges as a leader,” he said.

How ‘war on terror’ was fought and won in Southeast Asia – for now - Conflict News

Al Jazeera English

How ‘war on terror’ was fought and won in Southeast Asia – for now | Conflict News | Al Jazeera

Indonesian special forces take part in an antiterrorism drill in Jakarta in 2018 [File: Tatan Syuflana/AP Photo]

By Aisyah Llewellyn

Published On 15 Sep 202315 Sep 2023

Medan, Indonesia – In the early 2000s, the potential for terror attacks in Southeast Asia appeared dramatically different from today.

Indonesia was rocked by the Christmas Eve church bombings on December 24, 2000, that killed 18 people. Just six days later, Metro Manila in the Philippines experienced similar bombings that killed 22 people.

In 2002, a series of bombings ripped through a popular nightlife spot in Bali, Indonesia, killing more than 200 people and leaving at least another 200 wounded.

In the following years, the JW Marriott Hotel, the Philippine Stock Exchange and the consulate, all in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta, were attacked, as were other locations across Southeast Asia.

The group responsible for the attacks, and others, was Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), whose members aspired to establish a hardline Islamic state in Indonesia and across wider Southeast Asia.

Often referred to by its initials, JI was alleged to have operatives in Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia and the Philippines, and was said to be linked to other groups, including al-Qaeda and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines’ Mindanao island.

Though JI was responsible for a long list of atrocities and hundreds of casualties in the early 2000s – its last recorded attack was the bombing of a police compound in West Java province in 2011 – the group, and the fear of terror attacks, is largely forgotten in the region now.

So, how did Indonesia’s and other governments in Southeast Asia effectively curtail a regional threat while the United States-led “war on terror” left entire countries shattered and regions of the world in chaos following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US?

“The early 2000s certainly felt dangerous at the time,” Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, told Al Jazeera.

“But the Bali bombing really shook Indonesia out of its complacency. The new terrorism law changed the public perception of the perceived level of danger and the authorities had free rein to do their work without political interference,” Abuza said.

Indonesian forensic policemen walk past destroyed cars near the site of 2002 bomb blasts at Kuta on Indonesia’s resort island of Bali [File: Beawiharta/Reuters]

‘It broke JI’s back’

At the time of the Bali bombings in late 2002, Indonesia did not have specific and targeted antiterrorism legislation, although this was quickly drafted and signed into law in 2003 and applied retroactively to some of the perpetrators of the attack on the popular holiday island.

Three senior members of JI, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi, were quickly arrested, prosecuted, and executed in 2008 for their roles in masterminding the bombings.

A fourth perpetrator, Ali Imron, was sentenced to life in prison.

In 2003, Hambali, a Malaysia-based member of JI, allegedly responsible for securing funding for the group, was arrested in Thailand after spending months hiding out in the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh.

Renditioned by the US, Hambali was tortured at CIA “black sites” before being transferred to the US military’s notorious Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba where he remains imprisoned to this day for his alleged role in the Bali bombings.

Indonesia and other governments in the region continued to close the net between JI members and their leaders.

In 2007, Abu Dujana, the head of JI’s military operations, was arrested. In 2010, Abu Bakar Bashir, the “spiritual head” of the organisation, was captured and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was released early in January 2021.

“When people were arrested, it broke JI’s back,” Abuza said.

“But JI as an organisation still existed and the government gave it ample space to exist, allowing it to run its madrasas [Islamic educational institutions], charities and businesses,” he said.

The Indonesian government officially declared JI an illegal organisation in 2008, but authorities took a more measured approach by continuing to allow its members a degree of autonomy provided they did not engage in violence.

‘Jihad as a spiritual struggle’

According to Farihin, a member of JI based in Indonesia, the organisation remains active, although it has now changed its philosophy to one of pacifism and focuses on works such as religious teaching and other socially-minded causes.

“There is no focus on violence now,” he told Al Jazeera.

“Only on jihad as a spiritual struggle to guard against our personal sins as individuals,” he said.

“All religions have this concept in some form.”

While Farihin still describes himself as a member of JI, he said the original grouping has fractured and splintered many times over the years, owing to people having different views and opinions.

These differences of opinion are regularly cited as another reason for the success of the regional approach to the so-called “war on terror” – a mix of internal political disputes and external security operations.

By 2007, Abuza recounted, JI was “riddled by factionalism” as remaining members of the organisation jostled for power and clashed on how to create a blueprint for their operations moving forward.

“Abu Dujana had different ideas for the organisation and felt that bombing foreigners was not the way to achieve its aims,” Abuza said.

“Enough people in JI thought it was best to lie low after the Bali bombing and that the attack had not been productive,” he said.

“Abu Dujana was not arguing that killing foreigners was morally wrong, just that it was not productive as, with each attack and subsequent arrests, the organisation was getting weaker.”

Counterterrorism work continues

Indonesia also came a long way in regards to creating an effective counterterrorism framework that has significantly weakened networks of potential attackers across the region, said Alif Satria, a researcher at the department of politics and social change at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia.

“First is the creation of Densus 88 in 2003 through the help of other countries. This has ensured that Indonesia has a well-functioning counterterrorism unit with the necessary intelligence and operational skills to dismantle networks,” Satria told Al Jazeera.

Densus 88 or Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88, was a unit formed in 2003 under the umbrella of the National Police and was funded, equipped, and trained in part by the US and Australia.

Policemen from Indonesia’s elite antiterrorism unit Detachment 88 during a drill in Jakarta in 2010 before a visit by then-US President Barack Obama [File: Supri/Reuters]

Satria added that another milestone was the creation of Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2010.

Deradicalisation programmes led by the police in the early 2000s were also critical in ensuring that those arrested did not re-engage with hardline groups once they were released.

“As a result, Indonesia has managed to keep its recidivism rate at around 11 percent,” he said.

However, the counterterrorism work conducted by the Indonesian authorities is still in progress.

Who will emerge next?

Open-source data collection shows that between 2021 and 2023, more JI members were arrested than members of other groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an ISIL-affiliated group responsible for recent attacks in Indonesia and the wider region.

Some of the more recent incidents include the 2018 Surabaya bombings in which three Christian churches were attacked in the city of Surabaya by a husband and wife and their four children, one of whom was just nine years old. Fifteen people were killed.

The same group was also behind the Jolo Cathedral bombings in Sulu in the Philippines in 2019 that killed 20 people.

“Between 2021 and 2023, there were some 610 people arrested, 42 percent of whom were JI and 39 percent JAD and other pro-Islamic State groups,” Satria said.

“For me, that goes to show that, despite not conducting attacks, JI is very much still active, be it in conducting recruitment, fundraising or preparing for its regeneration,” he said.

Abuza agreed with that cautious tone, saying the lack of clear leadership on a global scale for hardline groups had also contributed to a general sense of quintessence.

But that could quickly change.

“These organisations are living organisations and respond to the external environment,” Abuza said.

“Everyone is waiting to see what happens in the Middle East and who emerges as a leader,” he said.

“Someone will,” he added.

Al Jazeera English

11. Long Enlistments, Culture Wars, and Disconnect From the Public: Expert Outlines How the US Military's Recruitment Is Falling Short

Long Enlistments, Culture Wars, and Disconnect From the Public: Expert Outlines How the US Military's Recruitment Is Falling Short

Peter Feaver, Political Science Professor at Duke University said the military is struggling to recruit new soldiers because it's no longer in line with the values of young people and public confidence is low

Published 09/16/23 12:57 PM ET|Updated 18 hr ago

Yelena Dzhanova

themessenger.com · September 16, 2023

The U.S. Military has been struggling to grow its ranks as new enlistments have decreased, which has led to the government institution missing its recruitment goals.

Last year, the Army fell noticeably short of its goal of 60,000 new soldiers. And this year, military officials have previously expressed that they're not confident they'll be able to hit the new 65,000 active recruit goal.

"We are not going to make that goal," Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told lawmakers at a congressional hearing in May. "We are doing everything we can to get as close to it as possible; we are going to fall short.

A scholar who studies the relationship between civilians and the military said the dip in recruitment is tied in part to low public confidence in the armed forces.

In an op-ed last month, Peter Feaver, professor of political science and public policy at Duke University, noted that the public confidence rate rests on a myriad of factors like patriotism and the military’s performance.

"[T]he military should not be complacent about its relative status because confidence in the military is high — but hollow," he wrote. "The pillars undergirding the public’s confidence are eroding. "

Elaborating in an interview with The Messenger, Feaver said public confidence tends to skyrocket when the U.S. military pulls off a successful mission. Recent examples include the capture of Saddam Hussain in 2003 and the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden.

The results of a Gallup poll conducted in June show that public confidence in the military is at 60% — the lowest it’s been since 1997, a steady decline in recent years.

In addition to low public approval, other factors are also driving low recruitment rates, said Feaver, the author of Thanks for Your Service, his book on military confidence that came out over the summer.

But public confidence isn’t enough to sustain the military. In fact, Feaver calls it a “tier two factor” in military efforts to bolster recruitment.

Civil-Military Disconnect

Tier one factors, Feaver said, include a strong economy and differing values between civilians and military personnel.

People generally gravitate toward the military when the economy is bad, he said. If the economy is picking up — the U.S. economy grew by a healthy 2% in the last quarter — then civilians might be less inclined to join the military because there are other employment options available.

Additionally, there’s a widening chasm between the military and civilians in terms of what commitment to work looks like. Feaver said the military career model is outdated and based on the premise that a new recruit will commit years of their life to service.

“But young people today, they just don’t approach job opportunities that way,” Feaver said. “The military is still built on the idea that we're going to recruit people who will commit six years of their life. … And the idea that they would be at the same organization for that long is not typical nowadays.”

The Armed Forces generally requires a commitment of four years of active duty and two years of inactive duty. Compare that to the Marine Corps, which offers a two-year enlistment, the shortest amount of all six branches of the military. Notably, Feaver said, the Marines have been able to meet their recruitment needs.

“It’s not an accident,” he said.

Other turn-offs to the military might be whether its officers are behaving or living up to their values. Concerns are mounting, for example, as sexual assault cases in the military continue to rise — but accused perpetrators continue to get off the hook. Women are particularly concerned about being sexually assaulted while serving, Feaver said.

U.S. Army Specialist Chad Morton, of George West, Texa,s stands next to a burning oil well at the Rumayla oil fields March 27, 2003 in Rumayla, IraqMario Tama/Getty Images

Culture Clash

Another reason recruitment might be low is that the military has in recent years become the object of a culture clash, with civilians on both sides of the political aisle feeling like it’s out of touch with their values.

On the right, Americans are beginning to associate the military with “woke” policies and practices, thanks to Republican leaders like Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, who earlier this year decried the institution on that account.

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantisJoe Raedle/Getty Images

"I think the military that I see is different from the military I served in," DeSantis said in May of this year. "I see a lot of emphasis now on political ideologies, things like gender pronouns. I see a lot about things like DEI, and I think that that's caused recruiting to plummet."

And on the left, the military represents extremism, Feaver said. Dozens of people charged in relation to the January 6 insurrection in 2021 were affiliated with the military.

Whichever way you see it, the result is the same: Americans are discouraged from joining.

Feavers thinks the military, if it makes a few changes, can bolster recruitment. It’s important to note that while recruitment across the military is down, retention is not, meaning that people who join tend to be okay with the conditions inside. That means there’s a disconnect between what the public perceives happens in the military and what actually occurs.

But recruitment efforts still serve as a “temperature check” on how effective a tool the military is in foreign policy and U.S. efforts to negotiate and collaborate with other countries. So a good reading on the thermometer can be vital, Feaver said.

"[T]he military is part of a stable of the federal governing institutions that are all viewed as working well. And we're not in that sweet spot right now," he said, adding that the military has to get creative, particularly with its recruiting strategies to get back in the public's good graces.

As an example of an effective recruiting strategy, Feaver praised a TV advertisement promoting the U.S. Air Forces that ran two years ago.

In the ad, U.S. Air Force General Charles Q. Brown sits on a chair in a hangar as videos of airplanes and airmen in combat interrupt him on screen.

“When I’m flying, I put my helmet on, my visor down, my mask up,” he says. “You don’t know who I am — whether I’m African American, Asian American, Hispanic, white, male, or female. You just know I’m an American airman, kicking your butt.”

That ad, Feaver said, was clever in that it toed the line between the left and the right.

“That's a very effective ad that that plays off with some of the controversy of diversity, but in a way that keeps the focus clearly on mission,” Feaver said.

But the military also has to find ways to connect to younger people and distance itself from perceptions on both the left and the right.

Otherwise, if the military doesn’t shape up, retention rates could begin to drop, posing new problems for the United States in international affairs and domestic efforts.

“As bad as we think it is now,” Feaver said of the state of the military, “it’s going to get worse if retention rates drop.”

themessenger.com · September 16, 2023

12. The long arm of Chinese law is getting longer in Southeast Asia

Excerpts:

What seems more likely is that China will act selectively. Beijing wants to garner diplomatic praise when it does take action, while bolstering its influence with regional security services.

China aims to “kill the chicken to scare the monkeys,” by sending a clear signal to the syndicates that they will be targeted if they continue to commit crimes in China.

Through selective but well-publicized operations, the government will try to allay public concerns and demonstrate that it will not allow Chinese citizens to be victimized by criminal networks operating overseas.

However, some SEZ and the criminal enterprises that run them remain in Beijing’s broad strategic interests. As such, it remains to be seen whether China will continue to put pressure on the governing authorities to shut the zones, illegal casinos and scam centers.

The long arm of Chinese law is getting longer in Southeast Asia

Commentary by Zachary Abuza

2023.09.15

benarnews.org

For years, Chinese criminal organizations have been setting up shop across Southeast Asia, built on the proliferation of Chinese-dominated Special Economic Zones (SEZ) including Boten in Laos, Shwe Kokko in Myanmar, or the casinos in Cambodia’s Sihanoukville.

Despite the fact that fugitives from Chinese law often ran these networks, Beijing saw them as a useful tool for advancing its interests. Local governments were on the take, and for the most part, Chinese authorities turned a blind eye to the problem.

In Europe triads do everything from marshaling patriotic actions from overseas communities, to quelling dissent and disappearing opposition figures, to opening doors for Chinese businesses, according to a recent report by ProPublica.

In Southeast Asia, Beijing similarly uses criminal gangs as instruments of statecraft. The archipelago of SEZ along China’s southwestern flank were, in essence, “splinters” of Chinese sovereignty, where local law enforcement had little to no jurisdiction.

Recently, however, Chinese law enforcement agencies have intensified their cooperation with Southeast Asian counterparts to address the scourge in transnational crime, money laundering, illicit drug production, human trafficking and cyber scams.

The answer to the question “Why is China moving now?” is becoming increasingly straightforward amid a flurry of international media and think-tank reports on lawlessness and rights abuses in Chinese-controlled economic zones in Southeast Asia.

Beijing is facing reputational and diplomatic costs for turning a blind eye to labor and sex trafficking, cyber scams and other crimes in the zones. International media exposés have laid bare China’s culpability.

Many of these scam centers and human trafficking rings are being run by fugitives from China. First and foremost, they are wanted for crimes committed within China.

Chinese victims

More importantly for Beijing, the scam centers are praying on Chinese in sufficient numbers that authorities feel they have to take action. This is all the more so as the Chinese economy slows, and people are more susceptible to scams or human trafficking, while illicit drug use is climbing.

China’s pro-active approach also reflects the fact that there are now enough Chinese citizens who are amongst the 120,000 trafficked people in Myanmar’s SEZ and 100,000 in Cambodian scam centers that authorities are being forced to act. Radio Free Asia reported in May about allegations of 1,000 Chinese in a single scam center in Myanmar whose families had to pay $30,000 to secure their release.

The bigger questions are how selective will China be in the targets of cross-border law enforcement cooperation with its southern neighbors and how long will the proactive stance last?

Recent law enforcement cooperation with Southeast Asian counterparts really got started in 2012 with the arrest of drug lord Naw Kham, wanted for the October 2011 death of 13 Chinese sailors. China compelled law enforcement in Laos and Thailand to assist in the hunt and made sure that they got the credit.

Cooperation was sporadic afterward, until recently.

In August 2022, Thai authorities arrested She Zhijiang, a Chinese national holding a Cambodian passport, whose Yatai International Holdings has developed Myanmar’s Shwe Kokko since 2017. She has been fighting extradition, but is certain to lose.

In June 2023, six Chinese suspects were apprehended and returned to China from Myanmar in a joint operation, according to the South China Morning Post. Since then there’s been a steady return of Chinese nationals.

Just last month, news broke that Singapore authorities had arrested 10 individuals in conjunction with a Singapore $1 billion (U.S. $737 billion) money laundering scheme from Cambodian and Philippine casinos.

Authorities seized 94 properties, Singapore $125 million ($91 million) in bank accounts, cash, 50 luxury vehicles and countless luxury items.

Police officers pose for a photo with suspects of telecom scams as they were brought back to China from Cambodia at Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport in Chengdu, China, Aug. 24, 2017. [Wu Guangyu/Xinhua via Getty Images]

The investigation and asset seizures have since expanded to Singapore $1.8 billion ($1.3 billion) and includes 24 individuals. The probe has also expanded to include $56 million in real estate the United Kingdom. Though all were born in China, nine of the 10 arrested in Singapore were naturalized Cambodian citizens.

While it has gone unsaid, Chinese law enforcement provided key information on the operation to their Singapore counterparts, which fits a pattern of a much more proactive posture of Chinese law enforcement in Southeast Asia.

The investigation and asset seizures have since expanded to Singapore $1.8 billion ($1.3 billion) and includes 24 individuals. The probe has also expanded to include $56 million in real estate the United Kingdom. Though all were born in China, nine of the 10 arrested in Singapore were naturalized Cambodian citizens.

In late August, Myanmar handed over 24 nationals to Chinese authorities, according to Radio Free Asia reporting.

In September, Chinese law enforcement, working with their client in Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), raided 11 scam centers in Shan State accused of swindling victims out of 120 million yuan ($16.4 million). Law enforcement arrested 269 people, including 186 Chinese nationals who were immediately returned to China. Chinese state media described 21 of the returnees as “golden masters” or the ringleaders.

Within days, the number of people returned to China reached 1,207. Footage of Chinese police escorting a column of detained scammers surfaced on social media.

Selective actions

In another but unrelated case, six people responsible for human trafficking were sent back to China from Myanmar.

To date, China’s actions in Myanmar have been focused in northern Shan state – which raises the question why Chinese authorities are moving against some but not others on that conflict-ridden country's complicated ethnic map.

The UWSA has not taken similar measures in its headquarters area of Kokang in Shan State. Likewise, the scam centers in areas controlled by Karen border guard forces that are aligned with the junta, such as Shwe Kokko and KK Park, or in Lashio or Tachileik in Shan State are still operational.

In next-door Laos, the Golden Triangle SEZ continues its expansion into a city now with its own airport. On Sept. 11, Lao authorities returned 164, including 46 from the Golden Triangle SEZ, but it is unclear whether this reflects an overall crackdown on Zhao Wei’s criminal empire.

What seems more likely is that China will act selectively. Beijing wants to garner diplomatic praise when it does take action, while bolstering its influence with regional security services.

China aims to “kill the chicken to scare the monkeys,” by sending a clear signal to the syndicates that they will be targeted if they continue to commit crimes in China.

Through selective but well-publicized operations, the government will try to allay public concerns and demonstrate that it will not allow Chinese citizens to be victimized by criminal networks operating overseas.

However, some SEZ and the criminal enterprises that run them remain in Beijing’s broad strategic interests. As such, it remains to be seen whether China will continue to put pressure on the governing authorities to shut the zones, illegal casinos and scam centers.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or BenarNews.

benarnews.org

​13. Ukrainian soldier says US-made Bradley fighting vehicles are 'priceless' in nighttime assaults, offering visibility better than in daylight

Ukrainian soldier says US-made Bradley fighting vehicles are 'priceless' in nighttime assaults, offering visibility better than in daylight

news.yahoo.com · by Jake EpsteinUpdated September 15, 2023 at 12:54 PM·4 min read381Link Copied

A Ukrainian serviceman of the 47th Magura Separate Mechanized Brigade drives a M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle at a position near a front line in the Zaporizhzhia region on June 26, 2023.REUTERS/Rfe/Rl/Serhii Nuzhnenko

• Ukrainian soldiers have relied on US-made Bradley fighting vehicles to stay alive in combat.
• Bradley crewmembers have praised the armor for being strong and durable on the battlefield.
• In a recent interview, one soldier said the Bradleys are "priceless" during nighttime assaults.

US-made Bradley infantry fighting vehicles have proven invaluable for nighttime operations against Russian forces, a Ukrainian soldier said, describing the armored transport as strong, durable, and highly capable in combat.

Throughout its months-long grinding counteroffensive, the Ukrainian military has relied on its arsenal of M2A2 Bradleys to brave incoming Russian fire, navigate across sprawling minefields, and face other deadly hazards. Kyiv's soldiers have credited the vehicles with keeping them alive in battle, saying that they wouldn't survive the same threats in Ukraine's Soviet-era troop carriers. In some cases, Bradleys have even been send to rescue civilians stranded under heavy fire.

In a recent video interview with Ukraine's Strategic Communications Directorate, which was published on Thursday by the country's defense ministry, a Bradley crew from the 47th Mechanized Brigade described their experience training on the vehicle and then employing it on the battlefield. The interviewees — a commander, gunner, and driver — praised the Bradley for being strong and for its ability to withstand mine blasts.

"It's a serious machine, a very serious machine," a soldier said.

Soldiers and mechanics from Ukraine's 47th Mechanized Brigade test-drive a Bradley at a secret workshop in a wooded area in the Zaporizhzhia Region.Ed Ram/For The Washington Post via Getty Images

One soldier described the Bradley's thermal imager of being "very high quality," allowing the crew to clearly see targets several miles out. He said that although the firepower range of the Bradley is lacking — its primary gun is a cannon that can fire hundreds of 25 mm rounds a minute — its projectiles can still cause significant damage.

"The shrapnel density is crazy, the firepower density is just insane," the soldier said. "Target acquisition takes seconds, just seconds. At night, this machine is absolutely priceless, simply invaluable. You capture targets much faster, visibility is better than during the day."

Another soldier said comparing the Bradley to its Soviet-era counterparts is like "night and day." He said the vehicle is "suitable for breakthroughs," and is capable of undertaking defensive roles and evacuating wounded troops.

—Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) September 14, 2023

Highly maneuverable and capable of traveling at speeds of over 40 mph, Bradleys are heavily armored vehicles that can transport up to six fully equipped troops to and from the battlefield, provide fire support, and carry out reconnaissance missions. They are armed with Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles — capable of hitting enemy tanks and armored vehicles in the distance with high explosive warheads — and two guns, including the 25 mm M242 Bushmaster chain gun and a 7.62mm M240C machine gun.

The Bradley was initially built as a response to Soviet infantry fighting vehicles, and it entered service in the 1980s before being deployed to the Gulf War in the following decade. According to a 1992 Government Accountability Office report on the Bradley's performance during that conflict, the vehicle "proved to be lethal" and its weapons demonstrated that they were "effective against a variety of targets." The Bradley was then sent to Iraq in the 2000s.

The US announced in early January that it would send Bradleys to Ukraine, and because it is a tracked vehicle, it was initially misidentified by some observers as a tank. "It's not a tank, but it's a tank killer," Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder said to reporters at the time in an attempt to clear the apparent confusion.

"It will provide a significant boost to Ukraine's already impressive armor capabilities. And we're confident that it will aid them on the battlefield," Ryder said.

Ukrainian soldiers and mechanics work on a Bradley at a secret workshop in the Zaporizhzhia region on July 13.Ed Ram/For The Washington Post via Getty Images

Indeed, these vehicles eventually reached the battlefield in April, giving Kyiv a significant armor boost alongside other heavy weaponry provided by NATO countries that was delivered ahead of the much-anticipated counteroffensive. But despite the heavy praise by Ukrainian soldiers, Bradleys are not indestructible and they have still fallen victim to Russia's formidable defenses and relentless artillery in the months since.

According to the latest Pentagon data, the US has pledged a total of 186 Bradleys to Ukraine as part of the nearly $44 billion in security assistance that the Biden administration has committed to Kyiv since Russian forces invaded in February 2022. Open-source intelligence collected by the site Oryx shows that 53 of the Washington-provided vehicles have been destroyed, damaged, or abandoned during fighting.

It does not appear to be the case that any of the Bradleys have been captured by the Russians, and Ukrainian crews have repaired some enough to return to combat.

Read the original article on Business Insider

news.yahoo.com · by Jake EpsteinUpdated September 15, 2023 at 12:54 PM·4 min read381Link Copied

​14. ANALYSIS: How ATACMS Will Help Ukraine

ANALYSIS: How ATACMS Will Help Ukraine

A guide to the powerful Army Tactical Missile Missile Systems (ATACMS) which, recent news reports in the US suggest, might be soon on its way to Ukraine.

https://www.kyivpost.com/analysis/21688

By Bohdan Tuzov

September 16, 2023, 2:34 pm | Comments (4)

Photo: illustrative / AFP

The US media site ABC News quotes a US official saying, in relation to ATACMS, that “They are coming,” while at the same time hedging his bets by noting that, as always, such plans are subject to change until officially announced.

A second official said the missiles are “on the table” to be included in the next US military security assistance package for Ukraine, although a final decision has not been made. 

If they do come, ATACMS will potentially play a significant role in destroying Russian materiel and personnel and important command centers as well as in interdicting enemy logistics. 

Designed to destroy targets at ranges up to 300 km, these missiles could effectively target Russian military facilities in occupied Crimea and the high-profile Kerch Bridge. That is assuming the US would not place restrictions on their use against legitimate targets located on Ukrainian territory.  

It is possible that, as with F-16 fighter aircraft, the US might impose restrictions on the use of ATACMS against enemy forces located on.

What is ATACMS?

ATACMS (pronounced “attack’ems”) is a tactical ballistic missile manufactured by the US defense company Lockheed Martin. Development of the missile started in 1980, based on a US requirement for a long-range, non-nuclear capability to strike enemy rear-area logistic and reserve positions.

It has a solid propellant motor which gives it a range of up to 300 km. The missile is 4 meters high and 610 millimeters in diameter. 

MORE ON THIS TOPIC

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It can be fired from the tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), both of which are in use with the Armed Forces of Ukrainian (AFU).

To date there have been five variants of the missile produced:

• M39 cluster munition – inertially guided, carrying 950 M74 anti-personnel and anti‑materiel sub-munitions with a range of 25-165 km. Production ceased in 1997; total produced: 1,650;
• M39A1 – GPS-aided guidance added, size of motor increased resulting in reduced payload of 300 M74 APAM sub-munitions but maximum range increased to 300 km. Production ceased in 2003; total produced: 610;
• M48 – GPS-aided guidance fit with 230-kilogram WAU-23/B penetrating high-explosive blast fragmentation warhead (same as US Navy Harpoon anti-ship missile), maximum range 300 km. Production 2001-2004; total produced: 176;
• M57 – improved version of M48 with greater accuracy: Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 9 meters. Production 2004-2013, total produced 513;
• The M57E1 – upgraded M39 and M39A1 with improved motor, updated navigation and guidance software and hardware giving a CEP of 3 meters. It is fitted with the WAU-23/B warhead section instead of the M74 APAM sub-munitions with aproximity sensor for airburst detonation. Production commenced in2017 with total assessed quantity produced 1,200.

Once delivered to Ukraine, the missiles will quadruple the 70 range of the current M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS platforms, which have already become game changers. 

Using the current weapons, the AFU have destroyed a number of enemy ammunition dumps and command centers along with hundreds of armored vehicles, artillery, antiaircraft systems and radar stations and their crews. 

ATACMS, will give Ukrainian forces the ability to destroy such targets far deeper into the enemy's rear.

In 2022, the average price of one ATACMS missile was approximately $1.5 million.

History

The XMGM-140A missile was first test-launched in 1986. In 1991, the modified MGM-140 was officially commissioned for use by the US Army with shortly afterwards, 32 of the missiles being used during Desert Storm against Iraqi facilities. Their effectiveness was assessed as very high.

A series of upgrades that followed, one of which being GPS guidance added to the inertial targeting system, significantly increased the speed, range and precision of the ATACMS. In 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom saw the launch of more than 450 ATACMS missiles.

The Iraqi army's outdated air defenses were simply unable to defend its important facilities, communications hubs and command centers against the American missiles that flew at a formidable speed of 5,000 kmph.

Work began on an ATACMS replacement in 2016, which became the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) program in 2019, with a planned in-service date of 2023. PrSM, as currently envisaged will be fired from the same M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS launchers with a range in excess of 500 kilometers.

Why does Ukraine need ATACMS?

While many Russian military bases, logistics facilities and other targets in Crimea are out of reach of Ukraine's HIMARS rockets, ATACMS would effectively overcome this shortcoming. In particular, they could neutralize the Russian ballistic missile complexes that frequently bombard Odesa.  

ATACMS is high-speed ballistic missile that climbs as high as 50,000 m, changes trajectory in flight and accelerates up to Mach 3 making it extremely difficult to intercept.

The short-term provision of even a small number of ATACMS could radically change the situation, because they can interdict Russia's key supply routes that run very far from the frontlines.

By destroying bridges and railroad facilities they would significantly debilitate the Russian forces. The loss of missile and radar complexes in the occupied territories, would mean they could no longer terrorize Ukrainian cities.  

Bohdan Tuzov

He studies economics at Shevchenko Kyiv National University. Published in “NV”, “Ukrainian Interest”, “Ukrinform”. Area of interest: technologies, military equipment.

15. Ukraine’s best defense is to decolonize the Russian Federation from within

Hmmm....

Resistance and unconventional warfare. Can Ukraine mobilize, influence, and support the ethnic minorities inside Russia?

Sounds like the author is advocating Gene Sharp's "From Dictatorship to Democracy" the use of non-violent resistance.

Excerpts:

We believe that the main challenge to Moscow’s imperialism will arise from the efforts of ethnic minorities inside Russia to decolonize themselves. Their sheer numbers preclude coercion or intimidation into silence. Their grievances are too conspicuous to be disregarded indefinitely. Their current predicament leaves them with few alternatives: either total erasure of their identity or engagement in a political struggle to challenge the existing status quo.

If properly supported, a drive for decolonization can generate enough momentum to foster a potent political discourse, founded on non-imperialistic values such as inclusivity, rejection of Russification, genuine diversity, and acknowledgment of ethnic minority rights. This can also lead to the establishment of stable, non-authoritarian political entities in the event of Russia’s disintegration.

For this vision to materialize, active engagement with these ethnic groups that advocate for non-authoritarian governance is imperative. We must establish communication channels with such groups, engage their leaders, and explore frameworks of mutual responsibilities, particularly centered around the commitment to non-violence and inclusivity.

We are confident that this engagement will bolster Euro-Atlantic security and reduce future threats by constraining Russia’s ability to lash out at its neighbors. An internal political transformation can deter aggressive wars by a decolonized and diminished Russian state.

Ukraine’s best defense is to decolonize the Russian Federation from within

BY YAROSLAV YURCHYSHYN, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 09/16/23 11:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4204367-ukraines-best-defense-is-to-decolonize-the-russian-federation-from-within/?utm_source=pocket_saves

Last month, Ukraine’s parliament established a special committee to formulate a legal framework for interactions with small and indigenous national movements within Russia. Its underlying goal is to establish enduring peace for both Ukraine and the trans-Atlantic community.

No treaty, political engagement, diplomatic arrangement or extensive dialogue has proven sufficient to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aspirations to impose his will on other nations. The contemporary Russian political tradition is notorious for disregarding commitments made to those perceived as rivals, rebels, or revolutionaries who challenge the ruling clique in Moscow. The imperial mindset, characterized by notions such as “civilizing missions,” “natural spheres of influence,” “non-historic nations” and ‘hierarchy of cultures” is deeply ingrained in the political culture of this vast multi-ethnic state created through conquest.

Resurgent Russian imperial ambitions shine through in the backing of separatists in Moldova and Georgia during the early 1990s, as well as subsequent invasions of Chechnya and Georgia. More recent cyberattacks against Estonia, France and Romania, along with ongoing efforts to manipulate public opinion in the U.S., demonstrate that even a weakened imperialist Russia remains a significant threat to NATO.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked the culmination of a deliberate strategy set in motion decades earlier. Consequently, it will not be enough merely to compel Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. This will not quell Kremlin ambitions or offer a lasting solution. Instead, drawing from our painful experiences, a broad consensus prevails across the Ukrainian political spectrum that Russia will continue to pose a threat to its neighbors as long as it clings to its current political mindset and retains its imperialistic past.

Many of our partners believe that effecting change entails engaging with the Russian democratic opposition and pressuring the Kremlin to embrace a diversified political system. We remain deeply skeptical. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine revealed that Russian society is broadly either cheering or ignoring the war, with a negligible minority actively opposing it. Simultaneously, numerous leaders within the Russian democratic opposition exhibit the same imperialistic mentality as the current regime, vehemently attacking grassroots initiatives that challenge the concept of a “united and indivisible Russia.”

The majority of genuine de-colonization initiatives, shunned by the Russian opposition, originate from various ethnic groups resisting the forced Russification of their societies. Although ethnic groups in Russia briefly experienced political and cultural autonomy following the Soviet Union’s collapse, this was swiftly reversed in the early 2000s. The Russian government has since worked to dismantle any traces of political autonomy in ethnic regions. It has also reintroduced Russification policies into the educational and public spheres, and eroded financial independence, which previously allowed ethnic republics to sustain themselves.

This, in conjunction with a subtle campaign to vilify those openly opposing Russification, has multiplied tensions in these ethnic regions.

Russia’s current descent into full-fledged authoritarianism, coupled with media restrictions reminiscent of China’s approach, fosters societal animosity toward dissenters from the “great mission of Russia.” Meanwhile, the ongoing decline of Russia’s federal system and economy compels the government to lean on its military and secret police to ensure stability and survival of its regime.

This leaves underfunded the local administrations responsible for supporting deteriorating infrastructure and social services. Such developments, combined with the push for Russification, could lead to a grim scenario, dreaded by many in Washington — either the rapid decline and violent disintegration of Russia, or else its transformation into a new Soviet Union that actively strives to dismantle the Euro-Atlantic community.

We believe that the main challenge to Moscow’s imperialism will arise from the efforts of ethnic minorities inside Russia to decolonize themselves. Their sheer numbers preclude coercion or intimidation into silence. Their grievances are too conspicuous to be disregarded indefinitely. Their current predicament leaves them with few alternatives: either total erasure of their identity or engagement in a political struggle to challenge the existing status quo.

If properly supported, a drive for decolonization can generate enough momentum to foster a potent political discourse, founded on non-imperialistic values such as inclusivity, rejection of Russification, genuine diversity, and acknowledgment of ethnic minority rights. This can also lead to the establishment of stable, non-authoritarian political entities in the event of Russia’s disintegration.

For this vision to materialize, active engagement with these ethnic groups that advocate for non-authoritarian governance is imperative. We must establish communication channels with such groups, engage their leaders, and explore frameworks of mutual responsibilities, particularly centered around the commitment to non-violence and inclusivity.

We are confident that this engagement will bolster Euro-Atlantic security and reduce future threats by constraining Russia’s ability to lash out at its neighbors. An internal political transformation can deter aggressive wars by a decolonized and diminished Russian state.

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn is a member of Ukraine’s parliament and head of its Temporary Special Commission on Development of Basic Principles of State Policy for Cooperation with National Movements of Small and Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation.

TAGS RUSSIA RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR UKRAINE VLADIMIR PUTIN

16. 80 Percent of Russians Consider Their Country To Be 'Great' as Putin Begs North Korea for Weapons

80 Percent of Russians Consider Their Country To Be 'Great' as Putin Begs North Korea for Weapons

Just as Russia’s erstwhile strongman Vladimir Putin met with North Korea’s great leader with cup in hand, the Levada Center, a respectable Moscow-based polling organization, revealed that 80 percent of Russians consider their country to be “great.”

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · September 16, 2023

Just as Russia’s erstwhile strongman Vladimir Putin met with North Korea’s great leader with cup in hand, the Levada Center, a respectable Moscow-based polling organization, revealed that 80 percent of Russians consider their country to be “great.”

The irony should be painful.

Putin goes begging to one of the world’s least great countries, thereby demonstrating that Russia is anything but great, while Russians remain persuaded that Mother Russia exudes greatness.

It’s actually worse than that.

Back in 2016, only 64 percent thought Russia was great. And in 2002, three years after Putin ascended the Kremlin’s throne, the figure stood at 43 percent.

Any minimally objective person capable of withstanding the allure of Putin’s crumbling personality cult would recognize that his misrule has succeeded in transforming Russia from the status of a great power to the status of a geopolitical lightweight, an economic beggar, and an international rogue. If those qualities make a country great, then all the more power to Mother Russia.

But note that perceptions of greatness almost doubled from the time Putin seized power in 1999 to today. This suggests that Russians identify Russia with Putin and, therefore, view their country as great only because they still continue to view Putin in a positive light.

And that, in turn, is ultimately testimony to the power of Putin’s propaganda machine and the continued influence of his ragged personality cult.

In a recent Telegram posting, the rabid propagandist Margarita Simonian referred to Putin as her Nachalnik (NB the upper case), a Russian word that translates best as boss. She should have referred to him as President, so calling him Boss reveals that her attitude toward Putin is not one of institutional respect, but of adulatory subservience. As the Levada poll indicates, Simonyan isn’t the only Russian with “Putin envy.”

Hence, even though Putin has pushed his country over a cliff and is likely to bring about chaos, civil war, and collapse, Russians blithely continue to ignore the writing on the wall and fixate on their Bossman.

There is a silver lining in this sad tale. Contrary to his expectations, Putin is not eternal, and some Russian analysts predict his physical and political demise by the end of the year. Whenever that event transpires, the end of Putin will leave his Russian fans with a political vacuum at the core of their political lives. It’s possible, given Russian political culture’s authoritarian bent, that they’ll fixate their adoration on some other man.

But it’s also possible that their love of greatness and their identification of great Russia with Putin will also open opportunities for change. When their Bossman goes, who knows? Russians might even consider growing up and abandoning their infantile infatuation with “great” father figures.

About the Author

Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

From the Vault

‘You Really Oughta Go Home’: F-22 Raptor Stealth Fighter Flew Under F-4 From Iran

A Second American Civil War?

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · September 16, 2023

17.  China Defense Chief Mystery Adds to Leadership Turbulence

China Defense Chief Mystery Adds to Leadership Turbulence

• Xi Jinping recently called for ‘unity’ in China’s military
• Li Shangfu was last seen in public on Aug. 29 in Beijing
• https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-14/us-believes-china-defense-minister-faces-inquiry-ft-says?sref=hhjZtX76

By Bloomberg News

September 14, 2023 at 7:36 PM EDT

Updated on September 15, 2023 at 1:46 PM EDT

A mystery surrounding the status of China’s defense minister is raising questions about turbulence within President Xi Jinping’s new line-up of loyalist leaders less than a year into his third term.

Li Shangfu hasn’t been seen in public for more than two weeks, with a steady trickle of reports suggesting China’s fourth-most senior military figure is the latest top Communist Party official to be abruptly ousted from the upper echelons of Xi’s ranks.

The defense chief is under investigation for corruption related to the procurement of military equipment, Reuters reported Friday, citing a regional security official and three people in direct contact with the Chinese military.

That follows an earlier report that Li canceled his attendance at an annual meeting with Vietnamese defense leaders last week on short notice. Beijing cited a “health condition,” two Vietnamese officials said, according to Reuters.

Li ShangfuPhotographer: Alexander Nemenov/AFP/Getty Images

The US ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel, wrote on social media platform X that Li had also skipped a meeting with the Singaporean Chief of Navy. “Something is rotten in the state of Denmark,” Emanuel said, quoting from Shakespeare’s Hamlet.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said she had “no information” when asked at a regular press briefing Friday about Li’s absence from Vietnam last week. Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn’t respond to a request for comment.

China’s Defense Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment, and Singapore’s Ministry of Defense didn’t respond to an email asking for confirmation of Li’s absence. China’s embassy in Washington declined to comment on Friday.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Friday told reporters “I don’t know about the status of the defense minister.” The Financial Times earlier reported the US government believes Li was stripped of his duties and under investigation.

The defense minister’s drop from public view comes after Xi purged several other top leaders in recent months without explanation. Those moves have fanned investor fears that Xi’s policy swings along with official data gaps are making China more volatile, just as Beijing seeks to attract foreign capital to buoy its slowing economy.

“Recent events all add to the existing uncertainty and create a sense of unease for other governments and entities that have to work with China,” said Ja Ian Chong, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. “Li’s disappearance only adds to speculation over developments within the CCP’s top leadership.”

That uncertainty shouldn’t be seen as a sign Xi faces challenges to his rule, said Jennifer Welch, Bloomberg Economics’s chief geoeconomic analyst who was formerly director for China and Taiwan on the White House’s National Security Council. “But they certainly raise questions about the dynamics in Beijing right now,” she added.

As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, “Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.” 1st: Defense Minister Li Shangfu hasn’t been seen or heard from in 3 weeks. 2nd: He was a no-show for his trip to Vietnam. Now: He’s absent from his scheduled meeting with the Singaporean Chief of Navy…

— ラーム・エマニュエル駐日米国大使 (@USAmbJapan) September 15, 2023

Xi’s decision to skip the annual Group of 20 leaders’ summit last weekend for the first time since taking power led to speculation that domestic issues were demanding his attention. US President Joe Biden said the Chinese leader’s absence was due to having “his hands full” at home.

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Those comments came after a series of unusual events in Chinese politics, made all the more significant because Xi was reported to have consolidated power and installed only trusted aides at last year’s leadership congress. While Li doesn’t have a personal history with Xi, as an aerospace engineer he’s part of the so-called cosmos club that the Chinese leader has elevated in an attempt to rival the US in technological prowess.

Such endorsement from Xi hasn’t sheltered rising stars of late.

The Chinese leader ousted his handpicked foreign minister Qin Gang after just seven months in the job. That same month, the People’s Liberation Army announced it was launching a wide-ranging corruption probe into hardware procurement going back to October 2017, without saying why that date was significant.

Li headed the equipment department from September 2017 to 2022, though the government has given no indication he’s suspected of wrongdoing. That probe coincided with Xi’s decision over the summer to abruptly purge two generals leading the secretive rocket force — manager of the country’s nuclear arsenal — also without explanation.

“What we’re seeing is a really heightened level of political risk in China,” said Drew Thompson, a former Pentagon official and a senior fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore. That was likely to create “fear, uncertainty and self-doubt” in China’s political system that could paralyze decision making, he added.

Perhaps anticipating those problems, Xi last week called for “unity, security and stability” within the military during an inspection tour in China’s northeast, as rumors about Li swirled in diplomatic circles.

• Read More on Xi’s Abrupt Moves:Xi Stresses Military Unity After Purging Rocket Force Chiefs
• Ouster of Xi’s Handpicked Foreign Minister Halts Rising Career
• Xi’s Unexplained G-20 Snub Erodes Image as Global Statesman
• China’s Military Probes Slew of Graft Issues Going Back to 2017

The defense minister made his last made a public appearance on Aug. 29, when he delivered a keynote speech at the 3rd China-Africa Peace and Security Forum in Beijing. He also traveled to Russia and Belarus in mid-August.

Li’s ouster could benefit the US, which sanctioned Li in 2018 over an arms purchase he oversaw from Russia. China has since refused to hold top-level military talks between Li and his US counterpart until those curbs are lifted. That lack of communication has raised concern about an accident potentially setting off a conflict.

While upheaval within the PLA’s rocket forces could diminish China’s military readiness, Li’s removal would be less impactful to any invasion of Taiwan, which Beijing has pledged to bring under its control someday.

“His position as defense minister means his main role is to lead China’s military diplomacy with other countries,” said M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “He does not play a direct role in the command of PLA forces.”

— With assistance by Philip Glamann, Rebecca Choong Wilkins, Colum Murphy, Jing Li, Lucille Liu, Philip Heijmans, Jasmine Ng, John Boudreau, and Jacob Gu

(Updates with Reuters report in third paragraph.)

​18. Why the US Military Values a PhD in Political Science

Why the US Military Values a PhD in Political Science

https://democracyparadox.com/2023/09/08/why-the-us-military-values-a-phd-in-political-science/

By Lieutenant Colonel Nerea M. Cal

In the summer of 2021, reports of the chaotic and rushed withdrawal from Afghanistan dominated the news, with harrowing images of Afghans – desperate to escape what would surely be oppressive rule by a Taliban government – clinging to the landing gear of U.S. Air Force cargo aircraft as they departed Kabul Airport. I watched with a mix of horror, sadness, and disappointment as twenty years’ worth of American foreign policy and the blood, sweat, tears, and treasure of thousands of Americans and Afghans ended in debacle. Ten years earlier, as a young Army captain and Blackhawk helicopter pilot, I flew through those very skies and landed at that airport dozens of times. This was not how any of us thought it would end, though perhaps we should have seen it coming.

My military service included combat tours in both Afghanistan and Iraq. These experiences motivate me to try to understand how wars end. Wars are only worth fighting if one wins, or at least improves the conditions present at its outset. Winning wars means knowing how to bring them to constructive ends. Although distinctly different conflicts, unsatisfactory “ends” to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have catalyzed my thinking on related questions: How can external actors – whether countries, inter-governmental organizations, or non-state actors – plan for and successfully manage the transition from war to peace? How can they help achieve enduring stability without becoming mired in protracted conflicts? What types of interventions are most successful in negotiating and securing an enduring peace? And what contextual factors should be considered when crafting an intervention policy and the third party’s eventual withdrawal?

As the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrated, these questions are critical for military leaders, policymakers, and civilians (especially those in the conflict country). Over the past year, I have had the opportunity to pursue doctoral studies in political science at Yale University. Upon completing my studies, I will teach International Affairs at the United States Military Academy at West Point. It is my hope that my research will in some small way help prevent future foreign policy failures of this kind.

The rationale for pursuing a PhD is that it will enhance my effectiveness in future Army assignments.  Entrusted with educating, training, and inspiring future Army leaders, I will bear an immense responsibility and opportunity to help shape the minds of those who will be confronted with unimaginable foreign policy challenges in the coming decades. Our Army’s leadership takes this task so seriously that it sends faculty to the best institutions in the most rigorous graduate programs. Beyond teaching the cadets information, I will be expected to show them how to think – how to parse through the noise, extract the important questions, consider the relevant context, and critically analyze the complex world around them to make the best decisions possible. In a strategic environment of increasing uncertainty and complexity, these critical thinking skills will prove more useful than military equipment and training. It is, I would argue, what sets our military apart from the rest of the world: that we expect our leaders to be able to think for themselves and make difficult decisions in ambiguous situations within their commander’s intent.

A third benefit to my participation in a civilian doctoral program is that it contributes to the effort to bridge the civil-military gap that is present and widening in our society. While the military currently enjoys a place of respect in this country, those who join are limited to an increasingly small pool of citizens not necessarily well-represented in academia. While at Yale, I am in a sense serving as an ambassador of my service, helping educate and expose students and faculty, many of whom are not originally from the United States, about our military. Many of these individuals will go on to influential roles in and out of academia where this knowledge may prove important. Likewise, I am being enriched by my relationships with a diverse and talented group of people and will surely, both consciously and unconsciously, incorporate their perspectives into my way of thinking. Attending graduate school is therefore not just about acquiring skills or producing research; it also serves a valuable social function with possible political implications.

Ultimately, my reasons for pursuing a PhD very much mirror what motivated me to join the military: I hope to serve my country as part of something important that gives me an opportunity to challenge myself, grow as a person and scholar, and make a constructive contribution to my organization and community that could lead to better informed and more successful foreign policy decisions. Certainly, neither path is easy or straightforward, but I believe the reward will be well worth the effort.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government.

About the Author

Nerea Cal served for sixteen years of military service as an Army Blackhawk helicopter pilot with overseas assignments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and South Korea. From 2016 – 2018, she served as an Assistant Professor in the Social Sciences Department at the United States Military Academy and Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute, teaching courses on international relations theory and conflict negotiation and settlement. She has published work relating to post-conflict reconstruction in Kosovo and the application of international law in cyberspace. She is a doctoral student at Yale University studying international relations and comparative politics. Her research interests focus on the role of third parties in conflict termination and post-conflict reconstruction.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com