Quotes of the Day:

"A society that mocks virtue prepares its own collapse.

– Plato

“I have a foreboding of an America in my children's or grandchildren's time -- when the United States is a service and information economy; when nearly all the manufacturing industries have slipped away to other countries; when awesome technological powers are in the hands of a very few, and no one representing the public interest can even grasp the issues; when the people have lost the ability to set their own agendas or knowledgeably question those in authority; when, clutching our crystals and nervously consulting our horoscopes, our critical faculties in decline, unable to distinguish between what feels good and what's true, we slide, almost without noticing, back into superstition and darkness...

The dumbing down of American is most evident in the slow decay of substantive content in the enormously influential media, the 30 second sound bites (now down to 10 seconds or less), lowest common denominator programming, credulous presentations on pseudoscience and superstition, but especially a kind of celebration of ignorance.”

― Carl Sagan, 1995

"Hard times are coming, when we'll be wanting the voices of writers who can see alternatives to how we live now, can see through our fear stricken society and its obsessive technologies to other ways of being, and even imagine real grounds for hope. We'll need writers who remember freedom: poets, visionaries – realists of a larger reality.

 Ursula K. Le Guin

1. Scoop: Republicans plan bill to consolidate government-funded broadcasters

2. Kim Yo Jong Warns Against Japan-South Korea-US Joint Military Drills

3. USFK commander calls for 'adaptability' in alliance modernization with S. Korea

4. Lee, Trump expected to meet in Gyeongju on sidelines of APEC summit: U.S. envoy

5. Top diplomats of S. Korea, China hold talks on Xi's likely visit for APEC, N. Korea

6. Police apprehend 2 Chinese nationals behind unauthorized mobile payments of KT users

7. Defense ministry to complete new defense reform plan by June 2026

8. Russian recruiter openly advertises 2K North Korean female workers for hire

9. Why there won’t be need for speculation when Kim Jong Un truly names his heir

10. Kim Jong Un moves to shore up support among overseas spies after Ukraine war honors

11. The Republic of Korea is a committed U.S. partner

12.  Seoul reviews $25 billion U.S. arms purchases

13. Massive Chinese sugar shipment aims to boost Kim Jong Un’s image before party celebration

14. N. Korea intends to participate in 2026 Asian Games in Japan: report

15. Exercises show Washington keeping alliances strong as Pacific adversaries bring new threats

16. Bookshelf: North Korea’s unique autocratic bloodline

17. 2025 Outlook on the North Korean Sanctions Regime: A Needed Turning Point in Sanctions Enforcement?

18. Fault Lines Daily Summary - September 17, 2025

1. Scoop: Republicans plan bill to consolidate government-funded broadcasters

Preserve the firewall. I am not sure this will meet the real need unless the firewall is protected and it remains an exemplar of freedom of speech. If it is "controlled" by the USG then it will lose its value. 

I give credit to Congresswomen Kim for doing her best to preserve VOA and RFA, et al., and especially my beloved Korean Service.

Excerpts:

Between the lines: The bill, titled "The Information Warfare Modernization Act of 2025," has a few Republican co-signers, including Rep. Joe Wilson of South Carolina, and Reps. James Moylan and Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, delegates from Guam and American Samoa.

Zoom out: The proposal would essentially kill USAGM and transfer more power and control over U.S. government-funded broadcasters to the administration.

• Such an effort is likely to face legal scrutiny, as it would challenge the existing firewall meant to protect independent broadcasters, like the VOA, from government influence.
• There have been several lawsuits waged against the administration by government-funded broadcasters and their employees alleging the executive branch has overreached in its efforts to dismantle USAGM, a congressionally appropriated agency.
• The administration has looked to continue firing USAGM employees, despite legal setbacks. Most recently, a U.S. district judge ruled in August that USAGM special advisor Kari Lake's effort to remove VOA Director Michael Abramowitz was unlawful.

Scoop: Republicans plan bill to consolidate government-funded broadcasters

The U.S. Agency for Global Media website is displayed on a phone with Voice of America branding in the background. Photo: Jonathan Raa/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Axios · Sara Fischer · September 15, 2025

https://www.axios.com/2025/09/15/republicans-bill-media-usagm-radio-free-europe-funding

Rep. Young Kim (R-Calif.) on Monday is set to introduce a new bill to consolidate government-funded broadcasters overseen by the embattled U.S. Agency for Global Media and give the State Department more control as a way to preserve their funding and continue their efforts to counter foreign disinformation.

Why it matters: The bill aims to salvage decades-long efforts by government-funded broadcasters to provide news reports to countries with little or no access to independent reporting, while appeasing conservatives who think USAGM should be abolished.

Zoom in: The bill aims to consolidate three USAGM broadcasters — Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks — into one unified broadcaster that receives government funding through a State Department-distributed contract, according to draft text reviewed by Axios.

• It doesn't provide a name for the proposed unified broadcast entity, but calls for the assistant secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the State Department to become the issuer of its funding contract.
• The unified broadcasting unit would be governed by a single board, essentially eliminating the independent boards at each broadcaster, but the individual agencies would still be able to preserve their individual branding.
• Oversight of Voice of America, the largest government-funded broadcaster within USAGM, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, would be transferred to the State Department's Office of Global Media within the Bureau of Global Public Affairs.
• The bill calls for all broadcasters to receive the same amount of funding as they are currently appropriated by Congress.

Between the lines: The bill, titled "The Information Warfare Modernization Act of 2025," has a few Republican co-signers, including Rep. Joe Wilson of South Carolina, and Reps. James Moylan and Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, delegates from Guam and American Samoa.

Zoom out: The proposal would essentially kill USAGM and transfer more power and control over U.S. government-funded broadcasters to the administration.

• Such an effort is likely to face legal scrutiny, as it would challenge the existing firewall meant to protect independent broadcasters, like the VOA, from government influence.
• There have been several lawsuits waged against the administration by government-funded broadcasters and their employees alleging the executive branch has overreached in its efforts to dismantle USAGM, a congressionally appropriated agency.
• The administration has looked to continue firing USAGM employees, despite legal setbacks. Most recently, a U.S. district judge ruled in August that USAGM special advisor Kari Lake's effort to remove VOA Director Michael Abramowitz was unlawful.

Yes, but: While Kim's bill would certainly challenge some of the independence of government-funded broadcasters, it does aim to preserve their funding as adversaries overseas try to fill an information gap left by the gutting of those news agencies.

• "Every time we fail to speak the truth, our adversaries fill the void. We cannot hand the microphone over to China, Russia, Iran and North Korea," Kim said in a statement.
• "This bill allows our trusted broadcasting partners to continue critical coverage of human rights abuses and repression in countries where it is suppressed, while ensuring that every taxpayer dollar effectively advances U.S. national security interests. If we don't preserve this critical channel of influence, we risk losing hearts and minds around the world."

The big picture: VOA was created more than 80 years ago to combat Nazi propaganda during WWII. Its mission, to promote democracy and American interests abroad through fact-driven journalism, has been supported for many years by both Republicans and Democrats.

• President Trump looked to defund USAGM in his first term, but his efforts were stymied by legal challenges.
• In recent years, Republicans have taken aim at USAGM, formerly the Broadcasting Board of Governors, arguing those agencies were mismanaged.
• Kim hopes her new bill will address the "logistical, operational, and editorial issues that limited VOA's effectiveness under USAGM by bringing it under the State Department in support of U.S. public diplomacy," her office said in a statement.

Editor's note: This story has been corrected to reflect the proposal would make a State Department official the issuer (not grantee) of the funding contract.

Axios · Sara Fischer · September 15, 2025

2. Kim Yo Jong Warns Against Japan-South Korea-US Joint Military Drills

We should not fear these statements or change our behavior because of them. This is Kim Yo Jong conducting the regime's political warfare and setting the conditions for future blackmail diplomacy. They want to create the conditions to extract concessions. They are targeting the engaers and those who support the Sunshine Policy 2.0 on steroids.  

Also, the regime frankly must exploit alliance DEFENSIVE exercises by calling them a threat to justify the suffering and sacrifice of the Korean people in the north as the regime prioritizes support to nuclear weapons and missile development (and support to the elite) over the welfare of the Korean people in the north. 

And this is also an indication that the regime understands that the TTX, Iron Mace, demonstrates that the alliance will prevail in a nuclear war and is not a backing away from the possibility that the regime could initiate a nuclear attack.

Kim Yo Jong and the regime give us so much to exploit from an information warfare and psychological operations perspective. If only we would conduct such operations.

Excerpts:

Trump recently expressed his intention to have a meeting with Kim again, but Pyongyang appears to have no interest in renewing the deadlocked nuclear talks unless Washington makes concessions first. 

Blaming Seoul and Washington for leaving it no choice but to build up more weapons for its safety, Pyongyang’s hawkish statements over Seoul and Washington’s military drills will likely work as justification for upcoming missile tests. That could include tests of inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or other strategic nuclear weapons that would raise high alarm in the United States.

North Korea’s strategy to increase and consolidate its leverage in the region by strengthening ties with Russia and China for forming a trilateral anti-U.S. cooperation. Lee, as he already acknowledged, will likely face growing challenges in creating a Korean Peninsula where the two Koreas don’t need to fight against each other. 

Kim Yo Jong Warns Against Japan-South Korea-US Joint Military Drills

North Korea’s hawkish statements over the annual military drills will likely work as justification for upcoming missile tests.

https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/kim-yo-jong-warns-against-japan-south-korea-us-joint-military-drills/?v=1

By Mitch Shin

September 15, 2025

Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington steams in formation with vessels from the U.S. Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Republic of Korea Navy during Freedom Edge 24-2 in the East China Sea, Nov. 13, 2024.

Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Geoffrey L. Ottinger

Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and the main voice on inter-Korean relations, issued a statement on Sunday, expressing Pyongyang’s hostile stance against the upcoming joint military drills between South Korea, the United States, and Japan from September 15 to 19. 

“If the present rulers have sympathized with the dangerous ‘idea’ cooked up by the former rulers and put it into practice with full consideration given to it, we will regard it as an unfiltered ‘demonstration’ of their anti-DPRK confrontational stand and ‘succession’ of confrontational policy,” Kim said in her statement published by North Korea’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency on September 14. (DPRK is an acronym of North Korea’s official name, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.) 

Kim did not specify which rulers she was referring to in her statement. All three countries involved – Japan, South Korea, and the United States – have new leadership since last year’s iteration of the drills. 

Both the South Korea-U.S. Combined Nuclear and Conventional Integration tabletop exercise, dubbed as Iron Mace, and the trilateral South Korea-U.S.-Japan military drills, known as Freedom Edge, will be carried out this week.

Despite South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s pragmatic overtures toward North Korea, his government appears to be strengthening military cooperation with the U.S. as North Korea’s ties with Russia have been enhanced following Pyongyang’s explicit support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Lee administration is unlikely to reduce the scale of the extensive joint military drills with the U.S. due to the North’s steady ambition to build up advanced nuclear weapons and its clear intention to take an anti-U.S. stance by building up trilateral coalition with China and Russia in the region. 

“I remind the U.S., Japan and the ROK that the reckless show of strength made by them in real action in the vicinity of the DPRK, which is the wrong place, will inevitably bring bad results to themselves,” Kim Yo Jong said. (ROK is an acronym of South Korea’s official name, Republic of Korea.)

Since the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, North Korea has taken clear steps to construct a “two-state” system on the Korean Peninsula. Overturning decades of policy, Kim Jong Un declared that his country has no interest in “reunification” with South Korea, which was labeled a “hostile state.” Pyongyang has also ruled out the possibility of employing its nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other countries, even with the United States. 

Trump recently expressed his intention to have a meeting with Kim again, but Pyongyang appears to have no interest in renewing the deadlocked nuclear talks unless Washington makes concessions first. 

Blaming Seoul and Washington for leaving it no choice but to build up more weapons for its safety, Pyongyang’s hawkish statements over Seoul and Washington’s military drills will likely work as justification for upcoming missile tests. That could include tests of inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or other strategic nuclear weapons that would raise high alarm in the United States.

North Korea’s strategy to increase and consolidate its leverage in the region by strengthening ties with Russia and China for forming a trilateral anti-U.S. cooperation. Lee, as he already acknowledged, will likely face growing challenges in creating a Korean Peninsula where the two Koreas don’t need to fight against each other. 

Authors

Contributing Author

Mitch Shin

Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula.

3. USFK commander calls for 'adaptability' in alliance modernization with S. Korea

(note just the USFK commander, but I digress).

Adaptability to achieve agility.

The commander is preparing the information environment for the release of the new National Defense (War) Strategy and the Force Posture Review.

Whatever the Pentagon reveals for the Asia-Indo-Pacific region and specifically for Korea, the CINCUNC/CFC/USFK and SUSMOAK will have to make it work to support US interests, deter war in the region, and contribute to the defense of the ROK.  

USFK commander calls for 'adaptability' in alliance modernization with S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 17, 2025

By Kim Hyun-soo

SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- The commander of the U.S. military in South Korea said Wednesday that Seoul and Washington need to modernize their decadeslong military alliance through "adaptability," as the Trump administration might seek to rework the alliance to better counter the threat from China.

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), made the remarks at a forum in Seoul, amid reports that Washington may readjust the role of the USFK to cope with a changing regional security environment, in addition to its defense posture to deter North Korea.

"How do we modernize our alliance and threats of all pastors and our processes? And I believe the answer to that is that we modernize through adaptability," Brunson said.

"Our alliance is not a relic of the past, it's a foundation for the future. We're not just reacting to threats. We're shaping the environment. We're setting the terms of stability in the Indo-Pacific," he said.

"We're not only defending today, we're securing tomorrow for our soldiers, for our citizens and for the generations to come," Brunson said.

Citing China's "unprecedented" encircling military drills against Taiwan in 2022, Brunson called for "coalitions" among like-minded nations in times of crisis.

"We also saw here in the Indo-Pacific, when China launched unprecedented, unprecedented encircling drills around Taiwan in 2022 in a matter of hours," Brunson said.

"Beijing mobilized aircraft, ships and missile systems in a coordinated display of force that caught the world's attention for regional militaries, it was a stark reminder that flash points can escalate without warning, and that deterrence and readiness must account for sudden shifts in tempo," he said.

"These examples remind us truly that security is not only about capabilities, but it's about coalitions, nations willing to come together quickly in moments of crisis," Brunson said.

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, speaks to reporters during a press conference at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on Aug. 8, 2025, in this file photo provided by his office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Earlier this week, South Korea, the United States and Japan launched their trilateral military drills, in what is seen as their continued efforts to deepen three-way security cooperation against North Korea's military threats.

The five-day Freedom Edge exercise got under way in international waters east and south of South Korea's southern island of Jeju from Sept. 15-19.

Brunson said the three-way drills were "a tangible display, and we are expanding beyond bilateral deterrence to integrated regional security."

"These exercises send an unmistakable message. We are united, interoperable and ready," he said.

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 17, 2025

4. Lee, Trump expected to meet in Gyeongju on sidelines of APEC summit: U.S. envoy

I hope POTUS comes bearing gifts to the ROK (say 30,000 B1 visas to support all the investment/infrastructure development from the largest foreign direct investor in the US).

Also, a US ambassador would be welcome as well. (not that Ambassador Yun is not doing great work for the US as the Chief of Mission but it is long past time to nominate a new US ambassador to the ROK). And it would also be helpful if the US accepted the ROK ambassador to the US.

(LEAD) Lee, Trump expected to meet in Gyeongju on sidelines of APEC summit: U.S. envoy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 17, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout)

SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to travel to South Korea next month to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and meet President Lee Jae Myung on the sidelines, the acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea said Wednesday.

Acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Joseph Yun made the remarks during a conference on the Seoul-Washington alliance as South Korea will host the APEC summit in the southeastern city of Gyeongju between late October and early November.

Lee-Trump summit in Washington

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (L) and U.S. President Donald Trump smile during their talks in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington on Aug. 25, 2025. (Yonhap)

Lee invited Trump to the gathering during their bilateral summit talks held in Washington last month.

Yun said he believes the two leaders had "successful" talks in August and are expected to meet again in Gyeongju.

Earlier in the day, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told a forum that he expects Trump to visit South Korea to attend the APEC though nothing has been confirmed.

At the forum, Yun assessed the bilateral alliance as being more powerful than ever but also said the Seoul-Washington alliance needs to change in accordance with new threats and reality.

He was apparently referring to the "modernization of the alliance" aimed at expanding Seoul's defense posture beyond the Korean Peninsula, including readjusting the role and size of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea under a concept known as "strategic flexibility."

Yun also stressed that people-to-people exchanges between the two nations are a key factor in buttressing the alliance.

Joseph Yun, acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, speaks at a conference on the Seoul-Washington alliance on Sept. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · September 17, 2025

5. Top diplomats of S. Korea, China hold talks on Xi's likely visit for APEC, N. Korea

Let's start speculating about a "4 party" meeting at Panmunjom with Trump, Lee and Xi and Kim. Once a rumor is started everyone will get on the bus to Abilene. All we need is a tweet from POTUS and it will be June 30 2019 all cover again.

(2nd LD) Top diplomats of S. Korea, China hold talks on Xi's likely visit for APEC, N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 17, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES article as talks began; CHANGES dateline)

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL/BEIJING, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of South Korea and China held talks in Beijing on Wednesday, with a focus on Chinese President Xi Jinping's likely visit to Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and North Korea issues.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the first such top-level diplomatic talks between the two countries since the launch of President Lee Jae Myung's government in early June. Cho arrived in Beijing earlier in the day. The talks were to be followed by a working dinner.

Cho's two-day trip comes as South Korea seeks to balance relations with Beijing amid a deepening U.S.-China rivalry, while maintaining strong ties with its sole ally, the United States, and the trilateral partnership with Washington and Tokyo.

"We hope for a mature development of our relations with China," Cho said at the start of the talks. "We hope the APEC summit will be an occasion to advance our ties."

Ahead of his departure, Cho said he understands Xi will visit South Korea next month for the APEC summit, and that he plans to discuss it when he meets his Chinese counterpart in Beijing later in the day.

Foreign Minister Cho Hyun speaks to reporters at Gimpo International Airport, in western Seoul, before heading to Beijing for talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on Sept. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)

After his summit with U.S. President Donald Trump late last month, Lee noted that Washington's push to counter China leaves South Korea with limited room to maintain the economic ties it had with Beijing in past decades, pushing Seoul to align more closely with U.S. policy.

Beijing responded that bilateral relations should not be influenced by a third country.

The Lee government wants to restore the inter-Korean relations that deteriorated under the preceding conservative government and resume dialogue with Pyongyang despite the North's repeated rejection of Seoul's overtures amid its close alignment with Russia.

In the foreign policy line finalized Tuesday, the Lee government said it will seek to advance relations with China in various areas, such as supply chain stability, while also securing Beijing's support for North Korea's denuclearization and improved inter-Korean ties.

Seoul believes that, if realized, Xi's visit next month for the APEC summit, set to be held in southern South Korea, would help reaffirm stable bilateral ties and allow leaders to discuss key issues of mutual interest, including North Korea.

Although Beijing has yet to confirm, Xi is widely expected to attend the APEC summit, set for Oct. 31-Nov. 1. China is the host for next year's APEC.

Cho and Wang will also likely share their assessments on North Korea after leader Kim Jong-un made a rare appearance at China's Victory Day celebrations in Beijing earlier this month, where he stood alongside Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"As Chairman Kim Jong-un (of North Korea) recently visited China, I will also hear their views on that and discuss North Korea-related issues," Cho said at Gimpo airport.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends a news conference in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Sept. 13, 2025, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)

Cho is expected to call for Beijing's role in supporting Seoul's efforts to restore ties and resume dialogue with Pyongyang, a core part of the Lee government's inter-Korean policy.

Cho may also use the talks to clarify Beijing's stance on the North's denuclearization, as Beijing made no mention of it after Xi's summit with Kim on the sidelines of the anniversary event marking the end of World War II.

The North's state media reported last week that Kim will unveil a policy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear forces and conventional weapons at its upcoming party congress.

Other outstanding bilateral issues are also expected to be addressed, including China's steel structures in the overlapping area of the Yellow Sea, a row that has heightened tensions between the two countries.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · September 17, 2025

6. Police apprehend 2 Chinese nationals behind unauthorized mobile payments of KT users

China's United Front Work department at work?

South Korea is a battleground for China's unrestricted warfare and three warfares. The ROK/US alliance must understand the threats from China that are ever present on the Korean peninsula.

Why are we not calling out China's strategy (that supports its own interests but north Korea's as well - number one being to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance and create dilemmas for both the US and the ROK)?

The basics here:   To counter China's and north Korea's strategy we must recognize their strategies, understand the strategies, EXPOSE the strategies to inoculate the Korean and American publics and the international community, and attack the strategies with a superior form of political warfare (led by information).

Police apprehend 2 Chinese nationals behind unauthorized mobile payments of KT users | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 17, 2025

SUWON, South Korea, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- Police have detained two Chinese nationals accused of making unauthorized mobile payments by hacking users of KT Corp., the country's No. 2 mobile carrier, officials said Wednesday.

The Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police said they apprehended two Korean Chinese men, aged 48 and 44, respectively, Tuesday on charges of violating the Information Protection Act and fraud by use of a computer, among others.

The 48-year-old is accused of making small unauthorized mobile payments of KT users by hacking their phones while carrying an illegal micro base station connected to KT's communication network between late August and early this month.

The other suspect in the case, identified as a 44-year-old Korean Chinese national, is charged with cashing the unauthorized payments.

Police apprehended the first suspect at Incheon International Airport, west of Seoul, upon his arrival in South Korea on Tuesday afternoon, before detaining the other suspect in Seoul's Yeongdeungpo district shortly after.

Authorities also secured the unregistered micro base station used in the scheme.

However, police have yet to piece together how the equipment was used to siphon personal information from KT users and make unauthorized purchases.

This photo, provided by the Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police on Sept. 17, 2025, shows a Chinese national being apprehended by police for allegedly making unauthorized mobile payments by hacking users of KT Corp. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Both suspects were identified as ethnic Koreans from China who had been working day jobs in the country with legal status. No signs that the two men had worked at KT or other mobile carriers had been found, according to officials.

Police plan to file an arrest warrant for the two suspects as soon as an initial investigation is completed.

A total of 199 cases of unauthorized mobile payments worth 126 million won (US$91,449) had been reported as of 6 p.m. Friday, according to a police tally.

The science ministry has separately announced that it detected 278 cases of damage worth about 170 million won on Wednesday.

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 17, 2025

7. Defense ministry to complete new defense reform plan by June 2026

Of course it will have been influenced by our new National Defense (War) Plan.

Both nations have to ask and answer the question of how to optimize their combined forces to defend national interests, deter war on the peninsula and in the region and defend South Korea and the US from north Korean conventional and nuclear attacks?

Defense ministry to complete new defense reform plan by June 2026 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 17, 2025

SEOUL, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry said Wednesday it will draw up a new defense reform plan for the Lee Jae Myung administration by June next year, with a focus on incorporating cutting-edge technologies amid shrinking military personnel in the country.

A defense reform plan, first established in 2005, is designed to outline the course of the government's defense policy, ranging from its defense operations, reorganization of military structures and military culture.

The ministry announced the plan during a conference led by Vice Defense Minister Lee Doo-hee and attended by key ministry officials, to discuss the details of the initiative earlier in the day.

During the meeting, participants shared an understanding of the need to reform the military in line with pressing challenges, including the gravity of the security environment and the declining number of military troops.

They also shared thoughts on devising a long-term plan to restructure the military based on artificial intelligence and cutting-edge technologies to make up for the manpower shortage, with the number of troops expected to fall to 65 percent of current levels by 2040.

The defense ministry plans to conduct in-depth discussions across the armed forces and receive consultations from relevant agencies, with the goal of completing the blueprint by June 2026.

This photo, provided by the defense ministry, shows Vice Defense Minister Lee Doo-hee attending a conference to discuss the Lee Jae Myung government's defense reform plan on Sept. 17, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

Related Articles

• S. Korea aims to expand use of AI technology in defense sector

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · September 17, 2025

8. Russian recruiter openly advertises 2K North Korean female workers for hire

KJU is making money through contracting out his slave labor.

Russian recruiter openly advertises 2K North Korean female workers for hire

Operation points to expansion of DPRK labor dispatches beyond construction industry, raising human rights concerns

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/russian-recruiter-openly-advertises-2k-north-korean-female-workers-for-hire/

Anton Sokolin September 17, 2025

North Korean workers at the Rajin Clothing Factory in March 2019 | Image: NK News

A Russian recruiting agency is openly advertising its ability to provide large numbers of North Korean female workers, offering up to 2,000 a week despite U.N. sanctions against DPRK overseas labor.

The St. Petersburg-based Startaff firm claims it can arrange North Korean workers for “sewing industries, agricultural complexes and for finishing and painting work,” according to its Sept. 5 bid on a publicly available tender platform.

The services appear to run afoul of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2397, which banned North Korean nationals from earning income overseas and demanded the repatriation of such workers by the end of 2019.

The agency states that it is willing to swiftly dispatch its workers to any area in Russia’s northwest at a rate of 900 rubles ($10.80) per person per hour. Russia’s ballpark minimum hourly wage is $1.68, suggesting that only a fraction of the agency’s fee would go toward paying salaries.

Startaff’s tender seeking clients to hire 2,000 North Korean female workers in the St. Petersburg region, as published on Sept. 5, 2025 (machine-translated from Russian) | Image: bicotender.ru, edited by NK News

1

2

Unique Kim, a researcher with the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), told NK News that Startaff’s solicitation of bids marks a shift from the established pattern of North Korean men mainly working in Russia’s construction sector.

“The emergence of such advertisements may align with the recent expansion of economic cooperation, with Russian entities seeking North Korean labor in sectors beyond construction,” she said, stressing the need to monitor the human rights situation as more DPRK workers enter Russia.

Citing NKDB research, Kim noted that North Korean laborers “remain subject to transnational repression,” with DPRK authorities confiscating documents, restricting movement and communication and imposing arbitrary wage deductions.

DPRK workers often “enter Russia without work permits,” she added, which enables firms like Startaff to “profit by brokering their labor.”

“These firms typically charge commission fees, which, combined with deductions by North Korean authorities, further diminish workers’ wages,” Kim explained.

“The workers being marketed in such advertisements are almost certainly dispatched through North Korean state-owned enterprises, even if the postings obscure these affiliations,” she added. “From recruitment to daily life in Russia, they are subject to tight control under the North Korean government, having little autonomy.”

Startaff (tax number: 7804695524) was founded by Sergei Reznikov in Aug. 2022 and brought in $16.6 million in revenue in 2024, though net profits reached just $19,208, according to tax records.

The company employed over 570 people as of last December and, in addition to recruitment, also engages in construction activities, cargo handling and fruit trade.

Startaff’s website and social media show that the company supplies workers to multiple firms across the country, listing e-commerce platform Ozon and the Russian defense ministry as its partners, according to one of its YouTube videos.

Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, said the firm’s openness about the scheme “shows how little Vladimir Putin cares about Western and South Korean opinion” and suggests a willingness to accept large numbers of North Korean workers.

The expert noted that “prominent figures” in Russia have called for employing more North Koreans as repayment for DPRK military assistance, as Russian media plays up problems with Central Asian migrant workers.

“With many men away at the front or wounded, the Kremlin may be hoping to ease social tensions by inviting primarily female North Korean workers,” Monday said. “Central Asia mainly sends men.”

North Korea emerged as Russia’s staunchest supporter following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with the DPRK supplying deadly cluster munitions, powerful artillery systems, ballistic missiles and most recently troops.

The bilateral relationship has also expanded beyond the military domain to include commercial exchanges, labor dispatches and the sale of DPRK products in Russia.

NK Pro previously found that North Korean workers continued to man construction sites across Russia’s Far East, and Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries has reportedly employed hundreds of North Korean women at its Moscow warehouse, a claim the company later denied.

Experts say Russia appears to be concealing the influx of DPRK workers in part by allowing them to enter the country under student visas, with a record number of North Koreans entering the country for education in 2024.

Edited by Bryan Betts

9. Why there won’t be need for speculation when Kim Jong Un truly names his heir

What does history tell us?

Kim Il Sung designated his son successor in 1973 and thus he had 21 years to prepare to take power (by purging all opposition). Kim Jong Il did not designate his son until perhaps 2009 thus giving him no time to prepare for leadership. His purging of opportunities to the form of more brutal executions than the car accidents and "accidental" drownings in the wintertime.

The lesson is that Kim Il Sung was strong and confident enough to designate his successor early. He was not threatened by his successor. Kim Jong Il was not so strong and confident and thus waited until almost the last minute. Where does KJU fall on that spectrum? But the most important question is what will happen if KJU does not designate a successor? There is no succession mechanism in the nK constitution? What will we do if we learn today that KJU has passed? ANd are we shaping the information environment now to prepare for that eventuality?

But I think KJU is toying with us and just likes to see our reactions to speculation about his daughter as a successor. And it keeps us from preparing for what comes next.

Why there won’t be need for speculation when Kim Jong Un truly names his heir

History shows signs surface quickly when North Korea settles on a successor, unlike the uncertainty around his daughter

https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/why-there-wont-be-need-for-speculation-when-kim-jong-un-truly-names-his-heir/

Fyodor Tertitskiy September 17, 2025

Kim Jong Un disembarks from a train with his daughter at Pyongyang station after returning from a trip to China in Sept. 2025 | Image: KCNA

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s first trip to China in over six years — this time with his daughter in tow — has kicked off yet another round of speculation about whether the girl is his designated heir.

State media showed the daughter, widely thought to be named Ju Ae, standing behind her father when he stepped off his armored train at Beijing station. While coverage did not report on her activities in China, she appeared again with him in photos of his return to Pyongyang and later in state TV footage of Kim at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing.

South Korea’s intelligence agency has interpreted her first appearance on an international trip as reinforcing her position as successor. Others like former spy chief Park Jie-won have expressed skepticism, suggesting a son is waiting in the wings. Global media has been abuzz with conjecture.

The speculation is understandable. North Korea invites rumor, and certainty is rare.

But history suggests these guessing games aren’t especially useful: When Pyongyang truly settles on a successor, the signs tend to surface quickly.

CHINESE PRECEDENT

The North Korean model of dynastic succession arguably owes something to the very country Kim just visited: the People’s Republic of China.

In 1969, Mao Zedong broke with the Communist habit of maintaining democratic facades and openly elevated Vice Chairman Lin Biao as his successor. That moment — when the mask slipped — offered Kim Il Sung a template for preserving his legacy and avoiding Stalin’s fate, in which successors repudiated the founder’s line.

Hints of this shift traveled fast, even across the Iron Curtain. By 1971, South Korean media was already speculating about who would follow Kim Il Sung. 

The early favorite wasn’t Kim Jong Il but Kim Yong Ju, the founder’s brother, who had been climbing the ranks and chaired the powerful Organization and Guidance Department. That guess had a precedent — Cuba’s Raúl Castro became second secretary in 1965 — so it felt plausible. 

And yet it didn’t happen. If there’s a lesson, it’s this: The seemingly “logical” choice on paper often isn’t the one North Korea makes. 

Founding leader Kim Il Sung with his successor Kim Jong Il | Image: Rodong Sinmun

SUCCESSION SIGNALS

Kim Jong Il’s appointment came in Feb. 1974. That’s Pyongyang’s official line, and in this case, available evidence broadly agrees.

The regime didn’t announce the decision publicly; in fact, it worked to obscure it. From 1974 to 1980, Rodong Sinmun and other outward-facing outlets avoided naming Kim Jong Il, instead ambiguously referring to him using the euphemism “Party Central (Committee)” instead.

Even so, the secret didn’t hold for long. By April 1974, mere weeks later, South Korea’s Naewoe Thongshin intelligence bulletin was already reporting on the succession campaign. Even in a tightly sealed Cold War environment, the truth leaked out quickly.

The second succession moved faster. From what we know, Kim Jong Il tapped his son Kim Jong Un as his successor on Jan. 8, 2009, his 25th birthday. By Jan. 16, South Korean outlets were already carrying reports about his elevation.

In both cases, once a real decision existed, outside indicators followed within days or weeks — not after years of rumor.

Former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il with his successor Kim Jong Un | Image: KCTV

WHAT WE (DON’T) KNOW

All of this brings us to Kim Ju Ae — if that’s even her name. 

Lee Il-gyu, a former North Korean diplomat in Cuba, has suggested it’s actually Kim Ju Ye (김주예). The “Ju Ae” label entered the media via Dennis Rodman, and it stuck largely because it came first, not because it was verified.

The daughter could indeed be the designated successor. Or the persistent rumor that she’s a decoy for a son being groomed out of public view could be true.

Neither scenario would be out of character for a regime that hid Kim Jong Il’s status in the 1970s and kept Kim Jong Un’s name out of the Rodong Sinmun for more than a year after his appointment.

In the meantime, the most reliable clues tend to come from people with proximity to the family or the elite. Kim Jong Il’s cook, Kenji Fujimoto — colorful reputation and all — correctly forecast Kim Jong Un’s rise as early as 2003. 

That doesn’t mean every insider whisper is gold, only that elite testimony often proves more predictive than decoding seating charts or reading the hems of parade uniforms.

To date, there has been no such testimony about where Kim Jong Un’s daughter fits into the regime’s leadership plans, again underscoring the need for caution.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter at a concert in June | Image: KCNA

THE TAKEAWAY

Speculation about succession in Pyongyang is irresistible, but it’s rarely productive for long. 

Twice now, North Korea has demonstrated a pattern: Once the leadership truly decides on a successor, the world learns about it quickly — first in classified channels and niche bulletins, then in the open through titles, slogans and protocols that become hard to miss.

So by all means, DPRK watchers should note the daughter’s appearances and track who stands where. 

But they should remember the record. The moment an actual decision is made, the evidence won’t trickle — it will flood. 

Until then, the smart posture is disciplined curiosity, not confident predictions.

Edited by Bryan Betts

10. Kim Jong Un moves to shore up support among overseas spies after Ukraine war honors

Is Kim fearing loss of support and control of his overseas assets?

Can he buy loyalty (only if it is backed by threats and coercion).

How can we exploit this?

It is time to target every nK overseas asset for defection or recruitment.

Kim Jong Un moves to shore up support among overseas spies after Ukraine war honors

The sudden message and family gifts on a state holiday—despite it not being a symbolically important anniversary ending in five or zero—is seen as an extraordinary measure

By Jeong Tae Joo - September 17, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/kim-jong-un-moves-to-shore-up-support-among-overseas-spies-after-ukraine-war-honors/

North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun reported on July 14, 2024, that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had carried out on-the-spot guidance on a range of construction projects underway in the city of Samjiyon on July 11–12. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sent a personal congratulatory message to operatives conducting secret missions overseas for the Sept. 9 holiday marking the foundation of the North Korean state.

“A congratulatory message for Day of the Foundation of the Republic in Kim Jong Un’s name was prepared by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the Ministry of Defense and the Military-Government Guidance Department and sent to agency headquarters and operatives carrying out special missions worldwide at midnight Sept. 8,” a high-ranking source in North Korea said recently.

A military source confirmed that the message “was sent to overseas branches through Pyongyang headquarters” and that gift boxes containing “high-end gift sets” were delivered to families of operatives who have been serving abroad for extended periods.

The operatives who received the message work for state agencies like the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Ministry of Defense on various overseas missions including delivering cash to the regime, generating foreign currency, money laundering, cyber hacking and intelligence gathering. They often pose as exchange students, cultural workers, traders or business people.

Kim praises agents as “patriots” and “hidden heroes”

In the message, Kim praised the operatives and wished them good health, calling them “patriots, hidden heroes and the party’s true warriors who fought on unseen front lines” for leaving their families to “faithfully carry out the state’s missions far away.”

The North Korean government is essentially justifying and praising activities that the international community has labeled as illegal money laundering and hacking operations.

The move is related to recent efforts to honor North Korean troops killed in the Russia-Ukraine war. North Korea handed out state commendations to fallen soldiers twice last month, sparking discontent among overseas operatives who learned about it. When their superiors discovered this dissatisfaction, they reported it directly to Kim, resulting in the congratulatory message.

Within North Korea, the measure is mostly seen as aimed at appeasing overseas operatives and reconfirming their loyalty rather than a genuine favor from Kim. In other words, it was an effort to calm those who felt relatively excluded and upset by the state’s large-scale efforts to honor troops fighting in Ukraine.

“There was concern that loyalty could weaken if not only the personnel sent overseas, but also their families at home weren’t properly cared for,” the military source said. “The congratulatory message and gift sets for families were coordinated by each agency simultaneously.”

The sudden message and family gifts on a state holiday—despite it not being a symbolically important anniversary ending in five or zero—is seen as an extraordinary measure demonstrating the regime’s urgency in managing overseas operatives and preventing ideological unrest.

“Amid continued international sanctions, operatives on special missions overseas are essentially a lifeline for the state,” the high-ranking source said. “Keeping them happy and ensuring their loyalty is more important than anything, which is why this special encouragement was sent.”

11. The Republic of Korea is a committed U.S. partner

MASGA.

But will KJU respond to Trump and Lee's "peacemaker" roles? I fear we will be playing two different games of Go/Baduk.

Excerpts:

The ROK-U.S. alliance will open a new chapter with Korea’s MASGA proposal: Make American Shipbuilding Great Again. At the bilateral meeting on Aug. 25, Mr. Trump and Mr. Lee confirmed mutual trust by emphasizing alliance modernization and cooperation in shipbuilding and nuclear energy. The ROK-U.S. cooperation will be strong and unwavering, based on the mutual trust shown at the ROK-U.S. summit.

I expect it to be consolidated in all areas of cooperation, including but not limited to North Korean nuclear issues, security in Northeast Asia, the economy, and science and technology. As the saying goes, “Blood is thicker than water.” This alliance, originally forged in blood, will last an eternity. The Korean people have not forgotten the aid and support provided by the U.S. during and after the Korean War. We are a peace-loving nation. In our 5,000 years of history, we have not once initiated an invasion of another country.

The Korean Peninsula is the only country that has remained divided from World War II to this day. For peace and stability in Northeast Asia, trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S. and Japan is critical. I hope the U.S. will also value our two countries’ friendship and remain Korea’s partner and ally.

As Mr. Lee proclaimed, once Mr. Trump embraces the role of a “peacemaker,” Mr. Lee will embrace the same. I sincerely hope Mr. Trump joins us in Gyeongju, the ancient capital of Korea, in October for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting.

The Republic of Korea is a committed U.S. partner

Presidents Trump, Lee should embrace peacemaker role

washingtontimes.com · The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

By Nak-in Sung - Tuesday, September 16, 2025

OPINION:

The Korean Peninsula has long been a geopolitical battleground for the world’s four major powers: the U.S., Russia, China and Japan.

China and Russia border the peninsula, and Japan is a close neighbor just across the sea. The U.S. is geographically the farthest away of the three, but it is the closest in relationship. To protect the Republic of Korea and all it stands for, the U.S. participated in the 1950 Korean War. Some 36,000 U.S. soldiers were killed in action. After the ceasefire, the U.S. served as a patron, providing aid and support to South Korea.

Since 1954, the State Department set out to provide extensive support for the postwar restoration. One of the key support programs was the Minnesota Project, which helped rebuild Seoul National University. In 2015, during my time as president of SNU, the school held a commemorative event to mark the 70th anniversary of the Minnesota Project. Thanks to it, SNU has grown into a world-class university in education and research, positioned as one of the top 50 institutions in the world, according to QS and The Times rankings.

SNU graduates pioneered Korea’s industrialization process, achieving breakthroughs in semiconductors, automobiles, shipbuilding, aviation and weapons. The Republic of Korea managed to achieve industrialization in the shortest period in history and is now the world’s 10th largest economy.

Compared with the fast pace of its economic development, Korea’s political democratization proceeded slowly. As in other countries in Asia, Africa and South America right after independence, the authoritarian system worked for a while. However, the constitutional government was highly unstable. The constitution was established in 1948, and after nine amendments, the 10th constitution was ratified in 1987. The constitutional government was finally stabilized and further consolidated liberal democracy.

The 1987 constitution lasts to this day. Under it, the Korean government has experienced five government transitions. The peaceful transitions of power indicate that constitutional government is functioning well. It does not mean, however, that there has been no political turbulence. The National Assembly of Korea impeached three incumbent presidents. One impeachment was dismissed by the Constitutional Court, but the other two were accepted.

The impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol was decided by the court on April 4 in a unanimous 8-0 decision. The Korean Constitution explicitly grants the president the right to declare emergency martial law. However, it also stipulates strict requirements for declaring martial law, which shall be declared “in time of war, incident, or other similar national emergency.” Mr. Yoon’s declaration did not meet such requirements. Within just three hours, the National Assembly passed a motion to lift martial law in accordance with the constitution.

The law also stipulates that martial law be lifted upon the National Assembly’s request. As a result of such proceedings, the 2024 martial law declaration ended in a failure. As the declaration was in violation of the constitution and the Martial Law Act, the National Assembly began impeachment proceedings against Mr. Yoon. These were carried out in compliance with the constitution and the relevant laws, which show that the democratic rule of law is functioning properly and strongly in Korea.

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Furthermore, the Korean people managed to demonstrate democratic civic awareness during this political whirlwind, evidence that Korea’s democracy has now entered a mature stage.

Had the declaration of martial law suspended Korea’s constitutional government, it would have led to a successful self-coup in one of the wealthiest countries in the world. A small number of people in Korea and the U.S. fuel theories about election fraud in the June presidential election, claiming the Chinese Communist Party seized Korea. These false claims directly contradict the achievements of Korea’s liberal democracy and obstruct economic, diplomatic and security cooperation between ROK and the U.S.

After the inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung, some also argued that the ruling party is too one-sided. On social media just hours before his meeting with Mr. Lee in Washington, President Trump raised doubts about a “purge” or “revolution” in Korea. After the bilateral meeting, such doubts were resolved.

The ROK-U.S. alliance will open a new chapter with Korea’s MASGA proposal: Make American Shipbuilding Great Again. At the bilateral meeting on Aug. 25, Mr. Trump and Mr. Lee confirmed mutual trust by emphasizing alliance modernization and cooperation in shipbuilding and nuclear energy. The ROK-U.S. cooperation will be strong and unwavering, based on the mutual trust shown at the ROK-U.S. summit.

I expect it to be consolidated in all areas of cooperation, including but not limited to North Korean nuclear issues, security in Northeast Asia, the economy, and science and technology. As the saying goes, “Blood is thicker than water.” This alliance, originally forged in blood, will last an eternity. The Korean people have not forgotten the aid and support provided by the U.S. during and after the Korean War. We are a peace-loving nation. In our 5,000 years of history, we have not once initiated an invasion of another country.

The Korean Peninsula is the only country that has remained divided from World War II to this day. For peace and stability in Northeast Asia, trilateral cooperation among Korea, the U.S. and Japan is critical. I hope the U.S. will also value our two countries’ friendship and remain Korea’s partner and ally.

As Mr. Lee proclaimed, once Mr. Trump embraces the role of a “peacemaker,” Mr. Lee will embrace the same. I sincerely hope Mr. Trump joins us in Gyeongju, the ancient capital of Korea, in October for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting.

• Nak-in Sung is a former president of Seoul National University and professor emeritus of constitutional law.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com

12. Seoul reviews $25 billion U.S. arms purchases

Damage to the US defense industrial base?

Seoul reviews $25 billion U.S. arms purchases

Posted September. 17, 2025 07:42,   

Updated September. 17, 2025 07:42

As tariff negotiations between South Korea and the United States remain stalled, the South Korean government, currently in talks with Washington over a security package, is reportedly reviewing a list of U.S. weapons purchases valued at $25 billion through 2030. Officials said the government believes the purchase is feasible when both ongoing and new U.S. weapons acquisition programs are considered.

“Negotiations on the security package are progressing well,” a senior government official said. “We agreed to purchase weapons along with increasing defense spending. In return, progress has been made in expanding enrichment and reprocessing rights.” The official noted that the security package talks, conducted separately from the tariff negotiations, have reached broad consensus on key issues.

The United States has called for increased defense spending and additional U.S. weapons purchases as part of allied modernization efforts. In response, the two countries have discussed gradually raising South Korea’s defense budget to about 3.5 percent of gross domestic product and purchasing roughly $25 billion worth of U.S. weapons.

The government is now reviewing whether the $25 billion in U.S. weapons discussed in the consultations is feasible, sources said. The review reflects Seoul’s own need to strengthen its defense capabilities to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.

The proposed U.S. weapons list reportedly includes the purchase of 20 F-35A stealth fighters; upgrades to F-35A, KF-16 and F-15K aircraft; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets such as maritime patrol planes and airborne early warning and control aircraft; long-range ship-launched surface-to-air missiles; sea-based ballistic missile interceptors; and upgrades to Patriot (PAC-3) systems.

Kyu-Jin Shin newjin@donga.com

13. Massive Chinese sugar shipment aims to boost Kim Jong Un’s image before party celebration

Is this the nK equivalent of "Let them eat cake?"

Massive Chinese sugar shipment aims to boost Kim Jong Un’s image before party celebration

"Word is quietly spreading that sugar is coming, and Pyongyang residents are the most pleased," a source told Daily NK

By Jeong Tae Joo -

September 17, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/massive-chinese-sugar-shipment-aims-to-boost-kim-jong-uns-image-before-party-celebration/

China agreed to provide massive sugar aid during summit talks tied to the 80th anniversary of its victory over Japan, with the shipment timed for North Korea’s ruling party anniversary in October representing a visible diplomatic achievement for Kim Jong Un aimed at stabilizing both prices and public mood.

A source inside North Korea told Daily NK on Monday that urgent party and cabinet instructions were issued Sept. 8 ordering the Ministry of External Economic Affairs and Ministry of Land and Maritime Transport to prepare plans for importing Chinese sugar and establish swift practical measures.

“This is the result of North Korea-China talks, scheduled to proceed intensively for about a month from late this month through next month, with import volumes specified at around 19,000 tons total,” the source said.

The sugar will arrive through Nampo Port, with the Ministry of External Economic Affairs reporting that improved temporary warehouses and dock facilities can handle the large shipments around the party founding anniversary without disruption.

The entire shipment will consist of refined sugar. While it would be cheaper for China to provide raw sugar, Beijing decided to supply high-quality refined sugar considering North Korea’s lack of refining equipment and technical capacity.

China uses ‘great power’ image to deepen dependence

A Chinese source confirmed the sugar aid plan, saying it represents “consideration for North Korea beyond economic benefit, particularly using the ‘great power gift’ image around North Korea’s anniversary to instill political subservience and economic dependence among North Koreans who can’t freely buy sugar.”

Expectations for sugar supplies are already growing in Pyongyang and major metropolitan areas. The large sugar imports could stabilize prices short-term following recent spikes from currency fluctuations, though regional effects may vary depending on distribution measures and targets.

“Word is quietly spreading that sugar is coming, and Pyongyang residents are the most pleased,” the source inside North Korea said. “This item is immediately appreciated by people as a precious commodity, so if holiday food supplies around the party’s 80th anniversary include sugar, Pyongyang citizens will be greatly satisfied.”

North Korea plans to use this year’s 80th party anniversary on Oct. 10 as a political turning point for internal unity. The regime appears to have multiple intentions: importing large quantities of Chinese sugar to stabilize prices and public sentiment while showcasing North Korea-China friendship and emphasizing Kim’s diplomatic achievements.

“The large-scale sugar imports will be reinterpreted as educational work highlighting the greatness of Kim Jong Un’s leadership on the diplomatic stage, leading to extensive study sessions,” the source predicted.

The massive sugar imports don’t violate sanctions against North Korea, as ordinary food items like sugar are considered humanitarian goods and excluded from restrictions.

However, transparency concerns about funding flows and transportation processes have consistently been raised regarding large-scale material transactions with North Korea. The need for caution has been emphasized given possibilities that North Korea could divert foreign currency obtained through legitimate trade toward weapons of mass destruction development, or smuggle sanctioned items during transportation.

14. N. Korea intends to participate in 2026 Asian Games in Japan: report

KJU is trying to come out of his shell and act on the world stage after the confidence builder in Beijing.

N. Korea intends to participate in 2026 Asian Games in Japan: report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yoo Jee-ho · September 17, 2025

TOKYO, Sept. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has expressed its intent to take part in next year's Asian Games set to be staged in Japan, a report claimed Wednesday.

Citing the organizing committee of the 2026 Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games, Kyodo News said North Korea is hoping to send a delegation of about 260 to 270, including some 150 athletes in 17 sports, to the multisport competition.

The 20th Asian Games are scheduled to run from Sept. 19 to Oct. 4 next year in Aichi Prefecture, with the prefecture's capital, Nagoya, serving as the main host.

The Kyodo report said the Japanese government will carefully consider opening its doors to North Korea.

Since February 2016, Japan has banned North Korean citizens from entering as part of sanctions against Pyongyang's repeated ballistic missile firings.

However, Japan made exceptions in sports, allowing North Korean men's and women's football teams to visit the country early last year to play qualifiers for the 2024 Paris Olympics.

The Asiad organizing committee will meet with leaders of each national delegation next week and bring them up to date on its preparations. According to Kyodo, North Korea plans to send one of its nationals residing in Japan to the meeting.

At the 2018 Asian Games in Indonesia, South Korea and North Korea marched under one flag at the opening ceremony and competed as a unified team in basketball, canoeing and rowing. They marched and competed separately at the next Asian Games five years later in China.

Hideaki Omura (L), governor of Aichi Prefecture in Japan, waves the Olympic Council of Asia flag as the host of the 2026 Asian Games, during the closing ceremony of the 2023 Asian Games in Hangzhou, China, in this file photo from Oct. 8, 2023. (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yoo Jee-ho · September 17, 2025

15. Exercises show Washington keeping alliances strong as Pacific adversaries bring new threats

A good message.

If only VOA and RFA were transmitting this into China and north Korea.

Exercises show Washington keeping alliances strong as Pacific adversaries bring new threats | CNN

CNN · Brad Lendon · September 16, 2025

South Korean Navy's destroyer Yulgok Yi I (R), US Navy's USS Benfold (C) and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's JS Atago (L) sail in formation during a joint naval exercise in 2023

South Korean Defense Ministry/Getty Images

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Seoul, South Korea —

The United States, South Korea and Japan this week are conducting “advanced” trilateral air and naval exercises in East Asia, less than two weeks after the leaders of Russia, China and North Korea issued an unprecedented challenge to the US-led world order.

The Freedom Edge 2025 exercise, being conducted around South Korea’s southern Jeju Island, is aimed at “countering North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and safeguarding peace and stability in the region,” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a news release.

The US military’s Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii said the exercise will be used to “refine ballistic missile defense” between the US and its two key Asian allies and represents “the most advanced demonstration of trilateral defense cooperation to date,” without giving details.

The five-day Freedom Edge drills come as the same time as a major US-Japan bilateral exercise – Resolute Dragon – that has seen Washington deploy missile launchers with the range to hit mainland China to Japan.

Though the exercises are planned well in advance, they come less than two weeks after the leaders of China, Russia and North Korea stood shoulder to shoulder in Beijing for a military parade that showcased China’s modern weaponry – including new ballistic missiles – and unprecedented solidarity between the three nuclear-armed authoritarian partners.

Increased cooperation directly with Russia has seen North Korea send troops and weaponry to aid its’ war in Ukraine, and Pyongyang and Moscow sign a mutual defense pact.

Many observers expect North Korea may get the benefit of Russian missile technology to further its nuclear missile program.

Meanwhile, in its readout of talks between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in Beijing, China made no mention of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a long-held goal. Analysts say that indicates Xi’s tacit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power.

Both Freedom Edge and Resolute Dragon have drawn criticism from adversaries.

A statement from North Korea’s Central Military Commission called Freedom Edge “the most comprehensive and offensive war drill for aggression in terms of scale, content and nature” that has been conducted on the southern Korean Peninsula.

“The US and its allies are gradually undermining the security environment of the Korean Peninsula,” the statement from Pak Jong Chon, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, said.

For its part, China last month urged the US not to send the Typhon missile system to Japan for the Resolute Dragon exercises.

Analysts noted important differences in the spectacle of the military parade in Beijing and the current exercises happening with the US and its allies.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin attend a military parade in Beijing on September 3.

KCNA/AP

“Kim, Putin, and Xi sent a clear geopolitical signal by appearing shoulder to shoulder at a massive military parade in Tiananmen Square. That was symbolic of a shared willingness to advance power and interests against external pressure,” said Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.

“In contrast, US-Japan-South Korea trilateral defense exercises are less political theater and more practical cooperation,” Easley said.

And they’re enduring, said Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul.

“Security cooperation between South Korea and the US, and among South Korea, the US and Japan have been in place well before economic issues emerged between Seoul and Washington,” Hong said. He added that the three share a view that “consistent responses and messaging toward North Korea and stable and continued exercises are required.”

In Korea’s case, those economic issue include the immigration raid at a Hyundai plant in Georgia that saw hundreds of South Koreans detained; and in Japan’s by a trade deal with Washington that some analysts say tilts in the US’s favor.

Robert Ward, Japan chair at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the Resolute Dragon exercises send “an important strategic message to China about the depth and breadth of US-Japan security cooperation.”

This year’s version of the annual exercises is the largest since they began in 2021, Ward said.

“Given the uncertainties over US trade policy, this is doubly important,” he added.

While the exercises off Korea and in Japan may be drawing headlines at the moment, it’s notable that they are just two of in a long list of US exercises and deployments around the region.

Last weekend, the US, Japanese and Philippine militaries concluded their second set of maneuvers in the South China Sea in a month, reaffirming “defense cooperation as tensions rise over China’s moves to tighten its grip on contested waters,” a press release from the Armed Forces of the Philippines said.

And last Friday, US and British warships steamed through the Taiwan Strait.

The People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command accused the US and British warships of “trouble-making and provocation.”

But the US military said they were exercising navigational rights and freedoms in what is an international waterway.

Taken together, the range of exercises show the military solidarity Washington often calls “iron-clad” appears to remain just that.

“This exercise series represents the latest indicator of the growing cooperation and interoperability among America’s allies in the Asia-Pacific region,” Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, said.

And, speaking specifically about the trilateral exercises off Korea, the US Indo-Pacific Command agrees.

“The continued cooperation of all three nations tangibly demonstrates strength and an unwavering commitment to the defense of our vital interests against shared threats and strengthens deterrence in the Asia-Pacific through bolstering combat-credible forces,” it said.

CNN’s Yoonjung Seo contributed to this report.

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CNN · Brad Lendon · September 16, 2025

16. Bookshelf: North Korea’s unique autocratic bloodline

Another book for the "to read pile"

Bookshelf: North Korea’s unique autocratic bloodline | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Robert Wihtol · September 8, 2025

More than 30 years after his death, North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung’s legacy endures. This sets Kim apart from tyrants such as Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong and Francisco Franco, whose deaths were catalysts for political change. From an autocrat’s perspective, Kim achieved much more, successfully passing the baton of power to his son, Kim Jong-il, who in turn passed it on to his own son, Kim Jong-un, making North Korea the world’s only hereditary communist dictatorship.

In Accidental Tyrant, Fyodor Tertitskiy examines the life of the despot who laid the foundations for the enduring pariah state. Tertitskiy, who has spent the past decade living in South Korea, has published extensively on North Korea’s political, social and military history.

Kim Song-ju, who would later change his name to Kim Il-sung (which can be interpreted to mean ‘Kim who becomes the sun’), was born into a middle-class Protestant family in a small village in Japanese-controlled Korea. He was educated at a Chinese school before joining an anti-Japanese partisan group and, later, the Soviet army in Manchuria. At the end of World War II, Kim was dispatched to Pyongyang, which was by then under Soviet control. Reflecting post-war political realities, Tertitskiy anchors his account firmly in the triangular relationship between North Korea, China and the Soviet Union.

Based on a wide range of sources, Tertitskiy sheds fresh light on Kim’s rise to power. When the Soviet leadership in 1945 needed to identify someone to head its newly acquired vassal state, 33-year-old Kim was being lined up for a relatively junior position and was not on the short-list for the top job. However, wrangling between the Soviet police and military intelligence, and the fact that Kim spoke passable Russian, eventually tipped the scale in his favour.

For his first decade in power, Kim remained firmly under Moscow’s control: ‘the top man in North Korea, second only to the Soviet ambassador’. Stalin’s death in 1953, followed by his successor Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 speech denouncing Stalin, marked a turning point.

With Soviet authoritarianism moderating, Kim was called to Moscow, where he was scolded for fostering a personality cult and disregarding his people’s wellbeing. Emphasising collective leadership, the Soviet leaders pressured Kim, who was both premier and chairman of the central committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, to give up one of his two titles.

Kim, however, decided to ignore the Soviet leaders’ advice, outmanoeuvred domestic opposition and skilfully used the Sino-Soviet conflict to distance himself from Moscow. Unrestrained, Kim then harshly purged his opponents, divided the population into social strata reminiscent of a caste system and expanded the country’s notorious network of prison camps.

The opening of the Chinese economy in the early 1980s and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s posed a further challenge. Kim faced pressure to open up the country, and resisting that pressure severely tested his political skills. Tertitskiy describes in fascinating detail how Kim narrowly escaped a 1992 coup attempt.

Tertitskiy also reminds us of some little-known historical gems. When the United States in 1945 tasked Colonel Dean Rusk—who would go on to become secretary of state—and a colleague with dividing the Korean peninsula, the only available map was the National Geographic Society’s ‘Asia and Adjacent Areas’ map. Lacking a detailed source, the two officers decided simply to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel.

When Stalin lectured Chinese military leaders on the need for the egalitarian People’s Liberation Army to introduce ranks and insignia, Kim was in the room and promptly decided that North Korea would adopt Soviet-style military ranks and uniforms. Emulating Stalin, Kim even designated himself Marshal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and wore a similar uniform. However, out of deference to the Soviet leader, he waited until Stalin was dead to wear the same insignia.

What is the formula that allows North Korea’s repressive political system to perpetuate itself? Tertitskiy ascribes it to the country’s deeply entrenched political and military elites, whose high social standing and privileged lifestyles are closely intertwined with the Kims’ dynastic rule. The elites’ loyalty, again, is upheld through all-pervasive controls and brutal sanctions.

Pyongyang has recently strengthened its ties with Moscow through the provision of soldiers and munitions to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, at the same time its relations with Beijing, its principal patron and trading partner, have remained cool.

However, in early September Chinese President Xi Jinping invited Kim Jong-un to join China’s recent large-scale commemoration of the end of World War II, where he gave Kim equal prominence alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin. The event was a major diplomatic victory for Kim and was seen by some as marking the emergence of a new China-led autocratic alliance.

By helping us to understand how Kim Il-sung steered his dictatorship through major geopolitical shifts, Accidental Tyrant provides valuable pointers about how North Korea might seek to position itself in the current rapidly changing global environment.

aspistrategist.org.au · Robert Wihtol · September 8, 2025

17. 2025 Outlook on the North Korean Sanctions Regime: A Needed Turning Point in Sanctions Enforcement?

From HRNK.

Excerpts:

Finally, the direction of U.S. sanctions will undoubtedly be influenced by whether or not the Trump administration attempts to once again negotiate with North Korea. It has been reported that the White House and State Department are preparing for possible talks with the Kim regime. In the event that the Trump administration decides to try and force North Korea to the table, it is likely that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened to impose maximum pressure before negotiations. This approach is especially likely given that weakened sanctions enforcement in recent years has allowed North Korea to reach a stronger position than it held in 2019. With Russia now acting as a strategic backer, North Korea may feel less compelled to enter negotiations at all. Therefore, if the Trump administration is indeed seeking talks, stronger sanctions will be a prerequisite. However, there is no guarantee that, once implemented, sanctions will last. Historically, U.S. presidents have offered sanctions relief in exchange for commitments from North Korea. For instance, prior even to the June 2018 Singapore summit, the Trump administration intervened to pause the enforcement of sanctions. More worrying though is the fact that human rights issues are unlikely to be an agenda item. Human rights were not mentioned in the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2007 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, and, most significantly given that it resulted from Trump’s previous diplomatic efforts regarding North Korea, the Joint Statement of the 2018 Singapore summit. This means that regardless of the direction the sanctions regime takes in relation to talks, it is unlikely to have any meaningful significance for human rights improvements in North Korea.

Despite North Korean human rights being mentioned in the NKSPEA, the inconsistent and weak enforcement of the sanction regime means that North Korea has been able to continue to violate the human rights of its people. In theory, the conditions set out in the NKSPEA imply that there are legally enforceable human rights benchmarks which must be met before sanctions are lifted. However, these conditions mean little if North Korea is able to evade sanctions with impunity. For this reason, the sanction regime against North Korea must be both extensive and well enforced. Even if formal North Korean commitment to improving human rights is essentially impossible, denying funds to the regime and its proxies could at least weaken its grip on the population. The formation of the MSMT may be a reason to be optimistic in this regard, given its potential to more effectively report violations enabled by Russia and China. However, there are also reasons to be skeptical. On top of the existing challenges in sanctions enforcement, the MSMT will face issues with its legitimacy which may hinder its reporting and enforcement capabilities. In addition, the MSMT’s power is highly dependent on the national sanctions regimes of its members, in particular the United States. Consequently, whether 2025 will be the necessary turning point in sanctions enforcement depends upon the decisions of the new Trump administration, whose policies so far have created vulnerabilities in the international sanctions regime. To conclude, while 2025 may be described as a year of change in sanctions enforcement, it remains uncertain whether these changes will lead to the stronger sanctions regime needed to restrict the North Korean regime’s ability to conduct widespread human rights abuses, and pressure it towards improving human rights.

2025 Outlook on the North Korean Sanctions Regime: A Needed Turning Point in Sanctions Enforcement?

https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/2025-outlook-on-the-north-korean-sanctions-regime-a-needed-turning-point-in-sanctions-enforcement

nkhiddengulag.org

By Max Smith

Edited by Diletta de Luca, HRNK Research Associate

On February 18, 2016, in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, the Obama administration signed into law the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (NKSPEA). The NKSPEA represented the first piece of comprehensive North Korea sanctions legislation in the United States, building on a series of U.S. executive orders and UN resolutions. In addition to mandating the designation of individuals involved in human rights abuses, the legislation set out the conditions under which sanctions may be lifted. These include the dismantling of North Korea’s weapons programs, the release of political prisoners, the lifting of censorship, the establishment of an open society, and the accounting for and repatriation of U.S. citizens. In this way, the NKSPEA, as well as UN and other national sanctions regimes, are a means of coercing North Korea into improving its dismal human rights record. Additionally, by denying the North Korean military and security apparatus easy access to funds, sanctions inhibit the North Korean regime’s ability to easily perpetrate human rights abuses. However, almost ten years after the enactment of the NKSPEA, not only has no progress been made towards human rights benchmarks, but the situation has deteriorated. North Korea has been developing its military capabilities at an alarming rate, it has further cracked down on human rights by instituting draconian punishments for cultural violations, and its network of political prison camps remains operational. Furthermore, despite the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea is arguably at its most resilient. The Kim regime has been amassing vast amounts of wealth through illicit trading, the dispatching of workers overseas, and cybercrime. It is clear, therefore, that the sanctions regime imposed on North Korea is in urgent need of strengthening if progress on human rights is to be achieved.

There are indications that 2025 could become a critical turning point for North Korean sanctions enforcement: the year marks both the inaugural meeting of the new Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), a group of nations who have volunteered to monitor the implementation of North Korea sanctions outside of the UN, and the first months of a new U.S. presidential administration. The creation of a new sanctions monitoring group could allow for more effective enforcement, as previous efforts under the UN Panel of Experts were obstructed by Russia and China. Meanwhile, a new administration in the White House could mean a new direction for U.S. sanctions policy. However, caution is warranted. North Korea and its enablers, in particular Russia and China, have grown increasingly brazen in their violation of international sanctions making enforcement more complex. The Kim regime’s survival has been facilitated through illicit imports taking place in Chinese waters, sales of weapons to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, and access to the international financial system through Russian and Chinese banks. Russia and China have also been vocal advocates for reducing sanctions against North Korea. This culminated in Russia vetoing the renewal of the Panel of Experts’ mandate in 2024. The challenge therefore not only lies in whether to expand sanctions, but also in ensuring they are effectively implemented amid widespread non-compliance and increasingly sophisticated evasion methods. Whether the MSMT and the Trump administration are equipped to meet this challenge remains uncertain, particularly given the possibility that the Trump administration’s attitudes regarding cryptocurrency and tariffs may make enforcement more difficult. The current White House’s relaxed stance on cryptocurrency regulatory enforcement may inadvertently discourage virtual asset service providers from adhering to their anti-money laundering responsibilities. Meanwhile, the recent sweeping tariff announcements have threatened the United States’ position in the global economy and created space for less tightly monitored financial centers. Finally, overshadowing all discussions on the direction of U.S. sanctions is the possibility of renewed negotiations between the United States and North Korea. While such talks could initially result in stricter sanctions, there is a risk that they could be lifted before any meaningful progress is achieved on human rights issues.

Although sanctions have been extensive on paper, they have so far not been fully enforced. North Korea has continued to engage in illicit trade, dispatch overseas workers, and carry out cyberattacks with minimal consequences. On November 21, 2023, 55 countries submitted a report to the 1718 UN Sanctions Committee, the body established to oversee the implementation of sanctions on North Korea, stating that the cap on oil deliveries to North Korea had been breached, possibly by as many as one million barrels. The ships involved in illicit trading have utilized a number of techniques to disguise their actions, such as transmitting false global navigation satellite systems signals, vessel identity laundering, “flag hopping,” and by using complex ownership and management structures. Multilateral cooperation from all stakeholders is needed, to share information on, investigate, and enforce these sanction evasion attempts. However, Russia and China rejected calls to take action, despite this trade occurring in Chinese waters and involving Russian and Chinese entities. Alongside trading, North Korea also continues to maintain access to the international financial system. The 2024 report of the UN Panel of Experts found representatives of North Korean banks present in China, Russia, and Indonesia, in contravention of UN Resolutions 2270 and 2321. This implies that North Korean banks, which manage funds for the country’s defense industry and security apparatus, as well as the Kim family, may be operating overseas. The Panel of Experts also investigated several joint ventures involving North Korean nationals in Russia, as well as Chinese bank accounts maintained by an alleged North Korean Ministry of People’s Armed Forces subsidiary. However, perhaps the most brazen example of enabled sanctions violations remains the infamous transfer of North Korean weapons to Russian forces in support of their war against Ukraine. North Korea’s support for the Russian invasion has increased Moscow’s incentives to block or weaken sanctions against Pyongyang. A clear example of this occurred last year, when Russia vetoed a resolution to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts, effectively terminating their role in support of the 1718 UN Sanction Committee.

Now that the Panel of Experts has been disbanded, its functions have been assumed by the MSMT. The Panel of Experts was created to assist the 1718 UN Sanctions Committee through gathering information and making recommendations. This means that whilst the UN sanctions regime against North Korea remains in place and is still enforced by the 1718 Committee, there is no longer a UN-mandated body providing expert reporting and advice on sanctions enforcement. Instead, South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, France, Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands have created a new body to monitor the enforcement of sanctions outside of the UN framework - the MSMT. While the MSMT introduces a new framework compared to the former Panel of Experts, the enforcement of sanctions will still pose substantial difficulties. Russia and China’s absence could give the MSMT greater freedom to report violations involving their entities, which otherwise may have been obstructed. However, this comes at the cost of reduced international legitimacy. MSMT recommendations will likely go unheeded by the 1718 Committee, as well as potentially other countries, as they originate from a non-UN and Western-dominated body. Russia criticized the Panel of Experts for “kowtowing to Western powers,” and will almost certainly make a similar argument to disregard the findings of the MSMT whilst it sits on the 1718 Committee. There is also the risk that MSMT members may exercise restraint to preserve diplomatic ties with countries found to be in contravention of UN sanctions. This must all be taken into account alongside the fact that the MSMT will face the same challenges as the Panel of Experts regarding the sanctions evasion techniques used by North Korean agents. The MSMT must somehow curtail North Korea’s illicit trading and access to the financial system without the support of the UN framework. The MSMT will have to rely on its capacity to influence the national sanctions regimes of its members, as well as potentially engage with other states by offering a means of reducing exposure to costly UN sanctions violations. This latter point is even more so the case with multinational corporations, who have a greater incentive to avoid the reputational and material risks of being found to have contravened UN sanctions. Thus, crucial to the MSMT’s success will be the diplomatic initiative of its members to engage with both state and non-state third parties, as well as a willingness to embrace the principles of impartiality and inclusivity. In this way, the MSMT will be able to build trust, set standards, and establish itself as a legitimate successor to the Panel of Experts. However, the MSMT must go further in order to overcome the challenges the Panel of Experts faced. Targeting those culpable of knowingly evading sanctions lies with the individual members, the strength of their own sanctions regimes, and their ability to effect compliance among state and non-state actors. Though the MSMT cannot easily interdict illicit trade in the waters surrounding North Korea, it can designate vessels, companies, and individuals involved. Domestic legislation can then be utilized to seize the assets of designated entities, prevent them from doing business in certain jurisdictions, or even arrest them. The MSMT can take action against those facilitating North Korea’s access to the financial system in the same way. This impact will grow if the MSMT is able to gain the compliance of key financial and maritime hubs, potentially to the extent that it surpasses the influence of the Panel of Experts. Nevertheless, this depends on the efforts made by individual members of the MSMT.

As the largest member of the MSMT, the United States is a key player. Even though the United States cannot directly prevent illicit trade between Russia, China, and North Korea, its ability to restrict access to the international financial system gives it significant influence in enforcing sanctions. In Donald Trump’s previous term, the number of new U.S. Treasury Department North Korea designations peaked at 137 individuals, vessels, and entities in 2017. This had an observable effect on North Korea’s economy, with its GDP estimated to have fallen by 3.5%. With Donald Trump once again in the White House, there are expectations for the tightening of the sanctions regime. Indeed, it appears as though the pace of designations is increasing, with six new designations as of May 12, five months into his presidency. However, there are also several reasons to remain cautious. The Trump administration’s favorable attitude regarding cryptocurrency, tariffs, and potential United States-North Korea talks provide reasons to be wary about the prospect of a revived and strengthened sanction regime. Cryptocurrency has provided a source of illicit funds for the Kim regime, and virtual asset ‘mixers’ offer the means to launder illegally obtained virtual currency. Easing off on the regulation of cryptocurrency and virtual asset service providers may therefore create vulnerabilities which North Korean cyber-actors can exploit to evade sanctions. Further issues are created by the Trump administration’s preference for tariffs as a form of coercive diplomacy, as the diplomatic backlash of excessive tariffs pushes nations to economically realign themselves away from the United States. Whilst these two factors potentially create vulnerabilities in the existing sanctions architecture, the prospect of U.S. negotiations with North Korea could alter it significantly as the Trump administration attempts to coerce the Kim regime. This could result in tightened sanctions in the short-term but may see them relaxed before they are able to have any meaningful impact on improving the North Korean human rights situation.

The proliferation of cryptocurrency and other virtual assets has provided North Korea with a large source of illicit funds. The Panel of Experts’ 2020 midterm report found that North Korean cyber-actors were targeting the virtual asset industry to avoid sanctions. Reinforcing the sanctions regime therefore requires tightening regulations and standards when it comes to cryptocurrency. This is all the more the case considering that the proceeds of cybercrime may be the Kim regime’s primary source of income. The report found that North Korean cyber-actors were using loosely regulated virtual asset service providers and brokering services to convert illicitly obtained virtual assets into clean fiat currency. The virtual assets industry is an ideal target for North Korean cybercriminals, as its rapid growth has often come at the cost of cyber security. Government intervention, both in the form of designating and taking down platforms, and in the introduction of cybersecurity standards and best-practices, is needed to address these vulnerabilities. However, equally important is industry cooperation and acceptance of standards. The Trump administration’s overhaul of cryptocurrency policies therefore has negative implications when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions, as it may discourage the stringent due-diligence needed to protect against cybercriminals, including those stealing and laundering funds on behalf of the North Korean regime. A recent memo from the Department of Justice narrowed the scope of enforcement by directing prosecutors not to charge regulatory violations in cases involving digital assets. Though exceptions are made for organized crime and terrorism, this directive may encourage firms to de-prioritize their anti-money laundering obligations, thus opening the door wider for malicious actors. Also necessary to consider is the Trump administration’s interactions with figures in the industry, which signal a move away from enforcing much-needed standards. On March 27th, Trump granted pardons to three co-founders of the cryptocurrency exchange “BitMEX,” who had failed to properly implement anti-money laundering and know-your-customer programs. These pardons arguably undermine the virtual asset regulatory framework by showing presidential support for industry leaders who did not fulfill their obligations. From the perspective of sanctions enforcement, it is crucial to ensure that virtual asset service providers do their part, by implementing the required programs, ensuring the robust cybersecurity of their platforms, and freezing coins they believe to be linked to crime. If virtual asset service providers de-prioritize their due diligence obligations, then more opportunities will be given to North Korea’s network of cybercriminals to conduct cryptocurrency theft and launder the proceeds of illicit activity. This would weaken the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement, by allowing the North Korean regime easy access to an alternative source of funds, and by making it harder for sanctions enforcement agencies to identify revenue generated by sanctioned activity.

The Trump administration’s attitude towards tariffs is another reason to be cautious regarding the future of the sanctions regime. Thanks to the dollar’s status in the global economy, even many non-U.S. banks clear international transactions through correspondent accounts in U.S. banks. The United States’ ability to exercise a large degree of control over access to the global financial system gives its national sanctions regime far more force than those of other countries. However, the United States’ position in the global economy has been threatened by the tariff announcement on April 2, which harmed the United States’ diplomatic reputation and signified a reordering of the economic order. Some countries have moved away from the United States in response to the tariff threat, and as a result have less incentive to comply with the U.S. sanctions regime. This was the case in Southeast Asia, where particularly high tariffs have paved the way for China to exert greater influence. Though nations there are moving to preserve ties with the United States, the tariffs have already damaged trust. This means that as well as reducing economic incentives to follow U.S. diplomatic initiatives, these tariffs have negatively affected U.S. soft power in the region. Southeast Asia is an important region when it comes to the enforcement of sanctions, as nations in the region still maintain ties to North Korea. Laos in particular, is a sanctions evasion hotspot, being home to numerous North Korean restaurants which generate cash for the regime. The compliance of these nations is crucial for effective sanctions enforcement, but this will be difficult to achieve as the United States loses influence in the region. By reducing the United States’ influence globally, the tariffs have also created room for alternative financial centers, which lack either the capacity or will to enforce sanctions with the same intensity as the United States. The EU is one such example. Though economically powerful and an important financial hub, the efficacy of its sanctions is undermined by uneven enforcement across Member States, and a relative lack of experience compared to the United States. In this way the tariffs have inadvertently and indirectly relieved pressure on North Korea and its enablers. As the United States steps back from the center of the global economy, vulnerabilities are created which the Kim regime will be able to exploit.

Finally, the direction of U.S. sanctions will undoubtedly be influenced by whether or not the Trump administration attempts to once again negotiate with North Korea. It has been reported that the White House and State Department are preparing for possible talks with the Kim regime. In the event that the Trump administration decides to try and force North Korea to the table, it is likely that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened to impose maximum pressure before negotiations. This approach is especially likely given that weakened sanctions enforcement in recent years has allowed North Korea to reach a stronger position than it held in 2019. With Russia now acting as a strategic backer, North Korea may feel less compelled to enter negotiations at all. Therefore, if the Trump administration is indeed seeking talks, stronger sanctions will be a prerequisite. However, there is no guarantee that, once implemented, sanctions will last. Historically, U.S. presidents have offered sanctions relief in exchange for commitments from North Korea. For instance, prior even to the June 2018 Singapore summit, the Trump administration intervened to pause the enforcement of sanctions. More worrying though is the fact that human rights issues are unlikely to be an agenda item. Human rights were not mentioned in the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2007 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, and, most significantly given that it resulted from Trump’s previous diplomatic efforts regarding North Korea, the Joint Statement of the 2018 Singapore summit. This means that regardless of the direction the sanctions regime takes in relation to talks, it is unlikely to have any meaningful significance for human rights improvements in North Korea.

Despite North Korean human rights being mentioned in the NKSPEA, the inconsistent and weak enforcement of the sanction regime means that North Korea has been able to continue to violate the human rights of its people. In theory, the conditions set out in the NKSPEA imply that there are legally enforceable human rights benchmarks which must be met before sanctions are lifted. However, these conditions mean little if North Korea is able to evade sanctions with impunity. For this reason, the sanction regime against North Korea must be both extensive and well enforced. Even if formal North Korean commitment to improving human rights is essentially impossible, denying funds to the regime and its proxies could at least weaken its grip on the population. The formation of the MSMT may be a reason to be optimistic in this regard, given its potential to more effectively report violations enabled by Russia and China. However, there are also reasons to be skeptical. On top of the existing challenges in sanctions enforcement, the MSMT will face issues with its legitimacy which may hinder its reporting and enforcement capabilities. In addition, the MSMT’s power is highly dependent on the national sanctions regimes of its members, in particular the United States. Consequently, whether 2025 will be the necessary turning point in sanctions enforcement depends upon the decisions of the new Trump administration, whose policies so far have created vulnerabilities in the international sanctions regime. To conclude, while 2025 may be described as a year of change in sanctions enforcement, it remains uncertain whether these changes will lead to the stronger sanctions regime needed to restrict the North Korean regime’s ability to conduct widespread human rights abuses, and pressure it towards improving human rights.

Max Smith, currently a research intern with HRNK, studied Korean for four years at SOAS University of London. During this time, he also spent a year abroad at Seoul National University. Whilst studying, he focused much of his independent research on South Korean foreign policy, including by analyzing different administrations’ approaches to North Korea.

In his final year at SOAS, Max cemented his interest in North Korean issues through a class on North Korean history, politics and society. After graduating, he built on this knowledge further through a two-month internship at the South Korean human rights organization PSCORE.

Max is currently doing a master’s degree in East Asian Studies at the University of Turku. For his master’s thesis, he plans on researching how foreign IGOs and NGOs can influence North Korean policy to improve the humanitarian and human rights situation there.

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Ramani, Samuel. “From Reluctant Enforcer to Outright Saboteur: Russia’s Crusade Against North Korea Sanctions.” 38 North, June 24, 2024. Accessed May 10, 2025. https://www.38north.org/2024/06/from-reluctant-enforcer-to-outright-saboteur-russias-crusade-against-north-korea-sanctions/.

Ravid, Barak, and David Lawler. “Scoop: Trump Admin Game-Planning for Potential North Korea Talks.” Axios, April 27, 2025. Accessed May 8, 2025. https://www.axios.com/2025/04/27/north-korea-talks-kim-jong-un-trump.

Reuters. “Trump Says He Still Has Good Relations with Leader of ‘Nuclear Power’ North Korea.” March 13, 2025. Accessed May 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-still-has-good-relations-with-leader-nuclear-power-north-korea-2025-03-13/.

Salama, Vivian, and Ian Talley. “U.S. Holds Off on New North Korea Sanctions as Summit Talks Progress.” The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2018. Accessed May 8, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prepares-sanctions-while-pursuing-revived-north-korea-talks-1527526255.

Shin, Hyonhee. “US, South Korea, Japan Unveil New Team to Monitor North Korea Sanctions.” Reuters, October 16, 2024. Accessed May 8, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-south-korea-japan-unveil-new-team-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-2024-10-16/.

Sneider, Daniel. “Is North Korea the Next Target of Trump’s Search for a Deal?” Korea Economic Institute, April 30, 2025. Accessed May 8, 2025. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/is-north-korea-the-next-target-of-trumps-search-for-a-deal/.

Song Sang-ho. “Russia-N. Korea Partnership Will Impact Trump’s Leverage in Diplomacy Toward Pyongyang: Expert.” Yonhap, May 3, 2025. Accessed May 10, 2025. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250503000500315?section=national/diplomacy.

Stanton, Joshua. The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea. Washington D.C.: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023.

Szyszczak, Erika. “Sanctions Effectiveness: What Lessons Three Years into the War on Ukraine?” Economics Observatory, February 19, 2025. Accessed May 10, 2025. https://www.economicsobservatory.com/sanctions-effectiveness-what-lessons-three-years-into-the-war-on-ukraine.

The White House. “Joint Statement of President Donald J.Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit.” June 12, 2018. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.

Tidy, Joe. “North Korean Hackers Cash Out Hundreds of Millions from $1.5bn ByBit Hack.” BBC, March 10, 2025. Accessed May 8, 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2kgndwwd7lo.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. “Recent Actions.” Last updated May 8, 2025. https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions.

UN News. “General Assembly Debates Russia’s Veto of DPR Korea Sanctions Panel.” April 11, 2024. Accessed May 24, 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431.

United Nations Security Council. “Work and Mandate.” Accessed May 21, 2025. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work_mandate.

United Nations Security Council. Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2024/215. March 7, 2024.

United Nations Security Council. Midterm Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), S/2020/840. August 28, 2020.

United Nations. “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” March 28, 2024. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm.

Vu, Khang. “North Korea and its Socialist Friends in Southeast Asia.” The Interpreter, April 12, 2024. Accessed May 27, 2025. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-its-socialist-friends-southeast-asia.

Watterson, Christopher J.“The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off?” 38 North, April 16, 2025. Accessed May 8, 2025. https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-face-of-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring-can-the-msmt-pick-up-where-the-panel-of-experts-left-off/.

Yoeli, Max. “Trump’s Tariff Policy Undermines His Own Agenda and the Foundations of US Economic Power.” Chatham House. April 16, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/trumps-tariff-policy-undermines-his-own-agenda-and-foundations-us-economic-power.

114th Congress of the United States, "Text - H.R.757 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016," February 18, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/757/text.

Vibhu Mishra, “DPR Korea Ploughing Ahead with Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programme,” UN News, May 7, 2025: https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/05/1163016.

Robert Collins, Greg Scarlatoiu (ed.), “North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy,” HRNK Insider, October 30, 2024, https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2024/10/north-koreas-lawfare-strategy.html.

See for example: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu, and Raymond Ha, “North Korea’s Political Prison Camp Kwan-li-so No. 25, Update 4,” Washington D.C.: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2024.

Ruediger Frank, “The New North Korea: How Geopolitical Advantages and Growing Middle Class Prosperity Challenge the Next South Korean President,” 38 North, April 22, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-north-korea-how-geopolitical-advantages-and-growing-middle-class-prosperity-challenge-the-next-south-korean-president/; Daniel Sneider, “Is North Korea the Next Target of Trump’s Search for a Deal?,” Korea Economic Institute, April 30, 2025, https://keia.org/the-peninsula/is-north-korea-the-next-target-of-trumps-search-for-a-deal/.

United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2024/215, March 7, 2024, pp. 49-54, pp. 59-61, pp. 64-65; See also: Joe Tidy, “North Korean Hackers Cash Out Hundreds of Millions from $1.5bn ByBit Hack,” BBC, March 10, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2kgndwwd7lo.

Christopher J. Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off?,” 38 North, April 16, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-face-of-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring-can-the-msmt-pick-up-where-the-panel-of-experts-left-off/

The 2020 midterm report by the Panel of Experts recorded illicit coal trading taking place in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area: United Nations Security Council, Midterm report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/2020/840, August 28, 2020, p. 19, pp. 136-139; see also Ibid, p. 130; See also United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 21-22.

United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 34-38, pp. 276-285.

Ibid, p. 53, and pp. 445-455.

Kim Eun-Bin, “Korea’s Foreign Ministry Protests China and Russia’s Calls for Ending Sanctions on North,” Korea JoongAng Daily, May 14, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-05-14/national/northKorea/Koreas-Foreign-Ministry-protests-China-and-Russias-calls-for-ending-sanctions-on-North/2307281.

United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” SC/15648, March 28, 2024. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm.

Sharon McCarthy and Victor Suthammanont, “DOJ’s New Crypto Guidance Muddies the Prosecutorial Waters,” Bloomberg Law, April 23, 2025, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/dojs-new-crypto-crime-guidance-muddies-the-prosecutorial-waters.

Shilo Grayson, “Trump’s Tariffs are Replacing Sanctions,” Royal United Services Institute, April 29, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/trumps-tariffs-are-replacing-sanctions.

United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 20 and p. 147.

Ibid, pp. 23-24.

Ibid, pp. 25-26

United Nations Security Council, Midterm report of the Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, August 28, 2020, p. 19, pp. 136-139; see also Ibid, p. 130; See also United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, pp. 21-22.

United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 53, and pp. 445-455.

The Korea Daesong Bank is affiliated with Office (Bureau) 39, which is notorious for its involvement in money-laundering and counterfeiting, see Joshua Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” Washington D.C.: The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023, p. 13; The Foreign Trade Bank was designated by the United States for facilitating transactions linked to weapons proliferation, see ibid, p. 47.

United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts, p. 54.

Ibid, pp. 34-38, pp. 276-285.

Samuel Ramani, “From Reluctant Enforcer to Outright Saboteur: Russia’s Crusade Against North Korea Sanctions,” 38 North, June 24, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/06/from-reluctant-enforcer-to-outright-saboteur-russias-crusade-against-north-korea-sanctions/.

United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

United Nations Security Council, “Work and Mandate,” accessed May 21, 2025,https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work_mandate

Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring: Can the MSMT Pick Up Where the Panel of Experts Left Off?”; Karl Dewey and Zuzanna Gwadera, “A New Mechanism for North Korean Sanctions,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 13, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/12/a-new-mechanism-for-north-korean-sanctions-monitoring/.

Hyonhee Shin, “US, South Korea, Japan Unveil New Team to Monitor North Korea Sanctions,” Reuters, October 16, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-south-korea-japan-unveil-new-team-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-2024-10-16/; Christy Lee, “New Body to Monitor North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Faces Doubts About Legitimacy,” VOA, October 17, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/new-body-to-monitor-north-korea-sanctions-enforcement-faces-doubts-about-legitimacy/7827082.html.

Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring;” Nika Pasko, “Monitoring Without Mandate: Can Sanctions Succeed Outside a UN Framework?,” The Interpreter, March 18, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/monitoring-without-mandate-can-sanctions-succeed-outside-un-framework; Christy Lee, “New Body to Monitor North Korea Sanctions.”

“General Assembly Debates Russia’s Veto of DPR Korea Sanctions Panel,” UN News, April 11, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/04/1148431.

Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Go Myong-Hyun, “Not Under Pressure - How Pressure Leaked Out of North Korea Sanctions,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, June, 18, 2020, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/not-under-pressure-how-pressure-fizzled-out-of-north-korea-sanctions/.

Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” p. 59.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Recent Actions,” accessed May 8, 2025, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions.

Alex O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” London: Royal United Services Institute, 2024, pp.3-4.

Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, p. 60.

O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” p. 6.

Panel of Experts, S/2020/840, p. 44.

O’Neil, “Upholding North Korea Sanctions in the Age of Decentralised Finance,” p. 8.

Ibid, p. 23.

McCarthy and Suthammanont, “DOJ’s New Crypto Guidance Muddies the Prosecutorial Waters.”

Ibid.

Eamon Javers and Dan Mangan, “Trump Pardons Three BitMEX Crypto Exchange Co-Founders, and Ex-Employee,” CNBC, March 29, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/28/trump-pardon-bitmex-crypto-exchange-money-laundering.html?msockid=05e700f335bc642b29200fd934e465ce.

Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” pp. 23-24.

Erika Szyszczak, “Sanctions Effectiveness: What Lessons Three Years into the War on Ukraine?” Economics Observatory, February 19, 2025, https://www.economicsobservatory.com/sanctions-effectiveness-what-lessons-three-years-into-the-war-on-ukraine.

Grayson, “Trump’s Tariffs are Replacing Sanctions.”

Ibid; Max Yoeli, “Trump’s Tariff Policy Undermines His Own Agenda and the Foundations of US Economic Power,” Chatham House, April 16, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/trumps-tariff-policy-undermines-his-own-agenda-and-foundations-us-economic-power.

Ben Bland, “Trump’s Tariffs will Push Southeast Asia Uncomfortably Close to China,” Chatham House, April 8, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/trumps-tariffs-will-push-southeast-asia-uncomfortably-close-china

Ibid.

Khang Vu, “North Korea and its Socialist Friends in Southeast Asia,” The Interpreter, April 12, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-its-socialist-friends-southeast-asia.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Erika Szyszczak, “Sanctions Effectiveness: What Lessons Three Years into the War on Ukraine?”

Barak Ravid and David Lawler, “Scoop: Trump Admin Game-Planning for Potential North Korea Talks,” Axios, April 27, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/04/27/north-korea-talks-kim-jong-un-trump; “Trump Says He Still Has Good Relations with Leader of ‘Nuclear Power’ North Korea,” Reuters, March 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-still-has-good-relations-with-leader-nuclear-power-north-korea-2025-03-13/; Seung-ho Lee, “U.S. State Department, White House Reportedly Preparing for Talks with North,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 28, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-28/national/northKorea/US-State-Department-White-House-reportedly-preparing-for-talks-with-North/2295309.

Watterson, “The New Face of North Korean Sanctions Monitoring.”

Sneider, “Is North Korea the Next Target of Trump’s Search for a Deal?”

Hyun-Ju Park, “North Korea’s Ukraine War Admission May Have Potential Trump Talks in Mind, Experts Say,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 28, 2025, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-28/national/northKorea/North-Koreas-Ukraine-war-admission-may-have-potential-Trump-talks-in-mind-experts-say/2295521; Song Sang-ho, “Russia-N. Korea Partnership Will Impact Trump’s Leverage in Diplomacy Toward Pyongyang: Expert,” Yonhap, May 3, 2025, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250503000500315?section=national/diplomacy.

Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea”, p. 78.

Ibid, pp. 60-61; Vivian Salama and Ian Talley, “U.S. Holds Off on New North Korea Sanctions as Summit Talks Progress,” The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-prepares-sanctions-while-pursuing-revived-north-korea-talks-1527526255.

Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” p. 77; The White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J.Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.

Stanton, “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea,” pp. 86-88.

Ibid, pp. 102-103.

nkhiddengulag.org

18. Fault Lines Daily Summary - September 17, 2025

An excellent news service from our good friend Dr. George Huthcinson that all Korea watchers will want to subscribe to.

You can sign up here. https://hutchinsong.substack.com/p/fault-lines-daily-summary-september-c85?utm

Fault Lines Daily Summary - September 17, 2025

Tracking the cracks and shifts at the fault lines of global power - with Korea at the epicenter.

George Hutchinson

Sep 17

 READ IN APP 

 Surface Scan

Seoul walks a delicate strategic tightrope—reinforcing its security strategy through exercises and the U.S.-ROK alliance structural framework while reopening fresh diplomatic space with China. Yet its leverage over Pyongyang remains limited, and continues to narrow. Meanwhile, at the global level, sanctions uncertainty, Russian oil disruptions, and Israel’s Gaza offensive magnify Korea’s exposure to volatile energy markets, factoring heavily into Seoul’s domestic equation.

 Epicenter

Summary:

• ROK Foreign Minister Cho Hyun departed for Beijing, declaring “China is a very important neighbor.” The upcoming talks with Wang Yi will be the first top-level diplomatic talks between the two countries since the launch of the Lee Jae-myung administration.

Source: Global Times — S.Korean FM departs for China visit, saying ‘China is a very important neighbor’

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• South Korea and the U.S. will hold senior-level Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) talks in Seoul next week, covering wartime OPCON transfer, alliance posture, and regional security cooperation.

Source: Korea Times — S. Korea, US to hold senior-level KIDD defense talks in Seoul next week

• According to the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a priority for the Lee Jae Myung administration is to meet criteria for OPCON transition. The Lee administration seeks to develop its alliance with the U.S. as one that will become a “future-oriented” strategic partnership alongside a “firm and mature” relationship with Japan.

Source: Stars and Stripes — South Korea seeks to retake wartime control of its armed forces

• Trade negotiations between South Korea and the U.S. remain deadlocked amid the ICE raid fallout, though Seoul insists on finding a “win-win solution” to avoid long-term rupture.

Source: Bloomberg — Korea-US Trade Talks Remain in Deadlock After Raid Fuels Tension

Impact:

Seoul’s dual-track strategy is strengthening the U.S. alliance while reopening space with China. KIDD and OPCON discussions reinforce alliance commitments while Cho Hyun’s Beijing outreach suggests careful diplomacy to keep the door open to China. On trade, the tension between deadlock and “win-win” rhetoric reveals Seoul’s struggle to defend industry interests and citizen protections abroad without rupturing ties. Collectively, these moves reveal Korea’s careful diplomacy with Washington and Beijing.

 Shifting Plates

Summary:

• Ukraine’s envoy to Seoul stressed that any talks with Pyongyang must address North Korea’s support for Russia’s war, underscoring the DPRK’s role in sustaining Moscow’s military campaign.

Source: NK News — Ukraine envoy says talks with North Korea must address support for Russia’s war

• While conducting the trilateral Freedom Edge drills with the U.S. and Japan, Seoul is publicly promising to renounce hostile acts toward North Korea and improve conditions for dialogue—but South Korean analysts claim the Lee administration has little leverage in this regard.

Source: Anadolu Agency — With ‘little leverage’ over North Korea, Seoul to renounce ‘hostile acts’ amid ongoing drills

Impact:

Dual narratives highlight the narrowing scope of Seoul’s influence on North Korea amid intensifying global and regional pressures. Ukraine is urging Seoul to confront DPRK activities that extend beyond the peninsula—activities that China tacitly approves. Simultaneously, Seoul is pledging to renounce hostile acts during Freedom Edge drills—an attempt to signal openness to dialogue of which analysts are skeptical. Together, these dynamics illustrate how external conflicts and regional deterrence efforts are converging to constrain Seoul’s options. Rather than creating new space for engagement, they risk boxing Korea into a reactive posture.

 Global Ripples

Summary:

• The EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia has been delayed under U.S. pressure, reflecting cracks in Western alignment over Moscow’s war economy.

Source: Reuters — EU’s 19th Russia sanctions package delayed as Trump applies pressure

• Russian oil output faces disruption after sustained Ukrainian drone strikes, raising global energy volatility and price risk.

Source: Reuters — Russia close to cutting oil output due to drone attacks, sources say

• Israel has launched a ground offensive in Gaza City, while a UN commission concluded that Israel is committing genocide. The escalation threatens to inflame regional instability and raises the risk of further oil market disruptions.

Source: CNN — Israel says Gaza City ground offensive has begun as UN commission concludes Israel is committing genocide

Impact:

Fragmented sanctions and disrupted Russian output already strain energy markets, but Israel’s Gaza ground offensive amplifies volatility by injecting Middle East risk premiums into oil pricing. For Korea, the convergence of European disunity, Russia’s constrained output, and Middle East instability magnifies its import vulnerabilities. These shocks threaten inflation, weigh on industrial production, and force Seoul to accelerate diversification strategies. Korea’s reliance on imported energy now sits at the center of its global exposure, making stability in faraway conflicts a direct determinant of its domestic economy.

 Convergence

Today’s fault lines converge on Seoul by amplifying the inherent challenges of managing its security needs through a U.S.-led security architecture and its trade-dependent economy intertwined with China. While talks with Beijing offer diplomatic calibration, Seoul’s security needs are threatened by North Korea’s nuclear intransigence and China’s tacit acceptance of the DPRK–Russia munitions pipeline— a geopolitical conundrum at the least. This leaves Seoul with very little sway over Pyongyang, pushing it into a reactive posture moving forward. Meanwhile, oil volatility and cracks in a unified sanctions strategy threaten South Korea’s economy. Seoul must navigate an ever-narrowing channel: balancing regional security needs with pragmatic outreach to Xi, while insulating its export engine from volatility that exploits the Russia–DPRK nexus as a vulnerability on its northern flank.

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Fault Lines (International Council on Korean Studies)

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com