"A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury."
- John Stuart Mill
"Try not to become a person of success, but rather try to become a person of value."
- Albert Einstein
"No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible." - Stanislaw Jerzy Lec
1. Top U.S. diplomat for East Asia calls China 'lawless bully'
2. US envoy to United Nations meets with Taiwan official in NY
3. Offensive Strike in Asia: A New Era?
4. Trump to increase weapons sales to 'Fortress Taiwan,' report says
5. Indo-Pacific Command leader underscores need for stronger missile defense on Guam
6. Report on potential genetic engineering of COVID-19 is met with criticism
7. Global COVID-19 pandemic cases reach 30 million
8. Trump's former spy chief is calling on Congress to create an election oversight commission
9. Moscow's Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies
10. Incirlik: Time for the U.S. Military to Leave
11. Conspiracy theories are the pathology of science
12. Black Lives Matter co-founder is leading an initiative funded by a pro-Chinese Communist Party
13. Russia announces troop build-up in Far East
14. U.S. hopes to name Qatar as major non-NATO ally, official says
15. When It Comes To Military Launches, SpaceX May No Longer Be The Low-Cost Provider
16. An "Alliance of Democracies": Is There Any There There?
17. Combat vet fights separation board in case that traces back to the Bin Laden raid
18. Special Ops Plan to Buy New Light-Attack Fleet May Get Pushed Back
19. USAF Special Ops wants VTOL aircraft with 'jet speed' to replace CV-22
20. The Future Role of the U.S. Armed Forces in Counterterrorism
1. Top U.S. diplomat for East Asia calls China 'lawless bully'
Maybe lawless is not completely accurate as one of the three warfares is legal warfare or LAWFARE. China believes in rule by law - exploiting the law for its own interests. It does not believe in the rule of law. This is one of the fundamental ideological differences between the community of democracies and the authoritarian regimes of the revisionist and rogue powers.
Top U.S. diplomat for East Asia calls China 'lawless bully'
Reuters · by David Brunnstrom, Patricia Zengerle · September 17, 2020
3 Min Read
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The top U.S. diplomat for East Asia said on Thursday China's recent actions around the world were not those of a responsible global actor, but of a "lawless bully," a further ratcheting up of rhetoric against Beijing as the U.S. election approaches.
FILE PHOTO: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell speaks to reporters as he arrives at Narita international airport in Narita, east of Tokyo, Japan, July 11, 2019. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon
In prepared testimony for a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, David Stilwell said the United States was not asking other countries to choose sides, but to stand up against China's "malign" behavior and to protect their own sovereignty and economic interests.
At the same time, Stilwell said U.S. competition with China need not lead to conflict, and that the United States sought to cooperate with Beijing where interests aligned, for instance on North Korea.
Stilwell said in the past several months there had been "particularly egregious examples of Beijing's conduct."
These included violence on its border with India and "aggressive" moves in the South China Sea, around Taiwan, and in waters China disputes with Japan.
He also referred to alleged Chinese attempts to "wipe out" Mongolian and Tibetan culture, "a continued campaign of repression and forced labor" in Xinjiang and Beijing's imposition of a "draconian" National Security Law in Hong Kong.
"These are not the actions of a responsible global actor, but a lawless bully," he said.
China's embassy did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Stilwell's remarks, but Beijing routinely rejects such criticisms as inaccurate and ill-intentioned.
Stilwell's comments came as the U.S. administration has stepped up criticism, sanctions and other actions against China as Republican President Donald Trump campaigns for reelection in November.
China has become the main foreign policy issue in the campaign. On Thursday, Senate Democrats announced their own program to counter China's global influence, unveiling sweeping legislation seeking to boost U.S. competitiveness and recast diplomacy with Beijing.
The top U.S. diplomat for European affairs, Philip Reeker, told the same Senate hearing Europe was "arguably" the central front in China's effort to supplant U.S. global leadership, but Russia remained the primary military threat there.
Reeker said the United States was working to set up a senior level meeting with the European Union late this month or early next to launch a dialogue on China.
Stilwell said Washington would continue to advance engagement with Taiwan, which China views as a lawless province, and provide it with arms to ensure it could defend itself, but stressed that Washington remained committed to a 'one-China' policy, which officially recognizes Beijing, not Taipei.
Earlier, China said it would make a "necessary response" to a visit to Taiwan by U.S. Undersecretary for Economic Affairs Keith Krach that began on Thursday, and had lodged a complaint with Washington.
Reporting by David Brunnstrom and Patricia Zengerle, Editing by Rosalba O'Brien
UNITED NATIONS -- U.S. Ambassador Kelly Craft had lunch Wednesday with Taiwan's top official in New York, a meeting she called "historic" and a further step in the Trump administration's campaign to strengthen relations with the self-governing island that China claims as part of its territory.
Craft said her lunch with James K.J. Lee, director of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York, at an outdoor restaurant on Manhattan's East Side was the first meeting between a top Taiwan official and a United States ambassador to the United Nations.
"I'm looking to do the right thing by my president, and I feel that he has sought to strengthen and deepen this bilateral relationship with Taiwan and I want to continue that on behalf of the administration," she told The Associated Press.
The meeting came weeks ahead of the Nov. 3 U.S. presidential election and barely a day before U.S. Undersecretary of State Keith Krach is due to arrive in Taiwan in the highest-level visit by a State Department official to the island in decades. He is expected to meet Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen on his visit and participate in an economic dialogue.
The activity is certain to exacerbate mounting tensions between Washington and Beijing over the COVID-19 pandemic, trade, Hong Kong and the South China Sea.
Warmer American relations with democratic Taiwan are largely a result of strong bipartisan support in Congress, but also appear to show how the Trump administration is willing to defy Beijing's threats and promote an alternative to Chinese Communist Party authoritarianism.
The Trump administration is pressing for Taiwan's inclusion as a separate entity in international organizations like the World Health Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization, and is pushing back against Beijing's diplomatic victories over Taipei this year that have included several small countries abandoning diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of China.
Craft said Lee, who was secretary-general in Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs until July and just arrived in New York, invited her to lunch and she accepted.
"It was a nice way for the host country to welcome him to New York and to hear about his family and his experience, and obviously his respect and admiration for the Chinese people" as well as the "many, many innovations in technology ... that Taiwan has to offer the world."
China has been stepping up its threat to bring the self-governing island under its control by military force with frequent war games and aerial patrols. It claims sovereignty over Taiwan and has been using its diplomatic clout to stop the island from joining any organizations that require statehood for membership.
Taiwan left the United Nations in 1971 when China joined and is excluded from all of its agencies, including the World Health Organization's assembly, where Taiwan's observer status has been stripped. At the same time, it has one of the most robust public health systems in the world, and has won praise for its handling of the coronavirus outbreak.
In May, a tweet from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, which ambassador Craft retweeted, expressed support for Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, saying the 193-member world organization was founded to serve "all voices," welcome "a diversity of views and perspectives," and promote human rights. It said "Barring #Taiwan from setting foot on UN grounds is an affront not just to the proud Taiwanese people, but to UN principles."
A spokesperson for China's U.N. Mission expressed "strong indignation and firm opposition," calling the U.S. Mission tweet "a serious violation" of the General Assembly resolution that gave China the U.N. seat, three U.S.-China joint communiques, and China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Craft said the 24 million people in Taiwan "need to be heard and they're being marginalized by Beijing."
"It really is a shame because they should be able to participate in U.N. affairs just like everyone else," she said. "If the U.S. doesn't stand up to China then who's going to when it comes to Taiwan, and not only Taiwan but Hong Kong and others?"
Craft said she and Lee "discussed different ways that we can best help Taiwan become more engaged within the U.N."
She echoed President Donald Trump in pointing to an email alert sent by Taiwan in December that the WHO ignored, warning about person-to-person transmission of the new virus in China, which indicated that the infection was highly contagious.
"Obviously we really are pushing for them to be back into the U.N., or have a role in the U.N. health assembly," Craft said, especially in light of Taiwan's recognition of the danger of human to human transmission of the coronavirus.
Lee called Craft "a terrific diplomat" and told AP that he is here to engage and being new in town he appreciates meeting people and making friends.
"Taiwan and the U.S. share the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law," he said. "We could make great partners."
Craft said the next step is "just being supportive ... and just making sure that he knows that the U.S. appreciates all of their contributions."
"They have so much to offer the world and are most unselfish about sharing best practices," she said. "They care about the relationship (of) the Chinese people with the Taiwanese. They care - which to me spoke volumes."
Craft stressed that U.S. and Taiwan share the goal of promoting democracy and she said she looks forward one day to meeting Tsai.
3. Offensive Strike in Asia: A New Era?
This will be one of the most important capabilities in a future major theater war. will our allies support development and deployment of these capabilities?
Offensive Strike in Asia: A New Era? - War on the Rocks
There has been both applause and anxiety in the wake of reports that Japan is considering the development of long-range missile systems. The move would be a significant shift in the country's capabilities, and it has alarmed many Japanese who believe that the acquisition would transform their country's military profile and could destabilize the nation and the region - and many others throughout East Asia share that apprehension.
But in the U.S. security community, the predominant response has been cheers and celebration. This should come as no surprise: Washington has long pressed Tokyo to do more for its defense and to acquire capabilities that allow it to contribute more to regional security. The news has also received strong support in the United States because it follows the Japanese government's unexpected and disappointing decision to scrap plans to buy an American-made missile defense system, Aegis Ashore, as a result of high costs, technical issues, and public opposition - including from local chapters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party - in cities where the system was to be deployed.
Is this reason to celebrate? Our answer is a cautious and qualified "yes." From a U.S. perspective, the acquisition of offensive strike options by allies makes sense only if they are developed within an alliance framework and with proper guardrails, and if they are deployed in consultation and cooperation with allies and partners. No ally is proposing to develop and deploy these capabilities without liaising with the United States, but it is unclear, for now, how these capabilities would be managed in an alliance context and what the implications would be for regional security.
There is a long way to go from a proposal by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's defense policy committee for an "enemy bases attack capability" to a deployed missile strike system. Moreover, Japan has long contemplated the development of such a capability. The idea emerged in the 1950s and has ebbed and flowed since, ensnared in debates over legality and fit, given resource constraints and public sentiment.
In recent years, however, Tokyo has considered the option more seriously as North Korean and Chinese missile threats have grown. In this threat environment, there is thus a good chance that development and deployment will proceed. But, at a minimum, it is far too early for Washington to celebrate - recall, for instance, that in March 2017 the Liberal Democratic Party examined but did not deliver on the issue.
Washington should also be cautious because a strike capability is not an unalloyed good. It can strengthen regional defense and deterrence, but it can also detract from, or even undermine, U.S. and allied cooperation and coordination. Much, if not more, depends on how and in what context these new capabilities are acquired, deployed, and employed rather than on what they are.
If Japan does acquire missile strike capabilities, it would not do so in isolation. Recently, Washington agreed to a substantial lengthening of the range and increase in the payload of South Korean missiles, changes that would allow Seoul to strike all of North Korea and some parts of China. Just last July, Washington also agreed that Seoul would get a green light to develop solid fuel for space launch vehicles. And a few months ago Australia committed to acquiring long-range strike weapons, a decision triggered by growing concerns in Canberra about China. In short, several U.S. allies, not just Japan, are acquiring strike capabilities.
The United States stands to benefit greatly from these developments, but there are potential risks as well as costs that Washington should not overlook.
At first glance, the benefits to the United States appear obvious. Missile threats from North Korea and China are growing rapidly and Washington's relationships with both countries are worsening sharply. In this environment, the United States would be well-served by more militarily capable allies that can help it counter these rising threats. While some may charge that such changes are insignificant relative to the threat, the key calculation is whether they would complicate an adversary's decision-making, introduce or add uncertainty about outcomes, and force that adversary to divert resources that might be used elsewhere. This is the logic behind Andrew Marshall's competitive strategies approach, which he developed to counter the Soviet Union during the Cold War but is applicable against China today: It requires thinking through and acting in ways that improve one's relative position against an adversary in a long-term competition.
Most optimistically, a concerted effort by the United States and its allies on strike might encourage adversaries to negotiate: first confidence building measures, then restraints, and later - likely, much later - arms control agreements. At present, however, the primary goal is to regain the initiative and turn the tables on adversaries, which have made important advances in strategic concepts and capabilities in recent years.
Countering the Chinese missile threat is particularly urgent: Beijing is increasingly capable of preventing U.S. military access to, and ability to maneuver within and around, the "first island chain," the first geographic barrier off the East Asian mainland that the United States has, since the 1950s, regarded as its primary line of defense in Asia. The just-published Pentagon report on China's military and security developments, for instance, estimates that Beijing has fielded approximately 200 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and more than 200 DF-26 missiles. This is impressive growth: The 2019 report estimated that Beijing had deployed 80 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and 80-160 DF-26 missiles, and the 2018 report reckoned China had about 16-30 launchers and missiles. The DF-26, dubbed the "carrier killer" or "Guam killer" because of its range and precision, can carry nuclear or conventional warheads.
If allies develop strike systems that help regain control of the first island chain, then the United States should promote those acquisitions. Equally important, these developments align with the recent U.S. effort to encourage allied governments to take on a greater share of the defense and deterrence burden. As stated in the Department of Defense's Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, "The United States expects our allies and partners to shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats." The acquisition of capabilities that allow allies and partners to assume more responsibility for regional defense should be encouraged.
In theory, then, missile acquisition and deployment by its Asian allies deserve U.S. support. These developments would not only help create a more favorable balance of power against adversaries, but also promote responsibility and burden-sharing between Washington and its allies.
On closer look, however, there are also real problems. For starters, opportunity costs: These systems are expensive, and it isn't clear that they are necessarily the tools to prioritize to strengthen defense and deterrence when fiscal belts are tight. Their price tag and deterrence effectiveness should be weighed against those of systems that will not be purchased because of budget constraints. They could come at the expense of efforts to boost resilience against the arguably more urgent gray-zone challenges, for instance.
Development of allied missile capabilities is also taking place in the context of U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and Washington's desire to deploy longer range missiles in the region. The United States has asked allies to accept U.S. missiles on their territory - their response has been ambivalent at best. U.S. deployments, however, would sidestep many of the opportunity costs associated with indigenous development, encourage greater partnership in the defense industrial sector, and - it should be noted - help reduce the trade imbalance by promoting allied purchases of U.S. defense equipment.
Deploying U.S. missiles would also address another American concern that is rarely voiced out loud: the risk of an ally entangling the United States in a conflict. Many U.S. strategists worry about an ally being emboldened by missile systems and acting in ways that could lead to an unwanted or avoidable conflict with North Korea or China. This fear of Asian allies going rogue has deep roots. Washington opted for bilateral alliances in the 1950s largely to ensure U.S. control over potentially destabilizing partners.
Of course, times have changed, and Washington now wants to empower its allies and give them much greater agency over their own national security and destiny. Some concerns linger, however, especially when it comes to allies acquiring weapons capable of producing strategic consequences.
Allies with greater military capability and freedom of maneuver risk other problems for the United States. This could heighten tensions among allies that are already high as a result of deep-rooted and still raw historical grievances. The Japanese-South Korean relationship could be shaken by missile developments by either country.
In private discussions, Japanese strategists note that South Korea's longer-range missiles not only threaten North Korea and parts of China but put Japan in range as well. A small group of South Korean strategists is quick to note that they worry as much about Japan as they do about North Korea or China. South Korean experts also warn that since their constitution defines the Korean Peninsula as a single country, a Japanese attack on the North would technically be an attack against the South, too. While South Korean experts indicate in closed-door meetings that their government would likely accept a Japanese attack on the North in some circumstances, they also make clear that it would be deeply controversial because, legally speaking, it would mean an attack on the Korean nation and fuel the belief that Japan is implacably hostile to Korea and determined to keep it divided.
The risk, in short, is that missile capabilities could stoke tensions among U.S. allies and undermine defense cooperation and the deterrence that it creates.
Finally, these capabilities could encourage allies to choose self-help and abandon the United States by developing independent nuclear weapons. Reflecting on Australia's recent decision to develop long-range missiles, for instance, one analyst has explained that "that possibility now moves further out of the shadows." If an ally decided to go down that path, others could follow - a development that could unravel the U.S. alliance system and eclipse the role of the United States as Asia's security guarantor.
Fortunately, allies interested in missile strike systems have discussed them within the framework of their alliance with the United States. The latest report of the Track-1.5 U.S.-Australia Indo-Pacific Deterrence Dialogue, for instance, notes that allies have consistently advanced their various deterrence requests within the framework of these longstanding arrangements, not outside or in opposition to them.
In addition, allies are pursuing complementary systems. Japan, for instance, wants to augment its ballistic missile defense system to deter adversaries from launching attacks on its territory. The goal is to minimize incoming missiles as much as possible before they are launched and knock out survivors in the air, while relying on the United States for more general defense. South Korea and Australia, too, are discussing - to an extent - their missile projects with the United States and making sure that they improve the overall alliance defense and deterrence posture.
Crucially, though, allies seem to favor developing and deploying "their" missiles over hosting U.S. missiles, in large part because they assess that they would have more control over these capabilities. Plainly, allies feel a need to hedge against a potentially unpredictable United States.
Washington should make sure that allies proceed with missile strike development and deployment plans within their alliance frameworks. This is vitally important to Washington because these weapons are capable of producing strategic effects and, therefore, strategic consequences. This demands that an acquisition decision be thought through in an alliance context before it is made. The United States and its ally should conduct a thorough assessment of a decision's benefits, risks, and costs. Opportunity costs should be discussed, too, and consideration given to how allied missile systems would complement U.S. systems planned for deployment in the region. Ideally, then, the acquisition of strike systems by allies would plug a gap (i.e., it would provide an alliance solution to an alliance problem).
Moreover, arrangements should be made to ensure that these systems would be used only in certain circumstances - preferably by mutual consent or, at a minimum, with prior coordination - and there should be consultations among allies as well. This "forcing function" - obliging the United States and its allies to think systematically about ends and means, along with new decision-making processes to better balance responsibilities and capabilities - could be the most valuable part of the acquisition of strike systems.
In an increasingly contested Asian security environment, the United States will benefit from more militarily capable allies. But Washington should not ignore the potential risks and costs, and it should work hard with its allies to mitigate them. The United States and its allies, in fact, should regard this task not as a challenge, but as an opportunity to tighten their relationships further.
David Santoro is vice president and director for nuclear policy at the Pacific Forum. He is completing an edited volume on the U.S.-Chinese strategic nuclear relationship and the impact of the multipolar context (Lynne Rienner, 2021). You can follow him on Twitter at @DavidSantoro1.
Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior advisor (nonresident) at the Pacific Forum. He is the author of Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions (Georgetown University Press, 2019).
The Trump administration is planning to undergird its mounting pressure campaign against communist China with a dramatic expansion in U.S. weapons sales to the democratic island of Taiwan, whose independence has long been threatened by Beijing.
Sources familiar with the plan have told Reuters that the U.S. plans to sell as many as seven major weapons systems, including mines, cruise missiles and drones to Taiwan - building on an effort known within the Pentagon as "Fortress Taiwan" aimed at countering Chinese military forces in the region.
While the U.S. has a long history of selling weaponry to Taiwan, the news agency reported on Tuesday that the pursuit of seven sales at once is a rare departure from precedent in which sales to the island have been spaced out and calibrated to minimize tension with Beijing.
China and Taiwan have been governed separately since the Chinese civil war of the 1940s when Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists lost to Mao Zedong's communists. The nationalists subsequently fled the mainland and established their own government on the island of Taiwan.
While Washington technically does not recognize Taiwanese sovereignty from China, it has a special relationship with the island democracy's 23 million people and laws in place that require the United States to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression.
President Trump emboldened Washington's posture toward the situation days before taking office in 2016 when, as president-elect, he made global headlines by phoning Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to express his support for Taiwanese democracy. The call was reported as the first in 40 years between a Taiwanese leader and an American president-elect.
Beijing responded angrily and has spent recent years ramping up Chinese military provocations near Taiwan, which is situated just 80 miles off the coast of mainland China. In early 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated outright that Beijing's goal is to absorb Taiwan and that China could use "force" to achieve the goal if necessary.
Reuters noted Tuesday that Taiwan's military is well-trained and well-equipped with mostly U.S.-made hardware, but China has a huge numerical superiority and is adding advanced equipment of its own.
The news agency claimed the new U.S. weapons slated for Taiwan - comprised of packages from Lockheed Martin Co LMT.N, Boeing BA.N and General Atomics - are now moving their way through the export process, according to three people familiar with the status of the deals on Capitol Hill, and that a notification to Congress is expected within weeks.
5. Indo-Pacific Command leader underscores need for stronger missile defense on Guam
And Japan. And Korea.
Indo-Pacific Command leader underscores need for stronger missile defense on Guam
U.S. sailors visit an Aegis Ashore missile defense system in Poland, June 25, 2019.
AMY FORSYTHE/U.S. NAVY
By SETH ROBSON | STARS AND STRIPES Published: September 18, 2020
Guam urgently needs an Aegis Ashore missile defense system to protect vital military assets from an increasingly aggressive China, according to the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
"There are billions of dollars in defense capability on Guam," Adm. Phil Davidson said Thursday during an online forum organized by the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. "There needs to be some investment in defending that."
The U.S. territory is home to air and naval bases and serves as a launching point for strategic bombers. The Navy is also building facilities to house a Marine Corps air-ground task force to accommodate a planned drawdown of Marines on Okinawa.
Aegis Ashore is a land-based version of the short- and intermediate-range missile defense system deployed on dozens of U.S. and Japanese navy cruisers and destroyers. NATO and the United States deployed the first ashore system in Romania in 2016. Japan scuttled plans for an Aegis Ashore installation earlier this year due to worries about rocket boosters falling on populated areas.
China's rapid development of the world's largest rocket force is a concern, Davidson said during the forum.
The force could strike U.S. forces on Guam and in the Far East with everything from ballistic missiles to maneuverable cruise and hypersonic missiles, warned the commander of 380,000 troops and civilians responsible for an area of operations stretching from the U.S. West Coast to India.
China's ability to launch missiles from submarines ranging farther from shore means Guam needs the 360-degree protection that Aegis can provide, he said.
Guam's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile defense battery can sense targets only within a 120-degree range, and it's pointed at North Korea, Davidson said.
"It's going to require a much deeper 360-degree persistent capability," he said, adding that it's important to invest in Guam's missile defense now.
"It is not necessarily about designing or creating a defensive system that is impenetrable or invulnerable against the entire missile inventory of a potential adversary. Rather it is about developing a combat credible deterrent."
INDOPACOM, in a report to Congress, put the cost of a system providing 360-degree air-missile defense on Guam at just under $1.7 billion.
Davidson has requested funding for the system starting in the next fiscal year as part of a Pacific Deterrence Initiative that parallel's a similar program in Europe designed to deter Russia.
Building Aegis Ashore is a pathway to defending against hypersonic missiles, Davidson said, adding that China's rocket force fires and exercises more often than that of any other nation.
"The vast capacity that China possesses when it comes to land-based ... cruise missiles and ground-based conventional missiles and where they are headed with ground-based hypersonic missiles represents an offensive threat throughout the region that is alarming not only to the United States but to all our allies and partners there as well," he said.
However, U.S. deterrence can't be fully dependent on missile defense and will require closing the gap in offensive missile capability with China, Davidson said.
"China has a profound advantage in ballistic missiles against the United States," he said. "They also have a profound advantage in ground-launched cruise missiles. We have to get into that offensive force game as well."
Last month, the U.S., citing Russian violations, withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a 1987 pact with Russia that limited both nations from fielding short- and intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and missile launchers that could be used to house nuclear or conventional payloads.
Rapidly growing capability in China and North Korea requires that Aegis be the starting point for the defense of Guam, Davidson said.
"We can't ... wait for some perfect solution to manifest itself in 2035 or 2040. We are in the threat environment now," he said.
China is building combat support, cyber and space capability, developing fourth- and fifth-generation fighters jets, deploying long-range air-to-air missiles and building maneuvering and hypersonic missiles and advanced warships comparable to the U.S. Navy's Ticonderoga-class cruiser and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, Davidson said.
"They are training with these systems and they're going it in realistic, integrated joint exercises," he said.
Riki Ellison, founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, which lobbies for missile defense, deployment and development, said U.S. forces can't protect forward bases today in the Far East from Chinese missiles.
"Our (aircraft) carriers can (protect themselves) with their Aegis ships but on the land side we don't have the capability," he said in a telephone interview Tuesday. "That has to be addressed."
The U.S. has been investing for 20 years on defeating ballistic missiles from North Korea, but the Chinese missile threat is far more advanced, Ellison said.
"This is a different game. It can't just be the U.S.," he said. "Australia has to chip in; so does Japan. This is not something that the U.S. can do on its own."
This aerial view of Naval Base Guam shows several Navy vessels moored at Apra Harbor, March 15, 2018. ALANA LANGDON/U.S. NAVY
6. Report on potential genetic engineering of COVID-19 is met with criticism
I think Bannon's propaganda attempt backfired. Science over propaganda? Unfortunately I think propaganda wins in tw out of three falls.
Report on potential genetic engineering of COVID-19 is met with criticism
Report on potential genetic engineering of COVID-19 is met with criticism. September. 18, 2020 07:20. ashilla@donga.com.
Li-Meng Yan, a former life science researcher at the University of Hong Kong, revealed a paper on Monday (local time) claiming that COVID-19 was artificially developed at a military research center in Wuhan, Hubei. The paper, which was revealed on a data-sharing website for scientists, garnered huge attention with 400,000 people worldwide reading it in just one day. However, scientists criticize that the paper is a typical conspiracy theory that lacks evidence. Facebook and Twitter also determined the theory as false information and took actions, such as blocking Yan's Twitter account.
Yan cited three reasons in her 26-page paper to explain why SAR-CoV-2 - the virus causing COVID-19 infections - is not the result of natural evolution.
First, she claimed that the genome sequences of two viruses - ZC45 and ZXC21 - found in bats in Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province are very similar to those of SAR-CoV-2. Second, she said that there are signs of certain sequences inserted into the gene of spike protein, which plays a crucial role in viral penetration into human cells. She also claimed that the fact that the sequences are similar to those of SARS-CoV, which causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), is evidence for an artificial insertion.
For spike protein to penetrate into cells, it needs to be cut by hydrolase. Yan claimed that the cut was made more advantageous for infection. "The laboratory creation of this coronavirus is convenient and can be accomplished in approximately six months," said Yan.
Reactions among scientists to her paper are icy. In particular, there is a lot of criticism against the signs of cut and inserted genome sequences, which she suggested as critical evidence of genetic engineering. "The basis of her claim is that specific genome sequences, which can be cut by hydrolase that is used to insert genome sequences, is found," said Jang Hye-sik, a researcher of Center for RNA Research at the Institute for Basic Science, who published the most detailed genetic map of SAR-CoV-2 in the world in April. "As such sequences can be discovered elsewhere by chance, however, it cannot be considered as meaningful evidence."
Global COVID-19 pandemic cases reach 30 million. September. 18, 2020 07:18. . While the number of global COVID-19 cases has exceeded 30 million, the number of daily new patients in South Korea rose to 153 on Thursday after decreasing close to 100. As new mass infections have occurred in elderly care facilities, auto manufacturing plants, and churches and the share of the patients whose infection routes are unknown has surpassed 25 percent, the disease prevention authorities are becoming warier.
The noticeable blind spot of the disease control efforts was senior infections. From 916 new patients diagnosed between September 10 and Wednesday, 360 people - about four out of 10 cases - were 60 or older. The fatality rate also increases with age - less than 0.5 percent for those under 60, 1.19 percent for those in their 60s, 6.47 percent for those in their 70s, and 20.57 percent for those aged 80 or older. Among the patients aged 60 or older, about 90 percent of all cases are serious. Mass infections in elderly care facilities are the reasons behind the increasing share of patients aged 60 or older and the rising fatality rate among seniors. So far, about one-third of all COVID-19 deaths in the country have come from senior facilities.
The disease control authorities said they will carry out sample diagnosis tests for care hospitals and facilities in Seoul and the nearby region. However, it is quite belated as the concerns about the management of senior care facilities have been raised a long time ago. The new measures put forward by the government are also impractical as they do not include actions on facilities where seniors stay for only certain periods of time per day, not overnight, even though they are more vulnerable to infection than residential facilities. In addition, the potential of viral spread is still existent as caregivers are allowed to interact with senior patients even though visitors are not permitted anymore.
It took nine months for the number of global COVID-19 cases to reach 30 million since the first report of mysterious pneumonia cases in Wuhan, China to the World Health Organization. It took 44 days for the number of cases to increase from 10 million to 20 million but it only took 38 days from 20 million to 30 million cases. This indicated that COVID-19 is spreading at a faster pace, which puts senior group facilities at a greater risk. As the pattern at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis where a number of senior deaths occurred from care facilities in other advanced countries is now affecting South Korea, attention is needed to effectively prevent it.
8. Trump's former spy chief is calling on Congress to create an election oversight commission
The number one priority for all elected officials and civil servants (and party officials) should be ensure the integrity of the election. Anyone who undermines the integrity of the election process or falls to protect the election process should no longer hold office, whether elected or appointed.
Trump's former spy chief is calling on Congress to create an election oversight commission
Former DNI Dan Coats outlined the proposed oversight commission in an opinion piece published Thursday in The New York Times in which he wrote that "our democracy's enemies, foreign and domestic, want us to concede in advance that our voting systems are faulty or fraudulent; that sinister conspiracies have distorted the political will of the people," among other things. As a result, Coats wrote, the "most urgent task American leaders face is to ensure that the election's results are accepted as legitimate."
Coats said Congress should "create a supremely high-level bipartisan and nonpartisan commission to oversee the election. This commission would not circumvent existing electoral reporting systems or those that tabulate, evaluate or certify the results. But it would monitor those mechanisms and confirm for the public that the laws and regulations governing them have been scrupulously and expeditiously followed - or that violations have been exposed and dealt with - without political prejudice and without regard to political interests of either party."
Though Coats doesn't take direct aim at Trump in the op-ed, it nonetheless presents a contrast with views espoused by his former boss, who has frequently made unproven claims that American elections are rife with voter fraud, stoking fears that the results might not be recognized as valid by millions of Americans.
Earlier this month, Trump launched a new baseless accusation about how he believes Democrats will attempt to commit fraud during the presidential election, telling North Carolina rallygoers to act as poll watchers to prevent fraud at voting locations. He has also claimed, without evidence, that he lost the popular vote in 2016 due to voter fraud.
Coats wrote that the proposed commission "would be responsible for monitoring those forces that seek to harm our electoral system through interference, fraud, disinformation or other distortions" adding that any illegal activity would be "referred to appropriate law enforcement agencies and national security entities."
The commission's members, Coats said, would be comprised of both Democrats and Republicans and "could include congressional leaders, current and former governors, 'elder statespersons,' former national security leaders," and others, including former Supreme Court justices and leaders in the private sector.
"They would accept as a personal moral responsibility to put the integrity and fairness of the election process above everything else, making public reassurance their goal," Coats wrote.
But top Republican senators on Thursday dismissed their former colleague's call to establish such a commission.
Asked if he backs Coats' recommendation, Senate Rules Chairman Roy Blunt told CNN: "No."
"I love Dan Coats, I have great respect for him. I don't think that's right," said Blunt, a member of Senate GOP leadership whose committee oversees election matters. "I think the states are well prepared to deal with this and are in much better shape from an election security perspective than they were in 2016."
The Missouri Republican continued, "One, I don't think there will be a commission, and two, I don't think we need a commission."
Other Republicans were uncertain how such a plan would work -- and said it would be far too difficult to implement before November.
"We couldn't do that before this election, I would imagine," said Sen. John Cornyn, a Texas Republican and member of his party's leadership team. He suggested such an idea could be something to look at for future elections. "It might not be a bad idea to have a neutral non-partisan body."
Sen. Marco Rubio, who runs the Senate Intelligence Committee, said he didn't read the details of Coats' plan. But the Florida Republican added: "One of the strengths of our system is that elections are conducted across thousands of counties, and it makes it difficult to mess with it."
This story has been updated with reaction from GOP senators.
CNN's Alex Marquardt, Maegan Vazquez and Manu Raju contributed to this report.
9. Moscow's Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies
Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington
September 2020
As the United States withdraws its military forces from parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, Russia is expanding its influence in these and other areas. But instead of deploying conventional Russian soldiers, Moscow has turned to special operations forces, intelligence units, and private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group to do its bidding. Russia's strategy is straightforward: to undermine U.S. power and increase Moscow's influence using low-profile, deniable forces like PMCs that can do everything from providing foreign leaders with security to training, advising, and assisting partner security forces.
Moscow's use of PMCs has exploded in recent years, reflecting lessons learned from earlier deployments, a growing expansionist mindset, and a desire for economic, geopolitical, and military gains. Ukraine served as one of the first proving grounds for PMCs, beginning in 2014. The Russians then refined the model as these private mercenaries worked with local forces in countries such as Syria and Libya. Over time, Moscow expanded the use of PMCs to sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and other regions-including countries such as Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Venezuela. PMCs now fill various roles to undermine U.S. influence and support Russia's expanding geopolitical, military, and economic interests.
With operations suspected or proven in as many as 30 countries across 4 continents and an increasingly refined and adaptable operational model, PMCs are likely to play a significant role in Russian strategic competition for the foreseeable future.
Spread of Russian PMC Activity since 2014
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Dates represent the earliest credibly documented PMC presence in each country. Not all PMC deployments are ongoing.
Roles & Missions
Russian Special Forces soldiers from the army's intelligence unit take part in a military drill at a training ground near the village of Mol'kino, Krasnodar region, on July 10, 2015. Photo by SERGEI VENYAVSKY/AFP via Getty Images.
Russian Objectives
PMCs play key roles executing Moscow's policy objectives and advancing Russian national security interests across the globe. Even though PMCs are technically illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, some of President Vladimir Putin's closest allies-such as Yevgeny Prigozhin-head Russian PMCs. A core component of Russia's "hybrid warfare" strategy, PMCs provide the Kremlin a quasi-deniable means through which to pursue Russian objectives, complementing or substituting for more traditional, overt forms of statecraft.
Foreign Policy
PMCs provide the Kremlin with a tool to expand Russian influence across the globe. Through the use of PMCs, Moscow can support state and non-state partners, extract resources, influence foreign leaders, and engage in other activities that further Russian foreign policy goals.
Military
With military skills and capabilities, PMCs enable Moscow to project limited power, strengthen partners, establish new military footholds, and alter the balance of power in out-of-area conflicts toward preferred outcomes while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability for the Kremlin. PMC contractors are also more expendable and less risky than Russian soldiers, particularly if they are killed during combat or training missions.
Intelligence
Often recruited from Russian military and security forces, PMC operatives build intelligence networks in key theaters to collect insights for Kremlin decisionmakers and conduct intelligence operations, including political influence, covert action, and other clandestine activities.
Economic
PMCs and associated energy, mining, security, and logistics firms provide Moscow a means to expand trade and economic influence in the developing world and build new revenue streams, particularly from oil, gas, and mineral extraction, to reduce the impact of sanctions.
Political
Typically run by Kremlin-linked oligarchs, PMCs and the lucrative benefits that can accrue from deployments give the Kremlin a lever for balancing competing political and financial interests among oligarchs and exploiting PMCs' quasi-legal status to ensure loyalty to Putin.
Informational
Moscow leverages even small-scale deployments to enhance global perceptions of Russian power and global influence while propagating pro-Russian narratives in foreign operating environments through PMC-linked media and disinformation outlets.
Ideological
PMCs serve as a tool to expand Russian soft power, including themes of "Russian patriotism" and Slavic identity among ideologically minded citizens in the former Soviet states and Balkans.
Training
PMCs conduct training before deploying abroad, including at bases inside Russia and likely with the support of Russian military and intelligence agencies. Russia's largest and most capable PMC, Wagner Group, conducts training at two camps attached to the location of 10th Special Mission Brigade of GRU Spetsnaz in Mol'kino, Krasnoday Kray, Russia.
The main base features a headquarters, an airborne training and obstacle course, weapons and munitions storage, and other military facilities.
North of the main military base, Wagner has a separate facility. The Wagner base was likely built between 2015 and 2016, encompasses approximately six acres, and consists of approximately nine permanent structures of varying sizes. Images show numerous and varying numbers of cargo trucks, small trucks, and civilian vehicles.
Features south of the main base include a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) unit-shown here-as well as an unidentified internal base and other training areas.
Tasks
PMC units conduct a variety of military, security, and information warfare missions in deployments abroad, sometimes augmenting regular Russian forces. PMCs may be specialized for key tasks or serve multiple battlefield roles.
Paramilitary
PMCs train, equip, assist, and enable host-nation security forces and/or local proxy militias for battlefield operations.
Combat
PMC specialists provide key tactical capabilities for specialized tasks, such as sniping, fire support, anti-air, and direct action.
Intelligence
Often PMC operatives linked to the Russian intelligence agency GRU recruit human intelligence sources, guide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and conduct political warfare, sabotage, and other covert action missions.
Protective Services
PMCs provide protective details for senior local government officials, including serving as presidential guards.
Site Security
PMCs secure key energy infrastructure, mining, and mineral extraction sites at the behest of host nations as well as for associated Russian companies operating the sites.
Propaganda and Disinformation
PMCs and associated media organizations disseminate pro-Russian messages and narratives to key online audiences while also building field organizations such as "patriotic youth camps" on the ground.
Ukraine
Date of Arrival: 2014
Украина
PMCs first began operating in Ukraine during Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 before taking on a central role in Moscow's ongoing covert war in Eastern Ukraine's Donbas region. Operating independently or augmenting regular Russian forces, PMC personnel in Ukraine including from Wagner Group reached between 2,500-5,000 during peak of fighting in 2015.
PMCs provided Moscow an ideal tool through which to pursue its geopolitical, military, and ideological objectives in Ukraine: destabilizing then consolidating control over Crimea and Donbas, undermining and pressuring Kyiv and its Western backers for diplomatic concessions, and doing it all while denying any official Russian involvement. However, while PMCs enabled Moscow and its Donbas proxies to seize and secure control over new "independent" republics in Donetsk and Luhansk, their battlefield achievements largely stalled since 2015, rendering the frontlines of Eastern Ukraine another Russian-backed frozen conflict. Moreover, Russian attempts to maintain "plausible deniability" for their actions fooled few Western governments, resulting in sanctions on Kremlin and PMC officials and organizations.
Nonetheless, Russia's intervention in Ukraine was one of the first battlefield applications of its new "hybrid warfare" doctrine, and Moscow integrated PMCs into its military operations. Russia applied several lessons, such as exploiting the military-like capabilities of PMCs and their official "deniability," to its next major foreign operation: Syria.
PMC combat support to Donbas separatists, particularly from Wagner Group, was decisive in pivotal early battles of the war in Eastern Ukraine from 2014 to 2015.
Click on the map for more information about an event.
Annexation of Crimea
March 2014
Battle of Luhansk Airport
Spring 2014
Shootdown of Ukrainian Il-76
June 2014
Battle of Debaltseve
Early 2015
Syria
Date of Arrival: 2015
Сирия
Building off its experience in Ukraine, Russia again turned to PMCs in Syria to help achieve important goals-including stabilizing the Assad regime and countering efforts by the United States and its partners. In addition, PMCs played a crucial role capturing oil fields, refineries, gas plants, and other energy infrastructure from rebels. Russian PMCs played an increasingly direct role in pro-regime combat operations over the course of the Syrian civil war and were often synchronized with Russian economic priorities, including securing key energy infrastructure. PMC personnel in Syria reached up to 1,000-3,000 personnel, including contingents from Wagner Group, Vegacy, E.N.O.T., Vostok Battalion, and other PMCs.
Syria was an important testing ground for the application of a hybrid-PMC deployment model, which is now being exported to other battlegrounds. PMCs acted as a ground force with skill sets similar to Russian Spetsnaz through which Moscow could limit regular Russian military casualties and provide deniability for high-risk Russian actions. PMCs synchronized military advances with economic priorities: capitalizing on ground advances in oil- and gas-rich areas, securing key pipelines, oil fields, refineries, and gas plants to stage future ground advances and draw profits. The Wagner Group's advance on the Conoco Plant in Dayr az Zawr in February 2018 demonstrates how Moscow used PMCs to take risks in a deniable manner. In this case, Wagner attempted to seize the U.S.- and partner-controlled Conoco gas plant both to secure an economically valuable site and test U.S. resolve.
T-4 airbase in central Syria served as a key airbase for Russia in January 2017 as part of its strategy and planning to retake eastern Syria. Battlefield needs in 2017 precipitated a steady increase in specialized ground forces, including Russian PMCs, which led the ground component of this stage of the war. By 2019, Russia had expanded its presence at T-4 to become an all-purpose, air, ground, and intelligence base for its missions in Syria. The following imagery of T-4 identifies possible PMC positions at the airbase in 2017 and 2019.
Full airbase shot of T-4, January 23, 2017.
Left: An infantry battalion position observed at T-4 was likely Russian since the Syrian Arab Army no longer displayed this type of formation six years into the war.
Right: A likely Russian logistics facility at T-4.
A tank company and support element position at T-4. Russia expanded its presence at the airbase since battlefield needs required increased ground forces.
Russian ground attack aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles in May 2019 indicate Russia's expanded presence at T-4.
This multi-mission role of PMCs-military, political, economic-and integration into host-nation proxy forces would next be employed in Libya.
Libya
Date of Arrival: 2015
Ливия
With lessons learned from supporting the Assad regime in Syria, Russia deployed PMCs to Libya's civil war to bolster General Khalifa Haftar, his Libyan National Army (LNA), and the eastern-based government in Tobruk. Since 2017, PMCs such as Wagner Group have been at the vanguard of Russian efforts, advising and enabling Haftar's LNA offensive into western Syria and assault on the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli in 2019. Moscow deployed up to 800-1,200 PMC personnel, primarily from Wagner Group, to multiple training sites, forward bases, and key energy and infrastructure facilities as of early 2020, conducting a variety of missions vital to Haftar's offensive and to Russian interests.
Translation
1,600 Russian "Wagner" PMC militants left the west of Libya after the defeat and flight of the Russian-Haftar troops. View original tweet.
One of Russia's primary deployment sites has been Al Jufra Air Base in central Libya, which has served as the launching pad for Wagner Group forces and Russian air support to the Tripoli campaign. A close examination of Russia's deployment at Al Jufra Airbase reveals an expansion of Russian air and ground forces. In particular, satellite imagery shows a growth in the presence of the Russian PMC Wagner Group, a core component of Russia's intervention in Libya.
Full airbase shot, June 6, 2020.
The arrival of a large contingent of Russian artillery and PMC Wagner Group forces, May 28, 2020.
A Russian Su-24 attack aircraft taxiing on an Al Jufra runway, demonstrating continued Russian military activity, June 8, 2020.
PMCs have been Moscow's spearhead for advancing its foreign policy, military, and economic interests in Libya. With the Libyan civil war, Russia saw a power vacuum and chance to exploit the instability to expand Russian influence, using PMCs to bolster Haftar, tip the conflict in their favor, and reap the rewards. In exchange, Moscow sought economic and military concessions, deploying PMCs to key oil and gas facilities and Mediterranean ports as those areas fell to the LNA. Russia also used Libya to strengthen ties to traditionally U.S. partners, namely UAE and Egypt. Since 2017, Russian PMCs have deployed to Egypt's Sidi Barrani airfield to direct joint Russian-Egyptian military support to Haftar. Newly acquired CSIS imagery shows the deployment of Russian equipment at Sidi Barrani in March 2017.
Left: A recently arrived Il-76 transport aircraft in March 2017 at Sidi Barrani. Russian special operations forces and private military contractors deployed to Sidi Barrani as part of a bid to support Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar.
Right: Vehicles on the aircraft apron at Sidi Barrani in March 2017.
Russia's deployment of PMCs to Libya has strengthened its geostrategic position and diplomatic influence in the country, ensuring Moscow's role in any resolution of the conflict and an end-state amenable to Russian interests. However, there were also limits to Moscow's use of PMCs. Despite assistance from PMCs, the LNA was unable to seize Tripoli and even triggered an expanding intervention from Turkey to bolster the GNA. Wagner Group alone has lost hundreds of fighters and key weapons systems in Tripoli's heavy ground fighting and from Turkish drone strikes. Nonetheless, through its PMC-led intervention, Moscow has gained a new strategic foothold and geostrategic position on the Mediterranean, as well as a bridgehead into the rest of the African continent.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Date of Arrival: 2014
Африка
Though Russian PMCs first appeared in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as early as 2014, Russia significantly expanded the geographic scope and missions of PMCs in Sub-Saharan Africa following its interventions in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya. Russia has primarily used PMCs to target resource-rich countries with weak governance, such as Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Madagascar. Though PMC tasks have varied from case to case to meet local needs, in each of these countries Russia exchanged military and security support for economic gains and political influence.
Sudan
Date of Arrival: 2017
In Sudan, Russia used Wagner Group to provide military and political support to President Omar al-Bashir in exchange for gold mining concessions. Russia also had a strategic motive to seek basing rights in the Red Sea. In November 2017, Moscow facilitated a mining operations agreement for M Invest, a Russian company tied to Yevgeny Prigozhin. PMC troops, who arrived the following month, provided training and military assistance to local forces. In addition, PMCs orchestrated a disinformation campaign to discredit protesters through many of the same techniques the Internet Research Agency, linked to Prigozhin, used in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Central African Republic
Date of Arrival: 2018
Russia has followed a similar model in the Central African Republic, where the Wagner Group and Patriot-another Russian PMC-have reportedly been active. Beginning in January 2018, Russia exchanged military training and security-primarily for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and mining operations-for access to gold, uranium, and diamonds. New CSIS imagery sheds light on the training camp these troops established southwest of Bangui in the ruins of the Palace of Berengo.
Wagner PMC Base in Berengo Progress
Following their arrival in 2018, PMC troops established a training camp in the ruins of former-emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa's palace at Berengo, southwest of Bangui. Troops repaired existing facilities and constructed new housing, storage structures, and training areas-including firing ranges and revetments. The imagery below shows the year-by-year development of the main base on the palace grounds and the two adjacent training areas, beginning with the conditions in 2017 before PMCs arrived.
PMCs Arrive
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Madagascar
Date of Arrival: 2018
In early spring 2018, Wagner Group sent a small group of political analysts to Madagascar to support incumbent President Hery Rajaonarimampianina's reelection bid in exchange for economic agreements on mining (chromite and gold), oil, agriculture, and the port of Toamasina. In April, additional troops arrived to provide security and military training, allegedly with the assistance of Federal Security Service and GRU officers. Though Rajaonarimampianina lost the election, he facilitated the promised agreements prior to leaving office. Ferrum Mining, a Russian company involved in one such deal, began operations on the island in October 2018 but soon paused due to strikes.
Mozambique
Date of Arrival: 2019
In Mozambique, Russia traded Wagner's military support against Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado province for access to natural gas. Wagner troops arrived in early September 2019 but were unprepared for the mission. They had little experience conducting operations in the brush and difficulty coordinating with local forces. After significant losses, Wagner troops retreated south to Nacala in November 2019 to regroup. Despite sending additional equipment and troops in February and March 2020, Wagner was replaced in April by the Dyck Advisory Group, a South African PMC. It is unclear whether any Wagner troops remain in the country.
Latin America
Date of Arrival: 2017
Латинская Америка
Russia's global use of PMCs has also extended to Latin America, though they are not as widespread as in Africa. PMCs have most notably played a role in Venezuela, though their presence has also been rumored in countries such as Nicaragua.
Venezuela
Date of Arrival: 2017
PMCs have been present in Venezuela since at least 2017 to guard Russian business interests and companies, such as Rosneft. Despite investments in the Venezuelan economy, Moscow's relationship with Caracas is primarily driven by a geostrategic desire to reassert its influence in the region at the expense of the United States. In response to the Trump administration's calling for the ouster for Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president in January 2019, Russia deployed approximately 100 security contractors, likely from Wagner, the same month to provide security to president Maduro amid political upheaval. These contractors conducted surveillance and cybersecurity protection in addition to physical security.
Outlook & Implications
August 4, 2018: Victor Tokmakov, first secretary of the Russian Embassy, presents diplomas to graduating recruits in Berengo. Russian military consultants have set up training for the Central African Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces after delivering weapons to the country. Photo by FLORENT VERGNES/AFP via Getty Images
These examples demonstrate Russia's expanding global use of the PMC model to advance its geopolitical and economic goals and undermine U.S. interests. PMCs provide the Kremlin a deniable means to project power and influence into its "near-abroad," as recent PMC activity in Belarus has demonstrated. They offer a glimpse of how Russia plans to compete with the United States in the future, particularly in weak, strategically located, and resource-rich states.
PMCs are an important instrument in a broad Russian toolkit that includes covert action, cyber operations, and other irregular activity across the globe. Yet PMC activities have not always been successful. In Libya, for example, Russia and its PMCs suffered a serious setback following the battlefield losses of Khalifa Haftar. Despite such problems, U.S. efforts to counter Russian PMCs have been weak and ad hoc. A more effective response should include several steps.
01 Make it public.
The first is publicly highlighting what Russian PMCs are doing, where they are operating, and how they are connected to the Russian government-including to President Putin and others in the Kremlin. This analysis provides important details of the scope and activities of PMCs.
02 Exploit PMC weaknesses.
A second step is to highlight and exploit Russia's challenges with PMCs. Many are ineffective, corrupt, and engaged in human rights abuses. In the end, Moscow's use of PMCs may actually undermine Russian influence rather than improve it. While PMCs have enabled Russia to shape conflict trajectories, gain influence in key theaters, and win military and economic concessions, there are limits to what PMCs can achieve. They have been most effective when deployed for limited or specific objectives, such as bolstering Syrian forces, aiding Donbas separatists in Ukraine, or gaining favor in the Central African Republic and Sudan. By themselves, however, PMCs are rarely decisive in winning conflicts, particularly when faced with capable and committed opponents or operating in unfamiliar terrain.
10. Incirlik: Time for the U.S. Military to Leave
I am not well versed in security operations in this region of the world but my knee jerk reaction to such calls is why give up the high ground? We need to multiple overseas basing capabilities if we are going to base our national security on the ability to project power. That said I can understand the issues around Turkey and its reliability. Just recall the 4th Infantry Division's inability to deploy to Iraq through Turkey in 2003.
Incirlik: Time for the U.S. Military to Leave
President Donald Trump seeks to reduce the U.S. military footprint around the world. Both the progressive camp within the Democratic Party and the libertarian wing of the Republican Party, meanwhile, want to reduce military expenditure. Many centrists want to re-invest in diplomacy: A complete end to the U.S. presence at Incirlik would check all boxes. It's time to take American forces out of Incirlik, the sooner, the better
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stopped in Cyprus on September 12 amidst heightened tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean while on his way to the Middle East. Shortly before Pompeo arrived, the Cypriot National Guard began a week-long exercise with the U.S. Navy. Senator Ron Johnson, meanwhile, has said the United States is "beefing up" its military presence at Souda Bay on Crete in part because of uncertainty about the future of the U.S. presence at the Incirlik Air Base outside the southern Turkish city of Adana.
Both Turkey and Greece joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, but it was Turkey upon which the United States came to rely. At the time both countries joined, Turkey had triple Greece's population; today it has an eight-fold population advantage over Greece. Turkey also was one of only two NATO members to border the Soviet Union. Beyond its sheer manpower, its control over the Bosporus and its geopolitical position along the Soviet Union's southern flank was crucial.
The United States foresaw the need for an air base in Turkey against the backdrop of World War II, but it would be almost a decade before the new Adana Air Base would begin operations. Renamed Incirlik in 1958, the base became a principle asset not only in Cold War reconnaissance as a U-2 hub, but also a key logistical element as the United States responded to military crises in Israel and Lebanon. Incirlik also became central to U.S. deterrence against the Soviets, and now Russia. The United States introduced nuclear bombs into Incirlik in 1959 and, today perhaps fifty nuclear weapons are stored on the base.
After the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Incirlik's strategic importance arguably grew. Its use during Operation Desert Storm forced Iraq to divide its air defense focus against operations from both the north and the south. It was crucial to the maintenance of the subsequent Iraqi no-fly zone and, after the 9/11 attacks, became crucial to air operations in Afghanistan. The Pentagon assumed Turkey would allow the United States to utilize Incirlik during the 2003 Iraq war; Turkey's refusal threw war planning into disarray and degraded trust. Still, the United States used Incirlik to fly combat sorties against the Islamic State.
When U.S.-Turkey relations decline, Incirlik often ends up in bilateral crosshairs. After the United States imposed an arms embargo on both Turkey and Greece against the backdrop of Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Turkey ended American military operations at almost all its airbases, and allowed U.S. presence at Incirlik only in the context of NATO operations. While Turkey eventually loosened those restrictions, Pentagon leaders usually look at negotiations over the use of Incirlik with the same enthusiasm as they do root canal: Turkey traditionally sought to leverage U.S. dependence upon Incirlik into operational, financial and diplomatic concessions. Prior to the 2003 Iraq war, for example, Turkey's opening position in periodic negotiations over the U.S. presence was that Turkey should have veto power over every flight and mission launched from the base, a demand which would make operations unwieldy if not impossible.
Turkey no longer has the leverage it once did. Because of Turkey's veto of U.S. transit, logistical, and combat operations ahead of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Pentagon began exploring alternatives. Over the last fifteen years, there has been a large expansion of the U.S. presence at Romania's Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base. Johnson's reference to Souda Bay hints at a more permanent, robust presence there. In 2017 and 2018, the United States spent $150 million upgrading an airbase in Jordan. Similar dynamics may be at play in Cyprus. Amphibious Ready Groups-replete with Harrier Jump Jets or F-35s, as well as Ospreys, and helicopters-increasingly circle in the Eastern Mediterranean.
While efforts to reduce American reliance on Incirlik are laudable, the question is less whether the United States has sufficiently diversified its defense infrastructure in the region and more whether any U.S. military presence in Turkey is a liability. Erdoğan and his aides incite anti-Americanism regularly through media outlets they now monopolize. The U.S. Navy has reduced port calls in Turkey after Turkish gangs assaulted American sailors in reaction to nationalist calls. After the abortive 2016 coup-an event Erdoğan insiders may have themselves staged or co-opted in order to justify the subsequent purge of political opponents-the Turkish government cut off electricity to the base and pro-Erdoğan groups demanded the arrests of Americans working inside.
Erdoğan is not averse to taking hostages. His desire to leverage the imprisoned American Pastor Andrew Brunson for U.S. policy concessions was the reason for his arrest. The State Department continue to warns Americans against traveling to Turkey because of the risk of arbitrary detention. Should conflict erupt between Turkey and Greece, should Turkey suffer some nationalist slight, or should Erdoğan want to distract the population against Turkey's faltering economy, he might order security forces to arrest Americans at Incirlik or even encourage mobs to overrun and seize the more than 1,000 American military and civilian personnel who populate the base.
That Americans in Incirlik could be captured is not farfetched: while American personnel in theory could defend themselves, as in 1979 when a mob of pro-Ayatollah Khomeini students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, American security will hesitate to fire for fear of worsening the diplomatic standoff or even precipitating their own lynching. Simply put, as relations sour, U.S. personnel at Incirlik could be considered future or potential hostages.
Certainly, the Pentagon is concerned. It has already begun to plan for the evacuation of nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik due to both the hostility of the Turkish government and Incirlik's close proximity to Jihadi-held areas across the Syrian border. Frankly, if the Pentagon has not already evacuated its tactical nuclear weapons from the base, it would be strategic malpractice. Diplomatic nicety, however, obfuscates a more basic question: If the nuclear weapons are not safe in Turkey, why are the personnel?
Every day U.S. forces and equipment remain at Incirlik puts Americans at risk. The United States cannot afford to wait until the inevitable crisis occurs before enacting their removal. A gradual withdrawal would endanger troops as declining numbers would heighten the remainders' vulnerable. Instead, the Pentagon should simply create a fait accompli: An overnight evacuation in which Turks awaken one morning to find all Americans personnel and aircraft departed with as much equipment as they could transport. It would need to be the military equivalent of the Baltimore Colts departing for Indianapolis in the middle of the night.
The small lobby of pro-Turkey partisans within the State Department and Congress will certainly resist any such action. They have long worked to defend Turkey from the consequence of Erdoğan's actions in the belief that Turkey is too big to lose, its anti-Americanism will evaporate post-Erdoğan, and that any reduction in cooperation would benefit Russia. Anyone who seeks to restore strong U.S.-Turkey ties, however, should welcome an end to the U.S. presence at Incirlik. The United States moved its air operations from Saudi Arabia to Qatar in 2003. Rather than lead Riyadh to embrace Russia or China, the change in military posture enabled Washington and Riyadh to navigate better a difficult time and sidestep a driver for anti-Americanism.
President Donald Trump seeks to reduce the U.S. military footprint around the world. Both the progressive camp within the Democratic Party and the libertarian wing of the Republican Party, meanwhile, want to reduce military expenditure. Many centrists want to re-invest in diplomacy: A complete end to the U.S. presence at Incirlik would check all boxes. It's time to take American forces out of Incirlik, the sooner, the better.
11. Conspiracy theories are the pathology of science
Conspiracy theories are another pandemic that are contributing to deaths. We should all be thinking critically and identifying and quashing these idiotic but dnagerous conspiracy theories.
Conspiracy theories are the pathology of science
Covid-19 has been a perfect case study of how mainstream scientists can be easily challenged and undermined by people with an axe to grind or a hidden political agenda
Science deals in probabilities rather than certainty. That is why in an age where online information is instantaneously available and people are taught to "question everything", it's not hard to cast doubt on mainstream scientists, that is, at least when they conflict with your own convictions. There will always be an online site, a YouTube channel or a non-peer-reviewed paper published by someone with a PhD to support your beliefs, however weird or improbable.
So, when you have a political agenda to push for and yet are contradicted by mainstream science, you do what former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon advises: "Flood the zone with s***."
You do that enough, people won't be able to tell the noise from the real message, the nuggets of truth buried under a mountain of manure. Though US President Donald Trump had come to blows with Bannon and disowned him, he has continued to practise Bannon's dark art, perhaps even excelling his former confidante. His latest?
"I don't think science knows," Trump said, again denying climate change as a cause of wildfires devastating California and a hurricane beating down on the Gulf coast, but blaming the fire disaster on poor forest management.
One suspects if his core supporters - whose votes will be crucial for his re-election in November - had not been among the worst of the hardcore climate deniers, he might well think more highly of the science.
Meanwhile, Bannon himself has been busy doing a bit of "flooding" himself, on China and the Covid-19 virus. He has had substantial help from fugitive mainland billionaire Guo Wengui and their multimillion dollar foundations whose sole aim is to topple the Chinese Communist Party.
For much of this year, both men have been busy promoting a conspiracy theory that the virus was biologically engineered in a Chinese lab. Bannon has slowed down a bit, though, after his arrest last month on Guo's yacht for allegedly defrauding donors in a private fundraising effort.
But one of their foundations managed to sponsor Yan Limeng, a former University of Hong Kong postdoctoral researcher who made the improbable claim that she had discovered before anyone else that Covid-19 could be transmitted human to human and that her finding was censored by the university.
That seems highly unlikely. If there had been such a finding, HKU would have been the first to jump on the roof to shout about it, just like it did back in 2004 when its researchers discovered that a coronavirus was the cause of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (Sars) outbreak from the previous year. All for scientific glory, of course!
A scientist examines Covid-19 infected cells during research for a vaccine in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Photo: Reuters
HKU said Yan had done no work related to the virus when China admitted the outbreak in December, nor in January, when the World Health Organisation declared it a public health emergency at the highest level. She was subsequently let go.
Since then, she has been promoting the conspiracy theory, including appearances in US right-wing news outlets such as Fox News. Her latest is a foundation-sponsored, co-authored scientific paper published in an open-source and non-peer-reviewed research repository, Zenodo.
Claiming Covid-19 is an artificial pathogen, the paper argues the theory of a natural origin of the coronavirus "although widely accepted, lacks substantial support".
However, her research supports "the alternative theory that the virus may have come from a research laboratory". Unfortunately, it has been "strictly censored on peer-reviewed scientific journals".
The absurd wordings should raise all the red flags. They claim mainstream scientists accept something that lacks evidence while a niche theory that few specialists support has substantial proof. And mainstream scientists go out of their way to suppress the evidence. But why?
First, Yan accused HKU of suppressing evidence of human-to-human transmission. Now, she is accusing the entire international scientific community of suppressing evidence that the virus was man-made.
I am certainly not a scientist, but I tend to take the easier explanation that accords with common sense, rather than a convoluted one from people who clearly have an axe to grind.
Sometimes, even as laypeople, we still have to pay attention to such claims because the issue directly affects us. And in a pandemic, it's a matter of life and death.
Of course, Bannon, Guo and Yan are not the only ones pushing the man-made virus theory for a political agenda. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has claimed that his government has strong evidence that the pathogen could be traced back to a lab at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, in the city where the outbreak began. He never got around to providing the evidence.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian once tweeted that US soldiers who took part in the international Military World Games held in Wuhan last October could have brought the virus.
So far, the lay public seems to have believed mainstream science that the virus was naturally evolved, rather than biologically engineered. But as with many controversial scientific and medical questions, it could have gone the other way. And we shouldn't speak too soon.
Alex Lo has been a Post columnist since 2012, covering major issues affecting Hong Kong and the rest of China. A journalist for 25 years, he has worked for various publications in Hong Kong and Toronto as a news reporter and editor. He has also lectured in journalism at the University of Hong Kong.
12. Black Lives Matter co-founder is leading an initiative funded by a pro-Chinese Communist Party
If true this should not tarnish all of those who support Black Lives Matters who are working for real change. Of course, if this is propaganda that is exactly the intent- to brand all supporters of Black Lives Matter with the broad brush that makes them out to be enemies of the state.
Black Lives Matter co-founder is leading an initiative funded by a pro-Chinese Communist Party group
A liberal initiative led by a co-founder of the Black Lives Matter movement is funded by a group linked to the Chinese Communist Party, it has been revealed.
Alicia Garza, 39, is the principal of Black Futures Lab, an advocacy group she created two years ago that works 'with black people to transform their communities', according to their website.
The New York Post reports, however, that the group is receiving funding from the San Francisco-based Chinese Progressive Association with ties to the People's Republic of China.
Garza has previously been described as a 'trained Marxist' by her BLM co-founder Patrisse Cullors.
'We are super-versed on, sort of, ideological theories. And I think that what we really tried to do is build a movement that could be utilized by many, many black folk,' Cullors said in an interview with The Real News Network.
On a funding page for Black Future Labs, it reveals how it is 'fiscally sponsored' by the Chinese group group.
The Chinese Progressive Association are not listed among the partners on their website yet thedonate buttonon Black Future Labs website links directly to a page on the CPA's own site.
Black Future Labs writes that its goal is to build 'black political power' and change 'the way that power operates-locally, statewide, and nationally'.
Their mission is to 'engage Black voters year-round', to 'use our political strength to stop corporate influences from creeping into progressive policies' and to 'combine technology and traditional organizing methods to reach black people anywhere and everywhere we are,' they add.
On their website, the CPA state that their group 'educates, organizes and empowers the low income and working class immigrant Chinese community in San Francisco to build collective power with other oppressed communities to demand better living and working conditions and justice for all people'.
Yet according to the Post, the group, founded in 1972, also has ties to the Chinese government, where there is a history of the mistreatment of black people.
According to Heritage.org, the CPA was founded 'during the heady days of the Marxist-oriented Asian American Movement'.
It cites a Stanford paper that states: 'The CPA began as a Leftist, pro-People's Republic of China organization, promoting awareness of mainland China's revolutionary thought and workers' rights, and dedicated to self-determination, community control, and "serving the people".'
It adds that it 'worked with other pro-PRC groups within the U.S. and San Francisco Bay Area ... Support for the PRC was based on the inspiration the members drew from what they saw as a successful grassroots model that presented a viable alternative to Western capitalism.'
The group has also held events with and supporting the Chinese government.
This included support for raising the Chinese flag over Boston's City Hall last year to celebrate the anniversary of the Communist Party's takeover of China. The group now has an active branch in the city as well as in San Francisco.
They also held a joint event with the People's Republic of China to help Chinese nationals renew their passports, the Washington Times reported.
Just this year, the coronavirus pandemic allegedly saw Africans living in Guangzhou, China, targeted with xenophobia, according to CNN.
There were reports that they were subject to random coronavirus testing or quarantined for 14 days in their homes, despite having no symptoms and there being no evidence they had contact with an infected person.
According to an advisory issued by the US State Department in May, there were also reports that bars and restaurants in China were ordered by law enforcement not to serve people of African origin.
'Moreover, local officials launched a round of mandatory tests for COVID-19, followed by mandatory self-quarantine, for anyone with "African contacts", regardless of recent travel history or previous quarantine completion,' the advisory said.
'African-Americans have also reported that some businesses and hotels refuse to do business with them.
'The US Consulate General advises African-Americans or those who believe Chinese officials may suspect them of having contact with nationals of African countries to avoid the Guangzhou metropolitan area until further notice,' it added.
However, China has voiced support of the BLM movement and used the Chinese Communist Party outlet China Daily to slam US 'racism and police violence'.
The Black Lives Matter movement started with the use of the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter on social media following the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the shooting death of black teen Trayvon Martin in February 2012.
It grew following a Facebook post by Garza called 'A Love Letter to Black People' published shortly afterward.
It regained traction this year following the brutal police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25.
The three founders of the movement and hashtag are activists Garza, Cullors and Opal Tometi, who expanded the project into a national network of over 30 local chapters between 2014 and 2016.
Garza is also behind the Movement for Black Lives which has described itself as 'anti-capitalist', according to Heritage.
'We believe and understand that Black people will never achieve liberation under the current global radicalized capitalist system,' it has stated.
It adds that in 2015, Garza also stated: 'It's not possible for a world to emerge where black lives matter if it's under capitalism, and it's not possible to abolish capitalism without a struggle against national oppression.'
According to the Maine Beacon, Garza said in 2019 that 'we're talking about changing how we've organized this country, so that we actually can achieve the justice that we are fighting for'.
'I believe we all have work to do to keep dismantling the organizing principle of this society, which creates inequities for everyone,' she added.
Garza is an organizer and writer living in California. As well as founding BLM, she has worked as the Special Projects Director for the National Domestic Workers Alliance.
13. Russia announces troop build-up in Far East
Reuters · by Alexander Marrow · September 17, 2020
2 Min Read
FILE PHOTO: Russia's Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu attends the opening ceremony of the International military-technical forum "Army-2020" at Patriot Congress and Exhibition Centre in Moscow Region, Russia August 23, 2020. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia is increasing its military presence in the Far East in response to rising tensions in the wider region, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said on Thursday.
In remarks cited on the defence ministry website, Shoigu said reinforcements were being sent because of tensions in the "eastern strategic direction", referring to an area encompassing Russia's eastern border with China and the wider Asia-Pacific.
Shoigu did not specify what the new threats were, or where the additional troops would go. He promised 500 units of new and modernised equipment for the region, as well as some improvements to the navy's Northern Fleet.
Alexander Gabuev, an analyst at Moscow's Carnegie Centre, said Russia was ensuring it has sufficient military capabilities in an area where conflicts could spill over, noting a rising risk of a naval clash between the United States and China.
"Russia cannot be left defenceless and it also needs to operate its capabilites there, in terms of air force, defence and personnel," he said.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia's concerns in the Far East centred around the actions of powers from outside the region, without specifying any countries or conflicts.
"All of these, of course, do not contribute to stability in this region," said Peskov.
Russia's Far East has also lately seen one of the longest sustained anti-government protest movements of President Vladimir Putin's two decades in power. The city of Khabarovsk, near the Chinese border, has seen weeks of demonstrations against the arrest of a local political leader.
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States hopes to move forward with naming Qatar as a major non-NATO ally, a status that provides foreign nations with benefits in defense trade and security cooperation, a senior U.S. official said on Thursday.
"We're going to move ahead, we hope, with designating Qatar a major non-NATO ally," Timothy Lenderking, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Arabian Gulf affairs, told reporters in a conference call.
U.S. and Qatari officials, including U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Qatar Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, met in Washington earlier this week.
"Major non-NATO ally" (MNNA) status gives a country preferential access to U.S. military equipment and technology, including free surplus material, expedited export processing and prioritized cooperation on training.
Qatar's Government Communications Office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Currently 17 countries have MNNA status, including Gulf Arab states Kuwait and Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet.
Qatar, host of the largest U.S. military facility in the Middle East, has been locked in a dispute with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt since 2017.
Washington has strong ties with all the states involved and sees the rift as a threat to efforts to contain Iran. It has pushed for a united Gulf front.
U.S. officials have recently expressed a desire to sell the F-35 stealth war plane to the UAE after it agreed last month to normalise ties with Israel. However, Israeli officials have objected, citing U.S. policy for Israel to maintain a military advantage in the region.
Reporting By Daphne Psaledakis and Arshad Mohammed; Additional Reporting by Alexander Cornwell in Dubai; Editing by Chizu Nomiyama and Steve Orlofsky
On August 7, the U.S. Space Force awarded contracts for Phase Two of its long-running launch services program, covering national security missions through 2027. United Launch Alliance and SpaceX were selected to provide the launch vehicles for over 30 missions, while Blue Origin and Northrop Grumman NOCwere not chosen.
Space Force officials made clear that source selection was driven mainly by past performance. United Launch Alliance, with a 100% success rate over two decades, won 60% of the Phase Two business. SpaceX won 40%. It was a major victory for SpaceX, vaulting it, as the Wall Street Journal observed, into "an elite tier of military suppliers."
SpaceX founder Elon Musk has been seeking this status for many years, and heaven knows his company has proven itself. In addition to introducing innovations such as reusable launch vehicles, it has managed to underprice even the Chinese in commercial competitions with its novel business strategy.
United Launch Alliance, which once enjoyed a monopoly of U.S. military launches, had to slim down and introduce a new family of more efficient launch vehicles to remain competitive. ULA is jointly owned by Boeing BAand Lockheed Martin LMT, both of which contribute to my think tank.
A SpaceX Falcon Heavy rocket on its first launch.
Wikipedia
But along the way to its breakthrough win with the Space Force on August 7, something curious happened in the way SpaceX priced its services. The price for using its Falcon Heavy vehicle more than doubled from what Musk originally claimed would be the maximum cost.
In 2018 he said the rocket would cost no more than $150 million to loft heavy payloads into orbit. But the award SpaceX received for a single mission in the first year of Phase Two was $316 million. That's quite an increase.
In fact, it's such a hefty price-tag that SpaceX is getting almost as much money for a single Falcon Heavy mission as the $337 million ULA is getting for two missions. We don't know details about the missions because they're all secret, but industry insiders say that all three payloads are sizable, and headed for geosynchronous orbit.
It isn't clear how this remarkable disparity in pricing came about. ULA bid a new launch vehicle called Vulcan Centaur that is said to be more efficient than its legacy Atlas and Delta rockets. SpaceX bid the same Falcon Heavy vehicle that in 2018 was priced at $130 million to loft another classified mission into orbit.
So how did the price-tag on a Falcon Heavy mission get from $130 million to $316 million? Darned if I know. I asked SpaceX for an explanation, but so far I haven't heard back.
We know that the higher cost isn't for additional boosters to increase thrust, because unlike Vulcan Centaur that option does not exist for Falcon Heavy. We also know that the added cost isn't for development money, because SpaceX was frozen out of an earlier phase in the launch competition when it might have received government R&D funding.
So in the absence of any additional details, the most plausible explanation is that SpaceX has raised the price it is charging-a lot. This may signal a new era in the company's business strategy, because it also has recently raised the price NASA must pay to deliver supplies to the International Space Station.
A casual observer might conclude that having secured long-term relationships with the government's civil and military space programs, SpaceX no longer feels as constrained to hold down costs.
One factor that presumably impacted pricing is that when SpaceX first broke into the military space market, its Falcon 9 launch vehicle couldn't carry many of the expected payloads, so the company's initial missions didn't involve heavy lifting. Under Phase Two, though, the bidders had to offer a fixed price for every conceivable national-security launch mission, and those included some really heavy satellites.
Whatever the explanation though-and I'm not claiming to have all the answers-SpaceX doesn't look like the low-cost provider of launch services to the Space Force. Its heaviest launch vehicle costs a great deal more than what was once cited as the expected maximum price, and its main competitor is delivering two missions for not much more than the cost of one SpaceX mission.
16. An "Alliance of Democracies": Is There Any There There?
I like the idea of a community of democracies. But it has to be values based: embrace and support of liberal democracy, freedom and individual liberty, free market economy, rule OF law, and human rights. To be a member of the community you must embrace, support, and protect these values and those who believe in them. It cannot simply be some kind of grouping to counter China. This is ideological competition because China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions
An "Alliance of Democracies": Is There Any There There?
As the region (and world) focus on the fight against the global COVID-19 pandemic, the "cold peace" between Washington and Beijing continued to heat up, with implications throughout and beyond the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. US pronouncements during the last four months should dispel any doubt that the US Asia strategy is aimed first and foremost at China, and more specifically at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While critics of the Trump administration's unilateralist approach continue to argue that "America First means America Alone," this does not appear to be the case where China is concerned. Not only does the much-maligned (including by us) "Quad"-the loose grouping of the US, Australia, India, and Japan-show signs of coordinated backbone, it seems to be forming the basis for a new "Quad-Plus" that includes other "like-minded states." The Quad's focus on the promotion of the rule of law and freedom of navigation has Beijing's attention, as does Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's recent comment that "(M)aybe it's time for a new grouping of like-minded nations ... a new alliance of democracies."
Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to hammer regional economies and the recovery, if and when it occurs, is likely to be long and uneven. It looks like there may be a new model that describes its impact, and it doesn't augur well for those countries. Finally, we offer some framing thoughts for a potential Biden foreign policy as the US presidential campaign enters the homestretch.
The Quad-Plus: An "Alliance of Democracies" in the Making?
The Trump administration took off the gloves in dealing with Beijing during the second third of the year. While President Trump himself focused on the "China virus," also referred to derisively as the "Kung Flu," other administration officials focused on China's ideology rather than just its behavior. Even Attorney General William Barr joined the chorus, encouraging the American people "to reevaluate their relationship with China, so long as it continues to be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party."
Of significance (at least to us) was the aforementioned Pompeo comment about "a new alliance of democracies." This puts into perspective the increased efforts by the four Quad members, collectively among themselves and in concert with others, to tighten the circle (dare we call it a "containment policy?") around an increasingly assertive China. The bilateral impact is covered expertly, as usual, in the US-China chapter, and we will not dwell on it here. We will look instead at how this relates to present and future multilateral cooperation in the region and beyond.
The Quad had its semi-official birth in late 2017 when the four national leaders met along the sidelines of the annual East Asia Summit "to discuss our shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific." As we noted at the time, the event reminded us of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's decade-old dream of a "Concert of Democracies," even if, at that point and until recently, it remained an informal cooperative effort.
But this may be changing. Simultaneous Quad-related July naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and Philippine Sea on July 21-22 involving a US aircraft carrier-the USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan, respectively-prompted The Hindustan Times to proclaim in a headline that "Twin naval exercises with US supercarriers signal QUAD has arrived." Reinforcing this message two days later, Pompeo announced that the "Quad is revived" while speaking at the US-India Business Council's India Ideas Summit. America, he said "desires a new age of ambition" in its steadily expanding partnership with India. All four navies are expected to meet up again in the Indian Ocean in November for the annual India-hosted Malabar naval exercise, marking Australia's first participation in this event in over a decade.
Figure 1 The aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz participate in naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and Philippine Sea on July 21-22. Photo: Reuters
Speaking at an online forum along the sidelines of the annual US-India Strategic Partnership Forum on Aug. 31, Deputy Secretary of State Steve Biegun took things a step further, noting that the US aimed to "formalize" its growing four-party strategic ties as part of a US effort "to push back against China in virtually every domain."
Biegun observed that "the Indo-Pacific region is actually lacking in strong multilateral structures. They don't have anything of the fortitude of NATO, or the European Union," further noting "(T)here is certainly an invitation there at some point to formalize a structure like this." He hastened to add that the Quad was not just about China: "I'd just be very careful to not define it solely as an initiative to contain or to defend against China, I don't think that's enough." Biegun also cautioned against being "too ambitious." In what could be interpreted (tongue-in-cheek) as self-criticism, he quickly downplayed his own NATO comparison: "I've heard loose talk about an Indo-Pacific NATO and so on. But remember, even NATO started with relatively modest expectations and a number of countries chose neutrality over NATO membership in post-World War II Europe."
Nonetheless, he also stressed that the Quad "isn't exclusive," pointing to recent efforts by a Quad-plus "natural grouping" involving the four plus South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam, focused on the pandemic: "Seven of us on a weekly basis at my level, so just below the ministerial level, and each of those governments met weekly, and it was incredibly productive discussion among very, very cooperative partners."
US National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien, speaking at the Atlantic Council on Aug. 28, also mentioned the growing importance of the Quad: "I think the Quad, which is really coming into its own ... is one of the most exciting diplomatic initiatives and one of the ... areas most likely to succeed and pay huge dividends in the future." O'Brien announced that he and his Quad counterparts would be meeting in Hawaii in October, and that Pompeo would likewise meet his fellow Quad ministers in September and October.
Biegun explained why: "The purpose here can be to create a critical mass around the shared values and interests of those parties in a manner that attracts more countries in the Indo-Pacific, and even from around the world, to be working in a common cause or even ultimately to align in a more structured manner with them."
It's still not clear who, even among the four, much less "around the world," will sign up for a more formal structured grouping, although Australia may be a prime candidate, based on Prime Minister Scott Morrison's early August comment to the Aspen Security Forum that "building a durable strategic balance" in the Indo-Pacific was a "critical priority." It was necessary, he said, for "like-minded nations to act more cohesively, more consistently, more often. To align."
Whatever is created will likely obtain bipartisan Congressional support. Writing in War on the Rocks in late May, Republican Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) and Democratic Sen. Jack Reed (D-Rhode Island), warned that the "foundation of deterrence is crumbling as an increasingly aggressive China continues its comprehensive military modernization," and announced their intention to establish a Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative will "focus resources on key military capabilities to deter China. The initiative will also reassure US allies and partners, and send a strong signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the American people are committed to defending US interests in the Indo-Pacific."
Other Multilateral Developments
Is a G10 possible? President Trump has yet to express any support for a new multilateral alliance mechanism-and given his lack of enthusiasm for alliances in general it is not expected he will do so anytime soon-but he did invite the two outlying Quad members, Australia and India, to attend this year's US-hosted G7 meeting, along with South Korea and (sigh) Russia. The meeting, originally slated for Camp David in June, has been postponed until September. This has spurred discussion of a possible G10 (sans Russia) to "promote strategic cooperation on global political and security issues and advance the norms and values of a liberal international order."
RIMPAC. Meanwhile, this year's RIMPAC maneuvers off Hawaii, dubbed the world's largest international maritime exercise, was a shadow of its former self, with only 10 of the usual two dozen national navies making the trek to Honolulu. Three of the four Quad members (not India) made the trip. China, which joined the exercise in 2016, was "disinvited" in 2018 and was not invited to this year's event. Due to COVID concerns participants were not able to come ashore and assist the struggling Hawaii economy. As a US Navy spokesperson explained: "The at-sea-only construct for RIMPAC 2020 was developed to ensure the safety of all military forces participating by minimizing shore-based contingents. This modified plan will allow us to conduct a meaningful exercise with maximum training value and minimum risk to the force, allies and partners, and the people of Hawaii." All told, at least 20 ships and some 5,300 personnel took part in the biennial maneuvers.
Working toward a "networked region." Defense Secretary Mark Esper reinforced the need for broader multilateral cooperation in dealing with the China challenge during his trip to the region in late August, even while acknowledging that the Pentagon was reexamining its current force posture in Northeast Asia. As acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs David Helvey explained: "When we talk about promoting a networked region, we're talking about building the relationships we have not only with our allies and partners, we're promoting the contacts, coordination, integration [among] our allies and partners themselves." Noting that the US was "heavily concentrated in Northeast Asia," Helvey said the Pentagon would "like to be able to make our presence more geographically distributed, more operationally resilient. "Maybe the future is going to be less about bases and more about places," he continued, "being able to operate across a multiplicity of locations, which give us the flexibility and the agility to respond to a variety of different threats and challenges." Some of us are old enough to remember when then-Pacific Command Commander Chuck Larson introduced his "places not bases" strategy in the early 1990s. Seems like the more things change the more they remain the same.
COVID Rattles Regional Economies
The COVID pandemic continues to wreak havoc around the world. The IMF anticipates that the Asia-Pacific economy will shrink by 4.7% this year before recovering and marking 5.4% growth in 2021. Unemployment is expected to rise from 3.9% to 5.5% of the region's labor force. In a summer survey by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), respondents said they don't expect an economic recovery to pre-crisis levels within the next five years.
Individual countries are suffering not just because of their own experiences with the virus and with measures to contain it but because of the ripple effects of COVID-prompted actions elsewhere. When the European and North American economies shut down, imports from Asia are reduced. In addition, shutdowns and lockdowns throttle the tourism that is the pillar of several Asian economies; as Cathrine Dalpino notes in her chapter, Thailand is the second worst-hit country in the world (after Jamaica), with its tourism revenues falling $47.7 billion (about 9% of its economy).
Figure 2 COVID shutdowns and lockdowns have throttled the tourism industry in several Asian economies. Immigration officers stand in an empty arrivals hall at Suvarnabhumi airport. Photo: Bangkok Post
Whatever the cause, the impact is severe. The US economy shrank by a third, although parts of it are rebounding (see below). Australia is experiencing its first recession in nearly 30 years, with GDP falling 7% in the June quarter, following a 0.3% drop in the first quarter. The head of National Accounts at the Australian Bureau of Statistics called the June report "by a wide margin, the largest fall in quarterly GDP since records began in 1959." Initial reports that Japan's economy had contracted 7.8% in the April-June quarter proved wrong. The revised figures were worse: the decline was actually 7.9% (compared to the preceding quarter), and the annual rate of decline was 28.1%. South Korea recorded a 3.2% decline in the second quarter, a worsening from the 1.3% contraction of the previous quarter. If there was a bright spot-and professionals always counsel skepticism about its numbers-it was China, where the economy posted 3.2% growth in the second quarter
Southeast Asian economies had a grim March-June quarter. Malaysia's economy contracted by 17.1%, the Philippines by 16.5%, and Singapore's economy shrank 13.2 percent, the sharpest contraction since 1976. Thailand registered a 12.2% decline, the worst since 1998 when it was hit by the Asian financial crisis. Indonesia's economy-the region's largest-shrank by 5.3%, its first contraction in over two decades.
In several of those countries, economic difficulties are compounded by political problems. The Thai government is struggling with its COVID response, with a new economic team resigning just weeks into the job. Malaysia is encountering political uncertainty as that government tries to gain its footing in the face of determined opposition from Mahathir Mohammad, recently ousted as prime minister by backroom shenanigans. While continuity is promised for Japan whoever takes over for Abe Shinzo, there will be questions about the new prime minister's longevity and ability to fill his predecessor's shoes.
What's in a Letter?
Normally obsessed with numbers, the COVID-19 outbreak has economists now focused on the alphabet. When the bottom dropped out of the global economy, speculation raged about the shape of the future economic trajectory. Would the rebound look like a "U"-a sharp decline followed by a continued lull which would in turn be followed by an equally sharp return to normal-a "V"-the same decline with a much shorter time before recovery-an "L"-an enduring and seemingly endless decline-or a "W" (which this font doesn't capture properly)-in which decline is followed by a series of seeming recoveries and subsequent collapses as waves of the virus return?
More than a half year into the pandemic, a letter for the recovery is emerging-and it is none of the above. Instead, the most accurate representation is a "K": a sharp decline followed by two separate recoveries, a strong one for some and a weak one for the rest. This is most apparent in the US, where in mid-August, the stock market had recovered from pandemic-triggered losses and the S&P 500 reached an all-time high. Unemployment in August was "only" 8.4% (we know, we know) but jobs have been returning to the economy at a speed that outpaces expectations. Still, all jobs are not created equal. One analysis concluded that in the US jobs are fully back for the highest wage earners, but fewer than half the jobs lost this spring have returned for those making less than $20 an hour.
Work conditions-top earners can work from home-contribute to the K-shaped recovery, but they don't explain it all; there is another factor at play. Market returns flow to a small group of citizens. "It's one recovery for financial market investors and another recovery for everybody else," explained one economist. Even Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin conceded the problem, acknowledging that "It's a two-tiered economy right now." While some larger firms are benefiting, "there's plenty of small businesses that are on the ropes."
This isn't just a US concern. Similar divergences are evident within Asian nations too. India is looking at a K-shaped recovery, as is Australia. One analysis shows that the rich-poor divide is most severe among developing nations in Asia. When Bloomberg looked at 17 emerging markets, it found a 42% correlation between gross domestic product per capita and stock performance since the pandemic hit in January. The correlation between GDP per capita and currency returns was 31%. Specifically, stock returns from four economies with per capita GDP above $10,000 in 2019-China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia-has been 20% higher than that of nations below that level (a list that includes India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand). In other words, wealthier nations are recovering at a quicker pace than less wealthy ones; and even that good news should be leavened by the fact that within recovering economies, internal gaps could be widening.
Countries that are wealthier are better able to spend money and provide some cushion for the economic damage done by the pandemic. Singapore has funded four fiscal stimulus packages worth close to S$100 billion ($72 billion), around 20% of GDP. South Korea has spent 270 trillion won ($226 billion), about 14% of its GDP. Poorer governments like the Philippines are struggling to find funds-Manila can't fund the 1.3 trillion pesos ($30 billion) stimulus package approved in June.
Biden's Asia Team
As the presidential campaign draws to an end, there are the usual speculations about foreign policy in a Biden administration should "regime change" take place in Washington. For a take on the candidate's foreign policy, check out his web page and the by-now ritual article in Foreign Affairs. The campaign has been tightlipped about its advisors, although a handful of top officials have been publicly identified with Team Biden and can be expected to take positions in his administration. There isn't much point in guessing who will get what post yet (he reportedly has over 1,000 members on his foreign policy team), but we can offer broad thoughts about Biden foreign policy should his campaign prove successful. Our next issue will dive more deeply into anticipated foreign policy changes or adjustments regardless of who prevails in November.
First, foreign policy will matter to the president and his administration. Biden has immersed himself in the subject throughout his political career, serving for many years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, becoming ranking member in 1997, and chair from 2001 to 2003 and then again from 2007 until he became vice president. In 2012, he was called the most powerful vice president on foreign policy, with the exception of his predecessor Dick Cheney. Biden knows the issues, takes an interest in them, and knows many key actors.
Second, foreign policy in a potential Biden presidency will revert to many of the more traditional US positions. Expect renewed support for multilateralism, US alliances, international institutions, and the rule of law. While the president will be engaged in foreign policy, he is likely to avoid the radical, seeming solitary gestures that Trump seems to revel in. Don't expect "bolt from the blue" summits with adversaries or tearing up of painstakingly negotiated treaties. Instead, he will rely on traditional foreign policy processes and institutions. That means that his foreign policy team will do the heavy lifting-as in most administrations. The senior-most advisors and likely top officials are known quantities: Tony Blinken (his long-time foreign policy advisor who also served two years of deputy secretary of State, Susan Rice (former UN ambassador and President Obama's National Security Advisor), Jake Sullivan (Biden's national security advisor when Blinken left), Michelle Flournoy (former undersecretary of defense for policy), Ely Ratner (former deputy national security advisor to Biden and China expert), among others.
Third, and critically for Asia, a Biden administration will continue the hard line against China-the center of gravity in US thinking about China has shifted, likely permanently, in that direction as Xi's "China dream" increasingly looks like America's nightmare-but it will likely be more strategic, more measured, more multilateral, and more acknowledging of the need to find areas to cooperate with China amid intensified "great power" competition with Beijing. Among other things, this means that Asia will remain a priority for a Biden administration and the ongoing effort at coalition-building, outlined above, is likely to continue.
Finally, for all that continuity, should he win, Biden will be obliged to address domestic challenges that have grown during the last two decades. Deficits have mounted-blame overseas adventurism, ill-advised tax cuts, the COVID crisis-and inequality has exploded. National divisions exposed by the Black Lives Matter movement have widened during the campaign. There is a widespread belief throughout the US body politic that its leaders have devoted more attention to foreign than domestic affairs. A competent and capable US administration should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time, but priorities will change and this will have implications for US relations with the rest of the world. Under Biden, the US will not be retreating to isolationism, but even an administration that understands and appreciates the value of cooperative relations with allies and partners will have to engage differently.
17. Combat vet fights separation board in case that traces back to the Bin Laden raid
Wow. With all the people releasing classified information to include those at the very highest levels of our government it is difficult to see the value of making this sergeant a scapegoat. There must be more to the story.
Combat vet fights separation board in case that traces back to the Bin Laden raid
armytimes.com · by Kyle Rempfer · September 17, 2020
A bizarre and frustrating tale of military bureaucracy that involves classified information from the 2011 Osama Bin Laden raid comes to a head next month.
Staff Sgt. Ricardo Branch, 38, an Iraq War veteran who is three years from retiring, will face a separation board over allegations that he fraudulently reenlisted after being punished for writing in a military email the name of the unit that flew commandos to kill the notorious al-Qaida leader nearly a decade ago.
"It's just so absurd because the information was already released by the Army," Branch said during a telephone interview, pointing to an official Army release from 2011 that names the unit and links them to the raid three years before he did.
Branch and his attorney, retired Army Lt. Col. Jeffrey Addicott, plan to go before the separation board in October at Branch's duty station of Fort Bliss, Texas, to argue that the soldier should be allowed to finish his Army career. Branch rejoined in 2018 after being separated the year prior due to the security violation, which Addicott called a "bogus charge" to begin with.
"They coded him to allow him to reenlist and then, years later, they say it should have been coded to not allow him to reenlist. That's what this chapter is about now," said Addicott, a former judge advocate who represents Branch pro bono through the Warrior Defense Project at St. Mary's University in San Antonio.
The origins of Branch's Kafkaesque story have been reported before, laid out in detail by author Jack Murphy at ConnectingVets Radio this spring and in two stories for the Washington Times three years ago.
The case began in February 2014, when Branch was working in the public affairs shop for the Army's elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Some 160th SOAR troops had recently toured a Boeing plant in Mesa, Arizona, and Branch was asked by a major from that group to review a Boeing press release about the visit prior to its publication.
Branch recommended in an emailed reply to the major that Boeing remove any mentions of the 160th SOAR's participation in the raid on Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, which had been included in Boeing's first draft of the article and attributed to the major.
Although the 160th SOAR's role in the operation was already well-known - in no small part because the Army stated it on their own website in 2011 - the Pentagon had technically not released the names of the units that participated.
Boeing agreed to the redaction, but problems for Branch were about to take hold.
Though the major who received Branch's email appeared to have no issues with the recommendation, other officers apparently felt differently. Branch forwarded the email to his boss, then-Maj. Daniel "Allen" Hill, for his situational awareness, he said. Hill then brought it to the unit's S-2. Hill did not respond to an attempt to contact him through a social media profile that matches his name and job.
A copy of the email that Staff Sgt. Ricardo Branch sent with the name of the unit that conducted the Bin Laden raid. (Courtesy of Jeffrey Addicott)
Branch was then accused of sending classified information through an unsecured channel, and was eventually handed a local Article 15 for the incident. He also received a negative NCO evaluation report documenting the security violation when he attempted to switch units due to the toxic work environment he claims the situation created.
"The punishment seemed very draconian," Branch said. "In the original email, I received the information from a commander, I gave him my guidance and we ultimately safeguarded the information. However, that information was already out."
"I suppose someone could have called me on a SIPR phone ... and read the article off in its entirety," Branch added. "But I didn't have a SIPR account."
Branch ultimately separated from the service in 2017. Three months later, after working retail in Clarksville, Tennessee, Branch decided to visit a recruiter to see whether there was any chance he could get back into the Army to earn his retirement.
To his surprise, there was. The reenlistment code on Branch's discharge paperwork was a "1," meaning he was fully qualified to rejoin, according to a redacted copy of his DD-214. Branch consulted with Addicott, who agreed there wouldn't be a problem reenlisting if that's what the code said.
Staff Sgt. Ricardo Branch and Benjamin Branch, his youngest son, share a moment together in Christmas 2019 before Branch would depart for a overseas tour in the Middle East. (Courtesy of Ricardo Branch)
Branch signed back up as an air defense artillery soldier, attended training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and reported to the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Bliss in May 2018, where his Army career returned to normalcy. By this March, Branch was deployed to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and was trying to reenlist one last time to complete his retirement goal.
At that point, though, Branch's request was denied and he was accused of a fraudulent enlistment, according to Addicott.
"I think it was simply a computer function screening through it all and saw the discrepancy," Addicott said. "At first, they said he could not reenlist and then they said he could, and now they said it's all [his] fault."
A commander's report shared with Army Times stated that the specific reason for the denial was that Branch was separated back in 2017 under the Qualitative Management Program, which can deny senior NCOs continued service based on qualitative grounds, according to Army Human Resources Command.
Branch also checked "NO" on an enlistment questionnaire that asked whether he had been previously rejected for reenlistment, the commander's report stated.
"I said 'no' because if I was denied service, my DD-214 would have reflected it," Branch said. "And the recruiter looked in the system, and I wasn't listed as a QMP, either."
Officials from Branch's current command did not comment on the circumstances of his case when reached for comment. They also declined to say whether Branch has received any negative evaluations since rejoining the Army.
"Out of respect and privacy policies, I cannot comment specifically on SSG Branch's performance or any past administrative actions while assigned to [2nd Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment]," said Maj. Albert Jernegan, the unit spokesman, adding, "but I can tell you that SSG Branch's commitment to selflessly serve is not overlooked."
18. Special Ops Plan to Buy New Light-Attack Fleet May Get Pushed Back
military.com · by Matthew Cox · September 17, 2020
The commander of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) hasn't given up on buying aircraft for close-air support and precision strike, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, but he acknowledged that congressional uncertainty over the fiscal 2021 defense budget may delay plans to purchase a new fleet of light-attack aircraft designed for the task.
Earlier this year, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) announced a new contract solicitation to eventually buy 75 manned aircraft for Armed Overwatch for special operations missions. The command asked for $106 million in its fiscal 2021 budget request for the proposal.
But AFSOC commander Lt. Gen. James Slife said recently that, while congressional committees understand the overall need for Armed Overwatch, they may not be convinced that fiscal 2021 is the time to buy new aircraft.
"I'm not really sure where we are to land, to be honest with you. ... Really, the question is one of timing whether [fiscal] 2021 is the time to jump into procurement or if we need perhaps a different acquisitions strategy that doesn't move quite as quickly as the one that SOCOM had originally proposed," Slife told reporters at the Association of the Air Force's virtual Air, Space & Cyber conference.
Earlier this summer, the Senate Armed Services Committee's version of the 2021 defense policy bill proposed that AFSOC hold off on buying Armed Overwatch aircraft until Air Force leaders show that the service can't already offer the same capability, Air Force Magazine reported.
Program officials had planned to conduct vendor demonstrations in November, but that may be delayed until next year, Slife said.
"Based on the delays in the budget timeline ... I would judge it unlikely that we will be doing vendor demonstrations in November, but I could be mistaken about that. ... I do think we will be doing demonstrations in 2021," he said.
Program officials are still working to define formal requirements such as "how many pounds of equipment it should carry, how long it should stay aloft, how long the runway would need to be for it to operate," Slife said.
"I believe we are going to make some substantial progress in 2021," he said. "I don't know if we will get to procurement in 2021, but I do believe we will conduct the demonstration and refine our requirements documents before we do a broader solicitation in 2021."
SOCOM's light-attack push came after the Air Force remained noncommittal on its own light-attack endeavor.
The Air Force announced in 2016 that it had plans to hold flight demonstrations with a handful of aircraft to test whether lighter, less expensive and off-the-shelf aircraft might be usable in combat zones such as Afghanistan. The service first held a series of light-attack experimental fly-offs and maneuvers at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, in 2017 in a two-phase approach. The second phase of the experiment was canceled following a fatal crash in June 2018.
Even with the second phase cut short, Air Force officials determined that the Textron Aviation AT-6 Wolverine and Sierra Nevada Corporation/Embraer Defense & Security A-29 Super Tucano were the best fits for its light-attack needs.
But last year, the service announced that it plans to purchase two or three light-attack aircraft from each company at most, stationing some of the aircraft at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and some with AFSOC at Hurlburt Field, Florida.
The US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is looking to leap ahead with the aircraft that replaces its Bell Boeing CV-22 Osprey.
That means the special operations command is not likely to buy the Bell V-280 Valor tiltrotor, Lieutenant General James Slife, commander of AFSOC, said during the Air Force Association's virtual Air, Space & Cyber Conference on 15 September. The V-280 is Bell's pitch for the US Army's Future Long Range Assault Aircraft programme, which aims to field a high-speed troop transport by 2030.
Source: US Air Force
CV-22B Osprey
"At least our initial thinking in AFSOC is that we're looking at a generation beyond current tiltrotor technology," he says. "We're not just looking at marginal improvements, in terms of speed, range and reliability, but we're looking at a generational movement for a vertical take-off and landing capability going into the future. I think it'll be probably something quite different than the V-22."
By some measures, the V-280 is comparable to the V-22 in performance, though Bell argues advances in tiltrotor technology make it cheaper to own and operate. For instance, the V-280 has a cruise speed of 280kt (519km/h), while the V-22 has a cruise speed of 241kt.
That is not to say that the US Army Special Operations Command might not be interested in the V-280, Slife notes. Rather, the tiltrotor is not a fit for the USAF's special forces.
Instead, AFSOC is looking further ahead for a more futuristic aircraft.
"There are a number of technology and drive system proposals out there that look like they may be within the realm of possibility; that they could provide like a generational step ahead in technology, get us up into jet speed kind of capabilities," Slife says.
"When you look at the future operating environment, where range and access are going to be challenging across the board... I think whatever comes next is going to have to be a generation [ahead] yet again."
Garrett ReimGarrett Reim is a military aviation reporter based in Los Angeles. He reports on military aircraft manufacturers and operators in North and South America. Send him your confidential tips, press releases and story ideas via garrett.reim@flightglobal.com. Follow him on Twitter via @garrettreim.
Abstract: Many senior officials believe that emphasis on counterterrorism for the past two decades has compromised the ability of the U.S. armed forces to perform other critical military missions and that strategic competition, not terrorism, must now be the primary concern. This essay provides observations on the future role of the armed forces in counterterrorism and the future role of counterterrorism forces in great power competition. It notes that it will be difficult to demote counterterrorism while terrorists still remain a threat. However, there will be a further shift to counterterrorism without counterinsurgency. Dividing the military into near-peer warfare and counterterrorism camps makes little sense. Future wars will require U.S. commanders to orchestrate capabilities to counter an array of conventional and unconventional modes of conflict, including terrorism. Reduced defense spending in the post-pandemic environment will further increase pressure to cut counterterrorism-but the savings will be modest. Shifting priorities should not mean discarding competence. The hard-won skills that result from decades of counterterrorism operations are fungible, indeed valuable to future military challenges, including great power competition. Terrorism itself is constantly evolving, demanding new approaches. The ability to rapidly adapt to changing threats is applicable to strategic competition.
For almost two decades since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the paramount mission of the U.S. security establishment has been counterterrorism-specifically, defeating the jihadi terrorist enterprise and preventing it or any terrorist organization from mounting another devastating attack on the U.S. homeland. U.S. armed forces have played a major role in this national effort and have borne much of the human cost.
In the view of many senior military officials as well as civilian critics, however, pursuit of the war on al-Qa`ida and later the Islamic State, along with their affiliates, allies, and spin-offs, has commanded too much attention and has consumed too large a share of national defense resources for far too long. As a result, the ability to perform other critical military missions and responsibilities has been compromised.
And although the operational capabilities of al-Qa`ida have been degraded, the territory seized by the Islamic State has been recaptured, and there have been no further large-scale terrorist attacks anywhere near the magnitude of 9/11, the cost in blood and treasure has been high and the results are seen by many as disappointing. The war in Afghanistan, America's longest war, seems unlikely to end in anything resembling a traditional military victory-or even end at all. Meanwhile, circumstances have changed. New threats have emerged, causing many to argue that U.S. armed forces need to change their priorities accordingly.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) summary describes a complex array of threats and challenges to U.S. national security. These include the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition as the United States is only just awakening from a period of strategic atrophy. The NDS also points to a weakening post-WWII international order and increased global disorder. It mentions new challenges to U.S. military dominance as the United States' competitive military advantage has eroded, rapid technological advancements, and the changing character of war. Its catalogue of threats includes rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction; non-state actors including terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, cyber hackers, and others with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Finally, it notes a U.S. homeland that is no longer a sanctuary from foreign attack.1 Some of these concerns come from assertions that could be challenged, but the appearance of new and complex challenges over the past 20 years is undeniable.
Defense officials have called for re-balancing, meaning that while U.S. armed forces engage in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East as well as other counterterrorism-related contingency operations worldwide, these missions must not erode the United States' ability to fight more conventional wars against increasingly aggressive major powers.2 The second paragraph of the NDS summary goes further, stating bluntly, "Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, [emphasis added] is now the primary concern in U.S. national security."3 The argument that the U.S. military must devote its attention to preparing for a possible shooting war with China or Russia is not new, although it is more emphatically presented in the NDS summary. It is the negative part of the phrase relating to terrorism that commands attention. It raises a series of questions.
How will the United States conduct counterterrorism during an era in which great power competition has been defined as the number-one national security priority? Will the United States be able to address both problem sets at the same time, or will concentration on near-peer threats lead to the inevitable erosion-or deliberate dismantling-of the United States' hard-won counterterrorism experience, capabilities, and gains? What effect will the shift in priorities have on the military institution itself? What are the potential risks? What are the political consequences? It is time for a comprehensive review of the United States' counterterrorism strategy. For reasons I will come to later in the essay, this has to be a national discussion, not exclusively a military debate.
As General Michael Nagata stated recently during a West Point Combating Terrorism Center roundtable-and I agree-it is a mistake to view decisions regarding the trade-off between defense planning and resources to great power competition or counterterrorism as a zero-sum game.4 This essay will argue that the United States faces a wide spectrum of threats. It is not a matter of guessing the right one. And it is not a matter of making a case for counterterrorism-that is not my purpose here. Future warfare may involve messy combinations of conflict modes (some of which may be new, such as cyber) and call upon all U.S. national defense resources to adapt and respond accordingly.
While the 2018 NDS is emphatic that terrorism is no longer the priority, two factors may serve as countervailing forces. Counterterrorism is events-driven. Terrorists events can command public attention and prompt public reactions that outweigh defense priorities.
The second factor, as General Nagata pointed out, is the strategic and political calculations of leadership. A president may seek to avoid military intervention, figuring that it will drag the country into a no-win, no-exit mess for which he or she will be blamed. But he or she will be criticized for projecting an image of American weakness, thereby inviting new terrorist outrages.
A president may, on the other hand, calculate that the situation demands an immediate military response or, alternatively, that withdrawal of already deployed forces brings unacceptable political risk. Or a president may reckon that his political base wants out of endless wars, regardless of the longer-term risks.
This is not to say that military strategy does not apply, or assert that the public opinion is fickle and politicians are feckless. Rather it is to note that public opinion is often divided on these strategic choices. The differences reflect deeply held philosophical views and do not change easily (although the emotive power of terrorism gives it short-term advantage). It is the absence of overwhelming consensus in favor of one or the other strategic priorities that makes strategic and political calculations so difficult and helps explain some of the reversals we have seen.
To address the future course of counterterrorism, it will be helpful to step back in time to explore how we got here. Where we are now reflects decades of events and responses-political and strategic decisions made in response to changing threats, but often reflecting past experiences. As often as it seemed necessary to use military power, avoiding the repetition of past debacles like the Vietnam War or the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq pulled equally in the opposite direction.
This essay provides a series of observations, grouped into eight sections, with implications for the role U.S. armed forces will likely play and need and ought to play in counterterrorism, based on the author's own experience and perspective. The first section of the essay will examine the difficulties in backing away from counterterrorism while terrorists still remain a threat and withdrawal from certain conflict zones poses national security as well as political risks. That leads to the question of whether the United States can effectively suppress or at least contain terrorist groups abroad without being dragged into costly counterinsurgency campaigns and nation-building missions, which is the subject of the second section. Without attempting to predict the shape of future wars, the third section of the article argues that future near-peer contests may be very different from past military contests with major powers. Dividing military operations into normal-war and everything-else columns makes little sense.
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on society and the economy is profound. Defense spending currently accounts for approximately half of total discretionary spending. That may not continue in the post-pandemic environment. What this means for counterterrorism budgets is discussed in the fourth section.
Shifting priorities from counterterrorism to strategic competition does not mean discarding competence. That is the subject of the fifth section, which outlines the long march away from counterinsurgency after the Vietnam War and the gradual, often reluctant, military engagement in counterterrorism operations from the late 1970s onward.
The sixth section argues that the hard-won skills that result from decades of counterterrorism operations are fungible, indeed valuable to future military challenges, including great power competition and near-peer warfare. At the same time, counterterrorism should not be seen as deriving from immutable doctrine handed down through the years. Terrorism itself, the seventh section argues, is constantly evolving, demanding new approaches and new capabilities. The ability to rapidly adapt to a changing threat landscape is a prerequisite in counterterrorism-and a more broadly applicable capability in strategic competition.
The eighth and concluding section takes us back to the original question of how the United States will conduct counterterrorism as great power competition becomes the priority mission and summarizes the final reflections. Reflection is the operative term here. What to many young men and women in today's armed forces is almost ancient history is to my generation personal recollection. A personal perspective is unavoidable.
As noted, my comments reflect a personal perspective: My formative military experience as an officer in the 7th Special Forces Group during the intervention in the Dominican Republic and in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam; my subsequent tours in Vietnam as a member of a newly created Long Range Planning Task Group; and my experience as a reserve officer (still assigned to Special Forces) admittedly influence my views.
Throughout this period, I remained deeply critical of the U.S. Army's performance in Vietnam. The Army, in my view, viewed the Vietnam War as an exotic interlude between the wars that really counted-World War II and a future conflict with Soviet forces in Europe-and therefore, it never fully embraced a counterinsurgency strategy.5 Instead, it remained wedded to large-scale conventional operations, which killed a lot of Viet Cong, but also killed a lot of civilians and destroyed the lives of many others. We did not protect and could not gain the allegiance of the people. The immensity of U.S. military power precluded learning many lessons along the way. After withdrawal, the Vietnam experience was all but erased.
In 1972, I initiated the RAND Corporation's research program on terrorism, believing then that it should be viewed as a new mode of conflict. Terrorism and irregular warfare have dominated my professional life since then. As terrorist violence escalated and terrorist attacks increasingly had strategic consequences, I became convinced that there was an appropriate military role in counter-terrorism-a role, not a solution.
Immediately after 9/11, I argued for a more formal declaration of war on those responsible for the attacks.6 The country had to mobilize for a national effort. Military force would be an essential part. The United States had already responded to terrorist attacks with military force on several occasions. The critical difference this time was that in previous cases, the United States responded to terrorist attacks with a single strike, then waited to see what terrorists or their state sponsors would do.
To me, "war" meant that the United States would not stop at one strike, but would initiate a continuing campaign aimed at destroying the organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks and bringing as many of those responsible to justice. There could be no respite for the historic core of al-Qa`ida. And if we were going to send young men-and increasingly women-into combat, they deserved an expression of national support. There was no declaration of war, but Congress' Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF), and in my view, it provided a reasonable substitute. As we were to later learn, the term "war" had unforeseen consequences.
The campaign, I thought back then, would remain narrowly focused on al-Qa`ida. I had no doubt it would require a long-term effort, one possibly lasting decades. New networks would have to be created to exploit intelligence across national frontiers. The strategy would have to include political warfare, aimed at reducing the appeal of the extremists and encouraging alternative views. The goals of the war could not be accomplished unilaterally-international cooperation would be a prerequisite for success.
However, I warned against keeping a large number of American troops in Afghanistan and expressed deep skepticism about getting into nation-building. National institutions hardly existed in the country. Once al-Qa`ida had scattered, I favored the deployment of small numbers of special forces to recruit and coordinate the actions of local proxies or tribal forces to prevent al-Qa`ida from reestablishing bases in the country. This was not about winning a war, but about a relentless pursuit, continuing intelligence collection, and when required, brief military interventions. For the most part, few in the Pentagon agreed with my thinking.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, in my (and many others') view, was a costly diversion and a strategic blunder. It distracted from the campaign in Afghanistan, significantly increased the burden on U.S. forces, and created new space for terrorist recruiting. In more recent years, I have worried that exaggerated apprehension on the part of politicians and a fearful public that sought to abolish all risk was keeping the United States engaged in perpetual wars on distant frontiers and a never-ending quest for absolute security at home. Over time, this obsession would have a corrosive effect on our political system.
My purpose here, however, is not to settle old scores, defend the role of special forces, or argue against reallocating military resources. Rather, I aim to provoke a broader discussion about the nature of future wars, the future of counterterrorism as a military mission, and the possible effects of shifting priorities.
Observation 1: It will be difficult to demote counterterrorism Military planners cannot claim that terrorism is no longer the primary concern because the counterterrorism mission has been accomplished and terrorists are no longer a threat. The 2017 National Security Strategy,7 the 2018 National Counterterrorism Strategy8-both prepared by the current administration, and the latest Worldwide Threat Assessment, which reflects the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community,9 all agree that terrorism remains a persistent threat to U.S. national security. Some analysts go further and argue that the worldwide jihadi menace-our current foe-is more dangerous than ever.10
The 'caliphate' declared and defended by the Islamic State was defeated as a territorial expression of the group, but the organization itself was not destroyed. It went underground or scattered to other jihadi fronts in Africa and South and Southeast Asia.11 The operational capabilities of al-Qa`ida have been degraded, but the organization survives and has proved resilient. U.S. officials thought that al-Qa`ida fronts had been contained or that the United States was close to a strategic victory over al-Qa`ida more than once only to be disappointed by comebacks. Al-Qa`ida now waits in the wings for U.S. forces to leave Afghanistan. Whether the Taliban will keep the jihadis under control as they have promised is questionable. As a recent U.N. report points out, the senior leadership of al-Qa`ida remains in Afghanistan and relations between the Taliban and al-Qa`ida remain close.12
The United States currently has about 8,500 troops actively engaged in Afghanistan,13 approximately 5,200 in Iraq (a figure set to be reduced to 3,000 this month),14 and under 1,000 still deployed in Syria.15 These numbers do not include the thousands more stationed throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Bringing U.S. troops home has proved difficult.
President Barack Obama wanted to end U.S. participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while avoiding outright defeat, but was unable to do so. When the military situation in Afghanistan appeared to be worsening, President Obama ultimately opted to send in reinforcements, although he accompanied the decision with a schedule for the eventual departure of all U.S. troops. He was later forced to abandon this timetable.16
While campaigning for president, Donald Trump promised to pull out of the war in Afghanistan. As president, he said that he had been persuaded that "a hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for terrorists, including ISIS and al Qaeda,"17 and in September 2017, he too sent in additional troops.18
It has been equally difficult to walk away from the Middle East. Iraq's refusal to sign a status of forces agreement that would protect U.S. troops in Iraq against local prosecution gave President Obama the opportunity to bring those troops home.19 However, the disengagement proved to be temporary. Two years into his administration, President Obama had to deal with rapidly evolving events resulting from the tumult that began with the so-called Arab Spring in 2011. In the months that followed the troop withdrawal, protests and armed uprisings occurred across the Arab world. Syria descended into a civil war that the jihadis exploited. Ultimately, jihadi formations dominated the rebellion while the Iraqi-led Islamic State broke with al-Qa`ida's subsidiary and dramatically expanded its control over eastern Syria and rolled across Iraq.
The collapse of Iraqi defenses in 2014 as Islamic State forces swept east obliged the United States to renew military operations to prevent further massacres and to preclude the Islamic State from becoming a new base for terrorist operations against the West. Washington assembled an international coalition and led an ongoing air campaign, which supported ground offenses by Iraqi and U.S.-led Kurdish and Arab recruits.
President Trump's trajectory on Syria and Iraq has been complicated as well. As a businessman in 2008, Trump expressed support for a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, but later blamed President Obama's premature withdrawal for creating the chaos that led to the rise of the Islamic State.20 As a presidential candidate, he said in 2016 that he would send up to 30,000 more troops to defeat the Islamic State.21 That did not happen when President Trump took office, although the U.S.-led bombing campaign intensified and the number of drone strikes on jihadi leaders increased.22
In late 2019, President Trump announced that the United States would immediately pull U.S. forces out of Syria, abandoning its Kurdish allies who had led the ground campaign against the Islamic State.23 That decision was reversed and U.S. military units remained in Syria, reportedly to protect the oil fields, but the administration indicated that it was still committed to getting U.S. forces out of Iraq.24 However, in January 2020, in response to anticipated Iranian action provoked by the U.S. killing of Iranian commander Qassim Soleimani, President Trump sent 3,500 additional troops to the Middle East although discussions aimed at withdrawal continue.25
The policy reversals reflect events. The United States' goal remains to remove itself from endless wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan, but defense decisions have been driven by the fear that withdrawing U.S. forces will lead to chaos in which al-Qa`ida, the Islamic State, or new jihadi entities will establish themselves and be able to launch terrorist attacks on the United States. It is the dark shadow of 9/11 that condemns the United States to perpetual fighting on distant frontiers.
Military commanders understandably want to turn their attention to what they consider to be greater threats to U.S. national security. At the same time, they do not want to 'lose,' and in the past, they argued for the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan and currently advise against precipitous withdrawals. Presidents want out as well, but must also calculate the political risks. A major terrorist attack on U.S. soil could be politically ruinous, especially in today's bitter partisan atmosphere. It could also prompt demands for new military interventions. The safest political course has been to accept the continuing military burden, kicking the can down the road, rather than risk being blamed for a new major terrorist attack or being propelled into new military adventures.
Observation 2: There will likely be a further shift to counterterrorism without counterinsurgency Even without a shift in priorities, the U.S. military is already moving toward a more narrowly focused counterterrorism effort. Direct U.S. participation in the Afghan counterinsurgency campaign is declining as U.S. forces continue to withdraw.26 Negotiations with the Taliban are intended to produce a political arrangement that ends the U.S. role in the fighting without permitting a return of al-Qa`ida or the expansion of Islamic State operations. Ensuring that al-Qa`ida does not make a comeback and that the Islamic State is not allowed to establish a base for international terrorist operations will remain the primary United States' residual concern. The U.S.-led campaign to destroy the Islamic State territorial expression has ended, and the number of U.S. troops still in Iraq is likely to be further reduced. Counterterrorism operations, however, will continue in the Middle East and elsewhere. How did we get here?
Unfolding events after 2001, plus hubris, overreach, strategic error, and mission creep pushed the United States into large-scale counterinsurgency and nation-building missions. In the immediate shadow of 9/11, pundits were predicting that terrorists would acquire weapons of mass destruction and carry out attacks with tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of fatalities.27 Terrorism at that level approached an existential threat. Instead of the predicted vertical escalation, terrorism violence spread horizontally.
As it turned out, al-Qa`ida would not be able to pull off another 9/11-scale attack, although this was a reasonable supposition immediately after the attacks and, in my view, the driving force for immediate action against al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan. Scattering al-Qa`ida's leaders and disrupting its operations prevented the group from mounting further large-scale operations, although they kept planning major operations and splinters of al-Qa`ida carried out attacks across the globe. Most of these occurred in Muslim majority countries (Tunisia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey). That produced an untold amount of suffering, but it had one positive effect. Directly threatened, governments that might otherwise have preferred to remain bystanders joined the global counterterrorist campaign. However, major terrorist attacks also occurred in Spain and the United Kingdom, and smaller-scale attacks occurred in the United States along with the continued discovery of terrorist plots. These lent credence to the continuing terrorist threat.
Meanwhile, the United States found itself dealing with escalating insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraqi resistance grew out of the chaos created by the removal of the ruling political structure, the disbandment of the Iraqi army, and the failure of the invading forces to maintain control. The deteriorating situation in Iraq diverted attention and resources from Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban to make a comeback.
It is extremely difficult to divide expenditures into counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, but counterinsurgency tends to be far costlier. Counterinsurgency operations required larger deployments of U.S. troops, which resulted in more American casualties and higher expenditures. Nor were counterinsurgency operations a domain where the U.S. armed forces could claim expertise or advantage. Coming 30 years after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, almost all of the Vietnam veterans had retired by 2002-what the military had learned about counterinsurgency had been long forgotten and would have to be relearned at great cost.
In his superb introduction to the new "Counterinsurgency Field Manual" issued in 2006, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl noted that "the American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army; indeed, it had no peer in that arena. It was, however, unprepared for an enemy who understood that it could not hope to defeat the U.S. Army on a conventional battlefield, and who therefore chose to wage war from the shadows."28 The insurgency that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq provided the impetus and the classroom. By 2006, the U.S. military on the ground had a better understanding and were better prepared to deal with the situation.
With only the embryo of a new national army in Afghanistan and with the Iraqi army disbanded, the burden of fighting fell largely on the United States (and, of course, those allies willing to engage in combat). No matter how strict the rules of engagement or how careful military operations were conducted, this put U.S. soldiers in the position of killing locals-combatants but, unintentionally, bystanders as well. That would not endear them to the local population. It also contributed to jihadis recruiting locally and internationally.
There were a number of proposals to withdraw U.S. forces from both Afghanistan and Iraq. General Colin Powell's warning-if you break it, you own it-summarized the thinking against just walking away, but an obligation to fix things was not the only concern. The security situation improved enough in Iraq to permit bringing U.S. forces home. But while the United States focused on Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated. Toppling the Taliban and going after al-Qa`ida was a counterterrorist operation. Fear that a Taliban return would allow the return of al-Qa`ida turned it into a counterinsurgency mission. It was counterterrorism that got us into counterinsurgency; it was fear of future terrorist attacks at home that kept us there.
By the late 2000s, some, notably then Vice President Joe Biden, argued that the necessary counterterrorism mission could be separated from the undesirable counterinsurgency task.29 While the prevailing thinking focused on a boots-on-the-ground strategy of nation-building and counterinsurgency aimed at defeating the Taliban, Vice President Biden argued for focusing on al-Qa`ida-defending Kabul and Kandahar instead of chasing Taliban insurgents around the country-and training Afghan soldiers to replace departing Americans while avoiding nation-building.30 Vice President Biden was not a dove as described in some news media accounts.31 He favored a continued strong American military presence, albeit with a reduced footprint, but sought to shift their role from aggressive pacification of the Afghan countryside-only the Afghan forces could do that-to a more narrowly targeted U.S. campaign, relying on drone strikes and special operations against the remnants of al-Qa`ida.32
This was not the course taken in 2009, however. U.S. troop reductions, especially since 2013, have reduced direct U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff's 2014 publication, Counterterrorism, Joint Publication 3-26, narrowed the definition of counterterrorism "to actions and activities to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks," thereby removing from the definition, "countering root causes." It also drew a line between counterterrorism operations and "counterinsurgency, security cooperation, and stability operations."33 Over the past 10 years, refraining from deployments of large expeditionary forces, avoiding direct U.S. participation in counterinsurgency campaigns, confining the American role to smaller training missions, and relying mainly on special forces and precisely defined airstrikes to go after terrorist cadres have become the precepts of the military's current and future role in counterterrorism. Despite the differences in rhetoric, there was continuity between the Obama and Trump administrations on these principles.34 They will guide any future responses.
Observation 3: Future wars will likely be blended, mixed, and gray Pentagon planners identify Russia and China as near-peer adversaries.35 Both countries have large nuclear arsenals and are investing in advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and hypersonic and cyber weapons that will dramatically change how future wars are fought.36 North Korea, which has nuclear weapons and is believed to have missiles that potentially can reach the U.S. mainland,37 and Iran, which has nuclear ambitions that many believe cannot be stopped as well as a large and diverse missile program, are also mentioned as regional threats or what might be called 'near, near-peers.'a
It is difficult for a country to predict what the next war will be like unless that country is planning a surprise attack. Then, at least, military planners may know what the opening battle might look like. That gives a potential advantage to a hypothetical Russian move into the Baltics or an assault by China on Taiwan, which would be hard to prevent and difficult to reverse without ascending to all-out war. Strategic war games simulating such scenarios do not turn out well for the West.38 It is therefore understandable that the Pentagon wants to re-assert military dominance-assuming it ever existed-in order to deter war and if deterrence fails, to win a shooting war.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to question the assumptions that underlie the likelihood of wars with near-peer adversaries or the necessity to prepare for them. However, it would be a mistake to assume that wars with near-peer adversaries will be exclusively large-scale conventional military engagements. To say that the United States has near-peer competitors is not to say that potential wars will take the form of what are historically viewed as near-peer contests. Major war in the future will not resemble major wars in the past. The decision to refocus on peer warfare should not be driven by nostalgia, the desire for tank parades, or the bottom lines of defense contractors.
There is a tendency to divide warfare into two domains. Some senior military leaders talk about "normal war," meaning large-scale conventional military operations, and other forms of armed conflict. These are variously described as irregular warfare, low intensity conflict (LIC), conflict other than war (COTW), military operations other than war (MOOTW), guerrilla warfare (GW), counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or hybrid warfare. Political warfare, psychological warfare, information warfare, cyber warfare, and measures short of war are thrown into the mix. Although some of the entries have more precise meanings in military doctrine, other entries are generic or overlap. This is not a taxonomy. It is a catalogue of the "other"-and like all things other, these forms of conflict are considered as strange, outside, departures from the canon, and of less significance than normal war.
Creating a divide between "normal" war and other forms of armed conflict would be a mistake. Recent history suggests a more complex future. Since departing from Vietnam, a conflict that saw both conventional and unconventional operations, the United States intervened in El Salvador's civil war, backed Contra guerrillas in Nicaragua, intervened in Lebanon where American forces increasingly became participants in the country's civil war and targets of terrorism, landed marines in Grenada, bombed Libya in response to its backing of terrorist attacks on the United States, protected Kuwaiti ships from Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf, and invaded Panama to arrest its president for drug trafficking.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 prompted an American-led mission to liberate the country-a large-scale conventional operation followed by continuing air operations aimed at enforcing a no-fly zone to protect the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and Shi`a Muslims in the south. In 1993, the United States increased its military presence to protect U.N. operations in Somalia, found itself dragged into its internal conflicts, then withdrew from the country after a psychologically devastating loss in the battle of Mogadishu. The United States sent troops into Haiti in 1994 to ensure a peaceful turnover of power, took the lead in intervening to prevent further slaughters in Bosnia in 1995, and intervened in the Balkans again in 1999 to support Kosovo independence and prevent ethnic cleansing. In response to terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa, the United States launched a missile attack on targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.
As a candidate, President George W. Bush had criticized the Clinton administration's multiple military interventions, but following the 9/11 attacks, launched the "Global War on Terror," which under different names continues to this day. To prevent Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction, the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, thus initiating what became America's second longest war and its most costly engagement since the Vietnam War. It was initially a successful conventional operation but was followed by a long, bloody insurgency.
Although determined to avoid further military involvement in the Middle East and North Africa, the United States under the Obama administration participated in the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, half-heartedly supported those fighting against Syrian leader Assad, and in 2014 increasingly became involved in military operations against the Islamic State. That same year, Russia seized Crimea and sent masked Russian soldiers in unmarked uniforms-the "little green men"-to participate in Ukraine's civil war. Also in 2014, China began building scores of bases on atolls in the South China Sea as well as a base in Djibouti.39
This military history at a gallop is relevant. It underscores the observation that events, not strategic preferences, determine military operations. It should be a cautionary tale to political leaders who make the ultimate decisions about when and where to employ military force. It is also a warning to military leadership that the country faces diverse challenges to its security that cannot simply be banished from consideration.
The brief recent history also shows an assortment of military operations. Foes of the United States are diverse and have used varied means to overcome America's perceived technological superiority and greater military might. Even near-peer adversaries have conducted their activities in ways that stop short of provoking a direct military response. And clearly the United States has struggled to craft effective responses, yet found it difficult to avoid engagements or depart from them. As former Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Michael Carns pointed out to me just before this article was published, "We can (and should) recognize that we face terrorism from parties who recognize that the 'terror' choice of political engagement is the best choice for them and the worst choice for us, given our mindset and our resultant 'way of war' once engaged."
One can sympathize with those who argue that these endless distractions drain our attention and resources to the point that the United States may now be in danger of losing its military superiority, despite defense expenditures that dwarf its competitors' combined defense budgets.b But it also suggests that as the United States devotes itself to recovering an undeniable edge in advanced military capabilities, it will only further oblige its foes to invent ways they can obviate America's advantage. (Israel is already in this conundrum.) Achieving overmatch will increase challenges in the gray area. To put it simply, the other forms of war are inescapable. The United States needs to examine the entire realm of warfare in the gray area.
Deterring nuclear adventurism may require maintaining an effective nuclear arsenal. Deterring conventional challenges may require acquiring and learning how to exploit the most advanced technologies to demonstrate that the United States will win any shooting war. However, tomorrow's wars may also include adversaries exploiting vulnerabilities created by the United States' increasing dependence on the internet, sabotaging the nation's critical infrastructure, or crippling its space-based surveillance and communications systems. Tomorrow's wars may also take the form of grinding long-term contests that avoid open battle-special operations, proxies, detached and deniable actors. And tomorrow's wars may include a terrorist component, remotely recruited or inspired by events-can we imagine a war with Iran that does not include Hezbollah's worldwide capacity for violence?
China and Russia have also learned by watching America's experience during the past 20 years of the "Global War on Terror." They may view proxy warfare and sponsorship of terrorism as effective ways to distract American attention and divert American resources.
Future wars will require U.S. commanders not merely to fight opposing armies, but to orchestrate a broad arsenal of capabilities to counter a blended array of conventional and unconventional modes of conflict, including terrorism.
A CH-47 Chinook helicopter assigned to the Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division prepares to land in order to extract Afghan National Army and U.S. soldiers assigned with the 1st Armored Division, and the 1st Battalion, 178th Infantry Regiment, Illinois Army National Guard following a advise-and-assist mission on September 17, 2019, in southeastern Afghanistan. (MSG Alejandro Licea/U.S. Department of Defense)
Observation 4: Competition for defense dollars will increase pressure to make cuts to counterterrorism With priority shifting to great power competition, expenditures for counterterrorism are already coming under increasing pressure as the Pentagon looks for money to develop significant new military and supporting technologies to overmatch what the Chinese and Russians are believed to be doing. At the same time, the competition for defense dollars will intensify as the defense budget itself comes under pressure. Given the costs of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic recovery, a ballooning annual deficit (forecast to be $3.7 trillion for fiscal year 2020), and massive national debt (currently at around $26 trillion), it is difficult to envision continued increases in defense spending at the level seen over the past several years.40 Future defense budgets are likely to be flat or even trimmed.
Economists at the RAND Corporation estimated in April 2020 that contraction of the U.S. economy caused by the pandemic could reduce defense spending, if held at 3.2 percent of GDP, by $350-600 billion over the next 10 years. This was before the surge in new cases of COVID-19 across the United States in June and July 2020 and not taking into account likely political decisions to shift government spending to other post-pandemic priorities.41
Major savings can be made by base closures or cuts to some of the big weapons acquisition programs, but these are politically protected by members of Congress who will not allow closures or cuts to certain acquisitions because of their impact on local economies and jobs. Political leaders may also see defense spending as a way to accelerate economic recovery. Under budgetary pressure, the armed forces tend to cut personnel. There were major cuts after the Vietnam War and again after the end of the Cold War. Very modest cuts occurred between 2011 and 2015. Counterterrorism operations are carried out primarily by Special Forces and Special Operations Forces, which also play a key role in near-peer contests. The question is how likely budget cuts/constraints may affect not just the forces, but the mission.
Defense budgets are Byzantine. There is no single counterterrorism budget, and it is difficult to isolate what is spent on counterterrorism. Part of the problem is agreeing upon what should be included. The broadest iterations of the total U.S. expenditures for counterterrorism include the costs of the war in Afghanistan-and the war in Iraq, since this was portrayed as part of the war on terror. Military counterterrorist expenditures would also include the costs of the campaign to destroy the Islamic State, military operations in other countries like Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines, and the continuing military assistance missions in many countries. The broadest cost calculations also include not only the actual costs of military operations, but the long-term costs of caring for those wounded and disabled in the wars, the interest costs of fighting on borrowed money, and other indirect effects.42 This puts the totals well into the trillions of dollars since 9/11, and it misleadingly suggests that great savings can be saved by pivoting away from counterterrorist missions.c
In fact, the potential savings by cutting counterterrorism expenditures in future defense budgets is likely to be relatively small. If counterterrorism expenditures are defined as the cost of military operations directed against terrorists, including special operations, drone strikes, support of proxies in conflict zones, and military training missions to build capacity in countries confronted with terrorist threats, then counterterrorism comprises only a small portion of the current $721.5 billion defense budget.
The 2021 budget request for the Special Operations Command is approximately $16.6 billion.43 Most, but not all special operations are currently devoted to counterterrorism.
The cumulative costs of operation "Inherent Resolve," the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State that began in 2014, reached $23.5 billion by March 2018-about $5-6 billion a year.44 With the destruction of the Islamic State, the bombing campaign, which was the most expensive component of the operation, is over, and the savings already have been realized.
The total costs of the U.S. drone program are difficult to calculate. Drones are operated both by the Pentagon and the CIA. Accurate figures are hard to come by. In its fiscal year 2019 budget, the Department of Defense requested approximately $9.4 billion for drones and associated technologies.45 Another assessment put the administration's request at $3.4 billion for drone procurement, research, development, testing, and evaluation.46 While the primary use of drones at present is in counterterrorism, it is widely assumed that drones will play a major role in future wars, including near-peer contests. Even if the Pentagon were to leave all counterterrorist drone strikes to the CIA, it would still be investing in drone technology.
Moreover, reductions in the number of Americans deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq and a tighter focus on counterterrorist operations could increase the reliance on air operations, including the use of drones. (The efficacy of drones as a counterterrorist weapon, their cost-effectiveness, legality, and morality versus other types of military operations continue to be matters of intense debate.)
Greater savings can theoretically be obtained by reducing the number of American boots on the ground. Expeditionary warfare is hugely expensive, hence the push to reduce the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, although U.S. military commanders, while noting that withdrawals are political decisions, warn against a premature or total withdrawal.47 Again, U.S. troops are in Afghanistan fighting Taliban insurgents, but these counterinsurgency operations are part of a broader counterterrorism strategy aimed at preventing the return of al-Qa`ida or other dangerous jihadi groups. When it comes to a hard decision, no president yet has wanted to take the risk.
This brings us back to the fundamental underlying dilemma. Americans understandably want and expect security against terrorist attacks, and many probably believe that, with sufficient force, terrorists can be defeated once and for all and the threat of further terrorism ended. That is what going to war with al-Qa`ida or the Islamic State was about. I realize now that the error in framing the counterterrorist campaign as war, which made sense at the time, was that it implied a finite ending, as most American wars have ended in the past.
But Americans are no longer willing to pay the price if that appears to be involvement in endless, unwinnable wars. Perhaps the jihadi terrorist enterprise can ultimately be suppressed, or it may fade away, although that could take decades-generations. Or today's terrorist campaigns may be subsumed by bigger wars or existential threats to civilization.
War fatigue does not mean, however, that public expectations of security have changed. We do not know that Americans are now more willing to accept increased risk. Military operations, in my view, have reduced the ability of our jihadi foes to launch large-scale attacks into U.S. territory from abroad, and these terrorist organizations have had only limited success in remotely inspiring homegrown jihadis to carry out attacks. But there are no equations that link military expenditures with measurable risk.
Statistically, the danger terrorism poses to any American is minuscule, but terrorism is not about statistics. It is about perceptions-fear, alarm, anger-and perceptions can be framed and manipulated. Deep divisions in American society and intense political partisanship ensure that any terrorist incident will be framed to maximize political advantage. One need only look at how Americans have handled the COVID-19 pandemic.
At the beginning of this essay, I said that the future role of the military in counterterrorism is not just a debate about strategy, but rather requires a national discussion, which we as a nation have yet to conduct. Meanwhile, the challenge to the military is to address how counterterrorism operations could be reframed to avoid terms that imply "victories" in the traditional sense.
Over the years, official documents, published articles, and public comments by active and retired military commanders and defense analysts have communicated ambiguous messages: Counterterrorism operations are essential, but military force cannot by itself defeat terrorists or end terrorism. Reinforcements are necessary. Complete or accelerated withdrawal of U.S. forces (from Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria) entails increased risks. Terrorism is no longer the priority; we must shift attention and resources to great power competition. All of these statements reflect specific military assessments and may be true, but the public may well be confused. The solution would be an honest national conversation about these trade-offs, but how to bring that about in the current political environment is not obvious.
Thus far, the savings from troop reductions have been disappointing. In 2011, the United States had 94,000 troops in Afghanistan at an estimated annual cost of $107 billion. In 2019, 9,800 American troops remained in the country at an estimated annual cost of $52 billion-a 90 percent reduction in troops resulting in a 51 percent reduction in costs.48 Further reductions in troops levels are likely, but with proportionately less savings.
Thousands of additional U.S. troops are deployed in Africa and elsewhere, training, advising, and fighting alongside local security forces, in some places battling extremist fighters with airstrikes and ground operations with local commandos. Although the Trump administration has been critical of overseas deployments in so many countries, these are comparatively low-cost operations and can be considered good investments. Not much money can be saved by reducing them, although a constrained defense budget render them vulnerable to cuts.
It is not merely a matter of budgets. U.S. troops are in Iraq not only to help the Iraqis fight terrorists, but also to counter Iranian influence in the region.49 U.S. counterterrorism assistance to various countries also encourages and facilitates international cooperation in sharing intelligence about terrorism. This cooperation has in the past proved vital in protecting the United States and its allies against terrorist attacks. The importance of U.S. counterterrorist capabilities and intelligence sharing was illustrated in June 2020 when French special forces killed Abdelmalek Droukdel, al-Qa`ida's longtime commander in North Africa. The United States assisted the operation by providing intelligence that located the target. France, which has 5,000 of its own troops in West Africa,50 and the United States are cooperating in preventing jihadis from establishing new strongholds in the Sahel.
Many of the places where the United States provides counterterrorism assistance are also arenas of great power competition-for example, Africa, and the Philippines. Terrorists in these countries directly threaten their governments, which need help. Offering training and assistance enables the United States to maintain access and develop influence.
The bottom line is that reductions in counterterrorism operations will come, but-counterinsurgency costs aside-these reductions will not free up large amounts for the development of capabilities to wage near-peer warfare. And cutting too deeply will have adverse strategic effects both in protecting the United States against terrorism and achieving other strategic goals. As the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command Africa General Dagvin R. M. Anderson noted in a recent interview in this publication, "pretty much every nation in Africa, has a concern about violent extremism and terrorism. And we bring great credibility and great value-Special Operations-to help them address that security concern. Being able to partner with them and address that security concern gives us access, gives us engagement opportunity and influence in order to then compete with these other global powers-China and Russia-to ensure we have access and the world has access to these resources as well that are vital to our economies."51
Observation 5: Shifting priorities should not mean discarding competence The Unites States' armed forces emerged from the Vietnam War scarred and grieved. Ten years of war, a troop commitment that in 1968 reached over half a million, vastly superior weapons, the loss of 58,000 dead and 300,000 wounded (with a higher percentage of survivors than in previous conflicts suffering multiple amputations or disabling wounds that likely would have resulted in death in previous wars), the heavy toll did not bring victory.52 Not only had the American public turned against the war, many had turned against the military establishment itself. Returning veterans found no welcome, only scorn.
Unwilling to learn the lessons of the war, American military leaders were instead determined to never let this happen again. To ensure that it would not, the army purged itself of everything that had to do with irregular warfare. Its counterinsurgency capabilities were systematically dismantled. Counterinsurgency, which had been a major preoccupation since the early 1960s, was almost totally erased from the training curricula. Special Forces-often disparaged and resented by many senior officers-were reduced. The military went back to preparing for fighting conventional wars-almost exclusively.
Initially, U.S. armed forces saw no military role in dealing with the growing phenomenon of terrorism. Until the late 1970s, this position was understandable. The terrorist groups operating in the cities of South America, Europe, and Japan at the time, despite the Marxist orientation of most, posed little direct threat to the United States, although some of them attacked U.S. targets, including diplomats, military personnel, and corporate officials. There was little the Pentagon believed it could do other than protect U.S. military assets abroad. Otherwise, it was not seen as the Pentagon's problem, and there were good reasons to avoid involvement. In the face of public disorder and escalating terrorist violence, British troops had deployed to Northern Ireland, but the United States faced no such domestic threat and, in any case, it was not a model that the United States could or wanted to emulate. Dealing with America's own domestic terrorist groups remained a law enforcement responsibility, not a military mission.
Events in the Middle East followed a different trajectory. From the early 1970s on, Middle Eastern militants increasingly targeted Americans and some plotted terrorist attacks in the United States. In many cases, moreover, their terrorist campaigns were supported by national governments in the region-Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Sudan, and Iran-as a mode of surrogate warfare. That changed the equation. State-sponsored terrorism became a growing U.S. national security concern, putting the option of military force on the table. The Pentagon continued to resist.
Airline hijackings, embassy seizures, and kidnappings during the late 1970s pushed the Pentagon into developing a hostage rescue capability, especially after the successful hostage rescues carried out by Israelis at Entebbe in 1976 and German commandos in Mogadishu in 1977. Unfortunately, the new U.S. force failed its first time out in April 1980 in an attempt to rescue Americans held hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The aborted operation revealed serious shortcomings in planning joint special operations.
The October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, in which 241 American service personnel died, was a turning point. At the direction of Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a commission led by Admiral Robert Long was created to review the military disaster. It concluded that the military had failed to adequately address and prepare for the terrorist threat. But the commission's conclusions went beyond events in Beirut to point out that the United States, and specifically the Department of Defense, was inadequately prepared to deal with the terrorism. "It makes little sense to learn that a State or its surrogate is conducting a terrorist campaign or planning a terrorist attack," the commission observed, "and not confront that government with political or military consequences ..."53
That position coincided with the views of Secretary of State George Shultz, a World War II Marine himself, who saw the use of military force as necessary to back up American diplomacy against terrorism, but still the military resisted. The argument continued through the mid-1980s. The United States eventually did employ limited military power in response to terrorist attacks on a handful of occasions as we will come to later in this essay, but it was not until 9/11 that the U.S. armed forces were given the counterterrorist mission that has occupied them since.
The current shift in priorities, explicitly downgrading terrorism, could easily slide into a repeat of the post-Vietnam dismantling of counterinsurgency capabilities. This could occur through budgeting reallocations, abandonment of advisory and support missions, or targeted reductions in force aimed at specialized units or personnel. The budget reallocations already occurring suggest they are likely to produce only modest savings. Abandoning missions and losing core competencies, in my view, should be avoided.
The shift in emphasis from counterterrorism to near-peer warfare is intended to be a makeover, not a turnover. If it is accompanied by a denigration of the counterterrorism mission this generation of U.S. military personnel have worked toward, retention could become a problem.
The Vietnam War and the wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East have affected the armed forces differently. Although 2.7 million Americans served in Vietnam (out of 9.1 million military personnel on active duty sometime during the Vietnam era) compared to 2.8 million who served in Afghanistan or Iraq between 9/11 and 2015),54 the Vietnam experience may have had a less lasting effect on the U.S. military than the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq for a variety of reasons.
The armed forces during the Vietnam deployment were much larger. The active duty strength of the armed forces in the late 1960s was approximately 3.5 million in the late 1960s-a post-World War II peak.55 Since 2000, the number of active duty personnel has ranged around 1.4 million. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were longer. The big buildup in Vietnam began in 1965, and by 1969, the withdrawal was underway. About a fifth of those who served in Vietnam were draftees, most of whom left the service after two years (although even in the all-volunteer force, most departures from the service occur after the first tour). Experience evaporated quickly. People serve longer in today's professional armed forces. As a result, multiple deployments to conflict zones are more common in today's armed forces. The post-9/11 personnel are also more likely to have seen actual combat. Repeated tours of duty have imposed a heavy burden on them and their families. Those who started their careers after 9/11-meaning most of the military-have yet to experience peace.
The retention issue is most critical for the Army. Army personnel (including the Regular Army, Reserve, and National Guard) account for 58 percent of the total deployed-troop years since 9/11 with the Marines, Navy, and Air Force accounting for the remaining 42 percent. There already has been considerable attrition of this deployment experience. Recent research shows that, as of 2015, soldiers accounting for 55 percent of this deployment experience no longer remain in the army. Those who served three or more tours represent an especially critical resource. As of 2015, about 40 percent of these "highly deployed" soldiers have left the military.56 Many of those who remain seem likely to finish their full military career.57
The career environment is critical. Many of these men and women could still be in uniform for another 10 to 20 years-a valuable source of institutional knowledge that the services should try to retain. Telling soldiers that they have spent their entire career fighting wars that the country no longer gives a damn about and that its political leaders now describe as dumb, stupid, or lost, inevitably affects morale. Veterans who saw service in Afghanistan or Iraq tend to be ambivalent about whether the wars were worth fighting.58 Although half thought fighting in Afghanistan was worth it, only a third thought both wars were worth fighting while another third felt that neither war was worth fighting.59 How closely this reflects the attitudes of those still on active duty is hard to say. If those who have devoted the last 10 or 20 years to counterterrorism perceive their experience and therefore themselves devalued as the military shifts its priorities to fight the 'right' wars, departures could accelerate.
If I could speak personally to each and every person currently in uniform, I would tell them, "The people of this country and its armed forces owe you more than today's polite but perfunctory 'Thank you for your service,' but instead a deep debt of gratitude for your devotion to duty and your sacrifices. The current effort to address new military challenges does not diminish your past contribution, your hard-earned military experience, or your future value to our nation's defense. These remain relevant and will be needed." That ought to be the hymn of senior military leadership, especially those setting personnel policies.
Observation 6: The need to catalogue and exploit counterterrorism skills Those with years of military experience dealing with insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan and the Middle East may not be the best qualified to drive armor divisions across the plains of Europe, command major naval battles in the Pacific, or engage in aerial dogfights with enemy aircraft. (We did not have these skills when we entered World War II either.) What exactly are the counterterrorist capabilities and skills that should be preserved?
Counterterrorist operations encompass a broad variety of tasks and missions. Many of the assignments fall into the category of advisory and support missions. These vary greatly from country to country, even from province to province. Small American contingents work with local military establishments to improve their effectiveness, enabling them to contain the insurgent and terrorist organizations without need for direct U.S. intervention. The American teams also provide independent assessments of the threat. The teams can assess the situation and determine when additional support might be required and what might work best. They are also a direct conduit of intelligence.
The military has also learned to enlist and work with proxies, both of which are traditional special forces missions. The United States supported the Afghan mujahideen to ultimately defeat the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 2001, it combined Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, an irregular force, U.S. Special Forces (some on horseback), and U.S. airpower to defeat the Taliban and scatter al-Qa`ida. In 2006, the United States exploited the discontent of local Sunni tribes to displace al-Qa`ida-aligned insurgents in western Iraq. In 2014, the United States assembled and supported a Kurdish and Arab ground force to recapture territory held by the Islamic State. The first of these was a part of the Cold War-a continuing contest between near peers. The others fall into the domain of counterterrorism broadly defined. All of these operations were innovative and successful. They did not bring lasting peace or produce the democratic governments that some hoped for; they did contribute to national security.
Success in these operations depends on detailed local knowledge of the physical terrain and human geography, and in some cases requires an ability to operate as isolated small units amid a civilian population filled with potential hostiles. The psychological pressure is enormous. The skills are as much diplomatic as military. Not everyone can do it well.
Special operations have changed since the 1960s when the emphasis was on the deployment of area-trained Special Forces teams that could assist local armies and recruit proxies where knowledge of language and culture were important, but that could also carry out active military operations in enemy territory. Since then, special operations have increased emphasis on kinetic operations-one-off strategic strikes by U.S. personnel as opposed to living with local forces.
The kinetic component of counterterrorism is essentially a manhunt. Continuing intelligence collection and analysis to understand the hierarchy and roles played by individual terrorist leaders is prerequisite to operations. Key figures become subjects of continuous surveillance over long periods of time to track their whereabouts at any given moment. That can lead to opportunities for a drone strike or the insertion of a specialized team, which requires its own specialized infrastructure-months of patient work culminating in a few minutes, even seconds on target. The 2011 killing of Usama bin Ladin in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is an example.
A key counterterrorism skill set that is relevant and should be honed further is the identification, mapping, and dismantlement of networks. For example, while the physical landscape and 'actors' are different, similar skills are needed to map out an al-Qa`ida cell in Pakistan and map out the specific activity of key vessels, state affiliated and proxy ones, utilized by China as part of its gray zone strategy in key areas of the South China Sea.
Information operations that seek to amplify or highlight fractures and inconsistencies in the ideals and behaviors of terror actors is another area where counterterrorism skills are transferable.
Rather than being a continuous, large-scale military campaign against enemy military forces, counterterrorism is a global campaign of thousands of tiny operations against an elusive foe. (The campaign against the Islamic State, which chose to defend territory, was an anomaly.) The operations are not sequential; there is no defined end-state beyond degrading and eventually disabling an organization-relentlessly pursuing its leaders and key personnel, preventing them from communicating, keeping them on the run, depriving them of an opportunity to assemble, cutting off their supply of weapons and sources of financing, discouraging their recruitment. Achieving "victory" in the traditional sense is not applicable.60
Operations must be conducted within the constraints imposed by tight rules of engagement while protecting friendly forces and supportive populations against terrorist attack. Counterintelligence capabilities depend heavily on human skills more than on weapons superiority, although capabilities for airstrikes and insertion are critical.
There are also deeper, critical but less obvious skills. All battle requires knowledge of the opposing forces, but none requires such detailed understanding of the enemy as counterterrorism-not just his military capabilities, but the terrorists' political strengths, beliefs, mindset, and concepts of strategy-and the physical, social, and psychological terrain in which the terrorists operate.
In addition to leadership skills honed in combat under trying conditions, counterterrorism brings experience in dealing with complex, multi-level, and multidimensional conflict situations. Obtaining a profound understanding of the adversary, rapid exploitation of intelligence, adaptability to different situations and conditions, and the ability to develop innovative solutions are skills that are clearly fungible to near-peer warfare.
These are the readily observable parts of counterterrorism. Those involved in military operations over the last two decades no doubt will have different views of what they do and how they do it, as well as different ideas about their own skill sets. It would be useful to catalogue these, distill lessons learned, and identify best practices before memories dim and war stories take over. The objective is not to write a new counterterrorism manual, which would soon be out of date and might even inhibit creative thinking, but rather to capture a history that can inform and inspire how the United States might address future terrorist threats, which are almost certain to arise.
Those deeply involved in counterterrorism operations over the past two decades might also be able to offer very different perspectives on how the United States might fight future near-peer wars. Counterterrorist practitioners have learned, for example, that very small forces can be deadly, that large military formations, concentrations, and platforms are vulnerable, that possession of superior weapons does not guarantee military success, that military success does not always translate to political success, and that war is very much a matter of manipulating perceptions. How might these skills apply to challenges from Russia or China?
However, years of practice in dealing with insurgents and terrorists brings more than lessons learned through trial and error; it may alter how one thinks about the art of war itself. In both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, field experience overrides doctrine. In conventional warfare, doctrine carries greater weight. We fight fewer large-scale conventional wars; therefore conventional warfare doctrine derives from wars fought in the distant past or models of unfought wars. In contrast, counterterrorism doctrine derives from continuous operations and is constantly being amended.
The last time the United States fought a conventional war against true near-peer adversaries was in the Second World War-75 years ago (although some might argue it was against the Chinese in Korea 70 years ago). It is true that the First Gulf War and the opening weeks of the Iraq War involved conventional operations, but Iraq was a third-rate military power, hardly a near peer. While these engagements reflected the latest developments in weapons and information technologies, basic doctrine survived.
The U.S. military entered the "Global War on Terror" with no counterterrorism doctrine and virtually no experience. And as already discussed, it had deliberately all but erased its memory of counterinsurgency. What it knows now derives from experience. In the case of counterinsurgency, it had to recover its memory, but then apply it to completely different sets of circumstances. In the case of counterterrorism, it had to learn from scratch. This has great importance in the professional formation of officers and senior NCOs.
Conventional warfare doctrine reflects weapons systems, which have long lives. The arsenal of counterterrorism is human. I am using the term "conventional warfare" instead of near-peer warfare because I have already argued that future near-peer wars are likely to be multidimensional and include both conventional and unconventional components. We are likely to prepare for them from a more conventional warfare perspective. That could be a limitation.
There is no single counterterrorism or counterinsurgency experience; even a campaign in a single country often comprises a hundred little wars. Beyond specific lessons, those who have spent the better part of the last two decades in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency roles have the benefit of multiple and diverse experiences. It creates a mindset that looks at each new situation not from the standpoint of existing doctrine, but as a fresh problem to be solved. Constantly walking into new situations, they have learned to be nimble thinkers. They might, therefore, have completely novel approaches to current near-peer challenges.
Observation 7: Terrorism is changing, too Counterterrorism is a continuously changing repertoire in response to a dynamic threat. As the terrorist threat evolves, strategy and tactics must change accordingly. The history of counterterrorism operations shows this evolution.
From the 1980s to the end of the 20th century, the United States used military power in response to state-sponsored terrorism-against Syrian and Druze positions in Lebanon in 1984 following the 1983 bombing of the American Marine barracks in Beirut, against Libya in 1986 in response to that country's continuing support of terrorist operations against American targets, against Iranian targets in 1987 following an Iranian attack on U.S.-flagged vessels in the Persian Gulf, and against Iraq in 1993, after that country was allegedly involved in a plot to kill former President George H. W. Bush during a visit to Kuwait. These were one-off operations in retaliation for terrorist attacks and intended to support U.S. diplomatic efforts to discourage state-sponsored terrorism. In response to the bombing of the 1998 American embassies in Africa, the United States more directly targeted terrorists, albeit ineffectually. Each of these responses was different. They were limited and mostly intended to send a message rather than cause serious military damage.
Since 9/11, the United States has conducted continuous military operations against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and irregularly in other parts of the world. Between 2014 and 2019, the United States conducted air operations and provided artillery support of Kurdish and Arab efforts to retake cities held by the Islamic State. Concurrent with these operations, there have been targeted killings of key terrorists. During the same time period, military forces have carried out a number of hostage rescues. The need for this specific capability will remain.
The counterterrorist campaign since 9/11 has been intense, global in scope, but (putting aside the invasion of Iraq) focused on a narrow set of jihadi foes connected with or issuing from those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The notion of expanding the "Global War on Terror" to include other terrorist foes-Hezbollah, for example-briefly came up during the more hubristic moments of the campaign, but efforts remained focused on those inspired by jihadi ideology. "Combating terrorism," the term used for decades to encompass broader U.S. efforts against worldwide terrorism, continued as a parallel, but separate effort from the narrower campaign against al-Qa`ida and its jihadi spin-offs.
The jihadi threat is not the same as that confronted in 2001, and operations against other terrorist organizations are likely to be different. As a consequence of military operations and law enforcement efforts, the jihadi enterprise is now more decentralized. And it is more locally focused as its cadres and recruiters seek to establish new fronts, which they have been doing for 30 years.
No longer able to assemble and train thousands of recruits in Afghanistan, al-Qa`ida has been unable to coordinate large-scale strategic attacks at anything near the scale of 9/11. Instead, it relies on its affiliates, which are also hard pressed, and on exhortation via the internet to inspire homegrown terrorists to carry out attacks in its name.
The Islamic State was able to bring tens of thousands of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq to support its newly declared caliphate, but its leaders generally did not exhibit the same commitment that al-Qa`ida did to strategic strikes directed against the United States. The barrage of attacks in France and Belgium between 2014 and 2016 was a notable exception, though no evidence has emerged that the Islamic State's then leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was personally involved in planning those operations in the way bin Ladin was with 9/11. However, the new leader of the Islamic State, who was previously al-Baghdadi's deputy, led some of its global terrorist operations.61 It is not clear yet how he may alter the group's trajectory.
The Islamic State destroyed itself in an ill-considered attempt to create a state and defend its territory in open battle against a vastly superior opponent. The caliphate, its principal achievement, ultimately became its graveyard. This implies no claim of strategic victory. The jihadi narrative remains a powerful draw to some, although there is often a myriad of personal reasons for this attraction. Both al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State survive in the shadows and are capable of comebacks, but the current threat is different from what it was.
Jihadi groups continue to wage war in South Asia, the Middle East, across the Sahel, East Africa, increasingly in Mozambique. Jihadi groups are also active in Sri Lanka and the Philippines. That al-Qa`ida, the Islamic State, or some new jihadi assemblage might set up shop in the wake of American withdrawals from Afghanistan or in new territory drives current counterterrorist concerns.
Meanwhile, the terrorist threat to the United States comes primarily from remotely inspired, but homegrown terrorists, who are less tethered to a central organization or even specific ideology. Their capabilities do not approach another 9/11, and that is progress. The worst terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 was the 2016 shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Florida, which killed 49. This event accounts for almost half of all of the jihadi-caused fatalities on U.S. soil since 9/11. Ironically, reducing the risk of large-scale terrorism has decreased American tolerance for any risk at all-even small-scale attacks provoke alarm and outrage at failures of security.
Other terrorist foes exist as potential threats on the horizon. Hezbollah, which has American blood on its hands from its terrorist operations in Lebanon in the 1980s and during the war in Iraq, has thousands of combatants, an impressive arsenal of rockets, and a global network engaged in drug trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, and other criminal activities. It has carried out terrorist activities in Europe, Asia, and South America.
Hezbollah has operatives in the United States as well;62 however, it is unlikely to take independent action against the U.S. homeland or launch an attack causing major loss of American lives. It would expose Hezbollah's patron Iran to retaliation by the United States, which would suspect (or choose to presume) that such action would not take place without Iranian approval. From Tehran's perspective, however, a small-scale terrorist attack could remind Americans of the trouble they will invite if the United States attacks Iranian interests.
A war with Iran would almost certainly provoke a sabotage and terrorism campaign carried out by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah adherents worldwide, and other Iranian assets including its proxies in Iraq and Yemen.63 Beyond these, there currently are no other identifiable terrorist organizations that have identifiable geographic bases and global reach. State sponsors may recruit local groups to act as proxies, but again, the risk of retaliation imposes constraints.
Lockdowns and restrictions caused by the coronavirus pandemic appear to have decreased the risk of terrorist attacks in non-conflict zones, according to the United Nations, but the Islamic State has increased its activity in the Middle East and Africa since the beginning of 2020.64 In addition to the immediate economic contraction, the pandemic may produce long-term economic stagnation. Some developing economies (those dependent on tourism or on certain commodities exports) may be particularly hard hit with increased unemployment and possible social unrest.65
The mass destruction scenarios that terrorists imagined and officials feared in the dark days immediately after 9/11 remain very remote possibilities, although they cannot be entirely dismissed. The pandemic has renewed concerns about bioterrorism.66 It is not that the pandemic gives terrorists new capabilities or points them to a new path they have not thought of before, but it has inspired a new cohort of political fanatics to think about how they might weaponize dangerous pathogens.67
We can only speculate how the coronavirus pandemic might affect American attitudes toward terrorism. Will the daily deaths of thousands of Americans-an experience that will last a generation-inure Americans to the far lesser body counts caused by terrorists in the years since 9/11? Does COVID-19's higher toll end of the 9/11 era just as the carnage of World War I eclipsed the wave of anarchist terrorism that began in the 1880s? Or have the virus, the protests, the economic hardships, and the deep political divisions so scraped the nation's nerves that even a minor attack will prompt unreasoning terror and fury?
The last several years have seen a resurgence of violence by ideologically-motivated terrorists, predominantly white nationalists, but also anarchist elements. Both of these dark streams are prevalent in American and European history. They widen or narrow according to economic and social stress. They are, however, loosely organized and lack geographic bases. The violent fringes share attitudes, but individuals operate autonomously. Galaxies rather than groups, they offer no targets for military operations. While potentially very dangerous, they pose more of a societal problem for political leaders and police to solve.
State governors can utilize the National Guard when necessary to maintain public order. Federal forces have, on occasion, been deployed to assist them in dealing with riots. In my view, the U.S. armed forces should avoid involvement in dealing with domestic terrorism. The current fraught political environment guarantees that any domestic military role in responding to terrorism will awaken suspicions that the armed forces are being used as an instrument of political oppression and could discredit the military institution itself.
There have been a number of discussions over the years about expanding the definition of terrorism to include drug traffickers or other transnational organized crime groups. This may have some statutory value to federal investigators, but it could also open the way for direct U.S. military involvement. The U.S. armed forces have carried out or supported military operations against insurgents and terrorist organizations that are also directly engaged in or benefit financially from drug trafficking-for example, the insurgents in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Taliban, and Hezbollah. With these exceptions, combating transnational organized crime lies beyond counterterrorism and would represent a significant expansion of the military role. It should be viewed with extreme caution.
Concluding Observation: So where do we go? We return to our original question: How will the United States conduct counterterrorism during an era in which great power competition has been defined as the number-one national security priority? Here are some final reflections and observations:
It is not the purpose of this essay to challenge the assumptions underlying the shift in priority from counterterrorism to near-peer warfare. Russia and China along with new technological developments pose threats that must be addressed. We cannot be certain what future wars will look like. However, we can say: The United States faces a broad spectrum of military challenges-both conventional and unconventional-and will need an array of capabilities to confront multiple modes and combinations of conflict, including terrorism.
The capability of the jihadis to mount large-scale terrorist attacks in the United States has diminished, and jihadis are currently more focused on local struggles, but they are resilient and opportunistic and remain a threat. A new situation could facilitate a comeback. State sponsorship could rapidly give them additional resources. A terrorist threat remains-there are powerful arguments against dismantling or discarding the military's counterterrorist capabilities. Military operations will remain a component of counterterrorism, and counterterrorism will remain a component of military operations.
U.S. counterterrorism training to countries in rough neighborhoods of the world enhances local capabilities but also creates relationships and opens access to local intelligence and augments U.S. diplomatic influence. Counterterrorism assistance is a currency.
The current shift in focus to near-peer warfare seems unlikely to replicate the military's purge of counterinsurgency after the Vietnam War. It will, however, mean less attention to counterterrorism. The war on terrorism has been the preoccupation of the military establishment since 2001-the only on-going war. A shift in mindset could result in counterterrorism being treated increasingly as a backwater.
Increasing constraints on defense budgets seem likely and will affect all plans. Counterterrorism operations will be a target of cuts, but expenditures for counterterrorism have already declined as the bombing and ground campaign to recapture territory seized by Islamic State has ended and U.S. troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq. Further cuts to counterterrorism will produce marginal savings.
Direct U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency abroad came about as a consequence of efforts to prevent further major foreign terrorist attacks in the United States. Counterterrorism drove us into counterinsurgency. This has been costly and is now being reduced.
Large-scale American deployments will likely be avoided. Future counterterrorism operations will likely be more narrowly focused, without engaging U.S. forces in counterinsurgency operations. Whether this can be done successfully is uncertain.
We have learned from experience to rely on indigenous forces assisted by small numbers of U.S. forces and backed by U.S. airpower. The campaign to destroy the Islamic State highlights the difference. The major U.S. contribution to counterterrorism worldwide today is training, technological assistance and the provision of equipment, special operations, drone strikes, and-when necessary-U.S. airpower.
Success in protecting the homeland against terrorism from abroad derives in part from a massive intelligence effort, which, in turn, has been assisted by unprecedented sharing of intelligence among security services and law enforcement organizations worldwide. This is a major achievement that requires continued cultivation. The willingness of many countries to share vital information about terrorism will require motivating partners with continued American involvement and assistance-often military-in dealing with the terrorist threats they face. The same relationships will be valuable in dealing with great power competitors.
Dividing the military into near-peer warfare and counterterrorism camps makes little sense. It is not either/or. Future near-peer wars may well involve a counterterrorist component as well as the orchestration of capabilities in other dimensions of conflict outside of the traditional battlespace. Almost certainly, it will require the special operations capabilities that have been honed in the counterterrorist campaign.
More importantly, the experience, skills, and attitudes acquired in counterterrorism are fungible and may provide unique and creative approaches to more conventional military contests.
While the COVID-19 pandemic and domestic protests have pushed terrorism off the top of the national news agenda, political leadership will likely remain cautious about troop withdrawals or any other visible reduction of U.S. counterterrorist capabilities, fearing that they could be blamed for any new terrorist attack. At the same time, politicians will likely be reluctant to commit U.S. forces to new deployments abroad.
Political leadership will likely be willing to continue, even intensify airstrikes and special operations to decapitate and/or place pressure on terrorist groups. There will be a willingness to strike back hard if the United States is attacked so long as it does not engage U.S. forces in another continuing campaign. Presidents in the future may prefer to retaliate with dramatic displays of force at a distance-a standoff approach to counterterrorism, which is understandable but will likely produce limited effects.
Continuing efforts to reduce the need to deploy U.S. troops by means of increasing local capabilities, advising and assisting local allies, and enlisting proxies will require traditional special forces skills-area knowledge, language, field diplomacy. It is closer to what special forces were doing in the 1960s and will be a specialized career path-not a career dead end. It provides an opportunity to utilize the vast skills of the United States' immigrant population or to offer paths to citizenship for foreigners.
Counterterrorism was never predominately military. The critics are wrong. The role of the military was always limited to what other elements of counterterrorism could not do. Military force was employed where law enforcement could not operate, where persuasion failed, where diplomacy had little effect, where government authority was hostile or non-existent.
As the terrorist threat evolves, so will counterterrorism. There are basic principles, but no fixed doctrine. The past is a guide, but each major campaign is an ad hoc response to unique circumstances. This is true for all warfare, but especially for counterterrorism operations.
Direct participation by the armed forces in counterterrorism operations has declined. Only a handful of terrorist organizations pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. There may be no military role at all in responding to some of the new terrorist threats on the horizon. And the armed forces should be wary of being pulled into countering domestic ideologically-driven threats.
If recent history tells us anything, it is that the role played by the U.S. military in counterterrorism was driven by events-the emergence of al-Qa`ida from a progression of events in Afghanistan including the Soviet invasion; the Iranian revolution and takeover of the American embassy; chaos in Lebanon and a bombing in Beirut; Libya's sponsorship of terrorist attacks on Americans; the 9/11 attacks; the Arab Spring; civil war in Syria; the rise of the Islamic State and collapse of the Iraqi army; the Islamic State's advertised atrocities. Most of these were surprises, although some, like the turmoil created by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, are consequences of our own making. Terrorism is the reflection of a volatile world. Events, not plans or preferences, will determine how much the United States will be able to shift or not shift resources away from counterterrorism and toward near peer competition. CTC
Brian Michael Jenkins is a former Green Beret and currently serves as Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND Corporation, where he initiated one the nation's first research programs on terrorism in 1972. His books and monographs on terrorism include International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict Aviation; Terrorism and Security; Unconquerable Nation; Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?; The Long Shadow of 9/11; When Armies Divide; and The Origin of America's Jihadists.
While the author alone is responsible for the views expressed in this essay, it benefited greatly from the thorough review and substantive suggestions provided by the CTC Sentinel's editorial team and editorial board as well as from the helpful observations and comments by others, including General (Ret) Michael P. C. Carns and a number of former Special Forces officers.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the Combating Terrorism Center, the United States Military Academy, or RAND.
Substantive Notes [a] Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, an author of the National Defense Strategy, includes North Korea and Iran in the near-peer problem sets. Jim Garamone, "National Military Strategy Addresses Changing Character of War," U.S. Department of Defense, July 12, 2019. Both countries are named along with China and Russia.
[b] According to the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, the United States spends more on defense than the next 10 countries combined. "U.S. Defense Spending Compared to Other Countries," Peter G. Peterson Foundation, May 13, 2020.
[c] There are multiple ways to calculate the costs of the war on terrorism, which is a higher figure than military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For just congressional appropriations for the wars, the figure was about $2 trillion in September 2019. See Emily M. Morgenstern, "Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status," Congressional Research Service, R44519, September 6, 2019. The gold standard for these calculations is Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs. Neta C. Crawford, "United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: $6.4 Trillion," 20 Years of War, Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, Brown University and The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, November 13, 2019. See also Leo Shane III, "Price tag of the 'war on terror' will top $6 trillion soon," Military Times, November 14, 2018.
Citations [1] "2018 National Defense Strategy," U.S. Department of Defense, 2018. Fulfilling a congressional mandate, the NDS replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the full document itself is classified. The Department of Defense released an unclassified summary, which is what is cited here.
[12] "Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council," United Nations, May 27, 2020.
[28] U.S. Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33-3.5), December 2006 (printed edition by the University of Chicago, 2007).
[33] "Joint Publication 3-26, Counterterrorism," Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 24, 2014.
[35] "2018 National Defense Strategy."
[42] Neta C. Crawford, "United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: $6.4 Trillion," 20 Years of War, Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs, Brown University and The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, November 13, 2019.
[52] "Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics," National Archives; Gerald W. Mayfield, "Vietnam War Amputees," Orthopedic Surgery in Vietnam, Office of Medical History, U.S. Army Medical Department.
[53] Report of the DOD Commission On Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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