Quotes of the Day:
"No leader should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no leader should fight a battle simply out of pique. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. Hence the enlightened leader is heedful, and the good leader full of caution."
-Sun Tzu
"As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice-there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community... this issue of paradigm choice can never be unequivocally settled by logic and experiment alone."
-Thomas Kuhn
"The day knowledge was preferred to wisdom and mere usefulness to beauty. . . . Only a moral revolution -- not a social or a political revolution -- only a moral revolution would lead man back to his lost truth."
- Simone de Beauvoir
1. ‘It was a mistake.’ CENTCOM admits Aug. 29 drone strike killed civilians, not ISIS
2. Austin Swears in Pentagon's New Special Operations Chief
3. American Power After Afghanistan: How to Rightsize the Country’s Global Role
4. Kyiv Airing Disappointment With Western Policies
5. Is the AUKUS alliance meaningful or merely provocation?
6. US-Australia submarine deal rocks NATO alliance
7. In Panjshir, Few Signs of an Active Resistance, or Any Fight at All
8. Labeling The Founding Documents ‘Offensive’ Is Just The Beginning Of The National Archives’ Spiteful Plans
9. This Marine officer wants to charge a general with ‘dereliction of duty’ over Afghanistan. (He can’t)
10.I Know General Milley, and He Was Just Doing His Job By James Stavridis
11. The Milley Miasma
12. Perspective | Milley’s calls reflect a crisis. But it’s not a military crisis.
13. Scientists created the world's whitest paint. It could eliminate the need for air conditioning.
14. How Chinese Strategists Think AI Will Power a Military Leap Ahead
15. Russian-Made Mi-17 Helicopter Flown By Secretive U.S. Unit Lands In Farmer's Field
16. 79 years after the first submarine-launched commando raid, Navy SEALs say it hasn't gotten any easier
17. How America Forgot It Needed to Understand The Enemy
18. Biden prepares to host historic ‘Quad’ summit at White House
19. The Taliban PR Campaign Has Not Ended, But Transformed
1. ‘It was a mistake.’ CENTCOM admits Aug. 29 drone strike killed civilians, not ISIS
We have to own this tragic mistake.
What if the NY Times and Washington Post did not conduct their visual and digital forensic analysis? Is there something we can learn from their TTPs?
What does this indicate for our "over the horizon" counterterrorism capabilities?
‘It was a mistake.’ CENTCOM admits Aug. 29 drone strike killed civilians, not ISIS
When officials signed off Aug. 29 on a Hellfire strike to obliterate a white Toyota they had been monitoring for eight hours, the belief was that it contained ISIS fighters carrying a bomb intended for U.S. troops outside the Kabul airport. The head of U.S. Central Command announced Friday that they were very wrong.
Marine Gen. Frank McKenzie concurred with previous media reports that the strike had killed as many as 10 people, including seven children.
“This strike was taken in the earnest belief that it would prevent an imminent threat to our forces and the evacuees at the airport, but it was a mistake,” he said, confirming that no ISIS fighters are believed to have been killed in the attack.
For days after the strike, Pentagon officials asserted that it had been conducted correctly, despite numerous civilians being killed, including children. The New York Times later raised doubts about that version of events, reporting that the driver of the targeted vehicle was a longtime employee at an American humanitarian organization and citing an absence of evidence to support the Pentagon’s assertion that the vehicle contained explosives.
A U.S. Central Command graphic maps the movement of a white Toyota Corolla believed to be carrying ISIS bombers on Aug. 29 in Kabul. A Hellfire missile strike hit the vehicle, carrying a non-government organization worker, killing him and up to nine other civilians in the area. (CENTCOM)
Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters two days after the attack that it appeared to have been a “righteous” strike and that at least one of the people killed was a “facilitator” for the Islamic State group’s Afghanistan affiliate, which had killed 169 Afghan civilians and 13 American service members in a suicide bombing on Aug. 26 at the Kabul airport.
After McKenzie’s remarks, Milley expressed regret.
“This is a horrible tragedy of war and it’s heart wrenching,” Milley told reporters traveling with him in Europe. “We are committed to being fully transparent about this incident.”
“In a dynamic high-threat environment, the commanders on the ground had appropriate authority and had reasonable certainty that the target was valid, but after deeper post-strike analysis our conclusion is that innocent civilians were killed,” Milley added.
Accounts from the family, documents from colleagues seen by The Associated Press, and the scene at the family home — where Zemerai Ahmadi’s car was struck by a Hellfire missile just as he pulled into the driveway — all painted a picture of a family that had worked for Americans and were trying to gain visas to the United States, fearing for their lives under the Taliban.
The family said that when the 37-year-old Zemerai, alone in his car, pulled up to the house, he honked his horn. His 11-year-old son ran out and Zemerai let the boy get in and drive the car into the driveway. The other kids ran out to watch, and the missile incinerated the car, killing seven children and an adult son and nephew of Zemerai.
But to officials tracking the Corolla, Zemerai and his vehicle matched intelligence reports of an imminent, ISIS-generated attack against troops at the Kabul airport. At the time, McKenzie said, they were tracking roughly 60 reports of threats.
One of those, specifically, had been a white Toyota. When they saw the vehicle stop outside of a known ISIS compound in the city, then make several more stops, picking up and dropping off several adult men, loading and unloading supplies, they thought they had their target.
“We tracked a lot of other people. We didn’t track anybody ... as closely as we did this, because of limitations on our resources,” McKenzie said. “And frankly, you know, we thought this was a good lead. We were wrong.”
One of those stops was to the office of Nutrition and Education International ― a non-governmental aid organization Zemerai had worked for over the previous 15 years.
Just before 5 p.m., McKenzie said, the vehicle pulled up to a compound approximately 3 km from the airport, prompting concern that if they had the right car, it could be at the airport gate within minutes.
“So the cumulative force of ... the intelligence that we gathered throughout the day, the position of the vehicle, its nearness to the airport, the imminence of the threat, and the other signals that we were getting throughout the day, all led us to the moment of deciding to take the strike,” he said.
Reports in Kabul quickly accused the U.S. of having killed nearly a dozen people, most of them children, but Pentagon leadership held to their original narrative in the following days, despite admitting there was a possibility of civilian collateral casualties.
RELATED
What unfolded in the execution of the policy to exit Afghanistan has been a disaster.
By Jeff Butler
One of their data points was that a secondary explosion after the strike, suggesting that there was explosive material in the car. McKenzie did not completely rule that out Friday, but said “the most likely cause was ignition of gas from a propane tank located immediately behind the car” when it exploded.
Those other imminent threats never materialized, but McKenzie could not say why. He hypothesized that an attack in Nangahar Province two days earlier had killed an ISIS-K planner associated with the potential attack.
The Defense Department is considering death gratuity payments to the families, McKenzie said. There will be some logistical challenges involved, because there are no more U.S. officials on the ground and the country is under total Taliban control.
On that note, McKenzie fielded questions on how CENTCOM’s “over-the-horizon capability” will be able to effectively target ISIS now that on-the-ground intelligence is no longer an option ― especially in light of how wrong this initial strike went.
“That is not the way that we would strike in an OTH mission going into Afghanistan against ISIS key targets,” he said. “For one thing, that will not be a self-defense strike. It will be done ... under different rules of engagement.”
Though McKenzie said the Aug. 29 strike was “not rushed,” he did clarify the difference between how they would go about responding to an imminent threat against U.S. troops versus a highly choreographed attack on ISIS-K assets.
“We will have a lot more opportunity, probably, than we had under this extreme time pressure to take a look at the target ... with multiple platforms, to have an opportunity to develop extended pattern of life,” he said. “None of these things were available to us, given the urgent and pressing nature of the imminent threat to our forces.”
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. Follow on Twitter @Meghann_MT
2. Austin Swears in Pentagon's New Special Operations Chief
The key points. The SECDEF appears to be keeping a key element of the former A/SECDEF's directive in place and trying to meet Congressional intent for "service oversight" of SOF. Recall Congress put the ASD SO/LIC in the ADCON chain of command: POTUS, SECDEF, ASD SO/LIC, CDR USSOCOM.
The question is whether the ASD SO/LIC, in that service secretary role, will have actual service authorities over SOF. (e.g., personnel management, ability to nominate an officer for SECDEF/POTUS consideration for the commander of USSOCOM)
Excerpts;
The assistant secretary job has two roles, Maier said in an interview. While it has the policy role it's always had supporting the undersecretary for policy, DOD and Congress have also directed SOLIC to serve as the service secretary for special operations forces.
"It's a bifurcated reporting structure [and] kind of tells you that SOLIC straddles a number of different areas," he said.
...
Austin holds regular meetings with the service secretaries, Maier said. "So, [it will be] the Army, Navy, Air Force and me," he said. "It's an interesting arrangement, certainly not how somebody traditionally would have viewed this role."
‘‘(f) ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND.—(1) Unless otherwise directed by the President, the administrative chain of command to the special operations command runs—
‘‘(A) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; ‘
‘(B) from the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; and
‘‘(C) from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to the commander of the special operations command. ‘‘(2) For purposes of this subsection, administrative chain of command refers to the exercise of authority, direction and control with respect to the special operations-peculiar administration and support of the special operations command, including the readiness and organization of special operations forces, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. It does not refer to the exercise of authority, direction, and control of operational matters that are subject to the operational chain of command of the commanders of combatant commands or the exercise of authority, direction, and control of personnel, resources, equipment, and other matters that are not special operations-peculiar that are the purview of the armed forces.’’.
My question is how is the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council (SOPOC) functioning?
‘‘§ 139b. Special Operations Policy and Oversight Council
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—In order to fulfill the responsibilities specified in section 138(b)(4) of this title, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, or the designee of the Assistant Secretary, shall establish and lead a team to be known as the ‘Special Operations Policy and Oversight Council’ (in this section referred to as the ‘Council’). ‘
‘(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Council is to integrate the functional activities of the headquarters of the Department of Defense in order to most efficiently and effectively provide for special operations forces and capabilities. In fulfilling this purpose, the Council shall develop and continuously improve policy, joint processes, and procedures that facilitate the development, acquisition, integration, employment, and sustainment of special operations forces and capabilities.
‘‘(c) MEMBERSHIP.—The Council shall include the following:
‘‘(1) The Assistant Secretary, who shall act as leader of the Council.
‘‘(2) Appropriate senior representatives of each of the following:
‘‘(A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
‘‘(B) The Under Secretary of Defense for Management and Support. ‘
‘(C) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
‘‘(D) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. ‘
‘(E) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
‘‘(F) The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
‘‘(G) The other Assistant Secretaries of Defense under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
‘‘(H) The military departments.
‘‘(I) The Joint Staff.
‘‘(J) The United States Special Operations Command.
‘‘(K) Such other officials or Agencies, elements, or components of the Department of Defense as the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.
Austin Swears in Pentagon's New Special Operations Chief
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III swore in Christopher Maier as the Defense Department's new assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict.
IF881
Christopher P. Maier is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Among his responsibilities are all special operations, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and information operations policy issues and the oversight of special operations peculiar administrative matters, on behalf of the Secretary.
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Maier, who was administratively sworn in June, is the first Senate-confirmed SOLIC chief under new parameters for the job.
The assistant secretary job has two roles, Maier said in an interview. While it has the policy role it's always had supporting the undersecretary for policy, DOD and Congress have also directed SOLIC to serve as the service secretary for special operations forces.
"It's a bifurcated reporting structure [and] kind of tells you that SOLIC straddles a number of different areas," he said.
Maier will have civilian oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command in the administrative chain of command, but not in the operational chain of command. Wearing one hat, he will be the defense secretary's civilian advisor for special operations issues and will report directly to the secretary.
Wearing the other hat, he will serve as a more traditional assistant secretary in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy where he'll coordinate policies on special operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian issues and counternarcotics.
Austin holds regular meetings with the service secretaries, Maier said. "So, [it will be] the Army, Navy, Air Force and me," he said. "It's an interesting arrangement, certainly not how somebody traditionally would have viewed this role."
Like a service secretary, Maier will be involved in the "man, train, equip" requirements for special operations forces. "In conjunction with [Army Gen. Richard] Clarke, the Socom commander, we will do a number of things in that role — setting the long term strategic goals and where we're trying to go; the objectives we're trying to meet; how training and recruiting, all these sort of manpower-related things, support that."
Maier will also have oversight on the budget. "As each one of [the special operations] components is building their individual budgets … it will bubble up to the overall SOF budget," he said. "We have the ability to set the objectives and then really look at how those investments and other monetary things are being done, and then advocate on behalf of Socom on the Hill."
Maier is also involved in the role special operations forces will play in the future and has been involved in deliberations on the global posture review, which will be released soon. What roles will special ops forces play in strategic competition with China and Russia? How will over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations work? How does training foreign militaries fit into the picture?
Maier also wants to emphasize what is a special operations mission and what missions should, or could, be done with more conventional forces. He noted that there is a gray area between special ops and conventional forces. "We could see special operations forces begin a mission and turn it over to conventional forces," he said.
"SOF has particular expertise that can be done in small numbers [with] low visibility," Maier said. Over the past 20 years, special ops forces have built "tremendous partnerships with counterparts in foreign militaries that gives us a tremendous reach globally."
In a competition with China and Russia, this special operations forces mission set may enable placement and access to "unlock a lot of other joint force capabilities against near-peer adversaries that they probably can't match," he said.
Maier said he is humbled to have this new job, and he promised to focus on the sacrifices that have been made to date by operators and their families. "I do think the requirements on SOF will continue, and it'll continue to be a national asset," he said. "SOF is a key part of where the country is going from a national defense perspective towards competition and really being a high return on investment."
3. American Power After Afghanistan: How to Rightsize the Country’s Global Role
Excerpts:
The belief, evidently held by the Biden administration, that democracy is under generalized attack from authoritarianism also needs to be rethought. Dividing the world along this line greatly reduces the chance that the major global problems—nonproliferation, climate change, global health, cybercrime, and financial stability—can be successfully tackled. There are simply too many authoritarian states whose active cooperation will be necessary. It is also vital that Washington be able to distinguish self-interest in another country from an ideological crusade, particularly with regard to U.S. policy toward China. Mistaking the Chinese Communist Party’s determination to strengthen its position at home and in its region for a global ambition to destroy democracy could prove truly disastrous, raising the likelihood of a war over Taiwan that would be catastrophic for all.
These changes do not add up to a new foreign policy doctrine. Given the pace and scope of recent global change and the depth of American political polarization, it is doubtful whether such an advance is currently possible. Moreover, some of the needed shifts are not within the power of the United States to make. It will be some time, for example, before other countries see an American choice not to intervene abroad or to draw down a foreign troop presence as something other than disengagement or retreat.
Still, these shifts would amount to a dramatic alteration in U.S. practice since the end of the Cold War. America would no longer see itself as “the cop walking a global beat,” as neoconservatives would have it, nor would it shrink its core interests to defense against threats from China and Russia, as some realists have proposed. These changes would lead to a policy rebalanced between military and nonmilitary instruments; more restrained in the launching of military interventions and wiser in their execution; more cognizant of the need for and the potential of multilateral instruments; less prone to unilateral—often self-defeating—actions; and more sensible in its attitude toward democracy elsewhere. They would mean, in short, an end to the tatters of hegemony to which the United States has been clinging.
American Power After Afghanistan
How to Rightsize the Country’s Global Role
For 30 years, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has searched unsuccessfully for a purpose for its now unrivaled global power. No other country (or combination of countries in the European Union) equals its combined military, economic, and political strength. Yet the United States has used this rare moment in history poorly, trying and discarding various rationales for a global role after experience has revealed their inutility or unpopularity. It first tried the all-encompassing role of “indispensable nation,” then the role of shaper and main pillar of a liberal world order, principal prosecutor of a global “war on terror,” protector and promoter of democratic governments (including regime change by force), and, finally, leader of the democratic side in a global contest between democratic and authoritarian governments. Throughout, Washington grew more and more reliant on the use of military power and, through lack of use, lost confidence in concerted diplomacy as a means of dealing with adversaries.
The existential threat of the Cold War had masked deep disagreements about the United States’ appropriate global posture. Ever since, debate has veered inconclusively between those who believe that U.S. interests are global and demand aggressive, often unilateral, leadership on most issues and those who argue for a narrower conception of the national interest and a more collaborative approach in pursuing it. The harder question of what constitute the core interests vital to national security also remains unanswered. Despite these divisions, Congress largely abandoned a serious voice on foreign policy, even on its constitutional responsibility to declare war. Other than on trade, the Senate managed to ratify only a single multilateral treaty in the last 25 years, rejecting many that were the United States’ own initiatives (such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) or that embody U.S. values (the Protocol on Torture), aims (the Kyoto Protocol on climate), and even domestic legislation (restricting international trade in tobacco).
There is now, perhaps, an opportunity to begin to end this impasse. Once attention shifts from tactical errors made in the closing weeks of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan to the drifting purpose and self-delusion of the preceding 20 years, the shock of failure in America’s longest war may provide an open moment to reexamine the lengthy list of earlier interventions and to reconsider U.S. foreign policy in the post–Cold War era more broadly.
DOOMED FROM THE START
A first step toward such a reappraisal would be to recognize that what happened in Afghanistan matched past experience. In 2003, the political scientist Minxin Pei examined the record of U.S. military interventions made for the purpose of regime change. His measure of success was whether democracy existed ten years after the departure of U.S. forces. Out of 16 such efforts, he identified just four successes: Germany and Japan after World War II, highly developed countries that had surrendered after total war, and tiny Grenada and Panama, where the United States made quick interventions of less than a year.
The success stories shared several characteristics, including a strong national identity, high state capacity, a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, relative socioeconomic equality, and previous experience—however short—with effective rule of law. Deep ethnic and religious divisions were fatal, as was alignment with an unpopular ruling elite, especially if it was highly corrupt.
Pei published his study just as the United States was declaring the end of “major combat” in Afghanistan and the transition to “stabilization and reconstruction.” Just 8,000 U.S. soldiers were in Afghanistan at the time. What is clear now—and should have been even then—is that Afghanistan had none of the qualities that predicted success and all of those that presaged failure. Setting aside the special cases of Germany and Japan, and assuming that Afghanistan will not be a democracy ten years from now, the U.S. failure rate is 86 percent.
Democracy cannot be delivered by force—although the United States keeps trying.
Among the many lessons that should be drawn from this experience, three are overriding. First, among colonial and postcolonial intervenors, the United States is particularly bad about ignoring the history, culture, and values of the countries in which it intrudes. This is not a result of ignorance. The individuals with the relevant knowledge are simply usually not in the room when top-level policy is made. Routinely, history and culture are treated as background or context rather than as critical factors that will determine success or failure—as they unmistakably did in Afghanistan.
Second, what happened in Afghanistan was not caused by the lack of good intelligence. Throughout history, the commonest form of intelligence failure has been the failure of civilian and military leaders to listen to what they don’t want to hear. At the outset of his presidency, Barack Obama commissioned a 60-day study to shape U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. In his memoir, he writes that the report “made one thing clear. Unless Pakistan stopped sheltering the Taliban, our efforts at long-term stability in Afghanistan were bound to fail.” U.S. intelligence agencies knew that the connections between Pakistan and the Taliban were deep and long-standing and that Pakistan was providing a safe haven for Taliban fighters and leadership. The conclusion should have been that the United States must somehow break that bond or cut its losses in nation building in Afghanistan. Instead, policymakers noted the problem, tried unsuccessfully to ameliorate it, and went ahead anyway.
The third lesson is one of process: U.S. policymakers cannot rely on the military to conclude that a mission is unachievable. The military’s core value is executing whatever mission it has been assigned. Its spirit is “can do.” Generals can identify difficulties in advance, but once a mission is underway, they will insist that things are getting better or that they will improve given more money, time, weaponry, and troops. The military will not question the validity of the mission. This means that a president who recognizes that the country has undertaken something it cannot achieve will at some point have to “reject the advice of his generals.” Americans should recognize and reward the rare moral courage President Joe Biden exercised in doing so—something three presidents before him failed to summon.
It is also worth noting that the United States has a habit of wildly exaggerating the consequences of its failures. In the last few weeks, there has been talk of “the end of empire,” a “return to isolationism,” and huge gains accruing to Russia and China (which may instead be saddled with the fallout from a continuing civil war in Afghanistan, growing opium production, and rising Islamic extremism). Similar talk, with far greater reason, greeted the end of the Vietnam War. Yet 15 years later, the United States won the Cold War and dominated the world.
LESSONS LEARNED
Setting aside such grim predictions, then, what might a different U.S. approach to foreign policy entail? A first step should be a hard look at the notion of American exceptionalism. Domestically, high income inequality, flat or declining intergenerational mobility, deeply polarized politics, racial division, rampant embrace of conspiracy theories, diminished civic duty, and even a question mark beside the sine qua non of democracy—the peaceful transition of power through elections—together make the “power of our example,” to use Biden’s phrase, dubious at best.
The U.S. record of international leadership is questionable as well. Since the mid-1990s, when the United States began to withhold its legally obligated dues to the United Nations and then to other international agencies, its foreign policies have, on balance, arguably weakened the world’s capacity to solve global problems. Among the agreements the United States has rejected since the end of the Cold War, in addition to examples cited above, are the Law of the Sea Treaty, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and the International Criminal Court. Most of the rest of the world approved them. It has also refused to ratify treaties protecting genetic resources, restricting trade in conventional arms, banning persistent organic pollutants and cluster bombs, and protecting persons with disabilities. In the first two years of Donald Trump’s presidency alone, it rejected the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, withdrew from (and then renegotiated) the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Paris climate accord, and the Iran nuclear deal. Major international agreements such as the latter two must now be designed to avoid formal treaty confirmation since the world knows the United States cannot deliver Senate ratification. If this is exceptionalism, a globalized, interdependent world needs less of it.
To that end, the United States should reconsider several long-standing practices. One is the belief that shunning another country—refusing to formally recognize it or talk to its representatives—is a useful form of leadership. To the contrary, there is clear evidence—from Cuba, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—that this practice mostly harms the United States, crippling diplomacy where it is needed most, draining the modicum of trust required for bridging differences, and necessitating that the most difficult and delicate negotiations be turned over to a middleman. Overreliance on sanctions, especially unilateral sanctions, is similarly unhelpful and should be drastically cut back.
Washington also needs to recognize the degree to which its own policies, spending, and rhetoric have fostered the belief that the only meaningful form of U.S. engagement abroad is a military commitment. Twenty-five years of near-constant U.S. military operations has conditioned the world to expect American interventions, to measure U.S. seriousness by them, and, among friends and allies, to underspend on their own defense. During both Democratic and Republican administrations, members of Congress have lavished funding on the Pentagon, tolerating enormous waste in return for dollars spent in their states and districts. At the same time, Congress has chronically underfunded the State Department and other nondefense foreign operations. As the defense budget has swelled, the gap has become grotesque. In the fiscal years 2019 and 2020, Trump’s budget proposals sought increases in defense spending that were larger than the entire State Department and foreign operations budget—which it still sought to reduce.
The United States should take a hard look at the notion of American exceptionalism.
This funding disparity translates into a huge disparity in human capital and operational strength—one that is compounded by a political patronage system that routinely puts ambassadorial posts into the hands of completely unqualified donors. Often, the lack of resources elsewhere forces the Pentagon to undertake humanitarian and governance duties for which it is ill suited and generally the most expensive option.
Finally, Washington’s policies on democracy promotion need a thorough reappraisal. Far too often, the United States acts as though democracy is, in the words of former U.S. Ambassador Chas Freeman, the “default political system.” To the contrary, it is the most demanding of political systems, requiring a literate, relatively cohesive population and a bedrock of institutions that can take a century or more to build. Laying a foundation for it can require a commitment of many decades, as the United Kingdom made in India and the United States made in South Korea. But countries that would welcome a lengthy foreign occupation are extremely rare in today’s world, if they exist at all. And domestic U.S. support for such commitments will only be sustained where the country’s core strategic interests are unmistakable. Criticizing the decision to end the war in Afghanistan for its lack of “strategic patience” misses the point that the American public had long grasped: there was no strategic interest in the war Washington was prosecuting. It should not be necessary to add that democracy cannot be delivered by force—although the United States keeps trying.
The belief, evidently held by the Biden administration, that democracy is under generalized attack from authoritarianism also needs to be rethought. Dividing the world along this line greatly reduces the chance that the major global problems—nonproliferation, climate change, global health, cybercrime, and financial stability—can be successfully tackled. There are simply too many authoritarian states whose active cooperation will be necessary. It is also vital that Washington be able to distinguish self-interest in another country from an ideological crusade, particularly with regard to U.S. policy toward China. Mistaking the Chinese Communist Party’s determination to strengthen its position at home and in its region for a global ambition to destroy democracy could prove truly disastrous, raising the likelihood of a war over Taiwan that would be catastrophic for all.
These changes do not add up to a new foreign policy doctrine. Given the pace and scope of recent global change and the depth of American political polarization, it is doubtful whether such an advance is currently possible. Moreover, some of the needed shifts are not within the power of the United States to make. It will be some time, for example, before other countries see an American choice not to intervene abroad or to draw down a foreign troop presence as something other than disengagement or retreat.
Still, these shifts would amount to a dramatic alteration in U.S. practice since the end of the Cold War. America would no longer see itself as “the cop walking a global beat,” as neoconservatives would have it, nor would it shrink its core interests to defense against threats from China and Russia, as some realists have proposed. These changes would lead to a policy rebalanced between military and nonmilitary instruments; more restrained in the launching of military interventions and wiser in their execution; more cognizant of the need for and the potential of multilateral instruments; less prone to unilateral—often self-defeating—actions; and more sensible in its attitude toward democracy elsewhere. They would mean, in short, an end to the tatters of hegemony to which the United States has been clinging.
4. Kyiv Airing Disappointment With Western Policies
Excerpt:
The accumulated frustrations may prompt Zelenskyy and Yermak to hedge their bet on the West and go ahead with their outreach to the Kremlin (see above).
Kyiv Airing Disappointment With Western Policies
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 141
September 16, 2021 05:55 PM Age: 2 days
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is reverting to his earlier, forlorn hopes of improving relation with Russia through a personal meeting with President Vladimir Putin. The Ukrainian president is eager to meet Putin “any time, any place”—whether bilaterally or in the framework of a “Normandy” summit (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France). The chief of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, is negotiating the conditions for a Zelenskyy-Putin meeting in either of those formats. This track ended badly for Zelenskyy in 2019 (see EDM, October 3, 16, 17, December 5, 2019).
A fresh outreach to the Kremlin looks incongruous with Zelenskyy’s messages during his recent visit to the United States (August 31–September 2) and since. The Ukrainian authorities have flooded the country’s media with images of Zelenskyy’s efforts to advance Ukraine-US relations and the quest for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Those efforts are sincere beyond doubt, although they are also calculated to ensure the support of Ukrainian patriotic opinion for Zelenskyy’s reelection. At the same time, Zelenskyy’s strong emphasis on Ukraine’s Western orientation carries its costs for the president and his Servant of the People party in the country’s east and south. A Zelenskyy-Putin meeting—or at least a convincing effort by Zelenskyy to bring it about—could help rebalance that electoral equation.
Such rebalancing may become a political necessity for Zelenskyy if Ukraine’s main Western partners continue to disappoint Kyiv’s aspirations. It is, indeed, the case that Kyiv’s uphill reform efforts are being inadequately recognized or rewarded; its Western “strategic partners” have yet to develop a strategic (as distinct from ad hoc, or piecemeal) approach toward Ukraine; and the level of Western political support for Ukraine has, overall, actually declined in recent months.
The high-profile event known as Yalta European Strategy (YES), just held in Kyiv as a “brainstorming” session, occasioned an unprecedented airing of frustrations by Zelenskyy and other Ukrainian officials (Ukrinform, President.gov.ua, September 13). While admitting to the slow pace of reforms in Ukraine, they feel that Western partners underestimate what has been achieved and the continuing efforts. “What we need is not strategic partners but strategic friends. Let the strategic partners talk about our shortcomings, let the strategic friends close ranks with us,” said Zelenskyy, apparently alluding to the largely empty Joint Statement on the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership, released on September 1, during his Washington visit (see EDM, September 7, 9).
Ukrainian officials see NATO de facto closing its door to a country that has built a combat-capable army and holds the line of Europe’s defense vis-à-vis Russia for the last seven years. “Ukraine is knocking at a door that no one intends to open.” “We are not begging. NATO needs us. NATO would be weaker without Ukraine. If you want to strengthen Russia, then do not take Ukraine,” Zelenskyy remarked (Ukrinform, President.gov.ua, September 13).
The US go-ahead to the Russo-German Nord Stream Two natural gas pipeline exposes Ukraine to severe risks. As Yermak noted during the YES forum, Russia is already using this project as an energy weapon against Ukraine (withholding transit) and in Europe (driving up prices to unprecedented levels). According to Yermak, political statements from Washington and Berlin that they would react to Russian political misuse of this pipeline are not reassuring. The Ukrainian president and government have asked for official commitments in writing, but Washington and Berlin have yet to respond (Interfax-Ukraine, September 13).
In an unprecedented public confession, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that “this country [Ukraine] has learned from a number of bitter lessons that Western promises are likely [to remain] unfulfilled. We do not believe in promises. […] Army, diplomacy and the Ukrainian people—this is what we have to survive” (The Independent, September 13).
The current year (thus far) seems particularly rich in the kind of lessons to which Kuleba alluded. The Joseph Biden administration became the source of the most serious disappointments. Following a policy review, one stage of which seems to have been concluded in April, the administration greenlighted the Nord Stream Two pipeline in May by waving the Congressionally mandated sanctions on Russian Gazprom. This decision reversed the Donald Trump administration’s policy that opposed the project’s completion. The Biden administration also withdrew support from a Ukraine-NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), also in May; and it went on in June to introduce previously non-existent criteria for Ukraine to qualify for a MAP. The administration has yet to nominate an ambassador to Ukraine or a special negotiator on the Russia-Ukraine conflict; both positions have been vacant for two years now (see EDM, May 6, 10, 27, June 1, 17). The Biden administration’s one important positive message is the abandonment of the Russian-imposed Minsk “agreements” regarding the war in Ukraine’s east. The Joint Statement on the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership, while poor in practical deliverables, nevertheless holds the prospect of reinvigorating that partnership when the Joint Commission meets again (see EDM, September 7, 9).
German policy is also frustrating to Ukraine though hardly disappointing; Berlin’s policy continued on its long-established track. When Green Party co-chair Robert Habeck attempted, in June, to stray from that track, proposing that Germany authorize sales of defensive military equipment to Ukraine, all German parliamentary parties (including Habeck’s Greens) issued statements against that proposal, as did the government. This stance also signifies closing NATO’s door to Ukraine de facto. On her farewell visit to Kyiv, Chancellor Angela Merkel asked Ukraine to transpose the “Steinmeier Formula” into Ukraine’s legislation, notwithstanding that it is incompatible with Ukrainian sovereignty and that Merkel had not previously made a political investment in Steinmeier’s idea (Ukrinform, August 22).
The accumulated frustrations may prompt Zelenskyy and Yermak to hedge their bet on the West and go ahead with their outreach to the Kremlin (see above).
5. Is the AUKUS alliance meaningful or merely provocation?
Comments from four scholars:
Dr Beyza Unal
Professor Kerry Brown
Dr Patricia Lewis
Dr Yu Jie
Is the AUKUS alliance meaningful or merely provocation?
Chatham House experts examine the potential implications of the new defence and security partnership between the UK, US, and Australia known as ‘AUKUS’.
EXPERT COMMENT
16 SEPTEMBER 2021 3 MINUTE READ
Technology and cyber threats
Dr Beyza Unal
The announcement mentions developing joint capabilities and information and technology sharing across the UK, US, and Australia and picks up on cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and quantum communications.
As part of this defence agreement, the UK, US, and Australia are aiming to protect the undersea fibre optic cables that provide part of the military and civilian communication for the West. Both Russia and China possess cyber and submarine technology. They could tap into these cables, allowing for eavesdropping and collecting data through cyber means. It is a matter of national and of NATO Alliance’s security to protect undersea cables.
The cross-section of quantum, artificial intelligence and cyber is equally significant because quantum communication technologies would allow new types of encryption, and thus would make eavesdropping obsolete. Similarly, with artificial intelligence and machine learning applications, the parties could detect known cyber threats to undersea cables.
The UK’s global role and China
Professor Kerry Brown
For the UK, this pact tries to make a reality of post-EU life and having a meaningful security role. This has irritated fellow Europeans such as the French because of their separate deals with Australia and shows the price London is willing to pay for this. It underlines the reality that – after taking control – the UK’s foreign and security policy is now decided in Washington.
China cannot hide its power but its last two years have been a masterclass in how to lose friends and fail to influence people
For China, it is another diplomatic failure. China cannot hide its power but its last two years have been a masterclass in how to lose friends and fail to influence people. Despite this, it will not change the reality that China is, and will continue to be, the great rising power of the region, and that this is a testament to that. The era of the US – jealously guarding its security sovereignty – is over. It now needs to face China in concert with others.
The main issue is what this sort of cooperation will do. Will it impede China’s intentions in the region? A little, but not significantly. As a symbolic move, this might work – but the problem is that Beijing sees this not as a sign of strength, but of hegemonistic powers being pushed for the first time ever to work in ways that they never bothered doing before because they are rattled.
Nuclear submarines and non-proliferation
Dr Patricia Lewis
This pact has been forged as a result of a number of key issues. Firstly, as China asserts its power in the Indo-Pacific region – particularly its naval and economic power – the US is looking for determined and capable partners to counter China’s geostrategic challenges.
This move could end up being a serious contribution in support of nuclear non-proliferation, offsetting real concerns about the increasing risks nuclear technology poses
Secondly, Australia had reached a point in its submarine programme that required a make-or-break decision. Earlier this year, concerns about the delays and cost overruns in the diesel submarine programme that Australia had with the French Naval Group led prime minister Scott Morrison to set up a new cabinet committee. In June, the Australian defence secretary said he would consider alternative options so this move, although a disappointment, should not have come as a huge shock to France.
Compared to their diesel-powered counterparts, nuclear submarines have many advantages – they have longer range, are generally quieter, and more difficult to detect. There are disadvantages also – they are more technically complex, have a higher level of technical secrecy, and require nuclear materials restricted for most states.
US and UK submarines currently use 93-97% HEU, the level of enrichment for uranium in nuclear weapons. Others such as France and China have submarines which use LEU, enriched to less than 20 per cent. However LEU and HEU set aside for naval propulsion is for military but not weapons purposes and therefore not subject to the same set of safeguards. In its capacity of G7 president, the UK has committed to ‘reinvigorate the aim of minimising the production and use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)’.
According to the UK, Australia remains committed to fulfilling all of its obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state, including with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Morrison has said that ‘Australia has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons and this proposal will remain consistent with Australia’s longstanding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation’.
In order to demonstrate this commitment Australia could negotiate a set of voluntary IAEA safeguards. There is plenty of time to do this as such a programme will take years to be accomplished. Australia could also use this opportunity to explore – with countries already possessing nuclear submarines and those, such as Brazil, in the process of developing this capability – establishing an internationally-accepted verification standard for all military reactor fuel.
This move could end up being a serious contribution in support of nuclear non-proliferation, offsetting real concerns about the increasing risks nuclear technology poses for international peace and security.
China’s perception and the Taiwan Strait
Dr Yu Jie
One of the most noticeable elements is fostering hi-tech military cooperation to deter China’s ever-growing capability in modernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air forces. It is also a direct counter measure to Beijing’s 14th Five Year Plan in the pursuit of an overall technological self-reliance both in military and civil spaces.
If successful, it will hamper Beijing’s capabilities to further acquire cutting-edge military tech to apply in its home-grown aircraft carriers. It is a significant step-up to counter China’s growing military presence in the West Pacific. Yet it remains ambiguous whether Japan will play a role or join AUKUS as the alliance develops.
Secondly and equally important, China also perceives the AUKUS pact as a provocation involving countries increasing their appetite to prepare for military escalation over the Taiwan Strait. Instead of entertaining the idea of military intervention, Beijing needs to find ways to appeal to the increasingly diverse island, which has become less attracted to the allure of greater integration.
Judging by a recent speech by President Xi, China is renewing its efforts to redefine its narrative on ‘re-unification’ of its renegade province. Such a move is also a derivative of the hardening view from the US towards challenging the current status quo of Taiwan.
6. US-Australia submarine deal rocks NATO alliance
Excerpts:
The possible short-term repercussions of this single event are many. The shrinking of NATO’s importance. China’s attitude toward hungry-for-trade, post-Brexit Britain. Fuether souring of already bad relations between China and Australia, driven down by Canberra’s criticism of Beijing’s policy toward its Muslim-minority Uighur population. And finally, increasing wonder about whether China will soon try to strangle Taiwan, the long-time breakaway region. Biden recently suggested the US would defend the island only to be contradicted by his aides.
For sure, more Cold War-style feints and jabs on the way.
US-Australia submarine deal rocks NATO alliance
Biden's push towards confronting China suggests disdain for Europe amid secretive decisions by Washington
The United States, by elbowing France aside in a deal with Australia over military submarine purchases, has once again raised doubts about Washington’s commitment to the NATO alliance.
Washington has also highlighted the speed with which President Joe Biden is pivoting, at least militarily, to East Asia.
When Biden succeeded the oft-hostile Donald Trump, European allies expected that his revival heralded a new era of close cooperation. Instead, NATO has been hit with secretive decisions by Washington that suggest disdain for Europe in general and, in this case, top ally France in particular.
Most lately, there was Biden’s helter-skelter withdrawal from Afghanistan and a chaotic exodus of civilians that took place with minimal coordination with NATO allies. In April, when Biden made his decision to pull out, NATO had some 7,000 troops in the country compared with 2,500 Americans. When in July, Biden ordered the evacuation of the Bagram joint military air base in Afghanistan, he not only failed to inform the Afghan government ahead of time but also NATO.
Biden offended his eastern European allies by acquiescing to Germany’s request it bless Nord Stream 2, the natural gas pipeline that bypasses Ukraine and might give Moscow free rein to use energy as an economic weapon against them.
The submarine decision shows that the American new military focus east may disrupt traditional allies in the West. The sub deal with further suggests there may be more urgency than expected in bolstering a budding Indo-Pacific alliance to include Japan and India.
Biden is scheduled to meet with leaders from Japan, India and Australia in Washington on September 23. It will be the first face-to-face meeting of the so-called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, which seeks to coordinate policies on several issues, notably China’s growing military power in East Asia.
The French were livid about the Australia about-face on submarines and US involvement. On Friday, President Emmanuel Macron recalled his ambassadors from Washington and Australia.
US President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron speak ahead of a NATO summit in Brussels on June 14. Photo: AFP / Dursun Aydemir / Anadolu Agency
France America’s oldest ally canceled a Washington party to commemorate the 240th anniversary of the sea battle between French and British ships off Yorktown, Virginia. The French victory permitted troops under the command of George Washington to defeat the British and end the Revolutionary war.
Macron had signed a $100 billion deal to sell Australia 12 diesel-powered submarines. Secretly, the US countered by arranging to provide Australia with technology to build nuclear-propelled subs and to cancel the French order. Secretary of States Antony Blinken said France was informed in advance of the deal, but he declined to say when.
French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian called the turn of events a stab in the back. “We had established a trusting relationship with Australia, and this trust was betrayed,” he said. He added France was given no heads-up on the change of plans.
Le Drian also launched an especially biting critique of Biden, comparing him to the despised Trump. “What concerns me as well is the American behavior,” he said. “This brutal, unilateral, unpredictable decision looks very much like what Mr Trump used to do. Allies don’t do this to each other.”
French Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly complained that the Americans had decided to push aside an ally “at a time when we are facing unprecedented challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.”
For all the hub-bub, the Macron government had not shown any enthusiasm for NATO possibly being dragged by the US into a confrontation with China. At the June NATO summit, Macron publicly threw scorn on the idea. “NATO is an organization that concerns the North Atlantic. China has little to do with the North Atlantic,” he said.
He wasn’t alone. Germany’s Chancellor Angel Merkel, described Russia, not China, as “a major challenge” and that NATO must not “simply negate China.”
“We have to find the right balance.” she concluded.
NATO had reserved its main worries about Russia. In its June communique, NATO descried Moscow as a “threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” China, on the other hand, “can present challenges.”
French Defense Minister Florence Parly said the US had pushed an ally aside. Photo: AFP / Ludovic Marin
The submarine agreement was part of the new alliance called AUKUS, an acronym for “Australia, United Kingdom, United States,” a technology-sharing quasi-alliance that is clearly aimed at China.
China expressed anger. Chinese foreign ministry official Zhao Lijian said the US, UK and Australia, “Should abandon the obsolete cold war zero sum mentality and narrow-minded geopolitical concepts and respect regional people’s aspiration and do more that is conducive to regional peace and stability and development – otherwise they will only end up hurting their own interests.”
Zhao tried to link the submarine nuclear propulsion agreement to the dangers of atomic weapon proliferation, a subject of particular concern to Japan and New Zealand. “China will closely monitor the situation,” Zhao said. China has plenty of nuclear-propelled submarines and is adding to its armory of nuclear tipped missiles on land.
The more bellicose Chinese Communist Party news outlet Global Times announced that, “Australian troops are also most likely to be the first batch of western soldiers to waste their lives in the South China Sea.”
The possible short-term repercussions of this single event are many. The shrinking of NATO’s importance. China’s attitude toward hungry-for-trade, post-Brexit Britain. Fuether souring of already bad relations between China and Australia, driven down by Canberra’s criticism of Beijing’s policy toward its Muslim-minority Uighur population. And finally, increasing wonder about whether China will soon try to strangle Taiwan, the long-time breakaway region. Biden recently suggested the US would defend the island only to be contradicted by his aides.
For sure, more Cold War-style feints and jabs on the way.
A former longtime foreign correspondent for the Miami Herald, Los Angeles Times and Washington Post, Daniel Williams currently writes from Rome.
7. In Panjshir, Few Signs of an Active Resistance, or Any Fight at All
The resistance has to develop. It is not a silver bullet and no one should expect immediate results. The resistance potential must be assessed.
In Panjshir, Few Signs of an Active Resistance, or Any Fight at All
On a recent visit, few civilians were about and signs of heavy fighting were scarce. What remained were opposing narratives and claims of massacres, ethnic cleansing and false charges.
Photographs and Text by Jim Huylebroek and Victor J. Blue
Torn posters of martyrs from previous wars at the entrance to the Panjshir Valley, Afghanistan, this week.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
On a recent visit, few civilians were about and signs of heavy fighting were scarce. What remained were opposing narratives and claims of massacres, ethnic cleansing and false charges.
Torn posters of martyrs from previous wars at the entrance to the Panjshir Valley, Afghanistan, this week.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Photographs and Text by Jim Huylebroek and
PANJSHIR, Afghanistan — In this lush strip of land — walled off from potential invaders by high mountain peaks and narrow, ambush-prone passes — former mujahedeen fighters and Afghan commandos regrouped in the days after the Taliban toppled the Afghan government, vowing to fight to the last man. With its history of resistance and its reputation for impenetrability, the Panjshir Valley seemed an ideal place for a determined force of renegades to base an insurgency.
By Sept. 6, however, the Taliban claimed to have captured the entire province of Panjshir, a momentous victory in a region that repelled numerous Soviet offensives in the 1980s, and had remained beyond the Taliban’s control during its rule from 1996 to 2001.
By The New York Times
On Tuesday, The New York Times traveled to the valley for the first time since the Taliban’s lightning offensive led to their seizure of power in Afghanistan last month. On the sides of the road, posters of fallen resistance fighters from previous wars had been torn down. The usually busy traffic had been replaced with wandering cattle, and the silence was punctured only by Islamic chants blaring occasionally from speakers on the few Taliban trucks.
A spokesman for the National Resistance Front maintained that the fight was far from over.
“Our forces are stationed throughout the valley,” the spokesman, Ali Maisam Nazary, said via WhatsApp. “The Soviets also claimed victory when they would enter Panjshir and see no fighting for days or weeks. But the mujahedeen in the ’80s would wait and then attack at the right time.”
A group of civilians walking toward the provincial capital of Bazarak in the Panjshir Valley.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times
Taliban fighters from Mazar-i-Sharif secure an area of the valley.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times
But in a journey through 40 miles of the province and the provincial capital, Bazarak, it became clear that combat had largely ceased, at least for now, and what resistance remained seemed confined to mountainous areas practically inaccessible by foot or by vehicle. Most of the residents had fled before the fighting. Those who stayed behind were struggling with spiking market prices and a lack of food.
During those weeks of fighting and even after, reports of the Taliban committing human rights abuses against captured resistance fighters and civilians circulated on social media. Yet the accounts of door-to-door search and seizures as well as public executions, all of which the Taliban denied, were impossible to verify or debunk.
Electricity and cellphone towers were cut, leaving an information vacuum that quickly filled with opposing narratives and claims of massacres, ethnic cleansing and false charges. A widely shared video claiming Pakistani drones were operating over the valley turned out to be graphics from a video game. Another video showed wads of cash and pieces of gold found by the Taliban at a house supposedly belonging to Amrullah Saleh, the former Afghan vice president. This report was denied by some Taliban officials, while others said it was true.
Patricia Gossman, associate director for Human Rights Watch Asia, said her organization has been tracking numerous claims of atrocities, but has struggled to confirm them. “There is an avalanche of unverified information on social media, but what is needed is a credible investigation of the claims of summary executions and other abuses,” Ms. Gossman said. “There is no other way to establish the truth and press for accountability.”
A man crossing a footbridge built on top of an old Soviet armored personnel carrier in Dara-e Hazara.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
A destroyed military vehicle littering the road.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times
Earlier this week, Basir Abdul, who spent 40 years living in Germany exporting cars to Afghanistan and the Middle East, made his way home through the Panjshir Valley, which he found largely deserted.
“Everyone goes ‘Taliban, Taliban,’” he said, “So I said to myself, ‘I have to see this.’”
Upon arriving at his house, Mr. Abdul, 58, assessed the damage: a few shattered windows and signs of intruders who had slept in the rooms. Someone had left behind a pair of combat boots and an orange scarf hanging from a branch.
“I am not sure if this was the work of the Taliban or thieves,” he said, “but people broke in while I was gone.”
Outside, Mr. Abdul scanned the horizon. His property sat in clear view of the tomb of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the renowned mujahedeen leader of the Northern Resistance who was assassinated by Al Qaeda operatives 20 years ago.
“The valley seems quiet,” Mr. Abdul said.
Not far down the road, a group of Taliban fighters was packing up their pickup trucks, still bearing the emblems of the now fallen Afghan security forces. “The fight has ended in Panjshir,” said the unit commander, Sabawoon, who goes by only one name. “There will be peace now. Those who laid down their weapons, we welcomed, and those who fought, things did not end well for them.”
“The fight has ended in Panjshir. There will be peace now,” said the Taliban unit commander, Sabawoon, who goes by only one name.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
A Taliban unit from Balkh Province packing up to head back north after fighting in Panjshir.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
His unit of 200 hailed from northern Afghanistan. They fought their way into Panjshir from neighboring Baghlan Province and made it to Bazarak last week.
Commander Sabawoon said that his men were headed to Mazar-i-Sharif, the capital of Balkh Province, where they would provide security.
Along the main road south of Bazarak, signs of heavy fighting were scarce. Some buildings had broken windows or the odd bullet mark, but structural damage was hard to find. About a half-dozen wrecked military vehicles dotted the road.
A surgical and maternity hospital in the valley received 60 to 70 people with conflict-related injuries in recent weeks, said Dr. Gina Portella, medical division coordinator for Emergency NGO, an Italian nonprofit that runs the facility.
“We had prepared for a mass casualty situation before the clashes started here,” Dr. Portella said. “Because many civilians left the valley in advance, the numbers stayed relatively low.”
On the side of the main road, Talibs formed a human chain and unloaded metal cans of ammunition from the parked trucks. Mortars, rockets, cartridges of various calibers and anti-personnel land mines recovered from decades-old weapons’ caches piled up around a rusting Soviet armored personnel carrier.
Weapons and ammunition recovered by the Taliban from caches, this week.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Mortar rounds sitting at an ammo dump as Talibs stack surplus ammunition found nearby.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times
Further along the winding road, deep the side valley of Dara-e Hazara, a blockade spanned the road, manned by armed fighters with thick Panjshiri accents. One of them explained they belonged to units that served under the previous government and that while they were no longer resisting, they had not yet surrendered.
Understand the Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan
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Who are the Taliban? The Taliban arose in 1994 amid the turmoil that came after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. They used brutal public punishments, including floggings, amputations and mass executions, to enforce their rules. Here’s more on their origin story and their record as rulers.
Who are the Taliban leaders? These are the top leaders of the Taliban, men who have spent years on the run, in hiding, in jail and dodging American drones. Little is known about them or how they plan to govern, including whether they will be as tolerant as they claim to be. One spokesman told The Times that the group wanted to forget its past, but that there would be some restrictions.
He said that Qari Qudratullah, the new provincial governor, was meeting with elders to discuss a peaceful handover.
A Taliban military commission official, Mullah Hafiz Osman, later confirmed this was true, while Mr. Nazary, the resistance spokesman, denied the claim.
Behind the Panjshiri fighters flew the green, white and black flag of the Northern Alliance, repurposed to signify the National Resistance Front, which is led by Ahmad Massoud, son of Ahmad Shad Massoud, the leader assassinated in 2001. But villagers said that the Taliban had long been active in the valley, and that their takeover had been negotiated by some of the residents.
Outside the tomb of the elder Massoud, a young Talib, far from his home in Helmand Province in the south, performed his evening prayers.
A Taliban fighter praying at the tomb of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the revered Northern Alliance resistance fighter.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times
Talibs arrange a shroud over Massoud’s tomb. Photos of the partially destroyed tomb appeared on social media recently alongside accusations that the Taliban had ransacked the place, sparking outrage.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times
Days earlier, photos of the partially destroyed tomb, in a dramatic hilltop mausoleum overlooking the valley, appeared on social media alongside accusations that the Taliban had ransacked the place. “This wasn’t our work,” one of the Taliban guards said. “Civilians broke in and smashed the glass.”
The site had since been repaired by the Taliban and was now in its original state. A group of guards stood around the tomb, and as evening fell, they stretched a green shroud over it and closed the doors for the night.
Outside the valley, those who had fled wondered if they would ever be able to return.
When the Taliban first entered Panjshir, Sahar, 17, and her family barricaded themselves at home, thinking the resistance would eventually chase the Talibs away. But the fighting steadily drew closer.
Neighbors started to flee, said Sahar, whose last name is being withheld to protect her identity. Her uncle and cousin were stopped at a Taliban checkpoint near the village, she said, where they were beaten and ordered to turn over their weapons and the names of resistance fighters.
Last week, the family escaped through the mountains. They walked for five days, through remote valleys and over mountain ridges. Sahar fainted three times from dehydration, she said, and her mother had blisters and swollen feet. Her father, who is diabetic, nearly collapsed.
Eventually, they hitched a ride to Kabul, the country’s capital, where they had relatives with whom they are now living.
“We don’t know what will happen,” Sahar said by phone from Kabul. “We may never be able to get back.”
A family leaving the Panjshir Valley with their belongings.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Farnaz Fassihi contributed reporting from New York, N.Y. Wali Arian contributed from Istanbul, Turkey.
8. Labeling The Founding Documents ‘Offensive’ Is Just The Beginning Of The National Archives’ Spiteful Plans
If this is true then this is out of control. A harmful language alert for the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence? Really?
Set aside the partisanship of the publication and the article.
This should be one area that we should all unite around. You either support and defend the Constitution and believe in the ideals and ideas written in our founding documents or you do not. That is the litmus test for me. You believe in freedom for all or you do not. You believe in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all or you do not. Yes the founding fathers owned slaves. Yes, the vote was first for men. But what is embedded in our ideals and ideas is the ability to correct our mistakes because we are striving for a more perfect union. We can (and must) study the history of the time and appreciate the context and language but it is the ideals and ideas upon which our nation was founded that is the essence of America. If you no longer believe in those ideals and ideas then I wonder what you believe in. Fight me on this.
By rewriting America’s history and 'recontextualizing' her founding documents, Biden’s National Archives is seeking to undermine our country's founders.
SEPTEMBER 16, 2021
Words matter, and few words have mattered more in the history of the United States than those contained within the U.S. Constitution, Bill of Rights, Declaration of Independence, and other founding-era documents stewarded by the National Archives.
Protecting and celebrating the most important works in U.S. history isn’t only important because the Constitution and Bill of Rights, as well as other documents in the National Archives, are still legally binding, but also because they tell a story of who we are as a nation and what it means to be American. Today leftists, including many officials in the Biden administration, are actively working to rewrite that story, and to undermine every part of America’s exceptional past.
Trigger Warnings On the Constitution
One notable example is the National Archives’ decision to post a “Harmful Language Alert” banner above documents in its digital archives, including the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. According to the Archives’ warning, its documents include many “outdated, biased, offensive, and possibly violent views and opinions,” as well as documents that “reflect racist, sexist, ableist, misogynistic/misogynoir, and xenophobic opinions and attitudes.”
Since the National Archives contains more than 100 million records, there are bound to be some that are offensive. But rather than identify prominent documents that are indeed offensive as such, the Archives chose to issue a “Harmful Language” warning across the board, knowing full well the documents read most often on its website and in its halls are founding-era materials like the Constitution.
You might be tempted to chalk up the Archives’ warning label to pure laziness. Being woke and accurate is hard when you’re in charge of maintaining millions of records, I’m sure. But it’s worth noting that the warning label emerged from the National Archives’ radical Task Force on Racism, which has developed dozens of other plans meant to give the impression that America’s history is full of racism, hatred, and violence, rather than highlight the nation’s incredible achievements.
Rewriting Historical Records
In a 105-page report issued by the task force in April 2021, the National Archives suggested it, like the United States, is full of “structural racism,” including “a Rotunda in our flagship building that lauds wealthy White men in the nation’s founding while marginalizing BIPOC [black, indigenous, people of color], women, and other communities.” Since the report’s release in April, Archivist of the United States David Ferriero has “accepted the recommendations in full.”
The report further stated other examples of structural racism at the Archives are “legacy descriptions that use racial slurs and harmful language to describe BIPOC communities.” According to the task force, the Archives must revise these descriptions as part of a long-term program to transform its exhibits, archival information and descriptions, and policies.
Alongside obviously offensive language, the report included many harmless or historically accurate “slurs” to be purged or “recontextualized,” such as “crippled,” “elderly,” “handicapped,” “slave,” and “Eskimo.” Following the recommendations of the report, descriptions will be altered to remove not only overtly racist language but also “information that implies and reinforces damaging stereotypes of BIPOC individuals and communities while valorizing and protecting White people.”
The Archives further says its website and catalog must be changed because their descriptions “over-describe the records and achievements of White men by using more extensive, superlative, and subjective language.”
‘Recontextualizing’ the Rotunda
Additionally, the Archives will transform its famous Rotunda to “create a more inclusive and historically accurate tribute to the nation’s founding.” Its “Reimagine the Rotunda” plan includes “contemporary views on the men who framed the founding documents and their participation in and positions on slavery,” new sculptures, and a “recontextualizing” of the murals now in the Rotunda.
The report also suggested new, intense diversity training courses for its employees. Although it isn’t clear exactly what those training courses may entail, a look at the task force report’s glossary reveals some of what National Archives employees could experience in the near future.
For example, the task force defines “White Privilege” as “The unquestioned and unearned set of advantages, entitlements, benefits, and choices bestowed on people solely because they are White.”
Even more disturbingly, the Archives says “White Supremacy Culture” is the “dominant, unquestioned standards of behavior and ways of functioning embodied by the vast majority of institutions in the United States. These standards may be seen as mainstream, dominant cultural practices; they have evolved from the United States’ history of white supremacy.”
By rewriting America’s history and “recontextualizing” her founding documents and the people who created them, Joe Biden’s National Archives is seeking to undermine the founders of our country and the values they fought — and in some cases, died — to establish and defend.
Undermining American Ideals
This is vitally important, because if America’s founding, Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Declaration of Independence become nothing more than additional examples of “structural racism” and “white supremacy culture,” then why should we protect them today? Why should we care about the “rights” they allegedly aim to protect?
This, not racial justice, seems to be the real reason for the Biden administration’s efforts. We can and should honor the legacies of black Americans, women, and all other groups of Americans, as well as recognize that in the past, some groups were horribly abused and mistreated — often by government.
But rather than see the civil rights advancements of the last two centuries as an extension of the principles of the founding era, the Biden administration, including the National Archives, is obsessed with demonizing our nation and “recontextualizing” seemingly every positive event in history as further proof of structural racism or other forms of bias. Furthermore, they often ignore that many of the Founding Fathers — including some Southern slaveholders — happily believed their efforts would someday result in the liberation of all people.
The founding of the United States wasn’t only the creation of a new country, it was the expression of a radical idea that has inspired the birth of countless freedom movements around the world: that all people are endowed with inalienable rights granted not by government, but by a higher power.
The National Archives Is Destroying Its One Job
Of course, America has not always lived up to this ideal. Women were not granted the right to vote until the 20th century. Black Americans were unjustly enslaved and then segregated, before being granted the rights they deserve. Jewish Americans, Irish Americans, Chinese Americans, Catholic Americans, and various other groups faced intense discrimination at one point or another in our history.
The United States has never been and will never be a perfect place, because it is composed of imperfect people. But the ideals that have served as the foundation of the American way, ideals that are clearly articulated in documents like the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Declaration of Independence, are about as perfect as mankind has ever devised.
Instead of trying to undermine American values, the leaders of the National Archives should fulfill their agency’s mission of promoting them — and the people who worked and suffered to create the greatest country the world has ever known. If they fail to do so, Congress should demand the president find new leaders who will.
Justin Haskins (Jhaskins@heartland.org) is the director of the Stopping Socialism Project at The Heartland Institute, where he also serves as a research fellow and editorial director.
9. This Marine officer wants to charge a general with ‘dereliction of duty’ over Afghanistan. (He can’t)
Give me a break. This guy needs an evaulation. What article in the UCMJ covers making bad assumptions? (yes he is using dereliction of duty - but does dereliction of duty cover bad assumptions?) On a serious note it is not bad assumptions that cause problems and failure. It is the failure to adjust or change the plan when assumptions are found to be erroneous.
This Marine officer wants to charge a general with ‘dereliction of duty’ over Afghanistan. (He can’t)
Good initiative. Bad judgment.
UPDATED SEP 18, 2021 9:09 AM
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A Marine infantry officer and former battalion commander who was relieved of command for demanding on social media that top military leaders be held accountable for the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal is now attempting to be the greatest barracks lawyer of all time.
Marine Lt. Col. Stuart Scheller appeared in a Sept. 16 video claiming that he intends to charge Marine Gen. Kenneth McKenzie Jr., head of U.S. Central Command, with dereliction of duty. In the video, Scheller said he was continuing to speak out even though it could jeopardize a deal that he claimed the Marine Corps had offered him, under which he would accept nonjudicial punishment, resign his commission, forfeit his military pension, and accept a general discharge under honorable conditions rather than face a court-martial.
Scheller argued that McKenzie needs to be disciplined for leaving Americans and military equipment worth millions of dollars behind in Afghanistan because military planners initially assumed that Afghan troops and police could defend Kabul from the Taliban for days or weeks once the evacuation began.
“I have read the entire UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] in the last two weeks of my purgatory – all of the punitive articles – and it turns out that all military officers are subject to the UCMJ,” Scheller said in the video. “Because it appears to me that no general officers are willing to hold each other accountable, I am submitting charges against Gen. McKenzie for his bad assumptions – not because I’m vindictive, but because the senior leaders need to be held accountable to the same standard as us.”
Marine Lt. Col Stuart Scheller. (Screenshot.)
On his Facebook page, Scheller elaborated that he plans to file 13 specifications of the charge against McKenzie – one for each of the service members killed in the Aug. 26 suicide bomb attack on Hamid Karzai International Airport’s Abbey Gate.
Scheller also posted what appears to be a text message exchange that he had with an unnamed military attorney, who told him: “I advise you not to pursue this idea of preferring charges against a senior commander as it will only cause you prejudice and potential legal harm.”
In the video, Scheller vowed to file the charges through his chain of command and directly to “the former Raytheon board director, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.” He also said he would file a complaint with the Department of Defense Inspector General’s Office.
The Marine Corps is not providing any information on Scheller, who is under investigation by his chain of command, said Capt. Sam Stephenson, a spokesman for Training and Education Command.
According to a CENTCOM spokeswoman, Scheller’s legal argument that all general officers are subject to the same military laws as other service members – and thus he can file charges against McKenzie – is faulty.
Lt. Col. Stuart Scheller announcing the resignation of his commission. (Screenshot via YouTube / Stuart Scheller).
“Although any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges, only a commander who has court-martial convening authority may refer those charges to a court-martial,” said Air Force Maj. Nicole Ferrara.
Service members have the right to make allegations of wrongdoing against other troops, not to charge them under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, said retired Marine Lt. Col. Gary D. Solis, who served as a military judge and a law professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point.
Under the military’s legal system, troops can submit a claim that other service members have committed wrongdoing by filling out a DD Form 458 and forwarding it to the summary court-martial convening authority, Solis explained.
“Of course, that allegation has reference to a specific charge in the UCMJ, but that doesn’t mean that: I said it; therefore, you are charged,” Solis said. “That means I can now initiate the process that would lead to a formal charge.”
While anybody in the military can obtain a charge sheet, only certain people in the chain of command can initiate charges by signing it, he said. Each command has a designated charging officer. In a Marine division, that person is typically the chief prosecutor.
“Now, I haven’t looked at the UCMJ in a while – in a week or two, and certainly not on this subject – but I’m confident that there are others who can initiate charges as well,” Solis said. “But those others do not include a corporal in a fire team in a squad in a platoon. It has to be somebody with some legal affiliation.”
The charging officer must have probable cause that the person in question committed the offense, such as written sworn statements taken by investigators or commanders, he said.
In layman’s terms: Service members can report wrongdoing, but only charging officers can begin the legal process, and only if they have evidence.
From a purely impartial standpoint, Scheller’s claim that McKenzie was derelict in his duties appears to be a little light on the evidence side. Scheller justified filing charges by claiming that McKenzie said during an Aug. 30 Pentagon news briefing that he had made “bad assumptions” about the situation in Afghanistan.
“I know you are a great American,” Scheller said in the video. “I know you didn’t intend to fail. I know you have served very honorably and are probably a great leader. But that doesn’t absolve you of the accountability of your bad assumptions.”
FILE PHOTO: U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, commander, U.S. Central Command speaks with members of the press from the Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2021. (DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Jack Sanders)
A check of the Defense Department’s transcript of the briefing revealed that McKenzie did not actually use the words “bad assumptions.”
Here is what McKenzie did say:
“Plans such as this are built upon a number of facts and assumptions, and facts and assumptions change over time. While observing the security environment deteriorate, we continued to update our facts and assumptions.”
“When the evacuation was formerly directed on August the 14th, we began to carry out our plan, based upon the initial assumption that the Afghan security forces would be a willing and able security partner in Kabul, defending the capital or a matter of weeks, or at least for a few days,” McKenzie also said “Within 24 hours, of course, the Afghan military collapsed completely, opening Kabul up to the Taliban’s advance.”
Scheller did not return a request for comment on Friday.
So, it does not appear that Gen. McKenzie has to worry about being handcuffed and advised of his Article 31 rights anytime soon. Scheller, on the other hand, may want to consult an actual attorney before he vows to “bring the whole f–king system down” again.
More great stories on Task & Purpose
10. I Know General Milley, and He Was Just Doing His Job
I Know General Milley, and He Was Just Doing His Job
Calls between top military leaders — friend and foe — are common and necessary to avoid potentially catastrophic misunderstandings.
September 16, 2021, 12:38 PM EDT
Be glad he was doing his job. Photographer: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is also chair of the board of the Rockefeller Foundation and vice chairman of Global Affairs at the Carlyle Group. His latest book is "2034: A Novel of the Next World War."
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I met Mark Milley, the now-embattled chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, almost 20 years ago in the Pentagon, and I met him because I had a problem. My job was senior military assistant to the secretary of defense, Don Rumsfeld, and every week we had to brief him on the “orders book.” This was a breakdown of the pending deployments that would send military units into combat – often complex and controversial decisions that only the secretary could make.
My problem was that Rumsfeld, a notoriously hard principal, was chewing through briefers. It needed to be a senior colonel or Navy captain with gravitas and battlefield experience, but more importantly someone who could gain the confidence of Rummy. The latter was the hard part, because the secretary was skeptical and a shrewd judge of character. He had fired a half-dozen briefers, a couple of them on the spot.
I went to my counterpart on the Joint Staff, which provided the briefers, and described what I needed: someone with strength to stand up to pressure, deep knowledge of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and inner character and self-confidence. Cue up Colonel Mark Milley, a Princeton graduate (like Rumsfeld), who has the gruff exterior and burly build of a New Jersey road-bar bouncer. Milley took a direct, confident and pragmatic tone. He was also a master of the most minute details in each operation, and added a sense of humor at appropriate moments. My problem was solved.
Some years later, Milley commanded troops as a general in Afghanistan, where his reputation and performance were further tested, and it was apparent he would go the distance into 4-star ranks. He has certainly needed every ounce of his character over the past two years as chairman, and the current firestorm over his calls to Chinese counterparts, as reported in a new book, will test it even more.
From my perspective, without benefit of seeing a transcript of any calls, it appears that Milley was conducting nothing beyond “Chairman 101” — simply doing his job. Senior U.S. military around the world frequently pick up the phone and call friends and foes to keep channels of communication open, provide perspective about specific incidents and reassure other nations of our intentions so miscalculations do not occur.
When I was the military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I would occasionally call or hold meetings with my opposite number in the Russian military, General Nikolai Makarov. Among many other topics, we discussed incidents at sea between our respective warships, counterpiracy operations in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, the situation in Ukraine and the state of affairs in Afghanistan. On all of those calls, my senior staff were present. But there was no requirement to have members of the National Security Council or Pentagon senior civilians involved — something Milley is now being criticized for. It was an appropriate, sensible and de-escalatory military-to-military conversation.
It is worth noting that there must be a transcript, recording or certainly detailed notes with quotations of any calls between Milley and Chinese leaders, and other people would have been on the line. A thorough examination of that information, under the boundaries of classification, by civilian leadership in the White House and Congress is warranted, simply to allay any concerns. I have no doubt that Milley was operating squarely within the boundaries of his appointed rule set.
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Given all the domestic turbulence in Washington throughout late 2020 and into the shameful events at the Capitol on Jan. 6, it was obvious that both our allies and opponents would be questioning the state of U.S. democracy. Especially to those in an authoritarian nation like China, it would have appeared so unusual that they might have expected a highly out-of-the-ordinary set of actions. Couple that with the revolving door among senior leadership in the Pentagon (an acting secretary of defense, who retired as a colonel), and it is clear that the propensity for a miscalculation or dangerous misunderstanding was high.
From all I can see (recognizing there are zero “on the record” statements about these calls so far), Milley did what we would want him to do – picked up the phone, called appropriate counterparts around the world, including the head of the People’s Liberation Army – and reassured them about the situation in Washington. What is extraordinary about that moment was not Milley’s actions; but rather the whirl of dangerous and divisive domestic politics that might have made outside observers believe we were headed into a period of destabilization and lack of coherent command and control. Mark Milley did the right thing in that moment, and we should be glad that he did.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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11. The Milley Miasma
We really need to conduct a thorough analysis of this to understand what happened. This piece offers new information beyond what I have seen reported about Woodward's and Costa's book.
One of the narratives that concerns me is the idea a president has the "right" to launch a preemptive strike. We talk about the president having the right to do this or the right to do that. We should not be talking about whether the POTUS have rights but instead about his responsibilities. He is a servant of the consituton and the nation. He has rights as an individual American and a human being. But as POTUS he has the responsibility to defend the constitution and the United States.
Maybe that is just semantics but I think one way to limit the power of the chief executives is to elect those who believe they have responsibilities as the president and not rights.
The Milley Miasma
We live in Strangelovian times.
Fact is, the only thing that can stop an unhinged president from starting an unprovoked war or even a surprise nuclear strike is a guy like Gen. Mark A. Milley. And there’s the rub.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice requires sworn officers to carry out even a horrible order—of which there have been many in the annals of war. It’s the kind of dilemma that was dramatized in the hit 1992 court martial drams A Few Good Men (which could’ve had many a remake over the past 20 years since 9/11). But in a scenario involving big power tensions and nuclear weapons, it’s a dilemma with existential dimensions.
President Donald Trump had every legal right to order an attack on China, or Iran or North Korea, even a nuclear strike, according to the Constitution, but that doesn’t mean Milley or some other authoritative figure didn’t have the moral right or duty to warn his generals to check with them first and assure China or whomever that no such plans were underway—lest an adversary take preemptive military action itself that could quickly spiral out of control.
"To say that the secretary of defense and his subordinates have a legal duty to comply with presidential orders is not to say that they should do so," Jack Goldsmith, who held high positions in the Justice and Defense departments, wrote back in 2017, when Trump was trading insults and fiery threats with Kim Jong-Un. But “they have to be prepared to accept the consequences of defiance," which include "resigning...resisting until fired, informing congressional leaders (in or out of public), or quietly coordinating with the Vice President and others for presidential removal under the 25th Amendment."
The mob is howling for Milley’s head, outraged over the general’s alleged assurance to his Chinese counterpart that he’d tip him off if an attack was in the offing, according to advance swatches of Peril, the forthcoming book by The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward and Robert Costa. More on that in a moment.
But there’s at least a good argument to be made that Milley should have resigned and explained why if indeed he and significant others, including CIA Director Gina Haspel, grew so alarmed over the president’s delusional insistence that the elections were rigged that they feared a right-wing coup was in motion, according to Woodward and Costa. A Milley resignation before the elections might well have jolted Republican fence-sitters out of their acquiescence in Trump’s increasingly erratic actions, especially if he went public with his fears that Trump might start a war to keep himself in office. Then again, Milley surely would’ve been accused by more than Trump and his allies of being way out of line, of even contemplating a leftwing coup of his own.
Wow, the times we live in.
But back to the general’s calls to his Chinese counterpart Li Zuocheng. The first reporting on Peril in the author’s own newspaper left the suggestion that Milley acted alone, almost as if he’d bought a burner phone and punched up Li from a back table in the Pentagon City Starbucks. But subsequent reporting and statements belie that.
A Fox News reporter, Jennifer Griffin, did some quick digging and came to the conclusion, as one U.S. official put it to her, that Millie’s calls “were not secret."
“Fox News has learned there were about 15 people present for the phone calls, which were video teleconference calls,” Griffin reported. “Sources familiar [with the matter] told Fox News that there were multiple notetakers present, and said the calls were both conducted with full knowledge of then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper and then-Acting Defense Secretary Chris Miller.”
So much for the “rogue general” charge. (Miller now says Milley didn’t come entirely clean.)
One official told Griffin “there was full civilian oversight of the phone calls, including a representative of the State Department, and Milley’s political adviser. Notes of the calls were taken and a summary note was sent to the Defense secretary and the intelligence community.“
"This was not done like some sort of conspiratorial thing," another participant who overheard the conversation told Fox News, normally a reliable channel for the Republican version of events.
If that weren’t surprising enough, another regular on Fox, retired four-star general Jack Keane (whom Trump once tried to recruit as his secretary of defense) also threw cold water on the notion that Milley went rogue. What the JCS chairman did was entirely appropropriate, said Keane, a Vietnam War combat veteran and presidential confidant who has been deployed to virtually every trouble spot over the past 40 years. Calming Chinese worries that a U.S. attack might be coming under the cover of East Asia military exercises was good, he said.
“Gen. Milley’s making a phone call to provide reassurances, which is his job,” Keane said on Fox. “I mean, he's executing his responsibility and he’s doing it in concert with his own advisers and then sharing that with the interagency” grouping.
“I don’t see anything that is undermining the civilian control of the military,” Keane added, rebuking Fox anchor Martha MacCallum for “regurgitating” such baseless charges. “If you took the facts, that are, I think, being sensationalized in this report, that would be an issue, as you just regurgitated here. But that is not what the Pentagon is reporting. It seems to be pretty much in sync with what we're used to seeing.”
None other than former Trump national security adviser John Bolton dismissed the notion that Milley had gone rogue. “I have no doubt that General Milley consulted widely with his colleagues on the National Security Council and others during this period,” Bolton said in a tweeted statement. “I would also be very surprised if many of them were not fully aware of General Milley's actions and that they fully concurred in them.”
Of course, Bolton and other former Trump advisors have been busy trying to rehabilitate themselves in the media these past several months as more and more tales from inside the “total clown car” emerge in books relying heavily on anonymous accounts by the administration’s insiders.
“Books like this are shaped by their sources, and those sources always have their own agendas,” noted Slate’s Laura Miller. “Former Attorney General William Barr, for example, is apparently granting long interviews to everyone writing a book-length account of Trump’s final year in office in an evident attempt to pass himself off as someone who moderated the president’s worst excesses. Trump aides who served as sources for [author Michael] Wolff, such as former White House chief of staff Mark Meadows, come across as voices of reason in then turn up in Peril trying to, say, hire the nutcase conspiracist Kash Patel to run the CIA.”
Pages Turning
“In 2013, [Milley] was the deputy commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and he would talk about winning and victory and how good the Afghan security forces were,” Whitlock summed up neatly on Amy Goodman’s Democracy Now show. “And even as the United States started to withdraw during the Obama administration, Milley was among the generals who kept expressing complete faith in the Afghan forces. And even though there were clear reports that they weren’t doing that well, that they couldn’t hold territory, Milley always vouched for them in public.”
So pick your poison—or potion. Partisans had already kitted up long before the Milley-China episode exploded over the writhing body politic. Guns were drawn and fired. Not hard to understand why: The self-dealing and truth-shading that has been the hallmark of official life in recent decades asks a lot of ordinary citizens trying to figure out what’s really going on. The story of Mark Milley and Trump, far more complicated now than when it first emerged, has made it all the harder.
“Was Trump contemplating an attack on China?” asks Andrew Bacevich, the retired Army colonel and independent thinker whose most recent book is “We don’t know; Trump himself denies it. Would any such attack have produced disastrous results, as Milley seems to have feared? Almost certainly.”
“But let’s be clear about where the problem lies,” Bacevich added in a Los Angeles Times opinion piece. “It’s with the existing U.S. system for controlling the use of nuclear weapons. That system placed Milley in a difficult predicament. Since the dawn of the nuclear era, Americans have entrusted presidents with the authority to initiate Armageddon on their own.”
Bacevich argued that “while Milley’s intentions may have been honorable, his actions were categorically wrong and set a dangerous precedent.”
But we now know Milley didn’t act alone, he didn’t go rogue, as Bacevich (whom I admire as a stand-up patriot) and several critics declared before all the facts were in.
Facts are hard to come by in this era of “fake news” and extreme polarization. But they’re worth pursuing. Indeed, our system depends on them, now more than ever.
12. Perspective | Milley’s calls reflect a crisis. But it’s not a military crisis.
Conclusion:
In a democratic society, the notion of civilian control of the military is predicated on the assumption that civilian leadership will be exercised in a lawful manner. If Milley and other military leaders sought to prevent potentially unlawful presidential actions, they weren’t breaking faith with democracy: Our democracy had already been badly broken by the highest civilian official in the land. And that’s a far different — and far bleaker — problem than a general walking the difficult line between obedience and conscience. Trump demonstrated how easily American norms and institutions could be subverted by a lawless president — and unlike Milley, millions of Americans, and scores of GOP elected officials, never even bothered to speak out.
Perspective | Milley’s calls reflect a crisis. But it’s not a military crisis.
Uniformed officers can only do so much when civilian leaders break norms
By Rosa Brooks
"Rosa Brooks is a law professor at Georgetown and former senior Defense Department official under President Obama. Her most recent book is “Tangled Up in Blue: Policing the American City.”
Yesterday at 9:47 a.m. EDT
In the waning days of the Trump administration, top U.S. military leaders reportedly worried that an unstable and erratic president might launch a nuclear strike or start an unprovoked war with China. Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told senior military leaders that he needed to be in the loop if President Donald Trump ordered a nuclear strike — and went so far as to call his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Li Zuocheng, to assure him that the United States was not on the verge of collapse and would not launch a surprise attack on China, according to a new book by The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward and Robert Costa. “He’s crazy, and what he did yesterday is further evidence of his craziness,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) told Milley about Trump two days after the Jan. 6 insurrection at the Capitol. “I agree with you on everything,” Milley replied.
Commentators and politicians on both right and left have been quick to view Milley’s reported actions as evidence of a crisis in civil-military relations; some Republicans even see it as treason in the military’s highest ranks. But notwithstanding the overheated reaction, there’s little reason to conclude from this episode that Milley or other senior military officers are no longer committed to democratic principles of civilian control of the armed forces. Woodward and Costa’s new reporting does document a crisis — but it’s primarily a crisis of politics, not of civil-military relations. And as with so much else about the Trump era, that means the power and responsibility to fix it lie squarely with voters and elected officials, not with uniformed officers.
It’s dismaying to learn that the nation’s top general believed that an unstable president might initiate a devastating global conflict on a whim, but there’s no compelling evidence that Milley did anything wrong in laying down a warning about Trump’s possible future conduct. For one thing, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the president’s senior military adviser and also has a responsibility to make candid recommendations to Congress, he is not formally part of the chain of command. That makes many of Milley’s statements about what other officers should do more or less hortatory in nature. But more broadly, the legal framework governing military obedience to orders is far murkier than many Americans might assume.
Yes, military officers have a general duty to obey their civilian commander in chief, as well as an obligation to refrain from “contemptuous speech” against the president and behavior likely to bring the military into “disrepute,” among other things. But officers also swear an oath to uphold the Constitution and have a duty to disobey orders to engage in unlawful activity. Depending on the specific circumstances, a presidential nuclear strike order — or an order to launch a conventional attack on another state — might be lawful or unlawful. Trump being Trump, Milley’s concerns about the lawfulness of future presidential orders hardly seem unfounded.
A spokesman for Milley, Col. Dave Butler, said Wednesday that the general “continues to act and advise within his authority in the lawful tradition of civilian control of the military and his oath to the Constitution.” While some Republicans have suggested that Milley’s statements to his Chinese counterpart constituted a treasonous offer to reveal classified military plans to a foreign adversary, Butler has pushed back, noting that Milley’s calls to foreign leaders were coordinated with other national security agencies and were part of his “duties and responsibilities conveying reassurance in order to maintain strategic stability.” In English: They were smart military diplomacy, intended to discourage a jittery China from launching a preemptive strike during a U.S. political crisis. Milley was just doing his job.
The devil is always in the details when it comes to questions of law and ethics. Military leaders may think a presidential command is unwise, but no one would claim they have the legal right to disobey an order solely because of partisan or policy disagreements. At the same time, it’s not difficult to construct hypotheticals in which even the most stalwart defenders of civilian control of the military would urge disobedience.
Explicit presidential orders to commit war crimes would be one easy case. For another, imagine a president who — hypothetically — experienced a sudden and severe psychotic episode. Imagine that this president summoned his military commanders one morning, told them that singing leprechauns had informed him that Australia had been taken over by demons, and then ordered nuclear strikes targeting major Australian cities. It’s a silly example, but it’s hard to imagine anyone insisting that such an order should be blindly obeyed: The use of weapons of mass destruction against a civilian population based on nothing more than presidential delusion would surely violate the laws of war.
Most real-life situations fall into grayer areas, making it difficult to state categorically whether a hypothetical order to attack China — let alone use nuclear force — given by Trump would be lawful or unlawful. That makes it equally hard to say whether military disobedience to such an order would be lawful or unlawful.
In normal circumstances, the many gray areas rarely lead to open disobedience, as senior military officials generally assume that all presidential orders are presumptively lawful. If anything, military leaders tend to err on the side of excessive deference to presidential mandates: In the early post-9/11 years, for instance, when the George W. Bush administration refused to provide Geneva Conventions protections to “war on terror” detainees and developed an “enhanced interrogation” program most military lawyers saw as illegal torture, senior military officials raised powerful internal objections — but none of them disobeyed orders or even resigned in protest.
Under Trump, military leaders, including Milley, began to show significant public signs of discontent — but only after the president repeatedly made clear his blatant contempt for the rule of law and democratic norms. When Trump suggested he might target Iranian cultural sites and strike Iran “perhaps in a disproportionate manner,” for instance, military leaders and Trump’s own defense secretary stated publicly that such actions would be illegal and that the U.S. military would “follow the laws of armed conflict.” In June 2020, after peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square were tear-gassed by federal authorities and Trump pulled Milley into a surprise photo op, the general apologized for his presence, noting that it had inappropriately created “a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.” In the run-up to the November election, Trump refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power if he lost the election, Milley made a public statement reminding the nation that the military had “no role” to play in domestic elections and would always “obey the lawful orders of our civilian leadership.” The pushback was polite but firm — and entirely appropriate.
Then, on Jan. 6, a violent mob of Trump supporters, inspired by Trump’s repeated false claims that the election had been stolen, and egged on by the president himself, stormed the U.S. Capitol in an effort to prevent Congress from certifying the results of the presidential election. Trump responded by praising the mob (“We love you”). This was the context within which Milley reportedly grew concerned that Trump might seek to launch a nuclear strike or start a war: The nation faced an existential political crisis, with a commander in chief who had repeatedly made manifest his willingness to trample on the Constitution and the norms that support it.
Against this backdrop, Milley’s efforts to ensure stability until the new and legitimately elected president could take office — and avoid an illegal or unethical military action — hardly constitute a refusal to accept civilian control. On the contrary: In an impossible and unprecedented situation, Milley did his best to remain scrupulously out of the realm of politics, and he repeatedly reiterated his loyalty to the nation, its law and its Constitution — all duties higher than that of mindless obedience to a president who had clearly indicated a willingness to ignore the law.
In a democratic society, the notion of civilian control of the military is predicated on the assumption that civilian leadership will be exercised in a lawful manner. If Milley and other military leaders sought to prevent potentially unlawful presidential actions, they weren’t breaking faith with democracy: Our democracy had already been badly broken by the highest civilian official in the land. And that’s a far different — and far bleaker — problem than a general walking the difficult line between obedience and conscience. Trump demonstrated how easily American norms and institutions could be subverted by a lawless president — and unlike Milley, millions of Americans, and scores of GOP elected officials, never even bothered to speak out.
Twitter: @brooks_rosa
13. Scientists created the world's whitest paint. It could eliminate the need for air conditioning.
And now for something completely different. This is a fascinating development.
Scientists created the world's whitest paint. It could eliminate the need for air conditioning.
| USA TODAY
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Climate change: 4 weapons to slow or reverse global warming
There are realistic ways to reverse or slow down climate change, and scientists made it simple by choosing four of the best.
Buzz60
- The paint has now made it into the Guinness World Records book as the whitest ever made.
- The idea was to make a paint that would reflect sunlight away from a building.
- The paint reflects 98.1% of solar radiation while also emitting infrared heat.
The whitest paint in the world has been created in a lab at Purdue University, a paint so white that it could eventually reduce or even eliminate the need for air conditioning, scientists say.
So why did the scientists create such a paint? It turns out that breaking a world record wasn't the goal of the researchers: Curbing global warming was.
“When we started this project about seven years ago, we had saving energy and fighting climate change in mind,” said Xiulin Ruan, a professor of mechanical engineering at Purdue, in a statement.
The idea was to make a paint that would reflect sunlight away from a building, researchers said.
Making this paint really reflective, however, also made it really white, according to Purdue University. The paint reflects 98.1% of solar radiation while also emitting infrared heat. Because the paint absorbs less heat from the sun than it emits, a surface coated with this paint is cooled below the surrounding temperature without consuming power.
Using this new paint to cover a roof area of about 1,000 square feet could result in a cooling power of 10 kilowatts. “That’s more powerful than the air conditioners used by most houses,” Ruan said.
Typical commercial white paint gets warmer rather than cooler. Paints on the market that are designed to reject heat reflect only 80% to 90% of sunlight and can’t make surfaces cooler than their surroundings.
Two features make this paint ultra-white: a very high concentration of a chemical compound called barium sulfate – also used in photo paper and cosmetics – and different particle sizes of barium sulfate in the paint, scientists at Purdue said.
Researchers at Purdue have partnered with a company to put this ultra-white paint on the market, according to a news release.
14. How Chinese Strategists Think AI Will Power a Military Leap Ahead
Excerpts:
Lastly, the U.S. military should ready itself for a future warfighting environment, where the PLA’s realization of its intelligenization ambitions will increase vulnerabilities to the American way of war. If realized, Chinese military strategists’ ambitions could portend an environment that has become less familiar in recent decades for the U.S. military—one in which disorientation, misinformation, and complex deception are commonplace during conflict with a peer adversary. Preparing for this increasing possibility, while maintaining resolve, and effectiveness will be essential to prevailing in a cognitive confrontation.
China believes it is racing toward AI-enabled future military dominance. However, it remains unclear if China is truly on the cusp of achieving a Revolution in Military Affairs, or if it is merely stumbling along with paralleling some of the post-Cold War approaches and ambitions of the U.S. military. Either way, a deeper understanding of the PLA’s push toward intelligentization can galvanize constructive American military efforts and preparedness, regardless of China’s actual progress.
How Chinese Strategists Think AI Will Power a Military Leap Ahead
The U.S. military should ready itself for a warfighting environment in which the PLA’s realizes its vision of "intelligenization."
The People’s Liberation Army has yet to adopt a definition, let alone a formal plan, for “intelligentization (智能化),” a Chinese vision for the transformation of warfare through artificial intelligence and automation. But Chinese military theorists see it as a rare opportunity for “leapfrog development” over adversaries. One author suggests that Star Wars will “become a reality”; another says the fantasies from “mythological fiction” will come true. Their writings, while not authoritative, have coalesced around several key themes that offer a crucial glimpse into potential PLA thinking and ambitions.
The PLA internalized lessons on “mechanization” and “platform-centric warfare” from the Second World War, and on “informationization” and networked operations from U.S. operations in the 1991 Gulf War. Whereas these earlier eras of warfare turned on “mechanization” in the “physical space” and “informationization” in the “information space,” PLA theorists argue that intelligentization will center upon a “cognitive space” that privileges complex thinking and effective decision-making. On battlefields where advanced AI technology enables better decisions, they write, the side that can better integrate human creativity and robotic calculating capacity will hold the crucial edge.
Chinese theorists often describe warfare that depends on humans and machines to collaborate as “algorithmic warfare,” an interesting parallel to the phrasing used by Robert Work, former deputy defense secretary. They also write about how “human-machine collaboration” can “realize human self-transcendence” and immeasurably improve the PLA’s centralized decision-making capability. A crucial use of artificial intelligence, they believe, will be in “battlefield perception systems,” a system that translates high-quality targeting data into ideal target sets for operational commanders.
PLA strategists also believe that ever-more-advanced autonomous systems will gradually replace human frontline combatants. These theorists believe the air domain has the highest potential for autonomy, with drones being integrated into air combat in two major ways. The first is unmanned-manned cooperation, wherein manned “mothership” fighters will direct autonomous drones during battle. The second is swarm warfare, which aims to overwhelm the enemy with masses of intelligent drones. The arrival of intelligent drones is expected to accelerate the OODA loop in unimaginable ways and to rewrite the “rules of the game” of air warfare.
Indeed, the military value of these systems will be more than their ability to destroy enemy forces, the strategists write. Above all, intelligentization will aim to achieve advantages in psychological warfare. Theorists describe a “cognitive confrontation,” in which PLA leaders will psychologically dominate opposing commanders through better and faster decisions. The PLA plans to employ all available tools to the overarching objective of reducing an enemy’s will to resist.
The United States military should work to better understand Chinese conceptions of intelligentization and the PLA’s efforts to integrate it into its model of future warfare. Taking advantage of some of the possible weaknesses of the PLA’s approach should be a top priority and would also help the United States military to shore up some of the weaknesses in its own vision and efforts. We recommend several key initiatives.
First, the simultaneous American efforts on joint all domain operations and JADC2 approaches and Chinese intelligentization may result in a future of parity, and despite major investments and progress, neither side will have gained a decisive advantage. However, nuanced differences in operational implementation, especially regarding mission command approaches for highly networked joint forces, may provide the U.S. with a margin of advantage. The U.S. military should move beyond its focus on technologies and system investments, and mature associated C2 and organizational aspects in parallel.
Second, the United States could enhance its own focus more on how attack the vulnerabilities of adversary battle networks and command and control (C2) systems. Intelligentization clearly seeks to build a highly centralized, and consequently potentially vulnerable, decision-making process for the PLA. Closely studying how to take advantage of these systems and approaches not only would give the United States a critical edge in future warfare, it would also help the U.S. military better understand the nature of its own envisioned future battle network and C2 vulnerabilities and more rapidly identify and attempt to mitigate them.
Third, the United States military should be more public in its discussions about the PLA’s intelligentization efforts. With other notable PLA efforts, the United States military has been content with sitting on classified awareness while losing valuable time for mobilizing a response. Several years were lost during the South China Sea island building campaign. Most recently, U.S. Strategic Command’s vague and scant public details about the rapid growth of the Chinese nuclear program did little, only for open-source investigators to finally sufficiently expose the efforts several years later. In the case of intelligentization, the U.S. military should not repeat this mistake yet again. Instead, it should more clearly highlight the nature of the PLA’s efforts as they continue to develop.
Lastly, the U.S. military should ready itself for a future warfighting environment, where the PLA’s realization of its intelligenization ambitions will increase vulnerabilities to the American way of war. If realized, Chinese military strategists’ ambitions could portend an environment that has become less familiar in recent decades for the U.S. military—one in which disorientation, misinformation, and complex deception are commonplace during conflict with a peer adversary. Preparing for this increasing possibility, while maintaining resolve, and effectiveness will be essential to prevailing in a cognitive confrontation.
China believes it is racing toward AI-enabled future military dominance. However, it remains unclear if China is truly on the cusp of achieving a Revolution in Military Affairs, or if it is merely stumbling along with paralleling some of the post-Cold War approaches and ambitions of the U.S. military. Either way, a deeper understanding of the PLA’s push toward intelligentization can galvanize constructive American military efforts and preparedness, regardless of China’s actual progress.
Ben Noon is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a former research assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Dr. Chris Bassler is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He formerly served as a civilian in the Department of Defense.
15. Russian-Made Mi-17 Helicopter Flown By Secretive U.S. Unit Lands In Farmer's Field
Russian-Made Mi-17 Helicopter Flown By Secretive U.S. Unit Lands In Farmer's Field
A Bell 407 helicopter from the same organization swooped in after the Mi-17 was forced to make an emergency landing.
YouTube screen captures
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Earlier this year, Dan Moore, who owns a farm in North Carolina, had unusual visits by not one, but two secretive aircraft. After a Russian-made Mi-17 Hip-type helicopter made an emergency landing, a dark gray Bell 407 arrived with replacement parts. The Bell 407 may well have been one of a trio that flew around the greater Los Angeles area in California earlier this year, something The War Zone covered extensively, and both of these helicopters may belong to an especially shadowy U.S. military aviation unit.
Moore, who is currently a member of the Civil Air Patrol, among other things, and has been a pilot for many years, had his encounter with these helicopters in May. However, he shared this story in more detail in a piece that the Air Facts aviation journal published this week.
"I received a call from my neighbor saying, 'Hey, did you know there is a helicopter in your front yard?'" Moore wrote of the event. "Wait, what? A helicopter? In my yard? I was confused, but also primed and ready to return the favor when I figured out somebody had made an emergency landing at my farm."
"Living in North Carolina, there is a lot of military activity in the airspace around me... So my answer to my neighbor was, 'Huh? No. No idea what is going on. What kind of helicopter?'" he continued. "My neighbor, who is in the special forces at Ft. Bragg [a major U.S. Army base in North Carolina] said, 'I don’t know. I’ve never seen one like it. Some big military thing.'"
The helicopter in question was an Mi-17-type with a tan-and-brown camouflage scheme, as well as a big black-painted section on at least the right side of the fuselage behind the exhaust for one of its two turboshaft engines. The pictures and videos that Moore took of this helicopter don't show any clearly obvious markings to identify who the operator is.
However, it did have a host of military features, including a sensor ball turret under the right side of the cockpit, as well as supplemental armor panels on either side. A large particle separator, useful for operations in sandy or otherwise dusty environments, was fitted to the front of the helicopter's two engine intakes. Its tail boom was covered in antennas, including a platter-type one typically associated with high-frequency satellite communications (SATCOM) systems.
Moore said he had his neighbor give his phone number to the helicopter's crew and soon got a call from the crew chief, who explained the situation. The Mi-17 would need to stay on his property until it could be repaired.
"My answer?" Moore recounted. "At the barn there is a white truck. The keys are in it. Go into town to get what you need. In the barn there is a full machine shop with all the tooling and supplies. The shop is open, go get what tools you need. I’ll be there in two hours.”
He said that the crew chief was a bit caught off guard by this show of hospitality. They didn't take him up on his offer, either. When Moore got to his farm he found the helicopter's crew pulling out a hydraulic oil cooler, which was apparently the root cause of the incident.
"I found the pilot and we chatted about what was going on. I explained that he’d landed at the single best place to put down he could have," Moore said. "He seemed pretty non-plussed till I explained that the pasture where he was sitting had power lines running through it till about a year before when I’d moved them to make the runway. And that all the other areas along his route of flight were either swamp or trees or houses. He turned a touch green when he realized what I was saying. He was in the only safe place he could put down."
Moore and his son, who "wants to fly helicopters in the Army and has been working towards that end for several years now," talked with the helicopter crew for a bit longer. He says when they finally got a stopping conversation and were about to leave, that's when they learned spare parts were on the way.
“Driving from where?” Moore asked.
“Oh no, they are flying in,” he got in response.
The Bell 407 subsequently arrived with what the crew needed to get the Hip up and running around. It also has a serial number on the tail, but it is not visible in the video Moore took of it.
This dark gray helicopter is a dead ringer for a trio of others that were spotted flying around Los Angeles and other nearby locales in January. If it is not one of those same three aircraft it has an identical configuration. Among other features, it has the same "egg-beater" or "O Wing" type ultra-high-frequency (UHF) SATCOM antenna on the tail boom and a pair of blade-type antennas under the forward fuselage that are generally associated with high-frequency radios or other communications systems. It also has the same type of high landing skids, which are mo commonly found on helicopters used for utility work, as well as law enforcement and military duties.
This smaller helicopter unloaded its cargo and left relatively quickly. By the next morning, the Mi-17 was good to go and had taken off, headed again for wherever its destination might have been.
As for what organization these helicopters belong to and who is flying them, not surprisingly, they didn't say, according to Moore. "These guys were all former military and they were doing some sort of REDACTED for REDACTED. It was all very hush hush," he said, adding that they told him they "were visiting from out of state."
It's also unclear whether it's a typo in the Air Facts story or if the crew of the Mi-17 deliberately gave him bad information, but Moore said they told him that helicopter "was an MI-24, the export version of another common helicopter in the Soviet Union." It is definitely not an Mi-24 Hind, which is a distinctly different helicopter gunship.
When the dark gray Bell 407s appeared over Los Angeles earlier this year, The War Zone explored a number of possibilities as to who might own them. A highly secretive U.S. Army element known as the Aviation Technology Office (ATO), which is based at Felker Army Airfield, part of Fort Eustis, in Virginia, remains the most likely operator of those helicopters – and, by extension, these ones.
This likelihood is further bolstered by the fact that ATO, which was previously known as the Flight Concepts Division (FCD) and, along with its own predecessor organizations, has long-standing ties to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is also understood to operate foreign-made types, including Mi-17 variants.
Satellite imagery of Felker regularly shows Bell 407s sharing the ramp with Mi-17s near ATO/FCD's main hangar. One image, available through Bing Maps, is high resolution enough that you can clearly see an Mi-17-type helicopter in very similar, if not identical configurations to the one that touched down on Moore's farm.
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A satellite image of Felker Army Airfield taken on Dec. 2, 2020. Three Bell 407s are visible on the ramp to the right, as are five Mi-17-type helicopters.
Bing Maps
A high-resolution satellite image showing an Mi-17-type helicopter at Felker Army Airfield.
SPRINGERVILLE MUNICIPAL AIRPORT
Another shadowy Mi-171E, which carries the serial number 15-5207 on the tail boom, sitting at Springerville Municipal Airport in Arizona in 2016. Like the Hip that touched down on Dan Moore's farm in North Carolina earlier this year, it also has a number of antennas on its tail boom, including one generally associated with high-frequency satellite communications systems toward the rear. It also has a large particle separator in front of the engine intakes. Other pictures of 15-5207 available online show that, in more recent years, it has been fitted with the same kind of sensor turret and supplemental armor as the one that touched down on Dan Moore's farm.
You can read more about ATO/FDC, which is one of the most secretive U.S. military aviation units known to be in existence today, in these past War Zone pieces. From what is publicly known, this unit provides very specialized, as well as discreet aviation support for special operations forces during covert and clandestine missions. It also has a bleeding-edge developmental role, helping to craft what's next in Army aviation, which sometimes aligns with its operational mission sets. For instance, it is understood to have led the development of the stealthy derivatives of the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter that were used in the raid on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011 that led to the death of then-Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.
Altogether, Dan Moore's tale about how his farm briefly turned into a small heliport is certainly unique in its most basic details. It is only made more so when one considers just how rare an opportunity he and his son were given to be so close to these shy helicopters and their crews.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
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16. 79 years after the first submarine-launched commando raid, Navy SEALs say it hasn't gotten any easier
79 years after the first submarine-launched commando raid, Navy SEALs say it hasn't gotten any easier
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1 members pull a shipmate aboard the guided-missile submarine USS Michigan during a SEAL delivery vehicle familiarization exercise in the southern Pacific Ocean, February 20, 2012.
US Navy/MCS3 Kristopher Kirsop
- In August 1942, US Marine Raiders conducted the first amphibious attack ever launched from submarines.
- Advances in technology since then have allowed commandos to conduct far more complex submarine operations.
- Submarine operations are a great way to deploy special-operations forces, but they're still tough to pull off.
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August marked the 79th anniversary of the first special-operations raid directly supported by submarines.
Decades later, submarine special-operations have become a staple of the Navy SEAL Teams and one of the US military's most valuable capabilities.
The first underwater commandos
US Marines aboard USS Nautilus just before launching the raid on Makin Island, August 17, 1942.
US Marine Corps
In August 1942, US Marine Raiders conducted the first amphibious attack ever launched from submarines.
During the raid on Makin Island, the USS Nautilus and USS Argonaut landed 200 Marine commandos on the small Japanese-held island with the goal of destroying enemy installations, capturing prisoners, and gathering intelligence.
Although the raid was neither a success nor a failure — the Marine Raiders achieved some objectives but failed on others — it paved the way for future special operations from submarines.
Submarine operations
US Marines aboard USS Argonaut upon their return from the Makin Raid, in Pearl Harbor on August 26, 1942.
US Marine Corps
Since World War II, advances in submarine and combat diving technology have allowed for far more complex submarine operations involving commandos.
Nowadays, submarines don't have to surface to land special operators, as they did during the Makin Island raid, and can instead deploy commandos while submerged.
Submarine operations can be used to ferry a special-operations team close to a target without leaving a trace, making them the perfect starting point for a special reconnaissance, direct action, sabotage, hostage rescue, or personnel recovery operations.
Navy SEALs, the maritime component of US Special Operations Command, are the natural choice for such operations. From the start, SEAL training emphasizes the water element, and all SEALs get advanced underwater training.
But Navy SEALs aren't the only special-operations unit in the US military that can launch from submarines. For example, Army Special Forces combat diver teams also train and conduct submarine operations.
A Marine climbs out of the lock-out trunk on USS Mississippi during a special-operations forces training in Hawaii, November 17, 2015.
US Marine Corps/Sgt. Tony Simmons
The difference between the two units, however, is that Green Berets use combat diving as an insertion method — a way to the target — whereas Navy SEALs can also conduct direct action or sabotage operations at sea after launching from a submarine.
Some submarine operations can last for long periods of time. The special-operations contingent aboard can be underway for days, weeks, or even months.
For example, during the Falklands War in the South Atlantic, British Special Boat Service commandos — the UK equivalent of SEAL Team Six — spent several weeks on submarines as they deployed from the UK to the Falklands to begin operations against Argentina.
When underway, the special-operations element will usually "make do" — sleeping, eating, planning, and working out wherever there is a little spare room, such as in the torpedo room.
Rife with danger
Navy divers and members of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2 and Naval Special Warfare Logistics Support conduct lock-out training with USS Hawaii, October 26, 2007.
US Navy
To prepare for submarine operations, Navy SEALs and other commandos with a maritime specialty conduct realistic training exercises, such as escape trunk drills in pools or reservoirs and dockside training on moored submarines.
Escape trunk drills are very important. Combat divers and submariners are placed in a spherical trunk about 6 feet tall that is flooded with water almost to the nose level. The trunk is placed at the bottom of the pool or reservoir. The person inside can breathe but can't do much more.
Then the trunk's hatch is opened to flood the last few inches, immersing the person inside and forcing him to swim 30 feet or 40 feet to the surface. This drill is used to simulate escaping from a sunk submarine.
"Submarine operations are always tricky and dangerous. You can't get complacent regardless how many platoons you have under your belt. But they are also very useful for several contingencies," a former Navy SEAL officer told Insider.
"Locking out and locking in — respectively, exiting and reentering a submerged submarine — are tricky affairs, especially if conducted in the dead of night. The ocean can get pretty dark at night. You can't even see your hand in front of your face, [it's] that dark," the former officer said.
"That's why we always operate in pairs, and operators are tied together by a rope. But these procedures are important, and we must master them for they allow us to infiltrate and exfiltrate clandestinely," the former officer added.
A diver from Naval Special Warfare Logistics Support diver conducts lock-out training with USS Hawaii, October 26, 2007.
US Navy
During lock-out and lock-in operations, Navy SEALs and other combat divers enter a specially designed room on top of the submarine, called the "lockout trunk," with their scuba gear. Then, the trunk slowly floods with water to match the outside water pressure.
Once that pressure is reached, the commandos open the hatch and swim out of the trunk, retrieving mission-essential gear from boxes fitted to the submarine's hull. The submarine remains underwater but close to the surface because the lower pressure there allows the commandos to operate.
"During a lockout operation, you have to be careful with the air levels, ensuring that the air supply within the trunk doesn't become over-polluted with CO2, because that can prove deadly or compromise the mission by emitting bubbles the enemy can pick up on sonar. It's a delicate process," the former Navy SEAL officer said.
In a conflict with China or Russia, submarine operations are a great way to deploy special-operations forces close to an enemy target.
The South China Sea, where Beijing is building and fortifying scores of man-made islands, or the Black Sea, where Moscow is turning Crimea into a fortress, would be ideal environments for such operations.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
17. How America Forgot It Needed to Understand The Enemy
Excerpts:
Political leaders often ignore the intelligence assessments they dislike. There is no stopping the willful rejection of information. But for those leaders with open minds, more frequent, probing studies of people’s underlying drivers, conducted by cultural experts or reliable foreign nationals, might at least reduce the chance of debacles.
As the inevitable post-mortems unfold in the coming months and years, there will surely be plenty of blame to go around. Was this primarily a failure of political leaders, of military strategy or training, of the intelligence community, or of all of the above? Rather than simply assigning blame, the more productive route will be to study what went wrong and strive to fix it. Has there been an unreasonable aversion to foreign nationals working on unclassified materials, an undervaluing of cultural experts, a tendency toward number worship, or an insufficient focus on people’s underlying drivers? If any of these mindsets have sabotaged U.S. success, there is a duty to rethink them.
How America Forgot It Needed to Understand The Enemy
Social scientists helped win World War II by judging enemy morale. But in Afghanistan, the U.S. army kept getting it wrong.
By Zachary Shore, the author of A Sense of the Enemy and Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions.
America’s recent loss in Afghanistan is drawing understandable comparisons to Vietnam—two conflicts where the U.S. leadership supposedly never grasped the power of morale, the role of culture, or the reality on the ground. While these comparisons are inescapable, the United States has not always been so unsuccessful. There are valuable lessons in the U.S. approach to determining how the enemy thinks—from a war the United States won.
In 1943, many experts believed that the German will to fight would soon collapse. The Russians had just beaten back the Germans at Stalingrad, while Allied forces had routed the Germans in Tunisia, leading to the capture of more than a quarter of a million Italian and German troops. The tide had clearly turned against the Nazi juggernaut. Buoyed by this dramatic momentum shift, many U.S. military and political leaders at the time could not imagine Germans continuing to fight for a lost cause.
That, at least, was the prevailing view, but a small and unusual group of intelligence analysts inside the United States disagreed, warning that Germans would lose the will to fight only with the invasion and destruction of the Wehrmacht itself. And the opinion of those unique experts carried weight. They were not only Germans (many of them Jews who had fled the Nazi regime), but they were also trenchant social critics, leading members of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. (The name of the school itself was coined after World War II, although it existed as a social research institute.) As declassified records of their reports reveal, they were frequently correct in their assessments of how German social structures shaped the war. Their focus on cultural and societal forces proved invaluable.
America’s recent loss in Afghanistan is drawing understandable comparisons to Vietnam—two conflicts where the U.S. leadership supposedly never grasped the power of morale, the role of culture, or the reality on the ground. While these comparisons are inescapable, the United States has not always been so unsuccessful. There are valuable lessons in the U.S. approach to determining how the enemy thinks—from a war the United States won.
In 1943, many experts believed that the German will to fight would soon collapse. The Russians had just beaten back the Germans at Stalingrad, while Allied forces had routed the Germans in Tunisia, leading to the capture of more than a quarter of a million Italian and German troops. The tide had clearly turned against the Nazi juggernaut. Buoyed by this dramatic momentum shift, many U.S. military and political leaders at the time could not imagine Germans continuing to fight for a lost cause.
That, at least, was the prevailing view, but a small and unusual group of intelligence analysts inside the United States disagreed, warning that Germans would lose the will to fight only with the invasion and destruction of the Wehrmacht itself. And the opinion of those unique experts carried weight. They were not only Germans (many of them Jews who had fled the Nazi regime), but they were also trenchant social critics, leading members of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. (The name of the school itself was coined after World War II, although it existed as a social research institute.) As declassified records of their reports reveal, they were frequently correct in their assessments of how German social structures shaped the war. Their focus on cultural and societal forces proved invaluable.
During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services, a forerunner of the CIA, recruited scores of scholars to assess America’s enemies. Their job was to help win the war by providing insights into how the enemy functioned and thereby avoid policy blunders. In just one of many examples, they corrected the then prevalent but mistaken view that German morale after Tunisia would crack. Although they did not use the term, they explained how this misperception was the result of what psychologists today call mirror imaging: the belief that the enemy thinks and acts as we do. In a democracy, loss of faith in the government can presage collapse, but in the Nazi dictatorship, they insisted, the sentiments of individuals mattered little.
As one of those scholars, Franz Neumann, correctly predicted in his report “German Morale After Tunisia” that only invasion and destruction of the Wehrmacht would make morale a political factor. For the average German, “Whatever their personal desires or fears, they must continue doing the Nazi job: the only alternative is the concentration camp or the executioner’s ax.”
Decades after World War II, the United States faced a major challenge in assessing the will of its Afghan allies to combat the Taliban once American forces withdrew. Press reports suggest that the intelligence community warned that the Taliban could eventually retake the country after a U.S. pullout, but the traumatic images from Kabul illustrate how vital it was to know whether the Afghans could hold out for years, months, weeks, or days.
It’s not yet clear if the intelligence community provided continuing, let alone accurate, assessments throughout the war of the Afghan army’s willingness to stand on its own. But the chaotic withdrawal occurred in part because planners assumed that the Afghan military would provide security. Even if they pessimistically anticipated a Taliban victory, they at least imagined that an army in which the United States had invested would not suddenly collapse. That assumption, in turn, rested on a mismeasuring of Afghan morale. In the planners’ defense, measuring morale is exceedingly hard, though the Frankfurt scholars often managed to do it.
What might have happened if the United States had had the benefit of the Frankfurt scholars throughout its long war in Afghanistan? Unfortunately, the chance of obtaining such incisive analysis proved far less likely once the Cold War heated up, as it became increasingly difficult to bring foreign nationals into the American intelligence establishment. Security concerns seemed justified when it was discovered that Franz Neumann had passed top-secret materials to the Soviets. Ever since, security concerns and the clearance process have largely precluded access to some of the people best able to grasp a foreign culture: the foreign nationals themselves. But the Frankfurt scholars were not just foreign-born; they were also deeply knowledgeable about social forces, and that is one area of America’s national security establishment that might need an upgrade.
The nature of the experts employed by the intelligence community is often opaque—but those of us working from the outside can guess at them through the results. An internal CIA review or a secure congressional panel might find that the community possesses a surfeit of military, political, economic, and technological analysts, but a dearth of sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and related specialists—and that the former are overvalued. Recent events in Afghanistan make painfully clear that knowing how many guns an army owns is less important than knowing whether soldiers will use them. Sometimes those guns have been sold to others, given to family, or left to rust in favor of more familiar weapons.
There may be sensible solutions to these problems. Gregory Treverton, former chair of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, once pushed for the assembling of foreign area scholars to assess unclassified documents while working on retainer, but he found it hard to gain traction for the plan. Similarly, the CIA briefly experimented with Open Source Works, an initiative that allowed nearly 100 native-level foreign-language speakers to offer their assessments of unclassified material, but the agency quickly shuttered the program.
From 2007 to 2014, the U.S. military employed anthropologists as part of its Human Terrain System project, and while some subsequent studies found the effort to be highly effective, it received strong criticism from the American Anthropological Association and others. That opposition created its own constraints on the program. Without the benefit of experienced scholars, and with severe management problems of its own, it was forced to rely largely on graduate students looking for a way to pay off their loans, some of them with no background in Afghanistan. Most tragically, the attempt to embed Human Terrain System personnel with front-line forces resulted in three deaths.
Those objections, however, would largely not apply to remote intelligence analysis on the Frankfurt scholars’ model. At least two benefits could flow from increasing the number of cultural analysts. First, it could help combat number worship—the tendency to be mesmerized by figures and to give them a credibility they often don’t deserve. Numbers don’t lie, but people often do. During the Vietnam War, U.S. military officials frequently inflated the numbers of enemy soldiers killed and understated the numbers of enemy troops entirely.
In one embarrassing example after the Tet Offensive, discussed in David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest, the military’s numbers didn’t even add up. At a briefing of the so-called Wise Men, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s council of establishment elders brought in to advise on the war, a military briefer claimed that they had killed 45,000 enemy troops during the battle. When one of the Wise Men asked what the enemy’s strength had been at the start of the offensive, the briefer stated it was between 160,000 and 175,000. The questioner then asked what the killed to wounded ratio was, and the briefer replied 3½ to 1. The questioner then observed that if those numbers were correct, the enemy had no effective troops left in the field—and yet someone was still shooting at Americans.
Did the so-called ghost soldiers in the Afghan National Army reflect a similar attachment to concrete numbers? The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported that the official figure of 300,000 Afghan troops was wildly inflated and may often have been 50 to 70 percent less, but such a robust figure may have felt too comforting for some leaders to reject. Both supporters and critics of the withdrawal have clung to the figure of a quarter-million or more members of the Afghan National Army as if it were reality over the last few months.
Numbers give the illusion of truth. They feel tangible, reliable, powerful. But not everything in war can or should be quantified, and that is especially true of morale. Perhaps investigations will discover that some leaders in the national security establishment overvalued hard data, such as numbers of troops, weapons, or aircraft, while overlooking the softer intelligence reports on Afghan motivations, ideological convictions, and commitments to a cause. Some 66,000 Afghan soldiers died fighting the Taliban, and many more fought bravely alongside their fallen comrades. Their commitment should never be questioned. What ultimately mattered, however, was not the number of soldiers who died but the conviction of those who failed to fight when it mattered most.
A second benefit of diversifying the intelligence community’s ranks is that it might help overcome the tendency to focus on intentions while ignoring drivers. As I wrote in my book A Sense of the Enemy, if intentions are what someone wants to do, drivers are why they want to do it. If, for example, an Afghan villager joins the National Army, his intention might be to fight the Taliban, but his underlying driver might be to secure a steady paycheck until a better offer comes along—or an offer he can’t refuse, such as violent intimidation by the Taliban.
Delving into soldiers’ motives can help us gauge at least some of the complexities of morale. It can also spotlight the ways that American actions altered Afghan drivers. By cutting a separate deal with the Taliban, by forcing the Afghan government to release some 5,000 Taliban prisoners, and by removing all the support on which the Afghan government depended, the Trump administration may have dealt a crushing psychological blow to America’s Afghan allies. As a result, many may have felt abandoned by the United States long before it withdrew. Those actions may have equally emboldened the Taliban, convincing them that their victory was inevitable. Certainly one area that anthropologists know well is the practices surrounding kinship. Deeper knowledge and sensitivity to the Afghan practice of switching sides, as occurred in the 1990s and in 2001, might also have helped planners prepare for what we have seen in the war’s final phase.
Political leaders often ignore the intelligence assessments they dislike. There is no stopping the willful rejection of information. But for those leaders with open minds, more frequent, probing studies of people’s underlying drivers, conducted by cultural experts or reliable foreign nationals, might at least reduce the chance of debacles.
As the inevitable post-mortems unfold in the coming months and years, there will surely be plenty of blame to go around. Was this primarily a failure of political leaders, of military strategy or training, of the intelligence community, or of all of the above? Rather than simply assigning blame, the more productive route will be to study what went wrong and strive to fix it. Has there been an unreasonable aversion to foreign nationals working on unclassified materials, an undervaluing of cultural experts, a tendency toward number worship, or an insufficient focus on people’s underlying drivers? If any of these mindsets have sabotaged U.S. success, there is a duty to rethink them.
18. Biden prepares to host historic ‘Quad’ summit at White House
Biden prepares to host historic ‘Quad’ summit at White House
President Biden is preparing to host the first-ever in-person summit of leaders from the so-called Quad countries — the U.S., India, Japan and Australia — in a sign of growing momentum behind what began as a Trump-era push to rally Asia’s most powerful democracies into a more formal grouping to confront and contain communist China.
The Sept. 24 White House summit dovetails with this week’s announcement of a U.S.-Australian-U.K. security pact that many see as a parallel effort to counter China. The administration’s embrace of the pact and promotion of the Quad underscores what analysts say is an accelerating U.S. shift in focus toward the Indo-Pacific region after decades of war and focus on terrorist groups in the Middle East and Afghanistan.
Mr. Biden has essentially picked up where Trump administration officials left off by embracing the Quad as a central vehicle for the strategic shift, triggering increasingly heated responses from Beijing. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said this week that the Quad is “doomed to fail” because its members are united by little more than the challenge they face from Beijing.
Regional experts, however, say the U.S., Japanese, Indian and Australian strategic alignment is openly and rapidly expanding in response to years of Chinese aggression against democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as Beijing‘s growing economic and military clout.
“This kind of cooperation among the Quad leaders, with a meeting at the White House, broadcasts clearly to China that it has a major challenge on its hands,” said Patrick M. Cronin, the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute in Washington.
Mr. Cronin said in an interview that he believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has encouraged pushback by embracing an offensive foreign policy.
“On top of all of Xi’s other problems, including those he’s facing at home with the COVID-19 pandemic, he has now galvanized four leading maritime democracies to spearhead a political, economic and military alignment that can stand up to China‘s provocations and coercion,” Mr. Cronin said.
“The fear that Taiwan could get whipsawed by China and that other regional actors, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, could be bullied by China has the Quad leaders wanting to help,” he said. “They want to do something about it to help insulate Southeast Asia from China’s bullying and coercion.
“The point here,” he said, “is that perception of the ‘China threat’ has dramatically risen in the eyes of New Delhi, Tokyo, Canberra and Washington in recent years.”
China has responded with increasingly heated rhetoric since August 2020 when Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun floated the idea that an informal U.S., Japanese, Australian and Indian defense alignment could be the core of a NATO-style alliance in Asia.
Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have downplayed the notion, saying the Quad has no momentum. They also have accused the U.S. of trying to militarize the region and foment a confrontation with Beijing.
Chinese analysts say the Quad countries have different agendas and challenges regarding China. One analyst compared the Quad grouping to “four patients with different illnesses but stay in the same hospital ward.” Skeptics also note that China is the single biggest import and export market for Australia and Japan and the biggest importer for U.S. and Indian markets.
Gaining momentum
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison will be coming to the U.S. for the U.N. General Assembly session next week, but the Quad meeting is likely to generate its own wave of international attention.
The grouping was initiated in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, although it struggled to gain major momentum as the U.S. and other powers still sought to engage with a rising China. Regional strategists say the landscape has been far more promising since the Trump administration put its weight behind the idea.
The Biden administration hosted the first virtual meeting of the Quad leaders in March. After a round of joint military exercises among the Quad nations, the meeting produced a joint statement in which the leaders vowed to coordinate closely on COVID-19 vaccine and climate initiatives.
They also pledged greater collaboration on “maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas.” The language references frustration among many Asian nations that view China‘s aggressive sovereignty claims and construction of military bases on artificial islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea as violations of international law.
Because most countries in the region depend heavily on China for trade, few have been willing to fully break with Beijing.
The March meeting spurred speculation that Washington may seek to establish an informal “Quad-plus” to include smaller nations on China’s periphery, including South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and perhaps Vietnam.
A senior administration official told The Times that “there are currently no plans to expand the Quad by adding additional countries,” but Mr. Biden’s top Asia policy adviser has openly sought to encourage others to “engage” with the grouping.
“This is not a fancy club,” Kurt Campbell, National Security Council coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, told an online event hosted by Stanford University in May. “If there are other countries that believe that they’d like to engage and work with us, the door will be open as we go forward.”
Chinese officials appear to be fuming at the notion. “China can retaliate economically if red line crossed,” a headline in the Chinese Communist Party-aligned Global Times warned ahead of the March meeting.
“Forming closed and exclusive ‘cliques’ targeting other countries runs counter to the trend of the times and deviates from the expectation of regional countries,” Mr. Zhao told reporters in Beijing on Tuesday when asked about the upcoming summit at the White House.
“It thus wins no support and is doomed to fail,” he said, and “relevant countries should discard the outdated zero-sum mentality and narrow-minded geopolitical perception.”
“China is not only a major engine of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific but also a staunch defender of regional peace and stability,” Mr. Zhao said.
Despite promoting the Quad, Biden administration officials have sought to avoid provocative rhetoric in public over the initiative. A White House statement announcing the summit of Quad leaders made no mention of China.
“Hosting the leaders of the Quad demonstrates the Biden-Harris Administration’s priority of engaging in the Indo-Pacific, including through new multilateral configurations to meet the challenges of the 21st century,” the statement said. “The Quad leaders will be focused on deepening our ties and advancing practical cooperation on areas such as combatting COVID-19, addressing the climate crisis, partnering on emerging technologies and cyberspace, and promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Mr. Cronin, meanwhile, said he believes China‘s expanding military activity near Taiwan — the island democracy where the communist government in Beijing has long claimed sovereignty — is likely also to be on the agenda.
“I think we’re going to see this dimension about peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, maritime security and defense technology cooperation, both through joint exercises and through research and development projects,” he said. “It’s just further augmentation of the defense dimension of the relationship.”
19. The Taliban PR Campaign Has Not Ended, But Transformed
The Taliban PR Campaign Has Not Ended, But Transformed
Messages of liberation and inclusiveness have given way to ones that serve the consolidation of power.
It was a slick media operation that, in the span of several years, morphed the Taliban’s public image from a movement known for sadistic executions in football stadiums into a band of young freedom fighters playing cricket in the snow. Yet, the persuasive rebranding campaign which suggested a more reasonable, more pragmatic “Taliban 2.0,” may be shifting back to “Taliban 1.0,” a new, darker phase resembling its pre-9/11 heritage. While some may suggest that the recent images of protest crackdowns, beheadings of soldiers and bearded, stone faced hardliners appointed to government positions are misunderstandings, excesses committed during a rapid takeover, or mistakes soon to be rectified, a closer examination suggests this is purposeful. Pre-takeover, the Taliban 2.0 communication objectives were to persuade internal and external audiences that the organization was reformed, liberal, patriotic and inclusive. Now they aim to intimidate, repress and control. Hardly a novel approach, this has been the playbook for totalitarian regimes throughout history.
As I argued in the Washington Post in 2019, the Taliban were able to depict themselves as patriots, legitimate negotiators, leaders committed to human rights and ready to govern with a broad-based inclusive government. They decried the corruption of the elected government and painted the military as traitors and tools of the occupiers. The “2.0” communications strategy had four main objectives: first, to erode the people’s faith in the government to rule honestly and provide security; second, to erode the morale of the Afghan forces by pushing a narrative that presented the Taliban as militarily undefeatable; third, to declare that a Taliban takeover was inevitable in the wake of the Doha agreement; and last, to rebrand themselves as a more moderate and reformed movement which would govern transparently and inclusively as well as respect human rights. This all proved catnip to the Afghan people and an international community desperate to withdraw, and terrifying to the Afghan security forces. The collapse of the Afghan military, quickly followed by a bloodless takeover of the government, were in no small part due to this effective strategy.
On Aug. 17, Zabiullah Mujahid, the heretofore faceless Taliban spokesman with more than 300,000 Twitter followers, gave his first in-person press conference. Sitting behind a podium and facing dozens of microphones, Zabiullah promised the world that the Taliban would respect women’s rights and extend a pardon to “all those who fought against us.”
Scarcely a month later, the Taliban appear to be reneging on nearly every pledge to Afghans and the international community. Despite repeated assurances by erudite spokesmen such as Zabiullah and the Doha-based Suhail Shaheen, the newly formed Taliban administration is anything but broad-based and inclusive, nor have they shown any interest in maintaining even the most basic civil liberties. With reports of women being whipped, and civilian executions, the carefully crafted image of Taliban 2.0 is increasingly showing cracks. The international community, still reeling from the harrowing evacuation scenes and grappling with the outpouring of refugees, helplessly watches from afar and voices “concerns,” proclaiming “conditions” and announcing that “they will be measured by actions, not words.”
But the international community needs to be careful. Interpreting the recent bumbling, clumsy public image as a sign that the Taliban no longer is concerned about its image, or that hard-liners have pushed aside the team who created the vision of Taliban 2.0, is done at its peril.
As the Taliban consolidated control over the country, either by force or through negotiation, the need for gentle persuasion has been replaced by a need for unquestioned subjugation to Taliban authority. The new campaign sees no need for persuasive images or reasonable social media messages as the objective is no longer to influence or convince. The message of liberation and inclusiveness during the struggle is irrelevant and the fundamental need to consolidate power is the new objective.
In this case, the post-takeover communications strategy targets the same internal and foreign audiences, but the messages and objectives are dramatically different—and not dissimilar to pre-9/11 Taliban objectives.
This new communications strategy has five major objectives: first, to impose control; second, to demonstrate the power to quash any armed resistance from former military or opposition movements; third, to pronounce new social norms throughout Afghan society; fourth, to limit speech and demonstrations except that which amplifies the new status quo; and fifth, to coerce the international community to accept the new realities. So far, the Taliban seem to be succeeding.
It would be perilous for the international community to delude itself into believing that the Taliban are malleable to influence or susceptible to persuasion. Secretary Antony Blinken may believe that the Taliban seek external legitimacy and support, but there are no signs to date that the group is modifying their behavior to earn that legitimacy. Others may believe that the post-takeover images of killings and beatings, and the repressive policies that strip away hard-earned rights of the past 20 years, are merely “mistakes” or “excesses of the transition period.” But one can take little solace from the historical records of totalitarian victories. Whether the 1917 Russian Revolution, the 1949 Chinese Revolution, the 1996 takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, or scores of other takeovers, coups and revolutions, it is the rare one that produces a moderate, inclusive government that respects free speech, human rights, and protection of minorities. That may have been the PR campaign of Taliban 2.0, but the current communications campaign suggests quite the opposite.
Tanya Goudsouzian is a Canadian journalist who has covered Iraq and Afghanistan for over fifteen years, and is former opinion editor of Al Jazeera English Online. Follow her on Twitter @tgoudsouzian.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
